No. 01-517

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2003 MT 44

BARBARA MILLER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF RED LODGE, MONTANA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,

In and for the County of Carbon, Cause No. DV 00-37,

The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Robert L. Stephens, Jr., Southside Law Center, Billings, Montana

For Respondent:

Jared S. Dahle, Nelson Law Firm, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 18, 2002

 Decided: March 13, 2003

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk
2

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Following a dog bite incident, Respondent City of Red Lodge (ìCityî) filed criminal

charges against the dogís owner, Appellant Barbara Miller, and obtained an order from Red

Lodge City Judge Carol S. Anderson to seize and impound the allegedly vicious dog. The

City served Miller with Judge Andersonís order and Miller elected to euthanize the dog

instead of boarding it at a local veterinary clinic. Miller then filed suit against the City in the

Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which was later removed to the

Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County. 

¶2 Millerís complaint against the City included due process, equal protection, statutory

infirmity, double jeopardy, and 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 claims. Upon motion by the City, the

District Court granted summary judgment to the City on Millerís due process, equal

protection, statutory infirmity, and double jeopardy claims but denied the Cityís motion for

summary judgment on the ß 1983 claim. Subsequently, the City filed a second motion for

summary judgment regarding the ß 1983 claim, on judicial and quasi-judicial immunity

grounds, which the District Court granted. Miller appeals from the District Courtís grant of

summary judgment in regard to the ß 1983 claim. We reverse and remand.

¶3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it granted the Cityís

motion for summary judgment on the ß 1983 claim pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and

quasi-judicial immunity.
3

BACKGROUND

¶4 In the summer of 1999, Miller resided in Red Lodge, Montana, in a rental property

owned by Gene Culver. On July 22, 1999, Culver visited Millerís residence to perform an

inspection on the property. As Culver attempted to inspect the property, Millerís dog, an

Akita named Mocha, bit Culver causing serious bodily injury. As a result of the incident,

the Red Lodge City Attorney filed a criminal complaint against Miller on July 23, 1999. The

criminal complaint charged Miller with: maintaining a public nuisance, a misdemeanor, in

violation of ß 7.02.091(1)(a) of the Red Lodge Municipal Code; failure to keep a domestic

animal within or upon her own property, a misdemeanor, in violation of ß 8.02.010 of the

Red Lodge Municipal Code; and maintaining a nuisance animal, fourth offense, a

misdemeanor, in violation of ß 8.04.080(E) of the Red Lodge Municipal Code. The City

Attorney also moved the City Court to ìorder the Red Lodge Police to immediately seize

[Millerís] dog, Akita, and to place the dog in a facility that keeps animals, at [Millerís] sole

expense, pending the outcome of this case.î

¶5 On July 23, 1999, City Court Judge Carol S. Anderson ordered Miller to post bond

in the amount of $500.00 and ordered the Red Lodge Police Department to immediately seize

Mocha and board it at Millerís expense. On the evening of July 24, 1999, Red Lodge City

police officers went to Millerís residence to execute Judge Andersonís order. The police

officers were unable to seize Mocha but successfully served Miller with a copy of the order.

According to Miller, she did not have sufficient funds to pay the $500.00 bond or the
4

estimated boarding fees. Therefore, on July 25, 1999, Miller had Mocha euthanized at a

veterinary clinic.

¶6 On August 5, 1999, Culver filed a complaint against Miller which sought money

damages, punitive damages, and reimbursement for medical expenses. On January 21, 2000,

Miller filed: (1) an answer to Culverís complaint; (2) a counterclaim against Culver alleging

violations of the Montana Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, harassment, and

negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (3) a third-party complaint against the City

challenging the constitutionality of the Cityís dog ordinances and asserting due process,

equal protection, double jeopardy, and 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 claims. On May 3, 2000, the

District Court bifurcated Millerís actions against Culver and the City. This appeal addresses

only those issues which pertain to Millerís suit against the City.

¶7 On October 3, 2000, the City filed a motion for summary judgment which argued that

no material facts existed that entitled Miller to relief under any of the alleged theories for

recovery. Following a hearing on the matter, the District Court, on December 5, 2000,

granted the Cityís motion in part and denied it in part. The District Court granted the Cityís

motion as to Millerís due process claim, equal protection claim, constitutional challenge to

the City ordinances, and double jeopardy claim. However, the District Court concluded that

material issues of fact did exist regarding the alleged ß 1983 constitutional deprivation.

Accordingly, the District Court denied the Cityís motion for summary judgment as it

pertained to the ß 1983 allegations. 
5

¶8 On March 8, 2001, the City filed a second motion for summary judgment. This time,

the City argued that it was immune from ß 1983 liability pursuant to the doctrines of judicial

and quasi-judicial immunity. On April 27, 2001, Miller filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment. The District Court held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on May 2,

2001. On May 7, 2001, the District Court granted the Cityís motion for summary judgment

and denied Millerís cross-motion for summary judgment. In granting the Cityís summary

judgment motion, the District Court concluded that all of the public officials implicated in

the action enjoyed immunity from suit. Therefore, by extension, the District Court

concluded that ìMillerís ß 1983 action against the City fails as a matter of law by reason of

the Doctrines of Judicial Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity.î

¶9 On May 29, 2001, Miller filed a motion requesting the District Court to reconsider

its summary judgment rulings. The District Court denied Millerís motion. Miller appeals

from the District Courtís May 7, 2001, order of summary judgment. Millerís appeal does not

challenge the initial summary judgment ruling with respect to the due process, equal

protection, double jeopardy, and statutory infirmity claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 We review a district courtís grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

evaluation under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., as the district court. Vivier v. State Dept. of Transp.,

2001 MT 221, ¶ 5, 306 Mont. 454, ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 958, ¶ 5. This Court has stated that:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist.

Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving

party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue
6

does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the

court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court

as to whether the court erred. [Citations omitted.]

Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Did the District Court err when it granted the Cityís motion for summary judgment

on the ß 1983 claim pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity?

¶12 As indicated above, on January 21, 2000, Miller filed a third-party complaint against

the City wherein she challenged the constitutionality of the Cityís dog ordinances and

asserted due process, equal protection, and ß 1983 claims. On December 5, 2000, upon

motion by the City, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the City on all

but the ß 1983 claim.

¶13 The District Court denied the Cityís summary judgment motion on the ß 1983 claim

because it found that the following material facts existed:

First, there are questions regarding whether Miller was deprived of a

constitutional right. The question of whether the attempted removal of Mocha

was unreasonable, in light of the facts alleged by Miller, must be answered by

the jury.

Second, was it reasonable to substitute an ex parte Order to seize for a

search warrant based upon probable cause? Third, does Red Lodge have an

ìunwritten policyî which results in the selective, retaliatory, enforcement of

its dog ordinances as Miller alleges?

Fourth, whether the Cityís policy amounts to deliberate indifference to

Millerís constitutional rights is also a fact question. Did the police officers act

with deliberate indifference to Millerís privacy and due process rights when

attempting to seize Mocha without a search warrant? Again, were their actions
7

reasonable? The Court finds the question of liability of the City and its police

officers mu[st] be reached by the jury.

Finally, there are questions of fact as to whether the Cityís policy of

allowing seizure of a dog through an ex parte Order rather than a search

warrant, when a dog is on private property, is the underlying force behind the

deprivation, if any, of Millerís due process rights. Also, if there is a policy of

selective, retaliatory, enforcement of dog ordinances, did this lead to

deprivation of Millerís constitutional rights? [Citations omitted.]

¶14 On March 8, 2001, the City filed another motion for summary judgment on the ß 1983

claim. This time, the City argued that summary judgment was warranted because ìthe City,

through the actions of its municipal employees, [is] immune from suit under ß 1983 pursuant

to the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.î Essentially, the City maintained that the City

Attorneyís acts of filing the criminal complaint and moving to impound Millerís dog

constituted ìintegral part[s] of the judicial process.î Therefore, pursuant to Imbler v.

Pachtman (1976), 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, the City Attorney enjoyed

an absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit. Next, the City argued that Judge Anderson

acted within her ìjudicial capacityî and did not act ìin clear absence of all jurisdictionî when

she issued the ex parte order. Pursuant to Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct.

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331, the City argued that Judge Anderson enjoyed an absolute judicial

immunity from suit. Finally, the City insisted that the police officers, in serving the order

of seizure upon Miller, faithfully ìexecuted a facially valid court order.î Therefore, pursuant

to Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Servs. (9th Cir. 1987), 834 F.2d 758, the

police officers enjoyed an absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit. As all of the Cityís

officials maintained immunity from suit, the City submitted that it too, by extension, enjoyed
8

immunity. The City cited Reisdorff v. County of Yellowstone, 1999 MT 280, 296 Mont. 525,

989 P.2d 850, in support of its ìimmunity by extensionî theory.

¶15 Based on the argument and authority submitted by the City in support of its second

motion for summary judgment, the District Court recanted its initial statements regarding the

ß 1983 claim:

Upon careful review of the doctrines of judicial immunity and quasi-judicial

immunity, in addition to [the officersí] depositions, the Court finds such

ìreasonablenessî questions were improperly raised.

Rather, the Court finds the proper analysis of Millerís ß 1983 action is

whether the city officials involved in this case are protected by judicial

immunity or quasi-judicial immunity. A determination of this issue boils

down to three questions: First, did City Attorney Thomas, when filing the

Complaint, act in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process?

Second, did Red Lodge Judge Carol Anderson act in clear absence of all

jurisdiction when issuing the ex parte Order? Third, were the officers

involved acting pursuant to a facially valid court order?

The District Court analyzed the federal case law addressing the asserted immunities and

concluded ì[t]he answer to the first question is yes, to the second question is no, and to the

third question is yes.î Based on the answers to the above questions, the District Court

entered summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that ìMiller fails to demonstrate

the City and its officials acted beyond their jurisdiction or without authorization of law. As

such, Millerís ß 1983 action against the City fails as a matter of law by reason of the

Doctrines of Judicial Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity.î The District Court relied

upon Reisdorff for the ìimmunity by extensionî proposition submitted by the City.
9

¶16 In Reisdorff, a justice of the peace from Yellowstone County ordered Linda Reisdorff

to reduce the number of animals on her property from approximately three hundred to fifteen

dogs, four horses, and two cows. Reisdorff later allegedly refused to allow authorities to

inspect her property. Therefore, the justice of the peace issued an ex parte order which (1)

ordered Reisdorff to immediately grant inspection of her property or face the prospect of

arrest for contempt and (2) granted animal control officials authority to ìtake steps it deems

necessary to bring the defendant into complianceî in the event the officials discovered

violations of the first order. The justice of the peace gave the officials full permission to

seize, remove, retain, and treat any or all of the remaining animals on Reisdorffís property

at their discretion. 

¶17 Ultimately, the animal control officials impounded one hundred and eight of

Reisdorffís animals. Thereafter, Reisdorff filed suit against numerous defendants, including

Yellowstone County and the City of Billings, claiming that the defendants exceeded the

scope of their authority and unlawfully impounded and euthanized her animals. Reisdorffís

complaint alleged that she was entitled to recovery, in part, pursuant to ß 1983. The District

Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants concluding that each was

entitled to judicial immunity. Reisdorff appealed the summary judgment ruling to this Court.

¶18 As for the ß 1983 claim, we correctly recognized that state immunity laws ìdo not

shield the State or its officials from liability based on 42 U.S.C. ß 1983.î Reisdorff, ¶ 32.

To assert immunity from ß 1983 liability, the immunity must lie in federal law. We then

referenced the two-part test for judicial immunity discussed in Stump and the doctrine of
10

quasi-judicial immunity discussed in Turner v. American Bar Assín (N.D. Texas 1975), 407

F.Supp. 451. We determined that the justice of the peace ìwas clearly acting in his judicial

capacityî and did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Reisdorff, ¶ 34. Further,

we concluded that the local authorities acted in furtherance of the court order, the validity

of which Reisdorff did not challenge. Reisdorff, ¶ 36. Accordingly, we held that ìthe

District Court did not err when it awarded summary judgment to governmental Defendants

and the employees of those governmental entities based on quasi-judicial immunity.î

Reisdorff, ¶ 36. Based on the federal case law discussed below, we conclude that we erred

in Reisdorff when we affirmed the summary judgment ruling on the ß 1983 claim in favor

of Yellowstone County and the City of Billings pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and

quasi-judicial immunity.

¶19 Title 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

¶20 In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (1978), 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct.

2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, the United States Supreme Court held that municipalities and

other local government units are ìpersonsî for purposes of ß 1983. To impose liability on

a local government unit, a claimant must establish the following:
1 Obviously, a court must determine whether a ß 1983 plaintiff has suffered a

constitutional deprivation prior to engaging in the Monell ìpolicyî or ìcustomî analysis. For, as

the Supreme Court stated in City of Los Angeles v. Heller (1986), 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct.

1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed.2d 806:

[N]either Monell, nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages

against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in

fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm. If a

person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police

officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of

constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point. [Citation Omitted.]

11

Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under ß 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

bodyís officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the ß 1983 action

against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible

for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments,

like every other ß 1983 ìperson,î by the very terms of the statute, may be sued

for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ìcustomî even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the bodyís

official decisionmaking channels.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36.

¶21 Stated another way, in evaluating a local governmentís ß 1983 liability, courts must

determine: (1) whether plaintiffís harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if

so, whether the local government unit is responsible for that violation.1

 Collins v. City of

Harker Heights, Texas (1992), 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1066, 117 L.Ed.2d 261.

However, a municipality or local government unit cannot be held liable solely because it

employs a tortfeasorñor, in other words, a municipality or local government unit cannot be

held liable under ß 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct.

at 2036. A plaintiff must show that the local government action was taken with the requisite
2

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals frames the inquiry into a local governmentís ß 1983

liability as follows:

To impose liability on a local governmental entity for failing to act to

preserve constitutional rights, a section 1983 plaintiff must establish: (1) that he

possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality

had a policy; (3) that this policy ìamounts to deliberate indifferenceî to the

plaintiffís constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ìmoving force behind

the constitutional violation.î

Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce (9th Cir. 1992), 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (citation omitted). 

3 See Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri (1980), 445 U.S. 622, 637-38, 100 S.Ct.

1398, 1408-09, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, and 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights ßß 104-119 (2000) for various

applications of the federally recognized absolute and qualified immunities from ß 1983 liability. 

12

degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the action and the

deprivation of federal rights. Board of County Comírs of Bryan County v. Brown (1997),

520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626. ì[M]unicipal liability under ß

1983 attaches whereñand only whereña deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made

from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final

policy with respect to the subject matter in question.î2

 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (1986),

475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452.

¶22 Federal case law reveals that in approximately the mid 1970s, the Supreme Court

embarked upon parallel tracts of ß 1983 developmentñon the one hand it continued to

cultivate the local government ß 1983 liability, while, nearly simultaneously, it continued to

expand upon immunities from ß 1983 liability.3

 In Owen, 445 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. at 1408,

the Supreme Court noted the absence of express immunity language in ß 1983, but stated that

ìwe have, on several occasions, found that a tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in
13

the common law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that ëCongress would have

specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.íî In Owen, the Supreme Court

recapitulated the types of government officials who maintained immunity from personal

liability based on a historical tradition of immunity. Following this analysis, the Court

concluded:

[T]here is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither

history nor policy supports a construction of ß 1983 that would justify the

qualified immunity accorded the city of Independence by the Court of

Appeals. We hold, therefore, that the municipality may not assert the good

faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under ß 1983.

Owen, 445 U.S. at 638, 100 S.Ct. at 1409. The Court further expanded upon this notion in

a footnote following the above statement:

The governmental immunity at issue in the present case differs

significantly from the official immunities involved in our previous decisions.

In those cases, various government officers had been sued in their individual

capacities, and the immunity served to insulate them from personal liability for

damages. Here, in contrast, only the liability of the municipality itself is at

issue, not that of its officers, and in the absence of an immunity, any recovery

would come from public funds.

Owen, 445 U.S. at 638, 100 S.Ct. at 1409, n.18.

¶23 In Kentucky v. Graham (1985), 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, the

Supreme Court sought to clarify the distinction between ìpersonal and official capacity

action suits.î There, the Court again summarized the elements of personal and official

capacity liability. Next, the Court discussed the differences in the defenses to liability as

follows:
14

When it comes to defenses to liability, an official in a personal-capacity action

may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses,

such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law. See Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (absolute

immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d

396 (1982) (qualified immunity). In an official capacity action, these defenses

are unavailable. The only immunities that can be claimed in an officialcapacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity,

may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.

Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. at 3105-06 (citations omitted).

¶24 Finally, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination

Unit (1993), 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517, the Supreme Court reaffirmed

its prior rulings on local government immunity from ß 1983 liability. Therein, the Supreme

Court stated:

[W]e reaffirmed in Monell that ìa municipality cannot be held liable under ß

1983 on a respondeat superior theory.î But, contrary to respondentsí

assertions, this protection against liability does not encompass immunity from

suit. Indeed, this argument is flatly contradicted by Monell and our later

decisions involving municipal liability under ß 1983. In Monell, we overruled

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), insofar as

it held that local governments were wholly immune from suit under ß 1983,

though we did reserve decision on whether municipalities are entitled to some

form of limited immunity. Yet, when we took that issue up again in Owen v.

City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1415, 63 L.Ed.2d

673 (1980), we rejected a claim that municipalities should be afforded

qualified immunity, much like that afforded individual officials, based on the

good faith of their agents. These decisions make it quite clear that, unlike

various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from

suitñeither absolute or qualifiedñunder ß 1983. In short, a municipality can be

sued under ß 1983, but it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or

custom caused the constitutional injury.

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166, 113 S.Ct. at 1162 (citations omitted).
15

¶25 Despite the foregoing case law, this Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling in

favor of the defendants in Reisdorff. In Reisdorff, ¶ 17, we noted that the plaintiff ìfiled a

complaint . . . against: Yellowstone County; the City of Billings; the Yellowstone County

Sheriffís Office of Animal Control; the Billings Animal Shelter; John Fleming; Darlene

Larson; Scott Lance of the BAS; and Does 1 through 10.î This Court framed the ß 1983

summary judgment issue on appeal as, ìDid the District Court err when it awarded summary

judgment to governmental Defendants and the employees of those governmental entities

based on quasi-judicial immunity?î Reisdorff, ¶ 4.

¶26 As the above federal case law indicates, our blanket affirmation of immunity in favor

of all of the defendants in Reisdorff constituted error. In Reisdorff, we correctly applied the

doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity to the extent we immunized any

ìemployees of those governmental entitiesî from individual ß 1983 liability. Further, while

Reisdorff does not expressly address this issue, the local government units would have been

entitled to summary judgment on the ß 1983 claim in the absence of a constitutional

deprivation, as alluded to in City of Los Angeles above. However, to the extent that we

afforded the local government units immunity from ß 1983 liability pursuant to the doctrines

of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, Reisdorff is hereby overruled.

¶27 In the case at bar, Miller filed a third-party complaint against ìSafeco Property and

Casualty Insurance Companies, Hoiness Labar Insurance, Inc., Gene Culver and City of Red
4

 Miller attributed liability to the City, in part, under the theory that ìthe enforcement of its

ordinances . . . violated the constitutional rights of Miller to equal protection and due process of

law.î

16

Lodge.î4 Miller did not include any of the City officials as named defendants in the

complaint, in individual or official capacities. Nevertheless, the City ultimately obtained

summary judgment based upon individual immunities unavailable to local government units.

¶28 In ruling upon the Cityís first motion for summary judgment, the District Court

appeared focused on the appropriate ß 1983 liability issues. That is, it queried whether a

constitutional deprivation occurred and, if so, raised questions regarding the origin of the

alleged deprivation. The second motion for summary judgment, with its corresponding

assertion of immunity, seemingly derailed the initial deprivation analysis. Unfortunately, it

appears that this Court motivated the diversion with our erroneous application of the ß 1983

immunities in Reisdorff.

¶29 Admittedly, it sounds somewhat disingenuous to proclaim that the District Court erred

when it granted summary judgment on the ß 1983 claim to the City on judicial and

quasi-judicial immunity grounds. After all, the District Court did so primarily based on our

direction in Reisdorff. However, for the reasons discussed above, Reisdorff erroneously

misconstrued and misapplied the ß 1983 immunities as they apply to local government units.

Therefore, we must reverse the District Courtís order of summary judgment. We do not

intend to pass judgment on the substantive immunity analyses undertaken by the District

Court in regard to the individual officials. For, the dispositive flaw in this case occurred

when the City obtained immunity by extension.
17

¶30 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

/S/ JIM REGNIER

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ JIM RICE