(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008 

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum

sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A).

Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while 

§802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n]

an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or

of a State or foreign country.” 

 Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an

offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government 

argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced 

to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction

was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess

countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term

“felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense 

does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both

(1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, 

per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court

ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined

exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition 
 

 

 

 

2 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year

qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.

(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used 

“felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares

what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not 

stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392–393, n. 10. 

Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. 

§3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense

. . . punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no

blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could

have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means 

a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year 

. . . .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise 

if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s

sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and

state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in

§841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony

drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of

drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of

§802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section 

serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.

(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 

1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an 

offense that is a felony under . . . any law of a State” (emphasis 

added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of

the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent

state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, 

Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-ofimprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10. 

(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in

determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Syllabus 

definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity 

is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381, 

387. Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a

manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is 

no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11. 

478 F. 3d 658, affirmed. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–11429 

KEITH LAVON BURGESS, PETITIONER v. UNITED 

STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 16, 2008] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

For certain federal drug offenses, the Controlled Substances Act mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for 10 years. 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). That minimum doubles to 20 years for defendants previously 

convicted of a “felony drug offense.” Ibid. The question in 

this case is whether a state drug offense classified as a 

misdemeanor, but punishable by more than one year’s

imprisonment, is a “felony drug offense” as that term is

used in §841(b)(1)(A).

Two statutory definitions figure in our decision. Section 

802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any

“offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a

felony.” Section 802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to mean an offense involving specified

drugs that is “punishable by imprisonment for more than 

one year under any law of the United States or of a State 

or foreign country.”

The term “felony drug offense” contained in 

§841(b)(1)(A)’s provision for a 20-year minimum sentence,

we hold, is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not 
 

 

2 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony.” A state drug

offense punishable by more than one year therefore qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies 

the offense as a misdemeanor. 

I 

Petitioner Keith Lavon Burgess pleaded guilty in the

United States District Court for the District of South 

Carolina to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U. S. C.

§§841(a) and 846.1 A violation of §841(a) involving that

quantity of cocaine base ordinarily carries a mandatory 

minimum sentence of 10 years. §841(b)(1)(A). The minimum sentence increases to 20 years, however, if the crime

follows a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense.” Ibid. 

Burgess had previously been convicted of possessing 

cocaine in violation of S. C. Code Ann. §44–53–370(c) and 

(d)(1) (2002 and Supp. 2007). Although that offense carried a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, 

South Carolina classified it as a misdemeanor. §44–53–

370(d)(1). Burgess’ prior South Carolina conviction, the

Government urged, raised the minimum sentence for his

federal conviction to 20 years. The enhancement was 

mandatory, the Government maintained, because Congress defined “felony drug offense” to include state cocaine 

offenses “punishable by imprisonment for more than one 

year.” 21 U. S. C. §802(44).2 

Burgess contested the enhancement of his federal sen-

—————— 

1Although Title 21 of the United States Code has not been enacted as 

positive law, we refer to it rather than the underlying provisions of the 

Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §801 

et seq., for the sake of simplicity. The relevant provisions of Title 21 

have not changed from the time of Burgess’ offense, and all citations

are to the 2000 edition through Supplement V. 2Burgess received a one-year suspended sentence for his South Carolina conviction, but does not dispute that the offense was “punishable 

by imprisonment for more than one year.” §802(44) (emphasis added). 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

tence. The term “felony drug offense,” he argued, incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in 

§802(13) to mean “any Federal or State offense classified 

by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” A prior

drug offense does not rank as a “felony drug offense,” he

contended, unless it is (1) classified as a felony under the 

law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) 

punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per 

§802(44).

Rejecting Burgess’ argument, the District Court ruled

that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug 

offense” as that term is used in §841(b)(1)(A). Although

the District Court’s ruling subjected Burgess to a 20-year

minimum sentence, the Government moved for a downward departure based on Burgess’ substantial assistance 

in another prosecution. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(e) (2000 ed., 

Supp. V). The court granted the motion and sentenced

Burgess to 156 months’ imprisonment followed by ten 

years’ supervised release. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit affirmed. The “‘commonsense way to interpret 

“felony drug offense,”’” that court said, “‘is by reference to

the definition in §802(44).’” 478 F. 3d 658, 662 (2007) 

(quoting United States v. Roberson, 459 F. 3d 39, 52 (CA1 

2006)). The Fourth Circuit found nothing in the “plain

language or statutory scheme . . . to indicate that Congress intended ‘felony drug offense’ also to incorporate the

definition [of ‘felony’] in §802(13).” 478 F. 3d, at 662. 

 Burgess, proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of certiorari. We granted the writ, 552 U. S. ___ (2007), to

resolve a split among the Circuits on the question Burgess 

presents: Does a drug crime classified as a misdemeanor 

by state law, but punishable by more than one year’s

imprisonment, rank as a “felony drug offense” under 21

U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A)? Compare 478 F. 3d 658 (case below), and Roberson, 459 F. 3d 39 (§802(44) provides exclu-
 

4 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

sive definition of “felony drug offense”), with United States 

v. West, 393 F. 3d 1302 (CADC 2005) (both §802(13) and 

§802(44) limit meaning of “felony drug offense”). 

II 

A 

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U. S. C. §801 

et seq., contains two definitions central to the dispute 

before us; they bear repetition in full. Section 802(13)

provides: 

“The term ‘felony’ means any Federal or State offense 

classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” 

Section 802(44) states: 

“The term ‘felony drug offense’ means an offense that 

is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year 

under any law of the United States or of a State or

foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, 

or depressant or stimulant substances.” 

Burgess argues here, as he did below, that “felony drug 

offense,” as used in §841(b)(1)(A), should be construed to

incorporate both the definition of “felony” in §802(13) and 

the definition of “felony drug offense” in §802(44). Under 

his reading, the §841(b)(1)(A) enhancement is triggered 

only when the prior conviction is both “classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” §802(13), and 

“punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” 

§802(44).

The Government, in contrast, reads §802(44) to provide 

the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense.” Under the 

Government’s reading, all defendants whose prior drug 

crimes were punishable by more than one year in prison

would be subject to the §841(b)(1)(A) enhancement, regardless of the punishing jurisdiction’s classification of the 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

offense. 

The Government’s reading, we are convinced, correctly

interprets the statutory text and context. Section 802(44) 

defines the precise phrase used in §841(b)(1)(A)—“felony 

drug offense.” “Statutory definitions control the meaning

of statutory words . . . in the usual case.” Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198, 201 (1949). See 

also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When

a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow 

that definition . . . .”); 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, Statutes 

and Statutory Construction §47:7, pp. 298–299, and nn. 2–

3 (7th ed. 2007) (hereinafter Singer).

The CSA, to be sure, also defines the term “felony.” The 

language and structure of the statute, however, indicate

that Congress used the phrase “felony drug offense” as a 

term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to 

§802(13). First, Congress stated that “[t]he term ‘felony 

drug offense’ means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” §802(44) (emphasis

added). “As a rule, [a] definition which declares what a

term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated.” 

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392–393, n. 10 (1979) 

(some internal quotation marks omitted). See also Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 82, 86 (1937); 2A Singer 

§47:7, p. 306, and n. 20. 

Second, the term “felony” is commonly defined to mean a 

crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.

See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a) (classifying crimes with a

maximum term of more than one year as felonies); Black’s

Law Dictionary 651 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “felony” as “[a] 

serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for 

more than one year or by death”). Section 802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense . . . punishable

by imprisonment for more than one year,” in short, leaves

no blank to be filled by §802(13) or any other definition of 

“felony.” 
 

 

6 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate the definition of “felony” in §802(13), it easily could 

have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug

offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year . . . .” See Roberson, 459 

F. 3d, at 52. Congress has often used that drafting technique—i.e., repeating a discretely defined word—when it 

intends to incorporate the definition of a particular word

into the definition of a compound expression. See, e.g., 15 

U. S. C. §1672(a)–(b) (defining “earnings” and then defining “disposable earnings” as “that part of the earnings”

meeting certain criteria); 18 U. S. C. §1956(c)(3)–(4) (defining “transaction” and then defining “financial transaction” 

as “a transaction which” meets other criteria); §1961(1),

(5) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (defining “racketeering activity” 

and then defining “pattern of racketeering activity” to

require “at least two acts of racketeering activity”).3 

—————— 

3Burgess offers four examples of defined words nested within defined

phrases where, he asserts, the definition of the word is embraced 

within the phrase, although the word is not repeated in the definition of

the phrase. See Reply Brief 11–12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 11–12. In all but 

one of these examples, however, the definition of the phrase is introduced by the word “includes.” See 2 U. S. C. §1301(4), (6), (7); 18 

U. S. C. §2266(3)–(4). “[T]he word ‘includes’ is usually a term of 

enlargement, and not of limitation.” 2A Singer §47:7, p. 305 (some 

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus “[a] term whose statutory

definition declares what it ‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of

meaning . . . than where”—as in §802(44)—“the definition declares 

what a term ‘means.’ ” Ibid. See also Groman v. Commissioner, 302 

U. S. 82, 86 (1937) (“[W]hen an exclusive definition is intended the 

word ‘means’ is employed, . . . whereas here the word used is ‘includes.’ ”). 

Burgess’ fourth example is also inapposite. The definition of “debtor’s 

principal residence” in the Bankruptcy Code, he notes, does not repeat

the word “debtor,” itself a discretely defined term. See 11 U. S. C. 

§101(13), (13A) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Section 101(13A) states: “The term 

‘debtor’s principal residence’—(A) means a residential structure, 

including incidental property, without regard to whether that structure 

is attached to real property; and (B) includes an individual condomin-
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Fourth, our reading avoids anomalies that would arise if 

both 21 U. S. C. §802(13) and §802(44) governed application of the sentencing enhancement in §841(b)(1)(A).

Notably, §802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by

more than one year, while §802(13) includes only federal 

and state offenses. Incorporation of §802(13) into 

§841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a 

foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of

foreign offenses in §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug 

offense.” Furthermore, some States and many foreign

jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:1–4 (West 2005); Me. 

Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §1252 (Supp. 2007); Brief for 

United States 35. Burgess’ compound definition of “felony 

drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in those jurisdictions. See, e.g., 

United States v. Brown, 937 F. 2d 68, 70 (CA2 1991) (relying on New Jersey common law to determine that the 

State classifies offenses punishable by more than one year 

as felonies). No such uncertainty arises under the precise

definition Congress provided in §802(44).

Finally, reading §802(44) as the exclusive definition of 

—————— 

ium or cooperative unit, a mobile or manufactured home, or trailer.”

That definition, unlike 21 U. S. C. §802(44), is incomplete on its face

because nothing in the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” 

elucidates the word “debtor’s.” Given that void and 11 U. S. C. 

§101(13A)’s placement in the Bankruptcy Code, it is reasonable to 

assume that Congress wanted courts to read the phrase “debtor’s 

principal residence” in light of the separate definition of “debtor.”

Indeed, a contrary reading would yield the absurd result that every

residential structure is a “debtor’s principal residence.”

At most, therefore, Burgess’ fourth example illustrates the importance of considering context in applying canons of statutory construction. There may well be other examples lurking in the United States 

Code of nested terms that draw their meaning from two different

statutory provisions without repeating one term in the definition of the 

other. But “felony drug offense” is not among them. 
 

 

8 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

“felony drug offense” hardly renders §802(13) extraneous.

Section 802(13) serves to define “felony” for many CSA 

provisions using that unadorned term. See, e.g.,

§§824(a)(2) (revocation of license to manufacture controlled substances upon conviction of a felony), 843(b) (use 

of a communication facility to commit a felony), 843(d)(1)–

(2) (sentencing enhancements), 843(e) (prohibition on 

engaging in transactions involving listed chemicals upon 

conviction of a felony involving those chemicals), 848(c)(1) 

(definition of “continuing criminal enterprise”),

848(e)(1)(B) (mandatory minimum term for killing a law

enforcement officer to avoid prosecution for a felony),

853(d) (rebuttable presumption that property acquired 

during commission of certain felonies is subject to criminal 

forfeiture), 878(a)(3) (authority to make warrantless arrest 

where there is probable cause to believe a felony has been

committed). 

B 

The drafting history of the CSA reinforces our reading of

§802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense.” In 1988, Congress first used the term “felony drug

offense” to describe the type of prior conviction that would 

trigger a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under 

§841(b)(1)(A). See National Narcotics Leadership Act,

Pub. L. 100–690, §6452(a), 102 Stat. 4371. The 1988 

definition of the term was placed within §841(b)(1)(A) 

itself; the definition covered “an offense that is a felony

under any . . . Federal law . . . or . . . any law of a State or

a foreign country” prohibiting or restricting conduct relating to certain types of drugs. §6452(a)(2), ibid.4 But in 

—————— 

4The full definition stated: 

“For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘felony drug offense’ 

means an offense that is a felony under any provision of this title or any

other Federal law that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic 

drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances or a felony 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

1994, Congress amended the definition, replacing “an

offense that is a felony under . . . any law of a State,” ibid. 

(emphasis added), with “an offense that is punishable by 

imprisonment for more than one year under any law . . . of 

a State,” Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 

Pub. L. 103–322, §90105(c)–(d), 108 Stat. 1988 (emphasis

added). In lieu of incorporation within §841(b)(1)(A), the

new definition was placed in a discrete §802 definition

section. Ibid. 

This alteration lends considerable support to our reading of the statute. Before 1994, the definition of “felony

drug offense” depended on the vagaries of state-law classifications of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. The 

1994 amendments replaced that definition with a uniform

federal standard based on the authorized length of imprisonment. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” our reading serves an evident 

purpose of the 1994 revision: to bring a measure of uniformity to the application of §841(b)(1)(A) by eliminating 

disparities based on divergent state classifications of 

offenses. 

By contrast, Burgess reads the 1994 alteration as 

merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a

definition that already required—and, he contends, continues to require—designation of an offense as a felony by 

the punishing jurisdiction. That view, however, is difficult 

to square with Congress’ deletion of the word “felony” and 

substitution of the phrase “punishable by imprisonment

for more than one year.”

If Burgess were correct, moreover, the sole effect of the

1994 change would have been to exclude from the compass 

—————— 

under any law of a State or a foreign country that prohibits or restricts

conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances.” National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, Pub. L. 

100–690, §6452(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4371. 
 

 

10 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

of §841(b)(1)(A) the few drug offenses classified as felonies 

under the law of the punishing jurisdiction but subject to a

sentence of one year or less. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8.5 See 

also Brief for Petitioner 15 (purpose of 1994 alteration was 

to eliminate enhancement for “truly minor offenses” nonetheless classified as felonies). Burgess concedes that 

under his reading of the statute “the language that Congress added [in 1994] has very little practical effect,” but 

defends his interpretation on the ground that Congress

labeled the changes “conforming amendments.” Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 8. See also 108 Stat. 1987; Brief for Petitioner 

12. 

Burgess places more weight on the “Conforming

Amendments” caption than it can bear. Congress did not

disavow any intent to make substantive changes; rather,

the amendments were “conforming” because they harmonized sentencing provisions in the CSA and the Controlled

Substances Import and Export Act, 84 Stat. 1285, 21

U. S. C. §951 et seq. Treating the amendments as nonsubstantive would be inconsistent with their text, not to 

mention Burgess’ own view that §802(44) added a new 

length-of-imprisonment requirement to the definition of 

“felony drug offense.”

In sum, the 1994 alteration replaced a patchwork of 

state and foreign classifications with a uniform federal

standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment.

Burgess’ argument that Congress added something—the 

definition now in §802(44)—but subtracted nothing encounters formidable impediments: the text and history of 

the statute. 

—————— 

5The examples provided by Burgess of such atypical categorization, 

Brief for Petitioner 22, all carry maximum sentences of exactly one 

year. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13–701(C)(5) (West 2001), 13–

3405(B)(1) (West Supp. 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2925.11(C) (Lexis

2007 Cum. Supp.), 2929.14(A)(5) (Lexis Supp. 2007); N. C. Gen. Stat.

Ann. §§15A–1340.17, 90–95(d) (Lexis 2007). 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

Burgess urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determining whether the term “felony drug offense” incorporates 

§802(13)’s definition of “felony.” “[T]he touchstone of the

rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v. United 

States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “The rule comes into operation at the end 

of the process of construing what Congress has expressed,” 

Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961), and 

“applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of

statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous

statute,” United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994). 

Here, Congress expressly defined the term “felony drug

offense.” The definition is coherent, complete, and by all 

signs exclusive. Accordingly, there is no ambiguity for the

rule of lenity to resolve. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is 

Affirmed.