UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) KIESHA D. LEW IS , ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-359 (RBW) ) DANIEL WERFEL , IRS ) Commissioner , 1 ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Kiesha D. Lewis, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against the defendant, Daniel Werfel , in his official capacity as the Commi ssioner of the Internal Re v enue Service ( “ IRS ”), alleging (1) a c laim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of her right to privacy under the Nin th Amendment , see Complaint for a Civil Case (“Compl. ”) at 6–12 , ECF No. 1, (2) the violation of her right to privacy under the Pr i vac y Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a,

see id., and (3) the intentional infliction of emotional distress , see id. at 12–13. Currently pending before the Court is the defendant’s Motion to Dismi ss (“ Def. ’ s Mot. ”), ECF No. 6, pursuant to Fede ral Rule of C ivil Proc edure 12(b)(6). Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 2 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendant’s motion.

1 Daniel Werfel is the current Commissioner of the Internal Revenu e Service, and he is therefore sub stituted for Douglas O ’ Donnell as the proper party defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

2 In addition to th e filings already identi fied, t he Court considered t h e followin g sub mi ssion s in ren dering its decision: (1) the Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States ’ Motion to Dismiss P l aintiff ’ s C omplaint (“ Def. ’ s Mem. ”), ECF No. 6 -1; (2) the P laintif f ’s R esponse to Defendant’s Mot ion to Dismiss (“ Pl. ’ s Opp ’n” ), E CF No. 9; and (3 ) the Repl y i n Su pport of the United States ’ Motion to Dism iss (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 10

.2 I. BACKGROUND
A. Fact ual Backg roun d The follo wi n g allegations are taken from the plaintiff ’s Complaint, u nless otherwise specified. The plaintiff formerly worked at the IRS, see Compl. at 7, and as part of her employment, underwent a background investigation conducted by the Defense Counterin tellig en c e and Se curity Ag enc y ( “ DCSA ”), s ee id

. , Ex hibi t ( “ Ex. ” ) B (Pri vacy Act Request E

- mail (Apr. 22, 2022)) at 1 (noting “ that the Defense Counterintelligence and Secur ity Agency (DCSA) . . . conducted [the plaintiff’s background] invest igation ”), ECF No. 1-2. Starting in 2016, the plaintiff “ filed se veral co mplaints against the [IRS] for behavior t hat [she ] characterize[d] a s u nethica l, immoral, and against the federal government and IRS policy.” Id. at 7. Then, “ [i] n October 2017, [the plaintiff’s] employment with the IRS ended.” Id. However,

“ [d ]esp ite thi s fact, the IRS [allegedly] cont acted the [D CS A] several times in 2018 . . . to request an d obtain private, personal, and confidential information on [the p laintiff] without [her] knowledge or consent.” Id. “ In 2018, after receiving [the plaintiff ’ s] back ground investigation file, th e I RS [allege dly] perf o rmed a ‘ Suitability ’ adjudication on [her.]” 3 Id. at 9. “According to IRS policy, Suitability Inve stigations and Adjudications are only performed on IRS employees [,] ” id., but the plaintiff “w as not an IRS employee in 2018, [nor at that time ] had

3 The Defense Counterintelligenc e and Security Agency ’ s website defines a suitability adjudication as “ the evaluation of duly authorized personnel vetting informatio n that is relevant and reliable, to determine whether a person who performs or seeks to perform work for, or on behalf of, the Executive Branch, not including the President, the Vice President, or t heir respective Employees except as provided by 3 [ United States Code] or annual appropriations acts is: (1) suitable for government employment ; (2) e ligible for Logical and/or Physical Ac cess; (3) eli gible for Access to Classified Information; (4) el igible to hold a Sensitive Position; or (5) fit to pe rform work for or on behalf of the government as a Contractor Employee. ” Adjudicati ons , Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency , https://www.dcsa mil/Personnel

- Security/Adjudications

. The Court takes judicial notice o f t his information because it is available on the DCSA ’ s public website. See United States ex rel. Groat v. Boston Heart Diagnostics Corp., 255 F. Supp. 3d 13, 24 n .7 (D.D.C . 2017) (Walton , J.) ( “ [C]ourts in this jurisdiction have fre quently taken judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government agencies. ” (quot ing Pharm. Researc h & Mfrs. of Am. v. U.S. Dep ’ t of Health & Human Servs., 43 F. Supp. 3d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2014))).3 [she] been tentatively selected for an IRS p osition or appointed to a position at the IRS or at the
De par tment of Treasur y[,] ” id. at 10. In 2019, t he IRS also allegedly “contact[ed] a third party, the National Stud ent Clearingh ous e (NSC )”— a “nonprofit and nongovernmental organization that provides education reporting, data exchange, verification, and research services ”—“to ver ify [the plaintiff ’ s] educational information.” Id. at 11. “On February 11, 2019, IRS employee ‘ Do nnie Robbins,’ [allegedly] co nt acted [the] NSC to verify [the plaintiff ’s] education.” Id. Despite the plaintiff ’ s efforts to contact the IRS , “and sending various follow-up communications, [ the IRS has allegedly ] refused to provide an explanation as to why an IRS employee was con du cting this type of verifi cation on [th e pl aintiff]. ” Id. Finally, the IRS also allegedly “ collected and st ored non- tax related data on [the plaintiff]. ” Id. at 12. More specifically, when the plaintiff submitted a Freedom of Information
Ac t (“ FOIA ” ) request for her pers onnel sec urity i nvestigation file , she received “a total of 192 records[;] ” howev er, according to the plaintiff, since her “IRS employment ended [in ] October 2017,” these records should not have existed. Id. Accordingly , the plaintiff al leges that: Since filing fo r mal co mp laints in 2016, [s he] bel i eve[s] that [she ], [her] family, an d [her] frien ds have been the target of a consistent, coordinated, and ruthless digital assassination retaliation campaign. The goals of this campaign are to cause [the plaintiff] to lose [her] job (by c alling in to q ues t ion [her] se curi ty ad

judication ), cause undue financial burden (by causing [her] to have an unwarr anted tax debt, causing [her] checking account to be in the negative or arbitrarily making [her] credit score lower) and to punish anyone who [the IRS ] belie v e[s] [may be] as sisting [the plaintiff] in [her] fight against this behavior. Id. In other words, the plaintiff “ bel ieve[s] that [she has] been the victim of federal government officials abusing their positions and/or authority to depriv e [ her] of [her] Ninth Amen dment [r]ights and causing intentional infliction of emotional dis tress. ” Id. at 6.4 B. P rocedural Background Th e plaintiff filed her Co mplaint in this case on Fe bruary 8, 2023. See Compl. at 1. On April 11, 2023, the de fendan t f ile d his motion to d ismi ss. See Def. ’s Mot. at 1. The plaintiff filed her opposition on April 27, 2023, see Pl. ’ s Opp ’n at 1 , and the defendant filed his reply in
suppor t of his motion on May 8, 2023, see Def .’s Reply at 1.
II. STANDARD O F REVI EW
A R ule 12(b )(6) mo t ion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon w hich r elief ca n be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b )(6)], a complaint mus t contain sufficient factual matter, accepted a s tr ue, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v . Iqba l, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A cl aim is facially plausi ble “when the plaintiff pleads factual conten t that a llow s the co urt to d raw [a] re asonable inference that the defendant is li a ble fo r the mi sconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the complaint in favo r of t he pla intiff, who must be granted th e benefit of all inferences that can be derive d from t he facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted ). While the Court must “assume th e[ ] veracity ” of a ny

“ well -ple aded factual alleg atio ns” in a complaint, conclusory allegatio ns “are not en titled to the

as sumption of truth.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cau se of action, supported by mere conclusory stat ements , do not suf fice. ” Id. at 678 (ci ting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Also, the Cou rt need not “accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations[,]” or “inferences drawn by [the] p laintiff if those infe rences are not supported by the facts set out in the comp laint[.] ” He tti nga, 677 F.3d at 476. Finally, the Court “may conside r5 only the fac ts alleged in th e complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complain t[,] and matters of wh ich [the Court] may take judicial notice. ” Equ al Emp

. Op portunity Comm ’n v. St. Fr ancis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In applying th e ab ove fr amework, the Court is mindful of the fa ct that the plainti ff i s proceeding in this m atter pro se. Thi s app re ciation is requi red be ca us e the pleadings of pro se
p artie s are “to b e liberally constr ued, and a pro se complaint, however in artfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings dr afted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (inter na l quotation marks and ci tatio ns omi tte d). Fu rthermore, all fact u al allegations by a pro se litigan t, whether con tained in the complaint or other filings in the m atter, should be re ad t ogether in considering whether to grant a dispo sitive motion. See Ri char dson v. United Stat es , 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). However , just like parties represente d by attorneys, a pro se litigant “must compl y with the Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s l ocal rules[.]” Hedric k v. Fed. Bureau of In v est igation , 216 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2016) (c i tations omitted); see McNeil v. U nited States , 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“ [The
Su preme Court] ha [s] never suggest ed that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should b e interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by th o se who proceed without cou n se l.”)

. III. ANALYSIS The defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of
C ivil Pro cedure 12(b)(6) because : ( 1) “ [T] he Ninth Amendment does not convey the kind of substantive rights required to sustai n a § 1983 c laim [,]” Def. ’ s Mem. at 1 ; “ (2) [th e plaintiff ’ s] Privacy Act claim fails because she has not alleged any ‘ adverse effect ,’ among other deficiencies [,] ” id.; an d (3) “ [t]o th e extent that [the p]laintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress under the [F ederal Tort Claims Act (‘ FTCA ’) ], ” the plaintiff has not “sought6 relief at the administrative level as required ” by the FTCA, id. at 9. Although the plaintiff does not directly respond to the defendant’s arguments, she alleges that “ [t ]here are cases in wh ich the federal government has held in div iduals and/or entities resp onsible an d liable for privacy invasions.” P l. ’ s Opp ’n at 2. The Court will consider each of the defendant ’ s arguments in turn.
A. Whether the P laintiff Has Stated a Claim Under 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983
T he Court firs t considers the defendant ’ s challenge to the plai ntiff ’ s § 1983 claim that the IRS has violated her rig ht to privacy un der the Nin th Amendment. See Co mpl. at 6 –12. The plaintiff claims that 42 U.S.C . § 1983 “ gives citizens the r ight to seek civil action when a government official deprives one of any rights, privileges, or immunit ies secur ed by the Constitution.” Id. at 6. And here, the plaintiff alleges that she has “ been the victim of federal government officials abusing their position and/or authority to deprive [her] of [her] Ni nth Amendment Rights [.] ” Id. More specif ically, the plaintiff clai ms that the IRS violat ed her constitutional right to privacy when it allegedly “cont acted the [DCSA] sever al times in 2018 and the [NSC] in 2019 to request and obtain priva te , personal, and co nfidential information on [ the plaintiff], witho ut [her] knowledge or cons ent .” Id. at 7. The defendant responds that

“ [r ]e lief is not available [to the plaintiff] under § 1983” because “ the Ninth Ame ndment does not convey the kind of substantive rights required to s ustain a § 1983 claim.” Def. ’ s Mem. at 1.
“S ection 1983 is not the source of substantive rights bu t rather ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. ’” Blackman v. Dis trict of Columbia , 456 F.3d 167, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). “ In order t o s tate a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a] plaintiff[ ] ‘must establish that [she] was deprived of a right secured by th e Constitution or laws of the United Stat es, and tha t the alleged deprivation7 was committed unde r color of state law. ’” Ry nn v. Ja ffe , 457 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2006).
“T he Ninth Amendment states that ‘ [t]he enu meration in the Constitut ion of certain righ ts, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.’” Id. at 26 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IX). Accordingly, “ [a]s courts have consist ently held, the Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction, not a substantive ba sis for a civ il rights claim. ” Id. ; see also Wardlaw v. Pickett , No. 89- cv -1557 (O G), 1990 WL 209835, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 1990) (“ As courts have frequently noted, the [N] inth [A]mendment ‘ has never been recognized as independently securing any con stitut ional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim. ’” (quoting Standberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986))). Thus, the “ plaintiff[] cannot cite the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to support a § 1983 action.” Ja ffe , 457 F. Supp. 2d at 26. And the plaintiff does not provide any other substantive bases for her § 1983 claim. See gene rally Compl. The Court must, therefore, dismiss the p laint iff ’ s § 1983 claim.
B. Whether t he Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Unde r the P rivacy Act The Court n ext addresses the defendant ’ s challenge to the plaintiff ’ s Privacy Act claim

. See Compl. at 6 –12 . The plaintiff alleges that “ the IRS failed to foll ow establish protoco ls[,] ” id. at 8, when it allegedly “ obtain [ed] private, personal, and confidential information on [the plaintiff] ,” id. at 7, which constituted a violation of “ the Privacy Act of 1974[,]” id. at 8. More specifi cally, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the Privacy Act when it “ contacted the [DCSA ] sever al times in 2018 and the [NSC] in 2019 to request and obtain private, personal, and confidential information on [the plaintiff], without [her] knowledge or consent.” Id. at 7. The defendant claims that “ two critic al deficiencies in [the p]l ainti ff ’ s Priv acy Act claim are8 apparent. ” Def. ’ s Mem . at 8. As a threshold matter , the defendant claims that the “ [p]laintiff appears to have filed her Complai nt after the statute of limitations had already e lapsed. ” Id.
Mor eover , the defendant states that t he “ [p] lantiff has f ailed to allege the required elements of a claim for relief under the Privacy Act. ” Id. Because the Court ultimately concludes that t he plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the Privacy Act, the Court need not address whether the plaintiff ’ s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Bailey v. Fulwood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[I]n this Circuit, ‘ the statute of limitations period set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552 a(g)(5) is not a jurisdictional bar.’” (quoting Ku rsar v. Transportation Sec. Admin., 751 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) )).

“ To sta te a claim under the P rivacy Act, a plaintiff must establ ish that (1) the a gency violated a provision of the Act; (2) the violation was intentional or willful; and (3) the violation had an ‘ adverse effect ’ on the plaintiff i n the form of d amages. ” C hichak li v. Tillerson , 882 F.3d 229, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2018 ). He re , the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that “ the [alleged Privac y Act ] violation had an ‘ adverse effect ’ on [her] in the form of da mages. ” Id. At best , the plaintiff may be claiming that her emotional distres s adversely affected her

. 4 See Compl. at 8 ( “ [T]he IRS fail ed to follow established protocols resulting in what [the plaintiff] believes was a violation of [ her] constitutional right to privacy and the Privacy Act of 1974 resulting in Intent ional I nfliction of Emotion al Distress. ” ). Wh ile “emotional trauma alone is sufficient to qualify as an ‘ adverse effect ’ under [the Priv acy Act ,]” Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1984), a plaintiff is only entitled to re covery if the emotional trauma was “ ac ute, tangibl e, and severe enough to give rise to actual damages [,] ” Mulhe rn v. Gates , 525 F. Supp. 2d 174, 186 (D.D.C.

4 Indeed, nowhere in the plaintiff ’ s filings does she allege that the IRS ’s actions impacted her employment prospects or caused her any fina ncial harm. See Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 5 ( “ [T]he IRS has been unsu ccessful in its attempts to make me lose my job or my security adjudication. ” ); see id. at 5 –6 (“ [T]he federal government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to make me lose my job or my security adjudication[.] ”).9 2007) ; see also Rice v. United States, 245 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2007 ) ( “ Proof of adverse ef fect alone does not entitle plaintiffs to re cov ery und er the Privacy Act without a further showing of

‘ actual damages .’” (quoting Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004))). And here, a side from concl usory statements that she s uffere d emotional distress, the plaintiff does not describe the

se verity of he r distress or any actual damages that resulted from it

. See generally Compl. Accordingly, th e plaintiff fails to satisfy the third element of a Privacy Act claim

— viz. , “t he [alleged] violation had an ‘ adverse effect ’ on [her] in the form o f damages. ” Ch ichakli , 882 F.3d

at 233; see also Chao , 540 U.S. at 620–25 (holding that emotional anguish alone is insufficient, and that a plaintiff must show actual damages to recover under the Privacy Act). Accordingly, the Court concludes tha t i t must dismiss the plaintiff ’ s Privacy A ct claim. 5
C. Wh ether the Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Inten tional Infliction of Em otional Distress Under the Federal Tor t Claims Act Finally, the Court consider s the defendant’ s cha llenge to the plaint iff ’s intentiona l inflict ion of e motional dis tress claim

. See Compl. at 12 . As previously noted, see supra Section
I .A , the p laintiff “ believe[s] that [she] ha[s] been the v ictim of federal government officials abusing their positions and/or authority to deprive [her] of [her] Ninth Am endment [r]ig hts and

5 In her oppo sition , the plaintiff cites to five cases “ in which the federa l government [ ] held i ndividuals and/o r entities responsible and liable for privacy in vasions. ” Pl. ’ s O pp ’n at 2. However, none of the p laintiff ’ s cited cases are applicable to the present matter. Four of the plaintiff ’ s cited cases arose from enforcement actions b rought by the Federal Trad e Commission. See In the Matter of Lenovo Inc

. , 2017 WL 6885837 ( F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2017); United Stat es v. V t ech Elec. Ltd., et al. , 2018 WL 317978 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2018); LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm ’n , 894 F.3d 1221 (1 1th Ci r . 2018); In re Facebook, I nc., Con sumer Privacy User Profile Litigation , 402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. C al. 2019). More spec ifica lly, these cases involved FTC actions against private entities for vio lations of the Federal Tra de Commission Act. Here, the pla i ntiff ’ s suit neither invol ves private entities nor violations of the Fed er al Trade Co mmissio n Act. See generally Compl. And the plaintiff provides no rationale for why suits brought by the FTC against private ent iti es would be relevant to a matter invol ving the IRS ’ s alleged acquisition or use of an employee ’ s data. The final case the plaintiff ci tes , Van Bu ren v. United States , 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021), is simi larly inapposite. Van Buren involve d the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

— viz. , a statute that the plaintiff do es not invoke in her Co mplaint. Furthermore, the defendant in that criminal matter was a sta te police s erge ant, see id. at 165 2, not a federal employee or agency

. Accordingly , the Court is unpersuaded that the plaintiff ’ s cited ca ses have any bearing on the resolution of this case.10 causing intentional infliction of emotional distress .” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). More specifically, the plaintiff alleg es : Since filing fo r mal co mp laints in 2016, [she] believe[s] that [she], [her] family, an d [her] frien ds have bee n the ta rget of a consistent, coo rdinated, and ruthless digital assassination ret aliation campaign. The goals of this campaign are to cause [t he plaintiff] to lose [her] job (by calling into q uestion [her] security ad

jud ication ), cause undue finan cial bur den (by c ausi ng [her] to have an unwarr anted tax debt, causing [her] checking acc ount to be in the negative or arbitrarily making [her] credit score lower) and to punish anyone who [the IRS] belie ve[s] [may be] assisting [the plaintiff] in [her] fi ght agai nst this behavior. Id. at 12. The defendant argues that “[t]o th e extent that [the p]laintiff alleges intentional infliction of em otional distress under the FTCA, . . . she has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Def. ’ s Mem. at 9. More specifically, the defendant claims that “ the FTCA requires p laintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit in federal district court. ” Id. And , the defendant allege s that the “ [p]laintiff has not properly exhausted her administ rative remedies for her FTCA claim. ” Def. ’ s Reply at 3 n.1.
“ T he exclusive remedy for to rts committed by [g] overnment employees in the scope of th eir employment is a suit against the [g] overnment itself under the Fede ral To rt Claims Act (‘ FTCA ’), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80. In other wo rds , the FTCA works as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and claims for negligent and intentional infli ction of emotional dis tress against a federal agency can only be pursued via the FTCA. ” Wilson v. U.S. Dep ’t of Transp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) ( internal citation omitted). “Further, the F TCA bars claimants from bringing suit until they have exhausted their administrative remedies, which includes the requirement that cl a imants first bring their claims to the agency, and that the claims have been denied by th at agency. ” Id. ; 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a) (“An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of prope rty or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of11 the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing [.] ” ). “ To satisfy the FTCA ’ s administrative

exhaustion requirements, a plaintiff must first present [her] claim in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years of the cla im ’ s accru al. ” Yirenkyi v. U.S. Cent. Intel. Agency , 656 F. Supp. 3d 241, 248 (D.D.C. 2023). “ Such exhaustion ‘is a requirement of the FTCA,’ that the [District of Columbia] Court of Appeals has de emed to be jurisdictional. ” Emrit v. Nat ’ l Institu tes of Health , 157 F. Supp. 3d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2016) ( inter nal citat ion omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Obama, 770 F. Supp. 2d 188, 191 (D.D.C. 2011)) ; see Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Therefore, “F TCA claims may be dismissed f or lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff does not exhaust necessary administrative remedies under the FTCA, which is a mandatory prerequisite.” Tsitrin v. Lettow , 888 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92 (D.D.C. 2012).
A lth ough the plaintiff does not exp licitly in voke the FTCA in her Complaint, see generally Compl., the Court will liberally construe her filings as raising an in tentional infliction of emotional distress claim under the Federal To rt C laims Act

. See Harris v. Donahue, No. 11-

cv -2030 (BAH), 2011 WL 6759603, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2011) (“ The Court is min dful of [the] plaintiff ’ s pro se status, and liberally constru es her claim as one under the Federal Tort Claims Act [ ] against the United States of America. ” ); Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (“ A d ocument f iled pro se i s ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘ a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standard than for mal pl eadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” ( internal citation omitted) (quoting Est elle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976 )) ); cf. Ni edermeier v. O ff.12 of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting “the general judicial pr eference for

re so lving [claims] on the ir merit s rather than dismissing them on technicalities ”).
However , t he plaintiff has failed t o demonst rate that she satisfied the F TCA ’ s administrative exhaustion requirements. Although the plaintiff allegedly submitted a “ Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death ” form to the IR S on June 25, 2022, see Pl. ’ s Opp ’n at 35, the information contained in that form is insufficient to satisf y the F TCA ’ s exh austion requirements

. Specifica lly, the plaintiff ’ s form makes no reference to intentional infliction of emotional distress. See P l. ’ s Opp ’n at 35. Instead, the plaintiff simply states that her “rights under the U.S. Constitution, the Ninth Amendment – the right to privacy and the Privacy Act of 1974 were

v iolated. ” Id. However, t he plaintiff ’s intent ional infliction of distress claim

— viz., a common law tort —does not arise under the Ninth Amendment or the Privacy Act of 1974. Cf. Hollis v. Rosa Mexicano D C, LLC , 582 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting the standard for “ the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ” “ [i]n the District of Columbia ” (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965))). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to “ present[] [her intentional infliction of emotional distress ] claim to the [IRS] ” as required by the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 ; see Bembenista v. United States , 866 F.2d 493, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their medical malpractice claim, as their administrative complaint only alleged assault); Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34–35 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that “ [b]ecause [the plaintiff] asserted claims of negligen t investigation for the first time in her Complaint filed in this Court, s he failed to exhaust her administrative remedies w ith regard to these [specific] claims ” and “ [t]h us, the Court lack[ed] jurisdiction over these [speci fic] claims, and they must be dismissed ”). Thus , the plaintiff ’s
F TCA claim must “be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [as] the plaintiff d[id] not13 exhaus t [the ] ne cessary administrative remedies under the FTCA, which is a mandatory
prereq uisite. ” Tsitrin , 888 F. Supp. 2d at 92.
IV. C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court c oncludes that it mu st gr an t the defen dant’s motion to d ismiss.
SO O RDERED th is 10th day of January, 2024. 6

REG GIE B. WA LTON Uni ted Stat es District Judge

6 The Court w ill c onte m poraneously issue an Order consistent w it h this Memor a nd um Op inion.