Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

Achieving Space Superiority in 

an Era of Great Power Competition

Written by1

CDR Joseph J. Kruppa, 

LTC Kristina Sanders, and 

Maj Michael Martinez

It was never a guarantee that if you moved first in space that you were going to win. But in every 

wargame we played, if you were the second mover, you were guaranteed to lose.

—General David L. Goldfein, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff

Is the first mover in space the winner, as General Goldfein suggests? What does the first mover 

mean in terms of space superiority? With Russia and China steadily increasing their space-based 

capabilities to compete with the U.S., space is becoming the most strategically important domain 

in the operational environment with detrimental impacts to land, air, maritime, and cyberspace 

domains if threatened by adversaries. Consider a U.S. Special Forces team deep in enemy territory 

during a conflict with a peer adversary trying to geolocate a high-value target (HVT) for an 

airstrike. Detailed planning for the operation accounted for the protection of strategic 

communication satellites that the team utilizes in their area of operations. With the enemy jamming 

line of sight radio communications as part of the defensive posture, the team attempts to call in the 

HVT’s location via satellite communications. However, they are unable to send their report 

because, unbeknownst to the team, the peer adversary denied their ability to communicate via 

space by destroying the overhead communications satellite. Despite extensive planning for spacebased capabilities and essentially being the “first mover” regarding space support in joint military 

operations, the adversary is still able to disrupt and degrade efforts in space and to seize the 

military advantage.

The U.S. faces diverse threats from peer competitors in space, which has become the most vital 

domain for the joint warfighter. From global positioning systems (GPS) to ballistic missile defense 

systems, U.S. national security relies on space-based technology to gain and maintain the 

advantage in joint military operations. Additionally, the contested and congested nature of the 

space domain combined with outdated international policies, such as the Outer Space Treaty no 

longer guarantees the U.S. use of space as a refuge from great power competition as space 

dominance is one of China’s policy objectives.

1

Space Superiority in a Contested Environment

Many decades ago, the world saw the space domain as a peaceful sanctuary, and the U.S. enjoyed 

its space-based technology advantage over potential adversaries, a complicated reality in an era 

when space is a contested and easily disrupted environment. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 

1 The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of Joint Forces Staff 

College, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

recognized humankind’s interest in the “peaceful use” of the space domain and set the basis for 

space law.2 Space superiority, defined as “the degree of control in space [domain] of one force 

over any others that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without 

prohibitive interference from terrestrial or space-based threats,”3 remained easily achievable by the

U.S. for the decades to come.

While the U.S. focused on the Global War on Terrorism, China and Russia observed the 

importance of the space domain to the U.S. way of war and developed space-based offensive and 

defensive capabilities.4 In January 2007, China launched its first anti-satellite (ASAT) missile from 

a ground-based, mobile launcher against a malfunctioning weather satellite in low earth orbit 

(LEO).5Russia demonstrated an ASAT missile capability in 2015, and India conducted their first 

successful ASAT missile test in 2019. 6 Even with the successful test of a U.S. ASAT capability in 

2008, the proven capabilities of other countries highlight the erosion of the U.S. advantage and its 

ability to ensure space superiority in the 21st-century battlespace.

U.S. warfighters depend on space-based capabilities to conduct operations in all other physical 

domains (air, land, and sea). GPS navigation systems, high-bandwidth shipboard communications, 

and unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the MQ-1 Predator, all rely on space assets to conduct 

operations. Adversarial space disruption capabilities or advancements threaten the joint

warfighter’s ability to operate and execute missions effectively. Major General Tim Lawson, 

Mobilization Assistant to the Commander of U.S. Space Command, contends that “adversaries 

don’t have to dominate space, they merely need to have the capability to disrupt space 

operations.”7Emerging threats to U.S. space-based assets may include high-power lasers and 

satellite communications jamming. One method of combating the threats is by launching numerous 

small satellites into orbit to deter adversaries from kinetic aggression in space. 8 By doing so, the 

U.S. will also ensure resiliency and redundancy, thus protecting the ability of the U.S. to achieve 

space superiority.9

In 2005, General Lance W. Lord, [former] Air Force Space Command Commander, noted, “Space 

Superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and 

the high ground is space.”10China and Russia continue to modernize their counter-space 

capabilities to diminish, degrade, and disrupt an adversary’s use of the space domain, neutralizing 

the competitive advantage of the U.S.11 As the space domain will remain competitive, congested, 

and contested, the U.S. must take a more aggressive approach to be able to achieve space 

superiority when required and, under its terms, to freely operate in the domain.

Policies and Doctrine

The Outer Space Treaty, or more formally known as the “Treaty on Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies,” has been ratified by the United States, Russia, China, and 107 other United 

Nations members and establishes limitations for weaponizing space. While it does prohibit 

military-related events and activities on celestial bodies, it bans only weapons of mass destruction 

from being placed in orbit.12 Operating in the gray area, Russia, China, India, and the U.S. have 

successfully demonstrated an ASAT missile capability. Some of the tests have created substantial 

space debris that poses a threat to operational satellites nearby. By executing ASAT missile tests 
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

on their satellites, the countries are projecting the ability to disable or destroy an adversary’s 

satellite during a conflict. As nations have the inherent right to self-defense, the ASAT missile 

capability is arguably a form of peace through deterrence. As such, it can be construed as a 

defensive weapon within the construct of the Outer Space Treaty, specifically the “peaceful use” of 

the space clause.13

The continued testing of kinetic ASAT capabilities or their use in conflict will create additional 

amounts of space debris. Orbiting the Earth, the debris has the potential for wide-ranging impacts 

that could harm U.S. interests. Traveling in space at thousands of miles per hour, the impact of 

even the tiniest of space debris with orbiting satellites or spacecraft can cause significant damage,

creating even more space debris. Until the Earth’s gravity pulls it back into the atmosphere, the 

space debris will continue to orbit the Earth and threaten the operability of objects in its path. 

While the testing of kinetic ASAT capabilities may fall under the guise of “peaceful use,” their 

second and third-order effects may not be so peaceful.

In response to the U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian General Quasem Soleimani in January 

2020, Iran purchased commercial satellite imagery of Al Asad Airbase prior to their missile 

attack.14While the U.S. was able to evacuate the majority of planes and forces between Iran 

downloading the imagery and the attack, the event demonstrates how space commerce is affecting 

military operations. The 2017 National Security Strategy recognizes that the use of space by both 

governments and the private sector impacts U.S. military operations and their ability to prevail in 

conflict.15Even though it may seem contradictory that one of its priority actions is to promote 

space commerce, it brings to light the realization that technological advances in the private sector 

have opened the space domain to the world. On the one hand, the widespread availability of 

commercial technology threatens U.S. superiority, but on the other hand, the U.S. must continue to 

partner with the private sector to develop defensive mechanisms and maintain a competitive edge 

against their adversaries. Plainly stated, private sector partnerships project power in the space 

domain, and the sentiment is echoed in the 2020 National Space Policy. However, the Biden 

administration’s Interim National Security Strategy Guidance fails to address private sector 

partnerships in space even though it references the partnerships for cyberspace and 

counterterrorism.16 If the administration’s National Security Strategy fails to further private sector 

partnerships in space, the ability to achieve U.S. space superiority will be at increased risk.

The 2020 National Space Policy focuses on private sector partnerships to help enable U.S. spacebased capability assurance and defense.17 It also identified the Intelligence Community and 

Department of Defense as responsible for the development of space capabilities and services that 

provide intelligence and decisive military advantages.18 Addressing the enduring disorganization of 

its management, coordination, and use of space assets, the U.S. created the U.S. Space Force and 

reestablished U.S. Space Command to better organize their unity of effort in space and maximize 

U.S. military space activities.19

The U.S. Space Force helps to achieve U.S. strategic goals by 

exerting space power. Building a trained and capable force with robust offensive and defensive 

space capabilities assists the U.S. to leverage national power to influence and control the 

international system. In line with the other warfighting domains, the U.S. Space Force doctrine 

states that many critical objectives in space warfare are decision superiority, deterrence, dissuasion, 

compellence, and assurance, all of which reside in the cognitive domain.20While the U.S. Space 

Force is prepared to fight and win in the space domain, one of its core beliefs is to outthink, 
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

outwit, and outmaneuver the adversary within the cognitive domain.

The 2017 National Security Strategy suggests that the U.S. clearly understands the extreme risk 

that a conflict in space poses to achieving space superiority as it states that the U.S. will retaliate 

against any attack on their space interests with a deliberate response in the domain of their 

choosing.

21 Non-kinetic cyber fires in other domains can have just as big of an impact on 

adversarial space operations as kinetic fires without risking the use of the space domain due to 

space debris. Recognizing the danger to the space domain posed by creating space debris, the 

Space Force understands that success in the cognitive domain against adversaries is essential to 

achieving space superiority. Their mindset emphasizes how the benefits of a contested space 

domain outweigh an unusual space domain. Understanding the all-or-nothing dilemma 

underscores the imperative to ensure the space domain remains usable to achieve space 

superiority.

The Adversary’s Ability to Disrupt U.S. Space Superiority

In response to U.S. threat perceptions, Russia and China reorganized their services in 2015 and 

updated their military doctrines to emphasize space operations. Russia formed the Aerospace 

Defense Forces as a merger of portions of its Air Force and Outer Space Force to “monitor, 

identify, and prevent potential threats to its space security.”22China formed the Strategic Support 

Forces, which is a combination of electronic warfare (EW), space, and cyberspace capabilities.23

The changes highlight the renewed importance of warfighting in the space domain to remain 

competitive with the U.S. and the intent to counter U.S. and allied military effectiveness.

After the reorganization of its military services, Russia updated its counter space doctrine with 

information dominance as a key focus of its space-based capabilities. Russian military strategists 

identify space-based military capabilities as part of information dominance. They suggest that 

controlling the adversary’s understanding of the operational environment and impacting the 

decision-making process through information dominance is crucial in conflict.24Russia is cognizant 

of the U.S. reliance on space-based information systems and technologies, and of particular 

concern is U.S. long-range precision strike capability tied to space-based systems. 25 If Russia can 

disrupt or degrade the ability of the U.S. to maintain situational understanding during times of 

conflict, then they can exploit opportunities to achieve a military advantage.

Similarly, Chinese doctrine places importance on space-based “informative” warfighting systems to 

have real-time battlefield awareness.26 China assesses that counter space operations are a viable 

response to deter and counter regional conflicts, such as a potential U.S. intervention in Taiwan.27

China also identifies U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), navigation, and 

communications satellites as high payoff targets whose loss to the U.S. will significantly contribute 

to the success of China’s course of action.28While it is unlikely that China will overtly target U.S. 

satellites with kinetic strikes unless as part of a declared conflict, they could disrupt or degrade 

U.S. military satellite capabilities through nonattributable means such as directed-energy weapons 

or cyberattacks. China achieves information dominance by hindering the ability of the U.S. to 

maintain situational awareness of military operations. With the reorganization of Russia and 

China’s military service, updated counter space doctrine, and identification of U.S. satellites as 

high payoff targets in the space domain, U.S. space superiority will be challenged.
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

The development of dual-use space technology is another concern. Dual-use entails adversaries 

using commercial satellites for primarily benign purposes but also recognizes that the satellite 

capability can serve nefarious functions. For example, China developed a satellite robotic arm to 

perform maintenance functions allowing one satellite to latch on and conduct repairs on another 

satellite while in orbit.29 The robotic technology has dual-use concerns because it is possible to 

repair satellites just as much as it is possible to intentionally damage an adversary’s satellite 

electronic components, disabling the satellite. Even more alarming, in July 2020, Russia launched 

an object from Cosmos 2543, a Russian satellite already in orbit, under the guise of conducting an 

inspection on another satellite. 30 Based upon the speed of travel, U.S. Space Command assessed 

that the object was an anti-satellite test occurring in orbit.31 According to General Raymond, 

Commander of U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations, “The

Russian satellite system used to conduct this on-orbit weapons test is the same satellite system that

we raised concerns about earlier this year when Russia maneuvered near a U.S. government

satellite.”32

Before more recent endeavors in on-orbit space weapons, Russia focused on the development of 

terrestrial-based weapons, such as directed-energy weapons and EW capabilities that can disrupt 

space-based systems. As a result of limited resources due to international sanctions, they likely 

shifted to developing terrestrial-based weapons as a cost-effective way to remain competitive and 

to exploit U.S. reliance on space-based systems. 33Russia is developing directed-energy weapons 

such as lasers that can blind a satellite’s imaging sensor either temporarily or permanently.34Russia 

also favors the use of EW and demonstrated these capabilities during the conflict in eastern 

Ukraine in 2014.35 Ukrainian forces experienced jamming of their artillery battery radars, 

navigation systems, and smartphones.36By jamming Ukrainian artillery radar systems, Russia was 

able to fire on Ukrainian positions while protecting Russian forces from Ukrainian counterfire. 

Additionally, jamming navigation systems and smartphones degraded Ukraine’s ability to 

communicate and report location data. The effects from terrestrial-based systems demonstrate the 

successful interference of space-based systems that impacted tactical operations.

Compared to Russia, China expanded its satellite infrastructure and added the BeiDou Global 

Satellite Navigation System as part of its One Belt One Road Strategy. Even with the expansion, 

China remains second in the world to the U.S. in the number of operational satellites and adds 

thirty satellites to China’s existing satellite infrastructure of more than 120 ISR and remote sensing 

satellites.37The BeiDou constellation is commercial based with oversight by the People’s 

Liberation Army and offers civilian communications services to other countries. From a military 

perspective, analysts conclude that the constellation advances China’s capabilities in precisionstrike targeting and real-time situational awareness for command and control.38Alternatively, the 

emphasis on providing civilian communications services may support China’s simple pursuit of 

economic ventures to further their global influence. While the latter seems reasonable, the threat 

exists on both fronts because the BeiDou constellation removes the reliance on U.S. GPS and 

Russian GLONASS. The reduced reliance allows China the opportunity to jam or spoof the rival 

systems while continuing their military operations. The BeiDou constellation also allows China the 

strategic opportunity to connect more countries to its view of the international world by dominating 

space-based infrastructure.39 China believes that whoever controls space-based infrastructure will 

also dominate geopolitics.40Their reduced reliance and increased influence threaten both the U.S. 

led international order and the U.S. ability to achieve space superiority.
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

The reduced costs of space technologies have allowed for much greater access, which means one 

cannot attribute U.S. space superiority challenges solely to nation-states. The potential threat of 

non-state actors, such as terrorists or criminals, targeting U.S. space capabilities is a possibility 

because the actors do not have direct consequences if they act compared to nation-states that have 

investments in space technology.41Nonstate actors could conduct a kinetic attack on terrestrial 

space-based infrastructure, such as key satellite communications nodes or conduct a more

symbolic attack against a U.S. launch site, such as at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.

Nonstate actors could gain access to the same commercial EW technology as nation-states to 

disrupt U.S. space-based military capabilities. Additionally, criminals or “space pirates” with a 

motive to steal information to make a profit could conduct cyberattacks against military or 

commercial space technologies such as SpaceX. With the U.S. Space Force working in 

conjunction with industry, military space-based operations will likely be vulnerable to criminal 

activity. Overall, the changing Russian approach, China’s ventures to increase influence, and the 

reduced cost to access space that empowers non-state actors, all create challenges to achieving U.S. 

space superiority.

Conclusion

With Joint Force reliance on space-based capabilities for warfighting, an increasingly contested 

space domain, and outdated guidance based on the Outer Space Treaty regarding weapons in 

space, the U.S. will continue to face future challenges achieving space superiority especially in the 

new era of Great Power Competition. Freedom of action in the space domain is critical to the

success of joint military operations in the land, air, maritime, and cyberspace domains. With the 

creation of the U.S. Space Force in 2019 signaling an urgency in addressing space-based threats, 

the U.S. needs to further address additional ways to achieve space superiority when its counts. 

The U.S. must lead the effort in the United Nations to establish a new international agreement that 

builds upon the Outer Space Treaty and further defines what constitutes acceptable conduct in the 

space domain. 

Space, as a contested environment, requires detailed planning for redundancies, such as ground and 

airborne assets and quick-launching small rockets with replacement payloads for military 

communications, ISR, and navigation satellites to remain operable. Although expensive, 

redundancies would deter adversaries from viewing U.S. satellites and other space-based systems 

as attractive high payoff targets. The U.S. must also invest in non-kinetic cyber fires to disrupt an 

adversary’s use of space under certain conditions and to protect U.S. space-based capabilities.

Finally, space will be a contested domain for the foreseeable future, and the U.S. must prepare to 

fight with disrupted or degraded space capabilities. Leveraging industry and U.S. allies with 

satellites, such as Japan and India, will be important in creating a coalition of space partners that 

can achieve and maintain multinational space superiority if a country experiences a disruption of 

space-based capability during conflict. While China creates customer dependency for its BeiDou

satellite constellation, the U.S. needs to build its team of trusted partners to apply international 

pressure on adversaries to follow informal space codes of conduct until an updated Outer Space

Treaty is ratified. Overall, space, as the newest warfighting domain and in the age of a second 
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

space race, is critical to U.S. military operations across all other domains and requires thoughtful 

changes to international policy and U.S. capabilities to achieve U.S. space superiority when it

counts.

Notes

1 Paul B. Larsen, “Outer Space Arms Control: Can the USA, Russia and China Make this Happen,” Journal of 

Conflict & Security Law, 23, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 137–59. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krw026. 2 United Nations, Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” last modified January 1967. 

http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf.

3Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations, 2018. 4 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” 2019, www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications. 5 Andrew Hoffmann, “A New Era in the Weaponization of Space: The U.S. Space Force & an Update on the Outer 

Space Treaty,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol 29, no. 2 (Fall 2020): 327-352, (accessed 

January 28 2021).

6 “Explained: What Is Mission Shakti and Why It Is Important for India.” Plus Company Updates, March 29, 2019. 

https://search-ebscohostcom.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=edsggo&AN=edsgcl.580862341&s

ite=eds-live&scope=site. 7 David Vergun, “Space Challenges Prompt DOD Response, Space Superiority,” last modified August 21, 2020, 

https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2321670/space-challenges-prompt-dod-response- spacesuperiority/.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 General Lance W. Lord, “Space Superiority,” High Frontier, 2005, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7841-

genlnclrdspcsuperpdf#:~:text=Space%20Superiority%20is%20the%20future%20of%20warfare.%20We,the%20hig

h%20ground%2C%20and%20the%20high%20ground%20is.

11 General Joseph Dunford Jr., “Posture Statement of 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

before the 114th Congress House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee Budget Hearing,” February 25, 

2016, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20160225/104483/HHRG-114-AP02-Wstate-DunfordJ20160225.pdf.

12 United Nations Treaty Series, "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 

of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," October 10, 1967: 205. 13 Joan Johnson-Freese and David Burbach, "The Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space," Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists, 75, no. 4 (2019): 137-141. 14 U.S. Department of Defense, "Media Roundtable with U.S. Space Command Commander Gen. John Raymond," 

August 29, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1949346/media-roundtablewith-us- space-command-commander-gen-john-raymond/. 15National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017. 16 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. 17National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2020. 18 Ibid.

19 John Paul Byrne, Robin Dickey, and Michael P. Gleason, “A Space Policy Primer: Key Concepts, Issues, and 

Actors,” The Aerospace Corporation, January 2021.

20 United States Space Force, “Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces,” Space Capstone Publication, 2020. 21National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2017. 22Mahvish Malik, “United States and Russian Outer Space Weapon Capabilities- An Assessment,” Journal of 

Politics and International Studies, 6, no.1 (January-June 2020): 137-148. 

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/politicsAndInternational/PDF/10_v6_1_2020.pdf. 23 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” 2019, www.dia.mil/Military-PowerPublications. 24Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, eds. “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” 

Secure World Foundation, April 2018, 2-32, 2-34,
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 22 October 2021

https://swfound-staging.azurewebsites.net/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf. 25 Ibid.

26 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” 2019, www.dia.mil/Military-PowerPublications. 27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Andrew Hoffmann, “A New Era in the Weaponization of Space: The U.S. Space Force & An Update on the Outer 

Space Treaty,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol 29, no. 2 (Fall 2020): 327-352. 30Loren Grush, “Russia just tested satellite-destroying tech in space, U.S. Space Command claims,” The Verge, July 

23, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/23/21335506/russia-anti-satellite-weapon-test-kosmos-2543. 31 Ibid.

32 U.S. Space Command Public Affairs Office, “Russia conducts space-based anti-satellite weapons test,” July 23, 

2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satelliteweapons-test/. 33 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” 2019, www.dia.mil/Military-PowerPublications. 34 Ibid.

35Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, eds. “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” 

Secure World Foundation, April 2018, 2-32, 2-34,

https://swfound-staging.azurewebsites.net/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf. 36 Shawn Snow, “U.S. Could Learn from Intense Electronic Warfare Battle in Ukraine,” Military Times, October 

2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/10/30/us-forces-could-learn-from-intense-electronic-warbattle-in-ukraine/. 37 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” 2019, www.dia.mil/Military-PowerPublications.

38 Ibid.

39 Namrata Goswami, “The Economic and Military Impact of China’s BeiDou Navigation System,” The Diplomat, 

July 1, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-economic-and-military-impact-of-chinas-beidou-navigationsystem/. 40Ibid.

41 Gregory D. Miller, “Space Pirates, Geosynchronous Guerrillas, and Nonterrestrial Terrorists: Nonstate Threats in 

Space,” Air & Space Power Journal, (Fall 2019): 33-51, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ASPJ/.