### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 4, 200 4

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . RONALD BOW MAN

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-01525 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2003-02389-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Janu ary 13, 2005

G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J

. , d i s s en t i n g.

Be caus e I b el i ev e that the trial court er red by failing to char g e fr audulent use of a drive r’s license a s a lesser

included off

ense of identity theft, and be cause I

cannot conclude that the err or wa s harmless b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t, I w o u ld r e v e r s e th e d e f e n d a n t’ s c o n v ic ti o n a n d r e ma n d the matter for a new trial.

I nitially , citing T ennesse e Code Annota ted sec tion 40-18-110(c ), the state c ontends that be c a us e the de fe nd a nt f

a ile d to re qu e st the ins truc tio n o f l e sse r inc lud e d off e ns e s in w ri tin g pr ior

to tr ia l a nd fa ile d to pr e se nt the iss ue in his mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l, it is wa ive d. Ge ne ra lly
, the fa ilu re to prese nt an issue in a mot i o n for ne w trial re sults in waiver. Rule 3(e ) of the T ennesse e Rules of Ap p el l at e P ro cedure provide s that for a ppeals “ in all case s tried by a jury , no issue prese nted for revie w shall be pre dicated upon e rror in the admission or exclusion of evidence , jury instructions
g rante d or re fused, . . . or other ground upon which a new tria l is sought, unless the same was specific ally

stated in a motion for a

new tria l; otherwise such issues will be trea ted as waived.” See also State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding t hat a defe ndant re linquishes the rig ht t o ar gu e o n ap peal a ny issues that should have bee n prese nted in a motion for new trial). Whether prope rly

assig ned or not, howe ver, this court may consider pla in error

upon the re cord under Rule 52( b) of the T ennesse e R u l es o f C riminal Procedur e. State v. Og le, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1984)

.

B e fo re a n e rr or ma y be so re c og nize d, it m us t be “ pla in” a ndmus t a ff e c t a “ su bs ta nti a l r ig ht” of the a ccuse d. The wor d “plain” is sy nony mous with “clea r” or equivalently

“obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Plain er ror is not mere ly err or that is conspicuous, but

es p e c ia ll y e g r e g io u s e rr o r th a t s trik e s a t th e f a irn e s s , in te g r it y , o r p u b li c r e p u tati o n o f judicial
proce eding s. See State v. Wo o d en, 658 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). I n State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) , this court define d “substantial rig ht” as a rig ht of “funda mental proportions in the indictment pr ocess, a rig ht to the proof of e very element of the off ense and

. . . constitutional in nature .” I n that case , this c ourt established five fac tors to be

app lie d in de te rm ini ng wh e the r a n e rr or is p la in:-2-

(a ) T he re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli sh wh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ou rt ; (b ) a c le ar a ndun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w m us t ha ve be e n b re a c he d; (c ) a su bs ta nti a l r ig ht o f the a c c us e d mu st h a ve be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d; (d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or must be " nece ssary to do substantial just ice.

I d. at 641-42. Our supreme court char acte rized the Adkisson te st a s a “cl ea r a n d m eaningf ul standard” and empha siz ed that ea ch of the five fa ctors must be prese nt be fore an err or qualifies a s plain err or. State v. S mith, 24 S.W .3d 274, 282-83 (Te nn. 2000). The right to jury instructions on lesser inc luded offe nses is based, in lar g e measure, upon the consti tutional right to trial by jury . See Te nn . Co ns t. a

rt . I , § 6; Sta te v. B ow le s, 52 S.W. 3d 69
, 77 (T e nn

. 20 01 ). Th e e rr on e ou s f a ilu re to char g e the a

ppropriate lesser i n cl u d ed offe nses may qualify as “pla in” when the err or ca nnot be classified a s harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt. Cf. State v. Be n Mills, No. W 1999-01175-CCAR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, May 3, 2002) (er roneous f ailure to provide jury

instructions on lesser inc luded offe nses did not q u al i fy as plain er ror whe re the err or could be classified a s harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt).

The que stion of whether

a g iven offe nse should be submitt ed to the jury as a le sser include d offe nse is a mix ed question of law and fact. State v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Smil ey , 38 S.W .3d 521 (Tenn. 2001)). The standard of revie w for mixed questions of law and fa ct is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. I d.; se e also State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. The trial court has a duty “to give a complete cha rg e of the law applica

ble to the fa c ts o f a c a se .” Sta te v. Ha

rb iso n, 70 4 S. W.2 d 3 14 , 3 19 (T e nn . 1 98 6) ; see a lso Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 30.

I n Burns, our supreme court adopted a modified version of the Model Penal Code in order to determine w hat constitutes a lesser included off

ense:

An offe nse is a lesser

included off

ense if: (a) all of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the statutory el em ents of the offe nse cha

rg ed; or (b ) i t f a ils to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in p art (a ) o nly in th e respe c t th a t it c on ta ins a statutory element or

elements e stablishing (1) a differ ent mental state indicating a lesser kind of c ulpability ; and/or (2 ) a le ss se ri ou s harm or ris k of harm to the sa me pe rs on , p ro pe rt y or pu bli c int e re st,

or (c) it consists of (1) f a c il it a ti o n o f th e o f

f e n s e c h ar g e d o r o f a n o f f e n s e th a t o th e r w is e meets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (2) a n attempt to c ommit the offe nse char g ed or an offe nse that otherw ise meets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (3) solicitation to commit the offense char g ed or an offense tha t otherwise mee ts the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b)

.-3-

6 S.W .3d at 466-67.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt ha s a du ty to ins truc t the jury a s to a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e if : ( 1) re a so na

ble minds could acc ept the off ense a s lesser include d; and (2) the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support a convic tion for the lesser included offe nse. Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 469; see a lso St ate v. L ang ford, 994 S.W .2d 126, 128 (Tenn. 1999) . Moreove r, our supre me court has held that trial courts “ must provide an instruction on a lesse r-include d offe nse supported by the evidenc e eve n if such instruction is not

c on sis te nt w ith the the ory of the Sta te or of the de fe ns e . T he e vid e nc e , n ot the pa rt ie s, c on tr ols wh et h eran i n s t ru ct i o n i s re q u i r e d

. ” S t a t e v

. Al l en , 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 1
, 1 8 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ). Ou r h i gh

c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t the “

jury is not re qu ir e d to bel ie ve a ny e vid e nc e of

fe re d b y the Sta te ,” a ndhe ld that the authority

of the j u ry t o convict on a le sser-inc luded offe nse may not be taken a way , even wh e n p ro of

su pp ortin g the e lemen t di sti ng uis hin g the g re a te r o ff e ns e fr om the le sse r o ff

e ns e is
uncontrove rted. I d. at 189.

I disa g re e wi th the ma

jority ’s c on c lus ion that f

ra ud ule nt u se of

a dr ive r’ s li c e ns e is n ot a lesser inc luded offe nse of identity theft. B eca

use all the e lemen t s o f fraudulent use of a drive r’s license a re inc luded wit hin the statutory elements of ide ntitytheft, it is myview that it qualifies as a lesser included off

ense unde r part (a) of

the B urns test. As the m aj o ri t y n o t es, the off ense of identity theft is committed w hen a person “knowing ly transfe rs or uses, without lawful authority , a means of ide ntification of anothe r per son with the intent to commit, or otherw ise promote, ca rry on, or fa cilitate any

unlawful a ctivity .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14-150( a). Fraudule nt use of a driver’s license oc curs whe n a per son “[d] isplay [s] or represe nt[ s] as [ his] own any driver lice nse not issued to such person.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 50-601(3)

. The offense of identity theft re quires a know ing mental st at e. Be ca use no mens re a is specif ied in the fra

udulent use of a

driver’ s license statute, knowledg e or r eckle ssness would suffice to establish the culpable mental state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 3 0 1 ( c ) ( “ I f th e d e f in itio n o f a n o f

f e n s e w ith in th is ti tl e d o e s n o t p la in ly d ispe nse with a mental eleme nt, intent, knowledg e or r eckle ssness suffice s to establish the culpable me ntal state.”)

. Thus, there is no differe nce in the e lement of intent. See State v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 430 (Tenn. 2001) (“ [A] n intent element which dif fer s from the intent e lement of the char g ed offe nse only by one

o f t h e s e l o w e r

- h i e r ar c h y m e n t a l s t a t e s i s n o t a c t u a l l y t r e a t e d a s a d i f f e r i n g e l e m e n t

. ” )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y,

a s a n a c t, “ dis play ing or

re pr e sent in g [a

dr ive r’ s li c e ns e of

a no the r p e rs on ] as on e ’s ow n” wo uld seem to be w holly

encompa ssed by

the broa d lang uag e of the identity theft statute “use [] . . . of a means of identification of another person.” Acc ording ly
, it is my conclusion t hat t he trial court err ed by failing to char g e the jury on the lesser

included off

ense of fraudulent use of a

driver’ s license.

Next, in Allen, our hig h court c oncluded that whe n the trial court improperly fails to instruct

on a le sse r inc lud e d off

e ns e , the ha

rm le ss e rr or

inq uiry is the sa me a s f

or oth e r c on sti tut ion a l e rr or s: wh e the r it app e ars be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t that the e rr or did no t a ff e c t the ou tc ome of the tr ia l. 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d at 1 9 1

. I n m ak i n g t h i s d et er m i n at i o n , “are v i ew i n g co u rt s h o u l d co n d u ct a t h o ro u gh examina t i o n o f t h e record, inc luding the e vidence prese nted at trial, the de fenda nt’s theory of de fe ns e , a ndthe ve rd ic t r e turne d b y the jury .” I d. I n thi s c a se , wh ile the e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o support the conviction, it was less than ove rwhe lming. I n the i ndictment, the def endant wa s char g ed with knowingly

using the identification of a not h er “t o

. . . avoid[] a court appea ranc e.” T he-4-

testimonyof Off

icer C l ar k es t ab lished that the defe ndant pre sented he r with his father ’s driver ’s license a nd that she issued a ci t at i o n i n the name of his father . The c itation, however , was for a moving violation, driving an unreg istered vehicle, that permitted pay ment of a fine in lieu of a c ourt appea ranc e. The re w as no direc t evidence of the defe n d an t ’s motive in presenting his father ’s driver’ s license to the office r. Under these c ircumstance s, where a court appea ranc e wa s one of two options available to the de fenda nt in handling the c itation, I canno t co nclude that the trial court’s f a i l u r e t o c h ar g e f

r a u d u l e n t u s e o f

a d r i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e d i d n o ta f f e c tt h e o u t c o m e o f

t h e t r i a l

. In conseque nce, I believe that the error would qua lify as “pla in,” See Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 641-42,

a ndthat th e de fe nd a nt i s e nti tle d to a ne w t ri a l in c lud ing a n in str

uc tio n o n th e le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e of fr audulent use of

a drive r’s lice nse.

_______________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE