NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL M. MORITOMO, Petitioner/Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC 

SECURITY, Petitioner/Appellee, 

and 

TINA FISCHER, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0227 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FC2002-004790, FC2017-053288 (Consolidated) 

The Honorable Michelle Carson, Judge 

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL 

Michael M. Moritomo, Humboldt 

Petitioner/Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson 

By Jennifer Blum 

Counsel for Petitioner /Appellee 

Tina Fischer 

Respondent /Appellee

FILED 3-26-2024
MORITOMO v. STATE/FISCHER 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe 

joined. 

F O S T E R, Judge: 

¶1 Petitioner Michael Moritomo (“Father”) appeals the superior 

court’s ruling modifying his child support obligation to Tina Fischer 

(“Mother”). For the following reasons, this Court affirms. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In 2017, after Mother petitioned for child support, the court 

ordered Father to pay temporary child support to Mother for three of their 

common children: H.M., E.M., and L.M. The court issued final orders in 

2018, listing a monthly income of $5,416.67 for Father on the child support 

worksheet. About a year later, Father moved to modify the order citing a 

change of circumstances, namely that Mother was emotionally 

manipulating the children against him. To determine the amount of income 

that should be attributed to Father, the court heard, among other things, 

evidence that he ran an insurance company, that he previously held an 

insurance agent’s license, that the loss of his license limited his ability to 

conduct certain business, that he cohabitated with his significant other for 

years, and that he split costs with his significant other. The court found that 

he was receiving a continuing gift from his significant other and attributed 

to him the same amount of income as the 2018 order. 

¶3 In 2022, Father again moved to modify his child support 

order. His request alleged three changed circumstances justifying 

modification: (1) he fathered a new child, (2) he became a stay-at-home 

father, and (3) H.M. had emancipated. At trial, Father testified that he is 

currently a stay-at-home father with no income and that he last worked 

from 2016 until 2019 making between $12,000 and $20,000 per year. He 

further testified that he lived with—and cared for—four of his other 

children, none of whom he shared with Mother. He testified that he 

volunteers his time coaching and supporting youth athletes. He also 

testified that when he possessed his license to sell insurance, he made 
MORITOMO v. STATE/FISCHER 

Decision of the Court 

3 

between $35,000 and $50,000 per year and he twice unsuccessfully sought 

to regain the license, in 2013 and 2015. Father’s significant other testified 

that she had been paying his child support from her account because Father 

did not have a bank account or any income. 

¶4 The superior court partially granted the motion, finding that 

one child had emancipated and that Father was supporting one child at his 

home. But the court again attributed to Father the same amount of income 

used for the previous orders and denied including three other children 

living with him and his significant other because he failed to provide an 

acknowledgement of paternity for those children. Ultimately, Father’s child 

support order increased, even with the consideration of the change of 

circumstances. 

¶5 Father timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Child support orders are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 

viewing the record “in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s 

decision.” Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999). But a court’s 

attribution of income to a parent is reviewed de novo. See Pullen v. Pullen, 

223 Ariz. 293, 295, ¶ 9 (App. 2009). The superior court abuses its discretion 

if its order lacks a competent evidentiary basis. Little, 193 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 5.

To modify a child support order, the moving party bears the burden of 

proving that substantial changes in circumstances have occurred that 

warrant modifying the support. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 215 Ariz. 35, 39, ¶ 16 

(App. 2007); see also A.R.S. § 25-327(A). 

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Attributing Income to Father. 

¶7 Father makes several arguments that the court erred in 

attributing income to him. But each argument fails. 

A. The superior court properly attributed income to Father 

on the presumption that he could find suitable 

employment. 

¶8 Father argues that the record does not support attributing 

over $5,000 of income per month to him for child support calculations. 

Father points to his present unemployment and that his prior employment 

did not earn him a comparable income. 
MORITOMO v. STATE/FISCHER 

Decision of the Court 

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¶9 When a parent is unemployed, the court may attribute income 

to that parent on the presumption that the parent is capable of full-time 

employment earning at least minimum wage. A.R.S. § 25-320(N); A.R.S. 

§ 25-320 app. (“Guidelines”) § II(A)(4). The presumption may be rebutted 

by “contrary evidence” that the parent is incapable of such employment. 

A.R.S. § 25-320(N). The court must balance various factors regarding why 

the parent is unemployed before attributing income. Little, 193 Ariz. at 520, 

¶ 4. The Guidelines provide guidance to focus the courts’ exercise of their 

discretion. See id. at 521, ¶ 6 (“[T]he Guidelines are not substantive law, but 

function rather as a source of guidance to trial courts in applying the 

substantive statutory and case law.” (citation omitted)); Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 

419, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) (“[T]he Guidelines do not replace the exercise of 

trial court discretion; they focus it.” (internal quotations omitted)). “In 

construing the Guidelines, [this Court] look[s] first to their plain language” 

and “strive[s] to interpret the relevant section[s] in conjunction with other 

provisions of the Guidelines and consistent with their overall purpose.” 

Milinovich v. Womack, 236 Ariz. 612, 615, ¶ 10 (App. 2015) (citations 

omitted). Factors that courts may consider when attributing income include 

“[t]he parents’ assets, residence, employment and earnings history, job 

skills, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record and 

other employment barriers, and record of seeking work,” along with “[t]he 

local job market, the availability of employers willing to hire the parents, 

the prevailing earnings level in the local community,” and the field of 

employment’s standard full-time hours. Guidelines § II(A)(4)(d). 

¶10 Here, the record reveals several factors supporting the court’s 

attribution of income to Father. Father is below retirement age with no 

alleged physical or mental disabilities preventing him from working. His 

education and job skills previously permitted him to obtain an insurance 

license and earn between $35,000 and $50,000 in the mid and early 2000s. 

Although Father lost his insurance license and has twice failed to regain it, 

the last denial was in 2015 and the record does not show that his efforts 

would remain unsuccessful. Further, the record indicates that Father could 

obtain alternative employment and that he has obtained employment since 

losing his license. Father also participates in volunteer coaching activities 

about three to four hours a day, seven days a week, which indicates he has 

the time and capacity to work. He even testified that he would be willing to 

quit these volunteer activities if required to pay his child support 

obligations. 

¶11 When a parent voluntarily becomes unemployed, the court 

must also determine the reasonableness of that decision. Guidelines 

§ II(A)(4)(e)(ii)-(iii). These additional factors that the court must consider 
MORITOMO v. STATE/FISCHER 

Decision of the Court 

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include the financial impact on the children, the parent’s educational and 

physical capacity to find work, whether the decision “is likely to increase 

the parent’s earning potential,” whether the children are likely to benefit 

from increased future income, whether the parent can pay the child support 

obligation from other revenue sources, and whether the parent made the 

decision in good faith. Little, 193 Ariz. at 522-23, ¶¶ 12-13. 

¶12 Although this Court accepts that Father acted in good faith to 

care for his other children, this factor alone does not demonstrate error. See 

Milinovich, 236 Ariz. at 615, ¶ 10 (noting “that a parent’s child support 

obligation is paramount” (quoting Little, 193 Ariz. at 521, ¶ 6)). Father’s 

decision to stay home with his other children or do volunteer work will not 

increase his earning potential which would benefit his children under the 

child support order in the long run. Also, though the loss of his insurance 

license does mean he cannot do work requiring the license, his work history 

has demonstrated that he has run a company and worked in other 

capacities. Substantial evidence supports a finding that it is possible for him 

to find suitable work even without an insurance license. The record also 

shows that Father’s obligation has consistently been—and is currently 

being—satisfied by his significant other. Balancing these factors and the 

premise that Father’s child support obligation is paramount, his voluntary 

unemployment is unreasonable and supports the court’s attribution of 

income. 

B. The superior court properly attributed recurring benefits 

and gifts from his significant other in determining Father’s 

income. 

¶13 Father also contends that the court erred by attributing his 

significant other’s income to him. This Court agrees that the income of a 

non-parent, such as a new spouse or significant other, is not automatically 

included in the parent’s income. Guidelines § II(A)(2)(c). But the court can 

consider benefits derived from a new relationship. See Cummings v. 

Cummings, 182 Ariz. 383, 387 (App. 1994) (“[I]n considering the equities 

affecting child support, a court may still take into account any regular and 

substantial benefits a parent receives from remarriage.”). Also, a parent’s 

income for child support purposes includes “recurring gifts.” Guidelines 

§ II(A)(1)(b). Here, Father’s significant other paid his monthly child support 

and arrears payments, totaling about $1,100 per month from her own 

wages. These payments directly supported Father. In addition, Father is 

living free from the burden of monthly rent or mortgage expenses and other 

living expenses which are being paid by his significant other. These are 
MORITOMO v. STATE/FISCHER 

Decision of the Court 

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recurring benefits Father derives from his relationship with his significant 

other and may be properly attributed to him as income. 

C. The superior court properly considered Father’s ability to 

pay. 

¶14 Child support payments must consider a parent’s ability to 

pay. Guidelines § I(B)(1); see also In re Marriage of Allen, 241 Ariz. 314, 317, 

¶ 13 (App. 2016) (noting that the parents’ ability to pay is one public policy 

consideration rooted in the Guidelines). But the Guidelines account for a 

parent’s need “to maintain at least a minimum standard of living” by 

including a Self-Support Reserve Test. Guidelines § VIII(A). Here, the court 

properly applied the test when calculating Father’s child support. 

D. The superior court was not required to make specific 

findings. 

¶15 For family court orders, the superior court is not required to 

make specific findings of fact unless a party so requests, see Ariz. R. Fam. 

Law P. 82(a)(1), or if the court deviates from the amount of child support 

calculated by the Guidelines, Nia, 242 Ariz. at 424, ¶¶ 19–20. 

¶16 Here, no party requested written factual findings pursuant to 

Rule 82(a)(1). And the superior court did not deviate from the child support 

calculated using the Guidelines’ mechanism, so it was not required to make 

findings under Nia, supra. After review of the record, this Court finds no 

error with the court’s attribution of income to Father and ultimate 

calculation of child support. 

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Not 

Including the Other Three Children. 

¶17 Father contends that the court erred by not including his three 

other children who reside with him and his significant other in the child 

support calculation. Parents’ legal obligations to support other children 

may impact their child support obligation for the children at issue in an 

order, but when no legal obligation exists, child support is not impacted. 

Compare Guidelines § II(B)(2)(d) (“If a parent is the primary residential 

parent of a child from other relationships, that parent’s Child Support 

Income may be reduced.”) with § I(C)(1) (“The ‘support’ of other persons, 

such as stepchildren, is considered voluntary and does not impact the child 

support determined under the Guidelines.”). 
MORITOMO v. STATE/FISCHER 

Decision of the Court 

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¶18 Here, the court credited Father with supporting one 

additional child because it had already found that Father was the legal 

parent in a prior proceeding. As for the other three children, Father and his 

significant other testified that the children are theirs in common. But they 

never married, and paternity is not presumed if the child is born out of 

wedlock unless there is genetic testing, a signed birth certificate, or a 

notarized or witnessed voluntary acknowledgment. See A.R.S. § 25-814(A). 

Although Father testified that he signed the three children’s birth 

certificates, the court never received supporting documentary evidence. 

Further, the court specifically found Father was not a credible witness. 

Thus, the court did not err by finding Father failed to establish that he was 

the father of the other three children. See Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 

277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019) (“On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence but 

defer to the family court’s determinations of witness credibility and the 

weight given to conflicting evidence.”). 

¶19 Even if the court found the evidence of Father’s paternity 

adequate, whether to credit a parent with the support of other children lies 

within the superior court’s discretion. See Guidelines § II(B)(2)(d) (“If a 

parent is the primary residential parent of a child from other relationships, 

that parent’s Child Support Income may be reduced.”) (emphasis added); 

In re Marriage of Pacific, 168 Ariz. 460, 465 (App. 1991) (“[W]e find no abuse 

of discretion in the court’s decision to credit Mother but not Father for 

supporting other children.”). Notably, in 2019, the superior court addressed 

this same issue in a footnote when calculating Father’s child support 

obligation. At that time, it found that crediting Father for his other children 

was not in the best interests of the children affected by the order. 

¶20 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in including 

only one of Father’s additional children in its child support calculation. 

CONCLUSION 

¶21 For the reasons above, the court’s child support order is 

affirmed.