alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43880

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JACOB FREDERICK POOL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 646

Filed: August 18, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of four years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of two years, for killing/wasting a trophy mule deer during a closed season, 

affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Jacob Frederick Pool pled guilty to killing/wasting a trophy mule deer during a closed 

season, Idaho Code §§ 36-105(3)(c), -202(h)(1), -1401(c)(3), -1402(e)(5), -1404(a). The district 

court imposed a unified four year sentence, with two years determinate, and retained jurisdiction. 

In addition, the district court suspended Pool’s Idaho hunting license for his lifetime. Pool

appeals, contending that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Pool’s judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7281

GEORGE EARL PERRY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

BETSY DAVIS BEAMER, Secretary of the Commonwealth,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District

Judge. (CA-96-265)

Submitted: October 17, 1996 Decided: October 25, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George Earl Perry, Appellant Pro Se. James Walter Hopper, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Perry v. Beamer, No. CA-96-265 (E.D. Va. July 26, 1996). We

deny Appellant's motion for oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 25, 2018

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 18 -00570- CV

RUBIE BUCHALA, Appellant

V. ROBERT JOHNSON, JR. AND AUSTIN COUNTY, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Austin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 16CV-5395

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This appeal is from a judgment signed June 7, 2018. No clerk’s record has been filed. The clerk responsible for preparing the record in this appeal informed the court appellant did not make arrangements to pay for the record.
On September 11, 2018, notification was transmitted to all parties of the court’s intention to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless, within fifteen2

days, appellant paid or made arrangements to pay for the record and provided this court with proof of payment. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b).
Appellant has not provided this court with proof of payment for the record. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and Brown.
1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-20-00234-CR

__________________

MATTHEW LYLE ADDISON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 258th District Court

Polk County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2018-0011

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 3, 2020, the trial court convicted Matthew Lyle Addison of 

driving while intoxicated and sentenced Addison to confinement in the Polk County 

Jail for 10 days. In his appeal brief, Addison argued in part that his right to due 

process had been violated because a mental evaluation was necessary and ordered 

by the trial court but never completed. On August 10, 2022, we abated the appeal

and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to determine the feasibility 

of a retrospective competency evaluation. 
2

On April 26, 2023, the State filed an unopposed motion to reinstate the 

appeal, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court. The 

State informs the Court that the defendant is unable to cooperate with a competency

evaluation and it is in the interest of justice to dismiss the case.

“The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial asks whether the 

defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him.” Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 

689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “A criminal defendant who is incompetent may not be 

put to trial without violating due process.” Id. at 688. Depending upon the quality 

and quantity of the evidence available, in most cases a retrospective competency 

inquiry may be conducted consistent with the requirements of due process. See

Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). When a retrospective 

competency hearing is not feasible, however, the appropriate disposition of the 

appeal is to reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction and to remand the case 

for a new trial. See Greene v. State, 264 S.W.3d 271, 273 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2008, pet. ref’d). 

The State contends a retrospective competency evaluation is not feasible and 

asks this Court to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court so that 

the trial court may dismiss the case. Addison has not opposed the State’s motion. 
3

Accordingly, we reinstate the appeal, grant the State’s motion, vacate the judgment 

of conviction, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings as justice 

requires. 

VACATED AND REMANDED.

_________________________

JAY WRIGHT

 Justice

Submitted on April 8, 2022

Opinion Delivered May 24, 2023

Do Not Publish

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.
#### KODAK v. STATE.

No. 22282.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 18, 1942.

Marvin Beaty and H. R. Bishop, both of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAU CPIAMP, Judge.

Gus Kodak was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of ten years for robbery with firearms.

We find four bills of exception in the record which, in our view, present no error and a discussion of them is not given for the reason that they are in question and answer form without a certificate of the trial judge to the effect that it was necessary to give the questions and answers as is provided by statute. Vernon’s Ann.C.C. P. Art. 667, note 24, Vol. 2.

We find no exceptions to the court’s charge and the only question raised in the motion for a new trial is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. This will be the only matter considered.

It appears that on January 27, *1933,*while O. H. Simpson was engaged in his office in making a settlement with another party, two people entered the room and robbed him of $125. A pistol was used and Simpson was shot through the mouth, the bullet landing in his neck. The evidence submitted details the crime of robbery by firearms, as charged. It appears that appellant escaped and was located about eight years later in New York City, where he claims to have lived all of the time. He admitted his presence in Fort Worth a short while prior to the robbery. Fie had been discharged from the State penitentiary and went to Fort Worth to see a woman with whom he had been corresponding and he claims to have lived with her for the few days he was there. Soon after arriving, he met another party whom he had known in prison. This individual was apprehended soon after the robbery, was tried and convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for his participation in it with Kodak. Appellant contends that he left Fort Worth for New York to be with his brother and arrived there on January 15, 1933. He denies the charge against him and denies he was in Fort Worth at the time. Mr. Simpson went to New York with the officers, found the appellant in prison and brought him back to Texas. He identified the accused from the witness stand as the robber. A number of other witnesses were called who contradicted the appellant’s claim of an alibi. One of these witnesses testified that he loaned appellant $5 on a pistol the morning after the robbery of Simpson. The pistol was recovered by the officers and identified as being the one which the robbers took away from Simpson when he attempted to defend himself with it. This evidence connects him directly with the robbery and sustains Simpson’s identification of him. Appellant presented no evi*909dence to corroborate his claim of an alibi. All essential facts necessary to connect appellant with the offense were offered by the State and it was the province of the jury to determine all fact issues. The evidence amply justified the jury’s verdict.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
# C_2009036EN.01S00301.xml

| 13.2.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 36/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.2.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 36/s3

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NOTE TO THE READER

NOTE TO THE READER

The institutions have decided no longer to quote in their texts the last amendment to cited acts.

Unless otherwise indicated, references to acts in the texts published here are to the version of those acts currently in force.

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|Puerto Rico Number of Operable Refineries as of January 1 (Number of Elements)
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|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
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|1980's                                                                                                                            |        |        | 4      | 4      | 3      | 0      | 3      | 3      | 3      | 2     
|1990's                                                                                                                            | 3      | 5      | 5      | 4      | 4      | 3      | NA     | 2      | NA     | 2     
|2000's                                                                                                                            | 3      | 3      | 3      | 2      | 2      | 2      | 1      | 1      | 1      | 1     
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0     
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
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|Release Date: 6/14/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: June 2025
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JANICE LIND,

Petitioner :

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:

:

: No. 436 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 4th day of February, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

MADISON A. NEWELL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS 

HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER 

WILLED BODY PROGRAM,

Defendant.

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§

§

§

Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00938-O

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Judgment is issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). 

This action came on for consideration by the Court, and the issues having been duly 

considered and a decision duly rendered,

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 

1. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. The taxable costs of court, as calculated by the clerk of court, shall be borne by the party 

incurring the same. 

3. The clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Judgment to the parties.

SO ORDERED this 14th day of July, 2023. 

Case 4:22-cv-00938-O Document 23 Filed 07/14/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 95
# FILED December 30, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON DECEMBER 1997 SESSION

MARK LEE TYRE, ) ) APPELLANT, ) ) No. 02-C-01-9702-CC-0 0057 ) ) Lake County v. ) ) J. Steven Staf ford, Judge ) ) (Habeas Corpus) BILLY COMPTON, WARDEN, ) ) APPELLEE. )
FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Mark Lee Tyre, Pro Se John Knox Walkup Lake County Reception Cor rectional Facility Attorney General & Repor ter Route 1, Box 330 500 Charlotte Avenue Tiptonville, TN 38079 Nashville, TN 37243-0497 Elizabeth T. Ryan Assistant Attorney Gener al 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 C. Phillip Bivens District Attorney General P. O. Drawer E Dyersburg, TN 38024

OPINION FILED:_______________________________ AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO R ULE 20 Joe B. Jones, Pre siding Judge2 

## O P I N I O N
The appellant, Mark Lee Tyre (petitioner), appeals as of right from a judg ment ofhe trial court summarily dismissing his action for habeas corpus relief. The

trial court held the petitioner

is not entitledto habeas corpus relief because his sentences have not expi red, and the judgments entered in his case are not void upon the face of the judgment s. The petitioner

contends he is entitled to mai ntain an action for habeas corpu s to conte st the validity of the indictments based uponthis court’s decision in State v. Roger Dale Hill, Sr. , Wayne County

No. 01-C-01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 20, 1996). He argues the two counts of the indictment in question failed to set forth the requisite mens rea . It has long been established that the remedy of habea s corpus is limited in scope as well as relief. Archer v. State , 8 51 S.W.2d 157, 161-62 (Tenn. 1993); Passarel la v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per . app . denied (Tenn. 1994). In criminal cases, the remedy is available if (a) the judgment is void or (b) the sentence has expired. Passarella , 891 S.W.2d at 626. If the petition fails to establish one of these groundsfor relief,the trial court may dismiss the action wi

thout an evidentiary hear ing. Passarella , 891 S.W.2d at 827. In this case, the grounds for relief are cognizable in apost-convictionaction, not an action for habe as corpus . Theref ore, the trial cour t properl y summari ly dismissed the action for post-conviction for relief. Given these circumstances, this court is of the opinion the judgment

of the trial court should be affir med pursuant toRule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

__________ ________________

_____________

_ JOE B. JONES, PRESIDI NG JUDGE CONCUR:

______________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, J UDGE

______________________________________ CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 25, 2013

s1118

Order 

Clerk

November 25, 2013

147495

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147495

COA: 315569

Kalkaska CC: 08-002967-FC

LESTER VANDENBOSCH,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 12, 2013 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion 

for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
# C_2013026EN.01003801.xml

| 26.1.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 26/38 |
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26.1.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 26/38

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Action brought on 26 November 2012 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-538/12)

2013/C 26/71

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by P. Hetsch, A. Tokár and D. Kukovec, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative measures necessary to transpose Directive 2009/81/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC (2) and 2004/18/EC, (3) or in any case by failing to notify the Commission of those measures, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under those directives; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative measures necessary to transpose Directive 2009/81/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC (2) and 2004/18/EC, (3) or in any case by failing to notify the Commission of those measures, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under those directives;

1

2

3

| — | order the Republic of Slovenia, pursuant to Article 260(3) TFEU, to make a daily penalty payment of EUR 7 038,72, calculated from the day on which judgment shall be given in these proceedings; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Republic of Slovenia, pursuant to Article 260(3) TFEU, to make a daily penalty payment of EUR 7 038,72, calculated from the day on which judgment shall be given in these proceedings;

| — | order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period prescribed for transposition of the directive expired on 21 August 2011.

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(1)  OJ 2009 L 216, p. 76.

1

(2)  OJ 2004 L 134, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114.

3

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Mark Whitburn

Case 3:22-cv-01789-N Document 1-1 Filed 08/15/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 10
Case 3:22-cv-01789-N Document 1-1 Filed 08/15/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 11