[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-12360

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-00052-CDL-MSH

DOUGLAS LEE PARRIS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

OFFICER HILLARY TAFT, 

OFFICER SAM HUNTER, 

OFFICER VAUGHN MAXWELL, 

CORPORAL JASON GRIFFIN, 

CORPORAL CRYSTAL HATCHER, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(October 27, 2015)

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 1 of 13 
2

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Douglas Parris, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing some and staying the rest of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against 

Columbus, Georgia police officers who arrested him. After careful consideration, 

we affirm in part but vacate the district court’s dismissal of the illegal search claim. 

We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I.

In the early morning hours of June 4, 2012, Mr. Parris was arrested, after a 

domestic dispute, on charges of attempted arson, criminal damage to property, and 

possession of tools for the commission of a crime. Officers stopped Mr. Parris as 

he walked down a road a few blocks from his home, carrying a gas can, a 

backpack, and a metal rod. Mr. Parris alleges that the officers illegally searched

his backpack, found a blue funnel, and staged photographs showing that they found 

the blue funnel at Mr. Parris’s home in the gas tank of his vehicle. Mr. Parris also 

claims that when the officers finally placed him under arrest, they failed to notify 

him of his Fifth Amendment rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 

436 (1966). 

In an earlier lawsuit, Mr. Parris sued Charles Weaver, one of the officers 

involved in his arrest, under § 1983 alleging that the officer lacked probable cause 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 2 of 13 
3

to arrest him. See Parris v. Weaver (“Parris I”), No. 4:12-cv-330 (M.D. Ga.). 

After discovery, Officer Weaver moved for summary judgment. While the 

summary judgment motion was pending, Mr. Parris sought leave to amend his 

complaint to add claims that Officer Weaver also violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights by conducting an illegal search and his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to 

inform him of his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge recommended that the 

district court grant summary judgment to Officer Weaver because he had probable 

cause to arrest Mr. Parris and deny Mr. Parris leave to amend his complaint. The 

magistrate judge set forth two bases for denying leave to amend: adding new 

claims would prejudice Officer Weaver, who had already moved for summary 

judgment, and the amendment was futile because the new claims failed as a matter 

of law. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and 

entered judgment in favor of Officer Weaver. 

In this case (“Parris II”), Mr. Parris filed § 1983 claims against six other 

officers involved in his arrest. He alleged that the officers violated his: Fourth 

Amendment rights when they conducted an illegal search, falsely arrested him, and 

maliciously prosecuted him; Fifth Amendment rights when they failed to provide 

him a Miranda warning; and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they 

fabricated evidence. He also claimed that his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 

Amendment had been violated. Mr. Parris sought money damages as well as 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 3 of 13 
4

declaratory and injunctive relief. When Mr. Parris filed Parris II, his state criminal 

proceedings were still pending, and he was incarcerated.

The district court reviewed Mr. Parris’s complaint in Parris II to determine 

whether it was “frivolous, malicious or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). First, the district court dismissed Mr. 

Parris’s claims for illegal search, false arrest, and failure to follow Miranda 

procedures as barred by collateral estoppel, concluding that the identical issues had 

been decided against Mr. Parris in Parris I. Second, the district court dismissed 

Mr. Parris’s malicious prosecution claim on the ground that he had failed to state a 

claim for relief because the state criminal proceedings were ongoing and had not 

been terminated in his favor. Third, the district court abstained, under Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from hearing Mr. Parris’s claims that the officers 

violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process by fabricating evidence because the state criminal 

proceedings were still ongoing. These claims were dismissed to the extent Mr. 

Parris sought declaratory and injunctive relief and stayed to the extent he sought 

money damages. The district court directed Mr. Parris that upon completion of his 

criminal case, he should file a motion to proceed, informing the court of the 

outcome of his criminal trial. Mr. Parris appealed the district court’s order in its 

entirety.

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 4 of 13 
5

II.

We first must consider whether we have jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction turns 

on whether the district court’s order, which dismissed some of Mr. Parris’s claims 

and stayed others, is a final decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision is 

typically one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court 

to do but execute its judgment.” Mayer v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 

1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Ordinarily a stay order is not a final decision for purposes of § 1291.” 

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 

1194–95 (11th Cir. 2009). But, when a stay order leaves a party “effectively out of 

court” with respect to his federal claim, it is a final order. King v. Cessna Aircraft 

Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1165–66 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A “party is ‘effectively out of court’ when a federal court stays its hand pending 

the conclusion of related state court or state administrative proceedings.” 

Miccosukee, 559 F.3d at 1195. Because the district court stayed the case until Mr. 

Parris’s related state criminal proceedings were resolved, the order left him

effectively out of court. Thus, the order is a final decision, and we have appellate 

jurisdiction.

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 5 of 13 
6

III.

We turn to the district court’s decision to abstain from hearing Mr. Parris’s 

claims alleging violations of his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. We review a district court’s decision to abstain under Younger for abuse of 

discretion. For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, Ga., 281 F.3d 1209, 

1216 (11th Cir. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court “fails to 

apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the 

determination.” Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 

2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude there was no abuse of 

discretion here. 

Federal courts abstain from hearing cases that would interfere with state 

court proceedings when (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) the 

proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate 

opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceedings. 31 Foster 

Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003); see Younger, 401 U.S. 37. 

But Younger abstention is not warranted if “(1) there is evidence of state 

proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) the state law being challenged is patently 

unconstitutional, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the 

constitutional issues can be raised.” For Your Eyes Alone, 281 F.3d at 1214 n.11.

In analyzing Younger abstention, we must consider whether the “district court 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 6 of 13 
7

should have granted relief on [the] day on which it abstained.” Redner v. Citrus 

Cnty., Fla., 919 F.2d 646, 649 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990). When a plaintiff seeks monetary 

damages and Younger abstention applies, a district court may stay the action, instead 

of dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, until the state proceedings have run their 

course. See Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1985).

The district court concluded that Younger abstention was appropriate

because resolving Mr. Parris’s claims that the officers fabricated evidence and 

violated his speedy trial rights would interfere with, and potentially undermine, the 

results of the state court proceedings. On appeal, Mr. Parris argues the district 

court abused its discretion because his state criminal proceedings had ended when 

the district court abstained.1

 Two days before the district court entered its order, 

the state court entered an order dead docketing Mr. Parris’s criminal case. The 

order states that if Mr. Parris made no contact with his ex-girlfriend for six months, 

the state would move to nolle prosequi his criminal case.

2

 

We hold that when the state court dead docketed Mr. Parris’s criminal case, 

the case remained ongoing. Under Georgia law, a dead docketed criminal case 

 

1 Mr. Parris has not argued on appeal that the district court erred in abstaining because the 

state proceedings were motivated by bad faith or that the state court action was an inadequate 

forum to raise his constitutional claims. Because Mr. Parris has not briefed these issues on 

appeal, we deem them abandoned. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on 

appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” (internal citation omitted)), 

2 Although the state court’s order was not filed with the district court and is not part of 

the record on appeal, we will take judicial notice of it. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 7 of 13 
8

remains pending and is not terminated because dead docketing is simply a 

“procedural device by which the prosecution is postponed indefinitely but may be 

reinstated any time at the pleasure of the court.” State v. Creel, 454 S.E. 2d 804, 

805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The state court’s 

order further shows that the case remained pending because the prosecution agreed 

to nolle prosequi the case, which would terminate it, only if Mr. Parris refrained 

from contacting his ex-girlfriend for six months from the date of the order. 

Because Mr. Parris’s state criminal case was pending at the time that the district 

court entered its order, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

abstained from deciding his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims 

pursuant to Younger.

3

 

IV.

We next turn to Mr. Parris’s argument that the district court erred when it 

dismissed his Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims as barred by

collateral estoppel.4

 We review the district court’s decision de novo. Leal v. Ga. 

Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). Although we agree with the 

 

3 If and when Mr. Parris’s criminal case is terminated because, for example, the 

prosecutor moves to nolle prosequi the case and the motion is granted, Mr. Parris may file a 

motion in the district court to lift the stay on his claims seeking money damages.

4 In the district court, Mr. Parris also alleged that the officers violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by maliciously prosecuting him. But on appeal, Mr. Parris has made no 

argument that the district court erred in dismissing his malicious prosecution claim and thus has 

abandoned this argument. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 8 of 13 
9

district court that collateral estoppel bars Mr. Parris’s false arrest claim, we hold 

that collateral estoppel does not bar his claims alleging the officers performed an 

illegal search and failed to inform him of his Miranda rights. 

“[C]ollateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue that has already 

been litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding.” Pleming v. Universal-Rundle 

Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998). Collateral estoppel applies when: (1) 

“the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior proceeding,” (2) “the 

issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding,” (3) the determination of the 

issue in the prior litigation was a “critical and necessary part” of the judgment in 

the first action, and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a 

“full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). When the same court made the decision in the prior 

proceeding, the court may apply preclusion principles sua sponte. See Shurick v. 

Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010). 

We conclude that collateral estoppel bars Mr. Parris’s false arrest claim. 

First, in both Parris I and this case, Mr. Parris asserted that the officers lacked 

probable cause to arrest him. Although Mr. Parris sued Officer Weaver in Parris I

and now brings claims against six other officers, there is no requirement of 

mutuality of parties for collateral estoppel to apply. See Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. 

Claimant State of Fla., Dep’t of Transp., 768 F.2d 1558, 1578 (11th Cir. 1985). 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 9 of 13 
10

Second, in Parris I, the parties litigated the issue of whether there was probable 

cause to arrest Mr. Parris, and the district court resolved this issue when it held at 

summary judgment that probable cause to arrest existed. Third, the determination 

that there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Parris was a critical and necessary part 

of the judgment in Parris I because the district court granted Officer Weaver 

summary judgment on this basis. Fourth, Mr. Parris had a full and fair opportunity 

to litigate whether probable cause for his arrest existed in Parris I. He had the 

opportunity to take discovery to gather facts to support his false arrest claim and 

submitted a brief opposing Officer Weaver’s summary judgment motion in which 

he argued there was no probable cause. 

Mr. Parris argues he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

existence of probable cause in Parris I because Officer Weaver produced a dash 

cam video depicting the arrest after discovery closed. But Mr. Parris knew of and 

relied upon the video in Parris I to argue there was no probable cause for his arrest 

in his objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that summary judgment 

should be granted. In overruling the objection, the district court explained that it 

had considered Mr. Parris’s arguments and found them to be without merit. Given 

these facts, we reject Mr. Parris’s argument that he lacked a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate probable cause for his arrest in Parris I. Thus, we conclude

that collateral estoppel bars Mr. Parris’s false arrest claim. 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 10 of 13 
11

But collateral estoppel does not bar Mr. Parris’s claims alleging the officers 

performed an illegal search and violated his Miranda rights. Although Mr. Parris 

sought leave to amend his complaint to add similar claims against Officer Weaver 

in Parris I, the district court denied him leave to add the claims. Even assuming

that the issues of whether there was probable cause to search Mr. Parris or whether 

there was a Miranda violation were actually litigated in Parris I, we cannot say 

that the district court’s determination that these claims failed as a matter of law 

was a “critical and necessary part of the judgment” in Parris I. See Pleming, 142 

F.3d at 1359. The determination was not a critical or necessary part of the 

judgment because the district court alternatively denied Mr. Parris leave to amend 

his complaint and add these claims on a wholly separate ground: the prejudice to 

Officer Weaver of allowing Mr. Parris to add new claims after he had moved for 

summary judgment. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. i (1982) 

(explaining that when a court provides two alternative bases for its decision “either 

of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the 

judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone” for purposes 

of collateral estoppel). Accordingly, the district court erred when it concluded that 

collateral estoppel barred Mr. Parris’s illegal search and Miranda claims.5

 

 

5 We also cannot say that Mr. Parris is collaterally estopped from bringing an illegal 

search claim based on the district court’s conclusion in Parris I that the officers had probable 

cause to arrest Mr. Parris. The question in this case is different: whether the officers had 

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 11 of 13 
12

Nevertheless, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Parris’s § 1983 

claim alleging that the officers violated his Miranda rights for failure to state a 

claim. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1301 

(11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that we may affirm for any reason supported by the 

record, even if not relied upon by the district court). Mr. Parris alleges that the 

officers failed to follow Miranda procedures because they gave him no Miranda 

warning and continued to question him after he requested an attorney and invoked 

his right to remain silent. But we have recognized that an allegation that officers 

failed to follow Miranda procedures is insufficient to “assert[] a violation of a 

constitutional right in order to state a cause of action under § 1983.” Jones v. 

Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In Jones, we explained that the right to counsel during custodial interrogations 

recognized in Miranda was “merely a procedural safeguard, and not a substantive 

right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this precedent, we must 

conclude that Mr. Parris failed to state a claim under § 1983 because his allegation 

that the officers failed to follow Miranda procedures was insufficient to assert that 

the officers violated his substantive constitutional rights.

 

probable cause to search Mr. Parris when they first stopped him. In other words, we are required 

in this case to decide whether probable cause existed at a different, earlier moment during Mr. 

Parris’s encounter with the officers. Because the issue at stake in this case is not identical to the 

issue decided in Parris I, there is no collateral estoppel bar. See Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1359.

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 12 of 13 
13

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. We 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Parris’s claims except for the illegal 

search claim. We further affirm the district court’s order staying Mr. Parris’s Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendment claims for money damages pending resolution of his 

state criminal proceedings. We vacate the district court’s dismissal of the illegal 

search claim. Upon remand, the district court should consider whether it is 

appropriate to abstain from hearing this claim pending resolution of Mr. Parris’s 

state criminal proceedings. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Case: 14-12360 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 13 of 13