alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration
 Pursuant to section 1301.33(a) of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), this is notice that on September 6, 2000, ISP Freetown Fine Chemicals, Inc., 238 South Main Street, Freetown, Massachusetts 02702, made application by letter to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for registration as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed below: Drug
Schedule2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine (7396)
IAmphetamine (1100)
IIPhenylacetone (8501)
II
 
 
 The firm plans to bulk manufacture amphetamine for a customer and to bulk manufacture the phenylacetone for the manufacture of the amphetamine. The bulk 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine will be used for conversion into a non-controlled substance. Any other such applicant and any person who is presently registered with DEA to manufacture such substance may file comments or objections to the issuance of the proposed registration. Any such comments or objections may be addressed, in quintuplicate, to the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20537, Attention: DEA Federal Register Representative (CCR), and must be filed no later than January 29, 2001. Dated: November 14, 2000. John H. King, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration.


[FR Doc. 00-30295 Filed 11-27-00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410-09-M
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3

Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 1 of 9 PageID 3337
Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 2 of 9 PageID 3338
F

URTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me on this .i.L day of April 2022. 

3 of3 

Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 3 of 9 PageID 3339
Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 4 of 9 PageID 3340
Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 5 of 9 PageID 3341
Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 6 of 9 PageID 3342
Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 7 of 9 PageID 3343
Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 8 of 9 PageID 334
Exhibit C

Case 4:22-cv-00430-Y Document 82-3 Filed 04/08/23 Page 9 of 9 PageID 3345
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LUCAS HORTON, §

Plaintiff, §

§

vs. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-2475-E-BH

§

360 DIGITAL MEDIA, LLC, §

Defendant. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

After reviewing all relevant matters of record in this case, including the Findings, 

Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and any objections 

thereto, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the undersigned District Judge is of the 

opinion that the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and they are 

accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. 

The plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, filed January 4, 2023, (ECF No. 11), is 

DENIED.

SIGNED this 15th day of September, 2023.

Case 3:22-cv-02475-E-BH Document 19 Filed 09/15/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 69
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (the
Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mark Juliano, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|                     |  |  |  |                                                                          
|-------------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  | 
|Date: August 8, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/    MARK JULIANO                                                      
|                     |  |  |  | Mark Juliano Chief Executive Officer of Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.
FILED

June 19, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

 AT JACKSON

 JUNE 1997 SESSION

JOHNNY SMITH, JR. , ) 

) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9608-CR-00287 

Appellant, )

) Shelby County

V. )

) Honorable Chris Craft, Judge

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)

) 

Appellee. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

Johnny Smith, Jr., Pro Se Charles W. Burson

Reg. No. 12232-076 Attorney General & Reporter 

F.C.I. Memphis

P.O. Box 34550 (Beale-B) Janis L. Turner

Memphis, TN 38184-0550 Counsel for the State

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

William L. Gibbons

District Attorney General

Daniel R. Moody

Assistant District Attorney General

Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301

201 Poplar Avenue

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED: ___________________

AFFIRMED

PAUL G. SUMMERS,

Judge
-2-

O P I N I O N

In 1987 the appellant, Johnny Smith, Jr., pled guilty to the unlawful

possession of marijuana with intent to sell and convicted felon carrying a firearm. 

In 1996 he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, approximately nine years

after his convictions became final. The trial court dismissed the petition on the

ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations.

When appellant’s convictions became final, the law allowed three years to

file a petition for post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1990). 

The appellant's time period for filing his petition expired in 1990. Therefore, his

petition is time barred.

Accordingly, we find no error of law mandating reversal. The trial court's

dismissal of the petition is affirmed in accordance with Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App.,

Rule 20.

__________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge

CONCUR:

____________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, Judge

____________________________

JOE G. RILEY, Judge
#### Sara Offenhartz, Appellant, v Jeffrey R. Cohen, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Saxe, J.), entered September 12, 1989, which, *inter alia,*granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), denied plaintiff’s cross motion to amend the complaint, and denied defendant’s motion for costs, sanctions and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to CPLR 8303-a and 22 NYCRR part 130, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff’s action concerns an incident which occurred on September 2, 1982 in Milburn, New Jersey, in which the plaintiff’s mother and a private investigator allegedly attempted to take the 12-year-old plaintiff back to New York. At the time, the defendant, an attorney, was representing plaintiff’s mother in her divorce action and in proceedings to obtain a temporary restraining order enjoining plaintiff’s father from removing the children from New York. On February 13, 1989, plaintiff commenced an action alleging various causes of action in tort against defendant based upon the fact that defendant allegedly advised plaintiff’s mother to take the aforementioned actions.

The court properly dismissed plaintiff’s causes of action against defendant pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). No cause of action existed on a theory of negligence since there was no privity between defendant and plaintiff *(Michalic v Klat,*128 AD2d 505). With regard to the alleged intentional torts, defendant could not be liable for abduction since a cause of action for abduction belongs solely to a parent *(McGrady v Rosenbaum,*62 Misc 2d 182, *affd*37 AD2d 917). Nor may plaintiff’s mother, as a custodial parent, be liable for abduction *(McGrady v Rosenbaum, supra).*Although New York recognizes an action against a parent for assault, defendant was not liable for the acts committed solely by plaintiff’s mother and the private investigator under a theory of "aiding and abetting” since defendant committed no overt act in furtherance of the alleged assault *(Steinberg v Goldstein,*51 Misc 2d 825, *affd*27 AD2d 955). In addition, the court properly concluded that plaintiff’s proposed amendments to the *269complaint substituting kidnapping, attempted kidnapping and false arrest for abduction did not present meritorious causes of action.

We find that the IAS court acted within its discretion in denying defendant an award of costs, sanctions and attorneys’ fees. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Rubin, JJ. *[See,*144 Misc 2d 130.]
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, John  Daly,  the  President  of Humana  Trans  Services  Holding  Corp.  (the
"Company"),  certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the fiscal quarter
ended June 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
or 78o(d)); and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:   August 14, 2003


--------------------------
John Daly
President

                                       10



<PAGE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7565

TOMMY RAY ROBINSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ALVIN HOUSTON, Lieutenant; B. FORD, Sergeant;

R. GANT, Sergeant; W. PINKETT, Correctional

Officer II; D. CHASE, Correctional Officer II;

M. STEVENSON, Correctional Officer II, A.

SMITH, Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 00-7566

TOMMY RAY ROBINSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ALVIN HOUSTON, Lieutenant; BERNARD FORD, Sergeant; DION PINKETT, Correctional Officer II;

DARRICK CHASE, Correctional Officer II;

MAURICE STEVENSON, Correctional Officer II;

REGINALD GANT, Sergeant; EUGENE NUTH, Warden,

Maryland Penitentiary; J. OWENS, Property Room

Officer; OFFICER SMITTY; OTHER UNKNOWN NAMED

DEFENDANTS, et al,

Defendants - Appellees.
2

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-96-

1298-AMD, CA-96-896-AMD, CA-96-1388-AMD)

Submitted: January 17, 2002 Decided: January 25, 2002

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry Ray Robinson, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Stephanie Judith Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney

General, Wendy Ann Kronmiller, Assistant Attorney General, ToniJean Lisa, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Tommy Ray Robinson appeals the district court’s order granting

the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law in his

action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001).

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion, as

supported by its reasons as stated from the bench, and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. See Robinson v. Houston, Nos. CA-96-1298-AMD; CA96-896-AMD; CA-96-1388-AMD (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2000).

We deny Robinson’s motion for a transcript at government

expense because he has failed to establish grounds for the transcript. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1994). We also deny Robinson’s

motion for appointment of counsel and dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,532,000      
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               26,605,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                (6,184,000)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            23,773,000
<PP&E>                                      35,825,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             (11,699,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              58,192,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      199,107,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    62,063,000
<OTHER-SE>                                (206,778,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                58,192,000
<SALES>                                     24,920,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            24,920,000
<CGS>                                       18,586,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               26,498,000 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (175,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,600,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (23,589,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (23,589,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (23,589,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (1.56)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (1.56)
        

</TABLE>
#### BARRON v. STATE.

No. 21200.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 6, 1940.

Frank Sparks, of Eastland, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the theft of chickens, and by the jury fined the sum of $25.

Appellant pleaded guilty, and the issue presented to the jury by the court was the amount of punishment.

Bill of exceptions No. 1 complains of the circumstance that while the triq.1 of this cause was in progress a class of the public school of Cisco, Texas, came into the court room, evidently for the purpose of observing the procedure in the trial of criminal cases. During an interim in the trial, but in the presence of the jury, the trial court briefly addressed this class and explained to them the procedure relative to the trial of criminal cases, and the charge in this particular case in general terms.

We find naught in such a statement by the court of a harmful nature, nor anything calculated to influence the jury in any way to the detriment of the appellant, nor is anything in such remarks pointed out to us as calculated to influence the trial of this case to the detriment of appellant’s rights. However, we note that immediately upon appellant’s attorney objecting to such remarks, the court did turn to the jury and instruct them to pay no attention to any remarks so made by him to such public school class. Under appellant’s plea of guilty, we do not think a $25 fine evidenced any improper influences as exercised upon this jury.

Appellant’s bill of exceptions No. 2 is based on his objections to the introduction of a written confession signed by appellant, the main objection seeming to be because the warning incorporated therein ijmkes the statement that: “I, T. J. Barron, having been placed under arrest on a charge of theft of chickens do hereby make the following voluntary statement,” etc., whereas in truth and in fact no complaint had been filed at such time against appellant for the theft of said chickens, and therefore appellant’s attorney alleges that appellant was misled into making such statement. While the testimony does show that appellant did not at such time have a complaint filed against him charging the theft of such chickens, he was under arrest at such time on account of such theft, and the preliminary statement in such statement was true, and the truth could certainly not mislead him to his hurt, and especially in view of the light penalty assessed him upon a plea of guilty.

We see no error presented, and the judgment is affirmed. .
#### In the Matter of Anthony Ferraro (Admitted as Anthony J. Ferraro), a Suspended Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, Petitioner.

Second Department,

May 31, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Robert H. Straus*for petitioner.

*John S. McBride*and *Robert N. Isseks*for respondent.

*69OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

In this proceeding the respondent was charged with one allegation of professional misconduct. The petitioner moves and the respondent cross-moves to confirm the report of the Special Referee.

Charge one alleged that the respondent was convicted of serious crimes, as defined in Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d). Specifically, on or about October 27, 1988, the respondent, after a trial by jury, in the Supreme Court of New York, Westchester County, was found guilty of two counts of criminal solicitation in the fourth degree, class A misdemeanors, in violation of Penal Law § 100.05.

After reviewing all of the evidence, we are in agreement with the report of the Special Referee sustaining the charge of misconduct. The respondent is guilty of the misconduct outlined above. Accordingly, the petitioner’s motion and the respondent’s cross motion to confirm the report of the Special Referee are granted.

In determining an appropriate measure of discipline to be imposed, we have taken into consideration the respondent’s previously unblemished record as well as the character evidence presented on his behalf. Nevertheless, the respondent is guilty of serious professional misconduct. Accordingly, the respondent is disbarred forthwith.

Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Bracken, Brown and Lawrence, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the petitioner’s motion to confirm the report of the Special Referee is granted; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent’s cross motion to confirm the report of the Special Referee is granted; and it is further,

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately, the respondent Anthony Ferraro, is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent shall continue to comply with this court’s rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended and resigned attorneys (22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law §90, the respondent Anthony Ferraro is commanded to continue to desist and refrain (1) from practicing law in any form, either as principal *70or as agent, clerk or employee of another, (2) from appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission or other public authority, (3) from giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) from holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law.
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-19-00103-CV 

IN RE ARNOLD LEWIS FILEWOOD, RELATOR 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

 

April 15, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Relator Arnold Lewis Filewood, a Texas inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition 

for writ of mandamus with the clerk of this Court but did not accompany his petition with 

the required filing fee. By letter dated March 25, 2019, we directed Filewood to pay the 

filing fee of $155 or, in lieu thereof, to comply with chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code by filing an affidavit of indigence, an affidavit relating to previous 

filings, and a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.002(a), 14.004 (West 2017). We advised Filewood that if he did 

not comply by April 4, this proceeding was subject to dismissal without further notice. To 

date, Filewood has neither paid the filing fee nor submitted the materials necessary to 

proceed under chapter 14.
2

Unless a party is excused from paying a filing fee, the clerk of this Court is required 

to collect filing fees set by statute or the Supreme Court when an item is presented for 

filing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 12.1(b). An inmate who files an affidavit or a declaration of 

inability to pay costs in an appeal or original proceeding must also comply with chapter 

14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 14.002(a). An inmate’s failure to comply with chapter 14 is grounds for dismissal 

of the appeal or original proceeding. See In re Johnson, No. 07-16-00354-CV, 2016 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 11841, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 1, 2016, orig. proceeding) (per 

curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing inmate’s petition for writ of mandamus for failure to pay 

the filing fee or submit the materials required to proceed under chapter 14).

Because Filewood has failed to pay the filing fee or comply with chapter 14 of the 

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code within the time provided by this Court for 

compliance, his original proceeding is dismissed.

Per Curiam