A Profession of Arms 

and Thought

Leadership Design

Mosby and Joint Functions

Broken Windows

Campaigning

The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

“That All 

May Labor As 

One”

Fall 2014 
Campaigning 

Fall 2014

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69

Commandant

RDML John W. Smith, Jr 

Dean of Academic Programs

Dr. Patricia B. Strait 

 

Editor

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley 

Editorial Board: 

Professor William S. Marlowe

Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel

Dr. Frederick R. Kienle

Professor Stephen W. Dennis 

Joint Advanced Warfighting

School 

Dr. Robert Antis

Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School 

CAPT John Maxwell

Joint Continuing and Distance

Education School

COL Dale D. Fair

Joint Command, Control and 

Information Operations School 

COL Michael Miller

Cover images clockwise from the top:

USN: Chief Mass Communication 

Specialist Jennifer A. Villalovos/Released

USMC: Sgt. Adwin Esters

USCG: Petty Officer Richard Brahm

USA: Sgt 1st Class Rodney Jackson 

USAF Photo: Airman 1st Class Trevor T. 

McBride

Campaigning Fall 2014 1
Welcome to the Fall 2014 edition of the Campaigning journal. After a six-year hiatus, 

Campaigning was re-launched last spring to provide a forum for dialogue and discourse on topics 

relevant to leadership and planning at the operational level of war. This issue should not let you 

down: with essays that vary from a combatant command for the Arctic to how Joint staffs can

leverage generational differences, this edition of Campaigning has a broad range of topics that 

illuminate many operational-level opportunities and challenges.

As we look forward to the next decade, providing an education that empowers Joint 

professionals to develop creative approaches to the complex national security issues facing the 

U.S. Armed Forces is vital to meeting the objectives delineated by our leadership. Since there is 

no single best institution, instructional delivery method, or publication for doing that, the 

collective set of colleges within DoD provides the Joint force an excellent enterprise for creating 

diversity in thought. Each school has a specific niche and it is important to embrace the 

numerous methodologies available for building a large contingent of critically and creativelythinking, steely-eyed warriors. Here at the Joint Forces Staff College we benefit from multifaceted JPME 2 educational models: the 12-month program in the Joint Advanced Warfighting 

School (JAWS), the Joint Continuing and Distance Education School (JCDES) for our 

Reserve/Guard personnel, and the 10-week program hosted by the Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School (JCWS). While these schools seek to educate joint professionals in critical 

and creative thinking, as well as operational-level leadership and planning, each does so 

differently in order to reach a specific audience.

As the Joint force transitions from one that is engaged primarily in combat to one that is more 

heavily involved in training and partnership building, many officers will be unaccustomed to 

planning within the context of future global environmental conditions. There are many ways to 

successfully make this transition, and Joint education has a vital role to play in the development 

of the skills needed to address these conditions. Writing an article for one of the many 

professional journals published throughout the year is an effective method for building 

proficiency in analyzing and designing in an unfamiliar setting. Publishing enables ideas to 

quickly reach larger audiences and, more importantly, allows the author the opportunity to 

present a viewpoint that might not otherwise be seen or heard. The enclosed essays, which 

represent submissions from JCWS faculty and students in both JCWS and JCDES, should be 

thought-provoking-if you have any comments or questions, please feel free to email me at

john.maxwell@ndu.edu. 

It is an honor and privilege to lead the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. I am looking 

forward to cooperating with other DoD institutions, students, and faculty to provide a top-notch 

education to the women and men who are responsible for our Nation's defense. 

John Maxwell 

CAPTAIN, USN

Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) 

Joint Forces Staff College

Campaigning Fall 2014 2
In this issue of Campaigning: 

An Institution for the Profession of Arms and Thought 4

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley, JCWS Faculty

Leadership design: A Methodology to Analyze and 

Visualize an Approach to Global Leadership 9 

Dr. Frederick R. Kienle, JCWS Faculty

Joint Before Joint Was Cool: A Fresh Look at the Success

of Mosby’s Rangers in the Civil War 28

Lt Col Jeffrey Guimarin, Maj David Lawrence, and Lt Col Kevin Weeks,

JCWS 

Pirates and Broken Windows 37 

CAPT Steven Marinello, JCDES 

Leveraging Generational Differences in a Joint Staff 44 

MAJ Catie Boylston, LCDR Jed Espiritu, LCDR Jason Ileto, and Maj Steve Wick, JCWS 

COLDCOM: New Ground for a Cold War 53 

LTC Bart Hensler, Maj Benjamin Mather, and LCDR David Palilonis, JCWS 

What’s Next for NORAD? 64 

Maj Christopher Buckley, LCDR Sebastian Kielpinski, and Lt Col Thomas Walsh, JCWS 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the 

views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of 

Defense.

Campaigning Fall 2014 3
An Institution for the Profession of 

Arms and Thought 

By Dr. Daniel H. McCauley

People and organizations react differently to

change—some fight it whereas others

embrace it. I’m an embracer and, as such, 

eagerly read National Defense University’s

(NDU) senior leaderships’ recent Joint 

Force Quarterly article titled ‘“Breakout”:

A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation’s 

Future Strategic Leaders.’ The article stated

that “the time for meaningful change has

arrived.” Three reasons were given: the 

Chairman said to update the curriculum; we 

are in “a period of severely reduced 

resources;” and “we can do better.” 

Although each reason by itself would 

require responsible institutions to search for 

efficiencies, effectiveness, and relevancy, 

the proposed changes fail to provide an 

educational environment that prepares future 

leaders for collaborative, context-based 

problem solving. The direction posed in this

article simply does not qualify as

meaningful change as it focuses on the 

‘what’ and the ‘how’ without sufficient

emphasis given to the ‘why.’ Let me

explain.

First and foremost, change is needed! But

change is not needed because the Chairman

said so—although this is a solid cue that one 

should not ignore for too long. Change is not 

needed because some have criticized our 

academic rigor—even though NDU recently

passed its Middle States Accreditation. 

Change is not needed because our curricula

are not innovative—even though we update 

it annually. Change is not needed because

we do not leverage the student’s prior 

training and operational experiences—adult 

education is designed to leverage individual 

expertise and experiences. And change is

not needed because our research centers can

be linked better to support our students—

that goes without saying. 

In reality, change has been needed since the 

fall of the Berlin Wall, but the lack of a clear

national threat, a relatively good economy, 

and a decade plus of wartime budgets 

enabled the traditional paradigm to remain

in place despite clear indications otherwise.

Quite simply, defense spending 

overwhelmed any deficiencies in education. 

Fortunately, current and future fiscal

realities have forced NDU specifically, and

the Joint education enterprise in general, to

finally address long-needed change. Instead

of ‘tinkering in the margins’ in an attempt to

fit an old paradigm into a new fiscal reality,

NDU must embrace this new fiscal reality as

it develops a new educational paradigm.

This new paradigm must prepare the Joint 

force for the extraordinary tasks ahead—not 

for the tasks of a decade or two ago. 

So, how do we prepare joint leaders today 

for senior leadership positions a decade from

now? It begins by understanding education

and the role of joint professional military

education (PME). The Officer Professional 

Military Education Policy (OPMEP) 

describes the core competencies of 

education as providing a “depth of view,

diverse perspectives, critical analysis,

abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity

and uncertainty, and innovative thinking 

particularly with respect to complex, nonCampaigning Fall 2014 4
linear problems.” Joint PME’s goal is to

ensure the Joint force remains capable of

defeating our Nation’s adversaries through

the development of a depth and breadth of 

knowledge and habits of mind essential to

the Profession of Arms. Therefore, the task

of PME institutions is to contextualize the 

core educational competencies across the 

range of anticipated military operations. 

Whatever is taught must be flexible enough 

so that as the requirements or environment 

change, leaders have the adaptability to flow

with the changes. Flexibility eschews

standard answers or schoolhouse templates,

which are the cornerstone of training.

Education, on the other hand, encompasses

such things as theories, concepts, and

context to provide the individual with the 

tools to develop contextually nuanced

answers and design original templates. 

If education prepares students to be agile in

their thinking, NDU must frame the current

and future strategic environment within its

curricula to provide the context for Joint

leader education. Over the next decade, the 

strategic environment will be shaped by

megatrends such as individual 

empowerment, a diffusion of power, 

globalization, and changing demographic 

patterns. In addition, other lesser trends such

as governance gaps, crisis-prone global

economies, food and water pressures, and

the diffusion of disruptive technologies will

create environmental dynamics that generate

surprises and uncertainties for the Joint 

force. 

Unfortunately, the Profession of Arms as we

know it is inadequate in light of these trends 

and the military tasks associated with

providing global stability and security. 

Whereas our profession traditionally calls

for unique expertise in the application of 

lethal military force, the profession has

grown beyond the military instrument of 

power. Thus, Joint leaders must not only 

possess the skills and competencies

associated with the Profession of Arms, but 

must also possess the skills and attributes

associated with a Profession of Thought. If

Joint leaders continue to be taught in the 

same manner and with the same techniques

as in the past, expecting a different outcome 

is folly. 

What does this mean for education at NDU?

How do we institute ‘real’ change? It begins 

with a vision for Joint professional military

education. Not a vision for the University—

that’s an organizational vision and we have 

one already. What I’m talking about is a 

vision that explains ‘why’ we do the things

we do. A vision that identifies our core

Campaigning Fall 2014 5
values and acts as a guiding principle for

decision making and curriculum 

development. A vision that describes our 

core purpose as educators and the 

fundamental reason we exist. A vision that

provides a vivid description of a future a 

decade or more out, that reaches out and

grabs faculty and staff, and serves as a 

unifying focal point for University effort.

An educational vision for NDU must 

integrate the core competencies of education

with the demands of the future operating 

environment. It must also develop an

organizational structure that supports and

facilitates University interaction, and

promotes outreach and integration. As such, 

I propose the following five actions by

NDU. 

First, adopt the following seven thinking 

competencies as core values for education at

NDU. These seven competencies directly

link to the CJCS’ desired leader attributes, 

and comprise campaign thinking. These

competencies act as essential and enduring 

tenets of NDU because they describe who

we are and what we stand for—even in

times of fiscal austerity. 

- Critical thinking – provides a depth and

breadth understanding and leverages

hindsight, insight, and foresight (desired

leader attributes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). 

- Creative thinking - the ability to

challenge assumptions, recognize

patterns, and see in new ways (desired

leader attributes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6). 

- Contextual thinking - the use of skilled

judgment or observation by looking at

the environment encompassing a fact or

situation to achieve understanding, 

evaluate viewpoints, and solve problems 

(desired leader attributes 1, 4, 5, 6). 

- Conceptual thinking - used to

understand a situation or problem by

identifying patterns or connections 

(desired leader attributes 1, 2, 3, 6). 

- Collaborative thinking – used to

create synergy, improves performance,

and motivates people to learn, develop, 

share, and adapt to changes (desired

leader attributes 1, 4, 5, 6). 

- Cultural thinking – used to

understand the interconnected world, the 

incongruence of national borders, and

the synthesis of perspectives across a 

wide spectrum of cultures (desired

leader attributes 1, 4, 5, 6). 

- Communicative thinking – used to

understand the various means and modes 

of communicating as well as the 

challenges associated with

communicating complex issues between

individuals, organizations, societies,

cultures, and nations (desired leader

attributes 1, 4, 6) . 

Second, the reason we exist at NDU is that

we are essential to developing the finest

military in the world. Adopt as our core

purpose: to “develop adaptive and agile

leaders with the requisite values, strategic

vision and critical thinking skills necessary

to keep pace with the changing strategic

environment.” Taken straight from General

Dempsey’s ‘White Paper on Joint 

Education,’ this purpose acts as a guiding 

star for NDU—forever pursued, but never 

reached; unchanging but inspiring change.

Third, adopt as NDU’s educational vision: 

Campaigning Fall 2014 6
Imagine a university that is devoted to the 

Profession of Arms. 

Imagine a university that provides an 

educational foundation for Joint leaders

to achieve national security interests and

objectives in complex and unstructured 

environments. 

Imagine a university that seeks to

facilitate mastery of fundamentals in the 

art and science of war by encouraging 

intellectual curiosity, stimulating critical

thinking, rewarding risk-taking, and

understanding the value of 

multiculturalism. 

Imagine a university that seeks to remove 

traditional constraints on student thinking 

by identifying and supporting various 

learning styles, behaviors, and desires.

Imagine a university that seeks to build a 

culture of rigorous academic study that

stimulates the ability and passion of 

students. 

Imagine a university that prepares Joint 

leaders to operate globally now...and in

the future.

Fourth, adopt an alliance organizational 

structure that acknowledges the diversity of

the individual colleges and centers while

adding value through shared resources and

reduced risk in an uncertain fiscal

environment. The airline industry in the 

1990s is a great example of a successful

alliance that leveraged network synergies by

reducing costs and improving resource use.

What made the alliance successful for so

long was the acknowledgement by alliance

leadership of the strong individual airline

cultures that made further consolidation 

difficult. Each NDU component, while

having education in common with other 

members, has a well-defined mission that is

markedly different from other members. As

such, further consolidation of faculty, staff,

and research and curriculum processes

erodes effectiveness.

Fifth, leverage NDU’s centers of expertise

to provide contextual expertise and

relevance to University-wide curricula.

Invite other centers of expertise, such as

DARPA, World Futures Society, Johns 

Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, and

the Frederick S. Pardee Center for

International Futures, into the NDU alliance

to cover gaps in the development of current

and future contexts. 

Oh, I know that some of you are thinking 

‘Hold on. We haven’t changed a thing!’

Yes, on the surface that may appear to be 

true; however, superficial change, the kind 

that’s easy to see and even easier to do, is

the mark of a bureaucratic institution. Real

change, change that gets to the core of the

problem, begins with a vision. If the vision 

is crafted properly and leadership ‘walks the 

walk,’ then real change at the grass roots 

level will become a reality far faster than if

it were directed top-down. 

National Defense University is at the nexus 

of need and opportunity. It needs to change

to prepare Joint leaders better to face the 

uncertain and complex challenges presented

by technology, globalization, fiscal

Campaigning Fall 2014 7
constraints, and other environmental trends 

over the next decade. It also has the 

opportunity to rid itself of a structure 

developed in a bygone era and to replace it

with one that is flexible, adaptable, and

characterized by a ‘leader of leaders’

approach. This type of an approach, best

managed as an alliance, serves its member

organizations as a broad visionary, platform

builder, guardian, overseer, and strategic

communicator. 

We have a choice: we can change because

cost reductions are necessary; or we can

change because we understand our values,

we understand our purpose, and we envision 

a future that provides the Joint force the 

education it needs and deserves. NDU has

the opportunity to lead the JPME

community in supporting a Profession of 

Arms and Thought for the 21st Century. 

 

Author Bio: Dr. Daniel H. McCauley is a National 

Defense University professor at the Joint Forces Staff 

College located in Norfolk, VA. Dr. McCauley is a 

retired United States Air Force pilot and has served in 

various course director capacities including strategy 

and theater campaign planning. His areas of interest 

are strategic leadership, strategic foresight, strategy, 

design, and creative thinking. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 8
Leadership Design: A Methodology 

to Analyze and Visualize an 

Approach to Global Leadership

By Dr. Fred R. Kienle

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Martin Dempsey, is undeniably 

focused on imbuing tomorrow’s leaders with 

critical thinking skills and attributes that 

include abilities to understand security 

environments and to anticipate and lead 

change.1 He encourages every U.S. military 

leader to become a life-long learner and to 

embrace new methods of innovation, 

adaptability and critical thinking. One tool 

for leaders to design an adaptive approach 

toward leading and innovating in their 

organizations is a leadership design 

methodology. This design methodology, 

growing in use among military operational 

planners, can be directly applied to planning 

approaches to leading organizations in the 

military and across the national security 

environment. 

What is leadership design and what is it not? 

Leadership design is a way to think about 

leading nearly any organization in today’s 

challenging global environment. Leadership 

design is not a detailed and mechanical plan 

to be memorized and executed by the leader. 

Instead, leadership design provides a 

methodology and an ensuing opportunity to 

inspire creative thinking and learning. 

Leadership design spurs the leader to 

examine and depict a series of networks and 

interdisciplinary systems that relate and 

interact to create the activity that we call 

leadership.2 By actually visualizing an 

approach to leadership through an organized 

framework, nearly any leader can gain most 

of the necessary cognitive scaffolding for 

further understanding of the leader’s 

environment, the essential elements for 

practicing leadership and the potential focus 

areas and activities that can later give way to 

a more detailed leadership plan. The steps of 

leadership design outlined in this paper 

encourage the evaluation, analysis, 

synthesis, reflection, reasoning, and critical 

thinking necessary to increase the 

probability of a leader’s desired outcomes.3

Not to be trite, but leadership design is a 

journey and not a destination. As you read 

through the following methodology for 

confronting the often daunting task of 

leading an organization in today’s complex 

world, consider how you would use this 

framework to begin developing your plan to 

lead. Place your own organization and 

situation within the frame of this leadership 

design methodology. 

Defining Leadership

The first step in leadership design, as is 

usually the first step in leading most 

organizations, is understanding what 

leadership really is. Stogdill laments that 

there are as many definitions of leadership 

as there are people who have tried to define 

it.4

 Undeniably interdisciplinary and 

encompassing a wide range of fields 

including management, sociology, 

psychology, philosophy, anthropology and 

other arts and sciences, leadership has 

several components that remain visible 

regardless of the exact definition we attach 

to it.

5

 Northouse provides a conceptual 

model that identifies several key 

components that are central to the human 

Campaigning Fall 2014 9
phenomenon we call leadership; leadership 

is a complex process, leadership involves 

influence, leadership occurs in a group or 

organizational context and leadership 

involves goal attainment.6

 This leads to a 

general definition of leadership as “a 

complex process whereby an individual (the 

leader) influences a group (an organization) 

to achieve a common goal (a vision).”7 With 

this understanding, a leader can discern 

several components of a leadership process 

or system that lends him or her toward a

design process. 

Luthans contends that “leadership remains 

pretty much a ‘black box’ or unexplainable 

concept” but this does nothing to understand 

and decompose the complex leadership 

process.8 Demystifying this ‘black box’ 

leadership method by leveraging a basic 

design process presents leaders with a useful 

conceptual framework and an organized 

approach by which to lead a group or an 

organization. By linking environmental 

understanding, the leader’s vision, 

organizational objectives, and broad 

methodologies to focus actions and 

activities, the leader can leverage leadership 

design to create and visualize a cognitive 

pathway for influencing the selected group 

toward specific goal attainment.9 This is not 

to suggest that it there is a simple formula, a 

rigorous science or any mysterious 

cookbook that leads inexorably to successful 

leadership.10 But for those who invest in the 

development of a leadership design, the 

learning that takes place during the 

leadership experience can be significantly 

less painful and chaotic than the discovery 

learning that may otherwise be expected

The Leadership Design Process

The leadership design process, like 

leadership itself (and as in so many other 

disciplines), encompasses both art and 

science. Using design thinking to visualize a 

leadership approach requires empathy for 

the problem, rationality (science) to analyze 

and adapt solutions, and creativity (art) in 

the generation and application of insights 

and approaches.11 In many ways, the design 

approach is similar to systems thinking in its 

methods of understanding problems, 

visualizing potential solutions and 

developing an acceptable approach.12 In 

essence leadership design is a non-deductive 

approach to build systemic understanding 

and to formulate unique patterns of learning 

and action in order to assist leaders in 

transforming existing organizations’ 

conditions into a more desirable state.13

Leadership design prompts a leader to 

understand the relevant strategic global 

environment, to develop a holistic cognitive 

map and to shape decision analysis 

regarding what actions the leader may, or 

will, take to lead an organization. 

Leadership design equips the leader with the 

foundations of a broad leadership approach 

that enables analysis, reflection and a way to 

potentially recognize emergent 

opportunities. While an iterative process, 

and not necessarily a sequential process or 

methodology, leadership design does lend 

itself to some linear presentation as it 

unfolds across a time continuum. In many 

senses, leadership design enables a leader to 

understand, visualize and describe leader 

actions that, when synchronized within the 

organizational and global environments, can 

Campaigning Fall 2014 10
help solve organizational problems in 

movement toward attainment of the leader’s 

strategic vision.14

The Visual Mind Map: A First Step

Leadership design is a process that can best 

be visually expressed to help the leader (and 

followers) approach a more complete 

understanding of the design itself, and how 

it will lead to a defined vision. Leaders 

should be able to physically portray their 

leadership design to effectively express their 

environment, goals, ideas and depict their 

cognitive map.15 While strategic plans 

composed of words and numbers remain 

necessary, and metaphors enable leaders to 

think and relate in fresh ways, mindmapping and visual frameworks frequently 

yield distinctly unique insights.16 In the 

same way that Leonardo da Vinci relied on 

his sketchbooks to illustrate the relationships 

of his own ideas, leaders can derive 

invaluable insights from representing even a 

simple leadership design. Through 

continuous critical thinking and discourse 

that results in the creation of a design 

drawing, leaders can approach a more 

holistic understanding of the total leadership 

process while developing and then refining 

their own cognitive maps.17 The basic 

holistic leader design drawing starts as a 

simple sketch that enables the leader to both 

analyze and synthesize the relevant global 

environment, the important leader vision, 

goals, and actions. Morgan terms this 

imaging as “picture power.”18 The first 

picture may seem disjointed as the leader 

captures the beginnings of understanding the 

specifics of the environment, the 

organization, the “problem” (factors that 

must be addressed to achieve the desired 

vision) and the approach.19 This first “mind 

map” visual depiction begins the leadership 

design process in earnest. 

Figure 1, Understanding the Leadership Environment, Beginning the Design

Culture

Values

Resources

Ethics

People

Globalism

Leader

Theories

Info

Tech

Strategic

Goals Planning

Organizational

Design

The Current Organizational 

Environment

The Future Organizational 

Environment

Culture

Info Tech

Resources

Ethics

People

Globalism

Strategic 

Values Planning

Goals &

Vision Leader

Theory

Organizational

Design

The visual “mind-mapping” uses divergent 

thinking and a “blank sheet of paper” to 

begin understanding the environment, the 

organization, the “problem, the vision and 

the range of solutions or avenues that can be 

used to get from the current environment to 

the desired future environment, or the 

leader’s vision.20 Through this first 

conceptual model, the leader begins to 

further frame a sense of understanding for 

the environment, the organization, the 

problem and the related “systems” that will 

comprise the leadership design that will 

assist and guide the leader in accomplishing 

a refined vision.21 While the first effort at 

visualization may appear to be a disjointed 

mind-map, it sets the stage for a more 

organized leadership design visualization. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 11
Leadership Design Visualization: Sketch

the Approach to a Vision 

The leadership design sketch is the result of 

significant understanding, analysis and 

communicative efforts. Design’s holistic 

understanding of unique leader situations 

and opportunities is “reached through 

critical and creative thinking, mediated by 

discourse, repetitive drawings and 

continuous reflection.”22 It is an artful 

application of both critical and creative 

thinking. Observing the tension between the 

current situation on one side and the leaders 

vision on the other, in essence solving an 

existing problem, is at the very heart of the 

way leadership designers have to think.23

The design sketch works to pictorially 

illustrate and capture the leader’s mindmapping exercise.

Current State Desired State Organizational Frame Leader Vision Leader Assessments

Environmental Frame

today Strategic Foresight future

Global Considerations

Desired 

Conditions

Current 

Conditions

Leadership Lines of Effort

Figure 2, Visualizing a Leadership Design Approach; the Basic Sketch

If properly developed, the leadership design 

diagram (figure 2) serves to inform a wide 

variety of thinking and plans while offering 

a mechanism to integrate both thinking and 

planning. The leadership design ‘assists in 

the goal setting process while aiding in 

discerning objectives and mapping out a 

plan to achieve those goal and objectives.’24

A well depicted and articulated design aids 

in shaping the best path of organizational 

growth while helping to develop and 

integrate the most appropriate strategy and 

supporting rational to achieve both 

objectives and vision.25 The leadership 

design informs the organizational growth 

while also aiding in determining: 1) 

resources required to implement the chosen 

strategy, 2) team make-up, vision, and 

leadership necessary to implement the 

strategy, and 3) direction to be followed in 

pursuing objectives. Benefits of the 

leadership design process aid any 

organization’s ability to determine who they 

are, what they do, their business model, who 

and where their customers are, how the 

organization should develop, what the 

prevailing environmental conditions are, and 

other key influencers that shape leader 

actions. Once the overall construct of the 

visual depiction is conceptually understood, 

the next step is to develop the key individual 

components and references for the 

leadership design process.

Developing the Leadership Design: 

Building the Environmental Frame

Framing the environment helps a leader 

understand the context in which the 

leadership design will be applied.26 When 

framing the environment, the leader 

examines and studies the broad 

environment, whether global, regional or 

more localized, to comprehend and 

understand the conditions, circumstances 

and factors that affect the current conditions, 

the desired conditions and the potential to 

Campaigning Fall 2014 12
achieve the desired vision. To develop the 

environmental frame, the leader organizes, 

interprets, depicts and generally endeavors 

to make sense of the complex global, 

regional or local realities that will provide 

the backdrop for all future design 

endeavors.27 The leader considers factors 

including, but not limited to, economic 

globalization, governmental implications, 

global business dynamics, a wide range of 

international impacts (finance, markets, 

marketing, human resource management, 

public relations, politics, industries, 

competitive positioning, cultural stressors 

and others).28 By establishing an 

understanding of global, regional, crossagency and local realities in wide-ranging 

areas that might impact the leader’s 

organization, the leader is able to better 

understand the context in which all actions 

will occur and how environmental factors 

will impact efforts to accomplish the 

leader’s vision. Through understanding and 

consideration of global and regional trends 

(including technological breakthroughs, 

international megamergers, ethnic conflicts, 

religious tensions, radicalism, 

environmentalism and demographic 

dilemmas29), the leader recognizes 

unavoidable, potential challenges and 

contributions to vision attainment. 

Depending on the nature of the 

environmental frame (which is likely to 

change over time), the leader may need to 

modify approaches and perhaps, even the 

vision. While in the background, the 

importance of a comprehensive 

environmental frame to understanding the 

problem cannot be overstated (see figure 3). 

Current State Desired State Organizational Frame

Cultural Realities

Desired 

Conditions

Resource Constraints Other Systems

Leader Vision

Current 

Conditions

Leader Assessments

Environmental Frame

today Strategic Foresight future

Global Economic Trends

Globalization Trends Political Trends Demographic Trends

Market Trends Resource Trends

Figure 3, Building the Environmental Frame: The Context of the Design

Environmental Frame

The initial exploration of the overarching 

environment within which the organization 

exists, its various actors, their 

interrelationships and the evolution of 

significant trends establishes an initial 

narrative that should prompt useful 

questions, and perhaps generate answers, as 

the leader refines the leadership design.30

The environmental frame provides the 

“outer frame” in which the organizational 

frame will be developed to help illuminate 

the relationship(s) between the organization 

and the global environment in which it 

resides.

The Organizational Frame: 

The leader’s organization or group, while 

inexplicably linked to the external 

influences addressed in the environmental 

frame, is a separate and distinct entity with 

its own uniqueness and its own descriptors. 

Whether a large multinational corporation or 

a small local nonprofit, each organization 

has its own identity and characteristics. 

Regardless of the type of organization, every 

organization consists of “social entities that 

Campaigning Fall 2014 13
are goal-directed, designed as deliberate

structures and coordinated activity systems, 

and are linked to the external 

environment.”31 The leader must frame the 

organization as a system of interacting 

elements that acquires inputs from the 

environment, transforms them and 

discharges outputs to the external 

environment.32 Within the organizational 

frame, the leader must master the culture, 

size, technology, strategy, goals and 

environment of the organization. These 

interdependent contextual and structural 

dimensions will provide a backdrop for all 

design activities, though more narrowly 

focused than the environmental 

considerations, which will provide a basis 

for analysis and measurement. 

Sanders states that “in the new planning 

paradigm, strategic thinking, the most 

important step in any planning effort, begins 

by stepping back and observing the 

environment as it really is, a complex 

system of interacting variables.”33 This same 

approach applies to leadership design; the 

leader must properly assess the current 

organizational environmental space to 

understand prior leader efforts, 

interrelationships, various actors, existing 

problems and alternative potential 

solutions.34 

Developing the organizational frame forces 

the leader to confront the realities and 

details of the leader’s organization, the true 

“work space” of the leadership design. The 

organizational frame is meant to prompt the 

leader of any type of organization to 

understand the organization’s structure and 

more importantly, to consider that the 

organization is made up of people fulfilling 

the roles of management, the technical core 

and support staff. 

While seeking to understand the realities of 

the organizational frame, the details of what 

the organization is and what it might 

become in a global sense, the leader should 

consider consulting organizational theorists 

such as Galbraith, Handy, Nadler,Tushman 

and others .35 By studying, analyzing and 

mastering the organizational frame, the 

leader is better prepared to make 

modifications, improvements and changes to 

the many aspects of organizational design 

within the leadership design. More 

importantly, the leader will better 

understand his fit, role and responsibilities 

to the organization or group within its global 

environmental frame. This provides a 

coherent backdrop against which to analyze 

the organization through a somewhat orderly 

assessment process. At each step, the ideas, 

notes, insights and reflective thoughts 

should be captured in order to synthesize all 

that comes to light through the leadership 

design process.

Campaigning Fall 2014 14
Assessment: Building the Requisite 

Understanding to Proceed

An old aviators’ maxim asserts that the first 

thing a navigator must know is not where he 

wants to go, but where he is. While 

understanding the players, systems, trends 

and relationships in the environmental and 

organizational frames is essential, formally 

assessing the organization as it currently 

exists in the global environment is essential 

to the leadership design process. The leader 

needs to further refine and confirm an 

understanding of the current state of the 

organization beyond the wide understanding 

gained from the organizational frame. 

Acknowledging all of the players, prior 

problems and past trends is essential to 

initiating a leadership design. According to 

Mintzberg, “you cannot see ahead unless 

you can see behind, because any good vision 

of the future has to be rooted in an 

understanding of the past.”36 Just as insight 

about the present and foresight about the 

future make up two major components of 

strategic thinking, so too is assessment of 

the present a prerequisite, and a key step

toward a leadership design that supports 

attainment of goals and vision.37

There are a myriad of methodologies 

available to ascertain where any 

organization stands and where its 

component situations reside. While the 

profitability, productivity, processes, 

growth, customer satisfaction and efficiency 

are readily available metrics, the leader will 

benefit from a variety of assessment 

instruments as well.38 While there are 

numerous tools available, one fairly 

comprehensive assessment tool is the 

balanced scorecard. It not only provides 

performance measurements, but aids leaders 

in determination of what should be done and 

measured. Because the balanced scorecard is 

established in an effort to align the 

organizations vision with key work elements 

focused on a desired outcome, it is well 

suited for use as an assessment instrument 

within the leadership design.39 In this 

process, general focus is placed on targeting 

the right things to accomplish in the 

organization in order to achieve the specific 

objectives that support the leader’s vision. 

The leadership design then helps illustrate 

the requisite connectivity between the 

assessment’s focus and the objectives that 

contributes to the organization’s sustainable 

competitive advantage detailed in the vision. 

Leaders need to assess their organizations 

continually, through a variety of 

methodologies. 

Other assessment instruments, including the 

Competing Values Framework and the 

Organizational Culture Assessment 

Instrument also inform the leadership design 

process.40 Both of these tools help assess 

current culture, help determine desired 

culture and aid in plotting a course for 

potential organizational culture change to 

support an organization’s strategic direction 

toward the leader’s vision. Others tools, 

surveys and discourse prompt, including the 

Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire and 

the Strategic Leadership Team Survey, aid 

the leader in the assessment phase of the 

leadership design process.41 Another tool, 

Porter’s Five Forces Model of Competition, 

diagnoses the organization’s position with 

regard to the global environment, helping 

link a previous step in the design process to 

Campaigning Fall 2014 15
the leader’s assessment.42 Each of these

assessment tools, uniquely helpful in 

establishing insights into the current state of 

the all aspects of the organization, are 

depicted on the left, as the visual start point 

of the design process within the existing 

environments (see figure 5). Leaders at 

every level can benefit from finding the 

assessment tools that will work for their 

organizations. 

Current State Desired State

Organizational Frame

Cultural Realities

Desired 

Conditions

Resource Constraints Other Systems

Leader Vision

Current 

Conditions

Leader Assessments

Environmental Frame

today Strategic Foresight future

Global Considerations

Tools

CVF, BS

Surveys

Observe

Discourse

Figure 5: Assessment: Improving Understanding in the Design Model

Leadership design requires ongoing 

assessment, using tools previously 

described, as well as other assessment 

methods, to further define the current 

organization. Assessment informs the entire 

leadership design process and continues 

throughout the design process and related 

subsequent reframing as the leader executes 

a continuous monitoring, evaluation and 

reevaluation of progress toward attainment 

of objectives and leader vision. The leader 

must analyze and composite the assessment 

information to determine current conditions 

and the state of the organization. Like the 

navigator, the leader must first know 

precisely where he or she, others in the 

organization and the organization itself are. 

Only then can the leader proceed through 

the leadership design process. Once the 

leader understands the current state, it is 

possible to further develop and understand 

the leader’s desired state for the 

organization. 

The Leader’s Organizational Vision: a 

Critical Step

Once the navigator determines where he is, 

he determines where he needs to go; the 

same standard applies in leadership design. 

Most military leaders understand the need 

for objectives and end states; this is similar. 

Visually depicted on the right side of the 

leadership design diagram, the vision serves 

to bookend the leadership design process 

with an assessment of the current situation at 

the other end (the left side of the diagram)

(see figure 6). In essence, the vision 

provides the desired positive outcome, target 

or end state of the entire leadership 

process.43 

Current State Desired State

Organizational Frame

Cultural Realities

Desired 

Conditions

Resource Constraints Other Systems

Leader Vision

Current 

Conditions

Leader Assessments

Environmental Frame

today Strategic Foresight future

Global Considerations

Tools

CVF, BS

Surveys

Observe

Discourse

Figure 6: Leader Vision: Solving the Existing Problem through Design 

Community

Growth

Focus

Commitment

Goals

What needs to change?

The vision must be clearly articulated and 

captured as the focus of all leadership 

activity and then should also serve as the 

“primary point of origin” for all 

Campaigning Fall 2014 16
oganizational activities. The leader’s vision 

is, by its very nature, an ‘attractive, realistic 

and believable future.’44 Connecting the 

current organization and environmental 

conditions to the vision is of preeminent 

importance in the leadership design effort 

just as it is in the practice of leadership. 

Announcing and codifying the long term 

goal for the organization, the vision 

statement captured on the leadership design 

also presents both strategic guidance and 

motivational focus.45 The vision statement 

encompasses and frames values, culture, 

change, organizational design and change 

management and must be simultaneously 

clear, linked to stakeholder interests and 

feasible or attainable.46 In essence, vision is 

the most important part of the leadership 

design because it summarizes the 

organization’s preferred place for the future. 

Everything the leader and the organization 

do is aimed toward the vision. This is much 

more than simply espousing a reinvented 

leader vision when assuming leadership, but 

is a concerted effort to analyze and define 

where the organization should go. 

It is important that the clear, realistic and 

long term vision be based on a separate 

foresight process and should by no means be 

the leader’s singularly inspired image.47 One 

of the most important steps in leadership 

design, and clearly one of the first steps, 

development of the vision should answer the 

question “who and what does the 

organization want to be?”48 On the 

leadership design diagram, the vision drives 

everything occurring between the 

assessment of the current state and the 

vision itself. All subsequent activity in the 

leadership design process is focused on the 

ways to move the organization toward the 

leader’s vision. 

Determining the Leader’s Objectives for 

the Organization 

Most organizations in the business world 

seek to gain sustainable “competitive 

advantage” which is most frequently defined 

as a definitive measurement of success and 

an objective.49 Competitive advantage is 

what makes an organization distinctive and 

enables it to perform at higher levels than 

other similar organizations; competitive 

advantage enables an organization to 

maximize resource application for desired 

and beneficial results. Competitive 

advantage generally equates to a measurable 

and quantifiable condition that is most often 

related to some of the same metrics 

employed in assessing the current condition 

of the organization. By defining the 

organization’s competitive advantage, 

concrete and actionable concepts emerge; 

these should be captured by the leader and 

established as objectives to be met in order 

to ensure attainment of the leader’s vision.50

By defining these objectives as definitive 

indicators of competitive advantage, the 

leader should go beyond one-dimensional 

descriptors of organizational success and, in 

turn, define the descriptive (and quantifiable 

where possible) objectives of all leaderinfluenced organizational activities. 

Through a precise and concise definition of 

competitive advantage, the leadership 

designer goes beyond the process of 

strategic planning that naturally serves to 

promote clear objectives with connectivity 

to specific tasks. Montuori notes that “in the 

Campaigning Fall 2014 17
formulation of strategy, the very purpose is 

to create order, and forge an orderly, clear, 

and unambiguous path into the future.”51 

The application of clear competitive 

advantage objectives does this within 

leadership design process. Leadership 

design incorporates the objectives used in 

strategic planning in a more holistic, but 

nonetheless systematic, leadership process. 

Woodbury offers several strategic principles 

that help identify quantifiable areas as an 

organization delineates practical competitive 

advantage metrics.52 These include how the 

organization describes and measures itself in 

several key areas: organization for growth, 

improvement of quality, sense of 

community, and focus on the organization’s 

core mission issues.53 Going beyond 

Drucker’s traditional management by 

objectives, identifying these measurable 

objectives, clearly derived from the vision 

and the organization’s definition of 

competitive advantage, helps clarify the 

activities and considerations that should 

serve as linkages in the leadership design. 

These four objectives contribute a definitive 

sense of organizational direction without 

being overly prescriptive. 

As Jeffrey Pfeffer noted, successful 

organizations focus more on empowering

people to embrace a common set of goals 

than on articulating the right and specific 

“business strategy.”54 Goals focused on 

community, growth, commitment and focus 

serve as a foundation for useful and 

measurable shared objectives. These goals, 

articulated and quantified where possible, 

provide targets for all leader and 

organizational activities at every level – they 

link the vision to the activities depicted by 

lines of effort. Articulated and demonstrated 

leadership lines of effort then focus on these 

shared objectives enroute to a common 

vision. 

Leadership Lines of Effort: Concepts, 

Considerations and Activities that Link 

the Current Organization to the Future 

Vision

Leadership lines of effort fill the gap 

between the present and the future 

organization - between the existing 

circumstances and the vision. Lines of effort 

are used to visually and cognitively link 

multiple concepts, tasks, activities and 

objectives. Considered together, the lines of 

effort go beyond strategy planning alone as 

they prompt consideration and 

synchronization of a comprehensive set of 

considerations and activities. The leadership 

lines of effort are a particular array of 

activities and considerations, aligned and 

wholly interdependent, that move the 

organization from its current state toward 

achievement of objectives and attainment of 

the leader’s (and the organizations’) vision. 

The leader lines of effort also provide a 

framework for drawing appropriate 

organizational boundaries, prioritizing effort 

and shaping relationships between activities 

and actors.55 They are selected by the leader 

with help from his or her ‘strategic 

leadership team’ as they develop the 

leadership design. While there are a 

multitude of potential leader lines of effort, 

there are several key lines worthy of leader 

consideration regardless of the type or size 

of the organization and the environmental 

circumstances (see figure 6). These six lines 

Campaigning Fall 2014 18
of effort also synchronize nicely with the 

desired leader attributes endorsed by the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.56 

Current State Desired State

Organizational Frame

Cultural Realities

Desired 

Conditions

Resource Constraints Other Systems

Leader Vision

Current 

Conditions

Leader Assessments

Environmental Frame

today Strategic Foresight future

Global Considerations

Tools

CVF, BS

Surveys

Observe

Discourse

Figure 6: Leadership Lines of Effort: Actions to Link Present to Future

Community

Growth

Focus

Commitment

Goals

Leadership Lines of Effort

Culture

Values and Ethics

Strategic Planning and Design

Organizational Design

Change Management

Leadership Theories

Lines of effort are Interrelated

The Foundational Line of Effort: 

Theoretical Underpinnings

Of the six lines of effort depicted in figure 6, 

the leadership theory line is depicted on the 

bottom, to signify its role as a foundational

line of effort upon which much else is built. 

In leadership, as with most any significant 

human endeavor, there are theoretical 

underpinnings that can furnish the mind with 

“insight into the great mass of relevant 

phenomena and of their relationships.”57 All 

leaders learn about leading, but few 

remember leadership theories. Theories of 

leadership present a reasonably coherent 

conceptual structure of how critical 

variables interact by presenting ideas that 

can be put to the test and revised as new data 

accumulates.”58 Leadership theory 

contributes a researched foundation to 

substantiate its theoretical propositions and 

has applicability that extends to most, if not 

all, leadership contexts. A foundational 

leadership theory line of effort offers the 

leader a framework against which to weigh 

the tasks and activities in the other lines of 

effort. These theoretical underpinnings 

prompt the leader to review and consider a 

range of leadership theories, and to apply 

one or parts of all of these theories in 

practice. Leadership theory yields a way, or 

a behavioral map, upon which the leader can 

weigh actions within a style or approach to 

leadership.

Northouse, Yukl and Burns all define 

several basic concepts of leadership theory

that are central to the larger “leadership 

phenomenon.”59 These theorists provide 

both insights and the basis for measurement 

and analysis of approaches, styles and 

methods. In essence, all leadership tasks 

and activities can be considered against one 

or more theories; it is this theoretical 

underpinning that helps give order to the 

other lines of effort. Morgan suggests that 

theory provides a model for “detailed 

analysis, describing patterns and possible 

solutions.”60 While perhaps the least 

concrete of the lines of effort in terms of 

specific actions, the theoretical 

underpinnings provide the azimuth in terms 

of leadership styles, patterns and behaviors 

the leader wants to adopt and follow.61

Theoretical underpinnings are interwoven 

and translated into action in the other lines 

of effort listed directly above as depicted in 

figure 6. This line of effort, visually 

displayed on the bottom of the sketch to 

reinforce consideration and affirm its 

foundational role in the leadership design, is 

interrelated to each of the other lines of 

effort. The interrelationships and synergies 

of the multiple lines of operation are shown 

Campaigning Fall 2014 19
as arrows connecting all of the lines of effort 

with one another. Each line is related to and 

has impact on the other lines; all lines are 

interdependent. 

The Culture Line of Effort: Undeniable 

Impacts

Covey asserts that every leader or manager 

must ‘be aware of the culture, of the nature 

of the situation, and of the social will.’62

Black et al. emphasize that understanding 

the culture of an organization is a mandatory 

leadership capability to succeed within

contemporary global business-specific 

dynamics.63 The need to understand an 

organization’s culture, and the cultures of 

those in the organization, is critical to every 

leader today because the organizational 

culture relates directly to the organizational 

effectiveness and ultimately the 

organization’s success. It is the 

organizational culture that “provides the 

framework” to implement and operationalize 

organizational strategies.64 Without an 

understanding of the current and preferred 

cultures, the leader is likely to encounter 

underlying conflicts that will ultimately 

undermine any organization’s ability to cope 

with its external environment and adapt to 

growing change.65 The culture line of effort 

should prompt leaders to consider an 

essential and ongoing cultural audit to 

produce the requisite self-awareness to 

lead.66 It is the culture line of effort that 

causes the leader to reflect and to better 

identify the “do’s and don’ts” of making 

things happen within and across certain 

cultures.”67 In today’s world, the importance 

of cultural understanding is undeniable. 

This culture line of effort also serves to link 

the assessment findings and results to the 

organizations objectives, particularly in 

terms of developing community and 

organizational growth. Through an initial 

cultural audit during the leader’s assessment 

phase, the leader leverages cultural 

understanding to create increased awareness 

across the organization, refute 

misperceptions, demonstrate openness, 

collect feedback and safeguard against 

harmful cultural deviations.68 Each of these 

outcomes can be derived from specific 

actions taken along the line of effort. The 

culture line of effort clearly prompts the 

leader to embrace the role that culture plays 

in an organization and links directly to the 

leader actions in all other leadership lines of 

effort. The culture line of effort is also 

essential to managing the direction, depth, 

and disposition of an organization’s values 

and culture. By mastering and integrating 

the many roles and impacts of culture, the 

leader can build relationship and bridges 

within and across the organization while 

creating a sense of wholeness that leverages 

diversity and responsibilities across the 

organization.69 Culture, inextricably linked 

to values, sets the stage for consideration of 

the next line of effort. 

Values and Ethics Line of Effort: 

Inescapable Realities

Leaders must understand their own values, 

the values of the organization and the 

variances between the two. The values line 

of effort is paramount. Values and ethics are 

both the individual’s and the organization’s 

criteria for their most important decisions 

while serving as measuring sticks for 

Campaigning Fall 2014 20
priority determination.

70 Emphasizing this 

importance, Hultman and Gellerman assert 

that “without the capacity to formulate and 

act on values, life on the human level would 

not exist.”71 Nadler and Tushman emphasize 

that values and beliefs are “the basic 

building blocks of any organizational 

culture.”72

Leaders must remain cognizant of the role 

and impact of values and professionalism in 

their organizations; aligning this line of 

effort with the others is critical for 

successful endeavors across all 

organizations. Collins noted that “the first 

task for leaders is to create an environment 

and a process that enables people to safely 

identify and eliminate values 

misalignments.”73 For leaders to facilitate 

alignment with leader and organizational 

values, the leader must articulate, reinforce 

and exhibit desired values. Without 

identifying and consistently aligning the 

espoused and perceived values of the leader 

across all lines of effort, it may be 

impossible to further align the values that 

exist throughout the organization. The 

values line of effort is essential because 

‘values influence organizational strategy, 

corporate decisions on strategy and define 

individual behavior and decision-making.’74 

Strategic Planning, Design, 

Implementation: The Heart of the 

Leadership Design

Organizational strategy occupies a central 

role in the leadership design process because 

strategic thinking and strategic planning are 

at the heart of the leadership design (and 

becomes even more so at higher levels of 

leadership): conversely, leadership design 

should be the soul of strategic thinking and 

planning. Strategic planning focuses on 

collecting the right information (framing) 

while strategic thinking focuses on aligning 

the organization’s structure, design and 

environment to create synthesis.75 The 

leadership design influences strategic 

planning which engenders reframing and 

adjustment of the leadership design through 

an iterative and somewhat spiral process. 

For many leaders, in most organizations, the 

strategic plan is constructed without ever 

engaging in any leadership design effort 

which would help foster the necessary 

strategic thinking requisite for success

through synthesis. But by including strategic 

planning, design and implementation in the 

center of the leadership design drawing (see 

figure 6), it becomes a central pivot point 

and calls for integration with other 

leadership design considerations and 

actions. 

The strategic planning line of effort

develops both during and after the leader’s 

strategic thinking and should be viewed as 

less of a plan and more as a process that is 

“creative, dynamic, responsive...intuitive 

and part of an unpredictable and evolving 

environment.”76 The strategic planning line 

of effort prompts the leader to think in time 

using “both the institution’s memory and its 

broad historical context to think well about 

creating its future.”77 The strategic planning 

line of effort yields an orderly, clear, 

creative and unambiguous path into the 

future that lays out a series of interim goals, 

requisite activities and necessary actions to 

take the leader’s organization to the next 

level.78 As the centrally depicted line of 

effort, it is inherently linked to all of the 

Campaigning Fall 2014 21
other lines of effort and must be both 

deconflicted and synchronized with those 

other lines of effort. By orchestrating 

strategic planning, thinking and design along 

with all other lines of effort, the 

visualization becomes a more useful 

synchronization toll for the leadership 

design. 

Change Management Line of Effort: 

Actions to Shape the Organization 

“Change, rather than stability, is the today’s 

norm” for most organizations according to 

Daft.79 Simply adapting to change is 

insufficient for today’s leaders; today’s 

leaders plan for and lead change. Today’s 

leaders must accept change in a proactive 

rather than a reactive fashion and must 

anticipate both the certainty and necessity of 

organizational change across a variety of 

areas. All organizations must cope with 

change, but through proper leadership and 

synchronization of change efforts, most 

challenges associated with change can be 

avoided.80 The change management line of 

effort acknowledges that leaders must be 

prepared to “drive change, consolidate 

gains, and produce more change.” 81The 

change line of effort prompts the leader to 

develop a phased approach to change 

through the use of change-actions arrayed as 

definitive milestones while applying some 

type of change management model similar 

to Lewin’s three stages of change 

(“unfreeze-change-refreeze”) concept.82 

Kotter’s change process or Lewins’ “generic 

recipe for organizational development” both 

serve as constructive examples from which 

to model the change management line of 

operation.83 Like the others, this line of 

operation demands synchronization and 

continuous assessment, development and 

update. This line of effort must be linked to 

all of the other lines as the leader moves 

from the current organizational state to the 

desired organizational state.

Organizational Design Line of Effort: 

Tying the Architecture Together

Organizational design cannot exist in 

isolation from the other lines of effort. Like 

the change management line of effort, the 

organizational design and implementation 

leadership line of effort focuses on the 

process of reshaping organization roles and 

structure. More precisely, it is the alignment 

of structure, process, rewards, relationships, 

metrics, learning abilities and talent on the 

path to the goals and vision of the leader’s.84

The organizational design line of effort 

requires the leader to examine every facet of 

an organization’s existence to ensure 

organizational alignment that ensures 

competitive advantage while achieving 

strategic goals and the leader’s 

organizational vision. By addressing 

organizational design holistically, the leader 

discerns that the organization is right for the 

culture while organizational artifacts left 

over from an earlier era are reexamined for 

appropriateness and relevancy.85 

The organizational design line of effort 

should be inherently structured to facilitate 

achievement of activities, goals and 

objectives; it becomes the all-important 

formal framework for both communication 

and authority across the organization.86 The 

organizational design also presents an 

inescapable effect on the culture and 

therefore on the behavior of everyone within 

Campaigning Fall 2014 22
that organization.87 The organizational 

design line of effort carefully synchronized 

with and linked to the other lines of effort, 

gives structure and form to the 

organization.88 In consonance with the other 

lines of effort, the organizational design line 

of effort synthesizes elements from each of 

the other lines to transform to appropriate 

structure, policies and overall design of the 

organization to enable goal and vision 

attainment. It is the organizational design 

line of effort that allows the leader to begin 

moving away from a design process and, 

perhaps, more toward a planning process. 

Current State Desired State

Organizational Frame

Cultural Realities

Desired 

Conditions

Resource Constraints Other Systems

Leader Vision

Current 

Conditions

Leader Assessments

Environmental Frame

today Strategic Foresight future

Global Considerations

Tools

CVF, BS

Surveys

Observe

Discourse

Community

Growth

Focus

Commitment

Goals

Leadership Lines of Effort

Culture

Values and Ethics

Strategic Planning and Design

Organizational Design

Change Management

Leadership Theories

= Leadership Decision Points = Leadership Milestones

Figure 7: Facilitating Decisions, Milestones, Actions and Changes

Leadership Design: Linking the Art and 

Science of Leadership

As the leadership design reveals greater 

specifics about the environment, the 

organization, the current state, the desired 

state and the lines of efforts that require 

actions to ensure change, a series of 

decisions and milestones emerges. The 

leadership design begins to lend itself to 

interpretation as a program evaluation and 

review technique (PERT) model as the 

leader is able to identify near, mid and long 

term goals and tasks (and their relationships) 

that may be required to accomplish these.89 

And because the global and organizational 

environments are very dynamic, the leader is 

able to envision a series of decisions that 

may be required after each milestone is 

achieved. By discerning required actions, 

potential milestones and decisions that may 

occur the leader is able to consider 

intermediate factors along each line of 

operation that could impact attainment of the 

leader’s vision (see figure 7).

At this point in the methodology, the 

leadership design model begins to bridge 

between what Mintzberg might define as 

“strategic thinking” and “strategic 

planning.”90 Intermediate goals, or 

milestones, and decision points allow the 

leader to integrate considerations such as 

time, space and resources as a new level of 

granularity emerges from the leadership 

design process. At this point in the design 

process, the leader begins to go beyond 

conceptualization and understanding and 

instead moves toward pursuit of specific 

goals, task determination, determining 

responsibility for tasks, structuring of social 

systems to achieve goals, and initiative to 

find solutions to the problems previously 

identified (all leader characteristics 

identified by Stogdill).91 At this point the 

leadership design methodology substantially 

transitions from art toward science and the 

stage is set for a leadership planning effort. 

Conclusion: Taking leadership Design for 

a Test Drive

Leadership design borrows heavily from the 

military’s recent successful embrace of 

Campaigning Fall 2014 23
design thinking and, at the same time, is 

modeled on the key components and most 

successful courses at leadership and 

management educational programs across 

the country. This process is not meant to be 

a mechanical approach to guaranteeing 

success for any leader, but rather a way to 

plan and visualize the integration of 

evaluation, analysis, synthesis, reflection, 

reasoning and critical thinking activities 

requisite to leading an organization. While 

depicted in successive steps, the leadership 

design methodology is actually meant to be 

a scaffold around a critical thinking process 

focused on leadership and, more 

importantly, leading.

Leadership design is not really linear but 

must instead be an iterative process that 

assists the leader in visualizing a holistic 

cognitive picture-map to guide an approach 

to leading an organization. It provides a 

pictorial framework upon which to plan, 

position and link concepts, activities and 

considerations for the organizational leader 

and his or her leadership team. It becomes a 

basic approach to leadership actions, 

behaviors, priorities and thinking. In 

essence, it shapes decision analysis 

regarding what actions the leader may, or 

will take to lead the organization. The 

design is meant to become a useful 

framework to remind, prompt and guide the 

art and science of leadership. 

Leadership design is a first step in a new 

method aimed at integrating the 

multidimensional aspects of leadership. If it 

inspires a leader to make an effort toward 

visually depicting what is undeniably a 

complex human endeavor in a complex 

environment, it will have served a small 

purpose. If it inspires others to expand the 

process and promulgate a new approach to 

guiding leader actions, it can be considered 

successful. When privileged to take on a 

new leadership role, try walking through this 

process and see if it helps connect the dots 

for the inherently complex and challenging 

job of leading at every level in today’s 

global environment. It may not be an end-all 

by any means, but it provides a point of 

departure to think about assuming the 

challenging mantle of organizational 

leadership. As today’s leaders and 

tomorrow’s national security leaders evolve 

and map their own approaches toward 

leadership, the leadership design model 

might just help them be the kind of leader 

envisioned by the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

1 Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Education White Paper

(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 2012).

2 Ludwig Bertalanffy, General System Theory: 

Foundations, Development, Applications (New York, 

NY: George Braziller Inc., 1969).

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Campaigning Fall 2014 24
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14 U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-0, The Operations 

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21 Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, 

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Oxford University Press, 2006). Hatch provides a 

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demonstrating the interrelationships of systems 

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22 Bryan Lawson. 

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Smart Strategies to Grow Without Getting Derailed

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25 Sherman. 26 Daniel McCauley, “Design and Joint Military 

Planning,” Canadian Military Journal 12, no. 1. 27 McCauley. 28 Stewart Black, Alan Morrison, Hal B. Gregersen, 

Global Explorers; the Next Generation of Leaders

(New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), 158.

29 Robert Rosen, Global Literacies: Lessons on 

Business Leadership and National Cultures (New 

York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 18.

30 Bryan Lawson, 220-229. 31 Richard Daft, Organization Theory and Design (9th

Ed.) (Mason, OH: Thomson Higher Education, 2007), 

14.

32 Daft, 15. 33 T. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science

(New York, NY: Free Press, 1998). 34 Roger Martin, The Opposable Mind: Winning 

Through Integrative Thinking (Boston, MA: Harvard 

Business School, 2007). 35 Jay Gailbraith, Designing the Global Corporation

(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000); Charles 

Handy, The Age of Paradox (Boston: The Harvard 

Business School Press, 1994); David Nadler, & 

Michael Tushman, Competing by Design: The Power 

of Organizational Architecture (New York: Oxford 

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Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of 

Strategic Management (New York, NY: The Free 

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together,” Journal of Property Management, 75, no. 

4, 5 (July-August 2010). 39 S. Nagarajan, A. S. Nallathambi, P. Palaniappan 

& B. Sundarakani, B. “Customer Relationship-Based 

Strategic 

Planning Using Balanced Scorecard - a Case 

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and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the 

Competing Values Framework (3d. ed.)(San 

Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011). 41 Bernard Bass & Bruce Avolio, Multifactor 

Leadership Questionnaire for Research (Menlo Park, 

 

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Katherine Beatty, Becoming a Strategic Leader: Your 

Role in Your Organization’s Success (San Francisco, 

CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005). 42 Michael Porter, “How Competitive Forces Shape 

Strategy,” Harvard Business Review, 2, no. 57 (1979) 

137-145. 43 Northouse, 188. 44 Warren Bennis & Bert Nanus, Leaders: Strategies 

for Taking Charge (New York: Harper Perennial, 

1985) 88. 45 Cornelis de Kluyver& John Pearce, Strategy: A 

View from the Top (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 

Education, 2009). 46 John Kotter, A Force for Change (New York, NY: 

Free Press, 1990). 47 T. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science

(New York, NY: Free Press, 1998) 141. 48 Sanders, 141. 49 P. Rajan Varadarajan & Satish Jayachandran, 

“Marketing Strategy: An Assessment of the State of 

the Field and Outlook,” Journal of the Academy of 

Marketing Science, 27, no. 2 (1999) 120-143; 

Northouse; Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage: 

Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New 

York, NY: The Free Press, 1998). 50 Porter. 51 Alfonso Montuori, “From Strategic Planning to 

Strategic Design: Reconceptualizing the Future of 

Strategy in Organizations,” World Futures: The 

Journal of General Evolution, 59, no. 1 (2003): 3-20. 52 Woodbury, 5. 53 Woodbury, 5. 54 Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Human Equation: Building 

Profits by Putting People First (Boston, MA: Harvard 

Business School Press, 1998). 55 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating 

and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York, NY: 

The Free Press, 1998). 56 The Joint Staff Director for Joint Force 

Development, The Review of Joint Education

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 2012). 57 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. (Howard, M. and 

Paret, P., Trans.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1984). 58 Richard Hughes, Robert Ginnett & Gordon Curphy, 

Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience

(Boston, MA: Irwin Inc, 1993) 85. 59 James M. Burns, Leadership (College Park, MD: 

Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1978); Northouse; 

G. A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations (Englewood 

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006). 60 Morgan, Images of Organization, 58. 61 Northouse. 62 Stephen Covey, Principle-Centered Leadership

(New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992). 63 J. Stewart Black, Allen Morrison, Hal B. Gregersen, 

Global Explorers; the Next Generation of Business 

Leaders (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999). 64 M. J. Coolican, M. & J. L. Jackson, Integrating 

Culture with Strategy. (2002) Retrieved from 

www.leader-values.com. 65 Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and 

Leadership (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992). 66 Daniel Goleman, “What Makes a Leader?” 

Harvard Business Review (November-December, 

1998). 67 Thomas Zweifel, Culture Clash: Managing the 

Global High Performance Team (New York, NY: 

Select Books, 2003). 68 Kim S. Cameron& Robert E. Quinn, R. E. 

Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: 

Based on the Competing Values Framework (3d. ed.)

(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011). 69 Robert Rosen, Global Literacies: Lessons on 

Business Leadership and National Cultures (New 

York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2000) 172-4. 70 W. Gellerman, M. Frankel & R. Ladenson, Values 

and Ethics in Organization and Human Systems 

Development: Responding to Dilemmas in 

Professional Life (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 

1990). 71 K. Hultman & B. Gellerman, Balancing Individual 

and Organizational Values: Walking the Tightrope to 

Success (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2002). 72 Nadler & Tushman, 195-6. 73 James C. Collins, “Aligning Action and Values,”

Leader to Leader, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 19-24. 74 G. W. England, “Personal Value Systems of 

American Managers,” Academy of Management 

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Planning,” Harvard Business Review 72, no.1 (1994):

152.

76 Fiona Graetz, “Strategic Thinking Versus Strategic 

Planning: Towards Understanding the 

Complementarities,” Management Decision 40, no. 5 

(2002): 546. 77 Jeanne Liedtka, “Linking Strategic Thinking with 

Strategic Planning,” Strategy and Leadership 26, no. 

4 (1994): 30-35.

 

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78 Alfonso Montuori, “From Strategic Planning to 

Strategic Design: Reconceptualizing the Future of 

Strategy in Organizations,” World Futures: The 

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(New York, NY: Harper and Rowe, 1951). 83 Karl Weick & Robert Quinn, “Organizational 

Change and Development,” Annual Review of 

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Organization: From Informal Networks to Complex 

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social psychology (New York, NY: Harper and 

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Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of 

Organizational Structure (San Francisco, CA: JosseyBass, 1995). 89 Dragan Milosevic, Project Management Toolbox: 

Tools and Techniques for the Practicing Project 

Manager (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). 90 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, Joseph Lampel, 

Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of 

Strategic Management (New York, NY: The Free 

Press, 1998). 91 Stogdill. 

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 27
Joint Before Joint Was Cool: A 

Fresh Look At The Success Of 

Mosby’s Rangers In The Civil War

By Lt Col Jeffrey A. Guimarin, Maj David F. 

Lawrence, and Lt Col Kevin M. Wenks

From 1863 through 1865, Confederate 

Colonel John S. Mosby conducted an 

effective and wide-ranging cavalry 

campaign of irregular warfare behind Union 

lines in Northern Virginia and Maryland, 

winning him praise from subordinates, 

superiors, and foes alike. Many 

contemporaries and historians attributed the 

success of Mosby's Rangers mainly to the 

personal attributes of its leader or the 

particular tactics he employed. However,

viewing the operations of Mosby's Rangers 

through the lens of the six joint functions 

makes it clear that part of their success was 

underpinned by effective employment and 

integration of the six joint functions, 

demonstrating the universality of these joint 

functions to military planning and 

operations. 

Colonel John S. Mosby was an unlikely 

military hero. Yet, the actions of his unit, 

the 43rd Virginia Battalion, also known as 

Mosby’s Rangers, won him fame on both 

sides of the Mason-Dixon Line during the 

Civil War. A lawyer before the war started, 

Mosby initially joined a regular cavalry unit 

as a private. Later, he resigned from the 

Army after a disagreement with a 

commanding officer. Mosby had previously 

shown promise as a scout, so he was 

retained by General James E. B. “Jeb” Stuart 

on Stuart’s personal staff despite not being 

enlisted or commissioned. As a scout for 

Stuart, Mosby identified a weakness in the 

Union battle positions during the “Seven 

Days Battles” near Richmond, Virginia in 

June, 1862. His information was the key 

that enabled Stuart’s famous “ride around 

McClellan,” and Mosby personally scouted 

Stuart’s cavalry reconnaissance that led to 

General Robert E. Lee’s success against 

General George B. McClellan in the Seven 

Days Battles.1

In April 1862, the Confederate Congress 

authorized the organization and use of 

partisan groups that fought behind Union 

lines, but were required to operate by the 

Articles of War and Confederate Army 

regulations. Confederate Secretary of War 

Leroy Walker believed that official 

authorization of partisan units and 

commissions for their officers would ensure 

proper treatment by Union forces should the 

partisans be captured. 2 Partisan units were 

allowed to keep whatever captured materiel 

they needed, but had to turn the rest over to 

the Confederate Army. By September, 

1862, Confederate partisan units numbered 

six regiments, nine battalions, and several 

companies.3 While Mosby’s Rangers were 

not the only partisan unit in the Confederate 

Army, its exploits would make it the most 

famous. In August, 1865, the New York 

Times claimed Mosby’s career “will show a 

succession of...adventures unsurpassed by 

those of any partisan chief on record.”4

After proving his skills and his worth as a 

scout and cavalryman, Mosby was given 

command of a group of partisans in January, 

1863. This later group would be officially 

Campaigning Fall 2014 28
organized as the 43rd Virginia Battalion. 

Mosby operated in Northern Virginia and 

the Shenandoah Valley, strategic 

battlegrounds for the duration of the war. 

Union forces in Northern Virginia not only 

had to defend the capital of Washington, 

D.C., they also had to take the war to the 

enemy in Richmond. The Shenandoah 

Valley was strategic. It was an important 

zone for forces of both sides moving 

between the south and the north, and it was a 

critical agricultural zone for the south. 

Crisscrossing the valley were lines of 

communication that the Union needed to 

supply and sustain its armies in the field. 

The outposts near Washington, D.C. and the 

lines of communication that extended into 

Northern Virginia became Mosby’s prime 

targets. 

As Mosby explained, a “small force moving 

with celerity and threatening many points on 

a line can neutralize a hundred times its own 

number...the line must be stronger at every 

point than the attacking force, else it is 

broken. The military value of a partisan’s 

work is not measured by the amount of 

property destroyed, or the number of men 

killed or captured, but by the number he 

keeps watching.”5

 Mosby’s primary intent 

was to wear down Union forces operating in 

and passing through his territory, reducing 

their ability to attack Confederate forces.

Mosby achieved outstanding success during 

his 28 months as the leader of the 43rd

Virginia Battalion. A study of Mosby’s 

Rangers clearly demonstrates that Mosby’s 

leadership was the primary factor in the 

Rangers’ success. Ulysses S. Grant 

described Mosby in his memoirs, “There 

were probably but few men in the South 

who could have commanded successfully a 

separate detachment in the rear of the 

opposing army, and so near the border of 

hostilities, as long as he did without losing 

his entire command.”6 While Mosby’s 

personal attributes of bravery and intellect 

were important factors in his success, a 

comprehensive look at all of Mosby’s 

operations shows an important key to his 

success was his ability to integrate what we 

call the six joint functions today. 

The six joint functions are best defined in 

Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces.7

 They are defined as 

command and control, intelligence, fires, 

movement and maneuver, sustainment, and 

protection. While this is the current 

terminology used by joint planners in the 

U.S. military, they are timeless aspects of 

war that leaders have used to great success. 

Mosby succeeded by successfully 

integrating all of the joint functions in his 

operations. The following examples reveal 

how effective use of each of the joint 

functions was critical to his success, 

beginning with the most basic function of 

how a commander leads his forces, 

command, and control. 

Command and Control

“Command and control encompasses the 

exercise of authority, responsibility, and 

direction by a commander over assigned and 

attached forces to accomplish the mission.”8

 

A commander must have effective command 

and control over his forces to ensure unity of 

Campaigning Fall 2014 29
effort and synchronization of forces and 

effects. Mosby began his partisan campaign 

with 15 men, so command and control was 

relatively simple. The unit operated as a 

whole and followed his lead. His orders 

were basic, such as, “Charge ‘em; charge 

‘em and go through ‘em.”9 

As Mosby’s fame spread due his increasing 

success, more and more recruits came to the 

command. As the unit grew, Mosby 

organized separate companies and 

designated commissioned and 

noncommissioned officers to lead them. 

Mosby’s area of responsibility grew 

accordingly, and he was soon operating in 

an area that ranged from the Shenandoah 

Valley to Alexandria, Virginia, and from 

Southern Maryland down to Richmond, 

Virginia. By war’s end, Mosby’s unit had 

expanded to a battalion with nine 

companies.

Such a wide operating area and span of 

control posed difficulties for a unit with no 

access to a reliable communication system. 

Mosby relied on support from trusted 

members of the local populace to quickly 

spread word to his dispersed men about 

impending attacks. Word was passed from 

town to town through otherwise innocuous 

signals by the civilians, alerting the Rangers 

to a specific meeting place and time. Once 

the Rangers gathered, Mosby provided 

mission-type orders that included an overall 

intent of the mission. However, the timing 

and tactics would often be determined by the 

specific situation the unit found once they 

arrived at the designated objective. 

Mosby carefully selected the leaders of his 

companies. They were men he could trust 

implicitly, and men who understood 

Mosby’s intent and his operational method. 

This became crucial later in the war when 

Mosby’s Rangers operated against General 

Sheridan’s Union cavalry in the Shenandoah 

Valley in the fall of 1864. Mosby was able 

to divide his battalion into smaller units that 

would attack at multiple places 

simultaneously, increasing the pressure on 

Sheridan’s lines of communication.10

With communication channels coursing 

through the local populace via word of 

mouth, in person meetings, and what we 

term in today’s vernacular as “mission 

command,” Mosby effectively commanded 

the distributed operations of his many units 

over a wide operating area. His chosen 

command and control methodology fit the 

environment he was operating in and 

enabled him to conduct concurrent 

operations at multiple places without having 

to supervise and command the detailed 

execution of any one unit. Through careful 

selection of subordinate commanders using 

the criteria of trust, a shared understanding 

of the operational principles of the unit, and 

familiarity with Mosby’s “Commander’s 

Intent” the units were able to complete 

missions with relative autonomy, but unified 

in purpose and effect by Mosby’s expert 

direction. Mosby’s direction was often 

guided by the next of the joint functions, 

intelligence.

Campaigning Fall 2014 30
Intelligence

“Intelligence helps commanders and staffs 

understand the operational environment and 

achieve information superiority.”11 

Intelligence allows commanders to employ 

their forces where, when, and how they will 

have the greatest effect. It endeavors to 

prevent surprise by the adversary. 

Mosby excelled at gathering intelligence and 

using it as a force multiplier. Mosby 

gathered much of the intelligence himself by 

scouting out objectives on his own or with a 

small number of trusted associates. One 

Ranger described that Mosby “was the 

fastest ‘scouter’ I ever knew...It was his 

constant care not to take his men into any 

place that he could not bring them out.”12 

Mosby constantly kept other scouts out 

along key lines of communication, looking 

for weakly defended outposts and lightly 

guarded supply trains. 

Mosby employed the local civilian 

population in his intelligence gathering 

efforts, as most of the civilians in his area of 

operations were southern sympathizers. The 

civilians often told Mosby about the 

movement and location of Union forces. 

One particularly effective spy for Mosby 

was a young Fairfax County woman named 

Laura Ratcliffe. She had warned him of a 

nearby ambush Union forces had set for 

him. They often passed information to each 

other through letters left under a large stone 

that came to be known as “Mosby’s 

Rock.”13 Guided by intelligence and 

enabled by command and control, Mosby 

used his force to employ the third joint 

function, fires, effectively. 

Fires

“To employ fires is to use available weapons 

and other systems to create a specific lethal

or nonlethal effect on a target.” Fires is the 

application of military power to achieve 

desired effects. It includes the obvious flash 

and fire of kinetic strikes, but it can also

include the application of non-lethal 

capabilities.14

As one of the first modern wars that 

employed military power on the industrial 

level, the Civil War does not lack for 

examples of commanders who effectively 

employed fires. Mosby, however, is unique 

in that he employed fires in innovative ways. 

Mosby’s Rangers was one of the first 

cavalry units that eschewed the cavalry 

saber for the newly-developed .44 caliber, 

six-shot, Colt Army revolver. As Mosby 

explained, “I believe I was the first cavalry 

commander who discarded the sabre as 

useless...My men were as little impressed 

by a body of cavalry charging them with 

sabres as though they had been armed with 

cornstalks...I think that my command 

reached the highest point of efficiency as 

cavalry because they were well armed with 

two six-shooters and their charges combined 

the effect of fire and shock”15 Not only did 

he employ new weapons to conduct fires, 

but he employed them in creative ways to 

achieve multiple non-traditional effects in 

combination with fires, such as shock and 

awe.

Even though the revolver was the Rangers’ 

Campaigning Fall 2014 31
weapon of choice, Mosby modified his fire 

effects to match the mission at hand. In one 

of his most successful attacks at Anker’s 

Shop in Loudon County in February, 1864, 

Mosby divided his force into three units. 

One unit dismounted and took up positions 

with long-range carbines. The long-range 

carbines were not as effective on horseback 

as the revolvers, but Mosby used their long 

range to fix an oncoming Union cavalry unit 

in place. Once the Union forces were 

pinned down by the carbines, the two 

mounted units of Mosby’s force charged, 

firing revolvers. In the ensuing battle, 

Mosby’s Rangers killed at least a dozen 

Union troopers, wounded about 25, and 

captured 70. They also captured about 100 

horses, and all was at the cost of only one of 

Mosby’s Rangers killed and five wounded.16

Mosby incorporated other innovative forms 

of fires into his partisan unit’s repertoire of 

operations. As the unit began to focus more 

on Union train lines that were supporting 

forward-deployed Union forces in summer 

1864, Mosby sought authorization from 

Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon 

for the authority to create an artillery 

company comprised of four mountain 

howitzers.17 Mosby used the howitzers and 

explosives to derail trains and capture the 

troops and supplies they carried. This 

unconventional use of fire fixed enemy 

forces at a time when they were extremely 

vulnerable and permitted their exploitation 

by a significantly smaller force. For a small, 

light cavalry force operating behind enemy 

lines, fires could only be brought to bear 

through the expert employment of the fourth 

joint function, movement and maneuver. 

Movement and Maneuver

“Movement and maneuver encompasses the 

disposition of joint forces to conduct 

operations by securing positional advantages 

before or during execution...[and] allow a 

commander to choose where and when to 

engage an adversary or take best advantage 

of geographic and environmental 

conditions.”18 As a mounted unit, Mosby’s 

Rangers excelled at employing movement 

and maneuver operationally and tactically to 

achieve operational reach throughout their 

area of operations. 

Reacting to orders from General Robert E. 

Lee to prevent Union cavalry from attacking 

Confederate railroad lines, Mosby decided, 

“The only way I could do so was to excite 

continual alarm in their camps. Their 

outposts were often attacked all along their 

lines on the same night. This was the only 

way we could keep them home. On the 

same day, three or four detachments would 

go out; some to operate on Sheridan west of 

the ridge, some to keep Augur in 

remembrance of his duty to guard the 

Capital.”19 Through speed of maneuver 

combined with good intelligence of enemy 

positions and effective command and 

control of distributed units, Mosby was able 

to fix and harass significantly larger forces 

and prevent them from accomplishing their 

mission. 

Mosby used movement and maneuver at the 

tactical level to seize the initiative and break 

up Union forces. Mosby explained, “If you 

are going to fight, then be the attacker. This 

is an old principle, and it is also my own 

Campaigning Fall 2014 32
principle,” and later, “it was never my 

tactics to stand still and receive and charge, 

but always make a countercharge.” When 

Mosby’s Rangers attacked, it was not in 

ranks and files, but in a “wild swarm.”20 

Command and control challenges of the time 

contributed to limitations on maneuver. 

Thus, in order to command and control large 

forces, commanders often kept those forces 

arranged in rigid formations that limited 

their ability to move and maneuver around 

the battlefield. Mosby effectively integrated 

mission command, flexible weapons, such 

as pistols, and speed of maneuver to mass 

force quickly at vulnerable points and 

disaggregate enemy forces. However, none 

of the above could be accomplished if 

Mosby could not keep his forces in the field, 

which he accomplished through the fifth 

joint function, sustainment. 

Sustainment

“Sustainment is the provision of logistics 

and personnel services necessary to maintain 

and prolong operations until mission 

accomplishment.”21 A force cannot exist for 

long without sustainment. Meeting the 

needs for sustainment can often drag down a 

force’s ability to move and maneuver, as 

supplies must be transported and guarded. 

The needs of the Union forces in Virginia to 

sustain themselves at long distances from 

their support bases provided Mosby’s 

Rangers with their primary targets.

Mosby’s Rangers sustained themselves 

through two main sources: supplies garnered 

from the local Southern-sympathizing 

population, and by capturing Union 

supplies. When not on raiding parties, 

Mosby’s Rangers boarded in small groups 

with local citizens. The locals housed, 

clothed and fed the partisans, and even 

provided rudimentary communications for 

them, spreading the word when time came 

for the Rangers to gather for another raid or 

warning them of Union forces in the area. 

One of the reasons the locals were willing to 

support the Rangers came from the fact that 

many of the Rangers were residents of that 

area. Eighty to ninety percent of the 

Rangers were from Virginia, with more than 

one-third of the force coming from the 

counties that comprised the primary area of 

operations, Loudon, Fairfax, Fauquier, and 

Prince William counties.22 

Mosby went to great lengths to integrate the 

joint function of protection beyond his own 

forces to the civilian population that 

sustained his force. He maintained civilian 

law and order in his area of operations once 

war deprived the area of civilian 

governance. He ruled the area so 

effectively, that his section came to be 

known as “Mosby’s Confederacy.” He 

acted as judge and jury. One of his men 

described him as “a civil power of 

unquestioned authority,” and a Federal 

officer claimed that Mosby’s word “was law 

in that section.”23 By doing this, he was 

able to maintain influence and loyalty from 

the local population, which might have 

degenerated into chaos without his guidance. 

Mosby’s Rangers exploited the largess of 

the Union states’ industrial and agricultural 

superiority by claiming Union materiel they 

Campaigning Fall 2014 33
captured for themselves. The most famous 

instance was the October, 1864 “Greenback 

Raid” where the Rangers captured a Union 

supply train and $168,000 in Federal 

Greenbacks from two Union paymasters.24 

The Rangers split the loot among themselves 

and used it to pay for sustainment and 

supplies from the local population. As one 

Ranger claimed, the captured money 

“circulated so freely in Loudon that never 

afterwards was there a pie of blooded horse 

sold in that section for Confederate 

money.”25

As a small force operating behind Union 

lines, sustainment was a challenge and was 

provided for in an unconventional manner. 

It was the one joint function not completely 

under Mosby’s control. The Union saw it as 

a vulnerability and tried to exploit it, but 

with little success. Mosby was able to 

maintain his force in the field for the 

duration of the war due to the wider support 

from the residents of Mosby’s Confederacy. 

It is unclear, however, how much longer he 

could have sustained his force, had the war 

dragged on. Mosby was as vulnerable as the 

rest of the agrarian South, due to the Union 

blockade and the Union’s industrial 

production capability which could have 

sustained the war effort for much longer 

than the Confederacy could have maintained 

resistance. 

Protection

Protection “focuses on conserving the joint 

force’s fighting potential through active 

defensive measures...passive defensive 

measures...procedures that reduce the risk 

of fratricide.”26 Operating far behind Union 

lines, protection was paramount for Mosby’s 

ability to survive, let alone operate 

effectively. It was, perhaps, the one joint 

function that was so important to the 

survival of his unit that it drove how Mosby 

employed all of the other joint functions. 

Much of what Mosby did in terms of 

command and control, intelligence, fires, 

movement and maneuver, and sustainment 

was driven by the need to protect his unit, 

keep it intact, and avoid set-piece battles 

where he could be overmatched by 

numerically superior Union forces. 

Mosby achieved protection by designing his 

operations to integrate the other joint 

functions effectively and through his 

relationship with the local population. 

Mosby divided his unit into small, dispersed 

units that operated under mission-type 

orders. This enabled autonomous, yet 

simultaneous operations which were 

conducted to maintain the initiative and 

enable protection. Using the principles of 

dispersion, speed, and surprise, Mosby was 

able to conduct rapid strikes and subsequent 

withdrawals into protected locations. First, 

Mosby gathered detailed intelligence on 

Union positions to avoid strongpoints and 

strike where the Union outposts and supply 

trains were most vulnerable. Then, he 

employed fires in quick, violent strikes 

before Union forces could mount an 

effective defense. He moved against 

objectives at night to avoid detection and 

achieve an element of surprise. Then, his 

units retreated into the same local populace 

that sustained them, instead of staying out 

on the battlefield in large formations that 

Campaigning Fall 2014 34
could be discovered and engaged by the 

Union. Mosby took care to ensure that his 

force was seen as a welcomed force that 

supported the local population as best it 

could, and not as a force that imposed itself 

on the people. As a result, the local 

population provided protection by not 

exposing the presence of the Rangers in its 

midst.

 

Conclusion 

The above examination of the exploits of 

Mosby’s Rangers shows that among 

Mosby’s many leadership talents and skills, 

his innovation and integration of 

foundational military tenets contributed 

immeasurably to the effectiveness of his 

operations. By incorporating the 

foundational military principles now called

the Joint functions with his assigned 

mission, forces, and operating environment, 

Mosby demonstrated that such functions 

have enduring application for military 

planning and operations. 

Additionally, a few broad lessons about the 

employment of the six joint functions can be 

drawn from this study. Overreliance on one 

function, or the neglect of another may 

endanger the force or its ability to 

accomplish the mission. How functions are 

employed may have to evolve or change as 

an operation moves from one phase to the 

next, or as the operational environment 

changes. Innovative use of new 

technologies in any of the six functions can 

provide a unit with capabilities that quickly 

overmatch an opponent, such as Mosby’s 

use of revolvers instead of sabres for cavalry 

charges.

 

The names we call these functions may 

change and evolve over time as doctrines are 

updated and rewritten, but the importance to 

properly integrate them should be obvious to 

any military professional planning joint 

operations. Through the synergistic 

integration of all six joint functions, any 

military unit can best ensure it is 

incorporating the timeless fundamentals of 

war planning, and therefore increase its

chances of success in battle.

Team Biographies

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Guimarin, USAF. Lt 

Col Guimarin is currently serving as Director of 

Operations at the National Security Agency’s ISR 

Portfolio Management Office. He was commissioned 

through Officer Training School in 1995. Lt Col 

Guimarin earned a BA in History from the University 

of Colorado, Boulder in 1993 and an MS in 

Computer Information Systems from the University 

of Phoenix in 1999. 

Major David F. Lawrence, USMC. Major Lawrence 

is currently serving as Joint Planner, J-5, Allied Joint 

Force Command in Naples, Italy. He was 

commissioned through Officer Candidate School in 

January of 2000. Major Lawrence earned a BA in 

Political Science from the University of California, 

Los Angeles in 1999, an MBA from the University of 

Southern California in 2011, and an MA in Security 

Studies for Europe and Eurasia from the Naval 

Postgraduate School in 2012. Prior to his current 

assignment, Major Lawrence worked in the 

Operations Department of 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing 

and previously in VMA-513 and VMA-311 as an 

AV-8B Harrier Pilot. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Wenks, USAF. Lt Col 

Wenks is currently serving on the Joint Staff 

Directorate of Intelligence at the Pentagon. He was 

Campaigning Fall 2014 35
commissioned through ROTC at the University of 

Washington in 1993. Lt Col Wenks earned a BA in 

Political Science from the University of Washington 

in 1993, an MA in Strategic Intelligence from the 

Joint Military Intelligence College in 1998 and an 

MA in International Security Studies from the Naval 

Postgraduate School in 2008. Prior to his current 

assignment, Lt Col Wenks served as chief of the 

International Affairs Policy Branch at Pacific Air 

Forces at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI.

1

 John S. Mosby, Mosby's Memoirs (Nashville, TN: 

J.S. Sanders and Company, 1995), 111-114. 2 Jeffry D. Wert, Mosby's Rangers (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1990), 70.

3 Wert, 73.

4 Ibid., 290.

5 Ibid., 34.

6 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant 

(E-Book No. 4367. Project Gutenberg, 2004), 317. 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication 1: 

Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 

2013), I-17. 8 JCS, I-18. 9 Howard R. Crouch, Like a Hurricane (Catlett, VA: 

SCS Publications, 2013), 148.

10 Wert, 202. 11 JCS, I-18. 12 Wert, 80. 13 Ibid., 123. 14 JCS, I-18. 15 Mosby, 284-285. 16 Wert, 146. 17 Ibid., 185. 18 JCS, I-18.

19 Mosby, 289-290. 20 Wert, 83. 21 JCS, I-19. 22 Wert, 74. 23 Ibid., 124-125. 24 Mosby, 321. 25 Crouch, 169. 26 JCS, I-18-19.

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 36
Pirates and Broken Windows

By CAPT Steven J. Marinello

In a 1982 article for Atlantic Monthly, social 

scientists George Kelling and James Wilson 

introduced the “Broken Windows theory” of 

criminology.

1

 It asserts that a disordered 

environment (e.g., a neighborhood in which 

buildings have broken windows that remain 

unrepaired) negatively influences the 

behavior of residents resulting in further 

window breaking, additional vandalism and 

perhaps greater criminal activity (e.g., 

larceny or arson). Restated simply, an 

environment of perceived lawlessness leads 

to more lawlessness. Conversely, an 

environment that appears “policed” and 

“ordered” affects behavior in the opposite 

manner, and reinforces the stability of a 

neighborhood. In his book Tipping Point, 

Malcolm Gladwell further describes the 

phenomenon of surroundings affecting 

behavior as the “power of context.”2

The Horn of Africa (HOA) remains in a 

dramatic state of lawlessness. Weak or nonexistent government, corruption, and 

poverty characterize the region. Piracy 

springs from the perception that the 

environment is “disordered,” and its 

proliferation contributes to the regional 

context of lawlessness. Piracy is one of 

HOA’s “broken windows,” and “fixing” it 

would help re-establish order, redefine the 

regional social context, and change societal 

behavior. 

Commander Joint Task Force, Horn of 

Africa (CJTF-HOA) has as its mission the 

security and stability of the HOA region. It

has the most to gain from fixing the “broken 

window” of piracy. Due to its joint makeup, 

CJTF-HOA is a better choice than current 

anti-piracy actors and should have antipiracy as one of its core missions. 

Fixing “windows” in New York City

Violent crime in New York City during the 

1980’s showed an almost linear increase that

peaked in 1990 at about 175,000 violent 

crimes committed in a population of a little 

over seven million.3 This ten-year trend 

nested within broader historical state 

statistics dating back to 1965 that showed 

more than a threefold overall increase in 

violent crime from 1965 to 1990. 

Conventional wisdom would lead one to 

believe that this 25-year trend of increasing 

crime would continue unabated. Instead, 

violent crime was halved in just eight years,

4

and the cause of the reversal was as 

surprising as the results themselves. 

The beginning of New York’s reduction in 

crime can be traced back to 1985 and the 

New York City subway system. “Broken 

Windows Theory” co-creator George 

Kelling, an academic to that point, was hired 

by the New York Transit Authority (NYTA) 

as a consultant. He was to put his theory to 

the test combating rampant criminal 

behavior in the city’s underground train 

system. While conventional wisdom would 

lead one to target the most violent crimes 

first, Kelling’s recommendations centered 

on restoring order and reducing the 

perceived lawlessness, i.e., fixing the 

“windows” first. Graffiti and turnstile 

jumping (or fare-dodging) in particular 

helped define the subway system’s context 

that seemed to send the message, “anything 

goes.” Kelling advocated declaring war on 

Campaigning Fall 2014 37
graffiti and fare-dodging as a way to reset 

the social context. Initially, those initiatives 

were “panned” until they began to achieve 

astounding results. Not only did non-violent 

crime decrease, but violent crimes, too, as 

his campaigns established the message that, 

“order and lawfulness is the new ‘normal.’” 

The NYTA had successfully reshaped social 

behavior by leveraging change in a social 

context. 

The NYTA’s unprecedented success in 

reducing crime did not go unnoticed. In 

1993, the head of the New York Transit 

Police was appointed head of the NYC 

police to apply the “broken windows” theory 

to the entire city. William Bratton, the man 

who put George Kelling’s recommendations 

into action in the subway system, would do 

the same for the streets of New York City. 

Bratton sought a reduction in violent 

criminal behavior, not by hiring more 

homicide detectives, but by restoring a sense 

of order. One of the most famous examples 

was his campaign against the “squeegee 

men.” These were people who would clean 

windshields at traffic intersections 

unsolicited and then ask for money, often 

demanding it under threat of violence. What 

amounted to tacit robbery became a 

touchstone for the perceived lawlessness of 

the streets. In an adroit application of the 

law, Bratton began having them arrested for 

jaywalking and trespassing. “Squeegee 

men” disappeared and the streets 

immediately appeared to be more ordered. 

Additional initiatives aimed at petty crimes 

like public urination and drunkenness also 

helped reinforce the new “ordered” context. 

The results were impressive as violent crime 

in New York City fell twice as fast and for 

twice as long as the national average.5

 

Bratton restored order by “fixing broken 

windows” and leveraging the power of 

social context to change behavior. 

Africa – Opportunity and Challenge

“The diversity and complexity of the 

African continent offer the United States 

opportunities and challenges.” - U.S. 2010 

National Security Strategy

A secure and stable Africa is no longer a 

luxury. The global economy and security 

interconnectedness have made Africa’s 

challenges the world’s challenges. In his 

National Security Strategy, President Obama 

asserts that we will refocus our priorities in 

Africa on economic growth; combating 

corruption while strengthening good 

governance and accountability; and 

improving African security and rule of law.6 

Challenges abound in a security initiative of 

this nature, and they are no more apparent 

than in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Of the 

eight nations that make up the HOA Area of 

Responsibility, six rank in the top 25 in 

Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index. Sudan 

is #3 while Somalia earned the #1 ranking as 

most-failed state for the fourth straight 

year.7 HOA, which offers arguably the 

greatest regional challenge, numbers among 

its problems drought, famine, poverty and 

nearly nonexistent public services. HOA’s

main malady is, however, lawlessness, i.e., 

disorder. Like New York City in the 1980’s, 

this great challenge also presents a great 

opportunity. 

In Somalia, organizations like the United 

Nations, the United States Department of 

State, and the African Union continue to try 

Campaigning Fall 2014 38
to bolster the Transitional Federal 

Government while Non-Governmental 

Organizations like UNICEF and USAID 

attempt to address food and drought issues.8 

These conventional measures are necessary 

and effective to a degree, yet lawlessness 

and disorder remain. Could the countless 

entities charged with helping the 

development of Somalia and HOA be 

missing an opportunity to bring real change 

by addressing the power of context? 

What About the Broken Window? – The 

Current Anti-piracy Effort

Piracy is an obvious “broken window” in the 

HOA region and its continuation and 

proliferation sends a powerful message that 

disorder is tolerated. The cities of Garowe 

and Bosaso are “pirate towns”9 where piracy 

is big business for some. It has also proved 

a way for utterly poor Somalis to make a 

living and to attain a level of prestige within 

their communities. However, the 

proliferation and tolerance of piracy 

threatens international freedom of the high 

seas and regionally reinforces the social 

context that, “anything goes” in Somalia and 

the HOA region. There are some obvious, 

current anti-piracy efforts, but are they 

leveraging the power of context? 

In January 2014, the destroyer U.S.S. Kidd, 

steaming in the North Arabian Sea, 

answered a cryptic distress call from a 

merchant vessel that indicated pirates may 

have been on board. The U.S.S. Kidd 

intercepted the suspected pirated vessel, 

boarded it, arrested the pirates, and 

transferred them to a detention facility.10 

The remote intercept location and the 

lengthy prosecution process ensures that 

justice is neither swift nor publicized. The 

law enforcement action will remove a 

handful of pirates from the operating area 

but has no other effect on the context of the 

region. This scenario is common in the war 

on piracy that is being waged by three 

multinational task forces along with 

unilateral operations by at least five other 

nations. 

- Combined Task Force ONE FIVE ONE 

(CTF-151) is a Multinational Maritime 

Task Force answering to Commander US 

Fifth Fleet/Commander US NAVCENT, 

and comprised of approximately eight 

ships, Navy and Coast Guard boarding 

teams, a sniper team, military police and 

medical personnel. It was a ship from 

CTF-151 that conducted the wellpublicized sniper operations that 

eventually freed the captain of the U.S.-

flagged Maersk Alabama.

- Operation Atalanta (OA) is a European 

Union endeavor composed of between 

five and eight vessels, three maritime 

patrol aircraft and Vessel Protection 

Detachment Teams tasked with 

responding to distress calls, boarding 

vessels and detaining pirates. 

Additionally, OA ships perform escort 

duty for convoys of merchant vessels in 

its area of responsibility (AOR). 

- Operation Ocean Shield is NATO’s 

contribution to the anti-piracy effort with 

forces composed of between two and six 

ships and with a mission set that closely 

mirrors the other major operations in the 

AOR.

Established separately by their parent 

organizations, the three anti-piracy forces 

Campaigning Fall 2014 39
have enacted an informal daily 

communications regimen to coordinate their 

efforts, but it lacks any formal 

relationship.11 What they do share is a onedimensional, maritime-based, reactive, and 

largely singular approach to combating 

pirates. The established pattern—respond to 

distress, board vessel, arrest pirates, and 

transfer to detention facility—is always 

accomplished in the remoteness of the high 

seas, and lacks any ability to leverage the 

success in changing the social context of 

Somalia and HOA. 

The Real Lesson of the Subway

When contemplating the use of a context 

reset in Somalia and HOA, it bears returning 

to the New York City example. When 

addressing the “broken window” of turnstile 

jumping, the process was as important as the 

result. “The [NYTA] team would nab farebeaters one by one, handcuff them, and 

leave them standing, in a daisy chain, on the 

platform until they had a ‘full catch.’ The 

idea was to signal, as publicly as possible, 

that the transit police were now serious 

about cracking down....”12 The immediacy 

of perceived justice and the physical public 

display of order helped to define a new 

context. Additionally, they “...retrofitted a 

city bus and turned it into a rolling station 

house....”13 They reduced the processing 

time for turnstile jumpers to one hour. Most 

importantly, they broadcasted the new 

message of order. Restoring lawfulness to 

the subway system was an important and 

well-covered news story, and the targeted 

society became aware of a new “ordered” 

context. If context is to be leveraged in the 

repair of the piracy “broken window,” that 

process will also be just as important as the 

result. 

CJTF-HOA - Anti-piracy Stakeholder

and Best Fit for a Joint Solution

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of 

Africa conducts operations in the Combined 

Joint Operations Area to enhance partner 

nation capacity, promote regional stability, 

dissuade conflict, and protect US and 

coalition interests. –CJTF-HOA Mission 

Statement

Approximately 2,000 personnel representing 

all U.S. Services comprise Combined Joint 

Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 

Djibouti. It currently plays no part in antipiracy operations despite the fact that the 

success or failure of its stated mission 

hinges on stability, security and 

lawfulness—all of which are undermined by 

the context that rampant piracy provides. As 

an entity charged with reversing the trend of 

instability and lawlessness in the region, 

CJTF-HOA has much to gain by repairing 

the “broken window” of piracy. As was the 

case in New York, timely response, swift 

processing, and, most of all, public display 

are the keys to successful context reset. 

Additionally, where most anti-piracy efforts 

to this point have been maritime-centric, 

CJTF-HOA can bring all services to bear in 

crafting a more comprehensive solution to a 

context reset in the Horn of Africa. 

Timely Response

The time it takes for pirates to seize a 

targeted ship is about ten minutes.14 With a 

limited number of surface ships and 

maritime patrol aircraft and an area of 

operations encompassing 2.5 million square 

Campaigning Fall 2014 40
miles, anti-piracy forces can rarely interdict 

vessels while under attack.15 Additionally, 

pirates plan their attacks and avoid 

subsequent detection by exploiting large

gaps in anti-piracy coverage. 

A more timely anti-piracy response and an 

increase in patrol area coverage can be 

achieved through the incorporation of 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). By 

employing a unit like the Air Force’s 3rd

Special Operations Squadron, CJTF-HOA 

can leverage the capability of an asset like 

the MQ-1 Predator to provide long-range, 

high endurance coverage of the area of 

operations. The persistent tracking of 

known and suspected pirate vessels can

optimally enable positioning limited 

maritime assets. Escorted convoys will

know ahead of time if suspected pirate 

vessels lay along their charted course, and 

independently operating commercial vessels 

can be fore-warned allowing them to employ 

industry recommended countermeasures. 

Well-publicized use of UAVs would provide 

some level of deterrence and more 

importantly would increase the perception of 

a “policed” region.

Swift Processing

With the anti-piracy battle taking place in 

international waters, citizenship and 

jurisdiction issues make prosecuting pirates 

a challenging and lengthy process. One 

solution to the challenge of prosecuting 

pirates in the 18th Century was the Royal 

Navy’s establishment of vice-admiralty 

courts. These courts allowed those accused 

of piracy to be tried anywhere in the world 

by a court of seven naval officers.16 A 

similar solution today, while expedient, 

would likely not stand up to international 

scrutiny. 

While bringing back vice-admiralty courts is 

not a possibility, there may be another way 

to streamline the trial process. CTF-151 

currently uses Coast Guard personnel as 

boarding teams in a law enforcement 

capacity. Adding Somali law enforcement 

personnel to the maritime force would allow 

Somali suspects to be arrested and processed 

by agents from their country. With the 

majority of arrests involving Somali 

citizens, this would help speed the due 

process for a large number of suspects. 

Being able to publicize “swift justice” would 

allow CJTF-HOA to reinforce the new 

context of order further. 

Public Display

In restoring a sense of lawfulness, the most 

important element is making the new

ordered context visible to the target 

population. In the subway example, the 

public display of arrested suspects very 

visibly sent the message that turnstile 

jumping is not tolerated, and media reports 

showing increased order amplified the 

message.

CJTF-HOA can use a coordinated 

Information Operations (IO) campaign in 

order to promulgate the desired lawful, 

ordered context. Adding deployable 

elements from a unit like the Army’s 1st

Information Operations Command (IOC) 

can bring to bear military professionals who 

comprehensively plan IO campaigns and 

operationally integrate IO capabilities. To 

capture images from pirate arrests, the 

Navy’s Fleet Combat Camera Group can be 

Campaigning Fall 2014 41
employed aboard ship while a unit like the 

Army’s 55th Signal Company could 

document the ground transport and 

processing of suspected pirates. The goal of 

a comprehensive IO plan is to capture and 

publicize the entire anti-piracy process. The 

publication will include images and video 

from UAV monitoring, arrests aboard ship 

as well as the ground transport, trial and 

eventual jailing of convicted pirates. An 

effective IO campaign is the key to CJTFHOA establishing a regional context of 

lawfulness.

A More Joint Approach 

While bringing all multinational anti-piracy 

efforts together is a practical impossibility, 

bringing United States’ efforts under the 

control of one command is possible and 

desirable. As piracy is a maritime crime, 

one should not overlook the maritime aspect 

of the solution. However, it is only one 

portion of what should be a more joint 

solution. 

By expanding its use of joint forces, CJTFHOA will become the anti-piracy actor of 

choice. JJTF-HOA mission expansion 

should begin with the placement of CTF-151 

under its operational control. While CTF151 has limited elements of other services, 

CJTF-HOA is truly joint and scalable. By 

leveraging other service capabilities and 

building on the corporate experience and 

maritime operational success of CTF-151, 

CJTF-HOA can use its anti-piracy campaign 

as the bedrock for meeting it stated mission 

goal of a stable and secure region.

 

Conclusion 

There is more at stake in the battle to stamp 

out piracy than just the $7B lost each year17

due to higher insurance and increased 

security and operating costs. As 

demonstrated in New York City, initiatives 

which reinforce the perception of order and 

lawfulness reset social context and change 

societal behavior. By eradicating piracy, an 

obvious regional “broken window” is fixed 

and its increases the chance of resetting the 

social context of Somalia, the Horn of 

Africa and thus the African continent. An 

effective and comprehensive anti-piracy 

battle must be waged in a joint manner. 

CJTF-HOA, with its joint makeup and 

stakeholder status in African security, is 

clearly the logical choice as lead in antipiracy efforts and stands to gain the most 

from fixing the “broken window” of piracy. 

Author Biography: Captain Steven Marinello, USN, 

is an Active Reservist and designated Naval Aviator 

currently serving as Commanding Officer of NR 

NATO ACT Detachment Atlanta, in Marietta, GA. 

He was commissioned in 1990 upon graduation from 

the United States Naval Academy where he earned a 

BS in Computer Science. Prior to his current 

assignment, CAPT Marinello served as Commanding 

Officer of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron Four Six 

in Fort Worth, TX. In his civilian life, he is an 

International 767 First Officer with Delta Airlines.

1 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, "Broken 

Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," The 

Atlantic, March 1982, 1-2.

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 42
2 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little 

Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Company, 2000), 133.

3 United States Department of Justice Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, "Uniform Crime Reporting 

Statistics," 

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ucrdata/Search/Crime/Local

/RunCrimeJurisbyJurisLarge.cfm (accessed 

November 15th, 2012).

4 United States Department of Justice Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, "Uniform Crime Reporting 

Statistics," 

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ucrdata/Search/Crime/State

/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (accessed November 

15th, 2012).

5 Franklin E. Zimring, The City That Became Safe: 

New York's Lessons for Urban Crime and its Control.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) ix-x. 6 National Security Strategy, May 2010, 45.

7 Foreign Policy Magazine Online, "Failed States 

Index 2012 Edition: An Eighth Annual Collaboration 

Between Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace," Foreign 

Policy Magazine, 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_

2012_interactive (accessed November 15th, 2012). 8 United States Department of State, “U. S. Response 

to the Humanitarian Crisis in the Horn of Africa,” 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176580.

htm

9 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sub-Committee on 

Future Security and Defence Capabilities, The 

Challenge of Piracy: International Response and 

NATO’s Role: Draft Report, prepared by Raymond 

Knops, 053 DSCFC 12 E, 23 March 2012, 4.

10 Robert Mackey and J. David Goodman, "U. S. Navy 

Rescues Iranians Held Hostage," New York Times, 

January 6th, 2012, World News Section, Online 

edition.

11 European Union Naval Forces Website, “CounterPiracy ‘Big Three’ Meet at Sea,” European Union, 

http://eunavfor.eu/2012/08/counter-piracy-bigthree-meet-at-sea-2/ (accessed November 15th, 

2012).

12 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 144. 13 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 145. 14 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The Challenge of 

Piracy, 12. 15 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The Challenge of 

Piracy, 2. 16 Bruce Elleman et. al., Eds., Piracy and Maritime 

Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies. 

(Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College Press, 

2010), vi. 

17 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The Challenge of 

Piracy, 1.

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 43
Leveraging Generational 

Differences in a Joint Staff 

By MAJ Catie Boylston, LCDR Jed Espiritu, LCDR 

Jason Ileto, and Maj Steve Wick

Today’s private sector organizations may 

not feature generational gaps in their

organizational hierarchy—however, in the 

U.S. Military these gaps are almost 

guaranteed. The Defense Officer Personnel 

Management Act of 1980 mandates specific 

promotion gates for each military officer 

grade, creating a reasonable expectation that 

senior military leadership (i.e., three- or 

four-star general or flag officers) will be 

senior in age, with junior field-grade ranks 

approximately two generations behind. 

These generational gaps create a unique 

challenge for the military in which leaders 

will almost always be older than 

subordinates. 

Personnel in today’s military fall within one 

of three generations: Baby Boomers 

(Boomers, born between 1946 and 1964), 

Generation X (X-ers, born between 1965 

and 1981), and Generation Y (Millennials, 

born between 1982 and 2005).1

 Although 

there are generational differences between 

Boomers and X-ers, this gap is not as 

pronounced as between Boomers and 

Millennials. In addition to reduced age 

differences, Boomers and X-ers are often 

peers, having served at lower echelons in the 

military together with shared professional 

and personal experiences. Most notably, 

technological changes have had a similar 

impact and effect on these peer generations. 

Millennials, on the other hand, have 

developed exclusively within a 

technologically advanced military at war. 

Although the common characteristics that 

describe a single generation may not 

necessarily apply to every individual in 

these categories, these descriptors do explain 

an overarching trend within each group. 

Given the generational differences in 

technological savviness and the vast 

differences in life and military experiences 

between the Boomers and Millennials, an 

overarching strategy for developing a 

working relationship between generations is 

necessary. 

At a minimum, this strategy should address 

the potential challenges and advantages of 

these two generations working together in 

the staff environment—particularly on a 

dynamic, fast-paced, joint staff. The stark 

generational differences between Boomer 

General and Flag Officers and the rising 

class of Millennial Majors and Lieutenant 

Commanders (O-4s) poses potential 

challenges to the effectiveness of a joint 

staff. These challenges require a staff 

interaction strategy that maximizes the 

strengths of both generations while 

overcoming differences. Today’s Joint staff 

leadership must explore the underlying 

generational perceptions and characteristics, 

and leverage expectations of both Boomers 

and Millennials to capitalize on 

generationally influenced strengths and 

differences within the challenging Joint staff 

environment. 

Millennial O-4s on a Joint Staff 

Successful integration of personnel into a 

joint staff demands developing specific skill 

sets. Business and professional skills, such 

Campaigning Fall 2014 44
as time management, analytical and critical 

thinking, effective communication, and 

information technology, must be fused with 

interpersonal skills.2 Some of these skills, 

such as information technology, are secondnature to Millennials; other skills, such as 

face-to-face communication, require further 

development for this generation. A 

Millennial working on a joint staff for the 

first time marks a definite transition from a 

tactical and operational perspective to a 

strategic outlook. This transition results not 

only in a different viewpoint but also in

stark differences in working environment 

and required daily tasks and projects. 

A joint staff is different from a lower 

echelon staff in that joint officers must not 

only work collaboratively with peers at the 

strategic level, but must consider 

interagency contributions and the integration 

of all instruments of national power. For 

example, the Joint Operational Planning 

Process requires listening to and trusting 

peers, building an understanding of the 

commander’s intent, and transforming 

strategic guidance into a viable plan. In this 

environment, Millennials will, often for the 

first time, be tasked to interact with very 

senior officers and senior representatives 

from other agencies on a regular basis. 

Their unique skill sets hold the potential to 

make a significant impact on the operations 

and effectiveness of a joint staff. 

Overview of the Millennial Generation

The Millennials have emerged as part of the 

newest generation of American culture—one 

shaped by specific events and circumstances 

occurring during members’ formative years 

and characterized by common perceptions, 

characteristics, expectations, and 

preferences. Empirical research, popular 

literature, and the press suggest members of 

this generation are overly self-confident, 

self-absorbed, and self-important and lack a 

sense of loyalty, patience, and a strong work 

ethic.3 These resources also assert, 

however, that this generation tends to be 

upbeat, confident, open to change, and 

optimistic about the future, having been 

raised under heavy supervision by extremely 

protective and praise-giving parents, 

coaches, and teachers.

4 Millenials grew up 

under sheltered and exceptionally 

encouraging conditions. As such, 

Millennials tend to be extremely 

achievement-oriented and highly educated. 

In fact, they have been called the “most 

educated generation in American history.”5 

Millennials are the most connected and tech 

savvy generation in U.S. history, making 

them both technology-oriented and teamoriented due to the widespread availability 

of collaborative and networking tools. 

Millennial O-4s, therefore, stand to leverage 

a skill set that hinges upon optimism, 

achievement, collaboration, and 

technology—a significant skill set that 

leadership must cultivate to maximize 

Millennials’ staff contributions. 

Members of the Millennial Generation also 

exhibit a specific set of expectations that 

may run counter to the cultural norms of the 

older military generation. For most of their 

lives, Millennial O-4s have had access to 

endless amounts of data. This access 

facilitates the expectation of similar easy

Campaigning Fall 2014 45
access to organizational strategic plans and 

other “need-to-know” information before 

leaders are ready to release these plans to the 

organization (i.e. while they are still being 

formulated). It has been reported that, 

“Regardless of their low-level positions, 

Millennial workers feel a need to be kept in 

the loop of information.”6 Based on this 

expectation of free access to information, 

Millennial O-4s may also expect and seek to 

be assigned to important projects soon after 

being assigned to a joint staff.7

 

Additionally, given constant praise during 

their upbringing, Millennials may expect 

more frequent, more affirming, and more 

positive feedback from their supervisors 

than has been normal in traditional military 

culture.8

 Millennial O-4s may also seek 

greater work-life balance than previous 

generations since they consider work to be 

“a less significant part of their personal 

identities.”9 Military leaders must 

understand these preferences and 

expectations because the first Millennial 

promotion to O-4 will occur sometime 

between 2014 and 2015, and they soon will 

arrive as members of a joint staff. 

Overview of the Boomer Generation

Fully comprehending the dynamic in the 

work environment also requires an 

understanding of the general characteristics 

of the Boomer Generation. Like the 

characteristics outlined for the Millennials, 

many Boomer stereotypes serve as a starting 

point for addressing the potential challenges 

and advantages inherent in the Millennial 

and Boomer relationship. As a frame of 

reference, every four-star general or admiral 

currently serving in the United States 

Military is a part of the Boomer Generation. 

The literature consistently labels Boomers as 

hard-charging “workaholics” that will make 

any necessary sacrifices to advance their 

careers. Fueling this motivation is an 

optimistic and idealistic outlook on life.10 

Boomers prefer face-to-face contact and 

communication, recognize the value of 

collaborative team work, and place a 

premium on developing relationships in the 

workplace.11 Boomers build these 

relationships by making everyone in the 

organization feel like an important part of 

the team. 

Military Boomers, in particular, have been 

heavily influenced by three significant 

military states of tension: the Cold War, 

Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. They understand 

the effects, impacts, and frustrations military 

conflict can have on the younger 

generations. Boomers expect to be 

consulted for their opinions and are likely to 

offer their intent, mindset, and strategy to 

alleviate some of the frustrations stemming 

from the joint planning process. Finally, 

although the Boomer works at the strategic 

level of the organization, it is likely they 

will want to monitor the planning process 

and track the objectives and measures 

toward achievement of desired end states

closely. The characteristics of both 

generations are summarized in the Table 

below. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 46
Generational Comparison: Millennials and 

Boomers

Areas of Opportunity

Analysis of the generational traits of 

Boomers and Millennials yields areas of 

opportunity that may lead to enabling 

advantages for a joint staff, if identified and 

harnessed. For example, the contemporary 

environment is marked by the immense

growth and widespread availability of 

information. The technological savviness of 

the Millennials represents this generation’s 

most evident and greatest force multiplier. 

As pointed out by a private sector CEO, 

“They’re enormous consumers of 

information and can locate details about 

anything within seconds.”12 This capacity 

could enable rapid processing of information 

for planning and other staff activities. 

Boomers must harness Millennial O-4s’ 

technological capabilities by fostering a 

collaborative staff environment, 

understanding that both generations value 

teamwork as an effective means to 

accomplish strategic tasks. The Millennials 

also demonstrate a capacity to learn rapidly 

and the propensity for engaging in 

continuous learning and self-improvement. 

Boomers should recognize these Millennial 

traits as motivating factors and offer 

incentives such as additional educational 

opportunities. In return, the Joint staff will 

develop and benefit from a highly educated 

workforce. 

Although the Millennials are an 

independent-minded and determined 

generation, their attachment to their parents 

represents another potentially advantageous 

trait. With a minimum of 17 years 

difference from the Millennial Generation, 

Boomers should create an environment for 

parental-like mentoring. This influence 

empowers the commander to shape the staff 

and ensure unity of effort. Boomers can 

focus on their shared optimistic views of 

both the global environment and the future, 

creating a connection with the younger 

generation. This interaction can ultimately 

produce a positive undertone to the overall 

direction of the staff. 

Areas of Conflict

While opportunities exist because of the 

generational gap between Millennials and 

Boomers, potential risks may arise if 

Boomers are not cognizant of or do not 

address this gap. A joint staff represents a 

Millennials Boomers

Perceptions • Overly selfconfident, selfabsorbed, selfimportant

• Willing to make any 

sacrifice for career

• Lack of loyalty, 

patience, work ethic

Characteristics • Upbeat, confident, 

open to change, 

optimistic about 

future

• Optimistic, 

idealistic outlook

• Extremely 

achievementoriented, highly 

educated

• Value collaborative 

team work, work 

relationships

• Technology- and 

team-oriented

Expectations & 

Preferences

• Free access to 

“need-to-know” 

information

• Face-to-face 

contact/communicat

ion

• Assignment to 

important projects 

soon after arrival

• Consulted for 

opinions

• More frequent, 

affirming, positive 

feedback

• Close coordination 

on progress of 

projects

Campaigning Fall 2014 47
very demanding environment and may 

require long duty hours, particularly in 

events such as crisis action planning. The 

Boomers expect to work protracted hours, 

making necessary sacrifices to ensure task or 

mission completion. Boomers readily 

conform to the schedules of the 

organization, whereas Millennials desire the 

flexibility to adjust schedules to 

accommodate their personal lives.13 A 

potential unwillingness of Millennials to 

sacrifice their work-life balance may lead to 

conflict. Although Millennials may not 

necessarily fail to accomplish their given 

task, their motivation may wane if 

sacrificing this balance becomes the norm, 

and they lose the flexibility they so desire. 

The concepts of work and reward differ 

between these two generations. Boomers 

ascribe to the notion that by working hard 

they demonstrate their worth to the 

organization and, consequently, expect 

significant tasks. Millennials, on the other 

hand, believe they intrinsically add worth to 

the organization and immediately desire the 

assignment of significant tasks.14 Boomers 

find building a life-long career as a primary 

motivator while Millennials seek flexibility 

to accommodate their need for work-life 

balance.15 

At this point in their careers, Boomers’ 

focus remains primarily at the strategic 

level; however, due to their insatiable thirst 

for control and information, they tend to 

become involved in the operational details. 

Millennials, as more junior officers, tend to 

desire an autonomous work environment—

one in which they are free to accomplish 

their assigned tasks without interference or 

micromanagement. As a result of these 

opposing desires, Millennials may become 

discouraged or frustrated by perceived 

micro-management from the senior leader.

The Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and 

Action Guide (2012) identifies collaboration 

within a joint staff as a force multiplier to

enhance the planning and staffing process. 

However, authority is required for one staff 

to reach laterally and directly liaise with 

another. Millennials, through their personal 

or professional relationships, are likely to 

think “outside the box” and reach directly to 

peers in another staff when needed to 

complete a task. It is possible that the 

commander may view this as a sign of 

disloyalty or a breach of authority.16 

Additionally, this crossing of boundaries 

may cause friction between staffs if the 

appropriate staffing process is not followed. 

Based on their respective personal 

experiences in the military—from kinetic 

operations to humanitarian operations—

Millennials and Boomers may have differing 

opinions concerning the necessity of 

military participation in future regional or 

global conflicts. Boomers, shaped by the 

Cold War, will likely have the 

predisposition to take military action in 

conflict-ridden areas. Shaped by the 

ongoing and prolonged conflict in the 

Middle East, however, Millennials less 

likely will desire military engagement due to 

battle fatigue from a career deeply involved 

in constant war. This difference of opinion 

may cause Millennials to feel frustration and 

even disenfranchisement. Millennials in the 

Campaigning Fall 2014 48
military will undoubtedly follow orders and 

maintain the standard of military bearing; 

however, lack of understanding of their 

perspective could lead to severe degradation 

of productivity.

Recommendations

Senior military commanders can leverage 

several methods to exploit the advantages of 

the differences between the Boomer and 

Millennial generations. These methods can 

also mitigate potential areas of conflict at 

the same time: 

- Create two-way generational 

mentoring programs. Boomers and the 

Millennials share an optimistic view of 

the global environment and are confident 

about their future.17 A shared positive 

outlook, combined with the natural 

parent/child-like relationship (based 

solely on age differences), presents an 

opportunity for commanders to shape 

this younger generation for future 

leadership roles. Additionally, 

generational mentorship represents an 

avenue for senior leaders to share their 

vision and intent as well as to discuss the 

role and relevance of the U.S. military 

on the global stage. 

Boomer mentors and Millennial 

mentees, in particular, will likely 

embrace this opportunity as a two-way 

growth experience across their wide 

generational gap. The greatest challenge 

will be carving out the time to establish 

regular mentoring sessions to maximize 

the continuity and effectiveness of the 

program. 

 

- Offer advanced educational and 

training opportunities. Millennials are 

developing as possibly the mosteducated generation in history. Access 

to private sector learning continues to 

expand, and advanced degrees and 

training are more abundant than ever. 

Commanders need to recognize that this 

younger generation particularly yearns 

for knowledge and growth. Offering 

educational opportunities to joint staffs 

that are outside of the standard 

professional military education training 

(such as certifications from private 

universities or attendance at seminars 

focused on professional skills 

development) represents an incentive 

that Millennials will value. 

Another option for commanders is to 

provide personnel dedicated time during 

working hours to accomplish nonresident (online) training. This training 

provides commanders the ability to 

maintain a workforce that is at the 

leading edge of technology, 

collaboration, and other advances in 

today’s rapidly changing workplace.

- Provide opportunities to obtain a 

broad range of skills. Millennials desire 

the thrill that comes with changing jobs. 

Joint staff assignments are typically at 

least 36 months, allowing ample 

opportunity for reassignment to another 

directorate and therefore preventing a 

sense of stagnation. After successfully 

demonstrating their abilities, Millennials 

(and the rest of a joint staff) should be 

given the chance to take on more 

Campaigning Fall 2014 49
responsibility and expand their exposure 

to more strategic military issues. 

Increased opportunities will help foster a 

feeling of belonging to the organization, 

targeting the Millennial O-4’s loyalty 

and productivity. 

- Establish a transparent, 

collaborative culture and encourage 

(require) Millennials to participate, 

innovate, and communicate. A 

Millennial that feels involved will likely 

be a more effective team member. They 

will provide new perspectives within the 

collaborative environment, and be more 

committed to their supervisors than 

members from past generations.18 

Collaboration with peers and the chain 

of command will help shape Millennials 

to become more strategic thinkers, 

providing them with a perspective that 

cannot be gained by reading doctrine or 

textbooks. This collaborative 

environment will also enable joint staffs 

to integrate fresh perspectives from the 

entire workforce into finding new 

solutions to old problems. 

- Reward exceptional performance 

with additional time off. The demands 

of a joint staff are such that it is nearly 

impossible to accomplish every required 

task in the “normal” hours of the 

business day. The demand for afterhours work will certainly present a 

significant barrier to high performance if 

there is not a compensation system in 

place. Admittedly, the military is a 

volunteer force, and military members 

are professionals that will do what is 

necessary to succeed—Millennials are 

no different. Millennials, however, 

value their personal time to a greater 

degree than past generations. Fatigue 

from the past ten years of conflict, 

exacerbated by a demanding staff job, 

must be acknowledged. Although 

quarterly awards and public 

acknowledgement are excellent 

incentives, awarding additional time 

off—time that can be spent with family 

and friends—will be an effective means 

of rewarding the exceptional 

performance of a joint staff, particularly 

its Millennial members.19 

Conclusion 

The generational gap between Boomers and 

Millennials is a significant consideration for 

today’s military. A symbiotic and efficient 

working relationship between these two 

generations in particular is critical to ensure 

a cohesive force than can effectively 

accomplish the mission. To effectively 

maximize the potential of the incoming 

Millennial O-4s, it is important to recognize 

and foster their need to be included in the 

problem solving process and to 

acknowledge their accomplishments. 

Commanders must allow them the flexibility 

to balance outside interests and family with 

the military mission. Although the list of 

recommendations is not exhaustive, it 

represents a starting point for discussion on 

the future of staff dynamics. Boomers now 

have the opportunity to create a modern and 

effective command structure by recognizing 

the Millennials’ many positive attributes and 

Campaigning Fall 2014 50
effectively leveraging them within the 

current joint environment. 

Team Biographies

Major Catie Boylston, USA. MAJ Boylston is 

currently en route to serve in the J2 section at U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM). She was 

commissioned through ROTC at the University of 

Tennessee. MAJ Boylston earned a BA in Political 

Science and an MSSI in Strategic Intelligence from 

the National Intelligence University. In addition, she 

attended the Army’s Command and General Staff 

College in 2013. Prior to her current assignment, 

MAJ Boylston served as the SIGINT Collection 

Chief for US Forces Korea J2.

LCDR Jed Espiritu, USN. LCDR Espiritu is 

currently a Personnel Planner at Headquarters, U.S. 

Africa Command. He was commissioned through the 

U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. He earned a 

B.S. degree in Systems Engineering in 1998 and a 

M.B.A. in Financial Management from the Naval 

Postgraduate School in 2004. Prior to his current 

assignment, LCDR Espiritu served as the Officer in 

Charge of Personnel Support Detachment Yokosuka, 

Japan.

LCDR Jason Ileto, SC, USN. LCDR Ileto is currently 

an Operations Research Analyst at the Joint 

Distribution Process Analysis Center, US 

Transportation Command. He was commissioned 

through Officer Candidate School, Pensacola, FL in 

2003. He earned a B.S. degree in Physics from 

Southern Adventist University in 2003 and a M.S. in 

Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate 

School in 2011. Prior to his current assignment, 

LCDR Ileto served as Stock Control Officer and 

Aviation Stores Officer onboard USS BATAAN 

(LHD 5).

Major Steve Wick, USAF. Major Wick is currently a 

Joint Logistics Officer and Battle Watch Captain at 

the US Navy Military Sealift Command, Washington 

DC. He was commissioned through the United States 

Air Force Academy, earning a BS in Operations 

Research in 2001. In 2013, he also earned a MS in 

Logistics Management from the Air Force Institute of 

Technology. Prior to his current assignment, Maj 

Wick was an Intermediate Development Education 

Student in the Advanced Study of Air Mobility 

Program. 

1 No consensus exists in the literature as to the 

specific date ranges that each generation 

encompasses. 2 Joint Staff J-7 Joint Education & Training 

Directorate, Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and 

Action Guide, 3rd Ed., August 2012. 3 Karen K. Myers and Kamyab Sadaghiani, 

“Millennials in the Workplace: A Communication 

Perspective on Millennials’ Organizational 

Relationships and Performance,” Journal of Business 

Psychology 25 (2010), available at 

<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC286

8990/pdf/10869_2010_Article_9172.pdf> 4 Jessica Brack, “Maximizing Millennials in the 

Workplace.” (University of North Carolina KenanFlagler Business School, 2012), available at 

<http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/executivedevelopment/customprograms/~/media/DF1C11C056874DDA8097271A1

ED48662.ashx>; Headquarters, U.S. Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM), “Generational Make 

Up of USSTRATCOM, 2013 and 2020(+),” 

USSTRATCOM internal paper; Neil Howe and 

William Strauss, “The Next 20 Years: How Customer 

and Workforce Attitudes Will Evolve,” Harvard 

Business Review, July-August 2007; Darlene E. 

Stafford and Henry S. Griffis, “A Review of 

Millennial Generation Characteristics and Military 

Workforce Implications,” CNA Research 

Memorandum, May 2008, available at 

<http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/D001

8211.A1.pdf>. 5 USSTRATCOM, “Generational Make Up,” 1.

6 Myers and Sadaghiani, “Millennials in the 

Workplace,” 229.

7 Ibid.

8 Brack, “Maximizing Millennials in the Workplace”; 

Myers and Sadaghiani, “Millennials in the 

Workplace.”

9 Myers and Sadaghiani, “Millennials in the 

Workplace.”

10 Cathy Trower, “Traditionalists, Boomers, Xers, 

and Millennials: Giving and Getting the Mentoring 

You Want,” (presented at Brown University, 

October 16, 2009), available at 

<http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Provost/Adv

ance/Trower%20Generations%20and%20Mentoring.

pdf>

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 51
11 Mary Mack, “4 Generations in the Workplace,” 

(presented at TASC Conference, February, 2010), 

available at 

<http://www.clemson.edu/t3s/workshop/2010/TASC

%20Pres/4%20Generations%20In%20Workplace%2

0TASC%202010.pdf> 12 Kathryn Tyler, “The Tethered Generation,” HR 

Magazine, May 2007, 52(5), available at 

<http://www.shrm.org/Publications/hrmagazine/Edito

rialContent/Pages/0507cover.aspx> 13 USSTRATCOM, “Generational Make Up.” 14 Myers and Sadaghiani, “Millennials in the 

Workplace.”

15 Ibid. 16 Brack, “Maximizing Millennials in the 

Workplace.” 

17 Howe and Strauss, “The Next 20 Years.” 18 Myers and Sadaghiani, “Millennials in the 

Workplace.”

19 Brack, “Maximizing Millennials in the 

Workplace.”

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 52
COLDCOM: New Ground for a 

Cold War?

By LTC Bart Hensler, Maj Benjamin Mather, and 

LtCdr David Palilonis

Regardless of the range of opinions 

concerning the effects of global warming, 

the Arctic ice cap is receding. This 

recession allows increased maritime access 

through the Northwest Passage and Northern 

Sea Route (NSR), and will result in 

dramatically shorter shipping lanes and 

access to the Arctic’s vast natural resources. 

This access was previously unattainable due 

to persistent ice cover. Varied assessments 

exist, but most agree that the Arctic 

possesses upwards of 25 to 30 percent of the 

world’s undiscovered natural energy 

resources, along with vast mineral deposits. 

There is potential that significant sums of 

these resources reside in unclaimed or 

international waters. 

The United States is competing with actors 

whose aggressive Arctic strategies, politics, 

and ambitions perhaps run contrary to those 

of the United States and its allies. 

Unfortunately, the United States’ national 

strategy for the Arctic fails to articulate 

tangible actions for the Joint Force. DoD 

recently published its own Arctic Strategy, 

but it too fails to identify specific actions to 

focus military efforts. 

Time remains a critical factor, and the 

United States already is behind the 

competition in developing a cogent strategy. 

To regain the strategic initiative in the 

Arctic, the United States must take 

immediate action that increases its capability 

and capacity to project power, assure access, 

respond to crises, and secure claims to its 

natural resources.

Covering almost eight million square miles 

and touching the territories of eight 

countries (United States, Russia, Canada, 

Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and 

Iceland) the Arctic is both vast and sparsely 

populated. Although the Arctic covers 

almost six percent of the earth’s surface, it is 

home to only four million people of which 

one-third are indigenous, and half are 

Russian nationals.1

 And yet, this desolate 

expanse is rich in natural resources. Per the 

U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) 2008 

Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, the 

Arctic (as defined by the USGS as north of 

the Arctic Circle) potentially contains “90 

billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet 

of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of 

natural gas liquids.” Of this amount, 

approximately 84 percent occurs in the 

offshore area.

2

 This offshore area is now 

more accessible than ever due to the 

receding ice cap.

Despite the obvious value of the Arctic, 

however, the United States lacks the 

capability in the Arctic to rival other 

nations’ ambitions, territorial claims, or 

potential incursions. Competition in the 

Arctic is not dissimilar to any other 

geographic area, and although the harsh 

climate and isolation perhaps limits the 

number of actors, economic and political 

ambitions are still driving a rapidly

increasing level of competition. Both 

Russia and China have Arctic ambitions that 

affect the political and military environment. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 53
The U.S. limitation to projecting enduring 

power in the region is evidenced by a lack of 

ice-protected vessels and strategic ports 

within the Arctic Circle. Presently, military 

assets projected into the region must 

originate from either United States Pacific 

Command (USPACOM) or United States 

European Command (USEUCOM), and 

either presence would be transient at best,

without the ability to maintain a sustained 

above-surface maritime or air presence 

during a response scenario. 

Basing and power projection aside, the 

United States also lacks the ability to 

provide enduring access to the Arctic during 

months where ice covers most of the region. 

Although the NSR currently only is 

navigable during the summer months, some 

research suggests that the route may remain 

open year-round by 2040. 3

 Russia 

possesses a large icebreaker fleet; most 

significant, the fleet is nuclear powered

enabling them to break through Arctic ice 

and maintain critical SLOCs for Russian 

interests in the Arctic year round.4

 The 

United States possesses no such capability, 

fielding a total of three icebreakers, only two 

of which are operational. 

Modern-age icebreakers nominally cost 

about one billion dollars apiece—no small 

sum in an era of fiscal austerity. Further 

complicating this issue is the risk associated 

with relying so greatly on partner nations in 

the region to provide the required resources 

to access our Arctic claims. The United 

States’ strongest partner in the Arctic, 

Canada, has its own national agenda, and 

claims territorial space up to the geographic 

North Pole, a contestable claim from the 

U.S. perspective. While Canada enjoys 

much greater access and a viable claim to a 

significant amount of territory, The U.S.

should only expect as much help as Canada 

is willing to provide without potentially 

infringing upon their national interests.

Altogether this lack of basing and access 

assets compounds the problem of response 

to an Arctic military contingency or 

manmade disaster such as a major oil spill 

from a tanker or drilling platform. Military 

conflict aside—an unlikely near-term 

issue—exploration and exploitation of 

natural resources in the Arctic by 

commercial actors presents a unique 

challenge. As the proliferation of cargo 

ships, commercial fishing vessels, and 

energy exploration entities descend on the 

region, it creates an imbalance in response 

capabilities. Search and rescue, oil spills, 

ships stuck in ice—the list grows and there 

are insufficient mechanisms in place to 

address them. 

Strategic Context

In 2012, Arctic sea ice receded the farthest

in recorded history. In September of that 

year, the 5.4 million square mile Arctic 

Ocean was covered with an Arctic ice cap of 

1.3 million square miles. This cap was 18 

percent smaller than the previous low set in 

2007 and nearly 50 percent less than the 

long-term average of around 2.7 million 

square miles measured from 1979-2000.5

 

The map below is from the climate.gov 

website using data from the NOAA 

Environmental Visualization Lab and 

displays ice concentration on September 16, 

Campaigning Fall 2014 54
2012 compared to the previous record 

(yellow line) and the previous midSeptember median extent (black line).6

This smaller ice cap results in a larger 

accessible sea area, and means more than 

increased access to natural resources. It also 

means more access for countries and their 

merchant fleets to transit through the Arctic. 

The map indicates routes for the Northern 

Sea Route (green line) over Russia and the 

Northwest Passage (orange line) over 

Canada. These passages are a boon to 

global shippers based in Asia and Europe, 

and also allow countries such as Russia and 

China to quickly and efficiently position 

military forces around the globe. The 

Northwest Passage cuts 2000 NM and two

weeks from the normal transit through the 

Panama Canal. The NSR cuts the nominal 

distance between Yokohama and Rotterdam

by 4700 NM, which at a speed of 20 knots, 

saves at least a week from what is typically 

a three-week transit.

7

 If current trends in 

Arctic sea ice continue, the Arctic could be 

almost completely ice-free in the summer by 

2040, allowing almost any mariner to cross 

the Arctic.

8

Recognizing the potential of the region even 

before Arctic ice recession was realized, the 

Ottawa Declaration of 1996 formed an 

Arctic Council.

9

 The Arctic Council is 

made up of the eight Arctic countries as 

permanent members and six international 

organizations representing indigenous 

groups as permanent (non-voting) 

participants. In addition, the council has as 

observers 12 countries, nine international 

organizations, and 11 non-governmental 

organizations. The council’s mandate 

includes “common Arctic issues, in 

particular issues of sustainable development 

and environmental protection in the 

Arctic...” Noticeably however, the Arctic 

Council’s mission does not include “matters 

related to military security.”10 

The Arctic Council has no regulatory or 

enforcement authority but rather relies on 

member states to enforce its decisions; such 

as with its recent cooperation agreement on 

Arctic search and rescue operations.

11 

Canada is currently the chair of the Arctic 

Council, but in May of 2015 the United 

States will assume the 2-year chairmanship 

which is a potential opportunity to address

U.S. concerns. 

Arctic Actors of Interest

As a founding member of the Arctic 

Council, Russia possesses the greatest 

amount of Arctic coastline and therefore 

lays claim to a significant amount of 

resources. In an effort to maintain 

dominance of its assessed claims, Russia 

cleverly relies on a combination of policy 

Campaigning Fall 2014 55
and diplomacy. Russia deems a series of 

straits along the NSR as internal waters, 

giving her the power to control access and 

transit of these waters, exempt from typical 

free passage in international waters. Russia 

further lays claim to territory outside of its 

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), relying on 

the United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS is an 

international convention that codifies 

customary international law of the sea into a 

treaty regime. Over 160 nations signed onto 

the treaty that guarantees 200 nautical mile 

EEZs to littoral countries and delineates 

rules for claiming additional undersea 

territory by extension of the continental 

shelf. UNCLOS Article 234 states that 

nations may deny passage of foreign vessels 

that fail to conform to the owning nation’s 

prescribed maritime regulations and enables 

a coastal state to apply temporary and nondiscriminatory requirements on vessels 

operating in an ice-covered EEZ for the sake 

of environmental protection.12 

Empowered by UNCLOS Article 234, 

Russia wields tremendous influence in its 

claimed waters, requiring significant 

economic compensation, advanced notice, 

ice-breaker support, and other administrative 

requirements that play to Russia’s favor.13 

The outcome of this policy is Russia’s 

significant ability to influence – or restrict – 

use of its waterways. However, Russia’s 

heavy-handed approach is not without its 

shortfalls. The key terminology in 

UNCLOS Article 234 is the provision of an 

ice-covered EEZ. Climate change’s impacts 

to the amount of ice in the Arctic, i.e., 

rolling it back, hinders Russia’s ability to 

continue relying on its melting claim. 

Without the ice, Russia would have no 

lawful right to deny free passage of vessels 

transiting the NSR. Not to be caught off 

guard, Russia is quickly amending 

legislation and implementing new policy, 

while also still relying on a Soviet Union-era 

claim made in 1926 that identified an area of 

the Artic up to the North Pole. Not 

surprisingly, the identified area is a vast 

portion of the Arctic that nominally would 

not pass the common-sense test of belonging 

exclusively to the Russians.14 If successful 

in its efforts to claim additional area beyond 

its EEZ, Russia could increase its control of 

the Arctic almost exponentially, securing 

resource-rich deposits while dictating terms 

of passage for other nations. 

Complementing their diplomatic approach, 

Russia is attempting to build a credible 

military deterrence that could challenge 

would-be actors in the Arctic. Strategically, 

Russia announced a refocusing of military 

efforts in the summer of 2008. At that time, 

Russia’s Security Council adopted the 

“Principles of State Policy of the Russian 

Federation in the Arctic up to 2020 and 

Beyond,” which outlines the country’s 

strategy in the region, including the 

deployment of military, border, and coastal 

guard units to bolster security in the 

region.15 In September 2013, the Russian 

Navy reported that a North Fleet unit led by 

the guided-missile cruiser Peter the Great

arrived at the Novosibirsk Islands 

archipelago, and claimed that supporting 

airfields at the facility would be upgraded to 

support the largest Russian transport 

aircraft.16 The latest development is the 

Campaigning Fall 2014 56
announcement that Russia is establishing a 

new headquarters designed to bring all 

major Arctic forces under a single unified 

command. The report states that the new 

command is comprised of the Northern 

Fleet, Arctic warfare units, and air force and 

air defense units. Referred to as the 

Northern Fleet-Unified Strategic Command, 

the HQ “will be responsible for protecting 

Russia’s Arctic shipping and fishing, oil and 

gas fields on the Arctic shelf, and the 

country’s national borders in the north.”17

China’s Arctic ambitions differ from 

Russia’s, mainly because China does not 

have a geographic connection to the Arctic 

and therefore no territorial claims. China’s 

strategic interests in the Arctic are centered 

on economics and access. China's growing 

economy requires energy to continue 

stoking its growth, and with an estimated 25

percent of the world’s undiscovered energy 

resources potentially in the Arctic, China 

has a national interest in securing access to 

the region.18 Beijing has security concerns 

over their sea lines of communication with 

Europe and the Middle East. China depends 

on oil and gas shipments from the Middle 

East and volatile sea lanes like the Malacca 

Strait and territorial disputes in the South 

China Sea add to the concern. Though an 

Arctic passage does little to solve security 

concerns over energy shipments from the 

Middle East, it provides a much shorter 

route for China's exports to Europe. It is 

estimated that the maritime route between 

China and Europe would be reduced by 

almost 40 percent using the NSR.19 A 

Chinese university academic surmises that 

Chinese shipping companies could save an 

estimated $60 to $120 billion annually in 

costs by using the NSR to reach ports in 

Europe.20 

In May 2013, China earned admission to the 

Arctic Council as an Observer State, along 

with India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and 

South Korea. This inclusion as an observer 

is a tremendous accomplishment for China, 

who views admittance as an observer as a 

viable means of influencing the Council’s 

permanent members. Though Observer 

States are not voting members of the 

council, admittance constitutes recognition 

of China’s economic importance in the 

world.

21 Whether Russia and China can 

agree to a limited tactical partnership in the 

near future may determine the course ahead. 

Russia needs investment and markets for its 

Arctic energy sources; China has money and 

requires more energy. Economic principles 

nominally dictate that the two could reach a 

mutually beneficial common ground. 

Representing our strongest ally in the 

region, Canada published their Northern 

Strategy in 2009 articulating four pillars: 

Exercising Arctic Sovereignty; Promoting 

Social and Economic Development; 

Protecting the Arctic’s Environmental 

Heritage; and Improving and Devolving 

Governance in Northern Territories.

22 The

Canadian government’s most important 

concern is their sovereignty as evidenced by 

the increased funding they are providing to 

their Coast Guard and military to operate in 

the north. As an example, the Canadian 

Government has ramped up exercises in the 

far north with the creation in 2007 of the 

annual Operation Nanook. The 2012 

Campaigning Fall 2014 57
iteration focused on exercising Canadian 

sovereignty by tracking and interdicting a 

vessel of interest in the Hudson Bay.23 

Although Canada and the United States are 

closely allied in the region, there is one 

major disagreement. The United States, 

along with the European Union and other 

nations, sees the Northwest Passage as an 

international strait, meaning any nation can 

sail through under the rite of Innocent 

Passage without seeking Canada’s 

permission. Canada deems the Northwest 

Passage as internal waters that they control. 

Canada and the international community 

have “agreed to disagree” on this point.24

Strategic Guidance

With an understanding of the importance of 

the Arctic region and the many challenges 

the U.S. faces, U.S. policy and strategy may 

be examined. National Security Presidential 

Directive 66 (NSPD-66), released in January 

2009, clearly outlines the importance of the 

Arctic region. It identifies national security 

interests in the Arctic to include “missile 

defense and early warning; deployment of 

sea and air systems for strategic sealift, 

strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and 

maritime security operations; and ensuring 

freedom of navigation and overflight.”25 

The NSPD also identifies freedom of the 

seas as a top priority and warns of a 

vulnerability to terrorism and criminal acts. 

NSPD-66 directs that Department of State 

(DoS), DoD and Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) shall: “develop greater 

capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to 

protect United States air, land, and sea 

borders in the Arctic region” and to “project 

a sovereign United States maritime presence 

in the Arctic in support of essential United 

States interests.”26 Additionally, regarding

safe, secure, and reliable navigation as well 

as protecting maritime commerce, DoS, 

DoD and DHS shall “determine basing and 

logistics support requirements, including 

necessary airlift and icebreaking

capabilities” corresponding to the current 

level of human activity. 

In terms of Grand Strategy, little can be 

found in the 2010 National Security Strategy

or the Defense Strategy within the 2014 

Quadrennial Defense Review beyond 

general security concepts that are applicable 

to any region. There is, however, a National

Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) that

was released in May of 2013. It soon was 

followed by an associated Implementation 

Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic 

Region in January of 2014. These 

documents describe a strategy following 

three main lines of effort (LOEs): Advance 

United States Security Interests, Pursue 

Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship, and 

Strengthen International Cooperation.

27 

Component objectives under NSAR’s 

“security interests” LOE include the 

following: Evolve Arctic Infrastructure and

Strategic Capabilities, Enhance Arctic 

Domain Awareness, Preserve Arctic Region 

Freedom of the Seas, and Provide for Future 

U.S. Energy Security.

28 

Surprisingly, DoD is not the lead for a single 

one of the objectives or their myriad subcomponents. In fact, the only component 

objective for which DoD has a lead role 

Campaigning Fall 2014 58
involves developing a Framework of 

Observations and Modeling to Support 

Forecasting and Prediction of Sea Ice, under 

Increase Understanding of the Arctic 

through Scientific Research and Traditional 

Knowledge beneath the second LOE of 

Pursue Responsible Arctic Region 

Stewardship.29 DoD appears to have the 

lead role simply because the sub-objective 

depends on the NASA’s launching of the 

ICESat-2 (Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation) 

satellite in early 2016.30 Otherwise, DoD 

has no real part. With this in mind, it is 

clear the author of these two plans was not 

considering the actual strategic value of the 

Arctic region from a national defense

perspective. 

 

Between the release of the NSAR and its 

associated Implementation Plan, DoD 

published its own Artic Strategy in 

November of 2013. The document defines 

DoD’s desired end-state to be “a secure and 

stable region where U.S. national interests 

are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is 

protected, and nations work cooperatively to 

address challenges,”31 but still falls well 

short of direction similar to that given by 

NSPD-66. Additionally, the eight “ways” 

identified in this strategy suggest little to no 

additional “means” to achieve this end state. 

The strategy uses the “leverage existing 

capabilities” statement that has become so 

familiar in the current fiscally-constrained 

environment and is largely about 

maintaining the status quo through already 

existing exercises and providing support “as 

needed.” No specific objectives to better 

equip the military for increased Arctic 

operations were identified short of the 

possibility of “a new hanger” if needed. 

While a whole-of-government approach is 

critical to employing all instruments of 

national power, it is clear that partnering is 

becoming DoD’s alternative to 

congressional funding. It seems that the 

strategy is simply a reflection of the current 

fiscal environment where an explicit call for 

increased spending would likely run counter 

to an already established understanding that 

funds will not be approved. DoD’s strategy

admits “fiscal constraints may delay or deny 

needed investment in Arctic capabilities, and 

may curtail Arctic training and 

operations.”32 Despite abundant evidence 

supporting the rapidly changing Arctic 

environment, and unquestionable matters of 

strategic importance within the region, 

recent U.S. policy lacks a definitive or 

fiscally-supported plan to “project a 

sovereign United States maritime presence 

in the Arctic”33 in the foreseeable future.

Recommendations

If the United States is to secure its role as a 

dominant presence in the Arctic region, 

there are many tasks that need to be 

accomplished. First and foremost, strategic 

guidance must be revised to reflect a more 

proactive and funded role in developing our 

Arctic capabilities, thus bringing it in line 

with NSPD-66. Although DoD continues to 

experience significant cuts to the budget as 

we draw down from Middle East 

engagements, lawmakers must see the Arctic 

region as an entirely separate and distinct 

issue. While the direction to “leverage 

existing capabilities” is reasonable to an 

extent, the simple fact that the United States

Campaigning Fall 2014 59
does not possess an Arctic capable force 

cannot be ignored and demands appropriate 

funding—the bulk of which must initially 

take place within the DHS. 

The Coast Guard’s 2011 High Latitude 

study determined that six heavy and four 

medium (sized) icebreakers would be 

needed to fulfill its statutory mission 

requirements as well as the Navy’s presence 

requirements in the Polar Regions.34 These 

assets are critical to the nation’s ability to 

operate independently throughout the 

region. While the U.S. has long enjoyed a 

strong relationship with Canada, particularly 

through our shared border and complete 

integration of NORAD, it cannot depend so 

strongly upon their Arctic capable ships to 

bridge this critical gap in capability as they 

too are limited. Surprisingly, Canada has 

only six ice-breaking capable ships35 to 

cover their more than 125,000 miles of 

coastline, sufficiently monopolizing their 

time. If the U.S. were to have the capability 

to operate independently off its Arctic coast, 

let alone across the Arctic region, it needs 

the ships. Additionally, as the role of power 

projection goes beyond that of an ice 

breaker, the U.S. needs to invest in at least a 

pair of hull-reinforced destroyers or cruisers 

that will allow the Navy to project a 

dominant above-surface presence in the 

Arctic. With a pair of rapidly aging 

icebreakers and shipbuilding time taking up 

to ten years. The U.S. is already 

jeopardizing its ability to operate beyond 

2020. 

Besides the obvious matter of equipment, 

the issue of infrastructure must also be 

addressed. The United States needs to 

develop a deep water port that allows direct 

access to the Arctic. While such a port 

would obviously provide critical support to 

our access and power projection, it would 

also open the door to future resource 

exploitation as an invaluable resupply hub 

for the entire region. Additionally, a stable 

access port in the Arctic would greatly 

enhance our ability to conduct search and 

rescue missions, respond to and support 

disaster response, and maintain future 

navigational assets in the region. While 

efforts are already underway to identify 

potential locations for deep water ports in 

Alaska, with Nome & Port Clarence as top 

contenders,36 the United States is still 

nowhere near budgeting for such 

construction. 

Despite the current fiscally constrained 

environment, the United States must budget 

for this project so that construction can 

begin the moment a suitable location is 

selected. Similar to ships, construction can 

take a very long time. In the case of 

infrastructure, however, the U.S. does not 

have the luxury of off-site construction with 

a favorable weather environment. Ports 

obviously must be constructed in place, and 

with Alaskan weather allowing only a few 

construction-friendly months per year, this is 

a daunting project. A planning charter in 

2012 estimated such a project to be a 20-

plus year endeavor.37 Already missing the 

mark for 2025 operations, construction 

would have to start soon to be ready as a 

viable port before 2035. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 60
Command, control, and cooperation is 

another issue that must be addressed 

promptly. The current U.S. military 

structure for the Arctic is fragmented, 

including three separate Geographic 

Combatant Commands (GCCs) involved in 

Arctic affairs. While the Unified Command 

Plan (UCP) assigned primary responsibility 

for the Arctic to CDRUSNORTHCOM 

since 2011,38 the U.S. needs to consider 

formalizing control into either a 

consolidated sub-unified command under 

USNORTHCOM or into a Combatant 

Command of its own. Why not 

COLDCOM? Such an entity would absorb 

NORTHCOM’s JTF-Alaska, PACOM’s 

Alaska Command (both are already 

commanded by the same officer), and 

functions of EUCOM’s Arctic Security

Forces Round Table. Given the role the 

Coast Guard plays in the region, serious 

consideration should be made to having a 

Coast Guard officer as the Commander or 

Deputy of this command at all times. 

Consolidation of Arctic military 

responsibilities would allow the United 

States to focus on the region and coordinate 

DoD efforts in a whole-of-government 

approach to regional stewardship. Such 

focus would greatly reduce internal 

competition for resources and enable future 

international mil-to-mil partnering and 

cooperation under a true, single military 

spokesman for the region. This 

consolidation could not come at a better 

time as the United States will also be 

assuming from Canada the 2-year 

Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May 

of 2015. 

Lastly, and in preparation for this Arcticstates agreed upon leadership role, the 

United States must also identify and resolve 

internal political barriers to the signing of 

the UNCLOS. While doing so will have the 

obvious benefit of finally enabling the 

United States to claim sovereignty over 

portions of Alaska’s resource-laden 

continental shelf, it will also better prepare 

the U.S. for leading the Arctic Council, by 

the use of already-established international 

agreements, in this rapidly emerging 

northern frontier. UNCLOS has been 

supported by the last four U.S. 

administrations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

business groups, multinational corporations, 

and leading environmentalists. Ratification 

would give the United States a seat at the 

table to decide important uses of the ocean 

environment, including oil and gas 

exploration on the extended continental 

shelf in the Arctic.

39

The United States must take immediate 

action and address its strategic shortfalls in 

the Arctic region. Canada, Russia and 

China are all moving forward to achieve 

their national interests while the United 

States sacrifices readiness and capability. 

The lack of a coherent strategy undermines 

the United States’ ability to prepare for the 

benefits of increased economic opportunity 

and the risk of ceding the strategic initiative 

to other actors whose ambitions are not 

nested with our own. Power projection, 

basing, and access must be, to achieve unity 

of effort, the hallmark of a thorough strategy 

that guarantees United States participation in 

a contested area of growing importance. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 61
Team Biographies 

Lieutenant Colonel Bart Hensler, USA. LTC Hensler

is currently serving as a Civil Support planner in the 

Domestic Operations Division (J36) of United States 

Northern Command. He was commissioned through 

the United States Military Academy in 1997 where 

he earned a BS in Sociology, and an MA in 

Management from Webster University in 2009. Prior 

to his current assignment, LTC Hensler served as the 

Brigade Operations Officer for the 173d Airborne 

Brigade Combat Team.

Major Benjamin David Mather, USAF. Maj Mather 

is the EUCOM Exercise Event Planner and Deputy 

Desk Officer for the Joint Exercise Division, Joint 

Training, J-7, Joint Staff. He was commissioned 

through ROTC at Purdue University in 2001 earning 

a BS in Computer Engineering and has an MBA in 

Business Leadership from St. Joseph’s College of 

Maine. He is a Senior Pilot with over 2000 hours in 

the C-5B Galaxy and the KC-10A Extender.

Lieutenant Commander David Palilonis, USN. 

LCDR Palilonis is en route to the J87 at the United 

States Strategic Command. He was commissioned 

through ROTC at Cornell University in 1999. LCDR 

Palilonis earned a BS in Biology from Cornell 

University in 1999 and an MA in National Decision 

Making from the Naval War College in 2010. Prior 

to his current assignment, LCDR Palilonis served as 

the Executive Officer in the USS LOUISIANA 

BLUE SSBN 743.

1 Roger Howard. Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for 

Tomorrow's Natural Resources. London: Continuum 

International Publishing, 2009.

2 Kenneth J. Bird, Ronald R. Charpentier, Donald L. 

Gautier, David W. Houseknecht, Timothy R. Klett, 

Janet K. Pitman, Thomas E. Moore, Christopher J. 

Schenk, Marilyn E. Tennyson, and Craig J. Wandrey. 

"Circum-Arctic resource appraisal; estimates of 

undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle: 

U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049." U.S. 

Geological Survey. July 23, 2008. 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ (accessed Feb 

18, 2014).

3

 NOAA, “Will the Arctic be free of summer sea ice in 

30 years?” May 12, 2010. 

http://www.climate.gov/news-features/featuredimages/will-arctic-be-free-summer-sea-ice-30-years

(accessed March 03, 2014).

4 World Nuclear Association 2014

5 Roger Howard, “Ice Breaking,” The World Today 65, 

no. 10, 2009: 12-13. 6 Climate.gov 2012, "Arctic sea ice: 2012 record low 

was 18 percent smaller than previous record, nearly 

50 percent below average." www.climate.gov. Dec 4, 

2012. http://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/featured-images/arctic-sea-ice-2012-

record-low-was-18-smaller-previous-record-nearly

(accessed Feb 18, 2014).

7 Scott G. Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown." Foreign 

Affairs 87, no. 2, 2008: 63. 8 NOAA 2010, “Will the Arctic be free of summer sea 

ice in 30 years?” May 12, 2010. 

http://www.climate.gov/news-features/featuredimages/will-arctic-be-free-summer-sea-ice-30-years

(accessed March 03, 2014). 9 Wikipedia 2014 10 Andrea Charron, "Canada and the Arctic Council." 

International Journal, 2012: 765-783. 11 Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Daily. "Corridors of 

Power; Search and Rescue Treaty Arctic Council's 

First Legally Binding Accord." ProQuest. May 13, 

2011. 

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/docvi

ew/866399514?accountid=12686 (accessed Feb 16, 

2014).

12 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 

Sea, Dec 10, 1982, 

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreemen

ts/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm (accessed Aug 5, 

2014).

13 Douglas R. Brubaker, "The Northern Sea Route 

Regime: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge." Ocean 

Development and International Law, 1999: 320. 14 Lincoln E. Flake, "Russia and China in the Arctic: A 

Team of Rivals." Strategic Analysis (37:6), 2013: 681-

687.

15 Alexandr Golts, "THE ARCTIC: A CLASH OF 

INTERESTS OR CLASH OF AMBITIONS." Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2011: 46. 16 Voice of Russia 2013 Army; Russia resumes 

constant military presence in the Arctic - Defense 

Ministry. September 16, 2013. 

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_09_16/Russiaresumes-constant-military-presence-in-the-ArcticDefense-Ministry-3541/ (accessed February 12, 

2014).

17 Zachary Keck, The Diplomat. February 21, 2014. 

http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/russia-to-

 

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 62
establish-arctic-military-command/ (accessed March 

02, 2014).

18 Wendell Minnick, "Ice Station Dragon: China's 

Strategic Arctic Interest." Defense News, May 16, 

2011: 4.

19 Minnick, 2011. 20 Michael Byers, The Globe and Mail, "Asian 

Juggernaut Eyes Our 'Golden' Waterways," August 

29, 2011. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globedebate/asian-juggernaut-eyes-our-goldenwaterways/article626936/ (accessed February 17, 

2014).

21 Steven Lee Myers, "Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations 

as Observer States, Including China." New York 

Times, May 16, 2013: A9. 22 Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 

Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and 

Non-Status Indians, Canada’s Northern Strategy Our 

North, Our Heritage, Our Future. National Strategy 

Document, Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and 

Government Services, 2009.

23 Targeted News Service, "PM Participates in

Operation NANOOK 12." ProQuest. Aug 24, 2012. 

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/docvi

ew/1034941444?accountid=12686 (accessed Feb 28, 

2014).

24 James Brooke, "Arctic Shortcut for Shipping Raises 

New Fears in Canada: Arctic Shortcut Worries 

Canadians." New York Times, Jul 29, 2000. 25 The White House. "National Security Presidential 

Directive - 66." Washington DC, 2009. 26 Ibid. 27 The White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic 

Region." Washington DC, 2013.

28 Ibid. 29 The White House, "Implementation Plan for the 

National Strategy for the Arctic Region." Washington 

DC, 2014.

30 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

NASA's Ice, Cloud, and land Elevation Satellite. 2014. 

http://icesat.gsfc.nasa.gov/icesat2/mission_overvie

w.php (accessed February 13, 2014). 31 The Pentagon, "Arctic Strategy." Washington DC, 

2013. 32 Ibid.. 33 The White House, "National Security Presidential 

Directive - 66." Washington DC, 2009. 34 United States Government Accountability Office, 

"Arctic Capabilities." Washington DC, 2012.

35 USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy, 

"Mobility and Ice Operations Division." United States 

Coast Guard. July 18, 2013. 

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg552/ice.asp

(accessed March 7, 2014).

36 Kieran Mulvaney, "This Time No Nukes For 

Deepwater Port Plan." Discovery News. June 20, 

2013. http://news.discovery.com/earth/globalwarming/a-deepwater-port-in-the-alaskan-arctic130620.htm. 37 Paula Lowther, "Arctic Deep Water Port." Alaska 

Business Monthly. January 2012, 2012. 

http://www.akbizmag.com/Alaska-BusinessMonthly/January-2012/Arctic-Deep-Water-Port/

(accessed February 13, 2014). 38 Nathan Freier, "The 2011 Unified Command Plan - 

A Missed Opportunity?" Center for Strategic & 

International Studies. May 24, 2011. 

http://csis.org/publication/2011-unified-commandplan-missed-opportunity (accessed February 13, 

2014).

39 John B. Bellinger, III, "The United States and the 

Law of the Sea Convention." Berkeley, CA: (speech 

given as remarks at the Law of the Sea Institute), 

Nov 3, 2008.

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 63
What’s Next for NORAD?

By Maj Christopher J. Buckley, LtCdr Sebastian J. 

Kielpinski, and Lt Col Thomas Walsh

Introduction

No organization has had more to say in the 

defense of North America than the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD). It has been popularized by 

Hollywood and conspiracy theory. The 

name itself has become synonymous with 

Cold War bunkers, nuclear war, and fighting 

to the end of the world. In the mind of the 

average American, nothing flies over North 

America without NORAD consent, not even 

Santa Claus. However, the reality of 

NORAD is more than just air defense. What 

started as a mutual defense arrangement 

between the United States and Canada has 

evolved into a bi-national command 

organization tasked with the defense of 

North America. The further expansion of 

NORAD is a logical step to increase the 

efficiency of North American defense. That 

expansion should be done geographically, 

by incorporating Mexico as well as 

expanding NORAD’s domain to include 

cyber threats. 

Evolution of NORAD

The attack on Pearl Harbor created a deep 

and lasting scar on the American psyche. 

Military leaders were determined to deter 

any future attacks on the United States. The 

post-WWII Soviet Union was building a 

long-range bomber capable of striking North 

America, and the United States was resolute 

in its defense against this threat. The 

shortest flight time between the two nations 

is over the North Pole; therefore the ‘polar 

approaches’ became the priority for 

American defense.

1 This ‘polar concept’ 

highlighted the need for increased 

cooperation between the United States and 

Canada. The United States understood that 

to achieve its strategic ends it must have 

capable partners. It became obvious that to 

secure the defense of the United States, 

Canada must become a partner.2 This reality 

is as true today as it was in 1958. 

The term ‘Building Partner Capacity’ is a 

relatively new one, first introduced to the 

Department of Defense in the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review, but the 

concept is not new.3

 When retroactively 

applied to 1950s Canada, this is exactly 

what the United States was trying to 

accomplish. What began as a crash program 

to build a system of layered early warning 

radars throughout Canada eventually 

became the North American Air Defense 

Command (NORAD). NORAD is not just a 

bi-lateral defense agreement, it is a binational command. The unique command 

and control (C2) that it executes is the 

realized benefit of NORAD. This C2 

arrangement is unique because NORAD 

exercises operational, and sometimes 

tactical, control over its assigned or 

allocated forces, regardless of their country 

of origin.

4

Throughout its existence, the threat that 

NORAD faced has changed constantly. By 

the 1960s, the primary threat to North 

America had shifted from Soviet Long 

Range Aviation (LRA) to ballistic missiles. 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) 

and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 

(SLBM) had the ability to ‘leapfrog’ 

Campaigning Fall 2014 64
NORAD’s radar warning system. To 

counter the ballistic missile threat, the 

United States Air Force built a space-based

surveillance and missile-warning system and 

NORAD quickly assumed control of it. 

By the 1970s, NORAD had control over 

tactical warning and assessment of all air, 

missile, or space threats across the entirety 

of North America, and changed its name 

from North American Air Defense 

Command to the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command. In the 1980s, NORAD

modernized. New ground-based radar sites, 

updated satellite capabilities, and newer, 

faster, more agile interceptor aircraft 

increased NORAD’s capabilities 

exponentially. During that time, small, light 

aircraft were known to bring large quantities 

of drugs into America, and no organization 

was better equipped to detect and track these 

aircraft. Leveraging its increased 

capabilities, NORAD was now tasked to 

help fight the war on drugs. 

The end of the Cold War brought about 

questions related to the continued relevance 

of NORAD. Even though the Soviet threat 

was eliminated, their Russian successors still 

had long-range bombers, ICBMs and 

SLBMs to threaten North America. 

NORAD planners envisioned a world where 

other states and non-state actors could 

employ aircraft, cruise missiles or ballistic 

missiles against North America. The 

security of North America had not become

easier with the Soviet demise, and the U.S.-

Canada agreement became even more 

relevant to combatting the challenges of the 

21st Century. 

The 9/11 attacks highlighted what many 

people believed to be a failure of NORAD. 

Royal Canadian Air Force Brigadier General 

A.D. Meinzinger, NORAD deputy director 

of strategy said, “We weren’t postured to be 

looking inside the continent.”5 Given a new 

threat, Operation NOBLE EAGLE was 

conceived and immediately came under the 

purview of NORAD. NORAD was also 

finally invited into what became known as 

the ‘interagency.’ Interagency integration 

was not limited to the U.S.—the Canadian 

interagency sought NORAD’s capabilities as 

well.6

Up until 2001, threats to North America 

were focused on air and space. There was 

no need to explore threats in other domains. 

NORAD concluded that focusing solely on 

the air and space domains restricted its 

ability to protect North America. Therefore, 

NORAD added maritime warning to its 

expanding mission set. Through the years, 

NORAD has adapted to reach its three 

modern mission sets: aerospace warning, 

aerospace control, and maritime warning. 

As a historical case, NORAD can and 

should be viewed as a success story. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 65
However, NORAD has yet to reach its full 

potential: it does not include all of North 

America, and its domains are limited.

United States-Canada Defense 

Relationship

The Guidance for the Employment of 

the Force requires all Combatant 

Commands to ‘partner’ and there is 

no closer partner than Canada and 

no security and defense agreement 

stronger than NORAD. This 

agreement remains a world-class 

model of defense cooperation and 

information sharing.7

USNORTHCOM and NORAD Theatre 

Strategy

As a result of 9/11, United States Northern 

Command (USNORTHCOM), a geographic 

combatant command responsible for defense 

of the homeland across all domains, was 

created in 2002. NORAD was already 

protecting the homeland against air and 

space threats; therefore USNORTHCOM 

was co-located with NORAD and the two

command staffs were combined. The 

commander of NORAD is dual-hatted as the 

commander of USNORTHCOM. The 

creation of USNORTHCOM redefined the 

role of ‘homeland defense’ and NORAD’s 

role in that defense. USNORTHCOM’s 

mission statement is “United States 

Northern Command partners to conduct 

homeland defense, civil support and security 

cooperation to defend and secure the United 

States and its interests.” 

The key word is ‘partner,’ and 

USNORTHCOM is a partner in all of its 

endeavors. With domestic issues, the 

partners are the U.S. interagency (DHS, 

FEMA, FBI, etc.).8 With defense issues 

USNORTHCOM’s main partner is the 

Canadian Joint Operations Command 

(CJOC), formerly known as CANADA 

COMMAND.

9 CJOC and USNORTHCOM 

have complimentary missions. Both are 

responsible for deterring and, when directed 

by their Heads of State, defeating direct 

attacks against their respective homelands. 

Each nation recognizes that defense does not 

end at the border. How would these two 

new organizations bridge the gap between 

them? The air and space answer was easy. 

Success in air and missile defense rests on 

an integrated system of surveillance, 

warning and control at all altitudes. This

approach was true decades ago and remains 

true today. NORAD is the cornerstone of 

that capability. The Canadian Chief of the 

Defence Staff and the U.S. Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated a study to 

investigate the roles, missions and 

relationships for CJOC, NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM. The result was the TriCommand Study, which created three 

keystone documents:

The Tri-Command Framework (2009) 

described how the three Commands – 

CJOC, NORAD, and USNORTHCOM—

will operate and interact. It highlighted 

fundamental relationships and underscored 

command responsibilities concerning mutual 

support and cooperation. 

The Tri-Command Vision (2010) provided 

a strategic view on how the three 

Commands collaborate to achieve their 

missions and identified five strategic goals. 

Those goals are to strengthen the collective 

ability to detect, deter, defend against, and 

Campaigning Fall 2014 66
defeat threats to our nations; improve unity 

of effort with respective mission partners; 

develop a culture of continuous 

collaboration and cooperation in planning, 

execution, training, information 

management, and innovation; enhance 

intelligence and information sharing and 

fusion to support mission accomplishment; 

and strengthen the collective ability to 

provide appropriate, timely and effective 

support to civil authorities, when requested. 

The Tri-Command Strategy (2010) 

outlined a series of shared tasks designed to 

strengthen working relationships, including 

such things as improving the ability to share 

classified information and shared situational 

awareness in multiple domains (i.e., land, 

sea, air, space, cyber).10

USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility 

(AOR) is North America: the United States, 

Canada, Mexico, the Bahamas, and the 

waters surrounding them out to 500 miles. 

CJOC”s AOR is Canada, the Arctic and the 

waters surrounding them. NORAD’s AOR 

is North America, but its area of interest 

(AOI) is global. Threats to North America 

can originate from anywhere, which is why 

NORAD’s early warning system is now 

global; it is no longer just a radar fence in 

the Arctic. This global perspective is why 

NORAD gives an assessment on every 

unknown penetration of the Air Defense 

Identification Zone and every detected 

missile and rocket launch on the planet. 

When something significant occurs in North 

America, it could get confusing as to what 

organization is in charge. It is possible for a 

threat to be in all three commands’ AORs

simultaneously. In reality, the three 

organizations operate seamlessly as a result 

of the working relationship between 

USNORTHCOM and CJOC that is based

the 50-year foundation that is called 

NORAD. The close, interwoven defense 

relationship that currently exists is because 

of NORAD.

“USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two 

separate commands that are inextricably 

linked. Neither command is subordinate to, 

nor a part of the other...Our commands” 

missions are not only complementary, they 

are also inseparable.” 

General Charles H. Jacoby, USA

Commander of USNORTHCOM and 

NORAD

Transcript of testimony to House Armed 

Services, March 2012

The Politics of NORAD

NORAD is, at its core, a military agreement. 

To understand the politics behind NORAD, 

one must understand how the military fits 

into the political structure of the United 

States and Canada. 

The United States is a hegemonic force with 

no equal. While Canada and the U.S. are 

similar in physical size, the United States

has a population and gross domestic product 

(GDP) roughly ten times the size of 

Canada’s and spends 31 times more on 

defense. It would take a major movement of 

Canadian policy to affect the US, but any 

movement of U.S. policy has profound 

effects on Canada. 

The United States is a super-power, and its 

defense budget is the largest in the world. 

The U.S. Secretary of Defense has 

considerable influence in the political 

Campaigning Fall 2014 67
process, as do the Flag and General officers 

within the Department of Defense. U.S. 

political policy decision makers are 

intimately involved in military affairs. 

“[Being America”s neighbor] is like 

sleeping with an elephant. No matter how 

friendly and even-tempered...one is affected 

by every twitch and grunt.” 

Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau 

From a speech at the National Press Club, 

Washington DC, March 25, 1969

Canada is a “middle power” nation. Their 

defense budget is relatively small, and the 

cabinet position of Minister of National 

Defense is not a relatively high-status 

position. The Minister and the Flag and 

General officers of the Canadian Forces 

(CF) do not necessarily yield much political 

influence. As a result, the military of 

Canada does not play a significant part in 

major policy decision-making. The reverse 

is also true; the Government of Canada does 

not exert considerable influence over CF 

affairs. The Canadian Forces do not see this

as a weakness of their system, but as an 

opportunity. 

This permissive political-military 

relationship allows Canadians to make 

necessary distinctions as to the “best 

interest” of defense, which allows them to 

pursue their professional interests as a 

classic ‘middle power’ military. In other 

words, they have the freedom to explore 

cooperative alliances to their advantage to 

meet what they believe is in the national 

interest. This freedom is the real strength of 

NORAD. While administrations change

(Labour, Conservative, Democrat, 

Republican), the military alliance endures. 

The advantage for the lesser force, Canada, 

is that it has access to a level of defense 

technical sophistication that is not 

achievable in the Canadian system. The 

danger for Canada is that the larger U.S. 

forces will naturally dominate the interests 

of both participants.

11 In fact, both of these 

outcomes have occurred already. 

The Canadian Forces see the natural merger 

of needs with regards to national defense; 

they are willing to give up a certain level of 

control to gain an unparalleled level of 

access and security. However, the people of 

Canada see American hegemony over 

Canadian sovereignty. While there is an 

overwhelmingly positive feeling about 

Canada in the United States (84% 

favorable), the reverse is not true. Only 

45% of Canadians have a positive feeling 

towards the US.12 From the War of 1812 

through U.S. plans to annex British 

Columbia (1860s) to NORAD, Canadians 

have always had a fear of ‘Americanization’ 

and U.S. imperialism. 

NORAD is not the first time the United 

States and Canada have attempted bi-lateral 

defense agreements. In the 1930s, the 

United States proposed to integrate British 

Columbia into a unified West Coast military 

command. Canada opposed this 

involvement and feared American 

imperialism more than the possibility of 

Japanese invasion.13 Canada accepted 

NORAD only because of the overwhelming 

threat of Soviet nuclear attack, and the CF’s 

inability to stand alone. 

Some Canadian pundits call for actions 

against NORAD or any type of agreement 

Campaigning Fall 2014 68
that they see as threatening the sovereignty 

of Canada. Many Canadians feel that the 

result of a fully integrated continental 

security force would sacrifice Canadian 

sovereignty. There is a feeling within 

Canadian society that NORAD is the 

precursor for all military, security and 

foreign policy to be captured under the 

umbrella of a single, U.S.-dominated North 

American Command.14

This issue of Canadian sovereignty came to 

light twice with the question of Ballistic 

Missile Defense (BMD). In the 1980s, it 

was President Reagan’s Strategic Defense 

Initiative (SDI). In that case, Prime Minister 

Trudeau’s government held the NORAD 

agreement hostage until getting a clause 

added that eliminated Canada’s involvement 

in an active ballistic missile defense. SDI 

died, but the NORAD agreement lived on.15 

Again in 2004, BMD became a U.S.-Canada 

sticking point. President Bush’s North 

American “missile shield” was to be built 

under the auspices of NORAD, but Canada 

did not have the economic or the political 

will to participate. It is Canada’s position 

that “missile shields” are an inherently 

destabilizing force. Missile shields provide 

NORAD an offensive capability that 

violates the intent of the agreement, and 

shields undermine Canada’s positions on 

arms-control with the United Nations.

16

Pulling Canada into BMD through NORAD 

would have had drastic effects on Canadian 

foreign policy. In effect, the United States

was changing Canada’s foreign policy 

without their consent. 

In the end, Canada opted out of the BMD 

agreement and the United States continued 

alone. As a result, the Ground Based 

Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska and 

Vandenberg AFB, California are under the 

command and control of USNORTHCOM, 

not NORAD. While the commander of both 

organizations is the same person, the 

distinction is noticeable. Canada will 

receive warning of an attack through 

NORAD, but the decision to engage 

inbound missiles is decided wholly by 

Americans. This command and control 

arrangement is accepted by the Canadian 

government in order to maintain their 

sovereignty; they would not allow NORAD 

to change Canadian foreign policy. 

How important is NORAD to U.S.-Canada 

economic relations? The United States and 

Canada have the largest trade relationship in 

the world. Each country is the largest trade 

partner of the other. In 2013 Canada 

exported US$332B worth of goods to the 

United States and imported US$300B from 

the US. The trade relationship between the 

two countries crosses all industries and is 

vital to both nations’ success.17 This trade 

relationship is the basic foundation of the 

political framework between the two 

nations. One could argue that it was the 

creation of the North American Free Trade 

Agreement (NAFTA) that allowed economic 

prosperity to flow across the borders. 

Neither country wants to do anything that 

would diminish this flow. 

NAFTA was, and still is, hotly debated, and 

remains controversial. When the questions 

arose concerning if the economic systems 

could work together, NORAD was shown in 

a positive light. The NORAD agreement 

demonstrated that security and defense 

could work across borders, so why not 

Campaigning Fall 2014 69
economics. In other words, NORAD 

opened the door for NAFTA. To protect 

this new economic flow, security and 

defense was, and remains, crucial. NAFTA 

created the need for a stronger NORAD, and 

it enables the economic prosperity of North 

America.

The NORAD agreement is the pillar of USCanada security and defense relations, 

which is reflected in the priorities for the 

Commander of USNORTHCOM and 

NORAD. The NORTHCOM theater 

campaign strategy prioritized its top issue as

continuing strengthening and expanding 

international relationships like NORAD.18

The NORAD Agreement, and its associated 

terms of reference, provided the political 

connections that underpinned the longevity 

of the Canadian-U.S. defense relationship to 

the present.

19 This bi-national construct 

represents a unique and special alliance that 

is vital to the U.S.’s defense and economic 

prosperity. NORAD’s ability to operate 

across Combatant Command AORs and the 

United States’ and Canadian interagency 

departments is a force multiplier for the 

security of North America.20

The Future of NORAD

As NORAD leaves its Cold War roots 

behind it must continue to evolve. For 

purposes of discussion, it is useful to look at 

NORAD through two lenses: NORAD as an

agreement and NORAD as an organization. 

Do these two entities need to exist in the 

future?

NORAD as an agreement is based upon a 

relationship and is therefore somewhat 

abstract. The argument for the NORAD

agreement is as strong as ever. The 

evolving threat base and the lack of Soviet 

threats do not eliminate the need for a 

combined defense of North America. In 

fact, the threats to North America are so 

wide and varied that the need for a 

combined North American defense is greater 

today than it was in the 1960s. The 

economic ties that bind North America 

together require protection. Therefore, the 

argument for a combined North American 

defense is strong. 

The more germane question is does the 

requirement for combined defense require a 

physical organization? One can have an

agreement without having a building, 

patches, or personnel. At the time of 

NORAD’s creation, USNORTHCOM and 

CJOC did not exist. Today, both of these 

organizations are tasked with the defense of 

their homelands across all domains, 

including the air and space domain that 

resides with NORAD. It is possible for the 

organization of NORAD to be absorbed by 

the respective commands, and the agreement 

becomes the basis of the coordinating effort 

between the commands. 

Does having that separate organization add 

any efficiency to the process? The answer is

‘yes.’ The fact that the command, the 

physical organization, is a bi-lateral 

command makes the United States and 

Canada equals. Without this equality, U.S. 

hegemony would occur not only in theory, 

but also in practice. USNORTHCOM and 

CJOC are not equals. USNORTHCOM has 

the capability to wield far greater forces than 

CJOC. USNORTHCOM units responding 

to threats would have the defense of 

America on their mind, not the defense of 

North America. That equal footing is 

Campaigning Fall 2014 70
foundational to NORAD’s success, and the 

physicality of the organization makes it a 

reality.

If one were to sit down today with a blank 

slate and design a defense of North America, 

a NORAD-like organization would be the 

result. It might not be called NORAD, but it 

would operate the same as NORAD does 

today. Its mission set would not be 

restricted to air and space; rather, its 

mandate would address all threats to North 

America across multiple domains.

21 

Since NORAD’s inception, it has been 

focused on aerospace warning and control, 

and has continued to adapt to outpace these 

threats. While its manning has dropped by 

an order of magnitude from the hundreds of 

thousands that manned the Cold War 

landscape of the mid-1960s to the less than 

10,000 personnel it has today, its reliance on 

technology has increased exponentially.22

This reliance of technology makes North 

America, and NORAD in particular, 

critically vulnerable to cyber threats. 

In the current relationship that NORAD 

enjoys with CJOC and USNORTHCOM, 

NORAD leverages cyber capabilities that 

exist within CJOC and USNORTHCOM, 

but only to secure its ability to operate in air 

and space. In other words, NORAD does 

not combat cyber threats to North America, 

only cyber threats to the physical 

organization of NORAD. North America 

has become so integrated through 

commercial and industrial sectors, attacking 

any part of North America will have an 

effect on the rest of North America. 

Therefore, a cyber-attack on the United 

States is not only a U.S. problem—it is a 

North American problem. Since North 

America as a whole can be affected through 

the cyber domain, NORAD must be given 

the authority and capability to combat that 

threat. That doesn’t mean the organization 

of NORAD must grow or absorb other 

organizations like U.S. Cyber Command. 

However, the Bi-lateral agreement must 

grow to include the relationships to combat 

cyber warfare. This precedent has already 

occurred in the maritime domain when 

NORAD took on the maritime warning 

mission. It would not be as much of a 

paradigm shift as old-school NORAD 

participants may think. 

Cyber warning is a mission set for NORAD 

to take on, similar to the aerospace and 

maritime warning missions that already 

exist. NORAD, both the organization and 

the agreement, is not capable of cyber 

control because any such mission would 

have profound effects on individual national 

sovereignty. The cyber control mission, if it 

is even possible, must remain inside each 

country. 

To combat threats across more domains 

requires more partners. The blank slate 

NORAD design would partner with all 

nations in North America. There are six

countries in North America proper: Canada, 

United States, Mexico, Bermuda, Saint 

Pierre and Miquelon, and Greenland (only 

US, Mexico and Canada are sovereign 

states, the others are self-governing 

territorial overseas collectives). The 31 

nations of the Caribbean and the seven

nations of Central America are also 

commonly referred to as part of North 

America.23 While the 44 territories of North 

America combining into a defense and 

Campaigning Fall 2014 71
economic bloc would be ideal, it is also 

unfeasible, especially in the near term.

When we look at the physical threats to 

North America, where are the movement 

corridors? When it was Soviet bombers and 

missiles, the pathway was polar, which 

made Canada the obvious partner. Today 

the threats to North America travel through 

the south and create a definite need for 

Mexico’s immediate inclusion into 

NORAD.

There are definite similarities between the 

US-Canada relationship and the budding 

US-Mexico partnership. Mexico is growing 

into a middle power similar to Canada. USMexican trade relations are similar in scope 

and size to those of the United States and 

Canada. The US-Mexican past is marred by 

wars and territorial conflicts, just like the 

United States’ past with Canada. As 

NORAD takes steps towards mitigating any 

future threats, the addition of Mexico to 

NORAD is a logical pathway.

The main reason for strengthening security 

and defense ties with Mexico is the simple 

fact that Mexico is fighting a de-facto war 

right now. The United States and Canada 

cannot afford to have Mexico lose its war 

against the cartels and should provide any 

and all help to ensure a Mexican victory. 

The Obama Administration has recognized 

this and has signed on to the Merida 

Initiative to the tune of US$1.2B for 

counter-narcotics support. However, to 

demonstrate to the world that the United 

States and Canada are serious about 

Mexico’s internal issues, and that Mexico is 

considered a true friend, ally, and partner, an

invitation to join NORAD should be 

extended. Given that NORAD already 

monitors the air and sea approaches to North 

America, it would immediately increase 

Mexico’s capability to combat cartel 

activities in these domains. The joint 

command structure could facilitate 

intelligence and information sharing 

initiatives, and Mexico’s inclusion into 

NORAD would pave the way for a 

comprehensive multi-national counternarcotics enterprise in North America.24 A 

trilateral organization is exactly what the 

past five U.S. presidents have dreamed of, 

and what the current Mexican president 

desperately desires.

The economics of North America are 

multifaceted and well developed. The three 

main nations (Canada, the United States, and 

Mexico) run vastly different models. 

Canada has a small population with 

immense natural resources and high 

productivity. It has a low home 

consumption and depends on foreign trade 

more than any other developed country on 

0

200

400

20002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013

BILLIONS OF US DOLLARS

US IMPORTS vs EXPORTS 

with 

CANADA and MEXICO

Source: US Census Bureau

Canada Exports Canada Imports

Mexico Exports Mexico Imports

Campaigning Fall 2014 72
the continent. The United States has a vast 

internal market and the highest per capita 

consumption of goods in the world, and it 

depends mainly on internal trade over 

external trade (approximately three-quarters 

internal to one-quarter external). 

Mexico and Central America, by contrast, 

still have large sections of subsistence level 

populations.25 There are three main 

economic efforts in North America:

NAFTA, the Caribbean Community and 

Common Market (CARICOM), and the 

Central American Common Market 

(CACM).

26 Mexico is involved in all three 

of these arrangements. NAFTA itself 

comprises more than US$17T and is the 

largest trading bloc in the world. Mexico is 

the number three trading partner of the 

United States while the United States is the 

largest trade partner of Mexico. In 2013, 

Mexico did US$280.5B in imports and 

US$226.1B in exports, roughly 84% and 

75% respectively of US-Canada numbers.27 

This intra-continental economic flow is vital 

to all three nations and must be protected. 

The status of Mexico as an economic power 

is rising. NORAD would help Mexico 

secure and protect that economic 

relationship already in place. Adding 

Mexico to NORAD would help integrate 

more instruments of national power to a 

synergistic effect.

It will not be a simple task of placing the 

Mexican flag on the NORAD patch and 

claiming victory. Integrating Mexico into a 

North American defense structure will be 

difficult. First, there is no menacing Soviet 

threat to focus efforts. While Mexico is a 

member of the G20, it is not a member of

NATO. 

Second, turning NORAD into a trilateral 

agreement may have a negative impact on 

US-Canada relations, signaling to the 

Canadian government that the United States

does not need Canada as much as in the past. 

The United States and Canada believe that 

they have a special arrangement. Adding 

Mexico would make that arrangement less 

special. 

Finally, the political, military and economic 

structures and processes of Mexico are not 

as well developed as the United States or 

Canada. The Mexican Air Force would 

have very little effect on NORAD’s 

capabilities, and the United States would 

bear the brunt of the financial burden to get 

Mexico “up to speed” in aerospace warning 

and control.28 Mexico cannot discount the 

pressure of U.S. hegemony on its security 

posture and operations should it join in an 

alliance. 

Comparing 2014 Mexico to 1958 Canada 

leads to the conclusion that NORAD is right 

for Mexico. The cartel threat is as real to 

Mexico as the Soviet threat was to Canada. 

The United States’ mainland was the Soviet

objective, and to achieve their objective they 

had to go through Canada. Similarly, the 

drug cartels’ objectives are also in the 

United States, and they have to get through 

Mexico to achieve their objectives. Today, 

the interrelated economics within the region 

require greater security. The Mexican Air 

Force is not properly equipped (to Western 

standards) similar to the Royal Canadian Air 

Force’s inability to cover the massive 

Canadian territory and need for early 

Campaigning Fall 2014 73
warning and modernization in the 1960s. 

The Mexican economy cannot support the 

internal development of a modern and 

technologically advanced military, similar to 

the Canadian Force’s acquisition of U.S. 

weapons and aircraft. 

Conclusion 

Many look at NORAD as a physical

organization. It has people, buildings and 

budgets. There is a commander and there 

are colored patches to wear on military 

uniforms. However, there is more to it than 

just the physical elements. There is also the 

agreement of NORAD that has evolved over 

time and through threats and domains. 

However, the best way to look at NORAD is 

as an enabling force to greater political ends. 

Defense agreements, like war itself, are 

established and maintained for political 

gains. 

The NORAD brand represents much more 

than NORAD’s focused missions. NORAD 

brings benefit to the United States through 

partnering and cooperation, and has become 

a model for defense and security agreements 

that all Combatant Commanders desire in 

their AORs. NORAD is most beneficial to 

Canada, creating a security umbrella over its 

vast territory that it could not protect on its 

own, and providing access to cutting edge 

military technology and intelligence data. 

As evidenced by frequent citation in the 

speeches of national leaders, the NORAD 

agreement represents the best of military 

cooperation. Lessons drawn from 

the NORAD experience can apply in other 

AORs where partnering is vital to security 

and defense. A comparison between the 

Canada of NORAD’s inception and the 

Mexico of today is a valuable tool to 

determine the advantages of Mexican 

involvement in NORAD. Mexico’s ongoing 

struggle against the cartels highlights a 

definite and immediate need for increased 

security cooperation. Aiding Mexico is in 

the national interest of both the United 

States and Canada. 

NAFTA created and strengthened the 

economic ties that bind North America, and 

NORAD is strengthened by and strengthens 

those economic ties. To take NORAD to 

that next level, expanding into other 

domains, namely cyber with the addition of 

a cyber-warning mission, and growth to 

include Mexican participation should be 

pursued. The threat to North America 

certainly has changed—it’s not focused 

primarily on Soviet bombers anymore. 

Rather, new threats to North America are 

growing across multiple domains. North 

American defense requires more partners 

and greater domain authority to protect 

North America fully. 

Team Biographies 

Major Christopher J. Buckley, USAF (BS, 

Westminster College; MS, Columbia University; MS, 

USAF Test Pilot School). Major Buckley is currently 

serving as Strike Advisor to CDR USNORTHCOM 

at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colorado. 

He was commissioned in 2000 through the USAF 

Officer”s Training School at Maxwell AFB, AL. He 

is a Master Navigator with more 2,500 hours in 40 

different aircraft including five overseas combat 

deployments. Prior to his current assignment, Major 

Buckley was the Director of Operations for the 412th 

Flight Test Squadron at Edwards AFB, CA.

Lieutenant Commander Sebastian J. Kielpinski, SC, 

USN (BS, Campbell University, MBA, Duke 

University). Lieutenant Commander Kielpinski is 

currently serving as Supply Officer, Fleet Logistics 

Support Wing, Fort Worth, TX. He was 

Campaigning Fall 2014 74
commissioned in 1999 through the USN Officer 

Candidate School at Pensacola, FL. He is a U.S. 

Navy Supply Officer specializing in Acquisitions and 

in Supply Chain Management, serving on multiple 

naval platforms and completing two joint tours at 

NATO and Defense Logistics Agency. Prior to his 

current assignment, Lieutenant Commander 

Kielpinski served as the ISAF Budget Officer, Joint 

Force Command, Brunssum, Netherlands.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Walsh II, USAF (BA, 

University of Texas-Arlington; MA, Webster 

University; MS, Air Command and Staff College). 

Lieutenant Colonel Walsh is currently serving as 

Branch Chief, Joint Officer Management on the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, Washington D.C. He 

was commissioned in 1994 through the Reserve 

Officer Training Corps. He is a Personnel Officer 

who has served at the flight, squadron, Air Force 

headquarters and joint staff level, including two 

overseas deployments. Prior to his current 

assignment, Lieutenant Colonel Walsh served as the 

Commander, 55th Force Support Squadron at Offutt 

AFB NE.

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Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 

1945-1960. Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force 

History, 1991.

2 "A Brief History of NORAD." NORAD History. 

December 2012. 

http://www.norad.mil/Portals/29/Documents/History/

A%20Brief%20History%20of%20NORAD.pdf 

(accessed February 4, 2014).

3 Department of Defense. "QDR Execution 

Roadmap: Building Partner Capacity." Washington 

DC: Department of Defense, May 22, 2006.

4 "A Brief History of NORAD."

5 Miles, Donna. "US, Canada Think Ahead to 

“NORAD Next.”" US Department of Defense. 

January 7, 2013. 

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=1

18926 (accessed February 14, 2014).

6 "A Brief History of NORAD."

7 Jacoby, Charles H. NORAD and USNORTHCOM 

Theater Strategy. Theater Strategy, Colorado 

Springs: NORAD, 2011.

8 Ibid. 

9 Government of Canada. Canadian Joint Operations 

Command. January 21, 2014. 

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-orgstructure/canadian-joint-operations-command.page 

(accessed February 4, 2014).

10 —. "The Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship." 

National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces. 

November 22, 2013. 

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=th

e-canada-u-s-defence-relationship/hob7hd8s 

(accessed February 4, 2014).

11 Crosby, Ann Denholm. "A Middle-Power Military 

in Alliance: Canada and NORAD." Journal of Peace 

Research, February 1, 1997: 37-52.

12 BBC. "BBC World Service Poll." Globe Scan. 

2013. 

http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressrelea

ses/bbc2013_country_ratings/2013_country_rating_p

oll_bbc_globescan.pdf (accessed February 4, 2014).

13 Perras, Galen Roger. "Who Will Defend British 

Columbia? Unity of Command on the West Coast, 

1934-1942." Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 1997: 59-

69

14 Gabriel, Daniel. "U.S.-Canada Perimeter Security 

and an Integrated North American Command." Be 

Your Own Leader. June 7, 2011. 

http://beyourownleader.blogspot.ca/2011/06/perimete

r-security-and-integrated-north.html (accessed 

February 4, 2014).

15 Crosby, Ann Denholm.: 37-52.

16 Ibid.

17 US Census Bureau. US Trade in Goods with 

Canada. http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c1220.html#2012 (accessed February 

14, 2014).

18 Jacoby, Charles H.

19 “A Brief History of NORAD”

20 Jacoby, Charles H.

21 Carafano, James Jay, Jena Baker McNeill, Ray 

Walser, and Richard Weitz. "Expand NORAD to 

Improve Security in North America." The Heritage 

Foundation. July 27, 2010. 

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/exp

and-norad-to-improve-security-in-north-america 

(accessed February 4, 2014).

22 Lawson, Thomas J. "NORAD-Ever Evolving, 

Forever Relevant." Canadian Military Journal. May 

16, 2012. 

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol12/no3/page5-

eng.asp (accessed February 14, 2014).

 

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 75
23 Encyclopedia Britannica. North America. 2014. 

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/418612/

North-America (accessed February 25, 2014).

24 Carafano, McNeill, et.al.

25 Encyclopedia Britannica

26 UCSC. "Regional Trade Blocs." University of 

California-Santa Cruz. June 5, 2011. 

http://ucatlas.ucsc.edu/trade/subtheme_trade_blocs.p

hp (accessed February 25, 2014).

27 US Census Bureau

28 Carafano, McNeill, et.al

 

Campaigning Fall 2014 76
Campaigning is a Joint Forces Staff College journal designed as a forum for students, faculty, 

and senior fellows to provide the broader joint professional military education community 

insights into the application of joint warfighting principles through critical analysis and strategic 

thinking on current and future operations at the operational level of war. 

 

Prospective Campaigning authors are asked to note the following submission guidelines: 

• As a general rule, manuscripts of articles should be between 1500 to 3500 words in length, including endnotes. 

• All manuscripts will be unclassified.

• Manuscripts should be written in Times New Roman font, 12-pitch, and with 1 inch margins.

• Manuscripts must include a cover page with author’s (or authors’) name(s) and abstract (200 words or less).

• Manuscripts must be submitted in electronic format, on disc or by e-mail, in MS Word. E-mail address: 

mccauleyd@ndu.edu.

• Manuscripts should be accompanied by appropriate graphs, charts, photographs, maps or other illustrations which 

illuminate the context of the article. All images including photos and maps should be sent electronically or on a disc 

in high resolution as a JPEG file or other well-known formats for image reproduction. 

• Manuscripts should conform to Turabian academic style with endnotes rather than footnotes. Endnotes should be 

embedded and not attached. Separate bibliographies are undesired. All bibliographic material is to be contained in 

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• Acronyms and military abbreviations must be written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the 

abbreviated form in brackets. Military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.

• All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one short paragraph maximum) biographical sketch of the 

author(s), which includes current position and e-mail address. 

• All manuscripts normally will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, 

who will make recommendations to the Editor as to suitability for publication. Manuscripts will be judged on the 

originality and quality of the argument or discussion, the relevance and timeliness of the topic, and on quality of the 

writing style. Unless otherwise agreed upon, Campaigning insists upon right of first publication of any given 

submission.

• All manuscripts selected for publication in Campaigning must go through a security and policy review process. 

JFSC will provide the necessary coordination with the NDU Northern Campus for Pentagon Security and Policy 

review.

• In general, the mentoring of manuscripts will not be done—authors are responsible for the quality of the content, 

adherence to academic standards, and adherence to the format requirements listed above. The Editor reserves the 

right to make minor editorial suggestions for style, grammar and length, but will not make editorial changes which 

affect the integrity of the argument or discussion without reference to the author. 

• Campaigning will acknowledge manuscript submission within 10 days. If you have not received confirmation of 

receipt in that time, please contact the editorial staff at mccauleyd@ndu.edu. Authors will be notified of manuscript 

acceptance or declination. 

Campaigning Fall 2014 77
JFSC Vision

The flagship institution for educating national security professionals involved in planning and 

execution of joint operations. 

JFSC Mission

Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency 

operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, 

attitudes, and perspectives. 

Joint Forces Staff College

7800 Hampton Blvd

Norfolk, VA 23511

Campaigning Fall 2014 78