CAMPAIGNING

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

(JAWS)

JOURNAL OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART AND CAMPAIGNING

SPRING 2006
2 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Mission

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School

produces graduates that can create campaignquality concepts, plan for the employment of

all elements of national power, accelerate

transformation, succeed as joint force operational /

strategic planners and be creative, conceptual,

adaptive and innovative.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not

represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the

Department of Defense.
3 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

1 April 2006 

We are very pleased with the reception CAMPAIGNING has received throughout the joint and 

multi-national planning arenas. Our electronic distribution system has added new subscribers 

from the Philippines, Austria, Iraq, Romania, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, the 

Services, and all of the Combatant Commands. Our readership is instrumental to the continued 

success of CAMPAIGNING and we hope that you forward your copy to planning practitioners 

within your community. The web site associated with CAMPAIGNING has been operational for 

just a few months and already has well over one thousand hits. All of this good news 

demonstrates the necessity of a journal dedicated exclusively to joint campaign planners and the 

issues with which they deal. CAMPAIGNING is dedicated to continued fulfillment of that role 

and to provide a premier forum for the world-wide joint and combined planning community. 

The quality of OUR journal depends on our readership and the willingness of planning 

practitioners to provide relevant contributions focusing on joint campaign planning. First and 

foremost, we are dedicated to providing planners with a source of insight into current planning 

issues. It is our expressed desire that the interest in CAMPAIGNING will continue to grow due 

to the unique audience we serve and the contributions to our journal from its readers. 

This volume of CAMPAIGNING contains some very timely articles. LTG Russel L. Honoré and 

COL (Ret) Barney Barnhill have provided a relevant piece on the complexity of dealing with the 

largest humanitarian assistance operation the United States has ever seen, the response to 

Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs 

during Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom Mr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. has 

provided the first of two essays which provide an extremely valuable and provocative 

interagency perspective necessary for military planners. And our dear friend Dr. Milan Vego has 

provided another powerful contribution discussing the concept of Center of Gravity. We are also 

pleased to announce our first international contribution from LtCol Philipp Eder and Capt Johann 

Fischer from the National Defense Academy in Vienna, Austria who provide an extraordinary 

interpretation on the application of the lines of operation. Additionally, Lt Col Jim Sears 

provides an analysis of the importance of the recently instituted six-phase planning construct. 

We hope you find each of these articles informative and enlightening. 

Most importantly, for this journal to succeed we need your input. CAMPAIGNING clearly 

serves a unique population, joint campaign planners. There is not another journal that 

focuses exclusively on topics required by joint campaign planners. CAMPAIGNING will 

continue to focus on issues that serve as a resource for planners responsible for ensuring success 

in the Global War on Terrorism. If you would like to be placed on the electronic distribution list 

for CAMPAIGNING or would like to submit an article or comment on an article contained in this 

edition, please email your submission or comments to bollenbergc@jfsc.ndu.edu. 

Craig L. Bollenberg Sr. 

Colonel, USA 

Chairman 

Operational Art and Campaigning 
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Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Index

 5 Joint Task Force Katrina: “See First – Understand First – Act First.” 

LTG Russel L. Honoré and COL (Ret) Barney Barnhill 

16 Brave New World War - Part I - Why Leavenworth’s finest know 

they’re not in Kansas anymore 

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. 

23 On Center of Gravity 

Dr. Milan Vego 

50 A Solution for the Confusing Application of Lines of Operation 

LtCol Philipp Eder and Capt Johann Fischer 

61 The Brilliance of the Six-Phase Construct

Lt Col James R. Sears Jr. 

66 Deans Corner 

COL Fred Kienle 

67 Upcoming Events 

68 Letter to the Editor 

LtCol Matt Lopez 

70 Update: Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) 

72 Adaptive Planning (AP) Technology Update CDR John “Mick” Meissel 

74 JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications 
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Joint Task Force Katrina: 

“See First – Understand First – Act First.” 

By 

LTG Russel L. Honoré 

And 

COL (Ret) Barney Barnhill 

The aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita required a massive federal response that included 

the Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint Task Force-Katrina. The following pages will 

provide insight into the DoD response and offer observations for future Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities (DSCA) operations. 

Hurricane Katrina struck the east coast of Louisiana and the Gulf Coast of Mississippi on the 

morning of 29 August 2005 as a strong Category III storm. Less than 30 days later, on 24 

September 2005, Mother Nature delivered a second blow as Hurricane Rita struck the west coast 

of Louisiana and southeast Texas at Category III strength. The combined effects of these two 

storms resulted in what has now been determined to be one of the most destructive and costly 

natural disasters in American history, severely testing the concepts of the National Response 

Plan (NRP) and requiring the largest commitment of U.S. military forces on home soil in recent 

history. Storm effects quickly exceeded the response capabilities of state and local agencies 

across large areas as high winds and flooding caused extensive damage to critical infrastructure. 

When the New Orleans levee system was breached, millions of gallons of water quickly engulfed 

the city, stranding thousands of residents who had not evacuated in their attics or on rooftops. 

With lines of communication severely damaged or destroyed and thousands of residents 

stranded, it became a “worst case scenario” impacting the entire region, as well as the nation’s 

economy. 

Pursuant to Presidential approval and in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP), the 

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authorized the deployment of Title 10 forces (Title 10 active 

duty is a federal duty status and the President has command and control over the service 

member) in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA). The Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 

established the states of Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia and 

Louisiana as the Joint Operations Area (JOA), and in coordination with the Commander U.S. 

Forces Command (USFORSCOM), ordered First U.S. Army to establish Joint Task ForceKatrina (JTF-Katrina) effective 300853RAUG05, to assume Operational Control (OPCON) or 

Tactical Control (TACON) of Title 10 forces deployed to the JOA. 

Command relationships as defined within the framework of the NRP are not the same as those 

within DoD. The principle of unity of command exercised within DoD is not directed within the 

guidelines of the NRP. Instead, the NRP strives to achieve unity of effort. The concept of 
6 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Unified Command within the NRP, as derived from the Incident Command System (ICS), is 

used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross 

political jurisdictions in order to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, as was the 

case in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

VADM Thad Allen, LTG Russel L. Honoré, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagan, and President George 

W. Bush survey damage caused by Hurricane Katrina 

The DHS and FEMA, along with many other federal agencies, responded in accordance with the 

NRP and the activation of the corresponding Emergency Support Functions (ESF). Joint Field 

Offices (JFO) were established in Louisiana and Mississippi, with FEMA as the Federal Primary 

Agency (PA) and organized in accordance with the principles of the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). The purpose of a JFO, as stated in the NRP, is to “provide a 

central location for the coordination of federal, state, local, tribal, non-governmental and private 

sector organizations with responsibility for threat response and incident support.” See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Joint Field Office Organization 

A Principle Federal Official (PFO) was appointed to coordinate the activities of the Senior 

Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO), the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), and other 

Federal officials involved with the response. Although the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) 

and State Coordinating Officer (SCO) are the senior officials within the JFO, activities and 

priorities are determined by a JFO Coordinating Group. As written in the NRP, “The PFO does 

not direct or replace the incident command structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO 

have directive authority over the SFLEO, FCO, or other Federal and State officials. Other 

federal incident management officials retain their authorities as defined in existing statutes and 

directives.” DoD is represented in the JFO by a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) who is 

OPCON to USNORTHCOM with responsibility for advising civil authorities on DoD 

capabilities and validating requests for DoD assistance. 

Although First U.S. Army is not a Standing Joint Headquarters, it has historically conducted 

joint Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations and maintains Functional Plans 

(FUNCPLAN) to support crisis action planning. The on-order mission to provide consequence 

management includes establishing a Joint Task Force – Consequence Management (JTF-CM) 

and providing DCOs. 

 

Before Katrina reached hurricane status, the First U.S. Army Operations Center was tracking the 

storm and updating staff estimates...See First. We reviewed the First U.S. Army FUNCPLAN 

2501 (DSCA) and updated our mission analysis and staff estimates using our effects based 

analysis of the NRP-ESFs as our core tool for war gaming various scenarios and Request For 

Capabilities (RFC). Figure 2 is an example of our effects based analysis of ESFs 7, 8 and 9. The 

RFC identified forces and resource capabilities needed to support the potential tasks as 

determined during the mission analysis and included joint staff augmentations. 
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Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

 

Figure 2: Effects Based Analysis of Emergency Support Functions 

The JTF-Katrina staff developed the following assumptions with the understanding that 

situational awareness would be difficult to initially ascertain due to the effects of the storm: 

1. Recovery operations would exceed state and federal capabilities in the JOA. 

2. A Presidential Disaster Declaration (PDD) would be issued for LA, MS, AL and TX. 

3. Large numbers of people would be stranded in shelters throughout the JOA and 

surrounding states and would require basic life support for 30 plus days. 

4. New Orleans would be flooded if Katrina made landfall as a strong Category III or IV 

storm due to the levee system only being designed to withstand a Category III hurricane. 

5. Not all residents would evacuate and many would require emergency rescue and 

evacuation. 

Once JTF-Katrina was established, we issued an Execution Order (EXORD) to all joint 

subordinate commands. Our mission statement read; “First US Army establishes Joint Task 

Force Katrina (JTF-K), effective 300853RAUG05, and assumes Operational Control (OPCON) 

• Distribution of resources 

severely impacted due to 

impassible road networks and 

citizen’s ability to get to the 

distribution points 

• Distribution may be 

restricted to the most 

affected areas until additional 

resources become available.

• No incoming resources 

until the storm has cleared 

the area. 

• Damage Assessment & 

Humanitarian Aid 

Assessments restricted until 

LOCs are restored 

• Pre-positioning of supplies 

by air and land disrupted due 

to increasing winds, rain and 

evacuations

•Stockpiling will empty stores 

of food, bottled water, 

batteries, sanitary supplies, 

plywood, plastic and portable 

generators 

ESF #7 

RESOURCE SUPPORT

PA = GSA

3RD ORDER MAGNITUDE

24-96 (+) HOURS

2ND ORDER MAGNITUDE

1-24 HOURS

1ST ORDER MAGNITUDE

(-) 12 HOURS

• Distribution of resources 

severely impacted due to 

impassible road networks and 

citizen’s ability to get to the 

distribution points 

• Distribution may be 

restricted to the most 

affected areas until additional 

resources become available.

• No incoming resources 

until the storm has cleared 

the area. 

• Damage Assessment & 

Humanitarian Aid 

Assessments restricted until 

LOCs are restored 

• Pre-positioning of supplies 

by air and land disrupted due 

to increasing winds, rain and 

evacuations

•Stockpiling will empty stores 

of food, bottled water, 

batteries, sanitary supplies, 

plywood, plastic and portable 

generators 

ESF #7 

RESOURCE SUPPORT

PA = GSA

3RD ORDER MAGNITUDE

24-96 (+) HOURS

2ND ORDER MAGNITUDE

1-24 HOURS

1ST ORDER MAGNITUDE

(-) 12 HOURS

FUNCTION

EFFECTS

• Search and rescue only 

possible by helicopter and 

boat until roads are cleared 

and/or flood waters recede

• Officials overwhelmed with 

requests for assistance

•Aerial Search and Rescue will 

not be available until winds 

drop below 45 knots in the in 

the affected area

• Search and rescue 

operations severely 

degraded by impassible 

roads due to flooding, 

downed power lines and 

trees, and debris fields

• Request for Swift Water 

Rescue will increase due to 

flooding and especially flash 

flooding

• Search & rescue teams 

respond to initial calls for 

assistance in coastal areas.

• Ariel Search & Rescue will 

be restricted once winds 

exceed 45 knots. 

ESF #9

URBAN SEARCH & 

RESCUE (US&R)

PA = FEMA

• Thousands are homeless

• Public health threatened by 

shortage of drinking water, 

food that is in short supply 

and spoiling due to lack of 

refrigeration, damaged and 

flooded sewage treatment 

plants, dead animals, and 

other hazardous chemicals 

and material 

•Public Health threatened due 

to Sanitary conditions in rural 

areas, small communities and 

Emergency Shelters. 

• Local hospitals sustain 

severe damage 

• Hospitals that are open are 

overwhelmed with patients 

requiring emergency care

• Medical capability severely 

degraded

•Local Clinics and 

Nursing/Rest Homes will be 

without power. 

• Local hospitals, Nursing 

Homes and Rest Homes 

evacuated/ patients 

transferred to treatment 

facilities outside predicted 

landfall area

• Emergency treatment 

capability degraded

ESF #8

PUBLIC HEALTH & 

MEDICAL SERVICES

PA = DHHS

• Search and rescue only 

possible by helicopter and 

boat until roads are cleared 

and/or flood waters recede

• Officials overwhelmed with 

requests for assistance

•Aerial Search and Rescue will 

not be available until winds 

drop below 45 knots in the in 

the affected area

• Search and rescue 

operations severely 

degraded by impassible 

roads due to flooding, 

downed power lines and 

trees, and debris fields

• Request for Swift Water 

Rescue will increase due to 

flooding and especially flash 

flooding

• Search & rescue teams 

respond to initial calls for 

assistance in coastal areas.

• Ariel Search & Rescue will 

be restricted once winds 

exceed 45 knots. 

ESF #9

URBAN SEARCH & 

RESCUE (US&R)

PA = FEMA

• Thousands are homeless

• Public health threatened by 

shortage of drinking water, 

food that is in short supply 

and spoiling due to lack of 

refrigeration, damaged and 

flooded sewage treatment 

plants, dead animals, and 

other hazardous chemicals 

and material 

•Public Health threatened due 

to Sanitary conditions in rural 

areas, small communities and 

Emergency Shelters. 

• Local hospitals sustain 

severe damage 

• Hospitals that are open are 

overwhelmed with patients 

requiring emergency care

• Medical capability severely 

degraded

•Local Clinics and 

Nursing/Rest Homes will be 

without power. 

• Local hospitals, Nursing 

Homes and Rest Homes 

evacuated/ patients 

transferred to treatment 

facilities outside predicted 

landfall area

• Emergency treatment 

capability degraded

ESF #8

PUBLIC HEALTH & 

MEDICAL SERVICES

PA = DHHS
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of Title 10 DoD Forces within the JOA to provide DSCA, as approved by the SECDEF, for 

disaster relief efforts associated with Hurricane Katrina; in order to save lives, mitigate human 

suffering and restore critical services. On order, transfers DoD relief operations to civil 

authorities.” Our command and control (C2) structure was organized to provide continuous 

collaboration and coordination with federal, state and local authorities. See Figure 3. 

JOINT LOG

COMMAND

(JLC)

BG TERRY

TF KILKENNY

(MCC)

RADM KILKENNY

JTF KATRINA

(MAIN)

MG YINGLING

MARFOR-K 

(SPMAGTF)

Maj Gen O’DELL

DCO

MS

NORTHCOM

ADM KEATING

PETERSON AFB 

JTF KATRINA (FWD)

LTG HONORÉ

FORT GILLEM 

DCO

LA

CAMP SHELBY 

38 IN (-)

MG VADNAIS 35 IN (-)

MG MASON

TF ALL

AMERICAN

MG CALDWELL

1 AETF

(ACC)

Maj Gen MAYES

PFO

VADM Allen

CPG (SOUTHEAST 

LOUISIANA)

BG GRAHAM

SJFHQ-N

BG MOULTON

DPFO

SJFHQ-(CE)

RADM O’Bryan

G3 / G5 PLANNING GROUP

TAG-LA

MG 

LANDRENEAU

COCOM OPCON TACON COORD DIRECT SPT

TAG-MS

Maj Gen CROSS

Figure 3: JTF-Katrina Command and Control Relationships

Unity of effort was achieved through the continuous face to face and satellite phone 

collaboration with the JFO, governors, National Guard commanders, local authorities, DCOs and 

USNORTHCOM. The success of the DoD effort ultimately fell back on the capability of JTFKatrina to collaborate and coordinate with these various agencies. 

Our C2 structure was organized as follows: 

• The JTF-Katrina (Forward) Command Post, led by the JTF commander, deployed to 

Camp Shelby, MS, on 30 August 2005, to gain immediate situational awareness, 

control current operations, and coordinate the efforts of DoD with FEMA and state 

and local civil authorities...Understand First. 

• The JTF-Katrina (Main) Command Post at Fort Gillem, GA, was established at full 

operational capability on 28 August 2005. Under the direction of the Deputy 

Commanding General, First US Army, the Main was responsible for maintaining 

situational awareness, managing requests for assistance and requests for forces and 

managing the battle rhythm and branch planning for future operations. The Main also 
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Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

managed transition and redeployment planning, and provided the “Reach-Back” 

capability for JTF-Katrina (Forward). 

• The JTF-Katrina Command Planning Group (CPG), led by a brigadier general was 

established in Louisiana on 31 August 2005 to assist the Federal and State 

Coordinating Officers and State Adjutants General in planning and coordinating DoD 

assistance. The CPG provided JTF-Katrina with a flexible Operational Command 

Post (OCP) with the capability to respond to current operations and planning within 

the JOA. The CPG was instrumental in coordinating the evacuation of approximately 

47,000 displaced citizens from the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center 

on 1-2 September 2005. Later into the operation, the CPG was placed in direct 

support of the PFO. 

 

• The U.S. Army 13th Corps Support Command (13 COSCOM), led by a brigadier 

general was established vicinity of the New Orleans International Airport on 8 

September 2005. The 13th COSCOM was the senior joint logistics agency with 

responsibility for commodity and distribution management of support to JTF-Katrina 

Title 10 forces and assisting other relief agencies and was later re-designated the Joint 

Logistics Command (JLC). 

 

• The USS Iwo Jima was docked in New Orleans and provided a C2 platform with 

communications capabilities and secure facilities for senior-level conferencing. The 

Iwo Jima also provided the capability for launching search and rescue and re-supply 

aircraft. Prior to the arrival of Hurricane Rita, the Iwo Jima was repositioned at sea 

with the mission to follow the storm and support relief operations based on Rita’s 

point of landfall and damage. As Title 10 forces from all branches and services began 

to flow to the JOA, our joint task organization was comprised of the Maritime 

Component Command (MCC), the Air Component Command (ACC), Marine Forces 

Command – Katrina (MARFOR-K) and the Army Forces Command (ARFOR) as 

indicated in Figure 3. 

 

The First Army FUNCPLAN 2501 outlines a four-phased concept of operation for DSCA 

operations. Knowing that Katrina would be a crisis response operation, we chose to retain these 

same phases for JTF-Katrina as a guide for future operations and planning. Phase I was 

Preparation, Phase II was the Deployment of Forces to the JOA, Phase III was the Execution of 

DSCA Operations in support of the Federal Primary Agency (PA), as authorized by the SECDEF 

and Phase IV was the Transfer of Remaining DSCA Missions and Recovery Operations to Civil 

Authorities and the National Guard and the Redeployment of Title 10 Forces. 

 

DCOs were deployed to Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama on 27 August 2005 to establish 

initial coordination with federal and state authorities and develop situational awareness. The 

USS Bataan, already operating in the Gulf of Mexico, was alerted on 28 August 2005 to support 

relief operations. Within hours after Katrina landfall, on 29 August 2005, rotary winged aircraft 

and small boats from the USCG commenced search and rescue operations. Rotary winged 

aircraft from the Army, USAF, USN, USMC and National Guard participated in search and 

rescue operations and began moving medical patients, evacuating personnel and performing 
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Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

cargo transport missions under “Immediate Response Authority.” U.S. Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM) assets along with the USNS Comfort, a hospital ship, were placed 

on alert and ordered to prepare for deployment. National Guard aircraft were made available to 

support operations under the pre-existing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts 

(EMAC)...Act First. 

 

On 30 August 2005, the USS Iwo Jima along with the USS Harry S. Truman, USS Shreveport 

and the USS Tortuga were alerted to provide humanitarian assistance. The Air Mobility 

Command’s C-5, C-17 and C-130 aircraft were used to deliver logistics stocks and evacuate 

displaced citizens. Fort Polk and the Naval Air Station New Orleans were activated as shelters 

for displaced citizens and medical assets were activated for 24/7 operations at Camp Beauregard, 

LA; Jackson, MS; and Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. During the period 2-4 September 2005, 

advanced elements of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), 82nd

Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and numerous other joint service units began arriving in 

the JOA to execute land DSCA operations. 

JTF-Katrina was supported by more than 22,000 Title 10 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines 

as well as the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). National Guard 

forces deployed to the JOA in Title 32 (Title 32 active duty is a state duty status and the service 

member remains under the command and control of his or her governor) or State Active Duty 

status and totaled over 50,000 personnel from all 50 states, 3 territories and the District of 

Columbia. The resulting synergy between Title 10 forces under JTF-Katrina and National Guard 

forces under the respective governors proved critical to the success of the overall relief effort. 

There were two major National Guard commands operating in the JOA; the 35th Infantry 

Division, OPCON to The Adjutant General, State of Louisiana, and the 38th Infantry Division, 

OPCON to the Adjutant General, State of Mississippi. 

Throughout the operation, JTF-Katrina used several enablers to facilitate collaboration and 

coordination with federal, state and local authorities in order to achieve mission accomplishment. 

Title 10 forces were used in non-doctrinal and non-traditional roles to save lives and restore 

critical services. 

Military communication packages with satellite voice and data capabilities made it possible to 

coordinate with USNORTHCOM, subordinate commanders and civil authorities at a time when 

commercial communications were not operational. DoD assets were used to deliver bulk and 

retail fuel to first responders when commercial fuel delivery capabilities were not operational. 

Military generators (30KW and larger) were used to provide auxiliary power generation to 

county and city Emergency Operation Centers (EOC), medical facilities, first responders and 

distribution centers until FEMA could employ other federal or contracted generators. Navy 

Construction Battalions (SEABEES) were employed to clear debris and open lines of 

communication to facilitate ground medical evacuation and governmental access to populated 

areas. We employed DoD assets to clear fire and police stations and hospitals to facilitate the 

restoration of critical services. 

A responsive “Reach Back” capability within JTF-Katrina gave us access to the forces and 

resources that could be deployed within 24 to 36 hours after notification. Liaison Officers 
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Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

(LNO) from higher and adjacent commands and all subordinate commands were located in the 

JTF-Katrina (Main) and proved invaluable to facilitating this capability. This “Reach Back” 

capability was critical during the initial phase when civilian assets were still in the process of 

mobilizing and moving to the affected areas. The mere presence of U.S. Military forces 

represented hope to displaced Americans and assured them that help was on the way. 

Military public affairs teams were employed to facilitate an unprecedented access to civilian 

media covering the response, and to synchronize the message among all members of the federal 

team. This proved critical in telling our story and informing the general public of the massive 

DoD response. Loudspeaker teams were instrumental in notifying displaced citizens of 

evacuation sites, distribution sites and other critical information for sustaining life. 

Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) and Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTFCS) augmented the JTF-Katrina (Forward) and (Main) with joint planning and communications 

capabilities. They provided critical knowledge and expertise in planning joint operations, 

logistics, medical, mortuary affairs and communications. 

The USACE provided our JTF-Katrina Staff Engineer Cell. They were critical to maintaining 

and understanding situational awareness pertaining to sewer, water and electrical services, the 

pumping of flood waters and levee repair. 

As our JTF staff capabilities increased, we implemented the SWEAT-M system for tracking and 

reporting damage assessments and Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). 

The acronym SWEAT-M represents Sewer, Water, Energy, Accessibility, Telecommunications 

and Medical Emergency Services. The advantage of using this format was that it was easily 

adjusted to answer the CCIRs without major changes in the process or presentation. See Figure 4. 

SEE FIRST – UNDERSTAND FIRST – ACT FIRST

JTF - KATRINA COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT JTF - KATRINA COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT

PARISH SWEAT-M STATUS

S=Sewage W=Water E=Energy A=Accessibility T=Telecommunications – M=Medical/Emergency

Figure 4: Sewer, Water, Energy, Accessibility, Telecommunications and Medical Emergency 

Services Assessment 
13 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Although legal constraints guided both planning and execution, they had little affect on our 

ability to accomplish the mission. The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) applied to all Title 

10 forces throughout the operation. At no time did Title 10 personnel support law enforcement 

or enter private residences or businesses without proper authority. Law enforcement tasks were 

performed by Law Enforcement Officers and National Guard personnel in Title 32 or State 

Active Duty status. Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) as specified in CJCSI 3121.01B remained 

in effect and commanders retained the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense. 

The constraints in the Posse Comitatus Act, the Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement 

statutes (10 USC 371-382) and DoD Directive 5525.5, did not restrict a commander’s 

“Immediate Response” authority, as authorized by DoD Directive 3025.1, to respond to requests 

from civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage. 

As recovery operations for Hurricane Katrina were expanding and progressing, Hurricane Rita 

struck on 24 September 2005. Rita brought a similar level of devastation and flooding to 

western Louisiana and southeast Texas, however our method of response changed as we were 

able to maneuver land forces along the flanks and naval forces from the rear of the storm. The 

fact that we already had the authority to respond and sufficient capabilities positioned within the 

JOA, allowed us to quickly assess the needs of civil authorities and assists them in reestablishing critical infrastructure and delivering humanitarian relief supplies. 

As the situation began to stabilize in Louisiana and especially New Orleans, subordinate Task 

Force commanders began coordinating the transfer of JTF-Katrina tasks to FEMA and the 

National Guard, while back at the JTF-Katrina (Main), joint planners were coordinating with 

USNORTHCOM for transition and force adjustments. The force adjustment of Title 10 forces 

was a phased operation that was linked to the measures of effectiveness and required SECDEF 

approval for units to depart the JOA. On 12 October 2005, after 44 days of DSCA operations, 

the SECDEF authorized JTF-Katrina to stand down. On 15 January 2006, we submitted the 

official JTF-Katrina After Action Review (AAR) to USNORTHCOM. 

 

In coordination with Vice Adm Allen (US Coast Guard and PFO for Hurricane Katrina) and MG 

Landreneau (Adjutant General – Louisiana) and in collaboration with USNORTHCOM, we 

recommended to the President, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government 

Affairs, the SECDEF and the Department of Homeland Security eleven quick fixes for 

improving a unified federal and state response for hurricane disaster relief. These 

recommendations are applicable, however, for consequence management during most natural or 

manmade disasters and terrorist attacks: 

1. Establish a pre-event Unified Command and Control (C2) organizational structure to 

conduct collaboration and coordination of plans and operations and to develop an 

understanding of federal, state, local, non-governmental and private sector capabilities. 

2. Pre-position a Unified Mobile Disaster Assessment Cell to develop an initial 

situational awareness, identify requirements and recommend priorities of effort. 

3. Designate a single DoD point of contact for the Federal Coordinating Officer 
14 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

(FCO) in order to establish a clearly defined line of support and facilitate the DoD 

response. 

4. Implement a state and local employee disaster clause to dual-hat/train employees to 

fill key disaster support manning shortfalls. Many of these public servants have critical 

administrative and logistical skills that can be utilized during recovery efforts. 

5. Pre-position interoperable communications assets that will assist first responders and 

emergency management agencies in gaining situation awareness and coordinating 

response and recovery operations. 

6. Establish external support (push packages/funding) to fill common resource shortfalls 

in order to facilitate the delivery of basic humanitarian relief supplies. 

7. Pre-allocate space in State Emergency Operation Centers to integrate federal and other 

external agencies, to facilitate collaboration and coordination, and synchronize all relief 

and recovery operations. This will assist federal and state authorities in establishing 

priorities of effort and will assist in eliminating the duplication of efforts. 

8. Develop a Continuity of Government Plan to sustain government functions during the 

critical period immediately following a disaster. This will enhance initial response and 

recovery efforts and facilitate the restoration of critical infrastructure. 

9. Pre-arrange support contracts for required resources in order to quickly backfill 

shortfalls in basic humanitarian relief supplies and services in order to facilitate the 

delivery of supplies to local authorities and citizens. 

10. Acquire and integrate assured power supply capabilities (gas stations, pharmacies 

and local emergency operations centers) in order to sustain command and control 

facilities, sustain the evacuation of a large population, assist first responders and sustain 

basic services. 

11. Gain industry commitments to sustain and maintain critical services in order to 

facilitate response and recovery operations and reduce the need for external support. 

In summary, our ability to “See First and Understand First” allowed us to “Act First.” 

Furthermore, the ability of our Armed Forces to react to such a devastating disaster while 

simultaneously fighting the War on Terror speaks volumes to the readiness, professionalism and 

training of our Active Duty, Reserve and National Guard. They performed efficiently and 

effectively in coordination and collaboration with federal, state and local agencies under austere 

conditions. 

Other disasters will surely follow, some with warning (hurricanes) and others without. 

Therefore, crisis action planning for DSCA must be developed using our proven Military 

Decision Making Process (MDMP) and based on worst case scenarios yet remaining flexible 

enough to support “Immediate Response” operations with limited situational awareness during 
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the initial phases. Future DSCA planning and execution must consider the non-doctrinal use of 

military forces, yet remain within the constraints of federal law and regulations. Our future plans 

must be joint efforts that support the NRP and are fully vetted with DHS, FEMA and other 

federal and state agencies. To accomplish this, joint planners must be familiar with the National 

Response Plan, and they must establish and maintain relationships with FEMA and state 

emergency management agencies in order to build trust and cooperation, and ensure a quick 

response. And remember! The “bad guy” (i.e. The Storm) always gets a “vote.” HOOAH! 

LTG Russel L. Honoré is the Commanding General, First United States Army. In 

addition to his experience as Commander, JTF-Katrina, General Honoré has served as 

Commander, Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland Security, United States 

Northern Command. His previous assignments include Commanding General, 2d 

Infantry Division, Korea; Vice Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, 

D.C.; Deputy Commanding General/Assistant Commandant, United States Army Infantry 

Center and School, Fort Benning 

COL (Ret) Barney Barnhill is a 31 year veteran of the US Army and the Army 

National Guard. Prior to retirement from active military service, he was the Director of 

Military Support, Joint Force Headquarters – North Carolina. He is currently a Contract 

Joint Military Planner (Capstone Corp) at Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, 

GA. He served as the Chief, Joint Planning Team (JPT) for Joint Task Force-Katrina. 

david.barnhill@first.army.mil 

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions to this article of COL Ron 

Rose, G3/Chief of Operations, First U.S. Army; COL (Ret) Mike Hawrylak, Contractor, 

First U.S. Army; LTC (Ret) Kevin Kahley, Contractor Planner, First U.S. Army; LTC 

(Ret) Charles Mitchell, Contractor Planner, First U.S. Army; and LTC (Ret) Don Reed, 

Land DSCA Officer, USNORTHCOM. 
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Brave New World War 

Part I - Why Leavenworth’s finest know they’re not in 

Kansas anymore 

By 

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. 

What can a wooly-headed civilian teach a combatant commander about conducting a military 

operation? After four years of working with the commanders of all nine geographic and 

functional commands, as well as USFK, NATO, and various JTFs, my answer is: not a whole 

lot. These leaders have deep experience, tested judgment, and other natural gifts that commend 

them to positions of high responsibility. If given the latitude to develop courses of action and 

apply the resources at their disposal, they will reliably accomplish important objectives, with or 

without the counsel of civilians. 

This humbling realization keeps me from attempting a little levity by venturing a clumsy 

wordplay about “Commandments” in the title – a decision all the more prudent since I will offer, 

as it happens, 10 ‘suggestions’ in Part II of this essay. Yet for all the deference owed to our 

combatant commanders, the reality is that official Washington is not shy about looking over a 

combatant commander’s shoulder and offering generous helpings of advice. 

My ‘suggestions’ will not end this fact of life in the contemporary American way of war. Nor 

should we necessarily wish to dial down the frequency or fidelity of communications between 

the nation’s capital and the distant field of battle. War has always been understood to be hard to 

manage in the best of circumstances. In the 21st century, it features some new management 

challenges: it is less likely to be confined to a single AOR; it is less likely to be an exclusively 

or even predominantly military contest; and contact with the enemy is more likely to occur in 

areas populated by civilians. 

These and other inconvenient conditions create a drag on a combatant commander’s presumed 

monopoly of control over the action. Moreover, regardless of the fog of war, more information 

on our military activities than ever before finds its way back home to be graphically arrayed and 

circulated to a wide audience of official and public spectators in the U.S. and abroad. Media 

commentary from the grandstand, some quite well informed and some quite critical, is by now a 

thriving cottage industry. Such is the freedom of speech that our military forces fight to 

preserve. 

Paradigms Lost 

America’s military engagements for most of the 20th century dealt with conventional, nationallydirected military aggressors, mercifully distant from our homeland, whose purposes we analyzed 

at length and whose will and capacity to keep fighting we were ultimately aiming to break. From 

these experiences emerged a political code of conduct in Washington: the commander’s 

assessment from the battlefield enjoys a special status, and the civilian leaders and policymakers 
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as well as the nation’s senior military leadership view their roles as supporting the commander 

on the scene in his (or her) warfight. 

The code generally endures, but 21st century conditions do not lend themselves as neatly to this 

functional concept for channeling all assets and resources to a supported commander – meaning 

a geographic combatant commander (or Commander USSOCOM) – or the related notion from 

past wars that civilians have little relevance to prosecution of the “kinetic” phase of an operation. 

What is new today is not just the emergence of non-state actor adversaries, their asymmetric 

methods, or their penetration of our homeland – important though all of these trends are. The 

strategic shift we have perhaps not grasped is that success in conducting the nation’s wars is no 

longer a function solely of mastering the other side’s center of gravity. 

Increasingly over the past decade or two, our own military engagements have departed from the 

WWII, Korea, Vietnam model where the enemy was perceived to be on the march in pursuit of 

political and territorial ambitions and the judgment was made that he had to be stopped, and 

soon, to avert a strategically unacceptable outcome. 

More recent operations in Panama, Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have all been less 

reactive and more pre-meditated: each was launched by our decision, on our timetable, and 

according to our plans. In most of these more recent cases, America’s adversaries have had 

occasion during the run-up to hostilities to ponder America’s intentions. How would we react if 

challenged? How large an effort would we risk? How ambitious would our political “war aims” 

be? We also had time to think hard about how they might exert leverage on our own national 

willpower. 

Domestic political debates, media second-guessing and public opinion swings have become a 

fixture of the American landscape when our forces are committed to a foreign engagement of 

any duration. That free exercise of our liberties is a good thing, but we need to recognize that it 

has become a prime focus of our adversaries’ strategies. Never mind that informed Americans 

believe this nation to be highly resilient when challenged, even indomitable when threatened; our 

adversaries are less informed, and appear to believe, or at least hope, otherwise. We focus on 

their rhetoric, apparent goals and decision calculus; but more than ever they are now focusing on 

ours. This factor alone expands the conflict both geographically and bureaucratically. It is not 

the only such factor. 

A Force of a Different Color 

The Iraq and Afghanistan operations both illustrate how the U.S. and its adversaries appear to be 

measuring their own respective progress by different yardsticks. In Iraq, U.S. authorities cite 

with justification the achievement of historic political milestones – three elections held, and a 

constitution adopted – as evidence that the extremists are not succeeding. We tally Iraqi 

security forces trained as a metric of the new Iraqi government’s readiness to stand on its own 

and we aggregate national levels of electrical power, potable water, oil production and other such 

civil amenities as indicators of the population’s welfare. 
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These are all meaningful metrics, and we are not wrong to cite them. But does the adversary 

read the same scoreboard, the same way? And what are we doing to ensure that his own 

scoreboard marks him as a failure at his own game, a loser in the eyes of his own target 

audience? 

Consider the secretive network of Sunni rejectionists and foreign Jihadists in Iraq. Since most of 

the foreign Jihadists have already consigned themselves to become casualties via suicide, their 

death at Coalition hands is not, in and of itself, a loss from their perspective. For some it is a 

destiny fulfilled, a mission accomplished. The only variable that matters to them is how many 

U.S., Iraqi and third country casualties they can take with them and how much the resulting 

public distress shakes the confidence of public opinion in coalition countries and erodes Iraqi 

popular support for our presence, role and program. 

Would it be surprising if we were to learn that some among the Iraqi resistance think they have 

succeeded since 2003 in framing the conflict on their terms rather than ours, i.e., maneuvering 

the mighty Americans into a grinding war of attrition that has cost the U.S. a division equivalent 

of ground forces killed or wounded? 

In Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, our side cites the steady progress in capturing or 

killing senior al Qaeda figures, clearly a top U.S. priority. At the same time, the videotaped 

missives from Osama bin Ladin and Ayman Zawahiri openly taunt the U.S. as though Arab and 

Islamic audiences will readily understand their survival to be their victory and our failure. 

Granted that there are vast cultural differences at play, it is still worth asking whether it matters 

that we and our adversaries seem to be talking past each other. 

President Bush, throughout 2005 and 2006, has given a series of speeches to explain to American 

citizens and international public opinion the stakes, the goals and the costs of waging this war on 

terrorism. In so doing, he has often cited Osama bin Ladin’s aspiration to create an all-powerful 

Caliphate, toppling moderate governments throughout the Middle East and ruling over the entire 

Islamic world. The specter of a total strategic collapse of Westphalian governance across a large 

and economically sensitive swath of the world at the hands of militant Islamists may well 

succeed in galvanizing domestic American support to continue backing the Administration’s 

efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But might not the popular perception among millions of youth in the Arab and Islamic “street” – 

the enemy’s center of gravity – accord bin Ladin a substantial measure of status, borne of fear if 

not respect, for a remarkable achievement? After all, this reclusive fugitive not only carried off 

the most spectacular act of terrorism in history on 9/11, but he now has the leader of the world’s 

sole superpower regularly advertising his political/religious program of action. 

The fact is that Al Qaeda has achieved not one iota of tangible progress toward this radical 

utopian vision of supplanting existing Arab governments with its fabled Salafist Caliphate. Why 

isn’t bin Ladin’s utter failure to steer the direction of political events a central theme of 

America’s wartime public narrative? Why not the cynicism of his using impressionable young 

Arabs as explosive mules, the moral corruption of promising sexual rewards for their fulfillment 

of this purported religious “duty,” the telltale opportunism and unseriousness in his 
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pronouncements on regional political causes, and the growing scar Al Qaeda’s bombings of 

unsuspecting innocents are inflicting on Islam? 

Osama bin Ladin may be six-foot-five, but the only way he can become ten feet tall is by the 

status we grant him. Perhaps our side has not fully grasped the extent to which our public 

demeanor and that of the enemy constitute a central front in this war. 

Dueling Banquos 

In recent months Americans proudly watched Iraqis and Afghans waving their ink-stained 

fingers to the cameras, and we were justified in savoring the legacy of democratic reform our 

soldiers’ exertions and sacrifices are yielding. Our adversaries, meanwhile, plastered images of 

the U.S. abuses at Abu Ghraib on walls, buses, and television, reveling in the derogatory 

message that sent about American principles and purpose. 

One would have thought that dispelling those toxic images as quickly and definitively as possible 

would be priority one. Indeed, was it not obvious that the U.S. forces, for all their incredibly 

selfless endeavors in Iraq, stood to suffer a terrible (and terribly unfair) reversal in their standing 

among many Iraqi citizens, to say nothing of Arab and international opinion generally, if the 

image of harsh American mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners inside Saddam’s most notorious prison 

was not quickly countered? 

Washington understood that the alleged abuse of prisoners was a body blow in the campaign for 

Iraqi hearts and minds. And yet, some in positions of responsibility seemed slow to find their 

voices in distancing the United States – and by extension, the United States Armed Forces – 

from the accusations. While Arab media savaged the U.S. over Abu Ghraib (harping as well on 

apparent deficiencies in accountability throughout the chain of command), the President’s 

advisors reserved their energies for a protracted effort to keep a venerated combat veteran in his 

own party from committing the U.S. by legislation to observe international legal prohibitions 

against torture. 

Their apparently overriding concern was to avoid a fettering of Presidential wartime 

prerogatives. But whether or not powers given under the Constitution could truly have been 

eroded by executive or legislative actions, the result of this baroque intramural debate at home 

was a diminished effort to stanch the bleeding of America’s reputation and influence abroad 

caused by the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal. 

In a mature democracy such as the U.S., leaders are expected to explain their actions and set 

public expectations when sacrifice is required. This tradition continues. However, the 21st 

century question posed by the current war effort is whether, if all our leaders seek to do in their 

public pronouncements is to solidify domestic support – are they not merely playing defense, and 

ceding much of the psychological battlespace to the adversary? 

It is fair to ask whether our political aims and declaratory policy are calibrated to the most 

efficacious political, cultural, and religious frequencies from which to undercut and diminish al 

Qaeda’s prestige, reputation and corresponding potency even as we continue physical measures 
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to capture or kill its operatives and disrupt its freedom of action. It is hard to shake the 

impression that we and our adversaries, while clearly fighting each other with lethal force, are 

not tugging on the same psychological line of rope. 

Through the Looking Glass, Darkly 

The larger point here is that this new kind of war is being fought on many levels, and American 

steadfastness, valor, generosity and goodwill in rebuilding the new democracies of Afghanistan 

and Iraq, even when accomplishing the defined tasks set for them, are pointing up gaps in the 

national effort. We have measurably reduced our adversaries’ physical capacity to harm our 

interests; it is less clear that we are breaking their will to fight on, or their hope of outlasting us 

and reconstituting their positions, in Iraq, or Afghanistan, or any place where these radicals 

operate. 

Granted that we know our adversaries cannot inflict enough pain on the U.S. to shake our 

commitment to wage war against them, they can and do use our democratic dialogue as fodder 

for self-aggrandizing, and perhaps self-deluding, propaganda. They may not know they are 

losing. 

The policy telescope we have long used to watch events in the AOR can no longer point only one 

way. It needs to be turned around so that we are more conscious of how the enemy is thinking 

about us, and what he is taking to be his own measures of effectiveness. The home team no 

longer has the luxury of acting as though “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” 

Not only should we be alert to the potential for a terror attack on U.S. soil; we should be aware 

that our political system, amplified by a media megaphone that echoes around the world, is part 

of the other guy’s AOR. This has implications for the way we fight in the future. 

The foregoing, admittedly, is more in the vein of broad analytical observation than something 

that points to specific changes in operational tradecraft at the combatant command level. But the 

new reality of an expanded battlefield is significant. To us, the going-in mission is military and 

political – destroying and degrading the other side’s capacity to control territory, exercise 

political power, and threaten civil populations as well as American interests. To the adversary, 

psychological effects appear to loom large as tactical objectives. The metrics by which we and 

our new enemy respectively measure our success and appeal to our supporters, as compared to 

past conflicts with traditional military adversaries, have become wildly divergent. 

The Agony of Victory 

The good news is that our military forces have achieved the goal the nation set for them, namely 

superiority at every level of the spectrum of military operations. No standing military force in 

the world could possibly wish to confront the Armed Forces of the United States in a hot war. 

That is why we find our forces today in Iraq and Afghanistan dealing with threats from persons 

whose identity, purposes and methods place them outside of the spectrum of military operations, 

including the laws of war, as these have been commonly understood for at least half a century. 

The bad news is that our country is now trying to apply the most advanced and capable tools we 

currently have for addressing security threats – military capabilities – to what arguably are non-
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military exigencies. A reasonable conclusion from the above discussion of the extremist 

adversary is that defeating him is not a military mission, not a DoD mission, but rather a national 

mission, albeit one with important military components. Nearly five years after 9/11, we still 

have precious little operational capability outside of DoD that could effect meaningful change in 

a tense post-conflict environment such as Iraq. 

In Washington, the need to adapt old tools to new conditions is increasingly recognized. DoD 

introduced the concept of transformation even before 9/11; the President created the Department 

of Homeland Security soon after; the 9/11 Commission led to establishment of the Directorate of 

National Intelligence; and Secretary of State Rice in January 2006 announced transformational 

measures in the nation’s diplomatic corps serving around the world. 

As laudable as these efforts may be, the U.S. Government continues to operate under the basic 

framework of The National Security Act of 1947. In other words, there is no concept of a 

national civilian “supported commander” equipped and empowered to synchronize the 

employment of disparate tools against extremism in a real-time, tactical manner worldwide. 

Thus, soldiers will still detain and interview the insurgents, intelligence agencies will liaise with 

foreign counterparts, diplomats and politicians will make the statements that constitute our 

public diplomacy effort, aid agencies will manage programs abroad, treasury officials will chase 

terrorist financing leads, and the NSC Staff will keep all these strands of programmatic activity 

generally coordinated. 

All the while, Washington think tanks are examining new concepts for interagency coordination, 

better plans for post-conflict reconstruction, and the daunting issue of more coherent ways to 

budget for national security activities of all kinds, among other reforms. While surprisingly little 

has been heard to date from Congress itself about ways that it might ‘transform’ so as to improve 

its vital oversight role, it is clear the U.S. national security community is sufficiently conscious 

of its institutional inadequacies to be exploring sensible changes, and this will affect the future 

planning and conduct of military operations. Will it be enough? 

All Quiet, Please, on the Western Front 

A Combatant Commander might be forgiven for thinking that much of the preceding deals with 

matters outside his purview. By traditional measures of a command’s purview, he would not be 

wrong. The purpose of this discussion is to connect the command’s operations with actions 

outside the AOR, including back home, as part of the same struggle, hence part of the same 

‘national’ mission. What in the past may have been perceived as exogenous factors to the 

operation could more properly be seen as geographically distant but centrally relevant aspects of 

the warfight. 

We can already begin to glimpse the nature of the expanded battlefield and the real-time 

interplay of military and non-military issues in 21st century conflict. There are non-military 

issues that belong on the military planner’s radar screen and oblige the commander on the scene 

to keep one ear cocked to civilian policymakers in Washington. The task of leading such an 

effort has become more complex. 
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After delivering for America a world in which no rival conventional force could credibly 

threaten its sovereignty or liberty, our military’s reward has been the task of protecting us in a 

world where practically unrecognizable enemies can inflict nearly intolerable pain on the nation. 

As different as this adversary is from military foes of the past, so is the shape of the U.S. effort 

that will decisively defeat it. Much of the work in crafting that effort still lies ahead. 

Part II of this essay will offer ten takeaways from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 

Freedom. Each is intended to illustrate further how the supported Commander of the future will 

need to be cognizant of operations well outside the lanes implied by the Unified Command Plan, 

his mission statement and even the execute orders that direct him to conduct an operation. 

 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. returned to private life in January 2005 after serving as 

Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs since May of 2001. He currently 

serves on the Board of Directors of the Henry L. Stimson Center and chairs the Programs 

Committee. Mr. Bloomfield has held high level positions in the Pentagon, White House 

and State Department. These positions included Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National 

Security Affairs (1991-02), Member, U.S. Delegation to Philippine Bases Negotiations 

(1990-91), Member, U.S. Water Mediation in the Middle East (1989-90), and Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89), among 

other positions in the Department of Defense (OSD/ISA) beginning in 1981. Mr. 

Bloomfield is the editor of Global Markets and National Interests – the New Geopolitics of 

Energy, Capital, and Information (Washington DC, CSIS Press, 2002). 
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On Center of Gravity 

By 

Dr. Milan Vego 

The soundness of a plan for a campaign or major operation essentially hinges on the proper 

determination of a center of gravity for both the enemy and friendly sides. Yet despite its 

importance, many commanders and their staffs pay inadequate attention to the theoretical 

underpinnings of the concept of center of gravity. Mistranslation of the uniquely German term 

Schwerpunkt as “center of gravity” instead of “weight (or focus) of effort”i in the English 

version of Clausewitz’s seminal work On War is perhaps the main reason for the widespread 

misconception that a physical location—such as the capital city—represents a center of gravity. 

Some doctrinal documents also include the enemy’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities, such as 

logistics, as the enemy’s center of gravity. In other cases, objectives are confused with the center 

of gravity. More recently, the proponents of the so-called “five-ring” theory and similar systems 

approaches consider various nodes not as decisive points but as centers of gravity. Common to 

all these approaches is that center of gravity is disconnected from its larger purpose—the military 

objective to be accomplished. Also, all too often, the need to determine the friendly center of 

gravity is neglected or simply ignored. Worse yet, despite all the facts to the contrary, some 

leading proponents of network-centric warfare state—openly or by implication—that the entire 

concept of center of gravity is irrelevant in the information age. 

What Is Center of Gravity? 

In generic terms, center of gravityii can be defined as a source of massed strength—physical or 

moral—or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or 

destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to 

accomplish a given military objective. In military terms, “mass” should not be understood 

literally. What matters most is the “massed effect,” not whether available combat potential (prior 

to combat) or combat power (generated in combat) is physically concentrated in a certain area. 

Because of modern weapons’ long range, lethality, and accuracy, centers of gravity in air warfare 

or, to a lesser extent, naval warfare do not necessarily have to be physically massed in a specific 

area; they may be dispersed throughout a large part of a theater. In contrast, ground forces are 

usually massed in a relatively small physical space. However, even in land warfare, modern 

 

i

 “Schwerpunkt,” H. Dv 100/900 VS-NfD, Fuehrungsbegriffe (TF/B) (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, February 1990), 

p. Sch-SEA; other related terms include “area of the weight of effort” [Schwerpunktraum], “weight of effort in an 

attack” [Schwerpunkt des Angriffs], etc. Huerth, US-NfD. Militaerisches Studienglossary Englisch, vol. 2/3 (Bonn: 

Bundessprachenamt, January 1993), p. 1060; “Schwerpunkt,” Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen 

Wehrwisenschaften, vol. 1: Wehrpolitik und Kriegfuehrung (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag von Walter de Grunter, 1936), p. 

649. 

ii In the strict definition of the term, a center of gravity is defined as “that point of an object around which its weight 

is evenly distributed or balanced; center of mass; point of equilibrium”; Webster’s New World Dictionary of the 

American Language, College Edition (New York, NY: The World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 237.
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armies are smaller and are deployed in a smaller part of the theater than was the case in World 

War II. At the national level and in a democracy, a center of gravity is usually the top civilian 

leadership and its will to fight. In a non-democratic state, such a center of gravity is the 

authoritarian or dictatorial leader and his inner circle and its will to fight. A nonmilitary center of 

gravity can also be a totalitarian ideology of the communist or fascist/Nazi variety. In other 

cases, the justness of the cause or the government’s legitimacy might be a center of gravity. In a 

hostage-taking situation, the hostages themselves, not the terrorists or the state holding them, can 

be considered the enemy’s center of gravity. In such a case, the hostages are used as leverage by 

the enemy to accomplish his objective. 

Importance of Center of Gravity 

The principal utility of the concept of center of gravity is in significantly enhancing the chance 

that one’s sources of power are used in the quickest and most effective way for accomplishing a 

given military objective. The proper application of the concept of center of gravity in its essence 

means the proper application of the principles of objective, mass, and economy of effort. The key 

to success is to identify the friendly center of gravity and protect it, and to identify the enemy’s 

center of gravity and then attack it with the requisite determination.iii

The enemy is not completely defeated unless his center of gravity—his relevant mass of power—

is destroyed or neutralized. One may seize the enemy’s capital, attack his logistics, and convince 

the majority of his population that further resistance is useless, but victory is not ensured unless 

the enemy’s forces are defeated in the field.iv Without destroying the enemy’s strategic or 

operational center of gravity, one’s strategic or operational success cannot be consolidated 

quickly, if at all. 

The courses of action focused on the enemy’s proper center of gravity normally will have the 

best chances of accomplishing one’s mission. An envelopment maneuver is less likely to achieve 

its very purpose unless it is aimed at obtaining a favorable position in regard to the enemy’s 

operational or tactical center of gravity. In contrast, a turning maneuver is aimed at cutting lines 

of supplies that sustain the enemy’s operational or tactical center of gravity; it represents, in fact, 

an indirect attack on the enemy center of gravity. Deception and counter deception efforts cannot 

be successful if the focus of one’s efforts is directed against the wrong enemy center of gravity. 

A properly identified center of gravity also creates prerequisites for selecting a sound method of 

applying one’s military and nonmilitary sources of power. An attack on enemy vulnerabilities 

will not cause the deteriorating effect desired unless it directly or indirectly affects the center of 

gravity.v

 

 

iii Thomas M. Kriwanek, The Operational Center of Gravity (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military 

Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986), p. 7. 

iv Gordon M. Wells, The Center of Gravity Fad: Consequence of the Absence of an Overarching American Theory 

of War (Arlington, VA: AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, March 2001), p. 4. 

v

. Phillip Kevin Giles and Thomas P. Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 31 January 1996), p. 19. 
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An attacker possessing superior combat potential or combat power should normally focus all his 

efforts on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s center of gravity. However, if the attacker 

is inferior in some critical aspect of military power, he might need to focus his initial efforts on 

seizing physical objectives before he can attack the enemy’s center of gravity, directly or indirectly. 

For example, the Germans, in planning their invasion of Norway (Operation Weseruebung Nord), 

focused their efforts on seizing selected ports and airfields before attacking the enemy’s center of 

gravity—the troops defending the capital of Oslo and forces defending the central and northern part 

of Norway. The reason for such an operational idea (scheme) was the Germans’ appreciation that 

their Kriegsmarine’s inferiority robbed them of any chance to defeat the Allied operational center of 

gravity—the Royal Navy—prior to the landing. 

The true value of center of gravity may be the framework the concept provides for thinking about 

war. In other words, the process of determining centers of gravity may be as important as the 

product.vi 

Analytical Construct 

An analytical construct should be used to determine the enemy and friendly centers of gravity; 

otherwise, the risk is too high that many critically important elements in the military situation may 

be partially omitted or even completely ignored. Obviously, the analytical process by itself cannot 

ensure that a center of gravity will be properly determined. The knowledge and understanding and, 

even more important, the judgment and wisdom of the commanders and their staffs are the keys to 

determining the proper center of gravity and selecting the method and procedures for attacking or 

protecting it. 

The principal factors in determining a solution for any military problem are the objective to be 

accomplished and the corresponding military situation. The size and complexity of the objective 

determine the scope of the situation in terms of the factors of space and time. Hence, the tactical, 

operational, and strategic situations are differentiated (see Figure 1). Any situation encompasses a 

large number of both physical and so-called “abstract” military and nonmilitary elements. Physical 

elements are tangible and are usually easy to quantify. The abstract or intangible elements are hard 

or even impossible to quantify with any degree of certainty. 

Commanders and theirs staffs are naturally interested in obtaining as much information as possible 

on all aspects of the situation. The larger the size of the military objective, the more diverse its 

components and hence the more complex and difficult it is to properly evaluate a given military 

situation. Therefore, despite all the enormous advances in information technologies, there is a limit 

to what can be technically transmitted and, even more important, to what the human element can 

possibly digest and use in making a sound decision. Regardless of how much information one 

possesses, the key is to focus on evaluating those aspects of the situation—arbitrarily called critical 

factors—considered essential for the accomplishment of the specific military objective. 

 

vi John B. Saxman, The Concept of Center of Gravity: Does It Have Utility in Joint Doctrine and Campaign 

Planning? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, 28 May 1992), p. 31. 
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Figure 1: Concept of Critical Factors and Center of Gravity

Tangible critical factors vary from the geographical in nature (positions, mountain passes, valleys, 

plains, straits, bays/gulfs; lines of operations or lines of communications, etc.) to the military forces 

(armed forces as a whole, individual services, theater/numbered armies and naval/air fleets, 

divisions, brigades, wings, squadrons, etc.) to the nonmilitary (state organization, diplomacy, 

economy, finances, agriculture, mineral resources, technology, culture, etc.). Intangible critical 

factors encompass such difficult- or impossible-to-quantify factors as alliance/coalition’s cohesion, 

quality of one’s leadership, soundness of doctrine, morale and discipline, unit cohesion, 

government legitimacy, public support, and will to fight. 

Critical Strengths vs. Critical Weaknesses/Vulnerabilities 

In the process of analyzing the military situation, it is highly useful to divide critical factors into 

two major groups: critical strengths and critical weaknesses. What is critical or less critical is often 

difficult to determine with any degree of precision. It is all essentially a matter of good judgment 

and experience. 

 

Critical strengths are friendly or enemy capabilities considered essential for accomplishing a given 

or assumed military objective. In military terms, critical strengths are primarily sources of 

physical or moral potential/power or elements that integrate, protect, and sustain specific sources 

of combat potential/power. 

At the highest level, the leadership of a nation, an alliance/coalition, insurgents, or an extremist 

group/movement normally comprises the most critical source of power. In the case of totalitarian 

regimes, the ideology—whether of the communist or fascist variety—is such a source of power; 

CRITICAL 

VULNERABILITIES 

(CVs) 

CRITICAL 

STRENGTH

MILITARY 

• TACTICAL 

•OPERATIONAL 

• STRATEGIC 

CRITICAL 

WEAKNESSES 

“PHYSICAL”

(TANGIBLE) 

“ABSTRACT” 

(INTANGIBLE) 

CRITICAL 

FACTORS 

CENTER OF 

GRAVITY 

FRIENDLY 

SITUATION 

ENEMY 

SITUATION 

SITUATION OF THE 

NEUTRALS 

MILITARY OBJECTIVE 

• STRATEGIC 

• OPERATIONAL
27 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

it is one of the critical strengths for al-Qa‘ida’s pan-Islamic fascism. The inner strength of an 

alliance or coalition is based on the permanence of the interests of the member states and their 

conviction of the righteousness of their cause. Likewise, one of the critical strengths for the 

government fighting an insurgency is its legitimacy. 

For a military force, critical strength is normally concentrated in one’s available combat 

potential/combat power. The latter has traditionally been composed of firepower, maneuver, 

leadership, and manpower. This is now changing, due to the steadily increasing importance of 

information for warfighting. Hence, information should be considered an integral part of the 

source of one’s combat potential/power. 

Critical weaknesses are those sources of power that are considered essential for the 

accomplishment of the objectives but are at the same time grossly inadequate to perform their 

intended function or task. At the national or alliance/coalition level, critical weaknesses could be a 

defeatist attitude on the part of most of the leadership, low morale of the population, weak public 

support for war or some other military action, and fragility of the coalition or serious disagreement 

on some fundamental issue among the alliance members. For insurgents, critical weaknesses could 

be the population’s growing disenchantment with their cause or a refusal of the populace living in 

the territory under their control to pay taxes or ransom money. For al-Qa‘ida, critical weaknesses 

include its perversion of Islamic teachings, reliance on Western banks for financial transactions, 

and heavy reliance on the Internet to communicate with its members and spread its message. 

For a military force, examples of critical weaknesses are inadequate mobility or firepower, 

incompetent leadership, rigid doctrine, low morale and discipline, weak unit cohesion, inadequate 

air defense or force protection, and insufficient protection of information systems. For example, in 

the North African Campaign, 1940–1943, the critical strengths of the German forces were their 

greater combat experience, better tactical doctrine and execution, better leadership, and superior 

equipment.vii British critical strengths included the superiority of their defense, a larger quantity 

of equipment, better support of their allies, and a better logistical supply system.viii The 

German critical weaknesses were weak and inefficient Italian allies and logistical support and 

sustainment difficulties; for the British, critical weaknesses included combat inexperience, weak 

leadership, and doctrinal inflexibility.ix 

Any critical strength can become a critical weakness due to enemy actions in the course of a 

conflict or war. For instance, one’s population’s support for a war might be high at the beginning 

of hostilities, but the destruction of the country’s infrastructure, a drastic drop in standard of living, 

large defeats in the field, and increasing losses among the civilian population due to the enemy’s 

action could erode that support so that it becomes a critical weakness. Or the high degree of 

cohesion in a coalition could be significantly reduced because one or more members leave the 

coalition or suffer a catastrophic defeat. A high degree of combat readiness or morale can be 

diminished so that it becomes a critical weakness. Likewise, the unit cohesion of one’s combat 

 

vii Kriwanek, The Operational Center of Gravity, p. 11. 

viii Ibid. 

ix Ibid., pp. 11–12. 
28 

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CAMPAIGNING

forces can be high at the beginning of a major operation or campaign but become a critical 

weakness due to higher-than-expected losses and poor leadership. 

Critical vulnerabilities are those elements of one’s military or nonmilitary sources of power open 

to enemy attack, control, leverage, or exploitation. For example, a resourceful opponent can 

exploit one’s aversion to high casualties to progressively weaken the country’s will to prosecute 

war, as happened in the United States during the Vietnam War. In 1993, the United States 

allowed itself to be in a situation where its vital interests were not at stake but the very survival 

of the Somalian clan leader Mohamed Farah Aideed was. This dangerously asymmetrical 

situation allowed Aideed to indirectly attack the U.S. strategic center of gravity—will to fight—

by exploiting the well-known U.S. critical vulnerability, an aversion to suffering high casualties. 

With no survival at stake, the United States could not protect and sustain popular and political 

support, while Aideed’s desire for independent power could be sustained indefinitely.x

 The 

enemy can also seriously degrade the cohesion of one’s coalition by attacking and defeating the 

weakest member. Public support for a war can be greatly weakened if the enemy is successful in 

feeding one’s press false stories or using other means of active disinformation. 

In most cases, the enemy’s or friendly critical vulnerabilities are related to critical weaknesses. 

However, this is not always the case; in some situations a critical strength can become a critical 

vulnerability if structurally or organizationally it lacks sufficient protection or support. This 

situation might exist in the case of some critical elements of logistical support and sustainment, C4 

nodes, or information systems. 

Critical factors are subject to small or significant changes resulting from the actions of enemy and 

friendly forces. The enemy’s critical strengths and weaknesses cannot be properly determined if 

one does not fully understand the enemy’s society or military culture, political traditions, and 

social customs, or has exaggerated sense of superiority. Thus, the key is to avoid mirrorimaging—an extremely difficult thing to do—in the process of analysis. Hence, one’s 

intelligence has a critical role in monitoring these changes on the enemy side and in providing 

planners with timely information. On the other hand, one’s lack of realism and overconfidence 

could prevent a sound evaluation of the true capabilities of friendly forces. 

Critical strengths and weaknesses differ considerably depending on the scope of the military 

objective to be accomplished and the corresponding levels of war. The higher the level of war, the 

more critical for ultimate success the critical factors are. In the case of military sources of power, 

what constitutes a critical strength at the tactical level can become a critical weakness if the 

required forces and assets are inadequate for the successful outcome of a campaign or major 

operation. For instance, one’s logistical support and sustainment can be a critical strength at the 

tactical level, but it can become a critical weakness at the operational level because of one’s 

inability to properly protect elements of logistical infrastructure or because of insufficient 

logistical resources to support and sustain much larger forces engaged in a campaign or major 

 

x

. Timothy J. Keppler, The Center of Gravity Concept: A Knowledge Engineering Approach to Improved 

Understanding and Application (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, June 1995), pp. 6–7. 
29 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

operation. Alternatively, morale and the will to fight at the tactical level might be high or very 

high, but the highest politico-military leadership’s will to fight or the strength of public support 

might be weak or sorely lacking. 

Center of Gravity’s Composition 

Any critical strength is composed of the main source of power (military or nonmilitary) and 

those elements used to integrate, protect, and support or sustain it. In regard to a center of 

gravity, the main source of power can be arbitrarily called the “inner core,” while all other 

elements can be grouped in the “outer core.” The critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities are 

usually found in the outer core of a center of gravity. In practical terms, the outer and inner cores 

of a center of gravity represent a whole (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2: Military Related Center of Gravity

The problem of what constitutes a center of gravity can be complicated because of the 

relationship between the inner core and those elements of the outer core having attributes of 

firepower and maneuver. For example, air defense or antisubmarine defense can be an element of 

protection for the inner core at the operational level, but it can become part of the inner core at 

the tactical level. A similar situation can exist in the case of some elements of support, as, for 

example, ground or naval fire support and air support. 

 

Neither military nor nonmilitary sources of power can function properly without their respective 

outer core. The integration elements, such as command structure, associated communications, 

FIREPOWER LEADERSHIP 

MANEUVER

TANGIBLE INTANGIBLE 

INNER CORE 

SUPPORT

PROTECTION 

INTEGRATION

OUTER CORE 

RANK & FILE

INFORMATION 

• INTELLIGENCE 

• LOGISTICS 

• OTHER 

• FIRE SUPPORT 

• AIR SUPPORT 

• FORCE PROTECTION 

• AIR DEFENSE 

• TACTICAL BALLISTIC 

MISSILE DEFENSE 

(TBMD) 

• DEFENSIVE MINE 

COUNTER 

• MEASURES (MCM) 

• OPERATIONS SECURITY 

(OPSEC) 

• COVER, CONCEALMENT,

AND DECEPTION (CCD) 

• OTHER 

• COMMAND STRUCTURE 

• C4 SYSTEMS 

• MILITARY/SERVICE 

CULTURE 

• WAY OF WARFARE 

• COMMON DOCTRINE 

• COMMON TRAINING 

• OTHER 
30 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

and other technical systems, link the leadership with all the other elements of sources of power. 

At the national level, the political system, government structure, and other unifying elements—

such as homogenous population, common political traditions, religion, and culture—can be 

integrating elements. Also, various media outlets controlled by the government can act as 

integrators. However, in a multinational state, religious or ethnic divisions, significant 

differences in culture, and fragmentation of the society into numerous tribes and clans are not 

integrators but often sources of great weaknesses and vulnerabilities. For a military force, the key 

integrators are the command structure and command relationships, communications, and 

automated data systems for command and control, military or service culture, national way of 

warfare, and common doctrine and training. For insurgents or an extremist organization, the 

media and especially the Internet play considerable roles in linking the respective leaders and 

active or passive supporters. 

Protection elements at the national level encompass the armed forces as a whole, paramilitary 

organizations, law enforcement institutions, regular and secret police, and other organizations 

intended to protect the government and the society. In turn, each of these contains certain 

elements of protection as well. Protection elements for operational or tactical center of gravity 

include air (space) defense; force protection; protection of information systems; cover, 

concealment, and deception (CCD); and operational security (OPSEC). For example, in the Axis

offensive in North Africa in the spring of 1942, the operational center of gravity (the German 

panzer divisions) would have been ineffective if not for the Luftwaffe’s support in neutralizing 

the British air and naval strength based on Malta, allowing supplies to reach Rommel’s forces in 

March and April. The German success during the British offensive in May–June 1942 (Operation 

Cauldron) would not have been possible without the flank protection of the panzer divisions 

provided by the Italian XXI and X Corps at the battle of the Gazala–Bir Hacheim line.xi 

Support and sustainment elements are critical for the performance of any element within the 

inner core of a given center of gravity. At the national level, the key elements of support in a 

conflict or war are the country’s or alliance/coalition’s military-economic system, diplomacy, 

finances, energy resources, electricity grid, and transportation systems. In a democratic state, 

public opinion is such a critical element of support, while in an authoritarian or totalitarian 

regime, the population’s morale is a much more important source of support and sustainment of 

the leadership’s will to fight. Sources of support and sustainment for al-Qa‘ida are financial 

contributions and the use of Western banks for financial transactions. For a military force, the 

main elements of support are intelligence and logistics.xii 

Tangible vs. Intangible Elements 

Normally, a center of gravity is composed of a combination of tangible and intangible sources of 

power. Whether tangible or intangible elements predominate is directly related to the nature of 

the objective to be accomplished. The more the objective is nonmilitary in its nature, the more 

 

xi. Kriwanek, The Operational Center of Gravity, p. 13. 

xii. Collin A. Agee, Peeling the Onion: The Iraqi Center of Gravity in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of 

Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1992), p. 35. 
31 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

intangibles comprise the center of gravity. Also, the higher the level of war, the more intangibles 

fall within the scope of a given center of gravity. In a high-intensity conflict or war, intangible 

elements of a center of gravity are primarily present at the national- and theater-strategic levels. 

Because the nature of the strategic objective in operations other than war is primarily nonmilitary 

(political, diplomatic, psychological, economic, etc.) the intangible elements of the center of 

gravity are fairly represented even at the tactical and operational levels. 

In land warfare, tangible elements of a center of gravity can range from an armored or 

mechanized battalion or regiment to numbered and theater armies. In naval warfare, a 

center of gravity can be a direct screen of a convoy, a surface strike group, a carrier strike group, 

an expeditionary strike group, or a major part of surface forces in the numbered and theater 

fleets. Likewise, in air warfare, a center of gravity can be the element of a force of combat 

aircraft that has the highest combat potential/power, such as a fighter or bomber squadron in a 

fighter/bomber wing, or the entire force of fighters and ground-based air defenses or bombers 

and numbered and theater air fleets. 

In the battle for Kursk (Operation Zitadelle to the Germans) in July 1943, the operational center 

of gravity on both sides was the armored and mechanized forces. The Germans had a 

technological edge in weapons and equipment, as well as greater experience and superior 

military efficiency. The Soviet strength was tactical combined arms defense, numerical 

superiority in men and materiel, excellent intelligence, and thorough planning. One of the 

Germans’ weaknesses was their inability to replace losses in armor, while a Soviet weakness was 

the inability to match German armored combined arms forces in a maneuver.xiii

In the netted forces at the tactical and operational levels, computer networks might also comprise 

a major part of the enemy or friendly center of gravity. As operational centers of gravity, 

computer networks are fundamentally different from conventional centers of gravity, in part 

because they lack attributes of firepower and maneuver. In contrast to traditional centers of 

gravity, the key components of a computer network are potentially highly vulnerable to an 

enemy’s disabling attack. 

Depending on the level of war, the intangible elements of a center of gravity include such 

unquantifiable or hard-to-measure elements as political leadership, the skill and efficiency of 

military commanders and their staffs, soundness of doctrine, combat motivation, unit cohesion, 

jointness/combinedness, and morale and discipline. In an alliance or coalition, the center of 

gravity might consist of the community of interests or common desires that hold the members 

together.xiv

 

 

xiii Kriwanek, The Operational Center of Gravity, p. 17. 

xiv. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 596. 
32 

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CAMPAIGNING

In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the U.S.-led coalition’s cohesion was (from the Iraqi perspective) 

an intangible element of the strategic center of gravity, while Saddam Hussein and his inner 

circle had the same role from the coalition’s point of view. Iraqi leadership was convinced that 

the Arab states were a particularly weak link in the coalition because of their fragile governments 

and cultural affinity with Iraq.xv It also believed that Israeli involvement in any manner would 

trigger popular Arab indignation and compel the Arab governments to scale back or end their 

support for the coalition.xvi 

There are instances when the strategic center of gravity can be composed almost entirely of a 

military source of power. This situation may occur in an immature theater, one that lacks 

nonmilitary sources of power. For example, in 1942–1943, during the Solomons Campaign, the 

Japanese ground, and striking elements of naval and air forces deployed in the Solomons were 

collectively the enemy’s theater-strategic centers of gravity for the Allies. 

The nature of center of gravity in an insurgency or counterinsurgency significantly differs from 

that in a high-intensity conventional war because the nature of the strategic objective is 

predominantly nonmilitary (political, psychological, informational, etc.). In an insurgency, rarely 

do the antigovernment forces mass enough forces to constitute a tangible operational center of 

gravity. Then, for the government, the rebels’ top leadership or the guerrilla force as a whole 

might comprise a strategic center of gravity. In the case of Marxist (-Leninist) or fascist (whether 

secular or religious) movements, ideology should be considered an important part of the strategic 

center of gravity. The individual rebel commanders and their forces in the countryside would 

constitute usually tactical and, in some exceptional cases, operational centers of gravity. For the 

insurgents, the government’s legitimacy and its armed forces would normally represent a 

strategic center of gravity that needs to be severely degraded, weakened, and ultimately 

destroyed. Therefore, the government’s task is to preserve and, optimally, enhance its legitimacy 

in the eyes of the majority of the country’s population. 

Legitimacy is a fundamental strength.xvii It is a condition based on the perception of the justness 

of the actions of the government. It is bestowed by the population. Without being widely 

accepted as legitimate, the government is unlikely to survive a determined insurgency. It is the 

governments’ lack of legitimacy in many of the current and future trouble spots that provides the 

various hostile factions with the power to operate in the manner they do. For an insurgency to 

succeed, it must concentrate a major part of its efforts toward the drastic reduction or elimination 

of the legitimacy of the government. This usually takes allot of time. At the same time, a 

counterinsurgency effort cannot be successful unless the government’s legitimacy is not only 

maintained but also increased in the eyes of the majority of the population. Legitimacy must be 

 

xv Norman Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15, 

no. 1 (March 1992), p. 10. 

xvi Ibid., p. 11. 

xvii J. M. Petryk, Legitimacy—A Center of Gravity for the Information Age (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 

ASMC 3/CSEM 3, 2000), p. 12. 
33 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

seen in the context of conflicts resulting from an increasing reliance on violence by a minority 

attempting to impose its will on the majority. This is where efforts must be focused to bolster the 

legitimacy of legal authority.xviii

During the insurgency in El Salvador in the 1980s, the strategic center of gravity for the 

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebel coalition was the legitimacy of the El 

Salvadorian government itself.xix A similar situation exists in Colombia, where the government 

forces are engaged in a protracted counterinsurgency effort against Marxist-led guerrillas 

(FARC/ELN). The eventual success or failure of counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq will ultimately 

depend not only on the leadership’s and security forces’ will to fight but, to a much larger 

degree, on whether the legitimate government is accepted by the majority of the Iraqi population 

and by the dissatisfied Sunni minority. 

 

Characteristics 

A center of gravity at any level of war has certain characteristics that are not found among the 

military objectives, geographic location, or decisive points. In terms of the factor of space, a 

center of gravity is often located in the relative proximity of the physical objective. This is often 

the case in war on land at the tactical and operational levels. In land warfare, the enemy’s 

operational reserves are a potential operational center of gravity for both the attacker and the 

defender. For example, in the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the German armored and 

mechanized forces, composed of the XIV Panzer Korps (29th Panzer Grenadier Division, 15th 

Panzer Division, and Herman Goering Division), constituted a proper operational center of 

gravity for the Allied planners.xx

In some cases, an operational center of gravity may be located beyond the boundaries of a theater 

of operations in which a new campaign is to begin. For instance, the Japanese plan for the 

invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 envisaged the destruction or neutralization of the 

major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet—the operational center of gravity for the Japanese Combined 

Fleet—based in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, prior to the attack on the Philippines itself. The Japanese 

aim was to cripple a major part of the U.S. Pacific battle fleet and thereby prevent it from 

interfering with the landings in the Philippines. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in the early 

hours of 7 December, and the Philippines’ U.S. air and naval bases shortly thereafter. 

An important characteristic of the operational or tactical enemy center of gravity is its ability to 

put the friendly center of gravity in physical danger (see Figure 3). This is not a characteristic of 

a military objective, a decisive point, or a critical weakness or vulnerability. In addition, any 

 

xviii Ibid., p. 13. 

xix. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, McNair Papers 

4 (Washington, DC: The Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 18. 

xx Walter Fries, Der Kampf um Sizilien 1943–1944, 11.12.1947 ZA/1 2311 T-2 Studien der Historical Division 

Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, Bundesarchiv/Militaerarchiv (BAMA), Freiburg, i.Br., p. 37. 
34 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

tangible element of an enemy strategic center of gravity represents a potential threat to one’s 

strategic center of gravity. 

Figure 3: Characteristics of Center of Gravity

The higher the level of war, the more fixed a given center of gravity is. Thus, a strategic center of 

gravity is a relatively fixed entity throughout the duration of the conflict; it shifts only if the 

leadership is changed or removed from authority or if a major part of the military or nonmilitary 

source of power drastically changes so the force reemerges as a completely different entity.xxi If 

an authoritarian or dictatorial ruler is assassinated or overthrown in a coup, the new ruler or 

group of rulers will emerge as part of the new strategic center of gravity. The enemy might 

continue the fight, or he might sue for a compromise peace or surrender. Likewise, the strategic 

center of gravity shifts or changes its character if one or more members of an alliance or 

coalition leave the war or change sides. 

 

 

xxi Giles and Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application, pp. 17–18. 

THE HIGHER THE

LEVEL OF WAR 

THE FEWER CENTES 

OF GRAVITY 

ETC.

IT IS NEVER A 

SOURCE 

OF WEAKNESS 

OPERATIONAL OR

TACTICAL CENTER OF 

GRAVITY CAN PHYSICALLY 

ENDANGER ONE’S 

OWN CENTER OF 

GRAVITY 

IT IS RELATED 

TO 

THE FACTORS

THE UTILITY OF

TACTICAL COG 

IS DOUBTFUL

MIX OF TANGIBLE AND

INTANGIBLE FACTORS

IS DIRECTLY RELATED

TO THE NATURE 

OF THE MILITARY 

OBJECTIVE 

IT CAN 

SHIFT IN THE 

COURSE OF 

CONFLICT/WAR

IT IS A SOURCE OF 

THE 

GREATEST 

STRENGTH 

(PHYSICAL OR 

MORAL) OR 

LEVERAGE 

IT CONTAINS BOTH 

TANGIBLE AND 

INTANGIBLE 

ELEMENTS 

SHIFT IN CENTER OF GRAVITY CAN OCCUR 

DUE TO:

•CHANGE OF THE OBJECTIVE 

•THE INITIAL CENTER OF GRAVITY IS 

DEFEATED/NEUTRALIZED 

• INTRODUCTION OF A NEW WEAPON 

• TRANSITION BETWEEN PHASES 

 OF A MAJOR OPERATION/CAMPAIGN 

• CHANGE ALLIANCE/COALITION 

• A NEW SOURCE OF POWER EMERGES

FOR EACH OBJECTIVE 

THERE IS 

A CORRESPONDING 

CENTER

IT IS DIRECTLY 

RELATED 

TO THE DERIVED 

OR REAL OBJETIVES 

CHARACTERISTICS 

THE OBJECTIVE 

ALWAYS 

DOMINATES CENTER 

OF GRAVITY
35 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

In the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the operational center of gravity for landand carrier-based air operations was Iraqi fighter aircraft and ground-based air defenses. In 

southern Iraq, the operational center of gravity in the initial major air-land operation was the two 

most capable divisions (6th Armored and 51st Mechanized) of the Iraqi regular army III Corps in 

the Basra-Nasiriyah area. The three IRG divisions defending the outer defenses south of 

Baghdad were the proper operational center of gravity for the coalition forces prior to the attack 

on the city.xxii In the course of the campaign, three IRG divisions deployed north of Baghdad 

became potentially another operational center of gravity. The city of Baghdad was, in military 

terms, an operational objective to be captured or controlled, not a strategic center of gravity, as 

some high-ranking military officials publicly stated. The 15,000-strong Special Republican 

Guards (SRG) and the 1,000- to-1,500-man Special Security Organization (SSO) defending the 

city from within were successive operational centers of gravity. This is a rare example of 

multiple centers of gravities existing for the same military objective, at the same level of war, 

and in the same physical medium. 

 

In a campaign, for each operational objective to be accomplished there is potentially a 

corresponding center of gravity. These centers of gravity are separated in terms of space and 

time. They should be attacked, simultaneously and/or sequentially, to defeat or neutralize a given 

military or theater-strategic center of gravity. In a campaign conducted in two or three physical 

mediums, not all operational objectives are equally important; hence, there exists a significant 

difference in the importance of the corresponding centers of gravity. The objectives at sea and in 

the air invariably support operational objectives on land. They have to be accomplished in order 

to create prerequisites for accomplishing the principal operational objective. Obviously, in the 

ultimate outcome of a land campaign that hinges on the fate of the ground forces, the most 

important operational center of gravity is the one that encompasses the most mobile and 

powerful enemy force on the ground. That center of gravity must be neutralized or destroyed by 

the efforts of two or more services. The Iraqi Republican Guards (IRG) represented the most 

important operational center of gravity for all U.S. and coalition forces in the offensive phase of 

the Gulf War of 1990–1991, as they did also in OIF. 

 

Normally, before the start of a ground offensive in a land campaign, air or naval forces are 

tasked to accomplish a number of operational objectives in their own medium. For example, the 

primary initial task of air forces is to obtain and then maintain air superiority, which, in turn, 

requires the neutralization or destruction of the enemy’s fighter aircraft strength—usually his 

operational center of gravity in the initial phase of war in the air. Naval forces, for their part, are 

tasked to obtain at least local and temporary sea control in a part of the maritime theater. For 

them the enemy’s operational center of gravity is the enemy fleet’s striking force. 

 

In the planned German campaign to invade Britain (Operation Seeloewe [Sea Lion]), the 

Luftwaffe’s opposing operational center of gravity was the Royal Air Force’s Fighter Command. 

Had the amphibious landing taken place, the Luftwaffe’s focus would have shifted to the enemy 

armored and mechanized forces defending the beaches or held in operational reserve. In the Gulf 

 

xxii. David A. Fulgham, “Not So Fast,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 31, 2003), p. 22. 
36 

Spring 2006 

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War of 1990–1991, the operational objectives for the U.S.-led coalition forces were to obtain air 

superiority in the theater of operations, obtain sea control in the northern part of the Arabian 

Gulf, and destroy the Iraqi ground forces in the southern part of Iraq and in Kuwait. Hence, the 

corresponding operational centers of gravity were the Iraqi fighters and ground-based air 

defenses—Iraqi missile-armed surface combatants (see Figure 4). 

Figure 4: Desert Storm Campaign 17 Jan-28 Feb 1991: Coalition Objectives and Corresponding 

Enemy Centers of Gravity (COGs) 

If the enemy’s strongest source of military power in a given part of the theater is physically 

concentrated, as were the IRG divisions in the Gulf War of 1990–1991, it is relatively easy to 

identify the enemy’s center of gravity. However, in some warfare areas, one’s forces are either 

widely dispersed throughout the theater or are employed to predominantly accomplish tactical 

objectives. In such a case, an operational center of gravity would rarely exist—most of one’s 

combat forces’ actions will be tactical in nature. Then, multiple tactical centers of gravity must 

be defeated or neutralized over time to ultimately defeat the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. 

This situation usually exists in insurgency and counterinsurgency. In an insurgency, 

antigovernment forces usually operate in small groups and use hit-and-run tactics. Therefore, 

they seldom offer the government forces the opportunity to completely destroy or neutralize 

them, unless they make the mistake of prematurely operating in larger formations, as the 

Yugoslav Partisans (guerrillas) did in late 1942. Communist leader Josip Broz-Tito gave the 

order to change tactics from small-scale attacks to large-scale operations conducted by eight 

newly established, so-called proletarian shock divisions. The Germans took advantage of Tito’s 

IRAQI 

FIGHTER 

STRENGTH 

OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING AIR 

SUPERIORITY IN THE KUWAITI 

THEATER OF OPERATIONS (KTO)

IRAQI 

REPUBLICAN 

GUARDS 

DESTROYING IRAQI 

FORCES IN KUWAIT

IRAQI 

MISSILE-ARMED 

SHIPS/CRAFT 

OBTAINING AND 

MAINTAINING SEA 

CONTROL IN THE 

NORTHERN PART OF 

THE ARABIAN GULF 

D

I

R

E

C

T 

A

T

IRAQI 

OPERATIONAL 

COG 

IRAQI 

OPERATIONAL 

COG 

IRAQI 

OPERATIONAL 

COG 

OPERATIONAL 

OBJECTIVE 

OPERATIONAL 

OBJECTIVE 

IRAQI 

STRATEGIC 

COG

COALITION 

STRATEGIC

OBJ 

SEA

GROUND 

AIR 

EFFECT

EFFECT

EFFECT

OPERATIONAL 

OBJECTIVE 

•SADDAM HUSSEIN 

 AND HIS INNER CIRCLE 

•SECURITY APPARATUS 

MEDIUM

•DEFEATING IRAQI 

FORCES IN KUWAIT 

AND SOUTHERN PART OF 

IRAQ 

•RESTORING KUWAITI 

 TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 

AND SOVEREIGNTY 
37 

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CAMPAIGNING

error, and trapped and decimated four of Tito’s “divisions” and two brigades in the Battle of 

Sutjeska in the southeastern part of Herzegovina in May 1943 (Operation Schwarz [Black]). This 

operation was also aimed at destroying a large force of the Royalist Chetniks in northwestern 

Montenegro.xxiii

The protracted nature of trade warfare at sea is largely a consequence of the fact that each side in 

a conflict avoids massing forces at the operational level. Hence, in an attack on the enemy’s 

maritime trade or defense and in protection of friendly maritime trade, the principal methods of 

combat employment of naval forces are major and minor tactical actions. The operational and 

ultimately strategic objectives are then accomplished over time. A similar situation exists in 

conducting theater wide air defenses. In each case, there are generally only a few opportunities to 

conduct major naval or air operations. 

Operational commanders should be fully aware of the ever-changing nature of the relative 

strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces. The intermediate objective can change from 

phase to phase of a major operation or campaign. There might be a significant shift in the 

capabilities of friendly or enemy forces due to the introduction of some highly advanced 

weapons or some new major force into the theater.xxiv A force different from the one that had 

been the enemy center of gravity at the beginning of the hostilities or military action can emerge 

as the center of gravity due to one’s own successes. In the Leyte operation, the commander of the 

U.S. Third Fleet, Admiral William F. Halsey, apparently believed that the most serious threat—

in modern terms, the operational center of gravity—to his Task Force 38 (fast carrier forces) was 

posed by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s Mobile Force, Main Body (fast carrier force), not Vice 

Admiral Takeo Kurita’s battleships and heavy cruisers of the First Diversionary Attack Force. 

One can contend that Halsey’s judgment was clouded by his obsession with fighting a decisive 

naval battle against enemy aircraft carriers, coupled with purposely vague orders from his 

superior, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area 

(CINCPOA)/Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC). Nevertheless, it seems clear that 

Halsey did not sufficiently account for the declining performance of Japanese pilots after the 

Battle of Midway. By October 1944, the Japanese carriers did not represent as large a threat to 

U.S. forces at Leyte as did Kurita’s heavy surface force. 

Higher-than-expected attrition, a poor state of morale and training, and a general inability to 

regenerate combat power might also lead to a shift of the enemy’s center of gravity to another 

type of force. Thus, once the plan is executed, the situation should be closely monitored and 

reassessed to detect potential changes or shifts in the enemy center of gravity.xxv 

 

xxiii Stephen Clissold, Djilas: The Progress of a Revolutionary (New York: Universe Books, 1983), pp. 95–96; 

Center for Military History, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941–1944) (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1st printed August 1954, facsimile edition 1989), pp. 36–7. 

xxiv Giles and Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application, p. 17. 

xxv Ibid., p. 15. 
38 

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CAMPAIGNING

A center of gravity can change in the course of a major operation or campaign because of 

changes in the factors of space, time, and forces. For example, during the major British air-land 

operation in North Africa in November 1941 (Operation Crusader), General (later Field 

Marshal) Erwin Rommel, commander of the Afrika Korps, tried, by maneuvering into the British 

Eighth Army’s rear, to indirectly destroy the enemy’s operational center of gravity. However, 

after the apparent destruction of the British 7th Armoured Division, the new operational center of 

gravity was formed by combining the remnants of that division plus the 32nd Tank Brigade from 

the Tobruk garrison and the 2nd New Zealand Division. This force had over 150 tanks. This 

happened because the Afrika Korps had withdrawn from the critically important Sidi RezeghTobruk area and Rommel did not interfere with the British efforts to regenerate their combat 

power.xxvi

The enemy’s center of gravity can also shift from one type of force to another concurrently with 

a change in the phase of a major operation or campaign, even though its ultimate objective 

remains unchanged. This situation usually exists when a phase changes because of a change in 

the medium in which a force moves or in which combat would take place—for example, from 

the sea to the shore or from the air to the ground. In an amphibious landing operation the 

operational center of gravity shifts from one type of force to another because of the shift of the 

main tasks. During the transit phase, the initial main task is defense and protection of the 

amphibious task force. Once the amphibious force starts landing, the main task shifts to securing 

the initial lodgment ashore. Hence, the operational center of gravity for one’s forces in the transit 

phase is the force that is assigned the task of distance cover and support. In most cases, such a 

force is a carrier group or heavy surface ship task force and, in some cases, land-based aircraft 

(see Figure 5). 

If the attacker lacks sufficient strength at sea, then the operational center of gravity might be 

represented by the land-based fighter aircraft providing cover to the amphibious forces at sea. 

For example, in the German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, the Luftwaffe’s 

fighters, not the German heavy surface forces, were the proper operational center of gravity for 

the Allies. However, in the amphibious phase, the attacker’s center of gravity shifts to that part 

of the landing force that has the highest combat power. 

Very often it is contended that the amphibious task force is the proper center of gravity for the 

defender—if that force is destroyed, then the attacker cannot conduct the planned amphibious 

assault. Yet the attacker would not plan an amphibious landing unless he believes he has 

sufficient combat potential to overcome the defender’s resistance. He would also deploy his 

amphibious task force (ATF) and the force for distant cover and support to be within mutually 

supporting distances at all times. Moreover, the amphibious task force at sea cannot threaten an 

enemy’s operational center of gravity on land, but the operational cover force can. 

 

xxvi Myron J. Griswold, Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy’s Center of Gravity (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff, 14 May 1986), p. 

17. 
39 

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CAMPAIGNING

Figure 5: Shift in a Center of Gravity in a Major Amphibious Landing Operation

Thus, for the defender, the primary objective initially is to destroy or neutralize the attacker’s 

distant cover and support, as the U.S. Navy did in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of 

Midway in May and June 1942, respectively. In both cases, the respective Japanese commanders 

intuitively knew that the planned amphibious landing could not proceed, because even if the 

amphibious force landed, no friendly force would be available to successfully defend and sustain 

it ashore. 

In the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, the proper operational center of gravity for the 

Argentines, prior to the British landing on the Falklands, was the two British carrier forces. 

Without these carriers and accompanying escorts, the British could not have landed. While the 

loss of the 15,000-gross-register-ton (GRT) transport Atlantic Conveyor, with its embarked 

equipment, on 25 May was a serious blow to the British effort, that ship was not a center of 

gravity for the Argentines, but one of the British critical vulnerabilities. The troops and 

equipment could be replaced relatively quickly, but not the aircraft carriers. After the landing, 

the British 3 Commando Brigade (despite its relatively small size) was the proper operational 

center of gravity for the Argentine defenders. For the British, the enemy’s operational center of 

gravity was not the Argentine carrier group, but the land-based fighter-bombers armed with 

Exocet missiles. After the landing, the operational center of gravity for the British forces shifted 

to the Argentine troops defending Port Stanley. 

In a major airborne operation, such as the German invasion of Crete (Operation Merkur) in May 

1944 or the Allied airborne landing at Arnhem (Operation Market Garden) in September 1944, a 

similar shift of center of gravity occurs. The only difference is that the escorting fighters 

represent the operational center of gravity before the arrival at the landing zone; after the 

SEA TRANSIT PHASE INITIAL LANDING PHASE 

INITIAL MAIN TASK

•DEFENSE AND PROTECTION OF 

AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) 

SUCCESSIVE MAIN TASK

•OVERCOMING BEACH DEFENSES 

•SEIZING THE INITIAL LODGMENT •CARRIER 

GROUP 

•SURFACE 

ACTION 

(STRIKE) 

GROUP 

•LANDBASED AIR 

•OTHER 
40 

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CAMPAIGNING

paratroops drop or the helicopters land, the airborne troops on the ground become the operational 

center of gravity. 

The Objective and Center of Gravity 

For each military objective to be accomplished, there is a corresponding center of gravity; hence, 

the terms tactical, operational, and strategic (national and military or theater strategic). A center 

of gravity cannot be considered in isolation from the corresponding military objective to be 

accomplished. In a war, one’s actions should invariably be related to some larger whole. It is the 

military objective that provides the larger framework within which the respective center of 

gravity is determined. The objective and the center of gravity must be in harmony with each 

other. One should always bear in mind that it is the objective and the situation that determine a 

center of gravity, not the other way around. A change in the military objective would result in a 

change in the situation. This, in turn, would require a partial or complete reevaluation of friendly 

and enemy critical strengths and weaknesses 

 

The greatest advantage of linking the objective and the corresponding center of gravity is that it 

ensures that one’s efforts are firmly focused on the objective to be accomplished. This should 

also enhance the possibility that one’s ends, means, and ways are not mismatched or 

disconnected. Without that linkage, it is quite possible that a major part of one’s efforts would be 

misdirected. Therefore, it is a serious mistake to consider or, even worse, apply the concept of 

center of gravity with little or no regard for the objective to be accomplished, as the proponents 

of the systems approach can do. 

In some cases, one’s military objective can be accomplished without destroying or neutralizing 

the enemy’s center of gravity. Ultimate success is achieved, but with a disproportionate loss of 

manpower and time. In other cases, failure to defeat the enemy’s center of gravity might 

considerably delay or even preclude one’s consolidation of operational or strategic success. If the 

enemy is allowed to recover from his losses, he may turn the initial defeat or setback into a 

victory. For example, Napoleon I in his ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812 eventually captured 

the enemy capital of Moscow. Although he won the bloody battle of Borodino on 7 September 

(26 August, Old Style), he failed to destroy Field Marshal Mikhail I. Kutuzov’s army—the 

Russian operational center of gravity—and thus the victory did not lead the tsar to ask for peace. 

In the end, Napoleon I was forced to leave Moscow and start a long, arduous withdrawal from 

Russia that ended in the gradual destruction of his Grande Armée. In a more recent example, the 

United States and its coalition partners have a continuing problem consolidating strategic success 

in Afghanistan because of the failure to decapitate or capture the Taliban’s top leadership and 

Osama bin Laden and his inner circle in the fighting around Tora Bora in December 2001. 

Levels of War and Center of Gravity 

The number of potential or real centers of gravity is directly related to the number of military 

objectives to be accomplished. Obviously, at the national-strategic and alliance/coalition levels 

there exist a single national-strategic objective and a single national-strategic center of gravity. In 

the war against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, a single national/coalition strategic objective 

had to be accomplished, and in each theater of war a single strategic center of gravity had to be 

determined. 
41 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

 

In the Vietnam War, for the North Vietnamese the proper strategic center of gravity was the will 

to fight and the alliance between the United States and South Vietnam (including their armed 

forces). After the U.S. will to fight was weakened to the point that it could no longer support 

South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese top leadership and the country’s armed forces as a whole 

became the new strategic center of gravity for the North Vietnamese leadership.xxvii For its part, 

the United States wrongly identified the Vietcong as the strategic center of gravity, rather than 

the North Vietnamese leadership, its will to fight, the North Vietnamese army as a whole, and 

North Vietnam’s community of interests with the Soviet Union and China. The proof that this 

was an error is that the Vietcong were virtually destroyed in the Tet Offensive in 1969 but the 

war continued until 1975.xxviii In the war against Afghanistan in 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring 

Freedom-OEF) and in OIF, the respective enemy’s leadership and its will to fight, combined 

with the security forces and regular armed forces as a whole, were proper strategic centers of 

gravity. 

The number of operational centers of gravity at the operational level of war is directly related to 

the number of operational objectives to be accomplished simultaneously or sequentially in a 

campaign. Depending on the enemy or friendly military strength, these centers of gravity can 

exist in each medium, that is, on the ground, in the air, and at sea. The sequencing of the 

accomplishment of the operational objectives determines the order in which corresponding 

operational centers of gravity have to be attacked or protected. 

At the tactical level of war, there are many major and minor tactical objectives to be 

accomplished. In theory, each of them requires a determination of the respective tactical center 

of gravity. However, the smaller the military objective, the smaller the force required to 

accomplish it and, therefore, the smaller the practical utility of the corresponding center of 

gravity. At the same time, the process of determination becomes much simpler, because smaller 

and less diverse forces are involved. At the lowest tactical level, because one’s force is reduced 

to a single-type force facing the same or a similar enemy force, the utility of the center of gravity 

is greatly reduced. It is only when dealing with major tactical forces and higher that the 

commanders and their staffs have to apply the analytical process leading to the determination of 

the proper center of gravity. 

The neutralization, serious degradation, or defeat of a center of gravity at a lower level of war 

necessarily results in a general weakening of the center of gravity at the next higher level. 

Generally, the loss of personnel and materiel reduces the enemy’s ability to create or strengthen 

his emerging operational center of gravity. Defeats in the field usually adversely affect the 

enemy’s will to fight. The destruction or neutralization of the IRG both in the Gulf War of 1990–

1991 and, more recently, in OIF generated a severe weakening of both tangible and intangible 

elements of the Iraqi strategic center of gravity. Likewise, successive defeats of an enemy’s 

 

xxvii Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: The Bantam Doubleday 

Dell Publishing Group, 1984), pp. 181–82, 184. 

xxviii Ibid., p. 178. 
42 

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CAMPAIGNING

tactical centers of gravity degrade his operational center of gravity, and by neutralizing or 

destroying the latter one defeats his strategic center of gravity. 

Determining a Center of Gravity 

The concept of a center of gravity is, along with the determination of the ultimate and 

intermediate objectives, the most critical part of any military planning process. After determining 

the ultimate strategic or operational objective, the operational commander and his planners 

should determine a corresponding center of gravity. Whenever the objective is modified or 

changed, all the critical factors should be reevaluated and then a new center of gravity should be 

determined. Determination of the enemy’s center of gravity is a vital element in establishing 

clarity of purpose, focusing effort, and, ultimately, generating synergistic effects in the 

employment of one’s sources of military and nonmilitary power. The higher the level of war, the 

more important it is to properly identify both the enemy and friendly centers of gravity. A plan 

for a campaign or major operation should be clearly focused on destroying or neutralizing the 

enemy’s center of gravity while adequately protecting one’s own; otherwise, the ultimate 

operational or strategic objectives will require far more time and resources than envisaged—or 

the entire expedition may even be doomed to failure. Therefore, a great deal of thinking and 

discussion should take place before the operational commander and his staff can determine 

proper centers of gravity with any degree of confidence. 

 

The process of determining an enemy or friendly center of gravity starts with a real or assumed 

objective to be accomplished. Directly related to the objective is a corresponding situation 

(tactical, operational, or strategic) (see Figure 6). 

Once the specific objective has been determined, the first step is to assess the corresponding 

situation in terms of the factors of space, time, and force. The larger the scope of the objective, 

the larger the space in which friendly and enemy forces will be employed. Also, the larger the 

space, the more complex the situation is. First, based on the analysis of the military situation, a 

list of enemy and friendly critical strengths and critical weaknesses should be compiled. In the 

next step of the process, only those critical strengths that can prevent the accomplishment of the 

enemy’s and friendly objective should be listed. Those elements of a given critical strength that 

serve as integrators, protectors, and supporters/sustainers should not be considered the potential 

strategic center of gravity. Likewise, the military critical strengths related to the factor of space, 

such as theater geometry and the elements of the outer core of the enemy and friendly combat 

potential/power that cannot endanger the respective centers of gravity should not be considered 

potential centers of gravity. The list of critical strengths that are not considered candidates for a 

center of gravity should be retained for further analysis aimed at determining methods of 

indirectly attacking the enemy’s or protecting the friendly center of gravity. Finally, a 

determination should be made concerning which among the critical strengths retained for further 

analysis are the most essential for the accomplishment of one’s real or assumed objective in 

terms of the factors of space and time. 
43 

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CAMPAIGNING

Figure 6: Process for Determining Center of Gravity 

 

Before final determination of the enemy’s center of gravity as the focus of planning, tests for 

validity should be conducted. The first question to ask is whether destroying, neutralizing, or 

substantially weakening or degrading the enemy’s potential center of gravity would create a 

ripple or cascading effect resulting in the progressive deterioration of the enemy’s morale, 

cohesion, and will to fight and thereby prevent the enemy from accomplishing his objectives. 

The second question is whether one’s forces are adequate to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s 

center of gravity, given existing political and other limitations on the use of one’s forces. The 

answers to both questions should be affirmative; otherwise, previously identified critical factors 

should be reassessed and a different strategic and subordinate operational center of gravity 

determined.xxix Another question to be asked is which of the enemy’s critical strengths will 

considerably hinder or even prevent one’s side from consolidating its strategic or operational 

success. 

 

Identifying the enemy’s proper center of gravity is a difficult task indeed, largely because a 

number of unquantifiable or hard-to-measure elements are involved. For instance, the enemy’s 

 

xxix William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, “Operation Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity,” Military Review 6 

(June 1993), pp. 5–6. 

ANALYSE 

RESPECTIVE 

MILITARY 

SITUATION 

IN TERMS OF THE 

FACTORS OF 

SPACE 

AND FORCE 

ENEMY 

CENTER 

OF GRAVITY 

FRIENDLY

CENTER 

OF GRAVITY 

MAKE A FINAL

DETERMINATION 

OF THE MOST

CRITICAL 

STRENGTH 

FOR 

ACCOMPLISHING 

ASSIGNED (OR 

ASSUMED)

STEP 

2 

STEP 

3 

STEP 

1 

STEP 

6 

STEP 

8 

LIST SEPARATELY FOR 

FRIENDLY AND 

ENEMY SIDE 

THOSE CRITICAL 

STRENGTHS 

THAT IN SOME WAY CAN 

PREVENT THE ENEMY OR 

FRIENDLY SIDE 

 FROM ACCOMPLISHING 

THEIR ASSIGNED OR 

 ASSUMED OBJECTIVE STEP 

7 

STEP 

4 

TO 

ATTACK 

TO 

PROTECT 

STEP 

5 

DERIVE A 

LIST 

OF 

CRITICAL 

FACTORS 

DETERMINE 

MILITARY 

SITUATION 

• TACTICAL 

• OPERATIONAL 

• STRATEGIC 

DETERMINE 

THE 

OBJECTIVE 

• TACTICAL 

•OPERATIONAL 

• STRATEGIC 

FRIENDLY

DETERMINE DETERMINE 

CRITICAL CRITICAL 

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 

ENEMY 

FRIENDLY 

LIST 

POTENTIAL 

CRITICAL 

VULNERABILITIES 

ENEMY 

COMMANDER’S 

QUESTIONS

ON CENTER OF GRAVITY

•WOULD ITS SERIOUS DEGRADATION, 

 NEUTRALIZATION OR DESTRUCTION 

 LEAD TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF 

MY 

•ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE? 

•CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY 

 ENDANGER MY FORCES FROM 

 ACCOMPLISHING THEIR ASSIGNED 

 OBJECTIVE? 

•CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY 

 COMPLICATE MY FORCES 

 FROM CONSOLIDATING THEIR 

 OPERATIONAL 

OR STRATEGIC SUCCESS?

ELIMINATE FROM

FURTHER CONSIDERATION 

CRITICAL STRENGTHS THAT 

LACK ATTRIBUTES OF FIRE 

POWER/MOBILITY OR SOURCE 

OF AUTHORITY/WILL TO FIGHT/ 

 LEVERAGE 

• GEOGRAPHY/LOCATION 

• THEATER GEOMETRY 

• COMMAND STRUCTURE 

 INTELLIGENCE 

• LOGISTICS 
44 

Spring 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

will to fight as a strategic center of gravity is too broad and imprecise, while the leader’s or the 

ruling elite’s will to fight is more specific. Another perennial problem is a strong tendency to 

mirror-image the enemy. What might be a critical strength for friendly forces might be less so, or 

not important at all, for the enemy. Another danger is of being misled by one’s ethnocentric 

views in assessing other cultures and societies. One should never assume that the enemy thinks 

and acts as one does.xxx In identifying the enemy’s center of gravity, one should always take his 

perceptions of reality as fully into account as his value system. This means that what might 

influence the enemy to abandon or change his assumed objective should be fully understood. 

 

The consequences of determining a wrong center of gravity at the strategic level are usually 

severe and often fatal to one’s entire war effort. Failure, for any reason, to determine a proper 

center of gravity in a major operation not only can lead to setbacks but also can be fatal to the 

operation’s outcome. In planning the German reoccupation of the Kerch peninsula in the Crimea 

between 8 and 15 May 1942 (Operation Trappenjagd [Bustard Hunt]), General (later Field 

Marshal) Erich von Manstein identified the enemy’s operational center of gravity as the Soviet 

forces defending the Kerch peninsula rather than those defending the major naval base at 

Sevastopol. Sevastopol was then defended by the Soviet Coastal Army, composed of eight 

divisions. The front line on the Kerch peninsula (stalemated along the Parpach Isthmus since 11 

April 1942) was defended by the Soviet Crimean Front, composed of three armies (the 44th, the 

47th, and the 51st) totaling 18 divisions and eight other combat formations, mostly brigade or 

regimental size. The Soviet forces could be quickly reinforced from the Caucasus area across the 

Kerch peninsula. If these forces were destroyed, then the fate of the Soviet garrison at Sevastopol 

would be sealed.xxxi Manstein determined the 41st and 47th Armies as the Soviet operational 

center of gravity, because two-thirds of the divisions of the Crimean Front were in these two 

armies.xxxii These divisions were deployed inside a salient along the narrow Parpach Isthmus, 

which extended westward well beyond the southern portion of the Parpach line held by the 44th 

Army. The geography made it impossible for the Soviet commander to simultaneously employ the 

bulk of his forces.xxxiii Hence, Manstein decided that to secure his operational objective, these two 

armies must be destroyed first.xxxiv His opponent, Lieutenant General D. T. Kozlov, in contrast, 

never recovered from selecting a wrong operational center of gravity—the XXXII and VII 

Romanian Corps. 

 

 

xxx John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 1988), pp. 58–59. 

xxxi Griswold, Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy’s Center of Gravity, p. 20. 

xxxii Ibid., p. 21. 

xxxiii Ibid. 

xxxiv Ibid. 
45 

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CAMPAIGNING

While an operational or strategic objective can be accomplished without destroying or 

neutralizing the enemy’s center of gravity, such an objective can be consolidated, if at all, only 

by exerting great efforts over time. This is especially true when the attacker has a small margin 

of superiority. In the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 (Operation Husky), the British Eighth 

Army and the U.S. Seventh Army landed at two different sectors at the southeastern part of the 

island. Their initial objectives after landing were to seize certain airfields and the ports of 

Syracuse and Licate, and then to capture the ports of Augusta and Catania and the airfield 

complex at Gerbini.xxxv However, the real objective for both armies should have been the 

destruction of the Axis ground forces on Sicily, and the German panzer and mechanized forces in 

particular, not the capture of ports and airfields. Yet the failure to focus on the destruction of the 

enemy operational center of gravity (the German panzer and mechanized forces) in Sicily after 

their landing on 10 July 1943 did not prevent the Allies from accomplishing their ultimate 

operational objective - the capture of Sicily and obtaining sea and air superiority in the central 

Mediterranean. However, the Germans evacuated to Italy’s mainland between 1 and 17 August 

(Operation Lehrgang) about 40,000 of their battle-hardened troops (including the Hermann 

Goering Division, the 15th and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, and 1st Parachute Division), 

51 tanks, 163 guns, 1,875 tons of ammunition, 9,800 vehicles, and 16,800 tons of equipment 

across the Strait of Messina.xxxvi These forces later faced the Allies in their landing at Salerno 

(Operation Avalanche) in September 1943. In addition, the Italians evacuated 70,000 to 75,000 

of their troops, 100 guns, and 500 vehicles from the island. xxxvii The Allied failure to destroy the 

enemy operational center of gravity required 38 days of hard fighting to secure Sicily. 

 

In general, the more capable the enemy force, the harder it is to identify the enemy’s operational 

center of gravity. The problem is more manageable if the enemy possesses smaller and less 

sophisticated forces, or if one part of his forces is much better equipped and trained than the 

others are, as was the case in the Gulf War of 1991 and OIF. In both cases the IRG was the most 

important operational center of gravity for the U.S. and coalition planners. By mid-January 1991, 

the Iraqis had deployed 42 to 43 divisions of about 336,000 poorly trained men in the Kuwaiti 

Theater of Operations (KTO). In addition, seven highly mobile, much better trained, and wellequipped IRG divisions, kept as operational reserve, were deployed in the Shaibah area.xxxviii

 

xxxv. C.J.C. Molony, et al., History of Second World War, Vol. V., The Mediterranean and Middle East, (London: 

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973), pp. 28–29. 

xxxvi Carlo D’Este, Bitter Victory. The Battle for Sicily, 1943 (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, 1988), pp. 513-14; Albert 

N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, assisted by Martin Blumenson, United States Army in World War II. The 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Sicily and Surrender of Italy (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, Department of the Army, 1965, p. 413. 

xxxvii Martin Blumenson, Sicily: whose victory? (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 147. 

xxxviii . Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War: Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 9–10; Rainer Brinkman, “Die Beispiel fuer Krisenmanagement,” in Hartmut 

Zehrer, editor, “Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: 

E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 89. 
46 

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CAMPAIGNING

U.S. planners correctly identified these seven divisions as the Iraqi operational center of gravity 

for the coalition ground forces. 

 

In the Kosovo conflict of 1999, the NATO planners correctly identified Serbian strongman 

Slobodan Milosevic, his inner circle and armed forces, and Serbia’s military-economic potential 

as a whole as a strategic center of gravity. They also properly chose the Yugoslav fighter aircraft 

and associated air defenses as the operational center of gravity for accomplishing the first 

operational objective in the operation—obtaining air superiority. NATO’s planners wrongly 

assumed that the 52nd (Pristina) Corps was the operational center of gravity on the ground in the 

(undeclared) Kosovo area of operations. That would have been true if NATO had planned to 

mount a ground invasion of Kosovo. However, one of NATO’s stated objectives was to prevent 

Serbian actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, the proper center of gravity on 

the ground was the Serbian security and paramilitary forces involved in the ethnic cleansing. To 

complicate the situation for the planners, these forces were deployed in small, mobile, and 

widely dispersed groups, making them very hard to destroy from the air. 

 

In coalition warfare, the operational center of gravity is usually found among the critical 

strengths of the partner that has the strongest will to fight and the best-trained and best-equipped 

forces. In World War II, whenever German and Italian forces were employed in the same area, it 

was invariably German panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions that comprised a real operational 

center of gravity for the Allied planners. For instance, in the Allied counteroffensive in North 

Africa in mid-November 1941 (Operation Crusader), determining the Axis operational center of 

gravity was relatively easy because of the vast disparity in the quality of leadership and weapons 

between the German and Italian forces. The Panzergruppe Afrika consisted of the German Afrika 

Korps, the Italian XXI Corps, and the Italian Armored Corps. General Ludwig Cruewell 

commanded Afrika Korps, composed of the 15th and 21st panzer divisions and the Afrika 

Division (later designated as the 90th Light Division). The Italian XXI Corps consisted of five 

infantry divisions, while the Italian Armored Corps was composed of the Ariete AD and the 

Trieste motorized division.xxxix The Afrika Korps had two-thirds of all the tanks in the entire 

Panzergruppe Afrika. The Italians had only 154 tanks, which were inferior in quality to the 

German tanks. The Italian leadership was poor. The Italian forces lacked antitank weapons, 

while the Germans used their excellent 88-mm FLaK 18 guns.xl 

 

In planning a campaign or major operation, a common mistake is to confuse the physical 

objective with the enemy’s center of gravity. Focusing on the objective instead of on the enemy’s 

center of gravity invariably results in unnecessary losses in personnel, materiel, and time. 

Therefore, the attacker who possesses superior combat potential should focus all his efforts on 

directly or indirectly destroying, neutralizing, or significantly damaging the enemy’s operational 

center of gravity. The Allied planners in the European theater in World War II repeatedly 

confused physical objectives, specifically ports or large cities, with the enemy’s operational 

 

xxxix Griswold, Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy’s Center of Gravity, pp. 10–11. 

xl Ibid., p. 13. 
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center of gravity. The results were inconclusive victories and unnecessary losses of personnel 

and time. The Allies won in the end largely because of their overwhelming superiority in the air 

and on land and their materiel superiority. 

 

In the Allied Operation Husky, the most important operational objective on the ground was the 

destruction of the Axis forces’ operational reserve: the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division with its 

three regimental teams—Group Enns in the southwest, Group Fullriede in the southeast, and 

Group Koerner in the Enna area as an unassigned reserve). In addition, the newly arrived 

Hermann Goering Division was also concentrated in the area of operational reserve of the Italian 

Sixth Army. However, this division was, with the permission of General Alfredo Guzzoni 

(commander of the Axis forces on the island), also available for employment by the Italian XVI 

Corps (defending the eastern part of the island). The Italian part of the operational reserve 

included a self-propelled artillery regiment, Livorno Division, plus reinforcing units arriving in 

Sicily from the mainland and organized into the fourth reserve force, Group Napoli (Naples). 

The German forces were the only mobile part of the Axis operational reserve. Hence, the Axis 

operational center of gravity was clearly the two German panzer divisions. However, the Allied 

planners failed to focus on defeating or neutralizing the Axis operational center of gravity; they 

chose instead to seize various major ports and provide close air support to their own troops on 

the ground. The ports, naval bases, and air bases on Sicily were either major or minor tactical 

objectives. 

In planning the amphibious landing at Anzio (Operation Shingle) carried out on 22 January 1944, 

the Allied commanders also confused the operational objective—the Italian capital of Rome—

with the real operational center of gravity, the German XIV Army with headquarters in Rome. 

This army served as an operational reserve of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German 

CINC of the South. The German X Army was deployed along the front with the U.S. Fifth Army 

and the British Eighth Army. xli 

 

In July 1944, in preparing their plans for the breakout from the Caen area (Operation Cobra), 

Allied planners focused all their attention on Brittany’s ports, as mandated by the Overlord plan, 

rather than taking advantage of superior mobility and mastery in the air to encircle and destroy 

the German forces.xlii The breakout started on 25 July. Some six days later, General Patton’s 

Third Army received the mission to seize Brittany’s ports. As the Third Army sent seven of its 

divisions down through the Avranches gap, the possibility of a deep penetration eastward to 

envelop and destroy the Germans west of the Seine River opened the prospects of a decisive 

victory. However, that opportunity was not seized, and the Third Army continued its drive 

 

xli Carlo D’Este, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1st edition, 

1992), p. 77. 

xlii Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, The European Theater of Operations, United States Army in World 

War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 196 1 -CMH Pub 7-5, 

reprinted 1989), p. 197; Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1983), p. 347. 
48 

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CAMPAIGNING

toward Brittany’s ports.xliii The operation was ultimately successful and the Cotentin peninsula 

was cleared of the mobile German forces. Yet a rather large number of Germans escaped the 

Allied trap and withdrew north of the Seine River. Ironically, even if Brittany’s ports had been 

captured and developed as originally planned, they would not have alleviated the Allies’ later 

logistic crisis. To meet the estimated requirements of 45,000 tons landed daily by D+90 (6 

September), the Brittany ports had to be captured and developed by D+60 (6 August). This 

became obvious on 3 August, the crucial day the armor might have been ordered east for an 

envelopment rather than toward the west, as Major General J. S. Wood of the 4th Armored 

Division had realized.xliv

 

Conclusion 

The theory behind center of gravity is relatively new. For the most part it emerged because of 

renewed emphasis on the study of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. The subsequent development 

and application of the term center of gravity was essentially based on a misunderstanding, 

because the English translation of Clausewitz’s work equated Schwerpunkt with center of 

gravity. Despite this misunderstanding, the concept of center of gravity is fully viable as a tool 

for planners at all command echelons. It can be applied across the spectrum of warfare. The 

prerequisite, however, is that the respective center of gravity be directly related to the objective 

to be accomplished; otherwise, the entire concept has little, if any, utility. In the past, the great 

captains and many lesser but successful commanders did not use the term center of gravity but 

intuitively knew that the quickest and most decisive way to defeat the enemy was to attack the 

strongest part of his army. This was the way Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, 

Frederick the Great, Napoleon I, Moltke, Sr., and many other commanders fought their 

campaigns. Attacking the enemy center of gravity and protecting the friendly center of gravity 

are a proven and viable concept despite the somewhat convoluted theoretical underpinnings. This 

concept needs to be further refined. It is here to stay; no changes in technology are likely to 

invalidate it. 

A full understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of center of gravity is 

crucial if commanders and their staffs intend to employ all available sources of power to achieve 

success in the shortest time and with the least losses for friendly forces. It stands to reason that, 

to accomplish the assigned military objective, one must focus the major part (though not 

necessarily all) of one’s efforts against the strongest source of the enemy’s power—his center of 

gravity. That will also ensure observance of the principle of objective, mass, and economy of 

effort. 

Operational commanders and their staffs should know and fully understand the concept of 

critical factors and the analytical construct used to identify a proper center of gravity for both the 

 

xliii A. Harding Ganz, “Questionable Objective: The Brittany Ports, 1944,” Journal of Military History 59 (January 

1995), p. 83. 

xliv Ibid., p. 93. 
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enemy and friendly forces. One of the first steps in that process is to properly determine the 

objective to be accomplished, which dictates the scope and complexity of the military situation. 

The objective also determines the method of combat employment of one’s forces and the levels 

of war. It is hard to see how the process of determining critical factors and center of gravity can 

be successful without a proper understanding of the distinctions and interrelationships among the 

levels of war. 

In the future, analysis of the enemy’s and friendly critical factors will be more complex than 

today because of the expected increased diffusion of critical strengths and critical weaknesses 

among military and nonmilitary sources of power. In contrast to today, ground forces will be 

geographically dispersed. In addition to traditional centers of gravity, computer networks will 

probably emerge as the most important part of operational and tactical centers of gravity. 

Copyright©2006 Dr. Milan Vego 

 Dr. Milan Vego serves as a professor with the Naval War College Joint Military 

Operations faculty which he joined in August 1991. He is the author of Operational 

Warfare as well as numerous books and articles published in professional journals and 

magazines. Dr. Vego’s most recent book is due to be published this spring. 
50 

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A Solution for the Confusing Application of Lines of 

Operation 

By 

LtCol Philipp Eder 

Capt Johann Fischer 

“During the hectic twenty-six days we’d just spent planning Afghanistan, I had developed a 

planning technique that focused on “Lines of Operation” – the tasks any given mission would 

call for – and “slices,” the various aspects of the country that would be affected by the lines of 

operation.”xlv

Lines of operation are used for planning and conducting operations at the strategic and 

operational level of war. In comparison to other planning tools like centers of gravity, very little 

literature can be found nowadays about lines of operation. Today lines of operation are used in 

various ways because in recent years two different concepts of their application have been used. 

Lines of operation are still valid in their traditional sense, like operating on interior or exterior 

lines, but they are also used in the campaign planning process as a vital tool to develop an 

operational design and courses of action. 

This essay tries to contribute to solving this dilemma by examining the roots of the theory of 

lines of operation and how the operational environment has changed since that time. 

Additionally, the way lines of operation are defined and applied today will be analyzed. This 

leads to new definitions and the authors’ explanation of why this is necessary. Finally, the 

applicability of the concept of lines of operation will be confirmed by taking a look at two 

prominent modern operations. 

Jomini and the Roots of Lines of Operation 

Contrary to the popular belief it was not Carl von Clausewitz who developed the theory of lines 

of operation although his influence in most aspects of operational art is undisputed. 

Antoine-Henri Jomini was the first military theoretician to discuss this concept in more detail 

and introduced the term into military theory.xlvi Jomini was born in Switzerland in 1779 and 

served in the French and Russian armies. After studying well known military historians of his 

time he published the “Traktat über die Große Taktik” and the “Prècis de l’art de la guerre.” The 

“Art of War” is his key work reflecting his considerations about the operational level of war and 

in this book he devoted himself specifically to lines of operation. Jomini writes: “They 

(authors’ comment: lines of operation) are divided into different classes, accordingly to their 

relations to the different positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, 

 

xlv Tommy Franks, American Soldier, 2004, p. 335. 

xlvi Further information about the historical roots can be found in the upcoming new version of: Milan N. 

Vego, Operational Warfare, to be published in 2006. 
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and to the enterprises projected by the commander.”xlvii He goes on, “Simple lines of operations 

are those of an army acting from a frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent 

bodies.”xlviii

When he writes about the practical utilization of lines of operation, Jomini goes into detail. He 

offers several options on how to utilize them. The concepts of interior versus exterior lines and 

concentric versus divergent lines are the most applicable: “Interior lines of operations are those 

adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that 

the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of 

time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force.”xlix He continues,

“Exterior lines lead to the opposite result and are those formed by an army which operates at 

the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.”l

Until today these thoughts can be found in nearly all regulations on the operational level of war 

in most western nations. It is interesting to note that his following theories are not so commonly 

known: “Concentric lines of operation are those which depart from widely-separated points and 

meet at the same point, either in advance or behind the base.”li And, “Divergent lines are those 

by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of 

course, necessitate a subdivision of the army.”lii 

Additionally, Jomini states 17 maxims in “The Art of War.” In the first maxim he underscores 

the importance of lines of operation: “If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the 

decisive point of the theatre of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of 

operation, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental 

idea in a good plan of a campaign.”liii

In the second maxim he describes the importance of geography as well as the force factor and 

highlights the interrelationship between forces, their main effort (which can be seen in context 

with the center of gravity) and lines of operation. “The direction to be given to this line depends 

upon the geographical situation of the theatre of operations, but still more upon the position of 

the hostile masses upon this strategic field. In every case, however, it must be directed upon the 

centre or upon one of the extremities.”liv 

“The Art of War” refers to the fundamentals of the operational concept and the operational 

design. This is expressed by the establishment of the interrelation between decisive points, 

 

xlvii Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War 1996, p. 101. 

xlviii Ibd, 1996, p. 101. 

xlix Ibd, 1996, p. 102. 

l

 Ibd, 1996, p. 102. 

li Ibd, 1996, p. 102. 

lii Ibd, 1996, p. 103. 

liii Ibd, 1996, p. 114. 

liv Ibd, 1996, p. 114. 
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objectives, center of gravity, lines of operation and the strategic level. This basic elements of the 

operational design is of timeless value and also applicable in today’s operational environment. 

(Figure 1) 

Figure 1: A generic operational design as used for teaching at the National Defense Academy, 

Vienna, Austria. The lines of operation lead from a base of operations via operational centers of 

gravity of different actors to the military endstate. 

While Clausewitz and Jomini never met in person they corresponded about their ideas. For some 

time Clausewitz accepted Jomini’s concept: “In strategy the side that is surrounded by the enemy 

is better off than the side which surrounds its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker 

forces. Colonel Jomini was right in this.”lv Later on Clausewitz changed his mind. While writing 

his main work “Vom Kriege” he opposed the concept of lines of operation due to the fact that to 

him they only made sense in an artificial theory while in a comprehensive analysis the offered 

rules and suggestions seemed useless to him. 

Lines of Operation and the New Operational Environment 

Since the development of the theory of lines of operation the military environment has changed. 

The highest political level has been separated from purely military leadership duties and 

concentrates on all aspects of national strategy. In consequence the military strategic level was 

established and with the higher complexity of warfare the necessity for an operational level of 

war became imminent. Due to this fact, on the strategic level the term “nonmilitary lines of 

operation” was introduced to compliment military lines of operation. In the western world the 

 

lv http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm (30.11.05) 
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democratic control of armed forces and the primacy of politics over the military have reinforced 

this aspect. 

Another valid aspect is the reappearance and regained importance of asymmetric conflicts after 

the end of the Cold War. Current threats like terrorism, illegal immigration, proliferation, 

organized crime, failed states and limited regional conflicts broaden the range of military 

operations. Asymmetric warfare in particular leads to a deeper unification of nonmilitary and 

military lines of operation, which has to be reflected when planning at the strategic as well as at 

the operational level. 

Additionally the evolution from the industrial age to the information age puts the factor of 

information on the same level with the classical operational factors of forces, space and time. 

This has a direct influence on the assessment of the decisive points and thus has to be reflected in 

the choice of lines of operation. 

Lines of Operation and Contemporary Doctrine 

“While lines of operation are important considerations in the design of campaigns and major 

operations, their importance should not be overdrawn.”lvi

This sentence can be found in the 1986 version of the U.S. Army’s FM 100-5, which is widely 

considered as one of the cornerstones of the renaissance of operational art. Nevertheless the 

concept of lines of operation can still be found in doctrine and OPLANS of all major western 

militaries. To get more clearance on today’s application of lines of operation, this article will 

take a look at a representative selection of relevant and up-to-date doctrine from NATO, the 

United States, Great Britain and Germany. The authors chose to analyze NATO doctrine because 

the Alliance is used as a tool to produce interoperability of the Armed Forces of its member 

states and partners in order to be able to conduct multinational operations. Logically in an ideal 

world, U.S., British and German doctrine should reflect this interoperability. As the reader will 

discover, this is not the case. 

NATO ́s 2002 AJP-3 Allied Joint Operation states: “Lines of operations link decisive points in 

time and space on the path to the center of gravity. They connect a force with its base of 

operations and its objectives. Lines of operations are conceptual planning tools. They do not link 

physical geographical features, nor do they describe the direction or axes of advance. Lines of 

operation establish the inter-relationship between decisive points, to establish the critical path 

along which operations must develop en route to the center of gravity, in order that events and 

actions are sequenced to achieve the end state.”lvii

 

lvi U.S. Army FM 100-5 Operations, 1986, p. 181. 

lvii NATO Allied Joint Publication 03 Allied Joint Operations, 2002, p. 3-7. 
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For our purpose, six aspects of this definition have essential importance: 

3⁄4 Lines of operation link decisive points. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation lead through a center of gravity - what kind of center of gravity is left 

open. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation lead to objectives. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation are a conceptual planning tool. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation do not link physical geographical features, nor do they describe the 

direction or axes of advance. 

3⁄4 This definition does not mention any character, variety or differences of lines of operation. 

The U.S.’s 2001 Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations states: “Lines of operations

define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the adversary. They 

connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. ... In modern wars, lines of 

operation attain a three-dimensional aspect. JFCs use them to focus combat power toward a 

desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space and over time 

in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat 

adversary centers of gravity.”lviii

Three aspects are worth mentioning: 

3⁄4 Lines of operation are seen in relation to the enemy and are therefore linked to combat 

power and are only seen in relation to an enemy center of gravity. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives but JFCs 

use them to focus combat power toward a desired endstate. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation are a tool to create a logical design. 

The US Army’s 2001 FM 3-0 Operations tells us about interior and exterior lines of operation 

and helps to clarify that there are different kinds of lines of operation: 

“When positional reference to an enemy or adversary has little relevance, commanders 

may visualize the operation along logical lines. This situation is common in stability 

operations and support operations. Commanders link multiple objectives and actions 

with the logic of purpose — cause and effect. In a linkage between objectives and forces, 

only the logical linkage of lines of operation may be evident. Multiple and complementary 

lines of operation work through a series of objectives. Commanders synchronize 

activities along multiple lines of operation to achieve the desired end state. Logical lines 

of operation also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary 

instruments of national power.” 

 

lviii US Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 2001,p. III 16 - III-17. 
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Three important aspects can be derived from FM 3-0: 

3⁄4 The distinction between the positional reference to an enemy or adversary and lines of 

operation (here introduced as “logical lines of operation”). 

3⁄4 These logical lines of operation are linked to Stability Operations and Support 

Operations. 

3⁄4 The concept of multiple lines of operation and the reference to nonmilitary instruments of 

national power. 

The United Kingdom’s 2004 JWP 5-00 Joint Operations Planning states: 

“Lines of operation are planning tools that establish the inter-relationship, in time and 

space, between decisive points and the center of gravity and are usually functional or 

environmental in nature. ...Although individual environmental lines of operation, such as 

an air line of operation can be valid, functional lines such as protection of Lines of 

Communication will often be more effective. ... Lines of operation also may continue 

beyond the achievement of the operational center of gravity in order to reach the 

strategic end-state. There may be occasions where some lines of operation will go 

through the operational center of gravity and continue beyond, as in certain operations, 

even after defeat of the operational center of gravity, actions need to be continued to 

achieve the operational end-state.”lix

Further important aspects derived from this publication are: 

3⁄4 There exist multiple lines of operation. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation can be “functional” or “environmental”. 

3⁄4 Lines of operation end in the center of gravity or continue beyond to achieve the military 

endstate. 

The German draft doctrine on operational art “Leitlinie Operative Führung von Einsätzen der 

Bundeswehr”lx adds the following aspects: 

3⁄4 Single lines of operation are assigned to different Component Commands. 

3⁄4 Military lines of operation have to be coordinated with nonmilitary lines of operation. 

3⁄4 There is a distinction between operating on interior and exterior lines and the term lines of 

operation. 

This very brief look at multinational doctrine shows how different the understanding of the 

theory of the lines of operation is. In planning for multinational operations this inevitably leads 

to confusion. The major differences are: 

3⁄4 While some publications focus on traditional warfare and only enemy centers of gravity are 

mentioned, others leave more freedom by not defining to whose center of gravity they 

 

lix UK Joint Warfare Publication 5-00 Joint Operations Planning, 2004, p. 2-17. 

lx Leitlinie Operative Führung von Einsätzen der Bundeswehr, 2. Mitprüfungsentwurf, 2004, p. 48. 
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refer. The latter reflects lessons learned in contemporary operations where multiple actors, 

friendly, neutral and adversary have to be considered, which we can find in major combat 

operations as well as in stability operations and support operations. 

3⁄4 Confusingly, lines of operation can either lead to a center of gravity, to objectives or to the 

endstate. 

3⁄4 Another difference is the application of lines of operation to achieve joint effects or to 

generate tasks for components. 

3⁄4 The division between operating on interior and exterior lines and the term lines of 

operation itself. Unfortunately introducing “logical lines of operation” “or functional lines 

of operation” does not help solve the confusion surrounding the term itself and opens the 

question, if there also exist “illogical”lxi or “dysfunctional” lines of operation. 

New Definitions 

This dilemma demands a new definition for lines of operation, which reflects the new 

operational environment and their application in formulating an operational design as well as the 

further evolution of the utilization of the theory of lines of operation. Currently, and this is very 

confusing, the term lines of operation has a double meaning and is seen differently in the western 

world’s militaries. On one hand we apply lines of operation accordingly to Jomini focused on the 

factor space, on the other hand we use this term as a part of his basic concept of operational 

design. This can be separated by introducing the term “operational alignment” to cover the factor 

space while defining lines of operation as part of an operational design. The authors chose the 

term operational alignment because it expresses the factor space more accurately and can also be 

used on the tactical level while the term “lines of operation” should be used as a comprehensive 

planning tool on the operational level of war. 

Operational Alignment 

Operational alignment describes different arrangements of a campaign with the alignment of 

forces covering the factor of space. The different variants are to operate on interior lines, to 

operate on exterior lines, to operate on concentric lines and to operate on divergent lines. There 

is common understanding in national European, NATO and American doctrines concerning 

operating on interior and exterior lines. The concentric and divergent approach, also based on 

Jomini’s theories, is not covered at all but is being used in today’s operations. (Figure 2) 

 lxi As stated by Milan Vego in a lecture at the National Defense Academy in Vienna, Austria on 20 January 

2006. 
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Figure 2: Operational alignment: Interior and exterior lineslxii

Concentric lines are those which depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point, 

either in advance or behind the base. Forces use at least two bases. (The original plan for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom using Turkey, Kuwait and other locations as bases can be used as an 

example for this concept.) (Figure 3) 

Divergent lines are those by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several 

distinct points. These lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army. 

Figure 3: Operational alignment: Concentric and divergent lines, authors 

 

lxii NATO Guidelines for operational planning, 2005, p.3-12. 

CONCENTRIC

DIVERGENT

Base of 

operations 

Base of 

operations 

Base of 

operations 

Base of 

operations 

Base of 

operations 
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Lines of Operation 

Although different in their approach, U.S. and European doctrine offer a good source for a new 

definition: Lines of operation link decisive points on the critical path to (the) center(s) of gravity 

and lead through the operational and military-strategic objectives to the military endstate. 

This definition reflects the idea that an open approach to the concept of center of gravity allows a 

broader application across the whole range of military operations, especially asymmetric 

operations, where multiple actors possess centers of gravity. Lines of operation leading to 

centers of gravity or objectives can be shortsighted and bears the danger of stopping military 

forces before they achieve an aim with relevance to the strategic level. The dominant factor on 

the operational level has to be the military endstate. In modern operations decisive points must 

be expanded and refined. They can be understood as a geographic location but also as source of 

military power or nonmilitary power. Their destruction or capture, control or defense, or 

continuous surveillance and monitoringlxiii is necessary to effect the center of gravity to achieve 

the operational and military strategic objectives and reach the desired military endstate. 

Planning for today’s operations has to consider the existence of several different military lines 

of operation. In addition, nonmilitary lines of operation – where the main effort lies on other 

assets than military forces – will have an effect. Both have to be coordinated to conduct a 

comprehensive approach to be successful in the modern operational environment. 

Lines of operation are a planning tool to create the operational design, which can cover the 

following aspects: 

1. The application as a conceptual tool for the operation level to arrange decisive points. The 

joint force, components and other military and non-military forces as well as in certain 

cases NGOs and IOs can conduct operations on conceptual lines of operation. The criteria 

for a conceptual line of operation are the actions and activities of the involved forces. 

2. Actions and activities of armed forces can be coordinated in three different ways: joint with 

joint lines of operation, component oriented with component oriented lines of operation

and a mixture of both. 

3. The operational design visualizes the OPLAN to check and control the progress of the 

campaign. In this context, lines of operation support the synchronization of available means 

and their proper utilization ensures that all efforts are shaped and focused to reach the 

military endstate. Additionally they are a vital tool in the development of courses of action, 

branches and sequels. 

Examples for the Application of Lines of Operation in Modern Operations 

Since the end of 2001 two operations have been conducted simultaneously but separately in 

Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom and a stabilization operation using the International 

Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF). The operational design of the first ISAF OPLAN 

 

lxiii Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare 2000, p. 8. 
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001/02 (UK Operation FINGALlxiv ) offers a good example for the new application of the lines 

of operation. (Figure 4) 

Figure 4: Operation FINGAL: Operational design Phase 1-3: HQ ISAF: Operation FINGAL 

OPORDER 001/02; Kabul; 2002 

Another example is given by General Tommy Franks’ explanation of his lines of operation in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Operational Fire, SOF Operations, Operational Maneuver, Information 

Operations, Unconventional Warfare/Support Opposition Groups, Political-Military, and CivilMilitary Operations.lxv Operational Fire and Operational Maneuver are joint lines of operation. 

SOF Operations are component oriented lines of operation. This is an example for the mixture of 

joint lines of operation and component oriented lines of operation in an operational design. 

Information Operations and Unconventional Warfare/Support Opposition Groups are conceptual 

lines of operation. Political-Military and Civil-Military Operations are nonmilitary lines of 

operation. A comparison of the application of the military lines of operation in those two 

operations shows their different quality. In a major combat operation the military lines of 

operation are used in a wider spectrum compared to stability operations. Nevertheless 

nonmilitary lines of operation have their value also in major combat operations and have to be 

considered in all phases of a campaign plan. 

 lxiv In accordance with UK doctrine the lines of operation end in the centre of gravity. 

lxv Tommy Franks, American Soldier 2004, p. 339. 
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Conclusion 

“Indeed, the lines of operation I listed on my legal pad involved much more than troops, tanks 

and planes.”lxvi

In today’s complex operational environment, where the military is only one of several strategic 

assets to reach a political endstate, the term lines of operation has to be defined in a new and 

broader way. To dissolve the confusion concerning the term and double application of lines of 

operation, the authors suggest the new term “operation alignment” to cover Jomini’s historical 

theory using lines to explain the alignment of forces in the battlespace as well as a new definition 

and meaning for lines of operation. To successfully plan and conduct modern operations it has 

become necessary to have a comprehensive utilization of lines of operation in combination with 

the operational design. Current NATO, national European and U.S. doctrines only partially 

explain the role of lines of operation in the campaign planning process. 

Planning and conducting multinational operations are difficult tasks. A different understanding 

of the same basic terms and concepts can cause severe damage to our troops and is not 

acceptable. This article focuses on lines of operation and the authors hope to help dissolve some 

of the confusion around this concept. It is time to find a common and clearly defined approach to 

all facets of operational art because in proper campaign planning they provide the source for 

sound sequencing and synchronizing of all available military and nonmilitary sources of power. 

. 

 

lxvi Tommy Franks, American Soldier 2004, p.339. 

 LtCol Philipp Eder is a General Staff Officer (15th General Staff Course) in the 

Austrian Armed Forces. He was the Austrian National Contingent Commander with ISAF 

1 in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2002 and is a 2003 graduate of the Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School Intermediate at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. 

Currently he is the head of the department for operational warfare at the National Defense 

Academy in Vienna, Austria. The Academy is responsible for the training of Austrian 

General Staff Officers. 

Capt Johann Fischer is a participant of the 17th General Staff Course at the 

National Defense Academy in Vienna, Austria. Prior to that he was in command of a tank 

company. In the third and final year of the course he wrote his master thesis on lines of 

operation. 

The authors would be very happy to receive your comments on this article under 

philipp.eder@bmlv.gv.at 
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The Brilliance of the Six-Phase Construct 

By 

Lt Col James R. Sears Jr. 

The new six-phase campaign planning construct in Draft Joint Publication 5-0 unnecessarily 

complicates campaign planning, ties the commander’s hands regarding transitioning between 

phases, and prescribes arbitrary phases a commander is forced to use regardless of his need in a 

campaign. As with all new transformational concepts, one cannot expect to convince naysayers 

with the first attempt at changing an established method of planning or conducting warfare. 

While these concerns cannot be arbitrarily dismissed, those critiques miss the point of the new 

construct: To change the way military commanders and planners approach campaign planning. 

The brilliance lies in two concepts regarding how the phases change thinking and draw planners 

away from their natural fixation on the end state of Phase III. First, the nature of the phases will 

naturally incorporate more interagency leadership at the end of a campaign as the military 

enables civil authority. Second, the new phases change the paradigm for success while shaping a 

theater or deterring conflict. 

Begin With the End in Mind 

Despite doctrinal guidance to the contrary, military planning has been deficient regarding 

interagency participation. There are many arguments for this, beginning with military criticism 

of interagency partners’ capacity, desire, and ability to participate in the planning process. The 

interagency process further complicates planning. It is cumbersome at best, and based on 

gaining consensus among various departments, each with widely varying cultures and ideas. 

Finally, none of those departments appreciate the level of planning required to conduct a 

campaign and may not impart the same level of importance to the planning process as the 

military. However, when viewed from the interagency perspective, those can be seen as excuses 

professed by the military to efficiently dismiss interagency participation and move on with 

military planners writing campaign plans. 

The six-phase construct brings renewed emphasis to interagency inputs by limiting phases with 

the majority of effort coming from the military to just two. Phases II (Seize the Initiative) and III 

(Dominate) are clearly militarily focused. One problem with that focus is that it still attracts 

planners to initially focus on them. Despite the best intentions to regressively plan, it is just too 

easy to focus on the military vision of the end state of the Dominate Phase. 

The other four phases, however, are more ambiguous and difficult to define strictly in military 

terms. Phases I (Deter) and IV (Stabilize) incur military efforts, but their inherent nature forces 

the commander to plan them with shared interagency responsibility. While a commander must 

be prepared to militarily seize the initiative, with a total interagency effort it may be possible to 

deter without much more than the threat of military deployment. Stabilize inherits the fruits of 

the Dominate phase, however its focus must be on the interagency partners to whom the military 

will turn over control to in the final phase. 
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Phases 0 (Shape) and V (Enable Civil Authority) have military participation but are clearly 

focused on interagency considerations. Conceptually, Shape is much easier to put in nonmilitary terms than many of the other phases. However, no other departments are organized 

regionally with significant resources similar to the Department of Defense. Therefore, the 

Combatant Commander will retain a significant role in shaping his theater. 

Enabling Civil Authority is a critical component of the six-phase construct for getting 

interagency partners into planning and executing campaigns. Draft Joint Publication 5-0 leads to 

the military being the supporting agency after transitioning to Enabling Civil Authority. In order 

for our partners to be ready to assume this authority their presence will be required throughout 

the process. If one regressively plans (i.e. begin planning with the final end state in mind), this 

encourages interagency integration throughout the planning process, starting with the final phase. 

End at the Beginning 

The previous, four-phase construct (Figure 1) approached phases as a means of transitioning 

from the beginning to the end of a campaign. While this is an over-generalization, the concept 

Figure 1: Previous Four-Phase Construct – JP 3-0, 10 September 2001 

of a campaign was a linear progression from the first to fourth phase with the purpose of getting 

through all phases with the least cost in blood and treasure. The purpose of Phase I was to 

prepare to seize the initiative. This is no longer the case with the new construct. 

The new Seize, Dominate, and Stabilize phases retain the classic military purpose of succeeding 

through each phase with the least cost. Moving on to the next phase indicates success. This is 

reflected in Draft doctrine through the weight of military effort in these phases (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Notional Military Effort by Phase – Draft JP 5-0 

The difference in the new construct comes from the purpose of early phases in the campaign. In 

the case of Shape and Deter, moving to the next phase indicates a failure of the current phase. 

The purpose of Shape should be to either never moving beyond Phase 0 or to shape the situation 

sufficiently to render contingency planning no longer relevant. For Deter, the joint force does 

not move to Seize unless Deter has failed. Therefore, the purpose of Deter must be to return to 

Shape while preparing to Seize. Even if the purpose is not to return to Shape, it is illogical to 

define success by the failure of deterrence. This is commensurate with common State 

Department thought that when the nation must move to armed conflict, State has failed its 

mission. The benefit of this reasoning is it brings our interagency partners into the beginning of 

the plan. 

Conclusion: The Brilliance 

The brilliance of this new thinking is how it encourages interagency integration into planning, 

regardless of where the commander begins his planning effort. A more accurate depiction of the 

six-phase construct shows the cumulative effort of all agencies in a campaign as a straight line 

above the military weights, with acknowledgement that the white space must be filled by our 

interagency partners (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Line Depicting Total Effort 

This cumulative effort graphically displays the earlier assessments that interagency participation 

is critical in the first and last phases of a campaign. It further shows significant interagency 

effort due to the implied nature of the Seize and Stabilize phases. 

The end result of this analysis, based on interagency verses defense efforts, is displayed in Figure 

4. The blue indicates a preponderance of interagency effort – in other words, the commander 

cannot expect to be successful in these phases without significant interagency coordination early 

in planning and execution. As one moves toward the middle, the transitions from interagency to 

military predominance (color shift from blue to red) are demonstrated by the shift from blue to 

red. The military receives primary consideration in the middle. 

Figure 4: Phases by Predominance of Effort 

Working with, incorporating, and utilizing the interagency are not new ideas. The “new” part is 

acknowledging that cannot happen without considerable change in military outlook toward 

planning. Unfortunately, if planners continue to resist the change by focusing on negative 

Phase 0 

Shape 

Phase I 

Deter 

Phase II 

Seize 

Phase III 

Dominate 

Phase IV 

Stabilize 

Phase V 

Enable 
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aspects of the new construct based on an outdated notion of military purpose, the fixation on 

kinetic solutions to Phase III will continue. The six-phase construct compels planners to 

incorporate interagency expertise in the final phase of a campaign as the military enables civil 

authority. It further includes their expertise in the Shape and Deter phases by driving the 

purpose of those phases toward staying in or returning to Shape instead of moving forward. This 

changed outlook provides the impetus for the planner and commander to look beyond Phase III 

and incorporate interagency expertise throughout the planning and execution of a campaign. 

 Lt Col Jim Sears, United States Air Force, is an F-16 pilot with combat experience 

in Operations Southern Watch and Enduring Freedom, and was an Airborne Forward Air 

Controller during Operation Anaconda.
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 Deans Corner 

By 

COL Fred Kienle 

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) Class 05-06 is immersed in the Operational Art 

6500 course, developing and honing their skills as joint campaign planners. Once again, lessons 

learned from the inaugural class have resulted in numerous adjustments and improvements to the 

JAWS curriculum. This year’s approach finds greater reliance on practical exercises and 

scenario-driven assignments while focusing on the most current versions of emerging doctrinal 

references. And once again, we are fortunate to host many distinguished senior fellows, superb 

guest speakers and subject matter experts in our seminars. 

General McKiernan recently spent time with JAWS Class 05-06 while attending Allied 

Command Transformation’s (ACT) Exercise Allied Reach conducted at the Joint Forces Staff 

College in January. As part of the rich discussions between General McKiernan and the JAWS 

students, the Commander of the United States Army Europe / 7th Army and Allied Land 

Component Command in Heidelberg provided some specific tips for aspiring campaign planners. 

Among the many lessons provided and guidance presented, General McKiernan reminded our 

JAWS students that: 

1. The Effect-Based Approach is something that good planners have always understood. 

It is not an entirely new approach. 

2. Components never have the final call on timings, force sizing, suspenses and other key 

decisions. These critical decisions reside at joint headquarters and are heavily influenced 

by political realities. 

3. The planning process is usually more important than the plan itself. This is an age-old 

adage that applies as much today as ever before. 

4. Wargaming must be done. The traditional “action-reaction-counteraction” method is 

essential and must examine the enemy, the environment and multiple options. 

5. Interagency planning and execution are the way of the world. We must all become 

attuned to interagency processes and associated responsibilities. 

6. Phasing is still an important part of the planning process. While the phases may 

become blurred they continue to provide needed organization. And note that Phase 0 

never stops. 

7. Planners and commanders must always keep all options open and determine what is 

the worst thing that could happen – then be prepared for it. This is the business of 

branches and sequels. 
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Needless to say, every JAWS student and faculty member copied these pointers into their 

notebooks for future use. 

The JAWS faculty is looking forward to a visit by the CJCS’ Process for the Accreditation of 

Joint Education (PAJE) team in early April. This team, much like the previous teams from the 

U.S. Department of Education and Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, will 

examine the JAWS program in detail to ensure adherence to rigorous standards and compliance 

with directed joint learning areas. These visits always foster useful exchange and encourage the 

sharing of best practices between the team and the visited institution. 

Thanks to all for the incredibly positive response to the JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning 

Department’s CAMPAIGNING Journal. The e-mail exchanges and quality of timely article 

submissions is simply astounding. The dialogue and debate engendered has exceeded our hopes 

and expectations. As always, please pass copies of CAMPAIGNING along to your colleagues 

and practitioners of all aspects of operational art. Finally, a sincere thanks to all of our 

contributors; you challenge us to think about our craft, and that is important work. 

Upcoming Events 

2-6 April: Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) visit 

10-13 April: Joint Special Operations University course 

24-27 April: COCOM West Trip 

8-12 May: Information Operations Planners Course 

16 June: JAWS Graduation 

24 July: JAWS class of 2007 begins 
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Letter to the Editor 

By 

LtCol Matt Lopez 

Congratulations on your inaugural issue of Campaigning. You hit the mark in attaining your 

goal of “providing planners with a source of insight into current issues regarding planning.” To 

paraphrase Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, USMC retired, what is missing in today’s 

doctrine development is honest and open dialogue of concepts and ideas. Your first issue was a 

step in the right direction in opening this dialogue and providing planners a resource for insights 

into developing concepts and ideas. 

The article, Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0 by Dr. Milan Vego of the 

Naval War College was thought provoking. His critical analysis of Joint Doctrine’s move to 

replace the four phases of campaign planning to a directed six-phase campaign plan highlights 

the challenge planner’s face in translating policy and strategy into operational plans. His article 

is just the type of open dialogue that is needed to help improve the doctrine writing process. It is 

exactly the type of contrasting and thought provoking view LtGen Van Riper advocates. 

Especially thought provoking are his insights into Phase 0 Shape and Phase 1 Deter. What is 

ambiguous in the current draft is the relationship between the shape and deter phase of an 

OPLAN and the Combatant Commanders Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). One 

could argue that for a designated OPLAN, Phase 0 and the TSCP are one in the same, with 

obvious flexibility to adjust to changing situations. I believe this option would meet the 

SECDEF’s intent of making OPLANs living documents. The alternative view would be to 

separate the shape and deter phase of an OPLAN from the TSCP, which would in essence bring 

us back to the old four-phase campaign planning paradigm. Another advantage to having a 

conceptual separation of six phases vice four is the focus on interagency planning. The hope is 

that the separate phases lead to a better transition between when the military is expected to be the 

supported element of national power and when it is the supporting effort. 

Dr. Vego’s analysis that the new six-phase construct is too prescriptive is much the same 

argument that occurred when Joint Doctrine accepted the four-phase paradigm of campaign 

planning. Although I agree with Dr. Vego’s assessment that the current draft’s articulation of the 

six-phases is somewhat confusing, I believe that creating the separation in phases 0 thru 2 helps 

planners to focus on integrating the other elements of national power into campaign plans. 

Although seemingly simplistic from a military planner’s perspective, viewed through an 

interagency perspective, phases 0 and 1 are imperative. 

Prior to finalizing the draft of Joint Pub 5, its authors must address Dr. Vego's concerns that 

Phase II and III, as currently written, focus only on offensive/kinetic operations. Left as written, 

JP 5 fails to satisfy DOD directive 3500.5 which requires doctrine to equally focus on 

stabilization operations as it does on offensive/kinetic operations. I applaud Campaigning for 

presenting Dr. Vego’s dissenting view. 
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In contrast to Dr. Vego’s thought provoking contribution, the article Network Centric Warfare 

at the Operational Level by Fred Stein and Hugh Kelly lacked critical analysis. In their 

advertisement for network centricity, the article does an outstanding job of highlighting the 

brilliant success of the CFLCC during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Phase III - the attack to 

Baghdad. Unfortunately, it high jacks that success and falsely elevates “Network Centric 

Operation” (NCO) to have been the center of gravity of CFLCC’s success. As the authors point 

out, information technologies are a key enabler and play an important role in C4ISR, but to credit 

every facet of the operation as a trumpet to Network Centric Operations is misleading. 

A case in point is the author’s inference that the CFLCCs staff was reorganized to conduct NCO. 

In reality, First Army, who serves as ARCENT had to reorganize to execute its functional role of 

a CFLCC. The re-organization for any Corp level staff is significant when they adapt to meet the 

functional role of a CFLCC. CFLCC’s success is the result of changes across DOTMLPF, not 

only its ability to network its forces. 

One of the most significant changes can be attributed to Generals Zinni’s decision to pre-assign 

ARCENT the role of CFLCC which enabled First Army to focus their training and development 

of capabilities to support their future role as a CFLCC. This designation allowed for the 

establishment of the habitual relationship that First Army developed with its subordinate 

commanders. 

Furthermore, if the authors expect the readers to accept that NCO was the driving force behind 

CFLCC’s success, critical analysis dictates that NCO also hold responsibility for the 

failures/challenges of CFLCC. The challenges faced in defeating the Sadam Fedayeen at An 

Nasiriya, the failure of the deep attack into the Karbala Gap, and the challenges faced in the 

transition to phase IV can all be studied as examples where CFLCC experienced challenges that 

were not overcome by the panacea of NCO. 

In conclusion, we, as planners, owe it to the young Americans who are forced to execute the 

plans we create to have the rigorous debate that LtGen Van Riper advocates. I congratulate 

“Campaigning” on its attempt to provide a venue for critical analysis and open dialogue about 

issues that affect planners. 

LtCol Matt Lopez has served as a planner in several billets including, the I MEF 

staff, the Commandant of the Marine Corps Strategic Studies Group and the Joint 

Staff’s Strategic Planning Cell He served as the Commanding Officer of 3rd Bn, 7th 

Marines during OIF I in Karbala, Iraq and during OIF II in Al Qaim, Iraq. LtCol 

Lopez was awarded the Silver Star for his actions in Husaybah on 14 April 2004. When 

the award was presented, LtCol Lopez was the highest ranking Marine to receive the 

Silver Star since the onset of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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Update: Process for the Accreditation of Joint 

Education (PAJE) 

The increasing need for current and relevant joint education is complicated by the fact that such 

education is presented by such a wide variety of institutions. Since a major purpose of joint 

education is to facilitate cooperation among the Services, there must be a certain level of 

consistency in what is taught and how it is presented, whether as part of the pure joint institutions 

of the National Defense University or the joint curricula of the Service staff and war colleges. 

The guidance to implement this consistency is provided by the CJCS in his Officer Professional 

Military Education Policy, CJCSI 1800.01C, or OPMEP. Each institution providing joint 

education is assigned specific joint learning areas and objectives in order to ensure that the 

students are receiving the appropriate education. There are also specific education standards that 

prescribe requirements for a variety of topics such as the learning environment, assessment, 

program evaluation, faculty hiring and development, and resurrecting, among others. 

 

The CJCS is specifically tasked to ensure the adequacy of joint education. His guidance must be 

implemented by an established process. The OPMEP accomplishes this through a Process for 

Accreditation of Joint Education, or “PAJE.” This process is used throughout the Department of 

Defense for schools teaching joint matters, and is the same process followed by colleges and 

universities and their regional accreditation agencies. The CJCS is responsible for ensuring that 

joint education requirements are met, and so the Joint Staff J7 coordinates this thorough review, 

which for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) will take place during the period 2-6 

April 2006. 

The PAJE program is the means by which the CJCS provides oversight, assessment, and 

improvement of joint education programs. The first phase in the process is that of certification, 

which is what JAWS is currently undergoing. Within two years of certification, the program will 

be reviewed again with a goal of receiving full accreditation, normally granted for a six year 

period. 

The review process began when JAWS faculty and staff conducted a detailed analysis of 

program strengths and areas needing improvements, with the information all detailed in a 

comprehensive self-study. This document then serves as the foundation for the assessment of the 

program by a team of experts from throughout DoD education institutions under the supervision 

of the Director, Joint Staff and the JS J-7. These experts are from peer institutions, and will 

carefully review the self-study in preparation for the visit. Then, during the week of 3-6 April 

2006 they will visit Joint Forces Staff College and carefully review all aspects of the JAWS 

program and the support provided from throughout the College. Some individuals will examine 

the curriculum in detail, ensuring that current and relevant information is being taught in 

accordance with the OPMEP. Others will review how students and the program are assessed and 

evaluated, how faculty are hired and prepared, and how the administrative and resourcing 

requirements are being met. 

 
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The PAJE provides much more than just an assessment of the JAWS program, though that of 

course is its primary goal. Just as important, it is also a sharing of best practices, from the JAWS 

program to those who are assessing, as well as from those assessing sharing with the members of 

the JAWS team. Over time, this PAJE process helps all institutions to better themselves and 

improve the overall joint education experience of their students. 

JAWS OPMEP Directed Learning Areas 

Learning Area 1 -- National Security Strategy, Systems, Processes and Capabilities 

Learning Area 2 -- Defense Strategy, Military Strategy and the Joint Operations Concepts 

Learning Area 3 -- Theater Strategy and Campaigning with Joint, Multinational and 

Interagency Assets 

Learning Area 4 -- Joint Planning and Execution Processes (Pre-Conflict Through PostConflict) 

Learning Area 5 – Information Operations 

Learning Area 6 -- Characteristics and Conduct of the Future Joint Force 

Learning Area 7 – Joint Strategic Leader Development 
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Adaptive Planning (AP) Technology Update 

By 

CDR John “Mick” Meissel 

The Secretary of Defense AP transformation initiative, as directed by the 13 December 2005 AP 

Roadmap, defines AP as “the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and 

systematically, as circumstances require.” Translated, it means the joint planning community will 

see a reduction in the traditional two year planning cycle to produce plans in less than six 

months. Planners will receive clear strategic guidance and benefit from frequent dialogue 

between senior civilians and military leadership. Plans will need to contain a range of embedded 

options for leadership consideration. They will be kept “living” through net-centricity and 

technology that automatically “trigger” flags that alert planners to key changes in guidance, 

assumptions, the threat, and the environment. The approved AP Roadmap defines a common 

agile AP Process that currently supports contingency planning, and in the near future, crisis 

planning and execution. The biggest capability gap faced by the planning community today is 

the lack of planning technologies to support AP. 

An abundance of automation today directly or indirectly supports joint operations. However, 

very little automation supports the art of planning. Most tools and technologies are not truly 

“joint” or able to be used by all planners in a supported or supporting role to a joint planning 

effort. Many are built for only one Service’s, COCOM’s or organization’s use. Most are 

execution-centric. Nearly all technologies are in varying states of development with fielding 

timelines that are unsynchronized. Result: Duplicative or stove piped capability gets delivered 

that is not interoperable with other technologies and does not support seamless data exchange. It 

is also not clear which “authoritative” databases will be used by these technologies. To 

implement AP as envisioned, the planning community needs integrated technologies that include 

a suite of planning and execution tools with transparent access to authoritative data. 

 

The Joint Staff (JS) J-7 and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) (OSD (P)) have formed 

an AP Technology Users Group consisting of planners from the Services, combatant commands 

and combat support agencies to determine capability gaps and requirements for an integrated tool 

suite. The near-term goal is to leverage existing technologies, making them interoperable and 

able to exchange data; and to develop new capabilities to address the gaps. These requirements 

are validated, approved and forwarded to Defense Information Support Agency (DISA) or other 

appropriate technology users’ groups to provide the desired material solutions. 

There are several key AP Technology initiatives being developed to complement the existing 

capabilities provided by Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J). The 

Collaborative Force Analysis, Sustainment and Transportation (CFAST) system is one success 

story with core capabilities that support planning. It is a joint operational prototype web portal 

that offers a “one-stop-shopping” collaborative planning environment. It contains more than 20 

applications that support capability-package requirements generation, phasing of forces, lift 

planning, sustainment and logistics planning, flow generation and transportation feasibility 

analysis. It is endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as an operational 
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prototype and has been globally fielded to the planning community via SIPRNET access. Pacific 

Command, European Command, Transportation Command and others are using it with great 

success. There is also huge emphasis on the integration of service sourcing tools with planning 

systems like CFAST to rapidly source contingency requirements, consistent with Service title 10 

responsibilities and JFCOM’s UCP Joint Force Provider mission, based on actual force 

availability and readiness. 

The Defense Readiness and Reporting System (DRRS) is a promising operational prototype that 

will greatly improve the tracking, visibility and, in the future, prediction of joint readiness. 

DRRS provides a new way for units to report readiness based on Mission Essential Tasks. Global 

Force Management (GFM) is an initiative that will provide a process, automation and global 

visibility of all forces while managing them across operations and contingencies based on actual 

force availability and readiness. The Interactive Gaming System (IGS) has shown tremendous 

potential to conduct traditional wargaming. When used in conjunction with other Modeling and 

Simulation (M&S) technologies, the combatant commands will have the means to rapidly assess 

the operational feasibility of courses of action, conduct detailed excursion analysis, and better 

assess risk to plans. 

 

The JS J-7 and OSD (P) are partnered to lead the AP transformation effort. The Joint Planning 

and Execution Community (JPEC) and other defense organization’s and communities 

recommendations and comments are welcome and encouraged. For more information, 

please contact CDR J. “Mick” Meissel, USN, at the Joint Operational War Plans Division, 

J7, the Pentagon, at commercial 703-697-2949, or DSN 227-2949; e-mail at 

john.meissel@js.pentagon.mil. 

CDR John “Mick” Meissel is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, J7, 

Joint Operational War Plans Division as a Strategic Planner and the Joint 

Staff lead for the AP Technology transformation effort. 
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JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications 

The following campaign planning publications are available from the Joint Advanced 

Warfighting Schools, Department of Operational Art and Campaigning web site. 

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/publications.asp

Case Studies 

• Horatio Nelson and the 1798 Mediterranean Campaign 

• The Mexican American War 

War Plans 

The following collection of war plans are from the Joint Forces Staff College Library. These are 

original World War II campaign plans that have been scanned electronically to enable easy 

accessibility by students of campaign planning. Each campaign plan consists of a back ground 

introduction (Word document) followed by the original plan in PDF format. 

• Introduction Reno IV Outline Plan 

− RENO IV Outline Plan 6 March 1944 

• Introduction Mindoro Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 

− Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 13 October 1944 

• Introduction to Operation “ECLIPSE” 

− Operation “ECLIPSE” Appreciation and Outline Plan 24 November 1944 

• Introduction Operation Plan 14-44 

− Operation Plan 14-44 Operation Iceberg 31 December 1944 

• Introduction to Tarakan Island Operations Instruction NO. 99 

− Operations Instruction NO. 99 Tarakan Island 21 March 1945 

NEW!
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Intent

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School

(JAWS) is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff

and combatant commands with a cadre of officers

expert in the joint planning processes and capable

of critical analysis in the application of all aspects

of national power across the full range of military

operations. Graduates will be capable of

synergistically combining existing and emerging

capabilities in time, space and purpose to

accomplish a range of operational or strategic

objectives. 

 
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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not

represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the

Department of Defense.