The Civil Rights of 

Institutionalized 

Persons Act: 

Has It Fulfilled Its 

Promise? 

National Council on Disability 

August 8, 2005 
National Council on Disability 

1331 F Street, NW, Suite 850 

Washington, DC 20004 

The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act: Has It Fulfilled Its Promise? 

This report is also available in alternative formats and on the award-winning National Council on 

Disability (NCD) Web site (www.ncd.gov). 

Publication date: August 8, 2005 

202-272-2004 Voice 

202-272-2074 TTY 

202-272-2022 Fax 

The views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the Administration as 

this and all NCD documents are not subject to the A-19 Executive Branch review process. 
 National Council on Disability 


An independent federal agency making recommendations to the President and Congress 

to enhance the quality of life for all Americans with disabilities and their families. 

August 8, 2005 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

On behalf of the National Council on Disability (NCD), I am submitting a report entitled The Civil Rights 

of Institutionalized Persons Act: Has It Fulfilled Its Promise? This report is one of a series of independent 

analyses by NCD of federal enforcement of civil rights laws. 

The impetus of this series was the 1996 national disability policy summit, in which more than 300 

disability community leaders from diverse backgrounds participated. Summit participants asked NCD to 

work with federal agencies to develop strategies for improving enforcement of federal laws that protect 

the rights of people with disabilities. 

This report examines the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) enforcement of the Civil Rights of 

Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), which was enacted by Congress in 1980 to protect the rights of 

people in state-run nursing homes, mental health facilities, institutions for people with intellectual and 

developmental disabilities, and correctional facilities for children and adults. NCD’s findings reveal that 

the DOJ has enforced the statute unevenly—performing well in some areas but poorly in others. 

This report provides recommendations for ways the DOJ could better protect the rights of people in 

institutions, including adopting strategic and multifaceted enforcement, broadening the breadth of 

investigations, resolving cases through enforceable consent decrees, increasing technical assistance to 

states to help them comply with federal laws, increasing federal agency coordination to support human 

and civil rights, making better use of the press, and including more and consistent data in its annual 

reports to Congress. 

NCD stands ready to work with federal agencies, state governments, the disability community, and other 

stakeholders to improve federal protection of the rights of people in institutions. We look forward to the 

day when the civil rights all people––whether they reside in institutions or have transitioned to the 

community––are respected throughout our nation and CRIPA becomes a footnote in scholarly articles as a 

law enacted to combat institutional conditions that no longer exist. 

Sincerely, 

Lex Frieden 

Chairperson 

(The same letter of transmittal was sent to the President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate and the Speaker 

of the U.S. House of Representatives.) 

1331 F Street, NW  Suite 850  Washington, DC 20004 

202-272-2004 Voice  202-272-2074 TTY  202-272-2022 Fax  www.ncd.gov 

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2 
National Council on Disability Members and Staff 

Members 

Lex Frieden, Chairperson, Texas 

Patricia Pound, First Vice Chairperson, Texas 

Glenn Anderson, Ph.D., Second Vice Chairperson, Arkansas 

Milton Aponte, J.D., Florida 

Robert R. Davila, Ph.D., New York 

Barbara Gillcrist, New Mexico 

Graham Hill, Virginia 

Joel I. Kahn, Ph.D., Ohio 

Young Woo Kang, Ph.D., Indiana 

Kathleen Martinez, California 

Carol Novak, Florida 

Anne M. Rader, New York 

Marco Rodriguez, California 

David Wenzel, Pennsylvania 

Linda Wetters, Ohio 

Staff 

Ethel D. Briggs, Executive Director 

Jeffrey T. Rosen, General Counsel and Director of Policy 

Mark S. Quigley, Director of Communications 

Allan W. Holland, Chief Financial Officer 

Julie Carroll, Senior Attorney Advisor 

Joan M. Durocher, Senior Attorney Advisor 

Martin Gould, Ed.D., Director of Research and Technology 

Geraldine Drake Hawkins, Ph.D., Senior Program Analyst 

Mark Seifarth, Congressional Liaison 

Pamela O’Leary, Interpreter 

Brenda Bratton, Executive Assistant 

Stacey S. Brown, Staff Assistant 

Carla Nelson, Secretary 

3 
Acknowledgments 

This report is the product of a team effort and incorporates the work of several people. The 

preliminary research, interviews, and document acquisition were conducted through a contract 

with Tony Records and Associates, assisted by Bob Williams and Ruthie Beckwith. Because of 

the unevenness of data and record systems regarding the implementation of the Civil Rights of 

Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), it was necessary to scale back the scope of the work to 

produce a snapshot view instead. 

Michele Magar and Bonnie Milstein assisted the National Council on Disability (NCD) in 

refining the preliminary research results and findings to produce a draft report. Elizabeth Akinola 

assisted with the data review and analysis. 

NCD would like to thank numerous CRIPA stakeholders, including leaders in areas of research, 

law, and education, along with people with disabilities and others with expertise in consumer 

self-directed advocacy, who gave their time during the development of this report. Our 

appreciation is also extended to the staff of the Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section 

of the Department of Justice. These federal agency personnel answered many questions, gathered 

documents, and shared data with the research team. In addition, they reviewed preliminary drafts 

of this document for technical accuracy. 

4 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................7 

Recommendations..................................................................................................................... 8 

Introduction....................................................................................................................................11 

Chapter 1. CRIPA: Legislative History and Legal Developments ................................................13 

Setting the Stage: The Enactment of CRIPA .......................................................................... 13 

Legal Developments Since the Enactment of CRIPA ............................................................ 14 

Chapter 2. How the Department of Justice Enforces CRIPA ........................................................15 

Complaints .............................................................................................................................. 15 

Investigations .......................................................................................................................... 17 

Letters of Findings .................................................................................................................. 20 

Conciliation............................................................................................................................. 21 

Lawsuits .................................................................................................................................. 25 

Overarching Enforcement Issues ............................................................................................ 30 

Public Education and Outreach............................................................................................... 31 

Web Site.............................................................................................................................31 

Media .................................................................................................................................32 

Reports to Congress ................................................................................................................ 33 

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................37 

Appendix I. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act .....................................................39 

Appendix II. Data from the Department of Justice’s Annual Reports to Congress, Letters of 

Investigative Findings, Complaints, Briefs, Settlements, and Court Decisions ............................49 

Enforcement Timelines........................................................................................................... 49 

Appendix III. Department of Justice Staffing and Budget Allocations 

for CRIPA (1995–2003) ................................................................................................................63 

Appendix IV. Mission of the National Council on Disability .......................................................65 

Overview and Purpose ............................................................................................................ 65 

Specific Duties ........................................................................................................................ 65 

International ............................................................................................................................ 66 

Consumers Served and Current Activities.............................................................................. 66 

Statutory History..................................................................................................................... 66 

Endnotes.........................................................................................................................................67 

5 
6 
One measure of a nation’s civilization is the quality of treatment it provides persons 

entrusted to its care.1 

Executive Summary 

Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act2 (CRIPA) in 1980 to enable 

the Department of Justice (DOJ) to protect the rights of people residing in state institutions. The 

law authorizes the Attorney General to initiate or intervene in lawsuits in federal court to 

vindicate the rights of people in state-run or locally operated jails and prisons, juvenile 

correctional facilities, public nursing homes, mental health facilities, and institutions for people 

with intellectual disabilities. 

Twenty-five years later, CRIPA remains critically important. The isolated nature of institutions 

and the vulnerability of their residents combine to create environments ripe for abuse. One and a 

half million Americans reside in 17,000 nursing homes, and 30 percent of those facilities have 

been cited for harming residents or placing them at risk of serious injury or death.3 

The actual incidence of abuse is far higher. Studies suggest that 80 percent to 85 percent of abuse 

in institutions goes unreported.4

 Abuse typically occurs behind closed doors. Residents and 

family members are often reluctant to report abuse for fear of reprisal. In some cases, disabilities 

may interfere with residents’ ability to ask for help or may lead caregivers to dismiss what 

residents say. 

This report examines how DOJ has used its congressional mandate. DOJ’s enforcement of 

CRIPA has been excellent in some respects and lacking in others. DOJ’s investigations of 

complaints are thorough and effective, and its letters of findings accurately reflect the results of 

its investigations and provide information about how states can remedy constitutional and 

statutory violations. CRIPA requires DOJ to attempt to persuade states to voluntarily comply 

with the law before initiating lawsuits, but DOJ has been too reticent to use its authority to 

litigate, preferring to focus too much time and energy on conciliation as a means of achieving 

compliance. When DOJ does litigate, it does so skillfully; however, it undermines its advocacy 

by resolving some cases through private agreements rather than enforceable consent decrees. 

7 
Recommendations 

This report suggests ways to improve DOJ’s CRIPA enforcement. A summary of the 

recommendations follows: 

1. Strategic Enforcement. DOJ should convene periodic meetings with experts, including 

people with disabilities, on the rights of people in institutions, to develop a list of the 

most egregious and widespread violations that exist in each type of institution covered 

under CRIPA. These experts should further assist DOJ staff by recommending which 

violations are most amenable to redress under the law, considering recent court decisions 

and the leanings of federal judges. To address these issues, DOJ should prioritize 

complaints for investigation. 

2. Breadth of Investigations. DOJ should broaden the scope of its investigations beyond 

specific complaint allegations to include overarching concerns, such as whether people 

with disabilities are being institutionalized in health care facilities or segregated within 

correctional facilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 

and the Supreme Court’s Olmstead decision. Moreover, DOJ’s investigations should 

include interviews with family members and local advocacy organizations. 

3. Speed of Enforcement. DOJ should create internal deadlines to reduce the time it takes 

to move from complaint to investigation to letters of findings. 

4. Litigation. DOJ should end its practice of filing simultaneous complaints and consent 

decrees. Instead, Department staff should file complaints promptly and use temporary 

restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and other enforcement tools available while 

litigation is pending to protect vulnerable populations and correct dangerous conditions 

as quickly as possible while the case progresses toward eventual resolution. Moreover, 

DOJ should revert to its earlier practice of resolving cases through enforceable consent 

decrees and end its growing reliance on private agreements. Finally, Department staff 

should err on the side of being more, rather than less, prescriptive in case settlements. 

Department staff should insist on specific outcomes rather than more general policies and 

procedures to remedy violations and guard against regression when monitoring ends. 

8 
5. Multifaceted Enforcement. DOJ should use a multifaceted approach to enforcement or, 

alternatively, should invite local civil rights organizations that have contacts with local 

reporters, community-based organizations, and elected officials to co-counsel cases and 

broaden the type of advocacy used to remedy CRIPA violations. In particular, DOJ 

should make better use of local protection and advocacy agencies charged with 

investigating abuse and neglect in institutions, and other nonprofit advocacy 

organizations with well-established records of protecting the rights of people in 

institutions. DOJ should find ways to enhance the number of CRIPA-specific state and 

local contacts to improve information dissemination. The primary role for CRIPAspecific contacts would be to raise public awareness across the country with respect to 

CRIPA rights and protections. 

6. Improved Technical Assistance to States. DOJ should improve its technical assistance 

to states by including experts from other federal agencies in a team approach to help 

states achieve compliance with constitutional and statutory protections for people in 

institutions. During meetings and in communications to impart such technical assistance, 

DOJ should ensure that local advocacy groups and stakeholders, such as families, are 

present. Assistance should be provided in ways that are sensitive to and appropriate for 

people from diverse cultural backgrounds. 

7. Federal Agency Coordination. DOJ should regularly solicit input from other federal 

agencies to help it uncover conditions ripe for enforcement actions under CRIPA. In turn, 

it should inform other federal agencies of evidence of illegal practices and conditions in 

institutions overseen by federal regulators. This mutual exchange of information should 

be institutionalized via the creation of Memoranda of Understanding with relevant federal 

agencies. While a mandated level of collaboration has begun with the Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS), Congress should ensure that DOJ also coordinates its 

enforcement with that of other federal agencies and seeks ways to increase its HHS 

collaboration. For example, it should report institutions to HSS that are in breach of 

Medicaid conditions of participation. In turn, HSS is authorized to withhold Medicaid 

funding if violations are not remedied within 24 to 48 hours. 

9 
8. Web Site Improvements. DOJ should publish all, rather than a representative sample, of 

its letters of findings, complaints, and court decisions on its CRIPA Web site. It should 

also publish a list of institutions under investigation. DOJ should increase its assistance to 

persons who face emergency situations by including a brief description of protection and 

advocacy agencies, along with the Web site for the agencies’ umbrella organization, the 

National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, Inc., which provides contact 

information for protection and advocacy organizations throughout the country. 

9. Strategic Use of the Media. DOJ should increase its use of the media to educate the 

public about the rights of people in institutions and the Federal Government’s role in 

protecting those rights by publicizing its investigations, findings, and victories on behalf 

of people who reside in institutions. 

10. More Thorough Reports to Congress. DOJ should improve its CRIPA enforcement 

reports to Congress by including the full range of data required under the statute. In turn, 

Congress should increase its oversight of DOJ’s enforcement of CRIPA and ensure that 

DOJ has sufficient funding and other support to do its work. 

10 
Introduction 

In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) to authorize 

the Department of Justice (DOJ) to use litigation to enforce the rights of people residing in state 

or local institutions. The law enabled DOJ to initiate or intervene in pending lawsuits to correct 

egregious and systemic violations of the rights of people in public nursing homes, jails and 

prisons, juvenile justice facilities, and institutions that house people with psychiatric or 

intellectual and developmental disabilities. DOJ is not authorized to represent individuals—it 

may only bring cases in response to a pattern or practice of violations. 

Protection of the nation’s most vulnerable individuals continues to be a vital DOJ responsibility. 

As this report was going to press, the New Orleans Times-Picayune reported that at least 33 

residents in Louisiana nursing homes had died from abuse or neglect since 1999.5 In the past six 

years, the majority of the state’s nursing homes have been cited for harming or endangering 

residents. In one particularly harrowing incident, red ants had eaten away the top layer of skin 

over much of one resident’s body before she was finally taken to a hospital for treatment. 

With the state imposing average fines of $1,970 for causing or contributing to the deaths of 

nursing home residents, the institutions have little incentive to improve their practices. Although 

federally funded protection and advocacy agencies have jurisdiction to investigate abuse and 

neglect at institutions that house people with disabilities, they are underfunded and most battle 

state agencies that are reluctant to disclose information about incidents of abuse and neglect.6 

This report reviews the quality of DOJ’s enforcement of CRIPA. It describes each step in the 

law’s enforcement and recommends ways DOJ might improve its work at each stage of the 

process. The text of the statute is included in Appendix I. Appendixes II and III contain charts 

that reflect data drawn from DOJ’s annual reports to Congress, which describe its CRIPA 

enforcement activities, as well as letters of investigative findings, complaints, briefs, settlements, 

and court decisions. Throughout this report, the terms “Department of Justice,” “DOJ,” “Justice 

Department,” and “the Section” (that is, the Special Litigation Section) are used interchangeably. 

11 
More than a dozen people generously shared their knowledge of DOJ’s CRIPA enforcement with 

the authors of this report. Some did so with the promise of anonymity and are referred to in the 

pages that follow as “observers.” The National Council on Disability (NCD) recognizes and 

commends DOJ staff for their cooperation and attention to detail, and for the volumes of 

information they provided during the development of this report. 

Although the authors of this report originally hoped to include measurable indicators of the 

quality of DOJ’s enforcement of CRIPA, this was impossible because of unavailable or 

incomplete data on such factors as when notices of intent to investigate were issued, dates 

investigations were initiated, and the outcomes of cases, as well as internal factors such as the 

budget and staffing devoted to CRIPA enforcement. DOJ’s annual reports to Congress and other 

data offered by DOJ did not contain information that permitted comparison over the 25 years of 

CRIPA enforcement. To the extent that longitudinal tracking was possible, it is contained in 

Appendixes II and III. This report relies on interviews with current and past CRIPA staff, as well 

as attorneys and experts who have worked with DOJ on CRIPA cases. 

NCD encourages broad dissemination of this report to encourage discussions and prompt ideas 

about how the Federal Government can improve its work to protect the rights of people in 

institutions throughout the nation. Interested readers may wish to read related NCD reports on 

the impact of the Supreme Court’s Olmstead decision, livable communities for all people, 

consumer-directed health care, and similar topics. These reports appear on NCD’s Web site 

(www.ncd.gov). 

12 
Chapter 1. CRIPA: Legislative History 

and Legal Developments 

Setting the Stage: The Enactment of CRIPA 

DOJ began working to protect the rights of people who reside in institutions before Congress 

enacted CRIPA.7 In fact, DOJ was viewed by many as a leader in this area and in the field of 

disability rights in general. DOJ participated in these cases as a litigating amicus curiae or as a 

plaintiff intervenor. 

When DOJ tried to initiate its own institutional reform cases, it encountered resistance from 

judges who ruled that DOJ lacked the authority to bring such cases.8 In response, DOJ and its 

supporters asked Congress to enact a statute to give DOJ standing to bring its own cases to 

protect the rights of people in institutions. Congress agreed that DOJ should be empowered to 

continue its important work, as indicated in the Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the 

bill that became CRIPA. 

The resources and skill which the Attorney General brings to such litigation cannot be 

matched by private counsel. The Justice Department’s access to the investigative resources 

of the FBI, the technical advice of other Federal agencies, and the professional assistance of 

nationally recognized experts in the field of institutional care enable it to develop a 

comprehensive record for adjudicating courts. The experience and expertise of Justice 

Department attorneys guarantees that litigation will be handled professionally, with a 

minimal expenditure of judicial time and resources. The presence of the Attorney General 

lends credibility to the proceedings and alerts courts, litigants and the public to the 

seriousness of the charges. Finally, DOJ provides the stability and continuity necessary to 

see litigation to its conclusion and to monitor implementation of court decrees.9 

As the Judiciary Committee report made clear, Congress gave DOJ the ability to use litigation to 

force recalcitrant states to respect the rights of people in institutions. 

Neither the Attorney General nor the committee suggest that litigation by the Justice 

Department is an ideal method for eradicating widespread institutional abuse. It is costly, 

time-consuming and disruptive of the operation of State and local governments. 

Experience has shown, however, that it is also the single most effective method for 

redressing systematic deprivations of institutionalized persons’ constitutional and Federal 

statutory rights. Until such time as every State and political subdivision assumes full 

13 
responsibility for protecting the fundamental rights of institutionalized citizens, the need 

for Federal enforcement of those rights will continue.10 

Legal Developments Since the Enactment of CRIPA 

Since the enactment of CRIPA, new laws and court decisions have had a dramatic impact on the 

rights of people in institutions. The most important of these are the ADA,11 the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act of 1995,12 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C.13 in 1999. 

The ADA was enacted by Congress to build on and broaden the rights of people with disabilities 

guaranteed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,14 which bars discrimination on 

the basis of disability by recipients of federal funds. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination 

on the basis of disability by state and local governments, and their contractors, in cases in which 

Section 504 does not apply. Because CRIPA covers institutions owned or operated by states or 

their political subdivisions, the ADA has had a direct impact on DOJ’s work on behalf of people 

in institutions. 

On June 22, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that unjustified institutionalization of people with 

disabilities was a per se violation of the ADA. The Court’s landmark Olmstead decision was the 

result of a lawsuit brought on behalf of two women who remained institutionalized in Georgia 

after the state hospital’s doctors had decided that the women were ready to live in the 

community. The decision was an affirmation of the ADA’s integration mandate and has been 

used across the nation by DOJ and others to challenge unnecessary institutionalization. The 

practical import of the Olmstead decision is that DOJ can investigate not only the conditions 

present in institutions but, more important, whether residents should be housed in an institution 

rather than in the community. 

In 1995, in response to complaints that prisoners and their advocates were clogging the courts 

with frivolous lawsuits, the Prison Reform Litigation Act was enacted by Congress. The law 

severely limits the ability of prisoners to vindicate their rights by, among other things, limiting 

attorneys’ fees available to lawyers who bring successful prisoners’ rights suits. As a result, the 

number of private attorneys willing to represent prisoners has dwindled—making DOJ’s CRIPA 

enforcement on behalf of incarcerated persons more important than ever. 

14 
Chapter 2. How the Department of Justice Enforces CRIPA 

Complaints 

DOJ receives thousands of complaints every year about violations of the rights of people in 

institutions. DOJ is alerted to such problems in a variety of ways, including letters and phone 

calls from individuals, advocacy groups, and elected officials; news reports; and referrals from 

other divisions of DOJ, other federal agencies, and the White House. 

There appear to be no internal deadlines by which complaints must be addressed, and it is not 

unusual for the Special Litigation Section to take weeks or even months to respond to a 

complaint. The statute allows DOJ to take action in response to “egregious or flagrant 

conditions” pursuant to a pattern or practice of violations of constitutional or federal statutory 

rights.15 The “pattern or practice” requirement means that the Section cannot respond to requests 

to address conditions, however egregious, that affect only one individual. However, the Section’s 

Web site states that it collects information about specific incidents so that staff can determine 

whether a pattern or practice of violations exists.16 

One frustration voiced by observers is that DOJ does not appear to use internal guidelines, other 

than those imposed under CRIPA, to decide which complaints merit investigation. Some 

advocates try for months to get DOJ’s attention, while a call from an elected official often 

prompts an immediate response. 

In response to a draft version of this report, a Department spokesperson wrote that DOJ does set 

internal deadlines and criteria for CRIPA enforcement. These are–– 

based upon a variety of factors, including, among others, the seriousness of the issues 

developed in the preliminary inquiry and during the investigation, the number of victims, 

pertinent statutory and case law, office resources, approach and response of the 

jurisdiction operating the institution, as well as consultant availability and 

responsiveness. 

The spokesperson also indicated that CRIPA enforcement staff welcome information from 

advocates and respond promptly to advocates’ calls and letters. 

15 
Some observers believe that, rather than selecting the most egregious or well-placed complaints 

to act on, DOJ should instead engage in strategic enforcement and investigate complaints that 

allow it to address and stem emerging problems nationwide. By focusing on widespread 

problems—such as the inappropriate placement of children and adults with psychiatric 

disabilities in correctional institutions or the lack of special education services in juvenile justice 

facilities—DOJ could leverage its enforcement capacity by signaling institutions across the 

nation to remedy targeted issues lest they be the next focus for CRIPA enforcement. 

Recommendation: The Special Litigation Section should convene periodic meetings with 

experts, including people with disabilities, on the rights of people in institutions to develop 

a list of the most egregious and widespread violations that exist in each type of institution 

covered under CRIPA. The experts should further assist Section staff by recommending 

which violations are most amenable to redress under the law, taking into account recent 

court decisions and the leanings of federal judges. The Section should then prioritize 

complaints for investigation to address these issues. 

DOJ has already embraced the concept of enforcement prioritization. In a report to the President 

on DOJ’s efforts to help the nation’s institutions comply with Olmstead, DOJ states that it will 

find ways to coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies. 

To identify those institutions where the greatest number of qualified individuals are 

unnecessarily institutionalized, exploring a DOJ database that analyzes the utilization 

reviews from institutions and ranks those with the highest percentage of reviews that 

show that individuals do not need the level of care the institution provides.17 

Coordination among federal agencies would be welcomed by those who are frustrated at uneven 

federal enforcement of disability rights. “Health and Human Services and the Justice Department 

don’t work together,” says one observer. “In fact, it’s often the case that a facility has an okay 

from HHS [which continues to fund the facility] while serious findings of violations are issued 

by the Department of Justice.” 

After reviewing a draft of this report, a Department spokesperson wrote that DOJ staff regularly 

solicit input from other federal agencies to learn about conditions that may violate constitutional 

16 
or federal statutory rights of people in institutions. As an example, the spokesperson wrote that 

DOJ staff routinely contact regional offices of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 

(CMS) to ask about conditions in government-run health care facilities. 

The ongoing collaboration to combat health care fraud and abuse in Medicare and other CMS 

programs within HHS is mandated by Congress. However, DOJ could increase its effectiveness 

by coordinating its CRIPA efforts with HHS and other federal agencies. Institutions with CRIPA 

violations are often also in breach of Medicaid conditions of participation. When life-threatening 

conditions are present, regulators can cite institutions and demand remedies within 24 to 48 

hours. Institutions that do not respond risk the loss of Medicaid funding—a risk few states are 

willing to take. 

Recommendation: DOJ should explore these and other methods of leveraging its ability to 

protect the rights of people in institutions through coordination with other government 

agencies. Congress should ensure that the necessary resources are provided to DOJ for an 

overall strategy to improve interagency coordination efforts and outcomes for people with 

disabilities. 

Recommendation: DOJ should institutionalize its practice of regularly soliciting input from 

other federal agencies to help it uncover conditions ripe for enforcement actions under 

CRIPA by developing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with relevant federal 

agencies. The MOUs should obligate federal agencies to alert CRIPA staff of suspicious 

conditions as soon as such information becomes available. This would enable timely receipt 

of information by CRIPA staff and would ensure that prompt information sharing 

continues with new Administrations. The MOUs should require information to flow in both 

directions by obligating CRIPA staff to inform other federal agencies of evidence of illegal 

practices and conditions in institutions overseen by federal regulators.18 

Investigations 

Before commencing a CRIPA investigation, the Attorney General must give seven days’ written 

notice to the governor, state attorney general, and director of the institution.19 The Section hires 

17 
experts to conduct the investigation after it sends out the seven-day-notice letter. Investigations 

typically include onsite tours of facilities, interviews with staff and residents, and review of 

medical records and other documents. 

However, not all institutions that receive seven-day-notice letters opt to cooperate with DOJ’s 

investigation. Some directors of institutions have refused to allow Section staff and experts 

access to their facilities. Arthur Peabody, an attorney who worked at DOJ enforcing the rights of 

people in institutions from 1972 until 1996, explains how the Section responded when it was 

denied access to facilities. “We engaged in careful negotiation and discussion. It was understood 

that if there was no cooperation, we would sue. It was a carrot-and-stick approach, and we 

almost always got access.” 

A DOJ spokesperson elaborates, “We can draw negative inferences from noncooperation. We 

make clear to the institution that this is happening.” Over the years, DOJ has developed a 

response when institutions refuse to allow investigators on site: 

If we can verify violations [without gaining access], we issue a findings letter, and then 

we start to negotiate on the issues we found. If we still encounter resistance, we’ll file a 

complaint. We’d never sign an agreement without access to an institution, and once we 

gain access we can always issue a second findings letter. 

According to DOJ, jurisdictions know they risk a complaint if they refuse to cooperate with 

Section investigations. “They all know—it gets around.” 

The Section enjoys high praise for the quality and thoroughness of its investigations. It hires 

nationally recognized experts to assist its staff and typically shares its experts’ reports with the 

director of the institution under review. “They do great investigations and hire highly competent 

experts,” says Mark Soler, president of the Youth Law Center and an attorney who has brought 

lawsuits challenging conditions in juvenile justice institutions for more than 25 years. Another 

person familiar with the Section’s work is equally enthusiastic. “Their investigations are solid; 

they search for the best expert witnesses.” 

18 
Steven Schwartz, executive director of the Center for Public Representation in Massachusetts, 

has litigated class action suits challenging conditions of institutional confinement for more than 

30 years. Schwartz agrees that the quality of the Section’s investigations is high. He believes, 

however, that the Section misses evidence of constitutional and statutory violations by limiting 

the scope of its investigations. 

The framework for settlement is shaped almost entirely by the framework of the 

investigation. The investigation is shaped by the type of expert conducting it. For 

example, if you’re looking at the use of medications, you’ve got to have a psychiatrist on 

the team. When I get a complaint of abuse, I go in and look at everything. They go in and 

look at abuse. Yet abuse relates to staffing, treatment programs, budget, etc. 

But a DOJ spokesperson counters, 

DOJ isn’t authorized to go on fishing expeditions. Our authority comes from the Attorney 

General, who wants to know what we’re looking for. So we go in looking for what was 

described in the complaint we received, but we don’t turn a blind eye to evidence of 

violations [not cited by the complainant]. 

David Utter directs the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana and co-counseled a case with DOJ 

attorneys that was filed in 1998 and challenged conditions at four state institutions for juveniles. 

He raises another concern regarding the Section’s investigations: 

They did a great investigation, but they didn’t talk with the parents. Parents are an 

important source of information. If they had been interviewed, DOJ would have 

discovered that many of the parents agreed to their children’s’ incarceration because their 

kids needed treatment, and there were no community programs available to provide it. 

Schwartz, Soler, and Utter also complain that Section staff and experts typically failed to consult 

local advocates, such as protection and advocacy agencies, when investigating conditions at 

institutions. 

In response to a draft version of this report, a DOJ spokesperson wrote that Department staff 

“routinely interview all stakeholders, including family members and advocacy organizations.” 

However, people outside DOJ who are familiar with CRIPA investigations and who were also 

interviewed for this report disagree. 

19 
Recommendation: The quality of the Section’s investigation is excellent. However, the 

Section should broaden the scope of investigations and include interviews with local family 

members and advocacy organizations. Additional sources of information will help DOJ 

collect evidence that can transform individual incidents into pattern and practice cases, 

and that will also help DOJ uncover violations that it may otherwise overlook. 

Letters of Findings 

After receiving reports from its expert consultants, Section staff prepare letters to governors and 

institution directors that contain the investigation’s findings, the facts supporting them, and the 

minimal remedial measures needed to address constitutional and statutory violations.20 The 

letters also provide statutory notice21 that, absent successful conciliation, DOJ may bring a 

lawsuit to enforce the rights of residents in institutions after 49 days have elapsed. 

During the early years of CRIPA enforcement, letters of findings were not made public. “We 

were told the letter was not a public document. I always wondered who we were protecting,” 

says Bob Dinerstein. Now an associate dean and law professor at American University’s 

Washington College of Law, Dinerstein worked at DOJ from 1977 to 1982, enforcing the rights 

of people in institutions. 

Recommendation: Today, DOJ publishes some of its findings letters on its CRIPA Web site. 

The letters publicize DOJ’s investigations, allow readers to contribute evidence DOJ may 

have missed, and add accountability to the enforcement process. DOJ should maximize 

these benefits by routinely publishing all its letters of findings on its Web site. 

Observers find DOJ’s letters of findings to be thorough and to accurately reflect the results of its 

investigations. The only consistent complaint is the length of time it takes for the letters to be 

issued—a complaint that began near the start of DOJ’s CRIPA enforcement and has continued 

since. A report on conditions at institutions for people with mental disabilities written in 1985 by 

the staff of what was then called the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped notes the 

following: 

20 
[T]he Department’s notice to the states as to findings have been sent up to 27 months 

after investigations are initiated. Such a lack of timeliness regarding matters determined 

to be egregious and flagrant abuses of the institutionalized [people with intellectual 

disabilities] potentially allows these conditions to fester, distorting the purpose of 

congressionally mandated intervention by DOJ.22 

Although DOJ has reduced the time it takes to issue letters of findings, many observers continue 

to complain that DOJ’s pace undermines its mission to protect the rights of people in institutions. 

“It creates problems with staleness of information and staff and administration turnovers,” says 

Soler. 

“If you look at the date the experts go in [to begin investigating a facility] versus the date the 

letter of findings goes out, it’s at least six to nine months,” says Schwartz. “Sometimes a year 

goes by from the time the experts submit their reports to when Section staff issue a findings 

letter.” Schwartz and other observers believe that timeliness is a critical issue, because delays 

place vulnerable people at risk. “From the time they decide to investigate, people are getting 

hurt.” 

Recommendation: DOJ should create internal deadlines to reduce the time it takes to move 

from complaint to investigation to letters of findings. 

Conciliation 

After issuing its letter of findings, DOJ must attempt to bring institutions into voluntary 

compliance with the law before resorting to litigation.23 The statute requires DOJ to offer 

“financial, technical, or other assistance which may be available from the United States and 

which the Attorney General believes may assist” in correcting practices and conditions which 

violate the law.24 

Some observers believe DOJ should share more information with states about federal funding 

sources that could be tapped to relieve conditions in institutions. For example, federal foster care 

programs without spending caps allow states to use federal funds to develop placement plans to 

move children from institutions to community-based programs. Most states do not take full 

advantage of this funding source, according to Soler, in part because they do not know it exists. 

21 
DOJ has pledged to provide more technical assistance to states to help them comply with the 

Supreme Court’s holding in Olmstead that unnecessary segregation of people with disabilities is 

a per se violation of the ADA. In its Olmstead report to the President, DOJ promises to 

coordinate with CMS and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to–– 

take advantage of Federal money available for the costs of housing in the community. 

DOJ will work with HUD to explore ways in which HUD representatives could be 

included in institutional meetings at which the transition of an individual from an 

institution to a community is discussed, so that HUD representatives can counsel 

individuals regarding housing options and assist with obtaining vouchers.25 

DOJ’s Olmstead report states that Department staff already provide the type of detailed technical 

assistance recommended by Soler to help institutions avoid unnecessary segregation of people 

with disabilities. The report states that DOJ has helped identify individuals who can be better 

served in community settings and that it “then works with jurisdictions to identify required 

residences, day programs, vocational opportunities, specialized services, medical care, and 

related services and other reports needed to serve individuals in the community.”26 

Recommendation: In the breadth of its work under CRIPA, DOJ should expand its current 

practice of providing detailed technical assistance to states on ways to comply with 

Olmstead. It should maximize federal technical assistance to states by including experts 

from other federal agencies in a team approach to helping states achieve compliance with 

constitutional and statutory protections for people in institutions. During meetings and in 

communications to impart such technical assistance, DOJ should ensure that local 

advocacy groups and stakeholders such as families are present. This will maximize the 

chances that the rights at issue will be protected and will add accountability to the process 

by empowering local groups and interested people with the knowledge they need to ensure 

that DOJ’s work will continue to be effective long after the Section’s case is closed. 

As with other aspects of CRIPA enforcement, some observers believe that DOJ spends too much 

time engaged in conciliation, to the detriment of people it is charged to protect. “Once the 

findings letter is sent, a long negotiation begins,” says Dinerstein. “The state may make some 

22 
cosmetic changes. Soon the facts have changed or aged, and that makes enforcement more 

difficult.” 

The emphasis placed on conciliation has also worried some observers, who say that over-reliance 

on obtaining voluntary compliance undermines DOJ’s capacity to fully enforce the law. 

“Conciliation works only if the other side believes litigation will follow,” says Dinerstein. 

DOJ’s reluctance to litigate was a hallmark of its work to enforce CRIPA in the years 

immediately following enactment of the statute. At that time, CRIPA enforcement was under the 

direction of William Bradford Reynolds, the first assistant attorney general for civil rights to 

enforce the statute. During oversight hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on the 

Handicapped in 1983, one former staff attorney testified about Reynolds’ approach to CRIPA 

enforcement. “As a result of Reynolds’ policy of conciliation, not a single enforceable agreement 

to eliminate civil rights violations has been negotiated with any mental retardation institution 

anywhere in the country.” 27 

Under Reynolds’ leadership, DOJ not only minimized its use of the courts to enforce CRIPA, it 

also reversed course on its position in lawsuits that were pending when CRIPA was enacted. 

Steve Whinston, a former Special Litigation Section attorney, testified that–– 

For ten years, the Justice Department argued to courts that [people with intellectual 

disabilities living in institutions] had a constitutional right to be placed in settings which 

are least restrictive of their personal liberty. Thus, institution residents should, wherever 

possible, be moved to more normalized noninstitutional environments where they will be 

more able to receive the training needed to achieve meaningful habilitative objectives. 

Suddenly, under Mr. Reynolds, this was no longer considered to be [a] constitutional 

right. Instead for the first time, institutions were acceptable for large numbers of persons. 

The whole orientation of the Justice Department’s litigation in this field has changed 

from enforcing the rights of the handicapped to establishing what are the limits of a 

state’s obligations to [people with disabilities]. The first question I was often asked under 

this Administration was, “What can we do to support the defendants on this issue?”28 

DOJ’s deference to states, although less pronounced, continued after Reynolds’ departure. 

“Department of Justice staff wanted us to sue so it would embarrass the front office and allow 

them to do something,” says Utter, whose case challenging conditions in Louisiana’s juvenile 

23 
justice facilities in 1998 was consolidated with a CRIPA enforcement action brought by DOJ 

five months later. 

Not everyone agrees that DOJ over-relies on conciliation at the expense of bringing lawsuits. 

Some former staff say there is merit in obtaining certain relief via conciliation, rather than taking 

the risks involved in litigation, particularly before an increasingly unsympathetic federal 

judiciary. 

“Litigation is not a good tool. We get the most reform, the best conditions change, with 

cooperation,” says a DOJ spokesperson. 

Litigation puts a jurisdiction in a posture where they don’t want to admit there are 

problems. So you spend lots of time convincing them they have problems. During that 

long period of time reform is not happening. And you’re forcing the state to spend money 

on litigation instead of reform. 

According to DOJ, litigation brings other problems. 

Litigation is not such a threat to them. There’s no financial incentive for states to solve 

problems. We don’t get attorneys’ fees or costs. So if they have to put in a sprinkler 

system in three years instead of now, they can buy time to get money together to solve 

problems. So litigation is a lose-lose for us. 

Asked why DOJ did not use conciliation deadlines to quicken the speed of reform, a Department 

spokesperson responded that Section staff did exactly that. “We set conciliation deadlines all the 

time. That’s our approach. If an institution says it will resolve its problems, we give them space, 

but we also give them time lines.” 

“It’s rare to have jurisdictions say, ‘Go ahead and sue us.’ They’re smart enough not to say that. 

We can’t sue if good faith negotiations are going on,” explains a Department spokesperson. “It’s 

our burden: We have to be able to demonstrate a record that they’re not negotiating in good 

faith.” 

24 
DOJ does not stop its enforcement efforts while waiting for the states to respond. “We’re 

working the paperwork. We keep writing them about serious problems, about emergencies.” The 

paper trail DOJ attorneys create acts as another lever toward reform. According to a DOJ 

spokesperson, “The private risk of liability becomes motivation [for reform] because the 

jurisdiction has a letter saying there’s a risk of suicide, and if a suicide happens, there’s private 

liability because they can’t say they didn’t know about the problem.” 

Recommendation: DOJ should continue to use its best efforts to obtain voluntary 

compliance before resorting to filing actions in court. However, it should set flexible but 

firm time limits on its efforts to conciliate and should routinely use its congressional 

mandate to litigate when such efforts fail to produce substantial, measurable results. By 

doing so, DOJ will enhance its ability to conciliate cases by sending a clear message to 

states that it will not hesitate to initiate lawsuits if it cannot obtain prompt, full, and 

verifiable voluntary compliance with the law. 

Lawsuits 

While DOJ resolves most of its cases through conciliation, it has successfully used litigation to 

resolve complaints. In fact, as Congress recognized when it enacted CRIPA, DOJ is uniquely 

positioned to protect the rights of people in institutions because of its resources, expertise, and 

the deference judges give to federal agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing statutes. 

“We had almost unlimited resources once the case was filed,” says former DOJ attorney Arthur 

Peabody. 

Most observers interviewed for this report agreed that the Section’s line attorneys were skilled 

and dedicated to their work. “When the state refused to settle, there were six months of onerous 

discovery involving more than 100 depositions and 10,000 pages of documents,” says Utter. 

“DOJ’s attorneys brought strong litigation skills and capacity to the table.” 

However, observers criticized other aspects of the Section’s litigation work, including the length 

of time it took for DOJ to file a lawsuit, the practice of filing complaints and resolutions 

simultaneously, the trend toward judicially unenforceable agreements in lieu of consent decrees, 

25 
and the limited scope and detail contained in resolutions. “The time period between obtaining 

credible evidence of violations and resolution is very slow,” says Schwartz. “DOJ gives states 

enormous latitude about when and how to fix problems.” 

Soler believes that one factor that delays CRIPA case resolutions is the Section’s practice of 

filing complaints and consent decrees simultaneously. Soler explains, 

It takes longer because you have to figure out the solution before you even file the 

complaint. During that time, the state often makes changes in facilities that make the 

experts’ findings stale, which in turn makes it harder to sue. Instead, they should file 

lawsuits promptly so they can address the most harmful, life-threatening safety issues 

immediately with temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. After that they 

can address less egregious issues through consent decrees. 

Soler worries that the Section files simultaneous complaints and consent decrees to save the 

states embarrassment that might result if reporters learn of complaints and have time to 

investigate before the case is resolved and becomes old news. “Their goal is to save the state’s 

face. It should be to save kids’ lives.” 

Not everyone agrees with Soler’s assessment. “The bottom line is that any kind of institutional 

litigation is complex and takes time,” observes a former Section attorney. 

With pattern and practice cases, it’s not just one issue or one plaintiff. You have to find 

enough evidence to prove systemic violations, and often your hands are tied because of 

bad precedents and issues like determining what professional judgment means. It’s very 

time-consuming. 

“We’ve done everything we can internally to move cases along,” says a Department 

spokesperson. “We assign two attorneys to each case, so if one is busy the case can still move. 

We have quarterly docket reviews, and we reward attorneys for moving cases quickly.” 

The practice that causes the most consternation among many observers, however, is the Section’s 

growing willingness to resolve some of its cases with an agreement rather than a judicially 

enforceable consent decree. Although a Department spokesperson pointed out that the former are 

26 
easier and faster to obtain, agreements do not allow Department attorneys to sue states for 

contempt if they fail to live up to their promises. 

“Ten years ago, DOJ addressed noncompliance with consent decrees by making a motion for 

contempt or moving for specific performance—they were willing to fight it out,” says one 

observer. 

Today line attorneys feel it would be hard to get backup from their supervisors to take 

aggressive actions against state governments. So in day-to-day interactions with 

defendants, they are more likely to cajole them into doing the right thing, and settle for 

halfhearted efforts at compliance. In fact, sometimes they set monitoring termination 

dates for cases in agreements without knowing how constitutional rights will be 

addressed. They’ve weakened the entire process of civil rights enforcement through this 

approach. They’re signing unenforceable agreements and walking out of cases as quickly 

as possible. 

Peabody agrees with the Section’s critics on this point. “Substance is more important than form, 

but as a bottom line we always wanted to resolve cases by enforceable documents so everyone 

knew what had to be done and that there would be penalties for noncompliance.” 

Another former staff attorney who worked on CRIPA enforcement also questions the practice of 

resolving cases without the advantage of judicial oversight. “It’s important that settlements be 

legally binding and judicially enforceable. You can use contempt motions and other enforcement 

mechanisms like court monitors—it’s important to have the power of the court.” 

But DOJ disagrees that court oversight is always helpful. 

In some cases, we use private agreements that we don’t file with the court. We do that 

with cooperative jurisdictions, where we don’t need the hammer from a court. We try to 

resolve a case at the most cooperative level rather than ramping it up. Attorneys on the 

other side don’t want a court order, and some jurisdictions take [private] agreements as 

seriously as consent decrees. 

A Department spokesperson continues, “If a jurisdiction doesn’t comply with it, they’ll see us in 

court.” However, as observers point out, DOJ would be unable to file a motion for contempt to 

force compliance with a private agreement. Instead, it would be forced to draft a complaint and 

27 
vet it through DOJ’s arduous approval process—and risk the chance that approval might be 

denied. 

In response to a draft of this report, a Department spokesperson wrote that since 2001, 4 out of 

14 investigations of health care facilities were resolved by private agreements, while 10 were 

resolved with consent decrees or dismissals conditioned on completion of remedial measures. No 

information was included about how investigations of other types of institutions were resolved. 

CRIPA enforcement observers, including attorneys who had previously worked in the Special 

Litigation Section, were unanimous in their view that private agreements are never appropriate 

vehicles for resolving CRIPA investigations. 

Another common complaint about DOJ’s CRIPA enforcement was that agreements used to settle 

cases are too general and not sufficiently proscriptive. “They use a cookie-cutter format to 

relief,” says Dinerstein. 

“They don’t see it as their job to identify a specific remedy,” agrees Schwartz. 

For example, they’ll require defendants to develop policies and procedures to keep 

people from harm. Or they’ll require institutions to hire sufficient staff. Specifics are 

never mentioned. It took years for them to agree to staff-client ratios—and that was 

because their own experts kept insisting on it. 

Schwartz continues, “They might ask for an internal complaint process, or incident tracking 

system, but they won’t specify how it should work, or what minimum standards should be in 

place.” 

Another observer comments, “You can trace the decline in civil rights enforcement to the 

emphasis on federalism. It has meant that the Federal Government stays the hell out of the state’s 

business.” 

According to a former CRIPA enforcement attorney, 

There have been differences in approach through the years about the level of detail in 

consent decrees, and the proscriptive nature of how to achieve outcomes. It’s that age-old 

28 
debate that breaks down along party lines. There’s merit in both positions. One view is 

that the most important thing is getting to the bottom line, that the method is less 

important than achieving the outcome. The other view is to be very proscriptive and 

detailed with every step along the way. 

“It’s a question of federalism and whether the Federal Government should micromanage the 

states,” says a DOJ spokesperson. 

[The Attorney General] didn’t believe we should be doing that. If you have specific 

numbers on staffing, for instance, 20 years later you’re arguing about dated numbers. We 

like broader language because it gives us outcomes, and we want states to have the 

latitude to figure out how to get there . . . and we’ll see them at the finish line. 

Recommendation: DOJ should end its practice of filing simultaneous complaints and 

consent decrees. Instead, Department staff should file complaints promptly and use 

temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and other enforcement tools 

available while litigation is pending to protect vulnerable populations and correct 

dangerous conditions as quickly as possible while the case progresses toward eventual 

resolution. 

Recommendation: DOJ should revert to its earlier practice of resolving cases through 

enforceable consent decrees and end its growing reliance on private agreements. Doing so 

will increase accountability and enable Department attorneys to use contempt motions and 

other enforcement mechanisms to ensure that states remain in compliance with federal law 

until DOJ and the court are satisfied that systemic reform has occurred. 

Recommendation: Given that people in institutions have few means for redressing 

complaints, and that limited staff and resources force the Section to ration enforcement to 

the most egregious cases, Department staff should err on the side of being more, rather 

than less, prescriptive in case settlements. DOJ’s staff and expert consultants are well 

positioned to be familiar with best practices and should be encouraged to use their 

expertise to provide detailed guidance to states whose substandard practices result in 

violations of constitutional and statutory rights. Department staff should insist on specific 

29 
outcomes rather than more general policies and procedures to remedy violations and guard 

against regression when monitoring ends. 

Overarching Enforcement Issues 

Several practices that transcend specific stages of CRIPA enforcement merit mention here. First, 

DOJ’s trial attorneys are widely regarded as competent and dedicated. “The line attorneys are the 

best attorneys I’ve ever worked with,” says a former Section attorney. “They were very smart, 

committed, and hard-working.” Another observer says, “Their staff lawyers are top-notch— 

bright and aggressive. They want to do a good job and are smart enough to do it.” 

Despite the talent and commitment of its staff, DOJ’s work is hampered by the slow pace of 

complaint resolution and the lack of strategic enforcement to respond to emerging national 

trends, such as the inappropriate placement of people with mental health disabilities in 

correctional institutions. DOJ’s policy of avoiding litigation, its practice of filing complaints on 

the same day it files consent decrees, its reliance on general rather than specific remedies, and its 

increasing acceptance of private, unenforceable agreements to resolve cases all work to limit the 

tools available to its talented staff to force states to redress constitutional and statutory violations 

of vulnerable populations who, in most cases, have no other means for relief. 

 DOJ also limits its effectiveness by using a narrow, traditional approach to law enforcement. 

“The Section doesn’t consider any campaign other than conciliation and litigation to effect 

changes,” says Soler. 

They don’t talk to local organizations, elected officials, or media. Institutions are 

entrenched organizations, and it takes a lot to change them—much more than just 

litigation. When we handle a case we talk to editorial boards, we propose legislation, and 

we engage parents’ organizations to sustain changes in juvenile justice systems so we can 

fully implement the reforms that the law envisions. 

Recommendation: DOJ should use a multifaceted approach to enforcement or, 

alternatively, should invite local civil rights organizations that have contacts with local 

media, community-based organizations, and elected officials to co-counsel cases and 

broaden the type of advocacy used to remedy CRIPA violations. In particular, DOJ should 

30 
make better use of local protection and advocacy agencies charged with investigating abuse 

and neglect in institutions, and other nonprofit advocacy organizations with wellestablished records of protecting the rights of people in institutions, such as the Youth Law 

Center,29 which protects the rights of children in juvenile justice institutions, and the 

ACLU’s National Prison Project,30 which works to protect the rights of incarcerated adults. 

DOJ should find ways to enhance the number of CRIPA-specific state and local contacts to 

improve information dissemination. The primary role for CRIPA-specific contacts would 

be to raise public awareness across the country with respect to CRIPA rights and 

protections. 

Public Education and Outreach 

Web Site 

The Special Litigation Section portion of DOJ’s Web site31 is DOJ’s primary vehicle for 

providing public education and outreach about CRIPA. It contains an overview of the Section’s 

work; the statute; sample complaints, briefs, letters of findings, court decisions, and settlements; 

and DOJ’s annual reports to Congress for the past eight years. It also provides information about 

how to file a complaint. 

The Web site is well organized and easy to use. Of particular note: The Section recently used the 

Web site to solicit information about conditions and incidents at Mississippi juvenile facilities, 

which the Section is suing for CRIPA violations. This is unusual, as the Web site contains 

information only about cases that have progressed to the letter of findings stage. 

Recommendation: The Section could make regular use of the public’s assistance by 

including information on the Web site that identifies all facilities the Section decides to 

investigate. 

The Web site could also be improved by adding information that would be helpful to 

complainants with emergency situations. The Web site’s FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) 

section states that–– 

31 
Even in cases where we are investigating a pattern or practice of alleged violations of 

individuals’ federal rights, the process of investigating the facility and then taking steps 

to remedy any violations found is a time-consuming process. Therefore, if you have an 

emergency situation, you should take steps to resolve the problem in addition to 

contacting our office.32 

Recommendation: The Section could provider greater assistance to persons facing 

emergency situations by including a brief description of protection and advocacy agencies 

that provide free legal assistance to persons with disabilities and are charged with 

monitoring abuse and neglect in institutions, as well as the Web site for the agencies’ 

umbrella organization, the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems 

(NAPAS).33 The home page for NAPAS includes contact information for protection and 

advocacy organizations throughout the country. To ensure that people who do not have 

identified disabilities but are in institutions also have referrals to agencies that can help 

them address emergency situations, the Section should also include referrals to wellregarded advocacy organizations such as the Youth Law Center and the American Civil 

Liberties Union’s National Prison Project. 

Recommendation: Finally, the Section should expand its excellent Web site by including 

information about all its cases rather than just a representative sample. 

A Department spokesperson says that “except for documents created before our system was 

computerized, DOJ’s Web site for the Special Litigation Section routinely publishes all findings 

letters, complaints, settlements, and court decisions.” However, DOJ’s annual report to Congress 

for 2003 states that DOJ obtained “20 substantial agreements” between January 2001 and midMarch 2004.34 The Web site contains approximately half that number for that time period. 

Media 

The Special Litigation Section makes little use of the media as a vehicle for public outreach, nor 

does it regularly issue media announcements of new investigations, the issuance of findings 

letters, or the initiation of lawsuits. Although DOJ rarely publicized its victories under CRIPA in 

the past, lately it has done so more frequently. 

32 
By choosing not to make better use of the press, the Section undermines its ability to enforce 

CRIPA. It loses the opportunity to increase public knowledge about the law and to augment its 

ability to learn about problems that CRIPA was meant to address. By opting not to advertise 

investigations, it weakens its ability to gather information from people with relevant evidence. 

By deciding to avoid coverage of its letters of findings, it loses the opportunity to win reforms 

that often follow media exposés of egregious conditions. And by remaining silent about its 

victories, it fails to maximize the deterrent effect of its work. 

Recommendation: DOJ should use the media strategically to educate the public about the 

rights of people in institutions and the Federal Government’s role in protecting those 

rights. DOJ should also inform the media about its investigations, so that interested parties 

can send DOJ relevant information that may prove helpful. Finally, DOJ should make a 

greater effort to publicize its victories, to inspire people who reside in institutions and their 

advocates to report CRIPA violations to DOJ and to increase voluntary compliance with 

the law by institutions. 

A Department spokesperson who reviewed a draft of this report wrote that “DOJ routinely issues 

press releases regarding our enforcement activities, documenting significant actions pursuant to 

CRIPA. These press releases can be found on the Civil Rights Division’s Web site at 

www.usdoj.gov/crt/pressindex.html.” However, a spot-check of this Web site revealed no 

information or media release regarding several settlements listed in the Special Litigation Unit 

Web site, including those reached with the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center (11/1/04), 

the W. J. Mamey Training School in Michigan (1/5/05), and the Woodward and Greenwood 

State Resource Centers in Iowa (12/24/04). 

Reports to Congress 

CRIPA requires DOJ to provide Congress with detailed information about its work to protect the 

rights of people who reside in institutions. However, DOJ’s annual reports to Congress do not 

always provide the information the statute requires, as Appendix II of this report makes clear. 

Specifically, the law requires DOJ to provide the following: 

33 
1. a statement of the number, variety, and outcome of all actions instituted pursuant to 

this subchapter, including the history of, precise reasons for, and procedures followed in 

initiation or intervention in each case in which action was commenced; 

2. a detailed explanation of the procedures by which DOJ has received, reviewed, and 

evaluated petitions or complaints regarding conditions in institutions; 

3. an analysis of the impact of actions instituted pursuant to this subchapter, including, 

when feasible, an estimate of the costs incurred by States and other political subdivisions; 

4. a statement of the financial, technical, or other assistance which has been made 

available from the United States to the State in order to assist in the correction of the 

conditions which are alleged to have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 

5. the progress made in each Federal institution toward meeting existing promulgated 

standards for such institutions or constitutionally guaranteed minima.35 

Although DOJ has begun to provide information about staff and budget devoted to CRIPA 

enforcement, reports filed before 2001 lack this information. Equally troubling, DOJ’s annual 

reports mention investigations launched with no tracking to indicate outcomes. For example, the 

reports indicate that an investigation of the Chicago-Read Mental Health Center was begun in 

fiscal year 1992 and closed 10 years later. However, there is no information about the findings or 

outcome of the investigation. Similarly, DOJ’s reports state that notices of intent to investigate 

were sent to the Arizona State Hospital and the Bangor and Augusta Mental Health Institutes in 

Maine in 1989, but there is no further word on either case. 

The reports also fail to explain the wide variation in enforcement from year to year. For example, 

in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1987, and 1995, DOJ issued no letters of findings; in 1988 DOJ issued 14 

such letters; and in 1998 DOJ issued 56 letters. In addition, the information contained in the 

reports differs from year to year, making it impossible to track or compare data. 

In short, DOJ’s annual reports make it impossible for Congress or other interested parties to 

monitor DOJ’s work. More important, the absence of strong annual reports undermines DOJ’s 

ability to leverage its work through voluntary compliance and serves to discourage people in 

institutions from reporting illegal conditions in institutions to DOJ. 

34 
Recommendation: DOJ should improve its CRIPA enforcement reports to Congress by 

including the full range of data required under the statute. Doing so will increase 

accountability and enable the public to better understand the Federal Government’s 

enforcement of the rights of people who reside in institutions. 

35 
36 
Conclusion 

Congress enacted CRIPA to give DOJ authority to initiate and intervene in lawsuits to protect the 

rights of people in institutions. Despite this mandate, DOJ has not made full use of its power to 

use the courts to force institutions to minimally comply with constitutional and statutory rights. 

Instead, it has placed too much emphasis on conciliation to secure compliance—even when 

conciliation has taken years to secure. In a growing trend, when DOJ has initiated lawsuits, it has 

agreed to settle increasing numbers of its cases with private agreements that are not enforceable 

by courts. Moreover, regardless of the method of enforcement, DOJ’s work has been slow—even 

in cases involving egregious conditions such as imminent threats to life. It is not unusual for 

investigations to take many months to complete, and lawsuits often are not initiated for many 

more months thereafter. 

Thus far, DOJ has chosen not to enforce CRIPA in a strategic way to address emerging national 

trends, such as the inappropriate incarceration of individuals because of behavior that is a 

manifestation of disability. The lack of strategic enforcement has further undermined DOJ’s 

ability to fulfill Congress’s intent to provide strong protection of the rights of people who reside 

in institutions. DOJ’s annual reports to Congress do not always contain the information the 

statute requires and, thus, make it impossible for Congress and other stakeholders to monitor 

DOJ’s performance. 

Despite these serious shortcomings, much of DOJ’s work has been exemplary. The 

investigations performed by DOJ staff and consultants are widely lauded. Virtually all the 

experts interviewed for this report regard DOJ’s staff attorneys as highly skilled and dedicated. 

In recent years, DOJ has begun to consider not just the conditions in institutions but, more 

fundamentally, whether the people in them need to be there at all—this is an important and 

promising new trend. DOJ’s Web site is user-friendly and provides useful information about 

DOJ’s CRIPA enforcement. 

“Has the promise been fulfilled?” Protection of human and civil rights is still needed today, 

whether people reside in institutions or are transitioned to live in the community. People with 

disabilities, advocates, families, and the media continue to call attention to egregious conditions 

37 
and allegations of abuse and neglect. If there is one overall recommendation that would lead to 

stronger CRIPA enforcement, it is that DOJ should begin to make full, timely, and strategic use 

of its authority under the statute to use the courts to force recalcitrant states to comply with the 

law. Additionally, DOJ should ensure that the settlements it obtains are fully enforceable by 

courts, as Congress intended. Only then will DOJ be able to fully realize Congress’ plan to rid 

this nation of unconscionable conditions that plague the lives of vulnerable people. 

38 
Appendix I. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 

42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. 

§ 1997. Definitions 

As used in this subchapter— 

(1) The term “institution” means any facility or institution–– 

(A) which is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on behalf of any State 

or political subdivision of a State; and 

(B) which is–– 

(i) for persons who are mentally ill, disabled, or retarded, or chronically ill or 

handicapped; 

(ii) a jail, prison, or other correctional facility; 

(iii) a pretrial detention facility; 

(iv) for juveniles–– 

(I) held awaiting trial; 

(II) residing in such facility or institution for purposes of receiving care or 

treatment; or 

(III) residing for any State purpose in such facility or institution (other than a 

residential facility providing only elementary or secondary education that is not 

an institution in which reside juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent, in need 

of supervision, neglected, placed in State custody, mentally ill or disabled, 

mentally retarded, or chronically ill or handicapped); or 

(v) providing skilled nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial or 

residential care. 

(2) Privately owned and operated facilities shall not be deemed “institutions” under this 

subchapter if–– 

(A) the licensing of such facility by the State constitutes the sole nexus between such 

facility and such State; 

39 
(B) the receipt by such facility, on behalf of persons residing in such facility, of payments 

under title XVI, XVIII [42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., 1395 et seq.], or under a State plan 

approved under title XIX [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.], of the Social Security Act, constitutes 

the sole nexus between such facility and such State; or 

(C) the licensing of such facility by the State, and the receipt by such facility, on behalf of 

persons residing in such facility, of payments under title XVI, XVIII [42 U.S.C. 1381 et 

seq., 1395 et seq.], or under a State plan approved under title XIX [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.], 

of the Social Security Act, constitutes the sole nexus between such facility and such State; 

(3) The term “person” means an individual, a trust or estate, a partnership, an association, or a 

corporation; 

(4) The term “State” means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any of the territories and possessions of the United States; 

(5) The term “legislative days” means any calendar day on which either House of Congress is in 

session. 

§ 1997a. Initiation of civil actions 

(a) Discretionary authority of Attorney General; preconditions 

Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any State, political 

subdivision of a State, official, employee, or agent thereof, or other person acting on behalf of a 

State or political subdivision of a State is subjecting persons residing in or confined to an 

institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, to egregious or flagrant conditions which 

deprive such persons of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous harm, and that 

such deprivation is pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of such 

rights, privileges, or immunities, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, 

may institute a civil action in any appropriate United States district court against such party for 

such equitable relief as may be appropriate to insure the minimum corrective measures necessary 

to insure the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities, except that such equitable 

relief shall be available under this subchapter to persons residing in or confined to an institution 

as defined in section 1997(1)(B)(ii) of this title only insofar as such persons are subjected to 

conditions which deprive them of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 

Constitution of the United States. 

(b) Discretionary award of attorney fees 

In any action commenced under this section, the court may allow the prevailing party, other than 

the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee against the United States as part of the costs. 

(c) Attorney General to personally sign complaint 

40 
The Attorney General shall personally sign any complaint filed pursuant to this section. 

§ 1997b. Certification requirements; Attorney General to personally sign certification 

(a) At the time of the commencement of an action under section 1997a of this title the Attorney 

General shall certify to the court–– 

(1) that at least 49 calendar days previously the Attorney General has notified in writing the 

Governor or chief executive officer and attorney general or chief legal officer of the 

appropriate State or political subdivision and the director of the institution of–– 

(A) the alleged conditions which deprive rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 

protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and the alleged pattern or 

practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities; 

(B) the supporting facts giving rise to the alleged conditions and the alleged pattern or 

practice, including the dates or time period during which the alleged conditions and 

pattern or practice of resistance occurred; and when feasible, the identity of all 

persons reasonably suspected of being involved in causing the alleged conditions and 

pattern or practice at the time of the certification, and the date on which the alleged 

conditions and pattern or practice were first brought to the attention of the Attorney 

General; and 

(C) the minimum measures which the Attorney General believes may remedy the 

alleged conditions and the alleged pattern or practice of resistance; 

(2) that the Attorney General has notified in writing the Governor or chief executive officer 

and attorney general or chief legal officer of the appropriate State or political subdivision 

and the director of the institution of the Attorney General’s intention to commence an 

investigation of such institution, that such notice was delivered at least seven days prior to 

the commencement of such investigation and that between the time of such notice and the 

commencement of an action under section 1997a of this title–– 

(A) the Attorney General has made a reasonable good faith effort to consult with the 

Governor or chief executive officer and attorney general or chief legal officer of the 

appropriate State or political subdivision and the director of the institution, or their 

designees, regarding financial, technical, or other assistance which may be available 

from the United States and which the Attorney General believes may assist in the 

correction of such conditions and pattern or practice of resistance; 

(B) the Attorney General has encouraged the appropriate officials to correct the 

alleged conditions and pattern or practice of resistance through informal methods of 

conference, conciliation and persuasion, including, to the extent feasible, discussion 

of the possible costs and fiscal impacts of alternative minimum corrective measures, 

and it is the Attorney General’s opinion that reasonable efforts at voluntary correction 

have not succeeded; and 

41 
(C) the Attorney General is satisfied that the appropriate officials have had a 

reasonable time to take appropriate action to correct such conditions and pattern or 

practice, taking into consideration the time required to remodel or make necessary 

changes in physical facilities or relocate residents, reasonable legal or procedural 

requirements, the urgency of the need to correct such conditions, and other 

circumstances involved in correcting such conditions; and 

(3) that the Attorney General believes that such an action by the United States is of general 

public importance and will materially further the vindication of rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

(b) The Attorney General shall personally sign any certification made pursuant to this section. 

§ 1997c. Intervention in actions 

(a) Discretionary authority of Attorney General; preconditions; time period 

(1) Whenever an action has been commenced in any court of the United States seeking 

relief from egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive persons residing in institutions 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of 

the United States causing them to suffer grievous harm and the Attorney General has 

reasonable cause to believe that such deprivation is pursuant to a pattern or practice of 

resistance to the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities, the Attorney 

General, for or in the name of the United States, may intervene in such action upon motion 

by the Attorney General. 

(2) The Attorney General shall not file a motion to intervene under paragraph (1) before 90 

days after the commencement of the action, except that if the court determines it would be 

in the interests of justice, the court may shorten or waive the time period. 

(b) Certification requirements by Attorney General 

(1) The Attorney General shall certify to the court in the motion to intervene filed under 

subsection (a) of this section–– 

(A) that the Attorney General has notified in writing, at least fifteen days previously, 

the Governor or chief executive officer, attorney general or chief legal officer of the 

appropriate State or political subdivision, and the director of the institution of–– 

(i) the alleged conditions which deprive rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and the 

alleged pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of such rights, 

privileges, or immunities; 

42 
(ii) the supporting facts giving rise to the alleged conditions, including the dates 

and time period during which the alleged conditions and pattern or practice of 

resistance occurred; and 

(iii) to the extent feasible and consistent with the interests of other plaintiffs, the 

minimum measures which the Attorney General believes may remedy the 

alleged conditions and the alleged pattern or practice of resistance; and 

(B) that the Attorney General believes that such intervention by the United States is 

of general public importance and will materially further the vindication of rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States. 

(2) The Attorney General shall personally sign any certification made pursuant to this 

section. 

(c) Attorney General to personally sign motion to intervene 

The Attorney General shall personally sign any motion to intervene made pursuant to this 

section. 

(d) Discretionary award of attorney fees; other award provisions unaffected 

In any action in which the United States joins as an intervenor under this section, the court may 

allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee against the 

United States as part of the costs. Nothing in this subsection precludes the award of attorney’s 

fees available under any other provisions of the United States Code. 

§ 1997d. Prohibition of retaliation 

No person reporting conditions which may constitute a violation under this subchapter shall be 

subjected to retaliation in any manner for so reporting. 

§ 1997e. Suits by prisoners 

(a) Applicability of administrative remedies. 

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or 

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 

(b) Failure of State to adopt or adhere to administrative grievance procedure 

The failure of a State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance procedure shall not 

constitute the basis for an action under section 1997a or 1997c of this title. 

43 
(c) Dismissal 

(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the 

court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. 

(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

(d) Attorney’s fees 

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, 

such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that–– 

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the 

plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under 

section 1988 of this title; and 

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for 

the violation; or 

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered 

for the violation. 

(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a 

portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of 

attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater 

than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant. 

(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an 

hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of 

Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel. 

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from entering into an agreement to 

pay an attorney’s fee in an amount greater than the amount authorized under this 

subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by the defendant pursuant to 

section 1988 of this title. 

(e) Limitation on recovery 

44 
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior 

showing of physical injury. 

(f) Hearings

(1) To the extent practicable, in any action brought with respect to prison conditions in 

Federal court pursuant to section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, pretrial proceedings in which the 

prisoner’s participation is required or permitted shall be conducted by telephone, video 

conference, or other telecommunications technology without removing the prisoner from 

the facility in which the prisoner is confined. 

(2) Subject to the agreement of the official of the Federal, State, or local unit of 

government with custody over the prisoner, hearings may be conducted at the facility in 

which the prisoner is confined. To the extent practicable, the court shall allow counsel to 

participate by telephone, video conference, or other communications technology in any 

hearing held at the facility. 

(g) Waiver of reply 

(1) Any defendant may waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983 of this title or 

any other Federal law. Notwithstanding any other law or rule of procedure, such waiver 

shall not constitute an admission of the allegations contained in the complaint. No relief 

shall be granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been filed. 

(2) The court may require any defendant to reply to a complaint brought under this section 

if it finds that the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits. 

(h) Definition 

As used in this section, the term “prisoner” means any person incarcerated or detained in any 

facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations 

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 

program. 

§ 1997f. Report to Congress 

The Attorney General shall include in the report to Congress on the business of the Department 

of Justice prepared pursuant to section 522 of Title 28–– 

(1) a statement of the number, variety, and outcome of all actions instituted pursuant to this 

subchapter including the history of, precise reasons for, and procedures followed in 

initiation or intervention in each case in which action was commenced; 

45 
(2) a detailed explanation of the procedures by which the Department has received, 

reviewed, and evaluated petitions or complaints regarding conditions in institutions; 

(3) an analysis of the impact of actions instituted pursuant to this subchapter, including, 

when feasible, an estimate of the costs incurred by States and other political subdivisions; 

(4) a statement of the financial, technical, or other assistance which has been made 

available from the United States to the State in order to assist in the correction of the 

conditions which are alleged to have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 

(5) the progress made in each Federal institution toward meeting existing promulgated 

standards for such institutions or constitutionally guaranteed minima. 

§ 1997g. Priorities for use of funds 

It is the intent of Congress that deplorable conditions in institutions covered by this subchapter 

amounting to deprivations of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States be 

corrected, not only by litigation as contemplated in this subchapter, but also by the voluntary 

good faith efforts of agencies of Federal, State, and local governments. It is the further intention 

of Congress that where Federal funds are available for use in improving such institutions, 

priority should be given to the correction or elimination of such unconstitutional or illegal 

conditions which may exist. It is not the intent of this provision to require the redirection of 

funds from one program to another or from one State to another. 

§ 1997h. Notice to Federal departments 

At the time of notification of the commencement of an investigation of an institution under 

section 1997a of this title or of the notification of an intention to file a motion to intervene under 

section 1997c of this title, and if the relevant institution receives Federal financial assistance 

from the Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of Education, the 

Attorney General shall notify the appropriate Secretary of the action and the reasons for such 

action and shall consult with such officials. Following such consultation, the Attorney General 

may proceed with an action under this subchapter if the Attorney General is satisfied that such 

action is consistent with the policies and goals of the executive branch. 

§ 1997i. Disclaimer respecting standards of care 

Provisions of this subchapter shall not authorize promulgation of regulations defining standards 

of care. 

§ 1997j. Disclaimer respecting private litigation 

The provisions of this subchapter shall in no way expand or restrict the authority of parties other 

than the United States to enforce the legal rights which they may have pursuant to existing law 

with regard to institutionalized persons. In this regard, the fact that the Attorney General may be 

46 
conducting an investigation or contemplating litigation pursuant to this subchapter shall not be 

grounds for delay of or prejudice to any litigation on behalf of parties other than the United 

States. 

47 
48 
Appendix II. Data from the Department of Justice’s Annual 

Reports to Congress, Letters of Investigative Findings, 

Complaints, Briefs, Settlements, and Court Decisions 

This appendix contains charts that describe how the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 

implemented CRIPA and reported its work. Data were culled from a variety of sources, including 

the Department’s annual reports to Congress, letters of investigative findings, complaints, briefs, 

settlements, and court decisions. Where there were no data, an “X” is placed in empty fields in 

these charts. 

Enforcement Timelines 

Charts A through E use data gleaned primarily from individual documents rather than summary 

data to calculate the length of time that elapsed between the Department’s implementation of the 

stages of CRIPA investigation. Relevant information was provided in a consistent manner for 

only 18 of the more than 300 CRIPA investigations reviewed for this report. Of these, 13 cases 

included all of the data needed to show the time elapsed from–– 

a. the date an investigation was initiated to the date a letter of findings was issued (2 months 

to 3 years), 

b. a letter of findings date to the date a lawsuit was filed (5 months to 10 years), and 

c. an investigation initiation date to the date a lawsuit was filed (18 months to 5 years). 

In nearly all cases, more than a year elapsed between the issuance of a findings letter and the 

initiation of a lawsuit. 

49 
Chart A. Institutions for People with Psychiatric Disabilities or Mental Illnesses 

State and/or

Institution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

InvestigationInitiation to Lawsuit Filed 

VA: CentralState Hospital(Petersburg) 

March 24, 1997 April 28, 1997 June 30, 1997 2 months May 6, 1999,

and settlementdate 

Oct. 4, 2001,approved jointmotion todismiss 

1 year 11 months 2 years 8 days 

Chart B. Institutions for People with Developmental Disabilities, Including Intellectual Disabilities 

State and/or

Institution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

Investigation

Initiation to 

Lawsuit Filed 

IL: HoweDevelopmentCenter 

April 18, 1986 Feb. 1989 July 31, 1989 5 months Jan. 18, 1992;

consent decreeon Jan. 3, 1994 

Dismissed Feb.14, 1996 

2 years 6 months4 years 5 months 

2 years 11months 

MD: RosewoodCenter 

Nov. 7, 1980 Nov. 1980 Feb. 19, 1982 1 year 3 

months 

Jan. 17, 1985,and consentdecree date 

June 4, 1986,not complying;Dec. 12, 1988,decreemodification 

2 years 11months 

4 years 2 months 

NM: Ft. StantonHospital andTraining School 

Nov. 30, 1984 Dec. 18, 1984 Dec. 24, 1985 1 year 11

months 6 days 

Aug. 8, 1986(after staterejected June 5,1986, consentdecree) 

1990 closedfacility and moved lastresident tocommunity;1998(monitoring) 

7 months 15 days 1 year 8 months 

50 
State and/or

Institution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

Investigation

Initiation to 

Lawsuit Filed 

PA: EmbreevilleCenter 

Sept. 11, 1986 Sept. 1986

initialinvestigation; “new” tourMarch 1989 

May 1988; thenFY92 (no specificdate stated) re:new tour findings 

2 years initialdata; “new” tour range: 3 yearsto 3 years 6months 

Sept. 12, 1994,consent decreewith communitybased services 

Closed 1998with monitoringof communityservices FY03;no specific date 

10 years (fromthe 7-day letter);6 years 4 months(from “new” tour letter) 

5 years 6months;possibly 3 yearsmore fromnotice to retour 

51 
Chart C. Publicly Funded/Operated Nursing Homes 

State and/or

Institution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

Investigation

Initiation to 

Lawsuit Filed 

PA:Philadelphia NursingHome** 

Aug. 17, 1995 Nov. 1995 FY97 (specific

data not stated) 

1 month to 12months 

August 13,1998, andsettlementagreement 

Nov. 7, 2001,joint dismissal motionapproved 

10 months to 1year 10 months 

2 years 9months 

CA: LagunaHonda Hospitaland RehabCenter 

FY98 (city);April 23, 2003,letter broadenedto include state 

Dec. 2001 (city);retour March 2002 (city); andAugust 2003(state) 

May 6, 1998(city/county); April 1, 2003, secondletter(city/county); Aug. 3, 2004 (state) 

3 years 7months(city/county); 1year (state) 

X Dec. 18, 2003,

court approvedsettlementcity/county 

X X 

**Reported as the first case stemming from joint investigation under CRIPA and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. and involving cooperative effort by 

the Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

52 
Chart D. Juvenile Justice Institutions Housing People with Disabilities 

State and/or

Institution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

Investigation

Initiation to 

Lawsuit Filed 

NJ: EssexCounty YouthHouse 

Jan. 6, 1986 March 1986 July 23, 1986 4 months Dec. 3, 1987,

and consentdecree;Nov. 4, 2003,decreeamended 

May 6, 1994,remedial order;April 4,1996,stipulation 

1 year 4 months10 days 

1 year 9 months 

LA: Bridge City,Monroe, Jetson,and Tallulah,CorrectionalCenters forYouth 

April 25, 1996 June 3, 1996 July 18, 1997 1 year 15 days Nov. 5, 1998;

1999 settlementagreement 

FY03 (nospecific datestated); jointdismissal motion re:compliance withcorrections 

1 year 4 months 3 years 5

months 

MS: TwoTrainingSchools (Oakleyand Columbia) 

May 8, 2002 June 24, 2002 June 19, 2003 1 year (11

months 5 days) 

Dec. 2003 July 2004 DOJ

request forpublic input 

5 months 1 year 6 months 

53 
Chart E. Adult Jails and Prisons Housing Incarcerated People with Disabilities 

State and/orInstitution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

Investigation

Initiation to 

Lawsuit Filed 

MI: ScottCorrectional;CraneCorrectional 

June 8, 1994June 9, 1994 

June 1994access denied 

March 27, 1995 9 months March 10, 1997 Consent decree

May 6, 1999 

2 years 1 year 9 months 

CA: CA MedicalFacility Dept. ofCorrections 

March 7, 1985 March 1985 Jan. 6, 1987 1 year 9 months Sept. 12, 1989;

second consentdecree March1990 

FY91 (nospecific datestated);stipulationsagreed; Feb. 14,1997 dismissal 

2 years 8 months6 days 

2 years 9months 

ID: Ada CountyJail 

X Jan. 3, 1983 April 18, 1984 1 year 3 months May 23, 1985,

and settlement 

Motion todismiss decreeDec. 18, 1986 

1 year 1 month5 days 

2 years 5months 

AR: CumminsUnit, AR Dept.of CorrectionsLincoln County 

Sept. 18, 1985 July 28, 1986;

expandedinvestigation Aug. 21, 1986 

Aug. 2, 1989 3 years No lawsuit filed Jan. 1994

investigation closed afterimprovementsand corrections;no furtherinformation 

X X 

AR: CrittendenCounty Jail(Marion County) 

Nov. 7, 1986 Nov. 1986 June 1, 1987 8 months July 13, 1989,

and consentdecree 

Dec. 19, 1990;Nov. 27, 2001,joint dismissal(court approved) 

2 years 1 month12 days 

2 years 8months 

MD: BaltimoreCity DetentionCenter 

Oct. 16, 2000 Dec. 12, 2000 August 13, 2002 1 year 8 months X X X X 

54 
State and/or

Institution 

Notice of Intent 

to Investigate 

(7-Day Notice) 

Date

Investigation

Initiated 

Date Findings

Letter Issued

(49-Day Notice) 

Investigation

Initiated to 

Letter of 

Findings 

Date Lawsuit 

Filed 

Type of Interim 

and/or Closing 

Action(s) 

Letter of 

Findings to 

Lawsuit Filed 

Investigation

Initiation to 

Lawsuit Filed 

MD: WicomicoCountyDetention 

Oct. 5, 2000 Jan. 26, 2001 Sept. 9, 2002 1 year 9 months X Private

agreementJuly 6, 2004 

X X 

OK: LeFloreCounty Jail 

Nov. 8, 2002 Dec. 10, 2002 April 17, 2003 4 months X X X X 

55 
Chart F. Number of Complaints Received, Investigations Initiated, and Letters of Findings Issued (1981–2003) 

According to DOJ staff, most complaints enumerated in this chart were CRIPA related. Before 1990, complete data were not available 

on the number of complaints and referrals received. Since 1990, inmates writing about conditions in their institutions formed the bulk 

of people who wrote letters. Most were not at a level of egregiousness to activate Department preliminary investigation leading to a 

potential CRIPA investigation. Referrals to the Special Litigation Section were called “referrals,” “responses,” or “inquiries” in the Department’s annual reports to Congress. The term used in each annual report is used in this chart. 

Fiscal Year Complaints Received Referral: White House/Congress Investigations Initiated (New) Letters of Findings Issued 

1981 X X 12 3 1982 X X 15 9 1983 X X 9 6 1984 X X 9 13 1985 X X 13 10 1986 X X 16 14 1987 X X 5 11 1988 X X 2 6 1989 X X 3 4 1990 1,585 letters 145 referrals 5 3 1991 1,468 letters 41 referrals 9 9 1992 2,800 letters 40 referrals 7 5 1993 2,904 letters 175 referrals 20 7 1994 2,684 letters 160 responses 16 17 1995 2,753 letters 85 referrals 27 24 1996 2,740 letters; 360 calls 110 referrals 7 13 1997 3,160 letters; 400 calls 85 responses 16 8 1998 3,200 letters; 400 calls 84 referrals 10 12 1999 9,300 letters; 400 calls 21 responses 5 6 2000 7,300 letters; 1,000 calls 30 responses 4 6 2001 7,700 letters; 100 calls 17 responses 6 2 2002 6,200 letters; 500 calls 140 inquiries 16 3 2003 4,000+ letters; 100+ calls 195 responses 12 18 

56 
Chart G. Number of New CRIPA Lawsuits Filed, Facility Location (1981–2003) 

The majority of CRIPA lawsuits were filed simultaneously with consent decrees. Among the few suits filed by DOJ without a consent 

decree filed on or close to the date of the complaint were the suits against Louisiana (1999) involving four correctional centers for 

youth where a consent decree was filed five years after the suit was filed, and the Buffalo Psychiatric Center in New York (1988) 

where a consent decree was filed after three years. Few “intervention” cases were included, such as the Department’s intervention in 

private cases against Louisiana’s Feliciana Forensic Facility (1982), Houston City Jail in Texas (1983), Mississippi’s Jones County Jail (1993), Montana State Prison and Louisiana’s Angola Penitentiary (1994), Angola Penitentiary in Louisiana (1994), Mississippi’s 

Simpson County Jail (1995), and Florida’s G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital (1998). There was also an emergency consent decree on behalf of youth in 20 of Puerto Rico’s juvenile justice facilities in 1994. The chart below also shows that lawsuits againstMississippi accounted for 14 of the 19 new cases filed in 1994 and 1995. 

Fiscal

Year Count of Cases Facility and State Date Lawsuit Filed Consent Decree Filed 

1981 None filed X X X 1982 1 intervention Feliciana Forensic Facility, LA

(Davis v. Henderson [E.D.] La) 

June 4, 1982 December 2, 1983 

1983 1 Oahu Community Correctional Center and Halawa High 

Security Facility,

Honolulu, Hawaii

[State won dismissal, May 10, 1983] 

March 4, 1983 X 

1 intervention Houston City Jail, Texas

[Case closed July 4, 1984, before 

permission granted] 

August 23, 1983 X 

1984 3 Jackson, Marquette, and Ionia Prisons, Michigan January 17, 1984 July 16, 1984 

Newark City Jail, New Jersey February 2, 1984 February 2, 1984 

Central State Hospital and Logansport State Hospital, 

Indiana 

April 6, 1984 April 6, 1984 

1985 5 Rosewood Center, Maryland January 17, 1985 January 17, 1985 

Bedford County Jail, Tennessee January 17, 1985 January 17, 1985 

57 
Fiscal

Year Count of Cases Facility and State Date Lawsuit Filed Consent Decree Filed 

Worcester State Hospital, Massachusetts February 11, 1985 August 25, 1987 

Ada County Jail, Idaho May 23, 1985 May 23, 1985 

Talledega County Jail, Alabama September 17, 1985 September 17, 1985

1986 7

(includes 1

investigation 

access suit) 

Los Angeles County Juvenile Halls 

[investigation access suit; added mental health services 

memorandum of agreement: 

December 12, 2002] 

March 27, 1986 X 

South Carolina State Hospital June 24, 1986 June 24, 1986 

Wheat Ridge Center, Colorado July 10, 1986 July 22, 1986 

Southbury Training Center, Connecticut July 25, 1986 July 25, 1986 

Fairview Training Center, Oregon July 28, 1986 July 28, 1986 

Ypsilanti Regional Psychiatric Hospital, Michigan August 7, 1986 August 7, 1986 

Ft. Stanton Hospital & Training School, New Mexico August 8, 1986 [became class 

action suit July 1987] 

[rejected by state] 

1987 5 Elgin Mental Health Center, Illinois October 2, 1986 February 17, 1987 

Metropolitan Developmental Center, Louisiana January 5, 1987 July 23, 1987 

Julia Tutweiler Prison, Alabama January 6, 1987 X 

Jefferson County Jail, Ohio April 9, 1987 April 9, 1987 

Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hospital, Michigan September 16, 1987 September 16, 1987

1988 3 Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility, Virgin Islands November 21, 1987 November 21, 1987 

Essex County Youth House, New Jersey December 3, 1987 December 3, 1987 

Buffalo Psychiatric Center, New York February 5, 1988 September 12, 1991

1989 3 Santa Rita Jail, California June 12, 1989 June 12, 1989 

Crittenden County Jail, Arkansas July 13, 1989 December 19, 1990 

California Medical Facility (Vacaville) September 12, 1989 September 12, 1989

1990 3 Los Lunas Hospital and Training School,

New Mexico 

October 27, 1989 February 2, 1990 

58 
Fiscal

Year Count of Cases Facility and State Date Lawsuit Filed Consent Decree Filed 

Ellisvile State School, Mississippi June 21, 1990 June 21, 1990 

Napa State Hospital, California September 17, 1990 September 17, 1990

1991 3

(includes 1

access suit) 

Guam Adult Detention Center, 

Rosario Detention Facility,

Inpatient Unit, Guam Department of Mental Health and 

Substance Abuse 

February 13, 1991 May 16, 1991 

Hawaii State Hospital, Hawaii March 7, 1991 July 1991 

San Diego County Jails, California

[investigation access suit] 

June 5, 1991 X 

1992 3 Arlington Developmental Center, Tennessee January 21, 1992 November 1993 

Howe Developmental Center, Illinois January 18, 1992 January 3, 1993 

Ebensburg Center, Pennsylvania February 10, 1992 No data 

1993 1 Jones County Jail, Mississippi 

[complaint in intervention] 

September 29, 1993 March 1, 1994 

1994 10 Conecuh County Jail, Alabama February 16, 1994 January 24, 1995 

Boswell Regional Hospital, Mississippi March 9, 1994 March 9, 1994 

Angola Penitentiary, Louisiana

[complaint in intervention] 

July 21, 1994 X 

20 Juvenile Justice facilities, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico X [August 22, 1994 emergency decree] 

October 6, 1994 

Embreeville Center, Pennsylvania September 12, 1994 September 12, 1994

Grenada County Jail, Mississippi September 19, 1994 September 19, 1994

Grenada City Jail, Mississippi September 19, 1994 September 19, 1994

Scott County Jail, Mississippi September 19, 1994 September 19, 1994

Neshoba County Jail, Mississippi September 19, 1994 September 19, 1994

Alcorn County Jail, Mississippi September 20, 1994 September 20, 1994

1995 9

(includes 1 

Tupelo City Jail, Mississippi November 14, 1994 March 7, 1995 

Forrest City Jail, Mississippi November 14, 1994 November 14, 1994 

59 
Fiscal

Year Count of Cases Facility and State Date Lawsuit Filed Consent Decree Filed 

intervention) Corinth City Jail, Mississippi November 22, 1994 November 22, 1994 

Montana State Prison, Mississippi December 1, 1994 January 31, 1997 

Harrison County Jail, Mississippi January 12, 1995 January 12, 1995 

Sunflower County Jail, Mississippi April 20, 1995 April 26, 1995 

Forrest County Jail, Mississippi April 20, 1995 April 20, 1995 

Simpson County Jail, Mississippi 

[complaint in intervention] 

April 25, 1995 X 

District of Columbia Village May 19, 1995 July 5, 1995 

1996 4 13 Juvenile Facilities, Kentucky November 13, 1995 November 13, 1995

Eastern State Hospital & Hancock Geriatric Facility, Virginia March 4, 1996 July 18, 1996 

Northern Virginia Training Center March 6, 1996 July 18, 1996 

Memphis Mental Health Institute, Tennessee March 15, 1996 March 27, 1996 

1997 6 4 Developmental Facilities, Tennessee November 22, 1996 July 3, 1997 

Crane Correctional, Scott Correctional, Michigan March 10, 1997 May 6, 1999 

4 Women’s Prisons, Arizona March 10, 1997 March 10, 1997 

Central and Southern Developmental Facilities, Wisconsin April 4, 1997 April 4, 1997 

Northern Virginia Mental Health Institute June 10, 1997 June 10, 1997 

Clay County Jail August 20, 1997 August 20, 1997 

1998 6

(includes 1

intervention) 

Maricopa County Jails, Arizona October 31, 1998 October 31, 1998 

Dooly County Jail, Georgia January 5, 1998 January 5, 1998 

13 Juvenile Justice Facilities, Georgia March 18, 1998 March 18, 1998 

G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital, Florida

[complaint in intervention] 

April 2, 1998 X 

Philadelphia Nursing Home August 13, 1998 August 13, 1998 

Louisiana State Penitentiary 

[settlement agreement filed] 

X September 24, 1998 

60 
Fiscal

Year Count of Cases Facility and State Date Lawsuit Filed Consent Decree Filed 

1999 7 Jetson, Tullulah, Bridge City, and Swanson/Monroe 

Correctional Centers for Youth, Louisiana 

November 5, 1998 January 17, 2003 

2 County Jails, Arizona December 22, 1998 December 22, 1998 

1 Prison, 4 Jails, and 1 Juvenile Justice Facility 

 Northern Mariana Islands 

February 23, 1999 February 23, 1999 

6 Facilities in Puerto Rico April 21, 1999 April 21, 1999 

Central State Hospital, Virginia May 6, 1999 May 6, 1999 

New Mexico School for the Visually Handicapped May 28, 1999 May 28, 1999 

Muscogee County Jail, Georgia September 23, 1999 September 23, 1999

2000 3 5 Maricopa County Jails, Arizona December 7, 1999 December 7, 1999 

Morgan County Jail, Tennessee February 10, 2000 February 10, 2000 

Jena Juvenile Justice Facility, Louisiana March 30, 2000 April 13, 2000 

2001 2 Ft. Wayne Developmental Center December 29, 2000 January 23, 2001 

McCracken County/Regional Jail January 19, 2001 March 15, 2001 

2002 3 Wyoming State Penitentiary April 15, 2002 April 15, 2002 

Nassau County Correctional Center, New York April 22, 2002 April 22, 2002 

Shelby County Jail August 12, 2002 August 12, 2002 

2003 1 Alexander Youth Services Center, Arkansas March 10, 2003 March 10, 2003 

61 
62 
Appendix III. Department of Justice Staffing and Budget 

Allocations for CRIPA (1995–2003) 

The chart below begins with fiscal year 2000 because that is the first year for which Department of Justice (DOJ) data provided

information on the number of full-time attorneys available for CRIPA work. According to a Department spokesperson, the Department does not track the number of dollars dedicated to CRIPA enforcement. Figures are estimates based on the judgment of 

Section managers. Where there were no data, an “X” is used in the empty field. 

Chart A. DOJ Staffing and Budget Allocations for CRIPA (1995–2003) 

63 

Fiscal

Year/Date Positions 

Attorneys for

CRIPA 

CRIPA

their work) ities Cases 

FY00 36 15 X $6 million X X FY01 42 14 7 $7.5 million 56.19 percent FY02 48 15 11 $8.9 million 58.89 percent FY03 55 20 18 $9.7 million 66.91 percent 

Special Litigation 

Section Attorney 

Full-Time 

Half-Time Attorneys for 

(at least 50 percent of 

Special Litigation 

Section Budget 

Allocations 

Special Litigation Section 

Budget Allocation 

for CRIPA Activ

Time on CRIPA 

About half the budget 

Greater than half the budget Greater than half the budget 
64 
Appendix IV. Mission of the National Council on Disability 

Overview and Purpose 

The National Council on Disability (NCD) is an independent federal agency with 15 members 

appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The purpose 

of NCD is to promote policies, programs, practices, and procedures that guarantee equal 

opportunity for all individuals with disabilities regardless of the nature or significance of the 

disability and to empower individuals with disabilities to achieve economic self-sufficiency, 

independent living, and inclusion and integration into all aspects of society. 

Specific Duties 

The current statutory mandate of NCD includes the following: 

• Reviewing and evaluating, on a continuing basis, policies, programs, practices, and 

procedures concerning individuals with disabilities conducted or assisted by federal 

departments and agencies, including programs established or assisted under the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, or under the Developmental Disabilities 

Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, as well as all statutes and regulations pertaining to 

federal programs that assist such individuals with disabilities, to assess the effectiveness 

of such policies, programs, practices, procedures, statutes, and regulations in meeting 

the needs of individuals with disabilities. 

• Reviewing and evaluating, on a continuing basis, new and emerging disability policy 

issues affecting individuals with disabilities in the Federal Government, at the state and 

local government levels, and in the private sector, including the need for and coordination 

of adult services, access to personal assistance services, school reform efforts and the 

impact of such efforts on individuals with disabilities, access to health care, and policies 

that act as disincentives for individuals to seek and retain employment. 

• Making recommendations to the President, Congress, the Secretary of Education, the 

director of the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, and other 

officials of federal agencies about ways to better promote equal opportunity, economic 

self-sufficiency, independent living, and inclusion and integration into all aspects of 

society for Americans with disabilities. 

• Providing Congress, on a continuing basis, with advice, recommendations, legislative 

proposals, and any additional information that NCD or Congress deems appropriate. 

• Gathering information about the implementation, effectiveness, and impact of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). 

• Advising the President, Congress, the commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services 

Administration, the assistant secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services 

within the Department of Education, and the director of the National Institute on 

Disability and Rehabilitation Research on the development of the programs to be carried 

out under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. 

65 
• Providing advice to the commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services Administration with 

respect to the policies and conduct of the administration. 

• Making recommendations to the director of the National Institute on Disability and 

Rehabilitation Research on ways to improve research, service, administration, and the 

collection, dissemination, and implementation of research findings affecting people with 

disabilities. 

• Providing advice regarding priorities for the activities of the Interagency Disability 

Coordinating Council and reviewing the recommendations of this council for legislative 

and administrative changes to ensure that such recommendations are consistent with 

NCD’s purpose of promoting the full integration, independence, and productivity of 

individuals with disabilities. 

• Preparing and submitting to the President and Congress an annual report titled National 

Disability Policy: A Progress Report. 

International 

In 1995, NCD was designated by the Department of State to be the U.S. government’s official 

contact point for disability issues. Specifically, NCD interacts with the special rapporteur of the 

United Nations Commission for Social Development on disability matters. 

Consumers Served and Current Activities 

Although many government agencies deal with issues and programs affecting people with 

disabilities, NCD is the only federal agency charged with addressing, analyzing, and making 

recommendations on issues of public policy that affect people with disabilities regardless of age, 

disability type, perceived employment potential, economic need, specific functional ability, 

veteran status, or other individual circumstance. NCD recognizes its unique opportunity to 

facilitate independent living, community integration, and employment opportunities for people 

with disabilities by ensuring an informed and coordinated approach to addressing the concerns of 

people with disabilities and eliminating barriers to their active participation in community and 

family life. 

NCD plays a major role in developing disability policy in America. In fact, NCD originally 

proposed what eventually became the ADA. NCD’s present list of key issues includes improving 

personal assistance services, promoting health care reform, including students with disabilities in 

high-quality programs in typical neighborhood schools, promoting equal employment and 

community housing opportunities, monitoring the implementation of the ADA, improving 

assistive technology, and ensuring that people with disabilities who are members of diverse 

cultures fully participate in society. 

Statutory History 

NCD was established in 1978 as an advisory board within the Department of Education (P.L. 95­

602). The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-221) transformed NCD into an 

independent agency. 

66 
Endnotes 

1

 Senate Judiciary No. 96-415, 96th Congressional Session, p. 1, and House Conference Report 

No. 96-987, p. 8. 

2

 42 U.S.C. 1997. 

3

 Testimony of Leslie G. Aronovitz before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, March 4, 

2002. Aronovitz is the director of Health Care–Program Administration and Integrity Issues, 

Government Accounting Office. 

4

 California Protection and Advocacy, Inc., State Council on Developmental Disabilities, USC 

University Affiliated Program, The Tarjan Center for Developmental Disabilities, UCLA, 

“Abuse and Neglect of Adults with Developmental Disabilities: A Public Health Priority for the 

State of California,” August 2003. The report is available at www.pai-ca.org/pubs/701901.pdf. 

5

 Jeffrey Meitrodt and Steve Ritea, “State of Neglect,” Times-Picayune, April 17, 2005. 

6

 Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, “Reporting Abuses of Persons with 

Disabilities,” May 2001. 

7

 The Department of Justice began enforcing the rights of people in institutions in 1971, when it 

accepted an invitation from U.S. District Court judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., to join the landmark 

case Wyatt v. Stickney (325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) as litigating amicus curiae. 

8

 See United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), aff’d, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th 

Circuit 1977) and United States v. Mattson, C.A. No. 74-138-BU (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976), 

aff’d, 600 F. 2d 1295 (9th Circuit. 1979). 

9

 Judiciary Committee Report to Accompany S. 10, Senate Report No. 96-415, 96th 

Congressional Session, p. 27. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Public Law No. 101-336. 

12 Public Law No. 104-134, Stat. 1321 §§ 801-810 (April 24, 1996), amended, Public Law No. 

105-119, 111 Stat. 240 (November 26, 1997). 

13 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 

14 29 U.S.C. 794. 

15 42 U.S.C. 1997a. 

16 See www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/complaints.htm#Institution. 

67 
17 “Delivering on the Promise: U.S. Department of Justice Self-Evaluation to Promote 

Community Living for People with Disabilities,” p. 38, available at 

www.hhs.gov/newfreedom/final/pdf/doj.pdf. 

18 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended authorizes federal agencies to 

withhold federal funds from recipients that violate the rights of people with disabilities. 

19 42 U.S.C. 1997b (a) (2). 

20 See 42 U.S.C. 1997b (a) (1). 

21 Ibid. 

22 “Staff Report on the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled,” prepared for Joint Hearings 

conducted by the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, Committee on Labor and Human 

Resources and the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related 

Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, April 1–3, 1985, p. 135. 

23 42 U.S.C. 1997b (a) (2) (B). 

24 42 U.S.C. 1997b (1) (2) (A). 

25 “Delivering on the Promise.” 

26 Ibid. 

27 “Staff Report on the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled,” p. 146. 

28 Ibid., p. 147. 

29 The Web site for the Youth Law Center is www.ylc.org. 

30 The Web site for the ACLU’s National Prison Project is 

www.aclu.org/Prisons/PrisonsMain.cfm. 

31 The Special Litigation Section portion of the DOJ Web site is available at

www.usdoj.gov/crt/split. Information about CRIPA enforcement is available at 

www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/cripa.htm. 

32 See www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/faq.htm#emergency. 

33 National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, Inc. (www.napas.org). 

34 Department of Justice Activities Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Fiscal

Year 2003, pp. 1–2, available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split_cripa03.pdf. 

35 42 U.S.C. 1997f. 

68