[Cite as Winland v. Christman, 2019-Ohio-2408.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONROE COUNTY

TIMOTHY L. WINLAND, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN L. CHRISTMAN ET AL., 

Defendants-Appellants.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 18 MO 0005 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio 

Case No. 2016-080 

BEFORE: 

Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D’Apolito, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed 

Atty. Timothy Pettorini, Atty. J. Fraifogl, Atty. J. McNab, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, 222 

South Main Street, Suite 400, Akron, Ohio 44308, for Plaintiff-Appellee, and 

Atty. Charles Bean, Thornburg & Bean, 113 West Main Street, P.O. Box 96, St. 

Clairsville, Ohio 43950, for Appellants-Defendants. 

 
 – 2 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

Dated: 

June 14, 2019 

 

Donofrio, J. 

{¶1} Defendants-appellants, John Christman, Katherine Haselberger, and 

Charlotte McCoy, appeal from a Monroe County Common Pleas Court judgment granting 

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Timothy Winland, on his claim to quiet 

title to certain oil and gas rights. 

{¶2} In 1994, appellee purchased 39.542 acres of land in Monroe County (the 

Property). In 2000, an oil and gas developer approached appellee about developing the 

oil and gas underlying the Property. The developer informed appellee that the oil and gas 

rights underlying the Property had previously been reserved by three individuals through 

three deeds: Edith Scarborough (by deed executed November 4, 1911); Bentley 

Scarborough (by deed dated April 15, 1916); and Watson Scarborough (by deed dated 

April 15, 1916). 

{¶3} Consequently, appellee retained an attorney to conduct a title 

examination. He then filed a quiet title action (ODMA lawsuit) against the three 

Scarboroughs seeking a declaration that their interests were either abandoned pursuant 

to Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act in effect at the time (the 1989 ODMA)1 or had been 

extinguished pursuant to the Marketable Title Act. Because appellee was unable to locate 

any of the three Scarboroughs or their heirs or assigns, he served them by publication in 

the local newspaper. 

{¶4} No one responded to the publication. Hence, on February 22, 2001, the 

trial court issued a judgment declaring that the three named Scarboroughs’ previouslyreserved interests were abandoned and had vested in appellee, or in the alternative were 

extinguished (the 2001 Judgment). The court quieted title to the oil and gas (including 

royalties) underlying the Property against any claims by the three named Scarboroughs, 

their heirs, or assigns. 

{¶5} In 2012, the developer informed appellee that the Property might be 

subject to another reservation of a two-fifths interest in the oil and gas underlying the 

 

1 Appellee filed his lawsuit during the time the 1989 ODMA was in effect (March 22, 1989 to June 30, 2006). 

Thus, the 2006 ODMA had no effect on his claim. 
 – 3 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

Property in favor of Harlan Scarborough and Maggie Fogle. Thus, appellee filed another 

action to quiet title. He served Harlan and Maggie and their heirs and successors by 

publication. 

{¶6} Appellants then came forward as the successors in interest, but not as 

successors of Harlan and Maggie. Instead, appellants claimed to be the successors in 

interest to Watson and Bentley. They claimed a royalty interest in the production of oil 

and gas from the Property. 

{¶7} Appellants traced their alleged interest back to 1884, when the Property, 

along with other adjoining property (collectively known as the Scarborough Tract), was 

conveyed to William Scarborough. When William died in 1899, his interest in the 

Scarborough Tract passed to five heirs in equal parts. Those heirs were Maggie Fogle, 

Harlan Scarborough, Edith Scarborough, Watson Scarborough, and Bentley 

Scarborough. 

{¶8} The Scarborough Tract was subsequently subject to several mineral 

reservations. 

{¶9} On October 17, 1908, Harlan and Maggie conveyed their two-fifths interest 

in the Scarborough Tract to John Umpleby as the guardian of Watson and Bentley 

Scarborough. But Harlan and Maggie reserved their right to the oil and gas underlying 

the Scarborough Tract. 

{¶10} On November 4, 1911, Edith conveyed her one-fifth interest in the 

Scarborough Tract to Umpleby as the guardian of Watson and Bentley. Edith reserved 

her one-fifth share of all royalties resulting from oil and gas production. 

{¶11} On February 28, 1916, Watson sued Bentley and his guardian, seeking a 

sale of Bentley’s interest in the Scarborough Tract with the exception of the oil and gas 

rights. At that time, Watson and Bentley each owned one-half of the surface and a onefifth interest in the oil and gas. Maggie, Harlan, and Edith were not parties to the lawsuit 

even though Maggie and Harlan still owned a one-fifth interest in the oil and gas and Edith 

still owned a one-fifth royalty interest in the oil and gas underlying the Scarborough Tract. 

{¶12} On April 15, 1916, the sheriff executed a sheriff’s deed conveying Bentley’s 

and his guardian’s interest to Watson except for “all the oil and gas in and underlying 

said premises, and also all rights and privileges now held by the Pure Oil Company, by a 
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Case No. 18 MO 0005

certain oil and gas lease[.]” Consequently, Bentley retained a one-fifth interest in the oil 

and gas. Watson then owned the entire surface of the Scarborough Tract and his onefifth interest in the oil and gas. 

{¶13} On April 15, 1916, Watson conveyed the Scarborough Tract to A.H. 

Anderson, subject to the reservation of his interest in the oil and gas. 

{¶14} On April 13, 1931, Bentley assigned his interest in the Pure Oil Company 

lease to Watson for the term of the lease. 

{¶15} After Bentley’s assignment, in 1931, title to the oil and gas underlying the 

Scarborough Tract was owned as follows. Maggie, Harlan, Watson, and Bentley each 

owned an undivided interest in the oil and gas. And Edith owned a one-fifth interest in 

royalties from the production of oil and gas. 

{¶16} On Mach 31, 1944, the Monroe County Common Pleas Court issued a 

judgment confirming the forfeiture of certain oil and gas royalty interests, including the 

interest of the Scarborough Heirs for delinquent taxes. On July 13, 1944, pursuant to that 

judgment entry, the Monroe County Auditor executed an auditor’s deed (the Auditor’s 

Deed) conveying the following one-eighth royalty interest to Nova Christman (Christman 

Royalty Interest): 

[T]he 1/8 or all the royalty in oil and gas in the name of Scarborough Heirs, 

under 70.70 (acres), Range 6, Township 4, Section 17 pt ne, former W.T. 

[sic] Scarborough Heirs farm now in the name of Martin L. Devore, listed by 

the Pure Oil Company. Any oil or gas lines to credit of same. Reservations 

for oil and gas – Monroe County Deed Records, Volume 83, Pages 542 and 

543. 

{¶17} The Auditor’s Deed refers to “Monroe County Records, Volume 83, Pages 

542 and 543.” These references are to the instruments that originally severed the above 

Christman Royalty Interest. Volume 83, Page 542 reserved a one-fifth interest for Bentley 

and Volume 83, Page 543 reserved a one-fifth interest for Watson. 

{¶18} Nova Christman died on May 3, 1992. His estate did not issue a certificate 

of transfer until March 26, 2007. All of Nova’s interest (the Christman Royalty Interest) 

passed equally to his three heirs – the three appellants. 
 – 5 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

{¶19} On April 12, 2013, after appellee’s notice of publication in the quiet title 

action against Maggie and Harlan, appellants filed a preservation claim under the 2006 

ODMA. Appellants claimed a right to royalties from the production of oil and gas from the 

Property. 

{¶20} On March 11, 2016, appellee filed a complaint against appellants. He also 

named as defendants Maggie, Harlan, Edith, Watson, Bentley, and all of their heirs and 

assigns (the Scarborough defendants). Appellee sought a declaratory judgment that he 

is the rightful owner of the oil and gas underlying the Property. Appellants counterclaimed 

seeking a declaratory judgment that they own the 1/8 royalty in the oil and gas interest 

underlying the entire Scarborough Tract. 

{¶21} The trial court entered a default judgment against the Scarborough 

defendants after they failed to enter an appearance. The matter proceeded against 

appellants. 

{¶22} Appellants and appellee filed competing motions for summary judgment. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee and against appellants. In 

so doing, the court found that appellants asserted an interest in the oil and gas royalties 

as successors of Watson and/or Bentley. Because appellee had already obtained a 

judgment in 2001 (approximately 17 years prior) against Watson’s and Bentley’s 

assignees, the trial court found any claim to the Christman Royalty Interest asserted by 

appellants was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court found that appellants 

were in privity with the parties to the 2000 ODMA lawsuit by virtue of being Watson’s and 

Bentley’s successors. It further pointed out that Watson, Bentley, and their unknown 

heirs, successors, and assigns were served notice of the ODMA lawsuit by publication. 

{¶23} The trial court went on to find that appellee had conducted a diligent search 

in order to ascertain who might own Watson’s, Bentley’s, and Edith’s interests. And when 

he was unable to locate any owners, appellee utilized notice by publication. The court 

noted that appellee’s search did not reveal appellants via the Auditor’s Deed because the 

Auditor’s Deed is not contained in the Grantor/Grantee Index of the county recorder’s 

office when conducting a search for Maggie, Harlan, Edith, Watson, Bentley, or the 

“Scarborough Heirs.” Instead, the Grantor/Grantee Index only lists the Auditor’s Deed 

under Nova Christman and the Monroe County Auditor. Additionally, the court noted that 
 – 6 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

for almost 15 years after Nova Christman’s death (from 1992 until 2007), appellants did 

nothing to transfer the record title of the Christman Royalty Interest to their names. In 

fact, they did not obtain a certificate of transfer for the Christman Royalty Interest until 

July 5, 2007, which was six years after the ODMA lawsuit concluded. 

{¶24} Based on the above, the trial court found no genuine issue of material fact 

existed and entered judgment in appellee’s favor. Appellants filed a timely notice of 

appeal on April 5, 2018. 

{¶25} Appellants raise nine assignments of error. They consolidate all but two 

of those assignments of error into one. We will address the assignments of error in the 

same manner as appellants. 

{¶26} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment ruling de novo. Comer v. 

Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. Thus, we shall apply 

the same test as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper. 

{¶27} A court may grant summary judgment only when (1) no genuine issue of 

material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 

(3) the evidence can only produce a finding that is contrary to the non-moving party. 

Mercer v. Halmbacher, 9th Dist., 2015-Ohio-4167, 44, 44 N.E.3d 1011 N.E.3d 1011, ¶ 8; 

Civ.R. 56(C). The initial burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements 

of the case with evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 

280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts 

to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of 

material fact. Id.; Civ.R. 56(E). “Trial courts should award summary judgment with 

caution, being careful to resolve doubts and construe evidence in favor of the nonmoving 

party.” Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 617 N.E.2d 1129 

(1993). 

{¶28} Appellants address their first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and 

ninth assignments of error together as one. 

{¶29} Appellants’ first assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, KATHERINE HASELBERGER, 
 – 7 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

CHARLOTTE MCCOY AND JOHN L. CHRISTMAN WERE BARRED BY 

THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN 

THAT THEY WERE NOT NAMED AS PARTY DEFENDANTS IN THE 

PRIOR ACTION * * * SINCE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, KATHERINE 

HASELBERGER, CHARLOTTE MCCOY AND JOHN L. CHRISTMAN 

WERE NOT NAMED IN SAID SUIT AND THERE WAS NO IDENTITY OF 

PARTIES NOR WERE THEY IN PRIVITY WITH THE THREE NAMED 

DEFENDANTS, SINCE THEIR PREDECSSOR IN TITLE, NOVA A. 

CHRISTMAN, HAVING OBTAINED HIS INTEREST FOR 1/8 OR ALL THE 

ROYALTY UNDER THE SUBJECT PREMISES FROM THE MONROE 

COUNTY AUDITOR IN A DEED IN 1944 WHICH DEED WAS THE 

RESULT OF A TAX FORFEITURE SALE AND THEREFORE, HIS 

PREDECESSOR IN TITLE WAS THE STATE OF OHIO AND, 

THEREFORE, NO PRIVITY EXISTED WITH THE NAMED DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS. 

{¶30} Appellants’ second assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE 

WAS NO NOTICE TO THESE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND THAT 

THE NOTICE TO THE THREE SCARBOROUGH HEIRS, AS SHOWN IN 

EXHIBITS HERETO, WERE ONLY SERVED ON WATSON D. 

SCARBOROUGH, BENTLEY SCARBOROUGH AND EDITH B. 

SCARBOROUGH, THEIR UNKNOWN HEIRS, DEVISEES AND 

LEGATESS, BY PUBLICATION. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF 

SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS IN THE COMPLAINT, PUBLICATION OF 

NOTICE, NOR IN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTRY. THEREFORE 

SAID JUDGMENT IS NOT BINDING FOR LACK OF PRIVITY AND 

SERVICE ON THESE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

{¶31} Appellants’ fifth assignment of error states: 
 – 8 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE INTEREST 

OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WAS ABANDONED OR 

EXTINGUISHED PURSUANT TO THE 1989 OHIO DORMANT MINERAL 

ACT (O.R.C. §5301.56) IN THAT THE UNDERLYING QUIET TITLE 

ACTION WAS DEFECTIVE IN THAT IT GAVE NO NOTICE TO THESE 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS IN THAT IT DID NOT NAME THEM AS 

DEFENDANTS NOR DID IT NAME THE SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS OF 

THE SCARBOROUGH HEIRS AS DEFENDANTS AND THAT AT THIS 

TIME, THE SCARBOROUGH HEIRS DID NOT OWN ANY INTEREST IN 

SAID PROPERTY DUE TO THE AUDITOR’S DEED TO NOVA A. 

CHRISTMAN IN 1944; THEREFORE, SAID QUIET TITLE ACTION WAS A 

NULLITY. 

{¶32} Appellants’ sixth assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN STATING THAT THE INTEREST 

CLAIMED BY DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WAS ONLY THE INTEREST 

OF SUCCESSORS OF BENTLEY SCARBOROUGH AND/OR WATSON 

D. SCARBOROUGH BY THE AUDITOR’S DEED WHEN IN FACT THE 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS CLAIMED NOT ONLY THAT INTEREST 

BUT THE INTEREST OF ALL THE SCARBOROUGH HEIRS WHOSE 

INTERESTS WERE EXTINGUISHED BY THE TAX FORFEITURE SALE. 

THUS THE SAME COULD NOT BE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES 

JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DUE TO THERE NOT BEING 

ANY PRIVITY BETWEEN THESE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND 

THE SCARBOROUGH HEIRS. THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ 

ROOT OF TITLE BEING FROM THE STATE OF OHIO AND NOT THE 

SCARBOROUGH HEIRS. 

{¶33} Appellants’ seventh assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THERE WAS PRIVITY 

BETWEEN THE NAMED SCARBOROUGH DEFENDANTS WHO WERE 
 – 9 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

SERVED BY PUBLICATION WHO HAD NO INTEREST IN SAID 

PREMISES AND WERE NOT IN PRIVITY WITH THESE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS. THEREFORE, SAID JUDGMENT WAS AGAINST THE 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 

{¶34} Appellants’ eighth assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING PRIVITY BY STATING 

THAT IN THE PRIOR CASE IN 2000, THAT THE SUCCESSORS AND 

ASSIGNS WERE NAMED WHEN, IN FACT, THE COMPLETE RECORD 

AS SHOWN IN THE ATTACHED EXHIBIT SHOWS THAT THERE WAS 

NO NOTICE TO ANY SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS OF THE 

SCARBOROUGH HEIRS. 

{¶35} Appellants’ ninth assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS’ COUNTERCLAIM AND ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR 

THEM. 

{¶36} In these assignments of error, appellants contend the trial court erred in 

finding that their claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they were not 

named as party defendants in the ODMA lawsuit nor were they in privity with the named 

defendants. They point out that their father, Nova Christman, obtained his title to the 

Christman Royalty Interest through a tax forfeiture sale, not from the Scarborough heirs. 

And they assert the ODMA lawsuit did not name or serve “successors and assigns” in its 

publication, complaint, or judgment entry. They further note that the ODMA lawsuit did 

not even name two of the five Scarborough heirs. 

{¶37} Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment on the merits 

bars any subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or 

occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action. Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 

Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), syllabus. 
 – 10 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

{¶38} The doctrine of res judicata is made up of two parts: claim preclusion (res 

judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). 

{¶39} Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions by the same parties, or those 

in privity with the parties, based on any claim arising out of a transaction that was the 

subject matter of a previous action. O'Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 

59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E .2d 803, ¶ 6. ¶ 7. 

{¶40} Issue preclusion prevents parties, or those in privity with a party, from relitigating facts or issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit. 

Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 1994-Ohio-358, 637 N.E.2d 917. Issue preclusion 

applies when three conditions are met: (1) the fact or issue was actually and directly 

litigated in the prior action, (2) the fact or issue was passed upon and determined by a 

court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) the party against whom issue preclusion is 

asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action. Id., citing Whitehead v. 

Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969), paragraph two of the syllabus, 

overruled in part by Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 1995-Ohio-331, 653 

N.E.2d 226. “Issue preclusion applies even if the causes of action differ.” O’Nesti, 113 

Ohio st.3d at ¶ 7. 

{¶41} This case involves issue preclusion as opposed to claim preclusion. The 

first two conditions of issue preclusion are clearly met in this case. 

{¶42} First, the issue here is the ownership of the oil and gas rights (including 

royalties), previously owned by Watson and Bentley, underlying the Property. That too 

was the issue in the 2000 ODMA Lawsuit (in addition to the ownership of Edith’s interest). 

{¶43} Second, the Monroe County Common Pleas Court, which is a court of 

competent jurisdiction, determined that appellee was the owner of the oil and gas rights 

underlying the Property. 

{¶44} The only question here is whether the third condition of issue preclusion 

was met. In this case, the parties are not identical to the parties in the 2000 ODMA 

Lawsuit. 

{¶45} Appellee asserts that appellants were named parties in the 2000 ODMA 

Lawsuit and the corresponding notice by publication. He suggests that the complaint and 

the notice included Watson’s and Bentley’s “assigns” and “successors.” 
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Case No. 18 MO 0005

{¶46} A careful reading of the named parties, however, reveals that appellee 

failed to name appellants. The complaint lists as defendants: (1) Watson; (2) Bentley; 

(3) Edith; and (4) “their unknown heirs, devisees and legatees[.]” Likewise, the legal 

notice by publication is addressed to: “WATSON D. SCARBOROUGH, BENTLEY 

SCARBOROUGH and EDITH B. SCARBOROUGH and their unknown heirs, devisees 

and legatees[.]” (Pt. Motion for S.J. Ex. C). The terms “assignees” and “successors” do 

not appear on either the complaint or the notice. 

{¶47} Black’s Online Law Dictionary defines “heir” as “[a] person who succeeds, 

by the rules of law, to an estate in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, upon the death of 

his ancestor, by descent and right of relationship[.]” It defines “devisee” as “[t]he person 

to whom lands or other real property are devised or given by will.” And it defines “legatee” 

as “[t]he person to whom a legacy is given[.]” Appellants do not share any of these 

relationships with Watson and Bentley. 

{¶48} Instead, appellants share the relationship of either “assignee” or 

“successor” with Watson and Bentley. Black’s Online Law Dictionary defines “assignee” 

as “[a] person to whom an assignment is made[.]” It defines “successor” as “[o]ne who 

succeeds to the rights or the place of another[.]” Appellee could have, but did not, name 

Watson’s and Bentley’s assignees and successors in the complaint or the notice. 

{¶49} Thus, in order for the third condition to be met, appellants must be in privity 

with Watson and Bentley or their heirs, devisees, or legatees. 

{¶50} “As a general matter, privity ‘is merely a word used to say that the 

relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to 

include that other within the res judicata.’” Thompson, 70 Ohio St.3d at 184, quoting 

Bruszewski v. United States (C.A.3, 1950), 181 F.2d 419, 423 (Goodrich, J., concurring). 

A party is in privity with another “if he succeeds to an estate or an interest formerly held 

by the other * * * because privity is a succession of interest or relationship to the same 

thing.” City of Columbus v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 45 Ohio St.2d 47, 51, 341 N.E.2d 298 

(1976). 

{¶51} In addressing privity when dealing with issue preclusion, the First District 

noted that “nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety of preexisting 

‘substantive legal relationship[s]’ between the person to be bound and a party to the 
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Case No. 18 MO 0005

judgment, such as preceding and succeeding owners of property.” Wright v. Heller, 1st 

Dist. No. C-160897, 2018-Ohio-149, ¶ 31, appeal not allowed, 152 Ohio St.3d 1482, 

2018-Ohio-1990, 98 N.E.3d 296, citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894, 128 S.Ct. 

2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155. It further observed that “‘[S]uccessive ownership interests in the 

same property are sufficient to sustain the flow of privity.’” Id., quoting City of Columbus 

v. Union Cemetery Assn., 45 Ohio St.2d 47, 51, 341 N.E.2d 298 (1976). 

{¶52} In this case, appellants claim to be the rightful owners of a royalty interest 

in the oil and gas underlying the Property. They claim the interest passed to them when 

their father, Nova Christman, died in 1992. Nova acquired any royalty interest he may 

have had from the Auditor’s Deed in 1944. The Auditor’s Deed refers to “Monroe County 

Records, Volume 83, Pages 542 and 543.” Volume 83, Page 542 had previously reserved 

a one-fifth interest for Bentley and Volume 83, Page 543 had previously reserved a onefifth interest for Watson. Thus, appellants’ interest (if any existed) can be traced back to 

Watson’s and Bentley’s interests. Appellants would be the successive owners of 

Watson’s and Bentley’s royalty interests. 

{¶53} “[O]ne who is in privity with another because of the transfer of property 

‘stands in the same shoes’ as to the rights of the prior owner in the same property, thereby 

giving the subsequent owner the same rights and obligation as the original owner had in 

regard to the property.” Berardi v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 1 Ohio App.2d 365, 370, 

205 N.E.2d 23 (8th Dist.1965). 

{¶54} Any interest Nova acquired came by way of the Auditor’s Deed referencing 

the Scarborough Heirs and specifically Watson’s and Bentley’s interests. Thus, Nova 

was in privity with Watson and Bentley. When Nova died, his property, including any 

royalty interest, passed to appellants. Appellants then “stood in the same shoes” as Nova, 

who was in privity with Watson and Bentley. Therefore, appellants were in privity with the 

named parties in the 2000 ODMA Lawsuit. 

{¶55} Because appellants were in privity with the named parties in the 2000 

ODMA Lawsuit, the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata to bar 

appellants’ claim in this case. 

{¶56} Accordingly, appellants’ first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth 

assignments of error are without merit and are overruled. 
 – 13 – 

Case No. 18 MO 0005

{¶57} Appellants’ third assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT GRANTING TO THESE 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS THE ENTIRE 1/8 OR ALL THE ROYALTY 

INTEREST UNDER SAID PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE 1944 

AUDITOR’S DEED ATTACHED HERETO IN THAT THERE WAS A NEW 

SEPARATE AND PERFECT CHAIN OF TITLE FOR SAID INTEREST IN 

SAID PROPERTY AS ESTABLISHED BY SAID AUDITOR’S DEED AFTER 

ONE (1) YEAR. 

{¶58} Here appellants argue the trial court erred in not quieting title in their 

names for the one-eighth Christman Royalty Interest. 

{¶59} Appellants’ fourth assignment of error states: 

 THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN STATING THERE WERE NO 

TITLE TRANSACTIONS AS TO SAID PREMISES WHERE IN FACT THE 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS PREDECESSOR IN TITLE, THEIR 

FATHER, NOVA A. CHRISTMAN, LEASED SAID PROPERTY TO 

RELIABLE EXPLORATION BY LEASE DATED AUGUST 8, 1981 AND 

RECORDED ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1981 IN VOLUME 120, PAGE 530 OF 

THE MONROE COUNTY LEASE RECORDS AND, FURHTER THIS 

LEASE WAS RELEASED FROM RECORD IN JANUARY, 1984 IN 

VOLUME 8, PAGE 299 OF THE SPECIAL RELEASE RECORDS IN THE 

MONROE COUNTY RECORDER’S OFFICE. 

{¶60} In this assignment of error, appellants contend the trial court was incorrect 

in finding there were no title transactions regarding the Christman Royalty Interest. 

{¶61} Because the doctrine of res judicata bars appellants’ action, appellants’ 

third and fourth assignments of error are moot. 

{¶62} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed. 

Waite, P. J., concurs. 

D’Apolito, J., concurs. 
[Cite as Winland v. Christman, 2019-Ohio-2408.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed 

against the Appellant. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.