1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DEWOLFF, BOBERG & § 

ASSOCIATES, INC., § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

 § Civil Action No.: 3:22-CV-2489-K 

v. § 

 § 

ED CLARK, § 

§ 

 Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Ed Clark’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 

7) and brief in support (Doc. No. 8) (together, the “Motion”). Plaintiff filed a 

Response in Opposition (the “Response”) (Doc. No. 12) and Defendant filed a Reply 

in Support (the “Reply”) (Doc. No. 15). The Court has carefully considered the 

Motion, the Response, the Reply, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable 

law. Defendant fails to establish that Plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law for 

breach of contract based on the non-compete covenant; therefore, the Court DENIES 

the Motion as to the breach of contract claim (Count 1). The Court GRANTS the 

Motion as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim (Count 2) because it is preempted

under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, to the extent it is based on 

misappropriation of trade secrets, and Plaintiff fails to state this claim with facial 

plausibility on another basis. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is a global management 

consulting company that specifically focuses on senior management and executives. 

Doc. No. 1-6, Ex. D-1 (Pl.’s Pet.) at 3. In building its business, Plaintiff alleges it “has 

developed and fiercely guarded its proprietary and confidential process” which includes

a three-part process used with each client “involving (1) Sales and Marketing; (2) 

Analysis; and (3) Operations.” Id. at 3-4. If the client follows this “proprietary” threepart process, Plaintiff guarantees “a 20-30 percent improvement in performance within 

six months of engagement.” Id. at 4.

Defendant Ed Clark began working for Plaintiff in January 2018 as a 

Management Consultant. Id. His employment agreement with Defendant includes a 

provision prohibiting Defendant from disclosing confidential information, competing 

with Plaintiff, and soliciting Plaintiff’s clients. Id. Due to his position, Defendant “was 

provided access to [Plaintiff’s] proprietary systems and processes, diagnostic materials, 

templates, intellectual property, software, and other non-public, confidential, and 

commercially-sensitive materials and data concerning [Plaintiff’s] analysis and 

operational approaches” which Plaintiff defines as its “Trade Secrets.” Id. at 6. In May 

2022, Defendant suddenly resigned his position. Id. at 7. Days before Defendant left 

his job, Plaintiff alleges he “accessed, downloaded, and forwarded to himself Trade 

Secrets from [Plaintiff’s] database.” Id. Plaintiff later learned that Defendant was hired 

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by one of its direct competitors, the Randall Powers Company (“Powers”), and that 

Defendant “is performing the same job functions” for Powers. Id.

Plaintiff filed this suit in state court against Defendant, asserting claims for (1) 

breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) misappropriation of trade 

secrets, and seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. 

Defendant removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and 

filed this Motion.

II. Standards of Review

Upon considering a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must presume all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff’s 

complaint to be true, and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency 

of its claims in its favor. Kane Enters. v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th 

Cir. 2003); Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009); see Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the court must take as true all of the 

factual allegations in the complaint, but it is not “bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 

court may consider only “the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, 

and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and 

referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 

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F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Kane Enters., 322 

F.3d at 374 (plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to 

avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim). If a plaintiff pleads facts which allow the 

court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct, the 

claim has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Although not the same as a 

“probability requirement,” facial plausibility calls for “more than a sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 556 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not 

‘show[n]’–‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. Partial Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss two of Plaintiff’s three claims for failure to state a 

claim: (1) breach of contract (Count 1) and (2) breach of fiduciary duty (Count 2). 

Defendant does not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for misappropriation of trade 

secrets (Count 3).

A. Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is based on Defendant’s alleged breach of two 

separate contractual provisions within Defendant’s Employment Agreement (the 

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“Agreement”): (1) non-disclosure of confidential information and (2) non-compete for 

one year after leaving Plaintiff’s employment. Doc. No. 1-6 at 8. Defendant does not 

move to dismiss the breach of contract claim based on his alleged violation of the nondisclosure provision. Instead, Defendant’s argument centers solely on the breach of 

contract claim arising from the non-compete covenant. See Doc. No. 12 at 1. Thus, 

the Court addresses this contractual provision only. Defendant contends that the noncompete covenant is unenforceable as being overly broad and ambiguous making it

impossible for a former employee to comply. Plaintiff responds that the non-compete 

covenant is reasonable and “narrowly tailored to specifically protect [Plaintiff’s] 

business interests.” Doc. No. 12 at 5. Plaintiff asserts that, even if the non-compete 

covenant is unreasonable, the Court is required under Texas law to reform the covenant 

rather than dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6). In his reply, Defendant reasserts his 

argument that the non-compete covenant is unenforceable and that, even if the Court 

were to reform the covenant, dismissal is still required. Doc. No. 15 at 2-8.

The Court must first determine which state’s law applies to this claim. In his 

Motion, Defendant states that the Agreement is governed by Delaware law and very 

generally addresses in one paragraph the treatment of these types of covenants under 

Delaware law. Doc. No. 8 at 10-11. Defendant then asserts that the Court may “agree 

that Texas law applies”, id. at 11 (citing DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc’s v. Pethick, Civ. Action 

No. 3:20-CV-3649-L, 2022 WL 4589161, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022)(Lindsay, 

J.) (applying Texas law to the same contract)) and concedes that Texas has the more 

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substantial connection to this matter. Id. Plaintiff goes on to cite exclusively to Texas 

law but concludes that the non-compete covenant is unenforceable under either 

Delaware law or Texas law. Id. at 12-15. Plaintiff, without any explanation or choiceof-law argument, “takes the position in its Response that Texas law applies.” Doc. No. 

12 at 3 n.1. In his Reply, Defendant again fails to submit a specific argument 

regarding the choice-of-law provision and which state law applies, just stating that 

under either state’s law this claim fails. Doc. No. 15 at 2, 6-8.

The Agreement here indeed contains a choice-of-law provision which provides: 

“This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 

the State of Delaware.” Doc. No. 1-6 at 20. Based on the briefing, however, it 

appeared to the Court that the parties believe Texas law applies here; both parties 

dedicate the bulk, if not all, of their respective arguments to this issue based on Texas 

law. As previously noted, neither party presents a proper choice of law argument to 

the Court. To provide some clarity on this issue, the Court ordered the parties to file 

either a joint stipulation that no conflict between Delaware law and Texas law exists 

on this issue or, if no agreement could be reached, briefing which includes a proper 

choice of law argument. See Doc. No. 35. The parties timely filed a joint Stipulation 

Regarding Choice of Law in which they “stipulate that no conflict exists between 

Delaware and Texas law on the issue of enforceability of the underlying restrictive 

covenants and that Texas law applies to the contract claim, as applied by each of the 

Parties in their filings to date.” Doc. No. 36 at 1. In light of the parties’ agreement 

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and stipulation that Texas law applies to the contract claims here, the Court applies 

Texas law in determining the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings to state a claim for 

breach of contract. See also Pethick, 2022 WL 4589161, at *9 (“As the parties both 

agree that Texas law applies, the Court’s analysis will also apply Texas law.”); cf. R.R. 

Mgmt. Co., L.L.C. v. CFS La. Midstream Co., 428 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Where 

there are no differences between the relevant substantive laws of the respective states, 

there is no conflict, and a court need not undertake a choice of law analysis.”); Hoffman 

v. L & M Arts, 774 F. Supp. 2d 826, 846 (N.D. Tex. 2011)(Fitzwater, CJ) (citing R.R. 

Mgmt., 428 F.3d at 222).

The Court now turns to the sufficiency of the breach of contract claim based on 

the non-compete covenant. “Reasonable covenants not to compete serve the legitimate 

business interest of preventing departing employees from ‘using the business contacts 

and rapport established’ during their employment to take the employer’s clients with 

them when they leave.” D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 211 (5th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 387 (Tex. 1991)). 

To be enforceable under Texas law, a non-compete covenant must include “limitations 

as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable 

and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the good will or other 

business interest” of the employer. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a). (The parties 

do not dispute the enforceability of the Agreement containing the non-compete 

covenant. See id.) Thus, courts have found non-compete covenants which do not 

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include a geographical restriction or which “‘extend to clients with whom the employee 

had no dealings during her employment’ or amount to industry-wide exclusions are 

‘overbroad and unreasonable.’” D’Onofrio, 888 F.3d at 211 (quoting Gallagher 

Healthcare Ins. Servs. v. Vogelsang, 312 S.W.2d 640, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) and citing Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 387)). The inquiry 

does not end there, however, for “[s]ection 15.51 of the Texas Business and Commerce 

Code requires courts to reform covenants found to be unreasonable as to time, 

geographical area, or scope of activity.” D’Onofrio, 888 F.3d at 212 (citing § 15.51(c)).

The non-compete covenant at issue here precludes Defendant, for a specified 

period of time, from “serv[ing] in any capacity, job or function . . . for any organization 

or entity that provides productive utilization services to any [DeWolff, Boberg & 

Associates] Clients.” Doc. No. 1-6 at 5. This covenant contains the required temporal 

restriction, but does not include a geographical restriction, and is not limited to 

Plaintiff’s clients with whom Defendant had dealings. See D’Onofrio, 888 F.3d at 211. 

Accordingly, under well-established law, the Court concludes that the non-compete 

covenant is “over broad and unreasonable.” D’Onofrio, 888 F.3d at 211; see TEX. BUS.

& COM. CODE § 15.50(a); see also Pethick, 2022 WL 4589161, at *9 (reviewing the same 

non-compete covenant between DeWolff, Boberg & Associates and another former 

employee, the court found the covenant to be “overly broad and unenforceable as 

written[.]”).

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However, the Court also concludes that dismissal of the breach of contract claim 

as to the non-compete covenant is not appropriate at this stage and based on this 

briefing. See also Pethick, 2022 WL 4589161, at *9 (despite finding the covenant 

“overly broad and unenforceable”, the court determined that dismissal was 

“premature”). Reformation was first raised in Plaintiff’s Response wherein Plaintiff 

argues Texas law requires reformation, and reformation, rather than dismissal, is the 

proper remedy. Doc. No. 12 at 6. In his Reply, Defendant contends that reformation 

cannot save the non-compete covenant because the conduct giving rise to the claim has 

already occurred. Doc. No. 15 at 6-7. In a footnote, Defendant states that reformation 

is moot based on the expiration of the restriction. Id. at 7 n.5. The parties’ briefing 

on this issue of reformation is lacking and Defendant did not demonstrate that Plaintiff 

cannot recover as a matter of law “even under a noncompete covenant that has been 

reformed.” Orthoflex, Inc. v. Thermotek, Inc., Civ. Action No. 3:11-CV-0870-D, 2011 WL 

5879330, at *1 (N.D. Tex Nov. 23, 2011)(Fitzwater, CJ). Accordingly, at the motion 

to dismiss stage, the Court does not decide whether the non-compete covenant could 

or should be reformed and whether Plaintiff could recover against Defendant for breach 

of contract if the non-compete covenant were reformed.

Having taken the well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court denies the Motion as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim (Count 1).

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B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

Plaintiff alleges a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on Defendant 

“stealing” Plaintiff’s “Trade Secrets”, including its “confidential customer 

information”, for his and his new employer’s benefit. Doc. No. 1-6 at 9. Plaintiff also 

alleges Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff “by accepting employment” 

with Powers, a direct competitor. Id. Defendant moves to dismiss this claim as being

preempted by the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”) because it is based on 

Defendant allegedly taking, using, and disclosing Plaintiff’s trade secrets. Doc. No. 8 

at 16-17. Plaintiff responds that this claim is not preempted because it is not based on 

Defendant’s misappropriation of Plaintiff’s trade secrets; but, even if it was based in 

part on trade secret misappropriation, the claim would not be preempted to the extent 

it is based on other conduct, such as Defendant accepting employment with Powers, a 

direct competitor, and “working duplicitously” for Plaintiff and Powers. Doc. No. 12 

at 8-10. In his Reply, Defendant concedes this claim is not preempted to the extent 

Plaintiff relies on “conduct unrelated to the misappropriation of information” as 

causing the injury. Doc. No. 15 at 8; see id. at 10. But Defendant contends it arises 

entirely from his alleged misappropriation of confidential business information or trade 

secret and, Plaintiff’s argument that it is based on Defendant’s “dual employment”

with Plaintiff and Powers at the same time is not grounded in the allegations in the

Petition. Id. at 8-10, 11.

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To establish a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the plaintiff must show (1) the 

existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. 

See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 

2017). Relevant to this tort claim, TUTSA includes a preemption provision which 

states, “Except as provided in Subsection (b), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, 

restitutionary, and other law of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation 

of a trade secret.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A. Subsection (b) provides: 

“This chapter does not affect: (1) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon 

misappropriation of a trade secret; (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon 

misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon 

misappropriation of a trade secret.” Id. “Trade secret” is defined under the statute as 

“all forms and types of information, including business . . . information, and any 

formula,” “plan,” “program device, program, code,” “process,” “or list of actual or 

potential customers” that (1) the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret 

and (2) derives independent economic value from not being generally known to or 

readily ascertained by another person through proper means. Id.§ 134A.002(6). 

“Misappropriation” includes “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who 

knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means” 

and “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent 

by a person who used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret” or 

“knew or had reason to know” that the person acquired the trade secret by improper 

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means. Id. § 134A.002(3). The statute defines “improper means” as including “theft,” 

and “breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, to limit use, or 

to prohibit discovery of a trade secret”. Id. § 134A.002(2).

Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed this, district courts in this 

circuit have consistently held that TUTSA’s preemption provision applies “to the 

extent a plaintiff’s tort claim is premised on the same facts as its claim for 

misappropriation”. Comput. Scis. Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., Civ. Action No. 

3:19-CV-970-X(BH), 2020 WL 2487057, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2020) (collecting 

cases), adopted by, 2020 WL 1428941 (March 24, 2020); see BKL Holdings, Inc. v. Globe 

Life Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 2432012, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2023) 

(“Although Texas courts have provided little guidance on the scope of TUTSA’s 

preemption provision, the majority of courts considering this issue—including this 

one—have held that TUTSA preempts all claims based on ‘the alleged improper taking 

of trade secret and confidential business information.’”). Here, Plaintiff alleges a claim 

for breach of fiduciary duty and also a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.

Having taken the well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is based, 

in part if not entirely, on Defendant’s misappropriation of trade secrets. Plaintiff 

alleges its “Trade Secrets” includes the “proprietary systems and processes, diagnostic 

materials, templates, intellectual property, software, and other non-public, 

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confidential, and commercially-sensitive materials and data concerning [Plaintiff’s] 

analysis and operational approaches.” Doc. No. 1-6 at 6. Plaintiff further alleges,

[It] has spent decades developing these Trade Secrets, which have 

resulted in [Plaintiff’s] success and competitive advantage in the 

marketplace. Likewise, should these Trade Secrets fall into the 

hands of a competitor, it would devastate [Plaintiff’s] hard-fought 

commercial and competitive advantage. Accordingly, [Plaintiff] 

goes to great lengths to fiercely guard its Trade Secrets, which are 

stored and maintained on [Plaintiff’s] servers.

Id. Plaintiff’s servers are allegedly password-protected and only “a small number” of 

employees whose jobs require this information have this password-protected access to 

these Trade Secrets. Id. Plaintiff alleges all employees are required to sign nondisclosure agreements related to this “highly sensitive information” and an employee’s 

access is revoked once it is no longer needed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that shortly before 

Defendant resigned, he “accessed, downloaded, and forwarded to himself Trade Secrets 

from [Plaintiff’s] database.” Id. at 7. Defendant allegedly resigned suddenly and began 

working immediately for Powers. Id. The information Defendant allegedly “stole” 

included Plaintiff’s “templates and information concerning [Plaintiff’s] systems, 

processes, approach and even about [Plaintiff’s] clients.” Id. Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant “misappropriated these Trade Secrets without [Plaintiff’s] knowledge or 

consent” and did so to benefit himself and Powers. Id. at 8. Specifically in support of 

its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendant “received confidential 

information, including access to [Plaintiff’s] confidential customer information[,]” and 

“breached his fiduciary duties to [Plaintiff] by accepting employment at Powers and, 

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before resigning, stealing [Plaintiff’s] Trade Secrets for his own and Powers benefit.” 

Id. at 9.

The Court finds that, as pled by Plaintiff, this claim is based on the information 

Defendant allegedly took, which was Plaintiff’s confidential business information or 

information that falls within the statutory definition of “trade secret”, such a customer 

lists. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(6); see also ScaleFactor, Inc. v. Process 

Pro Consulting, LLC, 394 F. Supp. 3d 680, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding that “TUTSA 

preempts claims based on the unauthorized use of confidential information that was 

not a trade secret”). This is the same information, which Plaintiff defines as its “Trade 

Secrets” or confidential information, that gives rise to Plaintiff’s claim for statutory 

misappropriation of trade secrets. See Doc. No. 1-6 at 9-10; see also Pro Mineral, LLC 

v. Marietta, Civ. Action No. 3:21-CV-2773, 2023 WL 2410884, at *6 (N.D. Tex. 

March 8, 2023)(Brown, J.) (court finding the TUTSA preemption provision extended 

to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty which was based on the same conduct as the 

misappropriation of trade secret claim). Thus, taking the allegations as true and in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the breach of fiduciary duty 

claim is preempted to the extent it is based on Defendant’s misappropriation of 

Plaintiff’s confidential business information or trade secrets. See BKL Holdings, --- F. 

Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 2432012, at *3. Therefore, the Motion is granted on this 

basis.

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Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s acceptance of employment with Powers, a 

direct competitor to Plaintiff, supports the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Doc. No. 1-

6 at 9. In its Response, Plaintiff cites Trueblue, Inc. v. DeRuby in support of its argument 

that TUTSA does not preempt this claim to the extent it is based on other conduct 

which Plaintiff contends is Defendant’s “dual employment” with Plaintiff and Powers

at the same time. Doc. No. 12 at 9 (citing Civ. Action No. 3:18-CV-0192-M, 2018 

WL 1784523 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2018) (Lynn, CJ)). In Trueblue, the court found

that, although the breach of fiduciary duty claim depended in part on the defendant’s 

misappropriation of trade secrets, the plaintiff pleaded sufficient factual allegations to 

state its claim on another basis. Trueblue, 2018 WL 1784523, at *2. The plaintiff in 

Trueblue alleged the defendant worked for a competitor while still employed by the 

plaintiff, used company resources, and solicited the plaintiff’s customers and staff, all 

at the plaintiff’s expense. Id. Here, Plaintiff contends that its Petition includes 

allegations “[Defendant] was working duplicitously at [Plaintiff] and for Powers and 

that ‘unbeknownst to [Plaintiff] it was, in essence, paying [Defendant] to work for a 

competitor.’” Doc. No. 12 at 10 (quoting Doc. No. 1-6 at [9] ¶ 37). However, a review 

of the Petition reveals no such allegation. Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant 

breached this duty “by accepting employment at Powers” which, according to Plaintiff’s 

allegations, he began after leaving Plaintiff’s employ. Doc. No. 12 at 7 & 9. Thus, 

Plaintiff has failed to plead its breach of fiduciary duty claim on a basis other than 

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misappropriation of trade secrets with “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the misappropriation 

of trade secrets or confidential business information is dismissed as it is preempted 

under TUTSA. To the extent this claim for breach of fiduciary duty allegedly arises

from Defendant’s employment with Powers, it is dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to plead sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part

Defendant Ed Clark’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. The Partial Motion to Dismiss is 

denied as to Plaintiff DeWolff, Boberg & Associates’ claim for breach of contract. The 

Partial Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff DeWolff, Boberg & Associates’ 

claim for breach of fiduciary duty and this claim is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 

Signed August 23rd, 2023. 

____________________________________

ED KINKEADE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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