ORDER – PAGE 1 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 DALLAS DIVISION 

R.M., § 

 § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1789-N 

 § 

JOSHUA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL § 

DISTRICT, § 

 §

 Defendant. § 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 This Order addresses Defendant Joshua Independent School District’s (“Joshua 

ISD”) motion to dismiss [3]. Because Plaintiff R.M. pled facts sufficient to state a claim 

for intentional discrimination under section 504, the Court denies the motion. 

I. ORIGINS OF THE MOTION

 This case arises out of a dispute regarding the alleged failure to provide educational 

accommodations to a fifteen-year-old student with an intellectual disability. Compl. ¶ 1 

[1]. During R.M.’s time in elementary school, Joshua ISD provided special education 

services at her home campus and placed her with other students who could act as positive 

behavioral models. Id. ¶ 2. When R.M. entered middle school in the fall of 2021, Joshua 

ISD placed her in a functional academics classroom at a different campus catering to 

students who had behavioral difficulties. Id. ¶ 4. Although R.M. typically does not exhibit 

behavioral issues, exposure to misbehaving peers disrupts R.M.’s stable growth. Id. 

R.M.’s parents removed her from special education and petitioned Joshua ISD for 

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ORDER – PAGE 2 

accommodations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. ¶ 5. R.M.’s 

parents asked to place her in the home campus with appropriate support and 

accommodations to facilitate her education. Id. Joshua ISD’s counterproposal would place 

R.M. in the functional academics classroom in her home campus. Id. R.M.’s parents 

rejected this proposal. Id. R.M. remained in the general education program without 

accommodations or services. Id. 

 In August 2021, R.M.’s parents filed an administrative due process complaint 

pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) based on Joshua 

ISD’s failures to provide appropriate services. Id. ¶ 6. The administrative hearing officer 

dismissed the claims on the basis that R.M.’s removal from special education deprived the 

officer of jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Id. ¶ 6. R.M. struggled academically during 

the 2021-2022 academic year due to the lack of appropriate support. Id. ¶ 19. R.M., by 

and through her next friends, D.M. and R.R., filed suit seeking injunctive relief to place 

R.M. in her home campus in the general education program with appropriate 

accommodations, compensatory educational hours, and costs and fees. Joshua ISD now 

moves to dismiss R.M.’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. Rule 12(b)(6) LEGAL STANDARD

 When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether 

the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 

42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court 

must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the 

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v. 

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ORDER – PAGE 3 

Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial 

plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true 

and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. 

Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must provide “more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that 

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). 

III. THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO DISMISS

 The Court denies Joshua ISD’s motion to dismiss because R.M.’s parents did not 

refuse to consent to services, and R.M. has sufficiently pled intentional discrimination 

under section 504. 

A. R.M.’s Parents Did Not Refuse to Consent to 

Services Under IDEA and Section 504 

 Joshua ISD argues that because R.M.’s parents revoked their consent, R.M. did not 

qualify for services under IDEA or the section 504 program. Mot. to Dismiss 3 [3] (citing 

34 C.F.R. § 300.300). At this stage of litigation, the Court must construe the allegations 

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ORDER – PAGE 4 

regarding the declination of services in R.M.’s favor. Gines, 699 F.3d at 816. The 

complaint states that R.M.’s parents “refused the proposal,” and R.M. “was forced to attend 

the general education classroom”; the Court infers that R.M.’s parents intended to continue 

negotiations over the appropriate accommodations and did not decline section 504 services 

altogether. Compl. ¶ 17. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss. 

B. R.M. Sufficiently Pleads Intentional Discrimination Under Section 504 

Joshua ISD further argues that the complaint’s allegations regarding intentional 

discrimination are conclusory. The Court disagrees. The complaint provides a litany of 

details to support the allegation of intentional discrimination. Joshua ISD provided 

services to R.M. at her home campus in general education classrooms throughout 

elementary school and presumably had knowledge of her stable educational development. 

See id. ¶ 14. But Joshua ISD provided R.M.’s parents no basis for changing this framework 

that benefited R.M. for many years. Id. ¶ 15. Joshua ISD provided no explanation before 

removing R.M. from the home campus where her siblings and friends would attend school 

or moving her to a functional academics classroom for students with behavioral difficulties. 

When R.M.’s parents raised these concerns and asked for appropriate accommodations 

through a separate program, Joshua ISD proposed the same allegedly problematic 

framework. Id. ¶ 17. The Court can infer bad faith and gross misjudgment from the sudden 

changes, lack of explanation, insistence on the same plan despite parental concerns, and 

the refusal to negotiate or compromise. 

Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded by Joshua ISD's argument that Fifth Circuit 

precedent undermines R.M’s claims. The Fifth Circuit has allowed placement on campuses 

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with centralized services in cases where the “child may have to travel farther ... to obtain 

better services.” Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M., 91 F.3d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 

1996). But R.M. alleges that Joshua ISD decided to move R.M. to a separate campus solely 

for the district’s convenience rather than any benefit to R.M. Compl. ¶ 15. Construing the 

complaint in R.M.’s favor, the Court can infer that the district’s decision demonstrated bad 

faith and gross misjudgment. Accordingly, R.M. has pled sufficient facts to state a claim 

for intentional discrimination under section 504. 

CONCLUSION

 Because R.M. has pled facts sufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the 

Court denies the motion to dismiss. 

 

 Signed November 16, 2022. 

 ___________________________ 

 David C. Godbey 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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