IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

PETER JONES, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2175-D-BN 

§ 

ULISSES RAMOS ANASTACIO, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Peter Jones, a resident of Dallas, Texas, filed a pro se Criminal 

Complaint & Petition for Guardianship & Order of Protection, naming as defendants 

individuals alleged to reside in Collin County, Texas and in Brazil. Dkt. No. 3. 

Senior United States District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater referred Jones’s 

complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

Through the complaint, which includes various citations to Texas’s penal and 

family codes, Jones requests wide-ranging relief, including that the Court appoint 

him as legal guardian or guardian ad litem for a minor. See Dkt. No. 3 at 4-5. And his 

complaint appears at least somewhat related to a closed divorce proceeding in Dallas 

County. See id. at 3 (requesting that this federal district court “overturn[] a ruling by 

the original 265th’s district court ... as an appeal”). 

After reviewing the complaint, the undersigned questions whether there is 

subject matter jurisdiction and, given the circumstances of this case, enters these 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 1 of 10 PageID 22
- 2 - 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should 

dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

These findings and conclusions provide Jones notice as to the jurisdictional 

deficiencies. And the ability to file objections to the undersigned’s recommendation 

that this case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (further explained below) offers 

Jones an opportunity to establish (if possible) that the Court does indeed have subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

Legal Standards 

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 

(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); see 

also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within constitutional bounds, 

Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.”); 

Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Federal courts 

are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack 

the power to adjudicate claims.”). 

They must therefore “presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 

and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the 

federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Correspondingly, all federal courts have an independent duty to examine their own 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-

84 (1999) (“Subject-matter limitations ... keep the federal courts within the bounds 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 2 of 10 PageID 23
- 3 - 

the Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter 

delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest 

level.” (citations omitted)). 

Jones chose to file this lawsuit in federal court and, by doing so, undertook the 

burden to establish federal jurisdiction. See Butler v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 762 

F. App’x 193, 194 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[A]ssertions [that] are conclusory [ ] 

are insufficient to support [an] attempt to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.” 

(citing Evans v. Dillard Univ., 672 F. App’x 505, 505-06 (5th Cir. 2017) (per cuiam); 

Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2001))). 

And, if Jones does not, this lawsuit must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, 

the court must dismiss the action.”). 

Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction 

depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established 

argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 

1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 

636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 

929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, 

parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ 

in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)). 

Under their limited jurisdiction, federal courts generally may only hear a case 

if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of citizenship exists between 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 3 of 10 PageID 24
- 4 - 

the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. 

In cases invoking jurisdiction under Section 1332, each plaintiff’s citizenship 

must be diverse from each defendant’s citizenship, and the amount in controversy 

must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b). 

This amount “is determined by the amount of damages or the value of the 

property that is the subject of the action.” Celestine v. TransWood, Inc., 467 F. App’x 

317, 319 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). 

And, “[f]or diversity purposes, state citizenship is synonymous with domicile. 

A change in domicile requires: ‘(1) physical presence at the new location and (2) an 

intention to remain there indefinitely.’” Dos Santos v. Belmere Ltd. P’ship, 516 F. 

App’x 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Preston v. 

Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., 485 F.3d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In 

determining diversity jurisdiction, the state where someone establishes his domicile 

serves a dual function as his state of citizenship.... Domicile requires the 

demonstration of two factors: residence and the intention to remain.” (citing Stine v. 

Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954))). 

“The basis for diversity jurisdiction must be ‘distinctly and affirmatively 

alleged.’” Dos Santos, 516 F. App’x at 403 (quoting Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 

F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2009)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit has therefore held “that a ‘failure to adequately allege the basis for diversity 

jurisdiction mandates dismissal.’” Id. (quoting Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 4 of 10 PageID 25
- 5 - 

803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991)). 

Under Section 1331, federal question jurisdiction “exists when ‘a well-pleaded 

complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 

plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question 

of federal law.’” Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)); see also

In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A federal question exists ‘if 

there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of 

federal law.’” (quoting Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 

(5th Cir. 1995))). 

The “‘creation’ test ... accounts for the vast bulk of suits under federal law.” 

Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257 (citation omitted). But 

“a federal court [is also] able to hear claims recognized under state law 

that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus 

justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a 

federal forum offers on federal issues.” That is to say, “federal 

jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) 

necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable 

of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state 

balance approved by Congress.” 

Perez v. Se. SNF, L.L.C., No. 21-50399, 2022 WL 987187, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 

2022) (per curiam) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 

545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005), then Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258). 

Discussion 

While Jones alleges that this lawsuit is “questionably a diversity case,” Dkt. 

No. 3, he fails to adequately allege a basis for diversity. Most apparent, there is not 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 5 of 10 PageID 26
- 6 - 

complete diversity based on the allegations, which reflect that Texas residents appear 

on both sides of this dispute. 

And no facts alleged raise a substantial, disputed question of federal law. Nor 

do the well-pleaded allegations reflect that there is federal jurisdiction over a state 

law claim. 

First, even if Jones cites to federal criminal statutes, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 3 

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343), “decisions whether to prosecute or file criminal charges are 

generally within the prosecutor’s discretion, and, as a private citizen, [Jones] has no 

standing to institute a federal criminal prosecution and no power to enforce a criminal 

statute,” Gill v. State of Tex., 153 F. App’x 261, 262-63 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curaim) 

(citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); United States v. 

Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)); see also Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 

654 (5th Cir. 2021) (In Linda R.S., “the Court repeatedly emphasized ‘the special 

status of criminal prosecutions in our system.’ It is a bedrock principle of our system 

of government that the decision to prosecute is made, not by judges or crime victims, 

but by officials in the executive branch. And so it is not the province of the judiciary 

to dictate to executive branch officials who shall be subject to investigation or 

prosecution.... As a result, courts across the country have dutifully enforced this rule 

in case after case – refusing to hear claims challenging the decision not to investigate 

or prosecute another person.” (collecting cases; citations omitted)). 

Relatedly, insofar as Jones intends to bring civil claims under criminal 

statutes, he fails to include allegations showing that he has a private right of action 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 6 of 10 PageID 27
- 7 - 

under any such statute. See Ennis Transp. Co. Inc. v. Richter, No. 3:08-cv-2206-B, 

2009 WL 464979, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2009) (“It is well established that generally 

there is no private cause of action for the violation of a federal criminal statute, and 

thus no jurisdiction for federal courts to preside over a suit between private parties 

when the only federal law allegedly violated is criminal. In rare circumstances, 

however, where a criminal statute has ‘a statutory basis for inferring’ the existence 

of a civil action, violation of a criminal statute may give rise to a private cause of 

action.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Tucker v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth 

Circuit, 815 F. App’x 292, 294 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Sections 241 and 242 are criminal 

statutes that do not provide for private civil causes of action.” (citations omitted)). 

Nor may Jones base federal question jurisdiction on a purported appeal of the 

state divorce proceeding. See Dkt. No. 3 at 3. 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “inferior federal courts lack jurisdiction 

‘to modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized by Congress.” 

Nunu v. Texas, No. 21-20446, 2022 WL 820744, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2022) (per 

curiam) (quoting Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013)); see 

also Miller v. Dunn, 35 F.4th 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 2022) (The doctrine “applies only 

to ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 

district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. 

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005))). 

Courts in this circuit have “consistently applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 7 of 10 PageID 28
- 8 - 

as a bar to federal jurisdiction over matters related to family[-law] disputes.” Evans 

v. Williamson Cnty. Gov’t, No. A-15-CV-436-SS, 2015 WL 4621449, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 

May 28, 2015) (collecting cases), rec. accepted, 2015 WL 4624708 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 

2015). 

And, insofar as Jones’s allegations may be read as seeking custody of a minor 

child or reconsideration by the Court of state-court-issued decrees related to divorce 

or custody, the narrow domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction may also 

apply. See Escalante v. Lidge, 34 F.4th 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he domestic 

relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, 

alimony, or child custody decree.” (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 

704 (1992))). 

Nor may the facts in the complaints be liberally construed to plausibly allege 

that the defendants violated Jones’s constitutional rights. 

“A plaintiff makes out a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the 

Constitution or of federal law, and then shows that the violation was committed by 

someone acting under color of state law.’” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293-94 (5th 

Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)). 

“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the 

defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law 

and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state 

law.’” Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting West 

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 8 of 10 PageID 29
- 9 - 

299, 326 (1941))). 

Jones alleges no facts to support that any defendant acted with the authority 

of state law. So, even affording liberal construction, he has not alleged federal 

question jurisdiction based on Section 1983. See Mitchell v. Clinkscales, 253 F. App’x 

339, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough Mitchell argues that Clinkscales is 

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell does not allege facts demonstrating that 

Clinkscales acted under color of state law; thus, Mitchell failed to plead and establish 

subject-matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal question. [And t]he 

district court was required to dismiss the complaint.” (citation omitted)); Harrington 

v. City of Shiner, Tex., No. 6:20-cv-00039, 2021 WL 4503013, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 

30, 2021) (“Harrington failed, not in stating conclusory or vague facts to support his 

Section 1983 claim, but in showing that the Section 1983 claim was not frivolous, 

insubstantial, or patently without merit given the facts that he did allege. Thus, the 

district court concluded that the claim did not raise a federal question given the lack 

of a foundation for the Section 1983 claim – that is, an alleged constitutional rights 

violation – as well as the lack of any factual allegations that could even imply the 

applicability of the statute.” (discussing prior dismissal by the court; citations 

omitted)). 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 9 of 10 PageID 30
- 10 - 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: October 6, 2022 

_________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-02175-D-BN Document 7 Filed 10/06/22 Page 10 of 10 PageID 31