Rel: December 16, 2022

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

CR-20-0228

_________________________

James Largin

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court

(CC-07-2129.60)

MINOR, Judge.

In this appeal from the denial of a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., 

petition, we consider whether James Largin had ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel in the proceedings that led to his capital-murder convictions 

and death sentences for killing his parents. Proving "the truism that, 

regardless of the mitigation strategy that capital defense lawyers choose, 

they are often 'damned if they do, and damned if they don't' when their 
CR-20-0228

2

clients later assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during 

collateral review," Morton v. Secretary, Florida Department of 

Corrections, 684 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 2012), this appeal requires 

us to consider Largin's claim that his trial counsel were ineffective during 

the penalty phase for introducing evidence of Largin's personality 

disorder—evidence that the sentencing court found mitigating. Although 

this Court has often considered claims that trial counsel was ineffective 

for not introducing evidence of a defendant's personality disorder, we 

have never ruled that counsel was ineffective for introducing such 

evidence, and, under the circumstances of this case, we reject Largin's 

request that we do so. We also reject Largin's other ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims, and we affirm the judgment of the 

Tuscaloosa Circuit Court denying Largin's Rule 32 petition. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On direct appeal, this Court summarized the relevant facts from 

Largin's trial:

"Peggy and Jimmy Largin were at home on the night of 

March 15, 2007, when they were shot multiple times with a 

.22 caliber rifle and their bodies were thrown down the stairs 

leading to the cellar in their home. Autopsy results showed 

that both victims died as the result of close-range gunshot 

wounds to the head.
CR-20-0228

3

"Sheri Largin Lake, Largin's sister and Jimmy and 

Peggy's daughter, testified that she went to her parents' house 

sometime after 9:00 p.m. on March 15, 2007, and her parents 

and her brother were there. Largin had a history of drug and 

alcohol abuse, and he had recently been told to leave a 

residential treatment center for failing to follow the rules. 

Jimmy had picked Largin up from the treatment center and 

had brought him to the Largin residence. Largin had been 

living with his parents for approximately one week. Sheri 

testified that her mother had not wanted Largin to stay in the 

house because he previously had stolen money and property 

from them.

"Sheri was unable to make telephone contact with her 

parents on March 16, 2007, which was unusual. She drove to 

their house that evening and found the house dark and the 

front door locked, which was also unusual. Sheri entered the 

house, called out to her parents, and walked to her mother's 

room, where she saw blood on the floor. She left the house and 

called emergency 911. The Largins had been in their

bedrooms when they were shot with a .22 caliber rifle, and 

their bodies had been dragged through the house and thrown 

down the basement stairs. A mop with blood on the handle 

was found in the kitchen sink. Forensic analysis revealed that 

DNA on the mop handle was consistent with a mixture of 

Peggy's DNA and Largin's DNA. Officers observed swirl 

marks on the kitchen floor that indicated that someone had 

attempted to clean something up with a mop. Largin's 

fingerprints were found on several containers of cleaning 

products recovered near the kitchen sink. Sheri testified that 

her brother was not at the house when she arrived that night 

and that her deceased sister's Trans Am automobile, which 

was kept on the Largins' property, was missing. Several items 

had been stolen from the house, including credit cards 

belonging to Jimmy and Peggy, a rifle, and Peggy's floral 

makeup bag in which she kept her set of keys and a 

substantial amount of cash.
CR-20-0228

4

"Testimony further established that Largin drove the 

Trans Am to a friend's house between midnight and 1:00 a.m. 

on the night of the murders. Largin purchased crack cocaine 

several times during the next 24 hours and smoked it with 

some of his acquaintances. Those acquaintances testified that 

Largin drove the Trans Am on several outings during that 

time, that he was in possession of the floral pouch that was 

identified as belonging to Peggy, and that he seemed to have 

a large amount of money. When Largin ran out of cash to 

purchase drugs, he began using his parents' credit cards. 

Several purchases were verified by receipts and surveillance 

videos. Largin purchased some items from a Walmart 

discount store and traded them for more drugs.

"Law-enforcement officers were notified of the issuance 

of a 'BOLO'—be on the lookout—for the Trans Am. Officers 

located the car parked at an apartment complex. Soon after 

the car was located, Largin and a companion came out of one 

of the apartments and walked toward the car. They had 

intended to travel to another location to purchase more crack 

cocaine. Officers took Largin into custody.

"Investigator Simon Miller had been a friend of Jimmy's 

for several years, and both he and Jimmy were members of 

the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. He also knew 

Peggy and had been introduced to Largin and Sheri. Miller 

had chatted with Largin on more than one occasion before the 

murders. Miller spoke with Largin at the police department 

after he was arrested, and Largin told Miller, 'It wasn't 

murder ... not in a cold-blooded sense.' (C. 836.) Largin further 

stated that he started to clean up the crime scene but then 

decided not to, and that he did not 'try to hide it.' (C. 838.)

"Several inmates with whom Largin had been 

incarcerated testified that they heard Largin admit that he 

had killed his parents. Largin also said that his parents were 

where they were supposed to be and that, if it were necessary, 
CR-20-0228

5

he would do it again."

Largin v. State, 233 So. 3d 374, 388-89 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). The jury 

convicted Largin of two counts of capital murder for killing his parents. 

See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975 (murder made capital because it was 

committed during a robbery), and § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975 

(murder of multiple victims made capital because it was committed under

one scheme or course of conduct).

At the penalty phase, the defense offered evidence about (1) 

Largin's work history, (2) his upbringing and family life, (3) his problems 

with substance abuse and depression, and (4) his alleged personality 

disorder. (Trial R. 2215-2434.)1 The defense also cited his lack of a 

significant criminal history. (Trial R. 2499.) 

Largin presented testimony from his uncle, Mike Largin; Jonathan 

Friday, a former boyfriend of Largin's sister, Sheri; Largin's great aunt, 

Christine Largin; and Largin's cousin, Teresa O'Rourke. Their testimony 

1"Trial C." refers to the clerk's record in Largin's direct appeal; 

"Trial R." refers to the reporter's transcript in the direct appeal. See Rule 

28(g), Ala. R. App. P. See also Hull v. State, 607 So. 2d 369, 371 n.1 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 1992) (noting that this Court may take judicial notice of its 

own records).
CR-20-0228

6

suggested that Largin's household during his childhood was filled with 

arguing, fighting, and verbal abuse. (Trial R. 2215-51 2271-94, 2351-52.)

Largin also presented testimony from Dr. Karen Salekin, a clinical 

psychologist and mitigation specialist. Salekin testified that she 

interviewed Largin 4 times and interviewed 19 individuals, including 

family members, former employers, and family friends. (Trial R. 2301.) 

Dr. Salekin was unable to speak with Largin's sister, Sheri, or with 

Largin's ex-wife, Dixie. (Trial R. 2305.) Other individuals refused to talk 

to her. (Trial R. 2306-07.) 

Dr. Salekin also reviewed "a large volume of medical records 

pertaining to [Largin's] mental health history, his hospitalizations at 

North Harbor, Indian River[s] [Community] Mental Health Center, the 

Crisis Stabilization Unit, Bryce Hospital, and Serenity Care." (Trial R. 

2308.) Dr. Salekin testified that, beginning in 2006, Largin was 

hospitalized several times for attempting suicide or having suicidal 

thoughts. (Trial R. 2309.) On cross-examination, she testified that some 

of Largin's suicide attempts or "gestures" could have been "manipulation, 

a way to attention, ... a way to get into the hospital to get help." (Trial R. 

2353.) She testified that Largin's ingestion of antifreeze and then telling 
CR-20-0228

7

others about it was likely not an instance in which he "intended to kill 

himself." (Trial R. 2357.) But she testified about one suicide attempt: 

"It would indicate that he went to the degree ... that he could 

have lost his life at that point in time. Could have. But as was 

mentioned before, he also did these things in front of people. 

And that—it's a game that is dangerous to play. When people 

go to that degree to try to kill themselves and weigh the 

likelihood of someone saving them and being taken to the 

hospital in the appropriate time, it's getting to the point 

where they are making a dangerous and bad decision. ...

"... [A]s I mentioned yesterday, I think they are 

manipulative gestures. But the judgment in making that—

and I think the [suicide attempt], the one before with the 

antifreeze, really demonstrates his inability to make good 

decisions, his potentially impulsive behaviors."

(Trial R. 2410-11.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that the records showed that Largin had 

"clinical diagnoses" of "[m]ajor depression," "impulse control disorder," 

and "polysubstance abuse disorder." (Trial R. 2312.) Dr. Salekin testified 

that Largin did not have an official diagnosis of a personality disorder, 

but she said that his records referenced traits she described as "Cluster 

B" traits—"behaviors that tend to get people in trouble interpersonally 

because they are either—they can be insulting people, they can be very 

clingy and needy people, they can be very arrogant people"—and "Cluster 

C" traits. (Trial R. 2312-13.) Dr. Salekin said that individuals with 
CR-20-0228

8

"Cluster B personality disorders" generally have "wild" emotions, are 

unpredictable, and "can be ... violent toward themselves" or others. (Trial 

R. 2313-14.) She testified that individuals with Cluster B characteristics 

are generally not treatable with medication, and care usually focuses on 

behavior management. (Trial R. 2313-14.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that "there did not seem to be a whole lot of 

successful treatment for Mr. Largin." (Trial R. 2315.) Salekin testified 

that, in her opinion, Largin had a "significant" mental illness. (Trial R. 

2318.) She testified that he had "a characterological problem" and that 

he suffered from "narcissistic personality disorder" ("NPD"). (Trial R. 

2319.) She testified that a person with NPD "comes across as being very 

arrogant, grandiose in their thinking, [and] tend to have a pretty high 

sense of entitlement meaning they want other people to do things for 

them." (Trial R. 2319.) Dr. Salekin cited the Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders as a basis for testimony. (Trial R. 2321.) 

Dr. Salekin stated that someone does not simply get over a 

personality disorder and that Largin could not just "get over" it. But, she 

testified, "long-term individual psychotherapy" could be beneficial. (Trial 

R. 2332-33.) She described Largin has having "more than just a bad 
CR-20-0228

9

personality. His particular group of characteristics are not pleasant.

People usually don't want to be around folks with this personality. They 

find them off-putting, entitled, demanding, those kind of things." (Trial 

R. 2334-35.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that, in her opinion, Largin had a "severe" 

mental disorder that had "impacted his ability to connect with people for 

probably for most of his life." (Trial R. 2337-38.) In her opinion, NPD 

caused him to have "trouble controlling his impulses." (Trial R. 2340.) 

Dr. Salekin testified about "impulsive behavior":

"It's just a way of describing someone who doesn't put a lot of 

thought into what they do. They just—they do things without 

thinking. They don't weigh the consequences of their 

behaviors very well and come out the other end needing to 

deal with what has happened and may have the hindsight of, 

oh, that was a bad idea, but they don't have the foresight to 

actually prevent themselves in the same way that people with 

good judgment [have]. We all make mistakes. But in these 

cases they are more apt to make bad judgments with little 

insight prior to making their decisions."

(Trial R. 2411-12.) Dr. Salekin testified that, in her opinion, Largin did

not "have the capacity to connect with people. ... He's not really going to 

understand what it might feel to other people having lost a child or 

experiencing an illness or something like that. ... [P]eople with this 

disorder don't have the real ability to feel for other people." (Trial R. 
CR-20-0228

10

2412.)

Dr. Salekin testified that she was not "trying to make excuses for 

what [Largin] did." (Trial R. 2341.) She stated: 

"I'm just trying to explain as best I can who Mr. Largin is and 

how he got to be the way he is. Mr. Largin is in a situation 

that's unusual and we're all trying, I think, to grasp what it 

could have been that got him into the situation. So that's all 

I'm trying to do and put it all together so that it makes some 

sense out of a very nonsensical and horrible situation."

(Trial R. 2341-42.) 

When questioned about specific statutory mitigating 

circumstances, Dr. Salekin testified that “in comparison to" other cases 

she had worked on, Largin's three domestic-violence charges did not 

present "a significant history of prior criminal activity," but she also did 

"not want to minimize the fact that he has ... three domestic violence 

charges." (Trial R. 2337.) On cross-examination, the State also asked Dr. 

Salekin about statements from Largin in which he said that, on his 

honeymoon, "he assaulted a man after seeing his wife kissing another 

man." (Trial R. 2376.) 

The State also asked Dr. Salekin about details of Largin's medical 

records. She acknowledged that the records suggested that Largin had 

used cocaine and that he had attempted suicide by trying to overdose 
CR-20-0228

11

using Xanax, cocaine, and alcohol, and by ingesting antifreeze. (Trial R. 

2355.) Dr. Salekin testified that Largin's chart from North Harbor had 

"'manipulative' all over it." (Trial R. 2361.) The records stated that 

Largin acted hostile toward the staff and misrepresented what they told 

him. (Trial R. 2363.) 

The records included statements that Largin gave a controlled 

substance (Klonopin) to another patient, that he had his wife sneak in 

cigarettes and marijuana, and that he had "cheeked medication .... 

keep[ing] [it] in [his] cheek, ... pretend[ing] [he] swallowed it, and [using] 

it for some other purpose." (Trial R. 2361-62, 2366). The records included 

statements from Largin that he regretted "putting a cat in a freezer" and 

that he regretted "in 1990 beating a man unconscious and trying to throw 

him off a balcony." (Trial R. 2375.) The records stated that Largin did 

not take responsibility for his actions. 

The State questioned Dr. Salekin about statements in the records 

that Largin had a good relationship with his parents and a good 

childhood. (Trial R. 2359, 2394). Dr. Salekin did not dispute that the 

records suggested that Largin's allegations of abuse or of a turbulent 

childhood came only after Largin had applied for disability benefits. 
CR-20-0228

12

(Trial R. 2360.) Dr. Salekin also testified that, while at North Harbor, 

"[t]he implication from the records was [Largin] was going to try to use 

his current hospitalization and the record that he had developed ... to 

then apply for disability status." (Trial R. 2358.) She testified, however, 

that it was not "unusual" for someone like Largin to at first refuse "to 

open up" about his childhood. (Trial R. 2408.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that she did not think "that poor parenting 

caused Mr. Largin to do anything." (Trial R. 2390.) She testified that in 

her opinion Largin was manipulative. (Trial R. 2396.) Dr. Salekin stated 

that she based her "diagnosis of Mr. Largin ... primarily ... on records 

because of [her] concern" that he could be manipulative. (Trial R. 2396.) 

She explained that being manipulative was "part and parcel of what he 

has, the disorder." (Trial R. 2406.)

Dr. Salekin summed up her opinion of Largin:

"So in terms of the uniqueness of Mr. Largin and his 

decisions, he in my opinion has this particular disorder to 

such a degree that his impairment is different. I can't tell you 

what part of his history impacted it and I can't tell you if there 

was something in his brain. I can tell you that in my opinion 

he became the person he did and did something very unusual, 

as maybe we can call it unique. He did something unusual 

that most people would not.

"But again people with disorders—many people with 
CR-20-0228

13

disorders do things that we don't understand. And this—I 

don't think anybody can really come up to a good explanation 

as to why it happened."

(Trial R. 2430.) 

At the end of the penalty phase, the jury recommended, by an 11-1 

vote, a death sentence for each count, and the circuit court followed the 

jury's recommendation and sentenced Largin to death.

The circuit court found that two aggravating circumstances existed: 

that Largin committed the murders during the commission of a robbery, 

§ 13A-5-49(4), Ala. Code 1975, and that he murdered both his parents by 

one act or under one scheme or course of conduct, § 13A-5-49(9), Ala. Code 

1975. The circuit court found that one statutory mitigating circumstance 

existed: that Largin did not have a significant criminal history, § 13A-5-

51(1), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court found that several nonstatutory 

mitigating circumstances existed: that Largin suffered from NPD; that 

Largin's turbulent family history affected his upbringing; that Largin 

suffered from alcohol- and substance-abuse problems; that Largin's 

education, military service, and work history were evidence of his good 

character; and that Largin exhibited good behavior while he was

incarcerated. The circuit court found that no other nonstatutory 
CR-20-0228

14

mitigating circumstances, "including remorse," existed. (Supp. Trial C. 

35-38.)

This Court affirmed Largin's convictions and sentences. Largin v. 

State, 233 So. 3d 374 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). The Alabama Supreme 

Court denied certiorari review on April 21, 2017, Ex parte Largin (No. 

1151272), and on that same date this Court issued a certificate of 

judgment, making Largin's convictions and sentences final. The United 

States Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 27, 2017. Largin 

v. Alabama (No. 17-5678).

In April 2018, Largin timely filed a postconviction petition under 

Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., challenging his convictions and sentence.2 (C. 

61.) Largin alleged three categories of claims: (1) claims alleging that his 

counsel was ineffective; (2) claims alleging that the State withheld 

exculpatory and impeachment evidence; and (3) a claim alleging that he 

2Largin paid the filing fee. (C. 60.) See Rule 32.6(a), Ala. R. Crim. 

P. ("A proceeding under this rule is commenced by filing a petition, 

verified by the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney, with the clerk of the 

court. ... [The petition] shall also be accompanied by the filing fee 

prescribed by law or rule in civil cases in the circuit court unless the 

petitioner applies for and is given leave to prosecute the petition in forma 

pauperis.").
CR-20-0228

15

has a long-term mental illness that, he alleged, renders him 

"categorically" ineligible for the death penalty.3

After the State responded (C. 204), the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court 

scheduled an evidentiary hearing on two of Largin's claims: (1) Claim 

I.A.1., in which Largin alleged that his counsel were ineffective for not 

having "a unified theory of the guilt and penalty phases" of his defense,

and (2) Claim I.A.5., in which Largin alleged that his counsel should not 

have called "Dr. Karen Salekin, a psychologist and mitigation expert," to 

testify during the penalty phase. (C. 69, 81, 278; R. 7-9.)

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Salekin testified that Largin's 

counsel retained her in the case as a mitigation expert. In that role, Dr. 

Salekin learned about Largin's family, personal, medical, psychiatric, 

and educational histories. (R. 11.) She reviewed records that counsel 

provided her, including records from Serenity House and DCH Regional 

3Largin does not challenge the circuit court's dismissal of his claims 

alleging that the State withheld evidence or his claim challenging the 

constitutionality of his death sentence. Thus, those claims are deemed 

abandoned and are not properly before this Court. See, e.g., Jones v. 

State, 104 So. 3d 296, 297 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) ("Other claims raised 

in [the] petition were not pursued on appeal and, therefore, those claims 

are deemed abandoned. See, e.g., Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91, 93 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ('We will not review issues not listed and argued 

in brief.').").
CR-20-0228

16

Medical Center and notes from Dr. Omar Mohabbat, Largin's outpatient 

psychiatrist at Indian Rivers Community Mental Health Center. (Trial 

C. 204; R. 15.) Dr. Salekin noted that, after reviewing the records, she 

talked with trial counsel. She said that her "primary concern was 

personality characteristics, all of which for Mr. Largin were negative. 

Things like arrogant, manipulative, lacking empathy for others." (R. 16-

17.) She "ultimately concluded [Largin] has narcissistic personality 

disorder, which is an elevated level of problems that lead to impairment 

in functioning .... in a manner typical or acceptable in our community, in 

our society." (R. 19-20.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that she considered "evidence of a personality 

disorder or characterological disorder" as "generally aggravating." (R. 

20.) She also testified that she would not advise a defense team to 

"proactively present evidence that their client suffers from a personality 

disorder." (R. 20-21.) She testified that ordinarily she would try "to 

contextualize a personality disorder within a defendant's life or his or her 

history" but that she was unable to do so in Largin's case because she had 

talked with "very few people that could provide any helpful background 

in terms of his upbringing and the things he experienced." (R. 22.) Dr. 
CR-20-0228

17

Salekin testified that she "warned" trial counsel early in the case that 

she was encountering "roadblocks" in getting a "full picture" of Largin's 

childhood home environment. (R. 23-25.) She stated that her testimony 

in the penalty phase about Largin's narcissistic personality disorder 

damaged his case and that she thought that Largin's counsel was "wrong" 

for calling her to testify. (R. 27-28.) 

Dr. Salekin identified other negative information in Largin's 

medical records that she had concerns about the jury learning such as 

Largin's putting a cat in a freezer, beating a man unconscious in 1990

and trying to throw him off a balcony, giving a controlled substance to 

another patient at North Harbor, and being released from Serenity Care 

for abusing medication. (R. 30-32.) The State questioned Dr. Salekin 

during the penalty phase about each of those instances, as well as other 

negative information in Largin's records. 

Dr. Salekin testified that she warned trial counsel before trial that 

she thought her "testimony would do more harm than good." (R. 34-35.) 

On cross-examination, however, Dr. Salekin acknowledged that no 

concern about testifying appeared in her notes about two months before 

Largin's trial or in an email from her to trial counsel about a month before 
CR-20-0228

18

trial. (R. 48-50.)

Dr. Salekin acknowledged at the Rule 32 hearing that, although 

narcissistic personality disorder is not curable, Largin could benefit from 

therapy. (R. 33, 47.) She also acknowledged that she spoke with "several 

individuals" about Peggy and Jimmy Largin. (R. 37-38.) She recalled 

speaking with Largin's cousin, Teresa O'Rourke, about her history inside 

the Largin home and "incidents of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse."

(R. 38.) Dr. Salekin also acknowledged that defense counsel had 

presented testimony during the penalty phase about Largin's turbulent 

home environment during his childhood. (R. 38-45.)

On questioning from the Rule 32 court, Dr. Salekin acknowledged 

that the sentencing court found that Largin's NPD was a nonstatutory 

mitigating circumstance, but she stated that she disagreed with that 

finding. (R. 54.) 

Leon Storie testified he and cocounsel James Smith represented 

Largin at trial and that Smith served as lead counsel.4 (R. 58-59.) For 

strategic decisions, Storie and Smith would "consult with each other and 

kind of bounce each other's ideas back and forth, pros and cons. 

4Smith died before the Rule 32 hearing. (R. 89.) 
CR-20-0228

19

Ultimately the final decision was [Smith's] as lead counsel." (R. 59.) 

Storie testified that Largin's case was his "first official appointment on a 

capital case." (R. 68.) Storie testified that he thought Smith "had handled 

about five capital cases in [that] circuit" before representing Largin. (R. 

69.) Storie stated that the "nature of the case made it difficult" because 

there was strong evidence of guilt including "a statement, a confession, 

.... [and] video of some transactions that were made with [Largin's] 

parents' money, credit cards, whatever." (R. 59.) He noted that, after the 

circuit court denied the motion to suppress Largin's statement, counsel 

"worked out a plea arrangement" for Largin to "plead guilty and ... 

receive a sentence of life without" the possibility of parole. (R. 60.) But 

because Largin "was not comfortable with admitting to the facts," the 

deal fell apart.5 (R. 60-61.) Storie testified that, after Largin refused the 

5On direct appeal, Largin argued that the trial court erred when it 

refused to accept his negotiated best-interest guilty plea. This Court 

noted:

"The State set out the terms of the plea agreement it had 

offered, and one of the terms was that Largin actually plead 

guilty to capital murder. The State made it abundantly clear 

that it would not agree to a best-interest plea. Largin then 

repeatedly stated [to the trial court] that he was unwilling to 

concede his guilt or to plead guilty to the crime with which he 

had been charged." 
CR-20-0228

20

plea deal, counsel thought that, for a trial strategy, their options were to 

"rely on basic reasonable doubt" or "offer an alternative scenario" that 

someone else committed the murders. (R. 61, 84.) He testified that "we 

ultimately went with offering an alternative scenario." (R. 61.) Storie 

noted that he "felt like once we lost on the motion to suppress, the penalty 

phase was going to become very important." (R. 61.) He also testified that 

counsel had "discussions about ... [what] could be perceived as 

inconsistent" theories in the guilt phase and penalty phase. (R. 84.)

Storie testified that they retained Dr. Salekin and, for mitigation, 

planned to present a theory that "Largin's father was an abusive man 

and had abused all the kids in the house and, because of this, had 

basically created an environment where they were afraid of him, they 

disliked him, and that ... [Largin] didn't really have much of a shot, given 

that environment." (R. 62.) Storie said that he and Smith "met with Dr. 

Salekin several times" and that he reviewed notes from Al Kofman, who 

"was the investigator" who "had taken notes of interviews he had done 

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 392. This Court rejected Largin's argument:

"Largin was unwilling to plead guilty under the terms offered by the 

State, and he cannot now argue that the trial court erred in refusing to 

accept his plea." Id.
CR-20-0228

21

with various folks who could offer possible mitigation." (R. 62-63.) 

He testified that "[a]t some point [Dr. Salekin] became concerned 

about her testimony. She was afraid that her testimony had the potential 

to backfire." (R. 64.) Storie testified that Dr. Salekin "never said I won't 

testify" but that he thought "she expressed concerns about whether she 

should testify." (R. 65.) Storie testified that he "took [her concerns] 

seriously." (R. 67.) He stated that "[t]he fact that there [were] parents 

involved was always an important factor because we thought a 

reasonable juror would ask why would a person kill their parents." (R. 

82.) He noted that Largin's case was not "your typical just killing 

somebody because of a drug deal or whatever." (R. 82.) Storie testified 

that Smith decided to present Dr. Salekin's testimony with "the 

knowledge that it could backfire" but thought "that there was a 

possibility that it could be helpful." (R. 86.) Storie testified that Smith 

"articulated that he felt that [Dr. Salekin] would offer something that 

would explain the behavior that the jury had already found had taken 

place." (R. 87.) 

After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. 

(C. 605.) The circuit court later denied Largin's motion for 
CR-20-0228

22

reconsideration, and Largin timely appealed. (C. 630, 645-46.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"'[Largin] has the burden of pleading and proving his 

claims. As Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides:

" '"The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading 

and proving by a preponderance of the evidence 

the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to 

relief. The state shall have the burden of pleading 

any ground of preclusion, but once a ground of 

preclusion has been pleaded, the petitioner shall 

have the burden of disproving its existence by a 

preponderance of the evidence."

" '"The standard of review this Court uses in evaluating 

the rulings made by the trial court [in a postconviction 

proceeding] is whether the trial court abused its discretion."

Hunt v. State, 940 So. 2d 1041, 1049 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). 

However, "when the facts are undisputed and an appellate 

court is presented with pure questions of law, [our] review in 

a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo." Ex parte White, 792 So. 2d 

1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). "[W]e may affirm a circuit court's 

ruling on a postconviction petition if it is correct for any 

reason." Smith v. State, [122] So. 3d [224], [227] (Ala. Crim.

App. 2011).

"'As stated above, [some] of the claims raised by [Largin]

were summarily dismissed based on defects in the pleadings 

and the application of the procedural bars in Rule 32.2, Ala. 

R. Crim. P. When discussing the pleading requirements for 

postconviction petitions, we have stated:

" '"The burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 

and Rule 32.6(b) is a heavy one. Conclusions 

unsupported by specific facts will not satisfy the 

requirements of Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). The 
CR-20-0228

23

full factual basis for the claim must be included in 

the petition itself. If, assuming every factual 

allegation in a Rule 32 petition to be true, a court 

cannot determine whether the petitioner is 

entitled to relief, the petitioner has not satisfied 

the burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 

32.6(b). See Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2003)."

"'Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

"'"'Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition 

itself disclose the facts relied upon in seeking 

relief.' Boyd v. State, 746 So. 2d 364, 406 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1999). In other words, it is not the 

pleading of a conclusion 'which, if true, entitle[s] 

the petitioner to relief.' Lancaster v. State, 638 So.

2d 1370, 1373 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)[, overruled 

on other grounds by Robey v. State, 950 So. 2d 

1235 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)]. It is the allegation 

of facts in pleading which, if true, entitle a 

petitioner to relief. After facts are pleaded, which, 

if true, entitle the petitioner to relief, the 

petitioner is then entitled to an opportunity, as 

provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., to present 

evidence proving those alleged facts."

"'Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1125 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). 

"[T]he procedural bars of Rule 32[.2, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] apply 

with equal force to all cases, including those in which the 

death penalty has been imposed." Burgess v. State, 962 So. 2d 

272, 277 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).

"'Some of [Largin's] claims were also dismissed based on 

his failure to comply with Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. In 

discussing the application of this rule we have stated:

" '"[A] circuit court may, in some 
CR-20-0228

24

circumstances, summarily dismiss a 

postconviction petition based on the 

merits of the claims raised therein. 

Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides:

"'"'If the court 

determines that the petition 

is not sufficiently specific, 

or is precluded, or fails to 

state a claim, or that no 

material issue of fact or law 

exists which would entitle 

the petitioner to relief 

under this rule and that no 

purpose would be served by 

any further proceedings, 

the court may either 

dismiss the petition or 

grant leave to file an 

amended petition. Leave to 

amend shall be freely 

granted. Otherwise, the 

court shall direct that the 

proceedings continue and 

set a date for hearing.'

"'"'"Where a simple reading of the 

petition for post-conviction relief shows 

that, assuming every allegation of the 

petition to be true, it is obviously 

without merit or is precluded, the 

circuit court [may] summarily dismiss 

that petition."' Bishop v. State, 608 So.

2d 345, 347-48 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis 

added) (quoting Bishop v. State, 592 

So. 2d 664, 667 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) 

(Bowen, J., dissenting)). See also

Hodges v. State, 147 So. 3d 916, 934 
CR-20-0228

25

(Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (a 

postconviction claim is 'due to be 

summarily dismissed [when] it is 

meritless on its face')[, rev'd on other 

grounds, Ex parte Hodges, 147 So. 3d 

973 (Ala. 2011) ]."

"'Bryant v. State, 181 So. 3d 1087, 1102 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2011).'

"Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 38–39 (Ala. Crim. App.

2012).

"[Largin's] remaining claims were denied by the circuit 

court after [Largin] was afforded the opportunity to prove 

those claims at an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 32.9(a), Ala. 

R. Crim. P.

"When the circuit court conducts an evidentiary 

hearing, '[t]he burden of proof in a Rule 32 proceeding rests 

solely with the petitioner, not the State.' Davis v. State, 9 So.

3d 514, 519 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 9 

So. 3d 537 (Ala. 2007). '[I]n a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., 

proceeding, the burden of proof is upon the petitioner seeking 

post-conviction relief to establish his grounds for relief by a 

preponderance of the evidence.' Wilson v. State, 644 So. 2d 

1326, 1328 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., 

specifically provides that '[t]he petitioner shall have the 

burden of ... proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 

facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.' '[W]hen the 

facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with 

pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 

proceeding is de novo.' Ex parte White, 792 So. 2d 1097, 1098 

(Ala. 2001). 'However, where there are disputed facts in a 

postconviction proceeding and the circuit court resolves those 

disputed facts, "[t]he standard of review on appeal ... is 

whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied 

the petition."' Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1122 (Ala. Crim.
CR-20-0228

26

App. 2003) (quoting Elliott v. State, 601 So. 2d 1118, 1119 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).

"Finally, '[a]lthough on direct appeal we reviewed 

[Largin's] capital-murder conviction for plain error, the plainerror standard of review does not apply when an appellate 

court is reviewing the denial of a postconviction petition 

attacking a death sentence.' James v. State, 61 So. 3d 357, 

362 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So.

2d 763 (Ala. 2001)). With these principles in mind, we review 

the claims raised by [Largin] on appeal."

Marshall v. State, 182 So. 3d 573, 580-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Largin argues that the circuit court erred in denying or 

summarily dismissing several claims in which Largin alleged that his 

counsel was ineffective. 

"'To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel's 

performance was deficient and (2) that the petitioner was 

prejudiced by the deficient performance. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

" '"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 

must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting 

for a defendant to second-guess counsel's 

assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, 

and it is all too easy for a court, examining 

counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, 

to conclude that a particular act or omission of 

counsel was unreasonable. [...] A fair assessment 

of attorney performance requires that every effort 

be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
CR-20-0228

27

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. 

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 

evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, 

the challenged action 'might be considered sound 

trial strategy.' There are countless ways to provide 

effective assistance in any given case. Even the 

best criminal defense attorneys would not defend 

a particular client in the same way."

"'Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

" '"[T]he purpose of ineffectiveness 

review is not to grade counsel's 

performance. See Strickland [v. 

Washington], [466 U.S. 668,] 104 S. Ct. 

[2052] at 2065 [(1984)]; see also White 

v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 

(11th Cir. 1992) ('We are not interested 

in grading lawyers' performances; we 

are interested in whether the 

adversarial process at trial, in fact, 

worked adequately.'). We recognize 

that '[r]epresentation is an art, and an 

act or omission that is unprofessional 

in one case may be sound or even 

brilliant in another.' Strickland, 104 S. 

Ct. at 2067. Different lawyers have 

different gifts; this fact, as well as 

differing circumstances from case to 

case, means the range of what might be 

a reasonable approach at trial must be 

broad. To state the obvious: the trial 
CR-20-0228

28

lawyers, in every case, could have done 

something more or something 

different. So, omissions are inevitable. 

But, the issue is not what is possible or 

'what is prudent or appropriate, but 

only what is constitutionally 

compelled.' Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 

776, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L. Ed. 2d 

638 (1987)."

"'Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313–

14 (11th Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted).

"'An appellant is not entitled to "perfect 

representation." Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 

796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). "[I]n considering 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 'we 

address not what is prudent or appropriate, but 

only what is constitutionally compelled.'" Burger 

v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987).'

"Yeomans v. State, 195 So. 3d 1018, 1025-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2013). Additionally, '"[w]hen courts are examining the 

performance of an experienced trial counsel, the presumption 

that his conduct was reasonable is even stronger."' Ray v. 

State, 80 So. 3d 965, 977 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting 

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 

2000)).

"We also recognize that when reviewing claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel 'the performance and 

prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed 

questions of law and fact.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). This Court, 

however, has held that when the same judge presides over 

both the original trial and the postconviction proceeding—as 

is the case here—and finds that, under the second prong of 

Strickland, trial counsel's errors would not have resulted in 
CR-20-0228

29

prejudice, '[w]e afford the experienced judge's ruling 

"considerable weight."' Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 53 

(Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (emphasis added) (affirming the circuit 

court's denial of Washington's postconviction ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim by applying the 'considerable 

weight' standard). See also State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707, 

721 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (affirming the circuit court's 

granting of Gamble's postconviction ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim by applying the 'considerable weight' standard) 

(citing Francis v. State, 529 So. 2d 670, 673 n.9 (Fla. 1988) 

('Postconviction relief motions are not abstract exercises to be 

conducted in a vacuum, and this finding is entitled to 

considerable weight.'))."

Marshall, 182 So. 3d at 582-83. With these principles in mind, we 

address Largin's arguments on appeal. 

I. CLAIMS DENIED AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Largin argues first that the circuit court erred in denying claims 

I.A.1. and I.A.5. after the evidentiary hearing. 

A.

Largin argues that "[t]he circuit court erred in denying Largin's 

claim [I.A.5.] that [his trial counsel were ineffective] by calling Karen 

Salekin to testify over her express warning that her testimony would do 

more harm than good." (Largin's brief, p. 20.) 

In denying this claim, the Rule 32 court found: 

"In claim I.A.5 of his petition, Largin challenges trial 

counsel's decision to call mitigation expert Dr. Karen Salekin 
CR-20-0228

30

to testify during the penalty phase. This Court recognizes that 

trial counsel's 'decision whether to retain witnesses, including 

expert witnesses, is a matter of trial strategy and "a tactical 

decision will not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim unless it was so patently unreasonable that no 

competent attorney would have chosen it."' Woodward [v. 

State], 276 So. 3d [713,] 764 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2018)]; see also

Clark [v. State], 196 So. 3d [285,] 306 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)] 

('"'Hindsight does not elevate unsuccessful trial tactics into 

ineffective assistance of counsel.'"' [quoting Davis v. State, 44 

So. 3d 1118, 1132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), quoting in turn 

People v. Eisemann, 248 A.D.2d 484, 484, 670 N.Y.2d 39, 40-

41 (1998)]). Additionally, this Court must review such 

challenges objectively and 'indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance[.]' Benjamin v. State, 156 So. 3d 424, 

430 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (citation omitted). In this instance, 

Largin has not overcome this presumption and shown that 

trial counsel's decision to call Dr. Salekin was unreasonable 

based on the circumstances at the time of trial. 

"First to the extent that Largin's petition alleges that 

trial counsel deficiently investigated the mitigation evidence, 

this Court finds that counsel performed a reasonable 

investigation. During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Salekin 

testified that she was retained early in Largin's case, that she 

reviewed multiple records and spoke with multiple 

individuals, and that she cautioned trial counsel that her 

testimony could potentially be harmful. [Leon] Storie testified 

that he and Smith not only met with Dr. Salekin regularly but 

also met with Investigator Al Kofman to discuss interviews 

Kofman had conducted. Storie also noted that Dr. Salekin 

expressed her concern to trial counsel that she 'was afraid 

that her testimony had potential to backfire.' He further 

testified that he had consulted with other attorneys who had 

worked death penalty cases about the best approach for 

Largin's case. There was evidence presented that [James] 

Smith researched parricide and mental health definitions, as 
CR-20-0228

31

well as obtained a reference manual on mental disability law 

and evidence and the Alabama Trial Manual published by the 

Equal Justice Initiative. Thus, this Court finds that trial 

counsel adequately investigated and prepared for potential 

mitigation evidence in this case.

"Second, this Court finds that trial counsel made a 

reasonable strategic decision to call Dr. Salekin. Largin was 

convicted of shooting his mother and father multiple times; 

both died from close-range gunshots to the head. Largin [v. 

State], 233 So. 3d [374,] at 388 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2015)]. After 

murdering them, Largin tossed his parents' bodies 'down the 

stairs leading to the cellar in their home.' Id. Though he 

attempted to clean up the murder scene, he eventually gave

up, stole an automobile, credit cards, and a substantial 

amount of cash, and set out on a cocaine binge. Id. at 388-89. 

This Court ultimately found two aggravating factors: Largin 

committed the murders during a robbery, and he murdered 

his parents pursuant to one act, scheme, or course of conduct. 

"As the record on direct appeal reflects, counsel offered 

evidence to show Largin suffered from a turbulent family 

history and presented testimony from Dr. Salekin regarding 

Largin's diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder and the 

relationship between his family history and his diagnosis. 

This Court finds that her testimony contextualized Largin's 

personality disorder, particularly that it explained that 

Largin's personality disorder amplified his reaction to conflict 

and explained guilt-phased testimony regarding his response 

to his parents' murder. Dr. Salekin testified that Largin's 

personality disorder was a 'severe,' 'significant mental illness,' 

and noted that individual therapy could work 'for someone 

like' him. Though she noted that characteristics of the 

disorder included manipulation, deceitfulness, and an 

inability to relate to others, she found that Largin's 

characteristics were 'so elevated that they impair[ed] his 

ability to function on a day-to-day basis, primarily ... 

interpersonally[.]' Dr. Salekin testified that his personality 
CR-20-0228

32

disorder was the result of both biological and environmental 

factors. She explained that the Largins were a 'high-conflict' 

family, which 'would impact child development in a sense of 

making them fearful.' She further explained that 'highconflict families tend to produce individuals who have deficits 

in interpersonal functioning. Narcissistic personality is one 

step above what [you] may expect in other people in similar 

situations.' Dr. Salekin testified that Largin's disorder 

worked to amplify issues that resulted from his family history. 

Dr. Salekin also explained that Largin and his sister, [Sheri], 

shared the same behavior in conflict as that modelled by their 

parents, who used physical violence during confrontations. 

She testified that their violent response to confrontation was 

a 'pattern in the home that these kids learned ... over the 

course of time.' She noted that Largin's witnessing the alleged 

physical abuse of his cousin, who lived in the Largin 

household until Largin was approximately seven years old, 

placed him 'in an environment where he [was] recognizing 

and being exposed to verbal violence ... as well as physical 

violence, so it would impact him.' Dr. Salekin opined that 

Largin's behavior in treatment facilities and his suicide 

attempts were consistent with his personality disorder. The 

suicide attempts allegedly demonstrated Largin's 'inability to 

make good decisions [and] his impulsive behaviors.' Further,

Storie explained during the evidentiary hearing that their 

overall theory for mitigation was to show that Jimmy Largin 

'was an abusive man' and had 'created an environment where 

[his children] were afraid of him ... [that Largin] didn't really 

have much of a shot, given that environment.' He testified 

that '[t]he fact that there w[ere] parents involved was always 

an important factor because we thought a reasonable juror 

would ask why would a person kill their parents. That is not 

your typical just killing somebody because of a drug deal or 

whatever.' Storie testified that '[a]t the time that [he and 

Smith] were preparing and strategizing ... [Dr. Salekin's] 

concerns [about her testimony] were heard and noted'; 

however, he and Smith 'felt that there was a possibility that 

[her testimony] could be helpful.' Storie further stated that 
CR-20-0228

33

although Smith made the ultimate decision to call Dr. 

Salekin, Smith 'articulated that he felt that she would offer 

something that would explain the behavior that the jury had 

already found had taken place.' 

"An examination of Smith's oral arguments contained in 

the transcript of the October 1, 2009, sentencing hearing ... 

demonstrated trial counsel's trial strategy in calling Dr. 

Salekin. Pages 35-36 of the sentencing transcript contain the 

following excerpts:

"'... Secondly, extreme mental or emotional 

disturbance, that he suffers from that and suffered 

from that at the time of the commission of the 

offense. The State wants to minimize the 

narcissistic personality disorder, but we heard Dr. 

Salekin testify that it was as to Mr. Largin 

debilitating. The problem is that narcissistic 

personality disorder by its very nature, its 

symptoms are the things that make us not like a 

person. Its symptom cluster is to cause a person to 

lie, to be manipulative, and to not understand the 

feelings of others. But those are symptoms of an 

illness, a mental or emotional disturbance, a 

condition over which he doesn't have control.

"'... Thirdly, that his capacity to appreciate 

the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of the law was 

substantially impaired. And again, this was from 

his narcissistic personality disorder, his 

depression, his mental and emotional disturbance 

which was testified to by Dr. Salekin and which 

was evident in the records reviewed. She talked 

about the records and was questioned about the 

records from Bryce Hospital, from North Harbor, 

from Indian Rivers, from the substance abuse 

place in Mobile where he was, Serenity House. So 
CR-20-0228

34

there was a history of problems of being able to 

conform his conduct to the requirements of law 

because of his substantial impairment caused by a 

mental condition over which he had no control.'

"Based on the above, this Court finds that Largin has 

not met his burden and shown that no reasonable attorney 

would have chosen to present Dr. Salekin's testimony during 

the penalty phase. This Court further finds that, even 

assuming counsel performed deficiently by calling Dr. Salekin 

to testify during the penalty phase, Largin has not met his 

burden of proving prejudice under Strickland. At trial, this 

Court determined that evidence that Largin suffered from 

narcissistic personality disorder was a non-statutory 

mitigating circumstance and considered such evidence 

accordingly when weighing the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. Largin has not shown that but for Dr. 

Salekin's testimony, he would have been sentenced to life 

without the possibility of parole for the murder of his parents. 

Accordingly, this Court finds Largin's ineffectiveness claim is 

without merit ...." 

(C. 625-29 (some citations omitted).) 

Largin argues that trial counsel's decision to call Dr. Salekin to 

testify was unreasonable under the circumstances. He asserts that, in 

calling her to testify, trial counsel disregarded Dr. Salekin's "informed 

and professional judgment" based on her investigation into Largin's 

background. He also cites Dr. Salekin's concerns about testifying and her 

"clear and repeated warnings" that her testimony might be more harmful 

than helpful. He argues that Storie's explanation—that he and Smith 
CR-20-0228

35

knew Dr. Salekin's testimony could backfire but that they hoped it would 

help explain Largin's behavior—is "unavailing and begets more 

questions." He argues that "counsel's decision boiled down to nothing 

more than hope that Salekin's testimony could be more helpful than 

harmful." (Largin's brief, pp. 27-38.) 

First, we note that Largin does not challenge the circuit court's 

finding that trial counsel "adequately investigated and prepared for 

potential mitigation in this case." (C. 626.) Instead, Largin's argument is 

that no reasonable attorney would have called Dr. Salekin to testify 

under the circumstances. This argument lacks merit.

"'The decision to call, or not to call, an expert witness fits 

squarely within the realm of strategic or tactical decisions. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 413, 85 

N.E.3d 665 (2017) (decision not to call psychiatric expert 

reasonable strategic decision); Commonwealth v. Hensley, 

454 Mass. 721, 739, 913 N.E.2d 339 (2009) (decision not to call 

expert strategic). Accordingly, we evaluate whether the 

decision was "manifestly unreasonable" at the time it was 

made. [Commonwealth v.] Holland, 476 Mass. [801] at 812, 73 

N.E.3d 276 [(2017)].'"

State v. Lewis, [Ms. CR-20-0372, May 6, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 63, 

112 N.E.3d 239, 253 (2018) (footnote omitted)). See also Brown v. State, 

288 Ga. 902, 909, 708 S.E.2d 294, 301 (2011) ("[A] tactical decision will 
CR-20-0228

36

not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless it 

was 'so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have 

chosen it.' McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 347, 667 S.E.2d 43 (2008)."). 

Counsel's decisions are reviewed objectively, and "'a court must indulge 

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance.'" Benjamin v. State, 156 So. 3d 

424, 430 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 463 U.S. at 690-91.) 

Largin cites several decisions for the proposition that there are 

"inherent dangers of evidence regarding personality disorders in death 

penalty cases." 6 (Largin's brief, p. 30.) Save one, those decisions involve 

claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not putting on evidence of a 

6Largin cites Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986); 

Littlejohn v. Royal, 875 F.3d 548, 564 (10th Cir. 2017); Evans v. 

Secretary, Dep't of Corrs., 703 F.3d 1316, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013); Warden, 

Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012);

Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 503 (8th Cir. 2011); DeYoung v. 

Schofield, 609 F.3d 1260, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010); Reed v. Secretary, Dep't 

of Corrs., 593 F.3d 1217, 1248 (11th Cir. 2010); Holsey v. Cummings v. 

Secretary for the Dep't of Corrs., 588 F.3d 1331, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009); 

Land v. Allen, 573 F.3d 1211, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. 

Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2006); and Guinan v. 

Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1230 (8th Cir. 1990).
CR-20-0228

37

personality disorder in the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial.7 In 

each case the courts held that, under the circumstances, counsel was not 

ineffective. But those decisions simply do not compel the inverse 

conclusion that Largin's trial counsel was ineffective for putting on 

evidence of his personality disorder. That Largin cites no decision in 

which trial counsel has been found ineffective for putting on such 

7In Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2006), 

trial counsel put on evidence of a personality disorder. Largin quotes this 

statement from that decision: 

"[I]t is likely that a juror considering Nelson's evidence of 

borderline personality disorder would have felt that he could 

give the evidence only one possible effect via the futuredangerousness issue: Such a juror would have seen the 

evidence as only aggravating, because Nelson's borderline 

personality disorder and the difficulty of treating it increase

the likelihood that Nelson will act out violently again. 

Consequently, there would be no vehicle to give mitigating 

effect to his evidence of borderline personality disorder, i.e., 

no way for the jury to express its conclusion that even though 

he is likely to be dangerous in the future, his mental illness 

makes him unworthy of the death penalty."

472 F.3d at 307-08. When read in context, that quote shows the 

problem with the former Texas statutory scheme at issue was

because that scheme did not allow the jury to find mitigating the 

evidence Nelson offered about his personality disorder. The court in 

Nelson did not hold that, were it separated from the 

unconstitutional statutory scheme, the evidence could not have 

been mitigating. Thus, Nelson does not support Largin's position. 
CR-20-0228

38

evidence is telling. 

In Morton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 684 

F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2012), the court addressed Morton's claim that his 

counsel was ineffective for presenting, at the penalty phase, expert 

testimony about the petitioner's antisocial personality disorder. The 

court stated:

"Habeas petitioners routinely ask us to rule that they received 

ineffective assistance when their trial lawyers failed to 

present evidence of an antisocial personality disorder, see, 

e.g., Reed [v. Secretary, Dep't of Corrs.], 593 F.3d [1217,] 

1245-49 [(11th Cir. 2010)]; Cummings [v. Secretary for the 

Dep't of Corrs.], 588 F.3d [1331,] 1365-68 [11th Cir. 2009)]; ...

so [trial counsel] chose a mitigation strategy that many 

postconviction lawyers contend can be effective. Although we 

have stated that evidence of antisocial personality disorder is 

'not "good" mitigation,' Reed, 593 F.3d at 1246, we have never 

ruled that a capital defense lawyer renders ineffective 

assistance as a matter of law when he introduces evidence of 

antisocial personality disorder for mitigation purposes. And 

for good reason. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court 

of the United States explained that 'the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be 

precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect 

of a defendant's character or record and any of the 

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a

basis for a sentence less than death.' 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.

Ct. 869, 874, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 

438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 

(1978)) (alteration and emphasis in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court ruled that 

a sentencing court violated the constitutional rights of the 

defendant by failing to consider expert testimony that the 
CR-20-0228

39

defendant had an 'antisocial personality.' Id. at 107-08, 102 

S. Ct. at 873-74.

"In the light of Eddings, there cannot be a per se rule 

that a lawyer renders ineffective assistance by presenting 

evidence of an antisocial personality disorder for purposes of 

mitigation. The Supreme Court of Florida, at Morton's urging, 

reasonably ruled that 'antisocial personality disorder is a 

valid mitigating circumstance for trial courts to consider and 

weigh.' Morton [v. State], 789 So. 2d [324,] 329-30 [(Fla. 

2001)] (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110, 102 S. Ct. at 874). 

That a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder has 

negative characteristics or presents a double-edged sword 

renders it uniquely a matter of trial strategy that a defense 

lawyer may, or may not, decide to present as mitigating 

evidence."

684 F.3d at 1168 (emphasis added; some citations omitted). The court 

also addressed Morton's argument that his counsel had performed 

deficiently by calling the expert, Dr. DelBeato, "to testify at the retrial of 

the penalty phase knowing that [he] had testified at the first penalty 

phase that Morton was a sociopath and shared traits in common with 

serial killers." 684 F.3d at 1168. Citing "Strickland's deferential 

standard," the court held that trial counsel 

"could have reasonably determined that Dr. DelBeato's expert 

testimony that Morton's childhood caused him to develop 

antisocial personality disorder, which led Morton to murder 

Weisser and Bowers, was necessary to explain to the jury why 

Morton's childhood might mitigate his moral culpability for 

the two murders. As Justice Thurgood Marshall once 

explained, '[e]xpert knowledge of human motivation' can be 
CR-20-0228

40

'highly relevant in the eyes of the jurors, for it might ... offer[] 

an alternative explanation for why [the petitioner] killed.'

Boyd v. North Carolina, 471 U.S. 1030, 1034, 105 S. Ct. 2052, 

2054, 85 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from 

denial of petition for writ of certiorari). In the absence of 

expert testimony that explains how a murderer's troubled 

past could have led him to commit a gruesome crime, Justice 

Marshall explained that 'scattered personal history evidence 

might have ... little apparent significance,' but 'expert 

evidence might well ... provide[] a link between the personal 

history evidence and that extenuation or reduction of the 

moral culpability of the killing that might call for a sentence 

of less than death.' Id.

"Expert testimony that Morton's traumatic childhood 

experience caused him to develop a psychological disorder 

that led him to murder an innocent elderly woman and her 

son would have provided context for Morton's mitigation case 

in the light of lay witness testimony presented during the 

resentencing. Morton's sister, Angela, testified during the 

resentencing that Morton suffered physical abuse from their 

father when Morton was a child. Angela also testified that 

their father raped her when she was a young girl. The problem 

for Morton's theory was that Angela suffered a more tragic 

childhood than Morton, but she was able to marry, find a job, 

and become a productive member of society. The horrors that 

Angela suffered during childhood did not cause her to become 

a murderer. Dr. DelBeato's expert testimony that Morton's 

troubled childhood caused him to develop a psychological 

disorder that led him to kill provided the jury with an 

explanation regarding why some people with troubled 

childhoods commit heinous crimes while others do not. [Trial 

counsel] could have reasonably decided that Dr. DelBeato's 

testimony was necessary to explain why Morton's childhood 

mitigated his moral culpability for the murders.

"[Trial counsel] could have also reasonably decided to 

call Dr. DelBeato to testify at the retrial of the penalty phase 
CR-20-0228

41

to preempt any effort by the prosecution to prove the same 

thing. See Awkal v. Mitchell, 613 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc) ('[K]nowing that the prosecution was going to call 

[the expert] anyway, Awkal's counsel opted to call [the expert] 

as a witness to take some of the "sting" out of [the expert's]

adverse opinion by being able to present his favorable 

testimony first and by incorporating the negative testimony 

into Awkal's case-in-chief.'). Florida law provides that the 

prosecution 'shall be provided a full opportunity to rebut the 

existence of mitigating factors urged by [the defendant] and 

to introduce evidence tending to diminish their weight if they 

cannot be rebutted.' Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991, 1001 (Fla.

1993). With Dr. DelBeato's testimony from the first penalty 

phase in hand, any prosecutor worth his salt would have 

attempted to use the damaging parts of that testimony to 

argue to the jury that, far from being mitigating, the 

testimony of Morton's mother, sister, and others about 

Morton's troubled childhood established that Morton had 

traits in common with serial killers and was a sociopath who 

could not be rehabilitated. If [trial counsel] had not called Dr. 

DelBeato during their case-in-chief, the prosecution could 

have argued that [trial counsel] were hiding unfavorable 

information from the jury, which would have damaged their 

credibility. Instead of allowing the prosecution to magnify the 

harmful aspects of Dr. DelBeato's testimony, [trial counsel]

downplayed those aspects of Dr. DelBeato's testimony by 

calling him as a witness during their case-in-chief and 

acknowledging the negative implications of his diagnosis of 

antisocial personality disorder."

684 F.3d at 1169-70.

Like the petitioner in Morton, Largin has not shown that his trial 

counsel performed deficiently in calling an expert to testify about a 

personality disorder with negative characteristics. The record supports 
CR-20-0228

42

the trial court's finding that "trial counsel made a reasonable strategic 

decision to call Dr. Salekin." (C. 626.) The record shows that the evidence 

against Largin was strong, including his inculpatory statements to the 

police that it "wasn't murder ... not in a cold-blooded sense" and that he 

"didn't try to hide it. [He] cleaned up a little bit and said to hell with it, 

[he wasn't] going to mess with this." (Trial R. 1293.) Largin refused to 

accept responsibility for murdering his parents, and evidence showed 

that he lacked an emotional response when he was told about the murder 

of his parents. The record supports the circuit court's finding that Dr. 

Salekin's testimony during the penalty phase "contextualized Largin's 

personality disorder, particularly that it explained that Largin's 

personality disorder amplified his reaction to conflict and explained guiltphase testimony regarding his response to his parents' murder." (C. 626.) 

As stated above, Dr. Salekin testified that Largin's personality 

disorder was "severe" and a "significant mental illness" but that 

individual therapy could work "for someone like" him. (Trial R. 2318, 

2332-33, 2338.) In Dr. Salekin's opinion, Largin's personality disorder 

"impair[ed] his ability to function on a day-to-day basis, primarily ... 

interpersonally." (Trial R. 2320.) Dr. Salekin testified that she thought 
CR-20-0228

43

that both biological and environmental factors caused his personality 

disorder. (Trial R. 2322, 2416.) Describing the Largin family as "high 

conflict," Dr. Salekin testified that those "families tend to produce 

individuals who have deficits in interpersonal functioning." (Trial R. 

2325-26.) And she testified that Largin's personality disorder amplified 

issues such as "regulating his emotion and interpersonal relationships." 

(Trial R. 2334.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that, based on her investigation, Largin's 

parents used physical violence during confrontations and, she said, 

Largin and his younger sister, Sheri Lake, learned that characteristic 

from their parents. (Trial R. 2326-27.) She described abuse that Largin 

allegedly witnessed in the household while his cousin lived with them. 

(Trial R. 2331-32.) Dr. Salekin stated that Largin's behavior in treatment 

facilities and his suicide attempts were consistent with his personality 

disorder. (Trial R. 2358, 2363, 2411.)

The strategic decision to present evidence of Largin's personality 

disorder belonged to Largin's trial counsel—not to Dr. Salekin. Largin 

has not shown that trial counsel's decision was deficient performance 

under Strickland.
CR-20-0228

44

Even if that decision were deficient performance, Largin has not 

shown prejudice under Strickland. The sentencing court found Largin's 

personality disorder to be a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. (Trial 

R. 2599.) Dr. Salekin's (and Largin's) later disagreement with that 

finding does not negate it. "In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the 

question .... [i]s whether it is 'reasonably likely' the result would have 

been different" if counsel acted differently. Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 111 (2011) (citations omitted). "The likelihood of a different 

result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Id. Addressing a claim 

alleging ineffectiveness during the penalty phase where a death sentence 

required a unanimous jury recommendation, the United States Supreme 

Court held that "prejudice here requires only 'a reasonable probability 

that at least one juror would have struck a different balance' regarding 

Andrus' 'moral culpability.'" Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. ___, ____, 140 S. 

Ct. 1875, 1887 (2020) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38

(2003)).8

8Unlike the Texas statutory scheme in Andrus, Alabama does not 

require the jury to be unanimous in its decision to recommend a death 

sentence. § 13A-5-46(f), Ala. Code 1975 ("The decision of the jury to 

recommend a sentence of death must be based on a vote of at least 10 

jurors."). 
CR-20-0228

45

The Rule 32 judge—the same judge who sentenced Largin to 

death—found:

"[E]ven assuming counsel performed deficiently by calling Dr. 

Salekin to testify during the penalty phase, Largin has not 

met his burden of proving prejudice under Strickland. At trial, 

this Court determined that evidence that Largin suffered 

from narcissistic personality disorder was a non-statutory 

mitigating circumstance and considered such evidence 

accordingly when weighing the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. Largin has not shown that, but for Dr. 

Salekin's testimony, he would have been sentenced to life 

without the possibility of parole for the murder of his 

parents."

(C. 629.) As stated above:

"[W]hen the same judge presides over both the original trial 

and the postconviction proceeding—as is the case here—and 

finds that, under the second prong of Strickland, trial 

counsel's errors would not have resulted in prejudice, '[w]e 

afford the experienced judge's ruling "considerable weight."' 

Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 53 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) 

(emphasis added) (affirming the circuit court's denial of 

Washington's postconviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim by applying the 'considerable weight' standard). See 

also State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707, 721 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2010) (affirming the circuit court's granting of Gamble's 

postconviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim by 

applying the 'considerable weight' standard) (citing Francis v. 

State, 529 So. 2d 670, 673 n.9 (Fla. 1988) ('Postconviction 

relief motions are not abstract exercises to be conducted in a 

vacuum, and this finding is entitled to considerable 

weight.'))."

Marshall, 182 So. 3d at 583.
CR-20-0228

46

We agree with the circuit court that Largin did not show prejudice 

under Strickland. He did not show that, had counsel not called Dr. 

Salekin to testify, "[t]he likelihood of a different result [was] substantial." 

Id. Nor did he show "'a reasonable probability that at least one juror 

would have struck a different balance' regarding [Largin's] 'moral 

culpability.'"9 Andrus, supra. We find no merit in Largin's assertions 

that his "case presents a rare situation where it is possible to objectively 

conclude that counsel's decision to put on a witness strengthened the 

State's case for death" or that Dr. "Salekin's testimony provided the bulk 

of the aggravating evidence against Largin." (Largin's brief, pp. 40-41, 

43-44.) 

Largin is due no relief on this claim.

B.

Largin argues that "[t]he circuit court erred in denying Largin's 

claim [I.A.1.] that [his trial counsel were ineffective] by failing to present 

a credible, cohesive, and sound theory of the defense linking the guilt and 

penalty phases of trial." (Largin's brief, p. 44.) 

9In Largin's case, the jury voted 11-1 to recommend death. Even if 

one more juror had voted against death, the jury still could have 

recommended a death sentence under § 13A-5-46(f), Ala. Code 1975. 
CR-20-0228

47

In denying this claim, the Rule 32 court stated:

"Largin alleges that trial counsel's decision to deny guilt 

during the guilt phase while then presenting mitigating 

evidence to explain why he murdered his parents during the 

penalty phase was ineffective assistance because it presented 

'conflicting' theories of defense to the jury. Notably, '[t]rial 

counsel's decisions regarding what theory of the case to 

pursue represent the epitome of trial strategy.' Clark [v. 

State], 196 So. 3d [285,] 306 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)] (citation 

omitted). Simply because counsel's 'defense strategy was 

ultimately unsuccessful with the jury does not render 

counsel's performance deficient.' Id. (internal citations 

omitted). With these concepts in mind, this Court finds that 

Largin has not shown that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance based on the theory of defense counsel presented 

at trial ....

"First, this Court notes that it presided over Largin's 

trial and heard strong evidence that Largin murdered his 

parents, including his inculpatory statements to Investigator 

Miller. Second, this Court notes that lead counsel, James 

Smith, was an experienced criminal defense attorney who had 

previously tried multiple capital murder cases before 

representing Largin. In his petition, Largin argues that trial 

counsel should have presented a defense wherein Largin 

accepted responsibility for his parents' murders to 'harmonize' 

the guilt phase with the mitigation evidence presented during 

the penalty phase. This Court finds, however, that there was 

no evidence offered during the evidentiary hearing to indicate 

that such a theory of defense was plausible. Indeed, Leon 

Storie testified that Largin's case was difficult because there 

was strong evidence of Largin's guilt and Largin had 

confessed to Investigator Miller. Storie also testified that 

although a plea agreement was reached, Largin refused to 

admit and accept responsibility for his parents' murder. This 

is further reflected in the record on direct appeal and from 

this Court's own recollection of the pretrial and trial 
CR-20-0228

48

proceedings wherein Largin refused to admit guilt to the 

murder of his parents. Thus, given his adamant denial of 

guilt, Largin has not shown by a preponderance of the 

evidence that trial counsel performed deficiently when 

counsel failed to present a theory of defense wherein Largin 

accepted responsibility for his parents' murder or shown that 

but for counsel's actions, the outcome of his case would have 

been different. Further, this is not a case where trial counsel 

were unaware of a plausible alternative theory of defense. See

Brownfield v. State, 266 So. 3d 777, 802 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2017) ('[I]f an attorney is aware of a line of defense and makes 

a conscious decision to reject it, rather than failing to raise it 

simply because he was unaware that it existed, it is more 

likely that the failure to raise the defense was reasonable.'). 

Rather, as Storie testified during the evidentiary hearing, 

once plea negotiations broke down, trial counsel were left with 

presenting a defense of 'basic reasonable doubt' or 'offer[ing] 

an alternative scenario for the jury to consider.' Storie also 

testified that although there was concern about presenting 

the theory of an alternative suspect while presenting 

mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, he and lead 

counsel (Smith) would have discussed how to best link 

potential theories of defense presented during both phases of 

trial. ... Storie explained that he and Smith would have 

discussed the way to counteract the potential inconsistency. 

Largin has not shown that this strategic decision was outside 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance or that 

no competent attorney would have chosen it. He has also 

failed to show that any alternative theory of defense—let 

alone one that admitted guilt—was available to trial counsel 

given Largin's demonstrated unwillingness to admit guilt or 

that presenting such an alternative theory would have 

changed the outcome of his case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687; see also Brownfield, 266 So. 3d at 802; Clark, 196 So. 3d 

at 306. As such, this Court finds Largin failed to show that his 

counsel presented 'conflicting' theories of defense and he did 

not meet his burden of establishing prejudice."
CR-20-0228

49

(C. 623-25 (some citations omitted).) 

On appeal, Largin argues that a conviction was "all but certain" and

that "reasonably prudent counsel would not have embarked on a guiltphase strategy so incompatible with the defense's theory for sentencing." 

(Largin's brief, p. 47.) He asserts that counsel should have "pursue[d] a 

theory that recognized the strength of the State's case against Largin, 

laid the groundwork to make a case of life in mitigation, maintained 

credibility in the eyes of the sentencer, and ... present[ed] evidence that 

would only help, not hurt, Largin's case for innocence." (Id.) Largin also 

argues that counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in calling Dr. Salekin 

"bleed[s] into this claim as well." (Id.) Finally, Largin argues that 

"[c]ounsel's theory of defense was concerning enough that the circuit 

court recognized the dangers of the course counsel was following," even, 

Largin says, "warn[ing] the defense about its perceived dangers of 

continuing to vilify Sheri Largin Lake to the jury." (Id.)

First, as we held above, counsel was not ineffective in calling Dr. 

Salekin to testify. There is thus no alleged ineffectiveness in that decision 

to "bleed" into Largin's claim I.A.1.

Second, as for the circuit court's statements about Largin's 
CR-20-0228

50

approach toward Sheri, the record shows that trial counsel argued that 

counsel was offering this evidence not to attack Sheri but to offer evidence 

about Largin's turbulent family history. (Trial R. 2249-54.) After the 

circuit court confirmed that Dr. Salekin found this evidence relevant 

during her assessment, the circuit court gave trial counsel a chance to 

discuss this strategy with Largin before continuing the penalty phase. 

(Trial R. 2255-56, 2269.) 

Third, as the circuit court recognized in denying relief:

" '"Hindsight does not elevate unsuccessful trial 

tactics into ineffective assistance of counsel."

People v. Eisemann, 248 A.D.2d 484, 484, 670 

N.Y.S.2d 39, 40-41 (1998).'

"Davis v. State, 44 So. 3d 1118, 1132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). 

'"The fact that [a] defense strategy was ultimately 

unsuccessful with the jury does not render counsel's 

performance deficient."' Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121, 160-61 

(Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 

1029 (Fla. 2009)). See also Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 

1001 (Fla. 2000) ('"Simply because the ... defense did not 

work, it does not mean that the theory of the defense was 

flawed."' (citations omitted))."

Clark v. State, 196 So. 3d 285, 306 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). And “[t]he 

reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially 

influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691.
CR-20-0228

51

Storie testified that, after Largin refused the plea deal, their 

options for a guilt-phase theory were to "rely on basic reasonable doubt" 

or "offer an alternative scenario" that someone else committed the 

murders. (R. 61, 84.) He testified that "we ultimately went with offering 

an alternative scenario."

The record shows that during the State's case-in-chief, George 

McShan, an inmate who was incarcerated with Largin, testified that 

Largin told him that he planned to tell his attorneys that "his sister [was] 

involved ... because his sister had assaulted his mama and father in the 

past. And he said he was going to let them know that his sister had just 

as much motive for killing his mom and dad as—just as much motive as 

he had." (Trial R. 1534.) 

Largin has not shown that trial counsel's strategies at the guilt and 

penalty phases were unreasonable. As noted above, the case against 

Largin was strong, and the evidence shows that he refused to take 

responsibility and showed no remorse. In the face of that evidence, 

Largin's refusal to admit guilt affected the trial strategies available to 

his attorneys. 

And even if counsel pursued inconsistent theories in the guilt phase 
CR-20-0228

52

and penalty phase of the trial, it would not mean that counsel was 

ineffective. As we recently stated:

"[N]umerous courts have held that it does not rise to the level 

of ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to argue 

inconsistent theories of the case.

" '"[I]t is not uncommon for lawyers to argue 

inconsistent defenses." [State v.] Westmoreland, 

2008 WI App 15, ¶ 21, 307 Wis. 2d [429] at 440, 

744 N.W.2d [919] at 925 [(2008)]. See also State v. 

McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 533, 424 N.W.2d 411, 

412 (1988) (Defendant "entered pleas of not guilty 

and not guilty by reason of mental disease or 

defect," contending that he did not kill the victim 

but was not responsible if he did.); State v. Nelis, 

2007 WI 58, ¶ 20, 300 Wis. 2d 415, 424, 733 

N.W.2d 619, 623 ("Nelis argued at trial that the 

evidence did not show that he and Diane S. had 

sexual intercourse on the night at issue. He 

further argued that, even if they did have sexual 

intercourse that night, it was consensual."); Brown 

v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 494-495 (4th Cir. 1989) 

(Inconsistent defenses "that Brown either did not 

commit the murders or did so while drunk" was not 

ineffective assistance of counsel.).

"'....

"'In light of the not uncommon practice of 

lawyers to argue inconsistent theories, we cannot 

say that the decision of Dekoria Marks's trial 

lawyer to argue them here deprived her of the 

right to constitutionally effective assistance, 

irrespective of whether we or the trial court view 

that strategy as the best. As we noted in 

Westmoreland, 2008 WI App 15, ¶ 21, 307 Wis. 2d 
CR-20-0228

53

at 440, 744 N.W.2d at 925: "As Strickland reminds 

us, there is a 'wide range of professionally 

competent assistance,' id., 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, and the bar is not very high, see 

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S. Ct. 1, 

157 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) (lawyer need not be a 

Clarence Darrow to survive an ineffectiveness 

contention)."'

"State v. Marks, 330 Wis. 2d 693, 706-08, 794 N.W. 2d 547, 

554-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)."

State v. Lewis, ___ So. 3d at ___. 

Largin is due no relief on this claim.

II. SUMMARILY DISMISSED CLAIMS

The circuit court summarily dismissed the rest of Largin's 

ineffectiveness claims as insufficiently pleaded or lacking merit. Largin 

argues that, in doing so, the circuit court abused its discretion. We 

address Largin's arguments in turn.

A.

In claim I.A.2., Largin alleged that his trial counsel did not 

investigate his "history of traumatic brain injury and headaches." 

(Largin's brief, p. 51.) In support of this claim, Largin alleged that he 

"has a long medical history of traumatic brain injuries and headaches"; 

that he told "counsel about this history and problems"; and that his trial 
CR-20-0228

54

counsel did not investigate "into head injuries that could have caused 

brain damage." (C. 74-75.) Largin alleged that, as a toddler, "he was 

involved in a car wreck," his "head flew into the dashboard and split it 

open," and he was treated for his injuries at DCH Regional Medical 

Center in Tuscaloosa. (C. 75.) He alleged that he was involved in another 

car wreck as a junior in high school, that his head was "split open" when 

he "collided with the front passenger window," and that he received 

treatment at DCH for that injury also. (C. 75.) Largin alleged that he 

"suffered head injuries" while playing football; that at age 22, he "began 

suffering crippling headaches ... that would begin late in the day and 

grow until the point that he could hardly function later in the evening"; 

that "[f]or years [he] was treated by Dr. Robert Ford, a board-certified 

neurologist, of the Ford Headache Clinic in Birmingham," who "learned 

that blood was not flowing evenly to both hemispheres of Mr. Largin's 

brain"; and that "Dr. Ford prescribed Lortabs to help Mr. Largin with the 

pain and Xanax to help him sleep." (C. 75-76.) Largin alleged that his 

"[t]rial counsel completely failed to investigate how Mr. Largin's repeated 

and severe head injuries might affect his mental functioning" and 

"completely failed to investigate Mr. Largin's history with extreme 
CR-20-0228

55

headaches." (C. 76.) Largin alleged that "[a]ll of these medical records 

would have been available through DCH Regional Hospital in Tuscaloosa 

or through the Ford Headache Clinic in Birmingham." (C. 76-77.) Largin 

alleged that because his trial counsel did not "investigate Mr. Largin's 

traumatic brain injury, the jury was erroneously informed that Mr. 

Largin had no organic brain damage." (C. 77.) 

Citing the pleading requirements of Rule 32 and this Court's 

decision in McMillan v. State, 258 So. 3d 1154, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2017), the circuit court denied this claim as insufficiently pleaded. The 

court found: "Largin does not assert that he has ever been diagnosed with 

organic brain damage despite alleging that he had received treatment 'for 

years' from neurologist Dr. Robert Ford. Moreover, neither the 

psychologist who perform[ed] Largin's court-ordered competency 

evaluation nor Dr. Salekin recommended further testing."10 (C. 611.) 

10The report from the competency evaluation noted that Largin did 

not report "any significant developmental or medical problems arising 

during his early childhood" but did disclose "a limited history of a motor 

vehicle accident" that "required stitches/sutures to close the wound," as 

well as possible concussions and "headache issues." Largin "denied any 

additional history of seizure, blackout, fainting, or vertigo." (Trial C. 392.) 

Dr. Salekin testified that she reviewed Largin's psychological and 

medical records, including records from North Harbor, Indian Rivers 
CR-20-0228

56

In McMillan, the circuit court summarily dismissed McMillan's 

claim that "his trial counsel should have investigated and presented 

evidence that he suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome and a traumatic 

brain injury." 258 So. 3d at 1177. The circuit court stated, in part: 

"'Based on the record before this Court, McMillan cannot 

prevail even if the facts in his amended petition are taken as 

true. Trial counsel obtained records, spoke to family members, 

hired a mitigation investigator, obtained the services of Dr. 

Ackerson [a board-certified forensic psychologist], spoke to a 

former social worker who knew McMillan during his time 

with DHR and obtained the benefit of a court-ordered 

evaluation. The penalty phase of trial shows that a great deal 

of effort went into preparing for the penalty phase and 

crafting an appropriate strategy. Trial counsel's performance 

in this matter was within the level of reasonable performance 

that is required by Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984)].... The petition does not uncover the existence of 

documents which went undiscovered by trial counsel or that 

clearly document the existence of medical conditions that 

were overlooked by defense counsel. Instead, McMillan 

asserts his defense team should have been more creative in 

coming up with new diagnosis previously unmade during his 

life. Such a claim, in this case, does not constitute 

ineffectiveness under either prong of the Strickland analysis. 

As such, this claim is dismissed.'"

258 So. 3d at 1178 (quoting the circuit court's order). In affirming the 

summary dismissal of this claim, this Court stated: 

"McMillan's entire pleading on this claim is based on 

Crisis Stabilization Unit, Bryce Hospital, and Serenity Care, Inc. (Trial 

R. 2308, 2344, 2346.) 
CR-20-0228

57

speculation. McMillan did not plead in either his original 

petition or his amended petition that he actually suffered 

from fetal alcohol syndrome or that he had been diagnosed 

with traumatic brain injury. Indeed, the entire argument is 

premised on the fact that counsel 'should have investigated'

and 'might have found' that McMillan suffered from those 

conditions. '[B]y presenting pure speculation and failing to 

plead any specific facts regarding [this issue] ... [the 

appellant] failed to plead facts supporting a general claim of 

prejudice.' Morris v. State, [261] So. 3d [1181, 1192] (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2016). 'Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

not built on retrospective speculation ....' Bone v. State, 77 

S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 'It is well established 

that, in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "[m]ere 

conjecture and speculation are not enough to support a 

showing of prejudice."' Elsey v. Commissioner of Corr., 126 

Conn. App. 144, 166, 10 A.3d 578, 593 (2011) (citation 

omitted). This circuit court properly dismissed this claim 

because no material issue of law or fact exists that would 

entitle McMillan to relief. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P."

258 So. 3d at 1178-79. On appeal, Largin does not address McMillan; he 

merely asserts that the circuit court was wrong in its conclusion. This 

does not satisfy Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., which requires that an 

argument include "the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with 

respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations 

to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on." 

" '"It is not the function of this Court to .... to make and address legal 

arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not 

supported by sufficient authority or argument." '" Ex parte Borden, 60 
CR-20-0228

58

So. 3d 940, 943 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 

20 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 

248, 251 (Ala. 1994)).

Largin did not sufficiently plead this claim, and the circuit court did 

not err in summarily dismissing it. See, e.g., McMillan, supra. 

B.

In claim I.A.3., Largin alleged that "[t]rial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek funds to hire an expert to explain the mitigating effects 

of Mr. Largin's brain injuries." (C. 77.) Largin alleged that "it is likely 

that Mr. Largin has organic brain damage of which the sentencer was not 

informed." (C. 78.) Largin alleged that "[b]ecause of the trial attorney's 

failed investigation and failure to obtain the appropriate expert, the 

sentencer was denied the opportunity to hear that Mr. Largin was in two 

serious car accidents when he was younger, suffered head injuries 

because of the accidents, and suffered from extreme headaches stemming 

from reduced blood flow within his brain," and "[t]he sentencer never got 

to hear from a neuropsychologist or neurologist about the effects of 

traumatic brain injury or the headaches, or to see the results of a scan to 

determine exactly what type of brain damage occurred." (C. 79.) Citing 
CR-20-0228

59

the pleading requirements of Rule 32 and Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d 1145, 

1166-67 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), the circuit court summarily dismissed 

this claim as insufficiently pleaded because Largin did "not identify an 

expert by name or explain the content of that expert's expected 

testimony." (C. 611.) In Lee, this Court stated: "'We have held that a 

petitioner fails to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. 

R. Crim. P., when the petitioner fails to identify an expert by name or 

plead the contents of that expert's expected testimony.'" 44 So. 3d at 

1166-67 (quoting Smith v. State, 71 So. 3d 12, 33 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008), 

overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lane, 286 So. 3d 61 (Ala. 2018)).

On appeal, Largin does not address Lee; he merely asserts that he 

sufficiently pleaded his claim. This does not satisfy Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. 

R. App. P. 

Largin did not sufficiently plead this claim, and summary dismissal 

was proper. See, e.g., Lee, supra; Jackson v. State, 133 So. 3d 420, 452 

(Ala. Crim. App. 2009). 

C.

In claim I.A.4., Largin alleged that his counsel "could have obtained 

funds to hire a neuropharmacologist to testify about the relationship 
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60

between his brain damage and his known drug use." (C. 80.) Largin 

alleged that he had "used drugs throughout his life" and that "[a] 

neuropharmacologist would have been able to explain to the jury the 

interplay between Mr. Largin's organic brain issues and the drugs he was 

using around the time of the offense." (C. 80.) Largin alleges that his 

counsel's failure to hire a neuropharmacologist "denied [the sentencer] 

the opportunity to consider the way that substances chemically altered 

Mr. Largin's brain on the night of the crime." (C. 81.) 

For the same reasons it dismissed claim I.A.3., the circuit court 

summarily dismissed this claim as insufficiently pleaded. (C. 612.) On 

appeal, Largin does not address the circuit court's reasoning, other than 

asserting that he sufficiently pleaded his claim. He did not. See, e.g., Lee, 

supra; Jackson, supra.

D.

In claim I.B.1., Largin alleged that his trial counsel should have 

objected to testimony from Lt. John Arnold, Sgt. John Nabors, and Paul 

McNutt about Largin's demeanor after he was arrested. (C. 100.) Largin 

alleged that their testimony and a comment about his testimony during 

the State's rebuttal violated Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1989). 
CR-20-0228

61

On direct appeal, this Court found no plain error in the admission 

of this evidence:

"Largin argues that the trial court erred when it 

permitted two officers [Lt. John Arnold and Sgt. John Nabors]

to testify about his demeanor at the time of his arrest, 

specifically, that, when he was taken into custody, he did not 

appear to be very surprised, he did not protest, and he did not 

ask the reason for his detention. He further argues that the 

trial court erred when it permitted Paul McNutt to testify that 

after he and Largin were taken into custody when they came 

out of the apartment, he heard the word 'homicide' over a 

police radio, and he assumed Largin heard it, but he did not 

observe any reaction from Largin. According to Largin, this 

testimony—and the prosecutor's comment on the testimony 

during rebuttal closing argument—was a violation of Ex parte 

Marek, 556 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1989), which abolished the tacitadmission rule in pre-arrest situations.

"....

"The Marek Court stated that a tacit admission

"'is made when "a statement incriminating [the] 

accused or charging him with crime is made in his 

presence and hearing, under circumstances 

naturally calling for a reply or denial, and he has 

full liberty to speak"; in such a case "his silence or 

failure to reply or deny is admissible in evidence 

as an admission of the statement or accusation; 

where, on being accused of crime, with full liberty 

to speak, one remains silent, his failure to reply or 

to deny is relevant as tending to show his guilt."

22A C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 734(1) at 1068-69 

(1961). (Footnotes omitted.)'
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62

"556 So. 2d at 379.

"As the Court made clear in Marek, a statement 

incriminating the accused or charging him with crime 'under 

circumstances naturally calling for a reply or denial' is a 

necessary predicate to a tacit admission. None of the 

testimony to which Largin now objects involved such a 

statement. Therefore, there was no tacit admission. 

Alexander v. State, 601 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Ala. Crim. App.

1992). Because there was no tacit admission, the prosecutor's 

reference to that testimony in rebuttal closing argument did 

not violate the prohibition against tacit-admission testimony.

"Furthermore, no error resulted from that testimony 

because evidence of a defendant's demeanor before or after the 

offense is admissible at trial. E.g., Pressley v. State, 770 So.

2d 115 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Lowe v. State, 627 So. 2d 1127 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Sheridan v. State, 591 So. 2d 129 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1991). Likewise, because the testimony was 

properly admitted, the prosecutor's reference to that 

testimony in closing argument was not error. Alexander, 601 

So. 2d at 1132."

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 397-98.

In Woodward v. State, 276 So. 3d 713, 768-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2018), the circuit court rejected a petitioner's claim that his counsel was 

ineffective for not objecting to certain testimony. The circuit court relied 

on this Court's holding in the petitioner's direct appeal that the

underlying claim had no merit. On appeal, the petitioner argued "that 

the circuit court's finding that claim was meritless because it was rejected 

by this Court on direct appeal" conflicted with Ex parte Taylor, 10 So. 3d 
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63

1075 (Ala. 2005). This Court disagreed:

"In Ex parte Taylor, the Alabama Supreme Court held that 'a 

determination on direct appeal that there has been no plain 

error does not automatically foreclose a determination of the 

existence of the prejudice required under Strickland to 

sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.' 10 So. 3d 

at 1078. However, Ex parte Taylor applies only to the 

prejudice prong of Strickland, not to the deficientperformance prong. See Clark v. State, 196 So. 3d 285, 311 n.4 

(Ala. Crim. App. 2015). Because this Court's holding on direct 

appeal establishes that counsel's performance was not 

deficient, Ex parte Taylor is inapplicable."

Woodward, 276 So. 3d at 769.

Relying on that principle from Woodward and citing this Court's 

holding on direct appeal in Largin that there was no tacit admission and 

thus no violation of Marek, the circuit court summarily dismissed this 

claim. (C. 612-13.) On appeal, Largin does not address Woodward or this 

Court's holding in Largin that there was no tacit admission and thus no 

violation of Marek, nor does he address the circuit court's reliance on that 

holding in Largin. This Court's holding in Largin refutes the claim on 

which Largin bases his argument that his counsel's performance was 

deficient. Because there was no tacit admission, counsel's failure to object 

was not deficient performance. See, e.g., Carruth v. State, 165 So. 3d 627, 

641 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a 
CR-20-0228

64

meritless objection); Yeomans v. State, 195 So. 3d 1018, 1034 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 2013) ("[B]ecause there is no merit to the legal theory underlying 

this claim of ineffective assistance, the claim was properly dismissed.").

Largin is due no relief on this claim.

E.

In claim I.B.2., Largin alleged that counsel should have objected to 

evidence of "prior bad acts." (Largin's brief, p. 62.) Largin alleged four 

"different issues under [Rule] 404(b)," Ala. R. Evid., in which he says 

counsel was ineffective: (1) for not objecting to "George McShan's 

testimony that Largin made statements about committing other murders 

(Trial R. 1538)"; (2) for not objecting to "numerous instances of Rule 

404(b) evidence about Largin being prone to anger, violence, and bizarre 

behavior (Trial R. 833-44; 885; 886-87; 945; 985; 1017-19; 1111; 1115; 

1126-34; 1196)"; (3) for not objecting to "the lack of notice from the State 

regarding Rule 404(b) evidence"; and (4) for not "request[ing] a limiting 

instruction regarding the Rule 404(b) evidence presented by the State." 

(Largin's brief, p. 63.) 

The Rule 32 court summarily dismissed this claim. (C. 613.) The 

court found: 
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65

"[T]hese underlying substantive claims were subjected to 

plain-error review. Largin, 233 So. 3d at 398. There, Largin 

argued that testimony from McShan regarding Largin's 

statement about two additional murders, testimony of his 

'extensive history of drug abuse and some of the behaviors he 

exhibited as a result of his drug abuse,' and the trial court's 

failure to give a limiting instruction on either resulted in 

reversible error. Id. In each instance, the appellate court held 

that no error, let alone plain error, occurred. Id. at 399-401. 

Thus, this claim is summarily dismissed because Largin has 

not pleaded facts sufficient to show that counsel's failure to 

raise these objections resulted in deficient performance.

Woodward, 276 So. 3d at 769." 

(C. 613.) 

On appeal, Largin does not address Woodward or this Court's 

holdings on direct appeal about the evidence to which he alleges his 

counsel should have objected. Largin's complete argument in support of 

the above issues is: 

"Had counsel objected, the circuit court would have 

excluded or severely limited any Rule 404(b) evidence and 

issued instructions to the jury regarding the proper uses and 

limitations of this evidence. But counsel failed to do so. 

Because counsel failed to do so, counsel performance [sic] 

deficiently in a manner that prejudiced Largin with the jury.

"In his petition, Largin satisfied th[e] pleading 

requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) and Hyde. Largin’s 

petition detailed facts that, if true, would entitle Largin to 

relief on this claim. Hyde, 950 So. 2d at 356. Therefore, this 

Court should reverse the circuit court’s summary dismissal of 

claim [I.B.2.] and remand for further proceedings." 
CR-20-0228

66

(Largin's brief, p. 64.) This argument does not comply with Rule 

28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. See, e.g., Ex parte Borden, 60 So. 3d at 943; 

Egbuonu v. State, 993 So. 2d 35, 38-39 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) 

("'Recitation of allegations without citation to any legal authority and 

without adequate recitation of the facts relied upon has been deemed a 

waiver of the arguments listed.' Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460, 486 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2002). 'Authority supporting only "general propositions of 

law" does not constitute a sufficient argument for reversal.' Beachcroft 

Props., LLP v. City of Alabaster, 901 So. 2d 703, 708 (Ala. 2004), quoting 

Geisenhoff v. Geisenhoff, 693 So. 2d 489, 491 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)."). 

Merely listing issues without further explanation does not comply with 

Rule 28(a)(10). Morris v. State, 261 So. 3d 1181, 1198 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2016) ("[The appellant] has provided no recitation of the facts relied upon 

in support of his argument; he merely refers to the record without setting 

forth any facts regarding why he believes he was entitled to relief. 

'[M]erely referring to the record without setting forth the facts in support 

of an argument is not sufficient to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.

App. P.' L.J.K. v. State, 942 So. 2d 854, 868 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)."). 

Except for the claim about the alleged lack of notice, this Court on 
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67

direct appeal addressed the issues on which Largin bases these 

ineffectiveness claims and held that they lacked merit. Largin, 233 So. 

3d at 398-401. Largin has not addressed these holdings, and we will not 

repeat them here. But those holdings show he is due no relief on those 

issues. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641. See also McNabb v. State, 

991 So. 2d 313, 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) ("Here, in our opinion on 

return to remand in McNabb's direct appeal, this Court noted that we 

found 'no error, plain or otherwise, in the guilt phase of the proceedings 

....' McNabb [v. State], 887 So. 2d [929,] 990 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2001)] 

(emphasis added). Thus, we did not limit our findings to the lack of plain 

error, but rather we found no error, a finding which includes a preservederror review.").

As for his claim about the State not giving notice of its intent to use 

Rule 404(b) evidence, Largin did not identify what evidence was admitted 

without notice or explain how the alleged lack of notice for such evidence 

prejudiced his case. Thus, he did not sufficiently plead the claim. 

F.

In claim I.B.3., Largin alleged that his counsel were ineffective for 

not raising "proper challenges during jury selection." (Largin's brief, p. 
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68

64.) He argues that "[c]ounsel should have more effectively argued that 

the State used its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner in 

violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)." (Largin's brief, pp. 64-65.) 

The circuit court, in summarily dismissing this claim, noted: 

"[Largin] asserts that counsel should have argued that [76] 

percent of the prosecution's strikes were improperly used to 

remove women solely based on gender and alleges that this 

Court 'would have found a prima facie case of discrimination 

and forced the prosecution to give gender-neutral reasons for 

its strikes.'"

(C. 614.) The circuit court dismissed the claim as insufficiently pleaded 

based on this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal, 

in which we stated:

"Largin argues that the large number of peremptory strikes 

exercised against women was indicative of a gender bias that 

establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. He states: 'A 

defendant can establish a prima facie J.E.B. claim solely on 

the fact that a prosecutor used a large number of peremptory 

challenges to strike female prospective jurors.' (Largin's brief, 

at pp. 45-46.) Largin is incorrect. This Court repeatedly has 

held that a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson

cannot be established by numbers alone. E.g., Luong v. State, 

199 So. 3d 173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), and cases cited therein. 

Furthermore, the fact that 6 of the 12 jurors and that both 

alternate jurors were women must be taken into account 

when considering whether the State exercised its peremptory 

challenges in a discriminatory manner, because it indicates 

that the State did not use all of its peremptory challenges to 
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69

exclude women from the jury. The State's use of 22 of 29 

strikes against female veniremembers does not raise an 

inference of discrimination."

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 403.

On appeal, Largin does not address that holding in Largin. This 

Court's holding in Largin shows that the claim underlying the allegation 

of ineffectiveness lacks merit. Thus, Largin is due no relief. See, e.g., 

Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641.

G.

In claim I.B.4., Largin alleged that his counsel should have sought 

funds to retain an expert to assist with jury selection. (C. 116.) Largin 

alleged that his "trial utilized a large potential venire and an expert was 

clearly needed to adequately challenge the State's peremptory strikes ... 

and to ensure the fairness and impartiality of the jury." (C. 117.) He 

asserted that "[c]ounsel simply was not prepared and equip[ped] to 

analyze the juror questionnaires ... and conduct a thorough voir dire to 

ensure the empaneled jurors would all consider his case fairly and fully." 

(C. 117.) 

In summarily dismissing this claim, the circuit court found:

"The record on direct appeal refutes this claim and shows that 

counsel did, in fact, request and obtain funds for a juror 
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70

consultant. (Trial C. 287-92.) Moreover, Largin does not 

identify the expert whom trial counsel should have retained 

or explain how this consultant would have affected the jury 

selection process. As such, this claim is summarily dismissed 

as insufficiently pleaded." 

(C. 614.) On appeal, Largin does not address the circuit court's findings. 

He merely reiterates the allegations he made in his petition and asserts 

that the claim was sufficiently pleaded. The circuit court did not err in 

summarily dismissing this claim. See, e.g., Lee, 44 So. 3d 1166-67. See 

also McNabb v. State, 991 So. 2d 313, 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) 

("[B]ecause this claim was clearly refuted by the record, summary denial 

was proper pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. See Duncan v. 

State, 925 So. 2d 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (adopting trial court's 

findings that summary dismissal of petition was proper where the claims 

were refuted by the record on direct appeal).").

H.

In claim I.B.5., Largin alleged that his "counsel failed to object to 

the introduction of highly inflammatory victim-impact evidence during 

the [guilt] phase." (C. 118.) He alleged that "counsel allowed the State 

to elicit powerful victim-impact testimony from Sheri Largin Lake ... and 

[from inmate] George McShan." (C. 118.) Sheri testified that “as a result 
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71

of what [she] saw that night" that she found her parents' bodies, she had 

been seeing a therapist and had been diagnosed with "post-traumatic 

stress disorder and depression." (Trial R. 900.) She also testified that her 

therapist had advised her not to testify. (Trial R. 900-01.) McShan 

testified that part of his motivation for testifying against Largin was his 

sympathy for Sheri. (Trial R. 1543.)

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded because it did not include "any factual 

allegation to suggest that this testimony influenced the jury's decision or 

explain how the outcome of his case would have been different if counsel 

had raised an objection." (C. 615.) The circuit court also cited this Court's 

rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal, in which we found no 

plain error:

"Largin next argues that the trial court erred when it 

admitted victim-impact evidence during the guilt phase of 

trial. Specifically, he argues that Largin's sister, Sheri, 

impermissibly testified that she had a young son and as to the 

effect the victims' deaths had on her and her son, including 

her treatment by a therapist for post-traumatic stress 

disorder and the identification of her therapist, who was in 

the courtroom. Largin further argues that the trial court erred 

when it permitted inmate George McShan to testify that he 

broke the inmates' 'code of silence' and testified against 

Largin at least in part because he felt sorry for Sheri. He 

argues that his conviction should be reversed because the 
CR-20-0228

72

testimony had no purpose except to encourage jurors to 

identify with Sheri in her grief and to bias the jurors against 

him.

"While the State was questioning Sheri about her 

observations at the crime scene when she arrived at her 

parents' house to check on them, Sheri testified that she saw 

blood on the floor. The State said it would not show her any 

photographs of what she saw on the floor and asked whether 

she had asked that she not be shown any photographs. Sheri 

confirmed that. The State then asked whether she was seeing 

a therapist as a result of what she saw that night, and she 

said she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 

disorder and depression, that she was seeing a therapist, and 

that she was testifying against the therapist's advice. Because 

the State was not going to show Sheri available photographs 

of the crime scene to corroborate her testimony about her

observations, her testimony about seeing a therapist provided 

an explanation for that. Therefore, the testimony was 

relevant and was not victim-impact testimony, and its 

admission was not in error. Even if that portion of Sheri's 

testimony could be considered irrelevant victim-impact 

testimony, its admission would not constitute plain error. The 

admission of victim-impact evidence during the guilt phase of 

a capital-murder trial may be harmless under Rule 45, Ala. R.

App. P. E.g., Russell v. State, [261] So. 3d [397,] [422] (Ala.

Crim. App. 2015)[, judgment vacated on other grounds, 137 S. 

Ct. 158 (2016)].

"'It is presumed that jurors do not leave their 

common sense at the courthouse door. It would 

elevate form over substance for us to hold, based 

on the record before us, that [the appellant] did not 

receive a fair trial simply because the jurors were 

told what they probably had already suspected—

that [the victim] was not a "human island," but a 

unique individual whose murder had inevitably 

had a profound impact on her children, spouse, 
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73

parents, friends, or dependents (paraphrasing a 

portion of Justice Souter's opinion concurring in 

the judgment in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 

838 (1991)).'

"Ex parte Rieber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. 1995).

"We have examined the record as a whole and we cannot 

conclude that Sheri's brief testimony about her diagnosis and

about seeing a therapist 'probably distracted the jury and 

kept it from performing its duty of determining the guilt or 

innocence of the defendant based on the admissible evidence 

and the applicable law.' Ex parte Rieber, 663 So. 2d at 1006. 

The record shows that the admission of this portion of Sheri's 

testimony was brief and that it did not deprive Largin of a fair 

trial or otherwise prejudice any of his substantial rights. 

Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury repeatedly 

that it must base its decision solely on the evidence and the 

law, and that it must not ... permit emotion, sympathy, or 

prejudice to influence its verdict. 'It is well settled that jurors 

are presumed to follow, not disregard, the trial court's 

instructions.' Brooks v. State, 973 So. 2d 380, 409 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2007). Therefore, even if Sheri's testimony about her 

diagnosis and treatment was admitted in error, the error 

would not rise to the level of plain error.

"....

"Largin argues that the trial court erred when it 

permitted George McShan to testify that his sympathy for 

Sheri was his primary motivation for testifying. He further 

argues that the trial court then highlighted this emotional 

connection by permitting the State to introduce McShan to 

Sheri while McShan was on the witness stand. We review 

these arguments for plain error only, because Largin did not 

raise these objections at trial. McShan testified that he 

identified with Sheri because, he said, 'I put myself in her 

place when I lost my father. See, my father was killed.... 
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74

That's when my life started going downhill.' (R. 1543.) Even if 

that portion of McShan's testimony and the introduction of 

Sheri to McShan were irrelevant, our review of the entire 

record clearly demonstrates that these events did not have an 

unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations or 

otherwise prejudice his substantial rights. The testimony and 

introduction were brief and innocuous. Moreover, the jurors 

were instructed that their verdict must be based on the 

evidence and the law, and not emotion, sympathy, or 

prejudice, and jurors are presumed to follow the trial court's 

instructions."

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 411-13.

On appeal, Largin does not address these holdings in Largin. This 

Court's opinion in Largin shows that the claims underlying the allegation 

of ineffectiveness lack merit. The circuit court did not err in summarily 

dismissing this claim, and Largin is due no relief. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 

So. 3d at 641.

I.

In claim I.B.6., Largin alleged that his trial counsel were 

"ineffective for failing to object to several instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct during the guilt phase of trial." (C. 121.) He alleged that 

counsel should have objected when:

(1) "[T]he prosecutor made improper comments during voir dire 

by repeatedly injecting himself personally into the case 

through statements such as 'I'm trying to use our system of 

justice to kill this man.'" (C. 121, quoting Trial R. 643-44.)
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75

(2) "[T]he prosecutor also presented to the venire an extended, 

graphic, and improper account of how chickens are killed in a 

barnyard with the bare hands. This unnecessary statement 

served to dehumanize the defendant and inflame the passions 

of the jury by comparing the situation of a capital juror to one 

who is asked to kill an animal." (C. 122, citing Trial R. 654, 

658-59.) 

(3) "[T]he prosecutor elicited improper testimony from jailhouse 

informant George McShan about a supposed 'code of silence' 

among prison inmates and the fact that McShan was breaking 

this supposed code because (1) Mr. Largin's act of killing his 

parents was beyond the pale even among prisoners; and (2) 

McShan was offended that Mr. Largin would try to blame his 

sister for the crime. ..." (C. 122, citing Trial R. 152-44.)

(4) "[T]he prosecutor improperly exhorted the jury to do its 'job' 

by delivering justice for the victims." (C. 123, citing Trial R. 

866.)

(5) "[T]he prosecutor's closing arguments improperly inflamed 

the passions of the jurors and encouraged them to reach a 

verdict based on sympathy and emotion. The prosecutor 

began by focusing his argument on the special status of the 

victims as parents and on the idea that Mr. Largin 'repaid' his 

parents for raising him and supporting him by killing them." 

(C. 123, citing Trial R. 2018-19.)11

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

11Largin also alleged that counsel should have objected to the 

statement, "at the close of [the State's] rebuttal argument," that the 

jurors should "do justice for the victims' daughter, Sheri Largin Lake, as 

well as for the victims themselves." (C. 124, citing Trial R. 2075.) Largin 

abandoned this claim on appeal. 
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76

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 615-16.) The 

circuit court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct 

appeal in which this Court addressed each of the issues on which Largin

bases this ineffectiveness claim and held that those issues lacked merit. 

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 413-18. Largin has not addressed these holdings, 

and we will not repeat them here. But those holdings show that he is due 

no relief on this claim. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641. 

Largin also argues on appeal that the alleged "improper comments 

and arguments ... cumulatively denied Largin his rights" and that 

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to those comments and 

arguments. In Woodward, we stated:

" '"[T]his Court has noted: 'Other states and federal courts are 

not in agreement as to whether the "cumulative effect"

analysis applies to Strickland claims'; this Court has also 

stated: 'We can find no case where Alabama appellate courts 

have applied the cumulative-effect analysis to claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.' Brooks v. State, 929 So. 2d 

491, 514 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) ...; see also McNabb v. State, 

991 So. 2d 313, 332 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); and Hunt v. State, 

940 So. 2d 1041, 1071 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). More to the 

point, however, is the fact that even when a cumulative-effect 

analysis is considered, only claims that are properly pleaded 

and not otherwise due to be summarily dismissed are 

considered in that analysis. A cumulative-effect analysis does 

not eliminate the pleading requirements established in Rule 

32, Ala. R. Crim. P. An analysis of claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, including a cumulative-effect analysis, 
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77

is performed only on properly pleaded claims that are not 

summarily dismissed for pleading deficiencies or on 

procedural grounds. Therefore, even if a cumulative-effect 

analysis were required by Alabama law, that factor would not 

eliminate [the petitioner's] obligation to plead each claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in compliance with the 

directives of Rule 32." '"

Woodward, 276 So. 3d at 742 (quoting Bryant v. State, 181 So. 3d 1087, 

1104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), quoting in turn Taylor v. State, 157 So. 3d 

131, 140 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)).

The circuit court found that "there was ... no cumulative error 

based on these claims" because each of the underlying claims lacked 

merit. (C. 615.) Thus, even under a cumulative-error analysis, Largin 

would be due no relief. See, e.g., Wiggins v. State, 193 So. 3d 765, 813 

(Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (holding that, because there was no error in any 

of the specific instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, there could 

be no cumulative error).

J.

In claim I.B.7., Largin alleged that his trial counsel were 

"ineffective for failing to fully and properly object to the State's 

impeachment of Ernie Tubbs." (C. 125.) Largin alleged that "[t]he trial 

court allowed the State to cross-examine defense witness Ernie Tubbs on 
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the basis of mere charges, on the theory that these charges were relevant 

to establish a bias against the State as the prosecuting entity." (C. 125.) 

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 616.) The circuit 

court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal 

in which this Court found no error or plain error in the State's crossexamination of Tubbs:

"Before Largin called Tubbs to testify, Tubbs's attorney 

informed the court that he would object to any questions 

regarding the pending charges. The State informed the court 

that it was actively prosecuting Tubbs for rape and for failing 

to comply with requirements of the community-notification 

act, but that it would not ask Tubbs about the facts of those 

cases. The trial court agreed that the State could ask Tubbs 

whether he had pending charges, and Largin stated that he 

had no objections. Thereafter, in response to Largin's 

questions on direct examination, Tubbs testified that he was 

residing in the county jail and that he had been charged with 

failing to register as a sex offender, domestic violence, 

sodomy, and rape. During cross-examination, the State 

confirmed the charges pending against Tubbs.

"'If error occurred it was invited by defense counsel. 

Invited error applies to death-penalty cases and operates to 

waive the error unless "it rises to the level of plain error." Ex 

parte Bankhead, 585 So. 2d 112, 126 (Ala. 1991).' Gobble v. 

State, 104 So. 3d 920, 945 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Largin did 

not raise this claim of error in the trial court and, in fact, he 

questioned Tubbs about the charges. As a result, we review 

for plain error only.
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"The trial court has substantial discretion in 

determining the scope of cross-examination. E.g., Albarran v. 

State, 96 So. 3d 131, 165 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). Rule 616, 

Ala. R. Evid., states, 'A party may attack the credibility of a 

witness by presenting evidence that the witness has a bias or 

prejudice for or against a party to the case or that the witness 

has an interest in the case.' In Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 

1276, 1298 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), we stated that '[i]t is 

always permissible to cross-examine a witness to ascertain his 

or her interest, bias, prejudice, or partiality concerning 

matters about which he or she is testifying, and generally 

anything that tends to show the witness's bias, 

unfriendliness, enmity, or inclination to swear against a 

party, is admissible.' The pending charges against Tubbs for 

failing to register as a sex offender, domestic violence, 

sodomy, and rape and his incarceration in the county jail 

would reasonably give rise to the inference that Tubbs had a 

bias against the State. Therefore, the trial court committed no 

error or plain error when it permitted the State to crossexamine Tubbs and confirm the evidence Largin had elicited 

on direct examination."

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 429.

On appeal, Largin does not address this holding in Largin. This 

Court's holding in Largin shows that the claim underlying the allegation 

of ineffectiveness lacks merit. Thus, Largin is due no relief. See, e.g., 

Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641.

K.

In claim I.B.8., Largin alleged that his trial counsel were 

"ineffective at numerous points when counsel failed to object to the State 
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80

introducing testimony that Mr. Largin lacked remorse." (C. 126-27.) The 

petition cited testimony from Investigator Miller, George McShan, and 

Jill Wortham. (C. 127-28.) 

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 617.) The circuit 

court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal 

in which this Court found no plain error in the admission of the 

testimony. Largin, 233 So. 3d at 426-27, 431.

On appeal, Largin challenges the circuit court's denial of this claim, 

but he does not identify any specific testimony or provide this Court with 

any citations to the record. This does not comply with Rule 28(a)(10), 

Ala. R. App. P. Largin also does not address this Court's holding in Largin

that the claim underlying the allegation of ineffectiveness lacks merit. 

Thus, Largin is due no relief. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641.

L.

In claim I.B.9., Largin alleged that his trial counsel were 

"ineffective for failing to challenge the ways in which the State bolstered 

Sheri Largin Lake's testimony at trial." (C. 129.) Largin asserted that 

"the court allowed improper refreshing of recollection and leading 
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testimony" and that Sheri "was allowed numerous times to testify to 

hearsay and make statements without any foundation, improperly 

increasing the impact of her testimony." (C. 129.) Largin alleged that the 

State improperly used the transcript of Sheri's 911 call to refresh her 

recollection, that the "prosecutor [led] Ms. Largin Lake to testify 

precisely in conformance with indictment," and that Sheri "testified that 

only she, her mother, and her father had keys to the house and that Mr. 

Largin had never been given [a] key to [the] house." (C. 129.)

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 618.) The circuit 

court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal 

in which this Court found that there was no plain error in the admission 

of the testimony. Largin, 233 So. 3d at 432.

On direct appeal, this Court addressed the alleged error that 

underlies this ineffectiveness claim: 

"The State explained to the trial court its reason for 

using the transcript of the 911 call during Sheri's testimony 

and stated that it 'would offer to play the nine-one-one tape 

again, interrupting it from time to time with other questions 

for [Sheri], and provide copies to the jury so they can follow 

along and not lose their place in the conversation.' (R. 904.) 

The trial court permitted the transcripts to be used as a 

demonstrative aid during the testimony, which did not have 
CR-20-0228

82

the effect of bolstering Sheri's testimony, and the trial court 

did not abuse its considerable discretion when it did so. E.g., 

Blanton v. State, 886 So. 2d 850, 868-69 (Ala. Crim. App.

2003). No plain error occurred.

"Largin's assertion that the trial court erred when it 

permitted the State to question Sheri in conformance with the 

indictment is meritless. The State had the burden of proving 

Largin's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In fulfilling its 

burden to prove its case, the State asked Sheri about items 

from her parents' home that she had been asked to identify in 

the months after the murders and which had been stolen 

during the commission of the crimes. That testimony did not 

bolster Sheri's credibility, and the trial court committed no 

plain error when it allowed the testimony.

"There is no merit to Largin's final claim that the trial 

court erred when it permitted Sheri to testify that, to her 

knowledge, her parents had never given Largin a key to their 

house. The testimony was based on her extensive personal 

knowledge of her parents' behavior and was properly 

admitted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and no 

plain error occurred."

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 432.

On appeal, Largin challenges the circuit court's summary dismissal

of this claim, but he does not address this Court's holding in Largin that 

the claim underlying the allegation of ineffectiveness lacks merit. He 

merely asserts that trial counsel should have objected. Largin is due no 

relief. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641. 

M.
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83

In claim I.B.10., Largin alleged that counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting to testimony from "the State's expert DNA witness, April Leon, 

... about testing of genetic material recovered from a metal mop handle 

found in the victims' kitchen." (C. 130.) 

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 619.) The circuit 

court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal 

in which this Court found that there was no plain error in the admission 

of the testimony. Largin, 233 So. 3d at 432-33.

On direct appeal, this Court addressed the alleged error that 

underlies this ineffectiveness claim: 

"Largin's next claim of error is that the trial court erred 

when it allowed expert testimony about DNA evidence that 

was, he says, irrelevant, confusing, and unfairly prejudicial to 

him. Specifically, he argues that April Leon, a forensic 

biologist in the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, 

should not have been permitted to testify that the genetic 

material recovered from the handle of the mop found in the 

victims' kitchen was consistent with a mixture of Largin's and 

his mother's DNA. He states that the testimony was improper 

because, he says, with regard to another piece of evidence, 

Leon had testified that she could not differentiate between 

genetic material from Largin and from his father. We review 

for plain error because Largin did not raise this claim in the 

trial court.

"As we have stated repeatedly: 'The question of 
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84

admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of 

the trial court, and the trial court's determination on that 

question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of 

abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 

(Ala. 2000). The premise underlying Largin's argument is that 

Leon should not have been able to testify that Largin's genetic 

material was part of the DNA mixture on the mop handle 

because, with regard to a sample of genetic material from 

another piece of evidence—the muzzle of a gun, Leon testified 

that she could not eliminate Largin as a source of the DNA 

mixture based on the biological relationship between him and 

his parents. Largin's premise is faulty. Leon testified that the 

reason she could not eliminate Largin as a contributor to the 

mixture of genetic material on the muzzle was that Peggy 

Largin was the major contributor to the material in the 

sample, and the amount of DNA from the minor contributor 

was insufficient to eliminate Largin as the contributor. 

Therefore, Leon was testifying about two distinct samples of 

genetic material, and the inconclusive results regarding the 

muzzle did not preclude testimony about the clear results she 

found during her examination of the genetic material on the 

mop handle.

"The testimony about the genetic material on the mop 

handle was relevant, see Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid., because it 

corroborated Largin's statement to the police and supported 

the State's theory of the case by establishing that Largin had 

tried to clean up the blood in the kitchen.

"Thus, the evidence was relevant and not unfairly 

prejudicial, Leon did not overstate her conclusions, and there 

was no plain error in the admission of the testimony."

Largin, 233 So. 3d at 432-33.

On appeal, Largin challenges the circuit court's summary dismissal 

of this claim, but he does not address this Court's holding in Largin that 
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85

the claim underlying the allegation of ineffectiveness lacks merit. He 

merely asserts that trial counsel should have objected and reiterates the 

arguments that this Court rejected on direct appeal. Largin is due no 

relief. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641.

N.

In claim I.B.11., Largin alleged that his trial counsel were 

ineffective for not objecting "to unnecessary and prejudicial autopsy 

photographs admitted at trial." (C. 133.) The State offered 23 autopsy 

photographs; Largin's counsel objected only to a photograph of Peggy's 

body "in which the top of the skull had been removed." (C. 133.) Largin 

alleged that if counsel had objected to all the photographs, "there is a 

reasonable probability that [the circuit court] would have sustained the 

objections and limited which gruesome pictures the jury saw," and "there 

is a reasonable probability that Mr. Largin would not have been found 

guilty of murder or sentenced to death." (C. 134.) 

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 620.) The circuit 

court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal 

in which this Court found that there was no error, plain or otherwise, in 
CR-20-0228

86

the admission of the photographs. Largin, 233 So. 3d at 433-34. As for 

the one photograph that trial counsel objected to, this Court held that 

"[e]ven though the photograph was gruesome, it demonstrated the 

character and location of wounds, and illustrated the medical examiner's 

testimony." 233 So. 3d at 434. This Court held: 

"We reach the same conclusion as to the remaining 

photographs. They depicted the character and extent of the 

victims' internal and external wounds, and they were used to 

aid the medical examiner's testimony. The trial court did not 

commit any error, much less plain error, when it admitted the 

photographs into evidence." 

233 So. 3d at 434. 

On appeal, Largin challenges the circuit court's summary dismissal 

of this claim, but he does not address this Court's holding in Largin that 

the claim underlying the allegation of ineffectiveness lacks merit. He 

merely asserts that trial counsel should have objected to all the 

photographs, and he reiterates the arguments that this Court rejected on 

direct appeal. Largin is due no relief. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 

641. Cf. McNabb, 991 So. 2d at 326.

O.

In claim I.C.1., Largin alleged that counsel were ineffective for not 

objecting "to prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase of trial." 
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87

(C. 134.) Largin alleged six instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and 

argued that those "improper comments and arguments, individually and 

cumulatively," violated his rights. (C. 135-40.)

The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that it 

was insufficiently pleaded and that it lacked merit. (C. 621.) The circuit 

court cited this Court's rejection of the underlying claim on direct appeal 

in which this Court found that there was no error, plain or otherwise, in 

the same six instances of alleged misconduct. Largin, 233 So. 3d at 416-

22. The circuit court also cited this Court's rejection on direct appeal of 

Largin's argument that "the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's closing 

arguments" violated his rights. (C. 621, citing Largin, 233 So. 3d at 422-

23.) 

On appeal, Largin challenges the circuit court's summary dismissal 

of this claim, but he does not address this Court's holding in Largin that 

the claim underlying the allegation of ineffectiveness lacks merit. Largin 

is due no relief. See, e.g., Carruth, 165 So. 3d at 641. Cf. McNabb, 991 

So. 2d at 326.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
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AFFIRMED.

McCool and Cole, JJ., concur. Kellum, J., concurs in the result. 

Windom, P.J., recuses herself.