UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION

CELESTE ELIZABETH HOWEY,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-0747-P

TRUIST BANK,

Defendant.

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On March 23, 2023, the United States Magistrate Judge issued 

Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendation (“FCR”) in this case. ECF 

No. 44. The FCR recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1.

Plaintiff filed Objections to the FCR on April 3, 2023, and Defendant 

filed a Response on April 6, 2023. ECF Nos. 45, 46. The Court 

accordingly conducts a de novo review of the FCR. 

For the following reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Magistrate’s 

ruling, ADOPTS the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF No. 

44), and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 45).

BACKGROUND

In August 2008, Plaintiff and her husband executed a Deed of Trust 

for a property with WR Starkey Mortgage, LLP, which was recorded in 

Johnson County, Texas. ECF No. 44 at 2. In April 2012, Plaintiff 

executed a second Deed of Trust on the same property naming Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as beneficiary and nominee for 

Cendera Funding Corporation. Id. at 1–2. The second Deed of Trust was

also recorded in Johnson County, Texas. Id. 

In April 2022, Mortgage Electronic assigned Plaintiff’s second Deed 

of Trust to Defendant Truist Bank on behalf of Cendera. Id. at 3. The 

second Deed of Trust released Plaintiff’s first Deed of Trust on April 30, 

Case 4:22-cv-00747-P Document 47 Filed 04/20/23 Page 1 of 4 PageID 348
2

2012. ECF No. 29 at 25. Defendant later began foreclosure proceedings 

on Plaintiff’s property ECF No. 44 at 1–2; ECF No. 26.

Plaintiff sued in August 2022. ECF No. 44 at 1–2. Among her litany

of allegations, she claimed constitutional violations, violations of 

fiduciary obligations, unenforceability of the current deed of trust, 

wrongful debt collection, negligence, and unjust enrichment. ECF Nos. 

26, 44. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for failure to state 

claim (ECF No. 27). 

LEGAL STADARD 

A. FRCP 12(b)(6)

A court may dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to

survive, a plaintiff must assert specific, well-pleaded facts and avoid 

conclusory allegations. Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 

F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006). And Plaintiffs must plead enough facts to 

assert a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 663, 678–79 (2009). A complaint is facially plausible when it alleges 

enough facts to allow a court to reasonably conclude that the Defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 663. But courts are not 

required to accept legal conclusions as true. Id. at 678.

ANALYSIS

The Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss be granted as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. This Court agrees.

First, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff failed to state 

both constitutional and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims because: (1) 

Plaintiff failed to show sufficient facts to plead that Defendant is a state 

actor subject to the United States Constitution, and (2) Plaintiff failed 

to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant was somehow 

Plaintiff’s fiduciary as assignee of the Deed of Trust and Plaintiff’s 

creditor. ECF No. 44 at 5.

Second, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff failed to state 

a plausible claim that her current Deed of Trust was unenforceable, 

negating Defendant’s rights to enforce payment or foreclose on the 

property. Id. at 6. In short, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that Plaintiff 

Case 4:22-cv-00747-P Document 47 Filed 04/20/23 Page 2 of 4 PageID 349
3

failed to allege any facts to plausibly show Defendant’s lien interest held 

through its Deed of Trust was invalid under Texas law. Id. at 6–7. 

Third, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff also failed to 

plead sufficient facts to conclude that Defendant wrongfully foreclosed 

upon her property or was negligent in doing so. Id. Moreover, the 

Magistrate concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for unjust 

enrichment because unjust enrichment as a standalone cause of action 

is not recognized under Texas state law, citing Richardson Hosp. Auth., 

v. Nnamdi Duru, 387 S.W.3d 109, 114 (Tex.App.—Dallas, 2012, no pet.).

Plaintiff objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation with a 

broadside of allegations. ECF No. 45. Among her various assertions, 

Plaintiff’s response draws often difficult-to-follow conclusions based on 

blended legal rules to insist that Defendant is liable for this slew of 

misconduct. ECF No. 45 at 5–7. 

Plaintiff then went on to accuse the Northern District of Texas itself 

of engaging in “criminal” conduct by rejecting her prior application for 

an Entry of Default, which allegedly allowed Defendant and the 

Northern District to conspire to “advocate the overthrow of the United 

States . . . constitutional form of government,” “conduct criminal 

activities to create fear under domestic terrorism . . . under the usage of 

a Military flag,” and—as if it could get worse—to “pillage and plunder 

[Plaintiff’s] loot.” Id. at 8–9.

At bottom, Plaintiff attempts to cut Defendant’s foreclosure loose 

from its moorings by seeking a declaration that her second and current 

Deed of Trust is unenforceable. ECF No. 44 at 5. But beyond that, 

Plaintiff then tacks to argue that, in fact, her second Deed of Trust 

reversed the parties’ roles to make her the creditor to whom Cendera 

Funding owes the sum secured by the Deed. Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is deficient from stem to stern. ECF No. 44. 

While she attempts to chart a new course by arguing constitutional and 

fiduciary bases to support invalidating her Deed of Trust, she offers no 

evidence to allow the Court to reasonably draw her legal conclusions. 

ECF No. 26. Likewise, she offers no facts to support that the foreclosure 

has been conducted negligently, or to support her contention that her 

Deed of Trust or its assignment were deficient under Texas state law. 

Case 4:22-cv-00747-P Document 47 Filed 04/20/23 Page 3 of 4 PageID 350
4 

Id. Plaintiff also fails to show any facts to overcome the lack of 

recognition for her unjust enrichment claim under state law. Id. 

 Indeed, Plaintiff’s Objections do no more than restate or augment the 

conclusory allegations stated in her amended Complaint. ECF No. 45.

Additional conclusory accusations of misconduct—much less domestic 

terrorism—on the part of the Court and Defendant will do no aid in 

salvaging a sunken claim. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (“the pleading 

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). Further, Plaintiff offers no 

support for her contention that the execution of her second Deed of Trust 

and release of the first made her the creditor to her own loan. ECF Nos. 

26, 45.

Therefore, for the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge’s 

Recommendation, this Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Complaint has run 

aground. 

CONCLUSION 

Having conducted a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s FCR, 

and Plaintiff’s Objections and Responses, the Court ADOPTS the 

reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s

Objections. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED on this 20th day of April 2023.

Case 4:22-cv-00747-P Document 47 Filed 04/20/23 Page 4 of 4 PageID 351