MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CHEYENNE HEADRICK, AS NEXT 

FRIEND OF MINOR S.S., § 

§ 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-02480-E 

§ 

BURLESON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL § 

DISTRICT, § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Burleson Independent School District’s (“Burleson ISD”)

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff Cheyenne Headrick 

(“Headrick”) asserts various state law claims, intentional sex discrimination under Title IX, and 

an Equal Protection violation under § 1983. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to 

Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the Title IX and state law claims are dismissed with 

prejudice, and the § 1983 claim is dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, the Court

DENIES AS MOOT Headrick’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF 

No. 19). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (ECF No. 1), and, at this 

stage, must be accepted by the Court as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(“[F]or the purposes of a motion to dismiss [courts] must take all of the factual allegation in [a] 

complaint as true[.]”) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Minor S.S. was a student at Norwood Environmental Science Academy, a public school in 

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Burleson ISD, from August 2021 to October 2021. (ECF No. 1 at 4). The Complaint alleges that 

S.S.’s experience at Norwood—as a nonverbal child with cerebral palsy—was traumatizing. (ECF 

No. 1 at 4). As alleged, S.S. would frequently be extremely emotional and screaming when his 

mother, Headrick, picked him up from school. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

On or about October 5, 2021, Principal Candice Cook contacted Headrick and informed 

her that “the school had discovered disturbing actions by the school’s faculty in the classroom.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 5).

Mangus and Monroe [minor S.S.’s teachers] would cover minor S.S.’s mouth when 

he would cry for up to thirty (30) seconds. It was reported that minor S.S. would be 

gasping for air as the suction could be heard from his mouth as he was trying to 

catch his breath. Principal Cook also read from a notebook of other reports that 

were gathered from other teachers. It was reported that Mangus and Monroe would 

talk to other teachers about how they would pinch under their arms or in student’s 

armpits to make them stop crying or “to give them a reason to cry.” Another report 

came to light that a teacher who was walking down the hall . . . heard a blood 

curdling cry. As the teacher entered the room, the teacher saw minor S.S.’s face 

pushed extremely close to the projector while the projector light was on. When the 

teacher removed minor S.S.’s face from the projector light, Mangus told the other 

teacher “he is your problem now.”

(ECF No. 1 at 5). More reports were made of Mangus and Monroe changing S.S. in the middle of 

the classroom and making inappropriate comments about him in front of the whole class. (ECF 

No. 1 at 5).

The Complaint asserts prior complaints and reports involving minor S.S. that had been 

reported to the school. (ECF No. 1 at 6). As alleged, Burleson ISD also told parents there were 

other children who were improperly restrained in classrooms—as well as other students with 

scratches and bruises. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Headrick asserts that Burleson ISD was aware of concerns 

regarding the teachers’ behavior and yet did nothing to monitor or supervise them. (ECF No. 1 at

6).

Further, Headrick alleges that Burleson ISD failed to properly investigate previous claims

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and failed to take immediate action concerning Mangus and Monroe. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Mangus 

and Monroe were not immediately terminated, and Burleson ISD gave no warning to faculty, 

students, or parents regarding Mangus and Monroe’s conduct. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Headrick argues 

that had Burleson ISD properly trained their employees on its Title IX policies and procedures, 

appropriate action would have been taken concerning Mangus and Monroe. (ECF No. 1 at 6).

Last, the Complaint asserts that Burleson ISD purports to have policies and procedures 

concerning Title IX, but that the only public location where Burleson ISD’s Title IX policy can be 

found is “a single webpage within Burleson ISD’s official website.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). Headrick

argues that Burleson ISD’s “willful ignorance in the face of the reported problems” subject it to 

liability for minor S.S.’s injuries. (ECF No. 1 at 7). Minor S.S. has been unable to return to school 

due to the circumstances. (ECF No. 1 at 7).

On November 11, 2022, Headrick initiated this litigation asserting both state law and 

constitutional claims against Burleson ISD: (1) intentional discrimination on the basis of sex under 

Title IX; (2) negligence; (3) negligent hiring; and (4) discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF 

No. 1 at 7-8). Burleson ISD moves to dismiss all of Headrick’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), arguing that Headrick fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If a 

plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the defendant may file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

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(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courts to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “the court must accept all well-pleaded 

facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Walker v. 

Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 725 (5th Cir. 2019). The court’s review is limited to 

the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion 

to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), 

L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS 

As stated above, Headrick asserts state law claims of negligence and negligent hiring, as 

well as intentional sex discrimination under Title IX, and a Fourteenth Amendment Equal 

Protection violation under § 1983. Burleson ISD moves to dismiss all of Headrick’s claims under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

A. Headrick Effectively Abandoned her State Law and Title IX Claims.

In her Original Complaint, Headrick asserts the following claims against Burleson ISD: 

(1) intentional discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX; (2) negligence; and (3) negligent 

hiring. (ECF No. 1 at 7-8.) In Burleson ISD’s Motion to Dismiss, Burleson ISD argues that 

Headrick failed to plead sufficient facts to support a claim for intentional discrimination on the 

basis of sex under Title IX. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Additionally, Burleson ISD contends that 

governmental immunity bars any actions against it for negligence or negligent hiring. (ECF No. 7

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at 15).

In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Headrick “withdraws the 

negligence and negligent hiring claims against Burleson ISD, as well as Plaintiff’s claim for 

intentional discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX.” (ECF No. 12 at 6). Therefore, 

Headrick has effectively abandoned these claims. Hernandez v. City of Grand Prairie, No. 3:16-

CV-2432-L, 2017 WL 4098596, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2017) (“When a plaintiff fails to 

defend or pursue a claim in response to a motion to dismiss . . . the claim is deemed abandoned.”).

Accordingly, the Court pretermits further discussion of these abandoned claims. The Court

dismisses Headrick’s negligence, negligent hiring, and intentional discrimination on the basis of 

sex under Title IX claims with prejudice. 

B. Headrick Failed to Plausibly Allege an Equal Protection Violation under § 1983. 

Headrick alleges Burleson ISD violated Headrick’s constitutional rights in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burleson ISD contends 

that Headrick failed to sufficiently allege facts showing a violation of Headrick’s constitutional 

rights occurred.

1. Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “some person has deprived him 

of a federal right” guaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (2) “the person 

who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 

U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The existence of a constitutional violation is a “threshold” requirement in 

any § 1983 claim. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 2009). “[W]ithout 

an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no § 1983 liability[.]” Becerra v. Asher, 105 

F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th. Cir. 1997).

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“Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of 1) a policymaker; 2) an 

official policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or 

custom.” Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Piotrowski 

v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “To sustain liability under § 1983, the [Plaintiff] must point 

to more than the actions of a [school district] employee, [Plaintiff] must identify a policymaker 

with final policymaking authority and a policy that is the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. 

The Supreme Court has explained that a governmental entity—such as Burleson ISD—

may not be held liable under § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some 

nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The Court next discusses Headrick’s 

acclaimed deprivation of her equal protection rights, and based on the reasons enumerated 

hereunder, the Court pretermits discussion of Burleson ISD’s policymaker or policies.

2. Headrick’s Equal Protection Claim

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 

‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a 

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Normore v. Dallas Indep. Sch.

Dist., No. 3:18-CV-02506-E, 2023 WL 3937785, at *14 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2023) (quoting City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985)).

To effectively state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Headrick must allege that 

minor S.S. (1) “received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals,” 

and (2) “the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. 

Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Priester v. Lowndes City., 354 F.3d 414, 

424 (5th Cir. 2004)). To establish discriminatory intent, Headrick must illustrate “that the decision 

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maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action at 

least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group.” Fennell, 804 

F.3d at 412. “Allegations [of discriminatory intent] that are merely conclusory, without reference 

to specific facts, will not suffice.” Fennell, 804 F.3d at 412.

Here, Headrick’s allegations of discriminatory intent by Burleson ISD are merely 

conclusory. Headrick only alleges that Burleson ISD discriminated against minor S.S. because of 

his disability. (ECF No. 1 at 9). In her Original Complaint, Headrick simply stated that “by singling 

out disabled students such as minor S.S. for disparate treatment . . . [Burleson ISD] carried out a 

policy that discriminated against disabled students.” (ECF No. 1 at 9). Headrick failed to plead 

factual allegations reflecting how minor S.S. was treated differently from a similarly situated 

individual. Additionally, Headrick fails to specifically define any policy or procedure of Burleson 

ISD’s. Headrick argues generally that Burleson ISD’s policies and training were inadequate and 

led to the harassment and injury of multiple students, including minor S.S. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). 

However, “inadequacy of policies and causation of harm do not in themselves prove a 

constitutional violation.” Adams v. Springtown Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:22-cv-00695-BP, 2023 WL 

2518858, at *3 (N.D. Tex. March 14, 2023).

It is further undisputed that disability is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection, 

and thus there is no heightened standard of review. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442-43

(holding that mental retardation was not suspect class and noting that “[w]here individuals in the 

group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the 

authority to implement . . . courts have been [] reluctant . . . to closely scrutinize legislative choices 

as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued”); Adams, 2023 WL 

2518858, at *3 (“Disability is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection.”). Therefore, as 

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pleaded, Headrick’s equal protection assertion does not state a claim as a matter of law. Thus, the 

Court must conclude that Headrick failed to plead sufficient facts to prove a constitutional 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

Because the existence of a constitutional violation is a threshold requirement, without an 

underlying violation of such, “there can be no § 1983 liability.” Becerra, 105 F.3d at 1047. As 

determined above, Headrick’s acclaimed constitutional violation does not pass the threshold. 

Accordingly, since Headrick failed to plausibly plead a constitutional violation, there can be no 

§ 1983 liability. Thus, the Court pretermits—as unnecessary—discussion on whether proof existed 

of a policymaker or an official policy to elicit municipal liability of Burleson ISD. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Burleson ISD’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6). 

Headrick’s state law negligence and negligent hiring claims, and Headrick’s intentional sex 

discrimination claim under Title IX are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Headrick’s Fourteenth 

Amendment Equal Protection claim under § 1983 is hereby dismissed without prejudice. The 

Court DENIES AS MOOT Headrick’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 

(ECF No. 19).

SO ORDERED: September 20, 2023.

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