UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION 

BROOKE GLADU,

Plaintiff,

v.

ONE WORLD FREIGHT SYSTEMS 

d/b/a NOR-TEX TRANSPORT 

SERVICES LLC

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:22-cv-1181

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

COMES NOW Plaintiff Brooke Gladu (“Plaintiff”) and files her Motion for Attorneys’ 

Fees pursuant to this Court’s April 16, 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. No. 25], and 

respectfully shows the Court as follows:

BACKGROUND

On May 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint against Defendant One World 

Freight Systems d/b/a/ Nor-Tex Transport Services LLC alleging hostile work environment and 

retaliation claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), the Texas Labor Code (§§ 21.001 

et seq.), and any other causes of action that may be inferred from the facts alleged therein. On 

April 16, 2024, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. No. 25] by which it 

granted Plaintiff’s First Amended Motion for Default Judgment. [Dkt. No. 23]. In its Order, the 

Court awarded Plaintiff $51,51,150 in backpay damages, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and 

the Court Ordered Plaintiff to submit a Bill of Costs and a motion to recover attorney’s fees. [Id].

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Plaintiff incurred $11,056.25 in reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in filing and 

prosecuting this Action against the defaulting Defendant.1 A true and correct copy of the detailed 

billing statements of attorneys’ fees is attached hereto as Exhibit A-1. App.004-006. Plaintiff 

incurred $547.45 in itemized attorney expenses. A true and correct copy of the detailed billing 

statements of attorneys’ fees is attached hereto as Exhibit A-2. App.007-008. Accordingly, in this 

Motion, Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees in in the amount of $11,056.25 incurred in 

prosecuting this Action. 

ARGUMENT

An award of attorney’s fees is governed by “the same law that serves as the rule of decision 

for the substantive issues in the case. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Kona Tech. Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595, 614 (5th Cir. 2000). Congress 

enacted 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) to authorize district courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to 

the prevailing party in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Combs v. City

of Huntington, Texas, 829 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2016); McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d

374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The [attorney’s fee] awards facilitate [civil rights] plaintiffs' access to

the courts to vindicate their rights by providing compensation sufficient to attract competent

counsel”). Moreover, “the court’s discretion to deny a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff [in a Title 

VII case] is narrow.” New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980); see also

Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F. App'x 909, 917 (5th Cir. 2008) (“a prevailing plaintiff 

ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.”) (citing Christiansburg 

Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978)).

1

See Exhibit A, Declaration of Jay D. Ellwanger. See App. 001–003.

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Pursuant to the Court’s Order granting Plaintiff’s First Amended Motion for Default 

Judgment, Plaintiff Gladu is a prevailing party under a Title VII claim subject to 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(k) and she is therefore entitled to the award of attorneys’ fees. See Vaughn v. Nebraska 

Furniture Mart, LLC, 2020 WL 1695695, at *6 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (granting Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Default Judgment and granting Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees where “[t]he court may award 

reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action.) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 

1988(b)); see also Cisneros v. UTC Providers-Austin, Inc., 2019 WL 13253467, at *7 (W.D. Tex. 

2019) (“Attorney’s fees are routinely awarded to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs) (citing White v. 

S. Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1982). The only factor left for the Court 

to determine is the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. Plaintiff Gladu’s request 

for attorneys’ fees and costs is “reasonable, sufficiently segregated, and supported by sufficient 

evidence.” GFRS Equip. Leasing Fund II, LLC v. Nguyen, 2022 WL 16577311, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 

Oct. 31, 2022). 

I. Plaintiff’s Requested Attorneys’ Fees are Reasonable.

In determining the reasonableness of fees, the Fifth Circuit applies a two-step analysis. 

Combs, 829 F.3d at 391 (citation omitted). First, the court must calculate the lodestar which is “the 

reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable rate.” Id. at 394. Second, the court should 

then determine whether there are special circumstances, commonly referred to as the Johnson

factors, that suggest an increase or decrease of the lodestar. Id. at 395; see also Johnson v. Ga. 

Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by 

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989).2 However, the second step must be taken in light 

2 The court may adjust the lodestar based on twelve factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) 

the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service 

properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) 

the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the 

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of the “strong presumption that the lodestar represents a sufficient fee” and “enhancements must 

necessarily be rare.” Combs, 829 F.3d at 395; see also Kostic v. Texas A&M Univ.-Com., 2015 

WL 9997211, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 

407357 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2016) (“However, a court may not adjust the award on the basis of any 

factor already accounted for in calculating the lodestar.”) (citation omitted). Further, the court must 

provide “a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination.” Jimenez v. Wood 

Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 660 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010)).

“[A] ‘reasonable’ fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake 

the representation of a meritorious civil rights case” and ... “the lodestar method yields a fee that 

is presumptively sufficient to achieve this objective.” Combs, 829 F.3d at 392–93 (quoting Perdue, 

559 U.S. at 552). Reasonable hourly rates “are to be calculated according to the prevailing market 

rates in the relevant community.” McClain, 649 F.3d at 381 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 

895 (1984)). 

Further, in determining the reasonableness of the number of hours expended in a case, 

“[t]he party seeking attorney's fees must present adequately documented time records to the court.” 

Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). “Contemporaneous billing records are 

acceptable documentation for determination of reasonable hours.” Cortes-Castillo v. One Time 

Constr. Texas LLC, No. 3:21-CV-2093-BH, 2023 WL 5826976, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2023) 

(citation omitted).

client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, 

reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and 

length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Add 

citation here

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Plaintiff Gladu first hired Ellwanger Henderson LLLP in 2022, formerly known as 

Ellwanger Law LLLP (“Ellwanger Henderson”), to prosecute her claims against Defendant.3

Ellwanger Henderson is a well-known civil rights law firm specializing in employment matters.4

Ellwanger Henderson represents clients nationwide with offices in Texas in Austin and Dallas, 

and the firm has litigated several cases in the Northern District of Texas.5

Throughout the two-year duration of this case, Plaintiff’s attorneys were required to: meet 

with Plaintiff to understand and formulate her legal claims; file an EEOC Charge and attend to 

Plaintiff’s Charge throughout the EEOC process; determine the legal issues present; identify the 

Defendant at fault; engage in numerous attempts to affect service; conduct legal research; 

communicate with parties and witnesses; draft several motions at the pleadings stage of this 

litigation; file a Motion to strike and perform legal research in connection with same; move for 

default judgment upon Defendants failure to appear, which included garnering the information 

necessary to prove Plaintiff’s claims on the merits and for her claims of damages. 

As set forth in more detail in the attached Declaration of Plaintiff’s attorney, Ellwanger 

Henderson’s billing rate ranges from an hourly rate of $100 for project assistants to $575 per hour 

for partners, depending upon the experience level and the reasonable billing rate of the particular 

attorney or legal assistant performing the work.6

3

See Declaration of Jay D. Ellwanger attached as Exhibit A, App.001-003. 

4

See Id.

5

Id.

6 According to the Consumer Price Index for legal services as generated by the U.S. Bureau of 

Labor Statistics, prices for legal services are 21.94% higher in 2023 versus 2017 (a $126.13 –

$21.94 difference range in value). See “Consumer Price Index for Legal Services”, U.S. Bureau of 

Labor Statistics, https://www.officialdata.org/Legal-services/price-inflation/2017-to2023?amount=575 (last visited Nov. 14, 2023); “Consumer Price Index for Legal Services”, U.S. 

Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.officialdata.org/Legal-services/price-inflation/2017-to2023?amount=100 (last visited Nov. 14, 2023).

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Ellwanger Henderson’s requested hourly rate is justified by the attorney’s and staff’s skills, 

experience, and accomplishments in the area of employment and civil rights litigation.

7

See 

Kostic., 2015 WL 9997211, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2015), adopted by 2016 WL 407357 (N.D. 

Tex. Feb. 3, 2016) (approving an hourly rate of $650.00 for an experienced employment law 

attorney in a Title VII case); Vaughn v. Nebraska Furniture Mart, LLC, 2020 WL 1695695, at *6 

(N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1694782 (N.D. Tex. 

Apr. 7, 2020) (finding that Plaintiff's counsel requested rate of $500 per hour was reasonable); 

Miller v. Raytheon Co., 716 F.3d 138, 149 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the attorneys reduced 

hourly rates of $577.50, $542.50, and $280 were reasonable, customary rates).

Further, Plaintiff Gladu does not seek an enhancement of the lodestar amount based on the 

Johnson factors because the lodestar fee has already accounted for all the relevant Johnson factors 

in this action. See Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prod. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The 

lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor, however, if the creation of the lodestar 

amount already took that factor into account; to do so would be impermissible double counting.”). 

Accordingly, Ellwanger Henderson’s reasonable attorney’s fees amounted totaled to

$11,056.25.

8 The total amount of attorney fees for this case is $11,056.25. Declarations supporting 

the fees have been attached and are incorporated herein by reference.

II. Plaintiff’s Requested Costs are Reasonable.

In addition to attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff Gladu is entitled to an award of costs under FED. R.

CIV. P. 54(d)(1) which provides that “costs other than attorneys' fees should be allowed to the 

7 The Texas Employment Lawyer Association's 2023 Attorney's Fee Yearbook has compiled a list 

of reasonable hourly rates charged by labor and employment attorneys of comparable skill, 

expertise, and experience in the Northern District of Texas. See Texas Employment Lawyer 

Association's 2023 Attorney's Fee Yearbook at 34-66, attached hereto as Exhibit B, App. 009-245.

8

See Exhibit A, App.001-003; see also Exhibit A-1, App.004-006.

Case 3:22-cv-01181-X Document 26 Filed 04/30/24 Page 6 of 8 PageID 113
prevailing party” unless the court otherwise directs. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). Moreover, the Fifth 

Circuit strongly presumes that the court will award costs to the prevailing party. See Byers v. Dallas 

Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2000) (“the standard procedure is to award costs 

to the prevailing party in Title VII suits.”); Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 

1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992) (“We recognize a strong presumption that the court will award costs to 

the prevailing party”) (citation omitted). 

Recoverable costs to a prevailing party include “[a]ll reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, 

including charges for expert costs, shipping of documents, court reporters’ costs, photocopying, 

paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone ... because they are part of the costs normally charged 

to a fee-paying client.” Associated Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. The Orleans Parish Sch. 

Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990). As such, Ellwanger Henderson’s reasonable costs 

amounted to an additional $11,056.25. The total amount of reasonable costs for this case is 

$547.45. Declarations supporting the costs have been attached and are incorporated herein by 

reference.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant this motion and award Plaintiff’s 

reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $16,337.50 and reasonable costs in the amount of 

$547.45. In total Plaintiff seeks $16,884.95. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees 

and Costs should be granted in full.

Dated: April 30, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jay D. Ellwanger

Jay D. Ellwanger

Texas State Bar No. 24036522

jellwanger@equalrights.law

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David W. Henderson

Texas State Bar No. 24032292

dhenderson@equalrights.law

ELLWANGER HENDERSON LLLP

400 S. Zang Blvd., Suite 600

Dallas, Texas 75208

(469) 998-6775 Telephone

(469) 998-8002 Facsimile

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the following by 

Federal Express, as service via ECF would be ineffective as Defendant has not engaged counsel 

who is admitted to practice before this Court. 

Anel Becirevuic

1313 Jetty Knot Trail, Wylie, TX 75098

/s/ Jay D. Ellwanger

Jay D. Ellwanger 

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