alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### BIELECKI v. STATE.

No. 21285.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 4, 1940.

*190Gaston H. Wilder, Jr., of Beaumont, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault; the punishment, a fine of one hundred dollars and confinement in jail for ninety days.

The injured party, Clara Dean Dionne, was approximately six years old at the time of the alleged offense. She testified that appellant took her into a garage and, after exposing his male organ, placed his hand on her female organ. She declared that he did not hurt her. According to her testimony, she reported the matter to her stepmother. Mrs. .Dionne testified that the injured party reported appellant’s misconduct to her. Testifying in his own behalf, appellant said: “I understand that I have been accused of indecent fondling of this young girl, the daughter of Dionne, and I will say that it is not true, that I did not do such a thing.”

It is shown in bill of exception No. 2 that counsel for the state asked Frances Ann Miller, a girl about seven years of age, the following question: “Sometime ago did he (meaning the defendant) do anything to you?” The question was timely and properly objected to, but before the court had the opportunity to rule upon such objection the witness answered in the affirmative. Obviously, the question and answer advised the jury that appellant had been guilty of indecently fondling the person of a child other than the injured party. Such testimony was not admissible under any exception to the rule excluding collateral offenses. See Hagood v. State, 104 Tex.Cr.R. 429, 284 S.W. 547. Hence the bill of exception reflects error, and, under the circumstances reflected by the record, we would not feel warranted in holding such error to be harmless.

We doubt whether the injured party was shown to be a competent witness. It has been observed that she was only six years of age. It is well settled that children, who, after being examined by the court, appear not to possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to .which they are interrogated, or who do not understand the obligation of an oath, are incompetent witnesses. See Jimenez v. State, 103 Tex.Cr.R. 163, 280 S.W. 829. A thorough examination of the witness might have shown her to be competent. However, the examination shown in the present record is not deemed sufficient to reflect that she possessed sufficient intelligence to relate the transactions concerning which she was interrogated or that she understood the obligation of an oath.

Because of the first error herein discussed, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Miller, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, (Mackston, J.), rendered April 15, 1988, convicting him of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the trial court erred when it limited the defense counsel’s summation by prohibiting comment on the failure of a prosecution witness to corroborate the complainant’s testimony regarding destruction of property inside a bar, a crime of which the defendant was not charged. We disagree. The defense counsel’s closing argument was not unjustifiably limited and the Trial Judge did not repeatedly interrupt his summation *(see, People v Brown,*136 AD2d 1, 16, *lv denied*72 NY2d 857, *cert denied*488 US 897; *People v Reina,*94 AD2d 727). In particular, the appellant’s claim that the defense counsel was improperly prohibited from commenting on the failure of a prosecution witness to corroborate the complainant’s testimony that the defendant damaged certain property at the scene of the crime is without merit. Neither the prosecution nor the defense elicited testimony from the witness on the collateral issue of whether or not he observed property damage *(cf., People v Reina, supra,*at 727-728).

The defendant’s contention that his conviction of assault in the second degree requires the dismissal of his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree is without merit inasmuch as criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree as defined in Penal Law § 265.01 (2) is not an inclusory concurrent count of assault in the second degree as defined in Penal Law § 120.05 (2) *(see,*CPL 300.30 [4]; *People v Green,*56 NY2d 427; *People v Glover,*57 NY2d 61; *People v Acevedo,*40 NY2d 701; *People v Mason,*128 AD2d 812).

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions *643and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Kooper, J. P., Eiber, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 172 Received in Senate (RDS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 172

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 30, 2009

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Providing for a conditional adjournment of the House of Representatives 
         and a conditional recess or adjournment of the Senate.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That, in consonance with section 132(a) of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, when the House adjourns on the legislative 
day of Friday, July 31, 2009, Saturday, August 1, 2009, or Sunday, 
August 2, 2009, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent 
resolution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it

              

 stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, September 8, 2009, or until 
the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent 
resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the Senate recesses 
or adjourns on any day from Thursday, August 6, 2009, through Tuesday, 
August 11, 2009, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent 
resolution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or 
adjourned until noon on Tuesday, September 8, 2009, or such other time 
on that day as may be specified in the motion to recess or adjourn, or 
until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this 
concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2.  The Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the 
Senate, or their respective designees, acting jointly after 
consultation with the Minority Leader of the House and the Minority 
Leader of the Senate, shall notify the Members of the House and the 
Senate, respectively, to reassemble at such place and time as they may 
designate if, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 30, 2009.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### BARKER v. STATE.

No. 21305.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 15, 1941.

R. T. Correll, of Perryton, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the county court of Ochiltree County of willfully setting fire to a fence, the property of another, and was by the jury fined the sum of $25; the charging part of the indictment being as follows: “That C. W. Barker on or about the 8th day of March, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and forty and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, in the Cpunty of Ochiltree, and State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully and wilfully set fire to a fence there situate, the property of another, to-wit, J. W. Moore, the said C. W. Barker then and there not being in possession of said fence at the time, and the said C. W. Barker not then and there being in control of said fence at the time of the said setting fire to said fence aforesaid,” etc.

The statute under which this prosecution is based being found in Vol. 3, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., as Art. 1388b — 1, reads as follows: “Section 1. Any person who willfully sets fire to woods, forests, fences, gr.ass or rubbish of any kind, on lands of which he is not in possession or control at the time of setting out such fire, or who willfully causes fire to be communicated to such woods, forests, fences, grass or rubbish, or who willfully and maliciously sets oil fire or causes to be set on fire any timber, weeds, or marshes, so as to cause loss or injury to another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction must be fined not less than Ten ($10.00) Dollars, nor more than Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars.”

It is our opinion that this indictment is defective in that it fails to allege that appellant set fire to this fence “so as to cause loss or injury to another,” that being the gist of the offense.

We are also of the opinion that, in the event of a further trial of this matter, the court should respond to the request of the appellant and give in charge to the jury a definition of the legal meaning of the term “willful”. See Bennett v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 237, 4 S.W.2d 62; Townsend v. State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 79, 51 S.W.2d 696.

On account of the defect in the indictment, this judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Table 4.1 FY 2014 Treasury Congresinoal Justification

Major IT FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 % Change

Investments Actual Actual Plan Request from FY 12

to FY 14 

0 0 0 0

Non-Major IT FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 % Change

Investments Actual Actual Plan Request from FY 12

to FY 14 

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 3,818.00 4,418.00 3,818.00 3,818.00 -13.58%

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 2,638.00 2,716.00 2,716.00 2,716.00 0.00%

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 2,554.00 2,684.00 2,684.00 2,684.00 0.00%

149 97.35 148.94 200.92 106.39%

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 123 77.88 0 200.92 157.99%

 DM&E: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 26 19.47 0 0 -100.00%

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 0 0 148.94 0 0.00%

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 390 340.94 410.97 481.13 41.12%

 DM&E: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries and Expenses 98 85.24 0 0 -100.00%

9,647.00 10,341.52 9,777.91 9,900.05 -4.27%

124 104.7 0 0 -100.00%

9,523.00 10,236.82 9,777.91 9,900.05 -3.29%

Major Non-IT FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 % Change

Investments Actual Actual Plan Request from FY 12

to FY 14 

2.06 2.16 3.11 3.11 44.07%

 O&M:

015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries & Expenses 

Proceeds of Sale 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.25 30.21%

 O&M: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries & Expenses 0.77 0.77 0.94 0.94 22.72%

 DM&E: 015-05-0119-0 / TIGTA Salaries & Expenses 1.25 1.20 1.922 1.922 59.90%

1.25 1.20 1.92 1.92 59.90%

0.81 0.96 1.19 1.19 24.22%

2.06 2.16 3.11 3.11

9,649.06 10,343.68 9,781.02 9,903.16

Information Technology

Funding Source 

Subtotal of All Major ITInvestments

Funding Source 

IT Infrastructure Mainframe and

Servers Services and Support (ITI

MSSS) 3,818.00 4,418.00 3,818.00 3,818.00 -13.58%

0.00%

IT Infrastruture End User Systems

0.00%

 Agency Funding

 Agency Funding

IT Infrastructure

Telecommunications (ITT TSS) 2,638.00 2,716.00

2,554.00 2,684.00 2,684.00

2,716.00 2,716.00

 Agency Funding

2,684.00

12.90%

TIGTA PARIS Property Module (PPM)

 Agency Funding

 External Contributions

TIGTA Performance and Results

Information System (PARIS) 488 426.17 410.97 481.13

and Support (ITI EUSS)

 Agency Funding

Subtotal of All Non-Major ITInvestments

Subtotal - IT DM&E

Subtotal - IT O&M

Total for Major Non-IT Investments

TIGTA Vehicle Fleet

 Agency Funding

Total Capital Investments 

9,900.05

Non-IT

Funding Source 

Subtotal - Non-IT DM&E

Subtotal - Non-IT O&M

IT Investments 9,647.00 10,341.52 9,777.91

Total for Major and Non-Major
Exhibit 10.4



Description of Oral Contract with Levy Huezey.







Pursuant to a verbal agreement, Levy Huezey has agreed to act as our President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director to manage the affairs of the Company for a one (1) year period beginning on the Effective Date, and thereafter the Term shall be automatically extended for successive one-year periods unless and until such time as either Levy Huezey or the Company shall give written notice to the other at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the then current Term that no such automatic extension shall occur. In exchange, Levy Huezey shall receive a monthly fee of $1,000 per calendar month. Such fee shall be payable on the first day of each calendar quarter. The fees due and owing Levy Huezey will not have a current impact on our liquidity and capital resources as all compensation due and owing Levy Huezey is being accrued and deferred until such time that Levy Huezey, in his sole discretion, believes it to be in the best interest of the Company to pay any such amounts due and owing. There are no annuity, pension or retirement benefits proposed to be paid to our current officer and director and employees in the event of retirement at normal retirement date pursuant to any presently existing plan provided or contributed to by the Company or any of its subsidiaries, if any. As of the date of this Prospectus, no funds have been paid to Levy Huezey.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATE OF THECHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER OFFNBH BANCORP, INC.

Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350):

I,
Mark J. Huber, Chief Financial Officer of FNBH Bancorp, Inc., certify, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18
U.S.C. 1350) that:

(1) 
The quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2009, which
this statement accompanies, fully complies with requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and;

(2) 
The information contained in this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2009, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of FNBH Bancorp, Inc.

|Date:  August 14, 2009 |  | FNBH BANCORP, INC.By /s/ Mark J. Huber      
       Mark J. Huber
Its:  Chief Financial Officer
|---------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging,
or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic
version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to FNBH
Bancorp, Inc. and will be retained by FNBH Bancorp, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Harry J. Brown, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Montgomery County (Aison, J.), rendered October 10, 1989, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.

There was no abuse of discretion in County Court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. A complete and thorough plea allocution was made and no evidence was presented other than defendant’s self-serving assertions to support his motion *(see, People v Franco,*145 AD2d 837; *People v Zuk,*130 AD2d 886, *lv denied*70 NY2d 659). Nor was it improper for the court not to have conducted a full evidentiary hearing. The record establishes that the court gave defendant ample opportunity to set forth and substantiate his claims before making its decision *(see, supra).*Finally, it is clear from the record that defendant was provided with effective assistance of counsel *(see, People v Bell,*141 AD2d 749).

Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur.
#### Ex parte BARCIA.

No. 7764.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Sept. 25, 1940.

Kahn & Branch, of Houston, for Andrew Barcia.

J. A. Copeland, of Houston, for Angelina Barcia.

PER CURIAM.

This is an original habeas • corpus proceeding instituted in this court by Andrew Barcia to secure his release from alleged illegal restraint of his liberty. It is admitted that the petition or motion for contempt was sworn to by the complainant before her attorney, such attorney acting as a notary public. It is further admitted by all parties that all proceedings in the district court by which relator was adjudged in contempt were and are void under authority of Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 123 S.W.2d 306, 314. It is therefore ordered that Andrew Barcia, relator herein, be discharged from custody.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                             FORM 10-Q CERTIFICATION

I, Marc Fierman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Source Interlink Companies, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)), for the registrant and we have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over
financial reporting.

December 10, 2004
                                       /s/ Marc Fierman
                                       ------------------------------
                                       Marc Fierman
#### Harry Butler BYARS, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 12778.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 12, 1941.

J. Piner Powell, of Brownwood, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The offense is receiving and concealing stolen property; the punishment, five years in the state penitentiary.

Appellant moves this court to dismiss his appeal in this case and has supported that motion by’ his affidavit stating, among other things, that he does not further desire to prosecute the same. :

The motion is granted and the appeal dismissed at the appellant’s request.

PER CURIAM.

. The ,foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-08-1998
<CASH>                                          22,746
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,593
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    204,702
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               282,366
<PP&E>                                         508,865
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,192,456
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          359,163
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           215
<OTHER-SE>                                     135,750
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,192,456
<SALES>                                      1,841,949
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,841,949
<CGS>                                        1,360,816
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,360,816
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              43,662
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 36,768
<INCOME-TAX>                                    17,961
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    18,807
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .78
        

</TABLE>