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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

MORRIS NEAL DAVIS v. STEVEN DOTSON, WARDEN

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 07-02-0278 Joseph Walker, Judge

No. W2008-00010-CCA-R3-HC - Filed July 29, 2008 

The petitioner, Morris Neal Davis, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal

of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court was

without authority or jurisdiction to sentence him outside his statutory sentencing range and, further,

that the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him above the statutory minimum sentence. The State

has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20

of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to allege any ground

which would render the judgments of conviction void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the

judgment of the Hardeman County Circuit Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of

the Court of Criminal Appeals

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN and

J.C. MCLIN, JJ., joined.

Morris Neal Davis, Whiteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; J. Ross Dyer, Senior Counsel; and Rachel

Willis, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The petitioner was indicted for two counts of rape of a child (Class A felony). On June 19,

2007, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to two counts of the lesser offense of aggravated sexual

battery (Class B felony). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner, a Range I offender, was

sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year sentences, Range II sentences.
 We are constrained to note that the petitioner has failed to file a completed brief on appeal. The brief submitted 1

by the petitioner contains no argument section, and, therefore, no citation to legal authority to support his argument. A

“Notice to the Court” is included, which asserts that the petitioner did not have sufficient time to complete the brief.

Though the rules of our court allow for waiver in this instance, we, nonetheless, elect review of the issue before us in

the interest of justice and judicial economy. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). 

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On December 5, 2007, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus relief

seeking relief from the imposition of an illegal sentence. In support of his petition, the petitioner

argued that the sentences imposed by the trial court were illegal because the court was without

jurisdiction to sentence him outside of his statutory sentencing range. He further asserted, relying

upon Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), that the trial court was without

jurisdiction to enhance his sentence above the statutory minimum sentence. On December 14, 2007,

the lower court summarily denied habeas corpus relief, finding that the petitioner’s claims were

without merit, as the petitioner’s sentences had not expired and the sentencing court had jurisdiction

to sentence the petitioner to the sentences received. Specifically, the lower court held that the

sentences imposed were not illegal as they were the result of a valid plea agreement and, further, that

any Sixth Amendment claims were waived.1

The right to seek habeas corpus relief is guaranteed by Article I, Section 15 of the Tennessee

Constitution. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State v. Ritchie, 20

S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000)); Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Tenn. 2004). However, the

grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are narrow. Id. Relief will only be granted

if the petition establishes that the challenged judgment is void. Id. A judgment is void “only when

‘it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment

is rendered’ that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or

that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Id. (quoting Archer v.

State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)). Unlike the post-conviction petition, the purpose of the

habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely voidable, judgment. Id. at 255-56; State ex

rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968). 

The petitioner has the burden of establishing either a void judgment or an illegal confinement

by a preponderance of the evidence. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994). If the petitioner carries this burden, he is entitled to immediate release. Id. However, if the

habeas corpus petition fails to demonstrate that the judgment is void or that the confinement is

illegal, neither appointment of counsel nor an evidentiary hearing is required and the trial court may

properly dismiss the petition. Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 20 (citing T.C.A. § 29-21-109 (2000); Dixon

v. Holland, 70 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tenn. 2002)); Passarella, 891 S.W.2d at 619. Because the

determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question of law, this court’s

review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn.

2000). 

The petitioner first argues that his sentence is illegal because he was sentenced outside his

statutory sentencing range. As noted, the petitioner, who qualified as a Range I offender, was
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sentenced to a term of fifteen years, a Range II sentence, for Class B felony convictions. According

to the petitioner, the law does not allow him to be sentenced outside his statutory range, which for

a Range I offender convicted of Class B felonies, is eight to twelve years. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

112(a)(2) (2006). However, the petitioner’s argument ignores that oursupreme court has repeatedly

held that a defendant can plead outside his range as part of a negotiated plea agreement and that

hybrid sentences, such as the one received by the petitioner, do not contravene the 1989 Sentencing

Act. See Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776 (Tenn. 2007); McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 798

(Tenn. 2000). In Hoover, the court specifically stated that “a plea-bargained sentence may legally

exceed the maximum available in the offender range so long as the sentence does not exceed the

maximum punishment authorized for the plea offense.” 12 S.W.3d at 780. Thus, a knowing and

voluntary guilty plea waives any irregularity as to offender classification or release eligibility.”

Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tenn. 1997). 

While the record before this court indicates that the petitioner was, in fact, a Range I

offender, it is clear, contrary to his assertions, that he knowingly agreed to be sentenced as a Range

II offender as part of the plea agreement. The judgments of conviction include a notation that the

petitioner willingly and knowingly accepted a Range II sentence. Moreover, the record includes a

signed, written statement acknowledging that the petitioner was pleading outside of his statutory

range. Additionally, prior to accepting the plea agreement, the trial court questioned the petitioner

extensively regarding his decision to accept the agreement, which specified a sentence outside his

applicable range. As such, the petitioner has failed to establish that his sentences are illegal or that

he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

The petitioner also argues he is entitled to relief, relying upon Cunningham v. California,

because the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence above the statutory minimum sentence of

eight years. However, the record before us fails to implicate the holding of Cunningham, as the trial

court made no factual determinations which it used to upwardly adjust the sentence imposed.

Regardless, it has been repeatedly held that, even if a petitioner is sentenced in violation of

Cunningham or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), such violation would

render the judgment voidable and not void. Wayford Demonbruen, Jr. v. State, M2004-03037-CCAR3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 30, 2005); Stanley Harvell v. Glen Turner, No.

W2004-02643-CCA-R3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 12, 2005); Earl David Crawford

v. Ricky Bell, No. M2004-02440-CCA-R3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 15, 2005). 

Upon consideration of the record, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court concludes

that the petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. He has neither

established that his effective fifteen-year sentence has expired nor that the trial court was without

jurisdiction or authority to enter the sentences imposed. The lower court properly determined that

the petitioner had failed to establish his entitlement to habeas corpus relief. When an opinion would

have no precedential value, the Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm the judgment or action of the

trial court by memorandum opinion when the judgment is rendered or the action taken in a

proceeding without a jury and such judgment or action is not a determination of guilt, and the

evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial judge. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R.

20. We conclude that this case satisfies the criteria of Rule 20. Accordingly, it is ordered that the
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State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20,

Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

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 JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE