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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

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v. §

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CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:22-CR-413-B

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MYRON JERMAINE WILLIAMS, §

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 Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Myron Jermaine Williams’s Motion to Quash and Dismiss 

the Indictment or Alternatively, Motion for a Bill of Particulars (Doc. 48). For the following reasons, 

the Court DENIES the Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment and DENIES AS MOOT the 

Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 

I.

BACKGROUND

A grand jury issued an Indictment charging Williams with possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Doc. 3, Indictment. After the 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), the grand jury issued a 

Superseding Indictment. Doc. 40, Superseding Indictment. The Superseding Indictment reads:

On or about October 7, 2022, in the Dallas Division of the Northern District 

of Texas, the defendant, Myron Jermaine Williams, knowing that he had been 

convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 

one year, that is, a felony offense, did knowingly possess, in and affecting interstate 

and foreign commerce, a firearm, to wit: a Taurus, Model G2c, 9mm caliber pistol, 

bearing serial number 1C021279.

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Moreover, prior to the defendant’s possession of the above-referenced 

firearm on or about October 7, 2022, he was convicted of at least three violent felony 

offenses or serious drug offenses committed on occasions different from one another.

In violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), the punishment for 

which is found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

Id. at 1. Williams’s charge under § 924(e)(1), the Armed Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”), subjects 

him to a higher minimum sentence than he would face absent the ACCA. Because the Superseding 

Indictment does not identify which prior offenses subject him to the ACCA charge, Williams Moves 

to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment or, Alternatively, for a Bill of Particulars (Doc. 48). The Court 

considers his Motion below.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v), defendants can move to dismiss 

their indictments for “failure to state an offense.” District courts may only dismiss an indictment if 

“the infirmity in the prosecution is essentially one of law.” United States v. Fontenot, 665 F.3d 640, 

644 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). When reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment for failure 

to state an offense, “the court . . . take[s] the allegations of the indictment as true . . . to determine 

whether an offense has been stated.” United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(citation omitted).

III.

ANALYSIS

The Court denies Williams’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. Indictments serve to 

“inform a defendant of the charge against him,” United States v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 

2011), and “ensure that the grand jury finds probable cause that the defendant has committed each 

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element of the offense.” United States v. Davis, 53 F.4th 833, 845 (5th Cir. 2022). Thus, “[a]n 

indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the charged offense, fairly informs the 

defendant of the charges against him, and ensures that there is no risk of future prosecutions for the 

same offense.” United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 2003). “Any fact that, by law, 

increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). “Generally, an indictment that 

closely tracks the language under which it is brought is sufficient to give a defendant notice of the 

crimes with which he is charged.” Franco, 632 F.3d at 884. But an indictment need not “allege in 

detail the factual proof that will be relied upon to support the charges.” United States v. USPlabs, 

LLC, 338 F. Supp. 3d 547, 557 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (Lindsay, J.) (quoting United States v. Crippen, 579 

F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1978)).

The Superseding Indictment is sufficient. It “inform[s] [Williams] of the charge[s] against 

him” by listing the specific charges and the conduct that qualifies for the charges. See Franco, 632 

F.3d at 885; Doc. 40, Superseding Indictment, 1. Because § 924(e)(1) would enhance Williams’s

sentence if he committed a violent felony or serious drug offense on three separate occasions, it is 

an “element,” and the jury must find the government has proven these three separate occasions 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103; Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 835 

(2024). The Indictment sufficiently charges § 924(e)(1). It “closely tracks the language” of the statute.

See Franco, 632 F.3d at 884. Furthermore, the Indictment cites § 924(e)(1) and describes Williams’s

qualifying conduct: that before he committed the offense charged in the Indictment, “he was 

convicted of at least three violent felony offenses or serious drug offenses committed on occasions 

different from one another.” Doc. 40, Superseding Indictment, 1. By describing this conduct, it 

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“ensures that there is no risk of future prosecutions for the same offense.” See Thomas, 348 F.3d at 

82. And it provides him notice of the crimes with which he is charged. Lastly, it requires the jury to 

find this element beyond a reasonable doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (requiring a sentence 

enhancement if a defendant has convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, 

committed on occasions different from one another”). Thus, the Court finds no reason the 

Superseding Indictment should be quashed or dismissed.

Williams argues the Superseding Indictment is insufficient because it “does not allege the 

prior convictions [subjecting him to an enhanced sentence under § 924(e)(1)] with reasonable 

particularity, time, place, and circumstances.” Doc. 48, Mot. Dismiss, 5. Therefore, he contends it 

“does not give [him] sufficient notice of the prior convictions” to allow him to prepare his defense 

and protect him from double jeopardy. Id. at 2. He cites to the Supreme Court’s recent holding in 

Erlinger, which requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s qualifying

offenses were committed on different occasions to increase his sentence under the ACCA. 602 U.S. 

at 835. Williams effectively argues that an indictment must specify not only that the defendant 

committed at least three qualifying offenses on separate occasions, but also must include information 

about the prior offenses themselves. See Doc. 48, Mot. Dismiss, 4 –5.

The Court is not persuaded. First, the indictment need not “allege the prior convictions with 

reasonable particularity, time, place, and circumstances,” id. at 5, because the indictment is not 

required to “detail the factual proof that will be relied upon to support the charges.” USPlabs, 338 

F. Supp. 3d at 557 (quoting Crippen, 579 F.2d at 342). Second, Erlinger “decide[d] no more than” 

that “a jury [must] resolve ACCA’s occasions inquiry unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

602 U.S. at 835. While the government will have to prove that each offense occurred on different 

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occasions at trial, the Indictment need not detail each prior offense for the jury to render its finding 

on the occasions inquiry. Such a requirement would mean that the indictment must detail factual 

proof. See USPlabs, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 557. The Superseding Indictment is sufficient.

Furthermore, the Court denies as moot Williams’s alternative Motion for a Bill of 

Particulars. “A bill of particulars is designed to apprise the defendant of the charge against him with 

sufficient precision to enable him to prepare his defense.” Davis, 53 F.4th at 845 (quotations 

omitted). Williams argues he needs “the case number, court, county, charge,” and the “date of 

indictment and conviction of each prior conviction that is alleged” to defend the charges against 

him. Doc. 48, Mot. Dismiss, 5. The government argues that it provided this information to Williams 

before he filed his Motion. Doc. 49, Gov.’s Br., 1–2, 1 n.1. But in any event, in its Response, the 

government provided every piece of information that Williams requested aside from the indictment 

dates for the prior offenses. Id. at 2. Williams therefore has sufficiently precise information to 

prepare his defense. See Davis, 53 F.4th at 845. His Motion is denied as moot. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Williams’s Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment (Doc. 

48) is DENIED, and his alternative Motion for a Bill of Particulars (Doc. 48) is DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED: November 21, 2024. 

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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