JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

(JAWS)

JOURNAL OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF OPER

J

ATIONAL ART AND CAMPAIGNING

SPRING 2007

A

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

(JAWS)

JOURNAL OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART AND CAMPAIGNING

SPRING 2007

CAMPAIGNING AMPAIGNING
ii 

Spring 2007 

CAMPAIGNING

Mission

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School

produces graduates that can create campaignquality concepts, plan for the employment of

all elements of national power, accelerate

transformation, succeed as joint force operational /

strategic planners and be creative, conceptual,

adaptive and innovative.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent

the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of

Defense.
CAMPAIGNING

Welcome to another installment of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School’s Department of 

Operational Art and Campaigning quarterly journal, Campaigning. Once again, we continue to 

receive a variety of feedback on previous editions and we encourage ongoing dialogue with our 

contributing authors. 

This quarter, Campaigning again features the Naval War College’s Dr. Milan Vego with his 

argument for the importance of considering the employment of an operational reserve. Dr. Keith 

Dickson, one of the Joint Forces Staff College’s own faculty members, offers an engaging article 

illuminating the importance of applying operational design when planning for operations in 

today’s complex battlespace. A current JAWS student, LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer, USCG, details 

the advantages and applicability of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) model for 

contemporary joint and multinational operations. Each of these submissions should substantially 

contribute to the ongoing dialogue and debate surrounding our profession. We are always 

searching for more contributors to keep the quality of our journal as high as it has been to date – 

please consider sending us your article for review and publishing. 

The current JAWS class is well immersed in the Operational Art and Campaign Planning portion 

of their curriculum and the students are laboring in the development of their individual campaign 

plans. As the academic year approaches the finish, most of the students are receiving joint 

assignments where they will be able to immediately put their planning competencies to good use. 

The JAWS faculty remains busy teaching, coaching, writing and developing next year’s 

curriculum for the incoming joint, multinational and interagency JAWS class. All are looking 

forward to the combined JAWS – Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) - Advanced 

Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) graduation ceremony that will be held at the 

Joint Forces Staff College on June 15th, 2007. 

Finally, our Campaigning editor, Colonel Craig Bollenberg, USA, continues to coordinate and 

assist with the publication of this journal while serving on the staff of the Multi-National Force – 

Iraq in Baghdad. COL Bollenberg continues to keep our faculty and staff updated and relevant 

while performing his “operational sabbatical” as Chief, Security Policy Division, MNF-I, SPA. 

We all appreciate Craig’s superb efforts and look forward to learning much from him on his 

return early next year. 

Frederick R. Kienle 

Colonel, USA 

Dean, Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) 

Joint Forces Staff College 

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CAMPAIGNING

Index

 1 On Operational Reserves 

Dr. Milan Vego 

23 Operational Design: A Methodology for Planners 

Dr. Keith D. Dickson 

39 The JIATF Organization Model: Bringing the Interagency to Bear in 

Maritime Homeland Defense and Security

LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer 

49 Upcoming Events 

50 JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications 

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CAMPAIGNING

On Operational Reserves 

By 

Dr. Milan Vego 

Copyright © 2007

Reserves in general are the principal tools in the hands of operational commanders for exercising 

and enlarging their freedom to act. The employment of reserves can often spell the difference 

between victory and defeat. Because of the characteristics of the physical environment, reserves 

are more commonly used in land warfare than in war at sea and in the air. Yet reserves can be 

created and employed for amphibious landing operations and major defensive air operations. 

Term Defined

In generic terms, a reserve is a force of a certain size and combat potential aimed at having a 

decisive effect or impact on the outcome of a given combat action. It is withheld from combat in 

the initial phase of an action, and its size and composition and the place and time of its 

employment are directly controlled by the higher commander. Hence, a reserve should not be 

confused with reinforcements, replacements, or second-echelon forces. Although related, they 

are not identical in terms of purpose, force size and composition/mix, location, and timing of 

employment.1 

Scale 

Depending on their purpose, tactical, strategic, and operational reserves are differentiated. A 

tactical reserve is designed to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a battle or engagement or 

some other tactical action (see Figure 1). 

PPT-01-VEGO-68(JMP)041101

MAJOR IMPACT ON

THE COURSE AND/OR 

OUTCOME

OF A WAR

MAJOR IMPACT ON 

THE COURSE AND/OR 

OUTCOME OF 

A MAJOR OPERATION

OR CAMPAIGN

MAJOR IMPACT ON

THE COURSE AND/OR 

OUTCOME OF A

TACTICAL ACTION

LEVEL OF COMMAND

STRATEGIC

• NATIONAL-STRATEGIC

• MILITARY-STRATEGIC

• THEATER-STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

• THEATER OF 

OPERATIONS

TACTICAL

SCALE PURPOSE

STRATEGIC

RESERVE

OPERATIONAL

RESERVE

TACTICAL

RESERVE

Figure 1: Level of Command 

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CAMPAIGNING

A strategic reserve is intended to have a decisive influence on the outcome of a single or several 

campaigns in a theater of war. A strategic reserve is generally controlled by national-strategic 

authorities or the supreme command, though in some instances it may be controlled by a 

subordinate theater commander. Strategic reserve is created from available forces or by reducing 

national commitments or changing strategic priorities in a given theater (of war). 

An operational reserve is a force of such size and combat potential as to have a decisive impact 

on the outcome of a campaign or major operation. In land warfare, it is usually composed of the 

most mobile and combat-ready combined-arms force, prepared and ready for employment at 

short notice on the order of the operational commander. An operational reserve is usually a onetime-use force.2

 It is designed to ensure and also consolidate operational success.3

A commonality of both strategic and operational reserves is that they are created and employed 

by strategic or operational commanders. Strategic and operational reserves are employed at the 

operational and tactical levels of war, respectively. The distinction between tactical and 

operational reserves is more a matter of their ultimate purpose than of their respective sizes and 

composition. 

Theory and Past Practices 

The concept of having reserves was reportedly invented by the Lacedaemonians (inhabitants of 

Sparta) and then adopted by the Carthaginians. Afterward, the ancient Romans embraced it. The 

Roman military theoretician Flavius Vegetius Renatus in his The Military Institutions of the 

Romans (De Re Militari) in 390 AD wrote that “the method of having bodies of reserves in the 

rear of the army, composed of choice infantry and cavalry, commanded by the supernumerary 

lieutenants generals, counts and tribunes is very judicious and of great consequence toward 

gaining the battle.” In his view, some reserves should be located in the rear of the wings and 

some near the center, to be “ready to fly immediately to the assistance of any part of the line 

which is hard pressed to prevent its being pierced, to supply the vacancies made therein during 

the action and thereby to keep up the courage of their fellow soldiers and check the impetuosity 

of the enemy.”4

Some of the most successful operational commanders in the modern era believed in the great 

value of having a sufficient reserve to use at the most critical time and place. Napoleon I (1769–

1821) insisted that the commander who last commits his reserve will be the victor.5

 In contrast, 

Frederick the Great (1712–1786) did not have any significant reserves in any of his numerous 

battles because he planned to accomplish everything in the initial encounter.6

Archduke Charles (1771–1847) believed that “the reserve must only be drawn into action if its 

employment is without any doubt decisive or if one is sure that it will be able to hold its own 

until they have rallied behind and taken the place of the reserve.” In any other case, “the reserve 

should be used to cover the retreat in order to prevent the dispersion and annihilation of the 

troops. It should be deployed behind the center or behind that wing which is singled out for the 

decisive attack. Now and then it may be drawn into action if only a final pressure is needed to 

complete victory; otherwise its main duty is always assuring and covering retreat.”7

 True to his 

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own teachings, Archduke Charles did not properly use his reserves in the battle of AspernEssling on 21 May 1809. Although the Austrians forced Napoleon I to withdraw, Archduke 

Charles dared not use his reserves and inflict a decisive defeat on the French. This, in turn, 

allowed Napoleon I to bring in reinforcements and finally defeat the Austrians in the battle of 

Wagram on 6 July 1809. That battle was won because of the French numerical superiority and 

Napoleon I’s envelopment of the Austrian left wing.8

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) in his On War wrote that a reserve can be intended either to 

prolong and renew the action or to counter unforeseen threats. He differentiated between 

strategic and tactical reserves. The first referred to forces in readiness for emergencies that are 

planned. Clausewitz’s focus was clearly on tactical reserves—those forces that are withheld to 

meet unforeseen events in a battle. In his view, the employment of a reserve cannot be planned 

because often “we do not even know the enemy’s measures until we see them, where they may 

be hidden by every wood and every fold of undulating terrain.”9

 

General Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779–1869) pointed out that reserves play an important role in 

modern warfare. He wrote that “wise government always provides good reserve for its armies, 

and the general uses them when they come under his command.” In his view, reserves should be 

organized at the national level; the army should have its own, and every army corps or division 

“should not fail to provide one.”10

Jomini differentiated between reserves on the battlefield and those intended to recruit and 

support the army. Whenever an army is on the offensive, it should always contemplate being 

forced onto the defensive. By positioning a reserve between the base and what he called the front 

of operations, the commander would obtain an advantage on the battlefield. He would be able to 

use the active reserve to intervene at any point of danger without weakening the active army.11

Jomini also advocated a strong reserve because an attacker is highly vulnerable if suddenly hit 

with a counterattack.12 Reserves should be employed either offensively or defensively. Jomini 

believed that reserves should be committed in the sector of main effort. They can then be used 

either for combat or to replace one’s losses. In defense, the commander should have a reserve 

ready to counterattack when least expected as the means to seize the initiative.13 Jomini 

highlighted that Napoleon I never failed to organize reserves for his campaigns.14

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. (1800–1891), was a proponent of tactical but not 

operational reserves. He wrote that in all battles and under all circumstances one must use 

everything that is available. One can never have too much strength available to achieve a victory. 

In his view, it was not advisable to leave behind a part of one’s forces in a rallying position for 

protecting a retreat. Doing so would weaken the forces whose victory would make retreat 

absolutely unnecessary. At the same time, Moltke, Sr., recognized that a reserve may never be 

lacking in fighting a major battle. However, such a reserve should be explicitly designated by the 

disposition for the battle or by an order at the beginning of the major battle.15 Moltke, Sr., also 

observed that success remains, as a rule, in the hands of the one who uses his reserves last and in 

a decisive manner. In fighting a major battle, the commander should never lack reserves. They 

should be ready for the commander’s immediate use. However, the commander must take care 

that the reserves are not employed against his wishes.16 

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Moltke, Sr., did not make allowances for a reserve force or employing a reserve in any of his 

three campaigns (in 1864, 1866, and 1870–1871). However, he allowed the higher commanders 

to hold their forces back while stressing that operational forces must be committed. He was 

successful in integrating two or three armies in such a way that there was never a need to hold 

back a reserve. At the strategic level, Moltke, Sr., considered the ability to generate forces and to 

reconstitute them tantamount to maintaining a reserve. In conducting his campaigns, he used all 

the forces available.17 

Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913), chief of the German general staff (1891–

1905), was emphatic in his rejection of the idea of having reserves behind the front.18 He 

believed that holding back of any general reserves was ill-advised because they would never 

reach the decisive place in time. He used the example of the battle of Koeniggraetz on 3 July 

1866, in which Moltke, Sr., did hold back reserves in the vicinity of Sadowa but had moved them 

to the enemy flank right from the outset. Moltke, Sr., also did not have ready reserves in the 

battles at Gravelotte–St. Privat (near Metz) in August 1870. In contrast, Napoleon I withheld his 

guards as reserves in the battle at Leipzig in 1813. For Schlieffen, the conclusion was clear: one 

wins at Koeniggraetz and loses at Leipzig. However, Schlieffen, like Moltke, Sr., was not 

opposed to having reserves at the tactical level. 

Schlieffen’s memorandum on the offensive against France and Belgium in 1905 did not provide 

for a force to be held back and committed to reach a decision. Although his successor as chief of 

general staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., made some drastic changes in Schlieffen’s plan, 

he did not make any provision for having an operational reserve. This decision was one of the 

contributing factors in the Germans’ failure to win the battle of the Marne in September 1914. 

Schlieffen modified his views on the importance of having reserves in 1909. He then contended 

that instead of having reserves assembled behind one’s front, which, in his view, must remain 

inactive and will be missed at the decisive place, it would be better to assemble a plentiful supply 

of ammunition. In Schlieffen’s view it is better to employ all the troops available to attack at the 

enemy flanks than to hold some in reserve. The stronger the forces that can be brought up, the 

more decisive the attack will be.19 

One of the leading German theoreticians in Schlieffen’s era, General Friedrich von Bernhardi 

(1849–1930), had a more nuanced view of the value of reserves. He wrote that the value of 

reserves is in prolonging or resuming combat and also in the case of some unexpected change in 

the situation.20 Bernhardi believed that reserves have a higher value for the defender than for the 

attacker. The defender is dependent on the actions of the attacker in determining how to deploy 

his forces and in recognizing the main direction of the attack. The defender should withhold 

some forces in reserve and employ them at the decisive point. In contrast, the attacker will 

dictate the terms of combat to the defender. In an attack, one can never be strong enough. Hence, 

one should not withhold one part of his force even temporarily, because that would weaken the 

offensive.21

German views on the value of having a reserve changed considerably in the aftermath of World 

War I. General Hans von Seeckt (1866–1936), chief of the Reichswehr, was a firm believer in 

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the importance of reserves. This belief was also reflected in the German army’s regulations 

issued in 1921 (F.u.G.—Fuehren und Gefecht 1921). Afterward, the prevalent view was that the 

commander mastered an uncertain situation best by having strong reserves in readiness. The 

Germans believed that reserves should be created even in the smallest tactical units.22 In the 

course of combat, and when a new, unclear situation emerged, the commander should always try 

to create a reserve. Having reserves provided a certain security, and their existence would 

facilitate the commander’s decision making. However, the Germans also realized that there 

might be situations in which the last reserve would have been used and it would not be possible 

to create a new one.23 There were also some instances where it was better not have a reserve.24 

The French Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929) was also a firm believer in the value and 

importance of reserves. He wrote that the reserve is a club, prepared, organized, reserved, and 

carefully maintained with a view to carrying out the one act of battle from which a result is 

expected—the decisive attack.25 General John F. C. Fuller (1878–1966), one of the early and 

most vocal proponents of mechanized warfare, emphasized the value of having strong reserves. 

In his view, the increased mobility on the battlefield carried with it the power of effecting 

innumerable surprises and the more the unexpected becomes possible, the stronger the reserves 

must be.26

Like the Germans, the Soviets in the interwar years put great emphasis on having strong 

reserves, especially in the conduct of offensive operations. One of the early and best Soviet 

military thinkers, General Aleksandr’ A. Svechin differentiated between strategic and operational 

reserves. In his view, an operational reserve is any division not committed in combat. Such a 

force is not tied to any particular sector or front, but is aimed to accomplish an operational 

objective. Svechin wrote that operational reserves play an important role in the strategy of 

attrition. They can be moved at the decisive moment to the decisive sector of a (major) operation. 

In contrast, a strategic reserve consists of units that are not yet completely formed or have not 

achieved full combat readiness, as well as trained replacements and stockpiles. Such a reserve 

consists of corps deployed in the country’s interior, or what he called “observation armies” 

deployed opposite the border of a neutral country. A strategic reserve is controlled at the national 

level. Svechin believed that the strategy of annihilation is incapable of acknowledging any 

strategic reserves that do not take part in accomplishing the mission within the framework of 

time and space represented by what he called general operation; he also contended that the 

strategy of attrition could and should use strategic reserves. In Svechin’s view, a protracted war 

cannot be won without strategic reserves. Strategic reserves are particularly important for a 

coalition against which an enemy can operate on interior lines.27

Soviet theoreticians further developed the concept of operational and strategic reserves in the 

1930s. The Red Army field regulations highlighted the importance of reserves in conducting 

(major) operations. The reserves were one of the central parts of the Soviet concepts of “deep 

battle” (glubokiy boy) and “deep operation” (glubokaya operatsiya), developed in the 1930s. The 

concept of deep operation envisaged the employment of an attack echelon, an echelon to develop 

success, reserves, aviation forces, and air assault forces. Such an operation would be conducted 

by a single or several “fronts” (army groups, in Western terms) supported by large aviation 

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s. 

ge army.

forces.28 In the 1930s the Soviets also began to emphasize the critical role of strategic reserves in 

winning a war. 

During their Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), for most of their offensive major operations, the 

Soviets had second echelons, reserves, and so-called “mobile groups.” The second-echelon 

forces varied from a combined-arms army in a front to a rifle corps in an army.29 However, in 

the first phase of the war (June to December 1941), the fronts consisted of single-echelon forces 

and, initially, two or three rifle divisions in reserve; later, a tank or cavalry corps was in reserve. 

The armies also consisted of a single echelon with one rifle regiment in reserve. In 1942, the 

steady increase in the numerical strength of the Red Army allowed fronts to operate in two 

echelons, with three to four rifle divisions in reserve plus a front mobile group composed of one 

or two tank corps. Similarly, the armies began to operate in two echelons, with a combined-arms 

reserve (antitank reserve, divisional artillery group, artillery destruction group, engineer reserve) 

plus one mobile group composed of one or two tank (or mechanized) corp 30

The Soviets further developed the concept of strategic and operational reserve in the postwar 

years. By the mid-1960s, they defined operational reserve as a “combined arms formation, and 

also formation or units of various service branches or forces used to carry out missions who arise 

suddenly in the course of a (major) operation.”31 A strategic reserve was described as “consisting 

of military-trained contingents and materiel stockpiles controlled by the Ministry of Defense or 

Supreme High Command (STAVKA) intended for use as supplementary resources both in 

peacetime and wartime.” Such reserves can also be created in the form of reserve components of 

the various services.32 In the late 1980s, a front consisted of three army corps and combinedarms armies in the first echelon, one combined-arms army in the second echelon (optional), and 

an operational maneuver group (OMG) composed of one tank army, plus one airborne division 

and an air army.33

 

Early airpower theoreticians generally neglected the use of air reserves. One of the most 

influential proponents of airpower, General Giulio Douhet (1869–1930) did not believe in the 

need for air reserves.34 In contrast, General William (Billy) Mitchell (1879–1936), in his 

writings on the use of airpower, recognized the need for cooperation with ground forces. He 

considered airpower a strategic reserve of the commander of a lar 35

Purpose

Obviously, if the course of events in combat could be precisely predicted, there would be no 

need for a commander to create a reserve. In that case, it would not only be foolish but border on 

criminality not to employ all available forces initially in the combat. However, the course of any 

combat action is hard to predict. The enemy can, and most likely will, act in a manner that 

cannot be fully anticipated. Hence, a prudent commander should have a force held back to react 

quickly to unforeseen developments and thereby ensure a successful outcome to the actions of 

friendly forces. 

In general, a reserve is mobile and the most effective means at the disposal of the commander.36

It is the commander’s principal means of influencing the outcome of an operation beyond the 

initial clash of forces.37 The commander should have a reserve to minimize the risks to friendly 

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forces. The commander should employ the maximum force available at the decisive place and 

time. This means that the commander should find a proper balance between the forces committed 

to the main effort and those assigned to serve as a reserve. At the tactical level, the commander is 

normally not concerned with sequels to the action in progress. In contrast, the operational 

commander must plan for sequels to follow the accomplishment of the operational or major 

tactical objective.38

 

The existence of a reserve provides flexibility to the commander in situations of ambiguity and 

uncertainty, chance, and chaos. Napoleon I, said that war is composed of “nothing but 

accidents.... A general should never lose sight of everything to enable him to profit from these 

accidents. That is the mark of genius.”39 

In general, a reserve enlarges the commander’s freedom to act. If properly sized and timely 

employed, the reserve can have a decisive influence on the outcome of a major operation or even 

a campaign. Sometimes just the threat of using one’s reserve can force an enemy commander to 

counter. One’s failure to have a reserve because of the need to maximize available strength might 

lead to a disaster if the enemy does not conform to one’s planning assumptions.40 

The main disadvantage of creating a reserve is that it reduces the combat potential of the forces 

initially committed in combat. This disadvantage is relatively more serious in an offensive 

campaign or major operation than it is when one’s forces are on defense. A reserve also requires 

combat support and combat service support that might be more urgently needed elsewhere. In 

addition, a reserve requires forces for its protection, which complicates the protection of other 

forces and installations in a given part of the theater. 

Command and Control

Normally, for each phase of a campaign or major operation, an operational reserve should be 

created and maintained. The Germans believed that reserves are an important—and often the 

last—means by which the commander can influence the course of combat and bring about a 

decision.41 Without readily available reserves, one’s command and control is paralyzed. Even a 

small reserve can decide the outcome in combat. After using the reserve, the utmost concern 

should be to create a new one.42 Only then can the commander regain the freedom to act.43

The operational commander should have adequate authority to create and, when necessary, recreate operational reserve and to determine its size and composition, its location, and the timing 

of its employment. He should have freedom of action in committing the operational reserve; 

otherwise, his ability to influence a major operation will be greatly reduced, and this might result 

in the failure of the major operation or even the campaign. However, this is not always the case. 

For example, on the eve of the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, the German 

Commander in Chief (CINC) of the West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, did not have 

control over the operational reserve deployed in his theater. Hitler and, nominally, the Supreme 

Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) had a reserve composed of the Panzer Group West with the 

I SS-Panzerkorps, consisting of two SS-Panzer divisions and one SS-Panzer Grenadier division 

plus one excellent panzer training division (Panzerlehr Division).

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The purpose of reserves should not be too general.44 Normally, the reserve should not be given a 

single mission; instead, several options for their eventual use should be anticipated. These 

options should be prioritized.45 The operational commander should not create a reserve at the 

expense of the battle. If the operational commander does not have the forces to create a reserve, 

then he should weigh the risks of pulling out his forces from less-threatened sectors.46 

In an offensive, an operational reserve can be used in the sector of main effort to consolidate and 

exploit combat success, maintain one’s operational momentum, counter enemy counterattacks, 

provide additional security and force protection, complete destruction of the enemy’s forces, and 

secure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear.47

The defender cannot concentrate his forces before he recognizes the attacker’s main direction of 

attack. Therefore, he needs to keep certain forces on hand to engage the enemy at the decisive 

point. The main role of an operational reserve in defense is to reinforce the fighting line where 

the main attack is made, a location that may not be known in advance; to protect one’s flanks 

against envelopment; and to be able to assume the offensive at the appropriate moment.48 

In conducting a prepared defense, a reserve can serve to slow the enemy’s advance. In defense, 

the role of an operational reserve is to ensure the commander’s flexibility in the employment of 

his forces, counter enemy attacks, exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities, reinforce one’s forward 

troops, block penetrations by the enemy’s forces, slow the enemy’s advance, and counter the 

enemy’s threats to his rear area. If the enemy penetrates through the gaps, any opportunity 

should be seized to carry out counterattacks. Then one’s reserve could be used to attack the 

enemy gaps or flanks.49

Creating Reserve Once the operational reserve is committed, the operational commander should make every effort 

to regenerate its combat potential or, if necessary, to reconstitute it.50A prudent operational 

commander should do everything possible to create reserves and thereby considerably enlarge 

his freedom to act; otherwise, his chances of success may be considerably reduced. The 

operational commander can create an operational reserve from the forces allocated or assigned in 

the basic or modified plan of a campaign. He can create a reserve by redeploying his forces from 

one part of the theater to another, or by scaling down or abandoning original objectives and 

thereby generating additional forces. A reserve can also be created by changing or abandoning 

hitherto-held positions or areas (trading space for force), reducing the forces assigned for 

operational protection, withdrawing forces from less endangered sectors, and abolishing tactical 

reserves and thereby obtaining forces to create an operational reserve. In the latter case, the 

operational commander would in effect reduce his subordinate commanders’ freedom to act.51

Size

The size of a reserve is difficult to determine because of the contrary requirement of having the 

largest forces available in the initial phase of the campaign or major operations and also having 

forces to hold back. This gives the commander the most important tool for influencing the course 

of action and its outcome.52 

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e.

ed 

 2 

y 

Among other things, the size of the operational reserve depends on whether forces are on the 

attack or on defense, and on the commander’s intent, the operational situation, the number and 

quality of the enemy forces, and the availability of forces. In general, an operational reserve must 

be sufficient to achieve the commander’s intent. The size of the reserve may depend on one’s 

ability to draw forces from elsewhere to deal with emergencies or fleeting opportunities.53 

In general, the reserve should be large enough to have a major impact on the combat power ratio 

between friendly and enemy forces when committed to combat. Because forces are always 

limited, the commander must find the right balance between the combat forces committed 

initially in the campaign or major operation and the forces to be withheld from combat. 

Obviously, the more forces held in reserve, the fewer the commander can commit to the 

operation initially. If the reserve is too large, then its requirement becomes a self-fulfilling 

prophecy: expressed differently, by assigning insufficient combat potential initially, the 

operational commander makes it almost inevitable that the reserve will be used.54

In general, a commander should have a larger reserve when facing a much stronger and more 

agile enemy. However, once the operational commander obtains the initiative and begins to 

dictate the terms of the battle, the reserve’s size should be reduced. Then the commander should 

assign larger forces to the sector of main effort. In some cases, the commander might not have a 

need for the reserves at all. In a delaying defense, the commander should have either a small 

reserve or none at all, because the aim is not to achieve a decisive victory but to trade space for 

time.55 

A larger force generally has a larger impact on the factors of space and time. However, the 

movement of a large force is more complicated than the movement of a small force. The larger 

force requires multiple lines of communications, greater logistical support and sustainment, and 

more complex measures for its concealed approach to its assigned area.56

Another factor in determining the reserve’s size is the commander’s knowledge and 

understanding of the operational situation. The less the operational commander knows about the 

situation, the larger should be the size of his forces held back in reserve. And the greater the 

enemy’s ability to exercise the initiative and impose his will, the larger one’s reserve should 

57 b

In the past, an operational reserve varied from several to a dozen or more divisions. The reserves

were organized at the high command, army group, individual army, and also army corps levels.

For example, in the invasion of Poland in September 1939 (Case Weiss), the Germans divid

their ground forces into two army groups: Army Group North (10 infantry, 1 panzer, and

motorized infantry divisions) and Army Group South (14 infantry divisions, 4 panzer, 4 

motorized infantry, 2 light motorized infantry, and one mountain division). Army Group North

had under its direct control three infantry divisions and one panzer division in reserve; its 3rd 

Army had one infantry division, and the 4th Army had two infantry divisions in reserve. Arm

Group South directly controlled one army corps with two infantry divisions, plus three other 

infantry divisions as a reserve. The 8th Army had only one infantry division in reserve; the 10th

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rmy had one light motorized division in reserve, while the 14th Army had only one infantry 

cluded 28 divisions and three brigades, plus one air 

ivision, directly under the control of the army general staff (OKH). By the end of June, 23 

r Division fought numerous battles with the muchperior forces on the Chir River. In the fighting, which continued for most of December, Balck 

 division. Some forces were embarked on the ships in the 

roximity of the landing beaches, and some were on-call reserves assembled at some distance 

ivision, on call after H-Hour; the 39th RCT of the 9th Division, plus the 9th Division Artillery 

ds at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. The 25th ID would serve as a 

oating reserve, ready to reinforce either corps with one RCT by A+2 Day and with the 

remaining RCT by A+4 Day.62

A

division in reserve.58 

At the start of their campaign in the west on 10 May 1940, the Germans had a total of 1412

/3

divisions plus three brigades. This number in

d

reserve divisions were actually employed.59

Sometimes for a major operation on land, a single division, or even a regiment or brigade, can 

serve as the operational reserve. For example, in December 1942, General Hermann Balck and 

his 11th Panzer Division were used as reserve for the LXVIII Panzer Corps during the ill-fated 

attempt by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Army Group Don to save the Sixth Army, then 

encircled at Stalingrad. The 11th Panze

su

destroyed the Soviet Fifth Tank Army.60

The operational idea for a major amphibious landing might contemplate using part of the landing 

force as a reserve after the first-wave troops have landed. Such a reserve can be committed to 

battle ashore in case of unexpectedly strong enemy resistance or the appearance of other enemy 

forces in the area. It can also be used for conducting a feint or demonstration to distract the 

enemy’s attention or tie down his forces along a certain part of the coast. The size of the reserve 

would vary, but it is generally much smaller than an operational reserve for a major land 

operation. However, it is not the size but the potential impact on the outcome of the landing 

operation that determines the force’s size. In some Allied landings in World War II, reserves 

were the size of one reinforced

p

from the landing objective area. 

In the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 (Operation Husky), both the British Eighth Army 

and the U.S. Seventh Army had what would be considered in land warfare a tactical reserve. The 

U.S. Seventh Army’s reserve consisted of four distinct and widely separated parts: the 2nd 

Armored Division (minus Combat Command A), reinforced by the 18th Regimental Combat 

Team (RCT) of the 1st Division and deployed with amphibious forces; the 82nd Airborne

D

in North Africa, ready to move at any time after D-Day; and the remainder of the 9th Division.61

The Allied plan for the invasion of Leyte (Operation King-II) on 20 October, 1944 (A-Day), 

envisaged simultaneous landings by the X Corps (1st CavDiv and 40th ID) and the XIV Corps 

(24th and 37th ID) in the Dulag area. One RCT of the 25th ID would make preliminary landings 

on A-2 Day to secure the islan

fl

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Force Composition

The composition of an operational reserve depends on many factors. The most important factor 

is what the operational commander expects to achieve by having an operational reserve. In 

general, the operational reserve should not be organized as a reaction force but rather as a force 

planned from the outset to achieve certain results.63 

In land warfare, the operational reserve should satisfy several requirements. It should be highly 

mobile, capable of independent operations, and able to quickly reach the employment area. It 

should be composed of diverse combat arms and capable of carrying out diverse tasks. It should 

have a high staying and striking power and a high degree of interoperability.64 Generally, 

armored and mechanized forces are the best suited as operational reserve in land combat. Such a 

force would require separate artillery support and close air support. In some cases, airborne 

forces can be optimally suited for the role of operational reserve because of their high state of 

combat readiness, short time needed for deployment, and high mobility. However, such forces 

might not have sufficient combat potential once they are committed to battle. They are also 

generally very vulnerable to enemy AA fires.65

Location The positioning of the operational reserve is one of the most critical decisions for the operational 

commander. Generally, an operational reserve should be positioned so that it can enter combat in 

a timely fashion. Its location would depend on several factors but chiefly on whether the forces 

would be on the offensive or defense, the anticipated enemy resistance, and the characteristics of 

the terrain. In general, holding back the reserve enhances its protection from the enemy’s attack. 

It also allows the operational commander a wider range of options because the reserve can be 

committed in several directions. On the other hand, by deploying the reserve forward, the 

operational commander can considerably speed up its commitment to combat when needed.66

Forces already committed in combat should not be used for protecting the reserve; this would 

increase the chances of a piecemeal defeat.67

In an attack, operational reserves normally should be deployed in a sector of main effort—that is, 

where the enemy’s forces are weakest—as the Germans deployed the operational reserve in their 

invasion of France in May 1940.68 However, forces assigned as reinforcements by the general 

staff or supreme command are usually deployed at some distance from the front line. Prior to the 

invasion of France in May 1940, the German army general staff (OKH) assigned staff of the 2nd 

Army and the staffs of four army corps, plus 43 divisions (including 19 divisions in the process 

of being formed), to be deployed at various locations in Germany as “OKH reserve” (in fact, 

reinforcements). Shortly after the start of the invasion, eight divisions were released and sent into 

combat. 

In defense, an operational reserve is usually deployed in a central location so that it can react 

quickly in any direction.69 This is especially the case in defense of a large island or of a 

peninsular position. For example, the Germans in their plans for the defense of Sicily created a 

two-part operational reserve, each part composed of what they called an “intervening group” 

(Eingreifendegruppe). One group was deployed in the western part of the island and was 

composed of the German 15th Panzer Division and two Italian divisions (26th Assietta and 28th 

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Aosta). In the eastern part of the island were deployed the German Hermann Goering Panzer 

Division and two Italian divisions (4th Livorno and 54th Napoli).70

In general, an operational reserve should be deployed, at least initially, in one’s operational depth 

but within striking distance of the enemy force. Such a location enhances the reserve’s 

concealment and minimizes the chances of premature engagement with enemy forces.71 (For 

example, one of the factors of the Prussian defeat in the battle of Jena-Auerstadt in October 1806 

was that their “strategic” (actually “operational”) reserve of 20,000 men under Prince Eugen von 

Wuerttemberg was under cantonment while the decision was made on the Saale River (near 

Gera).72 The Prussian main force under the king numbered 55,000 men). 

In their war with Turkey in 1877–1878, the Russians made a big error in declaring war before the 

mobilization of their troops was completed. They mobilized an army of about 300,000 men in 

the European theater. However, the Russians started their campaign on the Danube River with a 

force of only 135,000 men and left the Coastal Army of 50,000 men as “strategic” reserve 

deployed between Romania’s border and the Crimea. The remainder of the mobilized troops was 

held back in Russia proper. The consequences of the Russian decision to hold back large forces 

far away from the main theater are well known.73

Generally, the larger the operational reserve, the greater its distance should be from the flanks. 

An operational reserve should be held well back as long as its commitment is not required. 

However, the more certain the commander is about the reserve’s commitment and the more 

imminent it becomes, the further forward the operational reserve should be deployed.74 

The tendency to deploy an operational reserve in a relatively small physical area should be 

avoided whenever possible; such a reserve can be too vulnerable to enemy attack from the air. 

To prevent the enemy from simultaneously engaging the entire operational reserve, sometimes it 

is advisable to divide the reserve into a number of smaller but highly mobile and lethal elements. 

This would give the enemy more problems in delaying the employment of the reserve. In 

addition, using multiple routes to the concentration area reduces the chances of possible 

congestion during the reserve’s movement. It would also allow the forces to reach the area 

simultaneously. Hence, it is critical to have a good communication network, consisting of many 

longitudinal and lateral communications, in one’s operational depth. Dispersing the operational 

reserve also enhances the chance of deceiving the enemy as to the reserve’s intended use. In 

addition, it may delay the enemy’s ability to organize a force to counter the reserve’s 

employment.75 

 

Air units assigned to support the operational reserve can be positioned well in the rear because 

they can reach their intended target quickly. If the operational commander intends to use the 

reserves for counterattacking an enemy force that has penetrated his defenses, then the 

operational reserve should be positioned so that it can strike into the enemy flanks and rear.76

Sometimes the higher commander assigns as an operational reserve forces that clearly cannot be 

timely employed because they are positioned too far away from the theater in which the major 

operation or campaign is being conducted. For instance, in the Leyte operation, the General 

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Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ, SWPA) allocated the 32nd ID and 77th ID to the 

Sixth Army as reserves. However, because of the lack of shipping, neither of these divisions 

could reach Leyte from their staging areas until mid-November 1944. On 29 October 1944, 

GHQ, SWPA directed the 77th ID to move from Guam to the Solomons for rest and 

rehabilitation. The seriousness of the situation on Leyte led GHQ to release the 11th A/B 

Division and the 112th RCT to the Sixth Army. All these units reached Leyte between 14 and 23 

November.77 

Employment

Broadly speaking, a reserve can be used to either exploit unforeseen opportunities or master 

crises. It can be used to redeem failure or to prevent a failure from happening. Initial actions 

rarely accomplish decisive results. Such successes are more likely to result from exploiting 

opportunities that can be created or are identified in the course of a campaign or major operation. 

The reserve can also be used to overcome the consequences of a crisis that has occurred in the 

course of a major operation or campaign. In such a case, the reserve should be used not only 

defensively but offensively as well. In using the reserve to maintain his freedom of action, the 

commander also preserves the opportunity to deliver a decisive blow against the enemy. At the 

same time, he also reduces the enemy operational commander’s freedom to act. The enemy 

commander should be put into a situation where he will be uncertain of his foe’s real intentions. 

This is especially critical for success at the operational and strategic levels of war.78

In general, an operational reserve can be used for reinforcements, blocking, counterattack, and 

counterstrike. The employment of an operational reserve as echeloned reinforcements to bolster 

weakened forces at the front would not generally result in gaining the initiative or decisively 

defeating the enemy, because actions would lag behind the enemy’s actions. At the operational 

level, the use of a reserve as reinforcements would most likely lead to the loss of the initiative 

and ultimately might well end in failure. In contrast, the use of an operational reserve to block 

the enemy’s penetration can only prevent further loss of the initiative. This in itself would not 

lead to the enemy’s defeat; it can only be the first step toward going onto the offensive. The use 

of the operational reserve for a counterattack is aimed to annihilate or destroy the enemy forces 

and regain the space lost. Generally, it would lead to regaining the initiative and bringing about 

the decision.79

In conducting a delaying defense, the commander might create a reserve to counterattack or 

block enemy penetrations. If the momentum of the enemy attack has been halted or sufficiently 

slowed, then the reserve can be used to attack the enemy flank, either to deliver a decisive blow 

or to retrieve the situation. Otherwise, the reserve should be used to block the enemy penetration 

and provide an opportunity to counterattack.80 In a delaying defense, reserves should be used not 

to achieve a decisive blow but to trade space for time. Then the reserve can be employed to 

retrieve deteriorating situations and forestall a decision—for example, to disengage a decisively 

engaged unit, or to contain a penetration until one can restore the cohesion of the operation.81

Normally, the reserve should not be used in a piecemeal fashion; the exception to this is when 

the commander aims to maintain his freedom of action.82 Dispersing units assigned to a reserve 

should also be avoided.83 For example, the German experience on the eastern front in World War 

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paign.

II showed that the reserve should be employed in smaller rather than larger units.84 Using 

smaller forces as part of larger operational reserves was easier and more effective, at least for the 

Germans; units moving on multiple routes were more difficult to interdict than those moving on 

a single route. By using smaller forces, the commander retained flexibility and initiative. The 

small units moving over multiple routes to a point of concentration allowed German 

commanders to mass maximum combat potential forward. The use of smaller units also allowed 

specific objectives to be assigned to each unit. This forced the Soviets to fight several 

simultaneous battles on their flanks.85

Timing is one of the most critical decisions facing the operational commander. Napoleon I wrote, 

“In war there is but one favorable movement; the great art is to seize it.”86 The commitment of 

the reserve into combat should be timed to seize the initiative from the enemy or to maintain the 

initiative.87 The timing of introducing the reserve into combat should demonstrate the 

operational commander’s sound appreciation of the factors of space and time. He should 

determine in advance what circumstances would call for the commitment of the reserve, so that 

when such a situation arises, he can make the decision quickly.88 For example, in the battle of 

Borodino in September 1812, Napoleon I hesitated about when to commit his last reserve to the 

battle. He thereby probably failed to inflict a decisive defeat upon the Russians, and that might 

have cost him a cam 89

Generally, the commander who commits his reserve last achieves a certain advantage. 

Committing the reserve too soon is often a sign of a commander’s weakness or, even worse, 

cowardice. Sometimes the commander fails to timely commit his reserves or does not use them 

at all. At the Battle of Antietam on 17 September 1862, the Union general George B. McClellan 

held his VI Corps of some 20,000 men in reserve throughout the battle and suffered a tactical 

defeat at the hands of a Confederate force half as large.90 During the same battle the Confederate 

general Robert E. Lee committed and reconstituted his reserves several times by skillfully 

shifting forces and by the timely arrival of reinforcements from Harper’s Ferry (located at the 

confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers, some 65 miles northwest of Washington, 

DC).91

In committing his reserve the commander essentially plays his last card. Hence, he should not 

commit his reserve too early. At the same time, he should not hesitate to do it if it means 

achieving a decision or if the combat situation requires it.92

Lack of Reserves 

Sometimes a campaign or major operations are conducted without having a reserve. This 

situation can exist because of doctrinal views that a reserve is unnecessary or because high losses 

and an inability to replace them have made it difficult or impossible to create reserves to be held 

back. For example, the initial major operations on the western front in August 1914 started 

reasonably well for the Germans. They advanced fast on their left flank. However, a wide gap 

opened between the German 1st and 2nd armies, and the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) 

exploited the situation. The German army High Command (OHL) ordered the advance canceled, 

and the war on the western front turned into a positional war. The Germans did not have any 

operational reserve for a counterattack. Their offensive prematurely reached the point of 

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culmination on the right flank. There was no reserve to employ against the BEF and close the 

gap between the two German armies. General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., the German chief of 

general staff, made another mistake against the principle of concentration by detaching two army 

corps to the eastern front although nobody had asked for them.93

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) had a much smaller force than required, 

not only for the post-hostilities phase but also for the major combat phase. Perhaps the main 

reason for that situation was the uncritical acceptance by many that somehow network-centric 

warfare allows for much faster and simultaneous operations, allows any enemy to be defeated 

quickly and decisively, and eliminates any need for a reserve or even reinforcements. The 

proponents of network-centric warfare also dogmatically believe that advanced information 

technologies will allow U.S. forces to obtain what they call “information dominance.” The result 

of the inadequate force level for Operation Iraqi Freedom was that the planners could not provide 

for an operational reserve or large-scale reinforcements in the initial phase of the campaign in 

case something went wrong with the plan. This was perhaps one of the most serious flaws in the 

CENTCOM’s plan. 

The original plan for the invasion envisaged the advance of the 4th ID (Mechanized) from across 

Turkey’s territory to Baghdad. However, that plan was canceled because Turkey’s Parliament 

voted against the 4th ID (Mechanized) using Turkish territory. Hence, that division became 

theoretically available for employment from Kuwaiti territory. However, some 35 ships laden 

with 4th ID (Mechanized) heavy armor and equipment could not reach Kuwait until early April. 

To further complicate the matter, the CENTCOM did not issue orders for the movement of these 

ships until 27 March. On standby were 15,000 men and 230 tanks from the 1st Armored 

Division, based in Wiesbaden, Germany; the 17,000-man 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, 

Texas; and the 4,700-man 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) at Colorado Springs, 

Colorado.94 

By 25 March, three coalition divisions had advanced some 300 miles deep into Iraqi territory, 

and the follow-on division was about three weeks away from being phased into the theater.95 All 

hopes were on the air forces’ ability to help forces on the ground in case of any difficulties.96

Because of unexpected attacks by the Iraqi paramilitary forces (Fedayeens) in the rear of the 

coalition line, the 101st Airborne Division, initially slated to lead the charge to Baghdad, was 

instead used to secure Najaf, Hillah, Karbala, and other towns along the route. The Marines spent 

a week of hard fighting to secure Nasiriyah. In addition, one brigade of the 3rd ID was sent back 

to secure the lines of communications.97 The consequences for U.S. forces of not having any 

reserve or readily available reinforcements would have been much more serious if the enemy had 

been more competent and determined than the Iraqis were. 

Insufficient vs. Sufficient Reserves

In some cases, a campaign or major operation was planned and executed with inadequate forces 

assigned as operational reserve, either because the operational commander mistakenly assigned 

insufficient forces for such a task or because the overall ration of forces in a given theater did not 

allow sufficient forces to be assigned as an operational or strategic reserve. For example, in the 

German offensive in the spring of 1918, the German forces were composed of four army groups 

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totaling 126 divisions (including 52 assault divisions), or one-third of their Westheer (Western 

Army). These forces were employed in three echelons. To ensure operational success, the 

Germans required a strong operational reserve. Yet the army’s high command assigned only 

three divisions as a reserve—far less than required.98 In contrast, the Allies had 181 divisions. 

This included an army group reserve composed of seven divisions (the 3rd Army with five 

divisions, plus one U.S. infantry division and one cavalry division). The French organized their 

forces in two army groups with 42 and 56 divisions respectively. Each army group had three 

armies. The British forces totaled 63 divisions, and the Belgians had 13 divisions.99

In March 1944, the Allied force that landed at Anzio was under heavy German pressure and 

unable to expand the beachhead. The only option for relieving the German pressure was to 

mount attacks in other sectors of the front. However, the Allies did not have any reserve left on 

the Italian front. Some twenty Allied divisions were engaged with the Germans along the main 

front. The Germans, in contrast, had 12 divisions deployed along the Gustav Line and five 

divisions at Anzio, while eight divisions were in operational reserve.100

The Germans started their ill-fated invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941 without sufficient 

forces overall, and this severely limited their ability to hold back forces in operational reserve. 

This was one of the major contributing factors for the failure of the invasion. Initially the 

Germans had 112 divisions available for the invasion. These forces were divided into three army 

groups: Army Group North, 26 divisions (20 infantry, 3 panzer, 3 motorized-infantry divisions); 

Army Group Center, 48 divisions (31 infantry, 9 panzer, 7 motorized infantry, 1 cavalry 

division); and Army Group South—38 divisions (30 infantry, 5 panzer, and 3 motorized infantry 

divisions). The most serious problem was the lack of reserves and, therefore, the insufficient 

depth from which the campaign could be nourished. The army general staff’s reserve consisted 

of 21 infantry divisions, two panzer divisions, and one motorized infantry division. This force 

was too small for the offensive.101 The plan envisaged bringing these reserves to the initial area 

of concentration in the vicinity of Reichshof and eastward of Warsaw, while the smaller forces 

would be deployed in the areas of Zamose, Suvalki, and Eydtkau.102

By mid-August 1941, the army general staff’s reserve of 21 divisions was divided among three 

army groups as follows: Army Group South, nine infantry divisions and one infantry motorized 

division; Army Group Center, eight infantry divisions; Army Group North, three infantry 

divisions. Only one infantry and two panzer divisions were directly controlled by the army 

general staff. In other words, the army general staff lacked the means to influence the course of 

major operations on the eastern front.103

Because of Hitler, the German Wehrmacht essentially fought the war on the eastern front 

increasingly without operational or tactical reserves. At the same time, the forces’ combat power 

was steadily reduced, the front lines were overextended, and the supply situation was 

catastrophic because of the actions of the Soviet partisans in the Germans’ rear area.104 In 

contrast, the Soviet strength steadily increased, despite horrendous losses, especially in the first 

few months after the start of the German invasions. The Germans estimated in the winter of 

1941–1942 that the Soviets had 546 large formations of which 487 were deployed opposite the 

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front of Army Group Center. The German Army Group South then faced 168 large Soviet 

formations, including 50 divisions in operational reserve.105

The so-called battle of Kursk (Operation Zitadelle) took place in an area 310 miles wide and 250 

miles deep. According to the Germans, the operation lasted from 5 to 18 July 1943. The 

Germans failed primarily because the forces committed to the operation were grossly inadequate. 

Army Group Center had to cover the 125-mile front at Kursk Salient in the west with only nine 

weak divisions. They did not have a single tank, and had only 100 assault guns and selfpropelled antitank guns. The Germans concentrated all their available forces in the sector of 

main effort, and did not have any forces left to serve as an operational reserve.106 

Air Reserves

In air warfare, reserves are used in a more piecemeal fashion to reinforce forces operating in a 

sector of main effort, either in an offensive or on defense. Air reserves are also used to counter 

unforeseen threats; when the air situation is ambiguous; or when one is outnumbered or 

outclassed by the enemy in technology, training, or combat readiness. The longer the war, the 

greater the need for air reserves. The greater the numerical inferiority, the greater the need for air 

reserves. They can be used for counterattacks and to seize the initiative.107

The British used their air reserves in 1940 to wrest the initiative from the Germans. Commander 

of the Fighter Command Air Marshal Hugh Dowding used air reserves to deny the Luftwaffe’s 

air superiority, thereby contributing greatly to Britain’s ultimate victory. He divided fighter 

aircraft into two groups: No. 11 Group was deployed in southeastern England, and No. 12 was 

deployed north of London. The latter group had essentially the role of an air reserve. It initially 

guarded the sectors against possible enemy attacks. Additionally, 200 fighters were kept in 

“squadron reserve,” ready for combat if needed.108

After large initial losses in the first phase of the German invasion in 1941, the Soviets 

reorganized their air force. For the first time, air reserves were created as part of the air armies 

but under the control of the High Command (Stavka). These units had great mobility and 

maneuverability. They were organized at the strategic level but were employed at the operational 

level. Stavka had the sole authority to allocate air reserves to frontal air armies for the duration of 

ground and air operations. The first test of using these air reserves was the Kuban operation in 

the spring and summer of 1943. They were instrumental in achieving air superiority for the 

Soviet forces in that operation. Subsequently, Stavka used air reserves in support of the ground 

forces in the Kursk, Byelorussian, Vistula-Oder, Koenigsberg, and Berlin operations.109

Conclusion The concept of operational reserves is as viable today as it was in the past. Because of the 

characteristics of the physical environment, reserves are much more important in land warfare 

than in war at sea or in the air. Current and projected advances in technology can mitigate but not 

significantly reduce the fog of war and the effects of friction. War will always be full of 

uncertainties, and no one can realistically hope to obtain so-called information dominance. To 

meet unforeseen opportunities and overcome crises in the course of a campaign or major 

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operation, the commander should withhold some forces from the initial combat. The operational 

commander also must make sound decisions as to the size, force composition/mix, and 

positioning of the reserves he creates. To be useful, the operational reserve must have a 

significant impact on the course of a campaign or major operation. Hence, the size of the 

operational reserve is not as important as its combat power. 

The operational commander should properly determine the size of the forces for initial 

employment in combat and of the forces required for protection elsewhere in the theater. Perhaps 

the most critical decision for the operational commander is the timing of the use of the 

operational reserve. This is the “art” part of operational leadership. As uncertainty is reduced, the 

commander should reduce or even eliminate the forces withheld from combat. However, it is 

highly imprudent to believe, as the proponents of network-centric warfare apparently do, that 

somehow new information technologies invalidate the need to have reserves or reinforcements. 

An often-overlooked result of the emphasis on having steadily smaller forces, especially in land 

warfare, is the inability of commanders to create a reserve. This cannot but have highly negative 

consequences for the operational commander’s ability to successfully plan and execute a 

campaign or major operation. 

To be sure, there are some situations in which a commander would not want to create or re-create 

reserves. Yet it is clearly wrong to adopt the view that the future war will be fought without the 

need for reserves. The mission and the situation should be the sole determining factor for any 

commander in deciding whether or not to create reserves. The existence of a reserve enlarges the 

commander’s freedom of action and reduces that of his opponent’s. The reserve provides a 

commander with a wider range of courses of action and creates for the enemy the dilemma of 

how and when it will be used. Moreover, it ensures that the commander can master the situation 

in case events do not proceed as planned—as they usually do not. Reserves have proven their 

great value for commanders in exploiting unforeseen opportunities and thereby winning 

victories. 

A sound doctrine should neither overemphasize reserves or, worse, directly or indirectly state 

that a reserve should not be created and employed. There will always be situations where the 

commander will determine that the best course of action is to commit all available forces at the 

outset of a major operation or campaign. At the same time, there will also be many cases where 

the commander will be well advised to hold back some forces in reserve and thereby retain and 

enlarge his freedom of action. 

 Dr. Milan Vego serves as a professor with the Naval War College Joint Military 

Operations faculty which he joined in August 1991. He is the author of Operational 

Warfare as well as numerous books and articles published in professional journals and 

magazines. 

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1 Reinforcements are, in contrast, intended to replace one’s losses and prevent the enemy from gaining more space. 

They cannot result in obtaining the initiative against the enemy on the attack. Reinforcements are also committed 

piecemeal. The commander cannot plan at what time or place reinforcements will have to be sent. They are brought 

in incrementally for the purpose of reinforcing certain parts of the front line. Replacements are intended to replace 

units destroyed or withdrawn from the front line to be reconstituted. Both reinforcements and replacements are not 

necessarily composed of one’s most trained, mobile, and equipped forces. Second-echelon forces are intended to 

convert the tactical success achieved by the first-echelon forces into operational success. They are usually deployed 

in the sector of main effort. The prerequisite for creating second-echelon forces is a rather large numerical 

superiority. 

2

 Albert F. Turner, Jr., The Operational Reserve: What Should It Be Used For? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of 

Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 6 April 1988), p. 22. 3

 Terry W. Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 

1986), p. 3. 

4

 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari), translated by John Clarke, in 

Thomas R. Phillips, Roots of Strategy. A Collection of Military Classics (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service 

Publishing Co., 1940), p. 156. 

5

 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve , p. 10. 

6

 Hans Delbrueck, History of the Art of War, Vol IV: The Dawn of Modern Warfare, translated from the German by 

Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 435 7

 Rudolph von Caemmerer, The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century; translated by Karl von 

Donat (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1905), pp. 59-60; Delbrueck, History of the Art of War, Vol IV: The Dawn of 

Modern Warfare, p. 435. 8

 Ibid., p. 436. 

9

 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York, 

NY/London/Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, Everyman Library, 1993), p. 247. 

10 Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, translated by G.H. Mendel and W.P. Craighill (Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Press Publishers, 1971, originally published in 1862 by J.P. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, PA), p. 133. 

11 Ibid., p. 133. 

12 Turner, The Operational Reserve: What Should It Be Used For? p. 5. 

13 Kimble D. Stohry, Airpower in Your Hip Pocket: Under What Conditions Should an Operational Commander 

Constitute an Air Reserve? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, 29 May 1990), p. 6. 

14 Jomini, The Art of War, p. 133. 15 Daniel J. Hughes, editor, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings; translated by Harry Bell & Daniel J. 

Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 219. 

16 Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., Ausgewaehlte Werke, Vol 1: Feldherr und Kriegslehrmeister (Berlin: Verlag von 

Reimar Hobbing, 1925), p. 257. 

17 Michael D. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of Operational Art,” Military Review 9 (September 1990), p. 40. 18 Emanuel Kiliani, “Die Operationslehre des Grafen Schlieffen und ihre deutschen Gegnern (II. Teil),” Wehrkunde

3 (March 1961), pp. 134–35. 

19 Cited in Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation. The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen 

and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 51. 20 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Vom Heutigen Kriege, Vol II: Kampf und Kriegfuehrung (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 

1912), p. 300. 

21 Ibid., p. 303. 

22 Friedrich Wentzel, Kampferfahrungen aus dem Osten, MS # B-266, ZA/1 617, 5 April 1946, Studien der 

Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, 

Bundesarchiv/Militaerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i.Br., p. 22. 23 Lothar Rendulic, Entschlussfassung, MS # D-080a, 9 March 1947, ZA/1 1429, Studien der Historical Division 

Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, BA-MA, p. 10. 

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24 Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, editors, On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung (Boulder, CO: Lynne 

Rienner, 2001), p. 26.

25 Cited in John F. Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 1990), p. 63. 26 Cited in Charles R. Gregory, Operational Reserves—Renewing the Offensive Spirit (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 6 April 1988), p. 6. 

27Aleksandr’ A. Svechin, Strategy, edited by Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992; 

translation of Strategiya, Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 2nd ed., 1927), pp. 249, 303, 305. 28 David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 79. 

29 A. Poltavets, “Use of Support Echelons and Reserves in Offensive Operations,” in Selected Readings from 

Military Thought 1963–1973: Studies in Communist Affairs, vol. 5, Part II, selected and compiled by Joseph D. 

Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, published under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 195–96. 

30 Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, pp. 112–17. 

31 Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, published under the auspices of the United States Air Force 

(original title Slovar’ Osnovnykh Voennykh Terminov, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), (Washington DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 144. 

32 Ibid., p. 213. 

33 Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, p. 230. 

34 Stohry, Airpower in Your Hip Pocket: Under What Conditions Should an Operational Commander Constitute an 

Air Reserve? p. 8. 

35Ibid., p. 9. 

36 Wentzel, Kampferfahrungen aus dem Osten, p. 22; Rendulic, Entschlussfassung, p. 8. 

37 Turner, The Operational Reserve: What Should It Be Used For? p. 10. 

38 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 64. 

39 Cited in ibid., p. 64. 

40 Gregory, Operational Reserves—Renewing the Offensive Spirit, p. 24; Turner, The Operational Reserve: What 

Should It Be Used For? p. 11. 

41 W. Hiller, Vergleich und Bewertung der in der HDv 100/100 (TF/G) und in der Anweisung fuer Fuehrung und 

Einsatz 700/108 dargestellten Fuehrungsgrundsaetze (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 November 

1985), p. 16. 

42 Wentzel, Kampferfahrungen aus dem Osten, p. 22; Rendulic, Entschlussfassung, p. 8. 

43 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 3. 

44 Gregory, Operational Reserves—Renewing the Offensive Spirit, p. 28. 45 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 65. 

46 Gregory, Operational Reserves—Renewing the Offensive Spirit, p. 24. 47 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 5. 

48. Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol II: Combat and Conduct of War, pp. 287-88. 

49 Hiller, Vergleich und Bewertung der in der HDv 100/100 (TF/G) und in der Anweisung fuer Fuehrung und 

Einsatz 700/108 dargestellten Fuehrungsgrundsaetze, pp. 18-19; Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and 

Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 5. 

50 Condell and Zabecki, editors, On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung, p. 26. 

51 Fachbereich Fuehrungslehre Heer, Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Einfuehrung in das Seminar “Operative 

Fuehrung,” Teil A, Inspector of the Bundeswehr, Operative Leitlinie, 20 August 1987 (Hamburg: 11 November 

1993), pp. 19-20. 

52 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 64. 

53 Ibid., p. 66. 

54 Ibid., p. 65. 

55 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 

56 Turner, The Operational Reserve: What Should It Be Used For? p. 20. 

57 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 65. 

58 Klaus Meier, et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol 2, Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem 

Europaeischen Kontinent (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), p. 103. 

59 Ibid., p. 254. 

20 

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CAMPAIGNING

60 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 12. 

61. Albert N. Garland and Howard M. Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, History of U.S. Army in World War II 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1970), pp. 97–98. 

62 Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to 

Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1944 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, reprint, 1983), p. 348; Sixth 

Army HQ, Sixth United States Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 17 October 1944–25 December 1944 (28 

November 1945), p. 17. 

63 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 14–15. 

64 Ibid., pp. 15-16; Michael Buck, Anforderungen an operative Reserven in the 90er Jahren–Strukturen, Zuordnung 

zu operativen Fuehrungsebenen, Zusammenwirken fuer die Entscheidung in der Schlacht (Hamburg: 

Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 13 January 1991), p. 7. 

65 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 66. 

66 Condell and Zabecki, editors, On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung, p. 26. 

67 Ibid., p. 26. 

68 Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), p. 419. 69 Stohry, Airpower in Your Hip Pocket: Under What Conditions Should an Operational Commander Constitute an 

Air Reserve? p. 7. 

70 Walter Fries, Der Kampf um Sizilien 1943–1944, T-2. 11 December 1947, ZA/1 2311 Studien der Historical 

Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, BA-MA, p. 7. 71 Turner, The Operational Reserve: What Should It Be Used For? p. 19. 

72 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Vom Heutigen Kriege, Vol II: Kampf und Kriegfuehrung (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 

1912), p. 310. 

73 Ibid., p. 310. 

74 Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung, p. 26. 

75 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, pp. 20–21. 

76 Ibid., p. 21. 

77 William M. Leary, “Walter Krueger: MacArthur’s Fighting General,” in William M. Leary, editor, We Shall 

Return! MacArthur’s Commanders and the Defeat of Japan 1942–1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of 

Kentucky, 1988), p. 76. 

78 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” pp. 64-65. 

79 Buck, Anforderungen an operative Reserven in the 90er Jahren –Strukturen, Zuordnung zu operativen 

Fuehrungsebenen, Zusammenwirken fuer die Entscheidung in der Schlacht, p. 6. 

80 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 65. 

81 Ibid., p. 65. 

82 Gregory, Operational Reserves—Renewing the Offensive Spirit, p. 24; Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in 

Combat,” p. 65. 

83 Condell and Zabecki, editors, On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung, p. 26. 

84 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 12. 

85 Ibid., p. 13. 

86 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 67. 

87 Bullington, Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve, p. 21. 

88 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 67. 

89 Bernhardi, Vom Heutigen Kriege, Vol II: Kampf und Kriegfuehrung, p. 306. 

90 Schmitt, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” p. 67. 

91 Ibid., p. 67. 

92 Condell and Zabecki, editors, On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung, p. 26. 

93 Guenter Roth, “Operatives Denken bei Schlieffen und Manstein,” in Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger Ostertag, 

editors, Ausgewaehlte Operationen und ihre militaerhistorischen Grundlagen, Operatives Denken und Handeln in 

deutschen Streitkraefte, published under the auspices of Militarergeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (Bonn/Herford: 

Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1993 pp. 282, 284–85. 

94 Ben Rooney, “US Puts Tactics Before Tanks with a Fraction of Schwarzkopf’s Force,” Daily Telegraph, 26 

March 2003; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco. The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York, NY: The Penguin 

Press, 2006), pp. 120-23. 

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95 Joseph L. Galloway, “Risks of Iraqi War Emerging,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 March 2003, p. 1. 96 Thomas E. Ricks, “What Counted: People, Plan, Inept Enemy,” Washington Post, 10 April 2003, p. A1. 97 Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 2003), p. 48. 

98 Wilhelm Meier-Dornberg, “Die grosse deutsche Fruehjahrsofffensive 1918 zwischen Strategie und Taktik,” 

Military Historical Office, Operative Denken und Handeln in deutschen Streitkraeften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 

Vortraege zur Militaergeschichte, vol. 9 (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1988), p. 79. 99 Martin Voggenreiter, “Fruehjahrsoffensive 1918 und Ardennenoffensive 1944,” Wehrwissenschaftliche 

Rundschau 12 (December 1964), p. 736. 100 Samuel E. Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio: January 1943–June 1944, vol. 9, History of United States Naval 

Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 374. 101 Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operatives 

Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), pp. 42, 45. 102 Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch, Band II: Von den geplanten Landung in England bis zum Beginn des 

Ostfeldzuges (1.7.1940–21.6.1941), edited by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart: W. Kohllhammer Verlag, 1963), p. 

468. 

103 Philippi and Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operatives Ueberblick, p. 74. 104 Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Deutsche und Sowjetrussische Militaerische Fuehrung im Zweiten Weltkriege, P145, ZA/1 2162, Studien der Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military 

Studies Branch, BA-MA, p.133. 

105 Cited in Heinz Magenheimer, Kriegswenden in Europa 1939–1945: Fuehrughnsentschluesse, Hintergruende, 

Alternativen (Munich and Landsberg am Lech: Guenter Olzog Verlag, GmbH, 1995), p. 102. 106 Dieter Brand, “Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka. Aspekte der Operation Zitadelle; Juli 1943 im Abschnitt der 

Heeresgruppe Sued,” Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 5 (September–October 2003), 590. 107 Stohry, Airpower in Your Hip Pocket: Under What Conditions Should an Operational Commander Constitute an 

Air Reserve? , pp. 32-33. 

108 Cited in ibid., p. 16. 

109 Ibid., pp. 19, 21–22. 

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Operational Design: A Methodology for Planners 

By 

Dr. Keith D. Dickson 

Current thinking on the operational planning process has attempted to bridge the gap between 

mission analysis (defining objectives and endstate) and course of action (COA) development 

(task description and development) by integrating effects into the Joint Planning Process, 

sometimes called an effects-based thinking approach to planning. This involves identifying 

measures of effectiveness (MOE) in the mission analysis process and using a systems approach 

to the operational environment to identify a set of nodes and links that are to serve as the focus of 

action within the COA. Actions against key nodes are arranged to attain the desired effects. 

These effects in turn are intended to achieve named objectives that support the endstate.1 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes the essential purpose of the various elements of 

operational design is “to help commanders and staff visualize the arrangement of joint 

capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission.”2

 Although the essential 

purpose of operational design is clear, the intellectual process that allows the commander and 

staff to apply the elements within a “framework that underpins a joint operational plan and its 

subsequent execution” is not clearly outlined in doctrine.3 JP 5-0 lays out definitions of 17 

elements of operational design, but planners often encounter ambiguity in these definitions, 

because some terms are often applied interchangeably. Second, the only link between mission 

analysis and COA development are effects and measures of effectiveness. Nodes and links are 

supposed to contribute to COA development, but it is not clear how efforts are to be focused. 

Planners can spend valuable time making lists of measures of effectiveness, objectives, nodes 

and links, and effects and never have any idea how they are to use these lists to develop a 

coherent plan that covers all six phases of a campaign or how these items assist in taking a 

mission statement and endstate and translating it into a comprehensive operational plan that 

clearly articulates overall purpose and direction. 

1

 For an example of how broadly this effects-based approach to planning can be applied, see General 

(Retired) Gary Luck, “Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science, Best Practices: the Move Toward 

Coherently Integrated Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations,” Norfolk, Virginia, Joint Warfighting 

Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command, September 2006, pp. 23-24. Luck describes MOE (Methods of Effectiveness) 

that are to be developed during mission analysis and Methods of Performance (MOP) developed concurrently with 

the course of action (COA) development and selection, then formalized. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Battlefield will identify the nodes and links which are to be the focus of action. Arranging actions against these key 

nodes will attain effects. There is no explanation describing how planners are to use nodes and links, effects, and 

MOP to develop a COA or how the MOE fit into mission analysis. His approach has little relation to the operational 

design concept outlined in either JP 5-0 or JP 3-0, and interchanges terms without linking any of them to a process 

or structure. 

2

 Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 

(Signature Draft, 23 October 2006), Washington, DC: Joint Staff, p. IV-2. 

3

 Ibid., p. III-1. 

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This paper offers an approach to operational design intended to serve as the analytical bridge 

between the outcomes of the mission analysis process and the development of courses of action. 

The operational design is the concept and framework that provides a more complete 

understanding of the overall execution of the campaign. It applies the operational art as the 

means by which a commander and staff use a combination of imagination and intellect to 

develop an operational design that assists in visualizing the arrangement of component 

capabilities in time, space, purpose, and effect in order to support development of complete and 

comprehensive courses of action to achieve the mission. 

The process of operational design is outlined in the following steps: 

1. Define the endstate (in terms of desired strategic political-military outcomes). 

2. Define the objectives that describe the conditions necessary to meet the endstate. 

3. Define the desired effects that support the defined objectives. 

4. Identify friendly and enemy center(s) of gravity (COG) using a systems approach. 

5. Identify decisive points that allow the joint force to affect the enemy’s COG and look 

for decisive points necessary to protect friendly COGs. 

6. Identify lines of operation that describe how decisive points are to be achieved and 

linked together in such a way as to overwhelm or disrupt the enemy’s COG. This is 

done by descriptors that are derived by a logical or a functional approach. 

7. Identify how decisive points relate to phases to identify how operations are arranged 

in time, space, and effect, and to identify changes in phases, especially the critical 

transition from Phase III (Dominate) to Phase IV (Stabilize). 

8. Complete the detailed synchronization and integration of forces and functions, tasks, 

targets, and effects centered on decisive points and phases to achieve unity of effort. 

Step 1: Define the Endstate (in terms of desired strategic political-military outcomes). 

Operational design begins with a thorough and rigorous mission analysis. Three of the outcomes 

of mission analysis related to operational design are a defined endstate, clearly stated objectives, 

and the identification of enemy and friendly center(s) of gravity. These outcomes are essential 

and must be thoroughly understood because they provide the focus of all subsequent planning 

efforts. Time must be taken to accomplish this analysis. Operational planners must understand 

both the national strategic and military outcomes desired. These are derived from a variety of 

sources, such as the National Security Strategy, the Regional Combatant Command’s Theater 

Strategy, the Security Cooperation Plan regional objectives, The Department of State Strategic 

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Plan, Contingency Planning Guidance, and guidance received from higher authorities. Planners 

should not necessarily wait for guidance from higher authorities to define the endstate. The 

operational planner must have a strategic focus and an appreciation for the larger strategic goals 

defined in the national and theater level strategic documents mentioned above. By being able to 

articulate these goals, the planner assists in shaping and clarifying the endstate. 

Step 2: Define the objectives that describe the conditions necessary to meet the endstate. 

A clear and concise endstate allows planners to examine objectives that support the endstate. 

Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach the endstate. These are usually expressed in 

military, political, economic, and informational terms and help define and clarify what military 

planners must do to support the achievement of the national strategic endstate. Objectives are 

written as concise descriptive statements: Country Red is no longer a threat to regional peace. 

Country Blue’s IRBM capability is eliminated. 

Sometimes military and political objectives become decisive points in the operational design 

because they are essential not only to reach the endstate, but critical to affecting the enemy’s 

center(s) of gravity or protecting friendly center(s) of gravity. Above all, keep in mind that while 

objectives can be rephrased as decisive points, decisive points are not synonymous with 

objectives. Objectives always refer to endstate. Decisive points always refer to operational level 

center(s) of gravity. 

Step 3: Define the desired effects that support the defined objectives. 

From the objectives, a list of effects is produced that relate to achieving each of the objectives 

(“an effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of 

actions, or another effect”) Effects define conditions that must exist in order to accomplish the 

desired objectives.4 Effects are phrased as a complete thought expressed by the simple construct 

of subject-verb-object: Country Red renounces the use of WMD. Country Blue supports the 

introduction of UN peacekeeping forces. Effects exist at two levels: Effects related to strategic 

objectives and effects related to decisive points in the operational design. 

 4

 The definition of an effect is from Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, p. III-11. Joint 

Publication 5-0 refers to planning joint operations “based on analysis of national strategic objectives and 

development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects. . . . 

Joint operation planning uses measurable desired effects to relate higher-level objectives and effects to component 

missions and tasks.” (Ibid., p. xv). It concludes this section with the statement, “Like end state and objective, joint 

doctrine includes effects as an element of operational design.” Doctrine is unclear on differentiating how effects 

that relate to endstate are different from effects that relate to operational tasks. “The use of effects during planning 

is reflected in the steps of JOPP [Joint Operational Planning Process] as a way to clarify the relationship between 

objectives and tasks and help the JFC and staff determine conditions for achieving objectives. (Ibid., p. III-11). 

Rather than clarifying, doctrine adds another layer of confusion when it relates objectives, effects, and tasks without 

clarifying the relationship or how the operational design supports these elements. 

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Step 4: Identify friendly and enemy center(s) of gravity (COG) using a systems approach. 

The process of deriving centers of gravity has been thoroughly discussed and analyzed in 

numerous articles and will not be revisited here. Joint doctrine approaches analyzing centers of 

gravity in terms of critical factors: critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical 

vulnerabilities. In conventional operations there exists one operational center of gravity and 

usually one strategic center of gravity. The operational center of gravity will most likely shift 

during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV, creating a number of new centers of gravity that 

must be addressed in the operational design. In unconventional operations or stability operations 

that do not have a conventional combat operation involved, there may be a number of centers of 

gravity identified at the onset of mission analysis. By determining the critical vulnerabilities of 

the enemy center(s) of gravity, planners have a means to determine decisive points related to 

attacking those critical vulnerabilities.5

 

Step 5: Identify decisive points that allow the joint force to affect the enemy’s COG and look for 

decisive points necessary to protect friendly COGs. 

Decisive points emerge from an analysis of endstate, objectives, and center(s) of gravity. 

Broadly defined, decisive points are usually something the joint force will have to fight for to 

achieve. Sometimes decisive points are related to specified or essential tasks from the mission 

analysis. This makes sense because essential tasks describe what must be done to define mission 

success. Specified tasks may also become a decisive point. 

Operational designs will often have common decisive points because joint operations often share 

the same basic elements: air superiority, sea superiority, APODs/SPODs (air ports of 

debarkation/ sea ports of debarkation) secured, friendly lines of communication secure, sufficient 

attrition of enemy forces, enemy command and control neutralized, information superiority 

achieved, sufficient forces for decisive offensive action, reorganization and establishment of 

local control, borders secured. In addition to common decisive points, planners must identify 

those decisive points unique to their circumstances by examining both enemy and friendly 

centers of gravity and understanding what must be done in time and place to affect an enemy 

center of gravity and to protect a friendly center of gravity. Decisive points are not objectives, 

but objectives can become decisive points in certain phases of the operational design. 

 5

 See Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, (17 September 

2006), Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2006, p. IV-10, and Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, pp. IV-8 

to IV-15. For the academic discussion involved in analyzing center(s) of gravity within the professional community, 

the following are useful: LTC Christopher W. Fowler, “Center of Gravity: Still relevant After All These Years,” 

Carslile, Pa.: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 9 April 2002. Antulio J. Echevarra II, Clausewitz’s 

Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, September 

2002. Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron, “Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Issue 35, (October 2004), 20-27. 

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Step 6: Identify lines of operation that describe logically, functionally, or by a combination of the 

two, approaches that describes how decisive points are to be achieved and linked together in such 

a way as to overwhelm or disrupt the enemy’s COG. 

Lines of operation must be derived from decisive points. The kinds of decisive points related to 

a line of operation define the description of the line of operation. This is why decisive points 

must be determined first before defining lines of operation. Lines of operation are the least 

understood portion of operational design and, therefore, tend to be misapplied. The importance 

of well-defined and understood lines of operation is basic to linking decisive points, center(s) of 

gravity, objectives, and endstate. Properly defined, lines of operation provide clarity and 

distinction and provide the rationale for everything that the joint force does. Therefore, poorly 

defined lines of operation weaken the plan and lead to confusion. Joint doctrine’s description of 

lines of operation is only minimally helpful, but it does describe lines of operation falling into 

two categories—physical and logical—both related to a positional reference to the enemy.6 

Lines of operation should be broadly defined to encompass a more flexible way of thinking. 

Logical lines are descriptive and collective in nature and refer to conditions. Physical lines of 

operation should also be seen as relating to functions or functional components of the joint force. 

To understand how lines of operation should be defined, a review of CENTCOM’s approach to 

lines of operation for the campaign in Afghanistan is useful. CENTCOM defined four lines of 

operation: "Direct Attack of the Leadership of al Qaida and the Taliban," "Humanitarian Aid," 

"Destroying the Taliban Military," and "Operational Fires."7 

Note that the line of operation termed direct attack on al Qaida and the Taliban is logical and 

descriptive. An analysis of the decisive points required to reach the center(s) of gravity help 

define the line of operation. The line of operation should be derived from examining a number 

of required decisive points that lead to reaching and affecting the center(s) of gravity—the 

elimination of the Taliban (and al Qaida) military capability and the neutralization of the Taliban 

and al Qaida as a threat. By identifying decisive points first, planners will begin to see logical 

connections between certain decisive points that can then be collectively described logically or 

functionally. Once defined, this line of operation allows planners to integrate forces and 

capabilities. It also promotes synchronization defined by a series of decisive points that, in turn, 

 6

 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, pp. IV-20-21. “Commanders use physical LOOs [lines 

of operation] to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy 

is a factor. . . . JFCs use logical LOOs to visualize and describe the operation when positional reference to an enemy 

or adversary has less relevance.” 

7

 In his address to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush described 

the objectives in OEF as the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture 

of al Qaida leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. During a news briefing on 7 October 

2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld related several objectives for military operations in Afghanistan. 

Military operations were intended to make clear to Taliban leaders that the harboring of terrorists is unacceptable, to 

acquire intelligence on al Qaida and Taliban resources, to develop relations with groups opposed to the Taliban, to 

prevent the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists, to destroy the Taliban military allowing opposition 

forces to succeed in their struggle, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the Afghan people. 

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are directed at affecting a center of gravity, or in the case of the Taliban, achieving a set of 

objectives. 

Humanitarian aid is also a valid line of operation, but not descriptive. It is also logical in that it 

is derived from a requirement that supports the political military endstate (eliminate state 

sponsorship of terrorism and restoration of a stable, functioning state of Afghanistan that can be 

reintegrated into the international community) and is linked to the enemy center(s) of gravity. 

Providing humanitarian aid and assistance to the people of Afghanistan not only assists in 

relieving immediate suffering, but also contributes to moving the population away from support 

of the Taliban. Specific decisive points should have been derived that seek to achieve the 

endstate and attack the enemy’s center(s) of gravity, but in this case, may also be linked to 

creating an effect or achieving an objective. This line of operation also supports the integration 

of military and non-military elements. This line of operation will determine both responsibilities 

and requirements and serves as a means for coordination. Most importantly this line of operation 

will lay out specifically what the military can and cannot do. Thus, this descriptive line of 

operation helps military and non-military elements understand roles and functions within a 

campaign focusing effort on decisive points (which allows a means to measure effectiveness and 

level of accomplishment) focused on the proper endstate in support of the military’s attack on the 

enemy centers) of gravity.8 

Destroying the Taliban Military is a poor choice for a line of operation. It is descriptive, but 

clearly has no decisive points connected to it, and therefore cannot support an attack on the 

enemy’s center(s) of gravity. When planners use these broadly focused descriptors for lines of 

operation, it reveals a lack of understanding of the connection between endstate (supported by a 

list of objectives and effects that define the endstate), center(s) of gravity, and decisive points. 

Destroying the Taliban military force is certainly an objective (with its accompanying set of 

effects) that supports the endstate. Because objectives and effects have been determined during 

mission analysis, this objective then must become a decisive point within the operational design 

because it is an event or condition that must be met in order to affect the center(s) of gravity. 

Using this as a line of operation instead of a decisive point will serve to confuse and fragment 

unity of effort and prevent the synchronization of forces and effects because it does not provide a 

logical path to the enemy center(s) of gravity. 

 8

 One of the best references for planners developing an operational design for Phase IV-V is found in 

Conrad Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for the Military 

Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario,” Carlisle, Pa., Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003, Appendix A, pp. 63-

72. What Crane and Terrill describe as Categories could be used as logical lines of operation. Some critical tasks 

could be used as decisive points. Important and essential tasks could be tasks that support the decisive points. Note 

that Category 1 and category 8 activities are primarily military tasks, the rest are non-military tasks. In the 

operational design, the majority of the critical tasks described in those two categories must be accomplished before 

other non-military tasks can be begun. This supports phasing as well as understanding the link between security 

activities and responsibilities and non-military responsibilities. The decisive points in themselves then can be used 

as a means to measure progress and synchronize and integrate military and non-military efforts. 

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The other misidentified line of operation is operational fires. Operational fires here is intended 

to be a functional line of operation, but it is too broadly defined and does not contribute to 

focusing efforts on the enemy center(s) of gravity. Operational fires are integrated and 

synchronized in connection with every decisive point in the operational design and cannot stand 

alone as a line of operation. To be useful, operational lines must be tied to decisive points. 

Operational fires, both lethal and non-lethal, can be applied to the two valid lines of operation: 

humanitarian aid and direct attack on Al Qaida and Taliban leadership. For every decisive point 

along these two lines of operation, operational fires targeters and IO effects planners should lay 

out a sequence of targets and effects that support the achievement of each of the decisive points. 

This allows planners to allocate tasks to components and to begin the process of integration and 

synchronization of efforts to gain that decisive point. Decisive points along the numerous lines 

of operation are then synchronized in time, space, and effect, so that a dynamic model of focused 

actions is created that gives commanders and staff a more complete understanding of how, why, 

when, and how certain actions are taking place in the battlespace. Operational fires, therefore, 

support achievement of decisive points and cannot be a line of operations. 

Planners should always consider including Information Operations as a functional line of 

operations. First, it highlights the importance of IO in operational planning and assists IO 

planners in defining specific IO-unique decisive points related to center(s) of gravity 

(information superiority achieved, for example). 

Step 7: Identify how decisive points relate to phases to identify how operations are arranged in 

time, space, and effect, and to identify changes in phases, especially the critical transition from 

Phase III (Dominate) to Phase IV (Stabilize). 

Having determined in order—endstate, objectives and effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive 

points, and lines of operation—planners then can link lines of operation to decisive points and 

examine the how and where certain decisive points support multiple lines of operation. Phasing 

is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. Phasing helps in sequencing events in time, space, 

and effect both as a means of examining key events related to decisive points and as a means to 

understand the sequence of actions. This sequencing of decisive points assists in laying out the 

phases. Phasing is always the last step in operational design because it assists in defining 

precisely where one phase ends and another begins. This also provides a clear commander’s 

intent by phase in terms of what must happen when and where to achieve a specific set of 

outcomes related to the achievement of decisive points. Once achieved, a new phase begins. 

Phases can be concurrent, but clearly defined phases related to the sequencing of decisive points 

eliminates any ambiguity on the progress of the operation or where the force is at any one time in 

the operation. Although Phase 0 is included as part of operational planning, it is not included in 

the operational design because it is related to peacetime activities where the United States and its 

allies and partners have not committed to the use of military force. This is not to say that 

planners must not be fully aware of Phase 0 activities in the region as part of a larger 

understanding of strategic goals, but for the purpose of deploying forces with the intent to use the 

29 

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CAMPAIGNING

 

military element of national power to further national objectives, Phase I marks the starting point 

for the operational design.9 

Planners must appreciate the requirement for preparing for transition from Phase III to Phase IV. 

Arranging decisive points and understanding the requirements for transition allows the 

commander and components to move quickly from combat operations to stability operations. 

The most critical piece of phasing an operation is recognizing when and how the transition from 

Phase III to Phase IV begins. Operational design allows planners to examine the factors and 

conditions involved that lead to the transition occurring. The key factor in understanding when 

the transition from Phase III to Phase IV begins is when the enemy’s operational center of 

gravity is influenced. Once effected, the scope, scale, and purpose of all actions related to 

attacking the center of gravity shift immediately into a new set of lines of operation with new 

decisive points directed at a series of centers of gravity (or better described as the objectives that 

relate to achieving the endstate) that, when accomplished or influenced, lead to the desired 

endstate, which leads into Phase V. Planners must visualize this transition and examine how 

forces and functions flow from one state to another once the enemy’s operational center of 

gravity has been affected. In fact, some decisive points related to stability operations in support 

of the transition from Phase III to Phase IV may need to be established and accomplished before 

the transition to Phase IV can be initiated. These new lines of operation and decisive points are 

redefined but are still focused on centers of gravity (or objectives) and achieving the desired 

endstate. 

If stability operations also include counterinsurgency (COIN), most often planners will have to 

develop a separate but complimentary operational design that will have its own centers of 

gravity, lines of operation, and decisive points. Both operational designs then may share certain 

common decisive points and share the same IO line of operations. 

Stability operations in Phase IV require new lines of operation that will be political-military and 

logical. Decisive points will be specific conditions related to a hybrid of political-military, 

military-economic, and military–psychological conditions. The IO line of operations that ran 

through Phases I-III, will certainly continue through Phases IV-V, although new decisive points 

will be added or original decisive points will be modified. The focus of operational design for 

Phase IV is influencing the centers of gravity (or objectives) related to the desired endstate. 

Military tasks are clearly defined to assist in understanding what is necessary to accomplish 

decisive points in Phase IV. The targets and effects related to these decisive points will include 

more non-military tasks than military tasks, especially as the operation design moves closer to 

achieving the endstate. This analysis of military and non-military tasks will illustrate the limits 

of the military’s role and the conditions necessary to allow non-military agencies, NGOs, and 

others to play their role in achieving that decisive point. As objectives are met, the transition to 

Phase V can be defined. As the endstate is reached, military forces are able to redeploy. 

Operational design for Unconventional (COIN) and Stability and Support Operations is similar 

to Phase IV operations. Planners will find in stability and support operations situations where 

9

 See Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, p. IV-36. 

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CAMPAIGNING

there is no significant warfighting required, the operational design supports planning and phasing 

of activities to reach an operational endstate. The focus remains on endstate, objectives, and 

effects related to endstate, decisive points, and lines of operation. Insurgencies have in common 

decisive points and common lines of operation, and multiple centers of gravity. Endstate for 

COIN can be determined from historical examples as well as from an assessment of the situation. 

Insurgencies require the same basic means to survive: leadership, ideology, sanctuary, support, 

and a functioning combat force. The decisive points in an operational design for COIN, as in a 

stability and support operational design, will be a combination of political-military, politicaleconomic, political-psychological, and sociological, with their concurrent military and nonmilitary tasks, targets, and desired effects. Lines of operation will tend to be logical rather than 

functional, although a functional SOF line of operations could make sense in certain cases. 

The following are examples of operational design. 

OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Line of 

Operation -

Military-Political

MilLitaryyPolitical

Line of 

Operation -

Line of 

Operation -

Line of 

Operation -

Military-political

OP

COG

C

O

G

C

O

G

C

O

G

C

O

G

Line of 

Operation -

Line of 

Operation -

Line of 

Operation -

Line of 

Operation -

Phases I-III Phase IV

Military-Econ

COIN

C

O

G

C

O

G

C

O

G

Figure 1: Operational Design—Phases I to IV

 

This is a general schematic of the operational design framework (see Figure 1). In this example 

of a conventional operation, four lines of operation are directed at a single enemy operational 

center of gravity. Note where decisive points (small circles) are linked to illustrate where efforts 

along different lines of operation must converge to achieve the specific decisive point. The lines 

of operation converge on the enemy COG, thus ending Phase III (Dominate) and marking the 

transition to Phase IV (Stabilize). Four new COGs (or very possibly the objectives identified as 

supporting the endstate) emerge related to stability, and three new COGs (or objectives) emerge 

31 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

related to a parallel COIN operation. Note that new lines of operation must be defined related to 

these new COGs. Stability and COIN operations may require two separate operational designs 

and a related information operations line of operation that continues through from Phases I-III. 

Decisive points in stabilization and COIN decisive points are political, economic, psychological 

as well as military, and should be defined in some cases as hybrids. A complete operational 

design flows through Phases I through V. Planners can outline basic portions of Phases IV-V, 

identifying preliminary COG or objectives, decisive points, and lines of operation to assist in 

identifying what must shift during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV. 

 

From this outline, planners and the commander visualize what must happen when and allows for 

the detailed sequencing, integration, and synchronization of forces and functions to accomplish 

this design. 

Figure 2: Sample Logical Lines of Operations 

This example from JP 5-0 is logical and functional, organized along elements of national power 

(see Figure 2). The publication notes that these lines of operation are intended to assist “the 

combatant command and component planners maintain visibility of actions or events along those 

lines, which could affect current or future military actions. The most significant of these at this 

point is the diplomatic effort to dissuade Country Brown from supporting Country Red.” From 

this design alone, none of this information is obvious. It is unclear how commanders at any level 

can maintain any visibility except in the most generic sense. If the operational design’s most 

important factor is diplomatic, what role do military decisive points (DPs) play in supporting the 

achievement of a diplomatic DP? 

32 

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33 

Spring 2007 

CAMPAIGNING

This operational design defines some interrelationships between decisive points, but the lines of 

operation appear to be largely independent and far too general to have relevancy to detailed 

planning. Although there is no center of gravity defined, it is possible that the national strategic 

objectives may be serving in place of a COG. The endstate is not defined. The decisive points 

identified here are adequate, but very broadly defined and somewhat simplistic. For example, 

the decisive point in the military line of operation identified as “Destroy RED Corps” will need a 

detailed breakdown of targets, components(s), effects, that define the level of destruction 

required and how, in turn, the achievement of this DP supports the achievement of other DPs in 

other lines of operation. The design has no phasing identified, so there is no determination of 

what should happen when and to what purpose the achievement of each DP is related to 

achieving the objectives defined. 

This is a case where planners defined lines of operation first, then thought of decisive points 

related to the lines of operation. As a result, it may be argued that the diplomatic and economic 

lines of operation as defined here do not achieve much on their own. By examining the decisive 

points identified, the lines of operation could be redefined so that they are more descriptive in 

showing the relationship between the decisive points and the objectives. 

The following diagram (see Figure 3) takes all the elements from the operational design example 

in Joint Publication 5-0, pp. IV-13 to IV-22 and provides an example of an operational design 

structured according to the steps outlined in this paper. Immediately, the military functions 

become clear, focused on a center of gravity. The lines of operation are both functional and 

logical and relate to military decisive points in Phases I-III. Once the enemy operational center 

of gravity is influenced then new lines of operation emerge, which are more logical and deal with 

political-military functions. This operational design provides the outline for clear direction to 

commanders and provides an outline for more detailed planning. Military actions, especially in 

Phase I can be easily related to any diplomatic initiatives that occur. The IO line of operations 

strongly compliments and interfaces with diplomatic efforts. 
 

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 

Objectives O-1, 0-3 0-1 0-1, 0-3 0-2, 0-3 0-2, 0-3Effects E 1-1; 1-2; 1-3; 3-2; 3-3; 3-4 E 1-4 E 1-4; 1-5; 3-1 E 2-2 E 2-1; 2-3LOO LOO

Establish JTF Spt Establish UN task Force

Intial JFACC Ops Red Corps AD Interdict North Armor Stability (Pol/Mil)

Air 

 No Red forces in Gray/GreenSecure Captial Town Secure Borders

Security

RSOI IV MEF Control Key LOCs Destroy North Armor 

Land

Establish Intell Gray/Green trained in C/T

Secure PODs and Log Begin A/T counter-terror

DA Terrorists

PsyOps Against Red Reinforce StratComm Promote Stabilty Engage Red Media Support UN

Strat Comm / IO Strat Comm/IO

Int'l Support

Military End SaA stable, secur

with Red's militdefeated (if reqUS forces in suachieve nationastrategic object

Strat COGRed Ldrshp

Op COGNorthern Armored 

Corps

Military ObjectO-1) Gray and sovereignty maO-2) Regional is reducedO-3) Regional and stability re

Notes:1) This example is drawn from the vignette in JP 5-0, pp. IV-13 to IV-22. This example is not a complete operational design, but is complete to the extent of the information provided in the example. 2) JP 5-0 does not include clearly written endstate in this example. The endstates listed have been developed from the objectives as published in JP 5-0, pp. III-6 to III-13.3) In this example the strategic-operational military objectives and effects were placed in the phases in which related action will be taken relative to corresponding decisive points. 4) The effects (E 1-1 through 3-4) are listed in JP 5-0, p. III-13. They are not pertinent because each decisive point will have its own operatrional level effects listed. 5) Lines of operation and decisive points in Phases I-III are focused on the strategic and operational COGs; in Phases IV-V, new lines of operation will be designated to achieve objectives that support the endstate. The operational design has two components each with the proper focus. 6) Phase 0 is not included since activities planned for this phase are included in the Security Cooperation Plan. Planners should be familiar with current Phase 0 activities, but they are not part of the operational design. 7) Diplomatic and Economic lines of operation are NOT included here because the operational design is focused on center of gravity. Diplomatic initiatives are tied to the IO line of operations, but because there are no military DPs attached, a diplomatic line of operations is unnecessary. Nevertheless, joint force planning is integrated and synchronized with DoD and other US Govt agencies. With SecDef approval interagency planners can be enjoined to develop an overall interagency plan, but DoD does not tasking autority over other agencies to ensureactions are completed. The operational design for Phases IV-V clearly demonstrates the diplomatic, economic, and ploitical aspects within a military plan to assist reaching the desired endstate

Figure 3: Modified Operational Design from JP 5-0 

34 

Spring 2007 

CAMPAIGNING CAMPAIGNING
35 

Spring 2007 

CAMPAIGNING

DETER

STABILIZE 

+ RESTORE

IO

DETER FUTURE ALG / INSURGENT AGGRESSION

MARGINILIZE BIN LOGAN 

AND BIN MASSIE

SECURE EJECT CONV.

ALG REMNANTS

ID + CONTAIN

TU INSURGENT

PREVENT SIG. 

EXTERNAL INFILTRATION

ESTABLISH

ORDER

MIL ORDER CIVIL ORDER

PROVIDE

ESSENTIALS

ESSENTIAL

SERVICES 

RESTORED

ESSENTL

INFRASTRU

REPAIRED

RECONST

RECONST. 

TU MIL

RECONST.

TU 

GOVERNANCE

TRANSFER

LONG TERM 

GROWTH & 

IMPROVEMENT

PHASED H/O OF 

ORDER, ESSENT, 

RECONST

ALG DEFEAT JUSTICE MOVEMENT TO

NEW NORMAL

COALITION

PERMANENT

TU LDRS

IN CHARGE IMPROVEMENT

PRO-GOT POPULACE

CREATE ACCURATE 

INTEL PICTURE

POSITIVE DIPLOMACY

DENY FUNDING TO 

INSURGENCY

INFLICT PAIN ON 

ENEMY POPULATION

• ELIMINATE COMMS

• PAINT AS CRIMINAL 

• DEDICATE ISR PLATFORMS

• HUMINT / SIGINT ON BIN LOGAN + GOA

• MONITOR INTL BOUNDARY

• MONITOR FOREIGN FIGHTER FLOW

• MIO 

• FREEZE GOA ASSETS

• SEIZE BIN LOGAN ASSETS

• MONITOR INTL CASH FLOW

• EMBARGO OF NONFOOD/MED

• ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

• DENY ARMS / MATL

PREVENT GOT ILLEGAL + 

IMMORAL ACTS

• CONDEMNATION OF GOA

• PRO-GOT RESOLUTIONS

• REPUDIATION OF JIHAD

• COALITION OVERSIGHT OF SP/PARA

• COALITION OVERSIGHT OF JUD

• GRIEVANCE MANAGEMENT 

• CONTAIN

• REPATRIATE WILLING 

• ISOLATE LEADERS + NETWORKS

• CONFIRM ALLEGIANCE OF CIVIL LEADERS

• CORDON INSURGENT CONCENTRATIONS

• GAIN POSITIVE CONTROL OF WPNS / ORDNANCE

• FOREIGN FIGHTERS

• $$$

• COMMS

• WEAPONS / ORDNANCE

IDENTIFY SPOILERS

• KILL / CAPTURE

• INFRASTRUCTURE / NETWORK ATTACKS

• HUMINT COLLECTION

• PRESENCE PATROLS

• SECURE INTL BORDERS

• REPATRIATION / EPW

• REESTABLISH TU C2

• REASSERT CIVIL COC

• ESTABLISH CURFEWS

• VISIBLE PRESENCE

• LAW ENFORCEMENT

• IDP CONTROL / MANGMNT

• SWETMS

• POLICE / FIRE / 

AMBULANCE

• ROAD / BRIDGE GRID

• SPOD/APOD

• PLANTS / FACTORIES

• REEQUIP

• RESUPPLY

• REORGANIZE

• FID

• INFRASTRUCTURE

• OFFICE OF 

JUSTICE/REDRESS

• REAFFIRM SECULAR 

RULE OF LAW + CONST.

• GOA LOST; NO POINT IN FIGHTING

• RETURN TO PREVIOUS LIFE

• NOT A WESTERN INTERVENTION

• GOT IS LEGITMATE, ELECTED

• TU CITIZENS HAVE VOICE

• COALITION WILL STAY THE COURSE

• PREPARED TO RETURN AS NEEDED

• PARTNERSHIP BEYOND MILITARY

• FUTILITY OF ATROCITIES, 

CYCLE OF REVENGE

• ANTI-VIGILANTISM

• AUTHORITY W/ OVERSIGHT

• ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 

ACTIONS; CITIZENS + GOVT

• SOCIAL INTERACTION 

PATTERNS

• COMMERCE / MARKETS 

RETURN

• ELECTIONS AS SCHEDULED

• RETURN OF TOURISM

•SOCIETAL NORMS 

ESTABLISHED

•POLITICAL PROCESS 

PREDICTABLE AND 

ORDERLY

STRAT COG: LONG

TERM VIABILITY OF 

TUNISIAN GOVT

Figure 4: Phases IV-V

This example is a detailed breakout of Phases IV-V (see Figure 4). The information line of 

operation has been carried over intact from Phases I-III, but three new lines of operation have 

been defined along logical lines related to functions. The approach is to deter further 

conventional aggression, while conducting stability and support operations to support objectives 

(the large ovals) related to meeting the friendly strategic center of gravity. 

 

The decisive points are in the rectangular boxes and the subheadings under the decisive points 

are tasks related to achieving those decisive points. The IO line of operations has defined a 

series of key themes that support all of the other decisive points. It is important to remember that 

operational design is a product to assist planners in visualizing the interrelationships that must 

exist within the operation in order to achieve success. Details can be added, along with a matrix 

of related effects, targets (lethal and non-lethal), and additional tasks supporting the achievement 

of the decisive points. 
CAMPAIGNING

The next step in this outline is linking decisive points and arranging and synchronizing the 

decisive points in such a way that both military and non-military tasks are identified to define 

responsibilities. The tasks and decisive points can also serve as a means of assessing progress 

and identifying what coordination between military and non-military elements. 

Promote a stable 

political situation and

Government control 

People

PHASE 1

PHASE 2 –

PHASE 3 PHASE 4 –

Insurgent Networks

Insurgent Means

Strategic

End State

National 

sovereignty, 

territorial 

integrity and 

political 

independence 

of all states in 

region

Op 

End State

STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 STEP 4

The 

achievement 

of an 

acceptable 

level of 

National 

sovereignty, 

territorial 

integrity and 

political 

independence 

of Mica

What is Known

RMS and 

PHARM 

Freedom of 

action to 

influence 

GOM’s

sovereignty, 

territorial 

integrity and 

political 

independence

CoG

Identify, Define and 

Understand

Amnesty and 

reconciliation program

Gov’t demonstrates confidence 

and capability in political and 

security tasks

Local self-defense 

forces established

Counterguerrilla Force 

capable of sustained 

small unit ops

Curtail assets and limit 

resources

Urban areas and 

transportation 

networks secured

Identify key actors

Gov’t improves 

administrative 

capacities

Popular support is 

largely hostile or 

negative to insurgents

Resistance Alley is 

penetrated

Insurgent options and 

actions are limited

Insurgent cohesion is 

divided or disrupted

External support 

denied or minimized

Undercut/eliminate 

neutralize insurgent 

message

Relevant credible ideological or 

theological appeals to explain social 

political economic conditions

Resistance Alley is 

Isolated

Influence and Assess

What is Known

Disciplined police and 

intelligence apparatus

Raleigh is under 

GoM control

Military Decisive Points

Interagency Decisive Points

Insurgent goals are 

minimized

Figure 5: MICA COIN Operational Design 

This example is of an operational design for COIN (see Figure 5). Although there is nothing in 

doctrine that describes how to develop an operational design for COIN, the basic principles 

involved in the conduct of COIN should be applied to the specific situation. Insurgencies are 

exceptionally complex and, therefore, require a thorough analysis and understanding before 

developing the operational design. Nevertheless, insurgencies share common requirements for 

survival and can be attacked in a number of related ways as illustrated here. The lines of 

operation are defined both functionally and logically. There are decisive points identified for 

military and non-military components. The decisive points are heavily interlinked, showing the 

relationship between information as perceived by various elements of the population (What is 

Known), isolating the insurgents, and stability. Although there is one COG identified here, it is 

quite easy to define a COG or objective related to each line of operation. It is important to 

remember that insurgencies may have multiple centers of gravity (or objectives supporting the 

achievement of the endstate). Decisive points are broadly defined, but define clearly what must 

be accomplished, when to advance the campaign toward the endstate or objectives. 

36 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

 

Kinetic Ops

Unconventional 

Ops

Operational 

Maneuver

Influence

Ops

Support of 

Opposition 

Groups

Politco-Mil

Ops (CMO)

Humanitarian 

Assistance Ops

L.O.

Slices

(COGs) Iraqi Leadership

Internal Security

and Intelligence

WMD Infrastructure

Missile Prod.,

Maint., & Del. Cap.

Rep. Guard &

Special Rep. Guard

Autonomous Territory

in Iraq (Kurds)

Regular Iraqi

Army

Iraqi Commercial,

Economic, Diplomatic

Infrastructure

Iraqi Civilian

Population

Strategic / 

Operational 

Objectives

Regime 

Change

Regional 

Stability

GWOT

Figure 6: Initial Cut (Dec 01) of Lines of Operation and “Slices” for OIF 

This slide from the early planning for OIF shows the pitfalls of misidentifying COGs, objectives, 

decisive points, and lines of operation (see Figure 6). There is no endstate, and therefore no 

focus of the operational design. Nine centers of gravity are identified; most of them (the Kurds, 

Iraqi economic/diplomatic/commercial infrastructure, WMD infrastructure, missile production, 

etc.) are clearly not COGs. Instead they are important decisive points that should be related to 

the true center(s) of gravity: the Iraqi civilian population. An operational design that focuses on 

eliminating or isolating specifically defined decisive points (Iraqi leadership, Iraqi security and 

intelligence, Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, WMD infrastructure, the Regular 

Iraqi Army, economic/diplomatic/commercial infrastructure, for example) in time, space, and 

effect has an immediate effect on the real COG and achieves two of the operational objectives 

(GWOT is ill-defined and may or not be applicable, or may be a line of operation, rather than an 

objective). 

 

The lines of operation here are better defined as tasks related to achieving certain decisive points. 

The weaving of lines accomplishes nothing in visualizing the operation and ensuring 

synchronization and integration of capabilities to achieve unity of effort. There is a valid line of 

operations described as politico-military ops (showing an appreciation for the importance of this 

activity in reaching the objectives described), but this model cannot describe who, how, when, 

and why. A good operational design answers each of those questions and provides the 

framework to address the complexity of modern combat operations. 

37 

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CAMPAIGNING

Step 8: Detailed synchronization and integration of forces and functions, tasks, targets, and 

effects to achieve unity of effort. 

Decisive points must be examined individually and in detail to understand what is required. 

Planners must identify what targets (lethal and non-lethal) are related to the decisive point and 

what effects on those targets are required to achieve that decisive point. Targets are prioritized 

and assigned to components based on a time or priority sequence. The components must 

coordinate actions in support of achieving each of the decisive points. Each decisive point is 

then related to all other decisive points to incorporate a complete picture of what is happening 

across the battlespace during a space of time. Once this is done, it is relatively easy to identify 

changes between phases and define what is required within one phase before moving to the next 

phase. This allows coordination between military and non-military elements and definition of 

responsibilities. Once a phase is defined in terms of decisive points, the commander’s intent by 

phase can be completed, outlining clearly what is to happen, defining supported and supporting 

relationships, and describing priority of effort. Likewise, the critical tasks related to decisive 

points tied to the Phase III to Phase IV transition can be identified early and provide a base of 

understanding from which the commander can adjust to meet actual conditions. Having an 

operational design for Phase IV-V allows the planners to describe the sequence of military 

activities and identify the required support from non-military components that can be 

coordinated prior to hostilities. It serves as a point of departure for integration of military and 

non-military elements into Phase IV-V. 

Developing an operational design for conventional operations, stability operations, or 

counterinsurgency operations requires thinking in different ways and understanding the 

dynamics of the battlespace. The operational design provides planners a means to apply intellect 

and imagination to addressing the complexities of the battlespace. This methodology 

compliments current doctrine’s description of the elements of operational design to provide the 

framework necessary for understanding the relationship between endstate, objectives, effects, 

center of gravity analysis, decisive points, lines of operation and phasing to allow planners to 

develop an operational design that serves as a bridge between mission analysis and course of 

action development. It also serves as an overarching guide to the operation and assists the 

commander in defining his strategic concept. It addresses both conventional and unconventional 

operations and assists in defining the transition between combat operations and stability 

operations. Once the operational design is complete, commanders and staffs can develop courses 

of action that apply forces and functions in different ways but share the common understanding 

of endstate, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation. 

 Dr. Keith D. Dickson is a Professor of Military Studies at the Joint Forces Staff 

College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School. He has been a member of the JFSC 

faculty since 1999. A retired U. S. Army Special Forces officer, he has written books on 

military history and makes frequent presentations on modern warfare. 

38 

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The JIATF Organization Model: Bringing the 

Interagency to Bear in Maritime Homeland Defense 

and Security 

By 

LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer 

It has almost become a truism that today’s national security challenges require solutions that 

draw on all elements of national power. In maritime homeland defense (MHLD) and maritime 

homeland security (MHLS), as in so many other aspects of defense and national security in the 

post 9/11 era, military cooperation is not enough. All elements of national power and those of 

allied nations or coalition partners need to be coordinated for success. Leveraging all the 

resources and capabilities of the interagency community is, however, easier said than done. One 

template for doing so utilizes the joint interagency task force (JIATF) organizational model best 

illustrated by JIATF South in Key West, Florida. This article aims to present a model for 

leveraging the JIATF organization model to provide for the maritime security of the American 

homeland under the aegis of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and 

their new maritime warning mission. 

The Current MHLS/MHLD Situation 

Many organizations across multiple jurisdictions have roles in MHLS and MHLD. In the U.S. 

these include the Navy and the Coast Guard, the other military services, Customs and Border 

Protection, the FBI, and state and local authorities. In the full North American context, these 

partners also include Canadian Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Public Safety and 

Emergency Preparedness Canada, Canada Border Services Agency, and provincial authorities. 

No service or agency with responsibility for MHLS and MHLD missions has all the information 

or the full range capabilities and authority needed to get the job done successfully. 

Everyday cooperation and assistance between military services and civilian law enforcement 

agencies is coordinated and provided in the maritime domain. In the U.S., local police boats, 

Coast Guard aircraft and boarding teams, Customs and Border Protection inspectors and fast 

interceptor vessels, and Department of Defense forces are all working together to secure the 

maritime domain. This largely works because at the tactical level partnerships between federal, 

state, and local authorities and private industry existed before 9/11. This cooperation has been 

greatly expanded in the past six years through initiatives like area maritime security committees, 

bringing industry and government together, and joint harbor operations centers that create a 

single command and control node for multiple agencies in a port.1

 

1

 Stephen L. Caldwell, “Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts are Improving,” Testimony to U.S. 

Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government 

Management, Finance, and Accountability, (U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-933T, 10 July 2006), 

7-10. 
CAMPAIGNING

 

If a situation escalates from a routine security event to an MHLD threat, MHLS players may find 

themselves in the midst of a homeland defense operation where U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) has command and control authority. The plans, chiefly the Maritime 

Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan, and memoranda of agreement that currently exist 

for mutual support and transitioning responsibility from MHLS authorities to MHLD are 

appropriately non-specific.2 The organizations and agencies responsible for MHLS and MHLD 

need to be brought together before a threat manifests itself to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, 

and successful coordination. 

NORAD Can Answer the Maritime Call 

In May 2006 when the renewed NORAD agreement was announced by the U.S. and Canada, a 

new maritime warning mission was included. NORAD has provided situational awareness and 

homeland defense coordination for the aerospace environment since 1958. Now a similar 

warning mechanism was to be established and organized for the maritime domain. While the 

stage was set for the new maritime warning mission at NORAD, the renewed agreement was not 

specific and left key questions unanswered, namely, how should this new element be organized 

and function, and what resources, if any, would be made available for its implementation? Just 

as important, how should Maritime NORAD interact and partner with the services and agencies 

already engaged in MHLS and MHLD activities? Also, notable in the agreement are the very 

limited parameters of the initial maritime efforts at NORAD. As outlined, this is not yet a 

comprehensive program, but the start of the maritime mission at NORAD provides the U.S. and 

Canada a unique opportunity to address a number of critical security gaps in the maritime 

domain and truly contribute to the security and prosperity of both nations. 

The current planning process and initial stand-up of the new maritime warning component at 

NORAD in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is essentially resource neutral and includes only U.S. 

and Canadian military personnel.3

 The Canadian half of the required billets is being carved from 

the existing NORAD staff, while U.S. positions are being taken from existing NORTHCOM 

billets.4 Both U.S. and Canadian officials and commentators, including Assistant Secretary of 

Defense McHale and Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, hailed the 

development of a capability and structure that would be even greater that its aerospace 

antecedent.5

 The NORAD agreement as renewed in 2006, clearly provided language to support 

broader MHLS/MHLD efforts in outlining the requirement to, “monitor, control, and respond to 

threats so that [U.S. and Canadian] security is ensured.” The renewed agreement also permits, if 

2

 The White House, Maritime Operational Threat Response For The National Strategy for Maritime 

Security (October 2005). A variety of MOUs and this plan outline in broad terms how the Navy, Coast Guard and 

other responsible departments and agencies will coordinate when maritime threats to the homeland are detected. 

3

 When the NORAD agreement was renewed by Canada and the U.S. in May 2006, a new mandate for a 

maritime warning component was added to the existing NORAD aerospace defense mission. 

4

 Robert L. Hogan, CAPT, U.S. Navy, NORAD/NORTHCOM J-5, Chief, Maritime Division, Interview by 

author, (1 November 2006, author’s holdings). 

5

 Aarti Shah, “McHale: ‘Maritime NORAD’ Should Be More Than Equivalent of Air Model,” Inside the 

Navy, (Volume 18, Number 23, 13 June 2005); and Barry Cooper, “New NORAD Pact Will Serve Us Well.” The 

Calgary Herald, (10 May 2006, Final Edition, Pg. A 18. http://web.lexis-nexis.com accessed 9 August 2006). 

40 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

 

not mandates, interagency coordination for both MHLS and MHLD when it recommends, 

“utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies, to enable 

identification, validation, and response by national commands and agencies responsible for 

maritime defense and security.”6 The rather tentative first steps in implementing Maritime 

NORAD would make it seem that the U.S. and Canada risk falling short of the intent of the 

renewed NORAD agreement and missing the great opportunity it provides. 

The reality is that the U.S. and Canada are working in resource constrained times, but this does 

not preclude using innovative organizational models or breaking existing military command and 

control paradigms. In the globalized, interconnected world of the 21st century, military 

capabilities and organizations alone are not enough to protect U.S. and Canadian interests. The 

implementation of a joint, interagency, bi-national Maritime NORAD organization can be 

achieved short of full physical establishment of what would amount to a permanent Bi-National 

Joint Interagency Maritime Task Force. The JIATF organization provides a proven model that, 

coupled with regionalized MHLS/MHLD command and control, will secure the maritime 

domain for the U.S. and Canada. Though this article will describe a fuller organization, like that 

currently in place to combat drug trafficking at Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, the 

proposed joint, interagency, bi-national organization is scalable and can rely to a greater or lesser 

extent on virtual presence and cooperation. 

The JIATF South Organizational Model 

Established in 1989, JIATF South, first called Joint Task Force-Four and then JIATF East, was 

charged with the coordination of numerous U.S. government organizations and their effort to 

stop illegal drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Latin America. A subordinate command of 

U.S. Southern Command located in Key West, Florida, JIATF South focuses on intelligence 

fusion and detection and monitoring of drug smugglers in the air and sea lanes of the Caribbean, 

Central and South America, and the Eastern Pacific. It also coordinates patrols and logistics for 

forces deployed in support of the counter-drug mission. When smugglers are located and 

interdiction is possible, JIATF South shifts tactical control of forces to services and agencies 

with law enforcement authority, such as the Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration, 

for interdiction and arrest. The official JIATF South mission statement reads: 

Joint Interagency Task Force South conducts counter illicit trafficking operations, 

intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff 

suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and coordinates 

country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit 

traffic.7

6

 Government of the United States of America and Government of Canada, Agreement Between the 

Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command, (28 April 2006). 

7

 Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, Mission Statement, (http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/ 

accessed 8 Nov 2006). 

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Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

 

While counter-drug operations are a very specific mission, the general concepts behind JIATF 

South lend themselves very well to translation to MHLS and MHLD. 

JIATF South has a fully integrated, interagency command structure. Currently, the director is a 

Coast Guard rear admiral and the deputy director is a Navy captain. The rest of the command 

cadre positions and directorate leaders are a mixture of officers from the Air Force, Marines, 

Army, Navy and Coast Guard, as well as civilians from Customs and Border Protection, the 

Department of Defense, and other federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. If you call 

the JIATF South watch and talk to the command duty officer you will talk to an O-4 or O-5 level 

person who could be from any of the five services, or Customs and Border Protection. Other key 

partners such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, and U.S. intelligence agencies are 

represented by permanently assigned liaison officers. The key point is this organization has been 

successfully working for nearly twenty years and brings interagency partners together in a 

unified command structure, rather than the typical military command with just a few interagency 

liaison officers. This interagency command integration fosters trust and facilitates information 

sharing and coordination of operational assets rarely seen in the U.S. government, and could be 

leveraged for missions beyond stopping the illicit drug trade.8

JIATF South is not a traditional command with normal military authorities and prerogatives. 

Rather, it is a U.S. Department of Defense organization with voluntary participation from 

interagency partners who share the common goal of stopping illegal drug trafficking. Assigned 

U.S. military personnel are subject to normal military order and discipline, but interagency 

partners are only obligated to remain invested in JIATF South as long as the command assists 

them in achieving individual agency goals. As such, JIATF is a kind of interagency “coalition of 

the willing” whose effectiveness is inextricably tied to the alignment of participating 

organizations in working toward success in a fairly narrow mission area. In the U.S., this type of 

arrangement does not lend itself to interagency cooperation in many mission areas without 

specific direction or a mandate from the President or Congress. The good news for maritime 

NORAD is the myriad services and agencies concerned with MHLS and MHLD have goal 

alignment – they are all working to secure the maritime domain of the U.S. and Canada. While 

an official mandate from the U.S. and Canadian governments requiring the participation of key 

agencies is desirable, there is good reason to believe this model will work, even voluntarily, in 

bringing all these dedicated partners together under the aegis of NORAD. 

JIATF South, while strictly a U.S. command, also serves as an outstanding model for 

international operations coordination and information sharing. The command’s counter-drug 

operations include the participation of forces from key Western allies with interests in the region 

including the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands.9

 U.S. and allied forces work 

together in combined force packages, covering an extensive area of responsibility and seizing far 

8

 James Jay Carafano, “A Better Way to Fight Terrorism,” Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation (17 

May 2005, www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed05705b.cfm accessed 05 September 2006); and Richard W. 

Yeatman, “JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Issue 42, 3rd Quarter 2006), 26-27. 

9

 Recently Canada has agreed to join the JIATF South team by providing maritime patrol aircraft to assist 

in monitoring and detection efforts. 

42 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

 

more drugs together than they could individually. A typical operation might feature a U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection patrol aircraft, supporting a British warship with a U.S. Coast 

Guard boarding team onboard, working inside the territorial sea of a regional partner nation to 

stop, board, and seize a vessel smuggling cocaine. The Office of National Drug Control Policy 

reports growing mission success with this approach. 

Transit zone interdiction has been one of the bright spots in the national effort to 

stop drugs before they enter the U.S. For the third straight year, JIATF-South 

seized and/or disrupted a record amount of cocaine. Transit zone seizures and 

disruptions in 2005 amounted to 254 metric tons, compared to 219 metric tons in 

2004 and 176 metric tons in 2003.10

It is notable that these JIATF South cocaine seizure records were being broken at a time when 

fewer U.S. naval and air assets were available due to the high operations tempo associated with 

the Global War on Terror. These results point to the efficacy and force-multiplying aspect of the 

joint, interagency, and multi-national approach to operations at JIATF South. 

In addition to operational cooperation, JIATF South facilitates a robust international liaison 

program that results in a strong information sharing effort with various partner nations in Latin 

America and the Caribbean. Recognizing varying levels of cooperation, participation, and 

closeness with these regional partners, JIATF South has developed a unique, compartmentalized 

information sharing regimen. Liaison officers, from almost all regional nations attached to 

JIATF South, help smooth the coordination of operations and enaction of bi-lateral agreements. 

The command even has a secure, but unclassified, communications link to share operational 

information in real time called the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System.11 This 

system links the command centers of a host of Latin American navies, air forces, and coast 

guards to JIATF South in Key West, and to the Coast Guard commanders in Miami, Florida, and 

Alameda, California, who are responsible for interdiction operations in their area of 

responsibility. 

The JIATF South organizational framework could be effectively utilized by NORAD in 

establishing a joint, interagency and bi-national command to coordinate MHLS and MHLD 

information sharing, analysis, and command and control. NORAD has already mastered binational integration. The JIATF South model would bring key partners from Canadian and U.S. 

non-military agencies, like Royal Canadian Mounted Police and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, into the command structure. This undoubtedly will help build the trust and 

interagency ownership required for real information fusion and unity of effort. The information 

sharing and intelligence fusion model, in particular, should be looked to for guidance in 

establishing the maritime warning mission and a broader, comprehensive maritime NORAD. 

10 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Transit Zone Interdiction Operations Fact Sheet 

(http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/international/factsht/transit_zone_interdic_op.html accessed 10 

Nov 2006). 

11 CNIES, as the system is known, includes e-mail, chat, a means to share vessel and aircraft track data 

packaged with a remarkably useful Spanish-English translation function to foster international information sharing. 

43 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

 

For the U.S., interagency integration at NORAD would help fill the void between agency 

headquarters in Washington and field level operations. For instance, Customs and Border 

Protection has twenty field offices overseeing 317 U.S. ports of entry.12 The FBI has 56 field 

offices and more than 400 satellite offices.13 Integrating Customs and Border Protection, FBI 

personnel, and other agencies into the maritime NORAD structure, could also help provide 

operational level coordination in the maritime realm between the agency headquarters and 

tactical level field operations.14

Perhaps the most important advantage of the JIATF model for Maritime NORAD is that it would 

help close the seam between MHLS and MHLD by bringing together the lead agencies and 

partners under one organizational roof. Rather than rely on ad hoc arrangements during times of 

crisis, these stakeholders will be working together all the time. As intelligence and indicators 

point toward various threats, meaningful planning and coordination can take place before a 

critical event occurs. When an unforeseen event rapidly begins moving from a routine security 

situation to a defense threat, all the appropriate services and agencies would be represented to 

ensure a seamless hand-off from MHLS authorities to a NORTHCOM led defense homeland 

operation. Just as important, if MHLS/MHLD officials are presented with a terrorist attack fait 

accompli, the bi-national, joint, interagency NORAD organization would be able to coordinate 

initial response and mitigation efforts, and provide a smooth transition to NORTHCOM for its 

continued support to the Department of Homeland Security within the framework of the National 

Response Plan. 

Applying the JIATF concept to bi-national homeland defense and security is not new or 

completely novel. In its March 2006 report, the Bi-National Planning Group introduced several 

organizational concepts for improving North American defense and security. One of these, as 

shown in figure 1, was a Continental Joint Interagency Task Force fusing bi-national defense and 

security.15 The organization model proposed in this article is really the maritime subset of the 

comprehensive defense and security model proposed by the Bi-National Planning Group. 

Though desirable, establishing the Continental Joint Interagency Task Force may not be realistic 

in the short term because of fiscal, policy, and organizational culture barriers.16 The Bi-National 

Joint Interagency Maritime Task Force could serve as an excellent starting point for building the 

Bi-National Planning Group’s all domain joint interagency task force. 

12 Customs and Border Protection, Field Operations Offices 

(http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/cmcs/ accessed 10 November 2006). 

13 Federal Bureau of Investigation, About Us - Quick Facts (http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm accessed 

10 November 2006). 

14 The lack of operational level leadership is a key gap in homeland security. Before Secretary of 

Homeland Security Tom Ridge announced his resignation in late 2004, DHS was moving toward regionalization 

that would have provided unified, operational level command and control for the department’s agencies. When 

Michael Chertoff succeeded Ridge, the plans were shelved and are no longer being actively considered. 

15 Bi-National Planning Group, The Final Report on Canada and the United States Enhanced Military 

Cooperation (Peterson AFB, CO, 13 March 2006), 40. 

16 Bi-National Planning Group, 41. 

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CAMPAIGNING

Figure 1: Bi-National Planning Group’s 

Continental Joint Interagency Task Force Concept17

Finally, this organization could ultimately provide a structure for bringing our other North 

American neighbor, Mexico, into the maritime warning and command and control effort. With 

an inter-dependent economy, trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement, 

growing container ports on the Pacific coast, a large commercial fishing fleet, a significant 

passenger cruise business, and major petroleum operations in the Gulf of Mexico, efforts to 

establish North American MDA and a maritime shield, really cannot be complete until Mexico is 

brought into the U.S-Canadian partnership. Like the Continental Joint Interagency Task Force, 

this too may seem far-fetched today, but the JIATF South model has a solid international 

information sharing regimen that could bring Mexico, specifically the Mexican Navy, aboard the 

maritime NORAD effort in graduated stages. 

Command and Control Organization and Regionalization 

Successful MHLS and MHLD is such a daunting task in scope and complexity that it cannot be 

centrally managed in a single location. One of the key lessons learned from NORAD’s air 

defense history is the value of command and control regionalization in providing for the defense 

of North America. This regionalization allows NORAD to provide the appropriate level of air 

domain situational awareness and scrutiny of specific events. As necessary, incidents are 

 17 PSEPC stands for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the Canadian counterpart to the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Bi-National Planning Group, 40. 

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Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

 

elevated or delegated to the appropriate level for monitoring and action. This same type of 

command and control structure and regionalization is needed in the maritime domain. 

Much of the joint and interagency framework for the regionalization of Maritime NORAD 

already exists and only requires coordination and synchronization. In fact, Canada has already 

directed significant effort toward command and control regionalization in the maritime domain. 

Canada is establishing three Maritime Security Operations Centers using their Joint Task Force – 

Pacific (Athena) and Joint Task Force – Atlantic (Trinity) maritime operations centers as 

foundations on the West Coast and East Coast, while establishing a new operations center for the 

Great Lakes. These centers will fuse operations and intelligence with the Canadian military and 

key government agencies including the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, Canadian 

Security Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other law enforcement 

agencies.18

Regional maritime command centers in the U.S. should piggy-back on existing maritime 

command and control nodes, with the relationship between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard 

serving as the foundation. As previously noted, these two services already work closely together 

across the full spectrum of maritime operations at home and overseas. They bring the right mix 

of capabilities and authorities and provide key linkages between military and civilian forces and 

between the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security. At the tactical level, 

they already operate joint harbor operations centers with other key partners in places like Norfolk 

and San Diego. In other key military ports, local Navy and Coast Guard commands share 

information and jointly tackle security issues ranging from the escort of high value assets, 

maintenance of security zones, and security for military out loads and in loads. 

Currently, the most important U.S. MHLS/MHLD coordination occurs on the East and West 

Coasts between the numbered Navy fleets and the Coast Guard area commands. While Second 

Fleet in Norfolk and neighboring Coast Guard Atlantic Area in Portsmouth, Virginia, do not 

share a collocated command center, they do have significant command and control ties, 

communications compatibility, and information sharing protocols. Similarly, Third Fleet in San 

Diego is closely connected with Coast Guard Pacific Area in Alameda, California, even 

conducting weekly joint operations and intelligence briefings via secure video teleconference. 

These partnerships are familiar, tested, and already work with the NORTHCOM Joint Operations 

Center and the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander at U.S. Navy Fleet Forces 

Command on a daily basis. As shown in figure 2, the chain of command could go directly from 

NORAD to regional command centers, or from NORAD through Canada Command and 

NORTHCOM to regional command centers. 

18 Wayne R. Krause, LCol Canadian Forces, NORAD Maritime Initial Planning Team, Interview by 

author, (23 October 2006, via e-mail, author’s holdings). 

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Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Northeast

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Southeast

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Gulf of Mexico

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Inland Waters

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Northwest

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Southwest

Joint Interagency

Maritime Cmd Ctr

Alaska

NAVNORTH/JFMCC

Norfolk, VA

U.S. Northern Command

Colorado Springs, CO

Canada Command

Ottawa, Ontario

NORAD Maritime

Colorado Springs, CO

Figure 2: Possible Model for U.S. Regionalization of Maritime NORAD 

Ideally, regional maritime command centers would bring the Navy and Coast Guard together 

physically with other key players like CBP and FBI, as well as state agencies, represented by 

watchstanders and liaison officers. Practically, the current virtual connectivity between the 

Navy’s Second and Third Fleets and the two Coast Guard Areas is an acceptable starting place. 

However, the lack of representation from other services and agencies is a significant shortfall. 

Serious work needs to be undertaken to get at least Customs and Border Protection and FBI 

representation into this arrangement. One or more additional regional command center should 

also be considered to adequately cover the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, Western Rivers, and 

Great Lakes. As long as the NORAD command and control ties remain strong, these regional 

centers might have proportionally less Navy representation since they are largely internal 

waterways. Like other multi-tasked and multi-mission military commands, the NORAD regional 

maritime command centers would normally be transparent, doing the regular work the Navy and 

Coast Guard already does each day. Each service would work its issues with its inherent 

authorities and through the normal chains of command. 

Conclusion 

The safety and security of the North American maritime domain is essential to the wellbeing and 

economic prosperity of the U.S., Canada, and the rest of the world. The extraordinary size, 

scope, and complexity of this environment, coupled with the traditional divisions between 

defense and law enforcement make the task of providing effective North American MHLS and 

MHLD daunting. Through use of the JIATF organization model and regionalized command and 

control, all the capabilities of both the U.S. and Canadian interagency community would be at 

the disposal of MHLS and MHLD commanders. Most importantly, when something 

extraordinary requiring broad multi-agency or bi-national coordination did occur, all the 

47 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

command and control apparatus and relationships outlined in the Maritime Operational Threat 

Response (MOTR) plan would be in place, available, and well-practiced. 

LCDR Stuhlreyer is a Coast Guard officer enrolled at the Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School (JAWS). A boat forces officer, his previous assignments include 

Group St. Petersburg, FL, command of Station Monterey, CA, and supervisor of the 

Pacific Area/Eleventh District Command Center in Alameda, CA. He also taught history 

at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, CT. 

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Spring 2007 
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Upcoming Events 

• 30 April-3 May: Western Combatant Command Trip 

• 7-8 May: Homeland Security Planners Course 

• 22-23 May: Joint, Interagency and Multinational Planners Course 

• 15 June: JAWS Graduation 

• 19-20 April: Joint Senior Leaders Course 

• 23 July: JAWS Class of 2008 begins 

49 

Spring 2007 
CAMPAIGNING

JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications 

The following campaign planning publications are available from the Joint Advanced 

Warfighting Schools, Department of Operational Art and Campaigning. 

CAMPAIGNING Journal

• Fall 2006 [pdf] 

• Summer 2006 [pdf] 

• Spring 2006 [pdf] 

• Winter 2006 [pdf] 

Joint Operation Planning Primer [pdf]

Case Studies 

• Horatio Nelson and the 1798 Mediterranean Campaign [pdf] 

• The Mexican American War [pdf] 

War Plans 

The following collection of war plans are from the Joint Forces Staff College Library. These are 

original World War II campaign plans have been scanned electronically to enable easy 

accessibility. Each campaign plan consists of a back ground introduction followed by the original 

plan in electronic format. 

Introduction Reno IV Outline Plan [doc] 

• RENO IV Outline Plan 6 March 1944 [pdf] 

Introduction Mindoro Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO [doc] 

• Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 13 October 1944 [pdf] 

Introduction to Tarakan Island Operations Instruction NO. 99 [doc] 

• Operations Instruction NO. 99 Tarakan Island 21 March 1945 [pdf] 

Introduction to Operation “ECLIPSE” [doc] 

• Operation “ECLIPSE” Appreciation and Outline Plan 24 November 1944 [pdf] 

Introduction Operation Blacklist [.doc]

• Operation Blacklist Basic Online Plan [pdf]

50 

Spring 2007 
51 

Spring 2007 

CAMPAIGNING

Intent

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School

(JAWS) is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff

and combatant commands with a cadre of officers

expert in the joint planning processes and capable

of critical analysis in the application of all aspects

of national power across the full range of military

operations. Graduates will be capable of

synergistically combining existing and emerging

capabilities in time, space and purpose to

accomplish a range of operational or strategic

objectives. 

 
52 

Spring 2007 

CAMPAIGNING

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent

the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of

Defense