*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstancesset forth in 5THCIR.R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50476

(Summary Calendar)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES PAUL QUINLAN,

also known as Joe Quentin,

also known as Jim Quinlan,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-96-CR-79-ALL-DB

July 14, 1998

Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Following his conviction and sentence for various offenses involving child pornography, James

Paul Quinlan appeals the district court’s partial denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. Quinlan

contends that the search warrant, as drafted and executed, constituted an illegal general warrant and

that, as a result, all evidence seized during the December 15, 1995 search of his home should have
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been suppressed. Quinlan further argues that the search cannot be justified on the alternative ground

that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.

This court reviewsthe district court’sfindings offact on a motion to suppress evidence seized

pursuant to a search warrant for clear error and its ultimate determination of reasonableness under

the Fourth Amendment de novo. United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1994). Quinlan

urges that the warrant lacked the required specificity to meet the Fourth Amendments’s requirement

of particularity with regard to the itemsto be seized. See U.S. Const. Amendment IV. “The Fourth

Amendment prohibits issuance of general warrants allowing officials to burrow through a person’s

possessionslooking for any evidence of a crime.” United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 727 (5th

Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1547 (1996). A warrant must particularly describe the place to

be searched and the things to be seized. Id. This court has underscored that the test requires a court

to determine if the description in the warrant would permit an executing officer to reasonably know

what items are to be seized. United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing

Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503-04, 45 S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757). 

The district court in the instant case specificallyfound that PostalInspector Sheila Ryan’ssixpage affidavit was made part of the warrant by express language on the face of the warrant. The

district court further concluded that, if anything, the warrant wastoo narrowly drawn. We disagree.

Our review of the warrant indicates that it fails the Fourth Amendment’s particularity test because,

although there was a supporting affidavit which provided specific information regarding the items to

be seized, the warrant does not incorporate the affidavit by express language. See Beaumont, 972

F.2d at 561. 

The warrant in the instant matter contains a generalstatement that “property that constitutes
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evidence of the commission of a criminal offense and/or contraband, the fruits of a crime, and/or

things criminallypossessed” maybe seized. The Beaumont court held that “where a warrant contains

only the barest of generalized statements the particularity requirement is satisfied by reliance on an

affidavit when the affidavit is incorporated by reference into the warrant.” 972 F.2d at 561. The

particular warrant at issue in this case indicates that an affidavit was submitted by Ryan and that the

magistrate judge who approved the warrant accepted the affidavit as evidence of probable cause. The

warrant does not, however, reference the affidavit in any way as a restriction on the items subject to

the search warrant. Moreover, it does not impliedly incorporate the affidavit since the affidavit was

not even attached to it at the time it was executed.

Nevertheless, the admissibility of the evidence seized at Quinlan’s residence may be upheld

on the alternative ground that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule appliesin the instant

case. See, e.g., United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 845-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

433 (1997); Beaumont, 972 F.2d at 562;see also Matter ofJones, 966 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1992)

(this court can affirm on any ground supported by the record). An officer may rely on the validity

of a warrant so long as the warrant is supported by more than a “bare bones” affidavit. See United

States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1997). Because the parties do not contest the

inspectors’ belief that the warrant was valid, the issue is “ ‘whether there was an objectively

reasonable basis for the [inspectors’] mistaken belief.’ ” Beaumont, 972 F.2d at 562 (quoting

Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3428, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)). The

government points out that the executing inspectorstestified that they had reviewed Ryan’s affidavit

as well as its attachment—which listed with specificity the items to be seized from Quinlan’s

residence—prior to the search. Inspectors Ryan and Ross specifically stated that they were guided
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in their search by the items listed in the attachment. When questioned about why he seized certain

items, Inspector Sifuentes testified that he felt the items fell within the purview of the affidavit and

its attachments. 

Because the instant case is virtually identical to Shugart and Beaumont, we follow the

reasoning set forth in those opinions. A probable cause determination was made by the magistrate

judge; Ryan’s affidavit provided specific information of the objects of the search; Ryan was the

executing officer as well as the affiant; the other inspectors had reviewed the affidavit and the

attachment and knew that the items to be seized were enumerated therein; and the warrant easily

could have been made valid by the insertion ofthe phrase “see attached affidavit” along with attaching

the affidavit to the warrant. See Shugart, 117 F.3d at 845-46; Beaumont, 972 F.2d at 562. Under

the facts of this case, the officers’ good-faith reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable.

See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). The goodfaith exception therefore applies in the instant case to uphold the admissibility of the evidence seized

as a result of the December 15, 1995 search of Quinlan’sresidence. Accordingly, the district court’s

order partially denying Quinlan’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.