UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

LAUGHLIN ENERGY MOTOR SPORTS,

LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-CV-00876-P

AMERICANA PRO DETAILING PRODUCTS

LLC,

Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Americana Pro Detailing Products, 

LLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Under Rules 12(b)(2)

and 12(b)(5). ECF No. 17. For the reasons stated below, the Court 

DENIES the Motion. Though Plaintiff’s service was improper, in the 

interest of justice, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff one month to cure the 

deficiency. 

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of a sponsorship agreement between Plaintiff 

Laughlin Energy Motor Sports, LLC (“Laughlin”)—a Texas LLC

involving a professional race car driver and his team—and Defendant 

(“Americana”)—a one-member New York LLC that sells car washing 

products. ECF No. 9 at 1–4. The contract’s terms required Laughlin to 

display Americana’s logo on its car and driver during sixteen races 

Laughlin planned to participate in over 2018. ECF No. 23 at 7–8. In 

return, the contract required Americana to pay Laughlin in four 

installments. Id. Two of the twenty-four races scheduled for 2018 

occurred in Texas. Id.

After making the first two payments, Americana missed its third 

payment. ECF No. 9 at 3. Laughlin emailed Americana to ask about the 

status of the overdue third payment. ECF No. 23 at 9–10. In response, 

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Americana assured Laughlin that payment was on the way and gave 

Laughlin direct instructions about how to advertise Americana’s logo 

and products at an upcoming race in Dallas, Texas. Id. Americana also 

stated that a representative for the company would be present at the 

race. Id. 

After Americana missed a second payment, Laughlin filed suit in 

Texas state court. ECF No. 1. Subsequently, the Texas Secretary of 

State forwarded the service citation with Daniel Pikarsky—

Americana’s sole member—named as the lone addressee. ECF No. 17 at 

21. The citation was addressed to Post Etc., a company at which

Americana rented a mail suite. Id. However, the address omitted 

Americana’s mailbox, or “suite” number, from the mailing address. Id. 

As a result of this mistake, Americana asserts that an employee for Post 

Etc. signed the return receipt. Id. Americana further contends that Post 

Etc. was not authorized to accept service on Americana’s behalf. Id.

Despite the mistaken address, Post Etc. still notified Pikarsky of the 

service and delivered him the citation. Id.

Americana removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441 and now seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(5) and 12(b)(2). Id. at 1–22. Laughlin filed a Response (ECF No. 

22), and Americana filed its Reply. ECF No. 24. The motion is thus ripe 

for the Court’s consideration. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction but must 

present “only prima facie evidence.” Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta–Mix, 

Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a 

plaintiff meets its burden, district courts must “accept the plaintiff’s 

uncontroverted allegations as true and resolve all conflicts of 

jurisdictional facts contained in the parties’ affidavits and other 

documentation in the plaintiff’s favor.” Jones v. Artists Rts. Enf’t Corp., 

789 F. App’x 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2019). 

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B. Insufficient Service of Process

Before a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant, “the 

procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.”

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 

(1999). If a defendant was not properly served with process, the Court 

cannot exercise jurisdiction. McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 

902, 907 (5th Cir. 1995). When service of process is challenged by a 

defendant, the plaintiff has the burden to show that service was valid. 

Sys. Sign Supplies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 

1990). 

ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

District courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident 

defendants if two conditions are met: (1) if the forum state’s long-arm 

statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) if the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 

379 F.3d 327, 343 (5th Cir. 2004). And because the Texas longarm statute extends to the limits of federal due process, the two-step 

process “collapses into one federal due process analysis.” Sangha v. 

Navig8 Ship Mgmt. Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018). 

1. Due Process - Minimum Contacts

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits federal 

jurisdiction to cases where “the maintenance of the suit is reasonable, 

in the context of our federal system of government, and does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co. 

v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citing Int’l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314 (1945)) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

A court may also assert specific jurisdiction1 over a nonresident 

defendant “whose contacts with the forum state are singular or sporadic 

1 Neither party asserts that Americana is subject to general jurisdiction. Thus,

the Court only addresses whether specific jurisdiction exists. 

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only if the cause of action asserted arises out of or is related to those 

contacts.” Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., 818 F.3d at 212 (citing Daimler

AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014)). When a plaintiff asserts 

specific jurisdiction, a court must determine: (1) whether “the defendant 

purposefully directed its activities toward the forum state or purposely 

availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there”; and 

(2) whether “the controversy arises out of or is related to the defendant’s 

conduct with the forum state.” Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at 343. When a 

plaintiff successfully satisfies these two prongs, the burden shifts to the 

defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that its exercise would be 

unfair or unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

474 (1985).

As to the first prong, contacts that are “random, fortuitous, or 

attenuated” do not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Moncrief 

Oil, Int’l. Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2007). But a

single act by the defendant directed at the forum state can be enough to 

confer personal jurisdiction if that act gives rise to the claim being 

asserted. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415,

418 (5th Cir. 1993). And while a mere contract with a resident of the 

forum state is not enough on its own, the Court must also look to the 

context and activity surrounding the contract. See Stuart v. Spademan, 

772 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Americana’s conduct surrounding the contract directs and avails 

itself to Texas. While Americana contends that the terms of the contract 

did not directly implicate Texas, the record is clear that Americana was 

fully aware that Texas was a race location. It nonetheless chose to direct 

advertising activities in the state. ECF No. 23 at 9–10. In an email 

before a Texas event, Pikarsky stated:

Thank you for doing Dallas HW LEGENDS Tour. Andy will 

be there for us. [sic] covering the event. Please set your car 

up next to our HWCC display tent. Can you wear your 

HWCC Crew Shirt or suit?

Id. From this correspondence alone, Americana clearly knew the event 

was in Texas, had personnel attending the event, and gave specific 

instructions on how to advertise on Texas soil. Id. Americana knew that

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their logo would be displayed at a Dallas venue, worn by a driver, and

emblazoned on a stock car competing at a sporting event in Texas in 

front of Texan fans. The first prong is thus met. 

The second prong requires “a connection between the forum and the 

specific claims at issue.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 137 

S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). At bottom, “there must be . . . [a related] activity 

or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore 

subject to the State’s regulation.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025. 

Plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of a contract partially performed 

in Texas. Even if Americana did not have Texas on its mind at the time 

of contracting, the contract was partially performed in Texas under the 

unambiguous knowledge and direction of Americana. ECF No. 23 at 9–

10. And though the contract was allegedly breached before the Texas 

races, another payment was missed after the performance of the 

sponsorship deal in Texas. It follows that the breach of contract arose—

in part—out of Americana’s contacts with Texas. Thus, Laughlin met 

his burden of satisfying both prongs. 

2. Fair Play and Substantial Justice 

Because minimum contacts exist, the burden shifts to Americana to 

show that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with

“fair play” and “substantial justice.” Freudenspreung, 379 F.3d at 343.

If minimum contacts are present “it is rare to say the assertion [of 

jurisdiction] is unfair.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759–60 (5th 

Cir. 2009). But even where minimum contacts are present, courts must

consider the following factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the 

forum state’s interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and 

effective relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of 

controversies; and (5) the several states’ shared interest in furthering 

fundamental social policies. Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 

476, 487 (5th Cir. 2008).

First, the burden on Americana is minimal. It has already 

appeared in Texas state court and federal court without issue for 

nearly a year. Second, Texas has a substantial interest in enforcing 

contracts that involve its citizens. Third, Laughlin—a resident of Erath 

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County—has an interest in maintaining one convenient and effective

lawsuit in its place of domicile. Fourth, the judicial system’s concerns for 

the efficient resolution of controversies favors keeping cases in a single 

forum. Fifth, the many states’ interests are served by enforcing contracts 

and maintaining suits where they are properly brought. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that exercising personal 

jurisdiction over Americana is proper.

B. Improper Service of Process 

When a case is removed to federal court, state law applies in 

determining whether service was proper before removal. See Freight 

Terminals, Inc. v. RyderSys., Inc., 461 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1972). 

Since Plaintiff commenced the state-court suit before Americana’s 

removal, Texas law controls. Id. 

1. Addressee’s Signature

Americana contends that service was improper under the Texas 

Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court agrees. 

Under Texas law, when service is completed through certified mail, 

the return receipt must bear the “addressee’s signature.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

107(c). The Fifth Circuit interprets this statute strictly. See Ayika v. 

Sutton, 378 F. App’x 432, 434 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that service was 

improper under Texas law for a signature defect). Even if a defendant 

receives actual notice of the suit through defective service, “[a] 

defendant’s actual notice of the litigation . . . is insufficient to 

satisfy Rule 4’s requirements.” Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303, 

306 (5th Cir. 1988).

Here, the addressee of the citation was Americana’s sole member: 

Daniel Pikarsky. Americana contends that Pikarsky never signed the 

return receipt and that an employee from Post Etc. signed it instead. 

Americana adds that the employee from Post Etc. was not authorized to 

accept service for Americana. As a result, the burden shifts to Laughlin

to prove that either (1) the return receipt was signed by Pikarsky, or (2) 

that the employee from Post Etc. was Americana’s agent. See Sys. Sign 

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Supplies, 903 F.2d at 1013. Laughlin fails to meet its burden on both 

issues.

First, the signature at issue is not in the record, and Laughlin 

produces no evidence that it was signed by Pikarsky. See ECF No. 22 at 

12–14; ECF No. 26. Second, Laughlin argues that “service is still 

effective even though defendant’s agent, not defendant, has signed the 

return receipt.” ECF No. 22 at 13. To support this contention, Laughlin 

offers no evidence or proof that the post-room employee was an agent.

See ECF No. 22 at 12–14; ECF No. 26. Even if the post-room employee 

was an agent, the case cited by Laughlin is factually different as the 

plaintiff placed the return receipt in the record, and the signature 

explicitly stated that it was from “addressee’s agent.” Mahon v. 

Caldwell, Haddad, Skaggs, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1990, no writ). 

At bottom, Plaintiff has failed to produce the minimum amount of 

factual evidence necessary to meet its burden. Thus, service was 

improper. 

2. Rule 4(m) Service Out of Time

Laughlin’s service of process was improper under Texas law and thus 

the Court cannot properly exercise jurisdiction. See McGuire v. Sigma 

Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902, 907 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court may extend 

the time for service but only in limited circumstances. FED. R. CIV. P.

4(m). And because Laughlin sued in state court over 260 days ago, the 

Court must look to Rule 4(m) to potentially cure the deficiency. See ECF 

No. 1–5.

Rule 4(m) states that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days 

after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss the action 

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made 

within a specified time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). But “if the plaintiff shows 

good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for 

an appropriate period.” Id. When a plaintiff does not show good cause or 

request leave to cure service, the Fifth Circuit has consistently affirmed 

a district court’s power to dismiss. See Ayika, 378 F. App’x at 434 

(“[Plaintiff] failed to present any reasons why it should extend the time 

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period for filing service . . . . We thus find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s decision to dismiss . . . without prejudice.”); Traina v. 

United States, 911 F.2d 1155, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding no abuse of 

discretion for dismissing for improper service where the claim was time 

barred); Sys. Signs Supplies, 903 F.2d at 1014 (finding no abuse of 

discretion where a plaintiff “had ample notice of the defect in 

service, . . . did not attempt correction within the statutory period,” and 

“chose to dispute the validity of service”). 

Laughlin had ample notice of the defective service as Americana first 

brought attention to it in September 2022.2 Further, Laughlin had 

nearly two months to respond to, investigate, and gather evidence 

related to Americana’s second motion due to a requested extension 

granted by this Court. See ECF Nos. 19, 20. And even with this

abundant time, Laughlin presented no good cause argument for why the 

Court should extend the time for filing service—contending only that 

service was proper in its briefing. See ECF No. 22.

The Court thus has clear authority to dismiss this case. See Sys.

Signs Supplies, 903 F.2d at 1014. That said, a dismissal without 

prejudice at this stage would likely time-bar Laughlin from bringing its

claim. And because Americana was functionally served, the Court finds 

that a dismissal here—though permissible—is not just. Due to the small 

magnitude of the procedural misstep by Laughlin and the nonprejudicial nature of the defect to Americana, the Court grants Laughlin

extended time to cure the deficiency.

ORDER

The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 17), and hereby ORDERS that Laughlin must properly serve 

Americana on or before March 10, 2023.

2 Americana filed its first Motion to Dismiss, which identified the service issue on 

September 30, 2022, rendered moot by this Court’s order to replead according to local 

and federal rules. ECF Nos. 5, 7. 

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The Court further ORDERS that all deadlines are stayed until 

service is cured. 

SO ORDERED on this 7th day of February 2023.

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