IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

SONYA CHAPMAN, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2188-D-BN 

 § 

ADT LLC, § 

 § 

Defendant. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Sonya Chapman initiated this lawsuit against Defendant ADT LLC 

by filing a pro se Motion to File Civil Claim, attaching to that motion a handwritten 

one-page complaint and a Determination and Notice of Rights issued by the U.S. 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on September 1, 2022. See Dkt. No. 2. 

Chapman then filed a Supplemental Initial Complaint. See Dkt. No. 5. 

Senior United States District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater referred this lawsuit 

to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b) and a standing order of reference. And the Court has granted Chapman leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Dkt. Nos. 3, 6. 

To screen Chapman’s allegations under the IFP statute, the Court entered a 

notice of deficiency (the NOD) that first explained to Chapman that, while the 

supplement she filed identifies the elements of a prime facie case of employment 

discrimination, “she so far has not pled a plausible prima facie case by alleging facts 

to support each element she concludes she meets.” Dkt. No. 8 at 2. In response to the 

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NOD, Chapman filed an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 12. 

After reviewing Chapman’s amended allegations, the undersigned enters these 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, for the reasons and to 

the extent set out below, the Court should dismiss Chapman’s amended complaint. 

Discussion 

As set out in the NOD Chapman received before filing the amended complaint, 

[u]nder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not 

contain detailed factual allegations, but a plaintiff must allege more 

than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the 

plaintiff's allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). 

A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id.

And, to survive dismissal, a plaintiff must “plead facts sufficient 

to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by 

stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that a plaintiff contends 

entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 

12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see 

also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 

890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” 

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citing Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 

1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he degree of specificity necessary to 

establish plausibility and fair notice, and therefore the need to include 

sufficient factual allegations, depends on context.”))). 

Put differently, plaintiffs, through the complaint, must provide 

the Court enough factual content to demonstrate an entitlement to 

relief. Compare Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.”), with Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (“The burden is on the 

plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as 

true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556)). 

And, because Chapman asserts claims in the employment 

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context, to allege (and ultimately prove) such claims, she may either rely 

on direct evidence or proceed under a burden-shifting analysis. 

“‘[D]irect evidence is rare’” – it has been defined “as ‘evidence 

which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.’” 

Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(footnotes omitted). For example, “‘[a] statement or document which 

shows “on its face that an improper criterion served as a basis – not 

necessarily the sole basis, but a basis – for the adverse employment 

action [is] direct evidence of discrimination.”’” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Insofar as Chapman’s claims do not implicate direct evidence, she 

must proceed under a burden-shifting analysis, the first step of which is 

to articulate a prima facie case as to each cause of action. 

The prima facie elements of an employment discrimination claim 

under Title VII are that a plaintiff 

(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for 

the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some 

adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was 

replaced by someone outside his protected group or was 

treated less favorably than other similarly situated 

employees outside the protected group. 

McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2005)). 

A plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case to survive judicial 

screening under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Cf. Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. 

Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019); Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 

F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013). 

But a plaintiff must “plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate 

elements of [her] claim to make [her] case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of 

Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see 

also Meadows v. City of Crowley, 731 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(per curiam) (“Raj, however, does not exempt a plaintiff from alleging 

facts sufficient to establish the elements of her claims.” (citations 

omitted)). 

So, under [28 U.S.C. §] 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court must ask 

whether Chapman has provided enough facts to allege an actionable 

claim of discrimination. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 

512-13 (2002). And, if she “has not pled such facts,” it is “proper[ to] 

dismiss [the] complaint.” Meadows, 731 F. App’x at 318; see also 

Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766-67 (noting that the district court’s “task is to 

identify the ultimate elements of [the applicable employment-related] 

claim and then determine whether the” plaintiff has pled those elements 

but that a “district court err[s if it] require[es a plaintiff] to plead 

something beyond those elements to survive a motion to dismiss”). 

Dkt. No. 8 at 2-5. 

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Chapman, who alleges that she “is a 54-year old female” and “person of color,” 

Dkt. No. 12, ¶ 30, asserts multiple types of discrimination, see, e.g., id., ¶ 20 

(“Defendants intentionally treated Plaintiff differently than her peers, who were 

younger, of a different race, and color than Plaintiff, male, and as implied by 

Defendant’s actions and comments more subservient than Plaintiff.”); id., ¶ 97 

(“Plaintiff was the only female, over age 40, and person of color terminated during 

training.”). 

And, while Chapman filed a lengthy amended complaint, that filing is limited 

to recitations of prima facie elements and repetitive conclusions. So it lacks facts 

necessary to raise Chapman’s allegations of discrimination from speculative (or even 

conceivable) to plausible. 

For example, Chapman alleges that she was treated differently than her peers 

or “same or similarly situated employees.” See, e.g., Dkt. id., ¶ 14 (“Plaintiff contends 

that same or similarly situated employees had questions regarding job duties, job 

functions, and these same employees were not ostracized, and excluded from 

employment during training.”); id., ¶ 20 (“Defendants intentionally treated Plaintiff 

differently than her peers, who were younger, of a different race, and color than 

Plaintiff, male, and as implied by Defendant’s actions and comments more 

subservient than Plaintiff.”). 

But Chapman fails to provide factual content to show that she was treated 

worse than an employee who exhibited similar shortcomings, to raise an inference 

that the disparate treatment Chapman alleges was because of a protected status. 

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That is because “suffering some penalty in employment is not enough. For [an 

adverse employment action] to constitute disparate treatment, [Chapman] must have 

plausibly pled that [she] was treated worse than others for similar shortcomings, 

because of [a protected status].” Sanchez v. Chevron N. Am. Exploration & Prod. Co., 

No. 20-30783, 2021 WL 5513509, at *6 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam) (citing 

Ricci v. DeStegano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)); cf. id. at *5 (To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, alleged disparate treatment claims “must plausibly set out facts that the 

‘defendant took the adverse employment action against a plaintiff because of her 

protected status.’ [That is, a] plaintiff must allege ‘facts, direct or circumstantial, that 

would suggest [the employer’s] actions were based on [the plaintiff’s] race or national 

origin or that [the employer] treated similarly situated employees of other races or 

national origin more favorably.’” (quoting Raj, 714 F.3d at 331; emphasis by Raj)). 

Because Chapman was advised as to the proper pleading standards, including 

the need for factual specificity, prior to her filing the amended complaint, the Court 

should find that she has now stated her best case as to the employment 

discrimination claims in violation of federal statutes and dismiss those claims with 

prejudice. See Wiggins v. La. State Univ. – Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x 625, 

627 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Granting leave to amend ... is not required if the 

plaintiff has already pleaded her ‘best case.’ A plaintiff has pleaded her best case after 

she is ‘apprised of the insufficiency’ of her complaint.” (citations omitted)). 

That said, the time to file objections to these findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation (further explained below) allows Chapman another opportunity to 

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explain how she would cure the deficiencies outlined above and thus show the Court 

that her employment discrimination claims should not be dismissed with prejudice 

at this time and that the Court should instead grant her leave to amend these claims 

again. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per 

curiam). 

And, insofar as Chapman’s amended complaint also includes claims under 

state law, if the Court dismisses the employment discrimination claims with 

prejudice, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those 

claims. 

To determine whether it should “relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state law 

claims,” a court looks to “statutory factors set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)” – “(1) 

whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; (2) whether the 

state claims substantially predominate over the federal claims; (3) whether the 

federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional 

circumstances or other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction” – as well as “the 

common law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” set forth 

by Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Enochs v. Lampasas 

Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011). As “no single factor is dispositive,” 

Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008), “[t]he overall balance of the 

statutory factors is important,” Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159 (citation omitted). 

Here, that balance favors relinquishing jurisdiction over any remaining statelaw claims to allow Chapman to pursue those claims in a state forum. 

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Recommendation

The Court should dismiss Plaintiff Sonya Chapman’s claims of employment 

discrimination in violation of federal law with prejudice and decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims asserted in her amended 

complaint. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: February 21, 2023 

 _________________________________________ 

 DAVID L. HORAN 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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