IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

ANGELA RENEE ROUTTE, § 

§ 

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-993-P 

§ 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL § 

SECURITY. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

AND 

NOTICE AND ORDER 

This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 

Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b ). The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation 

of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows: 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Plaintiff Angela Renee Routte ("Routte") filed this action pursuant to Sections 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code for judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). Routte protectively filed her applications on December 

9, 2020, alleging that her disability began on October 2, 2019. (Transcript ("Tr.") 13, 224, 230.) 

After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Routte requested a hearing 

before an administrative law judge ("ALJ''). (Tr. 148). The ALJ held a hearing on January 24, 

2022, and issued a decision on May 18, 2022, denying Routte's applications for benefits. (Tr. 13-

24). On September 8, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Routte's request for review, leaving the 

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ALJ' s May 18, 2022 decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-4.) Routte 

subsequently filed this civil action seeking review of the ALJ's decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

SSI benefits are governed by Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. of the SSA, along with 

numerous regulatory provisions. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 416. Although technically governed by different 

statutes and regulations, "[t]he law and regulations governing the determination of disability are 

the same for both disability insurance benefits and SSI." Greenspan v. Shala/a, 38 F.3d 232, 236 

(5th Cir. 1994). 

The SSA defines a disability as a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful 

activity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A); McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 

1999). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a fivestep analysis is employed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the claimant must not be 

presently working at any substantial gainful activity. Substantial gainful activity is defined as 

work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.972. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 

1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), cited in Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). Third, 

disability will be found if the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an 

impairment listed in the Listing oflmpairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Fourth, if disability cannot be found on the basis of the 

claimant's medical status alone, the impairment or impairments must prevent the claimant from 

returning to his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). And fifth, the 

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impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any work, considering the claimant's residual 

functional capacity ("RFC"), age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(±), 

416.920(±); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999). At steps one through four, 

the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to show he is disabled. Crowley, 197 F.3d at 198. If 

the claimant satisfies this responsibility, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there 

is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of his existing 

impairments. Id. 

A denial of disability benefits is reviewed only to determine whether the Commissioner 

applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence 

in the record as a whole. Leggett v. Chafer, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen, 

837 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 

2001). It is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. A finding of no 

substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings 

support the decision. Id. This Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute 

its judgment for the Commissioner's, but will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if the 

evidence is present. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413,417 (5th Cir. 2000); Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383. 1 

1 There are four elements of proof that must be weighed in determining whether substantial evidence of 

disability exists: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the 

claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history. See 

Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991). 

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III. ISSUES 

In her brief, Routte presents the following issues: 

1. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s residual functional capacity 

("RFC") determination because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion 

evidence and her testimony; and 

2. Whether the ALJ erred in making her credibility assessment by failing to consider Routte' s 

"stellar work history." 

(Plaintiffs Brief ("Pl.'s Br.") at 1). 

IV. ALJ DECISION 

In her May 18, 2022 decision, the ALJ found that Routte had not engaged in any substantial 

gainful activity since October 2, 2019, her alleged onset date of disability, and that she met the 

disability insured status requirements of the SSA through September 30, 2022. (Tr. 16). At Step 

Two, the ALJ found that Routte suffered from the following "severe" impairments: "agoraphobia; 

generalized anxiety disorder, with panic symptoms; and major depressive disorder." (Tr. 16 

(emphasis omitted)). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Routte did not suffer from an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or equaled any section in the Listing. (Tr. 16-18). 

As to Routte's RFC, the ALJ stated: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant has the [RFC] to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567( c) 

and 416.967(c) except she should avoid very loud, level 5 noise; should avoid 

temp[erature] extremes; and should not drive as part of the job. She can perform 

simple routine tasks with only occasional interaction with coworkers and 

supervisors. She can have no interaction with the public. She is able to adapt to 

infrequent and gradual changes. 

(Tr. 18 (emphasis omitted)). Based upon this RFC assessment, the ALJ concluded that there are 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Routte can perform. (Tr. 22). 

Consequently, the ALJ found that Routte was not disabled. (Tr. 23). 

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V. DISCUSSION 

A. RFC Determination 

As to her first issue, Routte argues that the ALJ' s RFC determination is not supported by 

substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her testimony and the medical 

opinion evidence. (Pl.'s Br. at 6-17). Specifically, Routte argues that the ALJ improperly 

evaluated Peter Holm Ph.D. ("Dr. Holm")'s consultative psychological opinion and his proposed 

limitations, and that the ALJ failed to rely on the state agency medical consultants' findings. (Pl. 's 

Tr. 6-17.) In support, Routte argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is erroneous because it is 

not consistent with all of Dr. Holm's opinions, nor Routte's subjective complaints, regarding 

Routte's stress tolerance and social interaction limitations. (Pl.'s Br. at 13-14). 

1. Dr. Holm's Opinion and Routte's Subjective Complaints 

RFC is what an individual can still do despite her limitations.2 SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 

374184, at *2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). It reflects the individual's maximum remaining ability to do 

sustained work activity in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis. Id.; see 

Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617,620 (5th Cir. 2001). A regular and continuing basis is an eight-hour 

day, five days a week, or an equivalent schedule. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. RFC is 

not the least an individual can do but the most. Id. The RFC is a function-by-function assessment, 

with both exertional and nonexertional3 factors to be considered, and it is based upon all of the 

relevant evidence in the case record. Id. at 3-6. The responsibility for determining a claimant's 

2 The Commissioner's analysis at steps four and five of the disability evaluation process is based on the 

assessment of the claimant's RFC. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2005). The Commissioner 

assesses the RFC before proceeding from step three to step four. Id. 

3 Exertional capacity addresses an individual's ability "to perform each of seven strength demands: Sitting, 

standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling." SSR 96-Sp, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. Each function must be 

considered separately, but the final RFC assessment may combine activities. Id. Nonexertional capacity "considers 

all work-related limitations and restrictions that do not depend on an individual's physical strength," including mental 

limitations. Id. at *6. 

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RFC lies with the ALJ. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1990). The ALJ must 

discuss the claimant's ability to perform sustained work activity on a regular and continuing basis 

and resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. 

In making the RFC assessment, the ALJ must consider all symptoms, including pain, and 

the extent to which these symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with objective 

medical evidence and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, 

at *2 (Oct. 25, 2017); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. The ALJ must also consider limitations 

and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even impairments that are not 

severe. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. The ALJ may draw reasonable inferences from 

the evidence in making his decision, but the social security ruling also cautions that presumptions, 

speculation, and supposition do not constitute evidence. See e.g., SSR 86-8, 1986 WL 68636, at 

*8 (1986), superseded by SSR 91-7c, 1991 WL 231791, at* 1 (Aug. 1, 1991) (changing the ruling 

only to the extent the SSR discusses the former procedures used to determine disability in 

children). 

The ALJ is not required to incorporate limitations in the RFC that he did not find the record 

supported. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 790 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The ALJ as factfinder has 

the sole responsibility for weighing the evidence and may choose whichever physician's diagnosis 

is most supported by the record."). In reviewing the ALJ's decision, a finding of no substantial 

evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the 

decision. Boyd, 239 F.3d at 704. 

The ALJ's treatment of medical opinions is governed by the revised rules in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c, which apply to claims that were filed after March 27, 2017, such as the claims in the 

present case. See Winston v. Berryhill, 755 F. App'x 395,402 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

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404.1520c(a)); Governor v. Comm 'r o/Soc. Sec., No. 20-54-BAJ-EWD, 2021 WL 1151580, at *6 

(M.D. La. Mar. 2, 2021). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), the ALJ "will not defer or give 

any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior 

administrative medical finding(s), including those from [claimant's] medical sources." "When a 

medical source provides one or more medical opinions4 or prior administrative medical findings, 5 

[the ALJ] will consider those medical opinions or prior administrative findings from that medical 

source together using the factors listed in paragraphs ( c )(1) through ( c )(5) of' section 

404.1520c(a), as appropriate." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (footnotes added). The ALJ is not 

required to articulate how he considered each medical opinion or prior administrative medical 

findings from one medical source individually. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(l). 

"The most important factors [the ALJ] consider[s] when [ ]evaluat[ing] the persuasiveness 

of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings are supportability (paragraph ( c )(1) 

of this section) and consistency (paragraph (c)(2) of this section)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) 

(footnotes added). "The ALJ must explain the supportability and consistency factors for a medical 

source's medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings in his determination, and he 

4 Medical opinions are statements from a medical source about what the claimant can still do despite her 

impairment(s) and whether the claimant has one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions in certain 

abilities. These may include claimant's ability to: (i) perform physical demands of work activities, such as sitting, 

standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions (including manipulative or postural 

functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching); (ii) perform mental demands of work activities, such 

as understanding; remembering; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; carrying out instructions; or 

responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work pressures in a work setting; (iii) perform other demands 

of work, such as seeing, hearing, or using other senses; and, (iv) adapt to environmental conditions, such as 

temperature extremes or fumes. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). 

5 Prior administrative findings are findings other than the ultimate determination about whether the claimant 

is disabled, about a medical issue made by the Commissioner's federal and state agency medical and psychological 

consultants at a prior level of review of the claimant's current claim based on their review of the evidence in the case 

record. Such findings could be on issues including: (i) the existence and severity of the claimant's impairment(s); (ii) 

the existence and severity of the claimant's symptoms; (iii) statements about whether the claimant's impairment(s) 

meets or medically equals any listing in the Listing of Impairments in Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (iv) the 

claimant's RFC; (v) whether the claimant's impairment(s) meets the duration requirement; and (vi) how failure to 

follow prescribed treatment and drug addiction and alcoholism relate to the claimant's claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1413(a)(5). 

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may, but is not required to, explain how he considered the (c)(3) [through] (c)(5) factors, i.e., 

relationship with the claimant, specialization, and 'other factors."' Governor, 2021 WL 1151580, 

at *7. 

In this case, the ALJ spent a substantial amount of time discussing Dr. Holm's opinion and 

why she agreed or disagreed with various parts of the opinion. (Tr. 16-22). The ALJ stated that 

she was not "fully persuaded" by Dr. Holm's opinion because it was self-contradicting .. (Tr. 21). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Holm's statement that Routte would "have difficulty 

maintaining concentration to complete tasks" was in conflict with his findings that Routte was 

cooperative and alert, with logical, coherent, and relevant thinking, without looseness of 

associations, and that Routte was fully oriented with average estimated intelligence. (Tr. 21, 346-

49). Further, the ALJ found that the other medical evidence in the record was inconsistent with 

some of the limitations Dr. Holm opined. (Tr. 21). 

Similarly, the ALJ discussed Routte's subjective complaints and Dr. Holm's reliance on 

them. (Tr. 21). For example, the ALJ noted that Dr. Holm relied on Routte's statements that she 

could not be around others and that she had extreme agoraphobia while forming his opinion. The 

ALJ found that these statements were inconsistent with other evidence in the record, including 

that: (1) Routte had admitted to a doctor that she had no difficulty interacting with others; (2) she 

drove herself, alone, to her appointment with Dr. Holm; and (3) Routte's July 2021 statement that 

she babysat her grandchildren and was planning to visit them at her daughter's house. (Tr. 21, 

346-49, 405-13). Finally, the ALJ found it persuasive that at Routte's August 2021 annual mental 

examination she stated she felt well, only had mild impairments, and was able to function at a 

regular capacity. (Tr. 21, 405-13). 

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the evidence as 

a whole, utilizing not only parts of the opinions in the record, but also the other medical evidence 

in the record, including Dr. Holm's opinion and Routte's subjective statements. The ALJ discussed 

the evidence in the record in making her RFC determination, adequately explained the reasoning 

for such determination and for giving less weight to certain evidence and exercised her 

responsibility as factfinder in weighing the evidence and in choosing to incorporate limitations 

into his RFC assessment that were most supported by the record. See, e.g., Muse, 925 F.2d at 790. 

The ALJ properly weighed Dr. Holm's opinions against the other evidence and the record as a 

whole. The "ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a 

contrary conclusion." Moore v. Saul, No. 3:20-cv-48-DPJ-MTP, 2021 WL 909618, at *6 (N.D. 

Tex. Feb. 1, 2021). Because there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the ALJ's 

RFC determination and the ALJ properly considered Dr. Holm's opinion and Routte's testimony, 

remand is not required. 

2. The ALJ's Reliance on Medical Opinions 

Next, Routte argues that the ALJ substituted her own lay opinion for that of a medical 

opinion because she did not find Dr. Holm's nor the SAMC's opinions persuasive. (Pl. 's Br. at 

14-16). As noted above, the ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC based on all the 

relevant evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), 

the ALJ "will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to 

any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from 

[claimant's] medical sources." Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to give controlling weight 

to Dr. Holm's opinion, and, as discussed supra, the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Holm's opinion 

and explained why she found it somewhat unpersuasive. As to the ALJ finding the SAMC's 

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opinions unpersuasive, any error was in Routte's favor as the ALJ "found a more restrictive 

functional capacity regarding [Routte's] mental limitations" than the SAMCs did because of 

additional evidence received during the course of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 21 ). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit reversable error as to this issue. 

B. Credibility 

Finally, Routte argues that, in addition to the above discussed assertions, the ALJ' s 

credibility determination was flawed because the ALJ failed to consider her "steller work history. "6 

(Pl.' s Br. at 17-8). Specifically, Routte argues that her work history prior to her disability lends to 

her credibility and was erroneously ignored. (Id.). 

In evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints, the ALJ first considers whether there is a 

medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's 

symptoms. 20 C.F.R § 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. Once she finds 

impairment, the ALJ evaluates the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on 

the claimant's ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 

5180304, at *4. A claimant's statements about pain and other symptoms are not conclusive 

evidence of disability, but must be accompanied by medical signs and findings of a medical 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and 

that would lead to the conclusion that she is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). A claimant's 

testimony must be consistent with the objective medical evidence and other available evidence. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. 

6 The Court notes that Routte's argument that the ALJ's credibility analysis was defective because of the 

ALJ's previously discussed errors in formulating the RFC determination and evaluating the medical evidence in the 

record. Because the Court already determined that the ALJ did not err in the RFC detennination or in evaluating the 

medical evidence in the record, the Court will not consider such argument. 

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In all cases in which pain or other symptoms are alleged, the administrative decision must 

contain a thorough discussion and analysis of both the objective medical and other evidence in the 

record, including the individual's complaints of pain or other symptoms and the adjudicator's o,Nn 

observations. SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10-11. When assessing the credibility of an 

individual's statements, the ALJ considers, in addition to the objective medical evidence, the 

following: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of 

the claimant's pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 

( 4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has 

taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, which the claimant 

receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; ( 6) any measures other than treatment 

the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors 

concerning the claimant's functional capacity, limitations and restrictions due to pain or other 

symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8. An ALJ's 

unfavorable credibility evaluation will not be upheld on judicial review where the uncontroverted 

medical evidence shows a basis for the claimant's complaints unless the ALJ weighs the objective 

medical evidence and articulates reasons for discrediting the claimant's subjective complaints. 

Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638,642 (5th Cir. 1988); see Falco v. Shala/a, 27 F.3d 160, 163 (5th 

Cir. 1994). 

In evaluating Routte's credibility, the ALJ first set out the standard for evaluating 

credibility. (Tr. 20). Then, the ALJ stated: 

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant's 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the 

alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with 

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in 

this decision. 

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(Tr. 21.) The ALJ then carefully analyzed all the evidence in the record, including the medical 

evidence and other evidence in the record and compared it with Routte's own testimony. (Tr. 20-

22). 

In addition, contrary to Routte's claims, the ALJ was aware of her work history. For 

instance, the ALJ noted that "the claimant reported she was last employed in February 2017 doing 

office work for the same company for 17 years," and that she could not perform her past work. 

(Tr. 18-9, 22). While the references to Routte's work history were not made during the credibility 

determination, it is obvious that the ALJ was aware ofRoutte's work history during all parts of the 

disability determination, including the credibility determination. Moreover, work history is one 

of several factors for the ALJ to consider and any error by the ALJ, if any, in fully considering 

Routte's strong work history is harmless as substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility 

determination. 7 Thus, remand is not required on this basis. 

RECOMMENDATION 

It is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b )(1 ), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific 

written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's 

proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has 

been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de 

7 In addition, the Court notes that there does not appear to be any controlling Fifth Circuit cases requiring 

consideration ofa "strong work history" to determine a plaintiffs credibility. Garner v. US. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin, 

No. 1:17-CV-01084, 2019 WL 1088408, at *14 (W.D. La. Feb. 19, 2019). See also Roberson v. Colvin, No. , 2015 

WL 1408925, at* (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2015) ("[W]hile it may have been better for the ALJ to acknowledge plaintiffs 

30-year consistent work history, the failure to reference such in his findings does not mean he was not aware of the 

history.") 

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novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(l). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual 

finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest 

injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions 

accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass 'n, 79 F.3d 

1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 

ORDER 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until October 

3, 2023, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed 

and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be file within seven (7) days 

of the filing date of objections. 

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to 

the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby 

is returned to the docket for the United States District Judge. ~~ 

SIGNED September 19, 2023. 

N 

'ATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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