IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

MICHAEL ODOM, § 

#154143, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1934-B-BN 

§ 

SHERIFF GARRETT, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Michael Odom, an inmate at the Rockwall County jail, filed a pro se

complaint raising civil rights claims related to his incarceration. See Dkt. No. 1. 

After its transfer to this district, United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle 

referred Odom’s case to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

Where prisoners, whether incarcerated or detained pending trial, seek relief 

from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on initial screening, 

identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, 

that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” 

or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b). 

Here, consistent with the Filing Fee Order entered under the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (the PLRA), see Dkt. No. 13, ¶ 4, Odom moved for leave to amend his 

complaint, see Dkt. No. 17. The Court granted leave and notified Odom that it would 

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screen his amended allegations under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e). See Dkt. Nos. 

18, 19. After that, Odom made various filings, including a second motion for leave to 

amend, a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), and a motion to dismiss 

his case. See Dkt. Nos. 20-28. 

The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should terminate Odom’s motion to dismiss, deny the 

motions to amend and for a TRO, and dismiss this lawsuit for the reasons and to the 

extent set out below. 

Discussion 

I. The Court should terminate Odom’s motion to dismiss. 

Odom moved to dismiss his complaint, explaining that he “wishes to dismiss 

this case without prejudice if the court’s intentions are not to order defendants to 

answer and begin discovery” and that he “wishes to avoid a strike under the PLRA” 

and will “re-file at a later date if the court doesn’t serve the defendants and order 

them to answer the complaint.” Dkt. No. 28. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, subject to certain 

exceptions, including “any applicable federal statute,” a plaintiff “may dismiss an 

action without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party 

serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 

41(a)(1)(A)(i) (cleaned up). 

“[I]n the normal course, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the 

case by the filing of the notice of dismissal itself.” Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 

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523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010). 

But some courts have held that, where it applies, the PLRA, as an “applicable 

federal statute,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A), limits “Rule 41(a)(1)(A)’s right of 

voluntary dismissal,” Burley v. Unknown Defendants, No. 2:15-CV-143, 2015 WL 

8212681, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015) (“Congress passed the PLRA in 1996 after 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)’s substantive provisions were adopted, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, and, 

therefore, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)’s right of voluntary dismissal is subject to the PLRA.” 

(citing Hines v. Graham, 320 F. Supp. 2d 511, 524 (N.D. Tex. 2004))). 

In both Burley and Hines, the courts had spent considerable resources 

screening the plaintiff’s claims, and the notices of voluntary dismissal were filed to 

avoid an imminent dismissal on the merits and a strike under the PLRA. See also 

Large v. Beckham Cnty. Dist. Court, 558 F. App’x 827, 828-29 (10th Cir. 2013) (“While 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows for voluntary dismissal without a court order where the 

opposing party has not yet served an answer or motion for summary judgment, Mr. 

Large cannot use it to avoid the effect of a ‘strike’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) once his 

case was already screened and found meritless.” (citations omitted)). 

But a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 

concluded that a pro se prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis in an action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 retained the right to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit without prejudice 

even after a magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed with 

prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Thomas v. Phillips, 83 F. App’x 661, 661-62 

(5th Cir. 2003) (not specifically mentioning the PLRA). 

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As explained to Odom through an order entered March 1, 2023, 

[h]ere, the Court has begun to screen Odom’s claims but has yet to find 

them meritless. So, in response to Odom’s motion, the Court does not yet 

know whether his claims will ever be served and, if they are, if discovery 

will ever be allowed. See, e.g., Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 312 (5th 

Cir. 2022) (“When defendants assert qualified immunity in a motion to 

dismiss, the district court may not defer ruling on that assertion. It may 

not permit discovery – ‘cabined or otherwise’ – against immunityasserting defendants before it has determined plaintiffs have pleaded 

facts sufficient to overcome the defense.” (citation omitted)). 

Regardless, at least at this stage of this case, Rule 41(a)(1) still 

arguably provides Odom an “absolute right to dismiss [his] lawsuit.” 

Thomas, 83 F. App’x at 662. Such a dismissal will be without prejudice 

and will not count as a strike under the PLRA. 

But, because through his filing [Dkt. No. 28], Odom does not 

clearly express his intent to voluntarily dismiss this lawsuit, he must 

file a written response to this order by March 31, 2023 to either express 

his clear intent to dismiss this lawsuit (without prejudice) or notify the 

Court that he elects for the Court to further screen his amended 

allegations under the PLRA. 

Dkt. No. 29 at 3-4. 

Odom responded timely, informing the Court that he did “wish [for] the court 

to further screen [his] amended allegations to date.” Dkt. No. 30. 

The Court should therefore terminate Odom’s motion to dismiss. 

II. Odom fails to allege plausible claims, so his request for a TRO 

should be denied and his complaint as amended should be 

dismissed. 

The operative complaint is the amended complaint that the Court allowed 

Odom to file. But, because, in the amended complaint, Odom arguably references 

earlier filings, see Dkt. No. 19 at 2, the undersigned has, out of an abundance of 

caution, also reviewed the allegations in the original, superseded complaint, see King 

v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“An amended complaint 

supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended 

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complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier 

pleading.” (citing Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985))).

But, even considering all these factual assertions, Odom still has not alleged a 

plausible constitutional violation. 

First, insofar as Odom complains about how his grievances have been handled 

by the jail, such complaints do not plausibly allege a constitutional violation, as a 

prisoner does not have a constitutional right to have grievances resolved to his 

satisfaction. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005) (“As he relies 

on a legally nonexistent interest, any alleged due process violation arising from the 

alleged failure to investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.”); see also

Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App’x 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that 

the plaintiff had no actionable Section 1983 claim based on prison officials’ failure to 

process his grievances because he had no protected liberty interest in the processing 

of grievances); Lijadu v. I.N.S., Civ. A. No. 06-0518, 2007 WL 837285, at *3 (W.D. La. 

Feb. 21, 2007) (“[D]etainees do not have a constitutionally protected right to a 

grievance procedure – much less one that complies with their own personal 

preferences.” (cleaned up)). 

A prison system is not required to establish grievance procedures, 

and the failure of a jail or prison to establish or adhere to a grievance 

procedure does not rise to the level of an actionable constitutional claim. 

Accordingly, inmates have no basis for a civil rights lawsuit simply 

because they are unhappy with grievance procedures. [So a court should 

dismiss associated claims] with prejudice, as allowing [leave] to amend 

the grievance claim would be futile. 

Cornett v. Edge, No. 3:20-cv-89-M-BN, 2020 WL 890387, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 

2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b); Archie v. May, Civ. No. 13-3185, 2014 WL 993506, 

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at *3 & n.1 (W.D. La. Mar. 13, 2014) (collecting cases)), rec. accepted, 2020 WL 888535 

(N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2020). 

Odom next alleges claims of negligence against a defendant identified as Nurse 

Lloyd. To survive dismissal on this claim, Odom must “plead facts sufficient to show” 

that a negligence claim has “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, 

and directly events” that he contends entitle him to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 

Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)). 

But Odom fails to include such allegations. 

And, even if he had, to allege a constitutional violation based on the medical 

care that he has received at the jail requires, at a minimum, that Odom plead facts 

from which the Court may infer a due process violation based on deliberate 

indifference. See, e.g., Coker v. Dall. Cnty. Jail, No. 3:05-cv-05-M, 2007 WL 3022575, 

at *16 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007) (The “deliberate indifference standard [as defined in 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994),] is the appropriate standard for all denial of 

medical care claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (citing Hare v. 

City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc))). 

“‘Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’ but can be 

satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope v. 

Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal 

Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)). That is, “[d]eliberate indifference is a 

degree of culpability beyond mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must 

amount to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” 

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Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting 

James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne 

v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 

F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) (“‘[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely 

from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious 

harm.’ Rather, ‘the plaintiff must show that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored 

his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar 

conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.”’” 

(citations omitted)). 

So, alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide 

additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 

239 F.3d at 756; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997). 

And none of Odom’s allegations reflect that jail employees ignored his 

complaints or otherwise show “a wanton disregard for [his] serious medical needs.” 

Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Next, to the extent that Odom alleges other claims against Sheriff Garrett and 

Jail Administrator Caulkins in their individual capacities, Odom fails to include facts 

to show how either defendant allegedly harmed him. Cf. Isaac v. Glennis, 32 F.3d 

566, 1994 WL 442429, at *2 (5th Cir. July 29, 1994) (noting that the limitations 

applicable to alleging municipal liability “also apply when a sheriff or similar official 

is sought to be held liable for acts of his subordinates” (citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 

F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987))). 

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The Court should therefore dismiss Odom’s complaint as amended and 

necessarily deny his request for a TRO, as Odom has, at a minimum, failed to show 

“a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits” – merely the first of the 

four requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction, “an extraordinary remedy 

which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has ‘clearly carried the 

burden of persuasion’ on all four requirements.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of 

Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252, 253 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also

Young v. LeBlanc, Civ. A. No. 17-6329, 2019 WL 1199099, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 

2019) (“Courts have repeatedly recognized the delicate nature of issuing injunctions 

that are requested in the prison setting. Specifically, federal courts, due to judicial 

restraint, reluctantly interfere with matters dealing with prison operations. Federal 

courts give a range of deference to the decisions of prison administrators when it 

pertains to matters of prison administration, including discipline and the status of 

inmates.” (citing Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1990))). 

Leave to Amend 

While the Court should deny Odom’s pending motion to amend, as the 

amended (or supplemental) allegations set out therein are deficient for the reasons 

set out above – and thus the pending request for leave is futile – the time to file 

objections to this recommendation (further explained below) allows Odom an 

opportunity to explain how the fatal pleading deficiencies identified above can be 

cured and thus show the Court that this case should not be dismissed at this time 

and that the Court should instead grant leave to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 

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Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give 

leave to amend when justice so requires, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), but a movant must 

give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how 

those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. Thomas v. Chevron 

U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). If the plaintiff does not provide a copy 

of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court 

may deny leave. McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 

2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs ‘failed to amend their 

complaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district court with a proposed 

amended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the defendants to the 

substance of their proposed amendment’).”). 

And, if Odom fails to show that leave to amend should be granted, the Court 

should dismiss this case with prejudice. 

Recommendation

The Court should terminate Plaintiff Michael Odom’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. 

No. 28], deny his motion for leave to amend [Dkt. No. 20], deny his motion for a 

temporary restraining order [Dkt. No. 21], and dismiss Odom’s claims as amended 

with prejudice unless he shows a basis to grant further leave to amend the complaint. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

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P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: April 13, 2023 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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