Surrounded by 

Doctrine...and Losing

Project the False and 

Protect the Real

Operational Assessments 

and the Commander’s 

Decision Cycle

Mission Command at the 

Battle of Yorktown

Campaigning

The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

“That All May Labor As One”

Spring 2015 

Featured Essays
Campaigning 

Spring 2015

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69

Commandant

RADM John W. Smith, Jr 

Dean, Joint Forces Staff College 

Dr. Patricia B. Strait 

Editor

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley 

Editorial Board: 

Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe 

Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel

Dr. Frederick R. Kienle

Assistant Professor Stephen W. Dennis 

Joint Advanced Warfighting

School 

Dr. Robert Antis

Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School 

CAPT John Maxwell

Joint Continuing and Distance

Education School

COL Dale D. Fair

Joint Command, Control and 

Information Operations School 

COL Michael Miller

Cover image: The Joint Service Color 

Guard advances the colors during the 

retirement ceremony of Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry H. 

Shelton, at Fort Myer, Va., on Oct. 2, 

2001. DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel. 

(Released). 

i

Campaigning Spring 2015
Guest Editor’s Corner: 

Hello and welcome to the Spring 2015 version of Campaigning. I’m confident you’ll find this 

edition interesting as it takes on several issues highly pertinent to today’s joint warfighters. 

Reflecting the composition of the staff at the Combatant Commands, the vast majority of joint 

professionals in our student body at the Joint Forces Staff College are the O-4s and O-5s 

responsible for translating strategic guidance to tactical actions. The messy and difficult task of 

functioning at the operational level of war takes a great deal of expertise, which emphasizes the 

importance of joint education specific to this mission.

To understand the value of education at the operational level of war, we must appreciate that 

service members on our combatant command, component, and service staffs start their military 

careers at the tactical level. They are evaluated and promoted to senior leadership positions 

mostly due to their accomplishments at the tactical level. When they are placed in billets at the 

operational level, they often have to learn how to translate policy and strategy into tactical 

actions through on-the-job training. Once promoted to Flag or General Officer, these joint 

leaders no longer work as tacticians - they become strategists and policy experts so they can best 

advise senior military and civilian leaders. 

Many of our greatest military leaders were experts at the operational level of war. In World War 

II, the strategy of “Germany First” and “Unconditional Surrender” gave operational level 

commanders the necessary national-level intent to develop activities to accomplish those broad 

objectives. Led by their commanders, who were heavily involved in the strategy discussions, 

operational staffs accomplished the required work that put the Allies’ training, supply, and 

logistics machines into action. Operation DESERT STORM was successful because General 

Schwarzkopf and his staff translated President George H. Bush’s statement, “This will not stand” 

into a well-planned, well-sustained, and well-equipped force able to swiftly defeat the Iraqi 

military and return sovereignty to the nation of Kuwait. 

In contrast, not fully appreciating the role and complexity of operational level efforts adversely 

affected Phases IV and V during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Properly translating policy and 

strategy to unit actions became all the more difficult for our combatant command planners when 

the Iraqi military was disbanded and Baathists were removed from government positions. Had 

strategy and policy decisions been influenced more by operational activities, a different outcome 

may have been possible. 

Skill at the operational level of war relies on joint professionals that can understand the lessons 

of history, can systematically break down complex issues, and can make informed projections of 

broadly-defined future events. It takes a team of joint professionals, collaborating with a shared 

understanding of the environment (adversary, friendly and neutral) and a shared understanding of 

higher guidance, to accomplish these tasks effectively. Only then can that team - and the Joint 

Force Commander - articulate the right problem to be solved and then come to a reasoned

approach to solving it. 

ii Campaigning Spring 2015
The challenges we face across the military are far too complex for rote actions that are not 

informed by history, current events, and future predictions. Excellent policy, coherent strategies, 

and effective strategic communications are vital to successfully meeting our national objectives. 

Naturally, we spend time and effort educating our future senior military leaders because of the 

importance we place on the strategic level of war. It is also just as crucial to have logical and 

rational approaches that align the actions of tactical-level operators with national policy and 

strategy. Critical and creative thinkers are responsible for providing these approaches and plans; 

let’s make sure they are properly educated to take on this task. 

Enjoy this version of Campaigning - and let us know what you think. 

Very respectfully,

John Maxwell 

Captain, U.S. Navy 

Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School 

Joint Force Staff College

Campaigning Spring 2015 iii
In this issue of Campaigning: 

Features

Surrounded by Doctrine...and Losing......................................... 1

Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis, JCWS Faculty

Project the False and Protect the Real........................................ 17

CDR Michael Posey, JC2IOS Faculty

Operational Assessments and the Commander’s Decision Cycle........ 22

Mr Michael McGonagle, LTC Ed Chamberlayne, and Lt Col Richard Collins, JCWS 

Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown............................... 30 COL Jerry Turner, CDR Matthew S. Burton, and LTC Gregory Trahan, JCWS 

Commentary

Weaponizing Social Media: What We Can Learn from Our

Adversaries......................................................................... 43

CDR Christopher Hill, Lt Col Ryan White, and MAJ Kevin Thaxton, JCWS 

Decision-Making Models and the SS Mayaguez Crisis .................... 55

LTC Thomas Feltey, JAWS

Biofuels and the Defense Department: A Push Toward a 

Greener, More Secure Force ................................................... 62

LTC David Carey, LCDR James Hoey, and Maj Mark Enriques, JCWS 

The Conventional Force and Irregular Warfare: How the 

Conventional Force Can Relieve Mission Pressure on Special 

Operations Forces ................................................................ 71

LCDR John Dolby, MAJ Zachary Kerns, and Maj Chad Gugas, JCWS 

Putin’s Peninsula? How United States and NATO Policy 

Paved the Way to Crimea....................................................... 80

CDR Cielo Almanza, Maj Bincarousky, and Lt Col Todd Hoover, JCWS

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint 

Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

iv Campaigning Spring 2015
Surrounded by Design...and Losing

(Or the Tao of the Alternative 

View)

By Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis

Who believes that doctrine is your friend? 

That doctrine is liberating...that doctrine 

will set you free...that doctrine will cast a 

light unto your path? That you have to know

it to violate it? Or do you agree with Gen 

James N. Mattis, USMC that “doctrine is the 

last refuge of the unimaginative?” 

“Channeling” your “inner Mattis” will lead 

you to Oscar Wilde and Ralph Waldo 

Emerson, where, ultimately, “To be great is 

to be misunderstood.”1

 Mattis’ zinger is 

related to Wilde’s “consistency is the last 

refuge of the unimaginative”2 as well as 

Emerson’s “a foolish consistency is the 

hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little 

statesmen and philosophers and divines. 

With consistency a great soul has simply 

nothing to do. He may as well concern 

himself with his shadow on the wall.”3 How 

can we determine the appropriate balance of 

doctrinal “best practices” and creativity, of 

“method” and “no method”? 

Current joint doctrine attempts to walk the 

tightrope between creativity and the 

“consistency” mentioned above. “Joint 

doctrine is not dogmatic – the focus is on 

how to think about operations, not what to 

think about operations. It is definitive 

enough to guide operations while versatile 

enough to accommodate a wide variety of 

situations. Joint doctrine should foster 

initiative, creativity, and conditions that 

allow commanders the freedom to adapt to 

varying circumstances.”4

 Joint doctrine 

states that it is not policy, but authoritative 

guidance.5 In addition to providing 

guidance for joint operation planning and 

execution, it also “standardizes terminology, 

relationships, responsibilities, and processes 

among all US forces to free JFCs and their 

staffs to focus efforts on solving the 

complex problems confronting them.”6

 The 

doctrine expresses an aspiration - it “should 

foster creativity” - but is that aspiration

achievable? What drags doctrine down to 

the “unimaginative” realm? 

The language we use, the questions we ask, 

reveal the paradigm in which we work. In 

“The Semantic Turn: a New Foundation for 

Design,” Klaus Krippendorf states: 

“Language is a cultural artifact that enables 

humans to coordinate their conceptions, 

engage in joint action, and construct and 

reconstruct the realities they see. In the use 

of language, languaging, acting, and 

perceiving are inseparably tied to a 

constructive understanding. It is a truism 

that one cannot know what exists without 

conceptualizing it as such. Language is the 

primary source of conceptions.”7

 

Joint doctrine provides a language of 

operational art that has its historical, 

paradigmatic roots in the Great Captains of 

military strategy. Yet if “...the very premise 

of doctrine, which is to draw a common 

picture through the use of a common 

language, is the limiting factor in being able 

to develop new concepts, to build new 

frames, to confront new challenges”8

 then 

how can joint doctrine foster the creativity 

required to solve complex problems without 

also imposing semantic limitations that 

hobble the creative effort? And if “joint 

education is based on joint doctrine,”9 and 

doctrine stifles creativity, then how can joint 

doctrine mediate between a legacy

prescriptive institutional mindset and the 

education required to address current and 

future complex challenges? 

Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation 

Planning,” provides an expanded description 

Campaigning Spring 2015 1
and explanation of operational design, but 

paradigms that inform joint doctrine 

development create anomalies within the 

doctrine, especially in terms of doctrinal 

language. “...doctrine attempts to fix 

language with specific meanings. Fixing 

language, viewing the world through our 

doctrinal lens, actually works to fix our 

ability to conceptualize, and this fixation, or 

stagnation, keeps us from being able to see 

as far as we could.”10 Joint doctrine is 

developed through consensus from the 

services and combatant commands, among 

others, and this consensus struggles to 

synthesize a new pragmatic doctrinal 

paradigm that retains the best of traditional

principles and incorporates current best 

practices from the field.11 “New paradigms 

offer new ways to think about the world – 

new questions to ask and new ways to 

pursue them.”12 These tensions are 

institutionalized in joint doctrine, and this is 

carried into joint education and ultimately 

into operational decision-making. Arguably, 

this has always been the case. 

 

Second Seminole War

Now, imagine receiving a mission, with 

compelling moral and ethical implications, 

against a motivated, adaptive, 

unconventional foe, in the toughest terrain 

imaginable, under horrible weather 

conditions, with a joint force ill-trained, 

educated or even desiring to fight this kind 

of war, hindered by limited sustainment and 

strained force structure, on an uncertain 

time-table driven by Presidential policies, 

with fractured Congressional and American 

public support. Is this Vietnam? 

Afghanistan? Iraq? Syria? Iran? No. It is 

Florida during the Second Seminole War 

from 1835-1842. 

Why study the Second Seminole War? Who 

can distinguish it from the First Seminole 

War, or the Third? What is the relevance of 

the Second Seminole War to the wars we are 

in now, or the ones we need to be prepared 

to fight (or avoid) in the future? In the case 

of Native Americans, a national policy of 

Indian removal predated President Andrew 

Jackson’s by some three decades. The 

policy was as hotly debated then as it would 

be now. Our goal is to understand how 

commanders of the time attempted to 

implement the policy through military 

action. What was their understanding of 

what was going on? How did things work, 

why were things happening the way they 

were? Why did they get the guidance that 

they got? Why did they think the way they 

did?

The Second Seminole War, specifically the 

period from December 1835 to December 

1836, is one of the Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School (JCWS) Satellite 

Program’s historical vehicles to illustrate the 

aspects of joint doctrine’s “design” 

methodology, with specific attention to the 

elements of operational design. In earlier 

versions of joint doctrine, the design 

methodology looked strikingly similar to the 

process for conducting a strategic estimate, 

and the elements of operational design were 

called “facets of operational art.” The 

number and names of the elements have 

varied slightly over time and circumstance, 

but they still capture enduring aspects of 

operational planning, much like the 

principles of war and joint operations. They 

also reflect the language, logic and 

paradigms of generations of military 

operational artists. The commanders in the 

Second Seminole War estimated the 

situation by trying to understand the 

strategic direction and the operational 

environment and define the problems as they 

saw them. If joint doctrine from 2006 was

still in force this sentence would read: 

“CCDRs develop strategic estimates after 

Campaigning Spring 2015 2
reviewing the operational environment, 

nature of anticipated operations, and 

national and multinational strategic 

direction.”13 What is not apparent is the 

theory and logic behind design as a 

deliberately (or necessarily) structured way 

of learning, and the insidious institutional 

paradigm that drives operational artists and 

planners to formulaic solutions, i.e., 

template-based “products.” 

The Second Seminole War also provides 

opportunities to study leadership at various 

levels, from tactical to operational and 

strategic. In discussions about decision 

making and paradigms, Dr. Vardell Nesmith 

was apt to say during scores of staff rides to 

Gettysburg, “men do what they do for what 

to them are good reasons at the time.” In 

October 2013 the U.S. Army Combat 

Studies Institute published a study of 

leadership using Dade’s Battle in December 

1835, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff’s desired leader attributes are woven 

into this segment of the JCWS curriculum. 

The commanders led operations that 

reflected the logic of their operational 

approaches using a paradigm heavily 

influenced by the Napoleonic wars, and 

exposed flaws in their concepts of 

operations, integration of joint functions and 

application of elements of operational 

design. Additionally, their actions 

illustrated their critical abilities or inabilities

to: 

understand the security environment and the 

effect of all instruments of national power, 

to anticipate and adapt to surprise and 

uncertainty, to recognize change and lead 

transitions, to operate on intent through 

trust, empowerment and understanding, to 

make ethical decisions based on the shared 

values of the profession of arms, and to 

think critically and strategically in applying 

joint warfighting principles and concepts to

joint operations.14 

Our ability to understand what they faced is 

complicated by numerous limitations, 

including our use of contemporary doctrinal 

terms to frame our understanding of their

understanding. Nevertheless, to understand 

the Second Seminole War, it is necessary to 

be familiar with what preceded it, and this 

retrospective will challenge our 

“institutional” paradigm of the Seminole 

wars.

Indian Removal 

It is not surprising that the Seminoles would 

resist removal to “Indian Country.” What is 

surprising is how long it took for the United 

States to accomplish that goal. President 

Thomas Jefferson provided an early 

perspective of the national policy when he 

said, “Should any tribe be foolhardy enough 

to take up the hatchet at any time, the 

seizing the whole country of that tribe, and 

driving them across the Mississippi, as the 

only condition of peace, would be an 

example to others, and a furtherance of our 

final consolidation.” 15 Indian removal 

became a matter of law with the Indian 

Removal Act of 1830. The Second 

Seminole War was “responsibly ended” in 

August 1842 and a third war was fought 

from 1855-1858. No peace treaty was ever 

signed and thus the Seminoles remain 

“unconquered.” 

National strategic goals evolved over time. 

Starting in the 1790s, the fledgling United 

States negotiated with the Native Americans 

over the myriad relationships between the 

two bodies, including the issue of slavery. 

As white settlers pushed south and west, 

Spanish Florida became a destination for 

runaway slaves. Americans were beginning 

to feel the pull of “Manifest Destiny” and 

Campaigning Spring 2015 3
there were numerous clashes over cattle and 

slaves between settlers along the Florida 

border and Indians living in the Spanish 

territory.16 In the late 1820s, the Adams 

administration decided upon full Indian 

removal as they were leaving office. In his 

first annual message to Congress, President 

Jackson “recommended that land west of the 

Mississippi be set apart, and that the Indians 

in the East be encouraged, but not forced, to 

trade eastern for western land. If they failed 

to do so, they would be obliged to come 

under the harsh jurisdiction of the states.”17

The Seminoles 

The indigenous Indians of Florida were 

decimated due to war and disease during the 

period of Spanish colonial rule, and their 

depopulated lands were later reoccupied by 

various tribes that migrated into Florida due 

to European colonial wars and Indian 

expansion. Various migrating bands, such 

as Tamathli, Chiahas, Oconee, Yamassee, 

Talassee, Yuchi, Apalachicola, Lower Creek 

and Upper Creek were the constituent 

elements of the Alachua and Mikasuki bands 

of the Seminole tribe. The Alachuas were 

the principle band, and the Mikasuki were 

considered the most militant. With their 

migration and growing sense of separateness 

from the Creek Confederation, the 

Seminoles asserted their autonomy in 

Florida. The Creek Confederation (so called 

by whites because the Indians lived near 

creeks) was a loose association of “Upper” 

Creeks located in the valleys of the 

Tallapoosa, Coosa, and Alabama Rivers, and 

“Lower” Creeks from the lower 

Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers.18

“Red Stick” War during the War of 1812 

After the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, 

President Jefferson led efforts to increase 

overland access to New Orleans. Opening 

this line of communication resulted in more 

frequent settler and Indian interactions. The 

migrations of various Creek groups and 

interaction with Spanish and American 

culture contributed to a social fracture 

within the Creek culture: Upper Creeks who 

had less interaction with whites adhered 

more closely to tribal traditions than did the 

Lower Creeks, who had more interaction 

with the white culture and thus were more 

accommodating to it.19 The butchering of 

two white families near Nashville, TN, 

escalated into the “Red Stick” war that 

engulfed the entire Creek Confederation and 

included raids against Spanish and United 

States settlements, such as the massacre at 

Fort Mims in Alabama.

20 The U.S. response 

was a three-pronged invasion into Upper 

Creek territory, and on 27 March 1814, 

Andrew Jackson destroyed the combat 

power of the Red Sticks at the Battle of 

Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River. 

Jackson imposed a severe treaty on the 

Creeks at Fort Jackson; the vanquished Red 

Stick Upper Creeks (and also some allied 

Creeks) ceded 23 million acres in Alabama 

and Georgia. Jackson followed this victory 

with one over the British at New Orleans in 

January 1815. 

Routes of Southern U.S. Indian Removal Operations

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas Jefferson and Indian removal

Campaigning Spring 2015 4
Army Reorganization and the First 

Seminole War 

With the victory over the British, Congress 

immediately downsized and reorganized the 

Army, and MG Jackson was given 

command of the “Division of the South.” 

Attempting to protect settlers in the ceded 

area, Jackson directed BG Edmund Gaines 

to build a fort near the confluence of the 

Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, just north 

of the Florida border. Resupply of Fort 

Scott required naval vessels to navigate the 

Apalachicola River through Spanish Florida. 

In July 1816, when these vessels were fired 

upon, as expected, by a formerly British fort 

now controlled by runaway slaves and called 

“Negro Fort,” LTC Duncan Clinch 

destroyed the fort with a barrage of cannon 

fire from his gunboats, including “hot shot” 

that hit a powder magazine. In 1817, border 

incidents continued with Spain powerless to 

restrain the Seminoles and Seminole tribes 

refusing to abide by the terms of the Fort 

Jackson treaty. In November 1817, when 

Maj David Twiggs attempted to bring in 

Mikasuki chief Neamathla, the ensuing fight 

initiated the beginning of what became the 

First Seminole War. 

The Seminoles struck back after the attack 

and burning of Neamathla’s Fowltown by 

ambushing and massacring a resupply party 

on the Apalachicola River that included 

soldiers’ wives. The War Department’s 

initial response on 2 December 1817 was 

that “it was not politic to enter Spanish 

territory to chastise the Seminoles.”21 When 

John C. Calhoun became the Secretary of 

War a week later, he gave BG Gaines 

permission to cross into Spanish territory 

and “carry retribution to the savages” as 

long as they did not take refuge in a Spanish 

fortress, and directed MG Jackson to “take 

command in person and bring the Seminoles 

under control.”22 Jackson was directed not 

to take possession of any Spanish towns or 

forts so as not to jeopardize negotiations 

then being conducted between the U.S. and 

Spain.23 

Jackson’s Campaign against the 

Seminoles and Spanish Florida

Jackson’s campaign was delayed getting 

started from Fort Gadsden (erected at the 

site of the Negro Fort) for two months due 

to an inefficient supply system (mainly a 

failure of operational contract support), lack 

of adequate geographic knowledge of the 

area and few guides. Once started, Jackson 

destroyed Mikasuki towns and broke the 

strength of Seminole resistance while 

simultaneously scouring the countryside for 

supplies. He reported that the Spanish were 

supporting the Indians and he forced the 

surrender of St. Marks in April 1818. 

Jackson’s letter to the Spanish commander 

there stated, “To chastise a savage foe, who, 

combined with a lawless band of Negro 

brigands, have for some time past been 

carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war 

against the citizens of the United States, has 

compelled the President to direct me to 

march my army into Florida.”24 

Jackson continued his movements to 

contact, attacking and burning towns and 

seizing crops and cattle. At “Bowleg’s 

Town” on the Suwannee River, Jackson 

captured and subsequently hung two 

“British adventurers from the Bahamas” that 

had been instigating the Indians against the 

Americans.25 With these victories, Jackson 

returned to Fort Gadsden. The next month 

Jackson captured Pensacola with the 

following justification: “The immutable 

laws of self-defense, therefore, compelled 

the American government to take possession 

of such parts of the Floridas in which 

Campaigning Spring 2015 5
Spanish authority could not be maintained. 

Pensacola was found in this situation, and 

will be held until Spain can furnish military 

strength sufficient to enforce existing 

treaties.”26 As part of the terms of 

capitulation, Jackson offered full military 

honors, transport to Cuba, property rights, 

religious toleration and free trade. Jackson’s 

maneuvers provided the Madison 

administration diplomatic cover and the 

leverage it needed to force a treaty with 

Spain, the Adams-Onis treaty of 1919, 

which acquired Florida and defined the 

southern border of the United States all the 

way to the Pacific Ocean. 

Seminole Containment and Slavery

After the treaty with Spain, Congress 

immediately downsized and reorganized the 

Army and MG Jackson was “RIF’d” 

(reduction in force) out of the service. “Old 

Hickory” had upset too many in the 

Madison administration and Congress with 

his brand of foreign policy; as a sop, he was 

named the first Governor of the Territory of 

Florida. The treaty took two years to be 

ratified, and the transfer of land from Spain 

to the U.S. created many land title issues. 

The Seminoles occupied the land that was 

transferred but did not participate in the 

negotiations. Jackson recommended that the 

Seminoles be concentrated along the 

Apalachicola River near the borders of 

Alabama and Georgia, and sealed off from 

trade with Cuba. His goal was containment 

of the Seminoles away from white 

settlements and away from the line of 

communication between Pensacola and St. 

Augustine.27 

 

Jackson resigned in October 1821 and 

William P. Duval was commissioned to be 

Territorial Governor. The Seminoles were 

hesitant to plant crops because they feared 

the white men would take their lands, and 

Duval requested that the War Department 

increase their allowance for food, but his 

longer-term solution was to send the 

Seminoles west of the Mississippi. After 

Florida was organized as a territory, land 

speculation became rampant and white 

settlers moved in, bringing with them 

African slaves and a hunger for Indian 

land.28 “Slave catchers and strife followed, 

and by 1823 the Seminoles were eager to 

sign a treaty guaranteeing them a refuge in 

central Florida.”29 President Monroe said 

the Seminoles must either be moved out of 

Florida or moved to a smaller area. If the 

Seminoles were moved out of Florida it 

would reduce the tendency for slaves to seek 

sanctuary in Seminole areas. But the 

government had yet to identify lands west of 

the Mississippi River for that purpose. 

Treaty of Moultrie Creek and 

Establishment of the Reservation 

In September 1822, the Seminole bands 

selected Neamathla to represent them in 

negotiations at Moultrie Creek (a few miles 

south of St. Augustine) for a reservation 

within Florida. In the Moultrie Creek 

Treaty, the Seminoles surrendered all claim 

to land in Florida except for the reservation 

which comprised about four million acres 

between the latitude of Tampa Bay and the 

Caloosahatchee River further south. The 

reservation would be no closer than 20 miles 

to the coast, and the Seminoles would try to 

prevent concentrations of runaway slaves 

from forming in their area. In return, the 

U.S. would protect law-abiding Indians, 

keep unauthorized white men off of the 

reservation, and provide subsidies for 

livestock, equipment and an annuity for 20 

years, among other incentives. When the 

Senate ratified the treaty in December of 

1823, the Indians that moved became the 

responsibility of Governor Duval, and he 

now had to feed daily over 1500 Seminoles. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 6
The War Department sent LTC George 

Brooke to establish a military post on the 

flank of the reservation in the vicinity of 

Tampa Bay. 

The Seminoles argued that the reservation 

would not sustain them, and it was enlarged 

in 1824, but this did not reduce the settler 

and Indian interactions. Duval could not 

stop the Indians from spending their annuity 

on alcohol or enforce the law to keep 

shopkeepers from selling it to them. As the 

1 October 1824 deadline passed for all 

Indians west of the Suwannee to be on the 

reservation, more Seminoles were off the 

reservation than on it. On 27 January 1825, 

President Monroe sent a message to the 

Senate saying that an area west of Arkansas 

should be made into Indian Territory, and 

Indians would receive these lands in 

exchange for lands they would lose in the 

east. Another temporary expansion of the 

Seminole reservation was approved in 

December 1825; each expansion generated 

lawsuits due to Spanish land titles that had 

transferred with the Adams-Onis Treaty. 

Management of the Reservation 

Drought and other food supply problems 

caused the Seminoles to leave the 

reservation in search of food. The 

government-issued rations were expensive

and state-issued currency was depreciated 

by Federal banks. The government rations 

were insufficient to live on and Seminoles 

were starving to death. It was easier to raid 

existing farms and cattle than to plant food 

and raise their own.30 By late 1826, there 

had been so many requests to place soldiers 

closer to the reservation that the War Office 

decided to open a second post, “Cantonment 

King,” and Duval placed it in the vicinity of 

the Indian Agency near Silver Springs (just 

outside present day Ocala).31 The Florida 

Legislature passed several measures in early 

1827 to stop the atrocities against white 

settlements and prohibit whites from 

trespassing on the reservation or trading 

with the Seminoles. In January 1827, the 

federal government centralized military 

control by making COL Clinch the 

commander of regular military forces in 

Florida. In 1828 Brevet MG Winfield Scott 

attempted to close Cantonment King, but 

Floridians protested and Scott’s order was 

overruled until a new General of the Army, 

MG Alexander Macomb, agreed with him 

and closed it in 1829. Brevet BG Clinch 

protested, but Macomb said, “I cannot see 

that any danger can be apprehended from 

the miserable Indians who inhabit the 

peninsula of Florida.”32 Fort King would be 

resurrected in 1832. 

 

Jackson’ Election and Slavery Issues 

With Jackson’s election in November 1828, 

Indian removal continued to gain 

momentum. From Jackson’s perspective of 

the problem, the only way to save the 

Indians from annihilation within the states 

was to remove them from those states and 

put them outside of state jurisdiction. After 

the Indian Removal Act was signed in May 

1830, Congress appropriated $500,000 to do 

whatever was required to move the Indians. 

As 1831 proceeded, starving Indian bands 

preyed upon white herds and supplies. 

There were also numerous fugitive slave 

settlements among the Seminoles. White 

settlers were to be given opportunities to 

identify their runaway slaves and pay the 

territorial government for repatriation. The 

problem was that both sides, Seminole and 

white, held slaves belonging to the other.33

The Seminoles continued to deliver 

runaways to their former owners, but 

Floridians still felt they were holding back. 

The Seminoles grew to believe that the 

whites intended to take away all of their 

slaves. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 7
Treaties of Payne’s Landing and Fort 

Gibson

In January 1832, the War Department 

appointed James Gadsden to negotiate with 

the Seminoles to relocate to Indian 

Territory. Gadsden had built Fort Gadsden 

during the First Seminole War and was a 

commissioner during the Moultrie Creek 

treaty negotiations. He had also conducted 

the survey to define the boundaries of the 

reservation and commented on the fugitive 

slave settlements. Gadsden’s talking points 

were that the government could not continue 

to feed the Seminoles year after year and 

that the Seminoles would prefer life west of 

the Mississippi compared to a harsher 

situation in Florida.34 The treaty stated that 

the Seminoles would send seven of their 

chiefs to inspect the lands west of the 

Mississippi, and “should they be satisfied 

with the character of that country, and of the 

favorable disposition of the Creeks to 

reunite with the Seminoles as one people” 

then a deal would be binding.35 Little is 

known directly of the meeting except that 

the chiefs signed the treaty at Payne’s 

Landing. Later, the chiefs would claim that 

they did not sign the treaty or that their 

marks were forged, and that a key sentence 

was deliberately mistranslated to ensure that 

the Seminoles would agree to go.36

In March 1833, a treaty at Fort Gibson, 

Arkansas Territory was signed by the seven 

chiefs, which indicated that they were 

satisfied with the land and the Seminoles 

would move as soon as the government 

could make the arrangements. A dispute 

arose over whether the Seminole chiefs 

actually signed the treaty, or if they did sign 

were they coerced. President Jackson 

submitted the Treaty of Payne’s Landing 

and the Treaty of Fort Gibson to the Senate 

after the Seminoles signed the latter treaty; 

with Senate ratification in April 1834, the 

Seminoles had three years to relocate. The 

Seminoles argued that the Treaty of 

Moultrie Creek was still in effect, giving 

them at least nine more years on the land 

and annuities. This impasse would lead 

ultimately to war. 

 

Road to War 

In August 1833, former Congressman and 

Major General of Georgia Militia, Wiley 

Thompson, was named Indian Agent. In 

December 1833, Thompson took charge of 

the Indian Agency near Fort King. He 

assessed that the most influential group was 

the Indian-Negroes, who “had everything to 

lose and nothing to gain by a change, and 

their influence over their “masters” was 

decisive.”37 Thompson received an 

appropriation to distribute the annuity and 

pay claims to the Indians, mainly for stolen 

slaves. Final removal of the Indians was 

projected for spring 1835. At a meeting 

with the Seminoles in October 1834, 

Thompson observed that the Seminoles did 

not waste the annuity on alcohol but bought 

a larger-than-normal share of powder and 

ball. The Seminoles pushed back against 

relocating, and Osceola took center stage in 

rejecting the treaties and asserting Seminole 

claims to the land. When these reports 

reached Jackson, he directed that military 

forces be sent to protect the citizens and 

enforce the treaty. BG Clinch was given 

central command in Florida and Fort Brooke 

was reactivated. 

By early 1835 it was clear that the Indians 

did not want to move. Among the sticky 

issues was the ownership of Indian-Negroes. 

Slave holders lobbied the President – could 

the federal government buy the slaves? This 

could solve the problem of black influence 

over the Indians and remove the potential 

Campaigning Spring 2015 8
problem of the Creek Indians in the new 

Indian Territory taking the Seminoles’ 

slaves.38 Governor John Eaton, who 

replaced Duval in April 1834, reported that 

“if force was used against them they would 

fight. Should the government decide on 

violence, he recommended a ‘strong 

imposing force,’ not volunteers.”39 BG 

Clinch requested more forces and the timing 

of Seminole removal was left up to the 

officers on the ground. “Previous plans for 

removal had gone awry so often that the 

agent and the general were authorized to 

delay it as late as spring 1836.”40 

In March 1835 Thompson read a letter from 

President Jackson, “the Great White Father,” 

to the Seminoles telling them that they must 

move as they had promised. 

...If you listen to the voice of friendship and 

truth, you will go quietly and voluntarily. 

But should you listen to the bad birds that 

are always flying about you, and refuse to 

move, I have then directed the commanding 

officer to remove you by force. This will be 

done. I pray the Great Spirit, therefore, to 

incline you to do what is right. 

 Your Friend 

 A. Jackson41

In April, key Seminole leaders refused to 

sign a document acknowledging that the 

Treaty of Payne’s Landing was valid and 

Thompson removed their names from the 

list of chiefs. In June, Thompson humiliated 

Osceola by throwing him in chains and 

making him certify that the treaty was 

binding. With the increasing violence, 

Thompson forbade the sale of ammunition 

to the Seminoles. In July, Jackson endorsed 

a rule that prohibited unauthorized persons 

from entering the reservation. In August, 

Army courier PVT Kinsley Dalton was 

scalped and disemboweled on a mail run 

between Fort King and Fort Brooke.42 In 

October, the War Department rejected BG 

Clinch’s request for mounted volunteer 

militia to “prevent the continuous and 

dangerous intercourse between the 

Seminole-Negroes and the slaves on the 

plantations.”43 In November, Osceola 

murdered Charley Emathla, a Seminole

chief who was planning to move to the west. 

Other Seminoles who agreed to move west 

were camped at Fort Brooke, and the post 

commander provided food for these 500 

displaced persons. Communication between 

Fort King and Fort Brooke was effectively 

broken, and Governor Eaton enlisted 500 

horsemen under MG Richard Call (western 

Florida militia commander) and 250 under 

COL John Warren of Jacksonville. 

 

The Dade Massacre and beginning of the 

Second Seminole War

December 1835 was a month a chaos and 

tragedy. On 7 December, a mounted 

scouting party rode through a hammock and 

was ambushed. On 18 December, a wagon

train was ambushed by Osceola. On 20 

December, militia scouts located the hostile 

Indians and dispersed them. During 

Christmastime many east coast sugar 

plantations were wrecked, and by the end of 

the year the entire industry was destroyed. 

The Indians were roaming freely and whites 

crowded into settled areas and near the forts. 

MG Call reported that whites had deserted 

the area from the Suwannee River to the St. 

Johns River for 50 miles north of the Indian 

boundary.44 

With the growing violence attributed to the 

Mikasukis, BG Clinch decided to attack 

them at the forks of the Withlacoochee 

River, hoping “it would drive terror among 

the timid and wavering, and perhaps 

effectually silence the efforts of others in 

creating disaffection among them.”45 Clinch 

Campaigning Spring 2015 9
repositioned five companies from Fort King 

to Fort Drane (site of his plantation) and 

ordered two companies from Fort Brooke to 

move to Fort King. 

On 23 December Brevet Major Francis Dade 

led the two companies from Fort Brooke 

toward Fort King. Tracked by Seminoles 

the entire way, on the morning of 28 

December, 40 miles south of Fort King, 

Dade’s column was caught in ambush and 

105 out of 108 soldiers (including eight 

officers) were killed in the day-long battle. 

“Only when they had withdrawn did a 

swarm of Negroes come to kill the wounded 

and loot the dead.”46 The same day, Osceola 

led a war party to Fort King to riddle Wiley 

Thompson with bullets and take his hair. 

Halpatter Tustenuggee (aka war chief 

Alligator) said the Seminoles had worked on 

this plan for a year. The Seminoles would 

resist removal by terrorizing the Florida 

countryside with raids and atrocities, 

assassinating the Indian Agent, and 

“strik[ing] an effective blow at the meager 

American force.”47 

Even before the nearly simultaneous 

massacre and assassination, regular Army 

forces under BG Clinch were committing to 

take the fight to the Seminoles. On 24 

December, Clinch’s force was joined by 

Call’s mounted territorial volunteers, whose 

term of service ended 1 January 1836. It is 

certain that they did not know of Dade’s 

fate, and it is not clear that they knew about 

Thompson’s;4849 regardless, on 29 

December 1835, BG Clinch began his 

movement to attack the Seminole 

stronghold. After putting his regular force 

across the Withlacoochee using a single 

leaky canoe and leaving the mounted 

volunteers on the other side of the river, the 

Seminoles, led by Osceola, attacked the 

regulars and Clinch was forced to execute a 

hasty defense and withdrawal to Fort Drane. 

Dr. John Mahon made the following 

assessment of the result: 

This battle probably did more harm than 

good. First, it created in the army the 

erroneous impression that the Indians could 

be brought to the fight in large groups, more 

or less white-style. Second, it gave the 

savages confidence in the leadership of 

Osceola. Finally, when the column 

withdrew without trying to strike at 

Seminole settlements, the Indians reached 

the conclusion that they could stop any 

white force.50

Subsequent Operations in the Florida 

Theater, 1836 

The Jackson administration, Congress, 

territorial and military leaders took various 

actions to address the problem. Secretary of 

War Lewis Cass gave BG Clinch permission 

to call up the state militia and arranged for 

the cooperation of three Revenue Cutters 

from the Treasury Department.51 While not 

declaring “war,” Congress appropriated 

money in increasing amounts to fund the 

growing contingency operations, and the 

Adjutant General reported that the War 

Department, “perhaps under the influence of 

the President, was determined to protect the 

property of slaveholders. No terms would 

be offered to the hostiles...as long as one 

slave belonging to a white man remained 

among the Seminoles.”52 The Florida 

legislature increased the size of the militia, 

instituting a draft in counties with a low 

number of volunteers. In addition to 

requests for patrols by the West Indies 

Squadron of the Navy, on 19 January, 1LT 

Nathaniel Waldron, USMC, departed 

Pensacola for Fort Brooke with 57 

Marines.53 The combat zone in Florida 

overlapped two areas of responsibility, and 

SecWar Cass ordered MG Winfield Scott, 

commander of the Eastern Department, to 

Campaigning Spring 2015 10
take command of the Florida Theater – his 

strategic guidance was specific: “he might 

not open negotiations with the Indians until 

he had first reduced them to unconditional 

surrender.”54 Meanwhile, MG Edmund 

Gaines, commander of the Western 

Department, upon hearing of Dade’s battle 

in his area of responsibility, proceeded to 

raise volunteers and embark on transports 

from New Orleans to Tampa.

Gaines’s Operation: February – March 

1836 

MG Gaines’s operational idea was to move 

to Tampa with maximum combat power, 

retrace Dade’s march, and seek contact with

and destroy the Seminoles. While enroute to 

Fort Brooke, Gaines received orders from 

SecWar Cass directing him to proceed to the 

border with Texas and take command (the 

Alamo battle will occur two months later), 

but Gaines continued on to Tampa. On 20 

February, Gaines found the massacre site, 

and proceeded to Fort King and then Fort 

Drane for supplies. Gaines departed Fort 

Drane for Fort Brooke via BG Clinch’s 

battlefield and made contact with 

approximately 1100 Seminoles. 

Surrounded, MG Gaines sought assistance 

from BG Clinch at Fort Drane: Gaines 

would fix the Seminoles and Clinch would 

take them in the flank. MG Scott ordered 

Clinch not to relieve Gaines’s force; this 

contributed to an already-fierce rivalry 

between the two generals. The Seminoles 

had started a parley with Gaines when 

Clinch, acting on his own authority to 

relieve Gaines, surprised the Seminoles and 

caused them to disperse.

Scott’s Operation: March – April 1836 

MG Scott viewed Gaines’s uncoordinated 

offensive as disruptive to his elaborate 

campaign plan, especially Gaines’s force 

eating up Scott’s rations. Scott’s operational 

idea was to envelop the Seminoles from 

three directions in a tightly synchronized 

pincers, compressing and then destroying 

them near the Cove of the Withlacoochee so 

that they did not escape to the south. This 

effort failed for a variety of reasons, 

including Scott’s grounding in Napoleonic 

tactics and doctrine. Next, based on naval 

intelligence that the Seminoles had escaped 

to the south, he sent columns there to move 

to contact. On 21 May, Scott was directed 

by SecWar Cass to pick up the offensive in 

Alabama against resurgent hostile Creeks. 

After a month of discussions about who 

should next command the theater, Governor

Call was given command. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 11
Call’s Operations: September – 

November 1836 

On 16 March 1836, Richard K. Call was 

confirmed by the Senate to be the Territorial 

Governor of Florida. He had served as a 

regular army officer for eight years before 

becoming a lawyer and general of Florida 

militia in 1823. A friend and former 

roommate of Jackson’s, Call sold Jackson 

on a concept to defeat the Seminoles in a 

summer campaign. On 21 June, Call was 

given operational command: “Rarely before 

had a civil governor been given command of 

a field army made up, not only of his own 

militia, but of militia from other states and 

units of the regular army.”55 Call’s 

operational idea involved operating from 

four logistics hubs close to the Seminole 

stronghold to seek decisive battle and quick 

victory. Due to delays in receiving 

sufficient troops and sustainment, his initial 

effort to bring the Seminoles to battle failed. 

After reconstituting his force, his second 

operation also culminated in failure despite 

heavy contact with the Seminoles. 

Jackson’s stinging criticism of Call created 

an estrangement between them, and Call 

relinquished command to MG Thomas Jesup 

on 9 December 1836. 

Second Seminole War – The End of the 

Beginning

The Second Seminole War historical case 

presents opportunities to practice joint 

doctrine’s design methodology and glean 

examples of elements of operational design. 

From BG Clinch’s initial attack into the 

Cove of the Withlacoochee River to MG 

Gaines’s marching to the sound of the guns, 

and MG Scott’s textbook doctrinal approach 

to Governor Call’s repeated efforts for quick 

decisive victory, the leaders attempted to 

implement national policy through military 

action. The commanders demonstrated, to 

varying degrees, the current CJCS’s desired 

leader attributes. Their understanding of 

strategic direction guided their actions even 

as the operational environment changed

through the year of 1836. Their operational 

approaches reflected different conceptions 

of the problem they faced. But it was MG 

Jesup who saw the war in a fundamentally 

different light: “this...is a negro, not an 

Indian war.”56 The tide of war seemed to 

change for the better when MG Jesup began 

operations in late December 1836. 

Unfortunately, after MG Jesup, the war 

would continue under the commands of BG 

Zachary Taylor, BG Walker Armistead and 

COL William Worth, until changes in 

political leadership and policy, legislation 

and public support, and Seminole attrition 

enabled COL Worth to declare the war at an 

end on 14 August 1842. The problems of 

Indian removal did not go away in 1842, 

however...in 1855 a Third Seminole War 

was fought, concluding in 1858 on the eve

of the American Civil War. 

The doctrine of the time may have adversely 

affected the creativity required to address 

the complex problem represented by 

Seminole removal. The general officers in 

the Florida Theater had not attended the 

U.S. Military Academy, although most of 

the junior officers had. Many of the general 

officers had been in fights with the Indians 

before, while most of the junior officers and 

enlisted men had not been trained in Indian 

fighting, which was one of Jackson’s 

criticisms of the professional standing army. 

Major Leigh Read of the Florida militia 

publicly criticized MG Scott, who had been 

studying Napoleonic doctrine and producing 

army manuals since 1815, for applying “the 

shreds and patches of the obsolete system of 

European tactics where they could not 

possibly work.”57 If the leaders in 1836 had 

been familiar with current joint doctrine, 

Campaigning Spring 2015 12
would they have used it? Would it have 

mattered? 

The Tao of the Alternative View

A goal of joint professional military 

education phase II is for joint field grade and 

senior officers to think critically and 

creatively, analytically and synthetically, at 

the operational level of war and higher. A 

concern is that students are mired in a 

service-centric, tactical-level mindset, and 

for some students, breaking out of that 

paradigm is difficult business. Another 

concern is that leaders who will operate at 

the operational level may not be creative 

enough to “embrace ambiguity” because 

their thinking is constrained by adherence to 

joint doctrine. Is it true that the language of 

doctrine prevents development of extradoctrinal conceptualizations and frames? 

Do we develop these concepts outside of 

doctrine, or in spite of doctrine? If 

performance on JPME II pre-course 

assessments is a valid indicator, this concern 

is unwarranted. Student thinking is not 

constrained by joint doctrine because they 

do not know the joint doctrine. Students do 

have a tactical bias, based on their

experiences; this is the paradigm that JPME 

II seeks to break using historical cases such 

as the Second Seminole War. Officers have 

not had the time or inclination to read and 

reflect on joint doctrine (“it’s only a lot of 

reading if you do it”). In their joint 

assignments, they have not had to find the 

best practices unless an emergent situation 

calls for it or they will be teaching it to 

others. Officers are seldom able to complete 

the doctrinal and other reading assignments, 

and reflect on them, in the manner intended 

by the JPME II institutions; this is borne out 

by years of post-course student surveys. 

An interesting result of this shallow 

treatment of doctrine is that because the 

students do not know the joint doctrine and 

are not wedded to it, the joint doctrine 

actually challenges their institutional 

service-centric tactical-level paradigms. 

Joint doctrine (and by extension, joint 

education) provides an alternative frame of 

reference to challenge what they have 

learned at the tactical level. Students are not 

constrained by the language of doctrine 

because they do not know the doctrine. A 

few more generalizations: where Army and

Marine officers may know service doctrine, 

to the extent that joint doctrine differs from 

service doctrine, joint doctrine provides an 

alternative viewpoint. The Army and Air 

Force officers experience this when trying to 

understand the role of “conditions” or 

“effects” as elements of operational design. 

Joint doctrine developers attempt a synthesis 

of service doctrines through the consensus 

development of joint doctrine; however, 

there are internal logical inconsistencies in 

the doctrine which carry over into 

operational decision-making. 

 

Joint doctrine, specifically Joint Publications 

3-0 and 5-0, struggle to synthesize current 

best practices and legacy (“institutional”) 

time-tested principles such as the integration 

of joint functions, elements of operational 

design, and principles of joint operations. 

One source of friction is the juxtaposition of 

the paradigm of “ends, ways and means” 

with the abductive reasoning that is required 

in a complex world. Doctrine is goaloriented and depends heavily on the 

relationship of action to result, cause and 

effect. Current joint doctrine provides a 

glimpse into this challenge when it states: 

“The proximate cause of effects in complex 

situations can be difficult to predict. Even 

direct effects in these situations can be more 

difficult to create, predict, and measure, 

particularly when they relate to moral and 

cognitive issues (such as religion and the 

“mind of the adversary,” respectively). 

Campaigning Spring 2015 13
Indirect effects in these situations often are 

difficult to foresee.”58 At the philosophical 

level, this relates to issues of teleology, 

ontology and epistemology. The logic that 

manifests itself in joint doctrine describes a 

tension between an Aristotelian perspective 

of cause and effect and a Heraclitian 

perspective of constant flow and change. 

Joint doctrine may be leaning more toward 

Heraclitus as it emphasizes “red teaming”59

and says things like: 

...the commander must empower 

organizational learning and develop 

methods to determine if modifying the 

operational approach is necessary during 

the course of an operation. This requires 

continuous assessment and reflection that 

challenge understanding of the existing 

problem and the relevance of actions 

addressing that problem.60 

Is joint doctrine the right venue, or Joint 

Publication 5-0 the best place, for 

explicating the philosophy and theory 

behind operational design? If so, is the 

description of operational design sufficient? 

...you showed students a guitar, showed 

them a few cords, let them strum a few 

minutes and now they are going to walk out 

the door thinking they are musicians. Those 

of us who depend on OD [operational 

design] for planning on a daily basis will 

now have to deal with the monsters you have 

created for the rest of our careers. And since 

they passed a test...there will be no way to 

convince them.61 

The problem is not necessarily the wellintentioned attempt to infuse Joint 

Publication 5-0 with more design-oriented 

aspects. This has been a trend since 2006, 

when mission analysis included some design 

elements, to 2011, when these elements and 

mission analysis were broken out more 

discretely. The real issue is that legacy 

terms like the elements of operational design 

reflect an older logic that no longer fits 

contemporary conditions. Concepts like 

conflict termination are arguably more 

important than ever, yet seem to have 

dissipated in the current doctrine. The 

continuing cottage industry of debate about 

“center of gravity” in deliberate planning for 

contingencies and theater campaign 

planning reflects a discontinuity that begs 

for appropriate synthesis. “Lines of 

operation” are giving way to “lines of 

effort” that reflect a transition from an older 

logic geared toward linearity to a newer 

logic that acknowledges non-linearity. The 

Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, 

developed to complement Joint Publication 

5-0’s efforts, highlights the paradigmatic 

conflict with its attempt to write “effects” 

out of the vernacular and blurs the 

distinction between conditions, objectives 

and end states.62 Historical cases such as 

the Second Seminole War are developed to 

teach the elements of operational design; to 

the extent that effort is successful, 

paradoxically, the risk of constrained 

creativity may be increased.

 

What should cause more concern is where 

the institutional paradigm of doctrine is 

really in force: within the cadre of JPME II 

instructors. JPME II instructors seldom 

have actually used joint doctrine, except 

when they teach it. The group that may be 

most constrained by doctrine is the civilian 

educators, those who retired from active 

duty military jobs teaching joint doctrine

and now teach it as civilians. They may 

have the most difficult time breaking out of 

the paradigm. One challenge is the 

requirement to produce a JPME IIcertificated officer on an assembly-line 

model that tends toward a vocational 

emphasis vice an educational emphasis and 

yields “products.” All is not lost on the 

Campaigning Spring 2015 14
front line of instructors, however; these 

instructors, through years of experience 

teaching new students, have generally 

become masters of their craft. This mastery 

enables them to step outside of the joint 

doctrinal paradigm and look at situations 

from different perspectives. If the purpose 

of operational design is to create better 

understanding, and the Tao of design is to 

1 ("Self-Reliance" 1847) 2 (“The Relation of Dress to Art" 1885)

3 ("Self-Reliance" 1847) 4 (JP 1 2011, IV-3) 5 (JP 1 2011, IV-3) 6 (JP 1 2011, IV-3) 7 (The Semantic Turn: a New Foundation for Design 

2006, 20)

8 (Prolegomena: The Structure of Operational 

Revolution 2009, 111)

9 (JP 1 2011, IV-5) 10 (Prolegomena: The Structure of Operational 

Revolution 2009, 107)

11 (Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained 2007, 

67)

12 (Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained 2007, 

73)

13 (JP 3-0 2006, chg1 2008, III-3 to III-4) 14 (Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020 

2013)

15 ("President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison: 

February 27, 1803" 2000)

16 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 19)

17 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 72)

18 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 9-11) 19 (Osceola and the Great Seminole War 2012, 17) 20 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 16) 21 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 25)

22 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 25)

23 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 27) 24 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 26) 25 (CMH Pub 30-21 2009, 152) 26 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 40) 27 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 31-32)

look, deliberately, at situations differently in 

order to increase that understanding, to the 

point of uncovering problems with the 

structure of thinking about situations at a 

theoretical level, it is these instructors who 

will lead the way to determine the 

appropriate relationship between doctrine 

and design, consistency and creativity. 

28 ("A Reckless Waste of Blood and Treasure: The 

Last Campaign of the Second Seminole War" 2011, 

66)

29 ("A Reckless Waste of Blood and Treasure: The 

Last Campaign of the Second Seminole War" 2011, 

66)

30 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 61)

31 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 63-64) 32 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 67)

33 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 61)

34 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 75)

35 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 76)

36 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 76)

37 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 87-88) 38 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 93-94) 39 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 94)

40 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 94)

41 (Jackson, "Message to the Seminoles" 1836) 42 (Staff Ride Handbook for Dade's Battle, Florida, 28 

December 1835 2013, 31)

43 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 99)

44 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 102)

45 (The War in Florida: Being an Exposition of It's 

causes, and an Accurate History of the Campaigns of 

Generals Clinch, Gaines and Scott 1836, 99)

46 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 106)

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 15
47 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 103)

48 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 108)

49 (The Seminole Wars: America's Longest Indian 

Conflict 2004, 97)

50 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 112)

51 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 138)

52 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 138)

53 (Swamp Sailors: Riverine Warfare in the 

Everglades 1835-1842 1975, 19) 54 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 139)

55 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 168)

56 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 196)

57 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-

1842 1967, 161)

58 (JP 5-0 2011, III-21) 59 (JP 5-0 2011, III-4, III-5) 60 (JP 5-0 2011, III-3) 61 (Student 2014) 62 (Joint Staff 2011)

Author Biography

Stephen Dennis is an Assistant Professor in 

the Joint and Combined Warfighting School 

(JCWS) of the Joint Forces Staff College 

(JFSC), and a retired U.S. Naval officer. 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 16
Project the False and Protect the 

Real: Deceiving Hitler in 

FORTITUDE SOUTH 

By CDR Michael M. Posey 

Operations Security (OPSEC) is often

relegated to an afterthought. Do not leave 

your security badge on outside the building. 

Do not throw personally identifiable 

information in the trash. Do not discuss 

deployment information at the bus stop. 

Through ubiquitous training, have we lost 

our understanding of the tenets of OPSEC? 

Have we taken a discipline designed to blind 

and deafen our adversary and turned it into 

standard operating procedure (SOP) while 

ignoring its value at the operational level? 

When paired with deception, the value of 

OPSEC as a complementary discipline

becomes evident. Through the most complex 

and successful case study of deception, 

FORTITUDE SOUTH,1 we can see the how 

the Allies applied proactive OPSEC as 

countermeasures to operational 

vulnerabilities. 

FORTITUDE SOUTH, the WWII operation 

designed to convince Hitler that an Allied 

invasion of Europe would land at Pas de 

Calais instead of Normandy, was one of the 

most successful military deceptions 

(MILDEC) in history.2

 However, it could 

not have occurred without the essential 

secrecy afforded through strict OPSEC. 

FORTITUDE SOUTH not only set 

favorable conditions for the initial “D-Day” 

landing on June 6, 1944, but the operation 

convinced the Germans that the Normandy 

invasion was just a feint while the main 

attack would occur several weeks later at 

Pas de Calais.3

 MILDEC planners often 

study FORTITUDE SOUTH as a classic 

example of an ambiguity-decreasing military 

deception, which caused the adversary to be 

increasingly certain, decisive, and grossly 

incorrect about the friendly course of action. 

However, it is also a textbook example of 

how planners can combine the disciplines of 

MILDEC and OPSEC by emphasizing and 

protecting key indicators. Control of 

indicators, bits 

of information 

that can be 

pieced together 

to create 

evidence of 

friendly actions, 

proved 

instrumental in

selling the 

deception story 

to Hitler and his 

German high 

command, the 

Oberkommando 

der Wehrmacht 

(OKW). Actual 

Allied disposition of forces and intentions 

were proactively guarded. OPSEC played a 

vital role in ensuring that only the desired, 

misleading indicators, like the existence of 

the fabricated one-million soldier-strong 1st

U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) were presented 

to Hitler, while actual invasion preparations 

remained hidden. 4 By carefully projecting 

certain indicators using various MILDEC 

means, and protecting others with carefully 

controlled OPSEC measures, the Allies were 

able to shape Hitler’s perception of the 

operational environment, causing him to 

misallocate resources, notably keeping the 

Fifteenth Army fixed at Pas de Calais. 

Hoodwinking Hitler required the Allies to 

correctly portray false indicators while

protecting key truthful indicators. 

An indicator is information that is 

characteristic of an activity.5 Adversaries 

piece indicators together like puzzle pieces

to create evidence of friendly activities, 

Symbol of the fictitious 1st United 

States Army Group (FUSAG).

Campaigning Spring 2015 17
intentions, or capabilities. Vulnerabilities 

exist when adversary decision makers gain 

the initiative based on the indicators they 

can piece together, process, analyze, and 

subsequently act upon in a timely manner. 

However, by sowing the seeds of deception, 

indicators can become a friendly advantage. 

How? Uncertainty pervades all military 

operations because it is impossible to gather 

enough information in time to create 

certainty.

6

 Human beings, being unable to 

understand the entire complex, real 

environment, must create situational 

awareness, or representative pictures in our 

minds by “selecting, rearranging, tracing 

patterns upon and stylizing” key bits of 

information, e.g. indicators.7

 As such, 

friendly decision makers must vigilantly

ensure the right intelligence exists to build a 

picture of the adversary so that friendly 

forces can plan and conduct operations.8 For 

example, without ULTRA, the Top Secret 

decryption tool that allowed the Allies to 

decipher the German’s technical 

communications, Allied forces would have 

been unable to assess FORTITUDE 

SOUTH’s effectiveness as they executed the 

deception. Likewise, by controlling 

indicators, friendly forces can exploit an 

adversary’s imperfect picture of the 

operational environment. This proves 

especially useful when friendly forces know 

an adversary decision maker’s pre-existing 

biases well enough to ensure he sees what he 

is predisposed to already believe. 

In this case, Hitler was predisposed to 

believe the Allies would attack at the Pas de 

Calais.9 He believed its beaches to be ideal 

for an amphibious assault, being closest to 

the British shore. Additionally, Hitler knew 

success at Calais would allow the Allies to 

quickly advance to Berlin via Paris, a 

mirror-image of how Hitler advanced 

west.

10 OPSEC and MILDEC both seek to 

limit the adversary’s ability to derive useful 

information by observing friendly activities, 

and disrupting the adversary’s decisionmaking process.11 OPSEC protects certain 

indicators “to create an information 

vacuum” that can be filled with deception. 

Examining FORTITUDE SOUTH, one can 

see how the Allies misled the adversarial 

military decision maker, Hitler, to believe 

the deception story. 

FORTITUDE SOUTH’s deception story 

suggested that Allied forces would invade 

Pas de Calais in July. The Allies created the 

imaginary FUSAG, led by the 

swashbuckling, well-respected Patton,

through a variety of MILDEC means. These 

transmission means included double agents, 

part of the Twenty Committee (or Double 

Cross, XX Committee) whose agents fed the 

Germans misinformation. One XX member, 

Von Loop, informed the Germans of the 

influx of U.S. soldiers, all phantom, into 

Dover.12 Another double agent, Popov, gave 

German intelligence the FUSAG’s order of 

battle.13 The most famous of all the double 

agents, Garcia, known by his codename 

GARBO, fed the Abwehr the actual date and 

time of OVERLORD’s amphibious assault, 

yet did so too late for the Germans to act 

upon it. With his credibility established, 

GARBO’s future messages misled the OKW 

to believe that the Normandy invasion was 

merely an Allied feint.14 Additionally, 

pictures of British officials visiting the area

along with letters about women in Southern 

England corrupted by foreign troops were 

“leaked” to local British newspapers that 

eventually made their way to the German 

high command through neutral ports like 

Lisbon.15 

The Allies furthered the masquerade by

visualizing every way the FUSAG could be 

observed by German intelligence and 

providing visual and auditory indicators of 

its existence. They filled the electromagnetic 

Campaigning Spring 2015 18
spectrum with simulated radio traffic.16

They created tent cities, used smoke 

machines to simulate cooking, and 

constructed a staggering number of false 

tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft—

creating the most costly, in economic terms, 

MILDEC in history.17 They crafted sound 

tracks played through loudspeakers that 

filled the air with a cacophony of action.

18

During the night, the Allies used deceptive 

lighting to further their ruse.

19 Additionally, 

the Allies employed a version of “detainee 

seeding” to the ailing, unwitting Nazi 

General Cramer, who was being released 

from Britain to Germany. General Cramer 

toured southwestern England, the actual 

Allied staging area, while his “talkative and 

friendly” British escorts “carelessly” told 

him they were driving past Dover and seeing 

the FUSAG.20 The ruse continued, even 

during D-Day. As the assault ships bound 

for Normandy set sail, a large-scale 

diversion headed for Pas de Calais used

overhead chaff, false radio transmissions, 

and enough dummy ships to concoct two 

“ghost armadas” as the MILDEC means to 

overwhelm and confuse German radar 

operators.21 To confuse the Germans further, 

the size of the false FUSAG was equal in 

size to the actual invasion force.22 

Leveraging these MILDEC means, the 

deception goal of FORTITUDE SOUTH 

was to mask the real invasion of Normandy 

on D-Day, increasing OPERATION 

OVERLORD’s probability of success. 

Success of the invasion on Fortress Europe 

hinged on the deception objective: the 

German Fifteenth Army remaining fixed at

Pas de Calais for several days to allow the 

Allied invasion force to land amphibiously 

and be resupplied. 23 FORTITUDE SOUTH

efforts continued for over a week, until 

Hitler realized the ruse and moved the 

Fifteenth Army south from Pas de Calais.24

As Hitler dictated complete command of all 

Nazi forces, specifically the Panzer tank 

divisions, he was the deception target for 

FORTITUDE SOUTH. Although many of 

these deception means would be uncovered 

by today’s technology, like space-based 

intelligence assets, the Allies considered the 

capabilities of German reconnaissance and 

applied OPSEC measures accordingly. 

OPSEC supported the deception story by 

ensuring that unclassified information, in the 

form of indicators, remained protected from

“Hitler’s eyes,” German intelligence. One 

OPSEC measure was air defense. Fighters 

allowed German reconnaissance missions to 

fly over the FUSAG at high altitudes to see 

the elaborate visual display (not at low 

altitudes where details could be seen) while 

Allied fighter aircraft vigorously intercepted

any German aircraft flying over the actual 

staging grounds and ports in southwest 

England.25 To protect the invasion location, 

the Allies conducted twice as many bombing 

and reconnaissance missions over Pas de 

Calais as they did over Normandy.26 Neither 

the pilots flying these missions nor the 

soldiers who would storm the French 

beaches were told where the actual invasion 

would occur. The soldiers were issued 

ambiguous maps and confined to their 

sausages (staging areas) before the invasion. 

The Allied soldiers’ French “invasion 

money,” which could have let the German’s 

know of an impending invasion, was not 

given out until just a few days prior. By not 

disclosing invasion specifics to the troops, 

the Allies mitigated the risk of accidental 

disclosure. For the same reason, while 

simulated radio communications blared in 

the vicinity of the FUSAG, the actual 

sausages for the invasion were on radio 

silence. The Allies even tailed Eisenhower’s 

alleged “fling,” Ms. Kay Summersby, as 

part of the effort to ensure no one disclosed 

the deception plans.27 Finally, the Allies 

needed to keep quiet about the intentions of 

Campaigning Spring 2015 19
man-made harbors that would resupply the 

invasion force until a major port could be 

taken. By not adding any tell-tale resupply 

paraphernalia to the makeshift Mulberry 

harbors, the Germans interpreted the giant 

concrete blocks at sea to be anti-aircraft 

staging areas.28 

If the Germans knew the true purpose of 

these structures, it would be an indicator of 

the Allies’ actual invasion plans. Other 

security protocols were enforced alongside 

OPSEC to achieve essential secrecy. For

instance, physical security placed the entire

FUSAG staging area off limits to all 

civilians. Further, information security 

demanded the highly vetted, centralized

group of MILDEC planners employ

electronic “scramblers” on any telephonic 

communication.

29 So secret were the 

identities of MILDEC planners, they 

referred to themselves as “Bigots” to 

confuse any Allies without a need to know 

about the deception, as well as any potential 

German spies.30 While physical and 

information security aided in protecting the 

plan, carefully construed OPSEC measures 

controlled key indicators that would have 

revealed the Allies’ intentions for 

FORTITUDE SOUTH to Hitler. 

The proactive, operational tasks devised by 

the Allies during FORTITUDE SOUTH 

went far beyond the basic OPSEC 

programmatic-level. Instead, these measures 

focused on blinding the adversary sensors, 

controlling adversary conduits, and weaving 

falsehood into the OKW’s operational 

picture. In other words, the Allied planners 

built OPSEC into the operational plan to 

ensure that Hitler was misdirected during the 

largest amphibious invasion in history. 

FORTITUDE SOUTH hoodwinked Hitler, 

enabling the successful Allied invasion of 

Normandy. OPSEC played a vital role in 

ensuring that only the desired, misleading 

indicators, were presented to German 

intelligence, while actual preparation for the 

invasion remained hidden. Meanwhile, a 

carefully crafted deception story was 

conveyed to the German high command by 

cleverly projecting certain indicators using 

various MILDEC means. By manipulating 

and protecting key indicators, the Allies 

shaped Hitler’s perception of the operational 

environment. Ultimately, incorrect 

situational awareness caused the German

military leader to misallocate his resources. 

General Bradley, in an after-action report to 

General Eisenhower, noted the 

overwhelming success of FORTITUDE 

SOUTH in fixing at least 20 German 

divisions in the vicinity of Pas de Calais,

31

enabling the Allies to establish a beachhead 

in Normandy. By controlling the indicators 

in FORTITUDE SOUTH, the Allies misled 

Hitler until it was too late to act, creating an 

operational advantage enabling the 

successful Allied invasion of Europe. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 20
1 Jon Latimer, Deception in War, (New York: Overlook Press, 

2001), 205

2 Fowler and Nesbit, Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare

(Journal of Electronic Defense, June 1995), 2 3 William Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception

(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 219 4 Ibid, 111

5 Joint Publication 3-13.3, Operations Security, Jan 12, I-1 6 Naval Command and Control Doctrine, 12

7 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion,(Greenbook Publications, LLC 

2010) 4 8 Joint Doctrine, 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to 

Military Operations, I-3 9 Robert Greene, 33 Strategies of War (London: Profile Books, 

2006), 304 10 Barbier, Mary, D-day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the 

Normandy Invasion (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 170 11 Joint Doctrine 3-13.4, Military Deception, Jan 12, II-4 12 Breuer, 112 13 Ibid, 118 14 Stephen Talty, Agent Garbo: The Brilliant Secret Agent who

tricked Hitler and Saved D-Day (Boston: HMH Books, 2012), 167 15 Breuer, 116 16 Ibid, 177 17 Barton Whaley, “The 1% Solution: Costs and Benefits of 

Military Deception,” Information Strategy and Warfare (New 

York: Routledge, 2007), 131

18 Ibid, 114 19 Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the 

Second World War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 536 20 Breuer, 160 21 Ibid, 201

22 Latimer, xx 23 Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign 

(New York: Overlook, 2000), 118 24 Breuer, 236 25 Ibid, 185 26 Holt, 551 27 Breuer ,140 28 Ibid, 149

29 Ibid, 138 30 Bigots received their curious name by reversing a stamp of “To 

Gib” that was used on orders for officers headed to Gibraltar to 

support operations in North Africa in 1942. The title existed to

support essential secrecy. Breur, 149 

31 Brown, Anthony Cave, Bodyguard of Lies (Toronto: Harper and 

Row, 1975), 900

Author Biography 

CDR Posey is an active duty E-2C Naval 

Flight Officer with Naval Subspecialty in 

Information Systems and Operations. He 

currently serves as an instructor at the Joint 

Command, Control and Information 

Operations School, teaching joint, 

interagency, and multi-national information 

operations planning to mid-grade officers 

and civilian equivalents. He holds the 

academic titles of Assistant Professor and 

Master Faculty and is the course director for 

the Defense Military Deception Training 

Course at JFSC. He can be reached at 

michael.posey@ndu.edu 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 21
Operational Assessment and the 

Commander’s Decision Cycle

By Mr. Michael McGonagle, LTC Ed Chamberlayne, 

and Lt Col Richard Collins

In the 2000 National Football League Draft, 

Tom Brady was the 199th pick overall. He 

was the 7th quarterback picked that year. 

None of the quarterbacks picked before him 

have demonstrated the leadership and 

capabilities he has through his career; in fact, 

only two of those six are still in the league 

today and those as back-ups. Why did Tom 

Brady go so low in the draft yet his 

subsequent performance clearly demonstrated 

that he was the best quarterback available? 

The pre-draft report stated he had a poor 

build and was very skinny. Even after 

gaining 16 pounds since the end of his senior 

season at Michigan, the report said he looked 

frail and lacked physical stature and strength. 

It further stated that he could get pushed 

down easily, lacked the mobility and ability 

to avoid the rush, lacked a strong arm and a 

tight spiral, and couldn’t drive the ball down 

the field. Essentially the teams evaluating 

Tom Brady looked hard at the statistics, what 

we refer to as the Measures of Performance 

in operational assessment. However, these 

teams didn’t look at how well he played and 

how he continually led his team to comeback 

victories. They failed to base their assessment 

on the Measures of Effectiveness, another 

key component in operational assessment. 

Operational Assessment is a key input and 

component of the Joint Force Commander’s 

Decision Cycle. The operational assessment 

process helps commanders see a direct 

linkage between the missions they assign to 

subordinate commands and the effects and 

objectives laid out in the plan. The process 

helps commanders to determine not just if 

they are doing things right but, more 

importantly, if they are doing the right things. 

Commanders can view these assessments 

against their operational vision and intent to 

adjust operations to meet their objectives and 

end state. 

Current joint doctrine discusses assessments 

but provides no defined process or tool for 

the conduct of these assessments nor does it 

discuss the requirement to devote resources 

to the conduct of the assessment. This 

statement has been reinforced in recent joint 

publications and articles: 

“Planning processes supporting design do 

not resolve problems identified within today’s 

assessment practices ...”i

 and “...the current 

operational assessment process in joint 

doctrine is inadequate for the joint force 

commander to conduct adequate 

assessment....”ii

Therefore, the current commander’s decision 

cycle and the operational assessment process 

must be reassessed to ensure consistent, 

repeatable assessments.

Background 

The word “assessment” means many 

different things to different people, 

dependent upon the context. For the purpose 

of this discussion, we will use the definitions 

from Joint Publication 3-0 (Operations): 

“1. A continuous process that measures the 

overall effectiveness of employing joint force 

capabilities during military operations. 2. 

Determination of the progress toward 

accomplishing a task, creating a condition, 

or achieving an objective.”iii 

The operational assessment can help the 

commander know the answers to four critical 

questions: 1) “Are we meeting our 

objectives?” 2) “Do we need to change what 

we are doing tactically to achieve our effects 

and objectives?” 3) “Do we need to change 

Campaigning Spring 2015 22
what we are measuring & observing to see if 

our actions are correct?” 4) “Are we nearing 

the culmination point that allows the Joint 

Force to disengage, and/or to re-focus our 

efforts towards different objectives or 

missions?”

An assessment mechanism built on a defined 

and repeatable methodology with a mix of 

observable qualitative and quantitative 

indicators adds credibility to the process and 

the product. Both Commander Robert 

Michael, in his paper: “Effective Operational 

Assessment: A Return to the Basics”iv and 

Army Field Manual 5-0 recommend that an 

effective assessment combines, 

“...quantitative and qualitative indicators ... 

using informal assessment methods with 

formal methods.”v

The Assessment Process

Operational assessment is not a new concept; 

commanders have always sought to 

understand how well they were progressing 

towards mission accomplishment so they 

could either reinforce success or refocus 

efforts to gain the initiative. As the 

operational environment has become more 

complex and the need for integrated military 

operations has become more prevalent, the 

assessment process has also become more 

complex. Normally, the tactical commander 

can assess operations based upon almost 

instantaneous feedback from tactical actions, 

e.g., “did the bomb hit the target?” or “did 

the force seize the defined objective?” 

However, commanders at the operational and 

strategic levels must look beyond “doing 

things right” to help determine if their 

operations are successful. Not only did the 

bomb hit the target, but by hitting the target 

the electrical grid was shut down preventing 

an enemy armored force from moving on 

railcars to attack a key city. Thus, the city 

safe from attack, the government protected, 

and the people and their economic livelihood 

unthreatened. 

The commander’s decision cycle has four 

distinct steps: Plan, Direct, Monitor, and 

Assess (Figure 1).vi Operational assessment 

is a commander-centric process designed to 

support the commander’s decision cycle. The 

process entails three distinct tasks: 

continuous monitoring of the situation and 

the progress of operations; evaluating the 

operation against measures of effectiveness 

and measures of performance to determine 

progress relative to the mission, objectives, 

and end states; and developing 

recommendation/guidance for improvement. 

Planning for the Assessment 

Operational assessment is a continuous 

process and requires continual review of the 

assessment plan—to include validation of the 

measures and indicators—to provide timely 

and appropriate feedback to the commander 

and the planning staff (Figure 2). For the 

assessment process to support the 

commander, the assessment must be planned 

Figure 1: Assessment and the Commander's 

Decision Cycle

Campaigning Spring 2015 23
for as part of the overall planning process. 

Assessment planning is normally conducted 

during the Joint Operation Planning Process 

(JOPP) by the Joint Planning 

Group/Operational Planning Team 

(JPG/OPT). As the JPG/OPT develops the 

approved objectives and effects for the joint 

force they will begin to examine how the 

operation should be assessed. The planning 

effort lead may direct the formation of 

Effects Development and Assessment Cells 

during the planning process. The Effects 

Development Cell will consider the 

objectives and develop effects which will 

help to achieve them; they will also examine 

and define the undesired effects which may 

be created in the operation.vii

During the planning process the Assessment 

Cell will develop Measures of Effectiveness 

(MOE) for each of the identified effects 

(desired and undesired) to determine if 

actions taken are having an impact (effect) on 

the system intended. In short, they help 

determine if the command is “doing the right 

thing.” Measures of Performance (MOP) are 

used to determine if tactical actions taken are 

taken properly. They are a measure of the 

success of a particular action—i.e., “doing 

things right.” Typically MOPs are used by 

the current operations staff (J33) to track 

successful completion of missions while the 

MOEs are used by the Assessment Cell to 

help track progress towards achieving an 

assigned effect and objective. 

OEs measure or identify the trends and 

should be expressed in terms of increase or 

decrease. Using this format eliminates the 

common error of confusing an MOEIndicator for an MOE at this level. 

Additionally, MOEs do not measure “Blue” 

or Coalition actions; they are focused on the 

system behavior, state or capabilities. When 

building an assessment, it is important to 

remember to measure the things that need to 

be measured, not everything that can be 

measured. As a general rule of thumb staffs 

should develop 3-5 MOE per effect. 

For each MOE, a set of indicators (MOEIndicators or MOEI) are developed by the 

Assessment Cell. These indicators are the 

“metric” used for a specific activity. The 

assessment may use a mix of qualitative 

(opinion based) and quantitative (observation 

based) indicators. These indicators help to 

determine if the MOE trend supports 

achieving the desired effect. The assessment 

team may also need to find country specific 

or focus area expertise when selecting 

indicators to makes sure they are appropriate. 

Indicators help identify assessment-based 

collection requirements and need to be 

integrated into the collection plan. Forces 

deployed in the operational environment can 

help the assessment process by gathering 

information in their normal observations that 

help to answer specific indicators. Examples: 

“# of hospital beds in use at local medical 

facilities,” “# of hospital beds available for 

use at local medical facilities,” or “# of local 

business operating.” 

Figure 2: Assessment Plan Steps

Campaigning Spring 2015 24
These inputs, when compiled with other 

observations for the same indicator (or coupled 

with other indicators), help to develop a picture 

of the environment that serves to show a trend. 

That trend may support an objective Effect— 

“Medical facility capabilities are able to 

provide essential services without US military 

assistance” or a subjective Effect— “Local 

government improves the security environment 

allowing restoration of daily life.” See Figure 3

for the relationship between indicators, MOEs, 

effects, and objectives.viii

After building the assessment, it is important to 

periodically revalidate the MOE and MOEI to 

balance the changing measures with the 

requirement to establish a consistent measure 

that follow-on analysis can be based upon. 

Figure 4 provides a graphic view of how high 

performance on tactical tasks may not lead to 

achievement of operational effects and 

objectives. Conversely, low performance on 

tactical tasks can still achieve excellent results 

towards achievement of the effects. Using this 

example, it becomes apparent where resources 

are needed or being wasted on tactical tasks. In 

addition, it depicts the relationship of how the 

tactical tasks affect overall mission 

accomplishment and the achievement of the 

desired effect. Since there is not a direct 

correlation between performance on tactical 

tasks and mission accomplishment, the 

assessment process must look at all aspects of 

performance to develop an overarching view 

for the commander. 

For the assessment process to support the 

Commander’s Decision Cycle, resources must 

be dedicated to development of the assessment 

framework and to the conduct of the 

assessment. These resources come from across 

the staff for the development of the framework 

and for the tracking of inputs from the indictors 

and trends for each of the MOE. In addition to 

staff elements involved in the assessment, other 

elements within the command will be involved 

in the process through the indicators. 

 

Figure 4 - Interpretation of generalized 

operational-assessment resultsix

Organizing for Assessments

There are a number of people from across the 

command with key roles in the operational 

assessment process. The most important of 

these, as stated previously, is the commander. 

The Commander leverages staff 

recommendations and inputs as well as 

subordinate command assessments along 

with his own circulation across the operating 

Figure 3: Measurement of Effectiveness Example

Campaigning Spring 2015 25
environment, discussions with the varied 

stakeholders and his own experience and 

instincts to formulate his personal assessment 

of the situation. 

The Chief of Staff guides the staff work in 

the assessment effort to help the commander 

with his decision making process. Although 

the quantitative expertise of an operational 

research officer is critical to the assessment 

team, a team chief with recent operational 

experience and a broad operational 

perspective is necessary to align and guide 

the assessment activities to support the 

commander.

Many commands have recognized the 

importance of broadening stakeholder inputs 

into the assessment process. Commands have 

included members of the interagency 

community, coalition partners, nongovernmental organization members, and 

local representatives to enrich the inputs and 

quality of the assessment. During the 

execution phase of operations a crossfunctional team from across the staff may 

need to be brought together to collect the 

assessment inputs from the assigned 

indicators, track the trends for the MOEs and 

formulate the staffs assessment inputs. This 

team may have to brief the commander on 

the recommended assessment inputs and 

participate in the deficiency analysis to 

support the “what’s next” discussion with the 

planning staff. 

Decision Cycle Review

Presented with the results of the assessment, 

the Commander provides guidance to the 

planners to determine the future course of the 

operation. It is imperative operational and 

strategic level staffs and commanders 

recognize when they develop the assessment 

framework that progress towards achieving 

the effect may be neither instantaneous nor 

constant. The trend tracked by the MOE may 

show continual progress in a positive 

direction then stall or even temporarily 

reverse. This does not mean that the joint 

force is not doing the right thing; it may 

indicate temporary changes in the 

environment have stalled progress and the 

positive trend may begin again. 

When the trend analysis indicates the desired 

effects are being achieved, the commander 

may direct that actions or tasks continue as 

planned. When the trend analysis indicates 

that there is insufficient progress towards 

achieving desired effects (or that friendly 

actions are resulting in undesired effects), the 

assessors may initiate a deficiency analysis 

with the planners, analysts and relevant 

subject matter experts that will result in 

recommendations to the planners and 

ultimately the commander. The plan may 

then be adjusted following the 

recommendations derived from the 

assessment processes. 

Assessment Capabilities in the Joint Force

Beginning in 2007, United States Joint 

Forces Command fielded the Global 

Synchronization Tool (GST) for use by the 

combatant commands as an assessment tool.x

The first operational use of the GST was in 

the spring of 2008 for the conduct of the 

Integrated Assessment of Supporting Plans 

(IASP) conducted by SOCOM to support the 

Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) 

Campaign Assessment (GCA). Each 

Geographic Combatant Command used GST 

to facilitate input of its data and rationale in 

conduct of GWOT in its region. Global 

analysis of this information led to 

recommended changes in GWOT planning 

and operations. The GST continued to evolve 

to meet the growing need for a robust, global, 

web-based planning and assessment 

capability. It soon became the primary 

assessment tool for Joint Task Force and 

Campaigning Spring 2015 26
Theater Campaign Planning for United States 

European Command, Pacific Command, and 

Africa Command. 

The GST was originally designed as a suite 

of tools to assist planners in developing a 

systems perspective of the operational 

environment. The tools would assist the 

commander in examining likely adversary 

objectives and to promote consideration of 

Diplomatic, Informational, Military and 

Economic actions against key relationships, 

strengths, and vulnerabilities of the 

adversarial systems. Since that early 

development, the tools were later expanded 

to include the steps of the Joint Operations 

Planning Process and an operational 

assessment capability to provide the 

commander input from multiple sources in 

formulating his assessment. 

The GST was a web-based set of tools, 

owned by the US Government and hosted on 

SIPRNET servers at US Joint Forces 

Command and accessible by all joint 

commands. Extensive field testing and 

instruction took place at each of the 

geographic combatant commands; so much 

so that the commands began looking for new 

ways to use GST to assess their plans. On 

occasion, the GST was loaded onto “stand 

alone” laptop computers to allow use of the 

tool in a disconnected, degraded, or coalition 

environment.xi 

Unfortunately, the GST program was 

cancelled when United States Joint Forces 

Command was disbanded. Since that time, 

commands are using internally built Excel 

spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides to build 

their assessment frameworks and track the 

inputs from the indicators to provide 

assessment recommendations to the Joint 

Force Commander. These common tools may 

provide a view for the commander but the 

development of the product is tied to the 

capabilities of the individual staff officer, not 

a repeatable process and format.

Recommendations for Future Assessment 

Efforts

The Department of Defense should develop a 

defined and easily understood assessment 

process that is repeatable across commands, 

geographic areas and the range of military 

operations. This process should address both 

the individual elements of the assessment 

framework and the requirements for 

assignment of appropriate resources to build 

this framework in conjunction with the 

operational planning process. The personnel 

assigned to assessment efforts must 

understand the process, the operational 

approach, and the specifics of the plan. 

Assessors need access to the planning team to 

best understand how the operation is 

envisioned, and to the commander to relate 

their findings and recommendations. 

To support this process, the Department 

should field a tool to support the assessment 

process with the capability to tie together the 

understanding of the operational 

environment, the operational planning 

process, and operational assessments while 

taking inputs from across the staff and 

multiple organizations within the joint force. 

The Global Synchronization Tool, which is 

already owned by the United States 

Government and has received significant 

field testing, could be rapidly activated and 

fielded for use in the field to support this 

effort.

Assessments are ultimately a commander’s 

tool to synchronize efforts across the 

command and ensure mission success. It 

should include functionality for both 

subjective and objective measures as well as 

the ability to display results via graphical or 

as a table. This tool must have the ability to 

conduct operational assessments and merge 

Campaigning Spring 2015 27
them with higher HQ campaign plan 

assessments. Plan and assessment integration 

provides combatant commanders and 

subordinate commanders a shared and more 

complete view of their AOR and their 

operations. 

In addition, Robert Michael’s 

recommendation in “Effective Operational 

Assessment,”xii highlights key 

recommendations. Using various historical 

examples, Michael stresses the following:

- Avoid measuring activities and collecting 

metrics just because it can be collected; 

they must be applicable to the operational 

objectives and desired effects

- Combine quantitative and qualitative 

indicators 

- Use informal assessment methods with 

formal assessment methods

- Avoid excessive and overly detailed 

collection of metrics

The main premise of the paper is well 

captured in the last sentence of this paper: 

“...the Joint Staff must institutionalize these 

basic principles in a well-defined process 

through joint doctrine....”xiii

i Douglas J. MacIntyre, "Operational Assessment," 

Marine Corps Gazette, (2011), 17-22. ii Robert J. Michael, Robert J. II, "Effective 

Operational Assessment: A Return to the Basics." 

(Naval War College, 2010), 29. 

iii Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations

(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011). 

iv Michael, 29.

v Ibid.

vi Joint Staff, J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfighting. 

Commanders Handbook for Assessment Planning and 

Conclusion 

Assessment is essential to the successful 

execution of planning since the environment 

in which the plan was developed is constantly 

changing. Every operational commander, 

regardless of level, wants and needs to know 

how the command is doing in terms of 

mission accomplishment. The staff should 

develop a method for collecting information 

required to provide the commander an 

assessment recommendation for the 

operation. The operational assessment is the 

commander’s view of how the mission is 

progressing; the commander must make the 

decision to either continue the operation 

according to the current plan or to alter the 

effort in some manner—be that in the tools 

and organizations used to accomplish tasks in 

support of the mission or if the mission must 

be altered.

By building effects and MOEs for each 

objective, commanders can see a direct 

linkage to the tasks they assign to subordinate 

commands. It helps them to determine not 

just if they are doing things right but, more 

importantly, if they are doing the right things. 

Building an assessment on a defined and 

repeatable method adds credibility to the 

process and the product. It also gives the 

Commander confidence in the 

recommendations received from the staff 

before making operational decisions. 

Execution (Suffolk, VA: Department of Defense, 

2011).

vii Ibid.

viii Ibid. ix Clinton R. Clark and Timothy J. Cook, "A Practical 

Approach to Effects-Based Operational Assessment," 

Air & Space Power Journal (2008), 82-99. x United States Joint Forces Command, Design in 

Military Operations: A Primer for Joint Warfighters,

(Suffolk, VA: Department of Defense, 2010). xi Ibid.

xii Michael, 29. xiii Ibid.

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 28
Team Biographies: 

Mr. Michael McGonagle, DAF Civilian. 

Mr. McGonagle is currently serving as 

Technical Director, Joint Planning Support 

Element, Joint Enabling Capabilities 

Command, in US Transportation Command. 

He is a graduate of the US Army Officer 

Candidate School and retired from active 

service in 2000. Mr. McGonagle earned a 

BS in Criminal Justice from the American 

Technological University in 1986 and an MS 

in Strategic and National Security Studies 

from the Naval War College in 2010. Prior 

to his current assignment, Mr. McGonagle 

served as Program Manager for the Global 

Synchronization Tool at US Joint Forces 

Command. 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. 

Chamberlayne, Ph.D., P.E., USA. LTC 

Chamberlayne is currently serving as the 

Program Integration Branch Chief of the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers, HQ 

Department of the Army. He was 

commissioned through ROTC at the Virginia 

Polytechnic Institute and State University 

(VPI&SU) in 1993 with a BS in Civil 

Engineering; he later returned to VPI&SU to 

earn a MS in Civil Engineering (2002) and a 

Ph.D. in Industrial and Systems Engineering 

(2011). Prior to his current assignment, LTC 

Chamberlayne was the District Commander 

of the Charleston District, US Army Corps of 

Engineers. 

Lt Col Rich Collins, USAF. Lt Col Collins 

is currently serving as Commander 682 Air 

Support Operations Squadron, Ft Bragg NC. 

He was commissioned through United States 

Air Force ROTC in 1994. Lt Col Collins 

earned a BS in Aviation Management from 

Southern Illinois University in 1994, and an 

MA in Military Science and Management 

from Trident University in 2007. Prior to his 

current assignment, Lt Col Collins served as 

the Deputy Corps ALO, 18th Air Support 

Operations Group, Ft Bragg NC. 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 29
Mission Command at the Battle of 

Yorktown

By COL Jerry A. Turner, CDR Matthew S. Burton, 

and LTC Gregory S. Trahan

The operational artist who best applies the 

key attributes of mission command—

understanding, intent, and trust—is more 

likely to win the day. The United States 

military is attempting to codify “mission 

command” into joint doctrine and practice. 

To those outside of the military or 

uninformed by history, it may appear that 

mission command is a new concept based on 

modern technology and the complexity of 

the current environment. This is simply a 

matter of presentism and is unjustified. The 

truth is that those great captains, throughout 

history, who have practiced mission 

command, have largely been successful 

while those who have not are largely 

doomed to failure. An analysis of the battle 

of Yorktown, and the application of mission 

command by the generals on both sides of 

the fighting will test this hypothesis. 

The current definition of mission command 

in the Department of Defense simply does 

not accurately depict current thought on 

mission command for the Joint Force. The

definition is overly simplistic: “The conduct 

of military operations through decentralized 

execution based upon mission-type 

orders.”1

This type of oversimplification 

does not get to the heart of mission 

command and provides little understanding. 

In addition to the simple definition, JP 3-31 

does further describes mission command: 

As joint land operations tend to become 

decentralized, mission command becomes 

the preferred method of C2. Mission 

command is the conduct of military 

operations through decentralized execution 

based upon mission-type orders. It 

empowers individuals to exercise judgment 

in how they carry out their assigned tasks 

and it exploits the human element in joint 

operations emphasizing trust, force of will, 

initiative, judgment, and creativity. 

Successful mission command demands that 

subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise 

disciplined initiative, acting aggressively 

and independently to accomplish the 

mission. Orders are focused on the purpose 

of the operation rather than the details of 

how to perform assigned tasks. Essential to 

mission command is the thorough 

knowledge and understanding of the 

commander’s intent at every level of 

command and a command climate of mutual 

trust and understanding. Under mission 

command, commanders issue mission type 

orders, use implicit communications, and 

delegate most decisions to subordinates 

wherever possible.2

Although this is a much better description 

than the DOD definition, the key attributes 

of mission command are buried under an 

avalanche of words and ideas on command 

and control, resources, and sustainment. 

General Martin Dempsey’s White Paper on 

Mission Command more effectively lays out 

the key attributes of mission command. In a 

few pages, General Dempsey describes the 

future operational environment, the 

commander’s role in mission command, the 

key attributes of mission command, how to 

instill mission command, and the way ahead. 

Although all are equally important to 

understanding mission command, it is really 

his discussion of the key attributes of 

mission command that provides the heart of 

understanding: understanding, intent, and 

trust.3 Using these three key attributes of 

mission command, the Battle of Yorktown is 

examined. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 30
Mission Command Among the Allies?

The movements and decisions of the Allies 

(American Colonial, French, and Spanish 

forces) culminating in the strategic allied 

victory at Yorktown effectively illustrate the 

application of the principles of mission 

command. Even without a unified military 

command structure, the ability to conduct 

successful joint operations against the forces 

of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown was 

facilitated by the unity of effort of FrancoAmerican forces.4

 By developing a common 

understanding and shared context of the 

type of engagement for victory against the 

British forces, General Washington, and his 

subordinate leaders, were able to develop a 

clearly defined intent. Coupled with the 

careful development of trust among these 

nations’ military leaders, a time-constrained, 

yet highly successful joint campaign at 

Yorktown and in the waters of the 

Chesapeake Bay and the Virginia Capes

occurred. The success of the allies in 

applying the key attributes of mission 

command allowed the decentralized 

execution of a joint operation, which yielded 

a strategic victory that brought a successful 

end to the American Revolutionary War. 

Understanding

In mission command, a bottom-up and topdown understanding must be obtained 

through a co-creation of the operational 

environment. This shared context will set 

the stage for intent.5

 The Allies worked 

tirelessly in the lead up to Yorktown to 

establish a solid shared understanding of 

their operational environment and 

operational approach to defeating the 

British. Critical to the development of 

understanding was a conscientious effort to 

meet in person, to use letters to inform each 

other of changes in situation, to debate 

strategy, and to converge on an answer that

would ultimately align joint efforts for 

victory. From these deliberations, the Allied 

leadership gained shared context on the 

Necessity of Naval Supremacy, the 

importance of Survival, Timing, and 

Command and Control. 

Necessity of Naval Supremacy. The 

foundations for the Allied victory at 

Yorktown in 1781 were being laid as early 

as 1759 when the French King, upon 

recommendations of his advisors, set out 

upon a strategic investment establishing 

French Naval supremacy. In March of 1759, 

the Duc de Choiseul wrote in a letter to the 

French Ambassador to Sweden, “The true 

balance of power really resides in commerce 

and in America...” and that naval 

supremacy and fighting “the true war, the 

war upon the seas and in America...” was 

the only way to restore French prestige.6 His 

arguments led to an unprecedented 

investment in building a large, capable 

French naval force. The return on this 

investment occurred over two decades later 

when the leaders of the Allied forces 

developed a strategy for victory that was 

completely dependent upon the interruption 

of Britain’s command of the sea off the 

coast of America.

Throughout the first five years of the War, 

the American Revolutionary armies under 

the command of General Washington 

executed a strategy of survival, avoiding 

direct conflict that could result in the 

complete defeat of the fledgling army. 

Washington and his generals had a shared 

understanding that they did not have the 

forces capable of meeting and defeating the 

British in a decisive battle. However, while 

holding these forces together through sheer 

will and sense of purpose, he continually 

sought for the right circumstances to win 

such a decisive battle. Observing the British 

advantage of maneuver because of their 

Campaigning Spring 2015 31
command of the sea, Washington developed 

a contextual position that the Allied armies 

would not prevail until the balance of power 

at sea could be shifted. Washington 

considered naval superiority “as a 

fundamental principle, and the basis upon 

which every hope of success must ultimately 

depend.”7 

General Marquis de Lafayette echoed this 

shared understanding in his reports to Comte 

de Rochambeau, the assigned leader of a 

French expeditionary force of 6,000 soldiers 

being sent to America to fight under the 

direction of General Washington. Lafayette

informed the Count that there would be no 

success until and unless the Allies controlled 

American waters.8

 In 1780 Lafayette wrote

to his French ministers, “Situated and 

disposed as America now is, it is essential to 

the interest as well as the honor of France 

that our flag reign on these seas, that the 

campaign be decisive, and that it begin next 

spring...With naval superiority we can do 

everything, without it we can do 

nothing...With a naval inferiority, it is 

impossible to make war in America.”9 The 

allied leadership agreed that the formula for 

ultimate victory was a decisive battle that

entailed sufficient land forces attacking a 

British Army blocked from escape by the 

sea due to Allied naval superiority. While 

developing a vison for a battle for New York 

that never took place, Washington and his 

generals generated a common understanding 

of how success was to be attained if the 

circumstances presented the right 

opportunity. 

Survival. While diplomatic efforts to obtain 

French and Spanish support continued for 

the first years of the war, General 

Washington’s ability to convince his 

generals that survival of the armies was 

paramount in all engagements enabled the 

Colonial Armies to survive a series of early 

setbacks while obtaining the occasional 

victory against the British. These early 

victories ultimately provided the French and 

Spanish Governments reason to believe the 

Revolution could actually survive and 

succeed. This belief allowed the French and 

Spanish to risk supporting the rebel cause in 

the hopes an American victory would set the 

British Empire back and restore a balance of 

power to Europe. Washington was the 

supreme commander of the colonial armies, 

but it was extremely difficult for him to 

exercise his authority over large distances 

with poor means of communication. As a 

result, his generals exercised a considerable 

amount of independent authority10 based on 

what today is called mission command. 

Setting the example for his generals, 

Washington led multiple daring escapes that 

established the shared “can do” mindset 

among his generals. This mindset ultimately 

proved vital right up until the siege of 

Yorktown, when Lafayette used this mindset 

to avoid a major engagement with superior 

British forces under Lord Cornwallis in 

Virginia, while keeping the British 

landlocked in Yorktown as he awaited the 

combined forces of Washington and 

Rochambeau. As Larrabee stated, “...as 

long as Washington and his army were in 

the field and not dispersed or annihilated, 

the core of the independence movement 

lived and endured; and no amount of British 

victories in detail could add up to a winning 

of the war.”11 This shared principle of 

survival allowed time to present the 

opportunity for a decisive victory to the 

Allied forces.

Time is of the Essence. After over five years 

of war in which the colonial forces had 

survived but attained no comparative 

advantage, the leaders of both the American 

and French forces started realizing that time 

was of the essence. In May and June of 

Campaigning Spring 2015 32
1781, the Count de Rochambeau, General of 

the French armies in America, wrote a 

pivotal series of letters to his colleague, 

Admiral de Grasse, operating his French 

squadron of warships in the Caribbean. In 

these letters, Rochambeau emphasized the 

importance of de Grasse’s timely arrival off 

the East Coast of America and that “the state 

of affairs and the very grave crisis in which 

America, and especially the states of the 

South, finds herself at this particular time. 

The arrival of M. le Comte de Grasse would 

save this situation, all the means in our 

hands are not enough without his joint 

action and the sea superiority which he is 

able to command...that the Americans are at 

the end of their resources...I am quite 

persuaded that you will bring us naval 

superiority....”12 

In late summer, highlighting the importance 

of this critical window of opportunity, 

Rochambeau again described the decisive 

land battle against the British to Admiral de 

Grasse, and emphasized the British 

requirement of naval superiority for any 

chance for success. He offered the Hampton 

Roads region and New York as options from 

which de Grasse could choose to establish 

local maritime superiority and that the 

Allied land forces would act upon this 

decision. In subsequent correspondence 

between de Grasse and the Allied Generals, 

de Grasse made it clear that he could not 

stay one day beyond the end of October 

1781 due to his higher priority obligations in 

the West Indies.13 The stage was now set for 

a window of opportunity from July to 

October of 1781 for a decisive battle either 

in Virginia or New York. This shared 

understanding of the strategic posture of the 

Allied forces facilitated a sense of urgency 

among the Allied leaders to make a decision 

culminating in a battle at Yorktown. 

Command and Control. Following 

significant struggles with Allied command 

and control (C2) during the early years of 

the war, General Washington had 

established a very clear and orderly C2 

structure by 1781. Key to this structure was 

the voluntary subordination of senior, more 

experienced French officers to the command 

of General Washington. Marquis de 

Lafayette emphasized the importance of this 

C2 principle when requesting assistance 

from the French. He asked for “a decided 

naval superiority for the next campaign” and 

pointed out the importance of Rochambeau 

and any other French forces being under 

Washington’s orders without any 

accompanying secret instructions.14

Rochambeau himself made it clear that 

Washington “may do with him what he 

pleased.15 

This clear C2 structure enabled the leaders 

to debate, make decisions and efficiently 

communicate over long distances with slow 

means of communication to obtain shared 

understanding of their overall approach to 

their operations. It also allowed subordinate 

officers and troops to understand clearly 

who the decision makers were, freeing them 

to act when operational decisions were 

made. French and American allies achieved 

harmonious teamwork among their leaders 

in large part due to the way French officers 

of high rank agreed willingly to accept 

orders from generals and admirals to whom 

they were technically superior.16 

Intent

Once the foundation of common 

understanding was established, General 

Washington firmly outlined the 

commander’s intent for operations prior to 

and leading up to the Battle of Yorktown. 

The intent he articulated to his leadership 

was to Survive Until Circumstances 

Campaigning Spring 2015 33
Provided Opportunity for a decisive battle 

and to execute a Model for Victory that was 

essentially firm at a Time and Place as 

circumstances and opportunity allowed. This 

framework of intent enabled his leaders to 

maneuver and utilize their forces both on 

land and at sea in a decentralized manner to 

accomplish his strategic and operational 

objectives.

Survive Until Circumstances Provide 

Opportunity. In General Dempsey’s 

discussion of mission command, he stated, 

“Commanders will be required to 

understand intent to the level of effect; that 

is, strategic to tactical and across 

domains.”17 The Allied forces exemplified 

this understanding of intent during the years 

leading up to and the months directly before 

the Battle of Yorktown. The Allied leaders 

repeatedly had to make tactical decisions to 

avoid major combat, pull out of combat and 

even give up potential tactical victories to 

ensure Survival to accomplish the strategic 

goal of avoiding destruction of the Army 

until a decisive strategic victory could be 

assured. Early in the war, shared 

understanding was attained within the Allied 

force leadership and the intent carried out by 

all of Washington’s generals. This intent 

was executed up to the final skirmishes 

between Lafayette and Cornwallis in 

Virginia in the months leading up to the 

Battle of Yorktown. 

Model for Victory Firm. Mission command 

says that intent provides a “clear and concise 

expression of the purpose of the operation 

and the desired military end state.”18 After 

the first several years of fighting, the Allies 

realized there would be no ultimate victory 

against the superior British forces without 

gaining naval superiority in at least a limited 

region. Washington and his generals decided 

on a Model for Victory that was firm in 

structure but flexible in time and place of 

execution. The Allied intent was to mass a 

land army with siege equipment around a 

British Army that was blocked from escape 

and re-supply from the sea by a superior 

naval force provided by either the French or 

the Spanish. This model was originally 

attempted on a smaller scale in a battle 

where General Washington directed General 

Lafayette in February of 1781 to attempt to 

surround Benedict Arnold’s British Army in 

Hampton Roads. Although this attempt 

failed to trap Arnold’s army due to a failure 

of the French to take command of the sea in 

Chesapeake, it proved to be a dress rehearsal 

for the Battle of Yorktown.19 

Flexible Time and Place. With a firm 

Model for Victory established by the Allied 

leadership, the next key to the ultimate 

strategic victory at Yorktown was ensuring 

the intent maintained flexibility in the Time 

and Place of execution. The prevailing 

thought throughout the war was that a 

decisive battle would be fought against the 

British in New York, a British stronghold. 

Even up until the summer of 1781, General 

Washington was very focused on executing 

his Model for Victory against the British in 

New York. The French general, 

Rochambeau, played a critical role at this 

juncture in the war by convincing 

Washington and the American leadership 

that although the Model for Victory was 

right, they should not focus on New York as 

the place for a decisive battle. In May of 

1781, Rochambeau wrote the first in a series 

of letters that were to change the course of 

history. 

Upon his learning that Lord Cornwallis was 

now in Virginia, he wrote his colleague the 

Count de Grasse about Washington’s plan to 

attack the British in New York once naval 

superiority had been established by the 

French. However, he also highlighted that 

Lord Cornwallis’ Southern army was in 

Campaigning Spring 2015 34
Virginia and that French naval superiority in 

the Chesapeake Bay area may also present 

an option to execute their battle plan in 

Virginia. Ultimately, in his letter to de 

Grasse, Rochambeau gave de Grasse the 

option of where to establish naval 

superiority in lieu of directing him to New 

York.20 This flexibility set the stage for 

Admiral de Grasse to determine where naval 

superiority was most likely attained so the 

land forces could respond and maneuver as 

necessary. Ultimately, although Washington 

was set on a decisive battle in New York up 

until the late summer of 1781, he, too, 

remained flexible to circumstances that 

presented the best opportunity for success. 

His diary on 14 August states,: “Matters 

having now come to a crisis-and a decisive 

plan to be determined on-I was obliged, 

from the shortness of Count de Grasse’s 

promised stay on this coast-the apparent 

disinclination in their naval officers to force 

the harbor of New York...to give up all idea 

of attacking New York” and to mass troops 

in Virginia for an attack on Cornwallis.

21

Trust

General Dempsey rounds out the final 

element of mission command with stating 

that trust informs execution of intent and is 

the moral sinew that binds the force when 

couples with shared understanding and 

intent. In the victory at Yorktown, trust at 

multiple levels proved to be that vital 

element that enabled the shared 

understanding and intent of Washington to 

be realized. 

French Subordination to Washington. The 

willingness of proud and more experienced 

French officers from a major European 

power to subordinate them to the command 

of a young General from an unrecognized 

country rebelling against their colonial 

masters took tremendous trust and strategic 

vision. The French officers’ ability to 

understand the importance of the rebellion 

being led by American officers was an 

essential element of establishing the shared 

understanding of a clear C2 structure for the 

Allied forces.

Superior Officer Subordination to Junior 

Officers. Many cases existed in both the 

American and French forces in which 

superior and more experienced officers 

subordinated themselves to more junior 

officers to accomplish the right team 

dynamics for success. Early in the war this 

caused significant problems for Washington 

within the American army;22 however, 

Washington learned from this and made 

character and trust a key component of his 

selection of officers to serve under his 

command. This selectivity of officers 

created an environment where trust could 

enable senior officers to subordinate 

themselves for the right reasons at the right 

time. Examples of this presented 

themselves within the French forces as well. 

Admiral de Barras, a senior French Officer, 

subordinated himself to Admiral de Grasse 

during the operations in the Chesapeake to 

ensure continuity of the established C2 

structure. De Barras wrote, “No one is more 

interested that I in the arrival of M. de 

Grasse in these seas. He was my junior...As 

soon as I know that he is within reach of this 

place, I shall set sail to serve under 

him....”23 

International Trust. During the early years 

of the Revolution, the French and the 

Spanish stayed on the sidelines waiting to 

see what the American revolutionaries were 

made of and all about. Slowly, through their 

operational approach of Survival, the 

Americans gained the trust of the French 

and the Spanish that their effort was worth 

the risk of inciting British aggression. This 

trust allowed an alliance to be established 

Campaigning Spring 2015 35
which was vital to the success of the 

Americans in their war for independence. 

Other examples of this trust exist which 

enabled the operational maneuvers required 

to obtain the victory at Yorktown. One key 

example was the willingness of the French 

to trust the Spanish navy to protect French 

interests in the Antilles while the French 

navy supported Allied land operations off 

the coast of Virginia.24

Trust in De Grasse—Key to Victory. 

Ultimately, the Key to Victory rested in the 

trust that Rochambeau directly and 

Washington indirectly placed in the Count 

de Grasse. After providing him the intended 

Model for Victory and emphasizing the need 

for more troops and cash, Allied leadership 

trusted de Grasse to make the decision that

maximized the probability of establishing 

conditions for a successful decisive battle. 

The political tact and strategic vision that de 

Grasse displayed resulted in achieving a 

concentration superior to that of the enemy 

at the right time and place. He wrote to 

Washington and Rochambeau that the 

Chesapeake was “the point which appears to 

me to be indicated by you...as the one from 

which the advantage you propose may be 

most certainly attained.”25 He fulfilled this 

trust by establishing naval superiority in the 

Chesapeake by early September, setting the 

conditions prerequisite to the Allied Model 

for Victory. 

Mission Command Among the British

The British defeat at the Battle of Yorktown 

can be attributed to several events of 

“chance” (to borrow from Clausewitz), but 

two were decisive in sealing their fate. The 

first event to ensure the demise of the British 

was the decision by General Cornwallis, in 

direct contravention to the Commander-inChief of the British Army in America, 

General Clinton, was to depart South 

Carolina for Virginia. The second event that

contributed to the American victory was the 

defeat of Vice Admiral Graves, the acting 

commander of the British Fleet by the 

French Admiral De Grasse. While several 

chance events aligned against the British in 

the summer of 1781, both the decision of 

Cornwallis that led him to initiate operations 

in Virginia and the defeat of the British Fleet 

in September 1781 were preventable. 

Infighting and jealousy within the British 

chain of command, political gamesmanship 

within the British Parliament, unquestioned 

assumptions about the nature of the conflict 

with the colonists and poor awareness 

regarding British naval capability all 

conspired against the British ability to 

exercise the elements of mission command. 

Understanding

The Chinese general and philosopher, Sun 

Tzu said, “If you know your enemy and 

know yourself you need not fear the results 

of a thousand battles.” At the strategic and 

operational levels during the British 

expedition to subdue its rebellious colonists, 

they failed to understand their enemy and to 

a lesser extent their capability. 

At the strategic level, the British chain of 

command, key ministers in parliament and 

most notably King George III all 

underestimated colonist resolve to resist the 

British (Larrabee). The king found it 

inconceivable that the nascent Continental 

Army and colonial militia could withstand 

the British Army. King George III 

perpetuated group think of British primacy 

in any engagement with the fledgling 

colonial forces within his closest advisors. 

The king fostered the misunderstanding of 

colonial determination and capability by 

selecting and elevating to positions of 

authority only those who agreed with the 

king’s perception.26 The nepotistic method 

of selecting ministers, generals, and 

Campaigning Spring 2015 36
admirals favorable to the crown deprived 

King George III and the British Government 

of leaders capable of orchestrating a 

complex strategy and limited dissenting 

opinion about the prosecution of the war. 

Notable examples of where the criteria of 

agreeing with the king’s strategic direction 

were placed above capability were the 

selection of Lord Frederick North as First 

Minister and Lord Sandwich as the Minister 

of the Admiralty. In the case of Lord North 

as First Minister, he was intrinsically unable 

to compel the other ministers of the British 

Government to work in any concerted way 

toward achieving victory in the colonies.27

Larrabee states, “Given North’s personal 

qualities, his well-known indolence, his 

conciliatory disposition, his disinclination to 

make decisions,” the result was a fatal 

amount of sheer inaction at a time when 

action was imperative.” 

Nowhere did the elevation of the “Kings 

Friends” do so much damage as the 

selection of Lord Sandwich as Minister of 

the Admiralty. Under Lord Sandwich’s 

administration the British Navy languished, 

“Offices were bought, stores were stolen, 

and worst of all, ships unseaworthy and 

inadequately equipped, were sent to fight the 

battles of their country.”28 In addition to his 

administrative mismanagement, Lord 

Sandwich misrepresented the readiness and 

capability of the British Navy to his fellow 

ministers, allowing those responsible for 

directing the war to develop an overinflated 

sense of British naval strength. This

incomplete understanding of British naval 

strength facilitated the formulation of a 

flawed strategy. This flawed strategy was 

based on the belief that the colonial ports 

could be isolated from trade with other 

European powers, notably the French and 

Spanish. Lord Sandwich contested Lord 

Germain’s, the British Secretary of State for 

the Colonies and then American Affairs, 

strategic vision for the employment of the 

British Navy. Lord Germain wanted Lord 

Sandwich to direct the navy to contest 

French naval operations before they made it 

to the Atlantic. Lord Sandwich believed 

Lord Germain’s proposed course of action 

left the British coastline vulnerable and 

refused to direct the British Navy to engage 

the French until its ships were of no threat to 

Britain.29

Compounding the compilation of sycophants 

at the strategic level to manage the conduct 

of the war with the colonies was the manner 

in which strategy was developed. 

Ultimately, strategic direction emanated 

from King George III. Undermining the 

development of a strategy capable of 

defeating the colonists was the weekly 

consultations between the king and from his 

ministers. The consultations were routinely 

discussed with each minister individually 

instead of in a concerted manner so that all 

ministers understood the current situation 

and strategic direction.30 The manner in 

which ministers were selected and the 

method in which strategy was developed 

provided considerable friction against shared 

understanding at the strategic level that also 

hindered understanding at the operational 

level.

Nowhere was the lack of shared 

understanding of the Allied situation more 

evident than when juxtaposed with the 

British situation, specifically the chasm that 

existed between General Cornwallis, 

commander of the British Army in the 

South, and General Clinton. In fact, it is the 

very lack of operational level understanding 

that contributed to General Cornwallis’ 

decision to depart the Carolinas for Virginia. 

In the spring of 1781, Cornwallis and his 

army were recovering from their battle at 

Guilford Court House in Wilmington, North 

Campaigning Spring 2015 37
Carolina, a victory that exacted a hefty toll 

on the British forces. Far from believing that 

the colonists had been defeated in the South, 

Cornwallis could not force colonial forces 

under General Greene to a decisive battle. 

He believed Greene’s forces were receiving 

considerable support from the North, 

particularly from Virginia. Furthermore, 

Cornwallis believed the terrain in South 

Carolina favored Greene and his forces 

whereas Virginia, with its many rivers, was 

ideal to support land operations by the 

British Army. Additionally, Cornwallis 

believed that a victory in Virginia would 

prevent General Washington from 

reinforcing the South. 

These factors constituted General 

Cornwallis’ understanding of the operational 

picture in April 1781 and were considerably 

different from how General Clinton viewed 

the situation from his headquarters in New 

York.31 Cornwallis wrote in a letter to 

General Phillips in Virginia: “If we mean an 

offensive war in America, we must abandon 

New York and bring our whole force into 

Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, 

and a successful battle may give us 

America.”32

General Clinton expected Cornwallis to 

maintain control of South Carolina and 

specifically the Port of Charleston to isolate 

the South. General Clinton understood 

Georgia and South Carolina had not 

completely been pacified by the British 

victory at Charleston and Virginia supported 

partisan operations in South Carolina. To 

this end, General Clinton dispatched General 

Phillips and General Arnold to disrupt 

Virginia’s efforts to support South Carolina 

and prevent Washington from dispatching 

Continentals from the North to degrade 

General Cornwallis operations. 

Fundamentally, General Clinton disagreed 

that a decisive battle with the colonists could 

be achieved in the Chesapeake, calling 

Virginia “the graveyard of armies” and 

supposing a complete British defeat in the 

region.

33 Clinton saw as the primary threat 

the combined forces of Washington and 

Rochambeau in New York along with de 

Barras in Rhode Island. Clinton foresaw a 

decisive battle against the allies in New 

York and failing that a combined land and 

sea engagement against Philadelphia.34

The disjointed understanding of the 

operational environment added a layer of 

misunderstanding at the strategic level. Prior 

to departing Charleston and installing 

General Cornwallis as commander in the 

South, General Clinton authorized 

Cornwallis to communicate directly with 

Lord Germain.35 This direct communication 

between a subordinate commander with 

civilian authority separate from the 

commander-in-chief contributed to a lack of 

unity of command which prevented clear 

articulation and understanding of intent from 

the strategic down to the operational level.

Intent

If it was not written or explicitly 

communicated, it is certain that most British 

ground and sea operational commanders 

understood the intent to defeat the Colonial 

Army was the strategic end state that would 

bring the American Revolution to an end on 

British terms. It is questionable whether or 

not within the British command structure of 

the late 18th century whether there was an 

overarching vision of how to deal a decisive 

blow to the colonists. The British lacked an 

articulated clear intent from the strategic to 

the operational level that meant tactical 

actions would likely never be tied to the 

strategic end state of bringing the American 

colonies to yield to British authority. The 

command arrangement from the British 

Campaigning Spring 2015 38
Secretary of State to the army and navy and 

poor communication between General 

Cornwallis and General Clinton specifically 

inhibited articulation of clear intent in the 

summer of 1781. This poor communication, 

perhaps more than any other factor, led to 

the events culminating in British defeat at 

Yorktown. 

For any sustained operation in the American 

colonies, the British were dependent upon 

their connection back to England by sea. 

Naval power was a critical capability for the 

British, and it was the means by which the 

Army conducted operational maneuver, was 

supplied and reinforced. Most importantly, 

the navy had the critical responsibility of 

isolating the colonies from outside sources 

of support. However, the command 

arrangement employed by the British during 

the prosecution of the American Revolution 

did not reflect this critical link between the 

army and navy. The navy took its strategic 

direction from the Minister of the 

Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, and the Army 

from the Secretary of State in America, Lord 

Germain. In the American theater of war, no 

formal command authority existed between 

the Army and Navy to ensure each of their 

efforts were harmonized to achieve the 

strategic end state. The commander-in-chief 

directed the ground forces and the chief of 

the North America naval forces directed 

naval operations. The two commanders only 

once operated in a concerted effort and that 

during the battle of Charleston and 

“forthwith proceeded to quarrel furiously 

and for many months afterward.”36 Given 

the Army’s dependence on the Navy, what 

was required was an operational commander 

with authority to direct both the ground and 

naval forces jointly. 

Despite the ground and naval forces working 

independently, General Clinton convoluted 

his unity of command by authorizing 

General Cornwallis to communicate directly 

with Lord Germain in England. Lord 

Germain, perhaps spurred on by the belief in 

the superiority of British forces on the 

battlefield, desperately desired General 

Clinton to take offensive action. In the 

spring and summer of 1781, General Clinton 

was reluctant to initiate such an operation 

believing that New York would be retaken 

by General Washington’s forces. In late July 

1781, Lord Germain ordered General 

Clinton “that no troops were to be 

withdrawn from Virginia and that the main 

operation was to be an advance through that 

colony.”37 It is unlikely Germain would 

have given General Clinton those 

instructions had Cornwallis not been 

corresponding separately with him. 

General Clinton’s direction to General 

Cornwallis lacked a clear vision of how he 

saw the prosecution of the war. In May 

1780, after the fall of Charleston and reports 

of a French Fleet underway for America, 

Clinton departed Charleston for New York 

issuing Cornwallis the following order: 

 “To regard the safety of Charleston and 

the tranquility of South Carolina as the 

principal and indispensable objects of his 

attention. Only when those goals had been 

reached, and in a proper season of the year, 

was His Lordship at liberty, if he judged 

proper, to make a solid move into North 

Carolina.”38

In the aftermath of the British victory at 

Guilford Court House in March 1781, 

General Cornwallis had not heard from 

General Clinton regarding any concerted 

operations the army should undertake.39

General Cornwallis wrote to General 

Clinton regarding his desire to begin a new 

campaign in Virginia. General Clinton’s 

response back to Cornwallis was deferential 

regarding his intent for Cornwallis’ Army to 

be used to pacify South Carolina. General 

Clinton’s tone and tenor of his 

Campaigning Spring 2015 39
correspondence seemed to elevate General 

Cornwallis to that of an equal rather than a 

subordinate commander.40 The lack of clear 

intent by General Clinton left open for 

interpretation by General Cornwallis 

whether to proceed with a Virginia 

campaign. 

In June 1781, General Clinton’s direction to 

Cornwallis became even more convoluted 

and desperate. General Clinton was made 

aware of a possible combined offensive 

against New York by the combined 

American and French Army supported by a 

French Fleet. General Clinton sent General 

Cornwallis four letters with conflicting 

orders between June 8 and June 19.41 As 

before, General Clinton’s direction to 

Cornwallis was differential regarding these 

latest orders and provided no clear intent 

regarding the British Army in the South. 

Trust

General Dempsey states that “Building trust 

with subordinates and partners may be the 

most important action a commander will 

perform.”42 The nature of the relationships 

within the British command acted as a 

countervailing force toward any positive 

momentum achieved. Larrabee put it, “the 

principal reasons that England failed to 

subdue her rebellious American colonists 

was the internecine strife that prevailed 

among her principal commanders on both 

land and the sea.”43

Nowhere did the lack of trust manifest itself 

more clearly than in the relationship 

between Cornwallis and Clinton. The 

antipathy between the two generals began 

almost immediately when Cornwallis was 

installed as Clinton’s subordinate. Clinton 

found out that Cornwallis possessed a letter 

from Lord Germain he would eventually 

succeed Clinton as commander-in-chief. 

According to Germain, the intent of the 

letter was to prevent a German General from 

assuming the role of commander-in-chief. 

The fact that Germain had communicated 

his preference for the next commander-inchief without consulting Clinton was an 

insult. The matter proved an embarrassment 

to Cornwallis as well. Clinton noted that 

after the incident Cornwallis only visited 

Clinton headquarters when it was necessary. 

Clinton feared he would be relieved by 

Germain for the smallest mistake and 

became even more cautious in his actions. 

Clinton was hesitant to issue decisive orders 

to Cornwallis fearing that if the matter 

turned out badly, he would have to defend 

his actions from Germain.

Lord Germain contributed to a general lack 

of trust with General Clinton through his 

constant directives for troop movements and 

the initiation of campaigns. As General 

Dempsey explains, the relationship between 

providing direction and trusting subordinates 

“will be required to clearly translate their 

intent to their subordinates and trust them to 

perform with responsible initiative in 

complex, fast-changing, chaotic 

circumstances.”44 In May 1779, frustrated 

with the constant direction from Germain, 

Clinton fired off a letter stating, “For God’s 

sake, my Lord, if you wish me to do 

anything, leave me to myself, and let me 

adapt my efforts to the hourly 

circumstances.”45

The lack of trust between Germain and 

Clinton and Clinton and Cornwallis most 

directly contributed to the British defeat at 

Yorktown. Those relationships were part of 

a larger system of patronage that pitted 

officers against one another for favoritism 

from the British aristocracy. Officers in the 

navy and army would rise to increasing 

levels of responsibility not so much for their 

military prowess as their connection and 

Campaigning Spring 2015 40
favoritism, either by birth or marriage within 

the aristocracy. Another factor contributing 

to the lack of trust within the British military 

was that frequently a commander would be 

court-martialed for loss in a battle. If there 

were any question regarding the 

commander’s courage, competence or 

adherence to the strict instructions for naval 

combat a subordinate or superior could level 

charges against the responsible commander. 

Both the method of promotion and potential 

ramifications for losing in battle created an 

underlying level of mistrust in the British 

military.

Comparison of Allied and British Mission 

Command

In comparing the Allied and British 

operations through the lens of mission 

command, one cannot help but interpret that 

the French and American forces enjoyed 

significantly more shared understanding, 

clear intent and trust. The combined French 

and American Forces understood the 

necessity of naval supremacy, the survival 

of the American Army, the critical nature of 

time and the importance of a clear command 

relationship. The British, on the other hand, 

were hampered by an overestimation of the 

capabilities of their land and naval forces, 

the resolve of the colonialists, the nature of 

1 Joint Publication (JP) 3-31: “Command and 

Control for Joint Land Operations” (Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 2014) GL-7. 2 JP 3-31, 3. 3 Martin Dempsey, White Paper on Mission 

Command (Washington, DC, Chairman Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 2012), 1-4. 4 Robert W. Coakley and Stetson Conn, The War of 

the American Revolution (Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, United States Army, 1975), 79.

5 Dempsey, 5.

6 Harold A. Larrabee, Decision at the Chesapeake 

(New York: Charles N. Potter, 1964), 70. 

7 Ibid, 78-79. 8 Ibid, 78.

9 Ibid, 80.

the conflict with the colonies, and how to 

achieve victory. General Washington 

established clear intent for his subordinates 

that were fairly well executed by his 

operational and tactical commanders. 

Washington stressed the survival of the 

Army and that the revolution would not 

continue should the Army suffer a decisive 

defeat. Secondly, Washington developed a 

model to defeat the British that proved 

effective at the battle of Yorktown. Intent 

within the British Army was challenged due 

to a command relationship that prevented 

naval and ground forces from working in 

concert, micromanagement of tactical 

actions by strategic leaders, and poor 

directives from the British commander-inchief to subordinate commanders. Finally, 

the level of French and American trust in 

comparison to the British was substantial 

and perhaps more than any of the other 

elements of mission command led to the 

American victory at Yorktown. 

 

10 Ibid, 89. 11 Ibid, 89. 12 Ibid, 152-153. 13 Ibid, 262. 14 Ibid, 80. 15 Ibid, 82. 16 Ibid, 249. 17 Dempsey, 5. 18 Ibid, 5.

19 Larrabee, 130-131. 20 Ibid, 243-244. 21 Ibid, 252. 22 George F. Scheer, Military History of the American 

Revolution, “Washington and His Lieutenants: Some 

Problems in Command,” Department of History and 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 41
Association of Graduates, United States Air Force 

Academy (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1974), 139-140. 23 Larrabee, 250. 24 Ibid, 156. 25 Ibid, 154. 26 Ibid, 23. 27 Ibid, 27. 28 Ibid, 38.

29 Ibid, 42. 30 Ibid, 34. 31 Ibid, 114-124. 32 Franklin Wickwire and Mary Wickwire, 

Cornwallis: The American Adventure (Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 319.

33 Larrabee, 127 – 128. 34 Ibid, 127. 35 Ibid, 112. 36 Ibid, 98. 37 Ibid, 138. 38 Ibid, 109.

39 Ibid, 127. 40 Ibid, 130-135. 41 Ibid, 137. 42 Dempsey, 6. 43 Larrabee, 44. 44 Dempsey, 5. 45 Larrabee, 98.

Team Biographies 

Colonel Jerry Turner, USA. COL Turner 

entered the Army in 1986. He has served in 

positions from Scout to Section Sergeant. 

He received his commission through the 

Green to Gold program at the University of 

Texas at El Paso in 1994. His past 

assignments include Scout Platoon Leader, 

Troop Executive Officer, Squadron 

Maintenance Officer, Brigade S1, and 

Company and Troop Commander. After 

attending the Command and General Staff 

College he served as Division Planner, 

Squadron S3 and Brigade S3 prior to 

assuming command of the 3rd Squadron 4th 

U.S. Cavalry. COL Turner earned a 

Bachelor of Arts degree majoring in 

Political Science from the University of 

Texas at El Paso and a Master of Arts in 

Military Studies from the Air Command and 

Staff College. His military education 

includes the Armor Officer Basic and 

Advanced Courses, Scout Platoon Leader 

Course, and the Air Force Command and 

General Staff College. He has had tours of 

combat in Haiti,Kosovo, BosniaHerzegovina, Iraq, and Afganistan. 

Commander Seth Burton, USN. A 1994 

graduate of the University of Alabama in 

Huntsville with a degree in Chemical 

Engineering, CDR Burton reported in 1996 

for his first at-sea duty aboard USS 

JEFFERSON CITY (SSN 759) in San 

Diego, California. In 2005, he was assigned 

to Freiburg, Germany to study as an 

Olmsted Scholar in International Relations 

at the Albert Ludwig’s University of 

Freiburg. Following completion of studies 

in Freiburg, CDR Burton reported to the 

USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750) as 

Executive Officer in 2007, and subsequently 

served in position of Executive Officer of 

the Tactical Readiness Evaluation Team at 

Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic 

Fleet in Norfolk, VA. From January 2012 to 

August 2014, CDR Burton served as 

Commanding Officer of USS SCRANTON

(SSN-756). 

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Trahan, USA. 

LTC Trahan is an Infantry officer with over 

twenty years of service and has commanded 

at the O-5 level. He has served at multiple 

Joint and operational commands conducting 

contingency and campaign operations. 

Lieutenant Colonel Trahan is currently 

serving as an Observer / Trainer assigned to 

the Joint Staff J7, Deployable Training 

Division. In his capacity as an Observer / 

Trainer, Lieutenant Colonel Trahan 

participates and provides feedback to 

combatant commands on staff process 

associated with Joint Operations.

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 42
Weaponizing Social Media: 

What We Can Learn From Our 

Adversaries

By CDR Christopher Hill, Lt Col Ryan White, and 

MAJ Kevin Thaxton

During their spring 2014 invasion of Iraq, 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

manipulated social media like no other 

terrorist organization. They employed an 

array of slick anti-Western videos, timephased beheadings to instill terror, and 

global on-line recruiting. As they

advanced on Mosul, Iraq, they saturated 

the Internet with more than 40,000 tweets 

in one day,1 drawing immediate support 

from radicalized youth and condemnation 

from the free world. Their command of 

social media to inflate terror and recruit 

was nothing short of superb, not to 

mention that they did this while seizing 

half of Iraq. 

ISIS’s success raises questions about 

America’s ability to strike back in the 

social media battle space. Specifically, 

how did the United States let ISIS 

dominate social media? And what is the 

United States doing to prevent it from 

happening again? The answers to these 

questions are key because the United 

States should expect future terrorists—

indeed, any future adversary—to use 

social media as part of their battle plan. 

The Chinese government is years ahead 

on this point. With an army of low-paid 

social media manipulators2

 and a worldclass cyber and propaganda machine,3 the 

Chinese government waged a massive 

social media war against Hong Kong’s 

Umbrella Revolution, introducing a 

variety of new techniques not previously 

seen. From a U.S. perspective, there is 

much to be learned from ISIS and 

Chinese social media tactics. Notably, the 

United States is losing the social media 

arms race and needs to master some of its 

adversary’s tactics to seize the initiative. 

The United States must pursue a 

comprehensive social media strategy to 

collect intelligence, infiltrate adversary 

organizations, and communicate a 

strategic message.

A thorough analysis of social media 

warfare by ISIS and the Chinese in 2014 

reveals five core maxims for social media 

war fighting. First, censorship rarely 

works; second, social media provides 

good intelligence; third, social media will 

become increasingly resistant to 

intrusion; fourth, social media enables 

individuals to threaten nations; and fifth, 

if done right, social media can influence 

target audiences. To seize the initiative, 

therefore, the United States needs to 

incorporate these maxims into three 

wings of social media warfare: 

intelligence collection, infiltration, and 

strategic messaging.

ISIS Social Media Warfare 

The 2014 social media battle in Syria and 

Iraq was a seminal event in modern 

warfare. As Defense Secretary Hagel 

noted, “This is beyond anything we have 

seen.”4 For the first time in history, 

individual ISIS fighters documented their 

exploits in unfiltered real time, providing 

detailed information on what was 

happening on the ground.5 Defense 

Secretary Hagel was particularly 

impressed with ISIS’s use of social media 

“to increase its global profile and attract 

tens of thousands of fighters.”6 

To be sure, most modern terrorist groups 

use social media to promote their aims. 

They no longer need television 

intermediaries to broadcast their 

information – they simply publish it 

directly on social media within minutes. 

What separated ISIS from others was 

Campaigning Spring 2015 43
their sophisticated information campaign 

involving high-end, audio-visual 

marketing, and their ability to manipulate 

social media to inflate their message. 

Prior to their advance on Iraq, ISIS 

launched a media branch called Al-Hayat 

Media to target Western and non-Arabic 

audiences through social media. Al-Hayat 

Media produced videos, speeches, and 

images in multiple languages and placed 

them on a variety of social media 

networking sites to avoid censorship. 

When their Twitter accounts were shut 

down, they simply created new Twitter 

accounts or used other free social media 

venues such as Archive.org or Justpaste.it 

to get their message out. 7

 Notably, not all 

ISIS media content was intended to shock 

the West or to highlight their fighting 

credentials. They also projected 

themselves as capable governors with 

professional-quality videos and images of 

fighters helping children, aiding the 

infirm, and handing out ice cream cones. 8 

During their June 2014 advance on 

Mosul, ISIS encouraged supporters to 

download their Arabic-language Twitter 

app, The Dawn of Glad Tidings. This app 

allowed ISIS to post news content, such 

as audio and video clips, on the personal 

Twitter accounts of its entire subscriber 

base. To avoid triggering Twitter spam 

detection, content was metered out at 

careful intervals. Eventually, the content 

would start to “trend,” which, as a unique 

social media phenomenon, increases the 

chance that it will achieve a “viral” 

condition and gain greater exposure. This 

technique enabled ISIS get out 40,000 

tweets in one day.9

 ISIS also organized 

hashtag campaigns to train supporters on 

how to make their content trend and pop 

up on trend-tracking websites, such as 

@ActiveHashtags, which likewise results 

in even more retweets.10 To counter 

enemy intrusion, they even produced a 

training guide to help supporters maintain 

operations security with instructions on 

how to remove metadata from tweets and 

avoid photographs that would identify 

their location.11 

With viral content and battlefield success, 

ISIS was probed by thousands of 

interested young radicals. On sites such 

as Ask.fm, ISIS members interacted with 

potential recruits to answer questions 

covering everything from what socks to 

wear in battle to what flights to take to 

get into Syria.12 By September 2014, 

these techniques yielded more than 

15,000 foreign fighters from 80 nations;13

and as the United States led strikes 

against them, ISIS recruiters were still 

able to enlist as many as 1,000 foreigners 

per month.14 Never before had social 

media been used to replenish troop 

strength on the battlefield.

Chinese Social Media Warfare

As the United States fought ISIS, another 

social media battle emerged in Hong 

Kong. One of the most technologically 

advanced cities in the world, Hong Kong 

has a vibrant Internet culture with data 

cables and wireless routers that—unlike 

those on the mainland—are typically not 

under the direct control of the 

government. On one side were members 

of the Umbrella Revolution who 

harnessed smart phones to organize 

protests and report their progress to 

audiences in China and the world. On the 

other side was the Chinese government, 

whose sophisticated counter-information 

apparatus was controlled by a cadre of 

more than two million operators who 

regularly monitor and manipulate the 

Internet in support of the Communist 

Party.15 

2 

Campaigning Spring 2015 44
Hong Kong’s Internet culture is not 

entirely free from government control. 

Although China’s constitution permits 

freedom of speech and the press, its 

media regulations have been amended to 

punish those whose news content 

endangers the country.16 China also 

requires anyone wishing to post on 

China’s main social media networks to 

register with real names so that users, in 

essence, can be tracked, fined, or arrested 

for posting unfavorable content.17

In 2014, the Chinese government 

censored networks in Hong Kong and the 

mainland using bandwidth throttling, 

keyword filtering, and website 

blocking.18 Search words like Tiananmen, 

Hong Kong, or Occupy Central were 

either blocked or rerouted to sites 

favorable to the Communist Party.19 And 

as the protests picked up steam, the 

Chinese government blocked highly 

popular social media sites such as Sina 

Weibo, Instagram, and Flikr.20 Activists 

fought back through the use of mobile 

messaging apps such as WeChat since 

these apps effectively exist outside the 

Internet. Indeed, in recent years, mobile 

messaging apps have evolved to include 

group chat, video conferencing, and 

content sharing.21 The Chinese were able 

to block access to these, too, by 

eliminating activist user accounts, so 

many activists simply switched to another 

app called FireChat, a product developed 

by the San Francisco-based company 

Open Garden. FireChat incorporates 

Bluetooth technology and Apple Multipeer Connectivity Framework, 

connecting phones without a cellular 

network or Internet connectivity.22 The 

only drawback of FireChat is that it lacks 

encryption so it is still susceptible to 

Chinese government monitoring. 

Chinese government infiltration was also 

common. In June 2014, they initiated 

“bomb-scare” tactics during a Hong Kong 

vigil commemorating the 25th anniversary 

of Tiananmen. By creating fake Twitter 

accounts and posing as activists, Chinese 

infiltrators posted a police report 

declaring that six terrorists had just 

escaped from a prison and were heading 

into Hong Kong. Meanwhile, another 

false activist posted that he was at the 

vigil and saw an individual fitting a fake 

suspect’s description. His post was 

retweeted 315 times by a number of other 

Twitter accounts of dubious origin—all 

likely created by Chinese government 

infiltrators.23 While this particular tactic 

failed to stop the vigil, it is impossible to 

know the extent of Chinese government 

infiltration throughout the Umbrella 

Revolution, although this example does 

demonstrate Chinese government intent. 

Cyber warfare and social media warfare 

also converged in this online war. Aware 

that protesters had a tendency to 

download software to circumvent 

censorship, the Chinese government 

targeted several iPhone users with a virus 

that steals text messages, photos, call 

logs, passwords and other data. 

Masquerading as a regular software 

download for mobile messaging apps, the 

virus was injected by an email phishing 

scam. 24 Even now, countless phones are 

likely providing data back to the Chinese 

government. 

Despite continuous censorship and deep 

infiltration by the Chinese government, 

the Umbrella Revolution activists 

mobilized, coordinated activities, and 

gained support from people outside of 

China. In one notable case, the activists 

even used drones to produce videos for 

social media to illustrate the sheer size of 

their protests to a global audience.25

3 

Campaigning Spring 2015 45
Altogether, this battle demonstrated a 

number of emerging tactics—to include 

covert accounts, viruses, subterfuge, and 

digital countermeasures—which any state 

or non-state actor can expect to encounter 

when it goes to battle in the social media 

domain. 

Five Maxims for Social Media Warfare

These two social media battles reveal five 

core maxims that explain today’s social 

media warfare paradigm (Table 1). 

Table 1. Maxims for Social Media Warfare

1. Censorship is rarely effective. Due to 

technological advancements—often 

produced by American companies—it 

increasingly possible to circumvent 

tactics such as bandwidth throttling, IP 

blocking, wireless blackouts, and 

firewalls. When blocked from access to 

one social media venue, users move to 

another. When blocked from access to the 

internet, users move to wireless-enabled 

mobile messaging. Encountering blocked 

cellular networks, users move to 

Bluetooth. 

Notably, the United States private sector 

is the world’s largest producer of anticensorship technology. For example, 

when Twitter and YouTube deleted the 

beheading video of journalist James 

Foley, ISIS simply switched to a more 

secure social media site called 

Diaspora—a social media site created in 

2010 by New York University students 

concerned about Facebook privacy 

issues.26 There are also a number of nongovernmental organizations that build 

apps to hoodwink repressive regimes. 

The Guardian Project, for instance, is one 

private organization that creates free 

software for mobile devices to help 

individuals “communicate more freely” 

and to protect them “from intrusion and 

monitoring.”27 Despite the fact that The 

Guardian Project receives unspecified 

funding from the U.S. State 

Department,28 they are adamant about not 

creating back-door technology that would 

allow for government intrusion. 

Still, censorship—both comprehensive 

and limited—will, if anything, 

temporarily slow down social media use, 

but such tactics guarantee an acceleration 

of new countermeasures, or worse, inhibit 

good intelligence collection. 

2. Social media provides good 

intelligence. The United States, through 

dedicated collection and analysis of social 

media networks, can not only track what 

adversaries are saying on open-source 

social media, but may be able to predict 

human behavior. According to recent 

news reporting, there are several nascent 

efforts to exploit this concept. For 

example, in early 2012, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started 

development on a social media 

monitoring capability—described as a 

"geospatial alert and analysis mapping 

application"—to predict future events.29

Elements of the Department of Defense 

(DoD) use “population-centric” 

technology to provide “global and 

persistent indications and warnings 

capability that complements and 

enhances conventional sensors.”30 The 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Open 

Source Center even has a dedicated staff 

of several hundred “Ninja Librarians” 

1. Censorship is rarely effective 

2. Social media provides good intelligence

3. Social media will become increasingly 

resistant to intrusion

4. Social media enables individuals to 

threaten nations

5. Social media can influence target 

audiences

4 

Campaigning Spring 2015 46
who scour social media for intelligence.31

The CIA also has been known to partner 

with marketing companies like Attensity 

to analyze the entire Twitter network and 

evaluate “sentiments, hot spots, trends, 

actions, intent.”32 

The bottom line is social media provides 

a wealth of information on people, 

networks, and intent, but as demonstrated 

in recent social media wars, not all of its 

content is expected to remain open source 

indefinitely.

3. Social media will become 

increasingly resistant to intrusion.

Advances in encryption technology for 

mobile devices, mobile messaging apps, 

and traditional social media sites will 

increasingly disrupt intelligence 

collection efforts. Recently, FBI Director 

James Comey noted that his department 

is “struggling to keep up with the 

changing technology and to maintain our 

ability to actually collect the 

communications we are authorized to 

collect."33 This trend is likely to impact 

other United States intelligence agencies 

as well. 

Another way to get around technology is 

to compel private social media 

corporations to disable the accounts of 

offenders or to provide information on 

terrorist social media accounts.

34

However, these efforts have largely been 

futile since the material that needs to be 

blocked may have already gone viral—

having already leapt to other social media 

sites—or the perpetrator may have 

switched to a new account under a 

different name.35 Thus, much of the 

terrorist’s online information operations 

go unchecked; or his tactical plans end up 

locked inside an encrypted mobile device 

network. 

4. Social media enables individuals to 

threaten nations. Not all nefarious social 

media activity is a threat to the United 

States, but some of it is. As discussed, 

social media is used by individuals and 

groups as a tactical tool to organize local 

events, whether they are battlefield 

maneuvers or protest vigils. It is also used 

as a strategic messaging platform to 

radicalize populations, fundraise, and 

recruit thousands of fighters. Especially 

dangerous are hackers who blend cyberwarfare expertise with social media. In 

2013, for instance, the Syrian Electronic 

Army sent malware in a “phishing” email 

to members of the Associated Press and 

gained access to an account. On the main 

Associated Press Twitter page they sent a 

tweet to more than two million followers 

that said, “Breaking: Two Explosions in 

the White House and Barack Obama is 

injured.” Within three minutes, the Dow 

lost $136 Billion, but quickly recovered 

after it was determined that the tweet was 

fake.36 

The challenge for the United States is to 

balance passive intelligence collection on 

these threats—which effectively allows 

adversaries to continue radicalizing, 

recruiting, and coordinating activities—

with adopting Chinese-style tactics to go 

after threats by either shutting down 

individual accounts and servers or by 

infiltrating social media networks with 

undercover agents.37 At present, the 

balance leans towards intelligence 

collection.

5. Social media can influence target 

audiences. Social media sites bombard 

users with endless news, humor, 

advertisements, and the day-to-day 

musings of friends. To break through the 

noise and influence viewers, strategic 

messengers must follow certain rules. 

First, they must have the ability to 

5 

Campaigning Spring 2015 47
connect globally. This requires a 

multilingual staff, the ability to produce 

high-quality content quickly, a strong 

presence on a variety of social media sites 

(including thousands of “friends”), and 

the technical ability to make a message 

go viral. 

Second, once connected, the messengers 

must choose the audience they can 

realistically expect to influence. For 

example, ISIS did not expect the West to 

rally to its side; although, they did hope 

to inspire Western radicals to help fight. 

Similarly, the United States government 

cannot expect to meaningfully change the 

minds of radical ISIS sympathizers, but 

they might be able to have an impact on 

Middle Easterners who are increasingly 

fed up with extremist activity.38 A 

messenger’s credibility also matters 

because it increases the chance his 

content will be viewed, and thus enables 

the messenger to communicate ideas 

which resonate within a target audience. 

The United States, for example, is not 

likely to achieve widespread success in 

changing radicalized minds because it 

lacks credibility in most Middle East and 

North African countries.39 Local imams 

and religious leaders, however, might be 

more effective. 

The third way to influence the targeted 

audience is to ensure that the message 

elicits an emotional reaction. Highquality videos and images that either 

shock or inspire are, according to studies, 

more likely to be shared and gain viral 

traction,40 and therefore more likely to 

incite action. ISIS was exceptional in this 

regard.

 

An American Style of Social Media 

Warfare 

An American-style social media fight 

should focus primarily on three wings of 

social media warfare: intelligence 

collection, infiltration, and strategic 

messaging. Success depends not only on 

understanding the five maxims listed 

above, but also on discarding techniques 

that conflict with American values. 

Censorship as a fourth wing, for example, 

is out of the question. Not only is it 

ineffectual (Maxim 1); it is also violates 

freedom of expression. 

Intelligence Collection. The U.S. 

intelligence community has made modest 

strides in exploiting the data resident in 

open-source social media streams, and is 

even making progress on the production 

of algorithms that can predict future 

events. Indeed, the intelligence available 

in social media is quite good (Maxim 2). 

As noted in Maxim 3, however, it will 

become increasing difficult to access noninternet social media forums, such as 

mobile messaging apps, due to advances 

in encryption technology and the creation 

of other non-internet-based social media 

networks. These challenges are a problem 

domestically, as noted by the FBI, and a 

problem for the broader U.S. intelligence 

community. 

Infiltration. One way to get around 

encryption (Maxim 3) is to infiltrate 

social media with undercover on-line 

personas and to make “friends” with 

adversaries (Maxim 4). Agencies such as 

the FBI, CIA, and DoD require this 

capability, not only for passive 

intelligence collection and early warning 

(Maxim 2), but to potentially influence 

human behavior (Maxim 5) – that is, if 

they can establish a large enough 

presence and friend base. There have 

been a number of attempts to do this, but 

the overall scope and lessons learned are 

6 

Campaigning Spring 2015 48
not yet known. The FBI retains a number 

of online undercover employees, for 

example, who evidently befriend and nab 

potential terrorists in the United States.41 

The Agency for International 

Development (USAID) even developed a 

“Cuban Twitter” on mobile messaging 

apps—distributed through non-U.S. front 

companies—which Cubans can use to 

share news and avoid government 

censorship. In this effort, USAID 

established an undercover subscriber base 

to help move news content through the 

network, and when the time was right, to 

introduce political content to inspire 

Cubans to organize a “Cuban Spring.”42

The viability of this plan remains to be 

seen. There are also reports that the DoD 

created software that enables operators to 

create multiple online personalities—or 

“sock puppets” —to counter the extremist 

narrative on social media and be the "first 

with the truth."43 Again, the success of 

this effort and many others are not 

known. Outside of physically going 

undercover and joining the adversary, 

however, these efforts are still the best 

way to understand one’s enemy and 

influence real threats one-on-one. 

Embedded social media infiltrators may 

even be able to discourage an enemy 

course of action, or as the FBI 

demonstrated, encourage them to take a 

course of action that facilitates capture.

Such infiltration projects, however, are 

expected to come under tough public 

scrutiny. Free speech, particularly the 

right of social media users to be free from 

government intrusion, is sacrosanct in the 

United States. In the social media world, 

large networks inevitably contain U.S. 

citizens, on whom the intelligence 

community is prohibited from collecting, 

unless federal authorities can demonstrate 

that the subject is involved in terrorist 

activities. The legality of fake social 

media accounts has also come into 

question. If deemed “covert,” such 

accounts require direct presidential 

authorization and must include 

Congressional oversight.44 In the Cuba 

case, President Obama has insisted that 

USAID’s Cuban Twitter is not a covert 

operation and that it has actually helped 

information flow freely to Cubans.45 Still, 

the risk for the U.S. government, as it is 

with any intelligence program, is 

balancing individual liberty—especially 

when a U.S. citizen is involved—with the 

real threat of terrorist use of social media 

to radicalize, recruit, and organize 

(Maxim 4). Oversight and transparency 

are essential, and abuses of intelligence 

gathering must be addressed. As 

Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 

noted, "The U.S. government should be 

the champion for the internet, not a threat. 

They need to be much more transparent 

about what they're doing, or otherwise 

people will believe the worst.”46 Due to 

the real national security threats presented 

by groups such as ISIS, however, the 

intelligence community must establish a 

much more robust undercover presence in 

social media.

Strategic Messaging. The most 

transparent arm of an American-style 

social media war is its strategic 

messaging wing—that is, its public social 

media campaign to engage key audiences 

while promoting the benefits of American 

values and countering the enemy’s 

message. In this wing, the State 

Department has the lead. The Department 

of State’s Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communication, for 

example, has the task of developing 

“highly focused social media campaigns” 

to target violent extremism and terrorist 

organizations.47 As part of this effort, 

they established a social media presence 

7 

Campaigning Spring 2015 49
called “Think Again Turn Away,” which 

engages directly with terrorists and their 

supporters in multiple languages. 

Although the concept is a step in the right 

direction—at least as far as establishing 

an active presence and attempting to 

counter terrorist propaganda—the Center 

for Strategic Counterterrorism 

Communication has been plagued by a 

lack of support and messaging blunders. 

While intended to be the linchpin of a 

whole-of-government social media 

approach, it has suffered from low 

funding (approximately $5 million 

annually), a lack of interest from the 

National Security Council, and turf 

concerns from the National 

Counterterrorism Center. 48 Additionally, 

critics argue that its guerrilla campaign is 

a “gaffe machine” that “provides jihadists 

with a stage to voice their arguments—

regularly engaging in petty disputes” with 

terrorist supporters “and arguing over 

who has killed more people while 

exchanging sarcastic quips.”49

Altogether, the campaign does not fully 

meet the standards of Maxim 5—that is to 

say, the overall intent is on track, but the 

target audience and tactics need work. 

For example, menacing videos of dead 

ISIS soldiers—intended by “Think Again 

Turn Away” to frighten young, 

radicalized individuals from joining 

ISIS—are more likely have the opposite 

effect on this type of audience, 

encouraging them instead to join the ISIS 

campaign. Indeed, to some, martyrdom or 

the opportunity of martyrdom can be 

motivational.

Moreover, the State Department should 

not be the only strategic messenger. An 

alternative is to encourage private efforts 

to engage in online strategic messaging. 

One such effort is the Counter Extremism 

Project, which includes a number of 

former U.S. officials including Senator 

Joseph Lieberman. Based on the 

assumption that “we’ve been kind of 

absent” in the social media sphere,50 the 

group intends to “expose the architecture 

of support for extremist groups and their 

ideology and combat their spread by 

pressuring their financial support 

networks, countering the narrative of 

extremists and their online recruitment, 

and advocating for strong laws, policies 

and regulations.” 51 Another idea is to 

mentor Muslim scholars on establishing a 

large social media presence in order to 

counter terrorist ideology, while enabling 

them to build trust with vulnerable 

populations. There are risks indeed with 

helping private efforts engage in social 

media warfare—much the same as 

arming radical insurgent groups to 

overthrow governments—but this might 

be the only way to significantly expand 

America’s army of digital diplomats and 

social media influencers.

Some experts suggest that America’s 

online strategic messaging should not 

refrain from using propaganda and 

deception.52 As discussed in Maxim 5, 

however, credibility is a key component 

in influencing target audiences. The State 

Department in particular can increase its 

credibility by concentrating its social 

media message on promoting truth and 

countering untruth—similar to Voice of 

America radio programs across the 

world.53 In this sense, America should not 

be like the Chinese government. 

Who Must Lead Social Media 

Warfare? (Figure 1)

The Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI), whose stated mission is to “lead 

intelligence integration” and to “forge an 

Intelligence Community that delivers the 

most insightful intelligence possible,”54

must be responsible for intelligence 

8 

Campaigning Spring 2015 50
collection and infiltration. This ensures 

unity of effort across domestic 

intelligence agencies (including the FBI) 

and overseas entities, such as the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), all Service 

intelligence organizations, CIA, the Drug 

Enforcement Agency, the State 

Department, and the National Security 

Agency. In accordance with traditional 

missions and under the direction of the 

DNI, the CIA and FBI should have the 

lead in implementing a government-wide 

army of undercover social media 

warriors.

Figure 1. Social Media Warfare Coordination

As stated, the strategic messaging wing 

must fall under the State Department, 

with the additional responsibility to train 

and promote the efforts of other 

governmental and civilian entities to 

engage global audiences, while 

leveraging lessons learned from its own 

social media campaign. Training should 

not be limited to U.S. organizations and 

various citizen groups. Allies can also 

play a significant role in social media 

strategic messaging.

In all three wings, the Defense 

Department and DIA will play an active 

supporting role to ensure that relevant 

data makes it to the appropriate 

Geographic Combatant Commanders. 

Indeed, intelligence collection, 

infiltration, and strategic messaging can 

supplement information operations and 

provide predictive analysis relevant to the 

physical battlefield.

The biggest problem, however, is that 

there is no formal organization that can 

unite the efforts of the State Department 

and the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence in social media warfare. 

Intelligence collection, infiltration, and 

strategic messaging cannot operate in 

individual vacuums, nor should they 

focus on countering only terrorist threats. 

Indeed, social media warfare has 

application across the spectrum of 

threats—conventional, criminal, terrorist, 

etc. Thus, on direction from the President 

of the United States, the National 

Security Council must prioritize the 

development of an interagency 

coordination task force to, first, produce a 

relevant social media strategy, and 

second, to synthesize efforts across all 

three wings of social media warfare.

Conclusion 

The United States admits it has fallen 

behind in the information war against 

groups like ISIS.55 Intelligence collection 

and infiltration efforts are in their infancy 

and appear stove-piped across agencies. 

Strategic messaging is underfunded and 

clumsy at best. Worst of all, the entire

effort lacks leadership and a coordinating 

infrastructure to synthesize activities.

In this new fight, however, the United 

States can still learn from its adversaries 

and regain the initiative in social media. 

Success begins with applying the five 

maxims learned from ISIS and Hong 

Kong. Success continues with beefing up 

intelligence collection, infiltration, and 

9 

Campaigning Spring 2015 51
strategic messaging efforts, and wherever 

applicable, incorporating techniques 

already used by adversaries.

Social media is a fascinating new 

phenomenon. While it exists partly inside 

cyberspace and partly outside it, it is an 

outlet for all kinds of information, and for 

the first time, a means by which any 

information provider—individual, nonstate, or state actor—can interact 

personally on a global scale. 

Organizations that see social media as a 

1 J. M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The 

Atlantic, June 16, 2014. 2 Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere and Jonathan 

Ansfield, “China’s Censors Tackle and Trip Over 

the Internet,” The New York Times, April 7, 2010. 3 Tim Phillips, “Chinese Spin Doctors Urged to 

Spread 'Positive Energy' Online,” The Telegraph,

January 18, 2013.

4 Chelsea J. Carter and Azadeh Ansari, “Pentagon 

Chief: ISIS ‘Beyond Anything We Have Seen,’” 

CNN, August 22, 2014. 5 Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher and Peter R. 

Neumann, “#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance 

and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter 

Networks,” The International Centre for the Study 

of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2014, 

accessed November 7, 2014, http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-ReportGreenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleuncein-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf 6 Jim Garamone, “Hagel Says ISIL Threats Real, 

Must Be Dealt With,” DoD News, Defense Media 

Activity, September 18, 2014. 7 “New ISIS Media Company Addresses English, 

German and French-Speaking Westerners,” 

MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, 

June 23, 2014, accessed November 7, 2014 

http://www.memrijttm.org/new-isis-mediacompany-targets-english-german-and-frenchspeaking-westerners.html 8 Lorraine Ali, “ISIS’s Soft Weapon of Choice: 

Social Media,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 

2014.

9 Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter.”

10 Ibid. 11 Johnlee Varghese, “ISIS Releases Training 

Guide on ‘How to Tweet Safely, Without Giving 

Out Your Location to NSA’,” International 

Business Times, October 19, 2014. 12 “American ISIS Member From Chicago Active 

one-way news provider are missing the 

point. Those who use it as an interactive 

forum and embrace its “social” 

characteristics are much more likely to 

influence target audiences and succeed in 

their information goals, whatever they 

may be. Finally, the term “weaponize” 

was chosen not to sensationalize, but to 

emphasize the dominate role the United 

States must play in this new battle space 

in order to achieve global social media 

superiority. 

On Twitter And Facebook: 'Internet, Restaurants, 

Cars, iPhones... Allah Has Made... Jihad In Sham 

[Syria] So Easy',” The Middle East Media 

Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. 

5586, January 3, 2014.

13 “CIA Says IS Numbers Underestimated,” 

Aljazeera.com, September 12, 2014. 14 Greg Miller, “Airstrikes Against Islamic State 

Do Not Seem to Have Affected Flow of Fighters 

to Syria,” Washington Post, October 28, 2014. 15 Tim Phillips, “Chinese Spin Doctors Urged to 

Spread 'Positive Energy' Online.”

16 Beina Xu, “Media Censorship in China,” 

Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders,

September 25, 2014, accessed November 7, 2014, 

http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorshipchina/p11515.

17 Malcolm Moore, “China Moves to Control Sina 

Weibo Social Network with Real Names,” The 

Telegraph, March 16, 2012. 18 Beina Xu, “Media Censorship in China

19 Malcolm Moore, “China Moves to Control Sina 

Weibo Social Network with Real Names.”; also 

Patrick Frater, “China Extends Media Blocking as 

Hong Kong Protests Swell,” Variety, October 2, 

2014. 

20 Patrick Frater, “China Extends Media Blocking 

as Hong Kong Protests Swell.”

21 “Messaging Apps: The New Face of Social 

Media and What It Means for Brands,” IPG 

Media Lab, 2014, accessed November 7, 2014, 

http://ipglab.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/MessagingApps_Whitep

aper_Final.pdf.

22 Robert Mann, “Young Protesters in Hong Kong 

Have Found an Ingenious Way Around Cyber 

Censors,” AdWeek, October 2, 2014. 23 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “China’s Social 

Media Underground,” Foreign Policy, September 

16, 2014.

10

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 52
24 Paul Mozur, “Protestors in Hong Kong Are 

Targets of Scrutiny Through Their Phones,” The 

New York Times, October 1, 2014. 25 Mary-Ann Russon, “Flying Drones Capture 

Dramatic Scale of Hong Kong ‘Occupy Central’ 

Protests on Video,” International Business Times,

September 29, 2014. 

26 Jeff Stone, “Blocked On Twitter And YouTube, 

ISIS Turns To Diaspora And VKontakte To 

Disseminate Message,” International Business 

Times, August 22, 2014. 27 See The Guardian Project website at 

https://guardianproject.info, accessed November 

7, 2014.

28 Email interview with Mr. Nathan Freitas, 

Guardian Project Lead, October 10, 2014, 

available to authors.

29 “What The FBI Wants In A Social Media 

Monitoring App,” NPR.org, January 30, 2012. 30 Aram Roston, “Unwitting Sensors: How DoD is 

Exploiting Social Media,” Defense News, 13 

November 2012.

31 “How Does The CIA Use Social Media?” 

NPR.org, November 7, 2011. 32 Aram Roston, “Unwitting Sensors: How DoD is 

Exploiting Social Media.”

33 Fred Dews, “WATCH: FBI Director James 

Comey on Technology, Law Enforcement, and 

‘Going Dark,’” Brookings, October 16, 2014, 

accessed November 7, 2014, 

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookingsnow/posts/2014/10/fbi-director-james-comeytechnology-law-enforcement-going-dark 34 Caleb Garling, “Twitter C.E.O. Dick Costolo on 

Receiving Death Threats from ISIS,” Vanity Fair,

October 9, 2014; also Daniel Byman and Jeremy 

Shapiro, “We Shouldn’t Stop Terrorists from 

Tweeting,” The Washington Post, October 9, 

2014.

35 Jillian C. York, “The Internet is Not the 

Enemy,” Foreign Policy, October 23, 2014. 36 Max Fisher, “Syrian hackers claim AP hack that 

tipped stock market by $136 billion. Is it 

terrorism?” Washington Post Blog, April 23, 

2013.

37 Jeff Bardin, “Why America Is Losing the 

Online War with ISIS,” Yahoo Business Insider, 

October 6, 2014.

38 “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise 

in Middle East,” Pew Research Global Attitudes 

Project, July 1, 2014, accessed November 7, 

2014, 

http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concernsabout-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middleeast/

39 Julie Ray, “Opinion Briefing: U.S. Image in 

Middle East / North Africa,” Gallup.com, January 

27, 2009.

40 Maria Konnikova, “The Six Things That Make 

Stories Go Viral Will Amaze, And Maybe 

Infuriate, You,” The New Yorker, January 21, 

2014.

41 Robert Windrem and Mike Brunker, “No LOL 

Matter: FBI Trolls Social Media for Would-be 

Jihadis,” NBCNews.com, October 20, 2014. 42 Desmond Butler, “US Secretly Created ‘Cuban 

Twitter’ to Stir Unrest,” Associated Press, The 

Big Story, April 4, 2014. 43 Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: US 

Spy Operation That Manipulates Social Media,” 

The Guardian, March 17, 2011. 44 See Central Intelligence Agency website at 

cia.gov

45 Desmond Butler, “US Secretly Created ‘Cuban 

Twitter’ to Stir Unrest,” 46 “Wikipedia, Facebook Slam US Government 

Spying,” CNBC.com, March 14, 2014. 47 “Executive Order 13584 -- Developing an 

Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism 

Communications Initiative,” available at 

whitehouse.gov.

48 Ali Weinberg, “Obama’s Social Media Srategy 

Against ISIS Falling Short, Experts Say,” 

ABCnews.com, 1 October 2014.

49 Rita Katz, “The State Department’s Twitter 

War With ISIS Is Embarrassing,” Time.com, 16 

September 2014.

50 Alex Altman, “Government Veterans to Take 

Fight to Extremists on Online Battleground,” 

Time.com, 22 September 2014. 51 See the Counter Extremism Project website at 

http://www.counterextremism.com/projects/count

er-narrative- program#sthash.4qu73uD0.dpuf 52 Philip Ewing, “U.S. Struggles in the ISIL 

Propaganda War,” Politico.com, October 30, 

2014.

53 Voice of America’s (VOA) Charter states that it 

“will serve as a consistently reliable and 

authoritative source of news. VOA news will be 

accurate, objective, and comprehensive.” See the 

VOA website at 

http://www.insidevoa.com/info/voacharter/2322.html.

54 See Director of National Intelligence website at 

http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/mission.

55 Philip Ewing, “U.S. Struggles in the ISIL 

Propaganda War.”

11

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 53
Team Biographies 

Commander Christopher F. Hill, USN. 

CDR Hill is currently assigned to the

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Air Warfare Branch. He was 

commissioned through ROTC in 1996. 

CDR Hill earned a BA in Political 

Science from Tufts University and an 

MA in Security Studies from Georgetown 

University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Prior to his current assignment, CDR Hill 

served as Commanding Officer of Carrier 

Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE 

TWO FOUR.

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan White, 

USAF. Lt Col White is currently serving 

as Military Advisor, 

OUSD(AT&L)/A/Treaty Compliance for 

Open Skies at the Pentagon. He was 

commissioned through the ROTC in 

1997. Lt Col White earned a BS in 

History from Troy State University in 

1997, a Masters in Aeronautical Science 

from Embry-Riddle in 2007, and a 

Masters in Military Operational Arts and 

Science from Air University in 2011. 

Prior to his current assignment, Lt Col 

White served as Commander, 437 

Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Joint 

Base Charleston, SC. 

Major Kevin L. Thaxton, USA. MAJ 

Thaxton is currently serving as Deliberate 

Planner at the Joint Forces Component 

Command for Space. He was 

commissioned through ROTC in 2001. 

MAJ Thaxton earned a BS in Computer 

Science from Fisk University in 2001. 

Prior to his current assignment, MAJ 

Thaxton served as Space Operations 

Officer and Deputy Chief Space Support 

Element of the XVIII Airborne Corps. 

12

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 54
Decision-Making Models and the 

SS Mayaguez Crisis

By LTC Thomas M. Feltey

On May 12, 1975, the SS Mayaguez, a 

United States flagged merchant container 

ship, was fired upon then subsequently

boarded and seized by Cambodian gunboats 

near the island of Poulo Wai in the Gulf of 

Thailand approximately 60 miles off shore 

from Cambodia. This event set in motion an 

intense iteration of American decisionmaking led by the most senior leaders in the 

United States Government. The SS 

Mayaguez incident provides the policy 

maker and military planner an excellent 

opportunity to analyze and understand the 

dynamic nature of executive governmental 

decision-making. Ultimately, the United 

States arrived at a rational decision to rescue 

the SS Mayaguez as a result of choosing an 

option that best achieved the goals and 

objectives of the United States Government. 

However, some evidence also reveals

governmental politics influenced the United 

States’ decision.

To analyze and assess the United States’ 

decision-making during the SS Mayaguez

incident, Graham Allison’s rational actor 

and governmental politics models are used. 

In concluding his book, Essence of 

Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, Allison offers the decision-making 

analyst a series of “cookbook questions” to 

assist in unpacking or searching for the 

underlying determinants for his three 

models.1 Allison expertly analyzes and 

conclusively details the decision making 

during the Cuban Missile Crisis by 

examining a Soviet action, followed by an 

American reaction, and further by Soviet 

counteraction. He uses this method through 

all three models to arrive at the most 

accurate representation of both American 

and Soviet decision-making. As result of the 

prescribed brevity and limited information 

regarding Cambodian decision-making, this 

essay focuses solely on the American 

reaction—or more precisely the question; 

how did the United States arrive at the 

decision to launch a rescue operation after 

Cambodian forces seized the SS Mayaguez? 

To begin this analysis, it is first useful to 

appreciate the incident from the perspective 

of the Cambodians since their decisionmaking is not assessed with Allison’s 

models. Although detailed data regarding 

Cambodia’s decision-making is not 

currently available, there is enough 

information to construct a plausible 

explanation to Cambodian actions. Less than 

a month prior to the seizure of the SS 

Mayaguez, the United States-backed 

government of Cambodia fell to the 

Communist Khmer Rouge. Within that 

confusion, it is likely traditional and 

functional governmental apparatus were not 

fully operational. Nonetheless, Khmer 

Rouge gunboats began seizing and releasing 

a number of various foreign flagged ships in 

the vicinity of the Gulf of Thailand in an 

effort to assert territorial control.2

Circumstantial evidence suggests the 

Cambodian gunboats were not directly 

targeting the American SS Mayaguez, but 

once central authorities learned Americans 

were captured, they, in fact, took control of 

the incident via radio from Phnom Penh.3

Cambodian forces initially sought to bring 

the American crew to the Cambodian 

mainland. It cannot be certain what ends the 

Khmer Rouge were pursuing by moving the 

SS Mayaguez crew to the mainland; 

however, some potential gain through 

negotiation was certainly a possibility. 

As the situation rapidly unfolded, the 

Cambodians definitely grew concerned over 

Campaigning Spring 2015 55
the presence of United States airplanes and 

were even more distraught over the 

destruction of a number of their gunboats.4

One could assume that the Cambodians 

weighed the consequences of a conflict with 

America versus some potential negotiated 

prisoner settlement and decided to release 

the crew. This release of the SS Mayaguez 

crew by Cambodian central authorities in 

Phnom Penh in response to building 

American military pressure is indicative of 

“hypothetical Rational Actor perspective.”5

Rational Actor Model 

To understand how the United States arrived 

at its decision to launch a rescue operation in 

response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS 

Mayaguez crew it is necessary to answer 

five core questions: 

1. What are the objective circumstances that 

the United States conceived as threats and 

opportunities? 

2. What are the United States’ goals? 

3. What are the objective options for 

addressing the seizure of the ship and crew? 

4. What are the objective strategic costs and 

benefits of each option? 

5. What is the United States’ best choice 

given these conditions? 

Fortunately, there is ample evidence to 

support this analysis. 

Threats and Opportunities 

The SS Mayaguez incident occurred at a 

particularly sensitive time for the United 

States’ international and domestic image and 

reputation. The Khmer Rouge completed its 

takeover of Cambodia on April, 17 1975, 

and soon afterwards, on April 30, 1975, the 

North Vietnamese captured Saigon, South 

Vietnam. These two incidents were clearly

threats to worldwide freedom and 

democracy, and were indicative of the 

validity of the domino theory.6 Moreover, 

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “made it 

clear he believed the Southeast Asian 

debacle would inevitably lead other nations 

to test the will of the United States.”7

Kissinger and many in Congress thought 

North Korea would be the most likely 

candidate to test American resolve.8 In 

essence, this ostensibly small incident of 

state sanctioned piracy now threatened to 

shift the balance of power from the United 

States to one or more Communist countries.9

In addition, the United States’ diplomatic 

efforts to separate Egyptian and Israeli 

forces in the Middle East were rejected by 

Israel—another sign of weakened American 

leadership since Nixon’s resignation only 

nine months earlier.10 

In many ways, threats to American interests 

present opportunities, and this is exactly 

how American leaders viewed the 

Mayaguez incident. After the rapidsuccession of setbacks and threats to 

American credibility, President Ford saw 

this incident as an opportunity for the United 

States to demonstrate its “power and resolve 

in the face of challenge.”11 This desire to 

demonstrate to the world that American 

power still mattered underpinned the 

development of American goals. The goals 

for American action were simple and 

straightforward: “to recover the ship and its 

crew; and to do so in such a way to 

demonstrate firmly to the international 

community that the United States could and 

would act with firmness to protect its 

interests.”12

Options 

The National Security Council produced 

various options and proposals during a series 

of lively crisis action planning sessions that 

ranged along the diplomatic to military 

Campaigning Spring 2015 56
spectrum. These proposals included the 

following: 

- “Use diplomacy with the People’s 

Republic of China, the Cambodian 

government, and the United Nations in an 

attempt to have the ship and crew 

returned. 

- Conduct a military show of force. 

- Seize a Cambodian island in retaliation.

Authorize a helicopter landing on the 

Mayaguez.

- Order a landing on the USS Holt, with a 

subsequent seaborne approach to the 

Mayaguez.

- Assault Koh Tang with marines.

- Attack the port of Kompong Som with 

navy tactical aircraft.

- Authorize B-52 bombing of Kompong 

Som.”13

The National Security Council debated the 

efficiency of each of these distinct actions, 

but it was President Ford who grouped these 

potential actions into three distinct options: 

(1) diplomatic only; (2) diplomacy first, 

then, if necessary, strong, decisive military 

action; and (3) diplomacy first, then 

incrementally imposed military action.14

Costs and Benefits 

Each option the United States explored 

possessed its own unique costs and benefits. 

With the diplomacy only option, the United 

States immediately recognized the 

difficulties associated with it. The Khmer 

Rouge represented a fledging government 

still trying to gain complete control of its 

country, and its administration was neither 

mature nor practiced. While diplomacy is 

always prudent and beneficial, the feasibility 

of this option was questionable. President 

Ford equated the diplomacy only option to 

doing nothing and viewed the consequences 

of not reclaiming the ship and crew, and 

further damage to international reputation as 

“very, very bad.”15 The seizure of the USS 

Pueblo by North Korean in 1968 and the 

ensuing long-term hostage situation

provided clear historical context for the 

United States’ aversion to pursing a 

diplomatic solution only. The cost of not 

acting to secure the ship and crew was high. 

The next option available to the United 

States was diplomacy first then decisive 

military action. The benefits of this option 

included an attempt to resolve the incident 

diplomatically before resorting to military 

action; justification to use military force 

because diplomacy failed; a strong United 

States strategic message of “power and 

prestige” to its friends and enemies; and the 

rapid rescue of both the ship and the crew 

before they could be moved to mainland 

Cambodia.16 The greatest downside of this 

option was the potential failure of the 

military action to secure the crew and ship. 

Such a failure would manifest itself with a 

strategic message opposite of what the U.S. 

desired: lack of power and prestige.

Finally, the last option for consideration by 

the United States was diplomacy first then 

incremental use of force. The benefits of this 

option included initiating prudent diplomatic 

means to avert military action; a gradual 

escalation of military force as a signal of the 

United States’ strong commitment; and an 

off ramp for Cambodia to de-escalate the 

crisis. The downsides of this option included 

the perception of a weak response by the 

United States, and the potential of a longterm Pueblo-like hostage crisis due to slow 

ineffective military action.

Campaigning Spring 2015 57
Choice 

As a result of the threats, opportunities, 

options, and cost/benefit of each of these 

options relative to its desired goal, the 

United States rationally chose the diplomacy 

first then decisive military action option. 

This option best accomplished the goal of 

securing the ship and crew while sending a 

robust strategic message to the world that 

the United States would not tolerate this 

type of behavior. The associated decisive 

military actions were selected from a menu 

of military actions discussed in earlier NSC 

meetings. Once this option was selected, the 

United States National Security Council 

further developed the course of action by 

sequencing these proposals in time, space, 

and force prior to handing over the detailed 

planning and execution to the Department of 

Defense. While the rational actor model 

seems to answer the questions, there are 

indicators to suggest governmental politics 

may have influenced the decision.

Governmental Politics Model

To understand if governmental politics 

influenced how the United States arrived at 

its decision to launch a rescue operation in 

response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS 

Mayaguez crew, it is obligatory to 

investigate five questions. The answers to 

these questions strive to limit facts only 

pertinent to this particular model of 

Governmental Politics. Allison poses the 

following questions: 

Who plays? 

Whose views and values count in shaping 

the choice and action? 

3. What factors shape each player’s 

perceptions, preferred course of action, and 

thus the players’ stand on the issue? 

4. What factors account for each player’s 

impact on the choice and action? 

5. What is the action channel that is the 

established process for aggregating 

competing perceptions, preferences, and 

stands of players in making decisions and 

taking action? 

Players

Unlike many other Governmental Politics 

models in which key players are numerous 

and span the spectrum of government policy 

making, the key players for the Mayaguez

incident decision-making are limited to the 

principles of the National Security Council. 

The key players were as follows: President 

Gerald Ford; Henry Kissinger, Assistant for 

National Security Affairs and Secretary of 

State; Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant for 

National Security Affairs; and James 

Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. Other 

important players include William Colby, 

Director of Central Intelligence; and General 

David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

Unsurprisingly, President Ford along with 

his views and values played a prevailing role 

in decision-making. As the leader of the 

United States, his views were unique and 

reflected the office of President, and that of 

a career politician. President Ford was 

inaugurated only nine months earlier as a 

result of President Nixon’s humiliating 

resignation. President Ford certainly felt the 

office of the presidency’s reputation was 

damaged and that confidence must be 

restored.17 President Ford also realized he 

was not elected by the people and therefore 

possessed no clear mandate. President Ford 

personally took charge of leading the efforts 

to resolve the crisis. Arguably this was an 

opportunity to restore confidence in the 

presidency that had been severely shaken 

with Nixon’s resignation. In addition, 

President Ford was confronted with the War 

Powers Act that legislatively restricted his 

Campaigning Spring 2015 58
authority as commander-in-chief and 

directed consultation with Congress. 

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger 

viewed the War Powers Act as an obstacle 

to acting decisively to rescue the crew, and 

necessitated quick action while informing 

Congress along the way.18

Henry Kissinger was the next key player 

associated with the Mayaguez decisionmaking process. His views and values 

dominated the other players in the National 

Security Council. Kissinger was a brilliant 

historian, strategist, and an experienced 

statesman. He was supremely self-confident 

and possessed an exhaustive knowledge of 

defense capabilities, and crisis 

management.19 Most significant to his 

influence on the Mayaguez decision-making 

was “his grand strategic framework of 

“geopolitics”.”20 Kissinger approached this 

crisis within the following framework: 

opportunity, executive management, 

symbolic effect, firmness, deterrent effect, 

use of sufficient force, force as an 

instrument of diplomacy, the American role 

in the world, and domestic consensus.21

Kissinger’s framework captured his deep 

views and values, and irrefutably 

exemplified the decisions made during the 

crisis.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was 

in position for approximately two years as 

the Mayaguez crisis unfolded.22 Schlesinger 

was a proven academic of international 

affairs and a military expert. His values and 

views also suggest prudence, restraint, and 

proportionality as indicated through his 

dissenting debates with Kissinger regarding 

the use of B-52s on the Cambodian 

mainland.23 His recommendations were 

reflective of his views regarding domestic 

and international opinion. 

Finally, the last key player within Ford’s 

National Security Council was Lieutenant 

General Brent Scowcroft. General 

Scowcroft served as the Deputy Assistant to 

the President for National Security Affairs 

and as a valued and trusted agent of 

President Ford. Scowcroft’s most essential 

contributions to the NSC were his intellect, 

temperance, and prudence.24 Fundamentally, 

Scowcroft agreed with Kissinger’s 

geopolitical framework. However, in 

addition, Scowcroft focused in on core 

American interests like a laser and would 

counter Kissinger’s aggressive presentations 

of opinion with insightful counter points. 

Moreover, it was General Scowcroft’s view 

and historical comparison of the Pueblo

incident that greatly influenced the NSC 

decision to act strongly to avert another 

damaging hostage situation for the United 

States.

Perceptions, preferred actions and stands 

As illustrated, each of the key players’ views 

and values offered distinctive contributions 

to the Mayaguez decision-making process. 

However, as the Governmental Politics 

model suggests, a certain group process 

emerged that appreciably effected decision

making. Ultimately it was the group’s 

overall perceptions, preferred course of 

actions, and stand on the crisis that drove the 

diplomacy first—strong military action

option. Fundamental was the perception that 

United States’ power and prestige was 

damaged. The resignation of President 

Nixon, the fall of Saigon, and the failed 

American diplomatic efforts to barter an 

agreement between Israel and Egypt in the 

Sinai were all indicators that America’s 

strength and influence were on the decline. 

There was also a prevailing perception that 

the North Koreans would soon test the 

United States and that America would lack 

Campaigning Spring 2015 59
the will to respond.25 The perception that the 

Mayaguez incident was an opportunity to 

regain some domestic and international 

credibility was on the forefront of every key 

player’s mind involved in the decision. Reestablishing credibility became the NSC’s 

central goal. Since gaining power and 

prestige was framed as the main strategic 

outcome of the Mayaguez crisis, swift and 

decisive military action was essentially the 

default decision of the group. As Graham 

Allison describes in his discussion of the 

Governmental Politics Model, use of 

military force increases as the number of 

decision makers have an initial personal 

preference for military force.26 This 

approach was especially true in the 

Mayaguez incident. In fact, none of key 

decision makers truly considered a 

diplomacy only option. The face of the issue 

was always presented from a position that 

necessitated military action—to stop another 

Pueblo incident. Additionally, the threat of 

the Mayaguez crew, as hostages, moving to 

the Cambodian mainland raised the stakes 

and created an artificial deadline to act fast. 

All these factors are indicative of the 

Governmental Politics Model.

Factors and impact on choice and action 

Since the NSC was a small decision-making 

group within the framework of the 

Governmental Politics Model, the factors 

impacting each player were minor. Power 

and influence over decision is the pivotal 

factor impacting choice and action. 

President Ford, at the helm of the NSC, held 

all the power. Other key players were 

relegated to influencing the decision by

bargaining the degree and timings of 

military action. For example, Henry 

Kissinger supported the President’s desire 

for strong and quick military action; 

however, his desired course of action was 

much harsher and occurred along a faster 

time line than that supported by Schlesinger 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through 

skillful bargaining and a monopoly on the 

details of military action and preparation 

timelines, Schlesinger was successful in 

delaying the rescue operations by twentyfour hours and in using surgical military 

strikes on the Cambodian mainland instead 

of Kissinger’s preferred B-52 firepower 

demonstration. Another potentially 

significant factor affecting choice and action 

was the President’s decisions relative to the 

War Powers Act. The President deliberately 

excluded Congress from the decisionmaking process to preserve his freedom of 

action as the Commander-in-Chief. Despite 

legislation, the President only informed 

Congress of his actions after decisions were

already made and, in some cases, military 

action was complete. This is another clear 

signal of Governmental Politics at play.

Action channels 

This model concludes with exploring the 

question of action channels as a means of 

aggregating competing positions. Normally, 

it is through the bureaucratic action channels 

that seemingly irrational decisions are 

explained; however, the Mayaguez incident 

presents the analyst with an action channel 

purposely designed to limit government 

bureaucracy. President Ford demonstrated 

his keen understanding of bureaucratic 

government by deliberately containing the 

debate and decision-making to the National 

Security Council, despite the availability of 

other standard decision-making 

organizations. This early action by the 

President exemplified a mastery of 

governmental politics. Leading the NSC 

himself, the President ensured only the most 

trusted of likeminded advisors were part of 

the process and guaranteed a favorable 

decision. This technique also ensured the 

President himself could take much of the 

Campaigning Spring 2015 60
credit as a way to restore confidence in the 

leadership of the United States. 

The United States arrived at a rational 

decision to rescue the SS Mayaguez as a 

result of choosing an option that best 

achieved the goals and objectives of the 

United States Government. However, the 

influence of governmental politics played a 

major role in the United States’ decision to 

launch a rescue operation in response to the 

Cambodian seizure. Furthermore, the 

preceding analysis reinforces Graham 

1. Graham T. Allison and Phillip D. Zelikow, 

Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 

Crisis (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational 

Publishers Inc, 1999), 389.

2. The Mayaguez Incident, Case Study C14-82-443, 

Kennedy School of Government (1983), 2. 

3. U.S. Congress, Seizure of the Mayaguez, pt 2, 

208,194.

4. Ibid. 192.

5. Chris Lamb, “Belief Systems and Decision 

Making in the Mayaguez Crisis,” Political Science 

Quarterly 99 (Winter 1985): 697.

6. Ibid. 683.

7. Ibid. 684.

8. Ibid.

9. Robert J. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident: 

Testing America's Resolve in the Post-Vietnam Era

(Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2011), 

217. 

10. Robert C. Head, Richard G. Short, and Frisco W. 

McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision 

Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations 

(A Westview Special Study) (New York: Westview 

Press, 1978), 102. 

11. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, 218.

12. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 110.

13. Ibid. 114-115

14. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 117-118.

15. Ibid. 

16. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, 218.

17. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 71.

18. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 141-142

19. Ibid. 74.

20. Ibid.

21. See Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 75-76, for a 

detailed description of Kissinger’s framework.

22. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 76.

Allison’s view that to really understand the 

myriad aspects of decisions, multiple 

decision-making models must be used to 

gain a more complete understanding. As Dr. 

Greg Miller discussed during a Joint Forces 

Staff College lecture, the decision-making 

models are like search engines. They help 

the analyst identify the significant causal 

factors and the resultant is a strengthening of 

the explanations and understanding of the 

issue.

23. Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in 

the Mayaguez Crisis, 689.

24. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 78.

25. Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in 

the Mayaguez Crisis, 692.

26. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision. 311-

312.

Author Biography 

LTC Thomas M. Feltey, U.S. Army, is 

currently a student in the Joint Advanced 

Warfighter School, Joint Forces Staff 

College in Norfolk, Virginia. He most 

recently commanded the 2nd Battalion, 23rd 

Infantry Regiment, 4-2 Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team, in Afghanistan and Joint 

Base Lewis-McChord. He holds a B.S. from 

Rutgers University, a M.A. from the Naval 

War College and is a graduate of the 

Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. 

His assignments include tours with Armored 

Cavalry formations at Fort Hood and 

Germany, and with the NATO Allied Rapid 

Reaction Corps in the United Kingdom. He 

has four deployments in support of OIF and 

OEF.

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 61
Biofuels and the Defense 

Department: A Push Toward a 

Greener, More Secure Force

By LTC David Carey, LCDR James Hoey, and 

Maj Mark Enriques

Imagine a future conflict in which a 

deployed Marine purchases fuel for the

unit’s light armored vehicles (LAVs) and 

power generators from a nearby village 

farm. Procuring local fuel strengthens 

counter-insurgency efforts by bringing 

prosperity to the village and reducing the 

number of fuel convoys and associated IEDcasualties. Several months later, the Marine 

will return home on military and contract 

aircraft, all-consuming half the JP-8 

traditionally burned and with reduced CO2

emissions. In another region, a formation of 

F/A-18s will return to its Carrier Strike 

Group, whose non-nuclear ships and 

helicopters will also consume half the 

traditional fuel amounts. The formation’s 

fuel burns so efficiently, the jets will take 

off with enough ordnance to negate a second 

formation, saving fuel and flight hours while 

reducing risk. 

These scenarios are possible through 

continued military investment in sustainable 

biofuels. Biofuels provide the Department 

of Defense (DoD) an opportunity to reduce 

demand and improve the efficiency of 

operational energy in order to enhance 

combat effectiveness, and reduce risks and 

costs across the range of military operations. 

Therefore, the DoD must seek the 

comparative advantages afforded by biofuels 

and lead public and private sector efforts for 

the nation. To overcome the fiscal and 

political pressures preventing these realities, 

the DoD must expand current initiatives, 

garner Congressional support, and enable 

private sector and international investment. 

The Problem

The Department of Defense is the largest 

single consumer of petroleum products in 

the world, although it only accounts for 

about one percent of the energy Americans 

use. In 2010, the DoD consumed more than 

five billion gallons of fuel in military 

operations at a cost of $13.2 billion, a 255 

percent increase over 1997 costs.1 These 

high energy costs siphon resources away 

from training and equipping the Armed 

Forces. As the demand for energy grows, the 

reliability of global energy supplies is 

increasingly at risk. Transit and oilproducing nations, including those hostile to 

the interests of the United States and its 

Allies, can drive market and political 

volatility. 

Likewise, the increase in demand for fuel 

increased vulnerabilities for logistics

personnel. Potential disruption of fuel 

transport and supplies threaten battle space

freedom of maneuver. Over 3,000 Army 

personnel and contractors were wounded or 

killed during attacks on fuel and water 

resupply convoys in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, ground 

convoys were attacked 1,100 times.

2

 Future 

adversaries, including those armed with 

precision weapons, may be even more 

capable of targeting military supplies.3

 

The DoD Strategy

Energy availability costs and security are at 

the forefront of the challenges faced by the 

United States and the DoD. Prior to 2011, 

the DoD tended to treat energy as a 

commodity that would always be readily 

available, overlooking strategic, operational, 

tactical, and opportunity costs. In 2011, the 

DoD released an Energy Strategy outlining

three principles to enable a stronger and 

Campaigning Spring 2015 62
independent energy force: reduce the 

demand for energy in military operations; 

expand and secure the supply of energy for

military operations; and build energy 

security into the future force.4 These goals 

seek to improve military combat capability 

and increase energy security by addressing a 

significant military vulnerability: 

dependence on foreign oil.5 

Energy security is the assured access to 

reliable supplies of energy and the ability to 

protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet 

warfighting and installation needs. 

Strategically, the goal is to reduce reliance 

on fossil fuels. Tactically, the goal is to use 

energy sources available on location and 

improve energy efficiency. Both goals

increase military capability per energy input 

and improve military range and endurance, 

which will lead to increased force protection

and savings. 

Flexibility and sustainability link directly to 

energy access. Heavy fuel dependency is a 

concern for every warfighter whose tactics

in the battle space are limited by the range 

and endurance of ships, aircraft, or tactical 

vehicles. As previously stated, the need to 

provide fuel to tactical forces requires a 

long, and often vulnerable, logistics tail. 

This support requirement draws forces from 

combat operations and potentially exposes

them to hostile action. These additional 

requirements for securing and transporting 

fuel to tactical forces effectively increase the 

cost of fuel to what is called the “fullyburdened cost of fuel.”6

 Although fuel 

constraints may not be eliminated entirely, 

targeted investments in energy efficiency 

lengthen the “fuel tether,” enhancing combat 

capability, and providing more options to 

Joint Force Commanders. In a networked 

alternative fuels chain, significant potential 

exists to improve partner nation capabilities, 

reduce the risk to forces, and improve the 

stability of U.S. interests and those of its 

Allies. Efficient tactical power management 

will also be critical to accommodate nextgeneration weapons systems with increased 

power requirements. 

Navy 

The Navy successfully showcased its

alternative fuels program during the Rim of 

the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 

demonstration in 2012. This “Great Green 

Fleet” operated with no degradation of 

performance or mission using a “drop-in” 

biofuels blend. The two-day demonstration 

premiered the first biofuel-powered carrier 

landing and first biofuel refueling of an 

underway destroyer.7 The fuel was a 50/50 

mixture of biofuels (derived from cooking 

oil and algae) blended with traditional fossil 

fuels. As drop-in alternatives become more 

readily available, the Navy will make them a 

regular part of its bulk fuel procurement.8

The RIMPAC exercise was the initial

stepping-stone to a future Great Green Fleet, 

which will continue using alternative energy 

sources, including biofuel blends and 

nuclear power. Significant energy 

conservation measures will be a part of 

regularly scheduled deployments throughout 

2016. The exercise also demonstrated other 

energy-saving initiatives , such as the use of 

solid state lighting, changes to engineering 

maintenance procedures to increase fuel 

efficiencies, a shipboard energy dashboard, 

smart voyage planning decision aids, and 

structural changes to ships to reduce drag 

and hull resistance.9 Although biofuels did

not drive these efficiencies, their

advancements represent investments into 

future operational energy savings. 

Building upon the success of the RIMPAC 

exercise, the Departments of the Navy, 

Energy, and Agriculture, as directed by a 

Campaigning Spring 2015 63
2011 Presidential Directive, awarded three 

contracts to construct and commission biorefineries capable of producing drop-in 

biofuels to meet the transportation needs of 

the military and private sector. In total, the 

projects will produce more than 100 million 

gallons of military grade fuel beginning in 

2016 and 2017 at a price competitive with 

their petroleum counterparts.10 The 2020 

goal is to use alternative sources for half of 

all energy consumption afloat, which will 

require nearly 300 million gallons of 

biofuels.11 

The Department of the Navy, Energy, and 

Agriculture subsequently entered into a 20- 

to 30-year public-private initiative that 

builds upon the synergy of developing a 

competitive, advanced biofuels industry 

compatible with the military infrastructure. 

Each agency plans to provide $170 million, 

for a total of $510 million to support this 

initiative.

12 It is predicted the shift to 

synthetic fuels will result in the most 

significant step in jump-starting the 

manufacture and use of synthetic fuels 

within the broader U.S. economy and 

partner nations. 

Marine Corps

Although the Marine Corps defers to the 

Navy as the lead for the DoD’s Operational 

Energy Strategy target to promote the 

development of alternative fuels,13 they are 

pressing forward with Secretary Mabus’ 

vision. The Marine Corps Expeditionary 

Energy Office examines alternative fuels 

and ways to reduce operational energy 

requirements, critical to expeditionary 

operations from combat to humanitarian 

assistance. 

While the MV-22 has flight-tested biofuels 

successfully,

14 Marine biofuel testing has 

focused on light armored vehicles (LAVs) 

and power generators.15 In 2010, the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center began measuring 

LAV performance using biofuels. At nearly 

500 vehicles, LAV fleet represents a 

significant part of the Marine Corps motor 

pool.16 The year-long test proved the 20/80 

biofuel and diesel or jet fuel blends did not 

cause long-term damage, even after sitting 

for extended periods time.17 

During the same period, the Expeditionary 

Energy Office successfully tested power 

generators using cottonseed oil blended with 

JP-8 at Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan.18

While using the least amount of fuel of the 

services, Marines used 200,000 gallons per 

day [2011] in Afghanistan. Procuring fuel 

from local sources to power their vehicles 

and generators could significantly reduce 

resources, both lives and dollars, required to 

transport, store, and protect fuel. 

Air Force

Within the DoD, the Air Force consumes 48 

percent of the petroleum procured. Of that, 

81 percent goes to aviation. Acknowledging 

how the volume of consumed fuel impacts 

operations, the Air Force set a goal in 2006 

to reduce aviation fuel usage by 10 percent 

by 2015. Efforts to promote awareness, 

innovation, and adopt commercial airline 

efficiencies were extremely effective as they 

reached that goal in early 2013, saving $1.5 

billion in 2012.19 Future efforts and 

associated savings require more emphasis on 

the Air Force’s strategic approach to assure 

supply through the increased use of 

alternative aviation fuels.

20

The Air Force has completed certification

that all of its aircraft can operate on a 50/50 

biofuel blend. The Thunderbirds 

demonstration team performed a full show 

in May, 2011 using a biofuel blend, 

showcasing the ability to fly on biofuels 

Campaigning Spring 2015 64
without a loss of performance.21 Air Force 

investment has advanced biofuels 

development with several other milestones: 

the first supersonic flight, first 

transcontinental flight, and first air-refueling 

using biofuels blends.22

The next step could be encouraging partner 

nations to certify their aircraft to use biofuel 

blends, particularly those who fly Americanbuilt aircraft, air-refuel with U.S. tankers, or 

heavily rely on U.S. fuel during 

expeditionary operations. This certification 

would be in line with objectives to ensure 

interoperability with international partners,23

and would enhance future planning for airrefueling and basing. Some foreign 

militaries, such as the Royal Netherlands Air 

Force, have already certified biofuel aircraft,

and a technical review may be the only 

requirement for interoperability approval.24 

A potential future military advantage biofuel

could provide aviation is in the area of 

“super-fuels” such as JP-10. JP-10 is 11 

percent more efficient than JP-8, but it’s 

hard to produce, which increases costs. As a 

result, JP-10 is currently restricted to air-toair and air-to-surface missiles only. Last 

year, however, Naval Air Warfare Center 

researchers reported synthesizing “a fuel 

that had JP-10esque [thermal munit] 

properties from a blend of biobased 

terpenes” (hydrocarbons found in 

aromatherapy plants).25 Increasing the 

production and lowering the price of JP-10 

is not viable in the near-term. However, if 

terpenes can be engineered to improve the 

storage of and release of fuel, and 

proponents estimate a potential to produce 

500 gallons of JP-10 per acre,

26 the military 

advantage for aviation would be 

considerable. For example, an 11 percent 

increase in efficiency would provide a fullyfueled F/A-18 an extra 3,200 pounds of 

carrying capacity, the equivalent of 16 

additional Sidewinders, five Mavericks, or 

two stand-off land attack missiles 

(SLAMs).27 

Army

Like the Marine Corps, the Army is not as 

platform-centered as the Navy and Air 

Force, and thus presently focuses its green 

initiatives toward installations. This focus on 

installations makes sense as the Army is the 

largest facility energy consumer in the 

Federal government, spending $1.25 billion 

in FY2012.28 In February, the Army “began 

its long-awaited process for signing up to $7 

billion in renewable energy contracts over 

the next 10 years.”29 With these contracts, 

the Army Energy Initiatives Task Force 

(AEITF) aims to derive at least 25 percent of 

the electricity consumed by renewable 

energy by 2025. The AEITF focuses on five 

categories of renewable energies: solarphotovoltaic, wind, geothermal, biomass 

(that makes biofuel), and other alternative 

energy technologies. 

Through a promising public-private 

initiative, the Army has agreed to long-term 

land lease to the Hawaiian Electric 

Company (HECO) to build, operate, and 

maintain a 50 MW biofuel-capable power 

generation plant. The plant could begin 

operations in 2017 using blends of liquid 

biofuels and natural gas, reducing

dependence on oil and coal-based 

electricity.

30 The plant would give 

Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army Airfield, 

and Field Station Kunia, whose combined 

load averages 22.4 MW, priority in the event 

of a grid outage. Additionally, its “fast backup” capacity will allow for quick start-up 

and shut-down, improving integration with 

intermittent solar and wind facilities around 

the island. The plant will also have a “black 

start” capability, meaning it does not rely on 

the external power grid during a blackout. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 65
This feature is especially important in 

supporting the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) and 

municipalities during natural disasters.31

Finally, while not focused on developing 

aviation biofuels, the Army is posturing to 

use them. Earlier this year, the Army 

Aviation and Missile Research Development 

and Engineering Center completed flight 

tests of a UH-60A Black Hawk using a 

50/50 alcohol-to-jet biofuel and JP-8 blend. 

In September, the CH-47 Chinook 

completed its first successful flight.32 These 

flights, like the other Services’, showed 

neither loss of performance nor ill-effects to 

engines. 

Startups

One of the many beneficiaries of the DoD’s

biofuel initiatives is the continued growth of 

biofuel technology startup companies. 

History reveals that military necessity has 

often been the driver of innovation in 

technology: from the beginning of mass 

production and metallurgy through the 

nuclear age and into the Internet age. There 

are several startups in the biofuel field that 

are using military necessity to drive further 

research. Funded with $85 million from Bill 

Gates and other investors, plus $104 million 

in Government cash and loan guarantees, 

Sapphire Energy is the world’s only 

commercial outdoor algae biorefinery.33

Sapphire’s initial goal is to extract 1.5 

million gallons of crude oil from algae and 

to be price competitive by 2018. 

Another startup is Solayzme, which helped 

produce some of the 450,000 gallons of 

biofuel used during RIMPAC 2012. 

Growing algae in bioreactors with sugar and 

excrete crude oil, the biofuel produced by 

Solazyme produced aviation quality drop-in 

fuel already in use. In May [2012], Dow 

Chemical said it would tap a strain of 

Solazyme algae oil for use in electrical 

transformer insulating fluids. In addition, a 

“spin-off” of Solazyme’s biofuel research 

led to the discovery of additional strains of 

algae that provide food sources that could 

replace eggs and butter in a variety of 

foods.34

Opposition

Despite the substantial investment the DoD 

has made into biofuels, the recent progress 

in the industry, and potential military 

benefits, opponents wish to curb further 

military investment. Critics repeatedly cite a 

2011 RAND monograph, sponsored by the 

Defense Logistics Agency, stressing that 

biofuels “offer no particular military benefit 

over their petroleum-derived counterparts.” 

The monograph argues that current fuel 

supplies will not expire in the foreseeable 

future, and during a crisis, price increases 

would cause consumers to use less, and 

supplies would remain available. The 

RAND argument centers on three reasons: 

cost, supply, and politics. 

Currently, cost is the most significant 

hindrance to biofuels. Although the RAND 

monograph concludes with the curious 

remark that, “As long as the military is 

willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to 

have a problem getting the fuel it 

requires,”35 the U.S. military is neither 

willing nor able to absorb higher prices 

without strategic or operational risk. With 

that in mind, however, present fiscal 

constraints mean that for each dollar spent 

on emerging biofuel technology or research 

is a dollar that cannot be spent on training, 

readiness, and other acquisitions. Notably, 

the RIMPAC exercise consumed one million 

gallons of the 50/50 blend, at a cost of $13 

million, nearly four times the cost of 

petroleum.36 Air Force tests used biofuels 

Campaigning Spring 2015 66
costing up to $150 per gallon.37 While these 

initial biofuels costs are staggering, such

“fuels premiums” are also affected by the 

volatility of petroleum. For example, from 

FY04 to FY05, Navy expenditures for fuel 

increased by 55 percent while consumption 

only increased by one percent over the same 

period. That $912 million single-year 

increase in Navy fuels expenditures could 

cover the funds for 7,000 personnel or three 

littoral combat ships.38 

The cost of the drop-in biofuel is 

considerably higher than its petroleum 

counterpart, for now. Securing a fuel source 

at a consistent price and in high supply will 

provide strategic and tactical advantages, 

such as reduce foreign oil dependency, 

decrease supply line vulnerability, and 

increase operational capabilities. Regardless 

of the cause of high prices, it is clear that the 

DoD would benefit from price stable 

domestically produced biofuels for today 

and in the future. 

Limited supply and production of biofuels is 

another argument against further military

investment. The 2011 RAND monograph 

states, “Because of limited production 

potential, fuels derived from animal fats, 

waste oils, and seed oils will never have a 

significant role in the larger domestic, 

commercial marketplace. Algae-derived 

fuels might, but technology development 

challenges suggest that algae-derived fuels 

will not constitute an important fraction of 

the commercial fuel market until well 

beyond the next decade.” Specifically, 

animal fats and waste oil feedstocks are 

likely limited to 30,000 barrels per day. 

Vegetable oil feedstocks would be limited to 

200,000 barrels per day and require an area 

equal to 10 percent of croplands currently 

cultivated in the U.S. Algae feedstock would 

require “large investments in R&D” before 

determining cost and environmental 

impacts.

39

Production quantity is an important 

consideration and will likely prove 

prohibitive for some types of biofuels. 

However, limited production potential of 

biofuels should not deter the DoD from 

exploiting a possible opportunity. The DoD 

must commit to large investments in 

technology R&D, especially for technology 

beyond the next decade. If the United States

can develop algae-derived biofuel, there will 

literally be oceans of sustainable fuel for 

military and commercial consumption. 

The last argument by opponents is politics. 

In a somewhat strange twist, the military’s 

push for greener and less dependent energy 

sources has put them at odds with some of 

their staunchest allies in Congress. 

Republicans on the Senate Armed Services 

Committee assess the directive to the Navy, 

Energy and Agriculture Departments as 

undermining Defense priorities, and trying 

to “use our military as a piggy bank to fund 

the President’s domestic energy agenda.”40 

As evidence, they point to bankrupt solarpanel maker Solyndra.41 Still, “more than 70 

percent of insiders say the DoD’s move to 

use more biofuels will survive congressional 

opposition, arguing lawmakers will have 

trouble saying no to the Pentagon.”42 Draft 

Defense spending bills in each of the past 

two years have included language cutting 

biofuel expenditures and research though 

that language has been removed each time 

during final negotiations and voting. The 

DoD military and civilian leaders will likely 

continue pushing Congress for continued 

research and expenditures into biofuels for 

the foreseeable future. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 67
Final Thoughts

Perhaps the greatest impediment to biofuel 

acceptance is the skepticism often associated 

with emerging technologies. The Navy’s 

shift from coal to oil over 100 years ago is 

an example of dangerous skepticism of 

emerging technology with respect to cost, 

supply, and politics. In 1897, the Navy 

began testing marine engines using oil fuel 

but was very slow to adopt them for 

remarkably similar arguments presented 

against biofuels. In his 1902 annual report, 

Engineer in Chief of the Navy stated the 

following: 

It may be regarded as a certainty that, except 

wherein unusual conditions prevail, the cost 

of oil for marine purposes will generally be 

greater than that of coal [....] As regards to 

the question of supply, it may be more 

expensive if not difficult to transport and to 

store oil than coal [....] The mining and 

railroad companies have invested so heavily 

in the coal industry and the transportation 

facilities have been so perfected that it is 

now possible to quickly deliver a cargo of 

coal at any point in the world [....] Since it 

will require progressive development to 

perfect the transportation and the storage of 

oil, and as the world’s supply is still an 

unknown quantity, it will leave some time 

before there may be a reserve supply of oil 

at the principle seaports [....] The military 

aspect of the establishment of fuel stations 

may prove to be a serious problem, since it 

may not only necessitate heavy 

expenditures, but may involve the greater 

political question as to the wisdom of 

maintaining a complete chain of fuel stations 

between country and colony.43

In addition to the increased infrastructure 

and decreased cost, oil could be stored 

throughout the ship and eliminated stokers 

and half the required engine tenders. Yet 

even after accepting the use of oil by all 

navies as “inevitable,” Navy Chief of the 

Bureau of Steam Engineering expressed 

“fear of a failure of the supply,” the 

uncertainty of which “might develop into 

condition menacing the mobility of the 

whole fleet and safety of the nation.”44 

History and the world’s current dependence 

on oil prove how wrong these leaders were 

and should guard present leaders’ reliance 

on potential estimates of cost and supply. 

Private sector investment is another 

indication that biofuel development is not a 

DoD folly. In 2008, Virgin Atlantic flew the 

first commercial aircraft using a 20/80 

biofuel/kerosene mixture in one of four 

engines. In 2009, Continental Airlines 

demonstrated the first U.S. biofuels flight 

using a 50/50 blend of algae-derived biofuel. 

2011 saw United complete the first 

commercial revenue flight on biofuel.45 As 

well as uncertainty about future fuel costs, 

expected carbon-emission caps drive 

commercial airline actions. As such, the 

“industry as a whole has set for itself two 

goals to address emissions and fuel use: 

Achieve carbon-neutral growth beginning in 

2020 and reduce carbon dioxide emissions 

50 percent by 2050 compared with 2005 

levels.”46

Energy is essential for developing and 

employing U.S. combat capability in support 

of national security interests. Energy 

security provides the Joint Force with the 

ability to assure access to reliable supplies 

of energy, and the ability to protect and 

deliver sufficient energy to meet operational 

needs.47 Volatile oil markets and shrinking 

U.S. Defense budgets call for a balancing of 

missions and resources. Biofuels present a 

path to reliable, cost-effective, and 

sustainable alternatives to stabilize fuel costs 

and provide military operational advantages. 

While biofuel technology has a way to go 

before cost and supply are equivalent to 

Campaigning Spring 2015 68
fossil fuels, it is clear the DoD can, and 

must, continue to research and develop 

innovative ways to fuel the force. 

Domestically-grown or locally-sourced 

sustainable fuels creates a stabilizing effect 

for the DoD in a dynamic, fiscally-austere 

environment. 

1 Department of Defense. Operational Energy 

Strategy: Implementation Plan. Plan, Department of 

Defense, 2012.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5

Office of the Secretary of the Navy. U.S. Navy, 

Energy, Environment and Climate Change. 2014. 

http://greenfleet.the DoDlive.mil/energy/great-greenfleet/ (accessed October 2014). 6 Ibid. 7 Matthews, William. "Price Points: Weighing Cost 

of Biofuel Production Against Other Navy Priorities 

At Heart of Debate." Seapower, November 2012: 34-

36.

8 Office of the Chief of Information. Departments of 

the Navy, Energy, and Agriculture Invest in 

Construction of Three Biorefineries to Produce 

Drop-In Biofuel for Military. Article, Office of the 

Chief of Information, U.S. Navy, 2014.

9 Ibid.

10 Office of the Chief of Information. Departments of 

the Navy, Energy, and Agriculture Invest in 

Construction of Three Biorefineries to Produce 

Drop-In Biofuel for Military. 11 Department of Defense, Operational Energy 

Strategy: Implementation Plan. 12 Department of Defense, Operational Energy 

Strategy: Implementation Plan. 13 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational 

Energy. Energy Investment for Military Operations: 

For Fiscal Year 2003. Washington D.C.: Department 

of Defense, 2012.

14 U.S. Navy. "Department of the Navy Goes Green 

with Osprey." Biodiesel Magazine, August 23, 2011. 15 Lombardo, Tony. "Corps Tests Biofuels in 

Vehicles, Generators." Marine Corps Times, June 14, 

2011.

16 Lawlor, Maryann. "Marines Go Green." Signal 

Magazine, July 2010. 17 Lombardo, "Corps Tests Biofuels in Vehicles, 

Generators." 18 Lawlor, "Marines Go Green."

19 Insinna, Valerie, and Yasmin Tadjdeh. "Air Force 

Making Headway on Fuel Efficiency Goals." 

National Defense, June 2013. 20 U.S. Air Force. "U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic 

Plan," 2013. 21 Cook, Catherine. "Energy Security and Alternative 

Energy Sources." Inside Charleston, October 1, 2014. 22 Cook, "Energy Security and Alternative Energy 

Sources."

23 U.S. Air Force. "U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic 

Plan." 24 Klopper, Hal. "First Biofuel-Powered Military 

Helicopter Takes Flight." Boeing. September 1, 2010. 

http://www.boeing.com/Features/2010/09/bds_feat_r

nlaf_09_07_10.html (accessed November 7, 2014). 25 Lane, Jim. "Making Superfuels Affordable, Via 

Biofuels: the JP-10 Story." Biofuels Digest, February 

5, 2013.

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy 

and Sustainability. Army Energy and Sustainability 

Program. U.S. Army, 2014.

29 Amy S. Koch, Lorraine Mullings Campos. "U.S. 

Army looking for $7 Billion in renewable energy 

over the next ten years." Reed Smith mobile site, 

2014: 1-4. http://m.reedsmith.com/us-army-lookingfor-7-billion-in-renewable-energy-over-the-next-10-

years-03-12-2012/ 30 Clover, Ian. "Fast-Reacting 50 MW Power Plant 

Planned for Hawaii's Solar Revolution." PV 

Magazine, October 27, 2014. 31 Energy Initiatives Task Force. Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii 50 MW Biofuel-Capable Power Generation 

Plant. Fact Sheet, U.S. Army, 2014. 32 Keith, Ryan. "Engineers Test Bio-Fuel in 

Helicopters." Army.mil. October 16, 2014. 

http://www.army.mil/article/136334/Engineers_test_

bio_fuel_in_helicopters/?from=RSS (accessed 

November 8, 2014). 33 Woody, Todd. "Military Dividend." Forbes, 

9/24/2012: 44-48. 34 Ibid.

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 69
35 Bartis, James T, and Lawrence Van Bibber. 

Alternative Fuels for Military Applications. RAND 

Corporation, 2011.

36 Woody, "Military Dividend," 44-48. 37 Government Accountability Office. "Alternative 

Jet Fuels." Report to Congressional Requestors, 

2014. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663027.pdf 38 Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. 

Naval Synthetic Fuels Program. Report, Chief of 

Naval Operations, 2007.

39 Bartis and Van Bibber, Alternative Fuels for 

Military Applications. 40 Goldstein, Edward. "Military Alternative Fuels 

Research: The Navy’s Great Green Fleet, and 

Opposition from Congress." Defense Media Network.

September 6, 2013. 

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/militar

y-alternative-fuels-research-the-navys-great-greenfleet/ (accessed November 8, 2014). 41 Alexander, David. "U.S. Air Force tests biofuel at 

$59 per gallon." Reuters. July 15, 2012. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/15/us-usamilitary-biofuels-idUSBRE86E01N20120715

(accessed November 8, 2014).

42 Belogolova, Olga. "Insiders: GOP Won't Stop 

Pentagon's Green-Energy Push." National Journal 

Daily AM, 7/26/2012: 3. 43 Edwards, John R. Report of the U.S. Naval "Liquid 

Fuel" Board of Tests Conducted on the Hohenstein 

Water Tube Boiler: Showing the relative evaporative 

efficiencies of coal and liquid fuel under forced and 

natural draft conditions as determined by an 

extended series of tests. Government Print Office, 

1904.

44 Maurer, John H. "Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, 

Oil, and American Naval Strategy, 1898-1925." 

Naval War College Review, November-December 

1981: 60-77. 45 Peterka, Amanda. "Biofuels: Clean, Green Options 

Lacking as Airlines Seek Alternatives to Petroleum."

Greenwire, January 14, 2013. 46 Ibid. 47 Department of Defense. Operational Energy 

Strategy: Implementation Plan.

Team Biographies 

Lieutenant Colonel David Carey, USA. 

LTC Carey is currently in route to the 

Defense Intelligence Agency. He was 

commissioned through ROTC at Texas 

A&M University in 1994, where he earned a 

BS in Industrial Distribution Engineering. 

He earned a MS in Strategic Intelligence 

from the National Intelligence University in 

2008. Prior to his current assignment, LTC 

Carey served as the Senior THE DOD

Intelligence Liaison to the Center for 

Strategic Counterterrorism Communication 

at the State Department.

Lieutenant Commander James H. Hoey, 

USN. LCDR Hoey is currently serving as a 

Staff Officer, in the USAFRICOM J9 

Outreach Directorate. He was commissioned 

through the United States Naval Academy in 

2001 where he earned a BS in Economics. 

LCDR Hoey earned a MA in National 

Security Affairs, East Asia from the Naval 

Postgraduate School in 2007. Prior to his 

current assignment, LCDR Hoey served as 

the Combat Systems Officer in USS 

DEWEY (DDG 105). 

Major Mark Enriques, USAF. Maj Enriques 

is currently serving as Theater Security 

Cooperation Officer, in USNORTHCOM 

J35 Future Operations Directorate. He was 

commissioned through the United States Air 

Force Academy in 2003 where he earned BS 

in Computer Engineering. He earned an 

MBA from Touro University International 

in 2009. Prior to his current assignment, 

Maj Enriques served as Executive Officer to 

the Vice Commander, Fifth Air Force. 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 70
The Conventional Force and 

Irregular Warfare: How the 

Conventional Force Can Relieve 

Mission Pressure on Special 

Operations Forces

By LCDR John Dolby, MAJ Zachary 

Kerns, and Maj Chad Gugas 

The American military has a habit of 

forgetting the lessons it learns in 

irregular warfare (IW). The wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan have forced the United 

States to learn, or in many cases relearn, 

how to wage IW. The Department of 

Defense (DoD), in envisioning a postAfghanistan military, must inculcate the 

lessons learned from 14 years of fighting 

IW. As the primary IW force provider, 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) will 

struggle to source all of the requirements 

as operations shift from large-scale 

counter-insurgency operations (COIN), 

such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, to 

smaller intra-state IW conflicts. To meet 

the future demands of IW and COIN, the 

DoD must use conventional forces to 

reduce the burden on SOF personnel. 

In the decades between the Vietnam War 

and the removal of the Taliban in 

Afghanistan (OEF) in 2001, IW was a 

niche mission set for SOF. Today, IW is 

a commonplace task for conventional as 

well as SOF forces because of the 

importance of COIN operations in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the 

Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around 

the world. With IW becoming an

increasingly important mission, 

conventional forces must maintain their

capability to support future IW 

operations.1 A greater conventional 

force role in IW necessitates the clear 

delineation of the roles the SOF will 

conduct and the roles conventional 

forces will assume. 

The Environment

Following the Vietnam War, the U.S. 

military exorcised the lessons of IW as 

fast as possible in an effort to refocus on 

force-on-force warfare.2 The exception 

to this effort was within the SOF

community, which retained its IW focus 

as part of its broader mission set. For the 

next 30 years or so, irregular warfare, or 

more specifically counterinsurgency 

warfare, was viewed as a niche 

capability at best by the Services. 

During the first decade of the 21st

Century, the United States found itself 

attempting to fight counterinsurgencies 

in Iraq and Afghanistan using 

conventional warfare methods. The lack 

of IW doctrine and training in the U.S. 

conventional force’s mission set resulted 

in the creation of ad hoc elements unable 

to address the challenges resident in 

nations mired in insurgencies. These ad 

hoc elements, such as the Military 

Transition Teams (MTTs) and MultiNational Security Transition Command 

Iraq (MNSTC-I), were expected to 

accomplish the enormous task of 

creating and training foreign security 

forces without the requisite training or 

expertise.

3

 

The DoD’s failure to institutionalize 

previous IW lessons learned came with a 

high cost of blood and national treasure. 

This same approach, relying on the 

creation of ad hoc IW response 

mechanisms in times of crisis, is not an 

option for future U.S. security 

operations. Acknowledging this fact, the 

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) states, “Although our forces will 

Campaigning Spring 2015 71
no longer be sized to conduct largescale, prolonged stability operations, we 

will preserve the expertise gained during 

the past ten years of counterinsurgency 

and stability operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.”4 The DoD must ascertain

how the U.S. military will organize 

following its drawdown in Afghanistan 

to ensure IW capabilities remain and 

continue to develop. 

Fourteen years of war and the 

concomitant military spending, along 

with a sluggish economy, have depleted 

Government coffers, leaving the DoD to 

face significant budgetary constraints. In 

turn, these budgetary constraints are 

forcing policymakers to determine how 

and when the U.S. will employ its forces 

in the future.5 This fiscal reality has 

already resulted in a reduction in U.S. 

military forces as a cost-saving measure. 

Unfortunately, United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

predicts the requirements and demand 

for SOF will grow following the 

completion of the Afghanistan mission. 

Already undermanned, USSOCOM 

further describes the negative impact of 

frequent deployments on SOF personnel 

to maintain their skill set.

6

 

This nexus of increased requirements 

and decreasing budgets sets up a supply 

and demand cycle that is likely to remain 

unbalanced if the DoD does not pursue 

an alternative solution to the status quo. 

If, as USSOCOM predicts, the demand 

for SOF increases, who fills the 

shortfall? If budgetary constraints 

restrict or preclude the growth of SOF, 

will SOF continue to provide the 

responsive force the nation has grown to 

expect? Although the third SOF truth 

states, “SOF cannot be mass produced,”7

not all traditional SOF mission sets 

requires the same level of training and 

expertise. Therefore, it follows that if 

operational requirements will increase 

and SOF personnel levels will remain 

the same, conventional forces will be 

required to cover this shortfall. 

In a resource-constrained environment, 

both SOF and conventional forces gain 

from this symbiotic relationship. If 

conventional forces demonstrate a 

capability to meet increased IW 

demands, this relieves SOF from the 

worst aspects of its high operations and 

personnel tempo. In addition, this 

increased conventional force capability 

provides the DoD with an incentive to 

retain conventional force levels capable 

of executing both missions. Naturally, 

the conventional force must remain 

available in sufficient quantity when a 

conventional conflict becomes 

necessary. A properly constructed 

advisory corps could quickly transition 

to the structure of a conventional force. 

Roles 

A review of the relevant doctrine reveals 

that, while acknowledging some part for 

conventional forces in IW, there is a 

dearth of guidance on what specific roles 

SOF and the conventional force will 

assume. This specification is important 

since SOF and conventional forces could 

find themselves building similar capacity 

while other capabilities go unsourced. In 

his 2008 Command and General Staff 

College thesis, Major Joseph Escandon 

addressed the issue of IW roles. 

Escandon observed that a process 

existed within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff 

(JS) to identify those missions in Iraq 

and Afghanistan that SOF would 

conduct while the remaining missions 

Campaigning Spring 2015 72
would fall to the conventional forces to

conduct. Escandon described the 

process as reactive and dependent upon a 

“formula” based on criteria and guidance 

provided by the Secretary of Defense.8 

Although this process solved the 

immediate problems in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, it is not likely to translate 

into the context of future conflicts. 

However, the DoD could create a new 

formula to assign roles during future 

conflicts, this approach would facilitate 

the continuance of the current reactive 

process rather than transitioning to a 

proactive one. A proactive process

prepares conventional forces for IW 

before a crisis rather than simply 

backfilling the missions SOF is unable to 

fill. A clear delineation of roles for SOF 

and conventional forces in doctrine will 

provide conventional force leaders the 

ability to identify training requirements 

and understand what roles their force 

will undertake. This approach changes 

the way in which SOF and conventional 

forces interact, improving the synergy 

between the forces, increasing

capabilities, and enhancing trust. 

Another benefit of this approach is that 

of economy of force. If conventional 

forces are prepared for IW 

environments, less SOF may be 

required, which frees those forces up for 

other requirements or training 

opportunities. 

To determine how conventional forces 

can best complement SOF IW 

capabilities, it is first necessary to 

understand SOF operations and 

missions. In short, what makes Special 

Operations “special”? The Joint 

definition of Special Operations states, 

“Operations requiring unique modes of 

employment, tactical techniques, 

equipment and training often conducted 

in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments and characterized by one 

or more of the following: time sensitive, 

clandestine, low visibility, conducted 

with and/or through indigenous forces, 

requiring regional expertise, and/or a 

high degree of risk.”9

 This definition 

describes “special” criteria that fall into 

three broad categories: operations 

requiring specific equipment; operations 

requiring specialized skills or training; 

and operations involving risk. Risk can 

be further refined into two parts: 

political risk and risk to forces 

conducting the operation. These 

categories highlight the traditional SOF 

missions of unconventional warfare 

(risk), training foreign nation SOF 

personnel (specialized training and, in 

most cases, specialized equipment), and 

counterterrorism. 

In conflicts characterized by 

conventional actions, SOF augments and 

complements the missions of 

conventional forces. In an IW 

environment, the SOF and the 

conventional force need to flip the 

supported and supporting relationship 

around in which SOF conducts IW 

actions with conventional force 

augmentation. The fifth SOF Truth 

captures this idea that, “most special 

operations require non-SOF 

assistance.”10 This SOF Truth reminds 

us that SOF actions create the greatest 

effects when complemented by 

capabilities provided by others such as 

conventional forces, host nation forces, 

or other U.S. government institutions. 

Campaigning Spring 2015 73
Applications for Conventional Forces 

in IW

How would the practical application of 

conventional forces in an IW role 

function? Historical aviation foreign 

internal defense (FID) presents an 

interesting case study for analysis. Top 

U.S. Air Force leaders recognized the 

need for continuing aviation FID 

focused on IW capabilities. The former 

Secretary of the Air Force, Michael B. 

Donley, and the former Air Force Chief 

of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, 

stated, “...the Air Force must balance 

the requirements levied upon airpower in 

IW with the concurrent need to maintain 

decisive advantage in conventional 

warfare.”11 Immediately upon 

acknowledging the need for IW 

airpower, the first tension is uncovered 

at the Service Component level. It is a 

balancing game; something must give 

within the Air Force conventional 

warfare model to meet IW requirements. 

An additional question arises at the 

Service level. Is this IW force a standing 

force or should the Service develop the 

capability as needed for contingencies? 

To find the answer, three areas are

assessed: requirements; historical 

precedent; and the shortfalls between 

those requirements and current force 

structure.

Requirements

There are two reports providing broad 

requirements for conventional force 

participation in IW roles. The first report 

is from the Joint Staff–J7 Joint and 

Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) 

Section titled Decade of War: Enduring 

Lessons From The Past Decade Of 

Operations.

12 This key report identifies 

several solutions to enhance CF and SOF 

integration of which solution number 

two is noteworthy for this discussion. 

“Establish habitual training and mission 

relationships: maintain events that will 

allow SOF–[CF] to train together, 

expand those events beyond predeployment training and develop [CF] 

with a regional focus and a habitual 

relationship with corresponding theater 

special operations commands.”13 The 

second report is the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) IW Execution 

Roadmap that states the priority is to 

“transform the way DOD manages its 

military and civilian personnel to meet 

IW operational requirements.”14 The 

roadmap elaborates further that generalpurpose forces must “rebalance 

capabilities and capacity to 

conduct...long duration 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

operations; train, equip, and advise large 

numbers of foreign security forces; and 

foster the development of civil society 

and effective governance in ungoverned 

and under-governed areas.”15

Shortfalls 

Three categories of struggles reveal 

themselves when examining U.S.

conventional forces: capability, 

ambiguity, and relevancy. Regarding the 

struggle with capability, the 2010 QDR 

identified some consistent capability 

shortfalls for training partner aviation 

forces. As a solution, DoD intended to 

double its current capacity by 2012.16

The struggle with the ambiguity of the 

IW environment and the conventional 

force mindset revealed itself through the 

Unified Quest 2007 & 2008 concept 

exercises.17 The teams noted, “...the 

challenges of building IW campaigns 

demonstrated the discomfort and 

confusion of [conventional force] 

Campaigning Spring 2015 74
players when forced to wrestle with the 

ambiguity inherent in IW.”18 The teams 

found that while many of the IW tasks 

they perform are essentially the same, 

the conditions under which they perform 

them are different.19 

Finally, and possibly most significant, is 

the struggle with relevancy. By 

employing conventional forces to meet 

IW training requirements, either for a 

particular skill set or only during a 

particular phase, the advantage of 

developed relationships and cultural 

awareness so significant to SOF success 

in the IW environment is lost. For 

example, for ARSOF to conduct its 

missions, its units receive extensive 

foreign language training, are regionally 

oriented, are attuned to cultural customs, 

values and traditions, and are sensitive to 

the political implications and national 

interests that their decisions and actions 

affect.20 These attributes, amplified by 

persistent engagement with foreign 

forces, allow a more interactive 

relationship to form, enhancing the 

training of foreign forces and promoting 

a greater unity of effort within 

government at all levels.21 These three 

struggles of capability, ambiguity, and 

relevancy present a significant challenge 

in the transformation of applying 

conventional forces to IW missions and 

require paradigm shifts in structure, 

training, and employment.

Solutions

The military as a whole must 

acknowledge that the IW and the 

capacity-building mission are enduring 

missions.22 For the Air Force, Secretary 

of the Air Force Donley and Air Force 

Chief of Staff Schwartz acknowledged 

this, but this understanding must work 

its way further down the Service’s chain 

of command. The Air Force must 

develop leaders who have a clear 

understanding of irregular airpower 

application. That leadership is critical to 

closing the gap between desire and 

capability.23 The Service needs 

permanent solutions to meet the 

demands of general-purpose forces 

waging IW.24 An irregular warfare 

capable force can be developed 

relatively inexpensively from the 

existing combat structure within the 

Service. A standing IW force, equipped 

with an inventory of inexpensive 

aircraft, common to the regions SOF are 

employed in and designed to meet a 

variety of IW requirements, should be 

manned by personnel that have proper 

IW education and language training.25

The training provided to foreign nations 

should “also emphasize irregular 

concepts and training...based on the 

needs of partner nations.”26 Furthermore, 

“conventional and IW training, to 

include cultural awareness training, must 

be taught side–by–side at all levels of 

professional development.”27 

Identification, Recruitment, Training 

and Retention

Establishing an enduring conventional 

force capability to conduct irregular

warfare as directed in the 2014 QDR 

will require institutional mechanisms to 

identify, recruit, train and retain 

conventional advisors.28 Conventional 

forces provide great value in the 

irregular warfare realm and can relieve 

SOF of some of the burden for a 

growing mission set. It appears clear that 

the Services, the Army in particular, will 

face personnel reductions in the coming 

years. Maintaining a credible IW 

capability lends additional relevance to 

Campaigning Spring 2015 75
conventional forces in a time of fiscal 

austerity. 

Selecting the right personnel to conduct 

the IW mission from within the pool of 

conventional forces has historically been 

a challenge.29 It is neither desirable nor 

realistic to create a SOF-like level of IW 

proficiency within the conventional 

force. It takes a great deal of time and 

expense to create a SOF operator and 

making the conventional force more 

“SOF-like” would inevitably make SOF 

less “Special.” Those in the conventional 

force who are good fits for the SOF 

community end up there frequently and 

diluting the role of SOF would simply 

make the community less effective. 

However, there are certain 

characteristics that make some personnel 

more suitable for the IW mission than 

others. As Robert Ramsey points out in a 

paper for the Combat Studies Institute 

Press, “Careful selection and screening 

of advisory personnel is required. Not 

everybody can or should do advisory 

duty.”30

Conventional forces performing IW 

missions are typically performing 

advisory roles that require different skill 

sets and temperament from those of the 

combat soldier. An effective advisor 

should be culturally aware, comfortable 

operating within the local population or 

indigenous security forces, exhibit 

firepower restraint, and possess an 

ability to train others.31 IW requires a 

level of adaptability neither commonly 

practiced nor valued in the combat armsfocused conventional forces. 

Recognizing the importance of advising 

it is critical that the Services develop 

criteria by which they can identify those 

sailors, soldiers, airmen, Marines, and 

coast guardsman who would be good 

advisors. Such criteria might be similar 

but not identical to those used to select 

SOF. The standards cannot be as 

stringent and might include experience 

in training roles, empathy, problemsolving ability, and adaptability. Much 

of the literature on IW indicates that 

foreign language proficiency is critical 

to success in the IW mission.32

Unfortunately, as often as not, the 

advisor is not even working with a 

foreign military that speaks the language 

in which the SOF operator has trained. 

Therefore, while foreign language 

proficiency is certainly desirable, it is 

not a realistic objective for conventional 

forces personnel prior to specific 

training. The Services, however, should 

identify those individuals who have a 

moderate aptitude for learning new 

languages and, more importantly, a 

willingness to learn. The willingness of 

the Services to send high performing 

individuals with the motivation to 

perform the IW mission is critical to the 

success of the IW mission. Too often, as 

pointed out by Andrew Krepinevich 

during his 2007 testimony before 

Congress on the future role of ground 

forces, the “soldiers sent by the Army to 

serve as advisors are the men it can most 

easily afford to do without.”33 

Recruitment and retention within the 

conventional force must be linked 

closely to the IW mission. There is a 

well-documented gap concerning 

incentives within the traditional 

conventional force to recruit and retain 

the most qualified advisors. The 

perception within the Services, and the 

Army in particular, is that promotion 

boards tend to favor those soldiers who 

serve in conventional U.S. units over 

those performing advisory roles with 

Campaigning Spring 2015 76
foreign units.34 If the conventional force 

is to sustain a credible and effective IW 

capability, the Service must change its

cultural ethos to value IW capabilities as 

much as conventional warfighting 

capabilities. To facilitate promotion and 

retention, John Nagl of the Center for a 

New American Security has argued for 

creating a separate advisory corps within 

the conventional force that has 

designated career enhancing key 

developmental positions.35 

While the concept of an advisory corps 

is likely both personnel and cost 

prohibitive, what if the advisor corps 

was created from within existing Service 

organizations? Advisors could come

from a BCT, a Navy helicopter 

squadron, or an Air Force security forces 

squadron, for example. This approach 

certainly poses challenges to unit 

leadership, particularly in the BCT 

where the unit might lose a sizeable 

portion of its officer and NCO corps, 

thus degrading the unit’s ability to 

deploy in the combat mission. There are 

several solutions to this problem. First, 

DoD could create teams from within the 

pool of advisors within different units, 

decreasing the impact on each unit. 

Second, DoD could simply assume the 

risk that units providing officers and 

NCOs to serve in advisory roles could be 

at lower level of readiness. If, as many 

predict, IW becomes an increasingly 

important mission set over the next 

decade, it might be worth assuming the 

risk in order to build a cadre of advisors 

who are motivated to join and remain 

available for the IW mission. While the 

promotion and evaluation systems differ 

from Service to Service, the Services 

could provide direction or policy that 

would reward performance in IW 

missions.

Recruiting and retaining the right people 

is still not going to create the desired 

effect absent an effective training 

mechanism to ensure that conventional 

IW advisors are capable and 

professional.36 There are two key aspects 

to developing this mechanism for 

acculturation. First, the training 

curriculum must address the key skills 

required by a conventional advisor: 

cultural awareness, language ability, 

firepower restraint, advisory skills, 

knowledge of how to interact with civic 

leaders, and small-unit force protection 

capabilities.37 The second is having the 

right trainers. No doubt, there are 

experienced trainers within the 

conventional force; however, the 

primary expertise for the IW mission 

resides within SOF. DoD should create a 

joint SOF-conventional force IW 

training capability that leverages the 

expertise of both SOF and the 

conventional force, and it appears there 

may be movement in this direction. In a 

September 11, 2014 speech General 

Joseph Votel, Commander USSOCOM, 

discussed the need to improve SOFconventional interoperability and cited 

the National Training Center at Fort 

Irwin, where most COIN training occurs, 

as an example of improvements.38

Conclusion 

In the end, it all comes back to the fifth 

SOF Truth, “most special operations 

require non-SOF assistance.”39 The IW 

mission will remain an important one in 

shaping the security environment across 

the globe, and will require the combined 

efforts of SOF and conventional forces. 

Although, the conventional force has a 

history of conducting IW, it remains a 

mission set specific to SOF expertise. As 

the DoD looks to relieve the IW burden 

Campaigning Spring 2015 77
on SOF, it should look to the 

conventional force to supplement SOF 

capability for missions that do not 

involve unconventional warfare, training 

of foreign SOF, or counterterrorism. The 

Services can meet this demand by 

identifying specific areas in which they 

can contribute such as aviation FID or 

SFA. Once the Defense Department has 

identified relevant mission sets, the 

Services, working with USSOCOM, 

should develop policies and programs to 

identify, recruit, train and retain IW 

1 US Army, Stability, FM 3-07, (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-27. 2 Joseph E. Escandon, MAJ, “The Future of 

SFA”, (MA diss., US Army Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas 2008), 53.

3 “Military Transition Teams mission,” Accessed 

October 23, 2014, 

http://www.army.mil/article/25521/Fort_Riley_tr

ains_last_transition_team_before_mission_move

s_to_Fort_Polk/ and “Multi-national Security 

Transition Forces Iraq mission,” Accessed 

October 23, 2014, 

http://www.understandingwar.org/publications/c

ommentaries/status-mnstc-effort-train-andadvise-iraqi-security-forces. 4 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, (US DOD 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014).

5 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, (US DOD 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), 29.

6 “Q&A with Admiral William H. McRaven”, 

Special Warfare Magazine, APR-JUN 2012 

issue, 

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW25

02/SW2502QAAdmiralWilliamMcRaven.html. 7

 United States Special Operations Command, 

U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 

2014, USSOCOM Public Affairs Office (Tampa, 

FL: USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2014), 56.

8

Joseph E. Escandon, MAJ, “The Future of 

SFA”, (MA diss., US Army Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas 2008), 51.

9 Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

November 2010. In contrast the Joint Definition 

for Conventional Forces is, 1. Those forces 

capable of conducting operations using 

nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than 

designated special operations forces.

advisors. This approach will not be 

without some risk and cultural resistance 

within DoD, but it is an effort worth 

undertaking to ensure that SOF 

capability and capacity can meet the 

future demands of the global security 

environment. 

10 United States Special Operations Command, 

U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 

2014, USSOCOM Public Affairs Office (Tampa, 

FL: USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2014), 56.

11 George H. Hock Jr., "Closing the Irregular 

Warfare Air Capability Gap." Air & Space 

Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010). 

Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost

(accessed September 28, 2014), 5.

12 Russell J. Ames, “Interdependence Between 

Army Conventional Forces and Special 

Operations Forces: Changing Institutional 

Mental Models.” SAMS Monograph (July 2012-

May 2013), 30. 13 Ibid. 14 Kenneth C. Coons Jr. and Glenn M. Harned. 

"Irregular Warfare is Warfare." JFQ: Joint Force 

Quarterly no. 52 (2009 1st Quarter 2009). 

Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost

(accessed September 28, 2014), 2.

15 Ibid., 3. 16 Ibid. 17 Coons and Harned, 4. 18 Ibid., 5

19 Ibid, 6. 20 O’Brien, 3. 21 Ibid. 22 Hock Jr., 5. 23 Ibid., 6. 24 Coons and Harned, 7. 25 Hock Jr., 2. 26 Ibid., 5. 27 Austin, 1. 28 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, (US DOD 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), vii.

29 Joseph E. Escandon MAJ, “The Future Of 

Security Force Assistance: Is The Modular 

Brigade Combat Team The Right Organization?” 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 78
(MA diss., US Army Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

2008), 58.

30 Robert D. Ramsey III, “Global War on 

Terrorism Occasional Paper 18: Advising 

Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, 

Vietnam, and El Salvador,” Combat Studies 

Institute Press (2006), 114. 31 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Future of US 

Ground Forces: Challenges and Requirements,” 

(testimony presented to US House of 

Representatives, Washington, DC, April 17, 

2007), 13.

32 Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces, 

Combat Studies Institute Press (2006), 114. 33 Krepinevich, “Future of US Ground Forces,” 

10.

34 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Send in the 

Advisers,” New York Times, July 11, 2006, 

accessed October 20, 2014, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/11/opinion/11

krepinevich.html.

35 John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation; 

It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps,” 

Center for a New American Security, The Future 

of the US Military Series (2007): 7, accessed 

October 26, 2014, 

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publication

s/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf.

36 Krepinevich, “Future of US Ground Forces,” 

12.

37 Krepinevich, “Future of US Ground Forces,” 

13.

38 Matthew Cox, “Special Operations Chief 

Wants More Training with Conventional Units,” 

Military.com News, September 11, 2014, 

accessed October 22, 2014, 

http://www.military.com/dailynews/2014/09/11/special-operations-chief-wantsmore-training-with-conventional.html.

39 United States Special Operations Command, 

U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 

2014, USSOCOM Public Affairs Office (Tampa, 

FL: USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2014), 56.

Team Biographies 

Lieutenant Commander John Dolby, 

USN. LCDR Dolby is currently serving 

as the Basing and Posture Branch Chief, 

in the United States Special Operations 

Command Policy Directorate. He is a 

Naval Aviator who was commissioned 

through the Naval Academy in 1999. 

LCDR Dolby earned a BS in Political 

Science from the Naval Academy in 

1999, a MBA from Naval Postgraduate 

School in 2007 and a MA in National 

Security and Strategic Studies from the 

Naval War College in 2010. Prior to his 

current assignment, LCDR Dolby served 

as the Operations Officer at Helicopter 

Strike Maritime Squadron 75 in San 

Diego, California. 

Major Zachary Kerns, USA. MAJ 

Kerns is currently a Ground Planner in 

the Future Operations Directorate at 

Special Operations Command Central. 

He is a US Army Special Forces Officer 

with operational experience in Europe, 

Africa and the Middle East. MAJ Kerns 

earned a BS in Construction Engineering 

at Missouri Western University in 1998 

and a MA in Interagency studies at the 

University of Kansas in 2010. 

Major Chad Gugas, USAF. Maj Gugas

is currently serving as Assistant 

Secretary Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, 

MacDill AFB, FL. He commissioned 

through ROTC at the University of 

North Texas where he earned a BAS in 

Criminal Justice in 2001 and later earned 

his MA in Religious Studies from 

Southern Evangelical Seminary in 2012. 

Maj Gugas served in multiple 

operational and training command 

assignments culminating as KC-135R 

Evaluator Pilot, 97th Operations Group, 

Altus AFB, OK. 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 79
Putin's Peninsula?

How United States and NATO 

Policy Paved the Way to Crimea

By CDR Cielo Almanza, Maj Joseph Bincarousky Sr., 

and Lt Col Todd Hoover

It is incumbent on the military professional 

to constantly assess the strategic 

environment to inform national strategy, 

policy, and planning. In the words of Sun 

Tzu, “Victorious warriors win first and then 

go to war, while defeated warriors go to war 

first and then seek to win.”1 Without a 

comprehensive, recurring assessment of the 

environment, the military professional 

cannot effectively fulfill his or her duties. 

With this in mind, military professionals in 

the United States and Europe are asking, 

“What’s going on in Ukraine, and what’s 

next?” 

Though the United States and Russia are not 

at war, readers are reminded that conflict 

exists well before violence begins, driving 

the military professional to continuously 

understand and assess the peacetime conflict 

environment in hopes of preventing and 

avoiding violent action or war. Following 

the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 

1991, the United States and NATO became 

key players in Ukraine’s development as 

well as its current unfortunate situation. In 

understanding and assessing the current 

situation in Ukraine, the real or imagined 

role NATO and the United States factor into

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision 

making. When attempting to make sense of 

the Russia/Ukraine conflict and to frame the 

situation, the issue must be viewed from the 

perspectives of four major players: Putin, 

the United States, NATO, and Ukraine. 

Vladimir Putin

Dr. Jerrold Post, Former Director of the 

CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality 

and Political Behavior described profiling 

as, “perhaps most important in cases where 

you have a leader who dominates the 

society, who can act virtually without 

constraint.”2

 In the case of Putin, he sits atop 

a self-created pyramid (or vertical)3 of 

authoritarian control, and is surrounded by 

an inner circle of sycophants “who want to 

give him only good news.”4 Furthermore, 

Putin is the “most experienced leader of a 

major world power.”5 One consequence of 

this experience, as offered by Mr. Dimitri 

Simes, president of the Center for National 

Interest, is that Putin’s experience in 

international affairs coupled with his 

domestic control makes it so “there are few 

to whom he will turn for advice.”6

Understanding his current positon within 

Russia and the world, however, does not tell 

the whole story. Therefore a closer analysis 

of this intriguing and infuriating world 

leader is required. 

So, who is Mr. Putin? When Trudy Rubin 

of the Philadelphia Inquirer asked a group of 

“prominent Russian politicians and 

businessmen,” he did not receive an answer; 

instead, he received a long pause.7

 That is 

perhaps a fitting response, considering Putin 

has been referred to as “the man without a 

face,”8

 or the “man from nowhere.”9 The 

best person to ask might be Putin himself: 

In fact, I have had a very simple life. 

Everything is an open book. I finished 

school and went to university. I graduated 

from university and went to the KGB. I 

finished the KGB and went back to 

university. After university, I went to work 

for Sobchak. From Sobchak, to Moscow and 

to the General Department. Then to the 

Presidential Administration. From there, to 

the FSB. Then I was appointed Prime 

Campaigning Spring 2015 80
Minister. Now I’m Acting President. That’s 

it!10

If only it were that simple! In their book, 

Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Fiona 

Hill and Clifford Gaddy analyzed Putin from 

not only his multiple PR stunts, but also 

from the remarkable strength he displayed in 

his first two terms as Russia’s president.11

They concluded that Putin is the 

amalgamation of six individual identities: 

the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, 

the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the 

Case Officer.12 While none of these 

identities dominates Putin’s persona, they 

provide an extremely useful lens to 

understand his interactions with the Russian 

people, his near-abroad, and his major 

competitors/adversaries, both internal and 

external.

The remarkable and seemingly overlooked 

factor about Putin is addressed in his Statist 

identity; he is a Russian at heart—not a 

Soviet! He does not yearn for the good, old 

days of the Soviet Union. While he did state, 

“the collapse of the Soviet Union was a 

major geopolitical disaster of the century,”13

in his 2005 annual address to the Federal 

Assembly of the Russian Federation, his 

remarks had nothing to do with the impact 

on the Soviet Union and everything to do 

with the impact on Russia and Russians. In 

other words, the bad thing about the collapse 

of the Soviet Union was the pain it caused 

Mother Russia and her children. 

With that in mind, Putin sees himself as the

best option for Russia’s future: “his 

historical mission has been to assert himself 

as the country's singular, irreplaceable 

leader and to reclaim Russia's globebestriding status.”14 Whether he is in it for 

personal gain or ego could be logically 

deduced, it would not eliminate his fervent 

desire to see Russia reemerge as a global 

power,and to see the Rus Empire regain its 

former glory. Putin is sharply focused on the

“full restoration of Russian influence in the 

post-Soviet space and recognition by the 

West that this is indeed Russia’s rightful 

‘sphere of privileged interests.’”15 Perhaps 

most interesting post-Crimea is that Putin

may no longer be able to distinguish fact 

from fiction. Andrew Kuchins, director of 

the Russia and Eurasia program at the 

Center for Strategic & International Studies,

puts it quite well: “the frightening thing is 

that he appears to believe his own 

propaganda and lies.”16

To understand Putin, one must also address 

his views of the West, particularly the 

United States and NATO. Putin, when 

Acting President of Russia over 13 years 

ago, summed these views up succinctly, “we 

cannot forget that NATO and Europe are not 

one and the same thing. And I’ve already 

said that Russia is a country of European 

culture—not NATO culture.”17

Furthermore, Putin opines, “The founding 

fathers of NATO fear that their organization 

would change drastically [were Russia to 

join NATO]. From our perspective, it would 

change for the better, and from theirs, 

possibly for the worse.”18 It is possible he 

harbors lingering animosity toward NATO 

from the Cold War; or, maybe NATO just is 

not being led the way he thinks it should. 

Beyond his opinions of and feelings toward 

NATO, lies his relationship with the United 

States, the “one single power.”19 He sees the 

United States as economically and morally 

weak.20 He sees a pattern of hypocrisy as he 

considers U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Libya, and Syria as well as alleged U.S. 

behind-the-scenes maneuvering in Georgia 

and Ukraine.21 Moreover, Putin believes 

NATO and U.S. actions in Kosovo and 

Yugoslavia were illegal.

22 In other words, he 

does not believe the United States is in any 

Campaigning Spring 2015 81
position to criticize any of his actions. 

Furthermore, as the United States and the 

West have humiliated Russia,

23 it is his job 

to protect Russia “from its geopolitical 

rivals—above all, the United States and the 

European Union.”24 Putin “sees himself as a 

giant among weaklings,”25 and the United 

States and NATO have not done much to 

convince him otherwise except bombard 

him with phone calls and levy soft economic 

sanctions. 

NATO

While no formal declaration of an enemy or 

adversary is written into the Washington 

Treaty of 1949,26 it is not difficult to 

determine who NATO’s de facto enemy 

was, “When we pay our taxes, when we 

undergo our military training, when we 

make the sacrifices which we are making to 

remain free, let us place the blame where it 

belongs, on the men in the Kremlin.”27

When the Soviet Union applied for 

admittance, the response from Lord Ismay, 

the first Secretary General of NATO, says it 

all, “the Soviet request to join NATO is like 

an unrepentant burglar requesting to join the 

police force.”28 Lastly, in a lecture covering 

what NATO is and how it works, Lord 

Ismay offered his thoughts on the origin of 

NATO when he stated that the Soviets “got 

under their control one by one, the countries 

of Eastern Europe....It became obvious that 

unless something was done to restore the 

balance of military and economic power, 

there was no reason why the States of 

Western Europe should not also be gobbled 

up.”29 It is clear from the NATO record and 

the Alliance’s experience with the Soviet 

Union after World War II that NATO’s de 

facto enemy was a ground truth of the 

alliance.30 Then, somewhat abruptly and 

perhaps accidentally in November 1989, 

when “an East German Politburo member 

bungled the announcement of...limited 

changes to travel regulations,” the world 

saw the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 

thawing of the Cold War.31

While the West was celebrating German 

reunification and the end of the Cold War, 

the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 

struggled with one question: what next? For 

some, the answer seemed easy: join NATO. 

For others, the struggle for national identity 

as a result of newfound independence was 

significantly more difficult. To further 

compound the issue, when negotiating the 

reunification of Germany, the West initially 

assured the Soviet Union that NATO would 

not expand, “We are aware that NATO 

membership for a unified Germany raises 

complicated questions. For us, however, one 

thing is certain: NATO will not expand to 

the east.”32 There are multiple reports from 

the Russian side of the negotiation 

corroborating the German records, as well as

statements from then-U.S. Ambassador to

Moscow indicating the Kremlin was given a 

“clear commitment.”33 Furthermore, the last 

leader of the Soviet Union and winner of the 

1990 Nobel Peace Prize, Mikhail 

Gorbachev, asserts the United States 

promised “NATO wouldn’t move beyond 

the boundaries of Germany...but now half 

of central and eastern Europe are 

members....It shows they cannot be 

trusted.”34 Gorbachev goes on to say “we 

squandered” the 10 years after the Cold 

War,

35 referring to world leaders having not 

developed a new stability. He also claims 

the missile defense systems planned for 

Poland and the Czech Republic were, in the 

words of the Telegraph reporters, “an 

aggressive act against Russia.”36 Lastly, 

Gorbachev points out that NATO’s promise 

of eventual membership to Georgia and 

Ukraine has been interpreted as “an attempt 

to extend America’s...influence into 

Russia’s backyard.”37 Such membership 

would be seen as a “direct threat,” and the 

Campaigning Spring 2015 82
Russian War in Georgia in 2008 was a 

means to prevent it.38 

NATO expansion into Ukraine is an 

ominous suggestion, especially if one agrees 

that Russia cannot be an empire without 

Ukraine,39 as Putin reasons.

40 Ukraine is the 

historical center of the Slavic peoples, and 

Kyiv “was the center of the first eastern 

Slavic state, Kyivan Rus,”41 circa 862 AD.42

Much of modern Ukraine is widely accepted 

as the territory of the earliest known nation 

of the Rus, from whom ethnic Russians and 

Ukrainians have likely descended.43 There 

has been a close relationship between 

Ukraine and Russia since the dissolution of 

the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact the 

Russian empire of the 1700s absorbed most 

Ukrainian ethnographic territory. With the 

exception of a brief period of independence 

from 1917 to 1920, Ukraine was 

reconquered and forced to endure Soviet 

rule until independence came upon them 

once again in 1991.44 Based on both ancient 

and current history, Putin seems interested 

in bringing into a “civilizational union” the 

Eastern Slavs Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine 

comprise, warranting his “protection” 

against Russia’s strategic geopolitical 

rivals.45 The NATO promise of membership 

may have perpetuated a no-expansion 

Russian myth,

46 but it also fostered a very 

real geopolitical calculus of the Russian 

leader. 

United States

U.S policy toward the Soviet Union during 

the Cold War could be seen as a simpler 

problem set than current policy toward postCold War Russia. U.S. strategies for the 

Cold War centered on strong militaries and a 

determination to win, as made clear by the 

oft-cited Reagan quotation, “Here’s my 

strategy on the Cold War: we win; they 

lose.”47 While Cold War strategists, such as 

George Kennan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 

had their nuances, the adversary was clearly 

defined and a unity of effort existed across 

the diplomatic, military, and economic 

instruments of power. Since the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union in 1991, the absence of 

a clearly defined U.S. adversary allowed 

political, diplomatic, military, and economic 

agendas to begin competing for influence on 

Russian policy. The common hoped-for 

theme is one in which the United States and 

Russia work together. This approach was 

recently evidenced in Secretary of State 

John Kerry’s comments that Russia is a state 

“with whom we do not seek conflict, with 

whom we would much rather be working 

together to deal with the problems of the 

world.”48 Unfortunately, competing political 

and international agendas and the remnants 

of Cold War mistrust exacerbate an existing

schism that creates friction as opposed to 

compatible interests.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there 

have been three political administrations in 

the United States. Russia, for all intents and 

purposes, has only seen one formidable 

administration. It was during the Clinton 

administration of the 1990s that Russian 

President Boris Yeltsin faded, and the 

handpicked upstart Putin began to rise by 

2000. Since then, the only change in 

leadership was blatantly superficial, when 

Putin switched places with Prime Minister

Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. This change of 

scenery only lasted until 2012, when the 

Medvedev-Putin “castling move” returned

Putin to the presidency.49 Given the natural 

variability of three different U.S. 

administrations and the general continuity of 

the Russian leadership perspective, it is easy 

to see how lack of continuity on one side 

could cause paths to diverge over two 

decades.50

Campaigning Spring 2015 83
During the Clinton administration there was 

optimism for partnership. Angela Stent

describes it well, “a selective partnership, 

where cooperation and competition 

coexisted.”51 The selective piece of this 

partnership began to reveal itself toward the 

end of Clinton’s first term, in a presidential

speech in October 1996 on the subject of the 

NATO enlargement timetable. In this 

speech, the President stated, “That's why the 

United States has taken the lead in a three 

part [sic] effort to build a new NATO for a 

new era. First, by adapting NATO with new 

capabilities for new missions. Second, by 

opening its doors to Europe's emerging 

democracies. Third, by building a strong and 

cooperative relationship between NATO and 

Russia.”52 Clinton follows later with “I 

know that some in Russia still look at 

NATO through a Cold War prism and, 

therefore, look at our proposals to expand it 

in a negative light. But I ask them to look 

again. We are building a new NATO, just as 

we support the Russian people in building a 

new Russia.”53 

Adding to these challenges of the Clinton 

era were international events such as the 

escalated Kosovo crisis in late 1998 to 1999. 

The heavily U.S.-influenced NATO 

intervention, juxtaposed against Poland, 

Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining 

NATO, gave a strong appearance of 

Western influence advancing toward Russia, 

or in the least, the perception that Russia’s 

considerations in global affairs were of no 

consequence. To the casual U.S. foreignpolicy observer, this coincidence may have 

all seemed positive, but for the fledgling 

Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, it

was reminiscent of the fall of the Soviet 

Union’s great-power position in Eastern 

Europe, as he had witnessed it from his time 

in East Germany. Despite all efforts, the 

U.S.-Russia relationship deteriorated at the 

end of Clinton’s second term. 

In the early 2000s, two newly elected 

leaders, Putin and George W. Bush, 

attempted to reestablish relations. This 

endeavor would prove difficult for a number 

of reasons, including the resulting Russian 

resentment of actions by which they felt 

marginalized. At its onset, the U.S.-Russia 

policy had the appearance of the Clinton-era 

selective partnership. While a foreign policy 

advisor to presidential candidate Bush in 

2000, Condoleezza Rice noted “the United 

States needs to recognize that Russia is a 

great power, and that we will always have 

interests that conflict as well as coincide.”54

The tragedy of 11 September 2001 provided 

a resurgence of relations. President Putin 

was the first to call President Bush with 

condolences. Thereafter, about a year of 

generally positive relations followed, 

including the Crawford Summit where the 

Bush administration emphasized the 

importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship 

by inviting Putin to President Bush’s 

personal home. 

By 2003, a multi-polar world emerged partly 

as a result of U.S. operation in Iraq, and the 

United States began to face diplomatic 

challenges from allies and Russia. From

Putin’s perspective, Western influence 

continued to move toward Russian borders, 

as seven more countries joined NATO in 

March 2004, including the three Baltic 

States. Further exacerbating tensions, Bush 

announced the Freedom Agenda in January 

2005, specifically supporting the so-called 

color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia as 

efforts in democratization.55 In 2006, U.SRussia relations continued to deteriorate as 

economic tensions rose between Ukraine 

and Russia, and as the United States 

negotiated developing missile defense in 

Poland and Czech Republic. In response to 

Vice President Dick Cheney’s controversial 

speech in Vilnius, Lithuania, a war of words

Campaigning Spring 2015 84
erupted and reached a crescendo when Putin 

gave his confrontational speech attacking 

U.S. foreign policy at the 43rd Munich 

Security Conference, March 2007.56 The 

Munich speech clearly marked a change in

the dynamics of the selective partnership 

that had previously existed. This rhetoric 

continued when Putin attended the NATO 

Conference at Bucharest in April 2008, 

advocating against membership action plans 

for Ukraine and Georgia. Having lost his 

composure, Putin reportedly told Bush that 

Ukraine was not even a “real state.”57 The 

relationship between the United States and 

Russia continued to spiral downward in late 

2008 with the Russo-Georgian War over 

South Ossetia, the U.S.-Poland agreement to 

deploy missile defense interceptors in 

Central Europe, and the Russian response

announcing a plan to install Iskander 

missiles in Kaliningrad. 

In March 2009, newly inaugurated President 

Barack Obama attempted a ‘reset’ of the 

deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations. Though 

Putin’s perspective was that a reset was 

unnecessary and contrived by Washington, 

speculation is that Obama succeeded in 

improving “the atmospherics and the 

substance of the relationship,”58 especially 

as it came on the heels of U.S.-Russian 

geopolitical confrontation the year prior. 

Recent events of the past year, however, has 

seen Putin “purge” the remaining remnants 

of the selective partnership. He has 

essentially embarked on a course for 

international multipolarity.59 As one analyst 

puts it, “there can be no reset of the reset,” 

and it is incumbent upon the United States to 

“carefully consider how to respond” to 

Putin’s challenge to the existing 

international order.60 Understanding 

Ukraine’s position in that order vis-à-vis 

Russia is an integral part to any coherent

response. 

Ukraine

According to a prominent historian, “the key 

to the future of the whole of Eastern 

Europe” teeters on the fulcrum of Ukraine’s 

handling of Russia.61 This is especially 

evident when one considers the demography 

of Ukraine and the implications for the 

country’s politics. Ukrainian demography 

portrays a country divided without a sense 

of national identity. Demographic splits 

exist largely along “ethnic, linguistic, 

religious, and regional” lines.62 Ethnically, 

there is a preponderance of Ukrainians 

although there is a large Russian population, 

most of whom were born in Ukraine. Some 

of the ethnic Ukrainians are quite 

nationalist, as are some of the Ukrainian 

Russians many of whom believe “we 

haven’t moved, the borders have.”63 These

polar opposites within Ukraine are reflected 

in the recent political approaches of the 

party in power: 1) those ethnic Ukrainians 

who desire a nation independent of Russia

(formerly the Soviet Union); 2) those ethnic 

Russians who live in and identify with 

Ukraine, but see it as being inseparable from 

Russia; and 3) others who convey a mix of 

the influences. These divisions are further 

supported by linguistic preferences.64

Inhabitants of Western Ukraine tend to 

prefer the Ukrainian language and identify 

with the Ukrainian ethnicity. Eastern 

Ukraine is home to most ethnic Russians 

and Russophones and prefer the Russian 

language. Furthermore, most cities, in 

contrast to rural areas, prefer the Russian 

language.65

Historically, the geography of Ukraine has 

played a divisive role. Over the centuries, 

various parts of Ukraine were subjected to 

different manifestations of dynasty and 

empire, which resulted in a dissociative 

nation.66 This dissociation harkens to Robert 

Cooper’s assertion that “you can’t build a 

Campaigning Spring 2015 85
state without a nation.”67 Nevertheless, as 

Andrew Wilson has so succinctly opined, 

“an unexpected nation is still a nation,” 

despite the historical diversity within it.68

Therefore, even though independence was 

thrust upon the Ukrainian people 23 years 

ago, the current conflict has been the 

catalyst for many to reconcile the notion of 

national identity.69 

To drive home the point, consider that “only 

half the country had risen up” during the 

2004 Orange Revolution.70 That revolution 

was a manifestation of the public’s 

dissatisfaction with overt fraud during the 

presidential elections that benefitted proRussian candidate Victor Yanukovych. 

Though the courts overturned the fraudulent 

results, the populace soon grew weary of an

Orange government that could not deliver.71

Yanukovych—the beneficiary of the 2004 

fraud—was thus legitimately elected in 

2010. Given the clear historical divisions 

amongst the Ukrainian people and the 

difficulty their politicians naturally face in 

trying to balance domestic concerns, NATO 

and the U.S would have benefitted from a 

cautious and thoughtful analysis of how to 

encourage Ukraine’s Western aspirations 

without disrupting its Eastern 

counterweight. The leaders of both Ukraine 

and Russia understood that “without 

Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire,” but 

with Ukraine controlled, “Russia 

automatically becomes an empire.”72 As 

Ukraine continues what has become an even 

direr struggle of national survival, the 

United States and NATO should inform a 

long-term strategic approach toward Ukraine 

and Russia with an appreciation of the 

historical and cultural dynamics that define 

their dependent relationship.

Recommendations

The impact U.S. and NATO actions and 

decisions since the end of the Cold War 

have had on Putin’s perceptions of the 

global world order and his foreign-policy 

calculus cannot be overstated. That the 

intent of those actions and decisions might 

not have been to humiliate or marginalize 

Russia is less important than Putin’s

perceptions. Ignoring how that perceived 

impact has played into the current events in 

Ukraine will likely only bring about further 

“unforeseen” geopolitical tragedies similar 

to the annexation of Crimea, the current 

separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and 

the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. 

The West may not agree with Putin’s 

rationale or his decision making, but he 

enjoys broad popular support and will 

remain the Russian leader for the 

foreseeable future. That popular support 

stems from the fact that Putin is a savvy 

domestic politician. A good portion of his 

foreign policy is actually directed toward his 

domestic audience.73 Putin understands the 

history of his people and the priority of his 

populace: stability.74 Strength of the 

economy, strength of Russia’s geopolitical 

position vis-à-vis other powers, and strength 

of leadership are three manifestations of his 

savvy that have lent themselves well toward 

domestic stability in Russia, in turn pushing 

Putin’s domestic popularity to the highest 

point in his long leadership tenure.75 

A sound policy toward Russia should 

consider not only how the United States and 

NATO are perceived, but also how Putin is 

using those perceptions to solidify his 

monopoly on domestic power. Indeed, 

former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael 

McFaul, cites domestic politics as the reason 

for Putin’s resurgence, couched in antiWestern sentiment to bolster popular 

Campaigning Spring 2015 86
support. As McFaul concludes, “the 

challenge for the West is how to deal with 

such behavior forcefully enough to block it, 

but prudently enough to keep matters from 

escalating dramatically.”76

There are a number of things the United 

States and NATO can do to answer such a 

challenge. The first step might be to 

develop an actual policy and strategy, 

openly communicate it, and keep it flexible 

enough to adapt it to changing realities on 

the ground. Despite contemporary Russian 

myths, there really has not been a coherent 

policy toward Russia since it emerged from 

Soviet yoke, as multiple administrations and 

other priorities have come and gone. 

Deciding long-term goals with respect to 

Russia would form a foundation on which to 

act, whether in pursuit of partnership, 

counterbalance, or some combination 

thereof. Such a foundation would also work 

toward closing the perception of a say-do

gap in the U.S.-Russia relationship and 

would be a departure from the short-term 

transactions that have characterized the 

relationship over the last decade. A keen 

understanding of Putin’s mindset and 

motives must precede any such goal 

formation, lest the resulting policy be just 

another reset. 

Any attempt to draw Putin back from 

violence will not be easy. Unfortunately, the 

environment has already been shaped and 

conflict has begun, and it is unlikely that any 

meaningful U.S.-Russia relationship will 

result until there has been a similarly 

meaningful transition of Russian leadership. 

But, there are things that can be done 

simultaneously with long-term goal 

formation that can at least move the 

relationship in the right direction. NATO 

should endeavor to bring Russia back to the 

table and reinvigorate the NATO-Russia 

Council. Though NATO cannot control how 

Putin spins such things for domestic 

consumption, NATO can control its own 

efforts to consider Russia’s position in 

global affairs and to find points of 

cooperation. NATO members should 

strongly consider altering Putin’s narrative 

by taking demonstrative steps back from the 

foolhardy declaration that Georgia and 

Ukraine “will become members of 

NATO.”77 Since that declaration in 2008, 

Georgia and Ukraine have both suffered 

militant Russian incursion, both have 

territorial integrity issues, and Ukraine is no 

closer to garnering popular support for such 

membership. Future membership for 

Georgia and Ukraine should be predicated 

upon the same criteria that every other 

European aspirant has had to meet; any 

premature promise of entry into the alliance 

only serves to feed Putin’s anti-Western 

public relations machine. 

NATO would do well to consider closing 

the membership “open door” altogether. 

David Yost, in his most recent 

comprehensive examination of the alliance, 

has made clear that the “risk 

of...overextension has become obvious.”78

But, not only has NATO’s mission 

transformation from collective defense 

created risk, so too has its absorption of new 

members. New allies have not necessarily 

translated into increased revenue to support 

the growing alliance. Moreover, the 

intergovernmental organization necessarily 

requires compromise of national interests to 

“reach a workable consensus” in furtherance 

of collective goals,79 however loosely 

defined. More members mean more 

compromises. It would seem the larger 

NATO gets, the more unwieldy it could 

possibly become. It might be worth 

exploring whether compromising with 

Russia could benefit the security of alliance 

members as much as compromising with 

new members might. Yost even concludes 

Campaigning Spring 2015 87
that cooperation with Russia is an essential 

element “to the future relevance of the 

Alliance.”80

The United States should find points of 

mutual interest and actually cooperate with 

Russia toward those ends. No key actor in 

the current European situation wants to see 

an escalation of conflict, especially between 

major powers; the United States might need 

to compromise short-term interests for longterm goals, or vice versa. The key will be to 

extract something from Putin in such an 

exchange. Putin’s perspective has been that 

the United States is weak and can capitulate 

rather inexpensively (Syria is a good 

example). If the United States were to stop 

the economic sanctions on Russia, for 

example, the cost to Putin must be clearly 

defined and well thought out. 

Nevertheless, both the United States and 

NATO will need to consider Putin’s 

domestic calculus when dealing with Russia. 

It is unlikely that Putin will accede to any 

compromises that will diminish his hold on 

domestic power. He will need to be able to 

spin any agreements or cooperation in such 

a way so as to not lose face with his 

constituents. That is ultimately Putin’s 

problem, but the U.S. strategist must keep it 

in mind, and perhaps even try to exploit it. 

The West has historically leveraged such 

leaders, despite their lack of democratic 

ideals, when priorities dictated. Global 

stability and prosperity currently so dictate, 

and the United States and NATO should 

move on from the uninformed Russia policy 

of the past in order to properly understand 

how to manage Putin going forward. Sun 

Tzu discussed the importance of knowing 

one’s enemy and knowing oneself.81 The 

United States and NATO’s lack of 

understanding of both Putin and the effects 

of their own policies contributed to the 

current issues in Ukraine; getting back to 

fundamental analysis of the problem to 

inform strategic policy and planning might 

just pave the right way forward. 

Conclusion 

A lack of appreciation for Putin’s mindset in 

U.S. foreign policy has contributed to the 

current Ukraine crisis. In addition to 

historical examples cited by Patrushev, one 

can see how Putin was “doubly 

emboldened” by how poorly the United 

States handled the Syria problem: “first, 

because the West looked weak, and second, 

because Russia had got away with massive 

arms shipments, many through the 

Ukrainian port of Odesa. So why not use the 

same tactics against Ukraine itself?”82

As Wilson has surmised, the last decade or 

so can be summarized by saying “the 

Russians went ape.”83 Notwithstanding the 

chaos Putin has brought to bear, this 

discourse should be considered an 

understanding of Putin’s strategic 

perspective vis-à-vis NATO and the United 

States, an understanding that seems to have 

been lacking from U.S. policy 

considerations. Putin’s perspective is one in 

which the United States has consistently 

sought to marginalize Russia in the 

international order since the end of the Cold 

War. Instead of defending themselves and 

their actions against Russia’s “humiliation 

myth,”84 the United States and NATO might 

be better served to incorporate that myth 

into its strategic planning.

Campaigning Spring 2015 88
1 Philip Martin McCaulay, Sun Tzu’s the Art of War

(Raleigh, North Carolina: Lulu.com, 2009), 26.

2 Jerrold Post, as quoted in Benedict Carey, “Teasing 

Out Policy Insight from a Character Profile,” The 

New York Times, March 28, 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/science/29psyc

h.html.

3 Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: 

Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C.: 

Brookings Institution, 2013), ix.

4 Thomas de Waal, as quoted in Susan B. Glasser, 

“Putin on the Couch,” Politico Magazine, March 13, 

2014, 

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/put

in-on-the-couch-104647.html, 4. Of note, several 

references in this paper are from this Glasser article, 

in which she compiles 22 contributions from 

“America’s most experienced Putin watchers.” 

Informed also by Hill and Gaddy’s Mr. Putin: 

Operative in the Kremlin, the authors understand 

there is no single, neat, and tidy bin for Putin. He 

must be analyzed and understood from a multitude of 

angles in order to determine the best courses of action 

for U.S. and NATO policy and strategy. 

5 Dimitri Simes, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the 

Couch,” 3.

6 Ibid.

7 Vladimir Putin, with Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya 

Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person: An 

Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s 

President, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: 

PublicAffairs, 2000), vii.

8 Masha Gessen, The Man Without a Face: The 

Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (New York: 

Riverhead Books, 2012), cover.

9 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 2. 10 Putin et al., First Person, xv. 11 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 9. 12 Ibid. 13 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal 

Assembly of the Russian Federation” (transcript), 

President of Russia, April 25, 2005, 

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/20

31_type70029type82912_87086.shtml.

14 David Remnick, “Patriot Games: Vladimir Putin 

Lives His Olympic Dream,” New Yorker, March 3, 

2014, 

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/03/pat

riot-games-2. 15 Angela Stent, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the 

Couch,” 3.

16 Andrew Kuchins, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on 

the Couch,” 5.

17 Putin et al., First Person, 178. 18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. 20 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 9. 21 Ibid. 22 Putin et al., First Person, 177-178. 23 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 8; Andrew Wilson, 

Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West (New 

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014), Kindle 

version, §Unfinished Europe.

24 Dmitri Trenin, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the 

Couch,” 4.

25 Andrew Weiss, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the 

Couch,” 7.

26 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (hereafter, NATO), April 4, 1949, 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171

20.htm. 

27 Lord Hastings Ismay, “Press Statement,” NATO,

October 18, 1952, 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_17313.ht

m.

28 Lord Hastings Ismay, “Russian Admission to 

NATO” (transcript), NATO, 

http://www.nato.int/history/doc/

5-Soviet-Union-s-request-tojoin%20NATO/Transcript%20of%20Lord%20Ismay'

s%20Memo.pdf.

29 Lord Hastings Ismay, “NATO What It Is and How 

It Works,” November 5, 1954, NATO, 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_17417.ht

m.

30 It is also clear from the U.S. Senate record, as 

recounted in David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act

(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 

Press, 2014), 4.

31 Mary Elise Sarotte, “A Broken Promise? What the 

West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion,” 

Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014), Military & 

Government Collection, EBSCOhost, accessed 

November 10, 2014. 

32 Uwe Klußmann, Matthias Schepp, and Klaus 

Wiegrefe, “NATO's Eastward Expansion: Did the 

West Break Its Promise to Moscow?” Spiegel Online 

International, 26 November 2009, 

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-seastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promiseto-moscow-a-663315-2.html; Sarotte, “A Broken 

Promise?”

33 Ibid.; Insights by the former ambassador into the 

current situation can be found at Jack F. Matlock Jr., 

“Who Is the Bully? The U.S. Has Treated Russia 

Like a Loser Since the End of the Cold War,” The 

Washington Post, March 14, 2014, 

http://wapo.st/1qDM0Jy.

34 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Adrian Blomfield 

and Mike Smith, “Gorbachev: US Could Start New 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 89
Cold War,” The Telegraph, May 6, 2008, 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/r

ussia/1933223/

Gorbachev-US-could-start-new-Cold-War.html. 35 Ibid. 36 Blomfield and Smith, “Gorbachev.” 37 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Blomfiled and 

Smith, “Gorbachev”; For NATO’s eventual 

membership to Georgia and Ukraine, see “Bucharest 

Summit Declaration,” NATO, April 3, 2008, ¶23, 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_84

43.htm: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s 

Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. 

We agreed today that these countries will become 

members of NATO.” 

38 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is 

the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that 

Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 

§The Western Affront, ProQuest Research Library, 

accessed November 2, 2014; Dmitri Trenin, 

“Russia’s Spheres of Interests, not Influence,” The 

Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 14, 

doi:10.1080/01636600903231089; Glasser, “Putin on 

the Couch,” 6.

39 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 6; Zbigniew 

Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign 

Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 80, 

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045920. 40 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 6. 41 “Ukraine: Security Assistance,” U.S. Department 

of State, 20 October 2008, http://go.usa.gov/U6sY. 42 “Rurik Dynasty,” Britannica Academic Edition, 

http://www.britannica.com.

43 “Russia,” Britannica Academic Edition, 

http://www.britannica.com; Andrew Wilson, The 

Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 2nd ed. (New 

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002).

44 “Ukraine: Security Assistance.” 45 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 4. 46 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, §Introduction; Sarotte, “A 

Broken Promise?”

47 James C. Humes, The Wit & Wisdom of Ronald 

Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 

2007), 11.

48 “US Urges Russia to Work Jointly to Solve Global 

Problems – Kerry”, TASS Russian News Agency, 

October 22, 2014, http://en.itartass.com/world/755825.

49 Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-

Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 

2014), eBook Collection, EBSCOhost, accessed 

November 3, 2014, §The End of the Tandem: Putin 

Returns to the Kremlin.

50 Along these lines, Sarotte offers the change of 

administration as a reason for Clinton staffer 

ignorance of what discussions with Russia took place 

under the previous White House regarding NATO 

expansion. See Sarotte, “A Broken Promise?” 

§Bribing the Soviets Out.

51 Stent, Limits, 13. 52 William J. Clinton, “Transcript of the Remarks by 

President W. J. Clinton to People of Detroit,” 

October 22, 1996, NATO, 

http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm. 53 Clinton, “Transcript.” 54 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National 

Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (2000): §Russian 

Weakness, Military & Government Collection, 

EBSCOhost, accessed November 10, 2014. 55 Stent, Limits; The White House, “Freedom 

Agenda,” National Archives and Records 

Administration, accessed November 10, 2014, 

http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda.

56 Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following 

Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security 

Policy,” transcript, February 10, 2007, President of 

Russia, accessed November 10, 2014, 

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/

speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type

82917type84779_118123.shtml.

57 Richard Lourie, “Those Ukrainian, Iranian NATO 

Blues,” The Moscow Times, April 14, 2008, 

http://www.

themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/thoseukrainian-iranian-nato-blues/361932.html. 58 Stent, Limits, 212.

59 Nikolas Gvosdev, “Putin’s Great Gamble,” The 

National Interest, October 28, 2014, 

http://nationalinterest.

org/feature/putins-great-gamble-11552. 60 Ibid. 61 Wilson, Ukrainians, xiii. 62 Ibid, 207. 63 Ibid, 217. 64 Ibid, 207-33. There are those who prefer to speak 

Ukrainian (Ukrainophones), those who prefer to 

speak Russian (Russophones), and those who have no 

preference. Though the numbers of Ukrainophones 

and Russophones are roughly equal, there is a 

minority of ethnic Ukrainians who prefer to speak 

Ukrainian. 

65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., 161, 101-51, 263-64. Simply looking at 

some of the maps Wilson has reproduced conveys 

this idea; cf. table of maps on page ix.

67 Robert Cooper, “Picking Up the Pieces,” Financial 

Times, October 25, 2008, http://www.ft.com. 68 Wilson, Ukrainians, xi. 69 Neil MacFarquhar, “Conflict Uncovers a Ukrainian 

Identity Crisis over Deep Russian Roots,” The New 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 90
York Times, October 18, 2014, 

http://nyti.ms/1CCeW7W.

70 Dominique Arel, “Ukraine since the War in 

Georgia,” Survival 50, no. 6 (2008): 15. 71 Taras Kuzio, “Will 2012 Bring Popular Revolt to 

Ukraine?” Eurasian Daily Monitor 9, no. 9 (2012), 

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm.

72 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature 

Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 80, 

http://www.jstor.

org/stable/20045920 (emphasis added).

73 Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s 

Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace,’” 

International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 1168-1169, 

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00762.x; Matlock, 

“Who is the Bully?”

74 Richard Sakwa, “Putin’s Leadership: Character and 

Consequences,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 6 

(2008): 879-897, doi:10.1080/09668130802161132; 

Grigory Ambrozheichik, “Cultural Profile of Russian 

Leadership,” International Journal of Leadership 

Studies 6, no. 3 (2011): 310-336, 

http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/

publications/ijls/new/vol6iss3/1_Ambro_pp310-

336.pdf; Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 211. 75 Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Russian Approval of 

Putin Soars to Highest Levels in Years,” Gallup, July 

18, 2014, 

http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russianapproval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx. 76 Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John 

Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who Started the 

Ukraine Crisis?” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014): 

§Putin’s Loss, ProQuest Research Library, accessed 

November 11, 2014.

77 “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” ¶23. 78 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 376. 79 Ibid., 377. 80 Ibid. 81 McCaulay, Sun Tzu’s the Art of War, 37. 82 Ibid. 83 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, §Introduction. 84 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, §Unfinished Europe.

Team Biographies 

Commander Cielo Almanza, USN. CDR 

Almanza currently serves as the Deputy J4, 

Special Operations Command Pacific, 

Honolulu, Hawaii. Commissioned through 

OCS in 1998, CDR Almanza earned a BS in 

Biology from Seattle University in 1996, 

and an MS in Operations Research from the 

Naval Postgraduate School in 2009. Prior to 

his current assignment, CDR Almanza 

served as a Logistics Planner for 

COMPACFLT.

Major Joseph Bincarousky Sr., USAF. 

Maj Bincarousky currently serves as the 

Deputy Chief, Office of Military 

Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Astana, 

Kazakhstan. He is a certified Regional 

Affairs Strategist, specializing in Russia and 

Eurasia. Commissioned through ROTC in 

2003, Maj Bincarousky earned a BA in 

Criminal Justice from Temple University in 

2003 and an MA in Security Studies from 

the Naval Postgraduate School in 2012. 

Prior to his current assignment, Maj 

Bincarousky served as the Chief, Force 

Protection Branch, USAF Special 

Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Florida. 

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Hoover, USAF. 

Lt Col Hoover currently serves as the 

Deputy Chief, Deterrence and Functional 

Plans Division, United States Strategic 

Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He was 

commissioned through the United States Air 

Force Academy in 1994 with a BS in Basic 

Sciences and was awarded an MS in Space 

Operations from the Air Force Institute of 

Technology in 2004. Prior to his current 

assignment, Lt Col Hoover served as the 

Commander, ADF-E Space Operations 

Squadron, Ft Belvoir, Virginia. 

 

Campaigning Spring 2015 91
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the end notes. 

• Acronyms and military abbreviations must be written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the 

abbreviated form in brackets. Military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.

• All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one short paragraph maximum) biographical sketch of the 

author(s), which includes current position and e-mail address. 

• All manuscripts normally will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, 

who will make recommendations to the Editor as to suitability for publication. Manuscripts will be judged on the 

originality and quality of the argument or discussion, the relevance and timeliness of the topic, and on quality of the 

writing style. Unless otherwise agreed upon, Campaigning insists upon right of first publication of any given 

submission.

• All manuscripts selected for publication in Campaigning must go through a security and policy review process. 

JFSC will provide the necessary coordination with the NDU Northern Campus for Pentagon Security and Policy 

review.

• In general, the mentoring of manuscripts will not be done—authors are responsible for the quality of the content, 

adherence to academic standards, and adherence to the format requirements listed above. The Editor reserves the 

right to make minor editorial suggestions for style, grammar and length, but will not make editorial changes which 

affect the integrity of the argument or discussion without reference to the author. 

• Campaigning will acknowledge manuscript submission within 10 days. If you have not received confirmation of 

receipt in that time, please contact the editorial staff at mccauleyd@ndu.edu. Authors will be notified of manuscript 

acceptance or declination. 

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JFSC Vision

The flagship institution for educating national security professionals involved in planning and 

execution of joint operations. 

JFSC Mission

Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency 

operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, 

attitudes, and perspectives. 

Joint Forces Staff College

7800 Hampton Blvd

Norfolk, VA 23511

Campaigning Spring 2015 93