MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 DALLAS DIVISION 

RALSTON OUTDOOR § 

ADVERTISING LTD., § 

 § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-01433-N 

 § 

CITY OF DALLAS, et al., § 

 § 

 Defendants. § 

 § 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 This order addresses the motions to dismiss [11, 15] brought by Defendants, the 

City of Dallas (the “City”) and the Dallas Board of Adjustment’s (the “Board”). Because 

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court grants the motion. 

I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

 This case arises from Ralston Outdoor Advertising, Ltd.’s (“Ralston”) ownership 

of a detached nonpremises sign (the “Sign”), more commonly known as a billboard, 

located on a Dallas Area Rapid Transit (“DART”) right-of-way. DART notified Ralston 

in 2020 that its construction plans for the new Silver Line expansion required Ralston to 

remove the Sign. Compl. ¶ 8 [1]. But DART and Ralston struggled to find a suitable 

new place for the Sign, as the Dallas City Code now bans the construction of new 

detached nonpremises signs and imposes several relocation restrictions on existing signs. 

Id. ¶¶ 9–14. When DART and Ralston could not identify a compliant location, Ralston 

submitted an application to the City to relocate the sign outside of DART’s right-of-way. 

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Id. ¶ 15. The City first refused to accept the application because it deemed the proposed 

site improper. Id. Then, after further correspondence from Ralston’s attorney, the City 

officially denied the application. Id. ¶ 16. Ralston appealed the denial to the Board, 

which affirmed the City’s decision. Id.

 Ralston filed this action seeking review of the Board’s interpretation of the 

relocation ordinance pursuant to Texas Local Government Code § 211.011 and, in the 

alternative, challenging its constitutionality. Defendants have moved to dismiss for both 

lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

II. THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER 

 JURISDICTION OVER RALSTON’S CLAIMS

 A “federal court may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining its 

jurisdiction.” Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616, 623 (5th Cir. 2023). Indeed, courts 

are “duty-bound to examine the basis of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte,” 

regardless of what has been raised by the parties. Probasco v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., 

LLC, 2017 WL 11717523, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (quoting Lane v. Halliburton, 529 

F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008)), rev’d on other grounds, 766 F. App’x 34 (5th Cir. 2019). 

 Ralston invokes federal question jurisdiction over its constitutional claims and 

supplemental jurisdiction over its petition for writ of certiorari to the Board. Compl. 

¶¶ 5–6. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Intuitively, 

federal question jurisdiction exists where the complaint asserts a claim created by federal 

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law. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing generally Am. 

Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)). 

 However, “interpretation of the federal question must be necessary to resolve the 

case.” Howery, 243 F.3d at 917 (citing Gully v. First Nat’l Bk., 299 U.S. 109, 112 

(1936)). Accordingly, a “suit does not create federal question jurisdiction when the 

federal question appears only in an alternative argument for relief.” Howery, 243 F.3d at 

918 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Op. Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 811–14 (1998)). As the 

Fifth Circuit has explained, “[a]n expansive interpretation of the federal question statute 

to allow federal courts to assert jurisdiction over cases with tangential and inessential 

federal components would step upon the authority of state courts to decide state law and 

ignore the capacity of state courts to decide questions of federal law.” Howery, 243 F.3d 

at 918–19. 

 Here, Ralston asks the Court to reach its constitutional claims only in the event 

that it affirms the Board’s interpretation of the Dallas City Code: 

Ralston contends that the City and Board illegally applied the Relocation to 

Remainder Section, but if they correctly applied the Relocation to 

Remainder section then the same section is unconstitutional. Ralston asks 

the Court to reverse the Board’s decision . . . or otherwise declare the 

Relocation to Remainder Section unconstitutional.”) 

Compl. 2 (emphasis added). Under Ralston’s construction of its claims, the Court may 

never need to reach a challenge to the constitutionality of the relocation ordinance. 

Accordingly, the Court lacks original subject-matter jurisdiction over Ralston’s 

alternative constitutional claims, which also forecloses supplemental jurisdiction over 

Ralston’s state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

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 Nor does the Court have original subject-matter jurisdiction over Ralston’s 

petition for writ of certiorari to the Board. Federal question jurisdiction can exist over a 

cause of action created by state law, but only if “(1) a federal right is an essential element 

of the state claim, (2) interpretation of the federal right is necessary to resolve the case 

and (3) the question of federal law is substantial.” Howery, 243 F.3d at 917 (citing 

generally Gully, 299 U.S. at 112; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for 

S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983)). Ralston alleges several grounds of error by the Board, none 

of which implicate federal law: “the Board did not properly review the City official’s 

decision” because it reviewed the official’s actions for abuse of discretion rather than de 

novo; the Board improperly credited “the City official’s negative response to the question 

of whether he believed he erred”; and the Board “fail[ed] to properly apply the 

Relocation to Remainder Section.” Compl. ¶¶ 21–22, 24. Because Ralston has not 

established that some federal issue is an essential, necessary, and substantial element of 

its petition for writ of certiorari, the petition cannot support original subject-matter 

jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

 Because constitutional claims pled in the alternative to pure state law claims 

cannot establish federal question jurisdiction, and Ralston’s petition for writ of certiorari 

to the Board does not implicate an issue of federal law, the Court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over Ralston’s suit. The Court accordingly dismisses Ralston’s claims 

without prejudice and with leave to amend. Provided that it can do so in a manner 

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consistent with this opinion, Ralston may file an amended petition within thirty (30) days 

of the date of this Order. 

 Signed July 26, 2023. 

 ___________________________ 

 David C. Godbey 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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