alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

                             FORM 10-Q CERTIFICATION

I, S. Leslie Flegel, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Source Interlink Companies, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)), for the registrant and we have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over
financial reporting.

September 9, 2004                               /s/ S. Leslie Flegel
                                                --------------------------------
                                                S. Leslie Flegel
#### Manuel Moye et al., Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Manuel Moye, Jr., Deceased, Appellants, v City of New York, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lewis R. Friedman, J.), entered January 31, 1990, which, *inter alia,*denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate a default and restore this action to the Trial Calendar, is unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs sought damages from defendant for the wrongful death of their son who committed suicide on Rikers Island in 1982. The action was commenced in May 1983. The action was marked off calendar on March 20, 1987, for plaintiffs’ failure to attend a pretrial conference. Plaintiffs’ counsel claimed that he had hired a calendar checking service and regularly read the New York Law Journal, but only learned that the case had been marked off in November 1989, at which time the motion was brought to vacate the default.

Cases which are not diligently pursued will be dismissed automatically one year after stricken from the calendar (CPLR 3404; *Rosser v Scacalossi,*140 AD2d 318). The presump*343tion that an action so dismissed has been abandoned is rebut-table, and the action may be restored upon a showing of a meritorious cause of action, a reasonable excuse for the delay, a lack of prejudice to the opposing party, and a lack of intent to abandon the action *(Rodriguez v Middle Atl. Auto Leasing,*122 AD2d 720, *appeal dismissed*69 NY2d 874).

Plaintiffs did not satisfy all these criteria. The attorney’s affirmation accompanied by copies of the pleadings was insufficient to demonstrate a meritorious cause of action; the suicide report annexed to the papers implies neither negligence nor causation *(see, e.g., Bergan v Home for Incurables,*124 AD2d 517). Nor did counsel present a sufficient explanation to excuse the three-year delay in moving to restore the action. Finally, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that defendant has not been prejudiced by the delay. Concur—Ross, J. P., Carro, Asch, Wallach and Smith, JJ.
Exhibit
32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Richard
W. Turner, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:
  (1)
                The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
  (2)
                The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 August
      16, 2010By
      /s/ Richard W. TurnerRichard
      W. Turner, Ph.D.Chairman
      and Chief Executive Officer
 
 A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to and will be retained by Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc. and will
be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### CARRUTHERS v. STATE.

No. 21823.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 17, 1941.

B. C. Jones, of Clarksville, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Upon his plea of guilty to the offense of hog theft, appellant was convicted and his punishment assessed at confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of two years.

No statement of the facts adduced upon the trial of this case nor bills of exception accompany this record.

By motion for new trial, appellant attempts to raise the question of jury mis-r conduct. The motion relied upon is not verified by either appellant or his counsel. Such a motion is fatally defective. Holloway v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 359, 111 S.W.2d 251; Coleman v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 229, 118 S.W.2d 600; Elder v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 150, *97*S.W.2d 203; and other cases collated under Note 11 of Art. 756, Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal Procedure.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### FITZGERALD v. STATE.

No. 21218.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 23, 1940.

S. H. Townsend, of Lufkin, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted for the offense of driving an automobile upon a public highway while intoxicated, and his punishment was assessed at confinement in the county jail for five days and a fine of fifty dollars.

The record is before this court without statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings herein seem to be regular, and we have no other alternative than to affirm the judgment, which is accordingly done.
Exhibit 10.1

 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO

 

WARRANT

 

TO PURCHASE COMMON STOCK OF

 

CIFC CORP.

 

This is a First Amendment, dated  September 24, 2015 (this “Amendment”), to the Warrant to Purchase Common Stock of CIFC Corp. issued by CIFC Corp. (“CIFC”) to DFR Holdings, LLC (“DFR Holdings”), originally dated December 31, 2013 and amended and restated on September 22, 2014 (the “Warrant”).

 

WHEREAS,  in exchange for a cash payment of $350,000 from DFR Holdings, CIFC has agreed to extend the expiration date of the Warrant; and

 

WHEREAS,  CIFC and DFR Holdings desire to evidence their agreement by amending the Warrant in accordance with Section 14.04 thereof.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual agreements set forth below, CIFC and DFR Holdings agree as follows:

 

1.                                      Definitions.  Except as specifically provided for herein, all capitalized words and terms used in this Amendment without specific definition  shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Warrant.

 

2.                                      Amendments to the Warrant.  Effective as of the date of this Amendment, the Warrant shall be amended as follows:

 

(a)         The definition of “Expiration Date” is hereby deleted in its entirety and the following is inserted in place thereof and substituted therefor:

 

“Expiration Date” means January 24, 2017.

 

3.                                      Complete Agreement.  In all other respects, the Warrant shall continue in full force and effect as executed.

 

4.                                      Governing Law.  This Amendment, and any claims or disputes arising out of or related hereto, shall in all respects be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the internal laws of the State of New York without reference to its choice of law rules that would apply the laws of any other jurisdiction.

 

[Signature page follows]

 











 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  the undersigned have each caused this Amendment to be duly executed by its authorized signatory as of the day and year first above written.

 

	
 
    	
CIFC   Corp.
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:   
    	
/s/   Julian Weldon
    
	
 
    	
Name:   
    	
Julian   Weldon
    
	
 
    	
Title:   
    	
General   Counsel and Secretary
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
DFR   Holdings, LLC
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:   
    	
/s/   Andrew Intrater
    
	
 
    	
Name:   
    	
Andrew   Intrater
    
	
 
    	
Title:   
    	
Manager
    


 

2
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATE OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



This Certificate is being delivered pursuant to the requirements of Section 1350 of Chapter 63 (Mail Fraud) of Title 18
(Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the United States Code and shall not be relied on by any person for any other purpose.



The undersigned, who is the Chief Financial Officer of CCF Holding Company (the Company), hereby certifies as follows:



The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company (the Report),
which accompanies this Certificate, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and all information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.





Dated this 14th day of November, 2003.



/s/    Mary Jo RogersMary Jo Rogers, Chief Financial Officer




A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stafford Anderson, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Bernard Jackson, J.), rendered June 29, 1989, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of robbery in the first degree and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate term of from 9 to 18 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s application at trial for a material witness order was deficient in both form (CPL 620.30 [1]) and substance (CPL 620.20 [1] [a], [b]). Appellant failed to demonstrate that Martinez possessed material testimony or was not amenable to subpoena.

With respect to defendant’s request for a missing witness charge as to Martinez and another witness, there is no indication that either witness was under the People’s control. While the court would have been better advised not to refer to the defendant’s "election” not to testify in its no adverse inference charge, considering the instruction as a whole, we find no basis for reversal *(see, People v Diggs,*151 AD2d 359, 362). Defendant’s remaining arguments are either unpreserved or *361without merit. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Carro, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
     Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1996 and is qualified in its
     entirety by reference to such Form 10-K.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          14,182,246
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,816,019
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                25,130,001
<PP&E>                                         197,414,761
<DEPRECIATION>                                  15,387,840
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 212,035,156
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           22,548,317
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                        242,500
<COMMON>                                           359,771
<OTHER-SE>                                     (79,823,926)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   212,035,156
<SALES>                                         25,195,645
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                25,195,645
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   61,352,364
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,212,564
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (40,061,217)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (14,503,595)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    292,372
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (25,849,994)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (1.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (1.34)



</TABLE>
#### LUNDY v. HARDY.

No. 11092.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

Jan. 9, 1941.

D. R. Bullard and Fountain & Sandlin, all of Houston, for appellant.

Miller & Sapp, of Houston, for appellee.

CODY, Justice.

This cause is a companion one to D. T. McIver v. Rufus Hardy, Jr., 146 S.W.2d 1054, numbered 11090 on the docket of this Court and to R. A. Welch v. Rufus Hardy, Jr., 146 S.W.2d 1057, numbered 11091, on *1058the docket of this court, opinions in which were this day handed down reforming and affirming the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant’s interest in this case is identical with the interest of appellant in No. 11091, R. A. Welch v. Rufus Hardy, Jr., this day handed down, as stated supra, he having appealed from the judgment of the County court because it allowed only a recovery on the basis of 24/81 of 1/20 instead of 24/81 of 1/15 as found by this Court in the above two causes to be the proper basis for recovery. Therefore, the judgment of the court below will be reformed so that it shall be in favor of appellant in the sum of $101.08, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per an-num from November 21, 1939.

Reformed and affirmed.
# C_2014212EN.01000301.xml

| 7.7.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 212/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.7.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 212/3

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 May 2014 — Louis Vuitton Malletier v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Friis Group International ApS

(Case C-97/12 P) (1)

1

((Appeal - Community trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Figurative mark representing a locking device - No distinctive character - Partial invalidity - Regulation (EC) No 40/94 - Article 7(1)(b)))

2014/C 212/03

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Louis Vuitton Malletier (represented by: P. Roncaglia, G. Lazzeretti, M. Boletto, E. Gavuzzi and N. Parrotta, avvocati)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent), Friis Group International (represented by: C. Type Jardorf, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings:

Re:

Re:

Appeal against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 14 December 2011 in Case T-237/10 Vuitton Malletier v OHIM and Friis Group International (Representation of a locking device), by which the General Court partially granted an action for annulment brought by the proprietor of the Community figurative mark representing a locking device, for goods in Classes 9, 14, 18 and 25, against Decision No R 1590/2008-1 of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 24 February 2010, partially annulling the decision of the Cancellation Division which rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity of that mark

Vuitton Malletier

OHIM and Friis Group International (Representation of a locking device)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Dismisses the cross-appeal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the cross-appeal;

| 3. | Orders Louis Vuitton Malletier, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and Friis Group International ApS each to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders Louis Vuitton Malletier, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and Friis Group International ApS each to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 126, 28.4.2012.

1

---
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS AUSTIN

Honorable D. W. Stakes General Manager Taxas Prison Systesi Huntsville,Texas Dear E.r.Stalies:

3 Texas pr

We beg to acknowle ing for an opinion fro= this your latter askfro3 the Var us to either Coka 6:Iron

e whether or not the the Texas I?rison

System, tbi? Prison 3oard, has gotiato a sale or lease

Artfcle 63360, Vcrnun*s Revised Civil Statutes, is as rollowe"'TheZoard shall have power to authorize the rmna@r to ml1 x%.4. ~LLspOseof all p-o~ucts oi'all farms ax: 52xlustries con-netted with the prison system and all

personalaud wveable property,at such prices anil

on such terms and render such rules as it may deem best and adopt; and it may lease any real estate for agriculturalor grazing purposes or lease ether Sixed property and appurtenances belonging theretoupon such terms as it may deem advantageous to the interests of the prison system.* The language 'all personal and moveable property* in the above grant of power, is suSSicient,we think, to authorize themanager of the Texas Prison Gystemupon being authorizedby the Board so to do, to 'sell and illspose* of the propertydesoribedby you.

Of course, the action crfthe Board will be governed by the considerationwhether or not such sale and disposit&on OS the propertywill be advantageous to the Interests of the Prison System.

Very trulyyours ATTOlWB GENi3U.L

OF TZCA.!.! // 

# I be -9 Ooie S eer 1 A5sisiant
**Exhibit 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

          This Certificate is being delivered pursuant to the requirements of Section 1350of Chapter 63 (Mail Fraud) of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the United States Code and shall not be relied on by any person for any other purpose.

          The undersigned, who is the Chief Executive Officer of CCF Holding Company, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certifies as follows:

          The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company (the “Report”), which accompanies this Certificate, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and all information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

This 14th day of May, 2003.

| /s/ DAVID TURNER                                                        |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                                         |   |
| **David Turner, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)** |   |