J-S33020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

VICTOR FULTON COLLINS JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 440 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-04-CR-0001378-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 8, 2023

Victor Fulton Collins, Jr. (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed in the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas following his 

jury conviction of possession of controlled substances (fentanyl) and 

possession with intent to deliver (PWID) controlled substances (fentanyl).

1

 

Appellant raises five issues on appeal challenging the denial of his pretrial 

suppression motion, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions, trial court rulings concerning testimony regarding a “hand to hand 

transaction” and the Commonwealth’s expert witness, and the court’s denial 

of his motion for extraordinary relief based on an inconsistent verdict. For 

the reasons below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30).
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In the early morning hours of May 15, 2021, Appellant was arrested 

after New Brighton police officers recovered drugs from the floor of the 

passenger seat in a car in which he was the passenger. He was subsequently 

charged with PWID (fentanyl), possession of controlled substances (fentanyl)

and possession of drug paraphernalia.2

On December 15, 2021, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion

seeking, inter alia, suppression of the evidence recovered from the car stop, 

which he argued was not supported by reasonable suspicion. See Appellant’s 

Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 12/15/21, at 4-5 (unpaginated). The suppression 

court3 conducted a hearing on June 8, 2022, at which time the Commonwealth 

presented the testimony of New Brighton Police Officer Jeremy Conley.4

Officer Conley testified that on May 15, 2021, he was positioned in his 

patrol vehicle in the 500 block of Eighth Avenue in New Brighton, “monitoring” 

the 600 block of Seventh Avenue, because the police “had been receiving 

complaints about . . . drug trafficking” in that area. N.T., Supp. Hrg., 6/8/22, 

____________________________________________

2 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).

3 President Judge Richard Mancini conducted the suppression hearing, and 

Judge Kim Tesla presided over the subsequent jury trial.

4 We summarize the suppression hearing testimony in detail because Appellant 

challenges the suppression court’s ruling, and “[o]ur scope of review from a 

suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the 

suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Tillery, 249 A.3d 278, 280 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (citations omitted).
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at 11.5 In addition to his duties as a New Brighton police officer, Officer Conley 

explained that he was a member of the Attorney General’s drug task force,

and, as such, had been involved in numerous narcotics investigations. See 

id. at 10.

During his surveillance, Officer Conley observed Appellant, whom he 

recognized “[f]rom prior incidents over [his] eight year career[,]”6 walking 

towards another male. N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 12. He stated:

I observed [Appellant] approach . . . another male. They walked 

up to each other. I seen a hand-to-hand exchange, and then they 

both immediately walked separate ways.

Id. Officer Conley agreed the “hand-to-hand” exchange he observed was 

“[p]retty much identical” to those he had seen as a member of the drug task 

force. Id. 

Officer Conley then drove from his surveillance position to the area 

where the transaction occurred and saw Appellant walking “into the dead end 

of 7th Street off of Seventh Avenue.” See N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 14-15. As the 

officer approached, a vehicle emerged from the dead-end street with Appellant 

as the passenger. Id. at 16. Officer Conley drove around the block, pulled 

____________________________________________

5 The reference to “March 15, 2021” in the hearing transcript appears to be 

a typographical error. See id. at 11 (emphasis added).

6 At one point, the Commonwealth’s attorney asked the officer how he knew 

Appellant. See N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 13. Officer Conley answered, “He’s a 

known drug trafficker.” Id. Appellant’s counsel immediately objected, and 

the suppression court sustained the objection. Therefore, we do not consider 

that testimony in our analysis. 
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up behind the vehicle, and initiated a traffic stop. Id. As the vehicle was 

pulling over, the officer saw Appellant “immediately” make “furtive 

movements, bending forward.” Id. at 17.

Officer Conley called for backup, and two additional officers arrived 

shortly thereafter. See N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 17. While Officer Conley was 

speaking to the driver, who was identified as Jason Walzer, Appellant, 

unprompted, “leaned over and said, ‘I was just getting a ride to my dad’s 

house.’” Id. at 17-18. 

Officer Conley subsequently removed Appellant from the vehicle. See

N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 19. While he was conducting a pat-down search, another 

officer “observed on the floorboard where [Appellant’s] feet were a plastic bag

that contained stamp bags.” Id. Officer Conley placed Appellant in handcuffs 

and obtained Mr. Walzer’s consent to search the vehicle. See id. at 18-19. 

In addition to the stamp bags, the search revealed a scale under the front 

passenger seat (where Appellant had been sitting), and glass crack pipe in the 

glove compartment, which Mr. Walzer admitted was his.7 See id. at 19, 21-

22. Officer Conley searched Appellant incident to his arrest and recovered, 

inter alia, $1,848.00 in cash. Id. at 21. Although his field test of one of the 

stamp bags was “positive for the presence of heroin and fentanyl[,]” later lab 

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7 Mr. Walzer also had another crack pipe on his person. N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 

22.
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results confirmed only the presence of “fluorofentanyl[,] a Schedule I 

controlled substance.” Id. at 20-21. 

Under cross-examination, Officer Conley acknowledged that he did not 

see any items change hands during the initial hand-to-hand street exchange 

between Appellant and the other male. See N.T., Supp. Hrg., at 26-27. He 

commented, however, that “[d]rugs can be so small that they can be 

concealed and exchanged in a handshake.” Id. at 26. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the suppression court took the motion 

under advisement, and, on July 19, 2022, entered an order and accompanying 

opinion denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.8 See Order, 7/19/22. The 

case proceeded to a jury trial commencing on November 14, 2022.

At trial, Officer Conley recounted the events leading to Appellant’s arrest

and provided testimony substantially similar to his testimony at the 

suppression hearing. However, his trial testimony included the following 

details: (1) the digital scale recovered under the front passenger seat was 

not “shoved . . . towards the back[,]” but rather, “right at the front underneath 

the seat[;]” (2) the baggie recovered from the passenger floorboard contained 

“three different groups of little baggies with a [rubber band] around them. . . 

along with numerous empty stamp bags[;]” and (3) the lab report indicated 

that one group of baggies, “labeled Mercedes,” contained fluorofentanyl, but 

____________________________________________

8 The order and opinion also denied a motion for habeas corpus, which is not 

relevant to this appeal.
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another group of baggies contained no controlled substances. See N.T. Jury 

Trial, 11/15/22, at 69, 70, 97-98. The Commonwealth also presented a 

stipulation regarding the state crime lab report. See id. at 94. The report 

indicated that the “net weight” of the drugs recovered was “0.14 grams, plus 

or minus 0.1 gram, and one of those bags was confirmed to contain 0.025 

grams, plus or minus 0.003 grams fluorofentanyl.” Id. at 96.

The Commonwealth also called Center Township Police Detective Aldo 

Legge to testify as an expert witness.

9

 Detective Legge stated that he is a 

29-year veteran officer with the Center Township Police, and has extensive 

experience in narcotics investigations through his work with the Beaver 

County Drug Task Force, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 

task force, and the FBI Transactional Organized Crime Task Force. See N.T., 

11/15/22, at 184-85. He estimated that he had been conducting narcotics 

investigations “[a]lmost the entirety of [his] career [or] at least 25 years.” 

Id. at 185-86. Detective Legge described his training and continuing 

education in that field. See id. at 186-87, 189. He stated that he had testified 

as an expert in drug trafficking on one prior occasion, in August of 2022. See 

id. at 189.

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9

In addition, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the two New 

Brighton police officers who responded to the scene to assist Officer Conley ─ 

Officers Jonathon Pisano and Donald Dobson. See N.T., 11/15/22, at 149-

72.
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In cross-examining Detective Legge regarding his qualifications, 

Appellant’s counsel focused on the fact that he had only been an expert on 

one prior occasion and he offered his opinion in that case on behalf of the 

Commonwealth. See N.T., 11/15/22, at 191-93. Thereafter, the trial court 

accepted Detective Legge as an “expert witness in the area of drug 

trafficking.” Id. at 193. Appellant made no objection. See id.

The trial court summarized Detective Legge’s expert testimony as 

follows:

Detective Legge testified that when conducting investigations into 

potential narcotic distribution schemes, drug task forces look for 

certain paraphernalia, such as plastic bags, envelopes, paper 

wrapping, duct tape, packing tape, certain kinds of packages, and 

small scales for weighing drugs. Detective Legge concluded that 

[Appellant] possessed the fentanyl, digital scale, and plastic 

stamp bags with the intent to sell fentanyl. He stated that drug 

dealers use digital scales like the one found in this case to package 

specific amounts of the narcotics they intend to sell. He also 

shared his professional knowledge that drug dealers often 

package their product in plastic stamp bags, much like the ones 

found on the floor in the front of the passenger’s seat in this case.

 Detective Legge . . . noted that stamp bags used for the sale 

of narcotics typically have a brand on them to denote the potency 

of the drugs contained in the bag, like the stamp bags marked 

with the Mercedes logo found near [Appellant]. According to the 

detective, one stamp bag’s worth of narcotics would be worth 

somewhere between $7-10. He also [opined] that the 

denominations of the currency found on [Appellant’s] person 

indicated his involvement in distributing controlled substances. 

Detective Legge . . . testified that it is unusual for a personal drug 

user to have over $1,000 in cash on their person. Further, a drug 

user would typically have some sort of paraphernalia that they 

would use to introduce the substance into their body, such as a 

syringe in the case of heroin or fentanyl.
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On cross-examination, [Appellant’s c]ounsel brought out 

several alleged errors in Detective Legge’s report[, including the 

fact that the] report . . . stated the wrong numerical amount as 

the net weight of the seven stamp bags with the Mercedes logo 

that were tested at the laboratory. According to the laboratory 

report, the net weight of those seven stamp bags was 0.14 grams, 

but Detective Legge’s report stated that the net weight of the 

stamp bags was 0.175 grams. Detective Legge acknowledged this 

mistake, but he still held to his conclusion that the net weight 

stated in the lab report demonstrates an intent to deliver the 

narcotics. 

[Appellant’s c]ounsel observed that, given this net weight of 

the contents of the baggies with the Mercedes logo on them, 

combined with the fact contained in Detective Legge’s expert 

report that one gram of fentanyl is worth at least $150, the total 

value of the fentanyl contained in the baggies found . . . in the 

vehicle at [Appellant’s] feet . . . was worth between $21-35. Since 

the laboratory only confirmed that one bag weighing 0.02 grams 

contained fentanyl, [Appellant’s c]ounsel concluded that this bag 

contained about $3-5 worth of fentanyl. Finally, [Appellant’s 

c]ounsel questioned Detective Legge’s opinions deriving from the 

fact that [Appellant] had small denominations of currency on his 

person, since law enforcement might find either large or small bills 

suspicious. . . . [Appellant’s c]ounsel also brought out the fact that 

the digital scale found [under the passenger seat] was not sent to 

the laboratory for testing.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/11/23, at 8-9 (record citations omitted; some paragraph 

breaks added).

On November 17, 2022, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 

charges of PWID and possession of controlled substances, but not guilty on 

the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant’s sentencing 

hearing was conducted on December 16, 2022. At that time, Appellant’s 

counsel presented an oral motion for extraordinary relief seeking an arrest of 

judgment, judgment of acquittal, or a new trial. See N.T. Sentencing H’rg, 

12/16/22, at 9-10. Counsel argued the drug evidence should have been 
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suppressed and the jury’s verdict was inconsistent. See id. at 10-20. The 

trial court denied the motion and proceeded to sentence Appellant to a term 

of 33 to 120 months’ incarceration followed by five years’ probation for PWID; 

his remaining conviction merged for sentencing purposes. See id. at 20, 63-

64. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, challenging the 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and arguing the verdict was 

inconsistent. See Appellant’s Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 12/23/22, at 

1-2 (unpaginated). Appellant also requested transcription of the trial 

transcript, and permission to filed supplemental post-sentence motions after 

review. See id. at 2. The trial court later granted Appellant until February 

16, 2023, to file supplemental post-sentence motions. See Order, 1/26/23, 

at 1 (unpaginated). Appellant filed a supplemental motion on that date,

challenging the trial court’s rulings permitting Officer Conley to testify 

regarding the “‘hand to hand’ interaction that he observed on the date in 

question[,]” and permitting Detective Legge to testify as an expert witness. 

See Appellant’s Supplemental Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 2/16/23, at 2 

(unpaginated). The trial court conducted oral argument on March 10, 2023, 

and denied Appellant’s motions on March 21st. This timely appeal follows.10

Appellant presents the following six issues for our review:

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10 Appellant complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
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[1] Whether the trial court erred in denying . . . Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress on July 19, 2022[?] . . .

[2] Whether the trial court erred in permitting [Officer Conley] to 

testify at trial as to the “hand to hand” interaction that he 

observed on the date in question[?] . . . 

[3] Whether the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth

to present [its] last witness in [its] case-in-chief as an expert[?] . 

. .

[4] Whether the trial court erred in not granting extraordinary 

relief [because] the jury verdict should have been set aside for 

being inconsistent, in that, the jury acquitted Appellant of the 

possession of drug paraphernalia count[?]

[5] Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to 

prove the elements of the underlying drug offenses[?]

[6] Whether the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (some capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant contends Officer Conley had no reasonable

basis to conduct the vehicle stop, and, therefore, the suppression court erred 

when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of 

that stop. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. He argues that although the officer’s 

purported basis for the stop was a hand-to-hand narcotics exchange, Officer 

Conley conceded “he was unable to see any object ‘change hands’ between

the two people.” Id. at 12. Relying on several decisions of this Court, 

Appellant insists that Officer Conley was “operating on a hunch[,]” which was 

insufficient to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion that Appellant was 

engaged in the sale of narcotics necessary to support the vehicle stop. See 

id. at 13-16.
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Our review of a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress is guided by 

the following:

Our standard of review . . . requires us to consider only the 

Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the defense’s evidence 

as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the record supports the suppression court’s 

factual findings, we are bound by those facts and may reverse 

only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

However, . . . where the appeal turns on allegations of legal error, 

the suppression court’s conclusions of law are not binding as it is 

this Court’s duty to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts. As such, the legal conclusions of the 

lower courts are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 263 A.3d 247, 252 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied

sub nom. Dunkins v. Pennsylvania, 142 S. Ct. 1679 (U.S. 2022). 

Moreover, our scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing. See Tillery, 249 A.3d at 280. 

To justify an investigatory stop of a vehicle, police officers must possess 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Knupp, 290 

A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super. 2023). See also Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 

A.3d 1195, 1201 (Pa. 2019) (“[A] traffic stop is an investigative detention that 

itself requires reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”). “

In reviewing whether reasonable suspicion . . . exists, we must . 

. . examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 

there exists a particularized and objective basis for suspecting an 

individual [ ] of criminal activity. Even innocent factors, viewed 

together, may arouse suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 

Knupp, 290 A.3d 767 (citations & quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme 

Court has explained:
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[A]n investigative detention is constitutionally permissible if an 

officer identifies specific and articulable facts that led the officer 

to believe that criminal activity was afoot, considered in light of 

the officer’s training and experience. [I]n determining whether 

the officer acted reasonably . . ., due weight must be given, not 

to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the 

specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 

from the facts in light of his experience.

Adams, 205 A.3d at 1205 (citations & quotation marks omitted; emphasis 

added).

Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the suppression court 

concluded Officer Conley possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop 

the vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger and briefly detain him. See

Supp. Ct. Op. at 8. The court opined: 

[W]here an experienced narcotics officer, who was monitoring a 

specific block late at night due to reports of drug activity, observes

a man, known to him[11]. . . , walk up to another male and conduct 

a hand-to-hand exchange[, after which,] both individuals 

immediately part ways, under the totality of the circumstances, 

[the officer] had sufficient reasonable suspicion supported by 

articulable facts to briefly detain [Appellant], regardless of the fact 

that the officer could not identify the object that was exchanged 

between the individuals. 

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11 We note the suppression court stated that Appellant was known to Officer 

Conley “to distribute narcotics[.]” See Supp. Ct. Op. at 8. However, as noted 

supra, the trial court sustained an objection to this testimony during the 

suppression hearing. See N.T., Supp. H’rg, at 13-14. Thus, we do not 

consider that fact in our analysis. 

Nevertheless, Appellant did not object when Officer Conley testified that 

he recognized Appellant “[f]rom prior incidents over [his] eight year career[,]” 

and that Appellant was “known to [him.]” N.T., Supp. H’rg, at 12. 

Accordingly, the fact that Officer Conley knew Appellant based upon past 

police interactions is a relevant factor in our analysis.
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Id. at 8. 

Upon review, we detect no basis to disturb the suppression court’s 

ruling. First, Officer Conley, as a member of the Attorney General’s drug task 

force, was very experienced in narcotics transactions, and particularly “handto-hand” exchanges. See N.T., Supp. H’rg, at 10-11. He explained that he 

was monitoring the 600 block of Seventh Avenue ─ where he witnessed 

Appellant’s interaction with the other male ─ because the police department 

“had been receiving complaints about . . . drug trafficking” in that very area. 

Id. at 11. Officer Conley observed Appellant ─ whom he knew from “prior 

incidents” with police ─ approach another man, conduct a “hand-to-hand 

exchange, and then . . . both immediately walk[ ] separate ways.” Id. at 12. 

Although he did not see any objects change hands, Officer Conley agreed that 

the exchange he witnessed was “[p]retty much identical” to the hand-to-hand 

exchanges he observed as a member of the drug task force. Id. at 12, 26-

27. He also explained that “[d]rugs can be so small that they can be concealed 

and exchanged in a handshake.” Id. at 26.

We conclude this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 

A.3d 373 (Pa. Super. 2013), is instructive. In that case, a police officer was 

on routine patrol in a “very high in crime and very violent” neighborhood, 

which the officer had patrolled for five years. Id. at 375 (record citation & 

quotation marks omitted). The officer testified he was “personally aware of . 

. . nonstop open-air narcotics sales” in the area. Id. (record citation & 

quotation marks omitted). While driving down a block at mid-morning, the 
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officer observed the defendant engage in a “hand-to-hand transaction with an 

unknown male.” Id. at 376 (record citation omitted). Similar to the case 

before us, the officer acknowledged he “did not observe money or objects pass 

between the two individuals, [but] testified that ─ based upon his training and 

years of experience ─ he was of the conviction that he had just witnessed a 

narcotics transaction.” Id. After the exchange, the defendant looked “directly 

at the marked police vehicle” and ran to the porch of a nearby house, and 

pretended like he was reading a newspaper. Id. (record citation omitted). 

The officer approached and asked the defendant if he lived at that address 

and if he had any identification. See id. The defendant responded no to both 

questions. See id. The officer then asked the defendant to stand up so he 

could pat him down for safety reason, and, when he stood up and spread his 

legs, a baggie of suspected narcotics fell from his pants. Id. at 376-77. 

The defendant was arrested and later filed a suppression motion, 

asserting, inter alia, the officer had no reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigatory detention. Clemens, 66 A.3d at 377. The trial court denied the 

motion, and a panel of this Court affirmed on appeal. See id. at 377, 380-

81. The Clemens panel emphasized the following facts: (1) although he did 

not see any items or money exchanged, the officer testified that “based upon 

his experience and training, he witnessed [the defendant] engage in a handto-hand narcotics transaction[;]” (2) the officer was “extremely familiar” with 

the area ─ which was “home to nonstop open-air narcotics sales” ─ and 

“extremely experienced in narcotics investigations[;]” and (3) after the 
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defendant saw the marked vehicle, he “suspiciously ran onto the porch” of a 

nearby residence and “pretended to read a newspaper.” Id. at 380 (quotation 

marks omitted). The Court concluded: 

Given these “specific and articulable facts,” we agree that 

“an objectively reasonable police officer would have reasonably 

suspected” that [the defendant] had sold narcotics to the 

unidentified man. As such, we agree that the investigatory 

detention was properly supported by reasonable suspicion.

Id. 

The facts in the present case are very similar to those in Clemens. 

Officer Conley, who was experienced in narcotics investigations, observed 

what he believed to be a hand-to-hand exchange between Appellant ─ whom 

he knew from prior encounters with police ─ and an unidentified male in an 

area where he was conducting surveillance based upon specific complaints of 

drug trafficking. Although Appellant did not see Officer Conley, like the 

defendant in Clemens, he did proceed immediately to a dead-end street and 

enter a vehicle parked therein. We conclude that, under the totality of the 

circumstances, Officer Conley had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigatory detention of Appellant and did so by conducting a 

traffic stop. 

Moreover, the cases upon which Appellant relies do not compel a 

different result. In Commonwealth v. Carter, 779 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. 

2001), an officer was on “general patrol” in his marked vehicle in a high drug 

and crime area of Pittsburgh. See id. at 592. Mid-afternoon, the officer 
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observed the defendant walk towards a parked pick-up truck and being 

conversing with the occupants. Id. The defendant placed his left hand in his 

jacket and began to remove it when he looked in the direction of the officer 

and “mouthed the word ‘popo’ (meaning police).” Id. The officer pulled in 

front of the truck and recognized one of the occupants as a known drug user. 

Id. At that point, the defendant began to walk away, and the officer asked to 

speak with him. Id. During the conversation, the officer told the defendant

to put his hand in his pocket, but then “went for his side arm and asked [the 

defendant] to show his hands.” Id. The defendant displayed a baggie of 

drugs and began to flee. See id. He was subsequently apprehended and 

arrested. Id.

The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress, which the trial court 

granted. See Carter, 779 A.2d at 592. On appeal by the Commonwealth, a 

panel of this Court affirmed. See id. at 595. Relevant herein, the panel 

concluded that the officer’s observations “could not have given rise to a 

reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was engaged in criminal activity.” 

Id. at 594. The panel explained that while the officer saw the defendant put 

his hand in his pocket as he spoke to the occupants of a car in a “notoriously

drug infested area of the city[,]” he did not see the exchange of any items, or 

observe any furtive movement. Id. at 594-95. Thus, the Carter Court 

determined that while the officer may have had an “educated hunch” that a 

drug deal was imminent, the facts presented were “insufficient to create a 
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reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was engaged in the sale of illegal 

narcotics on the date in question.” Id. at 595.

Appellant insists that, in the present case, Officer Conley was similarly 

“operating on a hunch[.]” See Appellant’s Brief at 14-15. We disagree. Here,

Officer Conley was conducting surveillance based upon specific “complaints 

about . . . drug trafficking” in the area where the hand-to-hand interaction

occurred. See N.T., Supp. H’rg, at 11. He saw Appellant, whom he recognized 

from “prior incidents” with police, walk up to another man and engage in what 

he described as a “hand-to-hand exchange” after which both men immediately 

walked “separate ways”. See id. at 12. Officer Conley agreed that the 

transaction he witnessed was “[p]retty much identical” to the hand-to hand 

narcotics exchanges he observed during his work with the drug task force. 

Id. Moreover, while he acknowledged he did not see any items change hands, 

he noted that “[d]rugs can be so small that they can be concealed and 

exchanged in a handshake.” Id. at 26. Accordingly, Officer Conley’s 

experience, particularly with the type of interaction he witnessed,

distinguishes this case from the facts in Carter.

Appellant also relies upon this Court’s unpublished decision in

Commonwealth v. Almanzar, 1463 EDA 2019 (unpub. memo. at 14) (Pa. 

Super. 2020),

12 in which a panel of this Court concluded officers did not 

____________________________________________

12 Unpublished, non-precedential decisions of this Court “filed after May 1, 

2019 . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.” Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2).
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possess probable cause to stop and search the defendant’s vehicle after 

observing him and his co-defendant “conduct[ ] one, daytime, trunk-to-trunk 

transfer of a bag.” Acting on “complaints about several Hispanic men entering 

and exiting [a] property while carrying packages[,]” officers conducted 

surveillance at the property on May 22, 2017. Id. at 1-2. Although they 

observed several men exiting and entering the property and various vehicles, 

exchanging unidentified items, the officers did not observe either the 

defendant or his co-defendant that day. Id. at 2-3. 

When they conducted additional surveillance two days later, on May 

24th, officers witnessed the defendant arrive in his vehicle and back up to a 

Jeep, so that the trunks of the two vehicles were facing each other. See 

Almanzar, 1463 EDA 2019 (unpub. memo. at 3). The Jeep was one of the 

vehicles involved in the transactions on May 22nd. See id. at 2. At that time, 

the co-defendant “retrieved a large, green bag from the trunk of the Jeep and 

transferred in into the trunk” of the defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 3. When the 

defendant drove off, officers stopped him and searched his trunk, where they 

found “1,150 bundles of heroin inside the green bag.” Id.

After his arrest, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

recovered from the warrantless vehicle search. Almanzar, 1463 EDA 2019 

(unpub. memo. at 4). The trial court granted the motion, finding the evidence 

was insufficient to establish probable cause for the vehicle stop. Id. at 6. 

Despite the fact that the investigating officer stated he “had seen drug dealers 

park in a trunk-to-trunk’ formation to transfer contraband” in the past, and 
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that the defendant’s vehicle had been involved in a “prior drug 

investigation[,]”13 the trial court concluded:

Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the [c]ourt did not 

find that the single, midday transfer of a bag, whose contents 

were unknown, from the trunk of one car to another between two 

unidentified individuals provided officers with probable cause to 

search the vehicle Appellee was driving.

Id. at 14 (citation omitted & emphasis added). The trial court further 

recognized that during surveillance two days prior, officers “observed separate 

encounters that involved no money, but only the transfer of a box of diaper 

and an object[, which lacked] specificity to determine whether drugs were 

actually being moved[.]” Id. at 13-14 (citation & quotation marks omitted). 

As noted supra, a panel of this Court affirmed on appeal.

Appellant maintains that, like the officers in Almanzar, Officer Conley 

“did not observe any items of contraband being exchanged, nor could he 

articulate any facts that would demonstrate criminal activity was afoot[; 

rather,] the activities of [ ] Appellant were ordinary or innocuous.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 15. For the reasons discussed above, we disagree. Moreover, we 

emphasize that the Almanzar Court considered whether the facts supported 

a finding of probable cause, not reasonable suspicion. It is well-settled that 

“[r]easonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause

necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 

996 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 2010) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth 

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13 Almanzar, 1463 EDA 2019 (unpub. memo. at 13).

 
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v. Jackson, 302 A.3d 737, 748 (Pa. 2023) (“[R]easonable suspicion requires 

more than a mere hunch but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for 

probable cause.”) (citations & quotation marks omitted). Thus, for that reason 

alone, Almanzar is distinguishable. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant’s first 

claim fails.

We address Appellant’s remaining issues together. In his second claim, 

Appellant argues the trial court erred when it permitted Officer Conley to 

testify regarding the “hand to hand” exchange he witnessed which precipitated 

the vehicle stop.14 See Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant maintains there was 

no “foundation” for the testimony since Officer Conely admitted he did not see 

any items exchanged between the two men. See id. at 18. Moreover, 

although the court sustained his objection and issued a cautionary instruction, 

Appellant insists the jury was prejudiced by the testimony because they 

submitted a question to the court concerning how they were to consider the 

“hand-to-hand” interaction in their deliberations. See id.

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14 “[T]he admissibility of evidence is a matter solely within the discretion of 

the trial court[, and t]his Court will reverse an evidentiary ruling only where 

a clear abuse of discretion occurs.” Commonwealth v. Woeber, 174 A.3d 

1096, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
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Third, Appellant insists his conviction should be set aside due to the 

jury’s inconsistent verdict.15 See Appellant’s Brief at 20. Because the jury 

acquitted him of the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, that was based 

on the scale recovered from under his seat, Appellant argues the jury could 

not have convicted him of PWID, when the Commonwealth’s expert considered 

his possession of the scale as critical evidence of his intent to deliver the drugs. 

See id.

In his fourth claim, Appellant contends “the Commonwealth did not lay 

a proper foundation to establish” Detective Legge was an expert witness.16 

Appellant’s Brief at 19. He emphasizes it was only the second time the 

detective was recognized as an expert, and that he “clearly had a bias in favor 

of the Commonwealth.” Id. Moreover, Appellant argues Detective Legge’s 

opinions should not have been admitted because the “phraseology” he used 

in his expert report does not comply with Pa.R.E. 702. Id. at 20.

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15 “It is well-settled that inconsistent verdicts are permissible” and “this Court 

will not disturb guilty verdicts on the basis of apparent inconsistencies as long 

as there is evidence to support the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 234 

A.3d 824, 829 (citations omitted).

16 “[T]he admission of expert testimony is a matter of discretion for the trial 

court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Powell, 171 A.3d 294, 305 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). Furthermore, “the standard for qualifying an expert is a liberal one:

the witness need only have a reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge 

on a subject for which expert testimony is admissible.” Id. at 306 (citation & 

quotation marks omitted).
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Appellant’s final two claims challenge the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence support his convictions. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-25. Regarding 

the sufficiency of the evidence,17 Appellant contends the evidence does not 

support a finding that he was “the sole possessor and potential trafficker of” 

the drugs found in the vehicle. See id. at 22. He emphasizes the vehicle was 

owned by the driver, Walzer, who was within “arms length” of where the drugs 

were recovered, and who was in possession of two crack pipes which could 

have been adapted to ingest the fentanyl. See id. Furthermore, Appellant 

emphasizes the following: (1) the digital scale was not submitted for drug 

analysis or fingerprint testing; (2) Detective Legge did not consider the fact

that Appellant could have used the cash he carried to ingest the fentanyl; and 

(3) the small amount of fentanyl recovered was more consistent with personal 

use than distribution, and had a street value of only $3 to $5 per bag. See 

id. at 23. 

Finally, with regard to the weight of the evidence,18 Appellant insists the 

“verdict should shock one’s sense of justice” because the jury concluded that 

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17 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires this Court to 

“determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 302 A.3d 117, 120 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(citation omitted).

18 A challenge to the weight of the evidence must first be presented to the 

trial court, “and if that court rejects the challenge, on appeal, we review its 

rejection of the claim for abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Lynch, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant “did not possess the primary piece of evidence (the digital scale) 

the Commonwealth argued proved intent to deliver,” and, accordingly, must 

have improperly considered the “hand-to-hand” interaction testimony. 

Appellant’s Brief at 24-25. 

Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant 

statutory and case law, we conclude the trial court thoroughly addressed and 

properly disposed of Appellant’s remaining five claims in its May 11, 2023, 

opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/11/23, at 10-27 (trial court opining that (1) it

properly sustained the objection to Officer Conley’s testimony that “hand to 

hand” interaction was an “exchange” and issued a cautionary instruction to 

the jury that it may presume was followed;19 (2) jury’s purported inconsistent 

acquittal on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia did not undermine 

the guilty verdict on charge of PWID since “even without the digital scale, the 

____________________________________________

242 A.3d 339, 353 (Pa. Super. 2020). Here, Appellant properly preserved his 

weight of the evidence challenge in a timely filed post-sentence motion. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3) (weight of the evidence claim must be raised 

before the trial court before sentencing, at sentencing, or in a post-sentence 

motion); Appellant’s Motion for Post-Sentence Relief at 1-2.

19 We note the trial court, alternatively, concluded Appellant “waived his 

objection” to the officer’s testimony regarding the “hand-to-hand exchange” 

because he did not object the first time the officer referenced a hand-to-hand 

exchange. See Trial Ct. Op. at 19. We do not agree. The first two times the 

officer referenced a “hand-to-hand exchange” he was explaining, in general, 

that he had observed these types of drug sales in his work with the drug task 

force. See N.T., 11/15/22, at 35. However, shortly after the officer stated 

he witnessed Appellant engage in such an exchange, Appellant objected. See 

id. at 39. Thus, we would not determine the objection was waived.

 
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evidence [was] sufficient to support [the] conviction[;]” (3) it did not err in 

permitting Detective Legge to testify as expert based on his experience, and 

Appellant did not object when court qualified the detective as an expert 

witness; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions of 

PWID and possession of fentanyl since the Commonwealth established (a) 

Appellant had constructive possession of the drugs recovered from the 

passenger floorboard when he was seen making furtive movements in that 

area as the vehicle was stopped, and (b) “the packaging of the drugs and 

large sum of cash[ on Appellant], together with the expert witness and 

absence of personal use paraphernalia, sufficiently established an intent to 

deliver[;]” and (5) “the jury’s verdict did not shock the conscience” 

considering the evidence regarding Appellant’s furtive movements, the 

packaging of the drugs recovered from the vehicle, the large sum of cash 

recovered from Appellant, and the lack of personal use paraphernalia for 

fentanyl). 

Accordingly, for the remainder of Appellant’s claims, we rest on the 

court’s well-reasoned bases, and direct that a copy of the trial court’s May 11, 

2023, opinion be filed along with this memorandum, and attached to any 

future filings in this case.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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DATE: 12/8/2023