IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of:

JASON LEROY DAVIS,

Petitioner.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 38777-1-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PENNELL, J. — Jason Leroy Davis is serving a life sentence as a result of a

conviction for one count of first degree burglary. Mr. Davis was also convicted of two 

counts of a protection order violation. He has filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) 

challenging the convictions. Several of Mr. Davis’s claims are untimely and do not 

qualify for review. Of the timely claims, none merit relief. The PRP is therefore 

dismissed.

FACTS

Jason Leroy Davis was subject to a protection order prohibiting him from having 

contact with his estranged wife. While the protection order was in place, Mr. Davis drove 

his child to the wife’s house after a scheduled visit. Upon arriving at the home, Mr. Davis

became upset and went inside. An argument ensued, resulting in a physical altercation 

between Mr. Davis and his estranged wife. 

FILED

MAY 9, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

2

Mr. Davis was initially charged with one count of residential burglary and one 

count of violation of a protection order. The parties engaged in discovery and plea 

negotiations. The State then successfully moved to amend the charges to add one count of 

first degree burglary and second count of violation of a protection order.

The case proceeded to a jury trial and Mr. Davis was convicted as charged in 

the amended information. The State sought a life sentence based on the first degree 

burglary conviction, arguing Mr. Davis qualified as a persistent offender under former 

RCW 9.94A.030(38) (2015). The trial court agreed and imposed a life sentence on the 

first degree burglary conviction. The terms of incarceration for the remaining three 

convictions were ordered to run concurrently. 

Mr. Davis timely appealed his convictions and sentence. This court largely 

affirmed, but remanded with instructions to vacate Mr. Davis’s conviction for residential 

burglary based on double jeopardy. See State v. Davis, No. 36859-9-III (Wash. Ct. App. 

Aug. 20, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/368599_unp.pdf. 

Procedural history after direct appeal

The opinion in Mr. Davis’s direct appeal was filed on August 20, 2020. Id. A 

motion for reconsideration was denied on October 6, 2020. The Washington Supreme 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

3

Court denied Mr. Davis’s petition for review on March 3, 2021. The appellate mandate 

returning the case to the superior court was issued on March 11, 2021.

Acting pro se, Mr. Davis filed his PRP with this court on March 1, 2022. He later 

filed a motion to supplement his PRP on June 10, 2022, together with his supplemental 

PRP. The clerk of this court granted Mr. Davis’s motion, accepted the supplemental 

PRP for filing, waived the filing fee, and called for a response from the State. The State 

responded to the PRP and moved to strike hearsay statements in Mr. Davis’s 

supplemental PRP, including its Appendix H. The State’s motion to strike was referred to 

the acting chief judge to be decided with the PRP. Mr. Davis then filed a reply in support 

of the PRP. The acting chief judge deemed the PRP not frivolous and found Mr. Davis 

indigent, and ordered that (1) the PRP be referred to a three-judge panel for a decision on 

the merits, (2) Mr. Davis be appointed counsel, and (3) a schedule be set for supplemental 

briefing. After supplemental briefing had been submitted, the PRP and motion to strike 

were set for consideration by this panel without oral argument.

ANALYSIS

Timeliness of petition

A personal restraint petition must be filed within one year of the date a judgment 

and sentence becomes final. RCW 10.73.090(1). Here, the mandate on Mr. Davis’s direct 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

4

appeal was filed on March 11, 2021. Mr. Davis’s judgment and sentence therefore 

became final as of that date. RCW 10.73.090(3)(b). Although the 2021 decision remanded 

Mr. Davis’s case with instructions to vacate his residential burglary conviction, this was 

merely a ministerial correction to the judgment and sentence and did not change the 

finality date. See State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 41, 216 P.3d 393 (2009) (A case is final 

when no appealable issues remain.). Thus, outside an exception to the one-year time bar, 

Mr. Davis needed to file his PRP on or before March 11, 2022. RCW 10.73.090(1).

Because Mr. Davis’s initial PRP was filed on March 1, 2022, it was timely and 

will be considered on the merits. 

But Mr. Davis’s June 10, 2022, supplemental PRP and June 6, 2023, supplemental 

brief both raise new facts and claims that were not filed within the one-year time limit. 

Such newly raised claims do not relate back to the original PRP. See In re Pers. Restraint 

of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 435, 446-47, 309 P.3d 459 (2013) (An untimely PRP submission 

resting on “facts and legal theory entirely distinct” from a timely PRP claim will not 

relate back.). Although the COVID-19 pandemic and lack of responsiveness from trial 

counsel may have posed some hardships to Mr. Davis, he has not submitted any 

documents or legal citations with his June 10, 2022, and June 6, 2023, filings that were 

not available to him in March 2022. We therefore find no basis for tolling the one-year 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

5

time period. See id. (Equitable tolling does not apply when the petitioner could have 

raised all claims along with the timely PRP.).

An exception to the one-year time bar applies when a judgment and sentence is 

invalid on its face. RCW 10.73.090(1). “‘[I]nvalid on its face’ means the judgment and 

sentence evidences the invalidity without further elaboration.” In re Pers. Restraint of 

Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 866, 50 P.3d 618 (2002).

Mr. Davis claims his judgment is invalid on its face because the Persistent 

Offender Accountability Act of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (POAA), chapter

9.94A RCW, is unconstitutional. We disagree with this characterization. No court has 

ever declared the POAA unconstitutional. Analyzing a constitutional attack of the POAA 

would require an elaboration of facts and law outside Mr. Davis’s judgment and sentence. 

Mr. Davis’s attempt to avoid application of the one-year time bar based on facial

invalidity therefore fails.1

 

1 Despite arguing his claim under RCW 10.73.090(1), Mr. Davis’s argument 

follows the framework of RCW 10.73.100(2), which exempts from the time bar claims 

of constitutional challenges of the statute a defendant was convicted under either on its 

face or as applied. This argument also fails. “The statute does not provide an exception 

for when the statute under which the defendant was sentenced was unconstitutional,” as 

Mr. Davis argues here. In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 18 Wn. App. 2d 707, 716, 493 

P.3d 779 (2021). Thus, the exception to the time bar does not apply.
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

6

Based on the foregoing, we strike as untimely the additional claims for relief 

asserted by Mr. Davis on June 10, 2022, and June 6, 2023. Our review is limited to the 

timely claims filed on March 1, 2022.

Analysis of timely claims

To obtain relief through a PRP, Mr. Davis must show actual and substantial 

prejudice resulting from alleged constitutional errors or, for alleged nonconstitutional 

errors, a fundamental defect that inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice. 

In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 813, 792 P.2d 506 (1990). To avoid 

dismissal, Mr. Davis must support his claims with facts and not merely bald or conclusory 

allegations. Id. at 813-14. The supporting evidence must be based on “more than 

speculation, conjecture, or inadmissible hearsay,” and failure to provide such evidence 

necessitates dismissal of the petition. In re Pers. Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 886, 

828 P.2d 1086 (1992). This court will dismiss a petition if it “fails to present an arguable 

basis for collateral relief in either law or in fact, given the constraints of the personal 

restraint petition vehicle.” In re Pers. Restraint of Khan, 184 Wn.2d 679, 686-87, 363 

P.3d 577 (2015) (plurality opinion).
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

7

Assistance of counsel

Mr. Davis contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. To be entitled 

to relief, Mr. Davis must show both that (1) defense counsel’s representation was 

deficient and (2) the deficient representation was prejudicial. In re Pers. Restraint of

Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 840, 846-47, 280 P.3d 1102 (2012) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). A petitioner

establishes actual and substantial prejudice if they meet the standard of prejudice 

applicable on direct appeal: that but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome would have been different. In re Pers. Restraint of 

Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525, 538-39, 397 P.3d 90 (2017). If one prong of the Strickland test fails, 

this court need not address the remaining prong. State v. Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d 480, 507, 

438 P.3d 541 (2019).

1. Failure to properly request continuances and follow court rules

Mr. Davis argues trial counsel moved for several continuances without following 

the court’s procedures for requesting the continuances. He also seemingly contends trial 

counsel requested continuances without accomplishing the objectives listed as reasons for 

the continuances, despite admonishments from the superior court.
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

8

Mr. Davis does not explain how counsel’s purported struggles with court 

procedures impacted the outcome of his case. This claim therefore fails. 

2. Failure to object to the State’s amended information

Mr. Davis contends trial counsel was ineffective when they failed to object to the 

State’s amended information. But the record shows that trial counsel did object and the 

objection was overruled. This claim fails. 

3. Failure to enter a not guilty plea under the second amended 

information

Mr. Davis argues trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to insist 

Mr. Davis be arraigned on the second protection order violation charge, which was added 

when the State amended the information. Mr. Davis does not explain how he was 

prejudiced by this purported mistake. His claim for relief therefore fails. 

4. Failure to interview critical witness and conduct other witness 

interviews

Mr. Davis argues trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to research, 

investigate, or interview a single witness, most notably Mr. Davis’s child, who was a 

witness to the events in question. But the record indicates trial counsel did interview 

the child by telephone. Defense counsel did not call the child as a witness at trial, 

explaining her testimony was unnecessary because Mr. Davis had decided to testify. 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

9

Rep. of Proc., State v. Davis, No. 36859-9-III (RP) (Mar. 6, 2019) at 188-89. Given 

defense counsel did interview the child and decided not to call the child to testify for 

strategic reasons, Mr. Davis has not shown either deficient performance or prejudice.

Mr. Davis also does not specify any other witness he contends trial counsel should have 

interviewed, and provides no evidence showing his allegations are based on more than 

mere speculation. This claim fails.

5. Counsel’s pretrial representation that Mr. Davis would not testify

Mr. Davis appears to contend that, at a pretrial hearing, trial counsel incorrectly 

told the trial court that Mr. Davis would not be testifying at trial. Mr. Davis does not 

explain how he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s statement. This claim fails.

6. Failure to understand jury pools and jury questionnaires

Mr. Davis appears to claim trial counsel was ineffective in selecting a jury. His 

argument on this score consists of just one line in his petition. He states, “Incompetence 

in understanding of jury pools and declines any questionnaires for jurors; can find no 

issues or reasons of why jurors may be biased (in a domestic violence case).” PRP at 15

(citing RP (Jan. 11, 2019) at 33-35). Mr. Davis provides no argument regarding what 

specifically was deficient about trial performance. And he does not explain how he was 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

10

prejudiced by trial counsel’s performance regarding the mechanics of jury selection. 

This claim fails. 

7. Failure to obtain co-counsel

Mr. Davis next argues trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to associate 

with co-counsel as suggested by the trial court. The record reflects that the trial court 

encouraged trial counsel to associate with co-counsel, that trial counsel sought additional 

time to associate with co-counsel, but that co-counsel never appeared in the case. The 

record contains no evidence as to why trial counsel did not associate with co-counsel. 

Nor does Mr. Davis show that he was prejudiced by the absence of co-counsel. This claim 

therefore fails. 

8. Conceding guilt 

Mr. Davis argues trial counsel was ineffective by conceding guilt during opening 

statement and summation. Specifically, during opening statement and summation defense 

counsel agreed that Mr. Davis had entered his estranged wife’s house and that he violated 

the protection order. The State responds that defense counsel’s arguments were strategic 

and designed to gain trust with the jury in order to argue against the first degree burglary 

charge. We agree with the State.
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

11

Defense counsel does not behave ineffectively by acknowledging undeniable facts, 

even if such facts mean the defendant is guilty of a particular count. See State v. Silva, 

106 Wn. App. 586, 596, 24 P.3d 477 (2001). Here, the evidence was overwhelming that

Mr. Davis had violated the protection order. He had exchanged text messages with his 

estranged wife in violation of the order, made a postarrest statement in which he admitted 

to going to his estranged wife’s house on the date of the alleged assault and burglary, 

and admitted during his own testimony that he had gone inside the wife’s house on the 

date in question.

Defense counsel made an apparently strategic decision to argue that Mr. Davis 

may have violated the protection order, but he was not guilty of anything more serious 

because he never engaged in an assault. This argument was consistent with Mr. Davis’s 

testimony. Had the jury agreed with counsel’s argument, Mr. Davis would have been 

acquitted of any charges that required proof of assault, such as first degree burglary and 

one of the two protection order violations. And the jury likely would have acquitted 

Mr. Davis of residential burglary, since it may have found that he did not enter or remain 

in the wife’s home to commit a crime.

Given the circumstances of Mr. Davis’s case, defense counsel’s strategy was 

reasonable. Based on his judgment and sentence, it appears Mr. Davis would have been 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

12

facing no more than five years in prison had defense counsel’s strategy prevailed. This 

was a much better outcome than the mandatory life term required by the first degree 

burglary conviction. The fact that defense counsel’s strategy was unsuccessful does not 

mean counsel performed deficiently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This claim for relief 

therefore fails.

9. Failure to request self-defense instruction

Mr. Davis argues trial counsel was ineffective because they did not propose a 

self-defense jury instruction despite arguing that Mr. Davis violated the protection order

in self-defense. This ground for relief was previously raised and rejected on direct review. 

We therefore will not revisit this argument unless we determine review is necessary in the 

interests of justice. See In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, 196 Wn.2d 330, 341, 473 P.3d 663 

(2020). The interests of justice may be met if there is an intervening change in the law or 

some other justification for failing to raise a crucial point or argument. Id. 

Mr. Davis argues that the interests of justice warrant review of this claim because 

this ground for relief had been raised on appeal only through a RAP 10.10 pro se

statement of additional grounds for review (SAG), and Mr. Davis had limited time to 

develop the claim. Mr. Davis also complains that this court’s opinion on direct appeal 

dedicated only one paragraph to the self-defense instruction claim.
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

13

We do not find good cause to reconsider our prior decision. A SAG is intended to 

provide an appellant an opportunity to raise “additional grounds for review” that were not 

raised by legal counsel. RAP 10.10(a). This court treats issues raised in an appellant’s 

SAG with the same consideration as issues raised by counsel. At times, the issue raised in 

a SAG may be the lone issue that warrants providing relief. See, e.g., State v. Whitlock, 

188 Wn.2d 511, 518 n.3, 396 P.3d 310 (2017). The fact that an issue raised by counsel or 

in a pro se SAG results in only a brief discussion in a final opinion does not mean that it 

has not been fully considered. To the extent a party believes the court has overlooked or 

misapprehended a fact or detail in its opinion, the remedy is to move for reconsideration. 

See RAP 12.4. The remedy is not to revisit a decided issue through filing a PRP.

10. Failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction

Mr. Davis argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for a 

lesser-included offense jury instruction. However, his contentions do not specify which 

lesser-included offense he believes should have been included. This claim does not, 

therefore, merit further review. 

Double jeopardy

Apart from his ineffective assistance claims, Mr. Davis argues his two protection 

order violation convictions violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. We are 
No. 38777-1-III

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

14

unconvinced. As tried to the jury, Mr. Davis’s two protection order charges were based 

on separate conduct. One count involved Mr. Davis’s contact with his estranged wife 

through the use of a mobile phone. The other count involved Mr. Davis’s assault of his 

estranged wife when he entered her residence. Double jeopardy does not prohibit separate 

convictions and punishments for these two separate offenses. See State v. Mutch, 171 

Wn.2d 646, 655-56, 254 P.3d 803 (2011). 

CONCLUSION

None of Mr. Davis’s claims of error warrant relief or further hearing. The PRP 

is dismissed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in 

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040.

_________________________________

Pennell, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________ _________________________________

Staab, A.C.J. Fearing, J.