Maintaining the Warrior 

Ethos: Tenets to Guide the 

Integration of Women into 

Joint Combat Positions

The Russian Use of Media as 

an Influence System

Applying the Clausewitzian 

Trinity to Assess and Defeat 

Violent Extremist Organizations: 

A Case Study on ISIS

The Role of Innovation Cells in 

Department of Defense 

Innovation

Campaigning

The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

“That All May Labor As One”

Featured Essays

Spring 2017
Campaigning 

Spring 2017 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69

Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College 

RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN

Acting Dean, Joint Forces Staff College 

Col Peter E. Yeager, USMC 

Editor 

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley 

Editorial Board: 

Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe 

Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel 

Dr. Frederick R. Kienle 

Cover image: JCWS Students 

of Seminar 5, Class 17-01. Photo 

by Daniel McCauley. 

Director, Joint and Combined

Warfighting School

CAPT Paul A. Crump, USN

Director, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School

COL Stephen C. Rogers, USA

Director, Joint and Combined

Warfighting School - Hybrid

Col Tricia L. York, USAFR

Director, Joint Command,

Control and Information

Operations School

COL Maxwell Thibodeaux, USA

Campaigning Spring 2017 i
In this issue of Campaigning: 

Editor’s Corner........................................................................................iii 

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley 

Features 

Maintaining the Warrior Ethos: Tenets to Guide the Integration of Women into 

Joint Combat Positions................................................................................1

Maj Meridee J. Trimble, LTC Eldridge D. Browne, LCDR Daniel S. McClure, and 

MAJ Kenrick D. Forrester 

The Russian Use of Media as an Influence System.............................................14

MAJ Robert P. Farrell 

The Role of Innovation Cells in Department of Defense Innovation.......................27

CDR James Darkenwald, LCDR Christopher Casne, and MAJ Trevor Voelkel 

Applying the Clausewitzian Trinity to Assess and Defeat Violent Extremist 

Organizations: A Case Study on ISIS.............................................................40

CAPT Michael Baze, COL Lisa Whittaker, LT Col Stanley Searcy, and CDR Frankie Clark 

Commentary 

Truthfulness, Trust, and the Practice of Military Deception................................51

LTC John W. Bauer, Ph.D. 

Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War to Peace Through 

Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: Understanding the Relevant 

Literature..............................................................................................58

Thomas J. Snukis 

The Foresight Factor 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Derived from a Subsystem 

Analysis of North Korea.............................................................................66

MAJ Tyler J. Standish and LTC Edward D. Cuevas 

Author Submission Guidelines.....................................................................81

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint 

Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 ii
Welcome to the 2017 Spring edition of 

Campaigning. This edition’s Features 

section presents four JCWS student essays 

that discuss timely, relevant topics that 

affect the Joint force. The first featured 

essay, “Maintaining the Warrior Ethos: 

Tenets to Guide the Integration of Women 

into Joint Combat Positions,” by Major 

Meridee Trimble, Lieutenant Colonel 

Eldridge Browne, Lieutenant Commander 

Daniel McClure, and Major Kenrick 

Forrester, suggests integrating women into 

combat arms and special operations roles 

will draw on the lessons learned from the 

integration of African Americans and openly 

homosexual personnel into the all-volunteer 

force. The successful integration of women 

into these new roles depends upon three 

imperatives: standards, leadership, and 

messaging. 

The second featured essay, “The Russian

Use of Media as an Influence System,” by 

Major Robert Farrell, argues that the 

problem of a Russian state-sponsored media 

did not end with the demise of the Soviet 

Union. Rather, the current Russian formal 

and informal media systems purposefully 

promote conspiracy theories and other 

propaganda to subvert democratic stability 

and foment violence. Major Farrell provides 

an in-depth analysis of the Russian media 

system and concludes with 

recommendations for U.S. policymakers. 

In our third featured essay, the authors 

assess ISIS through the lens of the 

Clausewitzian Trinity. In their essay, 

“Applying the Clausewitzian Trinity to 

Assess and Defeat Violent Extremist 

Organizations: A Case Study on ISIS,” 

Captain Michael Baze, Colonel Lisa 

Whittaker, Lieutenant Colonel Stanley 

Searcy and Commander Frankie Clark 

advocate by applying the principles of the 

Clausewitzian model, the U.S. would 

develop a better understanding of 

organizations and groups such as ISIS. 

“The Role of Innovation Cells in DoD 

Innovation,” by Commander James 

Darkenwald, Lieutenant Commander 

Christopher Casne, and Major Trevor 

Voelkel is our fourth featured essay. In this 

essay, the authors’ state as the DoD faces a 

growing set of innovative adversaries, the 

ability of the U.S. to provide the necessary 

defenses are handicapped by budgetary 

constraints, large bureaucracies, and 

cumbersome acquisition processes. To

counter this disadvantage, the authors 

propose aggressively developing and 

supporting ‘game-changing’ innovation cells 

within the Department of Defense. 

In our Commentary section, Lieutenant 

Colonel John Bauer, PhD, provides an indepth discussion of the virtue of truth in his 

essay, “Truthfulness, Trust, and the Practice 

of Military Deception.” LTC Bauer submits 

the idea of military deception and 

truthfulness can and should be reconciled in 

a systematic and principled way. 

Our final commentary is from Associate 

Professor Tom Snukis entitled, “Developing 

an Operational Approach for the Transition 

from War to Peace Through Stabilization, 

Reconstruction, and Development: 

Understanding the Relevant Literature.” In 

this essay, Snukis examines relevant 

research material on the subject and 

Editor’s Corner

Campaigning Spring 2017 iii
highlights areas that U.S. policymakers, 

diplomats, Joint warfighters, and other 

governmental agencies must account for as 

they seek to understand emerging postintervention environments. 

This edition’s Foresight Factor analyzes 

North Korea from a system’s perspective 

and assesses the current U.S. policy’s 

effectiveness. Major Tyler Standish and 

Lieutenant Colonel Ed Cuevas apply 

strategic foresight tools, such as historical 

time-lining, force field analysis, futures 

wheels, implications trees, as well as other 

tools in the assessment of the policy. As a 

result of this analysis, Standish and Cuevas 

provide policy recommendations. 

We hope you enjoy this edition of 

Campaigning. You can let me know what 

you think by emailing me at 

mccauleyd@ndu.edu.

Daniel H. McCauley 

Editor 

Campaigning Spring 2017 iv
Maintaining the Warrior Ethos: 

Tenets to Guide the Integration of 

Women into Joint Combat 

Positions

by

Maj Meridee J. Trimble, LTC Eldridge D. Browne, 

LCDR Daniel S. McClure, and MAJ Kenrick D. 

Forrester

Introduction

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 

announced the complete integration of 

women into direct ground combat positions 

beginning on January 1, 2016.1 The joint 

force must be prepared to answer critical 

questions about this integration process. Is 

there a military necessity now or ever to

integrate women into these positions? Will 

combat effectiveness be sacrificed for the 

advancement of diversity and social justice? 

Will the cost of integration, in terms of time, 

money, and equal representation, be worth 

the effort if the results yield substantially low 

numbers of women in these positions? Time 

will reveal the answers to these questions; 

however, the joint force’s approach will have 

an unequivocal effect on the outcome of the 

integration process. Regardless of one’s 

position about integration, the process has 

begun--what is important is not why it is 

being implemented, but how it will be 

implemented. Similar to racial desegregation 

and the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell

(DADT), the joint force can successfully 

make the change, provided the plan and 

process incorporate the critical imperatives

learned from previous implementation plans. 

All military occupations and specialties, 

without exception, are now available to 

women meeting the qualifications and 

standards of the 220,000 previously restricted 

positions.2 Gender integration and combat 

effectiveness studies informed the decision to 

open armor, infantry, reconnaissance, and 

special operations positions to qualified 

female participants. There were two key 

purposes behind the decision to integrate 

women into direct ground combat positions. 

The first was to ensure the Department of 

Defense (DoD) fully acquired and applied the 

talents and skills of every service member to 

critical jobs across the organization. The 

second was to ensure the equal opportunity 

standard was applied throughout the 

organization regardless of race, sexual 

orientation, or gender.3

 

There have been divergent opinions 

regarding the numerous studies conducted in 

favor or against the integration of women into 

combat positions. Opponents cited studies 

that concluded combat effectiveness and unit 

morale would be negatively impacted by the 

integration of women into traditionally allmale combat units. These conclusions were 

supported by studies that highlighted the 

statistically significant success of all-male 

teams over gender-integrated teams in 

numerous infantry-related tasks.4 Ultimately, 

the debate will continue among members in 

Congress and the U.S. population about why 

women should or should not be integrated. 

What is not in debate is the mission as a joint 

force. The Secretary of Defense determined it 

is in the best interest of the joint force to 

integrate women into combat positions to 

better manage talent and create more equal 

Campaigning Spring 2017 1
opportunities. Therefore, it is critical to

establish an implementation plan and a 

process ensuring the integrity of combat 

effectiveness and unit cohesion. 

The integration programs to desegregate the 

armed forces, in 1948, and to repeal DADT, 

in 2011, provide critical insight about the 

imperatives required for success. These two 

historical integration programs exemplify 

how social dynamics in the military 

influenced the broader social environment, in 

the case of desegregation, and vice versa, 

with the repeal of DADT. The critical 

imperatives throughout these historical 

vignettes exemplify the importance of 

leadership; the enforcement of standards; and 

messaging to soldiers, leaders, and the U.S. 

population. The application of these 

imperatives, coupled with a strong

understanding of group dynamics, will assist 

policymakers and unit leadership to manage 

organizational change during the transition to

gender-integrated direct ground combat 

units. 

The Key Tenets of Membership

The military services reflect the broader 

American demographic composition of 

diverse sub-cultures and groups sharing like 

values, identities, customs, and traditions. 

Within these groups, two key tenets 

contribute to the long-term survival of group 

norms and cohesion. Group norms establish 

essential rules for the behavior of members 

and leaders within the group.5 Often 

informal, norms form the structure of the 

roles, interaction, and goals of the group. The 

second key tenet of any group is cohesion. 

Cohesion is the key tenet that attracts 

members to the group and provides members 

solidarity and morale to achieve group 

goals.6 Norms provide the structure of every 

group, but cohesion holds the group together.

Combat arms and special operations units 

comprise an esteemed group of service 

members, including Air Force Combat 

Controllers and Pararescuemen, Navy 

SEALs, Marine Corps Infantrymen, and 

Army Rangers. The identity of these groups 

is defined as “warriors among warriors.” The 

group norms of these elite teams ascribe to an 

achievement of higher standards, a more 

aggressive nature, and a sharpened warrior 

ethos above all other service groups. The 

cohesion that holds members together can be 

defined in two primary categories: task and 

social cohesion.7

 

Task cohesion is defined as the technical 

capabilities required to accomplish group 

activities or a mission. Task cohesion is the 

shared commitment among members to 

achieve a goal that requires the collective 

efforts of the group.8 This type of cohesion 

often translates into the combat effectiveness 

of a unit. Social cohesion is defined by the 

social-oriented factors that unify and bond 

members in pursuit of goals. This type of 

cohesion directly equates to unit morale. 

Social cohesion is the extent to which group 

members like each other, prefer to spend 

social time together, enjoy each other’s 

company, and feel emotionally close to one 

another.9

 

To successfully integrate women into combat 

arms and special operations units, service 

Campaigning Spring 2017 2
members and the public must have a clear 

understanding of the expectations a group’s 

membership entails. Unit membership is 

driven by group norms, and acceptance by 

the group is based on the new member’s 

ability to conform to the critical factors that 

support cohesion. The challenge is having 

these types of units accept new members, 

specifically women, without unit members, 

supporters in Congress, and the public 

questioning the viability of unit survival 

based on the organizational change dynamic. 

If integration fails to observe the two aspects 

of cohesion, the result will be detrimental to 

new members and the unit. Opponents will 

inaccurately claim the failure as proof that 

women cannot achieve the same standards as 

men, rather than recognize it as a systematic 

failure of implementation. 

Desegregation of the U.S. Military

Racial desegregation offers a perspective 

about how task cohesion and social cohesion 

were initially obstacles to integrating the 

armed forces, but eventually served as the 

reasons integration succeeded. Racial 

desegregation of the armed forces was 

propelled by social pressure, manpower 

shortfalls, and high casualty conflicts during 

World War II and the Korean War. Similarly, 

changing social, cultural, and organizational

dynamics brought about the decision to 

integrate women into combat arms units. 

Initiatives to integrate the armed forces 

during conflict eras provide insight into some 

of the challenges faced during an extensive 

organizational overhaul. The DoD’s racial 

bias centered around what leadership 

believed African Americans could 

accomplish, describing task cohesion, and 

how African Americans could fit into the 

organization, describing social cohesion. 

The biases that African Americans faced in 

the broader U.S. social context were mirrored 

in the early era of integrating the armed 

forces. Racism, segregation, and treatment as 

second-class citizens limited the professions 

in which African Americans were allowed to 

serve, and quotas restricted the number of 

African American service members to 

10%.10 Opponents argued that integrated 

units would degrade task cohesion, unit 

morale, and effectiveness and senior leaders’ 

misperceptions about African Americans 

included lack of discipline and inferiority.

Consequently, African American units

struggled to gain the same opportunities 

afforded to Caucasian units, which would 

have allowed soldiers to demonstrate 

competence in the complex and high-stress 

environment of combat. Misperceptions 

about the capacity to function in combined 

arms units or hold positions of leadership 

over Caucasians relegated African 

Americans to manual and service-oriented 

positions, particularly as food preparation 

and transportation specialists in the U.S. 

Navy and U.S. Army.11 

The momentum to integrate was propelled, 

prior to and during WWII, by the African 

American community fighting for the right to 

serve and by challenging the status quo. 

African American soldiers sought social 

cohesion and identified as Americans 

fighting an oppressor.12 Among 

recommendations made to the Secretary of 

War in 1941, were that African Americans be 

Campaigning Spring 2017 3
trained in the same locations as Caucasians to 

facilitate efficiency, cut costs, and to improve 

training and throughput of Army Air Corps 

pilots and ground crews.13 Additionally, a 

statement discussing the intolerance of 

discrimination was recommended, 

emphasizing the message be communicated 

to commanders in the field.14

World War II marked the initial integration 

of African Americans into the military’s 

social fabric. Select Caucasian officers 

advocated for change because of African 

Americans’ demonstration of task cohesion 

on the battlefield and the ability to overcome 

racial challenges while defending the 

nation.15 Some Caucasian officers’ positive 

experiences commanding African American 

troops during WWII bolstered the push 

toward integration. One such experience was 

expressed by the commander of the 600th

Field Artillery Battalion, comprising all 

African American officers and soldiers, at the 

conclusion of the Italian Campaign in 1945. 

The commander stated, “I believe that the 

young Negro officer represents the best we 

have to offer, and under proper, sympathetic, 

and capable leadership, would have 

developed and performed equally with any 

other racial group....They were Americans 

before all else.”16 

African American Marines fighting in the 

Pacific theater battles, at Peleliu and 

Okinawa, demonstrated that race was not a 

factor in determining how service members 

perform. The strong task cohesion exhibited 

by African American soldiers at each 

opportunity countered the negative 

perceptions by opponents of desegregation.17

Despite such achievements during World 

War II, racism was the reason none of the 433 

Medals of Honor (MoH) from this conflict 

were awarded to African Americans. 

Although some commanders nominated 

African Americans, it was not until 1996 that 

seven among those MoH nominees were 

awarded for actions during the war.18

On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued 

Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the 

Armed Forces, mandating the “equality of 

treatment and opportunity for all persons in 

the armed forces without regard to race, 

color, religion, or national origin."19 This 

order included a provision that allowed for a 

gradual desegregation of the services to 

preclude a negative impact on morale or 

standards. Consequently, desegregation took 

nearly five years for the change to be 

implemented across the services because of

institutional and social biases. An advisory 

committee was established to examine the 

rules, practices, and procedures of the armed 

services and recommend ways to implement 

the order.20 Despite considerable resistance 

to the executive order from the military, it 

served as an impetus to change social norms 

and the services were nearly integrated by the 

end of the Korean War.21

Desegregation of the armed forces required 

considerable external pressure to force 

change in the military because social norms 

created friction and hampered integration. 

The Navy and Air Force integrated early in 

the process; however, the Army and Marine 

Corps resisted change.22 The slow progress 

of the Army’s desegregation prompted a 

letter from the American Veterans 

Campaigning Spring 2017 4
Committee admonishing the service for 

taking over three years to implement 

Executive Order 9981.23 The Army took an 

additional three years from the issuance of 

the order to integrate, as noted by a 1952 

memo from the Commander of the European 

Command to subordinate Army units, 

directing full integration.24 

Concurrently in the Far East Command, 

personnel shortages during the Korean War 

forced the Army to change. Units in Korea 

performed well because they operated 

cohesively, which diffused racial tensions. 

To build social cohesion in a diverse culture, 

two or more opposing elements must unite in 

a shared endeavor, experience the same 

shared hardships, and build trust in order to 

identify shared interests.25 A relevant

example of social cohesion was when the 

Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps 

witnessed integrated units in combat 

operations and subsequently issued a study to 

determine the efficacy of integration.26 As a 

result, the Commandant “announced a 

general policy of racial integration on 13 

December 1951, thus abolishing the system 

first introduced in 1942 of designating certain 

units in the regular forces and organized 

reserves as Black units.”27 The entire military 

was desegregated by 1953; however, it took 

many years for racial tensions to subside.

African Americans continued to suffer the 

impact of discrimination with lower 

performance ratings than Caucasians and

earned limited placement in senior 

positions.28

There are several implications from racial 

desegregation that are applicable to the 

integration of women into combat units. 

First, the process to overcome bias will take 

time and will not occur quickly. Conflict as a 

catalyst for change, specifically, WWII and 

the Korean War, served as examples of how 

units contended with racial bias. Overcoming 

bias, in the context of gender, will be 

similarly contended with as women integrate 

into all combat positions. Second, change

must be driven by senior leaders and be 

effectively communicated down to the 

combat arms and special operations units. 

Commanders must address the current 

institutional and cultural biases and shape the 

environment to change norms. One 

programmatic difference between racial 

integration and women in combat, which may 

assist to overcome bias, is that quotas will not 

be used. The quota systems used during 

World War II and the Korean War were not 

successful and actually hindered progress, 

allowing biases to persist. Performancebased standards are the metric that will 

ensure task cohesion; strong leadership will 

set the tone to ensure social cohesion. 

Twenty-first century conflicts have opened 

the door for a change in the social norms of 

direct ground combat units. Women will 

likely face similar institutional and social 

biases and endure challenges similar to what 

African Americans experienced. Women will 

have to demonstrate success using the same 

standards as male counterparts. As the 

achievement of task cohesion occurs, social 

cohesion will develop, and women will be 

accepted as part of the group. Among the 

hurdles initial candidates may encounter are 

lower performance reports, slower career 

progression, and a struggle for the same 

Campaigning Spring 2017 5
growth opportunities afforded to male 

counterparts. Women will have to prove 

themselves worthy of being considered part 

of the group by maintaining high standards 

and achieving task cohesion to gain 

acceptance, and ultimately, achieve social 

cohesion. Integration will be a slow process 

and shortcuts will derail and dilute the 

accomplishments of those women who are 

able to break into the group and achieve 

social cohesion. 

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell

The DoD’s 1981 policy of DADT continued 

the ban on homosexuals in the military, with 

the justification that “homosexuality is 

incompatible with military service.”29 One of 

President Clinton’s campaign promises 

included supporting the service of openly

homosexual personnel in the armed forces. 

The DoD was directed to research ways to 

ensure personnel could neither be questioned 

about sexual orientation, nor declare 

homosexuality. In the interim, the threat of 

discharge remained common for personnel 

openly declaring homosexuality or by 

marrying or attempting to marry an 

individual of the same sex.30 Several 

Congressional efforts to repeal DADT were 

unsuccessful from 2005 to 2009 when acts 

were introduced to replace current laws with 

updated language eliminating discriminatory 

language based on sexual orientation. 

President Obama’s 2010 State of the Union 

Address revealed the intent to work with 

Congress and the DoD to repeal DADT.31 A 

DoD working group was established to 

discuss how the military would incorporate 

openly homosexual personnel if the DADT 

policy were repealed. Concurrently, think 

tanks researched whether or not the repeal of 

DADT would positively or negatively impact 

the services. Concerns included what aspects 

of the repeal would be addressed, how the 

effects would be measured, and in what ways 

unit cohesion would be impacted, if at all. 

Think tanks determined personal bias was 

estimated to have less sway over dedication 

to achieving the mission, indicating that 

sexual orientation did not influence group 

cohesion; however, mission accomplishment 

could be at risk.

32 Arguments against the 

repeal described a potentially pejorative 

impact on unit performance and social 

cohesion.33 A 2009 letter to Congress, signed 

by 1,167 retired Flag and General Officers, 

expressed “unequivocal support for current 

law and opposition to any action to repeal or 

weaken it,” citing “adverse effects for 

recruitment, retention, and overall readiness 

that eventually would break the all-volunteer 

force.”34 Such claims resonated as markedly 

similar to the arguments against the 

integration of African Americans into the 

armed forces. 

The DoD working group recommended that 

for the DADT repeal to be implemented

successfully, strong leadership, a clear 

message, and proactive training and 

education were key imperatives.35 A support 

plan for implementation was released with a 

message that emphasized a LeadershipProfessionalism-Trust paradigm.36 The plan 

detailed a three-tiered education and training 

framework: Tier 1 (Expert Level); Tier 2 

(Leader Level); and Tier 3 (Service Member 

Level).37 Each service branch was directed to 

Campaigning Spring 2017 6
conduct and document the training of all 

personnel. Tier 1 training was provided to 

experts who were predicted to deal with 

DADT repeal issues, including chaplains and 

judge advocates. Tier 2 training was provided 

to command leadership personnel and 

focused on the foundations of leadership, 

professionalism, discipline, and respect. It 

emphasized that command leadership must

set the conditions for success of the DADT 

repeal training and implementation plan, 

including building unit cohesion, while 

maintaining readiness. Finally, Tier 3 

training provided education for all service 

members about policies and standards of 

conduct. 

The working group concluded that repealing 

DADT “would impose minimal risk to 

military readiness in terms of unit cohesion, 

recruitment, retention, and performance.”38

The Senate and House of Representatives 

repealed DADT and President Obama signed 

the law on December 22, 2010.39 On July 22, 

2011, the President, Secretary of Defense, 

and Joint Chiefs of Staff certified 

implementation of the DADT repeal, which 

went into effect on September 20, 2011. 

Conclusions of an assessment one year after 

the repeal indicated “no negative impact on 

overall military readiness or its component 

parts: unit cohesion, recruitment, retention, 

assaults, harassment, or morale.”40 It must be 

considered that the DADT repeal likely 

caused an increase in honesty among service 

members, which resulted in improved trust 

and ability to work together effectively.

41 In 

an environment where people can be honest 

with one another, it allows to deeper bonds of 

trust to develop and increases social 

cohesion.42 The dire consequences 

envisioned by opponents of the DADT repeal 

paralleled arguments made against racial 

integration. Both were overcome by careful 

and thoughtful leadership and education. 

Developing a key messaging strategy was 

one important lesson learned from the 

implementation of the DADT repeal, which 

can be applied to the formal integration of 

women into direct ground combat positions. 

The Leadership-Professionalism-Trust 

paradigm was paramount to the success of the 

DADT repeal. It committed leaders and 

subordinates to obey and comply with 

standards of conduct and highlighted that 

each and every member of the force must 

treat one another with respect.43

Organizational change begins with 

leadership buy-in and is implemented with

education and training. As learned during 

racial integration and the DADT repeal, the 

creation and maintenance of standards, as 

applied to task requirements, builds social 

cohesion. Furthermore, the social context 

aligned with the timing of guidance from 

civilian leadership and served as the impetus 

to repeal DADT.

The Approach for Gender Integration

A critical realization of complete gender 

integration is that the implementation 

program, to open all direct ground combat 

positions to women, constitutes the final step 

in a long-standing acceptance of women in 

the military. Policies expanding the 

integration of women into combat roles have 

endured decades and reflect the dynamics of 

social change. The transition to an allCampaigning Spring 2017 7
volunteer force, recruiting and retention 

conditions, and the evolving definition of 

combat, combat missions, and direct ground 

combat broadened women’s integration into 

previously restricted roles.44 The DoD’s 

1994 policy barred women from participating 

in units below the brigade level in which 

ground combat was the primary mission, 

namely armor, artillery, infantry, combat 

engineering, and battalion or smaller special 

operations units.45 

Former Secretary of Defense Panetta released 

a directive in 2013 to explore implementation 

policies and plans, which resulted in studies 

about unit cohesion; equipment, gear, and 

uniform modifications; facility and 

infrastructure modifications; the propensity 

to serve in combat roles; and international 

issues.46 After careful analysis drawn from 

the conclusions of 41 military department 

studies, Secretary Carter ordered all combat 

positions be opened to women. This section 

highlights three imperatives that emerged 

from the literature about how gender 

integration could occur successfully: 1) 

enforcement of standards, 2) leadership’s 

management of cultural change, and 3) 

leadership’s messaging and promotion of

group norms and social cohesion. 

The first imperative to successful 

implementation is the enforcement of 

standards. An abundance of studies have 

been conducted to determine if women 

should be excluded based on physical and 

physiological factors. Most concluded that 

women are capable of executing these tasks; 

however, the size of the female population 

that can execute these extraordinarily 

physically and psychologically demanding 

tasks is small.47 When considering the 

current assessment and selection standards 

for special operations units, it was 

determined that the standards were valid for 

determining candidates’ success in training 

and in the operational environment.48

Consequently, most women cannot achieve

the minimum standards; however, most men 

are also incapable of achieving the same 

standards. High standards are what create the 

elite force and are factors in developing 

group cohesion.49

Another aspect of enforcing standards is the 

avoidance of injuries. To be successful in 

combat arms and special operations units, 

women in these specialties must physically 

rank among the top 15% of all service 

women.50 Several studies concluded that the 

women who perform at this level have been 

successful in the pilot programs. One 

advantage to creating gender-neutral 

standards is that most direct ground combat 

specialties did not previously require 

entrance assessments. Males were able to 

volunteer directly into these fields based on 

gender, similar to previous segregation 

policies that placed Caucasians in positions 

of superiority, despite any entry-level 

qualification standards. Consequently, this 

resulted in a segment of the male population 

suffering injuries, which limited success 

rates. The new gender-neutral standards help

screen male and female applicants to ensure

future success and to enhance group 

cohesion.51 The key to implementation is 

reinforcing standards and ensuring service 

members adhere to the standards within these 

groups. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 8
The second imperative to successful 

implementation is the role of leadership 

during the implementation process. 

Leadership is critical to preventing bias and 

effectively managing change. Unit 

commanders are responsible for managing 

this cultural shift within their formations. 

First, commanders will have to communicate 

that tasks and jobs must be assigned by 

meritocracy and ability, not by gender. 

Second, as learned from racial integration, 

the use of quotas would be contradictory to 

the application of standards; gender-neutral 

standards will likely result in unequal 

participation among men and women. Third, 

physical and other differences between the 

genders will be accounted for during 

implementation.52

Leadership will be required to not only 

prevent bias, but also to establish positive 

norms within the group that support social 

cohesion. An example of how understanding 

group norms contributes to success was 

highlighted in a multi-year study conducted 

by Google, an industry leader in leveraging 

group dynamics. A key conclusion was that 

the best way to build a perfect team is to 

create norms that regulate how members treat 

one another. The Google study offered two 

useful findings to empower leaders managing 

change in a group’s culture. First, a group’s 

collective intelligence can be raised with the 

right norms.53 Second, teams are optimized 

by understanding and influencing group 

norms.54 Military leadership at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels of joint teams 

will set the tone by managing the positive and 

negative factors affecting group norms and 

unit cohesion. 

The third imperative is the aspect of 

messaging from the leader to the group 

members and to the external environment of 

the group. The successful integration of 

women into combat positions hinges on the 

reinforcement of positive group norms and 

unit cohesion elements. Social cohesion is 

predicated on the group sharing certain 

values, beliefs, and identities. All of these 

factors coalesce to build a perception about 

how the group interacts with one another and 

with other groups. Formal and informal 

communication inside and outside of the 

group is critical to the group’s identity. An 

essential message to group members is that 

candidates who desire to join the group 

understand the group norms and must want to 

be a part of the group. The standards required 

to enter into combat positions will ensure that 

only those candidates who possess the 

ambition and motivation will endure the 

hardship required to enter into these types of 

positions. Messaging will reassure members 

that the unit’s fundamental identity has not 

changed.

Another critical aspect of the message is 

understanding the audience and having the 

right messenger deliver the message. 

Physical standards have to be developed and 

universally implemented across the force at 

the highest level, but the message has to be 

tailored to the lowest level. Leaders at the 

lowest level have established credibility and 

a higher level of influence over 

subordinates.55 The leaders within the units 

understand the specific dynamics of the 

Campaigning Spring 2017 9
group based on the local environment. These 

leaders can deliver the message with great 

credibility that resonates with group 

members. Implementation will only work if 

the lowest level leaders are empowered to 

influence and motivate group members to 

conform based on their established 

credibility. 

Conclusion

The lessons learned from integrating African 

Americans and openly homosexual 

personnel, into the all-voluntary military 

force, are that the equal opportunity to serve 

did not affect combat effectiveness or unit 

cohesion. These groups were accepted 

because members achieved the standards and 

ascribed to the norms within units. Minority 

groups ultimately have a lower representation 

within these types of units, not because of 

restrictions, but because most individuals 

comprising these groups do not socially want 

or need to conform to these types of units.56

Additionally, leadership helps to shape group 

norms. Leadership highlights the 

professionalism, high esteem, esprit de corps, 

and mission success required to remain in 

these types of units. The integration of 

women into combat arms and special 

operations units will yield low numbers, but 

those who meet the physical and task 

standards will be successful.

The successful implementation of women 

into direct ground combat positions will be 

incumbent upon three imperatives: standards, 

leadership, and messaging. Standards should 

not cause concern because the shift to genderneutral standards will offer the equal 

opportunity to apply. Should a member meet 

or exceed the physical standards, task 

cohesion will be achieved. Should a member 

psychologically identify with the group 

characteristic, social cohesion will be 

achieved. Leadership is crucial to the group’s 

continued success by ensuring the right 

members are present in the unit, regardless of 

race, or sexual orientation, or gender. 

Messaging is an important part of the 

socialization process because leadership will 

be responsible for reminding current 

members that new members are applying, 

passing, and joining because of the desire to 

be a part of an elite unit. Additionally, as new 

members arrive to units, messaging should 

continue with the gender-integrated group to 

build and strengthen group cohesion. 

The dimension of time is an important aspect 

to the three imperatives, as each needs to be 

addressed now and at the beginning of the 

implementation process, to ensure current 

members adjust to the impending change in 

group dynamics. It has taken decades to reach 

this level of integration and the remaining 

steps to completion will more than likely take 

years. The acceptance of women into direct 

ground combat positions can only be 

achieved by the artful way in which 

commanders apply leadership and messaging 

to the implementation process, while 

enforcing the standards. Successful 

significant cultural shifts are not made 

overnight but are gradually changed over 

time. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 10
Author Biographies.

Major Meridee Trimble, PhD, USAF. Maj Trimble is 

a Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer, currently 

stationed at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea. She 

recently completed a Southeast Asia Foreign Area 

Officer assignment at the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency in Arlington, VA. Maj Trimble 

earned a BA in Asian Studies from Thomas Edison 

State College, a MA in Management and Human 

Resources Development from Webster University, a 

MA in International Relations from St. Mary's 

University, a MA in National Security Affairs (Far 

East) from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a 

PhD in Educational Management (Higher Education) 

from Hampton University. 

Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge Browne, USA. LTC 

Browne is currently serving in the Army G8 as a 

Force Development Planner. He recently completed a 

joint tour as a ground planner for United Nations 

Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces 

Korea UCJ35 Future Plans. He was commissioned as 

an Infantry Officer in the Army and earned a BS in 

Psychology from the University of Southern Illinois 

at Edwardsville in 1997, a MA in Management from 

Webster University in 2009, and a MS in Operational 

Art from the School of Advanced Military Science 

(SAMS) in 2010. Prior to his last assignment, he 

1 Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Opens All Military 

Occupations, Positions to Women,” December 3, 

2015, DoD News - Defense Media Activity, 

December 3, 2015, accessed, February 1, 2016, 

http://www.defense.gov/News-ArticleView/Article/632536/carter-opens-all-militaryoccupations-positions-to-women 2 Ibid.

3 Ash Carter, “Remarks on the Women-In-Service 

Review” (speech presented December 3, 2015, 

Pentagon Press Briefing Room). 

http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/SpeechView/Article/632495/remarks-on-the-women-inservice-review 4 Department of the Navy - Headquarters United 

States Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps 

Assessment of Women in Service Assignments 

(Quantico, VA: August 18, 2015).

5 Donelson R. Forsyth, Group Dynamics (Belmont, 

California: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013).

served in operational and tactical units with multiple 

deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lieutenant Commander Daniel McClure, USN. 

LCDR McClure is currently serving as Chief Medical 

Plans, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Fort Eustis, 

VA. He was commissioned through Medical Enlisted 

Commissioning Program in 2001. LCDR McClure 

earned a BS in Nursing from the University of 

Maine, Fort Kent, in 2001, a MBA from TUI 

University in 2006, and a MA in National Security 

and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War 

College in 2013. Prior to his current assignment, he 

served as the Department Head Surgical Services 

onboard USNS COMFORT. 

Major Kenrick Forrester, USA. MAJ Forrester is 

currently serving in the Joint Staff J37 as an action 

officer. He was commissioned through Officer 

Candidate School as an Infantry Officer and then 

selected as a Special Forces Officer. He earned a BA 

in Business Administration from Upper Iowa 

University in 1999, a MA in Political Science from 

Kansas State in 2004, and a MMS in Military Studies 

from Marine Corps University in 2013. Prior to his 

current assignment, he served as the 7th Special 

Forces Group Executive Officer.

6 Kenneth L. Dion, “Group Cohesion: From ‘Field of 

Forces’ to Multidimensional Construct,” Group 

Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice 4, no. 1 

(March 2000): 7-26. 7 David G. Myers, Exploring Social Psychology, 4th

edition (New York: McGraw-Hill College, 2006). 8 Kristy N. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal 

Opportunity in the Armed Services: Background and 

Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 

R44321, December 23, 2015. 

9 Ibid.

10 "The Army and Diversity,” U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, accessed February 18, 2016. 

http://www.history.army.mil/html/faq/diversity.html#

african.ESRC=dod_160122.nl

11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 "Survey and Recommendations Concerning the 

Integration of the Negro Soldier into the Army, 

September 22, 1941,” Harry S. Truman Library and 

Museum, accessed February 13, 2016, 

Campaigning Spring 2017 11
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_coll

ections/desegregation/large/documents/index.php?do

cumentdate=1941-09-22&documentid=11-

1&pagenumber=1

14 Ibid.

15 West A. Hamilton "The Negroes' Historical and

Contemporary Role in National Defense" (reading

presented at Hampton Conference on National

Defense, November 25, 1940).

16 Robert Hodges Jr., "African American 92

nd

Infantry Division Fought in Italy During World War

II," HistoryNet, June 12, 2006, accessed February 28,

2016. http://www.historynet.com/african-american92nd-infantry-division-fought-in-italy-during-worldwar-ii.htm.

17 Christopher A. Browning, “Segregation versus

Integration: The Racial Policy of the Marine Corps

from 1942-1962,” (master’s thesis, United States

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine 

Corps University, March 25, 2013), accessed

February 28, 2016. www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA601677.

18 “African American World War II Medal of Honor

Recipients," U.S. Army Center of Military History,

accessed February 28, 2016,

http://www.history.army.mil/moh/mohb.html

19 Executive Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (July 26,

1948). 

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Christopher A. Browning, “Segregation versus

Integration: The Racial Policy of the Marine Corps

from 1942-1962,” (master’s thesis, United States

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine 

Corps University, March 25, 2013), accessed

February 28, 2016. www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA601677. 

23 “Michael Straight to Harry S. Truman, November 

9, 1951,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum,

accessed February 13, 2016.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_coll

ections/desegregation/large/documents/index.php?do

cumentdate=1951-11-09&documentid=2-

5&pagenumber=1

24 "Memo: Racial Integration of EUCOM Army

Units, April 1, 1952, Nash Files, Truman Papers,"

Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, accessed

February 13, 2016,

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_coll

ections/desegregation/large/documents/pdf/15-7.pdf. 

25 "Social Cohesion,” Wikiprogress, accessed

February 28, 2016,

http://wikiprogress.org/articles/video/socialcohesion/#cite_note-Maxwell-1.

26 Christopher A. Browning, “Segregation versus

Integration: The Racial Policy of the Marine Corps

from 1942-1962,” (master’s thesis, United States 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine 

Corps University, March 25, 2013), accessed 

February 28, 2016. www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA601677. 27 Ibid., 20-21. 28 "The Army and Diversity,” U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, accessed February 18, 2016. 

http://www.history.army.mil/html/faq/diversity.html#

african.ESRC=dod_160122.nl

29 Kristi N. Kamarck, Women in Combat: Issues for 

Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42075, 

December 3, 2015. 30 David F. Burrelli, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: The 

Law and Military Policy on Same-Sex Behavior,” 

Congressional Research Service, R40782, October 

14, 2010.

31 Kristi N. Kamarck, Women in Combat: Issues for 

Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42075, 

December 3, 2015. 

32 Bernard D. Rostker, Susan D. Hosek, and Mary E. 

Vaiana, “Gays in the Military: Eventually, New Facts 

Conquer Old Taboos,” Rand Review, Spring 2011, 

accessed March 1, 2015, 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/randreview/issues/2011/spring/gays.html

33 Gary Schaub, “Unit Cohesion and the Impact of 

DADT,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2010): 85-

101.

34 Aaron Belkin et al., “One Year Out: An 

Assessment of DADT Repeal’s Impact on Military 

Readiness,” Palm Center - Blueprints for Sound 

Public Policy, September 20, 2012. 35 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report of the 

Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with 

a Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” (November 30, 

2010).

36 U.S. Department of Defense, “Support Plan for 

Implementation: Report of the Comprehensive 

Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of 

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” (November 30, 2010). 37 Ibid. 38 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report of the 

Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with 

a Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” (November 30, 

2010).

39 Ibid. 40 Aaron Belkin et al., “One Year Out: An 

Assessment of DADT Repeal’s Impact on Military 

Readiness,” Palm Center - Blueprints for Sound 

Public Policy, September 20, 2012. 41 Ibid. 42 Charles Duhigg, “What Google Learned from its 

Quest to Build the Perfect Team,” The New York 

Times Magazine, February 25, 2016.

Campaigning Spring 2017 12
43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report of the 

Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with 

a Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” (November 30, 

2010).

44 Kristi N. Kamarck, Women in Combat: Issues for 

Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42075, 

December 3, 2015. 

45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Patricia Horoho, “Solider 2020: Injury 

Rates/Attrition Rates Working Group - Medical 

Recommendations” (USAMEDCOM briefing 

presented June 24, 2015).

48 Karen Kelly and Jason Jameson, “Navy Sea, Air 

and Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare CombatantCraft Crewman (SWCC) Physical Standards 

Validation Report” (San Diego, CA: Warfighter 

Performance Department Naval Health Research 

Center).

49 Ibid. 50 Department of the Navy - Headquarters United 

States Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps 

Assessment of Women in Service Assignments 

(Quantico, VA: August 18, 2015).

51 Ibid. 52 Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Opens All Military 

Occupations, Positions to Women,” December 3, 

2015, DoD News - Defense Media Activity, 

December 3, 2015, accessed, February 1, 2016, 

http://www.defense.gov/News-ArticleView/Article/632536/carter-opens-all-militaryoccupations-positions-to-women 53 Charles Duhigg, “What Google Learned from its 

Quest to Build the Perfect Team,” The New York 

Times Magazine, February 25, 2016. 54 Ibid. 55 James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, Credibility: 

How Leaders Gain and Lose it. Why People Demand 

It (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass), 2011. 56 Emmett E. Burke, Black Officer UnderRepresentation in Combat Arms Branches,

Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of 

Advanced Military Studies, United States Army 

Command and General Staff College, 2002).

Campaigning Spring 2017 13
The Russian Use of Media as an 

Influence System

By 

MAJ Robert P. Farrell

For much of its history, the Russian 

government has been known to engage in 

media manipulation and control. During the 

Cold War, the United States took a relatively

active approach to countering these efforts with 

a structure and policy centered on the United 

States Information Agency (USIA). However, 

much of USIA was dismantled or subsumed 

into the Department of State in 1999. This, no 

doubt, seemed reasonable at the time given the 

euphoria of the breakup of the Soviet regime, 

but today there is a growing realization that the 

problem of a Russian State-sponsored media 

did not actually end with the demise of the 

Soviet Union. 

Russian use of media to support their incursion 

into Crimea was clear. It was, in fact, openly 

acknowledged by high profile member of the 

Russian Parliament, Nikolai Valuyev, who 

wrote on Twitter, “This is an information war. 

We flew into this heroic city of Sevastopol to 

personally support residents and learn the 

situation on the inside.”1

 In addition to 

supporting the annexation of part of the 

Ukraine, there is ample evidence that the 

Russia media apparatus is promoting 

conspiracy theories, throwing fuel onto U.S. 

police brutality and racial fires, alleging U.S. 

government misconduct,

2 and most 

egregiously, actively interfering with the U.S. 

election process.

3

 Meanwhile, there is little 

evidence that U.S. information policy has 

changed to address these issues although there 

have been calls for action from senior members 

of Congress. Notably, Congressman Ed Royce, 

chairman of the House of Representatives 

Foreign Affairs Committee stated during a 

hearing that “Russia’s propaganda machine is 

in overdrive, working to subvert democratic 

stability and foment violence.”4 Clearly, this is 

an area that requires examination. To that end, 

I will use a variety of strategic foresight and 

systems thinking tools to scrutinize Russian 

media. This analysis begins with an internal 

look at the Russian system then progresses to 

look at trends, implications, and potential 

future scenarios before assessing current U.S. 

policy with regards to Russian media, and, 

finally, recommending changes. 

This project will attempt to model the media 

system used by the Russian government in their 

attempts to exert influence in the interests of 

the State. By necessity, it will represent 

something of a simplification. Russia is not 

well-known for being particularly forthcoming 

in this area, so good information is fairly scant; 

especially when limiting the search to open 

source. The following Casual Loop Diagram 

(CLD) is based largely upon John A. Dunn’s 

“Lottizzazione Russian Style: Russia’s Twotier Media System,”5 and is supplemented by 

prior research conducted on the subjects of 

Russia’s concept of “maskirovka”, their central 

national narratives, and their “Troll Army.” A 

diagram such as this is a useful way to visualize 

a system, and graphically examine 

relationships and the flow of interactions 

within it. In the case of Russian media, it allows 

us to take an enormously 

Campaigning Spring 2017 14
 

complex system and represent it in a way that 

fosters discussion and understanding. 

This graphical representation of the system 

reveals a pattern which may be surprising for 

one who expects a largely State-sponsored 

media apparatus to be fairly linear. In fact, 

different types of media are approached 

differently, and even this relatively simple 

model points to other factors influencing media 

which, while being uniquely Russian, do not 

devolve into strict governmental controls. 

At the center of the CLD, you will find the 

two tiers of the Russian system which Dunn 

compares to the Italian system of 

Lottizzazione. Simply put, Tier 1 media is

characterized by tight State control of content 

and messages while Tier 2 media has a 

“degree of freedom” [note that no media in 

Russia is completely free; there is always

the threat of potential government retaliation 

related to their content.] Tier 1 media includes 

most TV channels and a significant number of 

radio and newspaper outlets. Tier 2 media 

includes some newspaper and radio, but is 

mostly distinguished by inclusion of the 

majority of the Internet media producers. 

These two tiers are connected to specific 

audiences based upon where these individuals 

seek their news; 1st Tier to TV-news centered 

Russians (which according to 2010 data 

represent 94% of the populace) and 2nd Tier of 

Russians mostly connected to Internet-centered 

news (estimated at less than 10% of the 

population). Russians in the 1st and 2nd Tiers 

form the pool of individuals who constitute 

popular support for the Russian government. 

Popular support to the regime, to the extent that 

it exists, has a very strong relationship with the 

preservation of the State.

Figure 1.

Campaigning Spring 2017 15
Moving from this section over to the left and 

upper section of the CLD, we can see that the 

Russian State media authority6 has an 

important role in the overall system. It has a 

direct and strong link to 1st Tier media in that it 

dictates strategic communication and routinely 

requires some media outlets to publish specific 

content. 1st Tier media, in turn, submits content 

back to higher State authority for approval in a 

balancing feedback loop as these media outlets 

seek to preserve their organization and perhaps 

also curry a little political favor. The State 

media authority is itself heavily influenced by 

the ruling elite, namely Vladimir Putin and his 

inner circle.7 Also, Russian “narratives” and 

the concept of “maskirovka” provide ready 

heuristics which guide media direction in the 

absence of direct instructions. 

To clarify, there are generally considered to be 

three central Russian narratives: Fortress 

Russia, Savior of Europe, and the Good Czar. 

Fortress Russia provides a metaphor for Russia 

as a besieged nation whose people have an 

inherent toughness and unity which will 

inevitably break any potential invaders. A 

number of historical examples can be cited, and 

it is a relatively easy story to wrap into nearly 

any world event whether Russia is truly 

threatened or not. As well, in the past there 

were a number of times Russians were not 

aware of an impending attack until it actually 

occurred. The Savior of Europe narrative 

typifies the times Russia has come to the aid of 

wider Europe, and has been the decisive 

element in victory. This is mostly tied to

WWII, and is a ready justification for the 

westward expansion of their influence. The 

Good Czar narrative again harkens back to 

history and advances the ideal that Russia has 

been the strongest under firm leadership, and 

that all Russians will benefit from strong and 

decisive leadership in the end—even if it seems 

harsh and whether or not they specifically agree 

with the leader. Finally, a quick explanation of 

the Russian concept of maskirovka. It is 

sometimes over-simplified as just military 

“denial and deception,” but it tends to go far 

beyond typical military cover, concealment, 

misdirection, and the like. In fact, it is central 

to nearly all Russian political pursuits. It often 

results in what can seem like knee-jerk denials 

and lying in the advancement of political 

interests. Truth is inconsequential when a lie 

can simply be repeated often enough for some 

to believe it, or even to just cause a little doubt 

since misinformation can be used as an 

excellent temporary delaying tactic. The recent 

action in Crimea provides a good example. The 

Russians inserted “rebels” and “humanitarian 

convoys” while continuously denying any part 

in the annexation until after it had been 

completed. The same general principle can be 

observed in play with wider Russian media 

activity. 

While the State media authority does directly 

impact the 1st Tier media, the system does not 

show a direct connection to 2nd Tier media. 

Research provides some insight as to why they 

do not appear to have much of a direct 

relationship. There appears to be a broad 

recognition as to why direct control of the 2nd

Tier (and particularly the Internet) is 

inadvisable. For one, this “relatively free” 

media provides a “safety valve” for opposing 

viewpoints and dissent. Russian authority may 

well prefer zero opposition, but they are 

practical enough to know they don’t want 

revolution to be the first indication they have of 

dissent. Secondly, they have an understanding 

that Internet access is a requirement for a 

Campaigning Spring 2017 16
complex and modern society. And lastly, there 

is a need to maintain a certain external image. 

Namely, they need to be perceived as a relative 

democracy if they wish to continue to be 

included in the G8, Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the 

Council of Europe.8 These three elements are 

all depicted as negative interconnections 

because they inhibit governmental controls. 

The final section of the CLD is the quite 

interesting Troll Army9 “system within a 

system.” While there are actual physical 

locations, manpower, and financial 

expenditures associated with the Russian Troll 

Army, it will be examined here more 

conceptually. First, a definition is in order. A 

troll army consists of people, typically young 

people, who are paid by the State to flood select 

portions of the Internet with pro-government 

information. Sometimes this takes the form of 

a new blog, Facebook or other social media 

posts. Other times it comes in the form of 

comments to those very posts or to other news 

articles and media. It is common to have 

simultaneous, complementary efforts to 

influence both domestic and foreign audiences. 

This is a serious and concerted attempt to shape 

real-life perception via the virtual domain. 

There is every indication that modern use of 

this technique is top-down driven, and that it 

does support a higher propaganda strategy. 

In the CLD, the Troll Army is depicted as being 

surrounded by a reinforcing loop because once 

distortion, innuendo, and conjecture are 

released into the “wild” of the Internet, there is 

no way to remove it and little that can be done 

to control what it may morph into. In this loop, 

the nominal starting point is the introduction of 

the “trolling”10 activity. In this case, trolling

perhaps falls slightly outside of the typical 

slang definition. The Troll Army engages in an 

influence attempt that can be described as 

“State-sponsored Internet sock puppetry.” This 

term describes the use of a false online identity 

to sway online opinion, shift what people think 

of as the dominant viewpoint, or to undermine 

dissent. Following the loop in the CLD, the 

next step is often accomplished through a 

process called “astroturfing.” This is 

essentially the obfuscation of the troll’sidentity 

so that a message can be portrayed as coming 

from the “grassroots.” Continuing on the loop, 

the portrayal of Russian State-sponsored 

information as being spontaneous bottom-up 

information often results in the propagation of 

this material by “useful idiots.” People 

unrelated to the Troll Army that “share” and 

“like” and otherwise spread the information 

across social media and the wider Internet, but 

are blind to the overall goals of the organization 

which originated it. Finally, the loop is closed 

as changes to the wider perspective of the 

Russian government influence further attempts 

by the State to affect the information 

environment leading to changing and 

potentially more effective State-sponsored 

Internet sock puppetry. 

The result of this loop spills out into the 

information environment, and effects an 

international audience, although once released 

into the Internet wilds it is relatively 

uncontrollable. This impact on international 

audiences ideally supports the goal of 

increasing external influence. 

The final link on the CLD to discuss is the 

connection of the Troll Army to 2nd Tier media. 

This relationship is a balancing feedback loop 

as the Troll Army appears to be the State 

Campaigning Spring 2017 17
mechanism to stabilize the uncontrolled 

consequences of a relatively free Internet. The 

Troll Army takes direction from the State 

media authority and then follows it to impact 

and counterbalance the influence of 2nd Tier 

media. To support this goal, the Troll Army 

receives and responds to the activity in the 2nd

Tier closing this loop. Note that this connection 

to the 2nd Tier provides the Troll Army with a 

mechanism to impact Internet news-centric 

Russian citizens and influence them to support 

the regime. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence 

that they do exactly that by high levels of 

activity in community-level websites virtually 

flooding them with nationalist and pro-Putin 

comments. Note that the Troll Army retains a 

higher degree of control over the consequences 

of their internal reinforcing feedback loop 

when the audience is strictly internal. Russian 

data on Russian servers can be effected by the 

State if need be, and there is pressure that can 

be brought to bear if 2nd Tier media seeks to 

take an action in direct opposition to the State, 

such as an attempt to expose the existence and 

operations of the Troll Army. 

Outcome and Leverage Variables

Now that the system is graphically depicted, it 

is possible to garner some valuable information 

about it beginning with the outcome and 

leverage variables. The outcome variable is the 

element that is most impacted by the “flow” of 

the system, and the leverage variable is 

essentially the fulcrum of the system. What 

element, if changed, will exert the most force 

on it? The outcome element of this system 

appears to be “Popular Support for the 

Regime” located to the far right of the CLD. 1st

and 2nd Tier media both connect only to this 

element, and popular support is further 

connected to the Russian narratives; which in 

many ways supersede Russian media in that 

they essentially spring directly from national 

identity. While “Preservation of the State” was 

identified as an element impacted by “Popular 

Support,” that does not seem very useful as an 

outcome element. For one, it is broad and likely 

impacted by a multitude of factors not 

presented in this CLD. For another, 

preservation of the State is very much a 

“redline” for Russia. It would not be advisable 

to advance that point in this paper as even a 

discussion just touching on regime change can 

have strategic implications.

The leverage element in this system is perhaps 

less clear, but seems to be the Russian Troll 

Army. However, this is partly based upon 

global trends not well captured in this CLD. It 

is a relative truism and common knowledge 

that Internet usage is increasing everywhere. A 

logical extrapolation of this results in the 

supposition that 2nd Tier media within Russia 

will gain more prominence, and an increasing 

number of Russians will obtain their news from 

Internet sources bypassing Russian State 

controls over 1st Tier media. Assuming that the 

Russian government allows individuals and the 

media a “degree of freedom” on the Internet to 

provide a safety valve, preserve their external 

image, and maintain access to modern society, 

the primary method to influence this growing 

demographic is through their Troll Army. In 

addition, the Troll Army appears to be the 

primary means to reach out and touch 

international audiences and therefore seems to 

be integral to Russian international influence. 

Global Trends

It is important to recognize that Russia media 

does not exist in a vacuum. There are global 

Campaigning Spring 2017 18
drivers and trends that impact the system in 

ways not depicted in the CLD. Recognizing 

these trends and drivers can deepen our 

understanding of the system by identifying 

these external factors and analyzing their effect 

on Russian media. In a rapidly evolving 

information environment there are many trends 

which affect media. There are also a number of 

trends specific to Russia. These factors were 

taken into consideration and whittled down to 

a “top 10.” 

1. General proliferation of Internet usage

2. Increasing prevalence of social media

3. Emerging use of cyber as an offensive 

instrument of national power 

4. Accelerating technology allowing for 

increased access to information

5. Worsening Russian fiscal situation 

6. Increased Russian political willingness 

to use cyber capability for political gain

7. Russia demonstrating increasing 

expansionist tendencies 

8. Increasing Russian State-control over 

citizenry

9. Worsening U.S./RUS relations 

(possibly subject to change) 

10. Decrease in the importance of TV news 

programming as more people seek 

news from Internet sources 

The global trends above act as exogenous 

variables as they are external factors effecting

the Russian media system. However, there are 

also endogenous variables which should be 

taken into account. These variables are internal 

and inherent to Russia media. There are six 

identified as the most important considerations. 

The top six endogenous variables are: 

1. State-run media’s need to maintain or 

gain budget 

2. Inner circle and State media leadership 

desire to stay in political favor

3. Need to retain and recruit trolls, 

especially those with foreign language 

expertise

4. Potential for unfavorable and 

transparent election results to damage 

regime

5. 2nd Tier media contradiction of 1st Tier 

media reporting

6. Regime willingness to control media if 

that’s what it takes to remain in power 

To take this analysis a little further, let’s 

explore what may drive a specific condition

Russia may seek in the future. Will Russia seek

to shift priority of control from 1st tier media 

towards greater direct control over their 2nd tier 

media? This seems to be a very real possibility 

as a reaction to more Russians beginning to 

consume news and other media from Internet 

sources. Figure 2 depicts this scenario. In the 

center is the possible issue of a Russian 

decision to shift their media control efforts to 

be more Internet centric. Since we have 

identified endogenous and exogenous variables 

at play with Russian media in the above lists, 

we can examine what is supporting or 

inhibiting this condition. 

In Figure 2, the forces working towards this 

state are list on the left, and those working 

against it are on the right. The size of the arrows 

reflects the strength of the force at play, as do 

the numbers (rated on a scale from 1 to10). The 

resulting Force Field Analysis demonstrates 

that the forces working for the change are 

greater and stronger than the forces working 

against it. Most notably, a general proliferation 

of Internet usage and the regime’s strong desire 

to remain in power are pushing towards an 

Campaigning Spring 2017 19
increased Russian control over 2nd Tier media. 

However, there are factors working against 

such a change, the strongest of which are the 

desires of 1st Tier media to retain their budgets 

and power position within the state, the 

difficulty in finding the talent required to allow 

the public access to the Internet while still 

exercising a tight control over content, and the 

Russian need to keep a reasonable relationship 

with the US to maintain trade and diplomatic 

freedom of action. 

To continue the analysis, it’s reasonable to ask 

the question of what would happen if the 

Russian government were to take the step of 

establishing control over 2nd Tier media, to 

include their citizens’ use of the Internet. One 

way to look at this is to create an Implications 

Tree. This analysis places the change at the 

center and branches out to depict first-, secondand third-order effects of this change. As none 

of these effects are guaranteed to occur, each

has its likelihood assessed and recorded as a 

percentage above the directional arrow. In 

addition, each effect is assessed as either 

positive or negative from the U.S. 

perspective. This is depicted as a green oval 

for positive to U.S. policy makers and as a red 

oval for negative. 

Out of the myriad of first-order effects that

could occur, two are examined in Figure 3. Of 

these, one seems uniformly negative from the 

position of the U.S.: Russia successfully uses 

this media control to influence their populace 

to support territorially expansionist national 

policy. A second-order effect of this would be 

to strengthen public support for an increasing 

military buildup with third-order effects of a 

new U.S./RUS arms race or a “use it or lose it” 

mentality; the idea being when two large 

militaries face off, victory goes to the one who

strikes first. Another possible second-order 

effect is that the Russian government uses the 

support for expansion to fuel a drive into 

neighboring territory. Third-order effects to 

this action are proxy wars or increased 

Figure 2.

Campaigning Spring 2017 20
asymmetric attacks to gain more territory at the 

margins as has indeed already occurred in 

Crimea and Georgia. 

A different first-order effect has more potential 

positive outcomes for the U.S., but doesn’t 

seem nearly as likely. Russia could find control 

over 2nd Tier media so difficult that they would 

need to expend so much of their resources on 

internal control that they no longer have the 

time or resources to consider expansionist

policy. A second-order effect to this potential 

reality that seems likely is that it would 

increase cronyism and corruption within 

Russia. The third-order effects are a certain 

increase in wealth and power disparity and a 

less much less certain possibility of popular 

resentment which leads to significant protest

and civil unrest. The latter could be a positive 

outcome for the U.S. as long as it leads to a 

more open society and friendlier U.S./RUS 

relations. A very different potential secondorder effect is that Russian preoccupation with 

internal affairs would lead to increased security 

for Eastern European nations. This would 

almost certainly lead to greater Westernization 

of these countries and increased trade 

opportunities for the U.S.

Working forward from the Implications Tree, 

we can build an Alternative Scenarios Matrix

as shown in Figure 4. This matrix allows us to 

examine two possible environmental changes 

and their potential interaction with each other

to produce a quad chart with four potential

scenarios. This chart can help to remove some 

of the uncertainty within the environment. 

Figure 3.

Campaigning Spring 2017 21
Along the y-axis, we explore varying degrees 

of control over 2nd Tier media that Russia may 

apply. At the top, we have “relatively free.” 

This is the status quo where Russia mostly only 

influences 2nd Tier media with their Troll Army 

efforts. At the bottom is a scenario where 2nd

Tier is tightly controlled and, among other 

things, Russian citizens no longer have Internet

access to free and open information. Along the 

x-axis, the Russian government focuses on 

regime preservation and controlling their 

internal population on the left side, and to the 

right they focus on influencing their population 

to support Russian territorial expansion. This 

creates four possible quadrants. 

 Figure 4.

In the upper left, we have the “March of the 

Trolls.” In this scenario, the open nature of the 

Internet provides the Russian population with a 

multitude of new viewpoints and ideas. The 

State fears the changes that may develop from 

this, but still acknowledges that a modern 

society requires access to information. So, they 

continue (and perhaps increase) their Troll 

Army efforts to counter what they perceive as 

a negative Western influence. People still have 

relatively open access to information, but they 

are very consistently assailed with propaganda 

and sophisticated influence efforts. Many 

Russian citizens feel that they can tell the 

difference and think independently, but they 

are largely mistaken. Troll Army officials gain 

stature and influence as their efforts become a 

central feature of regime preservation.

The upper right quadrant is “Springtime for 

Putin.” In this scenario, Russian influence 

efforts are so effective that Russian citizens 

almost completely on their own begin to 

disregard Western influence streaming over the 

Internet. Russian narratives are so strong, and 

resentment for the West runs so deep, that the 

Troll Army shifts efforts away from internal 

control and focuses extensively on fostering a 

desire to expand Russian territory 

and regain stature in the world. 

Russian leadership would be able to 

plan a number of expansionary 

schemes and expect that the Russian 

population would be willing to 

sacrifice to support them. The regime 

would feel itself to be in the very 

strong position of enjoying popular 

support even if expansion were 

causing what it would doubtless call 

“short-term” deprivation. Hope for a resurgent 

Russia would bloom eternal. 

The bottom left quadrant, “Pravda Reborn,” is 

perhaps the least desirable from the Russian 

standpoint. The Russian government decides to 

exercise strict control over 2nd Tier media, but 

the effort is so consuming that they must focus 

almost exclusively on internal control of their 

population. All information must be approved 

by the State, and penalties for “unofficial 

news” are severe. Russia would be a stark place 

where “informing” on neighbors would be 

common, and no one could be fully trusted. It 

Campaigning Spring 2017 22
seems likely that this sort of system would 

eventually collapse under its own weight, much 

as it did in the recent past in the Soviet Union. 

Before it did collapse, however, it would wreak

a good bit of societal devastation. 

Finally, the bottom right quadrant is “Thunder 

in the West.” In this scenario, the Russian 

government is controlling 2nd Tier media and 

effectively using it to influence popular support 

for the establishment of new Mother Russia. 

The regime would sound a near-continuous 

drumbeat about the great destiny of the Russian 

people and argue for the restoration of the 

territorial lines of the Soviet Union. "Cry 

'Havoc!', and let slip the dogs of war." This 

scenario is certainly quite dangerous for the 

West, even if the threat would likely be nakedly 

obvious. At the least, it would spark a costly 

Cold War and force the U.S. to make some very 

difficult decisions about the defense of Eastern 

Europe. 

Armed with these four scenarios, we can next 

use a Stress Test to examine how policy or 

strategy might be postured to deal with them. 

The purpose of this test is to inform strategic 

thinking by assessing how current U.S. policy 

stacks up against each of these scenarios and 

assesses it as green, amber, or red against each

(Figure 5). In addition, the Stress Test is then 

used to assess how a recommended U.S. policy 

would perform in each of these scenarios

(Figure 6). 

The current U.S. policy with regard to Russian 

use of influence and propaganda is not 

particularly well defined. Mostly, it is centered 

on exposing Russian lies as they occur 

primarily on an ad hoc basis. This is 

accomplished through a combination of press 

releases, statements made at levels as high as 

the POTUS (Strategic Communication), and 

through reliance on free and independent 

(mostly U.S.-based) media reporting. This 

reactive and fairly weak approach can only do 

so much to counter a concerted and practiced 

state-centered apparatus such as Russia’s. 

The policy as it stands would likely satisfy the 

requirements of the Pravda Reborn scenario 

since Russia would be inwardly focused on 

tight informational control of their internal 

population. The U.S. would continue to 

provide truthful information to the 

international community in a non-aggressive 

fashion on the assumption that some of it will 

find its way into Russia and contribute to the

system eventually collapsing under its own 

weight. The effects may be a slower than a 

more aggressive information stance, but would 

likely have an eventual impact.

Similarly, the current U.S. policy would partly 

satisfy the requirements of March of the Trolls. 

In this scenario, U.S. information will certainly 

find its way across the borders into a relatively 

open Russia, but an aggressive Troll Army 

would likely enjoy much success in countering 

it. Still, the Russian government will be 

focused on internal population control and not 

represent a great threat to U.S. interests. One 

can suppose that the evolving nature of the 

Internet and the continuing free flow of 

information would one day result in a 

significantly more liberal and open Russian 

society in this scenario.

Where the current U.S. policy falls short is in 

both instances where the Russian regime uses 

their media capabilities to focus on expansion, 

whether they keep their 2nd Tier media 

relatively free or not. In both Springtime for 

Putin and Thunder in the West, U.S. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 23
information policy can do little to affect a 

growing desire towards nationalism and 

expansion. The U.S. approach is simply too 

weak to impact a message which is predicated 

on strength, whether the Russian message is 

spread through the Troll Army or through strict 

governmental media controls. In these 

scenarios, the U.S. would be forced to rely on 

other means of national power to veer the

Russian government from this dangerous 

course. 

Figure 5.

Given the relative weakness of current U.S. 

information policy as it pertains to countering 

Russian influence, there are several changes 

worth considering. First, the U.S. should 

establish a United States Information 

Department (USID) in order to fully recognize 

and manage the “I” element of national power 

(DIME). A blueprint of sorts for this does exist 

in the form of the largely defunct or 

marginalized shell of the former U.S. 

Information Agency (USIA) which existed 

between 1953 and 1999. Before being 

subsumed into the Department of State, the 

USIA can be said to have had a key role in 

ending the Cold War on terms very favorable 

to the U.S. I advocate resurrecting the 

organization and elevating leadership to a 

Secretary-level position. Second, the U.S. 

should establish a more aggressive information 

posture. There are significant levels of cyber, 

social media, and traditional media expertise 

resident in the U.S. that could be used to 

accomplish information-related objectives in 

ways that they are currently not. The newly 

established USID would be the perfect vehicle 

to channel this expertise. Lastly, clearer and 

more enduring strategic communication would 

help to focus information efforts more 

effectively. Currently, strategic 

communication is very often gleaned from 

Presidential speeches and the like, and is quite

dependent on the personality of whoever is 

elected POTUS - as well as their experiences 

while growing into the office. Information 

policy can shift rapidly and be relatively 

uncertain year in and year out. Contrast this 

with the relative steadiness of U.S. military 

programs and policy and one can see how 

information-related systems stand out as much

less consistent than other vital national 

considerations. 

As shown in in Figure 6, these recommended 

policy changes are postulated to result in a 

more effective response to potential Russian 

information activities. They would fully satisfy 

the requirements under March of the Trolls and 

Pravda Reborn as properly focused (and 

funded) U.S. media expertise will prove to be 

more than a match for Russian efforts. It is 

quite reasonable to believe that Russian 

resources would be overmatched in these

scenarios. However, the revised policy is less 

likely to be fully effective when the Russian 

government focuses their efforts on 

encouraging an expansionist Russia, such as in 

the Springtime for Putin and Thunder in the 

West scenarios. The reasoning behind this 

assessment is that the power of the cultural 

Russian narratives runs too deep for U.S. 

influence to fully convince Russian citizens. 

However, it is likely that there can be enough 

doubt placed into the public consciousness that

Campaigning Spring 2017 24
Russia can perhaps be swayed from taking the 

most dangerous road, especially after 

diplomatic, military, and economic pressures 

are applied.

 Figure 6.

In summary, the Russian media system is 

complex but understandable. Their control of 

more traditional media is strong, but they have 

a considerably softer touch with less traditional 

media, the Internet media in particular. The two 

tier system this creates produces something of 

a gap in the “2nd Tier” of their influence efforts 

that they fill by use of a Troll Army. With this 

capability, they augment the influence over 

internal audiences they exert with “1st Tier” 

media and also reach out to external audiences. 

This system was depicted by a Casual Loop 

Diagram (CLD) that was then used as the 

starting point for identifying Global Trends

and Endogenous Variables, factors which 

effect the system but aren’t necessarily pictured 

in the CLD. Both these internal and external 

variables were incorporated into a Force Field 

Analysis to examine the possibility of a 

Russian decision to apply their media control 

ethic to include 2nd Tier media. This, in turn, 

informed an Implications Tree that analyzed 

potential first-, second-, and third-order effects 

of this possibility as well as determining their 

probability and impact on U.S. policy and 

strategy. The Implications Tree served as the 

basis for an Alternative Scenarios Matrix

which laid out four possible futures based upon 

a Russian decision of level of control of 2nd

Tier, and to what use they turn their influence 

efforts. And finally, these scenarios were 

examined through the lens of current and 

proposed US policy, and subjected to a Stress 

Test. 

In the overall findings, it appears that the 

central reason for the Russian media control 

system (or the outcome element) is “Popular 

Support for the Regime,” and the most versatile 

and potentially powerful tool they have to 

effect this (the leverage element) is the 

“Russian Troll Army.” Exogenous and 

endogenous trends are currently pushing the 

Russian government towards the step of 

exerting direct government control over their 

2nd Tier media with implications that are likely 

to be bad for the U.S., Russian citizens, and the 

wider European community. In four possible

future scenarios envisioned, current US policy 

is generally inadequate in addressing them. To 

more fully address the strategic environment 

foreseen by this analysis, a revised U.S. 

information policy is needed. This policy 

should feature the establishment of a United 

States Information Department, a more 

aggressive information posture, and clearer and 

enduring strategic communication. 

Author Biography. 

Major Robert P. Farrell, USA, is an Information 

Operations Planner at U.S. Strategic Command. He is a 

graduate of Miami University, and commissioned from 

Officer Candidate School in Fort Benning, GA in 2001. 

He began his military career in the Air Defense 

Artillery serving as a Platoon Leader, Executive Officer 

and Battery Commander with several PATRIOT units 

in Germany. Upon selection to the Information 

Operations functional area, he served as a planner in the 

Fourth Infantry Division in Fort Carson, CO and

attended Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 

California earning a Master of Science in Joint 

Information Operations. MAJ Farrell has deployed to

Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM, 

and NEW DAWN.

Campaigning Spring 2017 25
1 Siddique, Haroon, McCarthy, Tom, and Yuhas, Alan, 

“Crimean parliament seizure inflames RussianUkrainian tensions – live,” The Guardian, February 27, 

2014, accessed December 7, 2016, 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/ukrain

e-pro-russian-gunmen-seize-crimea-parliament-liveupdates#block-530f715ae4b04289b0526a22 2 Weisburd, Andrew, Watts, Clint, and Berger, JM, 

“Trolling for Trump: How Russia Is Trying to Destroy 

Our Democracy,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 

2016, accessed December 7, 2016, 

http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trumphow-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-our-democracy/ 3 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland 

Security and Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence on Election Security, October 7, 2016, 

accessed December 7, 2016, 

https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statementdepartment-homeland-security-and-office-directornational

4 McGreal, Chris, “Vladimir Putin’s ‘misinformation’ 

offensive prompts US to deploy its cold war 

propaganda tools,” The Guardian, April 25, 2015, 

accessed December 7, 2016, 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/25/usset-to-revive-propaganda-war-as-putin-pr-machineundermines-baltic-states

5 Dunn, J. A. (2014). Lottizzazione Russian Style: 

Russia's Two-tier Media System. Europe-Asia Studies,

66(9), 1425-1451. doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.956441

6 Note that better identification and system mapping of 

this authority is desirable, but beyond the scope of this 

work.

7 See footnote 2. A worthy study, but well beyond the 

current scope of this paper.

8 Russia seems to prefer to view itself as a “guided 

democracy.” A fact I only include because that’s just a 

great turn of phrase, isn’t it?

9 The web brigades, also known in English media as 

the troll army, are state-sponsored anonymous Internet

political commentators and trolls linked to Russian 

government. (Source of definition: Wikipedia: 06 NOV 

16)

10 In Internet slang, a troll is a person who sows discord 

on the Internet by starting arguments or upsetting 

people, by posting inflammatory, extraneous, or offtopic messages in an online community with the 

deliberate intent of provoking readers into 

an emotional response or of otherwise disrupting 

normal on-topic discussion. (Source of definition: 

Wikipedia: 06 NOV 16)

 

Campaigning Spring 2017 26
The Role of Innovation Cells in 

DoD Innovation

by

CDR James Darkenwald, LCDR Christopher Casne, 

and MAJ Trevor Voelkel

During the conflict, losses by the enemy were 

unsustainable - their heavy armored vehicles 

were no match for our ingenuity, field 

expediency, and the creativity of our footsoldiers. My ground commanders quickly 

and efficiently engineered a field expedient 

solution to defeat the enemy’s armored 

threat. Identification of the issue to an 

engineered solution took a mere 30 days to 

get the new explosive charge to the front 

lines. Not only did the charges make it to the 

front lines quickly but exportable training 

packages were also distributed and 

implemented across my entire areas of 

control. Within three to four months, 90% of 

the battlespace had the capability to defeat 

the enemy’s armored and dismounted 

threats. Industry was able to produce up to 

8,000 explosive devices per year with the 

average cost of around $250 per unit. The 

average cost of the enemy's armored vehicles 

ranged between $500,000 and $1,500,000 

and took exponentially more time to produce.

Unfortunately, the above story is not a 

vignette of a successful U.S. Department of 

Defense (DoD) acquisition and innovation 

process—this is a story from the perspective 

of the Taliban in Afghanistan based on actual 

experiences by U.S. Commanders. The 

Taliban were able to quickly identify the 

strength of the Coalition forces and were 

innovative in finding a way to counter it 

utilizing the now infamous improvised 

explosive device (IED).

How can the U.S. Joint Force transform ideas 

from thought to implementation as quickly as 

our adversaries? What organizations do they 

turn to if they have ideas? If there is an 

organization or command that can receive 

their ideas? Do they have the means to 

implement them? Although still a relatively 

small sample size, specialized innovation 

cells have quickly proven successful in 

driving innovation throughout the DoD. The 

Department’s culture, contracting timelines, 

and the typical hierarchal organizational 

structure has proven ineffective in quickly 

adapting to our adversary. Highlighting this 

is the fact that from 2001 to 2011 the Defense 

Department spent over $46 billion on a dozen 

weapons systems that never even entered 

production. That is more money than the 

combined annual budgets of NASA, the FBI, 

and the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID). 

Currently, there is a clear focus on innovation 

at the very top of the DoD. Former Defense 

Secretary (SecDef) Chuck Hagel announced 

in November 2014 the Defense Innovative 

Initiative (DII) and with it, the “3rd Offset 

Strategy.” This initiative was described by 

Hagel “... as an ambitious, department wide 

effort to identify and invest in innovative 

ways to sustain and advance America’s 

military dominance for the 21st 

century.”1Additionally, former Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey said 

in 2013, “...we need to expand our concept of 

Campaigning Spring 2017 27
what innovation means. Innovation is about 

new stuff and new ideas. We must prioritize 

innovation not only in our material solutions, 

but also in our warfighting concepts, 

organizational constructs, and 

relationships.”2

From its inception, the DoD has been at the 

cutting edge of innovation; however, recent 

conflicts have proven that the Department’s 

construct is too slow to effectively adjust to 

an ever-changing adversary. This innovation 

gap is due primarily to the DoD’s 

cumbersome acquisition process and large 

bureaucracy. For the Department to get back 

to its roots of out innovating its enemy, it 

must find an effective way to drive impactful 

change through innovation without 

fundamentally changing its time-tested 

construct. The DoD’s current signature 

innovation project, Defense Innovation UnitExperimental 2.0 attempts to do exactly that 

and therefore deserves further study. 

Additionally, innovation cell examples are 

sprouting up throughout the DoD with solid 

results and thought provoking lessons 

learned. The United States European 

Command (EUCOM) Rapid Innovation Cell 

(ERIC) and the Chief of Naval Operations’ 

Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) are two such 

innovation cells that require further 

evaluation. In a time of ever-tightening 

budgets and increasingly innovative 

adversaries, the DoD can no longer rely on its 

18th Century construct and 20th Century 

acquisition process to drive innovation from 

within. The employment of specialized 

innovations cells spread throughout every 

facet of the DoD would drive innovation 

within the U.S. Joint Force and potentially 

lower ever increasing acquisition costs and 

timelines.

DoD Innovation 

When former SecDef Hagel announced DII 

he was hoping the program would launch the 

department into a game changing “3rd Offset 

Strategy.” An offset strategy is nothing more 

than a strategy which seeks to leverage the 

U.S.’ innovative strength to counter an 

adversary’s strength. The first two U.S. 

offset strategies came in the 1950s and 1970s, 

respectively. The 1st offset strategy launched 

during the beginning of the Cold War as the 

U.S. and NATO sought advantages over the 

Soviet Union to offset their enormous 

conventional strength. The 1950s saw the 

Soviet Union able to bring to bear 192 

divisions in a conventional war.3 It was 

impossible for the alliance to match that 

conventional strength so they sought to offset 

that by developing their nuclear arsenal. Not 

just by sheer numbers, the U.S. looked to its 

advantage of reliable and technologically 

superior weaponry and delivery systems. 

This nuclear deterrence would counter the 

Soviet Union until the 1970s when they 

began to reach parity with the U.S.4

The 2nd Offset Strategy examined how the 

U.S. could counter Russia’s nuclear arsenal 

while still addressing the large Soviet troop 

strength. The idea that was born was to utilize 

conventional munitions with a zero-miss 

probability. From this simple idea, Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) was given the mission to 

determine how to defeat the Soviet’s large 

formations with a “deep attack.” This was a 

Campaigning Spring 2017 28
true example of innovation from both a 

technology and organizational perspective. 

The Russians (in the early 1980s) surmised

that these precision conventional munitions 

would achieve the same destructive effects 

(as tactical nuclear weapons) and thus the 

U.S. effectively offset the Russian strengths 

while requiring them to spend enormous 

amounts of capital on countering the U.S. 

advantages—effectively ending the Cold 

War by bankrupting the Russians. 

The 2nd Offset Strategy helped produce new 

technologies such as the Global Positioning 

System (GPS), precision munitions, 

intelligence/surveillance and reconnaissance 

platforms, and new delivery systems (stealth) 

with global reach. This highly successful 

strategy provided decisive operational 

advantage for almost four decades. The 

DoD’s current advantages are beginning to 

dissipate as more and more nation, nonnation states, and terrorist organizations gain 

similar advantages with the increasing pace 

of technology proliferation.

5

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter built on 

Hagel’s vision by providing further support 

of the 3rd Offset Strategy with $3.6 billion 

toward the FY 2017 Defense Budget.6 One of 

the largest differences between the 3rd Offset 

Strategy and the previous two is that it is not 

aligned against a single known actor (Figure 

1). As Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert 

Work stated, this strategy is focused on 

“...multiple potential competitors, from small 

regional states like North Korea and Iran, to 

large advanced states like Russia and China, 

to non-state adversaries and actors with 

advanced capabilities.”7 This new strategy 

must be flexible, creative and agile to succeed 

in today’s world. The DoD must combine 

future technology with innovative 

operational concepts to create an advantage 

over our future adversaries. The luxury of 

choosing one specific strategy focused on 

deterring or defeating one adversary is no 

longer a reality. Innovative agility will be a 

cornerstone of future success by the DoD. 

Figure 1. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 29
Defense Innovation Unit- Experimental 

(DIUx)

Realizing the vital need for innovation within 

the DoD, Secretary Carter announced the 

creation of the Defense Innovation UnitExperimental (DIUx) in April 2015 in Silicon 

Valley. 

The mission of DIUx is as follows: 

“As our name implies, DIUx is just that: an 

“experiment.” We continuously iterate on 

how best to identify, contract, and prototype 

novel innovations through sources 

traditionally not available to the Department 

of Defense, with the ultimate goal of 

accelerating technology into the hands of the 

men and women in uniform.”

DIUx scouts emerging and breakthrough 

technologies and builds direct relationships 

to DoD.8 Since its inception, it has 

undergone significant adaptations and 

growth. Most notably, it opened new offices 

in Boston in July 2016 and Austin in 

September 2016. Prior to these openings, 

Secretary Carter noticed DIUx was not fully 

meeting his intent and potential; 

consequently, he changed the operating 

concept by introducing DIUx 2.0 in May of 

2016. Version 2.0 included a consolidated 

reporting structure, with DIUx reporting 

directly to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, and a leadership team comprised of 

partners with experience in technology, 

strategy, business and management.9

Despite being in operation for just 18 months, 

DIUx has awarded more than $36 million in 

contracts to both small and large companies 

focusing on innovative solutions to the

department’s most vexing challenges. DIUx 

most notable contract thus far is a $12.6 

million “high speed drone” to work alongside 

the Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

Smaller contracts include a $153K headworn stimulation system contract that 

theoretically can increase the brain’s natural 

ability to adapt to training. To date, DIUx has 

realized a 66% cost savings and 50% time 

savings over typical DoD research, design, 

and acquisition processes.10

EUCOM Rapid Innovation Cell

The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 

Rapid Innovation Cell (ERIC) was 

established in December 2015 by the 

EUCOM Deputy Commander (DCOM), 

Lieutenant General William Garrett, in an 

effort to spur innovation within the 

command. A re-emerging threat from Russia, 

immigration crises, and ever-present terrorist 

activity within the EUCOM area of 

operations (AO) requires an innovative 

culture when the status quo is no longer 

acceptable. With the overall goal of creating 

a culture of innovation at the combatant 

command, the ERIC was established to “get 

after” innovation from within and cultivate it 

throughout. 

ERIC’s slogan is that it “provides a forum to 

make the Joint Force better through powerful 

ideas, unique solutions, and intellectual 

courage.”11 The group consists of a collection 

of individuals from multiple disciplines 

within the EUCOM Headquarters staff. A 

mix of officers and enlisted personnel from 

Campaigning Spring 2017 30
each of EUCOM’s core directorates 

(Administration, Intelligence, Operations, 

Logistics, Future Plans, Communication, and 

Legislative Affairs), the ERIC is a directed 

collateral duty for the team’s six to eight 

personnel. The intention behind the team’s 

construct is to ensure innovation is 

interwoven into the day to day business of 

EUCOM, vice a primary duty where the 

ERIC personnel would possibly be viewed as 

outsiders trying to push innovation on those 

that “work for a living.” 

The two initial goals for the ERIC are 1) to 

establish a simple, easy to understand 

submission and idea selection process and 2) 

partner with industry to establish important 

private/public relations and learn from the 

way private industry incorporates innovation 

into its business models. The ERIC focuses 

on innovations that have Joint Force impacts 

and ideally will make EUCOM more 

efficient and effective as a combatant 

command; however, all ideas (no matter how 

big or how small) are welcome. 

Construct of the ERIC submission and idea 

selection process were modeled off of a 

combination of current and former military 

innovation cells as well as what that the team 

noted from their experience partnering with 

industry. The main purpose of the construct 

was to make it easy to understand and 

fair/impartial to implement (see Figure 2. 

ERIC Submission and Selection Process). 

Figure 2. 

Once per quarter the group hosts a selection 

forum for the top ideas that were submitted 

for that particular quarter. The innovation 

submission owners of those top ideas are 

brought to EUCOM Headquarters to brief the 

DCOM and ERIC team in a relaxed 

environment. Presenters are given the

flexibility to present in any way that they 

choose with PowerPoint (i.e. the DoD’s “go 

to” briefing platform) as the least preferred 

option. Ideally, once innovations are selected 

and granted ERIC approval, they are then 

cultivated by the idea originator (i.e. 

“owner”) as well as an assigned ERIC team 

member. The long-term goal is to incorporate 

each selected innovation into an existing 

program of record with a sustainable funding 

source. ERIC has received over 60 innovative 

submissions in the cell’s first year of 

existence, eight of which have been selected 

for cultivation and resourcing. The most 

notable that has been implemented thus far by 

the ERIC is the automated EUCOM morning 

update brief that pulls data from existing 

sources (instead of manual entry) and 

therefore saves an average of 40 man hours 

per week. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 31
Chief of Naval Operations’ Rapid Innovation 

Cell (CRIC)

Founded by the CNO in 2012, the CRIC was 

established to “provide junior leaders with an 

opportunity to identify and rapidly field 

emerging technologies that address the 

Navy's most pressing challenges” of being a 

Force that requires massive monetary 

investment to greatly increase combat 

effectiveness.12 The CRIC capitalized on the 

unique perspective and familiarity that junior 

leaders possess regarding modern warfare, 

revolutionary ideas, and disruptive 

technologies. The CRIC’s primary missions 

were to rapidly bring new concepts and 

technologies into the Navy and to build a 

culture of innovation within the Navy. For 

the first mission, the CRIC was very 

successful; the success of the second mission 

is undetermined as the CRIC was 

disestablished in the spring of 2016 due to 

funding impacts. 

In only three years, the CRIC brought 

additive manufacturing to ships, highlighted 

augmented reality in the workplace, and used 

data analytics and machine learning in new 

ways to drastically reduce the time and cost 

of integrating systems of maintaining 

aircraft. The CRIC enabled the 

reprioritization of over $1 billion in Navy 

investment during its three year lifespan at 

minimal cost to the U.S. taxpayers; however, 

the CRIC was established in the middle of 

sequestration as a special project and as a 

result faced an uphill climb from the start.

Consequently, the CRIC was disestablished 

in 2016 in a likely congressional attempt to 

take a firm stand against unnecessary 

spending. 

Innovation Cell Lessons Learned

The lessons learned by DoD Innovation Cells 

in general and the ERIC through the 

program’s first year of existence have been 

numerous. Outside of leadership buy-in 

(which is required for innovation to succeed 

at any level), the innovation cell lessons 

learned can be broken down into five broad 

categories; speed, DoD mindset change, 

private/public partnering, dedicated 

innovation funding, and information 

operations (IO). 

Speed

The iterative process from identifying a 

problem to producing a viable solution isn’t 

easy. Combine the normal challenges with 

the complex DoD acquisition process and 

hierarchal structure and you face some 

serious headwinds when trying to innovate. 

Several years can pass from the time it takes 

to develop a concept, present it to the right 

government agency, create a project, and 

make a contract award.

13 For example, the 

process of conceiving of a new project at 

DARPA, getting it approved and funded, and 

then selecting and awarding contracts, will 

typically take two years.14 The humbling fact 

is that DARPA is considered one of the 

“faster” organizations at navigating this 

process by DoD standards. These same 

challenges are experienced by all levels of 

government, to include the innovation cells 

that were put in place to help “speed” things 

up. It became quickly apparent, to teams like 

Campaigning Spring 2017 32
the ERIC, that changes at higher levels of 

government were needed if the innovative 

ideas and solutions were to succeed beyond 

the concept phase. 

A good example of how DoD is trying to 

adapt to the constraints of the acquisition 

cycle is the NAVY Program Executive Office 

Enterprise Information System- Innovation 

Cell (IC). This innovation cell is an example 

of how an enterprise, NAVY PEO (Program 

Executive Office), has made an attempt to 

bridge the gap between industry innovation 

and Navy Enterprise I.T. acquisition. Tying 

together the pull of ideas (i.e., problems, 

solutions) to the means of funding is critical 

to making innovation work. Navy PEO is 

attempting to deliver a fundamental change 

in how the Navy acquires technology. As the 

speed characteristic of industry innovation is 

helping drive the DoD to modify acquisition 

cycles, this innovation cell is attempting to 

lead the Navy’s charge into the commercially 

available technology arena by delivering 

technology and acquisition insight to Navy 

programs as a whole.15 The cell is working 

closely with Program Management Offices 

(PMOs), and Industry, to help drive timely, 

innovative solutions for enterprise-wide 

needs. New approaches like these and other 

innovative ways of working within the 

constraints of our current system are needed 

if DoD stands a chance at winning the battle 

against time. 

DoD Mindset Change

“Even though it can be counterproductive to 

an efficient operation and cost the 

organization time and money, radical 

innovation development is the best way to 

introduce the significantly different products 

and services.”16 Radical innovation requires 

significant risk of failure. For innovation to 

truly thrive, the fear of failure must be 

eliminated within an organization...in fact, 

innovation and failure are synonymous. For 

companies like Apple and Google, failure is 

just part of their business model; for the DoD 

failure is, many times, not an option. 

The ERIC quickly realized that many of their 

innovations were doomed for failure shortly 

after they were selected for cultivation—

explaining this failure to senior leaders 

proved very challenging. If innovation is to 

truly thrive within the DoD, the acceptance of 

innovative failure is critical. Leadership sets 

the climate within the DoD and innovation 

can only thrive if creativity is encouraged, 

trust is established and the fear of trying new 

things is minimized. WD40 was given its 

name (Water Displacement 40) because the 

mixture failed the first 39 times it was 

attempted...this amazingly innovative 

product now accounts for annual sales of over 

$350M.17

There are certainly areas within the DoD 

where failure is still not an option. Innovation 

happens to not be one of those areas. Leaders 

at all levels within the department must 

understand this dichotomy for innovation to

truly thrive. 

Innovation faces DoD cultural challenges, 

which will manifest themselves well into the 

future. Some of the cultural challenges are 

basic to the way DoD organizations are 

structured. The typical stove-piped 

Campaigning Spring 2017 33
hierarchical construct doesn’t always allow 

for the quick communication and action 

needed for innovation to succeed. Depending 

on where you sit, there are many barriers that 

create challenges moving up and down in the 

organization. It only gets worse when you 

take into account the challenge of trying to 

“cross” organizations. 

Private/Public Partnering

DoD innovation has been reliant on a strong 

public/private partnership for many years. 

The ERIC realized this pivotal link early on 

and therefore quickly established partnering 

opportunities with Adidas, DaimlerChrysler, 

IBM and many other large successful 

companies within Germany (i.e. the location 

of EUCOM HQ). The two main takeaways 

from these experiences were that 1) 

innovation must become part of the DNA of 

an organization, it cannot be forced or 

coerced, and 2) private industry isn’t afraid to 

take chances on big ideas if the potential is 

there. Whereas the DoD innovates 

incrementally within its existing products and 

services, private industry leadership often 

times encourages “more radical innovation in 

the organization so they can remain 

competitive”.18 

Partnerships are only as strong as the efforts 

by both parties to strengthen and cultivate the 

relationship. The ERIC team quickly realized 

that private industry is infinitely more 

flexible and adaptable than the DoD at taking 

on a new partner. Innovation cells must think 

differently (within the confines of what’s 

legally and morally allowable) to ensure that 

these pivotal private industry relationships 

are cultivated and co-beneficial in nature. 

Working together with private industry is 

absolutely key to long term success of DoD 

innovation. With its private industry 

construct, DIUx is greatly increasing the 

acceptance of this practice and breaking 

down barriers that previously existed 

between private industry and the DoD...this 

may well prove to the future of Federal 

government innovation. 

Dedicated Innovation Funding

Although dedicated funding proved to be the 

undoing for the CRIC, mandating direct 

access to funding is critical to success of DoD

innovation cells. Many of the innovative 

ideas the ERIC cultivated over the past year 

were stalled due to lack of funding and/or a 

program of record. The conflict to fund 

innovation arises when sound and logical 

business decisions do not take into account

the “possibilities” for adopting radical 

innovations.19 Leaders must make funding 

innovation a priority. Either a set-a-side 

source of money needs to be established for 

innovative ideas at an organization level or 

the Defense Acquisition community must 

create a flexible acquisition process for 

quick, small procurements tied to innovation. 

These acquisition vehicles already exist for 

organizations such as USAID that typically 

cannot wait for the contract vetting process; 

however, innovation cells do not have the 

authorities in place to utilize them. 

The second portion of funding that should be 

addressed for a DoD innovation cell to 

succeed is to have at least one full-time 

person dedicated to the cell. Although 

Campaigning Spring 2017 34
keeping innovation internal to each 

directorate/department at a combatant 

command is important, there must still be one 

person that focuses on innovation on a full 

time basis. Collateral duties are a priority 

only until the full time job gets busy.

SecDef Ashton Carter providing further 

support of the 3rd Offset Strategy with $3.6 

billion toward the FY 2017 Defense Budget 

and establishing DIUx will hopefully lead to 

direct funding for other innovation groups 

and efforts. Establishing flexible acquisition 

vehicles and learning from the CRIC’s 

mistake of making innovation a line item 

budget item will be key to realizing this 

essential goal. 

Information Operations (i.e. advertising)

Like all businesses and government 

departments, results matter. Consequently, 

effectively advertising successes is pivotal to 

long-term success of innovation cells. 

Innovation cells must use all means 

necessary (e.g., social media, radio, 

newspapers, TV, etc.) to tell the story of who 

they are, what they have done, and how they 

are going to make the Joint force better. 

The ERIC utilized Super Bowl TV 

commercials as a way of introducing the 

organization to the broader Europe DoD 

audience. By mid-March, over 20 innovation 

submissions had been received. With the 

exception of the ERIC’s Super Bowl 

commercials, the most significant event for 

the innovation cell was an Unmanned Aerial 

System (UAS) demonstration showcased for 

the EUCOM directors. The event started with 

approximately 10 people and grew to well 

over 50 people within the first hour. The 

number and type of off-shoot ideas that 

occurred as a result of this simple event 

demonstrated that a large part of creating an 

innovative culture is simply allowing an 

environment where creative convergences 

can occur. 

Although “rapid” is the second word of the 

acronym ERIC, making changes (even 

obvious ones) in a timely manner has proven 

to be a major challenge. The DoD needs to, 

as CNO Adm. John Richardson said, “fail 

often, fail early." The 3rd Offset Strategy calls 

for rapid prototyping and experimentation to 

help deliver breakthroughs in key areas. 

However, before the DoD can approach rapid 

prototyping and experimentation, the 

Department needs a clear and enduring way 

to target key problems, establish partnerships 

with industry, and develop the processes and 

policies to gather and select potential 

solutions to those problems--quickly! 

Way Forward 

Too often the aforementioned acquisition 

methodology and bureaucratic processes of 

the DoD proves too costly and slow to 

provide the warfighter the product they 

require when they require it. The DoD has 

some of the brightest minds in the world and 

specialized innovation cells can be utilized 

as a way to harness (i.e., crowdsource) all of 

their creative talent and ideas. To be 

effective, DoD needs to take into account 

the above lessons learned and the experience 

gleaned from these specialized innovation 

cells and related organizations that have 

Campaigning Spring 2017 35
made headway in furthering innovation 

within the DoD. Key challenges can be 

overcome by keeping in mind some specific 

ideas. 

Bring forward problems and solutions 

quickly. Cultural and organizational 

structure problems are natural 

impediments. This is why these beacons 

of innovation like DIUx, ERIC, CRIC, 

and NAVY PEO-EIS excel. At their most 

basic level, these cells provide the ways, 

through a dedicated process, to highlight 

issues and help champion solutions to the 

subject matter experts and organizations 

that can carry them forward. One of the 

key advantages to these innovation cells 

is that they sit outside of the typical stovepiped DoD bureaucratic structures. This 

construct allows them to reach up and 

down, and across enterprises. This quick 

communication provides a rapid way to 

“cross-pollinate” ideas and problems that 

would otherwise be unknown to those 

outside of the small nucleus within the 

organization where the problem, or 

solution, resides. 

Provide the means to execute. If 

innovation is important, DoD leadership 

needs not only to support these 

innovation cells organizationally but 

monetarily, too. These cells have been 

relatively inexpensive, but their impact 

has been shown to provide a very high 

level of “return on investment.” It is 

essential that DoD sustain existing cells, 

encourage new ones, and develop 

established pathways for information to 

flow within the inter- and intraorganizational networks and critical 

outside sources of innovation. It is 

increasingly difficult for organizations to 

argue to maintain these innovation cells 

in an environment of shrinking personnel, 

resources, and funding. Supporting these 

innovation cells that help generate the 

ideas is crucial so that the rapid 

prototyping and experimentation can take 

place in organizations downstream. 

Partner with industry. The experiment 

known as DIUx has taken on a big role in 

bringing DoD and industry together. The 

individual cells have also shown initiative 

in bringing together industry. However, 

this shouldn’t be left as an “experiment” 

only. This level of engagement should be 

a normal way of doing business and it 

should be coordinated. Further expansion 

and coordination amongst innovation 

cells and industry is required to help 

leverage this engagement. DIUx and 

other innovation cells should actively 

support conferences, innovation-jams, 

and other engagements to bring together 

DoD personnel and industry experts to 

help learn from each other and leverage 

various backgrounds and perspectives to 

tackle problems facing each side. As the 

level of awareness of DoD issues begins 

to circulate amongst the innovation 

network, further refinement and 

coordination on topics discussed will help 

drive thought and problem solving to 

where innovation is most needed. Proper 

execution will act as a force multiplier to 

what is already being accomplished

within DoD. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 36
Communicate the process. If someone 

has an idea, we need to be consistent and 

effective at communicating who they can 

turn to. At the very minimum DoD needs 

to provide a “road map” of the network 

that links commands, enterprises, and 

other organizations to these innovation 

cells and other nodes within the network. 

People need to know where they can 

plug-in if they have an idea or solution. 

Showing the linkages to not only the 

innovation cells, but between likeminded organizations like Science and 

Technology departments and DoD’s 

Rapid Reaction Technology Office are 

some examples of how we can leverage 

potential sources of knowledge and help. 

Again, the goal is to identify the problem 

and solution quickly! To do this, 

everyone needs to know how they fit 

inside the network and who they need to 

contact.

Taking into account the above ideas, the 

graphic below (Figure 2) shows a notional 

relationship between the key players in DoD 

innovation, specialized innovation cells, 

industry, and the centers of innovation 

within DoD.

By relying on traditional culture, structure, 

and processes, the DoD risks falling victim to 

the tyranny of time and a bureaucracy that is

not supportive, efficient, or geared toward 

rapid innovation. Even more troubling, if the 

DoD creates these initiatives/cells and then 

allows them to “fail,” the end effect for U.S. 

Forces is a clear signal that innovation isn’t 

truly valued (the CRIC disestablishment is a 

clear example of this lack of foresight). 

Conclusion 

The DoD faces a growing set of innovative

adversaries that are not waiting for the U.S. 

Figure 3.

Campaigning Spring 2017 37
to catch up, do not use the same rulebook, 

often do not wear uniforms, and in some 

cases, can conduct an act of war from their 

couch. Their ability to be nimble and skirt the 

ethical and moral values the U.S. defends 

only compounds the risk. To compete in the 

rapidly changing battlespace with evertightening budgets, the DoD must change the 

way it approaches innovation. It must backup high level innovation talk by aggressively 

supporting initiatives such as specialized 

innovation cells. If sustained and 

empowered, innovation cells can set 

conditions to quickly turn the Department’s 

disadvantages of cumbersome acquisition 

processes and its bureaucratic construct into 

a “game changing” advantage by leveraging 

the ideas of the department’s immensely 

1 Pellerin, Cheryl. 2014. Defense.gov. November 15. 

Accessed October 15, 2016. 

http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603658

. 

2 Dempsey, Martin. 2013. "From the Chairman: 

Sustaining Our Edge." Joint Forces Quarterly 4-5. 3 Bitzinger, Richard. Assessing the Conventional 

Balance in Europe, 1945-1975. Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 1989. 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2859.html.

4 Work, Robert. "The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and 

Its Implications for Partners and Allies." Center for a 

New American Security Conference. Willard Hotel, 

Washington D.C. 28 Jan. 2015. Speech.

5 Walton, Timothy A. 2016. "Securing the Third 

Offset Strategy." JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 82: 

6-15. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost 

(accessed October 16, 2016).

6 Aaron Mehta, “Defense Department Budget: $18B 

Over FYDP for Third Offset,” Defense News, 

February 9, 2016

7 Work, Robert. "The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and 

Its Implications for Partners and Allies." Center for a 

New American Security Conference. Willard Hotel, 

Washington D.C. 28 Jan. 2015. Speech. 8 CARTER SEEKS TECH-SECTOR 

PARTNERSHIPS FOR INNOVATION." States 

News Service 23 Apr. 2015. Biography in Context. 

Web. 16 Oct. 2016.

talented and innovative workforce. Success 

of the 3rd Offset Strategy and resultant 

continued U.S. military dominance in the 21st

Century may very well depend upon it. 

Author Biographies

MAJ Voelkel is currently assigned to U.S. European 

Command as a Joint Counterterrorism Planner in the 

J3X Special Operations Branch.

CDR James Darkenwald is currently assigned to 

USEUCOM as the head, naval strength plans in the J1 

directorate and was recently selected to lead the 

Director’s Action Group (DAG) for the USEUCOM 

J1.

LCDR Chris Casne is currently assigned as a staff 

officer in EUCOM.

9 Ferdinando, Lisa. 2016. "Defense.gov." DIUxofficial-working-at-speed-of-business-to-bring-techto-warfighters. October 13. Accessed October 16, 

2016. 

http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/973315

/DIUx-official-working-at-speed-of-business-tobring-tech-to-warfighters. 10 Mehta, Aaron. 2016. "Defensenews.com." DIUx 

Offers $36 million in FY16 Contracts. October 14. 

Accessed October 18, 2016. 

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/diux-offers-36-

million-in-fy-16-contracts. 11 https://www.eucom.mil/medialibrary/photo/35159/eucom-rapid-innovation-cellfinal-approval 12 CHIPS Magazine. 2015. "CNO's Rapid Innovation 

Cell." January 27. Accessed October 16, 

2016. 

http://www.doncio.navy.mil/%28m4jrto45tn

pm4b45jxmngz3v%29/CHIPS/ArticleDetail

s.aspx?id=5896. 

13 Hugh Montgomery, Bureaucratic Nirvana 

(Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute Press, 2013)

14 http://www.potomacinstitute.org/steps/featuredarticles/83-department-of-defenses-innovationexperiment

15

http://www.secnav.navy.mil/innovation/inncell/Pages

/default.aspx

 

Campaigning Spring 2017 38
 

16 “Managing for Innovation: Reducing the Fear of 

Failure” Alan Kuyatt University of Maryland, 

University College, Journal of Strategic Leadership. 

Vol. 3 Iss. 2, Winter 2011, pp. 31-40. 17 Wd40. 2016. Wd40 Company. November 6. 

Accessed November 6, 2016.

http://www.wd40company.com/about/history/. 

18 Desouza, K. C., Dombrowski, C., Awazu, Y., 

Baloh, P., Papagari, S., Jha, S., & Kim, J. (2009). 

Crafting organizational innovation processes. 

Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice, 11(1), 

6-33. 

19 Mumford, M. D., & Licuanan, B. (2004). Leading 

for innovation: Conclusions, issues, and directions. 

The Leadership Quarterly, 15(1), 163-171.

Campaigning Spring 2017 39
Applying the Clausewitzian Trinity 

to Assess and Defeat Violent 

Extremist Organizations: A Case 

Study on ISIS.

by

CAPT Michael Baze, COL Lisa Whittaker, Lt Col 

Stanley Searcy, and CDR Frankie Clark, 

Note: The Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) known as Daesh, 

Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), Islamic State in Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL), and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will 

be referred to as ISIS for the purposes of this paper.

Introduction

The retaking of Ramadi by U.S. trained Iraqi 

forces in 2015 was viewed by many as 

confirmation of the U.S. approach to 

defeating ISIS. By that time, ISIS had lost up 

to 40 percent of its holdings in Iraq and 10 

percent in Syria. Coalition attacks on ISIS’ 

financial resources were hindering its 

sustainment efforts and ISIS’s battlefield 

losses included up to 20,000 fighters since 

2014.1 To many, it appeared as though the 

U.S. and its coalition partners were winning 

the fight. 

Despite such reversals, ISIS continued to be 

very much alive at the operational and 

strategic levels. In 2016, White House 

officials acknowledged ISIS forces could still 

be over 25,000, suggesting ISIS recruiting 

efforts were overcoming battlefield losses. 

ISIS forces still controlled key locations 

throughout the Euphrates River Valley, 

Sunni Arab tribal regions in eastern Syria and 

western Iraq, and power bases in Mosul and 

Raqqa.2 ISIS’ campaign had grown from a 

regional effort to one that was global in 

scope; with affiliates emerging in locations 

from Palestine to Afghanistan, the Arabian 

Peninsula, and African states.3 Through highproduction social media campaigns, ISIS’ 

message resonated with a small but 

dangerous minority of Muslims worldwide.4 

This uneven record of progress raises 

questions about the long-term efficacy of the 

U.S. strategy against ISIS. As the campaign 

to retake Mosul is ongoing, ISIS’ 

organization, methods, and policies through 

the lens of the Clausewitzian Trinity (people, 

government and military) model are 

examined. A very important question to 

answer is: Is ISIS a state? At the risk of 

providing legitimacy to ISIS by 

acknowledging its status as a state, it is 

important to answer this question to better 

understand how to defeat it. If ISIS is a state, 

the application of the Clausewitzian Trinity 

model can provide useful tools to developing 

an effective whole of government strategy 

against it. This review suggests the relevance 

of this approach in combatting ISIS moving 

forward and highlights that the key to ISIS’ 

survival has been its ability to assume the role 

of a state for disenfranchised Sunni 

communities in Iraq and Syria. 

Background

ISIS originated in 1999 under the leadership 

of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who established 

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).5 Under Zarqawi, 

AQI executed several high-profile attacks 

that gained global notoriety. What first 

appeared to be typical, localized terrorist 

attacks, proved to be a larger plan by Zarqawi 

to draw the U.S. military and AQI into a 

protracted war; the ultimate goal being to end 

U.S. “imperialism” in the Middle East. The 

assumption by U.S. senior strategic 

leadership that the Arab community would 

Campaigning Spring 2017 40
embrace a U.S. presence in the Middle East 

[following the Iraq invasion] proved grossly 

inaccurate. In reality, the U.S. presence in 

Iraq served as a catalyst to unite AQI. 

Ousting the Saddam Hussein regime and 

dismantling the Iraqi military had the 

unintended consequence of bolstering 

recruitment for violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) united against a 

perceived U.S. occupation. AQI set out to 

defeat the U.S. in an Afghan-style war and 

create an Islamic Principality, or Emirate in 

Iraq.6

AQI achieved significant headway toward its 

goals by exploiting sectarian strife between 

Sunni populations and Shia leadership.7 This 

served the dual purpose of undermining U.S. 

and partner legitimacy while increasing AQI 

recruitment. AQI’s efforts were facilitated by 

the sectarian nature of the al-Maliki 

government. Following the Anbar 

Awakening, and subsequent withdrawal of 

U.S. “surge” forces, al-Maliki reneged on 

most of the assurances made to the Sunni 

populations for fair treatment in a new Iraq. 

Iraqi Sunnis found themselves increasingly 

abused and disenfranchised by the newly 

formed democratic and Shia-led government. 

Perceiving U.S. abandonment and betrayal 

by al-Maliki, many Sunnis subsequently 

looked to self-preservation and shifted their 

allegiance to the very insurgents they were 

fighting previously. This pattern of 

disenfranchisement became a recurring 

theme as AQI morphed into ISIS. 

Zarqawi was killed in 2006 during a U.S. 

bombing mission, but AQI did not fall apart. 

His successor, Abu Omar al-Bagdadi, was 

killed in 2010; giving rise to a new leader, 

Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, who expanded the 

Islamist fight into Syria.8 Syria was already 

embroiled in civil war between Shia and 

Sunni elements of the population; thus ripe 

for ISIS. In Syria, ISIS continued to train, 

recruit, and strengthen the organization. 

Today ISIS enjoys a highly sophisticated 

level of organization, complete with 

ministers to perform government functions.9

ISIS has recruited former Iraqi military 

service members, leveraging their experience 

and professional expertise. It has used social 

media to recruit record numbers worldwide. 

ISIS also organized to finance and resource 

its claimed territories, solidifying their 

governance in parts of Iraq and Syria. Using 

revenue from oil fields in ISIS controlled 

areas and proceeds from the sale of 

antiquities, it has accumulated assets rivaling 

the GDP of many smaller nations.10 Is ISIS a 

state? Assessing it against the Clausewitzian 

Trinity model will provide the answer. 

Clausewitzian Trinity as a Model to Study 

ISIS 

In On War, Clausewitz presents three 

invariable characteristics to the nature of war: 

(1) violence, hatred and animosity, (2) 

probability and chance, and (3) reason.11

“War is, therefore, not only a true 

chameleon, because it changes its 

nature in some degree in each 

particular case, but it is also, as a 

whole, in relation to the predominant 

tendencies which are in it, a 

wonderful trinity, composed of the 

original violence of its elements, 

hatred and animosity, which may be 

looked upon as blind instinct; of the 

Campaigning Spring 2017 41
play of probabilities and chance, 

which make it a free activity of the 

soul; and of the subordinate nature of 

a political instrument, by which it 

belongs purely to reason.” 

While these characteristics persist, their 

degree and intensity vary by means of the 

agents that Clausewitz chose to represent the 

wonderful trinity of war (people, army and 

government).

“The first (violence, hatred and 

animosity) of these three phases 

concerns more the people; the second 

(probabilities and chance) more the 

general and his army; the third 

(reason) more the Government...”12

The consistently changing world requires 

strategists who can adapt to provide plans 

that not only ensure the right wars are fought, 

but that they are fought effectively. 

Clausewitz provided a means for framing a 

war by examining the changing nature of 

these agents. Once it is clear where along the 

spectrum a conflict lies, as well as the 

relationships among those agents, it becomes 

possible for the strategist to identify the 

adversary’s motivations (ends) and tailor 

ways and means for their defeat. By 

demonstrating how all of the agents are used 

to show the Trinity exist within ISIS, it 

becomes possible to understand how 

Clausewitz’ model may be applied (See 

Figure 1).

13

Figure 1.

People 

Clausewitz often used the words people, 

community and nation interchangeably

(Figure 1). In most cases he seemed to refer 

to a larger community or nation when he 

mentioned “character of the people or 

state.14 Therefore, it is also reasonable to 

substitute the word nation in place of people. 

From here it is necessary to describe the 

characteristics of a nation, and establish 

whether or not members of ISIS share those 

traits.

A state has four distinguishing features that 

uniquely define it: population, territory, 

government and sovereignty.15 Contrary to 

the state, whose population may consist of 

several ethnicities, a nation is a group of 

people sharing the same ethnic background. 

That is, a nation shares a common culture, 

religion and language. While a state must 

have a territory with defined borders, a nation 

may spread across states. An example is the 

Kurdish nation, which extends across Iraq, 

Turkey, Iran and Syria.16 Another example is 

ISIS, which has now expanded across Iraq, 

Campaigning Spring 2017 42
Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi 

Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and 

Russia.17 

Sovereignty is the one factor that delineates a 

state from a nation. While a nation can exist 

with or without a state, a state cannot exist 

without sovereignty. An example of a nation 

with a state is Quebec; under the sovereignty 

of Canada.18 The Kurdish Nation and the 

Nation of Islam are illustrations of nations 

without states and which spread over more 

than one country.19 Sovereignty is the feature 

that enables a state to enter into agreements, 

pacts and covenants with other states. The 

nature of sovereignty is also the one aspect 

that makes a nation more enduring than a 

state, especially when the nation no longer 

identifies with the state that is supposed to 

represent them.20

In order for the people who make up ISIS to 

be categorized as a nation they have to share 

common ethnicity (culture, religion, 

language). The Center for Advanced 

Research on Language Acquisition has 

defined culture as: 

“The shared patterns of behaviors 

and interactions, cognitive 

constructs, and affective 

understanding that are learned 

through a process of socialization. 

These shared patterns identify the 

members of a culture group while 

also distinguishing those of another 

group.”21

The day-to-day living habits, style of dress, 

dietary practices, religious rituals, gender 

roles, and relationships between men and 

women in the aggregate reveal a common 

culture that distinguishes ISIS members from 

other groups. 

ISIS members are Sunni fundamentalist that 

share the same ideological branch of 

Wahhabism. Doctrinally, they strictly adhere 

to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, 

and reject philosophies of more liberal 

Muslims. They believe strongly that religion 

plays a prominent role across the spectrum of 

life—private, public and political. This 

includes the application of Sharia as the law 

of the people under the governance of a 

caliphate. Given that the official language of 

Iraqi and Syrian Muslims is Arabic it is 

reasonable to assert that the majority of ISIS’ 

members speak Arabic; thus having a 

common language. However, it should be 

pointed out that worldwide there are 1.57 

billion Muslims spread across 200 countries 

with approximately 90 percent being Sunni.22

Some of these non-Arabic speaking recruits 

serve ISIS as foreign fighters.

When the Ottoman Empire fell in 1922, the 

first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal 

Ataturk, abolished the last Sunni caliphate 

that had been in existence for five hundred 

years. Restoring the caliphate has been a 

zealous ambition of groups such as the 

Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and ISIS.23

Furthermore, ISIS believes they have been 

blessed by God and will reestablish the 

caliphate globally.24 It is evident that 

members of ISIS share a culture, religion, and 

language that readily distinguishes them as a 

nation. Moreover they identify with, and are 

bonded by, their collective desire for a global 

caliphate. Thus, ISIS satisfies the “people” 

criteria of the Clausewitzian Trinity. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 43
Military

The purpose of a military is to defend the 

sovereignty of the state, protect the citizens, 

and compel an adversary to submit to the 

government’s will. The military employs 

armed forces providing the means to conduct 

war. War is not the ends, but rather the ways 

for achieving the national interests of a 

country.25 Clausewitz asserted that “war is 

not merely an act of policy but a true political 

instrument, a continuation of political 

intercourse, carried on with other means.”26 

The aim of a military is to achieve the 

political purposes of the government. This 

requires a competent and skilled commander 

who is able to control his forces. Clausewitz 

emphasized this when he wrote, “A prince or 

a general can best demonstrate his genius by 

managing a campaign exactly to suit his 

objectives and his resources, doing neither 

too much nor too little.”27 The commander’s 

success in battle is also contingent on having 

a professional, disciplined and unified 

military force.28

Clausewitz believed strongly that the 

government should be the authority for 

establishing state policy, and should control 

the military. He also believed that 

government should determine how large its 

military should be. Furthermore, he 

considered it the responsibility of 

government to resource the military.29 

To substantiate whether or not ISIS has a 

legitimate military as defined above, several 

questions need to be answered. As a starting 

point, analysts should ask if ISIS has: 

• A military subordinate to civilian 

leadership?

• Civilian leadership able to 

direct/control its armed forces?

• A military strategy?

• A professional armed force?

• Weaponry and resources needed to 

conduct war and sustain a military 

force long-term?

• The ability to use its armed forces as 

a political instrument?

• Armed forces capable of

seizing/holding territory?

• A record of success in combat?

• Members in its armed forces that have 

committed war crimes?

A thoughtful analysis will help strategists 

develop plans to permanently defeat ISIS’ 

military. ISIS is led by a civilian-soldier, 

Baghdadi, with a loyal following of Sunni 

soldiers. However, ISIS governance seems 

to lie somewhere between an illegitimate 

caliphate and a military junta led by an 

authoritarian. This is likely not the civilianled military Clausewitz envisioned. Left 

unchecked, this could be a vulnerability for 

ISIS, especially if the armed forces are used 

against other Sunni Muslims in a way that 

violates Islamic law.

ISIS does have a calculated military strategy 

that aligns with its overall goal of 

establishing a global caliphate.30 The basic 

lines of effort of this strategy are to:

• Cultivate a professional officer corps.

• Develop a capable armed force.

• Provoke Shia to commit atrocities 

against Sunni; thereby motivating 

Sunnis to unite. 

• Attrite military opponents’ 

capabilities and morale. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 44
A deliberate effort to analyze how aligned 

ISIS’ principle goals are with its military 

strategy may prove beneficial in identifying 

strategies to defeat ISIS.

ISIS has a fighting force of approximately 

30,000 soldiers, with about 90 percent from 

Arab countries and 10 percent from Western 

countries.31,32 ISIS has managed to enlist 

over a thousand mid-to senior level 

commanders with considerable combat 

experience. Moreover, Baghdadi’s deputies 

were ousted senior officers in the Iraqi 

military.33 ISIS has accrued a substantial 

cache of weapons with a significant portion 

being U.S. weapons abandoned by the Iraqi 

army as well as other weapons captured 

during fighting in Iraq and Syria.34 

ISIS has a functioning and capable military

and its leadership is subordinate to a civilian 

authority. ISIS is utilizing its military to 

achieve political goals and its military has a 

strategy aligned with those political goals. Its 

military leadership and forces are competent, 

experienced, well equipped and financed, and 

have a proven track record. The military arm 

of ISIS satisfies the “military” criteria of the 

Clausewitzian Trinity model.

Government 

Clausewitz asserted the role of government is 

protecting its sovereignty while meeting the 

needs and welfare of the people. According 

to Thomas B. Hartman, governments consist 

of people who establish, administer and 

enforce policy, and preside over and protect 

the sovereignty of their country.35 He further 

stated the five functions of government are 

to: (1) provide national defense, (2) maintain 

domestic security, (3) administer economic 

policy, (4) deliver essential services, and (5) 

provide for the social welfare.36 

By having a strong military a government is 

able to protect both the sovereignty of the 

state and the nation. Through a legal system 

that includes politicians to establish laws and 

regulations, a police to enforce its laws and 

deter crime, and a military to quell 

insurgencies, governments are able to 

maintain civil order and protect their people. 

Governments generate revenue by setting 

fiscal policy, collecting taxes, printing and 

coining money, and regulating international 

trade policy, which enables financing of 

military and police forces, public works 

projects, and social welfare programs. 

Another crucial function of government is to 

provide essential services, such as affordable 

food, clean water, and sanitation systems. If 

such vital resources are restricted or 

unavailable the people will suffer and may 

turn against the government. In addition to 

essential services a state’s population often 

relies on the social welfare provided by the 

government, such as public education, 

healthcare, disease prevention, roads, 

transportation, and public broadcast systems. 

Depending on the type of government and 

character of its leaders, resources and 

services may or may not be equitably 

distributed. This unequal distribution is 

because what matters to the state is control of 

power and legitimacy. It relies on a loyal, law 

abiding populace. What matters most to the 

people is that they have security, essential 

services, and an economy that enables them 

to earn a living. If these needs are not met, or 

if government abuses its authority, the people 

may rebel. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 45
“On June 29, 2014, (days after taking control 

of Mosul, Iraq)...ISIS spokesman...Abu 

Muhammad al-Adnani announced the 

restoration of the caliphate under the 

leadership of...Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 

Adnani declared the group would henceforth 

be known as the Islamic State (IS) and 

Baghdadi as “Caliph Ibrahim.”37 ISIS had 

brazenly announced to the international 

community that they had established a 

unified federal Islamic government for the 

Muslim world. But is their proclamation 

credible? 

By the time ISIS had taken control of Mosul, 

ISIS managed to steal over two billion dollars 

(USD) giving it assets on par with many 

small nations, and making it arguably the 

wealthiest non-state terrorist group in the 

world.38 By 2016 ISIS’ military forces had 

succeeded in capturing 56,400 square miles 

of territory. This success, coupled with 

effective information operations, enabled 

ISIS to expand its influence and gain 

legitimacy among Sunni Muslims; even 

while facing international condemnation for 

its atrocities. Unlike prior VEOs, ISIS has 

seized tremendous power and territory in a 

very short period of time. The question now 

is will ISIS be able to secure the borders of 

the land it has captured? If so, will it have the 

resources needed to continue carrying out the 

governing functions of a sovereign state? 

By virtue of its military triumphs alone, one 

might argue that ISIS’ military is able to 

provide for its own “national” defense. 

“Domestic” security has been enabled by a 

robust system of territorial rules and practices 

under Sharia Law and enforced by security 

forces. Furthermore, ISIS has accrued 

significant revenue sources from oil, gas, 

agriculture, cotton, water, and electricity that 

enable it to support a robust economic 

policy—including provision of essential 

services and social welfare to ISIS 

members.39 With such resources, ISIS 

provides the key functions expected of a 

government and therefore satisfies the 

“government” criteria of the Clausewitzian 

Trinity.

ISIS has met the criteria of statehood under 

the three arms of the Clausewitzian Trinity 

model. If one chooses to accept ISIS as a 

“state” as outlined here, the next question is 

how does the U.S. apply this understanding 

to deal with ISIS in the future? 

Combatting ISIS

In 2006, tribes in Iraq’s Anbar Province 

turned against an AQI led insurgency. This 

“Awakening” worked for a time because it 

lacked a sectarian perspective (Sunni tribes 

fought Sunni insurgents) and was initially 

endorsed by the Shia-dominated government. 

The synergy between people, military, and 

government legitimized the effort. Although 

undone in 2009 as al-Maliki took a sectarian 

path, the effort demonstrated possibilities for 

undermining ISIS in future operations.40 

In 2014, the U.S. had few options in 

responding to the rapid advance of ISIS in 

northern Iraq and the surge was over. A key 

element of U.S. strategy to train and equip 

Iraqis to fight for themselves faltered as 

security forces dissolved amid ISIS 

advances. Sunni partners from the 

Awakening period no longer trusted the U.S.

or the Shia-dominated Iraqi government as 

many Sunnis joined ISIS. Further 

Campaigning Spring 2017 46
aggravating sectarian tensions, the only 

forces truly capable of engaging ISIS were 

the Iranian-backed, Shia Popular 

Mobilization Units (PMUs).41 In this 

environment, ISIS seized on the opportunity 

and assumed the role of Sunni protector. As 

Charles Lister notes: 

“Since its first days of operational 

existence in Iraq in 2003...IS has 

sought to engender and exploit chaos 

by rupturing foundational social 

fabrics, especially inter-sectarian 

trust and cooperation. The 

preeminent role of a largely Shia 

force [PMUs] – whose leaders 

include commanders designated as 

international terrorists by the U.S. 

government—in combating a Sunni 

extremist organization on Sunni 

territory is unlikely to heal existing 

societal rifts or to defeat the sectarian 

dynamics that IS has encouraged and 

fed off in Iraq for so many years.”42

ISIS’ successes in Iraq coincided with 

dramatic gains in Syria and with equally 

dramatic human consequences. The theme of 

damaged and dysfunctional relations 

between a government and its people were 

repeated. Weis and Hassan assert that 

sectarianism long predated the current 

conflict and is key to understanding the 

failure of U.S. and coalition attempts to 

defeat ISIS. There are clear indicators that the 

al-Assad government not only failed to 

address the interests of a majority Sunni 

population, but instead has encouraged 

sectarian tensions to solidify his regime’s 

power and legitimacy in the eyes of the 

international community.43 “This 

sectarianism was carefully manufactured by 

Assad from the get-go as a tool of his 

suppression,” stated Shiraz Maher, an expert 

on radicalization at King’s College London. 

“This was the original line, and it 

tried to do two things. First, peel off 

the rest of Syria from the Sunnis who 

were rebelling so that Alawite or 

Christian dissidents wouldn’t join the 

uprising...Second, provoke concern 

in the international community about 

what is taking place—namely, the 

minorities [Alawites] were all going 

to be slaughtered by terrorists [Sunni 

population].”44 

Against such a background, it is extremely 

difficult to imagine a future Syria where alAssad’s leadership will be viewed as 

legitimate by the majority Sunni population. 

Lister argues the key to ISIS’s defeat in Syria 

ultimately rests with the predominantly Sunni 

insurgency as the only recognized legitimate 

resistance. As with the Sunni Awakening, 

this effort saw gains against ISIS in 2013 and 

2014 in areas such as western Aleppo. The 

effort has been stymied, however, due to 

simultaneous pressures on the insurgents to 

fight the Syrian regime that is heavily 

supported by Iran. Exacerbating this 

challenge is the U.S.’s unreliability as a 

partner as it struggles to determine which 

insurgents to back, and given prior links 

between many “moderate” Sunni insurgents 

and terrorists’ organizations.45

Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria have at times 

been poised to deliver decisive blows to ISIS. 

However, tensions between Kurdish forces 

and Sunni militias, coupled with the larger 

Campaigning Spring 2017 47
competition between Kurdish militias and the 

Turkish government, limit possibilities.46 

Conclusions

U.S. and partner efforts against ISIS in both 

Iraq and Syria have been hindered by a 

fundamental disconnect between the people 

and central governments and the people and 

militaries. In the parlance of the 

Clausewitzian Trinity, ISIS has effectively 

filled the gaps by becoming the state for 

many disenfranchised Sunni populations. 

Lister asserts the driving force behind ISIS’ 

survival has not been embracement of their 

extreme ideology by affected populations, 

but rather: 

“In both Syria and Iraq, IS presents 

itself as both an army and an 

alternative “state” to defend against 

and replace repressive or failed 

political systems perceived as 

oppressive to Sunni Muslims...it has 

been this socio-politically focused 

image that has been most effective at 

securing IS the kind of roots into 

sectors of society that provide the 

potential for long-term survival.”47 

This view suggests that direct U.S. and 

partner military actions and attempts at 

counter-narratives can only go so far until the 

underlying roots of grievances that help 

legitimize ISIS’ role as a functioning state are 

addressed. U.S. actions in Mosul and beyond 

must strive to undermine this key pillar of 

ISIS’ strength by bolstering the legitimacy of 

affected governments in the eyes of their

people. In practical terms this means America

must sustain pressure on Iraqi leadership to 

include Sunni elements in power sharing, 

governance and military ventures. Supportive 

of this effort, there is a need to reduce the 

influence of Iranian-backed forces in Iraq. A 

way ahead in Syria along these lines may be 

untenable without regime change. 

ISIS has survived thus far by understanding 

the principles Clausewitz laid down as well 

or better than the U.S. and coalition partners 

have. It has established a government, a 

robust military, and people over which it 

governs—meeting the criteria of the 

Clausewitzian Trinity. In the future, 

application of the Clausewitzian model can 

help provide a useful framework for

analyzing strengths and vulnerabilities while 

informing more effective, whole-ofgovernment approaches to turning the tide 

against ISIS and similar extremists groups. 

Author Biographies

Captain Wayne Baze, USN. CAPT Baze is currently 

assigned as the Director of Aviation Warfare 

Distribution (PERS-43) at Navy Personnel Command 

in Millington, Tennessee. He graduated from Rice 

University in 1989 with a BA in Biology, and was 

commissioned in 1990 through AOCS. He also earned

a Masters in National Security Affairs from the Naval 

Postgraduate School in 2001. Prior to his current 

assignment, CAPT Baze served as Commanding 

Officer of the USS AMERICA (LHA 6).

Colonel Lisa D. Whittaker, USA. COL Whittaker is 

currently serving as a technical advisor in the United 

States Army Cyber Command. She was commissioned 

through the United States Military Academy at West 

Point. COL Whittaker earned a BS in Operations 

Research from the United States Military Academy 

and an MBA in Information Security from James 

Madison University. Prior to her current assignment, 

COL Whittaker served as an Army War College 

Fellow.

Campaigning Spring 2017 48
Lieutenant Colonel Stanley M. Searcy, USAF. Lt Col 

Searcy is currently serving as a joint counter WMD 

planner for the US Strategic Command’s Standing 

Joint Force Headquarters - Elimination. He received a 

direct commission through the Air Force Medical 

Services as a Bioenvironmental Engineer. Lt Col 

Searcy graduated from Oregon State University with a 

BS in Chemical Engineering, and has earned an MS in 

Paper Science from the University of Washington, an 

MA in International Relations from the University of 

Oklahoma, and an MS in Medical Physics from the 

University of Florida. Prior to his current assignment, 

Lt Col Searcy served as the commander of the 27th 

Special Operations Aerospace Medicine Squadron at 

Cannon AFB, New Mexico.

1 Thompson, M., & Malsin, J. (2016). War on ISIS 

update: Two steps forward, one step back. Time, 

187(6), 16-17. 2 Ibid, 16-17. 3 Ibid, 16-17. 4 Ibid, 16-17. 5 Solomon, H. (2016). Islamic State and the Coming 

Global Confrontation. London, UK: Palgrave 

Macmillan Publishing, 1.

6 Nance, M. W. (2016). Defeating ISIS: Who They 

Are, How They Fight, What They Believe. New 

York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 14.

7 Kirk, M., Wiser, M., Gilmore, J. (2016). The Secret 

History of ISIS. (Online Video). PBS Frontline.

8 Nance, M. W. (2016). Defeating ISIS: Who They 

Are, How They Fight, What They Believe. New 

York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 19.

9 Ibid, 24.

10 Sekulow, J. (2014). Rise of ISIS: A Threat We 

Can’t Ignore. New York, NY: Howard Books, 24-25, 

40.

11Clausewitz, C. (2009). On War: The Classic Book 

of Military Strategy - Translated from the original 

German by Colonel J.J. Graham. Military Strategy 

Books. Kindle edition, 13-14. 12 Clausewitz, C. (2009). On War: The Classic Book 

of Military Strategy - Translated from the original 

German by Colonel J.J. Graham. Military Strategy 

Books. Kindle edition, 13-14. 13 Diorio, D. (2016). The Implementation of 

Governance to Counter Islamist Militancy in 

Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkwa Province. Walden 

University, PowerPoint Presentation Slide 7.

14 Clausewitz, C. (2009). On War: The Classic Book 

of Military Strategy - Translated from the original 

German by Colonel J.J. Graham. Military Strategy 

Books. Kindle edition, 140, 197, 226.

Commander Frankie J. Clark, USN. CDR Clark 

detached from the OPNAV Staff as the Deputy 

Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval 

Operations at the Pentagon in Washington, DC. He 

was commissioned through ROTC at Morehouse 

College in 1995. CDR Clark earned a BS in Computer 

Science from Morris Brown College in 1995, a MS in 

Systems Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate 

School in 2000, and a MS in Strategic Studies from the 

Naval War College in 2010. Once he graduates from 

the Joint Forces Staff College he will take command 

of the Afloat Training Group (ATG) Mayport in 

Mayport, FL.

15 Global Policy Forum. What is a State? GPF Online 

https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/whatis-a-state.html (accessed October 15, 2016), 1. 16 Kountz, C., and Long, R. The Kurds: Nation 

Without a State. Harvard Political Review Online.

17 De Luce, D., and Hickey, C. Mapping the Spread 

of the ISIS Plague. Foreign Policy Online. 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/02/mapping-thespread-of-the-isis-plague/ (accessed October 15, 

2016), 1.

18 Guibernau, M. (2004). Anthony D. Smith on 

nations and national identity: a critical assessment. 

Nations and Nationalism, Vol.10 (1/2), ASEN, 132.

19 Kountz, C., and Long, R. The Kurds: Nation 

Without a State. Harvard Political Review Online.

20 Guibernau, M. (2004). Anthony D. Smith on 

nations and national identity: a critical assessment. 

Nations and Nationalism, Vol.10 (1/2), ASEN, 132-

135. 21 The Center for Advance Research on Language 

Acquisition Online. What is Culture? Minneapolis, 

MN. University of Minnesota. 

http://carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html 

(accessed October 21, 2016).

22 Pew Research Center Online – Religion and Public 

Life. Mapping the Global Muslim Population. (2009). 

http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-theglobal-muslim-population/ (accessed October 21, 

2016).

23 Sekulow, J., Sekulow, J., Ash, R., and French, D. 

(2014). Rise of ISIS – A Threat We Can’t Ignore. 

New York, NY. Howard Books, 19.

24 Speckhard, A. (2014). End Times Brewing: An 

Apocalyptic View on al-Baghdadi's Declaration of a 

Caliphate in Iraq and the Flow.

 

Campaigning Spring 2017 49
 

25 Clausewitz, C. (1984). On War – Edited and 

Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 

Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 75.

26 Ibid, 87. 27 Ibid, 177. 28 Ibid, 189.

29 Ibid, 195. 30 Lister, C. (2015). Islamic State – A Brief 

Introduction. Washington D.C. Brookings Institution 

Press, 26-35. 31 Ibid, 26. 32 Jewish Business News Online. (2014). The Main 

Characteristics of ISIS and Its Military Campaign 

(Part 2). Israel. The Meir Amit Intelligence and 

Terrorism Information Center. 

http://jewishbusinessnews.com/2014/12/04/the-maincharacteristics-of-isis-and-its-military-campaign-part2/ (accessed October 13, 2016).

33 Lister, C. (2015). Islamic State – A Brief 

Introduction. Washington D.C. Brookings Institution 

Press, 35.

34 Sekulow, J., Sekulow, J., Ash, R., and French, D. 

(2014). Rise of ISIS – A Threat We Can’t Ignore. 

New York, NY. Howard Books, 40-41. 35 Government.BusinessDictionary.com.WebFinance, 

Inc. 

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/govern

ment.html (accessed: October 16, 2016).

36 Hartmann, T. Government. Grolier Multimedia 

Encyclopedia. Grolier Online 

http://gme.grolier.com/article?assetid=0123980-0 

(accessed October 16, 2016).

37 Lister, C. (2015). Islamic State – A Brief 

Introduction. Washington D.C. Brookings Institution 

Press, 2.

38 International Monetary Fund. World Economic 

Outlook Database Online. 

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/we

odata/index.aspx (accessed October 14, 2016).

39 Lister, C. (2015). Islamic State – A Brief 

Introduction. Washington D.C. Brookings Institution 

Press, 38, 67.

40 Weiss, M., & Hassan, H. (2015). ISIS: Inside the 

army of terror New York, NY: Regan Arts, ©2015; 

First Regan Arts paperback edition. Chapter 5.

41 Ibid, 16. 42 Thompson, M., & Malsin, J. (2016). War on ISIS 

update: Two steps forward, one step back. Time, 

187(6), 16-17. 43 Thompson, M., & Malsin, J. (2016). War on ISIS 

update: Two steps forward, one step back. Time, 

187(6), 16-17. 44 Ibid, 16-17. 45 Ibid, 16-17. 46 Ibid, 16-17. 47 Ibid, 16-17.

Campaigning Spring 2017 50
Truthfulness, Trust, and the 

Practice of Military Deception

by

LTC John W. Bauer, Ph.D.

The U.S. military has a practical interest in 

the virtue of truthfulness, one of the 

character traits contributing directly to trust. 

Virtues, according to Aristotle, are moral 

excellences, a reflection of socially-praised

patterns of praiseworthy behavior. In other 

words, the virtues are the names we give for 

good moral habits. Virtues are inherently 

opposed to vicious acts, acts that are morally 

impermissible and that, because of our 

human tendency to habituate our actions, 

often develop into vices. The vicious acts 

that are always contrary to the virtue of 

truthfulness are lying and perfidy, both of 

which have the potential to be used 

instrumentally to accomplish military 

deception. If lying and perfidy are inherently 

un-virtuous, then it seems that such acts 

must always be avoided, even toward one’s 

enemies in war.

At the same time, military doctrine 

emphasizes the fundamental need to deceive 

one’s enemies in war. This is because 

successful military strategy lends itself to 

the concealment of intentions, misdirection, 

and other forms of deception. For this 

reason, military commanders regularly 

employ feints and simulated attacks to hide 

their actual intentions from their adversary, 

use camouflage and other techniques to 

mask their true location, or engage in 

concealment and surprise to ambush 

unsuspecting foes. Some might suggest that 

these tactics generate false beliefs, and, like 

lies, are necessarily in conflict with the 

virtue of truthfulness. Can these two ideas–

military deception and truthfulness–

seemingly in conflict with each other, be 

reconciled?

This essay suggests that it is not only 

possible to reconcile the two, but that they 

should be reconciled, and that this can be 

done in a systematic and principled way. 

Otherwise, the fundamental values of our 

profession risk being inconsistent. Part of 

this entails a strict adherence to the rules 

against lying and perfidy, rules reflected, to 

some extent, in the international law of war. 

It also requires a coherent understanding of 

what constitutes a lie, which is conceptually 

equivalent to perfidy, since both lies and 

perfidy are at their very essence acts of bad 

faith.

Truthfulness and the Rule Against Lying 

and Perfidy

One major reason the U.S. military values 

the virtue of truthfulness as both a moral 

excellence and a habit of desirable behavior 

is because truthfulness builds trust. If a 

country does not trust its military or if 

professionals within a military organization 

do not trust each other, the institution itself 

risks being dysfunctional. Without trust, a 

citizenry is likely to doubt whether its 

military will properly and reliably defend 

them; without trust, the necessary elements 

that underlie an effective fighting force, 

such as unit cohesion, obedience to orders, 

the willingness to make personal sacrifice, 

risk being imperiled. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 51
For this reason, trust and the need to build 

trust is not only emphasized in current U.S. 

military doctrine, it has been placed centerstage. Army doctrine refers to trust as the 

‘bedrock’ of the Army profession, and joint 

doctrine goes so far as to suggest that ‘trust’ 

is the principal reason why military 

professionals should act ethically and 

morally.

1

 Following this thinking, former 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN 

Martin Dempsey argues that military 

professionals must uphold the values that 

underpin our profession for the sake of 

building trust.

2 These values are the ‘joint 

values’ of the Armed Forces of the United 

States: duty, honor, courage, integrity, and 

selfless service. Two of these (honor and 

integrity) directly relate to truthfulness.3

The relationship between honor and 

integrity as values and truthfulness as a 

virtue is woven into the etymology of the 

two former terms. Honor takes its roots from 

the Latin term honos, which in the classical 

sense conveyed a sense of moral 

respectability. This is evident in the 

meaning of its adjective derivative, 

honestus, a word used to describe those who 

are morally upright, respected, or honest. It 

is from this term that the English words 

honest and honesty originate–an origin 

suggesting the ancients believed truthfulness 

served as the foundation for all honorable 

conduct and, in turn, all morally respectable 

behavior. 

Similar to honor, integrity also suggests 

strict adherence to a set of moral principles. 

One of these principles, because of its 

inseparable connection to moral 

respectability in general, is truthfulness. 

Taken from the Latin integer, meaning 

whole or one, the term integrity implies 

moral whole-ness. When communication 

and agreements are involved, this wholeness 

is achieved by being singular in both 

thought and word rather than duplicitously

asserting one thing yet believing or 

intending another. This connection between 

integrity, oneness, and purity is important to 

note because the essence of lying is to act in 

a way that is ‘double’ rather than as a 

unified, integrated whole. Lying, most 

fundamentally, is false assertion–an 

assertion contrary to what the speaker thinks 

or believes to be true. Such expressions are 

opposed to integrity, just as they are 

contrary to honor. For this reason, joint 

doctrine includes in its description of honor 

the imperative “never to lie, cheat, or 

steal.”4

Honor and integrity are also related to one 

another through the Latin notion of fides

(faith), the foundational idea that underlies 

the ancient vocabulary of agreement. Fides, 

most fundamentally, expresses the idea that 

what is promised will be fulfilled. 

Translated into English as both faith and 

trust, fides has two implicit moral 

requirements. The first obliges honesty 

while making agreements (either explicit or 

tacit), a requirement to always act in ‘good 

faith’ – ‘good,’ because the promiser is 

truthful and genuine in expressing those 

parts of the agreement he intends to fulfill. 

Hence, this first imperative demands 

truthfulness in each agreement as it is made 

(in the moment).

Campaigning Spring 2017 52
The second moral requirement inherent in 

fides stems from the expectation that a 

promise will be fulfilled, an expectation 

about the future. This expectation has more 

to do with the promisor’s reliability and 

capability to carry out the promise than it 

does with truth. From this expectation, the 

duty or obligation to fulfill promises 

receives its moral force. Because there is an 

expectation that those who promise will 

deliver on what they have pledged, there is a 

universal belief that those who make 

promises should do what they say they will 

do, given that the promise is reasonable and 

that the promisor has the requisite ability 

(i.e. ‘ought’ implies ‘can’). 

While both moral requirements relate to 

honor and integrity, the imperative ‘always 

act in good faith’ is the one that has a direct 

connection to truthfulness. Truthfulness, as a 

virtue necessarily entwined in honor and 

integrity, requires, at a minimum, that a U.S. 

military professional never enter into or 

affirm an agreement insincerely or 

duplicitously. Because this expectation of 

truthfulness is not only held, but also 

enforced as a norm of behavior throughout 

the military, a general trust is developed,

nurtured, and maintained. This is a trust not 

only between individuals, but an overall 

trust in the U.S. military as an institution 

and, perhaps, a trust that even extends to all 

human beings, especially with regards to 

promises and agreements. In contrast, if a 

U.S. military professional, each of whom 

has made a tacit agreement to live by the 

joint values, demonstrates dishonesty, not 

only does this damage trust in that 

individual, but it also tends to cause people, 

institutions, and even humanity in general to 

be held increasingly suspect.5 

The need for a basic trust in one’s comradesin-arms, co-workers, fellow citizens, and 

even one’s enemies, a trust that involves a 

belief in the sincerity of agreements and 

promises, is the fundamental idea behind the 

prohibition of perfidy in both joint doctrine 

and the international law of armed conflict. 

According to joint doctrine, illicit deceptive 

acts fall under the title of perfidy (i.e. false 

invitations to trust, or acts of bad faith). An 

example of perfidy is presenting a false 

white flag or flag of truce to launch a 

surprise attack.6 While international law 

only explicitly prohibits false invitations to 

trust that take advantage of an enemy’s 

willingness to abide by the law of armed 

conflict (thus making perfidious acts those 

stratagems that undermine the law itself), 

the spirit of the rule condemns all false 

invitations to trust. The reason this is the 

case is that every false invitation to trust 

involves entering into an agreement, 

oftentimes unspoken or implicit, in bad 

faith–therefore each instance of perfidy is, 

essentially, a lying promise. False 

invitations to trust constitute an act of bad 

faith, which can jeopardize future formal 

agreements between belligerents and even 

the cessation of hostilities, since the trust 

underlying the very ability to make 

agreements, such as those treaties that bring 

about the end of a conflict, risks being 

destroyed. 

Every act of perfidy, like the false white 

flag, extends a false invitation to trust; 

perfidy is, essentially, an attempt to establish 

Campaigning Spring 2017 53
the requisite trust (a tacit agreement) so that 

a promise will be believed (e.g. that I wish 

to surrender), a promise that what is being 

communicated is sincere or genuine, when, 

in fact, the promise is false. Each lie does 

essentially the same. In a lie, the liar

attempts to establish trust by communicating 

in the assertive context (thereby making a 

tacit agreement), but he does so falsely (i.e.

in bad faith). In a lie, the invitation to trust is

duplicitous and insincere, since the liar 

makes an assertion contrary to what he 

believes to be true. When used 

instrumentally to achieve military deception, 

both perfidy, and presumably all direct 

attempts to lie to one’s enemy, make those

perfidious deceptions not only morally 

flawed, since they are contrary to 

truthfulness, but also illegal, since they 

violate the prohibition of perfidy expressed 

in international law. 

Clausewitz and Permissible Deception

While international law and the rule against 

perfidy make clear what kinds of deception 

should be avoided, it is also worthwhile to 

characterize how military deception can be 

properly implemented. Clausewitz, perhaps 

to the surprise of some (because of the moral 

content of the subject), provides a good 

starting point.7

 It should be noted that 

Clausewitz, while by no means an 

enthusiastic supporter of elaborate 

deceptions,8 nevertheless addresses the issue 

of bad faith and military deception and, in 

doing so, echoes the prohibition of bad faith 

while recommending the proper way to use 

deception in war. In the introduction to his 

chapter on military deception (where he uses 

the German word list, meaning cunning or 

stratagem), he says:

The term “cunning” [list] 

implies secret purpose. It 

contrasts with the 

straightforward, simple, direct 

approach much as wit contrasts 

with direct proof. Consequently, 

it has nothing in common with 

methods of persuasion, of selfinterest, or of force, but a great 

deal with deceit, which also 

conceals its purpose. It is itself a 

form of deceit, when it is 

completed; yet not deceit in the 

ordinary sense of the word, 

since no outright breach of faith 

is involved. The use of a trick or 

stratagem permits the intended 

victim to make his own 

mistakes, which, combined in a 

single result, suddenly change 

the nature of the situation before 

his very eyes.9

 

Here, Clausewitz is careful to distinguish 

between deceptions that involve breach of 

faith (i.e. an act of bad faith) and what he 

calls “cunning.” Bad faith, he suggests, is 

not a proper use of deception, because this 

kind of deceit intends deception while at the 

same time inviting trust. Instead, he suggests 

that cunning, properly conceived, involves 

the concealment of one’s true intentions 

(“secret purpose”) while allowing the enemy 

to make his own mistakes. Because the 

enemy is always seeking to uncover one’s 

plans, provided one’s purposes are 

successfully hidden, the enemy may be 

tricked into misjudgment, which, in turn, 

places the enemy at a disadvantage. 

Campaigning Spring 2017 54
If Clausewitz is correct, the proper 

application of military deception need not 

and should not involve acts of bad faith. In 

fact, of the four techniques named in U.S. 

military doctrine – feints, demonstrations, 

ruses, and displays–none require, in and of 

themselves, bad faith. This is because the 

essence of stratagem, the use of misdirection 

and the concealment of one’s intentions, 

involves luring or trapping one’s enemy. As 

Liddell Hart explains, this causes one’s 

enemy, ideally, to make a false move “so 

that, as in ju-jitsu, his own effort is turned 

into the level of his overthrow.”10

An example from recent military history 

helps illustrate military deception entirely 

devoid of any invitation to trust extended 

toward the enemy. During the 1991 Persian 

Gulf War, the United States military devised 

and led a deception operation that occurred 

when coalition forces first began their 

offensive against Iraqi forces. In that 

conflict, the war plan sought “to deceive 

Iraqi forces regarding Coalition intentions 

and to conceal the Coalition scheme of 

maneuver.”11 One way coalition forces 

sought to accomplish this was by using 

decoy military equipment, such as inflatable 

helicopters. Another method used was to 

array coalition ground forces in a way that 

gave the appearance that the main attack 

would come directly across the border from 

Saudi Arabia into Kuwait. 

This false picture was painted just prior to 

the initiation of hostilities. Shortly after the 

air campaign began, coalition aircraft

succeeded in destroying the Iraqi air force, 

thereby removing Saddam Hussein’s ability 

to detect further coalition troop movements. 

This allowed the coalition force commander, 

General Schwarzkopf, to reposition his 

forces hundreds of miles to the west and 

attack into Iraq instead of Kuwait. The 

deception left American tanks free to enter 

Iraq and strike Saddam’s reserve divisions, 

his elite Republican Guard, from a direction 

and at a time they were least expecting.12

This example of permissible deception, one 

that avoided false invitations to trust, 

illustrates the use of display (simulations 

and disguises to cause an enemy to 

misinterpret the true disposition of one’s 

own forces) to mislead the Iraqi Army in a 

way that nonetheless preserves faith. In 

Army doctrine, the requirement to act in 

good faith is embedded in a single 

underlying principle for what constitutes a 

permissible stratagem, which is expressed in 

the following way: “In general, a belligerent 

may resort to those measures for mystifying 

or misleading the enemy against which the 

enemy ought to take measures to protect 

himself.”13 Applying this principle, it 

concludes, “It would be an improper 

practice to secure an advantage of the enemy 

by deliberate lying or misleading conduct 

which involves a breach of faith.”14 In other 

words, belligerents should expect to be 

deceived by their adversaries, but under 

situations when a direct invitation to trust is 

being extended, it is morally impermissible, 

unjust, and, in turn, unlawful to deceive 

one’s enemy.

Campaigning Spring 2017 55
Conclusion 

Truthfulness is considered a moral 

excellence in the military profession because 

it is directly related to fides, the confidence 

members of a society or institution have in 

the moral fabric underlying all promises and 

agreements. Lying is contrary to fides 

because with every lie a false invitation to 

trust is being made–an insincere tacit 

agreement, as it were, that the words 

asserted are believed true. The false 

invitation to trust is also the essence of 

perfidy, an act of bad faith occurring when

one party to an agreement makes a lying 

promise. In this way, the virtue of 

truthfulness contains two prohibitions: the 

rule against lying and the rule against 

perfidy.

Despite the fact that this inherently 

restrictive moral requirement is always in 

place, it is nonetheless worthwhile to point 

out that opportunities to communicate 

directly with one’s enemy in war and extend 

an offer of mutual trust are extremely 

limited, and when such opportunities afford 

themselves to belligerents, acts of bad faith 

are generally avoided out of prudence – that 

is, to preserve the ability to make future 

1 See for example Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 

1, The Army (Washington D.C., September 2012), 2-

1 and Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, 

D.C., March, 2013), B-2. (Henceforth JP 1.) 2 Martin Dempsey, “America’s Military – A 

Profession of Arms White Paper,” 2012.

3 JP 1, B-2. 4 Ibid.

5 This idea is a common theme in the Just War 

Tradition. Augustine, for example, says that when 

fides becomes damaged, it leaves “every brother 

appear suspect to every brother.” Augustine, Contra 

treaties, truces, and the like. If an enemy is 

lawfully deceived, it is usually the result of 

poor or faulty inferences; the desire to gain 

an advantage leads an enemy to guess his 

opponent’s intentions and designs and to 

guess wrongly. Helping one’s enemy make 

these erroneous inferences is part of the art 

of generalship, the essence of strategy. Yet 

to accomplish this, a military professional

need not sacrifice his honor; it is not only 

possible that he remain truthful, it is 

necessary, morally speaking. This 

conclusion, in turn, gives credence to the 

absolute principle suggested both in doctrine 

and in international law: to mislead one’s 

enemy and be victorious in the practice of 

waging just war, a military professional 

need not and should not lie. 

Author Biography

Lieutenant Colonel John Bauer is an Army strategist 

assigned to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, 

VA. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the 

University of South Carolina, and his research 

interests include Just War theory and the ethics of 

lying and deception. His previous assignments 

include teaching Philosophy at the United States 

Military Academy and serving as a strategic planner 

for Special Operations Command Korea.

Mendacium, 4 (PL 40). Aristotle makes a similar 

claim in his Rhetoric, where he says that if good faith 

has been taken away, “human intercourse ceases to 

exist.” Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.15 1376b 14. This 

reading of Aristotle comes from Grotius, referred to 

by many as the ‘father’ of international law. See 

Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and 

Peace), trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Indianapolis: The 

Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1925), III.25.1, 860. 6 International Red Cross, Customary Law. 

https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul. 

Accessed 4 June 2015.

 

Campaigning Spring 2017 56
 

7 His famous dictum “War is an act of force, and 

there is no logical limit to the application of that 

force” is sometimes understood to mean that all 

manner of violence should be used as a means to 

bring about a war’s end. For this reason, some have 

criticized Clausewitz for suggesting that ethical 

considerations and moral restraint has no place in 

war. See for example B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d 

ed. (New York: Meridian, 1967), 343. 8 Clausewitz suggests that the fog and friction of war 

tend to make the careful and meticulous 

implementation of traps and trickery all but 

unrealistic. Downplaying the efficacy of military 

deception, Clausewitz remarks, “Yet however one 

longs to see opposing generals vie with one another 

in craft, cleverness, and cunning, the fact remains that 

these qualities do not figure prominently in the 

history of war. Rarely do they stand the welter of 

events and circumstances.” Carl von Clausewitz, On 

War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 202. 9 Ibid. 10 Hart, 146. 11 U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the 

Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress

(Washington D.C., 1992), 102.

12 H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “Central Command 

Briefing,” Military Review (September 1991): 97. 13 FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, sect. 49. 14 Ibid., sect. 50.

Campaigning Spring 2017 57
Developing an Operational 

Approach for the Transition from 

War to Peace Through 

Stabilization, Reconstruction, and 

Development: Understanding the 

Relevant Literature

by 

Thomas J. Snukis

This essay is the second in a series of essays 

that focuses on the transition from war to 

peace through stabilization, reconstruction, 

and development. The first essay

concentrated on identifying the essential 

U.S. governmental strategic guidance, 

concepts, and doctrine surrounding 

stabilization, reconstruction, and 

development and can be found in the 

Campaigning Fall 2016 edition. This 

second essay examines several relevant 

books on the subject and highlights areas 

that the U.S. national security policymaker, 

diplomat, Joint warfighter and other 

governmental agencies must account for as 

they seek to understand an emerging postintervention environment. Future essays in 

the series will examine lessons from history, 

including the lessons from OIF and OEF, 

through an operational lens in an attempt to 

further the understanding of the U.S. 

national security apparatus, and conclude 

with an assessment and recommendations 

for the future. 

RELEVANT LITERATURE

There is a wealth of literature regarding

the study of conflict, stabilization,

reconstruction, and development. To gain

a deeper understanding of the intricacies

and issues faced by military, diplomatic,

and developmental practitioners, we

reviewed and studied a variety of

literature on the subject. Only scratching

the surface with our basic review, these

documents still provide a deeper

contextual understanding of conflict,

stabilization, reconstruction, and

development to the national security 

policymaker and practitioner and must be 

understood to better design, plan, prepare, 

execute, and assess operations of this

nature. We identified the documents 

below as very useful references for the 

U.S. national security professional.

After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and 

the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Janet A 

McDonnell, Department of the Army,

1999. 

This study provides excellent insight into

an example of effective stability and

reconstruction. The Kuwaiti model 

underscores the importance of host nation 

involvement, the utility of prior planning, 

and numerous other valuable lessons.

Concise and easy to read, this book 

identifies several critical variables that the 

Kuwaiti planning team, along with the U.S. 

advisors, emphasized. For instance, they 

organized their effort into ten teams to

handle the post-Desert Storm missions of 

stabilization and reconstruction. Those

teams focused on the following:

• Communication

• Transportation 

• Education 

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• Health and Food 

• Airports and Ports

• Electricity and water

• Oil

• Public works 

• Information

• Legal and political system.1 

A critical factor in the success of this effort

was the primacy of the affected nation 

(Kuwait) in driving the stabilization and

reconstruction process; however, without 

U.S. assistance “the people of Kuwait

would suffer tremendous physical and 

economic hardship that could lead to

further unrest in the region... U.S. officials

realized that winning the war was not 

enough; they must also secure the peace.” 2

Because of the specific situation in Kuwait

(pre-conflict security governance, 

economy, rule of law and social well-being 

were extremely effective), once the Iraqis

were ejected from the country, the Kuwaiti

law enforcement and internal security 

apparatus quickly regained civil control 

and civil order (with minimal U.S. troop 

assistance). Where the U.S. did provide 

extensive support was in the engineering

domain. “Based on ...priorities and

preliminary damage assessments, [U.S.] 

soldiers quickly repaired essential facilities

and functions...to meet the immediate

health, safety, and security needs of the 

Kuwaiti people.” A vital positive 

consequence of the U.S. activity was the 

impact their actions had on the Kuwaiti

people. “Task Force Freedom focused its

attention on repairing Kuwait’s

infrastructure particularly its electrical

grid.... Restoring power had a profound 

psychological, as well as physical impact

on the well-being of the Kuwaiti people.”3

Fixing Failed States: A Framework for

Rebuilding a Fractured World, Ashraf

Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Oxford 

University Press, 2008. 

This is an extremely informative book 

written by the current President of 

Afghanistan and the Director for the 

Institute of State Effectiveness. Most

useful is the proposed framework that

outlines the ten functions of the state.

Those functions as laid out by Ghani and 

Lockhart are: 

• Rule of law

• A monopoly on the legitimate

means of violence 

• Administrative control 

• Sound management of public 

finances

• Investments in human capital

• Creation of citizenship rights

through social policy 

• Provision of infrastructure services

• Formation of a market

• Management of public assets

• Effective public borrowing.4 

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United

States Institute of Peace, 2009. 

The framework described in U.S. Institute 

of Peace’s publication entitled Guiding 

Principles for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction, lays out five broad 

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categories labeled as end states. To 

achieve post-conflict stability, begin

reconstruction, and set the conditions for

longer-term development the end-states

must be addressed and ultimately

achieved to some culturally accepted

standard. Listed and defined below are

the five end states: 

• Safe and Secure Environment:

The ability of the people to 

conduct their daily lives without 

fear of systemic or large-scale

violence.

• Rule of Law: The ability of the 

people to have access to just laws

and a trusted system of justice that

holds all persons accountable,

protects their human rights and

ensures their safety and security.

• Stable Governance: The ability of

the people to share, access or 

compete for power through 

nonviolent political processes and

to enjoy the collective benefits and

services of the state.

• Sustainable Economy: The 

ability of the people to pursue 

opportunities for livelihoods 

within the system of economic

governance bound by law.

• Social Well-Being: The ability of 

the people to be free from want of 

basic needs and to coexist

peacefully in communities with 

opportunities for advancement.5

 

These end-states can serve as ready-made 

lines of operation for U.S. National

Security professionals and must be 

understood so as to inform postwar 

planning. 

Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction

Experience, Special Inspector General,

Iraq Reconstruction, 2009. 

This publication is extremely descriptive 

and chronicles the ‘hard lessons’ from the 

stabilization and reconstruction operations 

conducted after the Iraq regime was

toppled during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The ‘hard lessons’ are relatively not a good 

news story; however, they detail numerous 

practical examples of what worked and 

what didn’t work during the operation. The

examples are rich in detail and illustrate

the compelling prerequisites of securing

the people and restoring their well-being 

before any of the other end-states are 

achieved. 

Jay Garner the director of the Office of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian

Assistance (ORHA) during Operation 

Enduring Freedom clearly understood the 

priorities and sequencing requirements for

security and social well-being fairly as

evidenced in the eleven ORHA goals he

established. Those eleven goals are: 

• Security

• Salaries Paid Nationwide 

• Return Police to Work and Train

Them

• Return Ministries to a Functional 

Level

• Restore Basic Services to Baghdad

• Prevent a Fuel Crisis

• Purchase Crops 

• Solve Food Distribution Challenges

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• Install Town Councils Nationwide 

• Deploy and Integrate

Government Support Teams

with Local Government 

• Prevent Cholera and Dysentery 6

The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest 

Countries Are Failing and What Can Be

Done About It, Paul Collier, Oxford 

University Press, 2007. 

Collier, an economist, identifies and

examines four traps that the poorest

countries find themselves caught in. He

labels them the ‘conflict trap’, the

‘natural resources trap’, the ‘trap of 

being landlocked with bad neighbors’, 

and the ‘trap of bad governance in a 

small country’. His book appeals to the 

general population based on his 

straightforward approach. His content, 

though, certainly has utility for

diplomatic, development, and military

professionals.7

The Quest for Viable Peace: International 

Intervention and Strategies for Conflict

Transformation, Jock Covey, Michael J. 

Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley, 

Association of the United States Army,

2005. 

This book is filled with a wealth of 

practical information regarding 

stabilization, reconstruction, and longerterm development. The examples used

throughout the book center around U.S. 

and international involvement in the 

Balkan conflict. The study identifies

numerous key concepts and lines of action

that must be accounted for within a postconflict environment. First, the authors 

identify the importance of transforming

power within a post-conflict environment. 

They detail “the compelling necessity for

managing down conflict among local

factions.” They further contend that this

requires three sequential stages to develop.

Those stages are:

• Stage 1: imposed stability/an

unsustainable peace process

• Stage 2: viable peace/a sustainable 

peace process

• Stage 3: self-sustaining peace/a selfenforcing peace process

Their explanation for each stage is

extremely useful. These sequential stages

strongly support our proposition that

security and social well-being are the 

critical first steps towards achieving postconflict stability and must be prioritized

and sequenced above the other end states.

This study claims it takes about three

years to achieve Stage 1 objectives before

moving to Stage 2. Regardless of the 

timing, they recognize substantively the 

need to sequence actions before

attempting to accomplish the other endstates. Without security and social wellbeing, the other end-states lose 

importance. 8

Another key item addressed by Covey, 

Dziedzic, and Hawley is a concept

termed ‘temporizing strategy.’ While this

concept is critical for our understanding, 

it is imperative for national security 

decision-makers. The wide-ranging scope

Campaigning Spring 2017 61
of tasks within a post-conflict

environment reveals areas that must be 

attended to at some point (Stages 2 or 3) 

but cannot be addressed until actions are

first accomplished or pre-conditions 

established. Moreover, in some 

circumstances, to accomplish the task

correctly, “the temporizing strategy

would have to achieve several objectives, 

not all complementary.” When you must 

‘temporize’ an activity, higher-level

national decision-makers get frustrated.9

Two excellent ‘temporizing strategy’

examples from Operation Enduring 

Freedom were the approach the military 

and diplomats implemented regarding the 

Afghan opium problem and Afghan

warlords. Ultimately, both challenges

required attention because of the longterm destabilizing nature of these practices

and the fact that they are inconsistent with

basic U.S. values. In the short term, 

however, both were required for

immediate security purposes. If the 

coalition adopted an aggressive strategy

towards the Afghan narcotics trade and

warlord practices, they would have 

introduced a whole new set of 

destabilizing variables into an already

complex Afghan security environment. 

For many otherwise law abiding Afghan

farmers, laborers, truck drivers, and other 

associated workers, the opium trade 

provided their only means of earning a 

living. With no viable alternatives in

place, destroying or even just disrupting 

this economic source for a large number 

of Afghans would have most certainly

sparked even more unrest and violence. 

Fully understanding that disrupting the 

opium trade was not a viable practice for

the long-term, the Coalition also

understood that a ‘temporizing strategy’

of passive prevention was more

acceptable in the short-term as conditions 

were established for longer-term progress.

Although warlords and their practices are

not acceptable in a democracy, warlords

were a key element in Afghan society and

would need to be addressed with a longerterm strategy unless the Coalition wanted

to fuel the already unstable environment. 

Many of the warlords were true patriots in

the eyes of their people and factions. They

had fought the Soviets and won. They had

fought the Taliban and won. Now because

they did not fit the future vision for

Afghanistan from a U.S. perspective, they 

must be removed? Recognizing that the 

warlords were not part of a longer-term 

solution, Coalition leadership also

understood that removing the warlords

would spark additional conflict and

instability. This was unacceptable as well.

As a result, the Coalition adopted a 

‘temporizing strategy’ regarding the 

warlords and planned for their inclusion 

into the legitimate fledgling Afghan

governmental structure, in effect, co-opting 

the warlords. Most were given positions of 

importance and influence commensurate

with the power they were giving up as

warlords enabling them to retain their

prestige and power. While not the ideal, it

became a temporary solution and bought 

time until better government institutions

and practices could be established and

Campaigning Spring 2017 62
allowed to grow.

The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: 

Confronting the Contradictions of 

Postwar Peace Operations. Paris, 

Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. London: 

Routledge. 2009. 

This book by Paris and Sisk is a must-read 

for the U.S. National Security policymaker 

and practitioner. It is filled with excellent 

insight and a wealth of information. For 

instance David Edelstein’s chapter 

addresses the footprint and duration 

dilemma experienced by the U.S. 

government in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan.10 Also addressed within this 

edited volume are concepts from Jeffery 

Herbst who offers an approach that 

addresses the issue in this way, “let states 

fail: allow new forms and centers of 

political authority to emerge through 

conflict and cooperation without outside 

direction or intrusion...redraw national 

boundaries to reflect these new 

arrangements, rather than seeking to 

perpetuate the untenable fictions of many 

existing states.” 11 Correspondingly, 

Jeremy Weinstein introduces a strategy of 

“autonomous recovery” whereby states 

reach “a lasting peace, a systematic 

reduction in violence, and postwar 

political and economic development in the 

absence of international intervention.” 12

Under further scrutiny and deeper analysis, 

the pros and cons of each approach 

emerge. Regardless if one or the other or a 

hybrid would work in a given 

circumstance, they must, at a minimum, be 

considered with other available 

alternatives in a discourse contemplating 

the use of force or other extreme measures.

Why Men Rebel, Ted Robert Gurr, 

Princeton University Press, 1970. 

An adaptation of his doctoral 

dissertation,The Genesis of Violence: A 

Multivariate Theory of Civil Strife, Ted 

Gurr’s book is a classic study of men and 

women and what causes them to use or 

threaten to use violence through revolution, 

rebellions, guerilla wars, coups, and riots. 

As Gurr suggests, it is written for rebels and 

rulers. “Rebels should read it, for I think it 

implies means for the attainment of human 

aspirations that are more effective and less 

destructive to themselves and others....The 

study will surely be read by men seeking 

means for the preservation of public 

order.”13 

This study directly connects with 

postconflict stability, reconstruction, and 

development as our series of essays seeks 

means and methods to restore public order 

after it has disintegrated, regardless of the 

causal factors. We most certainly can gain 

valuable insights into our subject by looking 

at Gurr’s concepts. Gurr’s analysis becomes 

even more valuable as we are interested in, 

as is Gurr, the mindset and attitude of the 

individuals and population residing in or 

returning to a post-conflict environment. 

From Gurr we gain better clarity on the 

primacy of securing the population and 

providing for their social well-being. Gurr 

highlights the essential nature of a safe and 

secure environment and the value of fully 

accounting for the needs of the people as he 

defines three key concepts and their 

Campaigning Spring 2017 63
relationship: value expectations, value 

capabilities and relative deprivation. “Value 

expectations are the goods and conditions of 

life to which people believe they are 

rightfully entitled to.” 14 Gurr defines value 

capabilities “as the goods and conditions 

they think they are capable of attaining or 

maintaining, given the social means 

available to them.” 15 He then develops the 

relationship between the two as relative 

deprivation which is “ the perceived 

discrepency between men’s value 

expectations and value capapabilities. 

Discontent arising from the perception of 

relative deprevation is the basic, instigating 

condition for participants in collective 

violence....Societal conditions that increase 

the average level or intensity of expectations 

without increasing capabilities increase the 

intensity of discontent.”16 It is obvious that a 

functional knowledge of Gurr’s concepts is 

crucial in order to operate effectively in any 

environment but especially in a post-conflict 

environment. 

As Gurr looks at relative deprivation as a 

catylyst for rebellion or revolt he further 

reveals that “ Deprivation-induced 

discontent is a general spur to action.”17 It 

seems that the opposite would hold true as 

1 McDonnell Janet A. 1999. After Desert Storm: the 

U.S. Army and the reconstruction of Kuwait

Washington, DC: Department of the Army. 15.

2 Ibid. 10.

3 Ibid. 81.

4 Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. 2008. Fixing 

failed states: a framework for rebuilding a fractured 

world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 124-163. 5 United States Institute of Peace, and Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute. 2009. Guiding 

principles for stabilization and reconstruction. 

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 2-

9.

well. If you can remove or decrease the 

sense of relative deprivation you could 

induce a previously deprived population to 

positive action. This may not hold true but at 

a minimum, with the deprivation reduced or 

removed, a post-conflict population could in 

fact be neutral to the on-going changes

within their environment until a balance or 

equilibrium was achieved in the postconflict environment. Regardless, essential 

on both sides of the ledger as demonstrated 

by Gurr in his book, is the powerful role 

people play in the equation. 18

In conclusion, many of the practical 

examples, theories and concepts presented 

in the above books hold value for the US 

national security professional in a 

postconflict environment. Developing an 

understanding of these examples and 

concepts will give the U.S. government 

better insight when faced with missions of 

this nature in the future. In the next article 

we will examine specific examples from 

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom to inform the future. 

Author Biography.

Thomas J. Snukis is an associate professor at the

Joint Forces Staff College.

6 United States. 2009. Hard lessons: the Iraq 

reconstruction experience. Washington, DC: Special 

Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction.

7 Collier, Paul. 2007. The bottom billion: why the 

poorest countries are failing and what can be done 

about it. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8 Covey, Jock, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. 

Hawley. 2005. The quest for viable peace: 

international intervention and strategies for conflict 

transformation. Washington, D.C.: United States 

Institute of Peace Press.

9 Ibid.

10 Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2009. The 

dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the 

 

Campaigning Spring 2017 64
contradictions of postwar peace operations. London: 

Routledge. 81-104. 11 Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2009. The 

dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the 

contradictions of postwar peace operations, security 

and governance series. London; New York: 

Routledge. 12.

12 Ibid.

13 Gurr, Ted Robert. 2011. Why men rebel. Boulder, 

Colo: Paradigm Pub. x-xi. 14Ibid. 13.

15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 13-192. 18 Ibid.

Campaigning Spring 2017 65
Recommendations for U.S. Policy 

Toward North Korea Derived from 

a Subsystem Analysis of North 

Korea

by

MAJ Tyler J. Standish and LTC Edward D. Cuevas

Since the signing of the Korean Armistice 

Agreement and the de facto end to the Korean 

War in 1953, the United States’ engagement 

policy with North Korea has gone through 

multiple evolutions. Previous attempts to 

influence North Korean behavior with the 

threat of force, diplomacy, economic 

sanctions, and informational campaigns have 

had limited impact. Through the use of 

hostile actions, and while under international 

sanctions, North Korea has been able to 

achieve surprising military gains; to the point 

where they are, in effect, a nuclear capable 

country with an extensive and growing 

ballistic missile program. Over the past five 

years, the United States has turned more 

frequently to demonstrations of military 

power, or a “Show of Force” coupled with 

harsher economic sanctions in an effort to 

change the behavior of North Korea and its 

leadership to alter its provocative behavior 

and abandon or cease its nuclear weapons 

program. However, increased 

demonstrations of military power and 

additional sanctions have not produced 

substantive change and may have actually 

contributed to North Korean provocations. 

The current U.S. policy toward North Korea 

of Strategic Patience and Containment has 

had limited success. To support this thesis, 

we have applied a series of foresight tools to 

facilitate our analysis used to inform our 

assessment. The tools used are causal loop 

diagram, force field analysis, futures wheels, 

implication trees, cross-impact analysis, and 

stress testing of our conclusions. 

To understand the current U.S. policy with 

North Korea and to make policy 

recommendations, a short historical overview 

is necessary to provide the context of this

relationship. The number of incidents which 

have occurred between the U.S. and North 

Korea and South Korea, and North Korea 

affecting U.S. policy toward North Korea are 

too numerous to list for this analysis. 

Therefore, the chronology below lists only 

the most significant incidents.

Chronology of U.S.-North Korea 

Inflection Points:

- June 25, 1950: North Korea invades South 

Korea starting the Korean War. 

- July 27, 1953: Korean Armistice Agreement 

signed signaling de facto end to the Korean 

War. 

- August 18, 1974: Axe Murder Incident at 

the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); two U.S. officers 

killed; U.S. conducts large show-of-force. 

- March 6, 1992-Present: Various economic 

sanctions imposed against North Korea.

Sanctions are both multi-lateral (United 

Nations) and unilateral (U.S.) in nature. 

- July 8, 1994: Kim Il Sung dies; his son Kim

Jong Il takes power. 

- October 21, 1994: Agreed Framework 

between the United States of America and the 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

signed; key elements were being 

implemented until 2003 when U.S. assesses 

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that North Korea has continued its uranium 

enrichment program; each side blames the 

other for breakdown. 

- August 27, 2003-April 5, 2009: Six-Party 

Talks; during this timeframe, the U.S. South 

Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, and 

Russia conduct a series of meetings with the 

aim to find a peaceful resolution to security 

concerns as a result of the North Korean 

nuclear weapons program; many agreements 

are reached, but North Korea is continually 

found in breach of any agreement as it 

continues to develop and conduct tests of its 

nuclear capabilities. 

- March 26, 2010: Republic of Korea (ROK) 

ship Cheonan sunk; investigation implicates 

North Korea. 

- November 23, 2010: North Korea conducts 

artillery bombardment of ROK island 

Yeonpyeong resulting in four South Koreans 

killed and 19 injured. 

- December 17, 2011: Kim Jong Il dies; his 

son Kim Jong Un takes power. 

- February 29, 2012: U.S./North Korea “Leap 

Day Deal;” U.S. provides substantial food aid 

in return for North Korea agreeing to a 

moratorium on uranium enrichment and 

missile testing and a return of IAEA 

inspectors to Yongbyon, leading to a 

resumption of the Six-Party Talks. 

- April 6, 2012: North Korea attempts a 

rocket launch suspending the “Leap Day 

Deal.” 

- February 12, 2013: North Korea conducts 

nuclear test with estimated 6-7 kiloton yield. 

- December 21, 2015: North Korea 

successfully launches a ballistic missile from 

a submarine. 

- January 6, 2016: North Korea announces it 

conducted a fourth nuclear weapons test, 

claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb; 

this claim is disputed by experts due to the 

low yield of the explosion. 

- July 6, 2016: The US Department of 

Treasury announces designations on top 

North Korean officials, including the leader, 

Kim Jong Un, over ties to human rights 

abuses in North Korea. 

- August 3, 2016: North Korea fires a 

medium-range ballistic missile, the Nodong. 

The missile splashes down in Japan's 

economic exclusion zone, about 200 

kilometers off Japan's coast. 

- August 24, 2016: North Korea tests an 

SLBM, the KN-11. The missile ejects from a 

submarine and flies approximately 500 

kilometers on a lofted trajectory before 

splashing down in the ocean. The test appears 

to be a success. 

- September 9, 2016: North Korea conducts a 

fifth nuclear test. The seismic activity 

registers a magnitude of 5.0. 

- October 19, 2016: North Korea conducts a 

failed test of what is believed to be the 

intermediate-range Musudan ballistic 

missile. The missile explodes shortly after 

lift-off. This is the eighth test of the Musudan 

in 2016. Only the June launch was a success. 

North Korea As a System

A system is an interconnected set of elements 

organized in a coherent way that achieves a 

task or an objective. Within this definition of 

a system, it must consist of three things: 

elements, interconnections, and functions. 

When a system is broken down in this 

manner, we can gain understanding of the 

relationships within the system to determine 

how it will function in the future with other 

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systems. To understand North Korea, it is 

possible to model it as a system within the 

international community to determine if 

policy actions are having the desired effect. 

In 2014, the Special Representative for North 

Korea Policy from the U.S. Department of 

State provided testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific of the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in 

which he provided the basis for U.S. policy 

toward North Korea. The policy can be 

broken into eight main elements that are 

experiencing different levels of change (as 

indicated as increasing or decreasing and the 

rate of change).

Elements:

1. The amount of violations of 

obligations - increasing moderately

a. Pursuit of nuclear weapons - 

increasing moderately

b. Pursuit of ballistic missiles - 

increasing moderately

c. Crimes against humanity - 

increasing moderately

2. The effectiveness of diplomacy - 

decreasing slowly

a. Six Party Talks - decreasing 

rapidly 

b. Inter-Korean Relations - 

increasing slowly

c. The role of China - increasing 

slowly

3. The North Korean level of isolation - 

increasing moderately

4. The amount of North Korean 

provocations - increasing moderately

5. The amount of sanctions - increasing 

slowly

6. The level of deterrence actions with 

allies - increasing moderately

7. The level of human rights violations - 

increasing slowly

8. The ability to protect U.S. Citizens - 

decreasing slowly

The Special Representative gave a good 

synopsis of what actions the U.S. takes to try 

and change North Korea’s behavior. She 

states that North Korea can change its future 

if it simply changes its behavior, but she 

doesn’t provide any compelling reasons for 

North Korea to do so beyond ending its 

isolation. She fails to realize that the North 

Korean regime continues to succeed if it 

remains isolated. The causal link diagram 

helps demonstrate the flaw in this logic. The 

causal link diagram in Figure 1 is a graphic 

depiction of how the United States and the 

International community react to North 

Korea’s provocations and violations 

according to the speech from the Special 

Representative for North Korea Policy from 

the U.S. Department of State. Each oval in 

the diagram represents one of the elements 

that was introduced above, the relationship 

between the elements is depicted by the 

arrows between them. The diagram begins at 

the center when North Korea conducts an 

action. This leads to an increase (+) or 

decrease (-) in the associated element. The 

conclusion based on this tool is that all roads 

lead to isolation, the outcome element, of the 

North Korean regime, if the leverage 

element, diplomacy, is always decreased 

based on State Department policy. 

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Figure 1.

Furthermore, the North Korean regime 

benefits from the isolation that they 

experience. Through isolation they can keep 

themselves in power through repression of 

the populace. Therefore, when they violate 

their obligations to the international 

community or create provocations, they 

actually achieve their objectives through the 

responses of the international community, to 

include the U.S. reaction. The U.S. national 

policy as described by the Department of 

State posits that when North Korea conducts 

provocations or violates international 

obligations, the U.S. must conduct deterrence 

actions and sanctions while limiting 

diplomacy. These actions further isolate 

Pyongyang, and benefit the regime. To 

decrease the regime’s isolation, steady 

or even increasing diplomacy is 

necessary while containing or 

mitigating the effects of North Korea’s 

violations and provocations. 

Effects of Global Trends 

The relationship between the U.S. and 

North Korea does not exist in a vacuum. 

There are many regional and global 

factors to consider when determining 

future policy and strategy toward North 

Korea. To accomplish this, we 

identified several trends and 

endogenous (internal) variables

embedded within the U.S. system that 

provide information through feedback 

loops. The top ten global trends 

affecting the U.S. policy toward North 

Korea are derived from the CJCS Joint 

Operating Environment 2035 document. We 

selected:

1. New poles of economic power - Some 

emerging economies in the 

developing world are gaining relative 

to Western economies, to include that 

of the Unites States, its traditional 

European partners, and Japan. 

2. The weakening of traditional U.S. 

alliances - In Asia, perceptions of 

reduced U.S. commitment may 

encourage current allies and partners 

to pursue unilateral military 

modernization efforts or explore 

alternative alliances and partnerships.

3. The refinement of state hybrid 

stratagems - A number of revisionist 

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states will employ a range of coercive 

activities to advance their national 

interests through combinations of 

direct and indirect approaches 

designed to slow, misdirect, and blunt 

successful responses by targeted 

states.

4. The establishment of regional nuclear 

deterrents - The next two decades 

may feature competitors that pursue a 

rudimentary nuclear capability to 

establish a credible nuclear deterrent.

5. Emergence of alternative institutions 

of international order - The use of

financial instruments of power by the 

West to disconnect revisionist states 

will increase their incentive to pursue 

alternative political and economic 

arrangements.

6. Continuing internal collapse of weak 

states - Some central governments 

will find it increasingly difficult to 

maintain power and control over their 

populations as groups object to 

mistreatment and neglect.

7. Uncontrolled spread of weapons of 

mass destruction - It is likely that 

terrorist, insurgent or criminal groups 

will eventually obtain chemical, 

biological, radiological, or even 

nuclear weapons within the next two 

decades.

8. Demand for food or water exceeding 

local capacity to affordably deliver - 

Demand for supplies of food and 

water in the developing world will 

continue to increase.

9. Declining legitimacy of state 

authority - Under pressure from 

internal corruption or external 

stressors, state authorities in many 

parts of the world will be unwilling or 

unable to provide the level of support 

their citizens expect.

10. Open source design - Greater 

connectivity between states, groups, 

and individuals will facilitate more 

sharing of ideas and designs, which 

users can then modify, change, or 

otherwise improve to optimize them 

for their own purposes. 

Endogenous or internal U.S. variables are:

1. Maintaining force readiness

2. Need to maintain a broad portfolio of 

capable forces

3. Need to maintain an industrial base

4. Need to invest in science and 

technology 

5. Need to build on advancements in 

network warfare

6. Need to protect advanced 

technologies 

Force Field Analysis

A force field analysis diagram can help 

develop an understanding of how the global 

trends introduced above can affect change as 

it relates to North Korea’s actions. Force field 

analysis is a tool for decision makers to 

understand and analyze the forces or trends at 

play in the environment. Figure 2 is a 

diagram that attempts to show how these 

global trends either facilitate or help resist 

change as it relates to North Korean 

violations. The trends on the left side of the 

diagram help resist change or, in other words, 

help North Korea to continue violating 

Campaigning Spring 2017 70
international obligations. The trends on the 

right facilitate change. Each trend is also 

weighted according to their impact on the 

issue (authors’ note: the weights are 

subjective and based upon the authors’ 

understanding of the specific trend). The 

conclusion from this analysis is that the 

global trends identified will slightly help 

North Korea resist change and in the end it 

will remain isolated. 

Framing the Future

To frame how the future may look we used 

three distinct future wheels. The first futures 

wheel (Figure 3) explores the outcomes of 

the emergence of alternative institutions of

international order and incorporates the 

possibility of the emergence of a new pole of 

economic power as a first order effect of the 

original trend. If you follow along this trend 

line, there are at least three potential 

outcomes: development of new global 

currency, a reduction in U.S. trade, or an 

increase in U.S. trade. Each of these futures 

have three different potential outcomes, and 

if you look at reduction in trade you see that 

the outcomes: increase in U.S. self-reliance; 

the U.S. is forced to innovate; and the U.S. 

economy is weakened. 

Figure 2.

Figure 3.

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The second futures wheel (Figure 4) explores 

the possibility of North Korea refining their 

use of state hybrid stratagems like weapons 

proliferation, use of cyber weapons and other 

information operations, and engaging 

adversaries through proxies. Following one 

Figure 4.

Figure 5.

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possible future, we can look at North Korea 

developing more capable offensive cyber 

weapons which could lead to North Korea 

attacking the U.S. with cyber weapons which 

could have three possible future outcomes: 

no action by the U.S.; the U.S. counterattacks; or the U.S. moves to increase 

sanctions on North Korea. 

The third futures wheel (Figure 5) explores 

the possibility of North Korea collapsing

from the inside. The future wheel explores 

the possibilities following such a collapse 

and one possible scenario is that North Korea 

could experience a civil war following the 

collapse. This civil war could lead to a long 

conflict with a lot of casualties, similar to 

what Syria is experiencing now. A potential 

future derived from this scenario is a failed 

state within North Korea. 

These futures wheels indicated that every 

global trend has several second- and thirdorder effects that will impact U.S. policy 

toward North Korea and some of the trends 

can quickly become very large issues with 

global implications. To demonstrate this 

reality, the third futures wheel was then 

further explored as an implication tree

(Figure 6). Following the same example 

shown during the final futures wheel, at the 

center is the internal collapse of North Korea 

which is labeled as undesired from a U.S. 

perspective. After collapse, North Korea 

could experience a civil war, which is also 

undesired, with a 20% likelihood of 

occurrence. This civil war has a 20% 

likelihood of leading to a long conflict with a 

lot of casualties, which is also undesired. 

Given all of the preceding, it is 60% likely 

Figure 6.

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that North Korea would become a failed state

(Authors’ note: the percentages are based 

upon the authors’ estimate of the likelihood 

of each potential occurrence). 

Next, a cross-impact analysis was conducted 

to gain more insight into future developments 

between the U.S. and North Korea. Each of 

the top ten global trends were analyzed to see 

how they impacted each other as it pertained 

to U.S. policy toward North Korea. For 

example, the trend New Poles of Economic 

Power was analyzed against all other trends. 

The emergence of new poles of economic 

power and the weakening of traditional U.S. 

alliances could lead to new forms of currency 

to compete against the U.S. dollar. 

Continuing along the top of the graph, the 

emergence of new poles of economic power 

and the refinement of state hybrid stratagems, 

especially in North Korea, means that there 

would be additional economic sectors that 

could be targeted by state hybrid stratagems. 

The weakening of traditional U.S. alliances 

can be used as a good example of how this 

trend significantly affects all other trends in 

this cross-impact analysis. The impacts for 

each trend are shown below: 

• New poles of economic power - 

Impact: Strengthens the need for 

new economic poles. 

• The refinement of state hybrid 

stratagems - Impacts: Allies are 

more vulnerable to hybrid attack; 

which leads to the U.S. being more 

vulnerable to hybrid attack. 

• The establishment of regional 

nuclear deterrents - Impacts: New 

nuclear umbrellas; new alliances. 

• Emergence of alternative institutions 

of international order - Impact: Lack 

of U.S. leadership. 

• Uncontrolled spread of weapons of 

mass destruction - Impact: 

Nuclear/WMD attack on former 

allies. 

• Demand for food or water exceeding 

local capacity to affordably deliver - 

Impact: Decrease in U.S. 

humanitarian aid. 

• Declining legitimacy of state 

authority - Impacts: Rise of superempowered corporations; Rise of 

super-empowered individuals. 

• Open source design - Allies turn to 

open source design for weaponry to 

include WMD. 

The continuing internal collapse of weak 

states is a realistic possibility for North Korea 

and another good example of how a trend 

significantly affects all other trends in this 

cross-impact analysis. Here are the impacts 

for each trend within that row: 

• New poles of economic power - 

Impact: Collapsed states' economies 

put pressure on new poles of 

economic power. 

• The weakening of traditional U.S. 

alliances - Impact: Weak states strain 

alliances further. 

• The refinement of state hybrid 

stratagems - Impact: Collapsing 

states lash out using hybrid 

stratagems. 

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• The establishment of regional 

nuclear deterrents - No discernable 

impact. 

• Emergence of alternative institutions 

of international order - Impact: 

Collapsing states place burden on 

new institutions. 

• Uncontrolled spread of weapons of 

mass destruction - Impact: If 

collapsing states have WMD then 

they contribute to the spread of 

WMD. 

• Demand for food or water exceeding 

local capacity to affordably deliver - 

Impact: The collapsing of the state 

intensifies the crisis. 

• Declining legitimacy of state 

authority - Impact: The collapse of 

the state further weakens the state's 

authority. 

• Open source design - No discernable 

impact. 

The cross-impact analysis (Figure 7) shows 

that as multiple trends become reality in 

North Korea and across the globe it will have 

second and third order impacts that will 

change the future and possibility for change 

in the North Korean system. 

The illustration below (Figure 8) represents

the two variables that we selected as the most 

Figure 7.

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Figure 8.

uncertain: the weakening of traditional U.S. 

alliances and the continuing internal collapse 

of weak states, specifically North Korea. The 

upper right-hand quadrant represents a future 

in which North Korea collapses from internal 

strife, but U.S. alliances remain strong. This 

would lead to a period of pain for the Korean 

Peninsula, but would ultimately lead to 

reunification. The upper-left hand quadrant 

represents a future in which North Korea 

collapses but U.S. alliances are weakened. 

This would be an uncertain future as the 

influence in the area would be unknown, but 

it would potentially be under a new world 

order controlled by a different group or 

superpower, such as China or a Chinese 

alliance. The lower-left hand quadrant is 

similar, but North Korea would not collapse 

in this scenario. The lower-right hand 

quadrant represents a future where North 

Korea does not collapse, and U.S. alliances 

remain strong. This future most likely 

resembles the world today. 

Social Change and Policy

Social change can be defined as the process 

of planned or unplanned qualitative or 

quantitative alterations in social phenomena 

that can be analyzed in terms of the 

interrelated components of: identity, level, 

duration, magnitude, and rate of change. 

Since societies themselves are multi-faceted 

with many variables, it would stand to reason 

that there are several theories of social 

change and that one or more of these theories 

can be applied to different societies to 

describe how social change takes place 

within that society. 

Given the four future scenarios of New 

World Order, Reunification After a “Period 

of Pain”, Who’s in Charge, and Status Quo 

developed from the cross-impact analysis, we 

have identified six key stakeholders 

associated with U.S. policy towards North 

Korea: North Korea, U.S., South Korea, 

Japan, China, and Russia. Bishop and Hines 

espouse ten distinct theories of social change, 

or which six are applicable to the key 

stakeholders in U.S. policy towards North 

Korea. These theories are:

• Progress Theory: The key 

assumption of the Progress Theory is 

that today’s societies are better than 

past societies, and future societies will 

be better than the present. It is the 

dominant explanation of social change 

in Western societies and postulates 

that even though most Westerners 

respect other cultures, they believe 

Western society is the best of all 

societies.

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• Technology Theory: The Technology 

Theory assumes that the development 

and proliferation of technology is what 

drives social change. Just as change is 

inexorable, this theory suggests that 

the advancement of technology is 

inexorable as well. Additionally, it 

claims that technology is infinitely 

capable and as it continues to develop 

it will be able to support all societies at 

a high standard of living. 

• Culture Theory: The Cultural Theory 

suggests that social change is based 

more on a society’s history and culture 

than the material environment and that 

technology is part of that culture. The 

Culture Theory is a conservative 

theory through which change takes 

place slowly over a long period 

through socialization and exposure to 

other cultures. 

• Conflict Theory: This theory assumes 

that change occurs because of the 

conflict among different groups and 

individuals in a society and that 

conflict exists even in a homogeneous 

society. However, it also states that 

being in conflict binds people and 

groups more closely together if there is 

no radical conflict that threatens the 

existence of the society. 

• Market Theory: The Market Theory 

claims the production of goods and 

services is the most important mission 

of society and its economy and that 

capital investment is the best 

mechanism for continued progress in 

the future. It also states that social 

change is driven by ingenuity and 

adaptation because of competition in 

the marketplace.

• Power Theory: The Power Theory 

advances the notion that human 

agency is the dominant source of 

social change and the best explanation 

of change is the story of individuals 

acting to create change. In this theory, 

it is individual people, or at most small 

groups of people who have the 

requisite social power to influence 

large groups and institutions to 

achieve certain goals and thereby 

create social change.

Social Change Theories Applied to Key 

Stakeholders in U.S. Policy Towards North 

Korea:

 

• North Korea: Culture Theory, Power 

Theory, Conflict Theory 

• U.S.: Progress Theory, Market 

Theory, Technology Theory

• South Korea: Technology Theory, 

Culture Theory 

• Japan: Technology Theory, Culture 

Theory 

• China: Progress Theory, Power 

Theory, Culture Theory, Conflict 

Theory 

• Russia: Progress Theory, Power 

Theory, Conflict Theory 

 

One of the dominant social change theories 

for the U.S. is Progress Theory. One of its key 

assumptions is that today’s societies are 

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better than past societies, and future societies 

will be better than the present. It also 

postulates that even though most Westerners 

respect other cultures, they believe Western 

society is the best of societies. As such, the 

U.S. judges other societies against Western 

society and its values. Therefore, the U.S. and 

other Western nations will continue to be in 

conflict with North Korea as they attempt to 

get North Korea to accept Western standards.

The social change theories of Culture Theory, 

Power Theory, and Conflict Theory form the 

basis of societal change in North Korea with 

the dominant social change theory being the 

Cultural Theory. The Cultural Theory 

suggests that social change is based more on 

a society’s history and culture than the 

material environment, resulting in North 

Korea’s primary behavioral driver being the 

preservation of their current societal 

structure. The center of gravity for North 

Korean society is the Kim family regime and 

its stability. Regime stability allows the elites 

in North Korean society to remain in power. 

Therefore, it is imperative that the history and 

culture of North Korea are emphasized over 

anything else to maintain the power base of 

the Kim regime and its elites. This is 

accomplished through propaganda and 

institutionalization of North Korean society 

writ large. Through application of the Culture 

Theory, North Korea’s leadership can tightly 

manage any emerging societal change and 

ensure it is altered to support the Kim regime 

thereby ensuring regime stability. Because of 

this, North Korea will resist any attempts by 

the U.S. to force it into a different social 

paradigm. This resistance to change is one of 

the factors which drives North Korea’s 

isolationist tendencies, nuclear weapons 

development program, and provocative 

behavior. 

Stress Testing Policies

To determine their validity, proposed policies 

must be subjected to tests. One such test is the 

stress test (Figure 9). The stress test is a 

projection of a given policy under a specific 

set of various circumstances and risks over 

time. The primary purpose of the stress test is 

to determine the legitimacy of our proposed 

U.S. policy recommendations for dealing 

with North Korea. Through the exploration 

conducted over the course of this project, we 

developed three recommendations for U.S. 

policy towards North Korea: 1) Continue the 

Current Policy of “Strategic Patience and 

Containment,” 2) Direct Military 

Intervention, and 3) Involvement of China 

Through Diplomacy. During the stress test, 

we superimposed these policy 

recommendations across the four future 

scenarios of New World Order, Reunification 

After a “Period of Pain,” Who’s in Charge, 

and Status Quo developed in the Framing the 

Future analysis to determine which policy 

approach satisfies the scenario’s security 

Figure 9.

Campaigning Spring 2017 78
requirements, partly satisfies the scenario’s 

security requirements, or does not satisfy the 

scenario’s security requirements.

The current U.S. policy towards North Korea 

of Strategic Patience and Containment has 

had limited success. Although it has 

prevented direct military conflict between the 

United States and North Korea, it has neither 

stopped the development of their technology, 

nor prevented conflict in the form of 

provocations and retaliation between North 

Korea and South Korea. The ultimate 

strategic end of this policy is murky as it is 

unlikely to force North Korea to give up on 

their current programs, but it could delay 

further development, and attempt to halt any 

proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile 

technology to other states. Although the ends 

of this strategy are difficult to derive, the 

means of accomplishing this sliding end state 

are actionable and are currently being used by 

the United States and South Korea. In light of 

this analysis, we have postulated two 

additional policy options of Direct Military 

Intervention and Involvement of China 

Through Diplomacy. 

The policy of the Direct Military Intervention

recommendation is the destruction of North 

Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile 

programs through direct military action. The 

ways of this strictly military strategy are not 

limited to lethal weapons, but those would 

certainly be the most effective. Lethal means 

include air interdiction; ground assaults; and 

nuclear and/or conventional strikes against 

all nuclear and ballistic missile related 

facilities and equipment. Other ways 

available include offensive cyberspace 

operations, coercive sabotage operations, and 

other non-lethal operations. The destruction 

strategy is probably the most efficient 

method of directly dealing with the nuclear 

and ballistic missile threat from North Korea, 

and the most likely to achieve measurable 

and lasting results. However, this option is 

less likely to be acceptable by political 

leaders, the international community, and by 

any reasonable public. It may be acceptable 

to retaliate against North Korea in the event 

of an unprovoked attack with all options 

available, but it is less likely to be acceptable 

without provocation. Finally, North Korea is 

likely to respond militarily if any of their 

programs are attacked, which would also be 

unacceptable by international organizations. 

The policy of the Involvement of China 

Through Diplomacy is for the U.S. to engage 

China directly through the means of back 

door diplomacy to encourage them to use 

their influence with North Korea to deter 

their nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Although China claims that its influence with 

the current North Korean regime is not as 

strong as it has been in the past, they still have 

options through which they can impact North 

Korea. For example, China does not enforce 

UN economic sanctions against North Korea 

as strictly as they could. China remains North 

Korea’s main export destination with 84% of 

all North Korean exports landing somewhere 

in China. The next closest North Korean 

export destination is India where they receive 

a mere 5% of North Korean exports.

Therefore, there are levers that China can 

apply, if they desire, to coerce/compel North 

Korea to end their nuclear and ballistic 

missile programs.

Campaigning Spring 2017 79
Given the lack of success of the current 

policy, and the unlikely execution of the 

direct military intervention policy in the near 

future, we recommend a hybrid of 

continuation of the current policy of Strategic 

Patience and Containment to at least 

maintain the status quo, while placing 

renewed emphasis on Involvement of China 

Through Diplomacy. As previously stated, 

the current policy is limited in its 

effectiveness, but it does buy us time and 

decision space. In the decision space 

provided, we must continue to aggressively 

engage China to use their 

influence/diplomatic levers to open 

acceptable diplomatic channels with North 

Korea. Through application of this hybrid 

policy recommendation, we may be able to 

find a path towards resolution with North 

Korea.

Author Biographies.

Major Tyler Standish is assigned to the Headquarters, 

Department of the Army at the Pentagon in 

Washington DC. He was commissioned through the 

United States Military Academy after earning a 

Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering in 

2001. Additionally, he earned a Master of Science in 

Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence 

University in 2010. Operational assignments include a 

deployment with III Corps Artillery during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom and assignments at other tactical, 

operational, and strategic level organizations.

Lieutenant Colonel Cuevas is currently serving as the 

Chief of Government Relations, United States Forces 

Japan (USFJ), in Yokota AB, Japan. He was 

commissioned through ROTC at the University of 

Missouri-Columbia in 2000. LTC Cuevas earned a 

BA in History at the University of Missouri-Columbia 

in 2000 and a MA in East Asian Studies from the 

University of Hawaii-Manoa in 2013. Operational 

assignments include three deployments to Iraq with 

the 3rd Infantry Division in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom.

SOURCES

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Strategic Foresight, Norfolk, VA; Joint and 

Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), Joint Forces 

Staff College (JFSC), National Defense University 

(NDU), 2016.

Joint Staff J-7, The Joint Operating Environment: 

JOE 2035, Washington, D.C.; The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff of the United States of America, 2016.

Glyn Davies, U.S. Policy Towards North Korea: 

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of State, 2014.

Scott A. Snyder, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, 

Seoul, South Korea; Samsung Economic Research 

Review (SERI) Quarterly, 2013.

Greg Botelho, Jethro Mullen, and Kathy Novak,

“North Korea Issues Military Threat as Tensions 

with South Korea Rise”, Atlanta, GA, CNN; 2015 

http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/asia/koreastensions/, (accessed 12 August, 2016).

Kelsey D. Atherton, “Did North Korea Really 

Launch A Missile From A Sub?”, Winter Park, FL, 

Popular Science; 2015, 

http://www.popsci.com/north-korea-probablylaunched-missile-submarine, (accessed 12 August, 

2016).

Jeffrey Lewis, “No, the U.S. Doesn’t Have Plans to 

Nuke North Korea,” Washington, D.C., Foreign 

Policy; 2014, 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/17/no-the-u-sdoesnt-have-plans-to-nuke-north-korea/, (accessed 12 

August, 2016).

Young Back Choi, Whither North Korea, St. John’s 

University, NY; St. John’s University, 2014.

P. Bishop and A. Hines, Social Change: In Teaching 

about the Future, New York, NY; Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2012.

Gordon G. Change, Pyongyang Power Struggle, 

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Bo Ram Kwon, The Conditions for Sanctions 

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of Defense Analysis, 2016.

Campaigning Spring 2017 80
Campaigning is a Joint Forces Staff College journal designed as a forum for students, faculty, 

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JFSC Vision

The flagship institution for educating national security professionals involved in planning and 

execution of joint operations. 

JFSC Mission

Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency 

operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, 

attitudes, and perspectives. 

Joint Forces Staff College

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Campaigning Spring 2017 82