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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SERAFINA LICCARDI,

 Plaintiff,

v.

IAN SHORR; PARAMOUNT 

PICTURES/VIACOM; JEFF BEZOS; 

AMAZON PRIME VIDEO; and 

AMAZON.COM WORLDWIDE 

DISTRIBUTION, 

Defendants.

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Case No. 3:22-cv-02423-K-BT

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court in this trademark and copyright infringement case is 

Defendants Paramount Pictures/Viacom, Jeff Bezos, and Amazon.com Services 

LLC’s (the “Moving Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 

33). Specifically, the Moving Defendants seek dismissal of pro se Plaintiff Serafina 

Liccardi’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim as to all Defendants, and 

for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Defendant Jeff Bezos. For the reasons 

explained, the District Court should GRANT the motion and DISMISS all of 

Liccardi’s claims and causes of action. The District Court should also DENY

Liccardi’s requests to further amend her pleadings (ECF Nos. 35, 41, 42), as 

amendment would be futile. 

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Background

This case arises out of Liccardi’s allegations that Ian Shorr and the Moving 

Defendants plagiarized her autobiography, turned it into a movie titled Infinite, 

and distributed the movie worldwide for profit, in violation of federal intellectual 

property laws. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 30). While the Amended Complaint and 

Response to the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire are somewhat difficult to parse, 

the Court liberally construes Liccardi’s pleadings to assert three claims: copyright 

infringement, trademark infringement, and fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.1

See id. at 9 (ECF No. 30); Am. Resp. Quest. 5 (ECF No. 31). 

Succinctly stated, Liccardi alleges that she is the author of “The Return of 

the Divine Seraphim” (the “Autobiography”), an “autobiographical work of art 

based on [her] real-life experience of a Divine Intervention.” See Am. Compl. 11. 

(ECF No. 30). On October 13, 2021, she discovered that Defendant Ian Shorr had 

“pirated and plagiarized” her Autobiography for a movie called Infinite, using the 

premise from the first page of her book: “[a] Super-hero that comes to save the 

earth continuously through time.” Id. at 12 (ECF No. 30). Liccardi further alleges 

that she confronted Shorr on Twitter, and that his response was to post a tweet 

stating that “if a spec script has been around long enough, it should be considered 

a piece of established IP by the studio system”—admitting, according to Liccardi, 

to “plucking [her] story out of a ‘system.’” Id. (ECF No. 30). She alleges that 

1 Liccardi’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30) is the live pleading in this action. 

See Order (ECF No. 44).

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Paramount Pictures/Viacom produced the movie; the movie is streaming on 

Amazon Prime Video and being distributed worldwide; and Shorr and the Moving 

Defendants are profiting from the misuse of her intellectual property. Id. at 14 

(ECF No. 30). 

Defendants Paramount Pictures/Viacom, Jeff Bezos, and Amazon.com 

Services LLC2 filed the pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) and Brief in 

Support (ECF No. 34), arguing that the Court should dismiss Liccardi’s claims 

because she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to all 

Defendants, and because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Bezos. The 

Moving Defendants further point out that Liccardi has not properly served Ian 

Shorr, also named as Defendant in her Amended Complaint, but that all their 

arguments in the Motion apply equally to the claims against him. Liccardi failed to 

timely file a response to the Motion to Dismiss. Instead, three months later, she 

filed a Request for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 35), which 

Defendants oppose (ECF Nos. 36, 37), as well as two other submissions which the 

Court construes as requests for leave to further amend her pleadings (ECF Nos. 41, 

42). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Liccardi’s requests for leave to amend are 

ripe for determination. 

2 Amazon.com Services LLC avers that Liccardi incorrectly names it as Amazon 

Prime Video in the Amended Complaint. See Discl. (ECF No. 15). Liccardi also 

names Amazon.com Worldwide Distribution as Defendant, another entity that 

Defendants contend does not exist. See Br. 1 n.1 (ECF No. 34). 

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Legal Standards and Analysis

I. Moving Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

To survive Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Liccardi’s 

complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Liccardi’s factual 

allegations must “‘raise [her] right to relief above the speculative level,’” but they 

do not need to be detailed. Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 837 F.3d 523, 533 (5th 

Cir. 2016) (citing Rosenblatt v. United Way of Greater Hous., 607 F.3d 413, 417 

(5th Cir. 2010)). Liccardi claims have facial plausibility if she “pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556).

The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the 

complaint in the light most favorable to [Liccardi].” In re Great Lakes Dredge & 

Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 

F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). However, the Court does not accept as true 

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” 

Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Plotkin v. IP 

Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)).

Additionally, it is well-established that “pro se complaints are held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Miller v. Stanmore, 

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636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)). However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is 

proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, pleadings must show specific, wellpleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank 

of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 

881 (5th Cir. 1989)). 

Judged against these standards, the Court should dismiss Liccardi’s claims 

against Defendants due to her failure to state a claim. As to her copyright 

infringement claim, Defendants argue that Liccardi has failed to sufficiently allege 

that Defendants had a reasonable opportunity for access to the Autobiography or 

that the Autobiography and the movie Infinite are substantially similar. See Br. 7 

(ECF No. 34). Defendants further argue that Liccardi does not state a claim for 

trademark infringement because she has not sufficiently alleged that there is a 

likelihood of confusion between the two works. See id. at 14–15 (ECF No. 34). 

Finally, Defendants argue that Liccardi’s fraud claim fails because there is no 

private right of action for such a claim. See id. at 16 (ECF No. 34). 

A. Copyright Infringement

To avoid dismissal of her copyright infringement claim, Liccardi must plead 

sufficient facts to show (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of 

constituent elements that are original. Architettura, Inc. v. DSGN Assoc., Inc., 

2018 WL 3575878, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2018) (citing Armour v. Knowles, 512 

F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2007)). The first element requires allegations that the work 

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is original, can be copyrighted, and that the plaintiff has complied with statutory 

formalities. Id. (citing Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107–08 (5th Cir. 

2007)). The second element requires allegations of both factual copying and 

substantial similarity. Id. A plaintiff can establish factual copying by direct or 

circumstantial evidence; the latter of which requires a showing that (1) the 

defendant had access to the copyrighted work and (2) the two works contain 

similarities that are probative of copying. Id. Substantial similarity requires that 

the copyrighted expressions in the two works are sufficiently alike that the 

copyright to the original has been infringed. Id. To determine whether two works 

are substantially similar, the court should make a side-by-side comparison 

between the original and the copy to determine whether a layperson would view 

the two works as substantially similar. Vallery v. American Girl, LLC, 697 F. App’x 

821, 824 (5th Cir. 2017).

Here, Defendants do not dispute that Liccardi has satisfied the standard for 

pleading the first element of a copyright infringement claim in that she alleges that 

she holds a valid copyright for her work. See Br. 5 (ECF No. 34). But Defendants

argue that Liccardi’s pleading falls short in several respects as to the remaining 

elements: factual copying and substantial similarity. First, they argue that Liccardi 

has not provided sufficient factual allegations of direct copying, nor has she 

sufficiently alleged that Defendants had access to her copyrighted work as would 

be required to plead factual copying by circumstantial evidence. See id. at 7–8 (ECF 

No. 34). They also argue that Liccardi’s Amended Complaint does not allege any 

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substantial similarities between the protectable elements of the two works beyond 

what she describes as the “premise” of her Autobiography. Id. at 8–11 (ECF No. 

34). 

Indeed, Liccardi does not allege that Defendants directly copied her 

Autobiography; nor has she put forth facts that support a plausible allegation that 

Defendants had access to her work. A plaintiff in a copyright infringement case is 

required to plead that a defendant had “a reasonable probability of access” to the 

copyrighted work in order to plausibly allege factual copying by circumstantial 

evidence. See Knowles, 512 F.3d at 152. Access has been defined to include “an 

opportunity to view the copyrighted work.” Architettura, Inc., 2018 WL 3575878, 

at *5 (quoting Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978)). 

Although Liccardi includes an allegation in her Amended Complaint that her 

Autobiography was “established and circulating” on the internet “well before Ian 

Shorr plagiarized it,” Am. Compl. 11 (ECF No. 30), her allegation is wholly 

conclusory. She puts forth no specific facts in the Amended Complaint that would 

plausibly allege that any Defendant viewed or had an opportunity to view her

Autobiography. She has alleged that Ian Shorr was active on Twitter at one point 

in time, but not that her Autobiography was accessible on Twitter or elsewhere that 

any Defendant could have found it. See Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 503 (5th

Cir. 2020) (a work’s widespread dissemination in a relevant market may show a 

“reasonable opportunity for access”). Her allegations fail to raise any right to relief 

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above the speculative level. Knowles, 512 F.3d at 153 (“bare possibility” of access 

is insufficient to satisfy requirement to show “reasonable probability of access”).

Liccardi also falls short on the final element of her copyright claim, 

substantial similarity, by failing to allege that “the copyrighted expressions in the 

two works are sufficiently alike that the copyright to the original work has been 

infringed.” Knowles, 512 F.3d at 152. The court must make a side-by-side 

comparison3 of the original and the alleged copy to determine whether a layperson

would view the two works as substantially similar. See Vallery v. American Girl, 

LLC, 697 F. App’x 821, 824 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts may often decide substantial 

similarity as a matter of law, on either a motion to dismiss or on summary 

judgment. Randolph v. Dimension Films, 630 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746 (S.D. Tex. 

2009).

Although Liccardi alleges in her Amended Complaint that Shorr “used the 

entire premise from the very first page of [her] book VERBATIM,” Am. Compl. 

12 (ECF No. 30) (emphasis in original), she does not highlight any factual 

similarities whatsoever between her book and Infinite, nor does she plead that the 

two works are substantially similar at all, beyond this generalized “premise.” 

Liccardi does not explain where in the film the premise appears “verbatim.” In fact, 

Liccardi points out the differences between the two works in her Amended 

3 Liccardi did not provide the Court with a copy of her Autobiography, either with 

her Original or her Amended Complaint, but both the Autobiography and Infinite

appear in the record in their entirety as appendices to Defendants’ Brief in Support 

of their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF Nos. 27-1, 27-2). 

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Questionnaire, alleging that Shorr “eliminat[ed] Jesus Christ and the Spirit God 

Himself” and “turned the true story of [her] encounter with the Holy Spirit into a 

fake Hollywood piece of junk.” Am. Resp. Quest. 2 (ECF No. 31). Without 

identifying the protectable elements of her book that are substantially similar to 

Infinite, Liccardi cannot state a claim of copyright infringement that is plausible 

on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Even if Liccardi had pointed the Court to any similarities, a comparison of

the two works reveals that there are no “articulable similarities between the plot, 

themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, [or] sequence of events.” 

Randolph, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 746. Liccardi’s Autobiography and the film Infinite

share no characters in common, nor does Infinite track the plot, setting, or themes

of the Autobiography. As Defendants point out, and as Liccardi explains in her 

Amended Complaint, Liccardi’s work is a “collection of original illustrations, 

poetry, and narrative musings” based on her own life and experience. See Br. 17 

(ECF No. 34); Am. Compl. 11 (ECF No. 30) (describing the Autobiography as “a 

work of art based on [Liccardi’s] real-life experience of a divine intervention” and 

“a work of art based on the correlation of [her] name, Serafina, and the biblical 

angel of God”). The film Infinite, on the other hand, follows “a male character who 

is capable of remembering his past lives and joins forces with his fellow ‘Infinites’ 

to stop an endless cycle of life and reincarnation.” Br. 17 (ECF No. 34). The Court 

should conclude that a layperson would not find substantial similarity—or indeed, 

any similarity at all—between Liccardi’s Autobiography and Infinite, and dismiss 

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her claim in its entirety. See Randolph, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 747–48 (dismissing a 

copyright claim for failure to allege substantial similarity where the characters, 

plot, themes, and tones of the works were very different). 

Because Liccardi has failed to sufficiently allege facts to plead factual 

copying and substantial similarity, both essential elements of her claim of 

copyright infringement, the Court should dismiss this claim. 

B. Trademark Infringement

In her Amended Response to the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire, Liccardi 

alleges that Defendant Ian Shorr used a trademark protected design from the cover 

of her book—an upright infinity sign in the shape of an hourglass—“on the cover of 

his plagiarized book, which is likely to cause confusion with [her] original 

protected designed bookcover [sic].” See Am. Resp. Quest. 2 (ECF No. 31). 

Defendants respond that Liccardi has not alleged facts to show that the mark is 

legally protectable or show a likelihood of confusion, and therefore that she has not 

stated a claim of trademark infringement. 

To state a claim for trademark infringement, “a plaintiff must first show that 

the mark is legally protectable and must then establish infringement by showing a 

likelihood of confusion.” Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 

329 (5th Cir. 2008). To be protectable, a mark “must be distinctive, either 

inherently or by achieving secondary meaning in the mind of the public.” Id. A 

likelihood of confusion is “the gravamen for any action of trademark 

infringement.” Jim S. Adler, PC v. McNeil Cons. LLC, 10 F.4th 422, 426 (5th Cir. 

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2021). Courts use a non-exhaustive list of factors to evaluate whether there is a 

likelihood of confusion: (1) the type of trademark; (2) mark similarity; (3) product 

similarity; (4) outlet and purchaser identity; (5) advertising media identity; (6) 

defendant's intent; (7) actual confusion; and (8) care exercised by potential 

purchasers. Id. at 427. The likelihood of confusion element is fact-intensive, but 

“where the factual allegations regarding consumer confusion are implausible [], a 

district court may dismiss a complaint on the basis that a plaintiff failed to allege a 

likelihood of confusion.” Id. at 428–29. 

Here, Liccardi has not alleged a claim of trademark infringement. First, the 

Amended Complaint and Questionnaire are devoid of any facts suggesting that the 

design at issue—“an upright infinity sign in the shape of an hourglass”—is actually 

a registered mark or that the generic mathematical symbol is distinctive in any way 

that would make it protectable by law. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 30); Am. Resp. 

Quest. (ECF No. 31). Indeed, Liccardi has not alleged sufficient facts to show her 

design is eligible for protection because she fails to allege it has ever been used in 

commerce. F.M.D. Holdings, LLC v. Regent Fin. Corp., 2021 WL 5883136, at *21 

(N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2021) (explaining that a party seeking to assert trademarkrelated claims under the Lanham Act must generally show the mark was “used in 

commerce”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)). Use in commerce means the bona fide 

use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Liccardi fails to 

allege that her work has ever been sold, or even offered for sale, in the ordinary 

course of trade. In the absence of such allegations, Liccardi fails to state a claim of 

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trademark infringement. See Sgromo v. Bestway Enter. Co. Ltd., 2019 WL 

4686719, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 

2019 WL 4673756 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss 

trademark claim because plaintiff provided no facts to show use in commerce).

Further, beyond the conclusory statement that the cover of Infinite is “likely to 

cause confusion with [her] original protected designed bookcover [sic],” Liccardi 

includes no other factual allegations that would raise her claim beyond speculation 

to a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Because Liccardi includes no plausible facts to support her claim of 

trademark infringement, the Court should dismiss this claim. 

C. Fraud

Liccardi’s third claim is for fraud under the federal mail fraud statute, 18 

U.S.C. § 1341. She alleges throughout her Amended Complaint and Amended 

Questionnaire that Defendants’ fraud has caused her “irreparable harm.” See Am. 

Compl. 4 (ECF No. 30); Am. Resp. Quest. 4 (ECF No. 31). However, as Defendants 

point out in their Motion to Dismiss, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 is a criminal statute that 

provides no private cause of action. Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 

(5th Cir. 1977) (“We agree with the district court that our [prior decision] forecloses 

any such claim of a private right of action under [18 U.S.C. § 1341]”); Gipson v. 

Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2015 WL 11120538, *19 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2015)

(dismissing plaintiff’s 18 U.S.C. § 1341 claim because there is no private cause of 

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action available). Because there is no private cause of action available under the 

federal mail fraud statute, the Court should dismiss Liccardi’s fraud claims. 

D. Claims against Defendant Ian Shorr 

Liccardi has not properly served Defendant Ian Shorr and he has not 

appeared in this lawsuit. See Proof of Service (ECF No. 21) (indicating that the U.S. 

Marshal was unable to serve Shorr at the address Liccardi provided, as it was not 

his place of employment); Notice (ECF No. 20) (providing the Court with what 

Liccardi believes to be Ian Shorr’s address). Nonetheless, the Court should dismiss 

Liccardi’s claims against him along with the claims against the Moving Defendants. 

The Fifth Circuit has held that where a defending party establishes that a plaintiff 

has no cause of action, this defense generally also inures to the benefit of a 

defaulting defendant, and district courts have extended this holding to unserved

defendants. Armendariz v. Chowaiki, 2016 WL 8856919, *19 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 

2016) (citing Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001)); Roa v. City of 

Denison, 2017 WL 9287012, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4675062 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2017) (dismissing 

claims against unserved defendants upon finding that plaintiff had failed to state a 

claim against the appearing defendants, “as defaulting and/or unserved 

defendants may generally derive the benefit of a defendant party’s demonstration 

that the plaintiff has no cause of action”). Here, Liccardi asserts the same claims 

against Shorr as against the Moving Defendants, and the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is 

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not unique to any Defendant. Therefore, the Court should dismiss Liccardi’s claims 

against Shorr alongside her claims against the Moving Defendants. 

II. Bezos’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion

A federal court has jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the state 

long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant, and if the 

exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process under the United States 

Constitution. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 418 

(5th Cir. 1993). Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal 

due process, Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990), the Court 

must determine whether (1) defendants have established “minimum contacts” with 

the forum state; and (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Ruston Gas, 9 F.3d at 418 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945)).

The first prong is satisfied when a defendant “purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits 

and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 

(1985). The nonresident defendant’s availment must be such that the defendant 

“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the forum state. WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). This test “ensures 

that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ 

‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party 

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or a third person.’” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted). The 

“minimum contacts” prong of the inquiry may be subdivided into contacts that give 

rise to “specific” personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to “general” personal 

jurisdiction. Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Specific jurisdiction is only appropriate when the nonresident defendant’s contacts 

with the forum state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action. 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). 

The exercise of general personal jurisdiction is proper when the nonresident 

defendant’s contacts with the forum state, even if unrelated to the cause of action, 

are continuous, systematic, and substantial. Id. at 414 n.9. In evaluating the second 

prong of the due process test, the court must examine a number of factors in order 

to determine fairness and reasonableness, including: (1) the defendant’s burden; 

(2) the forum state’s interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective 

relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of controversies; and 

(5) the state’s shared interest in furthering social policies. Asahi Metals Indus. Co. 

v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing a prima facie case for the court’s jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant. See Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1993); 

Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). The court may determine 

the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral 

testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery. Stuart, 772 

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F.2d at 1192. Uncontroverted allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint must be taken 

as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be 

resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 

1990). After a plaintiff makes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 

defendant to present “a compelling case that the presence of some other 

consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 

477.

The Court should dismiss Liccardi’s claims against Defendant Jeff Bezos 

because Liccardi has not carried her burden of establishing this Court’s personal 

jurisdiction over Bezos. When faced with a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, the party 

seeking to assert jurisdiction—here, Liccardi—must present sufficient facts to 

make out a prima facie case supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Alpine 

View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000). In other words, 

in response to Bezos’s argument that personal jurisdiction is improper, it was 

Liccardi’s burden to show that Bezos in fact had minimum contacts with the state 

of Texas and that fair play and substantial justice would not be offended by 

subjecting him to jurisdiction here. 

Liccardi has failed to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

Bezos would be proper. She references Bezos only once in the Amended Complaint, 

on the “Certificate of Interested Persons” page, where she provides his name and 

an address in Washington. See Am. Compl. 2 (ECF No. 30). He does not appear in 

the Statement of Facts, Statement of Claim, or Summary of Facts sections of the 

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Amended Complaint. See generally id. (ECF No. 30). And Liccardi did not file a 

Response to Defendants’ Motion, where she might have provided additional 

argument that would establish Bezos’s possible minimum contacts with Texas. 

Liccardi’s Amended Response to the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire is similarly 

devoid of any factual allegations related to Bezos or his potential contacts with 

Texas, mentioning only her conclusion that Bezos “[d]istribut[ed] and [gained

financially] from Plagiarized/Counterfeit book and movie without permission—

currently.” Am. Resp. Quest. 3 (ECF No. 31). 

Given that Liccardi’s Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations 

whatsoever that would support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over 

Bezos, the Court should find that Liccardi has failed to satisfy her burden here, 

despite the liberal pleading standards afforded to pro se litigants. Smith v. Skopos 

Fin., LLC, 2019 WL 2374883, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2019) (Horan, J.), report 

and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1552033 (N.D. Tex. April 10, 2019)

(granting defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss because “[plaintiffs] failed to 

respond to [defendant’s] 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss—much less have they come 

forward to establish a prima facie case that the Court has jurisdiction over 

[defendant]”). The Court should grant the Moving Defendants’ 12(b)(2) motion to 

dismiss and dismiss all claims as they relate to Bezos for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. 

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III. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) provides that “[a] party may 

amend its pleading once as a matter of course.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Thereafter, 

“a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or 

the court’s leave. Id. Leave to amend “is by no means automatic” and is “entrusted 

to the sound discretion of the district court.” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 

427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Quintanilla v. Tex. Television, Inc., 139 

F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1988)). But Rule 15(a) requires that courts freely grant leave 

to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see Lyn-Lea Travel 

Corp. v. Am. Airlines, 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that motions for 

“leave to amend [should be granted] ‘freely,’ and the language of this rule ‘evinces 

a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.’”). The court may consider a variety of 

factors when deciding whether to grant leave to amend, “including undue delay, 

bad faith or dilatory motive on the party of the movant, repeated failures to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of the amendment.” 

Jones, 427 F.3d at 994 (citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 

(5th Cir. 1981)).

More than three months after the Moving Defendants filed their Motion to 

Dismiss, Liccardi moved for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 

35), seeking to add at least 20 new defendants and raising claims apparently 

unrelated to those appearing in the Amended Complaint. See Req. Leave to Am. 

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(ECF No. 35). Defendants oppose this request. According to Defendants, Liccardi’s 

request is procedurally deficient in that she filed it without first conferring with 

them as required by the Local Rules in this District. See Br. Resp. 4 (ECF No. 37).

But more importantly, Defendants argue, the Court should deny Liccardi’s request 

to amend her complaint for a third time because the proposed amendments do 

nothing to cure the existing deficiencies in her pleadings, and further amendment 

would be futile. Id. at 5–6 (ECF No. 37). In the time since Defendants filed their 

opposition to Liccardi’s Motion to Amend, Liccardi has filed what the Court 

construes as two additional requests to amend her pleadings. (ECF Nos. 41, 42). 

When the denial of leave to amend is based on grounds of futility, the Court 

applies the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard, under which “all 

well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” and “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face,” which requires the complaint to “allow[ ] the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Carter v. H2R Rest. Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 1653622, at *4 

(N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1608751 

(N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017). If “[t]he allegations are thus enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level and the plaintiff's claim for relief is plausible on 

its face, the amendment is not futile.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). A failure 

to comply with procedural rules can also be grounds to deny a party leave to 

amend. See Shabazz v. Franklin, 380 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798 (N.D. Tex. 2005).

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First, Liccardi’s Request suffers from procedural deficiencies. It is unclear 

whether the list of new defendants and new claims Liccardi included with her 

Request comprises the entirety of her proposed third amended complaint—she did 

not append a copy of her proposed amended pleading as an exhibit, as the Local 

Rules require. See LR 15.1. Instead, she petitions the Court for leave to “include the 

following discovery of defendants to this claim [] and for the following reasons[,]”

and lists those defendants and reasons. Req. Leave to Am. (ECF No. 35). And as 

Defendants point out, Liccardi did not confer with them before filing this request 

to amend, in violation of another Local Rule. “[A]ll parties, even those who proceed 

without counsel, must abide by the local rules of this Court.” Jones v. Dretke, 2004 

WL 1698291, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2004), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2004 WL 1944054 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2004). The Court has previously 

reminded Liccardi that there are conference requirements in the Local Rules. See

E-Order (ECF No. 17). Liccardi’s additional two requests to amend suffer from the 

same deficiencies. See Mot. Am. Quest. (ECF No. 41); Mot. to File Am. (ECF No. 

42). 

However, even ignoring these procedural deficiencies and assuming that the 

list of new defendants and claims Liccardi has included in her Request comprise 

the entirety of her proposed amended pleading, the Court should deny Liccardi 

leave to amend. The proposed amendments do not address any of the deficiencies 

Defendants identify in their Motion to Dismiss, and beyond conclusory statements 

and names of proposed new Defendants, there are no new factual allegations that 

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21

would cure the deficiencies identified in Liccardi’s claims of copyright or 

trademark infringement. The Court already attempted to elicit from Liccardi 

additional facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. But her Response to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire fails to supply the necessary facts to satisfy the 

pleading standard. Liccardi also previously availed herself of the opportunity to 

amend her Complaint after Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss, and as 

discussed above, that Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim.

Allowing Liccardi to amend her complaint a third time when none of the additional 

claims appear cognizable or able to cure the deficiencies in her previous pleadings 

would be futile, and the Court should deny her leave to do so. See Carter, 2017 WL 

1653622, at *4–6. 

As the Court has already provided Liccardi with several opportunities to 

state a claim for relief, and it is clear that further amendment would be futile, the 

Court should dismiss her claims without leave to amend. Schiller v. Physicians 

Resource Grp, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). 

Conclusion

The Court should GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in its entirety and 

DISMISS Liccardi’s claims against the Moving Defendants and Ian Shorr under 

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and DISMISS her claims against Jeff 

Bezos under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court should also 

DENY Liccardi’s Request for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. 

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SO RECOMMENDED. 

December 11, 2023.

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and 

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being 

served with a copy. See U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to 

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in 

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved part from appealing the factual 

findings and legal conclusion of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted 

by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

States Automobile Ass’n. 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

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