# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 2 6, 2019 *

Decided February 26 , 2019

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN , C ircuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER , Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE , Circuit Judge

No. 18

- 24 3 8

JEANINE L. JACKSON, Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.
PITNEY BOWES, INC., et al. , Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 18

- C

- 0769

Lynn Adelman , Judge

.

O R D E R

After she was fired from her job for argu ing with a co

- worker, Jeanine Jackson sued her former employer and three of its employees for wrongful discharge and other
state

- law tort s . The district court correctly ruled that it lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction over this suit, so we affirm the judgment

.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(A)

. The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not participating in this appeal. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 18

- 2438 Page 2

Jackson principally alleges that Pitney Bowes fired her , a temporary employee, for having a workplace argument , but retain ed two permanent employees involved in a similar dispute. She also alleges that the company created a hostile environment for temporary workers , retaliated against her because she threaten ed to sue it for negligen t supervision , a nd harmed her through its negligen ce

. The district court dismissed the suit at screening for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction

. S ee 28 U.S.C. § 19 15A

. On appeal, Jackson’s brief does not engage with the district court’s analysis or otherwise argu e why the court erred. Although we could dismiss the appeal on this basi s alone , see F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28 (a) , we have reviewed the substance of the complaint and conclude that federal subject

- matter jurisdiction is indeed lacking

. Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Jackson purports to invoke only federal

- question jurisdiction

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But th e complaint does not present a federal questio n under § 1981 or any other federal employment

- discrimination statute

. To state a question under federal law for race discrimination , a plaintiff need o nly allege “I was turned down for a job because of my race. ” Bennett v. Schmidt , 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998). Jackson does not allege that any defendant treated her differently , or with hostility, because of her race, or , for that matter , any other protected category like sex, religion , or age, see 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 2000e

- 2; 29 U.S.C. § 623, or that a defendant retaliated against her f or protesting such discrimination, s ee 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 3(a).

The district court might have considered allowing Jackson to amend her complaint if doing so could hav e corrected this defect. See Luevano v. Wal

- Mart Stores, Inc. , 722 F.3d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 2013)

. But an amendment would have be en futile. Jackson alleges that the defendants discriminated against her because she was a temporary worker and because she threatened to sue Pitney Bowes for negligence. As the district court correctly noted : “T emporary employment is not a protected class , and threatening to [sue] for negligence is not protected activity ” under any federal law.

Lacking federal jurisdiction, th e district court correctly dismissed Jackson’s
state

- law claims without prejudice

. A district court has no discretion to retain supplemental state

- la w claims when no basis for original federal jurisdiction exists

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ; Rivera v. Allstate Ins. C o. , 913 F.3d 603 , 617

– 18 (7th Cir. 2018) , as amended on pet

. for reh ’ g (Jan. 14, 2019)

.

AFFIRMED