IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lake Naomi Club, Inc. and Pocono :

Pines Community Association, Inc., :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1164 C.D. 2021

:

Eric Rosado and Alice Quinones : Argued: September 14, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge 

OPINION BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: October 28, 2022

Lake Naomi Club, Inc. and Pocono Pines Community Association, Inc.

(together, Associations)1 appeal from the September 14, 2021 Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Monroe County (Trial Court) denying their Post-Trial Motion. 

Following a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Eric Rosado

and Alice Quinones2 and denied the Associations’ request for injunctive relief.

This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania: Can a 

private, planned community adopt a restrictive covenant that prohibits lifetime 

1 Although Lake Naomi Club, Inc. and Pocono Pines Community Association, Inc. are 

distinct entities, as discussed in the Background section of this Opinion, we refer to Appellants 

together as “Associations,” unless we are discussing an action by only one entity.

2 Mr. Rosado and Ms. Quinones were married when they purchased a home in the Lake 

Naomi community in 1998 but have since divorced. Ms. Quinones no longer resides at the Lake 

Naomi property and has not actively participated in this case. On July 11, 2022, this Court entered 

an Order precluding Ms. Quinones from filing a brief and participating in oral argument.
2

registered sex offenders from residing within that community? To date, no 

Pennsylvania appellate court has considered this issue. For the reasons that follow, 

we conclude that a private community may not adopt such a covenant, and, therefore, 

we affirm the Trial Court’s Order.

Background

1. Covenant 14

Lake Naomi is a private, planned community in Tobyhanna Township, 

Monroe County, that is governed by the Uniform Planned Community Act (UPCA), 

68 Pa. C.S. §§ 5101-5414. Pocono Pines Community Association (Pocono Pines) is 

a nonprofit corporation that serves as the homeowners’ association for all deeded 

property owners in the Lake Naomi community, and all deeded owners of property 

in Lake Naomi are Pocono Pines members. Lake Naomi Club, Inc. (LNC) is a 

nonprofit corporation and the deeded owner of all common areas and amenities 

within the community. By operation of a July 11, 1988 deed from Pocono Pines to 

LNC, LNC has the right to enforce Pocono Pines’ Declaration and Covenants and to 

control the common areas and amenities within Lake Naomi.

At Pocono Pines’ 2013 annual meeting, some residents raised concerns about 

a sex offender who was living in Lake Naomi. As a result of these concerns, on 

March 30, 2016, Pocono Pines adopted a restrictive covenant (Covenant 14) 

amending its Declaration. Covenant 14 provides that no registered Tier III sex 

offender “shall occupy or reside in any [l]ot, dwelling, or common area within the 

boundaries of” the Lake Naomi community and “[n]o [unit o]wner or agent of an 

owner shall knowingly allow such a [p]rohibited person to occupy or reside in” the 

community. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 955a. The amendment was recorded on 

May 11, 2016.
3

Prior to adopting the amendment, Pocono Pines sent written ballots regarding 

the amendment to all members, including Mr. Rosado, and more than two-thirds of 

the members approved the amendment. The evidence at trial showed that 94% of 

those who returned ballots, comprising 71% of all unit owners, approved Covenant 

14.3

2. Underlying Criminal Proceedings

On June 9, 2015, a jury convicted Mr. Rosado of indecent assault, endangering 

the welfare of a child, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a minor. The 

convictions stemmed from offenses he committed against his then-seven-year-old 

step-granddaughter in his Lake Naomi home. The Trial Court sentenced Mr. Rosado 

to 30 to 72 months’ incarceration.

On February 10, 2016, Mr. Rosado was convicted in the State of New York 

of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree. The New York conviction 

stemmed from offenses he committed against the same step-granddaughter at his 

apartment in New York City during the preceding two years.

At the time of his convictions, Mr. Rosado was required to register as a Tier 

III sex offender for life in Pennsylvania under the Sexual Offender Registration and 

3 Section 5219(a)(1) of the UPCA provides:

(a) Number of votes required.--

(1) The declaration, including the plats and plans, may be amended only by vote or 

agreement of unit owners of units to which at least:

(i) 67% of votes in the association are allocated; or

(ii) a larger percentage of the votes in the association as specified in the 

declaration; or

(iii) a smaller percentage of the votes in the association as specified in the 

declaration if all units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use.

68 Pa. C.S. § 5219(a)(1).
4

Notification Act (SORNA I), which took effect on December 20, 2012. See former 

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.

4

 Mr. Rosado was also required to register as a Tier 

I sex offender in New York.

On August 23, 2018, Mr. Rosado was released on parole and moved back into 

his Lake Naomi home, subject to supervision by the Pennsylvania Parole Board

(Parole Board). Mr. Rosado’s supervision ended on September 23, 2021, during the 

pendency of this action.

3. Trial Court Proceedings

On November 7, 2018, the Associations hand-delivered a letter to Mr. Rosado 

informing him that, as a registered Tier III sex offender, he was in violation of 

Covenant 14 and requesting that he vacate his Lake Naomi property. On December 

14, 2018, the Associations sent Mr. Rosado a second letter requesting that he vacate 

his property. Mr. Rosado refused to do so.5

On February 5, 2019, the Associations filed in the Trial Court a Complaint in 

Equity, seeking to permanently enjoin Mr. Rosado from residing at his Lake Naomi 

property due to his status as Tier III sex offender. After several rounds of 

preliminary objections, the pleadings were closed on June 2, 2020. The Trial Court 

held a non-jury trial on February 19, 2021, and April 8, 2021. 

4

In 2018, the General Assembly enacted SORNA II, Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, as 

amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, which amended 

SORNA I and added new provisions that became effective immediately. We refer to SORNA I 

and SORNA II together as “SORNA” throughout the remainder of this Opinion.

5 Mr. Rosado, who is now 73 years old, continues to reside in his Lake Naomi home. The 

Trial Court found that “Mr. Rosado is the only person [the Associations] have sued to evict. In 

one other circumstance, a Tier III sex offender leased a [Lake Naomi] home. After being contacted 

by the [Associations], that individual moved out of the community.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/21, 

Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 40.
5

At trial, the Associations presented the testimony of several expert witnesses, 

who testified regarding the recidivism rates of sex offenders and the negative impact 

on property values of a known sex offender living within a community. Trial Ct. 

Op., 7/19/21, F.F. Nos. 32-39. The Pocono Pines community manager also testified 

regarding the child-centered nature of the Lake Naomi community. Trial Ct. Op., 

7/19/21, at 10-11.6

Mr. Rosado defended against the Associations’ action by asserting that 

Covenant 14 is unconscionable and against public policy. He also presented 

evidence that he has fully complied with the requirements of SORNA and his parole 

and has committed no offenses since his release from prison in 2018.

On July 19, 2021, the Trial Court issued its decision, declaring Covenant 14 

void as against public policy and denying the Associations’ request for injunctive 

relief. The Associations timely filed a Post-Trial Motion, seeking a new trial on the 

ground that the Trial Court’s decision was contrary to law and against the weight of 

the evidence. 

On September 14, 2021, the Trial Court denied the Post-Trial Motion. In its 

Opinion, the Trial Court relied extensively on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 

decision in Fross v. County of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193 (Pa. 2011), which held that 

an Allegheny County ordinance that broadly excluded sex offenders from residing 

6 The community manager testified that “[t]he community pool is 1,500 feet from [Mr.] 

Rosado[’s] property and the tennis court is 500 feet away.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/21, at 10-11. She 

also testified:

When Mr. Rosado did not move after Covenant 14 was adopted, Lake Naomi . . . 

publicized his on[]line Megan’s Law registration to members of the community, 

and closed a shuttle bus stop for a children’s summer camp near his property, 

picking up children in that area at their driveways instead.

Id. at 11.
6

in county population centers was preempted by the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 

9701-81, and the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code), 61 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-7301. 

While recognizing that the present case does not involve a municipal ordinance or 

the conflict preemption doctrine, the Trial Court nonetheless reasoned that “the 

Fross decision recognized Pennsylvania’s public policy to reduce recidivism among 

sex offenders and to improve public safety through the parole scheme established by 

the General Assembly.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21, at 3 (emphasis added).

The Trial Court also found that Covenant 14, which amended Pocono Pines’ 

Declaration, “is a contract that has been imposed by [Pocono Pines] on all . . . lot 

owners” and that “the court may refuse to enforce a contract that interferes with 

public policy.” Id. at 4. The Trial Court explained:

[The Associations] . . . attempt[] to distinguish the Fross decision 

by arguing that [Covenant 14] supports the predominate public policy 

[of] the protection of children, citing a passage from Pennsylvania State 

System of Higher Education [PASSHE], Lock Haven University v. 

Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties, 

193 A.3d 486, 499 (Pa.[]Cmwlth.[]2018) (“We agree with PASSHE 

that a well-defined and dominant public policy exists in Pennsylvania 

in favor of protecting children from child abuse, including abuse of a 

sexual nature.”)[.] However, the Fross decision did support that 

dominant public policy. The Supreme Court found that the best way to 

protect children and society was to allow the safeguards built into

Megan’s Law [now SORNA] to be employed.

What [the Associations] attempt[] to do is to protect the children 

in their community; but a banishment from Lake Naomi merely moves 

the offender somewhere else, perhaps closer to some other 

Pennsylvania family with children, despite the attempts of the [P]arole 

[B]oard to comply with the goals of Megan’s Law, now SORNA . . . , 

for the protection of all Pennsylvania residents. Most Pennsylvania 

communities are “child-centered[]”[;] Lake Naomi is not unique in that 

regard. [The Associations’] expert testified that ten percent of 

Pennsylvania housing is in community associations. Finding that these 
7

associations are free to remove sex offenders would have a similar 

deleterious effect on the statewide approach to sex offenders that 

concerned the Fross [C]ourt.

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).

The Trial Court also rejected the Associations’ assertion that Mr. Rosado’s 

challenge to Covenant 14 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Section 

5219(b) of the UPCA, 68 Pa. C.S. § 5219(b).

7

 The Trial Court observed that “[i]f 

[Covenant 14] did not violate public policy, Section 5219(b) [of the UPCA] would 

be dispositive here.” Id. at 8. However, the Trial Court concluded that, regardless 

of the statute of limitations, “a court may not enforce a contract that is contrary to 

public policy[.]” Id. (citing Rounick v. Neducsin, 231 A.3d 994, 1000 n.6 (Pa. Super. 

2020) (“[T]he issue of the legality of a contract can never be waived based upon the 

principle that the courts of this Commonwealth will not be used to enforce contracts 

that are illegal pursuant to a statute or that violate public policy.”) (emphasis added)).

Ultimately, the Trial Court held that the “Sentencing Code, the Parole Code[,] 

and the Fross decision have identified Pennsylvania’s public policy on the 

reintegration of sex offenders in Pennsylvania. Covenant 14 is a contract between 

[Pocono Pines] and its members that runs afoul of that policy.” Id. at 10. Therefore, 

the Trial Court concluded that the Associations were not entitled to a new trial and 

denied the Post-Trial Motion.

The Associations timely appealed to this Court. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Statement, the Trial Court adopted the reasoning of its prior decisions and reiterated 

its holding as follows:

7 Section 5219(b) of the UPCA provides: “No action to challenge the validity of an 

amendment adopted by the association under this section may be brought more than one year after 

the amendment is recorded.” 68 Pa. C.S. § 5219(b).
8

The Fross decision was based upon the preemption doctrine and 

did not address a restrictive covenant adopted by a community 

association. However, the Supreme Court’s ruling established a public 

policy that municipalities could not banish sex offenders because of the 

state[]wide legislative scheme to address sex offenders found in 

Megan’s Law and now SORNA.

Lake Naomi’s expert testified in this case that ten percent of 

Pennsylvania residents reside in a planned community. The question 

here is whether the[ Associations] are permitted to do by contract what 

no municipality may do under Fross. My ruling is that Fross and 

SORNA established a public policy that regulation of sex offenders, 

including their residences, is controlled by state statute, not by 

ordinances and not by restrictive covenants. 

Lake Naomi argues that it should receive special consideration 

because it is uniquely based on children[-] and family-oriented 

programs. Almost every community in our Commonwealth is 

protective of its families and children. If Lake Naomi is permitted to 

expel Mr. Rosado, he will have to relocate. Lake Naomi will have 

excluded a known sex offender whose residence was approved by the . 

. . Parole Board in accordance with SORNA, and another community 

will then be required to accommodate [Mr. Rosado].

Trial Ct. 1925(a) Stmt., 11/18/21, at 3-4 (emphasis added).8

Analysis

On appeal, the Associations assert that the Trial Court erred in invalidating 

Covenant 14 on public policy grounds because neither Fross nor any other precedent 

8 Generally, this Court’s review “‘of a court of common pleas sitting in equity is severely 

restricted. . . . We will not reverse if apparently reasonable grounds exist for the relief ordered and 

no erroneous or inapplicable rules of law were relied on.’” Eagleview Corp. Ctr. Ass’n v. Citadel 

Fed. Credit Union, 150 A.3d 1024, 1028 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation omitted). However, 

where the issue on appeal is purely a question of law, even in an appeal from a trial court sitting 

in equity, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Hess v. 

Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002) (applying plenary review to a question of law in an 

equity action); Com. v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 554 (Pa. 2002) (stating that where an “appeal raises 

a question of law, our scope of review is plenary”).
9

establishes a statewide public policy that prohibits a private, planned community 

from imposing a residency restriction on lifetime registered sex offenders. The 

Associations also assert that Mr. Rosado’s claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations in Section 5219(b) of the UPCA because he raised it more than one year 

after Covenant 14 was recorded.

1. The Fross Decision

We begin our analysis with a review of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fross, 

which was germane to the Trial Court’s ruling and is the primary focus of the parties’ 

arguments on appeal.

In Fross, a group of registered sex offenders challenged the legality of an 

Allegheny County ordinance that prohibited registered sex offenders from living 

within 2,500 feet of a child care facility, community center, public park, recreational 

facility, or school. 20 A.3d at 1197-98. The ordinance, in effect, prohibited sex 

offenders from living in most of the habitable and developed areas of Allegheny 

County. The sex offenders argued that the ordinance was preempted by the 

Sentencing and Parole Codes. Id. at 1198. In response, the County argued that the 

Parole Code and its accompanying regulations did not trump the well-established 

right of counties and municipalities to adopt local laws to protect the health, safety, 

and welfare of their residents. Id. at 1200. Thus, the County argued that the 

ordinance was a mere supplement to existing statutes and a valid exercise of the 

County’s legislative power. Id.9

9 Fross originated in federal district court, which held that the Allegheny County ordinance 

at issue was preempted by state law and entered summary judgment in favor of the sex offenders

who challenged the ordinance. Allegheny County appealed, and the Third Circuit certified the 

case for appellate review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Fross, 20 A.3d at 1194-95.
10

The Supreme Court disagreed with the County, concluding that the ordinance 

interfered with the intent of the General Assembly in adopting Megan’s Law and the 

Sentencing and Parole Codes and was, therefore, invalid under the conflict 

preemption doctrine. Id. at 1195. The Supreme Court first recognized that the 

General Assembly expressly listed among its purposes for adopting the Sentencing 

and Parole Codes the rehabilitation, reintegration, and diversion from prison of 

appropriate offenders. Id. at 1203. The General Assembly also determined that 

registered sex offenders, as a class, are eligible for parole and may benefit from those 

Commonwealth policies. Id. at 1204. The Fross Court observed that the primary 

means of implementing those policies is to offer familiar and stable environments to 

released sex offenders, like other convicted offenders, by promoting family and 

community ties and providing access to employment, counseling, and supervision. 

Id. The Supreme Court determined that the Allegheny County ordinance 

“effectively subvert[ed]” these goals. Id.

The Supreme Court also concluded that the ordinance failed to consider the 

General Assembly’s policy determination to facilitate the diversion of offenders 

from prison and the Commonwealth’s interest in the timely and effective 

administration of probation and parole as expressed in the Sentencing and Parole 

Codes. Id. at 1205. The County’s residency restriction limited the options available 

to sentencing courts and the Parole Board in designing adequate reintegration plans 

for sex offenders who are released from prison. Id. The Supreme Court explained:

[W]e are persuaded by the [sex offenders’] arguments that [Allegheny] 

County’s [o]rdinance interferes with the goal of Megan’s Law to reduce 

recidivism among sex offenders and improve public safety. Isolating 

all sex offenders from their communities, support systems, 

employment, and treatment is an approach contrary to that of the 

General Assembly, which requires individually tailored assessments 
11

and assistance with rehabilitation and reintegration for appropriate 

offenders. The [o]rdinance chooses the importance of residency over 

all other considerations expressly incorporated into the probation and 

parole scheme by the General Assembly. And, finally, it is not hard to 

imagine the effect on the statewide legislative scheme if all counties 

were to adopt similar residency restrictions. The statewide scheme 

would be eviscerated.

Id. at 1207. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Allegheny County 

“[o]rdinance impede[d] the accomplishment of the full objectives of the General 

Assembly, as expressed in the Sentencing and Parole Codes, and [was], therefore, 

invalid pursuant to [the] conflict preemption doctrine.” Id. at 1195 (emphasis 

added).

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the parties’ public policy 

arguments relating to Covenant 14.

2. Public Policy

A contract can be voided on public policy grounds only if it violates a 

dominant public policy established by statute or other legal precedent. Williams v. 

GEICO Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 32 A.3d 1195, 1200 (Pa. 2011). Our Supreme Court 

has explained:

When considering whether a contract violates public policy, we are 

mindful that public policy is more than a vague goal which may be used 

to circumvent the plain meaning of the contract. Rather,

[p]ublic policy is to be ascertained by reference to the 

laws and legal precedents and not from general 

considerations of supposed public interest. As the term 

“public policy” is vague, there must be found definite 

indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the 

invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy[.] . . . 

Only dominant public policy would justify such action. In 

the absence of a plain indication of that policy through 

long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of 
12

violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court 

should not assume to declare contracts . . . contrary to 

public policy. . . .

Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Oriental-Guillermo, 214 A.3d 1257, 1262 (Pa. 2019) (citation 

omitted) (emphasis added); see also Pittsburgh Logistics Sys., Inc. v. Beemac 

Trucking, LLC, 249 A.3d 918, 932 (Pa. 2021) (“‘[A]voidance of contract terms on 

public policy grounds requires a showing of overriding public policy from legal 

precedents, governmental practice, or obvious ethical or moral standards.’”) 

(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

First, the Associations assert that the Trial Court erred in relying on Fross to 

invalidate Covenant 14. The Associations point out that Fross involved an action 

by a county government, not a private community such as Lake Naomi. According 

to the Associations, Fross did not establish a statewide public policy prohibiting a 

private, planned community from imposing a residency restriction on lifetime 

registered sex offenders. The Associations also contend that neither the General 

Assembly nor Pennsylvania courts have established a public policy that prohibits a 

private, planned community from imposing a residency restriction on lifetime 

registered sex offenders. We disagree.

We conclude that the Trial Court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s 

reasoning in Fross. Although Fross involved a county ordinance and not a 

restrictive covenant by a private community, the Supreme Court’s ruling clearly

established a public policy that local counties and municipalities cannot impose sex 

offender residency restrictions due to Pennsylvania’s statewide legislative scheme

governing the release of sex offenders, manifested in SORNA and the Sentencing 

and Parole Codes. If local counties and municipalities must adhere to these 

statewide mandates, so must private residential communities. A private community 
13

may not impose more restrictive standards on where released sex offenders may live 

than county and municipal governments.

More recently, in TWL Realty, LLC v. West Hanover Township Zoning 

Hearing Board, 132 A.3d 533 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), this Court applied Fross to a case 

involving a township zoning ordinance that permitted only “nonviolent criminals” 

and “nonviolent crime detainees” to reside at privately owned community work

release facilities. The township zoning officer issued a violation notice to a private 

work release facility where two registered sex offenders resided. Id. at 534-35. The 

notice stated that because the offenders had committed Tier III sex offenses, the 

township considered them to be “violent” offenders, so they were precluded from 

living at the facility under the ordinance. Id. at 535. The facility appealed to the 

zoning hearing board, which upheld the ordinance. Id. The trial court reversed the 

zoning hearing board’s decision, concluding that the ordinance was preempted by 

the Sentencing and Parole Codes pursuant to Fross. Id.

The zoning hearing board appealed to this Court, arguing that the ordinance 

is not preempted by state law because, unlike Fross, there was no evidence 

demonstrating that the full purposes and objectives of the Sentencing and Parole 

Codes were obstructed by the ordinance. Id. at 537. The zoning hearing board also 

argued that the ordinance supported the Parole Board’s goals and the township’s

legitimate concerns for the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its 

residents. Id.

Relying extensively on Fross, this Court agreed with the trial court that the 

ordinance restricting which offenders may be housed in a private work release 

facility was preempted by the Sentencing and Parole Codes. Id. at 537-40. We

concluded as follows:
14

It is the purview of the sentencing courts and the Parole Board to 

determine which offenders are appropriate for community workrelease programs. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing was 

charged with adopting guidelines that the Parole Board must consider 

when paroling an offender. Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code[, 

42 Pa. C.S. § 9721(b),] charges the sentencing court with balancing the 

protection of the public with the rehabilitative needs of the offender. 

Section 6137(a)(1) of the Parole Code[, 61 Pa. C.S. § 6137(a)(1),] 

requires the Parole Board, when determining whether to parole an 

offender, to balance the best interests of the inmate with the need to 

avoid injury to the Commonwealth’s interests, should the offender be 

paroled. Section 6137(g)(4)(iv) of the Parole Code[, 61 Pa. C.S. § 

6137(g)(4)(iv),] specifically provides that the Parole Board may parole 

an offender only when “[t]here is no reasonable indication that the 

inmate poses a risk to public safety.” Additionally, Section 6102(1) of 

the Parole Code[, 61 Pa. C.S. § 6201(1),] states that the Parole Code 

provides several benefits to society including the provision of adequate 

supervision of the offender while protecting the public, the opportunity 

for the offender to become a useful member of society and the diversion

of appropriate offenders from prison.

Taken together, the Sentencing and Parole Codes demonstrate 

that when the Commonwealth places an offender in a particular workrelease program, the Commonwealth has determined that the offender’s 

placement is consistent with both the public’s safety and the needs of 

the offender to reintegrate into society. The [o]rdinance’s ban upon 

the housing of offenders with violent criminal histories is in conflict 

with the Commonwealth’s determination that an offender is suitable for 

placement in the work-release facility; a determination that includes a 

conclusion that public safety would not be jeopardized by the offender. 

If the [o]rdinance is allowed to stand, other municipalities will be able 

to enact similar ordinances that contain more restrictive standards 

than the Sentencing and Parole Codes, thus jeopardizing the 

Commonwealth’s parole scheme as embodied by the Sentencing and 

Parole Codes.

Id. at 539-40 (internal citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 

Applying the reasoning of Fross and TWL to the facts of this case, we 

conclude that SORNA and the Sentencing and Parole Codes establish a public policy 
15

that the regulation of released sex offenders is controlled by state law and may not 

be controlled by local ordinances or restrictive covenants. As this Court recognized 

in TWL, the Parole Board is charged with balancing public safety with the 

rehabilitation and reintegration of released sex offenders. Covenant 14 effectively 

restricts the Parole Board’s ability to release a sex offender to his own residence, 

even after the Parole Board has determined that the offender’s reentry plan is 

adequate and there is no reasonable indication that he poses a risk to public safety. 

Such a restriction interferes with the statewide statutory schemes that have been 

created to achieve a balance between public safety and rehabilitation. See, e.g., 42 

Pa. C.S. § 9721(b) (the trial court must consider the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant in determining a sentence); id. § 9754(c) (the trial court must impose 

conditions of probation that assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life); 61 

Pa. C.S. § 6131(a)(14) (the Parole Board has a duty “[t]o coordinate the reentry of 

offenders into the community using evidence-based practices that are effective in 

reducing recidivism”); id. § 6102(2) (“[T]he [Parole B]oard and any other paroling

entity shall first and foremost seek to protect the safety of the public.”). 

Consequently, once a sentencing court or the Parole Board has determined that a 

home is an appropriate residence for a released sex offender, a private community 

may not disregard that determination by enforcing its own restrictive covenant.

We also reject the Associations’ reliance on cases from other jurisdictions that 

have upheld sex offender residency restrictions, as we are neither bound by nor 

persuaded by those cases. See Ass’ns’ Br. at 35-37 (collecting cases from other 

states). The cited cases involved sex offender residency restrictions imposed by 

public governments, not by private residential communities. In any event, as 

discussed above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Fross – which is binding on this 
16

Court – plainly holds that county and municipal governments in Pennsylvania may 

not impose sex offender residency restrictions that conflict with those established by 

state statutes.

We conclude that the Fross holding applies equally to privately governed 

communities, because they are no less bound by public policy than county and 

municipal governments. Indeed, Section 5108 of the UPCA states:

The principles of law and equity, including the law of corporations and 

unincorporated associations, the law of real property and the law 

relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, eminent domain, 

estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 

receivership, substantial performance, or other validating or 

invalidating cause supplement the provisions of this subpart, except to 

the extent inconsistent with this subpart.

68 Pa. C.S. § 5108 (emphasis added). This provision indicates that planned 

communities governed by the UPCA, such as Pocono Pines, are required to comply 

with other applicable laws and legal precedent. Thus, pursuant to our Supreme 

Court’s decision in Fross, we conclude that a private, planned community may not 

adopt a restrictive covenant that conflicts with state statutes governing where a 

released sex offender may live. In other words, Covenant 14, like the Fross

ordinance, “stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes [and] objectives 

of the General Assembly” and is, therefore, against public policy. Fross, 20 A.3d at 

1207. 

Next, the Associations assert that the Trial Court failed to properly balance 

their interest in protecting their community from sexual predators against a 

convicted sex offender’s interest in residing in Lake Naomi. The Associations argue

that Lake Naomi is a child-centered community, and they have a responsibility to 

provide a safe and secure environment for their residents. The Associations also 
17

argue that Covenant 14 is consistent with the legislative finding, articulated in 

SORNA, that protecting the public from sexual predators is a “paramount” interest. 

See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.11(4) (“Sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing 

additional sexual offenses and protection of the public from this type of offender is 

a paramount governmental interest.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the Associations

contend that their need to protect the safety and welfare of their residents outweighs 

Mr. Rosado’s interest in living in his Lake Naomi home. 

A trial court sitting in equity must balance the parties’ competing rights and 

interests to achieve a fair and just result. See E. Hempfield Twp. v. Brubaker, 828 

A.2d 1184, 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (recognizing that “a court of equity enjoys 

broad discretion in fashioning remedies which balance the interests of affected 

parties”). That is precisely what the Trial Court did in this case. While a private 

community has a legitimate interest in providing a safe living environment for its 

residents, the Commonwealth’s legislative measures governing the release of 

convicted sex offenders were specifically designed for the protection of the public. 

See, e.g., 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.51(b)(1) (in enacting SORNA, it was the General 

Assembly’s intent to “[p]rotect the safety and general welfare of the people of this 

Commonwealth by providing for registration, community notification and access to 

information regarding sexually violent predators and offenders who are about to be 

released from custody and will live in or near their neighborhood[s]”) (emphasis 

added); id. § 9799.51(a)(1) (“If the public is provided adequate notice and 

information about sexually violent predators and offenders . . . , the community can 

develop constructive plans to prepare itself for the release of sexually violent 

predators and offenders,” including “meet[ing] with law enforcement to prepare and 

obtain information about the rights and responsibilities of the community and to 
18

provide education and counseling to their children”) (emphasis added); 61 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6102(1) (recognizing that the parole system provides “adequate supervision of the 

offender while protecting the public, the opportunity for the offender to become a 

useful member of society[,] and the diversion of appropriate offenders from prison”). 

As the Fross Court noted, in enacting these measures, the General Assembly made 

a determination that sex offenders, as a class, are eligible for parole and the best way 

to offer parole is to provide released offenders with familiar and stable environments 

that promote family and community ties and provide access to employment, 

counseling, and supervision. Fross, 20 A.3d at 1204. For this reason, “although 

acknowledging the high risk of recidivism among sex offenders, the General 

Assembly has generally rejected the option of simply excluding released offenders

from entire communities as the primary or even preferable means of protecting the 

public.” Id. at 1205 (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 9791(a)(2) and (b)) (emphasis added).

The Associations further argue that, unlike the ordinance in Fross, Covenant 

14 does not limit Mr. Rosado’s access to family, employment, counseling, public 

transportation, or support services conducive to his rehabilitation, because he can 

simply move to another community that does not have a sex offender residency 

restriction. According to the Associations, the evidence shows that Mr. Rosado has 

other housing opportunities in the Pocono Mountain area, as well as in Florida and 

New York where he also owns homes. However, the fact that Mr. Rosado owns 

other homes or can choose to live in another neighborhood is irrelevant. Mr. Rosado

has owned his Lake Naomi home for 24 years, and the Parole Board approved his 

release to that home in 2018. Since he returned to Lake Naomi, Mr. Rosado has 

complied with SORNA’s registration, supervision, and counseling requirements, has 

complied with the Parole Board’s conditions, and has committed no further sex 
19

offenses. By attempting to use Covenant 14 to banish Mr. Rosado from his lawfully 

owned home, the Associations are depriving him of his fundamental right to possess 

and protect his property. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All men are born equally free 

and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which 

are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and 

protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”) 

(emphasis added). The Associations have not demonstrated that Covenant 14 makes

the Lake Naomi community any safer than the General Assembly’s extensive 

legislative enactments regulating the rehabilitation and reintegration of sex 

offenders.

We conclude that Fross, SORNA, and the Sentencing and Parole Codes

establish a statewide public policy that the regulation of released sex offenders, 

including where they may live, is controlled by state law. Covenant 14 violates that 

public policy by unlawfully precluding a registered Tier III sex offender from living 

in his own Parole Board-approved home. Accordingly, we conclude that the Trial 

Court properly declared Covenant 14 void as against public policy.

3. Statute of Limitations

Finally, the Associations assert that the Trial Court erred in permitting Mr. 

Rosado to raise an untimely challenge to the validity of Covenant 14. Section 

5219(b) of the UPCA provides that “[n]o action to challenge the validity of an 

amendment adopted by the association . . . may be brought more than one year after 

the amendment is recorded.” 68 Pa. C.S. § 5219(b) (emphasis added). Here, 

Covenant 14 was recorded in 2016, and Mr. Rosado did not assert his claim that 

Covenant 14 violates public policy until 2019. The Associations point out that 

before Pocono Pines’ adoption of the amendment in 2016, notice was sent to all unit 
20

owners, including Mr. Rosado, in accordance with Section 5219(a) of the UPCA, 

and 71% of unit owners voted in favor of Covenant 14. The Associations further 

assert that Mr. Rosado admitted that he was aware of Pocono Pines’ consideration 

of the sex offender residency restriction as early as 2014. See R.R. at 687a-88a. 

Consequently, they contend that Mr. Rosado should have asserted a timely challenge 

to Covenant 14 within one year after its recording (i.e., by May 11, 2017), as required 

by Section 5219(b) of the UPCA.10 We disagree.

We conclude that the UPCA’s statute of limitations does not preclude Mr. 

Rosado from defending against an action brought by the Associations beyond the 

one-year limitations period, because the plain language of Section 5219(b) applies 

only to the filing of an action. See 68 Pa. C.S. § 5219(b) (“No action to challenge 

the validity of an amendment . . . may be brought more than one year after the 

amendment is recorded.”) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has recognized

that a statute of limitations must be strictly construed against a petitioner seeking to 

pursue a stale claim against a respondent, not against a respondent raising defenses 

to the petitioner’s claim. See Morrison Informatics, Inc. v. Members First Fed. 

Credit Union, 139 A.3d 1241, 1248 n.7 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]his Court has treated statutes 

of limitations as warranting strict construction, given that their purpose is to prevent 

stale claims which might prejudice the defense.”); Gustine Uniontown Assocs., Ltd. 

v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 842 A.2d 334, 346 (Pa. 2004) (“The purpose of . . .

limitation periods is ‘to expedite litigation and thus discourage delay and the 

presentation of stale claims which may greatly prejudice the defense of such claims.’ 

In light of the important purpose served by limitations periods, this Court has held 

that statutes of limitation are to be strictly construed.”) (internal citation omitted)

10 Mr. Rosado was apparently incarcerated when Covenant 14 was adopted in 2016, since

he was convicted in Pennsylvania in 2015 and was not released on parole until 2018.
21

(emphasis added).

11

 Because the Associations initiated this enforcement action

against Mr. Rosado, we conclude that the one-year statute of limitations is 

inapplicable here.

Conclusion

We hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fross established a dominant 

public policy that local counties and municipalities cannot impose sex offender

residency restrictions due to Pennsylvania’s statewide legislative scheme governing

the release of convicted sex offenders. We further hold that this public policy 

necessarily extends to private residential communities such as Lake Naomi.

The Associations contend that they should be allowed to banish Tier III sex 

offenders because of the child-centered nature of the Lake Naomi community. 

However, as the Trial Court pointed out, most residential communities in 

Pennsylvania are child-centered or are near child-centered areas such as schools, 

churches, and community parks. As the Trial Court cogently observed: 

Residents surrounding the Lake Naomi community, living in 

Tobyhanna Township or elsewhere in municipalities outside of planned 

communities[,] are unable to remove Tier [III] sex offenders as [the 

Associations] seek[] to do here. They must abide by the Supreme 

Court’s decision [in Fross] that the residences of sex offenders are 

regulated by Pennsylvania statutes governing sentencing, probation[,]

and parole. Lake Naomi’s solution to its problem of a resident sex 

offender is to force him to move elsewhere. All of the dangers 

complained of by the Lake Naomi residents will then be thrust upon 

other residents of our society, perhaps just down the road from them, 

11 In support of their statute of limitations claim, the Associations rely on two appellate 

decisions from other jurisdictions: Bilanko v. Barclay Court Owners Association, 375 P.3d 591 

(Wash. 2016), and Stadnicky v. Southpark Terrace Homeowners Association, Inc., 939 P.2d 403 

(Alaska 1997). Aside from the fact that this Court is not bound by case law from other 

jurisdictions, those cases are factually distinguishable. Bilanko did not involve a homeowner’s 

defense to an enforcement action brought by an association, and Stadnicky did not involve the 

application of a statutory limitations period.
22

who don’t live in a private community. Additionally, parole officers 

would not be able to approve Mr. Rosado’s residence in a home he has 

owned for many years that is compliant with [SORNA].

Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/21, at 14-15. 

While the residents of Lake Naomi want to preclude convicted sex offenders 

from living in their community, we cannot allow the Associations to enforce a

residency restriction that, in practice, contravenes the goals and purposes of SORNA 

and the Sentencing and Parole Codes. As the Trial Court noted, the Supreme Court 

in Fross “found that the best way to protect children and society was to allow the 

safeguards built into [SORNA] to be employed.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21, at 5; see 

also TWL, 132 A.3d at 540 (recognizing that the Parole Board’s determination that 

a facility is suitable for a released offender “includes a conclusion that public safety 

would not be jeopardized by the offender”). Because the Supreme Court has 

determined that those safeguards are sufficient to protect the residents of the Lake 

Naomi community and the public at large, we affirm the Trial Court’s Order.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision of this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lake Naomi Club, Inc. and Pocono :

Pines Community Association, Inc., :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1164 C.D. 2021

:

Eric Rosado and Alice Quinones :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 28th day of October, 2022, the September 14, 2021 Order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County is hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge