In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 15‐3308 & 16‐1254

IN THE MATTER OF:

AL‐HAROON B. HUSAIN,

Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2017

____________________

Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and

DEGUILIO, District Judge.

*

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. The Bankruptcy Court for the

Northern District of Illinois disbarred Al‐Haroon B. Husain.

(The court called the step “permanent suspension,” which is

disbarment by another name.) The United States Trustee be‐

gan the proceeding by alleging that Husain’s filings regular‐

ly failed to include debtors’ genuine signatures. The full

bench assigned the disciplinary proceeding to Bankruptcy

                                                  * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
2 Nos. 15‐3308 & 16‐1254

Judge Cox, who held a lengthy hearing and made extensive

findings. In re Husain, 533 B.R. 658 (N.D. Ill. 2015). In addi‐

tion to disbarring Husain, Judge Cox also ordered him to re‐

fund fees he had collected from 18 clients. When he did not

do so, Judge Cox held him in contempt of court.

Husain appealed both the disbarment and the contempt

finding to the district court. It assigned both appeals to the

court’s five‐member Executive Committee, which handles

the court’s disciplinary proceedings. The Executive Commit‐

tee affirmed the order disbarring Husain but dismissed the

appeal from the order holding Husain in contempt. Unfor‐

tunately, the Executive Committee did not transfer the con‐

tempt appeal to a single judge. Yet 28 U.S.C. §158(a) entitles

Husain to review by at least one district judge. We therefore

remand the contempt appeal to the district court for assign‐

ment to, and decision by, a single judge. The disbarment is‐

sue, by contrast, is ready for decision by this court.

The bankruptcy court found that Husain as a matter of

routine:

• Signed clients’ names to documents that the debtors

must verify under penalty of perjury. See 28 U.S.C.

§1746; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008. The signatures pur‐

ported to be the debtors’ own; Husain did not indi‐

cate that someone else was signing for the debtors.

• Copied and reused clients’ signatures, so that they

appeared to have signed documents they had not

seen.

• Applied these forged or copied signatures to docu‐

ments that did not reveal all of the debtors’ assets,

and which the debtors would not have signed had
Nos. 15‐3308 & 16‐1254 3

they seen the documents before they were submit‐

ted to the court.

• Submitted petitions and other documents on behalf

of ineligible debtors (including one Husain knew

lives in Bulgaria rather than Illinois, where Husain’s

multiple filings said he lives).

• Submitted documents that through statistical im‐

probability could not have been honest. For exam‐

ple, in a sample of 110 of Husain’s cases examined

by the U.S. Trustee, schedules in 106 reported that

the debtor had exactly $200 in cash, and in 93 of

these 106 the schedules reported exactly $600 worth

of household goods and $200 worth of clothing. Hu‐

sain testified that these numbers had been furnished

by his clients without his prompting; Judge Cox

found him not credible.

• Submitted documents that omitted material assets.

For example, the court found that the bankruptcy

papers Husain filed (and signed) for Mirza and

Sakeena Baig omitted two pieces of real property,

three motor vehicles, a bank account, a whole‐life

insurance policy, and a retirement account, even

though the Baigs had told him about those assets.

533 B.R. at 670.

• Lied on the stand during the hearing (the judge five

times wrote that Husain was “incredible,” once that

he was “not credible,” and once that he made a

“false statement”). Under oath, Husain denied

many of the facts described above; the judge did not
4 Nos. 15‐3308 & 16‐1254

believe him, and documentary evidence strongly

shows that Husain was lying to the court.

Husain’s brief in this court says that he accepts all of Judge

Cox’s factual findings. He contends nonetheless that they do

not justify disbarment. (In a letter filed after oral argument,

Husain’s lawyer asked for permission to file new briefs that

would contest the judge’s findings of fact. That request is

denied. One set of briefs is all any appellant is entitled to.

Counsel’s conclusion that he made a tactical error does not

justify a do‐over.)

We take Judge Cox’s findings as established and ask:

How can a lawyer who committed extensive perjury in a

disciplinary proceeding argue with a straight face that he is

entitled to remain in the court’s bar? How can a lawyer who

routinely omitted assets from debtors’ schedules expect to

remain in good standing? Husain’s appellate counsel con‐

tends, essentially, that “everyone does it”—for example, that

most filings in consumer bankruptcies contain schedules of

assets with the same numbers, whether or not those num‐

bers are plausible estimates of the debtors’ assets. It ought to

be enough, Husain asserted in the disciplinary proceeding,

to file the same list of assets in case after case and wait for

the Trustee to contest those that seem inaccurate. Judge Cox

emphatically (and properly) rejected that as a proposition

about appropriate practice; by making such an argument

Husain just added to the reasons for his disbarment. Judge

Cox added that most bankruptcy lawyers do not practice the

way Husain did. But suppose this is false. That might mean

that more disciplinary proceedings are in order; it would not

exculpate Husain.
Nos. 15‐3308 & 16‐1254 5

With respect to the forged or copied signatures, Husain

essentially shrugs his shoulders and contends that it just

does not matter whether the debtor has read the papers and

verified their truth. That may be so for some filings, but Rule

1008 enumerates those filings that must be supported by the

debtor’s personal pledge of honesty and accuracy. In the ab‐

sence of the debtor’s signature or other form of verification,

it is impossible to prosecute persons who misrepresent their

assets. A lawyer who tried to insulate clients from liability

for false schedules surely had to know that the responsibility

would fall on his own shoulders.

Husain’s assertion that clients authorized him to sign

their names is unavailing for two reasons: first, Judge Cox

found that many of Husain’s clients had done no such thing;

second, Rule 1008 requires a bankruptcy lawyer to obtain the

debtor’s verification for “[a]ll petitions, lists, schedules,

statements and amendments thereto”. No verification on the

debtor’s oath or affirmation, no valid filing. Husain has nev‐

er tried to reconcile his standard operating practice with the

language of Rule 1008.

One more subject requires a few words. This appeal has

been handled under seal. The briefs and the entire appellate

record have been concealed from public view. Even the ap‐

pellate docket has been sealed.

Our Clerk’s Office noted that the appeals involved a law‐

yer’s disciplinary proceeding and assumed that, because

many disciplinary proceedings initiated by this court are

conducted in confidence, disciplinary appeals also should be

confidential. That assumption is unwarranted. Judge Cox’s

opinion was published. There is no secrecy to maintain, no

reason to depart from the strong norm that judicial proceed‐
6 Nos. 15‐3308 & 16‐1254

ings are open to public view. See, e.g., Baxter International,

Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002). What’s

more, keeping any part of the briefs and record in an appeal

secret requires a judicial order. None was entered in this

case; secrecy was entirely the staff’s doing. All papers in

these appeals must now be placed in the public record, and

in future cases the Clerk’s Office will not seal the docket, the

briefs, or any part of the record without a judicial order.

The judgment disbarring Husain is affirmed. The Exec‐

utive Committee’s order in the contempt appeal is vacated,

and that aspect of the case is remanded for decision by a dis‐

trict judge.