J-S69002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

GRAZYNA SKLODOWSKA-GREZAK 

Appellant

v.

WIESLAW GREZAK 

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1491 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 28, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Domestic Relations at 

No(s): 5575 CV 2016, 

751 DR 2005

GRAZYNA SKLODOWSKA-GREZAK 

Appellant

v.

WIESLAW GREZAK

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1904 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 10, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 

5575 CV 2016, 

751 DR 2005

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2020

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak (“Wife”) and Wieslaw Grezak (“Husband”) 

have been enmeshed in divorce proceedings off and on since 2005. Wife now 

appeals1 pro se at Superior Court Docket Number 1491 EDA 2019 from entry 

of the divorce decree on March 28, 2019, following denial of exceptions to the 

Master’s Report and Recommendation equitably distributing marital property,

and at Superior Court Docket Number 1904 EDA 2019, from the June 10, 2019 

order denying Wife’s Petition for Supersedeas.

2

 We affirm.

On August 30, 2005, Wife filed a complaint in divorce, which she 

subsequently discontinued. In an opinion denying in part and granting in part 

the parties’ exceptions to the Master’s Report in this case, the trial court 

explained the procedural history of this case, as follows:

On August 3, 2016, [Wife] filed [a second] action in divorce 

against [Husband]. The parties were married on July 24, 1982, 

in Poland and there were two children born of the marriage, both 

of whom are now adults. On July 24, 2018, a hearing was held 

before Divorce Master Daniel M. Corveleyn, Esquire (“Master”). 

The Master filed his Report and Recommendations on August 27, 

2018. Husband filed Exceptions to the Divorce Master’s Report on 

September 13, 2018 and Wife filed Exceptions to the Divorce 

Master’s Report on September 17, 2018. Oral argument was held 

____________________________________________

1

 The appeal is timely. The divorce decree was entered on the docket on 

March 28, 2019. Wife filed her notice of appeal on Monday, April 29, 2019. 

Because the thirtieth day fell on Saturday, April 27, 2019, the appeal is timely. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days of entry 

of order appealed); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when last day of appeal period falls on 

Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, that day is omitted from computation of 

appeal period).

2

 We granted Wife’s request to consolidate the appeals on July 23, 2019. 

Order, 7/23/19.
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in this matter on November 1, 2018. We are now prepared to 

address the exceptions filed by the parties.

* * *

Husband is 59 years old and Wife is 56 years old. Husband is selfemployed as the owner and operator of Grezak Construction 

Company, a business registered with the state of New Jersey, 

Division of Consumer Affairs, as of May 1, 2006; and registered 

as a home improvement contractor in Pennsylvania. Wife is 

presently unemployed because of her alleged poor medical 

condition[]. At the Master’s hearing, Wife claimed to suffer from 

cardiac issues, and muscle spasms, however she admitted that 

she has not seen a specialist for these issues and she has not filed 

a physician’s verification for the claimed problems. Before she 

came to the USA, Wife claimed to have run a lucrative business in 

Poland making suits for Russian people. In the United States, she 

operated a cleaning business known as “Magic Wand.”

There was no indication of contribution by either party to 

the education, training or increased earning power of the other 

party. The source of income of each party was noted; and each 

party claimed to contribute to the preservation of the mar[it]al

home by either payment of taxes and/or remedial work. The 

parties lived a frugal life and the economic circumstances of each 

party at the time the division of property is minimal.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 1, 3–4.

The trial court continued the procedural history in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion, as follows:

On March 28, 2019, we entered an Opinion and Order 

denying [Wife’s] Exceptions to the Master’s Report and granting 

in part and denying in part [Husband’s] Exceptions to the Master’s 

Report. On April 26, 2019, [Wife] filed a “Motion to Open Final 

March 28, 2019 Decree in Divorce for Reconsideration and 

Modification in Part of March 28, 2019 Order/Petition for Special

Reliefs (sic)/Petition for Modification of Marital Debts and Post 

Divorce Alimonies for [Wife]/Petition for Constructive Trust” (sic)

which we denied in an Order dated May 3, 2019.

* * *
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On April 29, 2019, [Wife] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior 

Court of Pennsylvania and on May 3, 2019, we directed [Wife] to 

file her 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On 

May 15, 2019, [Husband] filed a “Petition for Appointment of a 

Realtor to List Marital Properties for Sale, for [Husband] to Obtain 

his Property left at the Marital Residence and for Contempt” 

(“Petition”)[.] Thereafter, on May 21, 2019, [Wife] filed a Petition 

for Supersedeas and on May 22, 2019, [Wife] filed a “Motion to 

Dismiss/Strike [Husband’s] Petition for Appointment of a Realtor 

to List Marital Properties for Sale, for [Husband] to Obtain his 

Property left at the Marital Residence and for Contempt” 

(“Motion”) (sic)[.] This [c]ourt scheduled a hearing on the Petition 

and Motion for June 3, 2019.

On May 24, 2019, [Wife] filed a “Concise Statements (sic) 

of the Errors Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)” (“Statement”). We file this Statement Pursuant to 

1925(a) in response to [Wife’s] Statement. In her Statement, 

[Wife] sets forth a confusing statement of her concept of this case. 

Similarly, [Wife] set forth a confusing, wordy statement in her 

Exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendations.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 6/6/19, at unnumbered 1–2.

We first address Husband’s request that we quash this appeal due to 

Wife’s noncompliant brief with our rules of appellate procedure.3 Husband’s 

Brief at 12–14; see Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Briefs . . . shall conform in all material 

respects with the requirements of these rules . . . and, if the defects are in 

the brief . . . of the [Wife] and are substantial, the appeal . . . may be quashed 

or dismissed.”).

____________________________________________

3

 We note, as well, that this Court entered a per curiam order on December 

3, 2019, precluding our Prothonotary from accepting any further filings in this 

matter. Order, 12/3/19.
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Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, “pro se status confers no special benefit upon the [Wife]. To 

the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding 

must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal

training will be his undoing.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–1212 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural 

rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Commonwealth v. 

Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

In the instant matter, the brief filed by Wife fails to conform to the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114–2119 

(addressing specific requirements of appellate briefs). Most egregious is 

Wife’s failure to provide a statement of questions involved. Our appellate 

rules provide, in part:

The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the 

issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances 

of the case but without unnecessary detail. . . . No question will 

be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions 

involved or is fairly suggested thereby. Each question shall be 

followed by an answer stating simply whether the court or 

government unit agreed, disagreed, did not answer, or did not 

address the question.

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Instead, Wife includes verbatim statements from 

paragraphs one through five of her Rule 1925(b) statement filed on May 24, 

2019, and a completely new issue labeled as number six, which was not 

included in the Rule 1925(b) statement, and therefore, is waived. In re 

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[I]t is well-settled that 
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issues not included in an appellant’s statement of questions involved and 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal are waived); Wife’s Brief 

at unnumbered iii–iv. Moreover, the statements that are presented on these 

two pages numbered one through five are unconnected by syntax and are 

nearly indecipherable. Significantly, none of the identified paragraphs 

presents a claim related to the order appealed in Superior Court Docket 1904 

EDA 2019.4 Because there is no issue before us related to the appeal in 1904 

EDA 2019, the June 10, 2019 order is affirmed.

“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on 

behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa.

Super. 2014). “When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, 

when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a 

court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 

A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 

983 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. 2009) (“Appellant’s failure to adequately develop 

____________________________________________

4

 Wife’s reply brief appears to be an attempt to present the same allegations 

of her original brief, with the added claim, for the first time, of an issue relating 

to the denial of supersedeas on June 10, 2019, the order appealed at Superior 

Court docket 1904 EDA 2019. Wife’s Reply Brief at 10–14. “[A]n appellant is 

prohibited from raising new issues in a reply brief. Moreover, a reply brief 

cannot be a vehicle to argue issues raised but inadequately developed in 

appellant's original brief.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 219 n.8 

(Pa. 1999); see also Bishops, Inc. v. Penn Nat. Ins., 984 A.2d 982 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (issue raised in reply brief inadequate where it was not raised 

in statement of questions involved and the appellant made only passing 

reference to issue in its brief as cross-appellee).
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his arguments or support his bald assertions with sufficient citation to legal 

authority impedes meaningful judicial review of his claims”); Stimmler v. 

Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (argument portion 

of brief must contain “sufficient citation to the record and legal authority, 

together with analysis, to guide this Court in its review of the issue.”).

Thus, because the defects in Wife’s briefs are so substantial that they 

impair our ability to conduct a meaningful review, we could dismiss the appeal 

at 1491 EDA 2019, as well. In consideration of Wife’s challenges as a nonnative English speaker and in light of the trial court’s valiant effort to sift 

through Wife’s allegations, however, we will not quash the appeal.

The verbatim “issues” Wife suggests, as excised from her Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement, are as follows:

CONCISE STATEMENTS OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL 

PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)/QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO 

ARGUMENTS

1. Whether the Trial Court erred (when did not consider) any 

evidence that [Husband] attempted to misled [Wife] in imposition 

on her his unfair marital settlement, and from February 24, 2017 

[Husband] possesses and acts in a willful manner culminating in 

agreements with authorities ...and ... law firm not assigned to this 

action, to leave [Wife] in nothing, as [Husband’] long term plan to 

retaliate against [Wife] for his 2005 incarnation resulted from his 

contempt of PFA involving extortion of $20,000.00 from [Wife], 

and whether the The Trial Court erred when refused to grant... 

[Wife’] February 24, 2017 ... and related Petitions.

2. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law or abuse of 

discretion during the March 23, 2018 hearing and thereafter by 

precluding review of [Wife’] pending Motions, Petitions ... related 

to her economic claims, inter alia, [Wife’s] imposition of discovery 

on [Husband] and alimony pendente lite ... when [Wife] was not 
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entitled to have requested continuance ... with English-Polish 

interpreter ... to have compressive testimony of [Wife] and crosstestimony of [Husband] ..., as this perpetuated a highly prejudicial 

environment for ... [Wife] and more significantly circumvented her 

rights to protection of the equitable distribution under the Divorce 

Code.

3. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law or abuse of

discretion by precluding [Wife] from proper procedural 

requirements for an adjudication of her economic claims finding 

no intimidation of ... [Wife] during the equitable distribution 

before the Divorce Master on July 24, 2018 equitable distribution 

hearing, and whether an economic justice was provided for her...

when can be no doubts that ... [Wife] was ... precluded from her 

rights to ...present her documents on her economic claims to 

equitable distribution, precluded to proceed on her exceptions on 

November 1, 2019, and whether the Trial Court should to review 

them supported by the new evidence requested in her April 26, 

2019 Motion to Open final March 28, 2019 Decree of Divorce for

Reconsideration and Modification in part of March 28, 2019 

Order/Petition for Special Reliefs/Petition for Special 

Reliefs/Petition for Modification of Marital Debts and Post-Divorce 

Alimonies for [Wife]/Petition for Constructive and April 29, 2019 

Motion to Supplement the aforementioned Motion/Petition.

4. Whether [Husband’s] intrinsic fraud and other 

misrepresentations were responsible for March 28, 2019 Order, 

and it is invalid in part, and the Trial Court should review [Wife’] 

economic claims fully incorporated by the April 26, 2019 ... and 

April 29, 2019 ... aforementioned Applications ... herein by 

reference.

5. Whether it was a proper exercise of discretion for the Trial Court 

not to assign the marital house in Pennsylvania to [Wife’s] name 

... when she acquired equity in Pennsylvania house and 

additionally invested $150,000.00 in funds and labor to save it 

from dissipation.

6. Whether [Husband] terminated his rights in Pennsylvania and 

Poland houses, caused delays, and there is no doubts that the 

Trial Court abused its discretion or committed an error of law, 

when ordered the exclusive authority on enforcement of the sale 

of Pennsylvania and Poland houses.
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Wife’s Brief at unnumbered iii–iv.

In determining equitable distribution, the trial court considered the 

following factors:

(1) The length of the marriage.

(2) Any prior marriage of either party.

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, 

vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs 

of each of the parties.

(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training 

or increased earning power of the other party.

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of 

capital assets and income.

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not 

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the 

acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the

marital property, including the contribution of a party as 

homemaker.

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during 

the marriage.

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time 

the division of property is to become effective.

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications 

associated with each asset to be divided, distributed or 

assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and 

certain.

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation 

associated with a particular asset, which expense need not 

be immediate and certain.
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(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of 

any dependent minor children.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 2–3 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)).

In reviewing awards of equitable distribution, we are guided by the 

following:

A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of 

equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the 

propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of 

marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal 

procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which 

requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court 

will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised” was 

“manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. 

In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, 

courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We 

measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of 

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a 

just determination of their property rights.

Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Morgante 

v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386–387 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted)).

“An abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing of 

clear and convincing evidence.” Yuhas v. Yuhas, 79 A.3d 700, 704 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (en banc). Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court 

to weigh the evidence and decide credibility, and this Court will not reverse 

those determinations as long as they are supported by the evidence. 

Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 822 A.2d 732, 742 (Pa. Super. 2003). We are also 
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aware that “a master’s report and recommendation, although only advisory, 

is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the question of 

credibility of witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe 

and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.” Childress v. 

Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455–456 (Pa. Super. 2011).

We note that the trial court, which has entertained over 2,000 pages of 

documents in this case, expressed its familiarity “with the procedural history 

of this case,” and acknowledged Wife’s “dilatory” conduct. Trial Court Opinion, 

3/28/19, at 6. Nevertheless, the trial court also opined that Wife, proceeding 

pro se, “zealously [was] representing herself.” Id. The court opined that 

while Wife “sincerely believed that she was prosecuting the case in her best 

interest,” “file[d] multiple motions and petitions,” and “was committed to her 

cause,” the court remained concerned that Wife intended to “delay the sale of 

the marital residence and the property in Poland.” Id. Our review of the 

entire record and the parties’ briefs compels our support for the trial court’s 

resolution of the aspects of Wife’s claims that are decipherable, and we rely 

on the March 28, 2019, and June 6, 2019 opinions of the trial court in affirming 

this case.5

Decrees entered March 28, 2019, and June 10, 2019, affirmed.

____________________________________________

5

 The parties are directed to attach those opinions in the event of further 

proceedings in this matter.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/20
488 OPINION AND ORDE�rcDIMIDfiU3ID:filECfiltEfμAi 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

GRAZYNA SKLODOWSKA-GREZAK, 

Plaintiff 

vs. 

WIESLAW GREZAK, 

Defendant 

OPINION 

No. 751 DR 2005 

No. 5575 CV 2016 

IN DIVORCE 

EXCEPTIONS TO 

DIVORCE MASTER'S 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On August 3, 2016, Plaintiff Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak ("Wife") filed an 

action in divorce against Defendant Weislaw Grezak ("Husband"). The parties were 

married on July 24, 1982, in Poland and there were two children born of the marriage, 

both of whom are now adults. On July 24, 2018, a hearing was held before Divorce 

Master Daniel M. Corveleyn, Esquire ("Master"). The Master filed his Report and 

Recommendations on August 27, 2018. Husband filed Exceptions to the Divorce 

Master's Report on September 13, 2018 and Wife filed Exceptions to the Divorce 

Master's Report on September 17, 2018. Oral argument was held in this matter on 

November l, 2018. We are now prepared to address the exceptions filed by the 

parties. 

When evaluating the merit of any exceptions filed to a divorce master's 

recommendation, this Court must first examine the master's report. In Pennsylvania, 

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488 OPINION AND ORDER- DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

"a master's report and recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the 

fullest consideration, particularly to the question of credibility of witnesses; because 

the master has the opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the 

parties." Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d. 448, 456 (Pa Super. 2011) (citation 

omittedi. However; the master's report "is advisory only ... and the reviewing court 

is not bound by it and it does not come to the Court with any preponderate weight or 

authority which must be overcome." Rothrock v. Rothrock. 765 A.2d 400, 404 (Pa. 

Super. 2000) (citation omitted). In determining issues of credibility, the Master's 

findings must be given the greatest weight because "it is he who heard and observed 

the witnesses." Mott v. Mott. 453 A.2d 1038, 1039 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citation 

omitted). "[Ajlthough the master's report is entitled to great weight, it is the 

responsibility of the court to make the final equitable distribution." Trembach v. 

Trembach, 615 A.2d 33, 35 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citing Morschhauser v. Morschhauser, 

516 A.2d 10 (Pa. Super. 1986)). 

In determining equitable distribution, the Master considered the following 

factors; 

( 1) The length of the marriage. 

(2) Any prior marriage of either party. 

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, 

vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of 

each of the parties. 

( 4) The contribution by one party to the education; training or 

increased earning power of the other party. 

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of 

capital assets and income. 

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not 

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits. 

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488 OPINION AND ORDER-DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the 

acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the 

marital property, including the contribution of a party as 

homemaker. 

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party. 

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage. 

( l 0) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the 

division of property is to become effective. 

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated 

with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which 

ramifications need not be immediate and certain. 

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated 

with a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate 

and certain. 

( 11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any 

dependent minor children. 

23 Pa. C.S.A.§ 3502(a). 

Specifically, the Master noted the length of the marriage and discussed the 

health and sources of income for the parties. Husband is 59 years old and Wife is 56 

years old. Husband is self-employed as the owner and operator of Grezak 

Construction Company, a business registered with the state ofNew Jersey, Division of 

Consumer Affairs, as of May I, 2006; and registered as a home improvement 

contractor in Pennsylvania. Wife is presently unemployed because of her alleged poor 

medical conditions. At the Master's hearing, Wife claimed to suffer from cardiac 

issues, and muscle spasms, however she admitted that she has not seen a specialist for 

these issues and she has not filed a physician's verification for the claimed problems. 

Before she came to the USA, Wife claimed to have run a lucrative business in Poland 

making suits for Russian people. In the United States, she operated a cleaning 

business known as "Magic Wand." 

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488 OPINION AND ORDER- DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

There was no indication of contribution by either party to the education, 

training or increased earning power of the other party. The source of income of each 

party was noted; and each party claimed to contribute to the preservation of the martial 

home by either payment of taxes and/or remedial work. The parties lived a frugal life 

and the economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is 

minimal. 

Husband has filed 8 exceptions to the Master's Report and Recommendations. 

These exceptions are set forth by Husband as follows: 

1. The Master erred in recommending that the listing of the martial home for 

sale is to be at a price recommended by a broker without raising disputes of 

either party inasmuch as the Master should have recommended that the 

broker set a listing price for the listing of the house regardless of objection 

by either party. 

2. The Master erred in not finding that the items contained in exhibit 13, 

which consisted of [a] series of thirty-five (35) pictures and a list of items 

of personal property, most of which were items used by Husband's 

business, should be distributed solely to Husband. 

3. The Master erred in recommending that the listing of the Poland Residence 

is to be at a price recommended by a broker without raising disputes of 

either party inasmuch as the Master should have recommended that the 

broker set a listing price for the listing of the house regardless of objection 

by either party. 

4. The Master erred in including Husband's 2000 Toyota Camry in the 

equitable distribution as the Toyota Camry was purchased by Husband in 

2015, three years after the separation of the parties. The separation of the 

parties as found by the Master was May 14, 2012. 

5. The Master erred in not including that the $5,000 in counsel fees to be paid 

by Wife, be made part of the equitable distribution calculation for the 

Master's recommendation dated August 27, 2018 or in recommending 

another concrete manner for Husband to be paid the fees. 

6. The Master erred in not including the $750 in counsel fees ordered by the 

Honorable Stephen M. Higgins on June 22, 2017, be made part of the 

equitable distribution calculation or in recommending another concrete 

manner for Husband to be paid the fees. 

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488 OPINION AND ORDER- DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

7. The Master erred in not including the $875 in court costs in his 

recommendation from August 27, 2018, to be paid by Wife, be made part 

of the equitable distribution calculation or in recommending another 

concrete manner for Husband to be paid the fees. 

8. The Master erred in not setting forth a clear method for equitable 

distribution and payment of fees considering the facts of this case. 

In his first and third exceptions, Husband contends that the Master erred in 

recommending that the martial home and the Property in Poland be listed for sale at a 

price recommended by a broker without raising disputes of either party. Husband 

argues that the Master should have recommended that the broker set the price for 

listing the sales of these homes regardless of objection by either party. 

Husband claims that he should be allowed to choose the broker for the sale of 

these properties and that Wife should not have any input due to her obstructive 

behavior. He further argues that Wife should not be given the opportunity to object or 

raise a dispute which he claims will further delay the final distribution of martial 

property. In her exceptions, Wife objected to every statement made by Husband's 

counsel. Wife claims that Husband has no interest in the marital residence and that he 

intentionally caused damage to it. Wife further claims that the marital residence was 

valued at $150,000.00 when Husband left the residence and that she has since 

remediated the home. Wife is requesting a credit of$150,000.00 for the remediation. 

At the Master's hearing, the parties disputed who had paid the taxes and 

insurance for the marital residence. The Master determined that Husband produced 

evidence of payments for taxes and a copy of a check for $2,500.00 which he testified 

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488 OPINION AND ORDER- DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

he gave to Wife towards taxes. Husband stated that Wife cashed the check and never 

paid the taxes. 

We are very familiar with the procedural history of this case and that Wife 

appeared to be dilatory in her conduct. However, we believe that Wife, being 

unrepresented in this case, was zealously representing herself. We believe that she 

sincerely believed that she was prosecuting the case in her best interest. Wife did file 

multiple motions and petitions; however, we believe that she was committed to her 

cause and that she intended to finalize the divorce. Nevertheless, we are concerned 

that Wife may delay the sale of the marital residence and the property in Poland. 

Therefore, the parties shall select a broker for the marital residence within 30 days and 

a broker to conduct the sale of the property in Poland within 90 days. The brokers 

shall set the listing price for each property and shall be authorized to periodically 

reduce the listing price until each property is sold. If the parties are unable to agree 

upon listing brokers within the time specified, either party may file a petition 

requesting they be given the authority to unilaterally select the broker or have one 

court-appointed. Husband's exceptions in this matter are granted. 

Next, Husband argues that the Master erred in not finding that certain 

photographs and personal items should be distributed solely to him. The Master 

listened to the testimony of the parties and determined that the items were martial 

property. In his brief, Husband states that he presented evidence in support of his 

testimony about the personal property which he had in the marital residence. He does 

not set forth the specific property to which he is referring. Husband simply states that 

6 
488 OPINION AND ORDER - DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

a vast majority of the property he left at the martial residence relates to his business. 

The Master had the opportunity to observe and assess the witnesses and their 

testimony regarding these items and we believe that the Master's finding that these 

items marital property was proper. We will not disturb bis determination. We find no 

error on the part of the Master and this exception will be denied. 

Husband argues that his 2000 Toyota Camry was purchased in 2015, after the 

separation, and therefore should not be part of equitable distribution. The Master 

notes in his Report and Recommendations that the 2000 Toyota Camry was titled on 

December 29, 2003, and issued on October 10, 2015. Husband testified that he 

purchased the 2000 Toyota Camry in 2015. [Notes of Testimony, July 24, 2018, p. 

128 (hereinafter referred to as "N.T.")] Husband indicated that the Kelly Blue Book 

value is listed as $1,937; however, he stated that the transmission is "dead." [N.T., 

p.129] Husband testified that the junkyard offered him $150 for the Camry. [N.T., 

p.129] The Master also noted that the car cannot be operated because of a damaged 

transmission. Wife did not rebut Husband's testimony. 

The only vehicles which were not included in martial distribution were two 

cargo vans which Husband purchased after separation. The Master recommended that 

Husband retain the three vehicles titled solely in his name. We find that based upon 

the testimony of Husband, the 2000 Toyota Camry was not marital property. 

Accordingly, we will grant Husband's exception and Wife's distribution will be 

reduced by $1,065.35 (55% of $1937.) 

7 
488 OPINION AND ORDER - DIVORCE DECREE.pd 

In Husband's exceptions numbered 5, 6, and 7, he claims that the Master erred 

by not including $5,000 in counsel fees, $750 in counsel fees, and $875 in court costs 

to be paid by Wife as part of equitable distribution. We recognize that these fees and 

costs must be made part of equitable distribution. 

Husband complains that the Master erred in not setting forth a clear method for 

equitable distribution and payment of fees in this case. The Master clearly set forth 

the equitable distribution scheme and the amounts due to each party. We believe that 

the Master's Report was not crystal clear on the method of distribution and payments. 

Therefore, equitable distribution and payment of fees, as set forth in the Master's 

Report and determined by this Court, shall be made from PNC Banlc Accounts Nos. 

5391 and 0328, thereby reducing Plaintiffs distribution from $21,573.27 to 

$14,948.27. Wife's net distribution shall be $13,882.92

1• 

Plaintiff has also filed Exceptions to the Master's Report and 

Recommendations. In reviewing her Exceptions, the Court is unable to cohesively list 

the exceptions. Plaintiff has raised issues which have been previously ruled upon by 

the Court or the exception is simply a confused statement of Plaintiff's idealism of the 

case. As such, we are unable to address the Plaintiff's Exceptions, therefore, her 

exceptions will be denied in total. 

1 $14,948.27 minus $1,06S.35 equals $13,882.92. 

8 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEAL m OF PENNSYLVANIA 

GRAZYNA SKLODOWSKA-GREZAK, 

Plaintiff 

vs. 

WIESLA W GREZAK, 

Defendant 

ORDER 

No. 751 DR 2005 

No. 5575 CV 2016 

IN DIVORCE 

EXCEPTIONS TO 

DIVORCE MASTER'S 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

AND NOW, this 'J_ � � day of March 2019, it is hereby ORDERED 

and DECREED as follows: 

1. Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak, Plaintiff and Wieslaw Grezak, Defendant 

are DIVORCED from the bonds of matrimony. 

2. Defendant's Exceptions to Divorce Master's Report are DENIED in 

part and GRANTED in part, as follows: 

a) Defendant's request to have the broker set the listing price for the Marital 

and property in Poland is GRANTED; 

b) The parties shall select a broker for the marital residence within 30 days and 

a broker to conduct the sale of the property in Poland within 90 days. The brokers 

shall set the listing price for each property and shall be authorized to periodically 

reduce the listing price until each property is sold. If the parties are unable to agree 

upon listing brokers within the time specified, either party may file a petition 
requesting they be given the authority to unilaterally select a broker or have one courtappointed. 

c) Defendant's objection to the 2000 Toyota Camry being listed as marital 

property is GRANTED and the amount of distribution to Wife shall be reduced by 

$1,065.35; 

d) Defendant's request for a clear method for equitable distribution and 

payment of fees is GRANTED, the payment of equitable distribution and fees shall be 

made from PNC Bank Accounts Nos. 5391 and 0328, thereby reducing Plaintiffs 

distribution from $21,573.27 to $14,948.27. Wife's net distribution shall be 

$13,882.92 after reduction of value of2000 Toyota Camry. 

4. Defendant's remaining Exceptions to Master's Report are DENIED. 

5. The remaining recommendations of the Master as to equitable 

distribution are affirmed and the parties are directed to comply with those 

recommendations. 

6. Plaintiffs Exceptions to Divorce Master's Report are DENIED. 

7. The court retains jurisdiction of any claims raised by the parties to this 

action for which a final order has not yet been entered. 

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BY THE COURT: 

"Chynna R. Beisel, Esquire 

Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak, pro se 

Daniel M. Corveleyn, Esquire, Divorce Master 

SMH 2019·012 

cc: 
1 STATEMENT PURSUANT T&trif�te!a.�)?312��}.p�

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

GRAZYNA SKLODOWSKAGREZAK 

Plaintiff 

vs. 

WIESLA W GREZAK , 

Defendant 

NO. 5575 CV 2016:,,.�

'1'51 l>��Ou;:, 

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

This matter before this Court on Plaintiff Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak's 

(hereinafter "Appellant") appeal of this Court's Order denying Appellant's Exceptions to 

the Master's Report. 

On March 28, 2019, we entered an Opinion and Order denying 

Appellant's Exceptions to the Master's Report and granting in part and denying in part 

Defendant Wieslaw Grezak's ("Appellee") Exceptions to the Master's Report. On April 

26, 2019, Appellant filed a "Motion to Open Final March 28, 2019 Decree in Divorce for 

Reconsideration and Modification in Part of March 28, 2019 Order/ Petition for Special 

Reliefs [sic]/ Petition for Modification of Marital Debts and Post Divorce Alimonies for 

Plaintiff I Petition for Constructive Trust" [sic] which we denied in an Order dated May 

3, 2019. Appellant also filed a "Motion to Supplement the Motion to Open Final March 

28, 2019 Decree of Divorce for Reconsideration and Modification in Part of March 28J 

2019 Order/ Petition for Special Reliefs [sic]/ Petition for Modification of Marital Debts 

and Post Divorce Alimonies for Plaintiff I Petition for Constructive Trust" [sic] on April 
1 STATEMENT PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925(A).pd 

29, 2019 which we denied by Order dated May 3, 2019. On April 29, 2019, Appellant 

filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and on May 3, 2019, we 

directed Appellant to file her 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On 

May 15, 2019, Appellee filed a "Petition for Appointment of a Realtor to List Marital 

Properties for Sale, for Defendant to Obtain his Property left at the Marital Residence and 

for Contempt" ("Petition") Thereafter, on May 21, 2019, Appellant filed a Petition for 

Supersedeas and on May 22, 2019, Appellant filed a "Motion to Dismiss/Strike 

Defendant's Petition for Appointment of a Realtor to List Marital Properties for Sale, for 

Defendant to Obtain his Property left at the Marital Residence and for Contempt" 

("Motion") [sic] This Court scheduled a hearing on the Petition and Motion for June 3,. 

2019. 

On May 24, 2019, Appellant filed a "Concise Statements [sic] of the Errors 

Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b)" ("Statement"). We file this 

Statement Pursuant to l 925(a) in response to Appellant's Statement. In her Statement, 

Appellant sets forth a confusing statement of her concept of this case. Similarly, 

Appellant set forth a confusing, wordy statement in her Exceptions to the Master's Report 

and Recommendations. 

First, Appellant complains that this Court erred in failing to consider evidence 

that Appellee misled her by imposition of his unfair settlement due to her duress, fraud 

and mistake. The Court notes that there was no agreement entered in this matter and the 

parties participated in a divorce master's hearing after which the parties filed exceptions. 

We find no error in this regard. 
1 STATEMENT PURSUANT TO PA RAP. 1925(A).pd 

Next, Appellant argues that during the March 23, 2018, hearing this Court erred 

by precluding her from obtaining a Polish interpreter, which prejudiced her. Initially, we 

note that the hearing concerned a petition for exclusive possession, which the Court 

ultimately granted in Appellant's favor. Additionally, Appellant had a Polish interrupter 

during several hearings; however, she failed to utilize the services of the interpreter and 

answered questions put to her by the Court in English. This Court is satisfied that 

Appellant is fluent in both the English and Polish languages. 

Appellant also complains that the Master erred in his findings and that the 

Appellee was credible. As we set forth on our Opinion and Order ("Opinion") dated 

March 28, 2019, a master's report and recommendation, although only advisory, is to be 

given the fullest consideration, particularly to the question of credibility of witnesses, 

because the master has the opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor 

of the parties. We addressed this issue in our Opinion and we will not address it further 

here. 

Appellant next complains that the Court erred by not reviewing the "intrinsic 

fraud" and other misrepresentations as she set forth in her April 26, 2019 and April 29, 

2019 motions. As Appellant has not set forth any particular error, therefore, we cannot 

address this statement of error. 

Appellant argues that the Court erred by failing to assign her the marital home 

when she paid off the tax liens and prevented a tax sale. At the time of the Master's 

hearing, both parties desired to remain in the marital home. Appellant related that she 

was in poor health and could not work and the Master noted that he did not believe that 

Appellant could pay Appellee for his interest in the martial property. In addition, 
1 STATEMENT PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925(A).pd 

Appellee provided canceled checks for his contribution towards the payment of taxes. 

We find no error here. 

In her final error complained of on appeal, Appellant claims that this Court erred 

by denying her May 3, 2019 Motion to Reconsider and because this Court lacked 

jurisdiction while her appeal was pending. Pa.R.A.P. 1701 (b)(2). (3) states, in pertinent 

part, that after an appeal is filed, the trial court may; (2) ''[ e Jnforce any order entered in 

the matter. unless the effect of the order has been superseded as prescribed in this 

chapter; (3) Grant reconsideration of the order which is the subject of the appeal." 

Hence, we may enforce our orders unless a supersedeas is filed. 

We find nothing further needs to be addressed. And therefore, we request the 

Superior Court to affirm our Orders of March 28, 2019, and May 3, 2019. 

BY THE COURT: 

�.2Dl4 

DATE 

cc: Chynna Beisel. Esquire 

Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak, pro se 

Prothonotary Superior Court of Pennsylvania