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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ABILENE DIVISION

GEORGE T. SHELTON, §

PLAINTIFF §

§

VS. §

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-00157-H

§

RANGER COLLEGE, §

DEFENDANT §

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Defendant Ranger College (“Ranger”), and files this motion for partial 

summary judgment and shows the Court the following:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. In his preamble to his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Ranger 

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). Dkt. No. 4, ¶ 39, 43. 

Although the preamble references THCRA, nowhere in his Amended Complaint does 

Plaintiff further allege a violation of THCRA. Accordingly, as a preliminary matter, 

Defendant requests summary judgment regarding any alleged TCHRA violation. As 

set forth below, Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII and 

42 U.S.C. §1981 claims.

2. Plaintiff claims that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race (Black) in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981 when his employment was terminated on October 8, 2020. 

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Dkt. No. 4, ¶¶ 39-42. For his Title VII claim, Plaintiff asserts that he was terminated 

based on his race and sex (Male). Dkt. No. 4, ¶¶ 43-49.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

3. The summary judgment standard is well established. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

4. Defendant incorporates by reference for all purposes the items attached to and made 

part of this Motion in Appendix: Evidence in Support of Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, as required by Local Rule CV-7.

IV. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE

5. Plaintiff was hired by Ranger with a one-year contract beginning June 1, 2020, and 

ending May 9, 2021. Dkt. No. 4, ¶ 4; Ex. A. Under the contract, Ranger employed 

Shelton as Assistant Men’s Basketball Coach/Academic Advisor and Dorm Supervisor. 

Dkt. No. 4, ¶ 5. Shelton’s contract provided, “New Employees will have a 6-month 

probationary period from date of hire.” Dkt. 1, Ex. A.

6. On September 18, 2020, the head of Ranger’s math department Jessica Brown 

communicates staffing difficulties with three classes and that Mr. Shelton declines to 

teach a class because, with his recruiting duties and responsibilities for fifty-two 

basketball players, he felt it would be too stressful. Dkt. No. 4, ¶ 8.

7. On October 5, 2020, Ranger’s president Dr. William Campion advised Shelton that if 

he was unwilling to teach a class he should resign. Dkt. No. 4, ¶ 9.

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8. Ranger received two separate complaints - one by a female employee and one by a 

female student – that Shelton had sexually harassed them. Deposition of Lindy 

Matthews, p. 39, l. 9 – p. 40, l. 11; Deposition of Dr. William Campion, p. 25 l. 16 –

p. 28, l. 20.

9. On October 8, 2020, within the 6 month probationary period of Shelton’s contract, Dr. 

Campion advised Shelton that his employment with Ranger is ended. Dkt. No. 4, ¶ 14.

10. Dr. Campion testified that Shelton’s employment was terminated for refusing to teach 

a developmental math class and because of two instances in which women complained 

that Shelton had sexually harassed them. Deposition of Dr. William Campion, p. 25 l. 

16 – p. 28, l. 20.

V. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Discrimination Based on Gender or Race in Violation of 

Title VII or Discrimination Based on Race in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981

11. Plaintiff asserts a claim under Title VII for intentional discrimination on the basis of 

gender (male) and race (Black). Dkt. No. 4, ¶¶ 39-42. Plaintiff also states a claim of 

discrimination based on race in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981. Plaintiff bases his 

claims under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. §1981 on the same facts. Discrimination 

claims brought under §§ 1981 are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII 

claims. Blount v. Alabama Co-op. Extension Service, M.D.Ala.1994, 869 F.Supp. 

1543. The same elements required to establish discrimination under Title VII are 

applicable to actions under § 1981. Hunter v. Citibank, N.A., E.D.N.Y.1994, 862 

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F.Supp. 902, affirmed 60 F.3d 810, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 483, 516 U.S. 978, 133 

L.Ed.2d 410.

12. A plaintiff can prove Title VII discrimination through direct or circumstantial 

evidence. Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.2003). If a plaintiff 

produces direct evidence that discriminatory animus played a role in the adverse 

employment action, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer, who must prove 

that it would have taken the same action regardless of discriminatory animus. Price 

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252–53 (1989). Here, Plaintiff makes no 

allegations constituting direct evidence of discriminatory animus. See Dkt. No. 4.

13. Where there is no evidence of direct discrimination, Title VII discrimination claims 

based on circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the framework established in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). Under the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Plaintiff must first present his prima 

facie case of discrimination, showing that he: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) 

was qualified for his position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was 

replaced by someone outside of his protected class or others similarly situated were 

treated more favorably. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–

43 (2000).

14. Plaintiff cannot identify any individuals who are similarly situated to serve as 

comparators to substantiate his discrimination claims under Title VII and under 42 

U.S.C. §1981. Accordingly, Ranger seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII 

claim and his 42 U.S.C. §1981 claim.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully moves this Court to grant this Partial Motion for Summary 

Judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims under TCHRA, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; deny 

Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety; and grant Defendant all such other and further relief, special or 

general, at law or in equity, to which it shows itself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

WALSH, GALLEGOS, TREVIÑO,

 KYLE & ROBINSON, P.C.

1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 450

San Antonio, Texas 78209

TEL NO.: (210) 979-6633

FAX NO.: (210) 979-7024

By: /s/ D. Craig Wood

D. Craig Wood

ATTORNEY IN CHARGE

State Bar No. 21888700

cwood@wabsa.com

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 31, 2023, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of 

the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

N. Sue Allen

1345 FM 1187 E, Suite 113

Mansfield, Texas 76063

sue@sueallenlaw.com

/s/ D. Craig Wood

D. Craig Wood

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