IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CITY OF DALLAS;

CITY OF ABILENE;

CITY OF ALLEN;

CITY OF AMARILLO;

CITY OF ARLINGTON;

CITY OF AUSTIN;

CITY OF BEAUMONT;

CITY OF CARROLLTON;

CITY OF DENTON;

CITY OF FORT WORTH;

CITY OF FRISCO;

CITY OF GARLAND;

CITY OF GRAND PRAIRIE;

CITY OF HOUSTON;

CITY OF IRVING;

CITY OF LEWISVILLE;

CITY OF McKINNEY;

CITY OF MESQUITE;

CITY OF NACOGDOCHES;

CITY OF PEARLAND;

CITY OF PLANO;

CITY OF ROWLETT;

CITY OF SUGAR LAND;

CITY OF TYLER; and

CITY OF WACO,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

DISNEY DTC, LLC;

HULU, LLC; and

NETFLIX, INC.,

Defendants. 

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-02071-L 

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT

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TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are subject to Texas’s Public Utility Regulatory Act 

(“PURA”);1 Defendants disagree. That core dispute will necessarily involve determining the 

scope of PURA and the Texas Legislature’s intent in passing it. Thus, this case ultimately will 

require a ruling that affects the fiscal operations of Texas and Texas municipalities. Five other 

federal courts, in cases involving similar state statutes and in suits involving at least some of 

the Defendants here, have held these cases should be remanded to state courts based on the

Supreme Court’s comity doctrine.2 None have refused to remand.

Defendants have offered no reason for this Court to go against these five decisions. 

Defendants rehash arguments that these five courts rejected and that no court has accepted in 

a fee case such as this one. This Court should continue the trend and remand this case.

ARGUMENT

I. Federal Courts Can Remand on Non-Statutory Grounds.

Defendants half-heartedly argue that federal courts lack authority to remand a case on 

non-statutory grounds. The centerpiece of that argument is Thermtron Products, Inc. v. 

Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), a case that has been abrogated on this very issue. See 

 1

 Tex. Util. Code § 66.001 et seq.

2

 See City of Fishers v. DIRECTV, 5 F.4th 750 (7th Cir. 2021); City of Kenner v. Netflix, Inc., No. 21-00445, 

ECF No. 61 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2022); Village of Shiloh v. Netflix, No. 3:21-cv-807, 2022 WL 873822 

(S.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2022); Gwinnett Cty. v. Netflix, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-21-MLB, 2021 WL 3418083 (N.D. 

Ga. Aug. 5, 2021); City of Creve Coeur v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 4:18cv1453, 2019 WL 3604631 (E.D. 

Mo. Aug. 6, 2019) (remand consolidated with Netflix and Hulu).

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Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353–54 (1988).3 At least five federal appellate 

courts, including one in a franchise fee case involving Defendants, have since recognized that 

Cohill “clearly overruled Thermtron to the extent that Thermtron had held that only statutory 

grounds for remand are authorized.” Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1263 n.26 (11th Cir. 

1999) (quoting Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1214 (3d Cir. 1991)); accord City of 

Fishers, 5 F.4th at 758 (stating Cohill limited Thermtron’s holding); City of Albuquerque v. Soto 

Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1098 n.12 (10th Cir. 2017) (recognizing ability to remand on nonstatutory grounds, citing Snapper); Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1501–02 (8th Cir. 

1992) (discussing Thermtron, Cohill, and Foster and holding “the district court had the authority 

to remand this case to state court based on abstention, a reason not expressly articulated in § 

1447(c)”).4 One district court also noted that Defendants have “mischaracterize[d] the effect 

of” Cohill “on the application to Thermtron to cases such as this.” Gwinnett Cty, 2021 WL 

3418083 at *3. Simply put, Defendants’ position is legally wrong.

Defendants’ cases cited in support of this point are inapposite. In re Wilson Industries, 

Inc., 886 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1989) concerned whether a plaintiff could “precipitate a remand 

 3

 Cohill explained that the language in Thermtron, “viewed in isolation, is admittedly far-reaching, but 

it loses controlling force when read against the circumstances of that case.” 484 U.S. at 355. While 

Thermtron involved a “clearly impermissible remand” based on simply an “overcrowded docket,” “an 

entirely different situation is presented when the district court has clear power to decline to exercise 

jurisdiction,” which “best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id. at 

356–57.

4 See also Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1407 n.5, 1416 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The point on which 

[Cohill ] departed from Thermtron was whether a district court could exercise its inherent, non-statutory 

power to remand a case on common law grounds,” and stating that Cohill instructed that the remand 

statute “does not contain all of the permissible grounds for remand. Courts often supplement statutory 

rules with judge-made rules.”); Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988), abrogated on 

other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996).

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of an action by amending the complaint to eliminate the basis for removal.” The parties in 

Lancaster v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 4:21-cv-481, 2021 WL 6754281 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2021) offered 

no basis for remand other than that the parties had stipulated to do so. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 

890 F. Supp. 1324, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1995) dealt with fraudulent joinder and premature removal 

questions in a case involving statutory removal. And Louisiana v. AAA Ins., No. 07-5528, 2011 

WL 5118859, at *11 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2011) did not concern state revenue and thus did not 

invoke comity even though the plaintiff was a sovereign state.

II. Comity Abstention is Proper.

Defendants argue that (a) there is no pending state proceeding to support abstention; 

(b) Plaintiffs’ claims are for damages and therefore cannot be remanded; and (c) comity 

abstention only applies to claims filed in federal court by taxpayers challenging state taxing 

schemes. None of these claims are availing.

First (at 9–10), Defendants argue that, because Texas’s administrative procedures for 

collecting taxes do not apply to the PURA fees, there is no “pending state proceeding” and 

Levin comity cannot apply. But Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010) does not 

require a “pending state proceeding” for comity to apply. Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 3418083 at 

*5 (rejecting Defendants’ argument and noting that “Defendants cite no authority indicating 

that any comity case has ever required a ‘pending state proceeding’ requirement”). Defendants’ 

supporting cases, dropped in footnotes, discuss other types of abstention and have nothing to 

do with Levin comity. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (Younger 

abstention); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (Younger abstention); Lake Carriers’ 

Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) (Younger abstention); Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. 

Case 3:22-cv-02071-L Document 37 Filed 11/03/22 Page 4 of 19 PageID 950
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Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1140 (11th Cir. 2013) (Colorado River abstention ). Neither Younger

nor Colorado River abstention is at issue here, and cases concerning those doctrines are 

irrelevant. Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 3418083 at *5 n.6 (finding Younger and Colorado River

abstention cases irrelevant to comity remands). Moreover, Defendants ignore that PURA 

provides distinct processes and procedures for the payment of fees and that the underlying 

lawsuit filed in state court is the exercise of PURA’s express enforcement mechanism. Thus, 

there was (and is) a pending state proceeding in the form of a state court case that was initially 

filed in state court and is there now after the district court’s remand.

Defendants next argue (at 10–11) that an action for damages cannot be remanded 

based on abstention principles, relying on Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 

719 (1996). But courts have already rejected this exact argument too. Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 

3418083 at *6 (holding that “Quackenbush was discussing Younger and Burford abstention when 

making this point, not Levin/McNary comity”).5 “And Quackenbush specifically distinguished

McNary [(itself a case for damages)] in regard to this principle.” Id. (citing Quackenbush, 517 

U.S. at 719). Moreover, Quackenbush “acknowledged the Court had approved the application 

of abstention principles in declaratory judgment actions.” Id. (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 

Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300 (1943)). Here, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that 

Defendants are subject to PURA and then the follow-on equitable relief to establish back fees 

that Defendants owe under that statute but have not paid—concrete monetary relief that is 

 5 Although Defendants waived this point in City of Fishers, the Seventh Circuit expressed serious doubt 

about Defendants’ argument here, finding that their reading of Quackenbush was too broad and noting 

that the “Supreme Court has permitted abstention in at least one case involving a request for 

declaratory relief tied to a damages action.” City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 758–59 (citing Fair Assessment in 

Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 111 (1981)).

Case 3:22-cv-02071-L Document 37 Filed 11/03/22 Page 5 of 19 PageID 951
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the direct consequence of the declaration and is not akin to common-law “damages.”6 Thus, 

Quackenbush is inapplicable.

It also makes no difference that Plaintiffs’ claims “do not constitute taxpayer challenges 

to state tax laws,” as Defendants argue (at 12). In fact, many cases remanded for comity do 

not comprise such taxpayer challenges. Some, as here, have been brought by local 

governments. See City of Fishers, 5 F.4th 750; City of Maryland Heights v. TracFone Wireless, Inc., 

No. 4:12cv00755, 2013 WL 791866, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2013); City of Creve Coeur v. 

DIRECTV, LLC, No. 4:18cv1453, 2019 WL 3604631, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 2019); see also 

Normand v. Cox Communications, LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 619, 626 (E.D. La. 2012) (suit brought 

by state tax collector). Others have been brought by one company against another, 

Saskatchewan Mut. Ins. Co. v. CE Design, Ltd., 865 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2017), or by an employee 

against a company, Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp., 840 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2016), or by a 

consumer against a company, Gwozdz v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 846 F.3d 738 (4th Cir. 2017).7

Thus, consistent with Levin’s broad language, courts have repeatedly invoked the 

comity doctrine to remand cases about fees.8 Defendants implore the Court to adopt Judge 

 6

 See Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 183 n.89 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Needless to say, an accounting 

is an equitable remedy that may require the payment of money; but such payment does not constitute 

damages, which is a remedy at law, not in equity.”); Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 700 & 

n.8 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that an equitable accounting is distinct from an award of money damages, 

even though such a remedy yields an award of money).

7 Lisowski v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-1729, 2021 WL 62627, at *2–*3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2021), 

a case arising under CAFA, is nothing like this case. The plaintiff in that case “suggest[ed] in his 

complaint that the tax-law issues have already been resolved by the Commonwealth.” Id. at *3. Lisowski

stands for the unremarkable point that federal courts can adjudicate cases that do not implicate novel 

and complex state tax-law issues.

8

 See Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 287 (1909); City of Fishers, 5 F.4th 

750; Z&R Cab, LLC v. Phila. Parking Auth., 616 F. App’x 527, 531 (3d Cir. 2015); Homewood Vill., LLC 

v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke Cty., No. 3:15-cv-23, 2016 WL 1306554, at *1, *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 

Case 3:22-cv-02071-L Document 37 Filed 11/03/22 Page 6 of 19 PageID 952
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Ambro’s concurring views in Z&R Cab, but those views failed to attract a majority and are 

against the weight of authority. Defendants also ignore that they conceded that the comity 

doctrine applies to fees in the Seventh Circuit. City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 755. Federal appellate

courts often take note of parties’ concessions in other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 184 

F.3d 858, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Defendants rely yet again (at 11) on stale authority to support their argument, citing

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004). The Supreme Court in Levin thoroughly 

distinguished Hibbs and expressly overruled a line of cases that used the Hibbs footnote to hold 

that comity was coextensive with the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) and only forecloses actions

brought by taxpayers to reduce taxes. Levin clarified that the Hibbs footnote did not “restrict 

comity’s compass,” and reiterated that the comity doctrine is “more embracive than the TIA.” 

560 U.S. at 424, 430–31; see also City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 754–55, 759 (discussing Levin’s 

clarification of Hibbs). Defendants are therefore wrong to rely on the Hibbs footnote.

There is no reason to believe the Supreme Court would endorse the tax-versus-fee 

distinction that Defendants ask this Court to adopt. The principles underlying the comity 

doctrine are based on federal courts’ appropriate reluctance to tell the States what revenue 

they can and cannot collect. Whether that revenue is in the form of a fee rather than a tax is 

 

2016), aff’d, 677 F. App’x 623 (11th Cir. 2017); Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 3418083; City of Creve Coeur, 

2019 WL 3604631.

 The fact that Homewood Village involved a dismissal instead of a remand is irrelevant. “Cohill

established that remand is appropriate when a district court has discretion to dismiss a case.” 

McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1991).

Case 3:22-cv-02071-L Document 37 Filed 11/03/22 Page 7 of 19 PageID 953
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immaterial. A federal decree prohibiting collection of a fee is just as insulting to federalism and 

as disruptive to State revenue as a federal decree prohibiting collection of a tax.

III. The Levin Factors Weigh in Favor of Remand.

Plaintiffs’ opening brief (at 10–11) established that all Levin factors weigh in favor of 

remand. Defendants argue otherwise, first asserting (at 15) that “a removed damages action” 

differs from a federally filed action seeking “federal-court review of commercial matters over 

which [Texas] enjoys wide regulatory latitude.” Levin, 560 U.S. at 431. But Plaintiffs primarily 

seek declaratory relief (see pp. 4–5, supra). Defendants’ removal places this case squarely 

alongside state taxpayer cases filed in federal court such as DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 

119, 125 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal on comity grounds), where DIRECTV had sued 

for a state franchise fee regime to “be declared unconstitutional.” The Fourth Circuit found 

the validity and constitutionality of franchise fees to be a “prerogative that North Carolina’s 

General Assembly has seen fit to reserve to itself. It is just this sort of heavy-handed federal

court interference in state taxation that the principle of comity is intended to avoid.” Id.

Comity precludes a federal declaration or injunction against the collection of a state tax.

There is no reason to accord Texas less deference than North Carolina simply because 

Defendants seek this relief following a removal instead of an initial federal court filing. Levin 

did not limit the comity doctrine in enforcement actions. Comity applies because Defendants 

seek federal court intervention in the local fee collection. City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 755 (stating 

the same and finding the distinction between who raised the claims “is of little moment”); 

Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 3418083 at *6 (stating same “regardless of who brought the underlying 

suit”). “[I]f comity is to mean anything, it would seemingly restrain the prospect of federal 

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court orders disrupting a state’s efforts to collect its life blood of revenue pursuant to the 

state’s own law.” Gwozdz, 846 F.3d at 743. That prospect is why Defendants sought removal—

a federal court order telling the State of Texas and its local governments what fees they can 

and cannot collect. That is the exact situation that Levin says should be avoided. By removing 

this case, Defendants are seeking “federal court intervention in matters over which the State 

of [Texas] and its municipalities have traditionally ‘enjoy[ed] wide regulatory latitude’—

specifically, utility regulation and gross revenue fees.” Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 3418083 at *5

(quoting Levin, 560 U.S. at 431); see also City of Creve Coeur, 2019 WL 3604631, at *5.

Second, Defendants claim that their removal is not an attempt to seek “federal-court 

aid in an endeavor to improve their competitive position.” Levin, 560 U.S. at 431. But courts 

in similar cases have held otherwise.9

Third, Defendants claim (at 16) that “the absence of any pending state tax process or 

administrative proceeding regarding the franchise fees” necessarily shows that Texas courts 

are no better positioned than federal courts to review the issues posed in this case. But, as 

stated at pp. 3–4 supra, there is no requirement for state processes under the Levin factors, and 

even if there were the case filed in state court would qualify.

Defendants admit (at 17) that they have lost this very argument in five other franchise 

fee cases,10 but argue that these decisions can be traced back to Normand v. Cox Communications, 

 9

 City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 756 (“[W]e agree with the district court’s observation that the streaming 

platforms removed the case and oppose the cities’ demand for fees as part of an attempt to maintain 

a competitive advantage over traditional cable providers.”); Gwinnett Cty., 2021 WL 3418083 at *5 

(“Defendants invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to improve their competitive position, namely over 

traditional cable television and landline telephone providers that pay franchise fees under the Act.”).

10 See n.2, supra (listing cases).

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LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. La. 2012). The Normand court found that the comity doctrine 

required it to remand, and it is not the only case outside of the franchise-fee context to do so. 

See City of Maryland Heights, 2013 WL 791866 (declining to exercise jurisdiction under Levin

over case involving business-license taxes and remanding to state court); Associated Elec. Coop., 

Inc. v. Town of Dell, No. 3:12CV00110–JMM, 2012 WL 2789708, at * 1 (E.D. Ark. July 9, 2012)

(declining to exercise jurisdiction under Levin over challenge to enforcement of town’s 

privilege taxes). Defendants argue (at 19) that “the Louisiana district court has limited Normand 

to its unique factual context,” yet one of the very fee remand decisions came from that same 

Louisiana district court. Compare Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 433 F. Supp. 3d 942, 962–63 

(E.D. La. 2020) (allegedly limiting Normand) with City of Kenner v. Netflix, Inc., No. 21-00445, 

ECF No. 61 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2022) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Levin without 

citation to Normand or Boudreaux). Defendants have lost this dispute before the very court that 

they claim limited comity.

Defendants next put forth the idea (at 16–17) that there can be no comity concern here 

because “[a]ny such federal interference already occurred in City of New Boston (where a Texas 

municipality voluntarily submitted resolution of this issue to the federal court).” Defendants 

cite no case for this proposition, likely because it is so obviously false. City of New Boston, a 

dismissal that was never appealed, applies only to the single plaintiff in that case. The City of 

New Boston was free to have its case heard in federal court, but no authority holds that, in 

voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction, the City of New Boston bound Plaintiffs, other Texas 

municipalities, the State of Texas, or its agencies to Judge Schroeder’s holding. Defendants do 

not—and cannot—allege that Plaintiffs are estopped from having this Court remand the case 

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to the Texas state courts. Nor would Texas state courts be bound by the federal court’s 

interpretation.

CONCLUSION

The remand issue here is identical to City of Fishers, City of Creve Coeur, City of Kenner, 

Village of Shiloh, and Gwinnett County—cases involving the same Defendants, many of the same 

attorneys, and the same comity issues arising under state franchise fee statutes. Defendants 

have taken a sixth bite at the federal apple, but their arguments are no better today than the 

five prior times. There is no reason to treat Texas’s municipalities and courts worse than those 

of Indiana, Missouri, Louisiana, Illinois, and Georgia or to afford them less deference 

regarding local revenue collection.

Overall, Defendants have failed to explain why this case is better suited for federal court 

than state court. Defendants’ position amounts to federal paternalism, paying short shrift to 

the federal-state balance that the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower courts to 

respect. The case should be remanded to Texas state court. 

Dated: November 3, 2022 /s/ Steven Wolens 

Steven D. Wolens

Texas Bar No. 21847600

Gary Cruciani 

Texas Bar No. 05177300

MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.

300 Crescent Court, Ste. 1500

Dallas, TX 75201

Phone: (214) 978-4000

swolens@mckoolsmith.com

gcruciani@mckoolsmith.com

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/s/ Austin R. Nimocks 

Austin R. Nimocks

Texas Bar No. 24002695

Johnny K. Sutton

Texas Bar No. 19534250

Luis A. Reyes 

Texas Bar No. 90001831

Christopher L. Peele 

Texas Bar No. 24013308

Cory R. Liu 

Texas Bar No. 24098003

ASHCROFT SUTTON REYES LLC

919 Congress Ave., Ste. 1325

Austin, TX 78701

Phone: (512) 370-1800

animocks@ashcroftlawfirm.com 

jsutton@ashcroftlawfirm.com

lreyes@ashcroftlawfirm.com 

cpeele@ashcroftlawfirm.com 

cliu@ashcroftlawfirm.com 

Steven M. Berezney (pro hac vice) 

Missouri Bar No. 56091

Garrett R. Broshuis (pro hac vice) 

Missouri Bar No. 65805

KOREIN TILLERY LLC

505 N. 7th St., Ste. 3600

St. Louis, MO 63101

Phone: (314) 241-4844

Fax: (314) 241-1854

sberezney@koreintillery.com 

gbroshuis@koreintillery.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

On Behalf of City of Dallas

Christopher J. Caso 

Texas Bar No. 03969230

CITY OF DALLAS

1500 Marilla St., Ste. 7DN

Dallas, TX 75201

(214) 670-3519

chris.caso@dallascityhall.com 

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On Behalf of City of Abilene

Stanley E. Smith

Texas Bar No. 00791694

CITY OF ABILENE

555 Walnut St., Ste. 208

Abilene, TX 79601

(325) 676-6251

stanley.smith@abilenetx.gov

On Behalf of the City of Amarillo

Bryan McWilliams

Texas Bar No. 24049776

CITY OF AMARILLO

601 S. Buchanan

Amarillo, TX 79101

(806) 378-3000

bryan.mcwilliams@amarillo.gov

On Behalf of the City of Arlington

Molly Shortfall

Texas Bar No. 24049382

David Johnson

Texas Bar No. 24060026

CITY OF ARLINGTON

Mail Stop 63-0300

101 S. Mesquite St., Ste. 300

Arlington, TX 76010

(817) 459-6878

molly.shortall@arlingtontx.gov

david.johnson@arlingtontx.gov

On Behalf of the City of Austin

Anne L. Morgan

City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 14432400

CITY OF AUSTIN

Law Department

P.O. Box 1088

Austin, TX 78767-1088

(512) 974-2268

anne.morgan@austintexas.gov

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On Behalf of the City of Beaumont

Sharae N. Reed

City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 24068467

CITY OF BEAUMONT

P.O. Box 3827

Beaumont, TX 77704-3827

(409) 880-3715

sharae.reed@beaumonttexas.gov

On Behalf of City of Carrollton

Meredith A. Ladd

Texas Bar No. 24003368

CITY OF CARROLLTON

1945 E. Jackson Rd.

Carrollton, TX 75006

(972) 466-3000

meredith.ladd@cityofcarrollton.com

On Behalf of City of Denton

Mack P. Reinwand

Texas Bar No. 24056195

CITY OF DENTON

215 E. McKinney St.

Denton, TX 76201

(940) 349-8333

mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com

On Behalf of City of Fort Worth

Laetitia Coleman Brown

Texas Bar No. 00792417

CITY OF FORT WORTH

City Hall

200 Texas St.

Fort Worth, TX 76102

(817) 392-7600

laetitia.coleman@fortworthtexas.gov

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On Behalf of City of Frisco

Richard M. Abernathy

Texas Bar No. 00809500

CITY OF FRISCO

Abernathy, Roeder, Boyd & Hullett P.C.

1700 Redbud Blvd., Ste. 300

McKinney, TX 75069

(214) 544-4000

rabernathy@abernathy-law.com

On Behalf of City of Garland

Brian England

Texas Bar No. 24059722

CITY OF GARLAND

200 N. Fifth St.

Garland, TX 75040

(972) 205-2380

bengland@garlandtx.gov

On Behalf of City of Grand Prairie

Megan Mahan

Texas Bar No. 24061203

CITY OF GRAND PRAIRIE

P.O. Box 534045

Grand Prairie, TX 75053

(972) 237-8026

mmahan@gptx.org

On Behalf of City of Houston

Arturo Michel

Texas Bar No. 14009440

YuShan Chang

Texas Bar No. 24040670

CITY OF HOUSTON

Legal Department

900 Bagby St., 4th Fl.

Houston, TX 77002

(832) 393-6442

arturo.michel@houstontx.gov

yushan.chang@houstontx.gov

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On Behalf of City of Houston

Ana Hernandez

Texas Bar No. 24046062

CITY OF HOUSTON

Ana Hernandez & Associates, PLLC

4101 Washington Ave.

Houston, TX 77007

(713) 337-3930

ana@anahlaw.com

On Behalf of City of Irving

Kuruvilla Oommen

City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 24007780

Janet Spugnardi

Deputy City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 24039192

CITY OF IRVING

825 W. Irving Blvd.

Irving, TX 75060

(972) 721-2541 x3656

koommen@cityofirving.org

jspugnardi@cityofirving.org

On Behalf of City of Lewisville

Lizbeth I. Plaster

City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 00787750

CITY OF LEWISVILLE

P.O. Box 299002

Lewisville, TX 75029-9002

(972) 219-5059

lplaster@cityoflewisville.com

On Behalf of City of McKinney

Mark S. Houser

Texas Bar No. 10049500

CITY OF MCKINNEY

Brown & Hofmeister, L.L.P.

740 East Campbell Rd., Ste. 800

Richardson, TX 75081

(214) 747-6100

mhouser@bhlaw.net

Case 3:22-cv-02071-L Document 37 Filed 11/03/22 Page 16 of 19 PageID 962
16

On Behalf of City of Mesquite

David L. Paschall

Texas Bar No. 15553800

CITY OF MESQUITE

1515 N. Galloway Ave.

Mesquite, TX 75149

(972) 216-6272

dpaschall@cityofmesquite.com

On Behalf of City of Nacogdoches

Steven Kirkland

City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 11522200

CITY OF NACOGDOCHES

P.O. Box 635030

Nacogdoches, TX 75963

(936) 559-2503

kirklands@nactx.us

On Behalf of City of Pearland

Darrin M. Coker

Texas Bar No. 00795023

CITY OF PEARLAND

3519 Liberty Dr.

Pearland, TX 77581

(281) 652-1600

dcoker@pearlandtx.gov

On Behalf of City of Plano

Paige Mims

Texas Bar No. 00787550

CITY OF PLANO

1520 K Ave., Ste. 340

Plano, TX 75074

(972) 941-7125

paigem@plano.gov

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17

On Behalf of City of Rowlett

David Berman

Texas Bar No. 02206990

CITY OF ROWLETT

Nichols, Jackson, Dillard, Hager & Smith

1800 Ross Tower

500 N. Akard St.

Dallas, TX 75201

(214) 965-9900

dberman@njdhs.com

On Behalf of City of Sugar Land

Meredith Riede

Texas Bar No. 24025614

CITY OF SUGAR LAND

P.O. Box 110

Sugar Land, TX 77487-0110

(281) 275-2700

mriede@sugarlandtx.gov

On Behalf of City of Tyler

Deborah Pullum

City Attorney

Texas Bar No. 00797269

CITY OF TYLER

P.O. Box 2039

Tyler, TX 75710

(903) 531-1161

dpullum@tylertexas.com

On Behalf of City of Waco

Jennifer Richie

Texas Bar No. 24007916

CITY OF WACO

P.O. Box 2570

Waco, TX 76702

(254) 750-5680

jenniferr@wacotx.gov

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18

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1, I hereby certify that the parties conferred about the motion 

to remand. The conference was attended by Steven M. Berezney and Garrett R. Broshuis (for 

Plaintiffs) and Jamie Drillette and Leon Carter (for Defendants) and resulted in a scheduling 

stipulation for anticipated motions. Defendants indicated at the conference that they oppose 

Plaintiffs’ motion. 

/s/ Steven Wolens 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 3, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed 

electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent via operation of the Court’s ECF system to all 

counsel of record. 

/s/ Steven Wolens 

Case 3:22-cv-02071-L Document 37 Filed 11/03/22 Page 19 of 19 PageID 965