UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

G&G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS,

LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00986-P

NO TE LEVANTES HONEY, LLC, ET AL.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. ECF 

No. 11. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part the Motion. 

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a prize fight. On November 2, 2019, Santos Saul 

Alvarez Barragan, known to most as Canelo Alvarez, fought Sergey 

Kovalev (the “Event”). As with any Canelo fight, millions of fans tuned 

in to watch the pay-per-view and a large percentage of viewers—

including Defendants—likely did so illegally. Plaintiff G&G Closed 

Circuit Events, LLC (“G&G”) had the exclusive rights to sublicense the 

right to exhibit the Event. Thus, every illegal stream or pirated link cut 

into their bottom line. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ restaurant—No Te Levantes Honey

(the “Establishment”)—used a pirated stream to show the fight to their 

patrons in violation of federal law. On the night of the event, Plaintiff 

sent an auditor to the Establishment to view the potential violation. The 

auditor claims to have seen the Event showing at the Establishment. 

Plaintiff later found out that the Event was also advertised on the 

Establishment’s social media beforehand. 

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Because of these violations Plaintiff sued. Defendants, however, 

failed to respond. The Clerk issued entry of default as a result. The 

Court now reviews this Motion for Default Judgement. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A plaintiff may move for default judgment under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). Courts use a three-step analysis 

to determine whether a party can secure a default judgment. See N.Y. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). First, a party 

must fail to respond or otherwise defend against an action. Id. Second, 

an entry of default must be entered when the default is established by 

affidavit or otherwise. Id. Third, a party must apply to the court for a 

default judgment. Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Procedural Requirements 

The Court must now determine whether default is procedurally 

warranted here. In doing so, the Court considers whether: (1) there is 

an issue of material fact; (2) substantial prejudice is present; (3) proper 

grounds for default are clearly established; (4) the defaulting party 

made a good faith mistake or committed excusable neglect; (5) default 

judgment would be a harsh remedial measure; and (6) the Court would 

feel obligated to set aside default upon a defendant’s motion. See Lindsey 

v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).

First, Plaintiff filed a well-pleaded complaint alleging facts that raise 

a right to relief. Because Defendants have failed to answer or otherwise 

respond, they admit Plaintiff’s non-conclusory allegations, except those 

relating to the amount of damages. See Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 

515, 525 n.29 (5th. Cir. 2002). Second, Defendants’ failure to answer or 

otherwise respond to the complaint brought the adversarial process to a 

halt, causing substantial prejudice to Plaintiff and its claims. In the 

inverse, Defendants have had ample opportunity to answer or otherwise 

respond and they face no substantial prejudice in doing so. Third, 

Defendants’ continued failure to participate in this litigation establishes

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the requisite grounds for default. Fourth, there is no reason to believe 

that Defendants are acting under a good-faith mistake or excusable 

neglect given they have made no efforts to reply nor expounded any

communications to either this Court or the Plaintiff. Fifth, a default 

judgment is not deemed harsh because it is the exact procedural device 

necessary for the Court to maintain its docket’s efficiency. See Arch Ins. 

Co. v. WM Masters & Assoc., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-2092-M, 2013 WL 145502,

at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2013).

Plaintiff properly served Defendants, Defendants have failed to 

appear, and Defendants are in default. Such circumstances satisfy the 

procedural requirement for default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). Sixth, 

nothing in the record suggests the Court would set aside its default if 

Defendants moved for such relief.

The Court concludes that default is procedurally warranted. 

B. Entitlement to Judgment

The Court next assesses whether the factual content of the pleadings 

provide a sufficient basis for default judgment. See Nishimatsu Constr. 

Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat’l. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).

Although defendants in default are considered to have conceded the 

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, the Court must evaluate the 

pleadings to ensure the complaint’s sufficiency. Id. at 1201. District 

courts refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to determine the 

adequacy of pleadings. See Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 

788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that a pleading complying 

with Rule 8 is sufficient for default judgment under Rule 55). Under 

Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must provide a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV.P. 8(A)(2). 

The pleadings must ultimately give Defendants sufficient notice of the 

claims alleged against them and their underlying bases. See Wooten, 788 

F.3d at 498. While the factual allegations need not be exhaustive, they 

must raise a right to relief beyond mere speculation and offer more than 

unsubstantiated accusations. Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 

605 and that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Section 605 of the Federal 

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Communications Act governs the “unauthorized publication or use of 

communications.” 47 U.S.C. § 605. It states in full:

No person not being authorized by the sender shall 

intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish 

the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or 

meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. 

No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist 

in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by 

radio and use such communication (or any information 

therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of 

another not entitled thereto. 

No person having received any intercepted radio

communication or having become acquainted with the 

contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 

communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such 

communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish 

the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or 

meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) or 

use such communication (or any information therein 

contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another 

not entitled thereto.

Id. 

In short, a party violates Section 605 by “[the] unauthorized 

interception of satellite or cable transmissions.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. 

v. Morelia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 809, 815 (N.D. Tex. 2015). 

Plaintiff’s complaint easily demonstrates this level of violation. 

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants intercepted and received or 

assisted in the interception and receipt of the transmission of the Event, 

and broadcast or assisted in the broadcast of the Event to the patrons of 

Defendants’ Establishment.” See ECF No. 11-1 at 8. As evidence of this, 

Plaintiff claims via sworn affidavit that an “[a]uditor entered 

Defendants’ Establishment and personally observed the Event being 

exhibited on one of the television[s] to the patrons inside of Defendants’ 

Establishment.” See Id. at 40. The auditor further claims that he

“personally witnessed the fifth (5th) round of the Blair Cobbs and Carlos 

Ortiz undercard bout.” Id. Lastly, Plaintiff claims the Establishment 

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advertised on social media that “the Event would be shown at the 

Establishment.” See Id. at 69.

Plaintiff properly establishes that a violation of Section 605 of the 

Federal Communications Act occurred. The Court next turns to analyze 

the applicable damages. 

C. Entitlement to Damages 

When a defendant defaults, “the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual 

allegations are taken as true, except regarding damages.” Jackson, 302 

F.3d at 525. Damages must be proven by a hearing or a demonstration 

of detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts. See United Artists 

Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). However, a hearing 

is unnecessary if the amount of damages can be determined with 

mathematical calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting 

documents. Id.

Here, Plaintiff requests three types of damages: (1) statutory; (2) 

punitive; and (3) attorney’s fees. See ECF No. 11 at 3. The Court 

addresses the validity of each in turn. 

1. Statutory Damages 

Because Plaintiff has established that Defendants displayed an 

intercepted communication, it may elect to recover statutory damages 

for this violation under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i). The statutory sum 

available is “not less than $1,000.00 or more than $10,000.00.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 605(e)(3)(c)(i)(II). If the Court finds that a violation was committed 

“willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or 

private financial gain,” it may, in its discretion, increase the damage 

awarded by an amount of not more than $100,000. Id. An aggrieved 

party who prevails shall receive full costs, including reasonable 

attorney’s fees. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).

Plaintiff seeks the maximum statutory sum of $10,000. The record 

supports this request. Once again, Plaintiff provides sufficient evidence 

of Defendants’ violation via affidavit. The auditor was present and saw 

the violation along with the social media posts advertising the event. 

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for statutory 

damages and finds that $10,000 is an appropriate amount.

2. Punitive Damages 

If a violation was committed “willfully” or “for the purpose of direct 

or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain,” the court 

may increase damages by “not less than $10,000.00 and not more than 

$100,000.00.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(c)(ii). 

The record shows that there were already a dozen people present for 

just the undercard fights at the Establishment. See ECF No. 11-1 at 40. 

This undoubtedly led to commercial advantage and private financial 

gain. Further, the willful nature of the violation is evident due to

Defendants having advertised the broadcast in advance on social media.

Id. at 69. This was not a rogue employee with control of an HDMI cord, 

this was an intentional broadcast, advertised beforehand, for the 

purpose of increasing business at the Establishment. The record thus 

supports an additional damages award of $10,000 for a willful violation.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for additional 

damages and awards Plaintiff the sum of $10,000. The Court now turns 

to address Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees. 

3. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff requests an award of attorney’s fees. And as the prevailing 

party, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of its costs, including reasonable 

attorney’s fees. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii). Thus, Plaintiff requests 

either (1) “an award of one-third of the actual and additional damages 

awarded to Plaintiff for the prosecution of this action through the final 

judgment requested” or (2) attorney’s fees based on the hourly time 

presented. ECF No. 11 at 12—13.

Plaintiff presents the affidavit of its counsel, David M. Diaz, in which 

he estimates his fee to be $2,400 for his time and work on this case. See 

ECF No. 11-1 at 52. This sum is based on a rate of $300 per hour and 

approximately eight hours of work. Id. Given this estimate, as well as 

the evidence and circumstances of the case, the Court finds Plaintiff's 

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request for $2,400 in attorney’s fees to be more reasonable than a onethird contingency fee ($6,600).

Although Plaintiff has not offered invoices or other evidence 

supporting the number of hours its attorney worked on this case, the 

Court accepts as reasonable Mr. Diaz’s estimate of his time and rates 

given his experience with anti-piracy cases as well as the authorities he 

provides. Id. at 47—55. Accordingly, the Court makes no adjustment to 

these figures and GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees in the 

sum of $2,400.

4. Costs and Post-Judgment Interest

While Plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs, Plaintiff has neglected 

to specify the amount of costs it seeks to recover. Moreover, Plaintiff does 

not provide any evidence establishing the costs it has incurred. As the 

Court is unable to determine the sum of the costs sought or the manner 

in which such a sum can be computed, it DENIES Plaintiff's request for 

costs at this time. Plaintiff may, however, provide supplementary 

briefing and evidence establishing the amount of costs it seeks.

The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that an equitable award of 

prejudgment interest should be granted to a prevailing plaintiff in “all 

but exceptional circumstances” Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum 

Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048, 1057 (5th Cir. 1996). Given there are no 

apparent exceptional circumstances in this case, the Court will GRANT

plaintiff’s request for post-judgment interest at a rate of 5.45% on all 

amounts awarded herein. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in 

part Plaintiff's Motion for Final Default Judgment. ECF No. 11. In 

particular, the Court:

• GRANTS Plaintiff’s requests for statutory damages in the 

amount of $10,000 and for additional damages in the amount of 

$10,000, for a total award of $20,000;

• GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees in the amount of 

$2,400;

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• DENIES Plaintiff’s request for costs of court, pending 

supplementation of the record;

• GRANTS Plaintiff's request for post-judgment interest at the 

rate of 5.45% on all amounts awarded herein.

If Plaintiff provides supplementary briefing and evidence in support of 

its request for court costs, it is ORDERED to do so on or before 

October 28, 2023.

SO ORDERED on this 28th day of September 2023.

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