IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

TRAVIS ADAMS AS A/N/F of A.A., §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00695-BP 

 § 

SPRINGTOWN INDEPENDENT §

SCHOOL DISTRICT, §

§ 

Defendant. §

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

In this case, Plaintiff Travis Adams (“Adams”) sues Defendant Springtown Independent 

School District (“SISD”) on behalf of his daughter for alleged violations of her constitutional rights 

and for discrimination based on a disability. ECF No. 8. Now before the Court is SISD’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and supporting Brief. ECF Nos. 13, 14. Adams 

has not filed a Response to SISD’s Motion. 

After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the Court GRANTS

SISD’s Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS LEAVE to Adams to file a Second Amended Complaint 

that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and addresses the deficiencies noted in 

this Opinion on or before December 6, 2022.

I. BACKGROUND

The following alleged facts are taken from Adams’s Amended Complaint and constitute 

the entirety of his claims. ECF No. 8. A.A. was a student at Springtown High School. ECF No. 8 

at 1. She had a disability, and the school was aware of her disability. Id. On January 31, 2022, a 

fellow student bullied A.A., she had a severe emotional reaction to this bullying, and she was 

unable to return to class and continue with her academic program. Id. A.A. reached out for help to 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 12 PageID 124
2

multiple SISD employees for hours, but they ignored her and did not provide any support. Id. The 

school did not provide her reasonable services or accommodations for her disability so that she 

could return to her academic program. Id. On the same day, A.A. attempted to take her own life. 

Id. A.A.’s family had to sell their home and move so that A.A. could attend a safe school elsewhere. 

Id. Adams alleges that A.A. suffered physical and emotional distress due to SISD’s discrimination. 

Id. at 2. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint for “failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim for relief, 

Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to 

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Rather, 

the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” with 

the court operating “on the assumption that all the complaint’s allegations are true.” Id.

District courts “can grant a motion to dismiss only if it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Scanlan 

v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Leffall v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 

F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)). Thus, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a 

claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must “take all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . and ask whether 

the pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 12 PageID 125
3

Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts may consider documents outside the complaint that 

are: (1) attached to the motion; (2) referenced in the complaint; and (3) central to the plaintiff’s 

claims. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Additionally, 

courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss 

into a motion for summary judgment. See Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 

757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Generally, a court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the 

complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

There exists a “well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state 

a claim.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of 

Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)). It is federal policy to decide cases on the merits 

rather than technicalities, and thus when possible the Fifth Circuit has recommended that suits be 

dismissed without prejudice on Rule 12 motions. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean 

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002); Hines v. Wainwright, 539 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 

1976) (vacating and remanding a Rule 12(c) dismissal with instructions to the district court to 

dismiss without, instead of with, prejudice). As a result, courts generally allow plaintiffs at least 

one opportunity to amend following a Rule 12 dismissal on the pleadings. Great Plains Tr. Co., 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 3 of 12 PageID 126
4

313 F.3d at 329; see In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 997 F. Supp. 

2d 526, 548–49 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Boyle, J.) (dismissing for failure to state a claim without 

prejudice, as dismissing with prejudice would be “too harsh a sanction”); Parker v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., No. 3:16-CV-00892-CWR-FKB, 2017 WL 4287912, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 27, 2017) (“It is 

well-established that plaintiffs who fail to meet their burden on a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings and yet may still have a viable avenue to recover should be granted leave to amend their 

complaint and make their best case.” (citation omitted)).

III. ANALYSIS

Adams sues SISD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), alleging that SISD violated A.A.’s 

constitutional and statutory rights. SISD moves to dismiss all of Adams’s claims under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Adams fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. SISD 

argues that Adams did not sufficiently allege facts that it violated A.A.’s constitutional or statutory 

rights. Further, SISD alleges there are not enough facts to allege an SISD policymaker enacted a 

policy or custom that caused a violation of A.A.’s constitutional rights.

A. Adams does not allege enough facts to state § 1983 claims against SISD for 

substantive, procedural due process, and equal protection violations.

Adams argues that SISD’s policies were inadequate and led to A.A.’s harm. ECF No. 8 at 

10. However, inadequacy of policies and causation of harm do not in themselves prove a 

constitutional violation. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely 

provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510

U.S. 266, 271 (1994). “The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional 

right allegedly infringed.” Id. To state a § 1983 claim, Adams must (1) allege a violation of a right 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 4 of 12 PageID 127
5

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Leffall, 28 F.3d at 525.

i. Procedural Due Process 

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state from depriving an individual of “life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The Procedural Due Process 

clause does not safeguard an infinite number of interests. Instead, a plaintiff alleging deprivation 

of her right to procedural due process must plead two elements: (1) the state interfered with a 

liberty or property interest; and (2) the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were 

constitutionally insufficient. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 

Adams alleges a right to public education and contends that A.A. was “bullied by a fellow 

student... had a severe emotional reaction to this bullying... was unable to return to class and 

continue with her education program.” ECF No. 8 at 1. Adams alleges further that the family had 

to sell their home and “move so that A.A. could attend a safe school elsewhere.” Id. at 1-2. SISD 

acknowledges a right to public education, but argues that the Amended Complaint is “devoid of 

any factual allegations tending to show that a[n] SISD employee deprived A.A. of public education 

without procedural due process.” ECF No. 14 at 3-4. 

The Amended Complaint lacks facts to show how SISD or its policies deprived A.A. of an 

appropriate level of due process. There are no facts to show that A.A.’s family asked for any sort 

of hearing or other right to be heard that SISD denied. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 

Adams only alleges that it took hours for A.A. to receive any help after the bullying incident and 

there are no facts stated about the incident or SISD’s actions in response. ECF No. 8 at 1. 

Accordingly, the Amended Complaint does not allege enough facts to support a procedural due 

process claim. 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 5 of 12 PageID 128
6

ii. Substantive Due Process 

The right to substantive due process protects individuals from the government’s arbitrary 

abuse of power to deprive the individual of liberty or property. Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248,

1256-57 (5th Cir. 1988). “Public officials violate substantive due process rights if they act 

arbitrarily or capriciously.” Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 562-63 (5th Cir.

2003). A public official's actions are arbitrary or capricious when they are not rationally related to 

a legitimate government interest. Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris Cnty., 236 F.3d 240, 251 (5th Cir. 2000).

Adams alleges that A.A.’s constitutional violations were committed under the “color of 

law” and resulted in A.A.’s physical, emotional, and psychological harm and damages. ECF No. 

8 at 11. SISD again responds that merely claiming a violation under the “color of law” without 

showing some “egregious official conduct” or action that “shock[s] the conscience” is not enough 

to survive its Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 14 at 4. 

The Amended Complaint’s limited facts do not satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)’s requirements. 

Adams alleges that SISD employees were acting under color of law, but he does not plead any 

facts supporting a conclusion that they abused their power or acted arbitrarily. ECF No. 8 at 11. 

To the contrary, the SISD Board of Trustee’s policies prohibited bullying, and there is nothing in 

the Amended Complaint that proposes SISD ignored this policy or executed it in an irrational 

manner. This claim is strictly a recital of only one of the elements necessary for a substantive due 

process violation, and Adams pleads no facts to support the alleged violation.

iii. Equal Protection 

To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Adams must allege that A.A. (1) 

“received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals” and (2) “the 

unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist.,

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 6 of 12 PageID 129
7

804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir.

2004)). To establish discriminatory intent, Adams must show “that the decision maker singled out 

a particular group for disparate treatment and selected h[er] course of action at least in part for the 

purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group.” Id.

Adams only alleges that A.A. was discriminated against because of her disability. ECF No. 

8 at 10-11. SISD contends “the Plaintiff does not plead factual allegations reflecting how a district 

employee treated A.A. differently from individuals outside of her suspect class or otherwise treated 

A.A. differently from a similarly situated individual.” ECF No. 14 at 5. 

Disability is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection. Wood v. Katy Indep. Sch.

Dist., No. CV H-09-1390, 2010 WL 11417849, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985)). As pleaded, Adams’s equal protection claim fails

as a matter of law. Because there are not enough facts pleaded showing any of the three underlying 

constitutional violations, Adams’s § 1983 claim on this point must be dismissed. 

B. Adams does not adequately plead municipal liability under § 1983.

To plead municipal liability under § 1983, as is the case against SISD, Adams must allege

“(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force 

behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847

(5th Cir. 2009). 

i. Official Policies

The first element of a § 1983 municipal liability claim requires the plaintiff to show an 

official policy. The definition of “official policy” applies not only to municipalities, but also to 

school districts. Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir. 1995). An “official 

policy” is either “(1) a policy statement officially adopted and promulgated by an official with 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 7 of 12 PageID 130
8

policymaking authority or (2) a persistent, widespread practice of district officials or employees 

that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents district policy.” 

Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992). A municipality’s official policy is:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted 

and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to 

whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, 

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so 

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents 

municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be 

attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom 

that body had delegated policy-making authority.

Id.; Eugene, 65 F.3d at 1304. Plaintiff must specifically identify each policy that allegedly caused 

constitutional violations, and the Court must determine whether each policy or custom is facially 

constitutional or unconstitutional. M.D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 253 (5th Cir. 

2018); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578–79 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Adams specifically identifies two policies in SISD’s Board Policy Manual that allowed for 

SISD’s discriminatory behavior.

Policy FFI (Legal) which states ‘The board shall adopt a policy, 

including any necessary procedures, concerning bullying 

that...Establishes the actions a student should take to obtain 

assistance and intervention in response to bullying (and)...Sets out 

the available counseling options for a student who is a victim 

of...bullying.’

ECF No. 8 at 9. 

Policy FFI (Local) which states ‘Any District employee who 

suspects or receives notice that a student or group of students has or 

may have experienced bullying shall immediately notify the 

principal or designee...When an allegation of bullying is reported, 

the principal or designee shall notify a parent of the alleged victim 

on or before the third business day after the incident is 

reported...The principal or designee shall promptly take interim 

action calculated to prevent bullying during the course of the 

investigation, if appropriate.’

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 8 of 12 PageID 131
9

Id. 

Adams pleads that the Local policy does not provide the immediate support or provision 

of counseling services for a bullying victim. Id at 10. The policy only provides for possible services 

to a bullying victim during the course of an investigation, not at the time the bullying is reported. 

Id. Adams asserts that this policy is “indifferent to the immediate safety issues of bullying victims 

and those victims’ inability to participate in their education program without reasonable services 

and accommodations.” Id. SISD argues that Adams has not established how the provision of 

services during the course of the investigation as opposed to at the outset deprived A.A. of her 

rights to all three pleaded constitutional violations. Adams has properly pleaded an SISD policy 

that relates to A.A.’s claims.

ii. Official Policymaker

The second element of a § 1983 municipal liability claim requires determining whether the 

person acting on behalf of the municipality was an official policymaker. The policymaker must 

have final policymaking authority and take the place of the governing body in a designated area of 

the municipality’s administration. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); 

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984). A municipality’s governing body 

may delegate policymaking authority expressly or implicitly. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 

762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984). Adams pleads that SISD’s Board of Trustees was authorized to adopt the 

Local policy, and SISD does not dispute this point. Under Texas law, an independent school 

district’s final policymaking authority rests with the district's board of trustees. Jett v. DallasIndep.

Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, Adams adequately pleads the element of an 

official policymaker for purposes of his § 1983 claim.

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 9 of 12 PageID 132
10

iii. Policy as Moving Force Behind Constitutional Violations

To show that a policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation, “a plaintiff

must show a direct causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation.” 

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580. For an official policy to be the moving force behind the violation of 

A.A.’s constitutional rights, Adams must show that the policymaker acted with “deliberate 

indifference” to the policy’s known or obvious unconstitutional consequences Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 

of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). To act with deliberate indifference, a state actor 

must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the victim’s health or safety. Id; see McClendon

v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002).

Adams alleges SISD deprived A.A. of her procedural, substantive due process, and equal 

protection rights. ECF No. 8 at 8-9. To support these claims, he alleges that A.A. had a disability, 

the school knew of her disability, she was bullied, she attempted to take her own life because of 

the experience, the family was forced to move schools for a safer environment, and that the SISD 

policies were the cause. ECF No. 8 at 3-4. SISD argues again that Adams has not pleaded facts 

sufficient to support that these policies caused or in any way relate to any of the three constitutional 

claims. ECF No. 14 at 6-7. 

Adams has not properly pleaded that SISD’s policy was a moving force behind a 

constitutional violation because he failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any constitutional 

violations occurred. Nor has he provided any factual support showing that SISD’s policies caused 

A.A.’s harm. Further, the Amended Complaint does not provide allege sufficient facts to allow the 

Court to make a reasonable inference about SISD’s role or fault in what is admittedly a sad set of 

circumstances. Therefore, Adam’s municipal liability claim against SISD under § 1983 also must 

be dismissed. 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 10 of 12 PageID 133
11

C. Adams does not state an ADA or Section 504 claim against SISD.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42

U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... 

shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, or be denied 

the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance....” Wilson v. City of Southlake, 936 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2019). 

The Court applies the same legal standards to the ADA and Section 504, and the same 

remedies are available under both acts. Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010). As a 

result, “[j]urisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.” Hainze v. Richards, 207

F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). To allege a claim under the ADA or Section 504, Adams must plead 

that A.A. (1) was a qualified individual with a disability; and (2) was excluded from participation 

in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of her public education, or was 

otherwise subjected to discrimination; (3) solely because of her disability. Id.

Adams alleges in the Amended Complaint that A.A. is a student with disabilities and SISD, 

knowing her disability, failed to make accommodations related to its policy on bullying. ECF No. 

8 at 1-2. SISD argues that the current pleadings lack any of the essential elements required for 

A.A. to recover on these claims. ECF No. 7-8. 

As with Adams’s constitutional claims, the Amended Complaint contains scant facts to 

support Adams’s legal assertions. Adams does not state what disability A.A. has, what 

accommodations she requested and did not receive, and how SISD’s bullying policies impacted

her disability or requested accommodations. Further, Adams alleges no facts supporting that any 

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 11 of 12 PageID 134
12

exclusion or discrimination was due to A.A.’s disability. Finally, Adams does not allege that any 

SISD employee knew that the Board of Trustee’s policies regarding bullying would lead to 

discrimination against A.A. due to her disability. Therefore, Adams has not pleaded facts to show

that anyone at SISD disregarded an excessive risk to A.A.’s safety. The Amended Complaint 

provides ample legal definitions and conclusions, but none of the allegations satisfy the Rule 

12(b)(6) requirements. The facts as presented do not allow the Court to reasonably infer that there 

was any SISD misconduct or that SISD caused A.A. to be deprived of her constitutional or 

statutory rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the undersigned GRANTS SISD’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13), 

and GRANTS LEAVE to Adams to file a Second Amended Complaint that complies with the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and addresses the deficiencies noted in this Opinion on or before 

December 6, 2022. If Adams files such a conforming Second Amended Complaint within that 

time period, the Court will DENY the Motion to Dismiss as moot, and the action will proceed on 

the Second Amended Complaint. If Adams does not do so, the action will be DISMISSED. 

Further, because Adams filed an amended complaint in response to SISD’s First Motion to 

Dismiss (ECF No. 6), the Court DENIES the First Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) as moot.

It is so ORDERED on November 22, 2022. 

______________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:22-cv-00695-BP Document 17 Filed 11/22/22 Page 12 of 12 PageID 135