J-S28039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1097 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-17-CR-0000182-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1165 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-17-CR-0000942-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: October 24, 2023

Appellant, Justin James Centra, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County after a jury found 

him guilty of Attempt to Commit Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three 

counts of Indecent Assault; Indecent Exposure; three counts of Corruption of 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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a Minor; Terroristic Threats, nineteen counts of Intimidation of Witnesses or 

Victims; and nineteen counts of Intimidation, Retaliation or Obstruction in 

Child Abuse Cases. Classified as a sexually violent predator and sentenced to 

an aggregate term of incarceration of eighteen years and three months to 

forty-two-years’ incarceration, Appellant challenges the consolidation of his 

cases, the jury instruction on the charge of Intimidation of Witnesses, and the 

legality of his sentence on the charge of Intimidation of Witnesses. We affirm.

The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as 

follows:

On August 24, 2020, Lawrence Township Police Department 

received a call regarding sexual abuse of a minor. [K.W.] reported 

that her stepdaughter, L.W., had returned home in the middle of 

the night from her grandmother, [S.C.’s], house. Also at the 

house was J.C., L.W.’s cousin, and Defendant [hereinafter 

“Appellant”], Justin Centra. Appellant is [related to all persons 

noted]. L.W. reported that she woke up around 3 a.m. to find 

Appellant rubbing her legs and trying to get into her pants. 

Appellant also asked L.W. if she would show Appellant “hers”, and 

if L.W. would like to see “his.” L.W. then contacted a friend and 

asked the friend to give her a ride home.

L.W. was taken to the Child Advocacy Century (“CAC”) for an 

interview. While L.W. was being interviewed, J.C. contacted K.W. 

and stated that Appellant had also been abusing J.C. for several 

years. Subsequently, J.C. was interviewed at the CAC. During 

her interview, J.C. recalled multiple instances of sexual abuse by 

Appellant. J.C. additionally claimed that Appellant was verbally 

and physically abusive.

Based on the statements of J.C. and L.W., a Criminal Complaint 

was filed against Appellant on August 25, 2020. The Complaint 

charged Appellant with Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); Attempted Aggravated Indecent Assault of a 

Child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); Corruption of Minors, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6301(a)(1)(ii); Indecent Exposure, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a); 
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Terroristic Threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); and Disorderly 

Conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). Appellant had his 

preliminary hearing on September 9, 2020, and all charges were 

waived to Court.

While Appellant was detained pending trial on the Aggravated 

Indecent Assault case, Appellant wrote sixteen letters to J.C. and 

made a total of twenty phone calls to J.C., [S.C.], and [K.W.] 

Within the majority of the letters, Appellant instructed J.C. to tell

the doctor, the District Attorney, and the Judge that she wanted 

Appellant to be released from jail. Additionally, Appellant told J.C. 

that she needed to tell the District Attorney that J.C. heard 

Appellant snoring during the time that L.W. accused Appellant of 

assaulting her. Moreover, Appellant instructed J.C. to tell the 

doctor and the District Attorney that J.C. only said that Appellant 

was abusing her because J.C. was upset that Appellant was not 

spending his money on J.C.

Between August 28, 2020, and December 15, 2020, Appellant 

made numerous phone calls while he was incarcerated. Over the 

phone, Appellant instructed [S.C.], J.C, and [K.W.] to tell the 

District Attorney that L.W. was lying. He further instructed [S.C.] 

and [K.W.] to take L.W. to the District Attorney’s office and have 

L.W. tell them she was lying about the incident. On December 16, 

2020, [K.W.] took L.W. to the District Attorney’s Office; once 

there, L.W. left a message that she needed to tell the District 

Attorney that she lied about the incident.

Based on the letters and phone calls made by Appellant, a second 

Criminal Complaint was filed on February 10, 2021. The second 

Complaint charged Appellant with Intimidation of Witnesses or 

Victims, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(2); Intimidation, Retaliation or 

Obstruction in Child Abuse Cases, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4958(a)(2)(ii); 

and Obstruction 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4958(b.1). Appellant waived his 

preliminary hearing on February 24, 2021, and all charges were 

bound over to Court. Afterwards, both cases proceeded with the 

normal pre-trial filings and procedures. On May 25, 2021, the 

Commonwealth filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases. A 

hearing on the Commonwealth’s Motion was held on June 28, 

2021. Subsequently, [the trial court] granted the Motion, and the 

two cases were joined for the purposes of a jury trial.

A three-day jury trial began on September 29, 2021. On October 

1, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of Attempt to Commit 
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Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three counts of Indecent 

Assault; Indecent Exposure; three counts of Corruption of a Minor; 

Terroristic Threats; nineteen counts of Intimidation of Witnesses 

or Victims; and nineteen counts of Intimidation, Retaliation or 

Obstruction in Child Abuse Cases.fn A hearing to determine 

whether Appellant is a sexually violent predator and a sentencing 

hearing was held on April 1, 2022. [The trial court] classified 

Appellant as a sexually violent predator and sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate term of incarceration of eighteen years and three 

months to forty-two years.

Fn: Appellant was found not guilty of the Aggravated 

Indecent Assault of a Child charge regarding J.C.;

Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims regarding L.W.; 

Intimidation, Retaliation or Obstruction in Child Abuse 

Cases regarding L.W.; and twenty counts of Obstruction.

Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion on April 27, 2022. On 

October 24, 2022, [the trial court] entered an Order denying 

Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion by operation of law due to the 

expiration of the 120-day deadline. Appellant filed a Notice of 

Appeal on September 22, 2022. Following Order of this Court, the 

Appellant submitted [its] Matters Complained of on Appeal

[pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/2022, at 1-3.

Appellant raises in his counseled appellate brief the following preserved 

issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the [trial court] erred when it granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate Case No. CP-17-CR942-2020 and CP-17-CR-182-2021 for Trial?

2. Whether the [trial court] erred when it failed to instruct the 

jury that they must find that the Intimidation of Witnesses 

counts amount to a Felony of the 1st Degree?
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3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it sentenced [Appellant]

for counts of Intimidation of Witnesses as felonies of the first 

degree, when a finding that such counts were felony 1 offenses 

was required to be made by the jury beyond a reasonable 

doubt?

Brief of Appellant at 6.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the case at No. 182 of 2021, charging 

him with witness intimidation and/or improper interaction with victims and 

witnesses, with the case at No. 942 of 2020, charging him with the underlying 

offenses committed against L.W. The trial court's decision in this regard is 

reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, as this Court has 

consistently held that whether “separate indictments should be consolidated 

for trial is within the sole discretion of the trial court and such discretion will 

be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear 

injustice to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 

210 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted). “Appellant bears the burden of 

establishing such prejudice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Melendez–

Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc )).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the joinder and 

severance of offenses as follows:

Rule 582. Joinder—Trial of Separate Indictments or 

Informations

(A) Standards

(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may 

be tried together if:
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(a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a 

separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury 

so that there is no danger of confusion; or

(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.

* * *

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1). 

Rule 583. Severance of Offenses or Defendants. 

The court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or 

provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may 

be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. Under Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due 

to the joinder must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant 

suffers when the Commonwealth's evidence links him to a crime. 

Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal 

denied, 574 Pa. 752, 830 A.2d 975 (2003).

The prejudice of which Rule [583] speaks is, rather, that which 

would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only 

by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury 

was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid 

cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant 

evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a 

natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for 

severance by itself.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997), cert. 

denied, 525 U.S. 1015, 119 S.Ct. 538, 142 L.Ed.2d 447 (1998)) (internal 

citations omitted).
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From these two rules, our Supreme Court established the following test 

for deciding whether a court should join or sever charges:

[1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be 

admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such 

evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger 

of confusion; and, if the answers to these questions are in the 

affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced 

by the consolidation of offenses.

Collins, 703 A.2d at 422 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 

496–97 (Pa.1988)).

Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate:

(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a 

common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission of two 

or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to 

prove the others; or (5) to establish the identity of the person 

charged with the commission of the crime on trial, in other words, 

where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that 

proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the 

person who committed the other.

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 156 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Morris, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. 1981)). 

Evidence of other crimes also may be admitted to demonstrate the 

defendant's consciousness of guilt. Commonwealth v. Selenski, 919 A.2d 

229 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff'd, 994 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2010) (stating: “[T]he 

offenses were properly consolidated, as evidence of the escape would be 

admissible in the homicide trial to show the Defendant's consciousness of 

guilt; evidence of the homicide would be admissible in the escape trial to show 

the Defendant's motive for escaping...”). “Additionally, evidence of other 
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crimes may be admitted where such evidence is part of the history of the case 

and forms part of the natural development of the facts.” Commonwealth v. 

Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Collins, 703 A.2d at 

423).

The above jurisprudence applies in the case sub judice. Here, the sexual 

assault-related offenses were admissible to establish motive for the charged

witness intimidation—which allegedly began four days after the assault 

charges were filed—and the witness intimidation offense was admissible to 

show consciousness of guilt of the charged sexual assault. Moreover, the 

overarching timeline of events comprising the two charges would be 

admissible at a trial at each docket to relate the complete sequence of relevant 

events. See Rule 582, supra. Finally, unfair prejudice would not result, as a 

jury could easily separate the evidence to the extent they involved distinct 

allegations of conduct occurring on different dates and locations. Accordingly, 

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 

Commonwealth’s motion for joinder.

In his remaining argument, Appellant addresses both his second and 

third issues assailing, respectively, jury instructions to the intimidation of 

witnesses charges and the legality of his sentences on those convictions. The 

basis for each issue is Appellant’s contention that the trial court violated 
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Apprendi and its progeny1 by instructing the jury that the most serious crime 

the Commonwealth had charged him with was a felony of the first degree, 

rather than allowing the jury to determine the most serious charges filed 

against him. Appellant misconstrues the factual determination to be made by 

the jury in deliberating on a witness intimidation case.

 When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we review the charge

as a whole to determine if it is fair and complete. Commonwealth v. Lake, 

281 A.3d 341, 347 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 291 A.3d 333 (Pa. 2023)

(citing Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(en banc)). “The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only when there 

is an inaccurate statement of the law.” Id. (citation omitted). “A charge is 

considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial 

judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to fundamental error.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

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1

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 

L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment 

requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt “any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum[.]” In other 

words, “any fact that increase[s] the prescribed statutory maximum sentence 

must be an ‘element’ of the offense [and] be found by a jury.” Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99, 106, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). 

The U.S. Supreme Court applied this principle to a criminal statute that 

increased the mandatory minimum sentence based on a finding that the 

defendant “brandished” a firearm and concluded that “facts that increase the 

mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted 

to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 117, 133 S.Ct. 

2151.
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 In this Court’s recent decision in Lake, we clarified that “the factual 

determination [required of a jury deliberating over a witness intimidation 

charge] is whether the act of intimidation is connected to the particular 

prosecution.” Id. at 350. We set forth the governing statutory scheme, and 

explained that the statute’s focus is on the most serious crime charged, since 

that is the one a criminal defendant attempts to escape by use of intimidation: 

The Crimes Code provides that when determining the grade for a 

conviction for Intimidation, the sentencing court must grade an 

Intimidation conviction according to the most serious crime that a 

defendant prevented a witness from reporting or testifying about. 

Of most importance to our analysis, however, is that the 

sentencing court must consider the charge that the 

Commonwealth filed against a defendant to determine the grading 

of the crime that the defendant prevented a witness from 

reporting. The statute does not require the sentencing court to 

consider whether the defendant is convicted of the underlying

crime:

(b) Grading.—

(1) The offense is a felony of the degree indicated in 

paragraphs (2) through (4) if:

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(2) The offense is a felony of the first-degree if a 

felony of the first-degree or murder in the first or 

second degree was charged in the case in which the 

actor sought to influence or intimidate a witness or 

victim as specified in this subsection.

(3) The offense is a felony of the second degree if a 

felony of the second degree is the most serious 

offense charged in the case in which the actor 

sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim 

as specified in this subsection.
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(4) The offense is a felony of the third degree in any 

other case in which the actor sought to influence or 

intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this 

subsection.

(5) Otherwise the offense is a misdemeanor of the 

second degree.

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4952(b)(1)-(5) (some emphasis added).

Id. at 348–49.

Lake then discussed the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Dixon, 

255 A.3d 1258, 1264 (Pa. 2021), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

held an Apprendi violation occurred because the jury instruction represented 

the first time the jury learned that Dixon’s first-degree felony charge of 

witness intimidation was connected to his attempt to suppress testimony in a 

separate murder trial. Initially, the Court observed that under Section 

4952(b)(2), “if a defendant intimidated a witness from testifying at a trial in 

which the Commonwealth had charged a defendant with a first-degree felony, 

then the sentencing court is to grade the Intimidation conviction as a firstdegree felony. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(b)(2).” Id. at 350-51. Turning to the facts 

before it, however, the Supreme Court noted that although defendant Dixon

was charged with intimidating a murder trial witness, the Commonwealth had 

not presented at his trial any evidence about the charge brought at the 

separate trial. It held, therefore, that this omission precluded the jury from 

making the factual connection between Dixon’s act of Intimidation and the 

first-degree felony charge prosecuted in his friend’s trial. Instead, it was the 
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trial court that made the factual connection, which brought about the 

Apprendi violation.

Dixon affords Appellant no relief, however, for its facts are 

distinguishable from those in the case sub judice. Here, the record establishes 

that the Commonwealth presented evidence to the jury that Appellant was 

charged with first-degree felony sexual assault and thereafter attempted to 

intimidate and influence his alleged victims and other prospective witnesses 

to make statements that would result in his release. As such, this case comes 

squarely under Lake, as jury was presented with facts connecting the act of 

intimidation to a particular prosecution. Accordingly, Appellant’s Apprendibased challenge to the jury charge fails.

Our disposition of Appellant’s second issue is likewise dispositive of his 

final issue directed at the legality of his sentence. “The defendant or the 

Commonwealth may appeal as of right the legality of the sentence.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a). “A challenge to the legality of sentence is a question of 

law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2019).

A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of 

the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge 

to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory authorization exists 

for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to 

correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Likewise, a 

sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. If a court 

imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by 

the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be 

remanded for correction.
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Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 

supra at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at ––––.

As discussed, supra, the Commonwealth presented to the jury a factual 

predicate for the first-degree felony charge under Section 4952(b)(2), and the 

jury found this and every other element to the charge proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Consequently, because the Appellant’s sentence was within 

statutorily prescribed legal parameters for a first-degree felony grade of 

Intimidation of a Witness, Appellant’s challenge is without merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 10/24/2023