SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1446-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PETER LEONCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted March 2, 2020 – Decided June 2, 2020

Before Judges Messano and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 11-02-0440.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Karen A. Lodesetro, Designated Counsel on 

the briefs). 

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the briefs).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1446-18T4

Defendant, Peter Leonce, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief (PCR). He was convicted at trial for his role in a gang-related 

double homicide. The jury found him guilty of murder with respect to one of 

the victims, twenty-three-year-old Michael Hawkins, and aggravated 

manslaughter with respect to the other victim, eighteen-year-old Muriah Huff. 

Defendant, who was a minor when the crimes were committed, raises numerous 

contentions in this appeal. Most were decided by the PCR court without an 

evidentiary hearing. All of defendant's PCR claims assert that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at various stages of the criminal proceedings. 

With respect to all but two of defendant's contentions, the PCR judge, 

Judge John Thomas Kelly, concluded that defendant failed to establish that

counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Judge Kelly found that counsel had 

rendered ineffective assistance with respect to the State's motion to transfer the 

case from juvenile to adult criminal court. Judge Kelly nonetheless concluded 

that defendant, who was one month shy of his eighteenth birthday when the 

homicides were committed, did not suffer prejudice from counsel's failure to 

contest the transfer of jurisdiction to adult criminal court. Judge Kelly 

concluded that it was not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been 

different had defendant opposed the State's waiver motion. 
3

A-1446-18T4

After convening a three-day evidentiary hearing, Judge Kelly further 

found that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to thoroughly 

investigate a potential alibi witness. However, based on his observation of the 

witness's testimony at the hearing, Judge Kelly determined that he would have 

been a poor alibi witness and ultimately would have caused more harm than 

good for the defense had he testified at trial. Judge Kelly thus found that 

defendant failed to establish that he suffered prejudice from counsel's failure to 

thoroughly investigate that witness's potential testimony. 

We have reviewed the record in light of defendant's contentions, the 

parties' briefs, including defendant's pro se submissions, and the applicable legal 

principles that govern this appeal. We agree with the PCR court that with two 

exceptions, defendant's PCR claims are either procedurally barred or else fail to 

meet the Strickland1standard for proving that counsel's performance fell outside 

the range of reasonable professional assistance. With respect to defendant's 

juvenile waiver contention, we agree with the PCR judge that while counsel's 

performance was deficient, it is not reasonably probable that jurisdiction would 

have remained in juvenile court had counsel advised defendant to contest the 

State's waiver motion. We also agree with the PCR court that while counsel was 

 

1

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
4

A-1446-18T4

obligated to more thoroughly investigate the potential alibi witness, his 

testimony at trial would not have changed the verdict and if anything would have 

undermined the defense. We therefore affirm the denial of PCR substantially 

for the reasons set forth in Judge Kelly's thorough and cogent oral opinion. 

I.

We briefly summarize the procedural history leading up to this appeal. 

Defendant was one of nine persons who were charged in connection with the 

gang-related double homicide. The State filed a motion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 

2A:4A-26 (repealed 2016) to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile to adult criminal 

court. The Family Part judge granted the application after defendant waived his 

right to a hearing on advice of counsel. 

Defendant was thereafter charged by indictment with multiple counts 

including (1) first-degree murder, (2) first-degree felony murder, (3) first-degree 

kidnapping, (4) first-degree conspiracy to commit murder/kidnapping, (5) thirddegree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, (6) fourth-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, and (7) third-degree hindering apprehension 

or prosecution. 

Defendant moved to suppress an incriminating statement he gave to police 

during a custodial interrogation. The trial court conducted an evidentiary 
5

A-1446-18T4

hearing after which it denied defendant's suppression motion. The case 

proceeded to trial. The jury found defendant guilty of the murder of Michael 

Hawkins, the aggravated manslaughter of Muriah Huff, criminal restraint, 

kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and hindering apprehension. 

The trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of forty-five 

years in state prison. More specifically, the judge sentenced defendant to a 

thirty-year term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility on the murder

conviction and a consecutive fifteen-year sentence subject to the No Early 

Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on the aggravated manslaughter

conviction. The sentences imposed on the remaining counts run concurrently to 

the murder/aggravated manslaughter consecutive sentences.

On direct appeal, we affirmed the trial convictions and consecutive 

sentences but remanded for the trial court to merge the conspiracy counts with 

the substantive offenses. State v. Leonce, No. A-3711-13 (App. Div. Sept. 16, 

2016). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Leonce, 

229 N.J. 602 (2017).

Defendant filed a pro se PCR petition that was followed by an amended 

petition submitted on defendant's behalf by assigned counsel. Defendant raised 

nine distinct issues for the PCR court's consideration. All of defendant's PCR 
6

A-1446-18T4

contentions assert that he received ineffective assistance of counsel pertaining 

to the waiver to adult court, the motion to suppress his statement, the jury trial, 

and the sentencing hearing. Judge Kelley ordered an evidentiary hearing only 

on whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call three 

specified witnesses at trial. The PCR court denied defendant's request for an 

evidentiary hearing with respect to the other contentions. After hearing oral 

argument, Judge Kelly denied defendant's petition for PCR for reasons spelled 

out in a comprehensive and highly detailed oral opinion that spans forty-nine

pages of transcript. Defendant now appeals from that decision. 

II.

The facts adduced at trial concerning defendant's role in the brutal killing 

of Michael Hawkins and Muriah Huff are recounted in our prior opinion and 

need only be briefly summarized in this opinion. Defendant was a member of 

the Luerdes Park Piru gang, which is associated with the Bloods. Michael 

Hawkins was a member of a rival gang, the Hoover Crips. Muriah Huff was not 

affiliated with a gang. 

On February 22, 2010, both victims visited the residence of codefendant 

Dennis Welch on Berkley Street in Camden. Other members of the Luerdes 

Park Piru gang lived in that house, which was rented by Welch's mother. Gang 
7

A-1446-18T4

members who were present believed Hawkins had previously stolen a bottle of 

liquor from them. At some point, Huff left Welch's bedroom and went 

downstairs. Hawkins remained in the bedroom with defendant, Welch, and 

several other Luerdes Park Piru gang members. An upper-echelon gang member 

ordered female gang members in the house to distract Huff. After a few minutes, 

Hawkins began screaming, "stop, please help me." Huff tried to go upstairs 

when she heard the screaming but the female gang members prevented her from 

assisting Hawkins. 

Defendant, Welch, and several other gang members kicked Hawkins and 

beat him with their fists and a baseball bat. They tied him up, placed duct tape 

over his mouth, and shoved him into the bedroom closet. They then rummaged 

through Hawkins's backpack and discovered a piece of paper linking him to the 

rival Crips gang. They took a photograph of Hawkins showing him bound and 

beaten and electronically sent the photo to other Luerdes Park Piru gang 

members with instruction to come to the house immediately. 

When they arrived at the house, the other gang members, including the 

gang leader, proceeded upstairs to Welch's bedroom. One of the gang members 

opened the closet door whereupon the leader shot Hawkins in the head five times 

from a distance of six inches. Hawkins was still breathing, however. The leader 
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A-1446-18T4

told the other members, including defendant, to "finish him." The leader and 

Welch then went downstairs to confront Huff. The gang members remaining in 

the bedroom proceeded to beat Hawkins to death, breaking every bone in his 

face. 

Defendant went downstairs to find the gang leader screaming at Huff that 

she "set him up." Huff pleaded for her life, claiming she "didn't do it." The 

gang leader put his gun against Huff's head and pulled the trigger, but the gun 

was empty. He then struck Huff with the gun twice in the face and ordered the 

female gang members to "F her up." As instructed, the females began beating 

Huff. 

During the attack, Huff pleaded for the female assailants to stop, 

screaming that "she didn't know, and she didn't do it." Welch's mother, who 

rented the house, attempted to intervene. The female gang members ignored 

her, and Welch escorted his mother to her bedroom and told her to stay there. 

The assault on Huff continued mercilessly. One of the female assailants 

broke a chair over Huff. The females then used parts of the broken chair to 

strike the victim. Despite Huff's continuing pleas and her promise that she 

would remain silent, the gang leader ordered the females to kill Huff. One 

female attempted to strangle Huff with her hands. Eventually, one of the mal e 
9

A-1446-18T4

gang members handed her a rope to use as a ligature. The female assailant 

placed the rope around Huff's neck, put her knee against Huff's back, and pulled 

on the rope. When that technique failed, a male gang member joined in pulling 

on the rope as Huff tried desperately to resist. The female then picked up a knife 

and attempted to stab Huff while the male gang member continued to pull on the 

rope around Huff's neck. The female tried to stab Huff, but the knife "just kept 

bouncing off." A male gang member took the knife and stabbed Huff several 

times. Defendant checked Huff's pulse and determined she was still alive. 2 The 

State maintains that defendant then took a plastic bag and placed it over Huff's 

head, finally killing her.3 

The gang members stripped the victims' clothing and carried the bodies to 

the basement. Defendant participated in cleaning up the house and disposing 

the baseball bat, rope, and victims' clothing. Defendant, Welch, and a third male 

gang member then dug a hole in the back yard and buried the victims. Police 

discovered the bodies three days later. 

 

2

 One of the female gang members, Shatara Carter, who was also Leonce's

girlfriend, gave conflicting testimony, initially stating that defendant had 

checked Huff's pulse but later claimed that "he didn't touch her." 

3

 Shatara Carter also told police that defendant placed the plastic bag over Huff's 

head. She testified at trial, however, that she was the one who placed the bag 

over the victim's head. 
10 A-1446-18T4

III.

Defendant, through his assigned counsel, raises the following contentions 

for our consideration:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE DEFENDANT 

ESTABLISHED THE TESTIMONY OF DONALD 

WILLIAMS WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED AN 

ALIBI TO THE MURDERS OF HAWKINS AND 

HUFF, THEREBY RAISING REASONABLE DOUBT 

REGARDING DEFENDANT'S GUILT.

POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS 

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AT 

SENTENCING IN FAILING TO ARGUE 

DEFENDANT WAS RECEIVING A SENTENCE 

THAT WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF LIFE 

IMPRISONMENT.

POINT III

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS 

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING 

TO ADVISE DEFENDANT REGARDING ALL 

ASPECTS OF HIS JUVENILE WAIVER HEARING, 

INCLUDING HIS RIGHT TO CALL WITNESSES ON 

HIS BEHALF AND FAILING TO INFORM HIM HE 
11 A-1446-18T4

COULD CHALLENGE EVIDENCE THE STATE 

WAS PRESENTING AGAINST HIM.

Defendant also submitted a pro se brief raising the following contentions:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 

THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 

ORDERING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 

[DEFENDANT]'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

A. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

INEFFECTIVE FOR ALLOWING THE 

STATE TO PRESENT CONFLICTED 

THEORIES THAT WAS VIRTUALLY 

UNCONTESTED. THIS VIOLATION 

DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL.

B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 

FOR FAILING TO INFORM 

PETITIONER AND/OR HIS PARENT OF 

THE RISKS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 

AGREEING TO A VOLUNTARY 

WAIVER TO ADULT COURT AND FOR 

FAILING TO ADVISE PETITIONER OF 

HIS RIGHTS AT THE JUVENILE 

WAIVER HEARING.

C. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 

FOR FAILING TO CALL PETITIONER 
12 A-1446-18T4

AND HIS MOTHER TO TESTIFY AT 

HIS SUPPRESSION HEARING.

D. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 

FOR NOT CALLING PETITIONER TO 

TESTIFY AT TRIAL.

E. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 

FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO 

DETECTIVE PATRICIA TULANE'S 

INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 

TESTIMONY.

F. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 

FOR FAILING TO CALL ARNETTA 

WELCH, DONALD WILLIAMS JR. [,] 

AND CLIVE HINDS AS DEFENSE 

WITNESSES AT TRIAL.

G. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 

FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE 

PROSECUTOR DISMISSING COUNTS 

SEVENTEEN AND EIGHTEEN OF THE 

INDICTMENT.

POINT II

THE STATE'S STAR WITNESS DARRLY [SIC] 

PIERRE RECANTED HIS TESTIMONY ON 

DEFENDANT'S POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, 

WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY DEPLETED THE 

STATE'S EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
13 A-1446-18T4

POINT III

THE DEFENDANT MUST BE RESENTENCED 

WITH THE COURT GIVING DUE 

CONSIDERATION THAT THE MILLER[4]/ZUBER[5]

FACTORS WHICH ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY 

REQUIRED FOR IMPOSING LENGTHY, 

CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT ON 

JUVENILE OFFENDERS BEING SENTENCED IN 

ADULT COURT.

IV.

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing 

this appeal. Post-conviction relief serves the same function as a federal writ of 

habeas corpus. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning 

for PCR, a defendant must establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence 

that he or she is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. (citations omitted). The 

defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the court with 

an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 

579 (1992). 

Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 

1, paragraph 10 of the State Constitution guarantee the right to effective 

assistance of counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

 

4 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

5 State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017). 
14 A-1446-18T4

at 686 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)); State v. 

Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To establish a violation of the right to the effective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must meet the two-part test articulated in 

Strickland. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show "that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. Reviewing courts indulge in a 

"strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. A defendant, in other words, 

"must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, in determining whether defense counsel's representation was 

deficient, "'[j]udicial scrutiny . . . must be highly deferential,' and must avoid 

viewing the performance under the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'" State v. 

Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 37 (1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, 

"[t]he quality of counsel's performance cannot be fairly assessed by focusing on 

a handful of issues while ignoring the totality of counsel's performance in the 
15 A-1446-18T4

context of the State's evidence of [a] defendant's guilt." State v. Castagna, 187 

N.J. 293, 314 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 165 (1991)). 

The second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show 

"that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 

a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. In determining whether defense 

counsel's alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense, "[i]t is not 

enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 

the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693. Rather, defendant bears the burden 

of showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Id. at 694.

The second Strickland prong is particularly demanding. "[T]he error 

committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's 

verdict or the result reached." State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) 

(quoting Castagna, 187 N.J. at 315). 

Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may prove that an 

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with 

his or her ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462–63. The PCR 

court should grant an evidentiary hearing when a defendant is able to prove a 
16 A-1446-18T4

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, there are material issues of 

disputed fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record, and the 

hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. Id. at 462; R. 3:22-10(b). 

To meet the burden of proving a prima facie case, a defendant must show a 

reasonable likelihood of success under the Strickland test. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 

463. "[C]ourts should view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant 

to determine whether a defendant has established a prima facie claim." Id. at 

462–63. 

"In order to establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than 

make bald assertions that [he or she] was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). The 

petitioner must allege specific facts sufficient to support a prima facie claim. 

Ibid. Furthermore, the petitioner must present these facts in the form of 

admissible evidence. In other words, the relevant facts must be shown through 

"affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or 

the person making the certification." Ibid.; see also R. 3:22-10(c) ("Any factual 

assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of relief must be made by an 

affidavit or certification . . . and based upon personal knowledge of the declarant 

before the court may grant an evidentiary hearing."). 
17 A-1446-18T4

As a general proposition, we defer to a PCR court's factual findings "when 

supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." State v. Harris, 181 

N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (quoting Toll Bros, Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 

502, 549 (2002)). However, when the trial court does not hold an evidentiary 

hearing, we "may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences drawn 

from the documentary record." Id. at 421 (citing Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 

F.2d 284, 291 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991)). Similarly, we review de novo the PCR court's 

legal conclusions. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540–41 (2013) (citing Harris, 

181 N.J. at 415–16).

V.

We first address defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective 

for failing to argue that the consecutive sentences he received on his murder and 

aggravated manslaughter convictions violate the principles set forth in Miller 

and Zuber. The United States Supreme Court in Miller held that youth and its 

attendant characteristics must be considered at the time a juvenile is sentenced 

to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 567 U.S. at 465. The 

Court outlined a series of relevant factors that courts must consider before 

imposing that sentence. Id. at 479–80 (identifying certain characteristics of the 

juvenile defendants relevant to sentencing, including the juvenile's role in the 
18 A-1446-18T4

offense, the juvenile's history of abuse or neglect, periods of time spent in foster 

care, prior suicide attempts, and a limited prior criminal history). 

In Zuber, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the same Eighth 

Amendment principles addressed in Miller apply to sentences that are the 

practical equivalent of life without parole. 227 N.J. at 429. The Court in Zuber

held that before a judge imposes consecutive terms that would result in a lengthy 

overall term of imprisonment for a juvenile, the court must consider the Miller

factors along with other traditional concerns. Ibid. 

This is not the first time defendant has presented the Miller/Zuber

argument to us. We addressed this contention on the merits when we reviewed, 

and ultimately affirmed, defendant's aggregate sentence on his direct appeal. 

Leonce, slip op. at 31–32. Rule 3:22-5 provides that "a prior adjudication upon 

the merits . . . is conclusive." We therefore agree with the PCR court that 

defendant is barred from raising the Miller/Zuber contention in the present PCR 

petition under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Even if we were to disregard the procedural bar, defendant's claim that 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing lacks merit 

under Strickland analysis. For one thing, contrary to defendant's present claim, 
19 A-1446-18T4

his trial counsel did not fail to argue the Miller factors at the time of sentencing.6 

Rather, counsel in his sentencing allocution highlighted defendant's youth and 

argued that imposition of consecutive sentences on the homicide convictions 

would be the equivalent of life without parole. Counsel, in other words, 

explicitly addressed the Miller factors at the sentencing hearing, arguing that the 

sentences imposed on defendant's murder and aggravated manslaughter 

convictions should be served concurrently, not consecutively, even though they 

involve two different victims. See generally State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 

(1985) (providing guidance on when to impose consecutive sentences); see also

State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429–30 (2001) (noting that "the multiple-victims 

factor [in Yarbough] is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in 

the imposition of at least two consecutive terms when multiple deaths or serious 

bodily injuries have been inflicted upon multiple victims by the defendant"); 

State v. Kelly, 406 N.J. Super. 332, 353 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 201 N.J. 471 

(2010) (affirming consecutive sentences imposed for a double murder).

The first Strickland prong requires a defendant to show that counsel,

"made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 466 U.S. at 687. In this instance, 

 

6

 At the time of sentencing, Zuber had not yet been decided. 
20 A-1446-18T4

counsel's performance at the sentencing hearing was not constitutionally 

deficient. Counsel made appropriate arguments on defendant's behalf with 

respect to the factors set forth in Miller and preserved the issue for appellate 

review. See State v. DiFrisco, 174 N.J. 195, 219–20 (2002) (observing that a 

trial strategy's failure to obtain the optimal outcome for a defendant is 

insufficient to show that counsel was ineffective) (citing State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 

233, 252 (1999)). Accordingly, defendant has not overcome the strong 

presumption that counsel's performance at the sentencing hearing fell within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 467 U.S. at 689. 

Furthermore, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's 

performance at the sentencing hearing, especially in view of our ruling on direct 

appeal in which we rejected defendant's Miller/Zuber argument and affirmed the 

consecutive homicide sentences. Defendant has failed to establish that it is 

reasonably probable that any additional arguments counsel might have made at 

the sentencing hearing would have led to concurrent sentences or a shorter 

aggregate sentence.7 Defendant has thus failed to establish the second prong of 

the two-part Strickland test. 466 U.S. at 694. 

 

7

 We note that the thirty-year period of parole ineligibility was the minimum 

sentence that could be imposed on defendant's murder conviction. N.J.S.A. 
21 A-1446-18T4

VI.

Defendant next contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 

challenging the admissibility of the incriminating statement defendant gave to 

police. Specifically, defendant contends counsel was ineffective by not calling 

him and his mother to testify at the suppression hearing. 

Counsel argued before the motion court that defendant's statement was not 

voluntary because (1) his sister accompanied him to the interview and her 

children were also being investigated in this case; (2) neither of his parents were 

present; and (3) he did not understand some of the language used to explain his 

Miranda rights. The motion court rejected those arguments, finding that the 

investigator's testimony concerning her efforts to reach out to defendant's 

parents was credible and that those efforts were constitutionally sufficient. See

State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 316 (2000) (holding that police officers must use 

their best efforts to locate a parent or legal guardian before beginning a custodial 

interrogation of a minor; the prosecutor must show to the trial court's satisfaction 

 

2C:11-3(b). The trial judge did not impose the life sentence authorized by 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b), which, under NERA, would have resulted in a parole 

ineligibility term of almost sixty-nine years. Furthermore, the fifteen-year 

sentence imposed on defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction is at the 

lower end of the ten-to-thirty-year range authorized pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

4(c). 
22 A-1446-18T4

that police were unable to locate a parent (citing In re J.F., 286 N.J. Super. 89, 

98 (App. Div. 1995))). The motion court concluded ultimately that defendant's 

statement was voluntary and admissible. 

On direct appeal, we affirmed the motion court's denial of defendant's 

suppression motion. Leonce, slip op. at 22–28. In reaching our conclusion that 

defendant's statement was properly admitted, we relied in part on the motion 

court's finding that Investigator Tulane was credible when she testified as to the 

efforts she made to locate defendant's parents prior to questioning him. We 

ruled that the efforts that were undertaken by Investigator Tulane to locate 

defendant's parents were sufficient and that the interrogation was properly 

conducted with defendant's older sister standing in place of a parent. Leonce, 

slip op. at 27–28. 

As we have noted, Rule 3:22-5 precludes consideration of a PCR claim 

that has already been adjudicated on the merits. In an effort to circumvent that 

procedural bar, defendant seeks to recast his previously adjudicated suppression 

argument as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We agree with the PCR 

court that defendant's present ineffective assistance claim is substantially similar 

to the voluntariness argument we have already rejected. But even assuming that 

defendant's ineffective assistance contention is not procedurally barred under 
23 A-1446-18T4

Rule 3:22-5, we conclude defendant has failed to establish either prong of the 

Strickland test with respect to counsel's performance at the suppression hearing. 

We first address defendant's contention that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to have defendant testify at the hearing. In order to establish that counsel 

rendered constitutionally deficient assistance based on the failure to call a 

witness, a defendant seeking to establish the first prong of the Strickland test 

must overcome the presumption that the failure to call the witness "might be 

considered sound trial strategy." State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 320 (2005) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Determining which witnesses to call to 

the stand is an "an art." Id. at 321 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 

A trial attorney must consider what testimony a witness 

can be expected to give, whether the witness's 

testimony will be subject to effective impeachment by 

prior inconsistent statements or other means, whether 

the witness is likely to contradict the testimony of other 

witnesses the attorney intends to present and thereby 

undermine their credibility, whether the trier of fact is 

likely to find the witness credible, and a variety of other 

tangible and intangible factors.

[Id. at 320–21.]

Given the difficulty inherent in selecting witnesses, a court's review of counsel's 

decision must be "highly deferential." Id. at 321 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689).
24 A-1446-18T4

Applying that deferential standard of review to the circumstances 

presented in this case, we agree with the PCR court that it was a reasonable 

strategic decision to prevent defendant from being subjected to crossexamination by the prosecutor. We therefore conclude that the decision not to 

have defendant testify fell within the range of reasonable professional 

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Furthermore, defendant has not established that he was prejudiced by the 

decision not to call him as a witness at the suppression hearing. Defendant has 

not presented any new legal or fact-sensitive arguments that his testimony would 

have addressed. As we have noted, the motion court found Investigator Tulane 

credible as to the circumstances of the interrogation. We therefore agree with 

Judge Kelly's conclusion that defendant's testimony would not have had a 

reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the suppression motion. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

We turn to counsel's decision not to call defendant's mother as a witness 

at the suppression hearing. Defendant claims in his pro se brief that his mother 

would have testified that police prevented her from being present during his 

interrogation. Cf. Presha, 163 N.J. at 320 (observing that when there has been 

a deliberate exclusion of a parent or legal guardian, the juvenile's confession 
25 A-1446-18T4

"almost invariably will be suppressed"). However, defendant fails to support 

this contention with sufficient, competent proofs. 

Defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that [he or she] was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel." Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. 

Rather, he must present facts in the form of admissible evidence, that is, 

"affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or 

the person making the certification." Ibid. Given the absence of any 

certification or affidavit from defendant's mother asserting that police 

affirmatively prevented her from attending the interrogation, we treat this PCR 

contention as a bald assertion and reject it. 

Defendant also claims his mother would not have allowed defendant's 

sister to "fill in" as his guardian for purposes of protecting his Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights. Defendant asserts in his pro se brief that he presented a 

certification to this effect to the court that heard the suppression motion. 

However, the record before us does not include any such certification. 8 

 

8

 The only certification from defendant in the record asserts that the investigator 

who took his statement never asked him for his mother's contact information or 

allowed him to try to contact his mother. This assertion is not enough to warrant 

an evidentiary hearing to expand the PCR record, much less warrant a new 

suppression hearing. As noted, to meet the burden of proving a prima facie case, 

a defendant must show a reasonable likelihood of success under the Strickland
26 A-1446-18T4

In any event, his mother's testimony that she would not have consented to 

the interrogation had she been present would not have created a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been 

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. One of the critical issues framed at the 

suppression hearing was whether police complied with the rules set forth in 

Presha governing the interrogation of minors over the age of fourteen. 163 N.J. 

at 317 (explaining that because the defendant was nearly seventeen years old at 

the time of the interrogation, stricter rules governing the interrogation of 

juveniles under the age of fourteen did not apply). 

When the custodial interrogation of a juvenile is lawfully conducted in the 

absence of a parent, a parent cannot void that ruling by later claiming he or she 

would not have consented to the interrogation had he or she been present. To 

hold otherwise would upend the holding in Presha by imposing, for all practical 

purposes, a per se rule that requires police to refrain in all cases from conducting 

a custodial interrogation without a parent present or else risk suppression of an 

 

two-part test. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463. We conclude defendant cannot show a 

reasonable likelihood of satisfying the second prong of the Strickland test in 

view of the motion court's finding that the investigator was credible in 

describing her efforts to contact defendant's parents before taking his statement. 
27 A-1446-18T4

otherwise voluntary confession at the parent's subsequent election. 9 Defendant 

offers no authority for the proposition that an absent parent holds such power to 

nullify a trial court's ruling—and in this case, an appellate court's ruling as 

well—that police were permitted to proceed with the interrogation in the parent's 

absence after having made reasonable efforts to contact the parent. 

In sum, the admissibility of a juvenile's confession is determined from the 

totality of circumstances that existed when the custodial interrogation was 

conducted, including whether police had made a reasonable effort to contact a 

parent. When as in this case police made such an effort, thereby satisfying the 

rule announced in Presha, admissibility of a confession does not depend on what 

might have happened had an absent parent been present. Because we have 

already ruled that the custodial interrogation was lawfully conducted in the 

absence of defendant's mother, her testimony at the suppression hearing would 

not have changed the conclusion that defendant's statement was admissible. 

 

9

 Presha held the absence of a parent or legal guardian from the interrogation of 

a juvenile is a "highly significant factor" when determining whether the minor's 

waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 163 N.J. at 315. The 

Court did not, however, impose a per se rule requiring in all cases that a parent 

be present. 
28 A-1446-18T4

VII.

We turn next to defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective by 

failing to advise him of his right to contest the State's motion to transfer the case 

from juvenile to adult criminal court. Judge Kelly found that defendant was 

afforded only fifteen minutes notice before being asked to waive his right to 

contest the transfer of jurisdiction. Judge Kelly aptly described the lack of prior 

notice as "problematic," especially considering the significant sentencing 

consequences of an adult homicide conviction as compared to a juvenile 

adjudication of delinquency.10 

Judge Kelly concluded that given the abrupt manner in which defendant 

was induced by his counsel to consent to the transfer of jurisdiction, defendant 

has established the first prong of the Strickland test. The PCR court concluded, 

however, that defendant failed to establish the second prong in the Strickland

analysis because it is not reasonably probable that the Family Part judge would 

 

10

 A juvenile adjudicated delinquent for murder is not subject to NERA or any 

other mandatory sentence or term of parole ineligibility. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A44 (permitting the sentencing court to impose a term of imprisonment but not a 

period of parole ineligibility). The record shows that the Family Part judge 

explained to defendant the difference between the potential adult sentence and 

juvenile disposition. Defendant responded that he understood. Defendant and 

his attorney engaged in a colloquy on the record in which defendant indicated 

he understood the nature of the proceedings and wished to waive the hearing. 
29 A-1446-18T4

have denied the State's waiver motion had it been contested. We agree that 

defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's handling of 

the State's waiver motion. Given the nature of the charges and the strength of 

the State's proofs, it is highly unlikely that counsel could have done anything to 

have prevented the transfer of this double homicide prosecution to adult criminal 

court. 

The statutory framework for waiving a juvenile prosecution to adult 

criminal court in force at the time was codified in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 (repealed 

2016). That statute provided: 

a. On motion of the prosecutor, the court shall, without 

the consent of the juvenile, waive jurisdiction over a 

case and refer that case from the Superior Court, 

Chancery Division, Family Part to the appropriate court 

and prosecuting authority having jurisdiction if it finds, 

after hearing, that:

(1) The juvenile was 14 years of age or older at 

the time of the charged delinquent act; and

(2) There is probable cause to believe that the 

juvenile committed a delinquent act or acts which 

if committed by an adult would constitute:

(a) Criminal homicide other than death by 

auto . . . .

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
30 A-1446-18T4

Our review of the statutory elements set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 shows 

that waiver to adult court in this case was virtually assured upon the State's 

motion. It is not disputed that defendant was older than fourteen when the 

homicides occurred. Indeed, he was just one month shy of turning eighteen. 

Nor can it be disputed that defendant was charged with "homicide other than 

death by auto." Thus, the only waiver element under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 that 

could have been contested was whether there was probable cause to believe that 

defendant committed the crimes.11 

Probable cause "is 'a well-grounded suspicion or belief that the juvenile 

committed the alleged crime.'" A.D., 212 N.J. at 205 (quoting State v. J.M., 182 

N.J. 402, 417 (2005)). "The trial court should find probable cause if the 

evidence presented and the reasonable inferences supported by that evidence 

give rise to a well-grounded suspicion or belief in the juvenile's guilt." Id. at 

221. This standard of proof is similar to the one that guides a grand jury's 

determination whether or not to indict. Id. at 205–06.

 

11

 As a result of a 2000 amendment to the waiver statute, juveniles sixteen or 

older were no longer entitled to present evidence that the prospect of 

rehabilitation substantially outweighs the reasons supporting the waiver once 

the State has established probable cause. State ex rel. A.D., 212 N.J. 200, 204 

(2012). Accordingly, involuntary waiver in this case essentially would have 

been automatic once probable cause had been established. 
31 A-1446-18T4

The record shows that at the time of the State's waiver application, the 

prosecutor was in possession of statements from multiple codefendants that 

defendant participated in the homicides. Had the waiver motion been 

challenged, the State would have been able to present evidence that satisfies the 

probable cause standard of proof. We thus conclude, as did the PCR court, that 

defendant suffered no prejudice under the second Strickland prong because the 

ultimate outcome of the State's waiver application would have been the same 

even if counsel had vigorously opposed the State's motion. Accordingly, 

defendant is not entitled to post-conviction relief regarding the transfer of 

jurisdiction and ensuing penal consequences. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

VIII.

Defendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial by 

failing to object to what defendant now characterizes as "conflicting theories" 

as to the manner in which Muriah Huff was killed. Specifically, defendant 

contends the State presented conflicting evidence as to whether Huff was 

strangled with a rope or suffocated with a plastic bag. He contends that counsel 

somehow rendered constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to object to 

the introduction of evidence concerning the use of both a rope and plastic bag 

to finish off the helpless victim. 
32 A-1446-18T4

This contention lacks merit and warrants only brief discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2). It is legally irrelevant for purposes of this appeal whether the victim's 

death resulted ultimately from strangulation by ligature or suffocation. The 

State adduced evidence the victim was subjected to both forms of lethal force, 

as well as to stabbing and beating. In these circumstances, defendant's 

culpability as an active participant in this brutal crime does not depend on which 

of these types of lethal force finally caused the victim's death. The State was 

permitted, in other words, to present multiple "theories," to use defendant's 

characterization. Any objection made by counsel on the grounds defendant now 

posits would have been frivolous. We therefore affirm the denial of PCR on this 

contention substantially for the reasons succinctly explained by Judge Kelly. 

IX.

We turn next to defendant's contention that counsel was ineffective in 

advising him not to testify at trial. He further argues that the PCR court should 

have convened an evidentiary hearing to examine counsel's basis for advising 

defendant not to testify. We agree with the PCR court that defendant has failed 

to establish a prima facie case warranting an evidentiary hearing much less 

grounds for a new trial. 
33 A-1446-18T4

Defendant claims he told his attorney he wanted to testify on his own 

behalf in order to rebut the State's "lies," but his attorney advised him not to take 

the stand because that would increase the chance of conviction. Defendant 

acknowledges on appeal that in the statement he gave to police, he admitted to 

being a gang member and also admitted to being present at the murder scene. 

He now contends that had he testified at trial, he would have acknowledged that 

he assaulted Hawkins but was outside the house when the gang leader came by 

to kill Hawkins. He also maintains that his credibility as a witness would have 

swayed the jurors. 

These assertions are unpersuasive. We do not believe that counsel was 

ineffective in advising defendant not to testify. As the PCR judge correctly 

ruled, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success under 

the Strickland two-pronged test. Defendant therefore has not established a prima 

facie case warranting a hearing to expand the record. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463. 

The testimony that defendant now claims he would have given would only have 

corroborated the State's proofs that he had beaten Hawkins shortly before his 

death. Defendant also would have been subject to cross-examination as to the 

timing and sequence of events that might further have exposed his culpability. 

We therefore conclude that counsel's advice was sound strategy that we decline 
34 A-1446-18T4

to second guess. See Norman, 151 N.J. at 37 ("'Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 

performance must be highly deferential,' and must avoid viewing the 

performance under the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689)). 

We further conclude that defendant has failed to establish the second 

Strickland prong. Despite defendant's confidence in his ability to sway the 

jurors, he has not established that it is reasonably likely that had he testified and 

admitted that he had beaten Hawkins but did not intend for him to die, the trial 

verdict would have been more favorable. 

We add with respect to the potential prejudicial effect of counsel's advice 

that the record clearly shows that defendant was told that the decision whether 

to testify was his and his alone to make. The trial court engaged defendant in 

an appropriate colloquy on the record during which the judge made clear that 

defendant had the right to testify on his own behalf notwithstanding the 

recommendation of his counsel. Defendant unequivocally stated that he did not 

wish to testify. In these circumstances, defendant is hard pressed to show that 

he was in any way prejudiced by his attorney's advice. 
35 A-1446-18T4

X.

Defendant next claims counsel was ineffective by failing to object to a 

hearsay statement made at trial by Investigator Tulane. During direct 

examination, the prosecutor asked the investigator where she had received 

information that defendant placed the plastic bag on Muriah Huff's head. The 

investigator answered that one of the female gang members, Shatara Carter, had 

implicated defendant while testifying at trial for another defendant, Clive Hinds. 

Defense counsel did not object to this hearsay testimony. Instead, he used 

Tulane's hearsay statement in an attempt to discredit her competence and 

objectivity, and to highlight the absence of forensic evidence against his client. 

During cross-examination, counsel questioned Tulane on this issue and induced 

her to admit there was no physical evidence linking defendant to the bag used 

to suffocate Huff, only statements of other witnesses. During this crossexamination, Tulane also indicated that Clive Hinds also implicated defendant 

in Huff's death. After Tulane testified that Hinds linked defendant to the plastic 

bag, defense counsel attacked the credibility of that statement, noting that Hinds 

was also charged with murder, did not provide the statement under oath, and the 

statement had not been subject to cross-examination.
36 A-1446-18T4

In his summation, counsel attacked the credibility of the statement 

Investigator Tulane relied upon. Counsel noted that the State had called other 

witnesses, including Shatara Carter, who testified that someone other than 

defendant placed the plastic bag over Huff's head. Counsel further argued to the 

jury that the State had not called Hinds as a witness. 

The PCR court noted that a timely objection to Investigator Tulane's 

hearsay testimony might have better served defendant's interests. After 

reviewing the record as a whole, and given the benefit of hindsight, we agree 

with that observation. Cf. Norman, 151 N.J. at 37 (cautioning reviewing courts 

to avoid judging counsel's performance under the "distorting effects of 

hindsight." (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). But we also agree with the 

PCR judge that the decision not to object to the hearsay statement was a 

reasonable strategic choice when viewed in the context of counsel's cross 

examination of Tulane and his closing arguments challenging her credibility and 

investigative prowess. Allowing the jury to hear about Hind's assertion via 

Tulane provided an opportunity for the defense to expose the investigator's 

reliance upon self-interested sources of information. It also enabled counsel to 

argue that Tulane relied on statements made by a witness the prosecutor did not 

present before the jury. 
37 A-1446-18T4

In view of the high degree of deference afforded to trial counsel in making 

such strategic choices, we conclude that defendant has failed to overcome either 

the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, or the closely 

related presumption that the challenged action "'might be considered sound trial 

strategy.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). 

XI.

Defendant next contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to the State's motion to dismiss two counts of the 

indictment pertaining to the rope used in the course of killing Muriah Huff. This 

contention lacks sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in this opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

The indictment identified the rope as a weapon used against Muriah Huff 

and charged defendant with possession of the rope and possession for an 

unlawful purpose. The prosecutor moved to dismiss those weapons counts at 

the conclusion of the State's case in recognition that the State had presented no 

testimony that defendant possessed the rope. The record shows that defendant 

considered whether to object to the dismissal but elected not to do so when the 

judge explained that if counsel objected and commented on the dismissal in his 
38 A-1446-18T4

summation, the prosecutor would be permitted to respond to the defense 

argument in the State's summation. We conclude, as did the PCR court, that 

counsel's election to refrain from objecting in these circumstances was a 

strategic decision that falls within the range of reasonable professional 

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

XII.

We turn next to defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective by 

failing to thoroughly investigate and call three witnesses to testify at trial: 

Donald Williams, Clive Hinds, and Arnetta Welch. As to these contentions, 

Judge Kelly found that defendant had established the need to expand the record. 

The PCR court thereupon convened an evidentiary hearing that was conducted 

over the course of three days. 

We note that the standard of review we apply is more limited when a PCR 

judge holds an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 ("Our 

standard of review is necessarily deferential to a PCR court's factual findings 

based on its review of live witness testimony."). We also have already 

acknowledged the deferential standard that applies under Strickland analysis 

when reviewing an attorney's decision whether to call a witness. See Arthur, 

184 N.J. at 321 (opining that a PCR court's review of counsel's decision whether 
39 A-1446-18T4

to call a witness must be "highly deferential" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689)).

A.

Because our review is necessarily fact-sensitive, we address defendant's 

ineffective assistance claims with respect to each potential witness separately. 

We begin with defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing 

to properly investigate the potential testimony of Donald Williams. Williams 

certified that he was outside the house smoking marijuana with defendant during 

the murders and "never heard [defendant] threaten or kill anyone." Defendant 

thus contends Williams would have served as an alibi witness. 

At the evidentiary hearing, both defendant and his trial counsel testified 

that defendant informed counsel that defendant was outside smoking marijuana 

with Williams at the time of the murders. Counsel testified that he believed that 

Williams' version was inconsistent with the testimony expected from other 

witnesses in the case. Counsel candidly acknowledged, however, that he did 

not perform a complete investigation with respect to Williams' potential 

testimony. 

Judge Kelly found that counsel's failure to perform a thorough 

investigation into whether Williams might have provided helpful testimony was 
40 A-1446-18T4

unreasonable and amounted to ineffective assistance. We agree with the PCR 

judge that defendant has established the first prong of the Strickland test. Our 

focus thus turns to whether defendant has also established that he suffered 

prejudice by the failure to call Williams as a defense witness at trial. 

Both Williams and defendant testified at the PCR evidentiary hearing. As 

Judge Kelly emphasized in his factual findings, their versions of events were not 

consistent. Williams testified he and defendant were smoking marijuana in 

Williams's car for about an hour outside the house in which Hawkins and Huff 

were murdered. Williams testified that no one exited the house to talk to 

defendant and that once they were done smoking marijuana, defendant went into 

the house and did not come back out. Williams then left. 

The version of events defendant presented in his PCR hearing testimony 

was very different. Defendant testified that while he was in the car with 

Williams, the gang leader exited the house, told defendant something happened 

inside the home, and instructed defendant to go inside. Defendant testified that 

when he went inside, he learned the murders had occurred. He then went outside 

to tell Williams what happened. 

The PCR court found that, "given these inconsistencies, Williams would 

have been a poor alibi witness. His version of events place defendant at the 
41 A-1446-18T4

property and in fact inside Berkley Street at the time of the murders and gave 

him ample opportunity to participate." Judge Kelly concluded that, "if Mr. 

Williams in fact had been called as a witness, he would have tremendously 

harmed [defendant's] position." 

Our own review of the record supports Judge Kelly's finding that Williams 

would have been a weak alibi witness at best, especially because the timeline he 

presented gave defendant ample time to participate in the murders. As the PCR 

court aptly noted, Williams's testimony would have placed defendant at the 

scene of the crime smoking a copious quantity of marijuana. We therefore 

affirm the PCR court's ruling that defendant failed to establish that it is 

reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different had 

Williams testified for the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also State v. 

Drisco, 355 N.J. Super. 283, 291 (App. Div. 2002) ("Counsel's fear that a weak 

alibi could cause more harm than good is the type of strategic decision that 

should not be second guessed on appeal."). 

B.

Hinds testified at the evidentiary hearing that defendant was outside the 

house at the time the murders were committed inside. However, it is highly 

unlikely that Hinds would have been available to testify at defendant's trial, and 
42 A-1446-18T4

even if he were, his credibility as a defense witness would have been impeached 

by prior statements he gave to police that inculpated defendant in the killings. 

After reviewing the record, we affirm the PCR court's conclusion that defendant 

has not established either prong of the Strickland test by his counsel's failure to 

secure Hinds as a trial witness. 

At the time of defendant's trial, Hinds's own trial conviction arising from 

the Hawkins and Huff homicides was pending on appeal. Defendant's trial 

counsel testified at the PCR evidentiary hearing that he would not have been 

able to call Hinds as a witness without consulting with Hinds's appellate 

attorney. Counsel testified that he "could not imagine that [Hinds's] appellate 

counsel would have given [Hinds] favorable advice about testifying at 

[Leonce's] trial." 

Judge Kelly concurred with that assessment. The PCR court observed, 

"[o]bviously, testimony given in court [at defendant's trial], when [Hinds] chose 

not to testify in his own trial, would have harmed [Hinds] going forward in his 

appellate work." The court concluded that "no competent counsel would have 

allowed [Hinds] to testify." 

We agree that it is unlikely that Hinds's appellate counsel would have 

allowed Hinds to testify at defendant's trial while his own appeal was still 
43 A-1446-18T4

pending. Importantly for purposes of our application of the Strickland/Fritz test, 

defendant has not produced any evidence in the form of a certification or 

affidavit from Hinds's appellate counsel to suggest that Hinds would have 

testified had he been subpoenaed by defendant's counsel. Defendant has thus 

failed to show that Hinds was available to present an alibi defense at defendant's 

trial.

In these circumstances, we do not believe that defendant's counsel was 

ineffective for failing to secure Hinds as a trial witness. But even assuming that 

counsel was constitutionally derelict in his efforts to secure Hinds' testimony, 

we conclude, as did Judge Kelly, that defendant has failed to show that he 

suffered prejudiced from counsel's performance. We reach this conclusion for 

two independent reasons. First, as noted, defendant has failed to show that it is 

reasonably probable that more diligent efforts by his attorney would have 

secured Hinds as a trial witness. To the contrary, it is reasonably probable that 

more diligent efforts by counsel would have been unavailing.

Second, even if Hinds had been available as a witness, his testimony 

would not have been likely to change the trial outcome because his credibility 

as an alibi witness would have been severely undermined by inconsistent 

statements he had previously given to police. For example, Hinds had 
44 A-1446-18T4

previously stated that defendant was second in command of the gang and had 

encouraged the female gang members to kill Huff. Hinds also told Investigator 

Tulane that defendant was one of the individuals who tried to strangle Huff. 

Judge Kelly considered Hinds's PCR hearing testimony in light of his prior 

inconsistent statements and concluded that, "[d]efendant cannot show that the 

jury would have credited any testimony of [Hinds] over the other witnesses' 

testimony." We add that Judge Kelly's credibility assessment was based in part 

of his ability to observe Hind's evidentiary hearing testimony. We therefore 

accept the PCR court's finding and conclude that defendant has failed to 

establish the second prong of Strickland with respect to the failure to call Hinds 

as a witness. 

C.

We next address defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to call codefendant Welch's mother, Arnetta Welch. Ms. Welch, who rented and 

resided in the house where the killings occurred, provided a certification 

claiming that she had been willing to testify that she did not see defendant 

assaulting Muriah Huff. She also claimed in her certification that defendant's 

trial counsel had never reached out to her. 
45 A-1446-18T4

Ms. Welch did not testify at the PCR evidentiary hearing because she 

could not be located. The PCR judge noted that she also could not be located at 

the time of defendant's trial despite efforts by both the prosecutor and 

defendant's trial counsel to contact her. 

The PCR court also found that had Ms. Welch testified at trial in 

accordance with her PCR certification, her testimony would not have altered the 

outcome. Ms. Welch had previously given a statement to Investigator Tulane 

claiming she did not witness either of the murders. Additionally, Ms. Welch 

was not in her son's bedroom when Hawkins was murdered. Furthermore, she 

had been taken to her own bedroom at an early stage in the assault upon Muriah 

Huff. Presumably, she was removed and isolated to her bedroom so that she 

would not be an eyewitness when the attack on Huff escalated to lethal force. 

Because she did not have opportunity to observe either homicide, she had no 

way of knowing whether, when, and to what extent defendant became involved 

in either attack. Her prior statement to police that she had been isolated in her 

bedroom, in other words, would have impeached any testimony she might have 

given that defendant was not involved in the murders. We therefore affirm the 

PCR court's ruling that it was not reasonably probable that the trial outcome 

would have been different had she testified. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
46 A-1446-18T4

XIII.

Finally, we reach defendant's last contention, raised for the first time on 

appeal in his pro se brief that Darryl Pierre, a fellow gang member involved in 

the murders, is prepared to recant his trial testimony. Because defendant did not 

raise this newly discovered evidence claim in his PCR petition, he is 

procedurally barred from raising it in this appeal. As a general proposition, 

appellate courts "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented 

to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless 

the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or 

concern matters of great public interest." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 

(2009) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). The 

reliability and potential impact of Pierce's possible recantation is not an issue 

that goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Nor is it a matter of great public 

interest within the meaning of this basic principle of appellate practice and 

procedure.

Aside from any procedural bar, we decline to exercise original jurisdiction 

in determining whether Pierre's anticipated recantation is reliable and whether 

it would have had an impact on the verdict in view of the of the other evidence 

adduced by the State. See State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 142 (2012) (explaining 
47 A-1446-18T4

that Rule 2:10-5 allows an appellate court to exercise original jurisdiction, but 

by exercising original jurisdiction, the court "would be addressing an 

evidentiary matter that should be addressed, on the record, in the first instance, 

by the [trial] court"); see also State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 427 (1976) ("Courts 

generally regard recantation testimony as suspect and untrustworthy." (citation 

omitted)).

Any additional arguments raised by defendant on appeal that we have not 

already addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.