UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF DALLAS DIVISION

Allyson Raskin,

Petitioner,

v.

Clay Jenkins & Michael

Scarpello

Respondents.

No. 4:22-cv-00746-O

Petitioner’s Response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss

TO THE HONORABLE ADA BROWN,

Respondents removed the above cause and subsequently filed a Motion to

Dismiss under local rules for Civil Procedure Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 5)

based on the Original Petition on September 19, 2022 (Doc. 3). Petitioner, Allyson

Raskin, has filed an opposition to the removal and respectfully responds to

Respondents’ motion as follows:

Case 3:22-cv-02012-E-BH Document 5 Filed 09/27/22 Page 1 of 25 PageID 621
Certificate of Service

On September 27, 2022, I served a true and correct copy of this response via

ECF to attorney for Respondents as follows:

Barbara S Nicholas

Email: barbara.nicholas@dallascounty.org

Benjamin Laurence Stool 

Email: ben.stool@dallascounty.org

J G Schuette

Email: jason.schuette@dallascounty.org

Attorneys for Defendants

By: /s/ Allyson Raskin

Allyson Raskin

5533 Meletio Lane

Dallas, TX 75230

Cell: 214-263-5802

Email: 

essentiallyally@gmail.com

Pro se

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................................................3

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................8

FACT-BASED MERITS................................................................................................10

REMOVAL....................................................................................................................12

STANDING...................................................................................................................15

INJURY IN FACT.........................................................................................................16

POLITICAL QUESTION...............................................................................................18

REMEDIABLE RIGHTS...............................................................................................20

PRAYER.......................................................................................................................25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Andrade v. Naacp of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex. 2011).................................14

Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 1991)......16

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)............13, 14

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979).................................................17

Bd. of Water Eng'rs v. City of San Antonio, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. 1955)....11

Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001).....................17

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)........................................................12

Cassettari v. County of Nevada, 824 F.2d 735, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1987)..................16

Cernosek Enters., Inc. v. City of Mont Belvieu, 338 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011......................................................................................11

Cernosek Enters., Inc. v. City of Mont Belvieu, 338 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)........................................................................11

Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology,524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975)...............17

3

Case 3:22-cv-02012-E-BH Document 5 Filed 09/27/22 Page 3 of 25 PageID 623
Consumer Crusade v. Fairon Associates, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1137-38 (D. Colo. 

2005)....................................................................................................................11

Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975)...................................................14

EEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998)...............13

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)...............................................................10

Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982)...11

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960)............................................16

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)...................................................17

Great American Fed. S. L. Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 396 n.15 (1979).......18

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)..................................................................18

Hernandez, 872 F.3d (9th Cir. 2017)......................................................................10

Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984).....................................................11

In re D.D.L., No. 13-22-00062-CV, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2022)...................11

In re S.M.D., 329 S.W.3d. (Tex. App. 2010)..........................................................11

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16, 54 S.Ct. 26, 27, 78 L.Ed. 142 (1933)....16

James C. Harrington, Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Liberties Under the Texas 

Bill of Rights, 68 TEX.L.REV. 1435, 1490 (1990).............................................15

Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 863, 

116 S.Ct. 174, 133 L.Ed.2d 114 (1995)...............................................................10

Life Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979)..........17

Low v. King, 867 S.W.2d 141, 144-45 (Tex. App. 1993).......................................15

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)........................12

McLellan v. Mississippi Power Light Co.,545 F.2d 919, 930 (5th Cir. 1977) (in 

banc).....................................................................................................................17

Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)......................................10

Nieto v. UAW Local 598,672 F.Supp. 987, 991-92 (E.D.Mich. 1987)..................17

Ocean Acres L.P. v. Dare County Bd. of Health, 514 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 

(E.D.N.C. 1981)...................................................................................................16

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. Ed. 288 

(1937)...................................................................................................................12

Patel v. Rios, No. 01-20-00856-CV, at *8-9 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2022)...............11

4

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Philip J. Pfeiffer W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, 43 SW.L.J. 81, 84

(1989)...................................................................................................................15

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 

(1969)...................................................................................................................15

Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 404 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005)...................10

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)......................................8

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).................................................................18

San Diego Gas Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,450 U.S. 621, 654-55, 101 S.Ct. 

1287, 1305-06, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981)................................................................16

Shamrock Oil Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 

1214 (1941)..........................................................................................................10

State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 357, 331 S.W.2d 737, 743 (1960)..............16

Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (Tex. 1993)................................................11

Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists,580 F.Supp. 662, 667 (D.D.C. 

1984)....................................................................................................................18

U.S. CONST. art. III § 1..........................................................................................14

United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Ctr., 264 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 

2001)....................................................................................................................10

United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357....................................................16

United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 

669, 686-88, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973)............................................13

Virginia v. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d 36, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2021)..............................14

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114...................................16

Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 194–201, 132 S.Ct. 1421)...............................................14

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 245.......................................................................................................17

42 U.S.C. § 1983.................................................................................................7, 17

42 U.S.C. § 1985.....................................................................................................17

42 U.S.C. §15371(b)..................................................................................................8

42 U.S.C. 1985........................................................................................................17

52 U.S.C. 20971........................................................................................................9

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HAVA........................................................................................................................8

TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 81.60..............................................................................8, 9

TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 81.61..............................................................................8, 9

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.003.........................................................17

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004 (a)(b)...............................................17

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.011.........................................................17

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 52.062...................................................................................9

TEX. ELEC. CODE §122.01....................................................................................8

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 122.032.................................................................................9

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 276.013...............................................................................12

TEX. ELEC. CODE Chap. 273...............................................................................17

TEX. ELEC. CODE Chp. 65.........................................................................7, 15, 17

TEX. GOV. CODE § 123.001.................................................................................10

TEX. GOV. CODE § 1471.015...............................................................................10

Other Authorities

EAC Cerification Manual 

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Cert_Manual_7_8_15_FIN

AL.pdf....................................................................................................................9

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 

POLICIES 91 (3d ed. 2006).................................................................................13

VSTL Manual

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/VSTLManual

%207%208%2015%20FINAL.pdf........................................................................9

Constitutional Provisions

Declaration of Independence...................................................................................12

Due Process Clause...................................................................................................8

Equal Protection Clause............................................................................................8

TEX. CONST. art. I § 1.....................................................................................12, 13

TEX. CONST. art. I § 2.....................................................................................12, 13

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TEX CONST. art. I § 3......................................................................................12, 17

TEX. CONST. art. I § 13.........................................................................................17

TEX. CONST. art. I § 17.........................................................................................17

TEX. CONST. art. I § 19.........................................................................................17

TEX. CONST. art. VI § 2....................................................................................9, 17

TEX. CONST. art. VI § 2 (c)............................................................................12, 15

TEX. CONST. art. VI § 4......................................................................................7, 9

U.S. CONST. amend. 1...........................................................................................13

U.S. CONST. amend. 14.........................................................................................13

U.S. CONST. amend. 15.........................................................................................13

U.S. CONST. art. I § 2............................................................................................13

U.S. CONST. art. I § 3............................................................................................13

U.S. CONST. art. I § 4..................................................................................7, 10, 13

U.S. CONST. art. III § 1..........................................................................................14

U.S. CONST. art. III § 2..........................................................................................14

U.S. CONST. art. III § 3..........................................................................................14

U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4.........................................................................................13

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INTRODUCTION

Respondents allege Petitioner lacks standing to complain that Dallas

County’s use of electronic voting machines deprives her of the right to vote, and

equate Petitioner’s complaint to a generalized grievance about the conduct of

government that alleges no injury particularized to her. Further, Respondents

describe further infractions upon Petitioners voting rights through the utilization

of uncertified, unreliable electronic voting systems in an election franchise as

“hypothetical injuries that she might suffer in the future” (asserting Petitioner’s

lack of standing with no injury-in-fact), and claim 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not

cover state law violations (ECF no. 6 pg. 5).

Petitioner sought a Declaratory Order that the Respondents adhere to the

constitutionally protected process of collecting and counting votes that ensures

integrity and transparency. This is to require hand-marked paper ballots that can

be cast with anonymity, following all Texas state election laws, and hand-counted

by residents of the state of Texas, not machines as Texas Election law specifies.

(TEX. CONST. art. VI § 4 and TEX. ELEC. CODE Chp. 65). Additionally,

Petitioner sought redress for the abuse and devastation of our United State and

Texas Constitutional rights and protections by our elected officials. Dallas County

is utilizing uncertified, computerized equipment that is, by nature, vulnerable to

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manipulation by unauthorized persons. The true results of an election that relies

upon computerized equipment can never be known with full confidence, and

Petitioner’s constitutional rights to vote will be denied if computerized equipment

is used.

Furthermore, Respondents concur with Petitioner’s claims concerning the

manner in which Dallas County conducts its elections. The Constitution explicitly

commits to the States the authority to determine the manner of conducting

elections. U.S. Const. art. I § 4. (Order granting MTD pg. 1-2). Thus, this case

belongs in State court as it presents a question of law that is important to the

jurisprudence of the state. Petitioner brought this case as an action in law and

equity under the Texas Constitution for violation of Petitioner’s Equal Protection

and Due Process rights by Respondents. Petitioner sought only equitable,

injunctive, and declaratory relief against Respondents for violation of Petitioners

clearly established Equal Protection and Due Process rights guaranteed to them by

and through the Texas Constitution. Petitioner did not seek damages. 

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FACT-BASED MERITS

One of the most basic requirements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is that

defendant personally cause — either by directing, or knowing of and acquiescing

in — the deprivation of a Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Texas codified HAVA into its

Election Code. Petitioner presents a substantial number of facts backed by credible

and official sources that demonstrate the electronic voting systems utilized in

Dallas County since the 2020 election do not perform according to the voting

system standards (TEX. ELEC. CODE §122.01) necessary to conduct free and fair

election, and were not properly certified (TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 81.60 and

81.61). (Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Emergency Relief Against

Electronic Voting Systems and Destruction of Records, pg. 10-39, and Appendix

6-7). Specifically, Texas Election Code §122.01(a)(3) states “operates safely,

efficiently, and accurately and complies with the voting system standards adopted

by the Election Assistance Commission”. Under HAVA 2002 (42 U.S.C.

§15371(b)) “requires that the EAC provide for the accreditation and revocation of

accreditation of independent, non-federal laboratories qualified to test voting

systems to Federal standards”. 

“In order to meet its statutory requirements under HAVA §15371(b), the

EAC has developed the EAC’s Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation

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Program.” The procedural requirements for this program are outlined in the EAC’s

Voting System Test laboratory Accreditation Program Manual1 and the EAC’s

Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual (OMB 3265-0018)2. The

accreditation for Voting System Testing Laboratories (VSTLs) “shall not exceed a

period of two (2) years...”, according to EAC guidelines. The accreditation for

VSTLs is signed by the Chairman of the EAC. As outlined in the complaint, the

EAC did not have quorum or proper signatures from the EAC chairman to allow

for certification of VSTLs from 2017 forward. Therefore, certification of machines

from 2017 forward was not conducted properly per the guidelines set by HAVA

and the EAC itself. 

Respondents, knowing the law, were knowingly remiss in their duties acting

under the color of law and are in violation of Texas statute in not acknowledging

the expiration of certifications of accreditation of VSTLs or the lack of legal

signature per HAVA thereby allowing voting machines to be used in elections

since 2020 violating Tex. Elec. code § 122.032, § 52.062, Tex. Admin. Code §

81.60 and § 81.61, which are apparent violations of TEX. CONST. art. VI §§ 2 and

4 and federal 52 U.S.C. 20971. Respondents acting under the color of law allowed

for the use of non HAVA complaint voting system equipment, software, and

1 	 	 h"ps://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/VSTLManual%207%208%2015%20FINAL.pdf

2 h"ps://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Cert_Manual_7_8_15_FINAL.pdf

11

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modifications for elections occurring in Dallas County in 2021 and 2022 violating

TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 122.032, 52.062, TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 81.60 and §

81.61, which are apparent violations of TEX. CONST. art. VI §§ 2 and 4, and

federal 52 U.S.C. 20971.

The evidence clearly laid out by Petitioner show that the Respondents failed

to take necessary actions to protect Petitioner’s right to vote and continue to do so

to this day, causing ongoing individual harm to Petitioner. Respondents’ failures

prove individual injury and harm to Petitioner (pg. 37-39). Respondents, when

made aware of the lack of proper certification, had jurisdiction within their official

capacity (TEX. GOV. CODE §§ 1471.015, 123.001 et seq.) to seek an injunction

and or restraining order from the attorney general on the voting

equipment/software to prevent the use of any part of the voting system/software.

“It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably

constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir.

2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); Hernandez, 872 F.3d

(9th Cir. 2017). 

REMOVAL

Removal of this case was improper, U.S. CONST. art. I § 4. “The Court is

ultimately persuaded that jurisdiction is lacking in these circumstances by the

Tenth Circuit's careful jurisprudence on the limited jurisdiction of the federal

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courts. As stated recently in Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 404 F.3d 1232, 1235

(10th Cir. 2005):

It is well-established that statutes conferring jurisdiction

upon the federal courts, and particularly removal statutes,

are to be narrowly construed in light of our constitutional

role as limited tribunals. Shamrock Oil Gas Corp. v.

Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed.

1214 (1941); United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest

Health Ctr., 264 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus,

if there is ambiguity as to whether the instant statute

confers federal jurisdiction over this case, we are

compelled to adopt a reasonable, narrow construction.

Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a

presumption against removal jurisdiction. Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871,

873 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 863, 116 S.Ct. 174, 133 L.Ed.2d 114 (1995).

Moreover, if the parties fail to raise the question of the existence of jurisdiction,

the federal court has the duty to raise and resolve the matter. Id.; see also

F.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Federal removal jurisdiction is statutory in nature and is to be

strictly construed. All doubts are to be resolved against removal. Fajen v.

Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982).

“Applying these principles...this Court finds that this case was improperly

removed due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Consumer Crusade v. Fairon

Associates, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1137-38 (D. Colo. 2005). Respondent argues,

“Because the Constitution explicitly commits to the States the authority to

determine the time, place, and manner of elections, U.S. CONST. art. I § 4, this

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case presents a nonjusticiable political question and the Court must dismiss it.”

(ECF no. 6 pg. 6). Petitioner argues this is the reason removal was inappropriate,

an attempt to prevent the case from being heard and a diversion, and the reason to

remand the case back to State court.

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STANDING

Respondents seek to challenge Petitioner’s standing in court as a voter. "The

general test for standing in Texas requires that there '(a) shall be a real controversy

between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined by the judicial

declaration sought.'" Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (quoting Bd. of Water

Eng'rs v. City of San Antonio, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. 1955)). Standing also

requires some interest peculiar to the plaintiff individually and not as a member of

the public. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984); Cernosek Enters., Inc.

v. City of Mont Belvieu, 338 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,

no pet.). Patel v. Rios, No. 01-20-00856-CV, at *8-9 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2022).

“"When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself serves as the

proper framework for a standing analysis." In re S.M.D., 329 S.W.3d at 12.” In re

D.D.L., No. 13-22-00062-CV, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2022). The privilege of

free suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under

adequate penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or

other improper practice (TEX. CONST. art. VI § 2(c), TEX. ELEC. CODE §

276.013).

Voting is an indisputable right “of the most fundamental significance under

our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). The

Constitutions of Texas and the United States recognize that human beings have

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“certain inalienable rights” to which they are entitled which arise as a matter of

natural right. The most crucial of these rights are the constitutionally protected

Fundamental Rights, which are rights that are so “implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty” that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were

sacrificed.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.

Ed. 288 (1937); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Petitioner has a vested interest in protecting the quality, accuracy, and

effectiveness of the individual votes cast by Petitioner to ensure the representative

leaders in society are lawfully elected by the consent of the governed for the

protection against tyranny and for healthy maintenance of our Republican form of

government bestowed upon us by our ancestors and for the advantage of our

descendants. It is time for the representative servants to remember who the genuine

authority of government is in this state. Dec. of Ind., TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 1, 2,

3, and art. VI § 2(c). 

INJURY IN FACT

Respondents’ legal argument attempts to strip Petitioner’s individualized

injury as each transaction – the vote – is personal and constitutionally protected

from dilution or manipulation. The carelessness of negating one vote is one too

many in a constitutional republic. If such impairment does produce a legally

cognizable injury, [the plaintiffs] are among those who have sustained it. Because

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they assert a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of

their votes, not merely a claim of the right, possessed by every citizen, to require

that the Government be administered according to law, the voters have standing to

pursue their equal protection claim. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct.

691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The negligence of our most treasured civic duty is

outrageous and shocking. Petitioner establishes concrete, particularized,

individualized injury. Our founding documents – namely the Declaration of

Independence, Article I §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the First,

Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 1, 2, 3 –

solidify the right to vote in order to ensure a Republican form of government. U.S.

CONST. art. IV § 4, TEX. CONST. art. I § 2. The governmental representatives of

a people bequeath consequences, whether positive or negative (the amount and

degree of harm the population of a society experiences correlates to how tyrannical

a representative authority becomes). Petitioner has endured her own individualized,

tangible, specific injuries as a result of election maladministration and malfeasance

over the series of elections since 2020 due to leadership failing to uphold and

defend the Constitution.

The assertion of the Respondents that Petitioner lacks standing to bring

claims is incorrect. Injury in fact “... is based not on the number of people affected

— a grievance is not generalized merely because it is suffered by large numbers of

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people. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES

AND POLICIES 91 (3d ed. 2006). As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]o deny

standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also

injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions

could be questioned by nobody." United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory

Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-88, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973).

Thus, "where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found injury

in fact." EEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998)

(citation omitted). Andrade v. Naacp of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex. 2011). The

actual and imminent injury will occur again during the 2022 Elections through the

utilization of electronic voting equipment and systems that the Respondents

acknowledge will be used.

POLITICAL QUESTION

Respondents utilize Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7

L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) as the standard for defining political questions (ECF no. 6 pg.

5-6). In contrasting the petition to these standards:

Petitioner’s case does not suffer from the first two Baker factors and “if the

first two Baker factors are not present, more is required to create a political

question than apparent inconsistency between a judicial decision and the position

of another branch." (citing Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 194–201, 132 S.Ct. 1421)).”

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(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing how

it is the "rare" and "exceptional" case when Baker ’s final three factors "alone

render a case nonjusticiable"). Virginia v. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d 36, 49-50

(D.D.C. 2021). Petitioner did not seek any relief outside the Judiciary requirements

of the Constitutional provisions in Article III §§ 1, 2, and 3. Petitioner sought to

return to the constitutional provision under TEX. CONST. art. VI § 4 and

underscored in TEX. ELEC. CODE Chp. 65: the textually demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department does

not apply. 

This case does not suffer from a lack of judicially discoverable and

manageable standards as "It is primarily the character of the standards, not merely

the difficulty of their application, that differentiates between those which are

political and those which are judicial." Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill.

1975). The fourth Baker factor does not render this dispute nonjusticiable because

there is no possibility of expressing a lack of respect due the Legislative branch

since the Legislative branch authored and passed Chapter 65 of the Texas Election

Code: provisions for paper ballots in obedience to TEX. CONST. art. VI § 4.

Further, TEX. CONST. art. VI § 2 (c) says “The privilege of free suffrage shall be

protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all

undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper

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practice.” It does not say quick, efficient, or expedient election. The constitution is

clear that the goal is for the election to be accurate, secure from fraud or

manipulation, and free. Constitutional interpretation does not disrespect a

coordinate branch of government, even when a court's interpretation does not

accord with a political branch's view. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–

49, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). 

REMEDIABLE RIGHTS

Respondents assert this is a federal question case as the “complaint relies

exclusively on federal law for all six causes of action. Id. at pp. 50-56.” (ECF no. 6

pg. 2). “The Texas Constitution itself provides for an independent grounding to

assert a constitutional cause of action wherein a governmental entity or the

officials thereof interfere with an individual citizen's rights which are protected by

the State constitution...See, Philip J. Pfeiffer W. Wendell Hall, Employment and

Labor Law, 43 SW.L.J. 81, 84 (1989); James C. Harrington, Free Speech, Press,

and Assembly Liberties Under the Texas Bill of Rights, 68 TEX.L.REV. 1435,

1490 (1990).” Low v. King, 867 S.W.2d 141, 144-45 (Tex. App. 1993). 

Petitioner emphasized her vote as her property (pg. 40). Assuming negligent

or offensive acts are committed in the performance of a governmental function, the

state should be held accountable and recompense made for the injuries caused by

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that act as an operating expense of achieving the governmental purpose. As the

court emphasized, "[o]ur fundamental law does not contemplate or require that

every private injury and loss which may be necessary to protect or promote the

public health, safety, comfort and convenience must always be borne by

individuals and corporations.” State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 357, 331

S.W.2d 737, 743 (1960). The Courts recognize the necessity of prohibiting a State

(or subdivision thereof) from exploiting a power to justify the imposition of an

"unconstitutional condition." "Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when

done to accomplish an unlawful end, United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324,

357, and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an

unconstitutional result." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105,

114. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960).

When the government takes private property, it must pay just compensation

to the owner. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16, 54 S.Ct. 26, 27, 78 L.Ed.

142 (1933). If the government fails to do so, the property owner may bring suit

under the takings clause to compel payment. Id; Causby, 328 U.S. at 261-62, 267.

This is equally true of an action against a state subdivision. See Cassettari v.

County of Nevada, 824 F.2d 735, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1987); Ocean Acres L.P. v. Dare

County Bd. of Health, 514 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (E.D.N.C. 1981), affirmed, 707

F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1983). The Constitution itself provides both the cause of action

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and the remedy. Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16, 54 S.Ct. at 27; San Diego Gas Electric Co.

v. City of San Diego,450 U.S. 621, 654-55, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 1305-06, 67 L.Ed.2d

551 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 748, 67 S.Ct.

at 1384. Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir.

1991).

Petitioner's petition for Declaratory Judgment and Emergency Relief was

based upon the United States and Texas Constitution. The state court has

concurrent jurisdiction with federal court regarding constitutional questions.

Petitioner used both state and federal statutes and constitutional provisions as much

of the State of Texas statutes and constitutional law parallels the federal; in

addition to the Respondents’ claims, Petitioner also brought the cause of action

under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 37.003, 37.004 (a)(b), 65.011, TEX.

CONST. art. VI § 2, TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 3, 13, 17 and 19, as well as a

multitude of Texas Election Code including Chapters 65 and 273. Count I was

brought under TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 17 and 19, and the First, Fourteenth, and

Fifteenth Amendments; Count II under TEX. CONST. art. I § 3, and the

Fourteenth Amendment; Count III and IV under TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 13 and 19,

Count V under TEX. CONST. art. VI § 2, and the First and Fourteenth

Amendments; and Count VI under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.003, §

37.004 (a)(b).

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Texas Codified HAVA and 18 U.S.C. § 245 confers a federally protected

right. Section 1983 of Title 42 creates a cause of action against anyone who, acting

under color of law, deprives an individual of rights secured by the Constitution or

by federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). Thus, “that, in those few cases in which

organic failures in a state or local election process threaten to work patent and

fundamental unfairness, a colorable claim lies for a violation of substantive due

process (and, hence, federal jurisdiction attaches).” Bonas v. Town of North

Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001).

Furthermore, Petitioner also incorporated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in the Counts

section of the petition. Because § 1985(3) refers to all federal rights, it is irrelevant

that the particular right sought to be vindicated thereunder was not in existence at

the time the cause of action was enacted. Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528

(1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (cause of action under § 1983 to

vindicate right under subsequently enacted statute). Great American Fed. S. L.

Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 396 n.15 (1979). Petitioner contends it is also

irrelevant if the petition matched the legal standard of BAR lawyers as all Courts

shall be open to the people of this nations for all controversies. U.S. CONST. art.

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III, TEX. CONST. art I § 13. The association between § 1985(3) and state law have

been heavily deliberated in the Courts: Life Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Reichardt, 591

F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979), (private conspiracy to deprive persons of equal

protection of state law is actionable under § 1985(3)); McLellan v. Mississippi

Power Light Co.,545 F.2d 919, 930 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (same); Cohen v.

Illinois Inst. of Technology,524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, C.J.) (§

1985(3); Nieto v. UAW Local 598,672 F.Supp. 987, 991-92 (E.D.Mich. 1987) (only

federally protected rights); Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists,580

F.Supp. 662, 667 (D.D.C. 1984) (only federally protected rights). Traggis v. St.

Barbara's Greek Orthodox Church, 851 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988). 

Respondent agrees that Petitioner wants to know if, in fact, her vote was

legal considering the lack of proper certification from a properly accredited VSTL

caused Petitioner to cast an illegal ballot. Petitioner’s “real complaint is that she

believes her vote (and the vote of every other voter) was invalid.” (ECF no. 6 pg.

9). Should a citizen of Texas decide to perform as a lawyer, doctor, teacher, etc.

without having received a certified degree from an accredited university – the

government would hold them criminally accountable for fraud. Choosing the

people who will represent this Petitioner as an official leader should require the

same – if not higher – standard. People vote every day. Determining the persons

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who will represent Petitioner in an official capacity is not a mere vote, but a civic

duty and choice protected by the Constitutions of the United States and Texas.

PRAYER

Respectfully, the Petitioner prays the court will grant the Motion for

Remand back to State Court filed August 26, 2022. However, if your Honor

chooses to assume jurisdiction, Petitioner prays this Court denies Respondents’

Motion to Dismiss and allows the Petitioner to amend the original petition to cure

defects. This Court GRANTS such other and further relief as may be just,

equitable, and proper including without limitation, an award of any attorneys’ fees

and costs to Petitioner.

Respectfully submitted this 27th day of September, 2022,

By: /s/ Allyson Raskin

Allyson Raskin

5533 Meletio Lane

Dallas, TX 75230

Cell: 214-263-5802

Email:essentiallyally@gmail.co

m

Pro se

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