PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD P. SPRINGER, a minor, by

his parents and next friends, Edward

and JoAnne Springer; EDWARD

SPRINGER; JOANNE SPRINGER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL

No. 97-1482

BOARD,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

ROBERT SPILLANE, officially as

Superintendent, Fairfax County

Public Schools,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge.

(CA-95-1789-A)

Argued: December 1, 1997

Decided: January 23, 1998

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, JONES, United States District

Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation,

and MICHAEL, Senior United States District Judge for the

Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Jones and Senior Judge Michael joined.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael Jeffrey Eig, BOGIN & EIG, Washington, D.C.,

for Appellants. Thomas John Cawley, HUNTON & WILLIAMS,

McLean, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew B. Bogin,

Helen Goff Foster, BOGIN & EIG, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

John F. Cafferky, Arthur E. Schmalz, HUNTON & WILLIAMS,

McLean, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge:

Edward Springer and his parents seek reimbursement from the

Fairfax County School Board for tuition paid to a private school in

which the Springers enrolled Edward after he failed the eleventh

grade. The School Board determined that Edward was not suffering

from a "serious emotional disturbance," as the Springers claim, and

that he was therefore ineligible for special education services under

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415

("IDEA"). The district court upheld the State Review Officer's determination that Edward was not disabled and that his parents were not

entitled to tuition reimbursement. Because the applicable IDEA regulations do not equate mere juvenile delinquency with a "serious emotional disturbance," we affirm.

I.

During most of his years in the Fairfax County school system,

Edward Springer demonstrated no need for special educational services. He progressed successfully from grade to grade in regular education programs. Throughout elementary school his grades were

consistently average or above average. He attended a private school

from seventh to ninth grade and received no special education services there. When he returned to Fairfax County schools for his tenth

grade year, he enrolled in regular education classes at McLean High

School and attained a C+ grade point average. Throughout this period,

Edward maintained positive relationships with his teachers and peers.

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During high school he participated in a church group, the Boy Scouts,

and the McLean High School wrestling team.

Edward developed significant behavioral problems in his eleventh

grade year. He was arrested in August 1993 for possessing burglary

tools and tampering with an automobile, offenses for which he was

sentenced to one year probation, fifty hours of community service,

and a suspended fine of $2,500. Edward would frequently sneak out

of his parents' house and stay out all night with friends. He stole from

his parents and others. He regularly used marijuana and alcohol.

Edward often broke school rules and had a high rate of absenteeism.

He was disciplined for driving recklessly on school property, cutting

classes, forgery, leaving school grounds without permission, and

fighting. Towards the end of the eleventh grade, Edward and his

friends stole a fellow student's car. Edward kept the car for a week

of joy-riding. In connection with this episode he was sentenced to

probation until his eighteenth birthday.

Although he continued to score in the average to superior range of

intellectual ability on standardized tests, Edward's eleventh-grade

performance suffered because he cut class and frequently failed to

complete assignments. During his week of joy-riding, he skipped

school and missed his final exams, causing him to fail three of his

seven courses for the year. His teachers, his mother, and Edward himself agreed that these difficulties resulted from truancy, lack of motivation, and poor study habits. At the time, Edward recognized that

with more effort he could obtain above average grades.

In response to his behavioral problems the Springers enrolled

Edward in September 1994 in the New Dominion School, a private

residential school located in Dillwyn, Virginia. The Springers

requested that the School Board fund this placement, claiming that

Edward exhibited a serious emotional disturbance, a qualifying disability under IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1). A Fairfax County

special education eligibility committee evaluated Edward's condition

and determined that his behavior indicated a conduct disorder that did

not qualify as a serious emotional disturbance. Thus the committee

ruled that Edward was ineligible for special education services and

tuition reimbursement.

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The Springers requested a local due process hearing, which took

place on February 9, 1995. The Local Hearing Officer ("LHO") rendered his decision on March 16, 1995. Relying exclusively on a letter

written by a psychiatrist, Dr. Joseph Novello, to the Juvenile Court at

the time of Edward's second brush with the law, the LHO found that

Edward suffered from a conduct disorder and a dysthymic disorder (a

moderate depressive disorder). Edward's "inability to get along with

his teachers and fellow students and to abide by school rules" was

deemed consistent with these diagnoses. The LHO concluded, without

elaboration, that Edward "should be considered`seriously emotionally disturbed' rather than merely `socially maladjusted,'" and that he

thereby qualified for special education services. Finding that Edward

was making educational progress at the New Dominion School, the

LHO ordered the School Board to reimburse the Springers for tuition

there.

The School Board appealed to a State Review Officer ("SRO"),

who reversed the LHO and found that Edward did not meet the

criteria for a seriously emotionally disturbed student under state and

federal special education regulations. The SRO primarily questioned

the LHO's reliance on the letter from Dr. Novello. First the SRO

noted that this letter was originally written at the Springers' request

to persuade a juvenile court judge to sentence Edward to three weeks

in a camp in Idaho rather than incarceration for the theft of another

student's car. The SRO noted that Dr. Novello had never testified in

person to elaborate on "[t]he sketchy, incomplete description and

evaluation of the Student's makeup" in the letter. The SRO concluded

that this sketchiness and incompleteness and "the casual reference to

his `clinical diagnosis,' all render [the letter] insufficient in detail and

dignity to use as the LHO did, which was to supply the theoretical

underpinning of a qualifying factual finding of disability."

Most critically, the SRO pointed out the abundant psychological

evidence that Edward did not have a serious emotional disturbance --

evidence that was not even mentioned by the LHO. Several separate

evaluations of Edward had uniformly supported the conclusion that,

while Edward was "socially maladjusted" and had a "conduct disorder," he exhibited no symptoms of a serious emotional disturbance.

In the face of this evidence, the SRO could not accept the LHO's con-

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clusory assertion that Edward should be considered"seriously emotionally disturbed" rather than merely "socially maladjusted."

The Springers filed suit in district court, seeking reversal of the

SRO's decision. At this point, they sought to supplement the administrative record with live testimony from Dr. Novello, although at the

state-level review they had represented "that the probable delays and

inconvenience in scheduling" his participation (and that of another

doctor) "outweigh the need for what they can contribute." The district

court granted the School Board's motion in limine, disallowing Dr.

Novello's testimony as "additional evidence" under 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(e)(2). The district court found that Dr. Novello had in fact

been available to testify throughout the administrative proceedings

and ruled that the Springers would have to live with their repeated

decisions not to call him. Further, given that Dr. Novello had not

examined Edward since before Fairfax County's initial eligibility

committee meeting, the district court determined that any testimony

the doctor could offer would not qualify as "additional" under the statute.

The district court thus agreed with the SRO that Edward was not

seriously emotionally disturbed. The court therefore ruled that the

School Board was not required to reimburse the Springers for tuition

at the New Dominion School. The Springers now appeal.

II.

A student becomes eligible for special education services if he suffers from a "serious emotional disturbance":

(i) The term means a condition exhibiting one or more

of the following characteristics over a long period of time

and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child's educational performance--

(A) An inability to learn that cannot be

explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors;

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(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and

teachers;

(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings

under normal circumstances;

(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness

or depression; or

(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms

or fears associated with personal or school problems.

 (ii) The term includes schizophrenia. The

term does not apply to children who are

socially maladjusted, unless it is determined

that they have a serious emotional disturbance.

34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9); see also Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Children with Disabilities in Virginia Part 1,

"Definitions," at p. 9 (restating federal definition of serious emotional

disturbance).

The regulatory definition delineates no fewer than four specific

conditions a student must satisfy in order to qualify for special education services as seriously emotionally disturbed: the student must

demonstrate that he has (1) exhibited one of the five listed symptoms,

(2) "over a long period of time," and (3)"to a marked degree," and

(4) that this condition adversely affects his educational performance.

Finally, the definition pointedly excludes students whose behavior is

attributable to social maladjustment, unless they also suffer an independent serious emotional disturbance.

In interpreting this regulation district courts are required to give

deference to the state and local education authorities whose primary

duty it is to administer IDEA. As the Supreme Court noted in Board

of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, "[t]he pri-

 6
mary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a

handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most

suitable to the child's needs, was left by the [IDEA] to state and local

educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of

the child." 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). Accordingly, we have held that

"[a]bsent some statutory infraction, the task of education belongs to

the educators who have been charged by society with that critical

task. Likewise, federal courts must accord `due weight' to state

administrative proceedings."* Hartmann v. Loudon Cty., 118 F.3d

996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206), cert.

denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3283 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1998) (No. 97-586). Above

all, federal courts must avoid the temptation "to substitute their own

notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities

which they review." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; accord Ash v. Lake

Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7J, 980 F.2d 585, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1992);

Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

III.

The Springers claim that Edward exhibited a serious emotional disturbance that entitled him to special education services, including

reimbursement for tuition at the New Dominion School. However, we

agree with the SRO and the district court that Edward's juvenile

_________________________________________________________________

*We reject the Springers' assertion that Doyle v. Arlington Cty. Sch.

Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991), requires a decision in their favor.

Doyle and this case are different in at least three respects. First, the LHO

in this case has no special claim to deference, as did the LHO in Doyle.

There "[t]he only point on which the local and state hearing officers differed in any consequence was in the credibility of one of the witnesses"

who had testified before the LHO and did not appear before the SRO. Id.

at 104. Here, by contrast, the LHO's decision did not turn on witness

credibility but on the weight to be given the Springers' evidence, an

inquiry which both the LHO and SRO are required to make independently. Second, the LHO in Doyle explained his result with some care,

whereas the opinion of the LHO in this case was both cursory and conclusory. Third, Doyle establishes a prima facie presumption of correctness for administrative findings, which requires that the SRO must

provide reasons for departing from the LHO's findings. Unlike the SRO

in Doyle, the SRO did exactly that here.

 7
delinquency did not reflect a serious emotional disturbance within the

meaning of the federal and state regulations implementing IDEA.

A.

It seems incontrovertible that Edward was socially maladjusted.

Although neither the federal nor the Virginia regulations define the

term, Edward's behavior fits the definition offered by experts and

accepted by the LHO and the SRO. The LHO rightly understood the

term to refer to "continued misbehavior outside acceptable norms."

See also In re Sequoia Union High Sch. Dist., 1987-88 EHLR Dec.

559:133, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("socially maladjusted [is] a persistent

pattern of violating societal norms with lots of truancy, substance . . .

abuse, i.e., a perpetual struggle with authority, easily frustrated,

impulsive, and manipulative").

The reports of psychologists and other witnesses at the local due

process hearing uniformly described Edward's condition in terms of

social maladjustment, not serious emotional disturbance. For example, in January 1995, Wendy Rudolph, Ph.D., a school psychologist

for Fairfax County, administered a battery of tests to evaluate

Edward's psychological condition. She found symptoms of social

maladjustment: Edward displayed "a disregard for social demands or

expectations. It appears that Ed understands these expectations but

that his behavior is not always guided by them." The most consistent

diagnosis of Edward's problems was that of a "conduct disorder,"

which supports a finding of social maladjustment. Conduct disorder

is marked by a pattern of violating societal norms and "is often associated with . . . drinking, smoking, use of illegal substances, and reckless and risk-taking acts," all behaviors that Edward exhibited.

Barbara G. Lanzer, a teacher and counselor of disturbed youth for

over twenty years, testified at the local due process hearing that

"[c]onduct disorder is often associated, most frequently associated

with socially maladjusted behaviors." And Dr. Rudolph opined that "a

conduct disorder is consistent with social maladjustment."

Courts and special education authorities have routinely declined,

however, to equate conduct disorders or social maladjustment with

serious emotional disturbance. See, e.g., A.E. v. Independent Sch.

Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 1991); Doe v. Board of

 8
Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65, 71 n.8 (D. Conn. 1990); In re Morgan Hill

Unified Sch. Dist., 19 IDELR 557, 564-65 (SEA, Cal. 1992). The fact

"[t]hat a child is socially maladjusted is not by itself conclusive evidence that he or she is seriously emotionally disturbed." A.E., 936

F.2d at 476. Indeed, the regulatory framework under IDEA pointedly

carves out "socially maladjusted" behavior from the definition of serious emotional disturbance. This exclusion makes perfect sense when

one considers the population targeted by the statute. Teenagers, for

instance, can be a wild and unruly bunch. Adolescence is, almost by

definition, a time of social maladjustment for many people. Thus a

"bad conduct" definition of serious emotional disturbance might

include almost as many people in special education as it excluded.

Any definition that equated simple bad behavior with serious emotional disturbance would exponentially enlarge the burden IDEA

places on state and local education authorities. Among other things,

such a definition would require the schools to dispense criminal justice rather than special education. As one Hearing Officer explained:

[I]t is not intended to be the duty of special education to

force socially maladjusted children to school by residentially placing them if they choose to remain truant. Programs

within other political divisions, such as the Juvenile Justice

system, . . . must address this serious problem. . . . If they

do not, then Congress should act to place this duty clearly.

In re Corpus Christi, 18 IDELR 1281, 1283 (SEA, Tex. 1992). We

agree and find that the conduct at issue falls within the explicit social

maladjustment exception to IDEA's coverage.

B.

As the district court recognized, finding that Edward was socially

maladjusted does not end the inquiry. The regulations contemplate

that a student may be socially maladjusted and suffer an independent

serious emotional disturbance that would qualify him for special education services under IDEA. The Springers insist that Edward's is

such a case. Like the district court, we disagree.

First we note the overwhelming consensus among the psychologists who examined Edward. No fewer than three psychologists

 9
examined him, and each independently concluded that he was not

seriously emotionally disturbed. An evaluation done in October 1993

by psychologist Randy Roberts, Ph.D., "[did] not indicate the presence of significant or major psychiatric disturbance." This finding

confirmed the assessment of Edward by psychologist Stanley J.

Kulewicz, Ph.D., who in July 1993 had identified"no significant

behavioral or emotional difficulties." Likewise Dr. Rudolph's January

1995 examination unearthed no evidence of an emotional disability.

In her detailed report, which is the most recent psychological analysis

of Edward, Dr. Rudolph described him as "a poised and pleasant

young man" who is used to being able to "`figure out' how to make

the people around him like him and allow him to have his own way."

Even when he was misbehaving, Dr. Rudolph concluded, Edward was

getting "his own way"; she testified before the LHO "that last year [in

the eleventh grade], in particular, Ed was getting what he wanted. He

didn't want to do work, so he didn't. He didn't like going to class, so

he didn't do that." Dr. Rudolph thus concluded that during this time

Edward was in complete control of his actions, which distinguished

him from emotionally disturbed individuals, who may be "in such

pain and in such difficulty that they cannot get to their goals." Based

on her thorough examination, Dr. Rudolph refused to attribute

Edward's behavior, troubling though it was, to any emotional disability or disturbance. Indeed, this case is somewhat remarkable in that

the relevant psychological evidence is virtually uncontradicted.

According to Ms. Lanzer's expert appraisal of this evidence, finding

that Edward is not seriously emotionally disturbed is not even "a close

question."

The Springers have given us no reason to doubt this professional

consensus. They first attempt to show that Edward exhibited one of

the five enumerated symptoms of a serious emotional disturbance by

asserting that he was unable "to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers," 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.7(b)(9)(i)(B). However, ample evidence supports the SRO's

contrary finding. His father indicated that "Ed has lots of friends

across a broad spectrum, from very good students to the academically

unsuccessful students." Edward perceived himself as "socially . . .

very involved with a large group of people that he considered

friends." Dr. Rudolph's observation of him confirmed this selfperception, as did his history of involvement with social and extracur-

 10
ricular activities during his time in the Fairfax County schools. Nor

did Edward fail to develop good relationships with teachers. His

French teacher from McLean High, Ghislaine Toulu, told the LHO

that she "really liked Ed, and . . . still really like[s] Ed." His history

teacher from McLean, Robert Peck, described Edward as "very

friendly [with] peers and me." And even Mr. and Mrs. Springer have

described Edward as "respectful of teachers and appropriate," and

indicated that he "got along well with his teachers." Nothing in the

record indicates that an inability to maintain interpersonal relationships existed at all, not to mention persisting"over a long period of

time" or "to a marked degree." See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9)(i). Thus,

neither the SRO nor the district court committed any error in rejecting

the contention that Edward was in any way incapable of forming and

maintaining relationships with peers or teachers.

The Springers also claim that Edward exhibited a second enumerated symptom, "a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression," id. at § 300.7(b)(9)(i)(D). However, we agree with the SRO and

the district court that the record simply does not support this contention. Three separate psychological evaluations of Edward revealed no

evidence of abnormal depression or other emotional disturbance. Two

of the psychologists who reached this result, Dr. Roberts and Dr.

Kulewicz, were chosen by the Springers themselves. Dr. Roberts even

noted that based on his depression and anxiety testing "Ed is reporting

significantly fewer symptoms and distress than is typical of an adolescent his age." The observations of those who had regular contact with

Edward during the eleventh grade confirm these psychological findings. For example, Edward's French teacher, who saw Edward on at

least 160 days during that year, testified that"[h]e did not appear sad.

There was no pervasive sadness. He had friends. He was laughing,

joking in the hallways."

The only contrary evidence, indeed the only hint that Edward ever

suffered from depression at all, was the "sketchy" and "incomplete"

letter from Dr. Novello diagnosing Edward with dysthymia. This condition is clinically defined as less severe than a major depressive disorder. Although Dr. Novello never elaborated on his diagnosis, Ms.

Lanzer confirmed that dysthymia is "sort of a low-grade depression."

She noted that in over twenty years of work with emotionally disturbed students she has never worked with a student who was classi-

 11
fied as seriously emotionally disturbed based solely on a diagnosis of

dysthymia. Thus, Dr. Novello's diagnosis would indicate only that

Edward suffered from mild or moderate depression, if anything.

This evidence simply does not support the Springers' claim that

Edward experienced "pervasive . . . depression," 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.7(b)(9)(i)(D).

There is one final flaw in the Springers' case for tuition reimbursement. Even if they had been able to demonstrate that Edward exhibited one or more of the five qualifying characteristics for a long

period of time and to a marked degree, the Springers still have failed

to establish the critical causal connection between this condition and

the educational difficulties Edward experienced, the final step in

proving a serious emotional disturbance. Id. at § 300.7(b)(9)(i). Prior

to his eleventh grade year, Edward had made steady educational progress, advancing from grade to grade on schedule. Cf. Rowley, 458

U.S. at 209-10 (evidence that student was advancing from grade to

grade indicated educational progress). In the eleventh grade Edward

stopped attending classes, regularly used drugs and alcohol, and

engaged in other criminal activities. The precipitous drop in Edward's

grades at this time appears to be directly attributable to his truancy,

drug and alcohol use, and delinquent behavior rather than to any emotional disturbance. See In re Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR

309, 311 (SEA, Tex. 1994) (noting that when student had made passing grades prior to involvement with drugs, "it is inferentially permissible to attribute any lowering of his grades to his unwise choice to

spend less mental energies on his academics and to spend more mental energies on [drug activities]"). Particularly given the paucity of

evidence that Edward suffered any sort of emotional disorder, it can

hardly be said that the record directs a finding that a serious emotional

disturbance adversely affected his educational performance. Edward's

delinquent behavior appears to be the primary cause of his troubles.

IV.

The Springers also challenge the district court's grant of the School

Board's motion in limine excluding live testimony from Dr. Novello.

We hold, however, that the district court's decision not to admit Dr.

Novello's testimony as "additional evidence" under 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(e)(2) was not an abuse of discretion.

 12
In Rowley the Supreme Court cautioned that IDEA left the primary

responsibility for teaching children and formulating educational policy with state and local education authorities. The Court reiterated

"that courts lack the `specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve `persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.'" 458 U.S. at 208 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)).

To give meaning to this rhetoric the Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit has outlined a strict approach to the concept of "additional evidence" in section 1415(e)(2). See Town of Burlington v. Department

of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359

(1985). As the court explained:

We construe "additional" in the ordinary sense of the word

. . . to mean supplemental. Thus construed, this clause does

not authorize witnesses at trial to repeat or embellish their

prior administrative hearing testimony; this would be

entirely inconsistent with the usual meaning of"additional."

We are fortified in this interpretation because it structurally

assists in giving due weight to the administrative proceeding, as Rowley requires.

Id. (citations and footnote omitted). A lax interpretation of "additional

evidence" would "reduce the proceedings before the state agency to

a mere dress rehearsal by allowing appellants to transform the Act's

judicial review mechanism into an unrestricted trial de novo." Roland

M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 997 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991). Therefore the exclusion of "testimony

from all who did, or could have, testified before the administrative

hearing" would be "an appropriate limit in many cases." Burlington,

736 F.2d at 790. We, along with other circuits, adopt the Burlington

approach. See, e.g., Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L., 102

F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 1996); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4

F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 825

(1994).

That approach counsels affirmance of the district court. The

Springers do not contend that Dr. Novello's testimony was not available during the administrative review process. In fact, Dr. Novello

 13
examined Edward months before Fairfax County's initial eligibility

committee meeting and had not seen him again after that time. Therefore, Dr. Novello's evaluation of Edward -- and anything he might

have added to the letter that is contained in the record -- was available well before the administrative process began. Neither does it

appear that Dr. Novello himself was unavailable to testify during any

phase of the administrative process. Although the Springers adverted

to scheduling difficulties, we see no error in the district court's finding that, despite these difficulties, Dr. Novello"doesn't fall within the

category of being unavailable."

Instead, what seems to have happened here is that the Springers

made the tactical decision to reserve the expense-- and the impact

-- of live testimony by Dr. Novello until trial in federal court. We

shall assume that their decision was made in good faith. However,

were we to allow these litigants to escape the consequences of a litigation strategy gone awry, we would invite future litigants to engage

in strategic behavior that may not be so innocent.

A lenient standard for additional evidence would have the consequence of making the whole IDEA process more time consuming, as

parties scrambled to use the federal court proceeding to patch up

holes in their administrative case. Whether this lengthy process would

serve students is doubtful at best. The IDEA was designed to facilitate

the inclusion of disabled children into the public education system.

See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 191-97. "Children are not static beings; neither their academic progress nor their disabilities wait for the resolution of legal conflicts." Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751,

760 (3d Cir. 1995). The district court's decision to exclude the evidence properly encourages thorough administrative review of special

education disputes. It facilitates the resolution of these disputes

sooner rather than later, and in so doing advances the aims of Congress in this statute.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

AFFIRMED

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