In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-13-00181-CR

KASSIE STEPHENSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 40,573-B

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Kassie Stephenson was convicted of burglary of a building, sentenced to fifteen 

months’ confinement in state jail, and ordered to pay a $368.00 fine, the trial court set her bond 

pending appeal at $40,000.00. When Stephenson’s attempt to have the bond lowered was 

rejected, she appealed that ruling. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(g) (West 2006).1

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

“The primary objective of the appeal bond is to secure appellant’s apprehension if [her] 

conviction is subsequently affirmed.”2

 Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1981). We review a trial court’s decision setting bond pending appeal for an abuse 

of discretion. Ex parte Dueitt, 529 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Read v. State, 959 

S.W.2d 228, 229 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). It is Stephenson’s burden to show that 

the amount of bond is excessive. See Ex parte Benefield, 403 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2013); Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849. 

Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides,

The amount of bail to be required in any case is to be regulated by the court, 

judge, magistrate or officer taking the bail; they are to be governed in the exercise 

of this discretion by the Constitution and by the following rules:

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In cases in which the assessed punishment for a felony conviction is less than ten years, the trial court has discretion 

to deny bail, revoke existing bail, or impose reasonable conditions on bail. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

44.04(c) (West 2006). However, the trial court’s “statutory authority to deny bail pending appeal in certain cases 

does not carry with it the authority to set excessive bail in such cases.” Ex parte Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 1987, no pet.) (per curiam).

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The trial court’s certification confirmed that Stephenson had no right of appeal from the underlying order of 

deferred adjudication. However, a motion for new trial has been filed, and a hearing has been scheduled, with 

respect to the trial court’s findings that Stephenson violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision 

and its resulting decision to adjudicate guilt. We note, however, that Stephenson stipulated that she violated the 

terms and conditions of her community supervision. 
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1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that 

the undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an 

instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was 

committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken 

upon this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the 

community shall be considered.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2005). 

“In considering what constitutes reasonable bail on appeal,” “primary factors,” such as 

the nature of the offense and length of the sentence, should be considered. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 

849. Stephenson judicially confessed to having entered, with intent to commit theft, a building 

located at 934 Rabbit Creek Drive in Kilgore, Texas, and owned by D. Cedillo.3

 The nature of 

the offense was non-violent, and the length of the sentence imposed was fifteen months’ 

confinement. These facts, taken alone, suggest that a reduction of the appeal bond amount would 

be appropriate. 

However, when considering the nature of the offense, we can also consider where the 

offense for which she was convicted occurred. Stephenson’s mother, Linda Main, testified that 

Stephenson lived with her at Rabbit Creek Circle prior to the offense and would live with her 

once again if she were to be released on bond during an appeal. The trial court noted that Main’s 

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The offense report included in the record showed that the stolen items were two window air-conditioning units, a 

refrigerator, a cooking stove, electrical wiring, and a central air-conditioning unit. 
4

residence “[was] in the immediate area” of the building she was convicted of having burglarized. 

The future safety of the victim is a statutory factor which the court could weigh in denying a 

bond reduction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15. 

In addition to the primary factors, ability to make bond, existence of a prior criminal 

record, work record, family ties, length of residency, conformity with previous bond conditions, 

aggravating factors, and other outstanding bonds are also relevant factors. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at

849–50. 

Before her conviction, Stephenson had previously and successfully been released on a 

$10,000.00 bond but argues that the record demonstrates her inability to obtain and post a 

$40,000.00 appeal bond. The trial court found that Stephenson was indigent. Main testified that 

Stephenson had no money and owned no property that could be used as collateral to secure a 

loan. A criminal defendant’s ability to make bond is “merely one factor to be considered in 

determining the appropriate amount of bond” and is not controlling. Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 

866, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). “[E]ven indigency, does not control the 

amount of bail.” Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1980). “To show that [she] is unable to make bail, a defendant generally must show that [her] 

funds and [her] family’s funds have been exhausted.” Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 149

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

According to Main, a bail-bonding company she contacted would require Stephenson to 

make an initial deposit of $2,300.00 as a condition for issuing such a $40,000.00 bond with the 

further requirement that she follow-up that initial payment with additional monthly payments. 
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Main testified that she was disabled, that her sole income was about $470.00 per month in Social 

Security disability income, and that her nephew (who lived in the home with her) was likewise 

disabled and received about $840.00 per month from the same source. Main related further that 

Stephenson’s other family and friends were able to supply only about $250.00 toward the 

payment of an appeal bond. Main failed to testify about her own monthly expenses. She 

claimed she could make a premium payment on a bond of only about $2,500.00 to $5,000.00, not 

the $40,000.00 appeal bond amount set by the trial court. Although Main testified that 

Stephenson lived in the same house with Main and Main’s nephew, together with “her 

grandmother and -- and my son,” the finances of neither Stephenson’s grandmother nor her 

brother were discussed. Main also failed to testify whether she or any other family member 

possessed collateral with which to secure a loan for the payment of bonding fees. From the 

record, it is not entirely clear that Stephenson’s family’s resources have been exhausted to the 

extent that the requested bond fee could not be satisfied. 

Stephenson points out that there is nothing in the record to suggest that she had a prior 

criminal record. Instead, she maintains, the record shows that “[s]he’s lived here all her life” and 

has family ties to the area, no aggravating factors were involved in the burglary, there is no 

record of any other outstanding bonds, and counsel believed Stephenson had “made her court 

appearances” and had not fled while subject to community supervision. 

However, Stevenson’s deferred adjudication community supervision was revoked after 

she failed “to report to [her] designated Probation Officer . . . in person for the months of March, 

April, and May, 2013,” and she signed a stipulation of evidence confirming her failure to do so. 
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The court recalled that “[t]hroughout her entire pretrial and then even on -- when she was on 

probation, the defendant had a problem reporting to Pretrial Services, and then one of the issues 

she got revoked on was reporting on probation.” Main testified that Stephenson’s previous 

failures were due to a lack of available transportation but added that she had recently acquired an 

automobile which would provide Stephenson transportation to court appearances. Stephenson 

has no work history, no property in the area, and no checking or savings accounts but now has 

access to an automobile. The record could lead the trial court to determine, in its discretion, that 

Stephenson—now faced with a jail sentence—could be a flight risk. 

“[T]he statutes treat conditions on pre-trial bond differently from conditions on bail 

pending appeal.” Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A condition 

of bail pending appeal “must only be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 402. Given the close proximity of 

Main’s home to the location of the offense committed by Stephenson and her failure to report to 

the community supervision officer despite having been ordered to do so, we conclude that 

Stephenson has not met her burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in setting a 

$40,000.00 post-conviction bond. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: September 6, 2013

Date Decided: September 17, 2013

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