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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

v. TRACY R. MARTIN Appellant No. 3864 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 17 , 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

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BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017 Appellant, Tracy Martin, pled guilty to one count of failing to stop after an accident causing damage to an attended vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743. The trial court proceeded to impose the negotiated sentence of t ime served

– approximately 3 months

– to 12 months ’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Martin’s court

- appointed counsel, Patrick J. Connors, Esquire, seeks permission to withdraw as counsel. As such, he has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant Attorney Connors permission to withdraw. Attorney Connors has complied with the mandated procedure for withdra wing as counsel. See Santiago , 978 A.2d at 361 (articulating Anders requirements); Commonwealth v. Daniels , 999 A.2d 590, 594J

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(Pa. Super. 2010) (providing that counsel must inform client by letter of rights to proceed once counsel moves to withdraw and app end a copy of the letter to the petition). Martin has not filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. 1 Counsel has identified one issue that Martin believes entitle s him to relief. Martin wishes to challenge the sentence imposed by the trial court

. We begin by observing that the maximum sentence imposed was not above the statutory maximum. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(b) (“Any person violating this section commits a misdemeanor of the third degree, punishable by ... imprisonment for not more than one year ....”) Nor is there any indication the court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. Martin has not identified any other possible issue with the legality of his sentence. We therefore turn to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. As Martin negotiated thi s sentence as part of his guilty plea agreement, he is precluded from challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. O’Malley , 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, we agree with Attorney Connor’s assessment that any chal lenge to Martin’s sentence is frivolous.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 1 Martin did file a response when Attorney Connors filed his notice of intent to file an An ders brief in lieu of a statement of matters complained of on appeal. In that response, Martin identified two issues he wished to raise on appeal: the legality of the sentence imposed and ineffective assistance of counsel. We address both issues in this me morandum.J

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Next, we address the issue raised by Martin in his pro se response to Attorney Connors’s notice of intent to file an Anders brief. Martin argues that both Attorney Connors and another member of the Delaware County
P ublic Defender’s Office rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally, claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are not ripe until collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes , 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013). However, in extraordinary cases where the tr ial court determines that the claim of ineffectiveness is “both meritorious and apparent from the record,” it may exercise its discretion to consider the claim in a post

sentence motion. Id ., at 577.
In Holmes , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explicitly identified ineffectiveness claims as “presumptively reserved for collateral attack[.]” Id ., at 577 n.10. The Court warned against trial courts appointing “new counsel post

- verdict to search for ineffectiveness claims.” Id . Thus, while the trial court reta ins discretion in addressing such claims, the presumption weighs heavily in favor of deferring such claims to collateral review. Further, the Court justified the creation of the “meritorious and apparent from the record” exception by explaining that “[t]he administration of criminal justice is better served by allowing trial judges to retain the discretion to consider and vindicate such distinct claims of ineffectiveness[.]” Id ., at 577 (emphasis added). Most importantly, the Court required anJ

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express waive r of the right to file a first, timely PCRA petition. See id ., at 579. Martin failed to expressly forgo his right to file a timely, first PCRA petition. Furthermore, this issue was never presented to the trial court in any filing. It is not even clear, fro m Martin’s handwritten filing, what he believes was ineffective about the Public Defender’s office’s representation. For all these reasons, we conclude that Martin’s claim that counsel was ineffective would be frivolous in this direct appeal

. As a result, we agree with Attorney Connors’s assessment that this appeal is wholly frivolous. We therefore grant his petition to withdraw, and affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Permission to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2017