2024 IL App (4th) 240742-U 

NO. 4-24-0742 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re S.W., a Minor,

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

Jessica M., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

)

) 

) 

) 

)

) 

)

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Adams County 

No. 20JA75 

Honorable 

John C. Wooleyhan, 

Judge Presiding. 

 JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s findings that respondent was unfit and that termination of the 

parental relationship was in the best interest of her child were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 Respondent Jessica M. is the mother of S.W., a minor (born in 2017). In September 

2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of S.W., who was subsequently 

adjudicated to be neglected and made a ward of the court. In January 2023, the State filed a petition 

for termination of parental rights, and in February 2024, the trial court concluded that respondent 

and S.W.’s father were unfit parents. Following a best-interest hearing held in February and April

2024, the court found it was in S.W.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 3 Respondent appeals, claiming the trial court’s findings were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

FILED

September 27, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 4 We affirm.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 A. Initial Filing

¶ 7 A petition for adjudication of wardship of S.W. was filed on September 2, 2020, 

naming his parents, respondent (mother) and Kelvin W. (father). The petition alleged neglect and

abuse arising out of an August 26, 2020, incident in which S.W. was dropped off at daycare with 

unexplained bruising. 

¶ 8 B. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Orders

¶ 9 In an adjudicatory order entered on March 23, 2021, the trial court made S.W. a 

ward of the court. In a dispositional order entered on May 4, 2021, the court found S.W. had been 

neglected. (Although the order in the record on appeal has the grounds redacted, we note the April 

5, 2024, termination hearing order clearly states that S.W. had been found neglected on May 5, 

2021.).

¶ 10 C. Motion for Termination of Parental Rights 

¶ 11 On January 25, 2023, the State filed a motion for termination of parental rights as 

to S.W. and alleged that both parents were unfit; the father is not a party to this appeal. The motion 

asserted that respondent was an unfit parent under section 1(D)(m)(i), (ii) of the Adoption Act (750 

ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2022)) because she (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct 

the conditions which were the basis for the removal of S.W., (2) failed to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of S.W. within any nine-month time period after an adjudication of neglect, and 

(3) failed to make reasonable progress toward S.W.’s return in any nine-month period after the end 

of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. The petition further 

contended that it was in the best interest of S.W. that respondent’s parental rights be terminated 
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and that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services be authorized to consent to

S.W.’s adoption. 

¶ 12 D. Fitness Hearing

¶ 13 The initial hearing on termination of parental rights was held on February 22, 2024, 

at which time five witnesses testified, including respondent. 

¶ 14 1. Emily Gregory

¶ 15 Emily Gregory is a visitation specialist with Chaddock Foster and Adoption 

(Chaddock) and served as such for S.W. from June 2022 to June 2023. She testified that at the 

beginning of that period, respondent had visitation with S.W. “twice a week,” on Thursdays and 

Fridays. “And then about mid-2023, I believe, she got down to one visit a week which would have 

been [] on Friday.” Gregory said there were a couple of issues with respondent not showing up for 

her visits, some of which were due to sickness. She said at least two visits were to be conducted 

remotely, but respondent did not show up. Some visits were terminated early because respondent 

said she needed to go to church. Although Gregory had no evidence that respondent had not been 

sick during the missed visits, she also had no knowledge of respondent providing documentation 

of illness as required. Gregory said that respondent made up the missed visits. 

¶ 16 Gregory said she did not observe any visits where respondent in any way abused 

S.W. She said respondent “provided him meals and interacted with him” and that the two 

sometimes played board games. She said that S.W. “would occasionally give [respondent] hugs 

and kisses when [he] would be leaving or showing up” from a visitation. She testified she did see 

S.W. throw a fit on one occasion, explaining:

“There was one time I went to pick him up from school and it took about an hourand-a-half to get him out of the building. He just totally refused to go to visits. 
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There [were] some other times that he would refuse or he would tell me he didn’t 

want to go and see mom but then we would get there and some of it, he would be 

fine, and then other times he just totally [did] not want to interact.”

¶ 17 She was also asked whether there were times when S.W. “didn’t want to end the 

visits when it was time to go,” to which Gregory answered: “He would say that he didn’t want to 

leave and say that he wanted to stay but he would still leave. He would only cry for probably two 

minutes until we drove away and then he would stop crying.” 

¶ 18 2. Kelsey Platt

¶ 19 Kelsey Platt, the former supervisor of foster and adoption at Chaddock, testified 

that it was her duty as supervisor to approve service plans for families being serviced by Chaddock; 

she supervised caseworkers Brett Landwehr and Megan McCoy. She discussed the service plans 

dated July 21, 2021, and August 10, 2022. According to Platt, “[t]he [July 21] service plan covers 

the six months prior to the date that is on the service plan so it would have been from six months 

prior to July to current.” She noted some of the goals that were listed for respondent, including 

“housing, cooperation, domestic violence, mental health services [and] her services and stability.”

Platt saw that respondent “was engaged in services but they were not satisfactory [sic] complete 

at that time.” She explained that respondent’s progress was not satisfactory in the area of domestic 

violence for the following reasons:

“She was engaged in the Eve Project. However, there were concerns reported by 

her domestic violence provider that she was not making progresses in the area of—

in the areas of like acknowledging or taking accountability for actions as well as 

she would miss appointments. I believe the terminology that the provider used was 

that she would let her physical health interfere with her services.” 
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¶ 20 Respondent’s progress was rated satisfactory in the areas of housing, employment, 

and parenting. Platt said respondent missed a total of nine visits with S.W. during that service plan 

period, three of which were excused.

¶ 21 Concerning the August 10, 2022, service plan, Platt said that respondent was rated 

as satisfactory overall but that “domestic violence and mental health were still rated 

unsatisfactory.” Concerning respondent’s housing, she said respondent was rated unsatisfactory 

because “she had moved out of her own apartment and lived with her mother at that time and she 

had reported it wasn’t a great situation for her.” There was also a period of 30 days where 

respondent was in jail. Platt explained, “She had, when the case opened, she was on probation for 

a domestic violence charge. She got another charge during the case, as well, and so that was 

revoked. Her probation was revoked and she had to do 30 days in jail.” Respondent did not exercise 

visitation while she was incarcerated but resumed visits upon her release. None of respondent’s 

visits were unsupervised.

¶ 22 Platt said that respondent had reenrolled in parenting classes through Hobby Horse 

during early 2021 and eventually completed them in April of that year. She said that the Hobby 

Horse classes involved parenting education and were not a substitute for Eve’s Project, which 

focused on domestic violence. Platt testified further that respondent “did complete the Eve’s 

Project and they reported satisfactory. However, we had discussions with [respondent] and we had 

concerns regarding their guarded—their guarded observations of the class.” Platt explained, “We 

requested that she start another, whether it be Eve Project or different domestic violence provider 

to start another one due to the guarded concerns and the guarded last report.” Platt said that 

respondent completed the course a second time at some point after the reporting period for the July 

2023 service plan. 
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¶ 23 3. Brett Landwehr

¶ 24 Brett Landwehr worked for Chaddock as a child welfare specialist and was the 

caseworker when the January 25, 2022, service plan was created. He said that respondent rated 

unsatisfactory in the subtask of cooperation because of her pending prior domestic violence case

and unsatisfactory in housing, employment, and mental health. However, her overall rating for the 

January 2022 report was satisfactory. He explained respondent’s unsatisfactory rating in the area 

of mental health was based on a report from the counselor from Eve’s Project, who said that 

respondent was still “not taking accountability and [was] blaming physical ailments.” He also said 

that some of the subtasks carried more weight than others and that it was still possible for a parent 

to be unsatisfactory on one or two subtasks but still be satisfactory overall. 

¶ 25 4. Megan McCoy

¶ 26 Megan McCoy had served as a welfare specialist at Chaddock since June 2022 and 

became the assigned caseworker for S.W. in September 2022. She testified concerning the January 

17, 2023, service plan, which covered August 2022 through the date of the plan. Respondent’s 

goals remained the same, and she rated satisfactory in cooperation, housing and employment, and 

mental health, but her parenting was rated unsatisfactory. McCoy said that 

“[respondent] had missed several visits. There were a couple visits that she canceled 

or that she left 30 minutes early to go to church. She left one an hour early to go to 

church. There were a couple that she missed due to sickness but did not provide 

documentation. The visits were just really inconsistent.”

McCoy believed that respondent provided documentation for a couple of the missed visits, but not 

all of them. 
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¶ 27 Concerning the subcategories of parenting and domestic violence, respondent was 

rated unsatisfactory. Regarding the latter, McCoy explained that, “At that point in time, we had 

asked her to reengage in classes through the Eve Project, not retake the entire class but just engage 

in follow-up classes to provide support and accountability and she had only engaged in a couple 

at that point.”

¶ 28 McCoy stated that respondent had rated unsatisfactory in the July 25, 2023, service 

plan subtask of cooperation because “[t]here was a domestic violence incident in her home during 

that reporting period and she did not inform me of the domestic violence incident.” The incident, 

which involved respondent and her then-boyfriend, occurred in the presence of the boyfriend’s son

and resulted in a domestic hotline call. McCoy said respondent’s housing was also rated 

unsatisfactory because her boyfriend was found to be living in the home, something which 

respondent had not reported. She also rated unsatisfactory in mental health because she had missed 

9 of 16 therapy sessions.

¶ 29 McCoy testified that respondent’s visitation in 2022 became more inconsistent; 

after March of that year, her visits were reduced in length from two hours, twice a week, to a single 

two-hour weekly visit. In April, visitation was reduced to every other week. 

¶ 30 5. Respondent

¶ 31 Respondent testified about visitation with her son, during which the two often 

played games and respondent would bring dinner. Respondent acknowledged that some of her 

visits ended early due to her church schedule and that she missed other visits due to illnesses; some 

of the missed visits were made up. Respondent said that she had stopped attending some of the 

Eve’s Project sessions because of an issue with the male instructor. She acknowledged that she 

had lived with her mother for a time due to financial issues and attended only 9 of 15 domestic 
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violence sessions. She also acknowledged there was a domestic violence incident involving her 

new boyfriend in 2023 that took place in her home. She believed she had made progress during 

the period from March 2022 through July 2023. 

¶ 32 The trial court admitted the service plan reports dated July 21, 2021, January 25, 

2022, August 10, 2022, January 17, 2023, and July 25, 2023, into evidence as Peoples’ exhibits 1 

through 5, respectively. 

¶ 33 6. Fitness Finding

¶ 34 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally found that respondent was 

unfit. According to the court, the service plans, although “an appropriate item of evidence for the 

Court to considerate [sic] at these hearings,” were not dispositive. Rather, “[t]he Court is required 

to look at all the evidence in the case to determine the fitness of the parents in relation to the needs 

of the minor.” The court observed:

“It is clear and I don’t think anybody disagrees with the fact that the date of 

adjudication in this case was in March of 2021, just about three years ago. And the 

evidence with regard to unfitness that has been presented is largely not in dispute 

in this case based on the exhibits and the testimony. We know from all that that 

both of the parents at different times following the date of adjudication and during 

the specific nine-month periods of time alleged that both parents were involved in 

some services during those times and at different times during those time periods, 

also the parents did make some degree of progress with some of those services. 

There were visits occurring between the minor and the parents, both parents. Those 

visits were always supervised by the Department or the agency. *** And all that 

was in the evidence today and is largely not in dispute. 
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The evidence was also *** undisputed that during each of the three month, 

three nine-month periods of time while the supervised visits were going on, that 

there never did come a time when the agency was able to make any kind of a 

recommendation that the visits for either parent could be unsupervised, [and] never 

a recommendation made that the minor be placed back into the custody of either of 

the parents. There were no recommendations ever made that the minor should have 

extended visits overnight or otherwise with either of the parents. The visits were 

always just supervised and that’s as far as it went.”

¶ 35 The trial court continued: 

“With regard to the mother, the allegations of unfitness as to her are that she 

failed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions which were the basis for 

removal, failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor within 

any nine-month period of time after adjudication. Court is going to find that those 

allegations have also been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The bottom 

line is throughout all the evidence in this case that the mother was involved in some 

services, has been involved in some services since the adjudication in March of 

2021 and has been having supervised visits but there were many times when efforts 

do not always translate into the type of progress that’s contemplated by the statute 

and that appears to be the case here. There were efforts made but it never translated 

into the type of substantial progress that would be necessary to consider having the 

minor placed back into the custody of the mother. So the Court is going to make 

those findings today with regard to the issue of unfitness as to each of the parents.”

A written order memorializing the court’s oral rulings was entered the same day. 
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¶ 36 E. Best-Interest Hearing

¶ 37 A best-interest hearing was held on April 5, 2024, at which McCoy testified that 

S.W. was six years old and currently residing with his maternal grandparents and half-brother. 

McCoy said S.W. appeared to be well adjusted in his placement and appears to be bonded to his 

foster parents and sibling. McCoy said that S.W. “look to [the foster parents] to have his needs 

met” and that he was “always giving them hugs, kisses,” and he “shows affection to them.” S.W. 

referred to the foster parents as “mom” and “papa.”

¶ 38 McCoy testified that the foster parents had ensured S.W. receives a proper 

education and that he made it to school or extracurricular events as needed. The foster parents were

aware of S.W.’s behavioral issues and had obtained assistance from his school, and the behavioral 

issues had declined. McCoy explained that S.W.’s behavioral issues “were worse around visit days, 

which were Thursdays and Fridays.” McCoy testified that the foster parents were willing to adopt 

S.W. and there were no issues at Chaddock with the child being adopted by the foster family. 

¶ 39 Following McCoy’s testimony, respondent moved to have the trial court take 

judicial notice of “the previous evidence as well as the exhibits received by the court.” No 

objection was made, and the court granted the motion. 

¶ 40 At the conclusion of the evidence and argument, the trial court determined it was 

in S.W.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. In rendering its oral ruling, 

the court noted that S.W. was currently six years of age and was “currently in a relative foster 

placement” and “has been in that placement for in excess of two years.” According to the court: 

“There have been some other placements prior to that, but this most recent one has 

been in place for over two years, has been the only home the minor has known for 
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those past two years. The minor appears to be well adjusted to the home, bonded to 

the foster parents and to the half sibling who also resides in that residence.

* * * 

The evidence has shown that all the minor’s needs are being met in the 

foster placement including any educational and [Individual Education Plan (IEP)] 

needs. The home appears to be safe and appropriate. It is considered a pre-adoptive 

placement due to the commitments which have been made by the foster parents.” 

¶ 41 The trial court further stated: 

“[T]here’s no doubt that as far as the mother is concerned that there’s love between 

the mother and the minor. We don’t know exactly what their relationship is at this 

point. There hasn’t been a lot of evidence, if any, presented to show when, if ever, 

it could be possible to consider placing the minor back into the custody of either of 

the natural parents. There’s been no recommendation made for that at any point 

including today.” 

¶ 42 Moreover, the trial court considered the numerous statutory factors applicable to 

the best interest of a minor regarding placement and/or termination and stated as follows:

“The court’s been able to consider those factors in evaluating these issues 

here today. We do know that the Juvenile Court Act [of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) 

(705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022))], which is what we’re operating under in 

these cases, does require that the court make every effort to achieve permanency 

for a minor as soon as that can be done for each minor involved. The statute even 

sets up a timeline of going to a point nine months after a date of adjudication that 

the court can begin considering whether or not parents have been making 
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satisfactory progress toward any type of a return home goal. In this case we’ve gone 

way beyond that time period of the nine months. We’re out over three years now 

trying to get things to make a determination if there was going to be a return home 

goal possible.” 

¶ 43 The trial court concluded that “the best opportunity for this minor to achieve 

permanency as required by the Juvenile Court Act is to be able to follow the plan which is currently 

in place through the agency, to be adopted by the current foster parents.” Accordingly, the court 

found that the State satisfied its burden of showing it was in “the best interest of this minor to have 

the rights of the natural parents be terminated, that the goal of this case will be changed to that of 

adoption.” A written order memorializing the court’s findings was entered the same day. 

¶ 44 This appeal followed.

¶ 45 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 46 On appeal, respondent challenges the trial court’s fitness and best-interest findings, 

claiming they were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 47 A. Judicial Notice

¶ 48 At the outset, we note that respondent’s statement of issues listed a challenge to the 

trial court’s decision to take judicial notice of the entire previous file in her case. However, 

respondent did not raise this point as an issue within her brief, nor did she make any arguments in 

support of that point. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) provides that 

“[p]oints not argued are forfeited” and the “failure to properly develop an argument and support it 

with citation to relevant authority results in forfeiture of that argument.” Ramos v. Kewanee 

Hospital, 2013 IL App (3d) 120001, ¶ 37. Accordingly, we decline to review that issue.

¶ 49 B. Unfitness Finding 
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¶ 50 At the fitness portion of the hearing on the termination of parental rights, it is the 

State’s obligation to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit” under one 

or more of the grounds provided by section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 

2022); 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2022)). In re Al. P., 2017 IL App (4th) 170435, ¶ 40. In 

reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not retry the case; instead, we are limited to deciding 

whether the trial court’s finding of unfitness is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re 

J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

only if the facts clearly demonstrate that the trial court should have reached the opposite result. 

In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. 

¶ 51 The trial court found that respondent was unfit under the applicable statute in that 

she failed to make reasonable progress toward return of the child to the home during any ninemonth period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)).

“Reasonable progress” is an objective standard; it means that a parent has made progress by 

complying with directives given for the return of the child such that the court will be able to return 

the child to parental custody in the near future. In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88. 

¶ 52 Here, the trial court acknowledged the importance of comparing respondent’s 

efforts against the various service plans, but it also looked to the entirety of the evidence at the 

hearing and determined that the State had met its burden in establishing unfitness. The court found 

it significant that although supervised visits were occurring, “there never did come a time when 

the agency was able to make any kind of a recommendation that the visits for either parent could 

be unsupervised, never a recommendation made that the minor be placed back into the custody of 

either of the parents.” Similarly, “[t]here were no recommendations ever made that the minor 

should have extended visits overnight or otherwise with either of the parents.” 
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¶ 53 The trial court also found it significant that respondent had not made sufficient 

progress in relation to her goals and her service plans. Here, we note that the trial court’s findings 

were based on its review of the evidence, which included hearing the testimony of five witnesses. 

We note that this court attributes great deference to a trial court’s fitness findings “ ‘because of 

[that court’s] superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility.’ ” In re 

A.L., 409 Ill. App. 3d 492, 500 (2011) (quoting In re Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1067 

(2004)). We find nothing to indicate that the trial court’s findings and conclusions as to 

respondent’s unfitness were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 54 C. Best-Interest Determination

¶ 55 Following a finding of unfitness, the focus shifts to the child. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 

347, 364 (2004). The issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is 

whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should be terminated. Id. Accordingly, at 

a best-interest hearing, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must 

yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id.

¶ 56 The determination of whether termination of parental rights serves a minor’s best 

interest relies on the consideration of several factors, including: 

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s 

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; 

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity 

of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes 

and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for 

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with 

parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the 
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risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to 

care for the child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072 (2006). 

See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a)-(j) (West 2022). “The court’s best interest determination [need 

not] contain an explicit reference to each of these factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on 

any basis used by the trial court below in affirming its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App 

(1st) 133119, ¶ 19. 

¶ 57 The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. “A reviewing 

court affords great deference to a trial court’s best-interest finding because the trial court is in a 

superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility.” J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 

190537, ¶ 33. Consequently, we will not reverse a trial court’s best-interest finding and termination 

of parental rights unless its decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re C.P., 

2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 68. 

¶ 58 Again, we note that the trial court considered all the evidence at the hearing and 

determined that the State had met its burden. According to the court, “The minor appears to be 

well adjusted to the home, bonded to the foster parents and to the half sibling who also resides in 

that residence.” It further stated, “The evidence has shown that all the minor’s needs are being met 

in the foster placement including any educational and IEP needs.” We further note that the foster 

parents had implemented age-appropriate disciplinary action to address S.W.’s behavioral 

problems, which had decreased. Moreover, they expressed a desire to adopt S.W. and have already 

executed the necessary paperwork. Finally, there was no evidence presented at the hearing

establishing that respondent was able to provide S.W. with the basic necessities that were already 

being provided by the foster parents. Thus, there is no evidence showing that continuation of 
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respondent’s parental rights would improve S.W.’s future, “including his financial, social, and 

emotional well-being.” In re L.B., 2015 IL App (3d) 150023, ¶ 14. 

¶ 59 A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if 

the facts clearly demonstrate that the trial court should have reached the opposite result. J.B., 2019 

IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. Here, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that it was in S.W.’s 

best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 62 Affirmed.