In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 13-3302 

YAROSLAV S. SKLYARSKY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

MEANS-KNAUS PARTNERS, L.P., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13 C 6707 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge. 

______________________ 

No. 14-2768 

YAROSLAV S. SKLYARSKY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

HARVARD MAINTENANCE, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13 C 859 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge. 
2 Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 

____________________ 

NO. 13-3302 SUBMITTED AUGUST 18, 2014 

NO. 14-2768 SUBMITTED OCTOBER 30, 2014*

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2015 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. For thirteen years Yaroslav Sklyarsky 

worked as a custodian at a Chicago office building. His employer changed several times during that period, and in 

April 2010 he began working for Harvard Maintenance 

when that company was awarded the building’s contract for 

janitorial services. Almost immediately Harvard supervisors 

began disciplining Sklyarsky. He complained to the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) that Harvard was 

treating him unfairly because of his Ukrainian national 

origin. Sklyarsky was fired in January 2013, and after exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed a pro se lawsuit against Harvard alleging discrimination and retaliation. 

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2, e-3, e-5(f).1 During discovery 

 

* We consolidated these related appeals for resolution. After examining 

the briefs and records, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). 

1 Sklyarsky already was an experienced pro se litigator; previously he 

had filed discrimination suits against two of Harvard’s predecessors. 

See Sklyarsky v. ABM Janitorial Servs.-N. Cent., Inc., 494 F. App’x 619 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant), 
Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 3 

Sklyarsky concluded that the building’s management company, Means-Knaus Partners, had been involved in Harvard’s discriminatory conduct, and he sought leave to join 

Means-Knaus as a defendant. Judge Kocoras, who presided 

over the suit against Harvard, denied that motion, telling 

Sklyarsky that Means-Knaus had “nothing to do with the 

employment contract” and that, if he wanted to sue MeansKnaus, he would have to file a separate action. Sklyarsky did 

that. Judge Gottschall, who was assigned to the new suit 

against Means-Knaus, screened Sklyarsky’s pro se complaint 

and dismissed the action sua sponte. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 

1999). She reasoned that, because Sklyarsky was suing Harvard, the doctrine of claim preclusion foreclosed a separate 

suit against Means-Knaus. Judge Gottschall did not discuss 

the lack of finality of the Harvard litigation or 

Judge Kocoras’s admonishment that Sklyarsky could sue 

Means-Knaus only in a separate action. Judge Kocoras would 

not reconsider after learning about Judge Gottschall’s decision, so Sklyarsky appealed the dismissal of his suit against 

Means-Knaus. While that appeal was being briefed, Harvard 

and Sklyarsky filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Judge Kocoras decided those motions in favor of Harvard, 

and Sklyarsky again appealed. We have consolidated his 

appeals, and we conclude that any procedural missteps were 

harmless. 

 

Sklyarsky v. The Millard Group, Inc., No. 06 C 1590 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (dismissed after settlement). 
4 Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 

The following background is drawn from the evidence at 

summary judgment in Sklyarsky’s suit against Harvard. We 

recount the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Sklyarsky. See Kvapil v. Chippewa County, Wis., 752 F.3d 708, 

712 (7th Cir. 2014); Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 981 (7th Cir. 

2014). 

Sklyarsky first received a written warning for insubordination in August 2010. His supervisor at the time, Violeta Stosic, had gotten pushback from Sklyarsky after assigning him extra work on a day the staff was shorthanded. 

Stosic again cited Sklyarsky for insubordination in October 2011 when he searched for a seniority list in Harvard’s 

office despite being told to stay out. After each written warning, Sklyarsky filed an administrative complaint with the 

EEOC and the IDHR, the first time claiming discrimination 

on the basis of national origin and the second time, retaliation. 

In February 2012, John Karpierz replaced Stosic as 

Sklyarsky’s supervisor. Twice that year Karpierz disciplined 

Sklyarsky for poor performance. The first time was in March 

when Karpierz issued a written warning for not adequately 

cleaning desks in the offices. Then in June, Karpierz gave 

Sklyarsky a one-day suspension, again for inadequate cleaning but also for being “loud and disrespectful.” After this 

suspension Sklyarsky signed a “Last-Chance Agreement” 

conceding that he had displayed “poor performance and 

conduct” and acknowledging that he would be fired immediately if he did so again within a year. Even so, Sklyarsky 

submitted another administrative complaint to the EEOC 

and IDHR. Then around November 2012, in front of 
Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 5 

Sklyarsky’s co-workers, Karpierz mocked his mixed use of 

Ukrainian and Polish. 

The last straw for Harvard was in January 2013 when 

Sklyarsky and co-worker Anders Kusper were disciplined 

by Karpierz for discussing personal matters on the job. 

Kusper received a warning, but Sklyarksy was suspended 

and then told by Harvard’s general manager that he was 

fired because of poor performance and the several disciplinary infractions. Once more Sklyarsky submitted an administrative complaint to the EEOC and IDHR; again he asserted 

discrimination and retaliation. After receiving notice of his 

right to sue, Sklyarsky sued first Harvard and then MeansKnaus under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 

U.S.C. § 1981. 

As noted, Sklyarsky appeals the adverse decision in each 

of his lawsuits. We begin with the case against MeansKnaus. Sklyarsky should have been permitted to join MeansKnaus as a defendant with Harvard because Sklyarsky accused the management company of participating with Harvard in the alleged discriminatory conduct. The district court 

relied on the absence of an employment contract in refusing 

to allow Sklyarsky to join Means-Knaus, but there were open 

fact questions on this point. In any case the absence of an 

employment contract would not have been a sound reason 

for cabining Sklyarsky’s lawsuit against Means-Knaus. A Title VII plaintiff might have joint employers. See Tamayo v. 

Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1088 (7th Cir. 2008); Heinemeier v. 

Chemetco, Inc., 246 F.3d 1078, 1082–83 (7th Cir. 2001); Arculeo 

v. On-Site Sales & Mktg., LLC, 425 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). 

And even if Means-Knaus was not Sklyarsky’s employer and 

did not have a contractual relationship with him, the com-
6 Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 

pany might still have faced liability under Title VII if it was 

affiliated with Harvard. See Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 

F.3d 662, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2013); Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1088;

Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 259–60 (7th Cir. 2001). And, similarly, a third party can be liable under § 1981 for interfering

with the plaintiff’s relationship with his employer. 

See Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 782–83 (7th Cir. 

2006). 

As for the suit against Means-Knaus, dismissal on the 

ground of claim preclusion was in error. The suit against 

Harvard was still pending and thus the interim ruling denying leave to add Means-Knaus as a defendant was not a final 

decision having preclusive effect. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. 

Detrex Corp., 45 F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1995); AVX Corp. v. 

Cabot Corp., 424 F.3d 28, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2005). Moreover, final 

or not, that ruling could not have precluded Sklyarsky from 

acting on the district court’s encouragement to pursue 

Means-Knaus in a later action. See Central States, Se. & Sw. 

Areas Pension Fund v. Hunt Truck Lines, Inc., 296 F.3d 624, 629 

(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that res judicata will not apply “if 

the court in an earlier action expressly reserves the litigant’s 

right to bring those claims in a later action”). Thus the error 

directing Sklyarsky to bring a second suit was compounded 

by dismissing that new suit as barred by the doctrine of 

claim preclusion. 

With hindsight, though, we now know that these errors 

did not prejudice Sklyarsky. His decision to sue MeansKnaus was made based on materials obtained during discovery that led him to conclude that the management company was involved in the alleged discrimination. But in this 
Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 7 

court Sklyarsky concedes that Means-Knaus had no role in 

Harvard’s decision to fire him. Indeed, at his deposition 

Sklyarsky acknowledged that Harvard initiated the adverse 

employment actions and that Karpierz, his supervisor at 

Harvard, was the “main decision-maker.” The evidence 

submitted by both sides at summary judgment supports 

Sklyarsky’s revised understanding of events: All of the 

forms recording his discipline are Harvard documents completed by Sklyarsky’s supervisors, who were other Harvard 

employees. The letter notifying Sklyarsky and his union 

about his dismissal was signed by Harvard’s general manager and is explicit that Harvard had decided to dismiss 

him. No evidence points to Means-Knaus, and Sklyarsky 

does not contend that anything would be accomplished by 

remanding his suit against the management company for 

further proceedings. For that reason we affirm the dismissal 

of the lawsuit against Means-Knaus. 

With that we turn to the grant of summary judgment for 

Harvard. In ruling against Sklyarsky, the district court addressed together his claims under Title VII and § 1981, since 

the same analysis applies to both theories of liability. 

See Hutt v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 

2014); Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th 

Cir. 2014). The judge first reasoned that Sklyarsky could not 

establish discrimination under the direct method of proof, 

see Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2014), 

because his only relevant evidence—Karpierz’s ridicule of 

his mixed use of Polish and Ukranian—was not enough for a 

jury to reasonably find discriminatory animus. Nor could 

Sklyarsky prevail, the judge continued, under the indirect 

method of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792 

(1973). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination un-
8 Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 

der that method, Sklyarsky was required to show membership in a protected class and that he was meeting Harvard’s 

legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse employment 

action, and was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of the protected class. See Ripberger, 773 

F.3d at 879; Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 

2014). Judge Kocoras explained that, so far as the undisputed 

evidence showed, Sklyarsky had not been meeting Harvard’s legitimate employment expectations and was not 

treated less favorably than non-Ukranian coworkers with 

similar disciplinary problems. And, finally, Judge Kocoras 

concluded that Sklyarsky could not prove retaliation because 

he lacked evidence that his administrative complaints 

prompted the progressive discipline, including the loss of 

his job. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 

2517, 2528 (2013). 

Sklyarsky contends that disputed issues of material fact 

preclude assuming that he was not meeting Harvard’s legitimate employment expectations. Sklyarsky explains that he 

was one of the best custodians in the building, had worked 

there for more than a dozen years, and was never the subject 

of complaints from building occupants. As for the warning 

Violeta Stosic issued in October 2011, Sklyarsky asserts that 

reviewing a seniority roster was not against the rules and 

that, concerning this incident, Harvard admitted to the 

EEOC and IDHR that he was meeting its expectations. 

Sklyarsky’s own opinion about his work performance is 

irrelevant. See Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 

740 (7th Cir. 2006); Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 

319, 329 (7th Cir. 2002). And focusing narrowly on the October 2011 incident accomplishes nothing, since Stosic’s warn-
Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 9 

ing did not lead to a loss in pay or change in job status and 

thus was not an adverse employment action. See Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816–17 (7th Cir. 2009); O’Neal v. City of 

Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2004); Oest v. Ill. Dep’t 

of Corrs., 240 F.3d 605, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, 

Sklyarsky stretches the record in saying that Harvard admitted he was meeting its expectations concerning this incident. 

What the defendant actually said in responding to his administrative complaint was that Sklyarsky’s “work performance as a janitor meets its expectations,” though he “repeatedly” had violated the company’s disciplinary rules “by 

committing repeated acts of insubordination.” In his appellate brief Sklyarsky selectively quotes this language to obscure Harvard’s point: Sklyarsky had repeatedly broken 

company rules, even though satisfactorily performing his 

custodial work. And though Sklyarsky is correct that company rules did not explicitly proscribe reviewing a seniority 

list, he did not dispute that he was disciplined after calling a 

supervisor a “nobody” and insisting that he could do what 

he pleased when the supervisor told him not to go into Harvard’s office. Further, by the time of his discharge in 2013, 

Sklyarsky had incurred five reprimands (including two suspensions) in less than three years. He insists that it would 

have been impossible for Karpierz to overhear him talking 

with his co-worker when he was disciplined the final time, 

but Sklyarsky did not dispute that the incident had occurred 

or that Harvard prohibits “interfering with any employee’s 

performance of duties by talking or other distractions during 

normal work hours.” 

Sklyarsky’s inability to show that he was meeting Harvard’s legitimate employment expectations is fatal to his reliance on the indirect method. See Brown v. Advocate S. Sub-
10 Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 

urban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1104–05 (7th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff 

must meet each element of a prima facie case to survive 

summary judgment under indirect method); Coco v. Elmwood 

Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179–80 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). Thus, 

we need not address his challenge to the district court’s conclusion that he did not identify a similarly situated employee 

who was treated more favorably. 

Finally, Sklyarsky asserts that his claims of retaliation 

should have survived summary judgment because, he maintains, he produced sufficient evidence of a causal connection 

between his complaints to the EEOC and IDHR and Harvard’s discipline. On his retaliation claims Sklyarsky proceeded under the direct method, which required him to produce evidence that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, that he suffered a materially adverse action, and that 

Harvard’s desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the adverse action. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528; Milligan v. Bd. of 

Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 388 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court concluded that Sklyarsky could not demonstrate a 

causal connection. Suspicious timing alone rarely establishes 

causation, but if there is corroborating evidence that supports an inference of causation, suspicious timing may permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment. See Coleman v. 

Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2012); Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2005). The only evidence of causation that Sklyarsky presented was suspicious 

timing between the reprimands, suspension, and his dismissal and the administrative complaints he filed. He did not 

identify any other evidence suggesting that his repeated 

administrative complaints motivated the discipline he received. The reprimands by themselves did not constitute 

materially adverse employment actions. See Chaib, 744 F.3d 
Nos. 13-3302 & 14-2768 11 

at 986–87; Brown, 700 F.3d at 1109; Harper v. C.R. England, 

Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 n.31 (7th Cir. 2012). And the six 

months that lapsed between his complaint in December 2011 

and suspension in June 2012 and his complaint later that 

month and his termination in January 2013 is by itself insufficient to support an inference of causation. See Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966–67 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding 

that five-week lapse alone does not support inference of causation); Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir. 

2009) (explaining that adverse action one day after protected 

activity was suspicious timing). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Sklyarsky’s 

suit against Means-Knaus Partners and the grant of summary judgment for Harvard Maintenance.