IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

LUBBOCK DIVISION 

JOHN GABRIEL RIOS, 

Institutional ID No. 11061 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

STATE OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants. 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:22-CV-266-BQ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Plaintiff John Gabriel Rios filed this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights based on a September 3, 2022 

arrest and subsequent detention. Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.

1 The United States District Judge 

transferred this case to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. 

ECF No. 17. The undersigned thereafter ·reviewed Rios's Complaint, as well as authenticated 

records from Lynn County, and ordered Rios to complete a questionnaire pursuant to Watson v. 

Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892- 93 (5th Cir. 1976). ECF No. 23. Rios completed and returned the 

questionnaire. ECF No. 32. 

Not all parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned magistrate judge. In 

accordance with the order of transfer, the undersigned makes the following findings and 

conclusions and recommends that the district judge dismiss all of Rios' s claims, except those for 

false arrest, unlawful detention, and conspiracy. As to Rios's false arrest, unlawful detention, and 

1 Page citations to Rios's Complaint refer to the electronic page number assigned by the Court's electronic filing 

system. 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 1 of 13 PageID 153
conspiracy claims, the undersigned recommends that the district judge stay and administratively 

close those claims until Rios's state criminal charges are resolved. 

I. Standard of Review 

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis by a prisoner against a 

government entity or employee if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § l 915(e)(2)(B)(2017); see also§ 1915A(b) (applying 

section to any suit by a prisoner against certain governmental entities, regardless of whether the 

prisoner is proceeding informa pauperis). A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either 

in fact or in law, for the wrong alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A 

complaint has no arguable basis in fact if it rests upon clearly fanciful or baseless factual 

contentions, and similarly lacks an arguable basis in law if it embraces indisputably meritle~s legal 

theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371,373 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). When 

analyzing a prisoner's complaint, the court may consider reliable evidence such as the plaintiff's 

allegations, responses to a questionnaire, and authenticated prison records. See Wilson v. 

Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483- 84 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th 

Cir. 1999) ( explaining that responses to a questionnaire or testimony given during an evidentiary 

hearing are incorporated into the plaintiff's pleadings); Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232,234 

(5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that courts may dismiss prisoners' informa pauperis claims 

as frivolous based on "medical and other prison records if they are adequately identified or 

authenticated" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations 

as true, but do not credit conclusory allegations or assertions that merely restate the legal elements 

2 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 2 of 13 PageID 154
of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467,469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). And 

while courts hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing 

complaints, such plaintiffs must nevertheless plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief 

above a speculative level. Id. (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 

2002)). 

II. Discussion 

A. Rios's Allegations and the Authenticated Records 

Rios asserts claims against the following Defendants: (1) State of Texas; (2) Lynn County 

Sheriff's Office (LCSO); (3) LCSO Officer Joshua Rocha; (4) LCSO Officer Katrina White, Lynn 

County Jail Administrator; ( 5) LCSO Sheriff Wanda Mason; ( 6) LCSO Officer J. Harrison, jail or; 

(7) LCSO Officer Fernando Portillo, jailor; (8) LCSO Lt. Alvarez; (9) LCSO Officer Aaron 

Vasquez,jailor; (10) LCSO Officer Ann Barrientez,jailor; and (11) LCSO Officer Alvarez,jailor. 

Compl. 3-4. 

Rios alleges that on September 3, 2022, Officer Rocha falsely arrested him. Id. at 5; 

Questionnaire I, ECF No. 32. According to Rios, Officer Rocha "did not have a warrant" to arrest 

him, nor did Rocha "go to the district court and file a complaint with the clerk ... before ... taking 

[Rios] into custody." Questionnaire 1. Officer Rocha allegedly transported Rios to the Lynn 

County Jail (Jail), where Officers Rocha, Barrientez, Vasquez, Portillo, Harrison, and Alvarez, as 

well as Lt. Alvarez, Administrator White, and Sheriff Mason, falsely detained Rios and subjected 

him to unlawful conditions of confinement.2 Comp 1. 6-8; Questionnaire 3, 5-7. 

2 The Court specifically asked Rios to affirm whether he was alleging any other claim against Officer Rocha, other 

than the false arrest claim. Questionnaire 3. Rios confim1ed that he asserts "a false imprisonment" claim, as well as 

allegations raised in other actions. Id. 

3 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 3 of 13 PageID 155
Rios further contends that all Defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights. 

Questionnaire 12- 13; see Compl. 3. Rios asserts that the State ofTexas, LCSO, and Sheriff Mason 

are responsible for the foregoing constitutional violations under a theory of vicarious liability. See 

Questionnaire 9- 12; see Compl. 3. 

Rios seeks monetary damages, "exonerations of all claims of interest tangible or 

intangible," "complete dissolution of the State of Texas government organization," and "20 years 

for all known committing the violation." Compl. 5-8. 

B. Some relief sought by Rios-exoneration and filing criminal charges against 

Defendants-is unavailable in this § 1983 action. 

To the extent Rios asks this Court to dismiss the pending state criminal charges against 

him or to otherwise exonerate him (id. at 6), he must pursue such relief through a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus.3 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973); Carson v. Johnson, 112 

F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (providing that a habeas petition "is the proper vehicle to seek release 

from custody"); Newman v. Reed, No. 3:18-CV-2679-N-BH, 2019 WL 652963, at *1-2 (N.D. 

Tex. Jan. 10, 2019) (recognizing plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 

in seeking dismissal of his state criminal case under § 1983, explaining that plaintiff could "only 

obtain declaratory or monetary relief in [a] § 1983 action"), R. & R. adopted by 2019 WL 6524 71 

(N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2019). 

Rios also possesses no right to have someone criminally prosecuted, and he cannot enforce 

criminal statutes through a civil request for relief.4 See, e.g., Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 

(5th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no "constitutional right to have someone criminally 

3 The Court does not construe Rios's request as a habeas petition because he clearly filed this action under * I 983. 

See Compl. 1- 8. 

4 For this reason, any purported claims based on violations of the Texas Penal Code or federal criminal statutes are 

frivolous and should be dismissed. See id. at 3-4; Questionnaire 11. 

4 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 4 of 13 PageID 156
prosecuted"); Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (N.D. Tex. 2007) ("Simply, a 

private citizen cannot enforce criminal statutes in a civil action."). 

The undersigned therefore recommends the district judge dismiss the foregoing claims for 

relief. Thus, the only potentially viable relief Rios seeks is monetary damages.5 Compl. 5-8. 

C. The Lynn County Sheriff's Office lacks the capacity to be sued. 

Rios names LCSO as a Defendant. Id. at 1; Questionnaire 9. Because LCSO is a non-jural 

entity, Rios cannot state a cognizable claim against it. 

"Federal courts in Texas have uniformly held that entities without a separate jural existence 

are not subject to suit." Torti v. Hughes, No. 3:07-CV-1476-M, 2007 WL 4403983, at *2 (N.D. 

Tex. Dec. 17, 2007) (citing cases for support); see Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Dep 't, 915 F. 

Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (quoting Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep 't, 939 F.2d 311, 313 

(5th Cir. 1991)) ("In Texas, county sheriffs and police departments generally are not legal entities 

capable of being sued, absent express action by the superior corporation (the county, in the case of 

the sheriff's department) 'to grant the servient agency withjural authority.'"). Rios has not pleaded 

any facts demonstrating a grant of jural authority to LCSO. Questionnaire 10. On this basis alone, 

the district judge should dismiss LCSO. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Denton Cnty. Sherf(f's Office, No. 

4:18-CV-00343-RAS-CAN, 2021 WL 4025800, at *6- 7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2021) (concluding 

Denton County She1iff's Office, a non-jural entity, should be dismissed, where plaintiff "ha[ d] not 

alleged that the [it] ha[ d] been granted the power to sue or be sued"), R. & R. adopted by 202 l WL 

3931116 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2021 ); Rambo v. Valdez, No. 3: 16-CV-002-O, 2016 WL 4398969, at 

5 Rios also seeks injunctive relief in the fom1 of dissolving the Texas government. Comp!. 5-8. During Texas's 

storied history. six flags have flown over its ''Empire wide and glorious." William J. Marsh & Gladys Yoakum Wright, 

Texas, Our Texas ( 1924). Rios cites no authority supporting the proposition this Court can order dissolution of Texas's 

current government. For this reason, among others, the Court declines the invitation and thereby obviates the need 

for possibly adding a seventh. 

5 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 5 of 13 PageID 157
*2 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2016) (recommending dismissal of non-jural entities, including the Dallas 

County Sheriffs Office). 

In addition, the Court observes that LCSO cannot be liable for the actions of its employees, 

e.g., those working in the department, because 42 U .S.C. § 1983 does not impose vicarious 

liability. Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1988). The undersigned therefore 

recommends the distiict judge dismiss as frivolous and with prejudice any claim against LCSO. 

D. The State of Texas enjoys sovereign immunity. 

Section 1983 provides for liability against any person who, acting under color of law, 

deprives an individual of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017). Neither states nor state agencies are 

"persons" against whom a § 1983 claim can be asserted. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. 

of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 

(1989)); see Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66 ("Our conclusion that a State is not a 'person' within the 

meaning of§ 1983 is reinforced by Congress' purpose in enacting the statute."). As such, the State 

of Texas is not a proper Defendant in this § 1983 action. Further, the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity bars Rios's claims against the State of Texas, "regardless of whether [he] seeks damages 

or injunctive relief." Gutierrez v. State of Texas, No. 3:16-CV-310-B, 2016 WL 3681414, at *2 

(N.D. Tex. May 11, 2016) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.s: 89, 101-

02 (1984)), R. & R. adopted by 2016 WL 3676586 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2016); see Cox v. Texas, 354 

F. App'x 901, 902 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to all 

suits brought against States and their agencies ... regardless of the relief sought." (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)); Jennings v. Abbott, 538 F. Supp. 3d 682, 691 (N.D. Tex. 

2021) ("The State of Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity from section 1983 claims."). 

6 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 6 of 13 PageID 158
Accordingly, Rios's § 1983 claims against the State of Texas should be dismissed. See 

Swisher v. Tex. Workers, Nos. 93-2388, 93-02591 , 93-2655, 1994 WL 733517, at* l (5th Cir. Dec. 

30, 1994) (per curiam) (affirming district court's dismissal of the State of Texas as a defendant 

and noting that Texas "is not a 'person' that can be liable under § 1983"). 

E. The district judge should stay Rios's false arrest, unlawful detention, and conspiracy 

claims pending resolution of his state criminal charges. 

Rios contends that Officer Rocha falsely anested him on September 3, 2022. Compl. 5; 

Questionnaire 1- 2. Although unclear, Rios appears to allege that the anest was unlawful because 

Officer Rocha (1) "did not have a wanant for [Rios] describing as near as possible," (2) did not 

"file a complaint with the clerk," and (3) had no "record for a conviction" for which Rios was to 

serve jail time. Questionnaire 1. Rios alleges that Officer Rocha transported him to the Jail, where 

Officers Rocha, Barrientez, Vasquez, Portillo, Hanison, and Alvarez, as well as Lt. Alvarez, 

Administrator White, and Sheriff Mason falsely detained him. Compl. 3-4, 6- 8; Questionnaire 5, 

7. Finally, Rios asserts that Defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights by continuing 

to prosecute him and "assisting [Officer] Rocha in the false imprisonment." Questionnaire 12- 13. 

Rios acknowledges, and the authenticated records confirm, that as a result of the September 

3 arrest, he was charged with, inter alia, possession of a controlled substance. 6 Id. at 2; see Com pl. 

10. Rios appeared before a state court magistrate judge the same day, who set bail at $5,000 on 

that charge. Questionnaire 2; Compl. 10, 17. 

In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking to 

recover damages for hann "caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid" must first prove that "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct 

6 Officer Rocha also arrested him for resisting arrest. search, or transport and interference with public duties. 

Questionnaire 2. According to Rios, those two charges are "not being continued." Id. 

7 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 7 of 13 PageID 159
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tiibunal authorized to make such 

dete1mination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." 

512 U.S. 477, 486- 87 (1994). Where a favorable judgment in the civil-rights action would 

"necessarily imply the invalidity of [a prisoner's] conviction or sentence" in his criminal case, the 

civil claim is barred unless the criminal conviction has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid. 

Id. at 487; see also Deleon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649,652 (5th Cir. 2007) ("When a 

plaintiff alleges tort claims against his arresting officers, the district court must first consider 

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction 

or sentence" and if it does, "the claim is barred." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Generally, Heck does not apply to pending criminal charges. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); Deleon, 488 F.3d at 655. Still, where Heck has possible future 

application, the court should stay the civil-rights action pending the outcome of the criminal case. 

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393- 94 ("If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted 

... it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil 

action until the criminal case ... is ended."); see Busick v. City o.f Madison, 90 F. App 'x 713, 713-

14 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (finding that the lower court should have stayed plaintiffs§ 1983 

claims pending resolution of his criminal proceedings because it was impossible to determine 

whether the civil claims necessarily implicated the validity of any conviction or sentence the 

plaintiff might receive); see also Boyd v. Farrin, 575 F. App'x 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2014) (per 

cmiam) (providing that although the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to claims for 

monetary damages, "the proper course of action is for a district court to stay the claims for damages 

pending the outcome of the state proceedings, such that they can move forward without 

interference"). This is because "until the pending criminal case has run its course, ... it may be 

8 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 8 of 13 PageID 160
difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the" § 1983 claim and the criminal charge. 

Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that if it is "premature 

to detennine whether or not [plaintiffs] damages claims are barred under Heck," "[t]he court 

may-indeed should- stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until" conclusion of the criminal 

proceedings). 

Rios's false arrest, unlawful detention, and conspiracy claims "relate to rulings that will 

likely be made" in his pending criminal case (Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393), resulting in such claims 

potentially being Heck-barred. See, e.g., Profit v. Ouachita Par. , 411 F. App'x 708, 708-09 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (approving district court's stay of plaintiffs§ 1983 claims attacking the 

"the legality of [his] ... arrest, prosecution, and detention" "until the alleged improper state 

criminal prosecution was concluded"); Diaz v. Ellis Cnty. Jail, No. 3:23-CV-402-E-BK, 2023 WL 

3395129, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2023) (recommending the district judge stay plaintiffs "claims 

that [d]efendants allegedly falsely arrested him and t[a]mpered with the evidence" until state 

criminal proceedings resolve), R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 3400522 (N.D. Tex. May 11 , 2023); 

Hunter v. Watkins, No. 3:14-CV- 1894- B- BH, 2015 WL 505430, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2015) 

(providing that plaintiffs allegation that officer "prepared a false police document in order to have 

him arrested and engaged in a conspiracy to file a false criminal case against him" must be stayed 

pending the outcome of state criminal proceedings against plaintiff), R. & R. adopted by 2015 WL 

509360 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2015). The undersigned therefore recommends that the district judge 

stay Rios's false arrest, unlawful detention, and conspiracy claims until the state c1iminal charges 

are resolved. 

9 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 9 of 13 PageID 161
F. Rios has not pleaded adequate facts showing that Defendants housed him in 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 

Rios asserts that Defendants "subject[ ed] [him] to bodily injury through living conditions" 

while at the Jail between September 3 and December 11, 2022. Compl. 6; Questionnaire 6-7. The 

Court asked Rios to "[ s ]pecifically describe the living conditions that alleged[ly] caused [him] 

bodily injury," but Rios provided no facts in support. Questionnaire 7. Instead, he stated: 

I was disabled as a person subject to the discretion of Lynn County Sheriffs Office 

employee's rules, policies, meal plan, hygiene, foreign bank account, phone 

system, commissary, camera system, protected computers, weapons used to keep 

me restrained. I was not innocent until proven guilty I was serving a sentence for 

a crime that had no conviction. I was taken away from my family, subject to the 

life of pain and suffering trying to cure a sickness that was not found, subject to the 

mental knowledge of it all at the moment and then having to endure the mutation 

of the living conditions. 

Id. (brackets omitted). 

The Constitution "prohibits the imposition of conditions of confinement on pretrial 

detainees that constitute ' punishment."' Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) 

(quoting Bell v. Wo(fish, 441 US. 520,535 (1979)). Where the challenged "restriction or condition 

is not reasonably related" "to a legitimate governmental objective," coutis "may infer" a punitive 

purpose. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Nevertheless, de minimis restrictions do not amount to 

punishment, no matter a defendant's intent. See id. at 539 & n.21 (defining "punishment" to 

include "arbitrary or purposeless" action but noting that there is "a de minimis level of imposition 

with which the Constitution is not concerned"); Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 106 (affoming dismissal of 

detainee's conditions of confinement claim, where he was subjected to a "de minimis level of 

imposition" such that the conditions did not amount to punishment). To establish a viable 

conditions of confinement claim, a detainee must demonstrate: "( 1) a rule or restriction or ... the 

existence of an identifiable intended condition or practice ... or that the jail official's acts or 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 10 of 13 PageID 162
omissions were sufficiently extended or pervasive'; (2) which was not reasonably related to a 

legitimate governmental objective; and (3) which caused the violation of [the detainee's] 

constitutional rights." Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) (brackets, 

internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

7 

Rios generally complains about conditions at the Jail, but he pleads no supporting facts 

showing Defendants subjected him to unlawful conditions. See Questionnaire 7. Rios's vague 

and conclusory assertions are insufficient to implicate the Constitution. See DeMarco v. Davis, 

914 F.3d 383, 386- 87 (5th Cir. 2019) ("We do not accept as true conclusory allegations, 

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." (quoting Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 

544 (5th Cir. 2010))); Sias v. Louisiana, 146 F. App'x 719, 720 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) 

(holding that vague and conclusory assertions provide an insufficient basis for § 1983 claims); 

Thompson v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., Ouachita Par., No. 3:12- cv- 1645, 2012 WL 6600338, at *3 

(W.D. La. Sept. 25, 2012) (explaining that "in order to be afforded the benefits of th[e] assumption 

[that plaintiffs factual allegations are true,] a civil rights plaintiff must support his claims with 

specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory 

allegations"). 8 As such, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss his claim. 

7 Based on Rios's allegations, the Court construes his assertions as a conditions of confinement claim, rather than one 

based on an episodic act or omission. See, e.g., Estate of Henson 1·. Wichita Cnty., 795 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(explaining that "[a]n episodic-acts-or-omissions claim ... faults specific jail officials for their acts or omissions," 

while "[a] challenge to a condition of confinement is a challenge to general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions 

of pretrial confinement" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Regardless of the legal theory, however, 

Rios's claim is conclusory and should therefore be dismissed. 

8 To the extent Rios's questionnaire responses may be construed as raising First Amendment, "Fourth Amendment 

inside the Jail," involuntary servitude, or excessive bail claims, they fail for the same reason. Questionnaire 7. Any 

speedy trial claim is likewise without merit. See Rayford v. Dall. Cnty. Sher({f's Dep 't, No. 3: 14-CV-486-L, 2014 

WL 13 18447. at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (providing that a~ 1983 plaintiff must first raise a speedy trial claim 

in the state trial court by filing a motion, "and then by petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals" (citing Chapman v. Evans, 744 S.W.2d 133, 135- 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988))); see also Kimble 1·. Par. of 

Jefferson, No. 21-409. 2021 WL 6618459, at *9 (E.D. La. Nov.3.2021) ("fW]hen a detainee like [plaintiff] seeks ' to 

enforce the state's obligation to bring him promptly to trial,' that relief is available only through habeas corpus 

proceedings." (quoting Brown v. Este!le, 530 F.2d 1280, 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. I 976))), R. & R. adopted by 2022 WL 

185197 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2022), aff'd, 2023 WL 1793876 (5th Cir. Feb. 7. 2023). 

11 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 11 of 13 PageID 163
III. Recommendation 

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the United States District Judge 

dismiss with prejudice Rios's following claims-those: (1) for unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement; (2) against the LCSO; (3) against the State of Texas; ( 4) requesting exoneration; and 

( 5) asse1ied under criminal statutes and that seek prosecution of Defendants. As to Rios' s claims 

for false arrest, unlawful detention, and conspiracy against Defendants Officer Rocha, Officer 

White, Sheriff Mason, Officer Harrison, Officer Portillo, Lt. Alvarez, Officer Vasquez, Officer 

Barrientez, and Officer Alvarez, the undersigned recommends that the district judge stay them 

pending resolution ofRios's state criminal charges. The undersigned recommends that the district 

judge direct the Clerk of Court to close this action for administrative purposes and require Rios to 

file a motion to reopen the case within sixty days of the date that the state criminal proceedings 

are no longer pending. 

IV. Right to Object 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) (2016); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding, conclusion, or recommendation to which objection is made, 

state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's Findings, 

Conclusions, and Recommendation where the disputed detennination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. 

Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual 

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district 

12 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 12 of 13 PageID 164
comt, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n, 79 F.3d 

1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Dated: September 2!j, 2023 . 

D. GORDON BRYANT ?JR. 

UNITED ST A TES M GISTRA TE JUDGE 

13 

Case 5:22-cv-00266-C Document 35 Filed 09/29/23 Page 13 of 13 PageID 165