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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JAGER GROUP LLC, §

§

 Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-2496-B

§

HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS

HOLDINGS, INC.,

§

§

§

 Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jager Group LLC’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 11). 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Jager Group’s Motion. 

I.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a breach of a settlement agreement. Jager Group and Defendant 

Healthcare Solutions Holdings, Inc. (“HSH”) entered into a promissory note (“the Note”) for 

$300,000 on May 7, 2019. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 8, 10. HSH eventually defaulted on the Note “by 

failing to make payment on the Note.” Id. ¶ 13. After Jager Group made a demand for payment 

and HSH failed to pay, Jager Group filed a suit for breach of contract on June 27, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 16–

18; Doc. 11, Mot. Default J., ¶ 10. The lawsuit was filed in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas 

Division, styled Jager Group, LLC v. Healthcare Solutions Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:22-CV1405-G. Doc. 11, Mot. Default J., ¶ 10. At the time, the balance of the Note was $375,800. Doc. 

1, Compl., ¶ 14. 

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On August 30, 2022, the parties entered into a settlement agreement (the “Settlement 

Agreement”). Id. ¶ 18. HSH agreed to pay Jager Group $375,000 in three installments on October 

1, November 1, and December 1, 2022. Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. A, § 2. If HSH failed to make these 

payments, Jager Group was to provide notice to HSH of such default. Id. §§ 3.1–3.2. HSH then 

had ten days to remedy the default or interest would begin to accrue on the payments. Id. § 3.2. 

HSH failed to make a payment to Jager Group on October 1, 2022. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 21. 

Jager Group notified HSH of its default on October 6, 2022. Id. ¶ 22. HSH did not remedy its 

default within 10 days. Id. ¶ 24. HSH then failed to make its required payment on November 1, 

2022. Id. ¶ 25. Jager Group filed this lawsuit on November 6, 2022, for breach of contract and 

fraudulent inducement. Id. ¶¶ 32–46. Jager Group later dismissed the fraudulent inducement claim

without prejudice. See Doc. 6, Stip. of Dismissal. As of the date of the Complaint, HSH had made 

no payments under the Settlement Agreement. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 26. 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for entry of default judgments in federal court. 

According to Rule 55, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 

failed to plead or otherwise defend, . . . the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(a). Once default has been entered, the Court may enter a default judgment against the 

defaulting defendant upon motion of the plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

That said, “[d]efault judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and 

resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. 

Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal footnote omitted). A party is not entitled to a 

default judgment merely because the defendant is technically in default. Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 

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207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). Rather, “the entry of default judgment is committed to the discretion of 

the district judge.” Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). 

Courts have developed a three-part analysis to guide this discretion. See, e.g., United States 

v. 1998 Freightliner Vin #: 1FUYCZYB3WP886986, 548 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 

First, courts consider whether the entry of default judgment is procedurally warranted. See Lindsey 

v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). The factors relevant to this inquiry include

whether material issues of fact are at issue, whether there has been substantial prejudice, whether 

the grounds for default are clearly established, whether the default was caused by a good faith 

mistake or excusable neglect, the harshness of a default judgment, and whether the court would 

think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion. Id.

Second, courts assess the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims and determine whether 

there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. 

Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that “default is not treated as an absolute 

confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right to recover”). In doing so, the 

Court assumes that due to its default, the defendant admits all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s 

complaint. Id. However, “[t]he defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to 

admit conclusions of law.” Id.

Third, courts determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiffs should receive. Ins. Co. of 

the W. v. H&G Contractors, Inc., 2011 WL 4738197, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2011) (“A defendant’s 

default concedes the truth of the allegations of the Complaint concerning the defendant’s liability, 

but not damages.”). Normally, damages are not to be awarded without a hearing or a demonstration 

by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts. See United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 

854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). However, if the amount of damages can be determined with 

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mathematical calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents, a hearing is 

unnecessary. James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310–11 (5th Cir. 1993). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Applying this three-part analysis, the Court concludes that a default judgment is 

procedurally warranted and supported by a sufficient factual basis in Jager Group’s Complaint.

A. An Entry of Default Judgment is Procedurally Warranted 

After reviewing Jager Group’s motion in light of the Lindsey factors, the Court finds that

default judgment is procedurally warranted. First, HSH has not filed any responsive pleadings. 

Consequently, there are no material facts in dispute. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893; Nishimatsu

Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206 (noting that “[t]he defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well

pleaded allegations of fact”). Second, HSH’s “failure to respond threatens to bring the adversary

process to a halt, effectively prejudicing Plaintiff’s interests.” See Ins. Co. of the W., 2011 WL 

4738197, at *3 (citing Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893). Third, there is no evidence before the Court to 

indicate that HSH’s silence is the result of a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” Lindsey, 

161 F.3d at 893. Fourth, HSH has failed to answer or otherwise respond to Jager Group’s complaint 

or motion since being served with the complaint over three months ago. See United States v. 

Washington, 2017 WL 3394730, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2017) (Boyle, J.) (entering default 

judgment against a defendant that failed to answer or otherwise respond to the plaintiff’s complaint 

for two months). Finally, the Court is not aware of any facts that would give rise to “good cause” 

to set aside the default if challenged by HSH. Thus, Jager Group has met the procedural 

requirements for default judgment.

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B. There Is a Sufficient Basis for Judgment in the Pleadings

In light of the entry of default, HSH is deemed to have admitted the well-pleaded 

allegations in Jager Group’s Complaint. See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. However, HSH “is not 

held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” See id. Thus, the 

Court must review the pleadings to determine whether they provide a sufficient basis for Jager 

Group’s claim for relief. See id. In conducting this analysis, the Fifth Circuit draws “meaning from 

the case law on Rule 8,” requiring “a pleading to contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 

490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “The purpose of this requirement is to 

give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Here, Jager Group seeks damages for HSH’s breach of the settlement agreement. Doc. 1, 

Compl., 6–7. To prevail on its breach-of-contract claim, Jager Group must show “(1) the existence 

of a valid contract, (2) performance or tendered performance by [Jager Group], (3) breach of the 

contract by [HSH], and (4) damages sustained by [Jager Group] as a result of the breach.” See 

Mays v. Pierce, 203 S.W.3d 564, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).1

After reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds that Jager Group has sufficiently pleaded 

its breach of contract claim. First, Jager Group has pleaded the existence of a valid contract and 

attached it to its Complaint. See Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 18, 33; see also Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. A. Second, 

Jager Group has pleaded that it fully performed under the Settlement Agreement. See Doc. 1,

1 The Court applies Texas law because the Settlement Agreement contains a Texas choice-of-law 

provision, see Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. A, § 6, and it does not appear to “violate[] a fundamental public policy of 

Texas,” see Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 2004).

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Compl., ¶¶ 34, 44 (stating Jager Group dismissed its previous lawsuit in reliance on HSH’s

representations in the Settlement Agreement that it would make the three required payments).

Third, Jager Group has pleaded breach by claiming HSH failed to make any of the required 

payments under the Settlement Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24–26; Doc. 11, Mot. Default J., ¶¶ 12, 14–

17. Finally, Jager Group has sufficiently pleaded its damages. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 37–38; Doc. 11, 

Mot. Default J., ¶ 27. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Jager Group’s Motion for Default Judgment 

on its breach-of-contract claim against HSH. 

C. The Court Is Able to Calculate Damages with Certainty 

“After a default judgment, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, 

except regarding damages.” United States v. Shipco Gen., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). Jager 

Group seeks “payment of all principal and interest due on the Settlement Agreement, prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by Texas law (including Tex[as] Fin[ance] Code

§ 304.003), and [Jager Group’s] attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this matter pursuant to [Texas 

Civil Practice & Remedies Code] § 38.001(8).” Doc. 1, Compl., 7–8. Jager Group supports its 

request for actual damages by attaching the Settlement Agreement and calculating the interest in 

accordance with the Settlement Agreement’s terms as of the Motion for Default Judgment’s filing 

date. Doc. 11, Mot. Default J. Ex. 1-A; Doc. 11, Mot. Default J., ¶ 25 (determining the principal

and interest owed to Jager Group totals $389,792.14). After review, the Court finds Jager Group 

has provided sufficient evidence of actual damages in the amount of $389,792.14. 

As to attorneys’ fees, “[u]nder Texas law, when a prevailing party in a breach of contract 

suit seeks fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long as there is proof of reasonable 

fees.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 

Code § 38.001(8)). In determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Fifth Circuit applies a two-step 

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procedure. La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323–24 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Hensley 

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The district court must first “determine the reasonable 

number of hours expended on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating 

lawyers.” Id. at 324. “Then, the district court must multiply the reasonable hours by the reasonable 

hourly rates.” Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984) (defining base fee to be product 

of reasonable hours and reasonable rate)). The applicant bears the burden of establishing a 

reasonable number of hours expended and proving that billing judgment was exercised. Saizan v. 

Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Next, the Court 

can increase or decrease the award amount based on the factors enumerated in Johnson v. Ga.

Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) overruled on other grounds by Blanchard 

v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989).

2 The fee applicant has the burden to demonstrate the 

reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and the need for any adjustment or enhancement under the 

Johnson factors. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 901–02.

Jager Group is seeking $714.48 in costs and $7,361.50 in attorneys’ fees. Doc. 11, Mot. 

Default J., ¶ 26. Jager Group has attached a declaration of Mitchell R. Garrett, one of its attorneys. 

Doc. 11, Mot. Default J. Ex. 2. Garrett declares that the attorney hours billed in this case “are 

reasonable and necessary under the circumstances of this case.” Id. ¶ 14. Garrett’s declaration also

includes an exhibit detailing how many hours Garrett and others spent on litigation and 

2 These factors include (1) the time and labor required to litigate the case; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill required to litigate the case; (4) whether taking the case 

precluded the attorney from other employment; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community;

(6) the fee or percentage of recovery the attorney quoted to the client; (7) whether the client or case 

required expedited legal work; (8) the amount involved and results obtained;(9) the experience, reputation, 

and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the attorneyclient relationship; and (12) awards made in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.

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descriptions of the tasks completed, as well as the hourly rates of all billing attorneys. Doc. 11, Mot. 

Default J. Ex. 2-D. Exhibit 2-D also includes cost breakdowns of the expenses Jager Group claims 

it is owed. Id. After reviewing the declaration and its exhibit, the Court finds that Jager Group has 

provided evidence of reasonable costs in the amount of $714.48 and fees in the amount of 

$7,361.50. 

Jager Group also seeks post-judgment interest. Doc. 11, Mot. Default J., 7. The Court 

applies Texas Finance Code § 304.003, which sets the post-judgment interest rate at the prime 

rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the date of 

computation. Tex. Fin. Code § 304.003(c)(1). The current prime rate is eight percent. Selected 

Interest Rates, Federal Reserve, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/ (last visited April 3, 

2023). The Court finds Jager Group is entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of eight percent 

per annum. 

To the extent Jager Group seeks additional damages, such as additional attorneys’ fees if 

HSH files post-judgment motions or appeals, the Court finds that Jager Group has not provided 

sufficient evidence to support such fees. See Doc. 11, Mot. Default J., 7. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Jager Group’s Motion for Default Judgment 

(Doc. 11). Accordingly, judgment in favor of Jager Group is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED against HSH in the amount of $389,792.14 in actual damages, along with an additional 

$104.17 per day from January 18, 2023, until the date of this judgment; $714.48 in costs; $7,361.50 

in attorneys’ fees; and post-judgment interest at a rate of eight percent per year beginning on the 

date of this judgment.

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SO ORDERED.

SIGNED: April 5, 2023. 

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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