Filed 5/21/15 P. v. Duenes CA2/6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

JAIME DUENES, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

2d Crim. No. B260749 

(Super. Ct. No. 2012011126) 

(Ventura County) 

 Jaime Duenes appeals from the judgment entered upon resentencing pursuant to 

the Safe Neighborhoods and School Act (the Act), enacted by Proposition 47. 

Appellant was convicted of a felony drug offense and sentenced to state prison. 

Pursuant to the Act, the trial court recalled the felony sentence and resentenced him to 

a misdemeanor. At the time of resentencing, appellant had been released from prison 

and was on postrelease community supervision (PRCS) for a period not exceeding 

three years. Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously continued him on PRCS 

for the remaining balance of the three-year period. We agree. The court should have 

placed him on misdemeanor parole for one year. Accordingly, we reverse. 

Background 

 In March 2012 a felony complaint was filed charging appellant with one count 

of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 1377, subd. (a)), at that 
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time an alternate felony-misdemeanor, and one count of being under the influence of a 

controlled substance (Id., § 11550, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor. The complaint alleged 

one prior separate prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b))1

 and one prior serious or 

violent felony conviction ("strike") within the meaning of California's "Three Strikes" 

law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Pursuant to a plea bargain, 

appellant pleaded guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine and admitted both 

the prior prison term and the strike. The misdemeanor charge was dismissed. 

Before pleading guilty, appellant initialed the following preprinted provisions in 

a Felony Disposition Statement: "I could be sentenced to the state prison for a 

maximum possible term of 7 years. [¶] After I have served my prison term, I may be 

subject to a maximum period of parole or post-release community supervision of 3 

years." In open court the prosecutor informed appellant "that the Court has offered to 

sentence you to no more than 32 months in prison followed by a three-year parole 

period." 

 The trial court dismissed the strike, suspended the imposition of sentence, and 

placed appellant on formal probation for 36 months on condition that he serve 365 

days in county jail. Probation was later revoked, and he was sentenced to prison for 

two years, four months. 

 In October 2013 appellant was released from prison to PRCS for a period not 

exceeding three years. In November 2014 he filed a petition for recall of his sentence 

and for resentencing pursuant to the Act. The trial court granted the petition and 

resentenced appellant to a misdemeanor. The court ordered appellant to serve 365 

days in county jail. Because he was entitled to credit for time served of 365 days, the 

court ordered that "the jail sentence is deemed served." The prosecutor conceded that 

"the only post-sentence supervision available . . . is one year of misdemeanor parole." 

The court disagreed. It ordered that appellant shall "remain[] on PRCS for the balance 

of the original [three-year] term following [his] release from prison." The court noted 

that, pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 1170.18, it has discretion to release a 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
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person from the one-year period of misdemeanor parole required upon resentencing to 

a misdemeanor. The court stated that it "will be exercising its discretion and not 

ordering a period of parole under [section] 1170.18. But this order is not being made 

because the court has determined that [appellant] should not remain on some type of 

supervision; instead, discretion is being exercised as indicated because [appellant] 

does remain on supervision pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 3451(a)." 

The court observed, "(If appellant was not otherwise continuing on PRCS, the court 

would not exercise its discretion to waive the one-year parole requirement.)" 

In determining that appellant remained on PRCS despite being resentenced to a 

misdemeanor, the trial court relied on the "[n]otwithstanding any other law" language 

of section 3451, subdivision (a). It noted that, in People v. Espinoza (2014) 226 

Cal.App.4th 635, 639-640, this court had observed: "The phrase '[n]otwithstanding any 

other law' is all encompassing and eliminates potential conflicts between alternative 

sentencing schemes. [Citations.]" The trial court considered section 1170.18 to be "an 

alternative sentencing scheme" within the meaning of Espinoza. The court concluded 

that the drafters of the Act are deemed to have been "aware that the lack of a provision 

[in the Act] either specifically repealing [section] 3451 and/or 'revising the entire 

subject' of the continuing supervision status would leave 3451 in full force and effect." 

The court continued: "To give effect to both statutes [sections 3451 and 1170.18], the 

court has resentenced [appellant to a misdemeanor] as required by [section] 1170.18 

and orders that [appellant] shall remain on PRCS for the balance of the originally 

ordered supervision term. This conclusion 'harmonizes' the provisions of the statutes 

regarding supervision, giving deference to the 'notwithstanding' language of [section] 

3451, language which is 'all encompassing' (Espinoza, supra) and which this court 

cannot ignore." 

Principles of Statutory Interpretation

 " 'Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo 

review.' [Citation.]" (People v. Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 980.) In 

interpreting a voter initiative, such as the Act, or a statute enacted by the Legislature, 
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such as section 3451, "[t]he overriding concern . . . is that the intent of the Legislature 

or the electorate . . . be effectuated. [Citations.]" (Taxpayers To Limit Campaign 

Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 764, fn. omitted.) " 'In 

interpreting a voter initiative . . . we apply the same principles that govern statutory 

construction. [Citation.] Thus, "we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the 

words their ordinary meaning." [Citation.] The statutory language must also be 

construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme [in 

light of the electorate's intent]. [Citation.]' " (People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 

451, 459.) 

The Plea Bargain Does Not Preclude Appellant from 

Arguing that He Is Not Subject to PRCS 

 The People contend that appellant's claim that he is not subject to PRCS "lacks 

merit" because "as part of a negotiated disposition, [he] agreed that in addition to 

serving a 'prison term' he would be subject to a maximum three-year period of parole 

or PRCS." "[D]efendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they 

agreed." (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) "The rationale behind this 

policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be 

allowed to 'trifle with the courts' by attempting to better the bargain through the 

appellate process. [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 295.) 

 As part of the plea bargain, appellant did not agree that he would be subject to 

PRCS. "PRCS conditions, like parole conditions, are not a matter of choice, and there 

is no voluntary consent to the conditions." (People v. Jones (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 

1257, 1267, fn. 8.) The Felony Disposition Statement advised appellant that he "may 

be subject to a maximum period of parole or post-release community supervision of 3 

years." The purpose of the advisement was to assure that appellant understood the 

consequences of his plea. "In all guilty plea . . . cases the defendant shall be advised 

of the direct consequences of conviction . . . ." (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 

Cal.3d 592, 605.) In People v. McMillion (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1368, the 
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appellate court concluded that the trial court had "erred in failing to inform appellant 

that a period of parole would follow the 16-month term in prison." 

The Trial Court Erroneously Continued Appellant on PRCS 

 "The statutory phrase 'notwithstanding any other law' has been called a ' "term 

of art" ' . . . that declares the legislative intent to override all contrary law. [Citation.]" 

(Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 5, 13, italics added.) 

"When the Legislature intends for a statute to prevail over all contrary law, it typically 

signals this intent by using phrases like 'notwithstanding any other law' or 

'notwithstanding other provisions of law.' [Citations.]" (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 

Cal.4th 393, 406-407, italics added.) 

 The one-year misdemeanor parole period of section 1170.18, subdivision (d) is 

not contrary to the three-year felony PRCS period of section 3451, subdivision (a). 

After the trial court resentences a defendant to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 

1170.18, the offense "shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes."2

 (Id., subd. 

(k).) PRCS is no longer available because it applies only to felons. Section 3451 is 

part of the Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (PRCS Act). (§ 3450 et 

seq.) Section 3450, subdivision (b)(5) of the PRCS Act provides: "Realigning the 

postrelease supervision of certain felons reentering the community after serving a 

prison term to local community corrections programs . . . will improve public safety 

outcomes among adult felon parolees and will facilitate their successful reintegration 

back into society." (Italics added.) Section 3451, subdivision (a) applies to all persons 

"whose sentence has been deemed served pursuant to Section 2900.5 after serving a 

prison term for a felony." (Italics added.) The implication of this language is that the 

Legislature intended the PRCS Act to encompass only felons who have served a prison 

term. It does not encompass persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor that, 

 

2

 The only exception concerns ownership or possession of a firearm. Section 1170.18, 

subdivision (k) provides that resentencing to a misdemeanor "shall not permit [the 

resentenced] person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any 

firearm or prevent his or her conviction under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 

29800) of Division 9 of Title 4 of Part 6." 
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by definition, is not punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. Section 17, 

subdivision (a) provides: "A felony is a crime that is punishable with death, by 

imprisonment in the state prison, or . . . by imprisonment in a county jail under the 

provisions of subdivision (h) of section 1170. Every other crime or public offense is a 

misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as infractions." 

Because appellant's drug offense is considered to be a misdemeanor for all 

purposes (§1170.18, subd. (k)), he is no longer a felon eligible for PRCS. Thus, 

section 1170.18 is not an "alternative sentencing scheme[]" that conflicts with the 

PRCS Act. (People v. Espinoza, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 639-640.) It is a 

different sentencing scheme for certain felony offenses that have been reclassified as 

misdemeanors. The trial court erred in ruling that the "[n]otwithstanding any other 

law" language of section 3451 required the continuation of appellant on PRCS. The 

court should have ordered him to serve a one-year period of misdemeanor parole 

pursuant to section 1170.18, subd. (d). 

Disposition

 The order continuing appellant on PRCS is reversed. The matter is remanded 

with directions to place appellant on misdemeanor parole for a period of one year 

commencing on December 8, 2014, the date that he was resentenced. In all other 

respects, the judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 

 YEGAN, J. 

We concur: 

 GILBERT, P.J. 

 PERREN, J. 
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Brian Back, Judge 

Superior Court County of Ventura 

______________________________ 

 Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender, Michael C McMahon, Chief 

Deputy and William Quest, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan 

Sullivan Pithey, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.