UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4781

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAMEIK DESEN ANDERSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (4:17-cr-00032-H-1)

Submitted: April 30, 2019 Decided: May 14, 2019

Before MOTZ and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Assistant United States Attorney, Donald R. Pender, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Rameik Desen Anderson appeals his sentence of 96 months of imprisonment for 

possession of firearms and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2012). He contends that the district court committed procedural error by failing 

to apply U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(c) (2016). This case was placed in 

abeyance for United States v. Lynn, 912 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2019). Lynn has issued, and this 

case is now ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand for 

resentencing.

“We ‘review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the 

[Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” 

United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). This review entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In determining 

procedural reasonableness, we must consider whether the district court properly calculated 

the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, gave the

parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, selected a sentence not based on clearly erroneous facts, and 

sufficiently explained the chosen sentence. Id. at 49-51. “A district court abuses its 

discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized 

factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, 

or commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, “a district court abuses its discretion when 
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it misapprehends or misapplies the applicable law.” Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 

910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Sentencing Guidelines,

If . . . a state term of imprisonment is anticipated to result from another 

offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under the 

provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant 

Conduct), the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run 

concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.

USSG § 5G1.3(c). However, “because the Guidelines are advisory, a district court is not 

obligated to impose a concurrent sentence pursuant to USSG § 5G1.3.” Lynn, 912 F.3d at

217. Instead, a court is only “required to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in 

determining whether to run sentences consecutively or concurrently.” Id.

Based on our review of the record, the district court did not address USSG 

§ 5G1.3(c)’s direction that it impose a sentence concurrently with an anticipated state 

sentence. We conclude that the court’s lack of consideration regarding USSG § 5G1.3(c) 

constitutes an abuse of discretion, as a court cannot properly exercise its discretion if it is 

not aware of the contours of its discretion. See Dillard, 891 F.3d at 158. Although the 

district court was free to reject the Guidelines, it was required to at least consider the 

Guidelines. See Lynn, 912 F.3d at 215. The record here does not reveal any consideration 

of USSG § 5G1.3(c) by the district court.

Ultimately, the requirement that a sentence be procedurally reasonable not only 

“promote[s] the perception of fair sentencing,” but also ensures that a reviewing court can 

provide “meaningful appellate review” of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Because the 

record does not show that the district court considered USSG § 5G1.3(c), we vacate the 
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judgment and remand for resentencing. We express no opinion as to whether the district 

court should accept or reject application of USSG § 5G1.3(c) to Anderson’s case. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

VACATED AND REMANDED