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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

BLACKHAWK MANUFACTURING 

GROUP INC. d/b/a 80 Percent Arms,

 Intervenor-Plaintiff,

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED, and

THE SECOND AMENDMENT 

FOUNDATION, INC.

 Intervenors-Plaintiffs,

v.

MERRICK GARLAND, in his Official 

Capacity as Attorney General of the United 

States, et al.,

 Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00691-O

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED AND THE 

SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC.’S

COMPLAINT

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1. Defense Distributed and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. challenge the 

federal government’s new regulatory definition of “firearm,” Definition of “Frame or Receiver” 

and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (Exhibit A) (hereinafter the 

new Final Rule), which illegally expands that keystone term of criminal law far beyond both its 

statutory and constitutional borders. The new regulatory definition of “firearm” is unprecedented. 

It uses supposedly delegated power to deem illegal for the first time ever vast swaths of traditional

Second Amendment conduct that Congress itself did not and could not choose to make illegal.

2. The new Final Rule contradicts the statute it is supposed to be administering. 

Congress in the Gun Control Act defined “firearm” to include a weapon’s actually finished “frame

or receiver.” Yet the new Final Rule expands the definition to criminalize (1) unfinished frames 

and receivers—i.e., non-frame and non-receiver articles that may become a frame or receiver if 

additional processes sufficiently alter their material constitution, and (2) frame and receiver “part 

kits”—i.e., kits of non-frame and non-receiver articles that may become a frame or receiver if 

additional processes sufficiently alter its material constitution. Both expansions contradict the Gun 

Control Act’s “firearm” definition, which plainly understands that an unfinished frame or receiver 

is not an actual frame or receiver and that a part kit to make a frame or receiver is also not an actual 

frame or receiver. Such obvious statutory overreaches violate the Administrative Procedure Act.

3. The new Final Rule also violates the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to 

perform the inquiries mandated by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111

(2022). To comply with the Second Amendment, the promulgating agencies needed to jettison 

balancing tests and consider only whether their regulation is “consistent with this Nation's 

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2126-32. Yet because that did not happen—itself 

a key APA violation—it is no surprise that the new Final Rule tramples true historical traditions.

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4. More fundamentally, the new Final Rule is an exercise of Legislative power that 

Congress did not in fact and could not have constitutionally delegated to the agencies at issue. 

Because the task of defining the Gun Control Act’s “firearm” term has vast economic and political 

significance, a valid delegation of that power would have to have been (1) articulated clearly, and 

(2) accompanied by intelligible principles for its exercise. But because Congress did not clearly

articulate a delegation of the power to define the Gun Control Act’s “firearm” term, no such 

delegation occurred in fact. The major questions doctrine establishes this. See, e.g., West Virginia 

v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). And because Congress did not accompany any such delegation 

with intelligible principles for its exercise, the separation of powers would not permit it. The 

nondelegation doctrine establishes this. See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022).

5. For these and other reasons, the federal government’s new regulatory definition of 

“firearm” should be held unlawful and set aside. Relief is especially critical for the instant 

plaintiffs, Defense Distributed and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., who but for the new 

Final Rule would be exercising their Second Amendment rights by engaging in the conduct that 

these Agencies have illegally criminalized. The resulting harms are concrete, particularized, and 

in many respects irreparable.

6. For years, Defense Distributed’s entire business model has depended on its ability

to deal in items that are not “firearms” under Gun Control Act itself and not “firearms” under prior 

regulations, but that are defined for the first time ever as “firearms” by the new Final Rule. The 

new Final Rule cuts a foundation of Defense Distributed’s business model out from under it, 

sweeping away critical revenues, saddling it with massive new compliance costs, causing service 

provider disruptions, and damaging Defense Distributed’s reputation and goodwill in the business 

community. These harms are largely irreparable and very probably existential.

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7. The Second Amendment Foundation’s members are suffering massive irreparable 

harms as well. Despite having a well-established constitutional right to manufacture their own 

firearm for self-defense at home, the new Final Rule stops SAF members from acquiring from 

firms like Defense Distributed the “unfinished” frames and receivers and/or frame and receiver 

“parts kits” that SAF members reasonably need to exercise their Second Amendment rights.

I. Parties

A. Defense Distributed

8. Plaintiff Defense Distributed is a private business corporation with headquarters 

and a principal place of business in Austin, Texas. Cody Wilson founded Defense Distributed and 

serves as Defense Distributed’s Director. 

9. Defense Distributed is the first private defense contractor in service of the general 

public. Since 2012’s Wiki Weapon project, Defense Distributed has defined the state of the art in 

small scale, digital, personal gunsmithing technology. 

10. Defense Distributed does business nationwide and in this district. Defense 

Distributed is a SAF member and a member of the Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc.

B. Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.

11. Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. (“SAF”) is a non-profit membership 

organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington. SAF’s principal place of 

business is in Bellevue, Washington. It is governed by a board of directors and has members 

nationwide and in this district. 

12. SAF promotes the right to keep and bear arms by supporting education, research, 

publications, and legal efforts about the Constitution’s right to privately own and possess firearms 

and the consequences of gun control.

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13. SAF brings this action on behalf of itself. SAF also brings this action on behalf of 

its members because at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his own right, the 

interests the suit seeks to vindicate are germane to SAF’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted 

nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 

C. Defendants

14. Defendant Merrick Garland is the Attorney General of the United States and the 

head of the United States Department of Justice. 

15. Defendant United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is an agency of the United 

States that administers and enforces the principal federal gun control statutes and, in particular, the 

National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968. 

16. Defendant Steven Dettelbach is the Chief Law Enforcement Officer and Acting 

Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. 

17. Defendant Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) is an 

agency of the United States that administers and enforces the principal federal gun control statutes, 

including the National Firearms Act of 1934 and Gun Control Act of 1968.

18. This complaint refers to the Defendants collectively as “the Agencies.”

II. Jurisdiction

19. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 supplies the Court with original federal question jurisdiction over 

this action because it arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The action so 

arises because it seeks declaratory, injunctive, and other relief pursuant to the Constitution of the 

United States of America, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706, the All Writs 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.

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20. An active, justiciable controversy exists amongst the parties about whether the 

Justice Department’s promulgation of the “Frame or Receiver” Rule, Definition of “Frame or 

Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (herein the new 

Final Rule), complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking requirements, 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 551-559, and the United States Constitution’s Second and Fifth Amendments. Declaratory 

relief would resolve this controversy and eliminate the burden imposed on Plaintiff stemming 

therefrom. 

III. Venue

21. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(e)(1)(B) and (C). A 

substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims occurred in this district. A substantial part 

of the property that is the subject of the action is situated in this district. Defense Distributed has 

engaged in several business transactions in this district and SAF members reside in this district.

IV. Facts

A. The Agencies illegally expanded “firearm” statutes to cover non-firearms.

22. “Firearm” is one of American criminal law’s most impactful statutory keystones. 

By exercising it “legislative Powers,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, Congress used the term “firearm” to 

create a litany of criminal and civil proscriptions that impact millions of Americans every day. 

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ch. 44 (“Firearms”). It is a crime for many Americans to possess a “firearm.” 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g). It is a crime for many Americans to transport or receive a “firearm.” 18 

U.S.C. § 923(a)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 923(a)(3). It is a crime for many Americans to manufacture a 

“firearm” at all, 18 U.S.C. § 923(a)(1)(A), and a crime for many other Americans to manufacture 

a “firearm” without a serial number, 18 U.S.C. § 923(i).

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23. Congress gave “firearm” its keystone definition in the Gun Control Act of 1968. 

The statute defines “firearm” to mean “(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is 

designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the 

frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any 

destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm.” 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(2). 

Congress never defined the “firearm” term’s constituent phrase “frame or receiver.”

24. To administer and enforce the Gun Control Act (and other statutes), Congress 

created within the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF). 26 U.S.C. § 599A(a)(1). Congress headed ATF with a Director that answers 

to the Attorney General. 26 U.S.C. § 599A(a)(1). DOJ, ATF, and those two administrative 

officials are this action’s Defendants and collectively referred to herein as the “Agencies.”

25. Without Congressional action, the Agencies redefined the statutory term “firearm” 

on several key occasions, using a variety of administrative procedures. The two most important 

redefinitions occurred via Agency administrative regulations promulgated in 1978 and 2022. 

1. 1978 Rule.

26. In 1978, the Agencies promulgated a rule that redefined the Gun Control Act’s 

“firearm” term by redefining the constituent phrase “frame or receiver.” Title and Definition 

Changes, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,531, 13,537 (Mar. 31, 1978) (formerly codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 

(2020)) (hereinafter the 1978 Rule). The 1978 Rule defined “frame or receiver” to mean “[t]hat 

part of a firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing 

mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel.” Id.

27. Under the 1978 Rule, the Agencies took the position that “items such as receiver 

blanks, ‘castings’ or ‘machined bodies’ in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid 

and un-machined have not reached the ‘stage of manufacture’ which would result in the 

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classification of a firearm according to the GCA.” The Agencies announced this position in an 

ATF publication titled “Are “80%” or “unfinished” receivers illegal?” that was last reviewed by 

the Agencies on April 6, 2020 and appeared online at https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/are-

%E2%80%9C80%E2%80%9D-or-%E2%80%9Cunfinished%E2%80%9D-receivers-illegal until 

at least December 23, 2022. A true and correct copy of this publication is attached to the complaint 

as Exhibit B.

28. Under the 1978 Rule, the Agencies also took the position that the Gun Control Act 

“does not impose restrictions on receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a ‘firearm.” The 

Agencies announced this position in an ATF publication titled “Are there restrictions on who can 

purchase receiver blanks?” that was last reviewed by the Agencies on June 24, 2020 and appeared 

online at https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/are-there-restrictions-who-can-purchase-receiverblanks until at least November 1, 2022. A true and correct copy of this ATF publication is attached 

to the complaint as Exhibit C.

2. The new Final Rule

29. In August 2022, the Agencies issued a new regulation that redefined the Gun 

Control Act’s “firearm” term by redefining the constituent phrase “frame or receiver.” Definition 

of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) 

(codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 447, 478, and 479). This is referred to as the new Final Rule. The new 

Final Rule redefines “frame or receiver” in several material ways.

30. The new Final Rule deletes the 1978 regulation’s general definition of “frame or 

receiver” and replaces it with new and separate definitions of “frame” and “receiver.” 27 C.F.R. 

§ 478.12(a) (codifying 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,735). The “frame” and “receiver” definitions operate 

generally, subject to exceptional provisions appearing later in the regulation. Id. (“Except as 

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otherwise provided in this section, the term “frame or receiver” means the following....). These 

redefinitions are codified in 27 C.F.R. § 478.12 at subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).

31. The new Final Rule also supplies a four-part set of specifying provisions about a 

“partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver.” These specifications are 

codified in 27 C.F.R. § 478.12 at subsection (c).

a. 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(a)(1) “Frame” redefinition

32. The new Final Rule generally defines “frame” to mean “the part of a handgun, or 

variants thereof, that provides housing or a structure for the primary energized component 

designed to hold back the hammer, striker, bolt, or similar component prior to initiation of the 

firing sequence (i.e., sear or equivalent), even if pins or other attachments are required to connect 

such component to the housing or structure.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,735. 

33. The new general “frame” definition is codified as 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(a):

§ 478.12 Definition of Frame or Receiver.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term “frame or receiver” 

means the following—

(1) The term “frame” means the part of a handgun, or variants thereof, 

that provides housing or a structure for the component (i.e., sear or 

equivalent) designed to hold back the hammer, striker, bolt, or 

similar primary energized component prior to initiation of the firing 

sequence, even if pins or other attachments are required to connect 

such component (i.e., sear or equivalent) to the housing or structure.

27 C.F.R. § 478.12(a)(1).

b. 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(a)(2) “Receiver” redefinition

34. The new Final Rule generally defines “receiver” to mean “the part of a rifle, 

shotgun, or projectile weapon other than a handgun, or variants thereof, that provides housing or 

a structure for the primary component designed to block or seal the breech prior to initiation of the 

firing sequence (i.e., bolt, breechblock, or equivalent), even if pins or other attachments are 

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required to connect such component to the housing or structure.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,735. The 

new general “receiver” definition is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(a)(2):

§ 478.12 Definition of Frame or Receiver.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term “frame or receiver” 

means the following—

. . .

(2) The term “receiver” means the part of a rifle, shotgun, or projectile 

weapon other than a handgun, or variants thereof, that provides 

housing or a structure for the primary component designed to block 

or seal the breech prior to initiation of the firing sequence (i.e., bolt, 

breechblock, or equivalent), even if pins or other attachments are 

required to connect such component to the housing or structure.

27 C.F.R. § 478.12(a)(2).

c. 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) “Partially complete, disassembled, or 

nonfunctional frame or receiver” specifications

35. After giving general “frame” and “receiver” definitions, the new Final Rule gives 

definitional specifications about a “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or 

receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. Specifically, the rule delivers three definitional specifications: 

(1) inclusions and exclusions, (2) a consideration authority, and (3) nonexclusive examples. 

i. The definitional inclusion and inclusion.

36. The first definitional specifications for a “partially complete, disassembled, or 

nonfunctional frame or receiver” are inclusions and exclusions. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. This part 

of the specification says that the terms “frame” and “receiver” “shall include a partially complete, 

disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, including a frame or receiver parts kit, that is 

designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function 

as a frame or receiver, i.e., to house or provide a structure for the primary energized component of 

a handgun, breech blocking or sealing component of a projectile weapon other than a handgun, or 

internal sound reduction component of a firearm muffler or firearm silencer, as the case may be,”

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and that those same terms “shall not include a forging, casting, printing, extrusion, unmachined 

body, or similar article that has not yet reached a stage of manufacture where it is clearly 

identifiable as an unfinished component part of a weapon (e.g., unformed block of metal, liquid 

polymer, or other raw material).” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. The definitional inclusions and 

exclusions are codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c):

§ 478.12 Definition of Frame or Receiver.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term “frame or receiver” 

means the following—

. . .

(c) Partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver. 

The terms “frame” and “receiver” shall include a partially complete, 

disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, including a frame or 

receiver parts kit, that is designed to or may readily be completed, 

assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or 

receiver, i.e., to house or provide a structure for the primary energized 

component of a handgun, breech blocking or sealing component of a 

projectile weapon other than a handgun, or internal sound reduction 

component of a firearm muffler or firearm silencer, as the case may be. The 

terms shall not include a forging, casting, printing, extrusion, unmachined 

body, or similar article that has not yet reached a stage of manufacture 

where it is clearly identifiable as an unfinished component part of a weapon 

(e.g., unformed block of metal, liquid polymer, or other raw material).

27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

37. The new Final Rule defines “readily” as “[a] process, action, or physical state that 

is fairly or reasonably efficient, quick, and easy, but not necessarily the most efficient, speediest, 

or easiest process, action, or physical state,” and says that, “[w]ith respect to the classification of 

firearms, factors relevant in making this determination include the following: (1) Time, i.e., how 

long it takes to finish the process; (2) Ease, i.e., how difficult it is to do so; (3) Expertise, i.e., what 

knowledge and skills are required; (4) Equipment, i.e., what tools are required; (5) Parts 

availability, i.e., whether additional parts are required, and how easily they can be obtained; (6) 

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Expense, i.e., how much it costs; (7) Scope, i.e., the extent to which the subject of the process must 

be changed to finish it; and (8) Feasibility, i.e., whether the process would damage or destroy the 

subject of the process, or cause it to malfunction.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

ii. The consideration authority.

38. The second definitional specification for a “partially complete, disassembled, or 

nonfunctional frame or receiver” is the consideration authority. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. This part 

of the specification says that, “[w]hen issuing a classification, the Director may consider any 

associated templates, jigs, molds, equipment, tools, instructions, guides, or marketing materials 

that are sold, distributed, or possessed with the item or kit, or otherwise made available by the 

seller or distributor of the item or kit to the purchaser or recipient of the item or kit.” 87 Fed. Reg. 

at 24,739. The consideration authority is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c):

§ 478.12 Definition of Frame or Receiver.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term “frame or receiver” 

means the following—

. . .

(c) Partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver. 

. . . When issuing a classification, the Director may consider any associated 

templates, jigs, molds, equipment, tools, instructions, guides, or marketing 

materials that are sold, distributed, or possessed with the item or kit, or 

otherwise made available by the seller or distributor of the item or kit to the 

purchaser or recipient of the item or kit..

27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

iii. The nonexclusive examples.

39. The third definitional specification for a “partially complete, disassembled, or 

nonfunctional frame or receiver” gives five nonexclusive examples of what is and is not a “frame” 

or “receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. It is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

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40. Example 1 says that a “frame or receiver parts kit containing a partially complete 

or disassembled billet or blank of a frame or receiver that is sold, distributed, or possessed with a 

compatible jig or template is a frame or receiver, as a person with online instructions and common 

hand tools may readily complete or assemble the frame or receiver parts to function as a frame or 

receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. It is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

41. Example 2 says that a “partially complete billet or blank of a frame or receiver 

with one or more template holes drilled or indexed in the correct location is a frame or receiver, as 

a person with common hand tools may readily complete the billet or blank to function as a frame 

or receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. It is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

42. Example 3 says that a “complete frame or receiver of a weapon that has been 

disassembled, damaged, split, or cut into pieces, but not destroyed in accordance with paragraph 

(e), is a frame or receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. It is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

43. Example 4 says that a “billet or blank of an AR-15 variant receiver without critical 

interior areas having been indexed, machined, or formed that is not sold, distributed, or possessed 

with instructions, jigs, templates, equipment, or tools such that it may readily be completed is not 

a receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. It is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

44. Example 5 says that a “flat blank of an AK variant receiver without laser cuts or 

indexing that is not sold, distributed, or possessed with instructions, jigs, templates, equipment, or 

tools is not a receiver, as a person cannot readily fold the flat to provide housing or a structure for 

the primary component designed to block or seal the breech prior to initiation of the firing 

sequence.”87 Fed. Reg. at 24,739. It is codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

B. The new Final Rule harms Defense Distributed.

45. The new Final Rule harms Defense Distributed directly, substantially, and 

irreparably. Until the Agencies promulgated the new Final Rule, Defense Distributed did business 

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by substantially dealing in (manufacturing, selling, delivering, shipping, transporting, and 

receiving) articles that (1) are not “firearms” within the ordinary meaning of the Gun Control Act, 

(2) are not “firearms” as the 1978 Rule defines that term, but (3) are defined for the first time ever 

as “firearms” by the new Final Rule. Solely because of the Agencies’ new Final Rule, Defense 

Distributed ceased the business of dealing in (manufacturing, selling, delivering, shipping, 

transporting, and receiving) articles that (1) are not “firearms” within the ordinary meaning of the 

Gun Control Act, (2) are not “firearms” as the 1978 Rule defines that term, but (3) are defined for 

the first time ever as “firearms” by the new Final Rule.

1. Unfinished frames and receivers

46. An “unfinished” frame is not a frame. An “unfinished” receiver is not a receiver. 

By definition, an “unfinished” frame is a non-frame article that may become a frame if and only if

additional processes sufficiently alter its material constitution; and by definition, an “unfinished” 

receiver is a non-receiver article that may become a receiver if and only if additional processes 

sufficiently alter its material constitution. These definitions of “unfinished” frame and

“unfinished” receiver accord with American common usage in the twenty and twenty-first 

centuries. Unfinished frames and receivers are also known colloquially as “80%” frames and 

receivers, frame and receiver “blanks,” and frame and receiver “castings.”

47. Until the Agencies promulgated the new Final Rule, Defense Distributed regularly 

engaged in substantial amounts of all of following activities without complying with the federal 

laws that apply to Gun Control Act “firearms”:

a. Dealing in unfinished receivers

b. Selling unfinished receivers

c. Delivering, shipping, transporting, and receiving unfinished receivers

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48. The new Final Rule harms Defense Distributed directly, substantially, and 

irreparably by redefining the statute’s “firearm” term to include, for the first time ever, unfinished 

receivers and unfinished frames. It does so with the definitional specifications for a “partially 

complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver” at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). There lie 

several clauses that operate both independently and conjunctively to make the statutory term 

“firearm” cover unfinished frames:

a. “Partially complete”: The regulation defines unfinished receivers as 

“firearms” by providing that the “terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ shall include 

a partially complete. . . frame or receiver . . . that is designed to or may 

readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to 

function as a frame or receiver. . . .” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). 

b. “Disassembled”: The regulation defines unfinished receivers as “firearms” 

by providing that the “terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ shall include a . . . 

disassembled . . . frame or receiver . . . that is designed to or may readily 

be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a 

frame or receiver. . . .” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). 

c. “Nonfunctional”: The regulation defines unfinished receivers as “firearms” 

by providing that the “terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ shall include a . . . 

.nonfunctional frame or receiver . . . that is designed to or may readily be 

completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a 

frame or receiver . . . .” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). 

49. Solely because the Agencies promulgated the new Final Rule, Defense Distributed 

ceased engaged in the following conduct:

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a. Dealing in unfinished receivers

b. Selling unfinished receivers

c. Delivering, shipping, transporting, and receiving unfinished receivers

50. In this respect, the Agencies’ promulgation of the new Final Rule thereby harmed 

Defense Distributed in the following ways:

a. Lost profits: The new Final Rule harmed Defense Distributed by causing a 

complete cessation of certain lines of business that deprived Defense 

Distributed of over one hundred thousand dollars in revenues to date.

b. Service discontinuation. The new Final Rule harmed Defense Distributed 

by causing a substantial business interruption—service providers ceased 

doing business with Defense Distributed—that cost Defense Distributed 

tens of thousands of dollars to remedy.

c. Attorney’s Fees. The new Final Rule harmed Defense Distributed by 

forcing Defense Distributed to pay for legal services necessary to ensure 

compliance with the changed “firearm” definition.

2. Part kits

51. A frame “part kit” is not a frame. A receiver “part kit” is not a receiver. By 

definition, a frame “part kit” is a kit of non-frame articles that may become a frame if and only if

additional processes sufficiently alter its material constitution; and by definition, a receiver “part 

kit” is a kit of non-receiver articles that may become a receiver if and only if additional processes 

sufficiently alter its material constitution. These definitions of frame “part kit” and receiver “part 

kit” accord with American common usage in the twenty and twenty-first centuries. Frame and 

receiver “part kits” are another variety of “unfinished” frames and receivers

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52. Until the Agencies promulgated the new Final Rule, Defense Distributed regularly 

engaged in substantial amounts of all of following activities without complying with the federal 

laws that apply to Gun Control Act “firearms”:

a. Dealing in frame and receiver parts kits

b. Manufacturing frame and receiver parts kits

c. Selling frame and receiver parts kits

d. Delivering, shipping, transporting, and receiving frame and receiver parts 

kits

53. The new Final Rule harms Defense Distributed directly, substantially, and 

irreparably by redefining the statute’s “firearm” term to include, for the first time ever, firearm 

parts kits. It does so in the definitional specifications for a “partially complete, disassembled, or 

nonfunctional frame or receiver” at 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). There the regulation defines frame and 

receiver parts kits as “firearms” by providing that a “a frame or receiver parts kit” can constitute 

“a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver,” which the regulation

already says the “terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ shall include.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). 

54. Solely because the Agencies promulgated the new Final Rule, Defense Distributed 

ceased engaged in the following conduct:

a. Dealing in frame and receiver parts kits

b. Manufacturing frame and receiver parts kits

c. Selling frame and receiver parts kits

d. Delivering, shipping, transporting, and receiving frame and receiver parts 

kits

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55. In this respect, the Agencies’ promulgation of the new Final Rule thereby harmed 

Defense Distributed in the following ways:

a. Lost profits: The new Final Rule harmed Defense Distributed by causing a 

complete cessation of certain lines of business that deprived Defense 

Distributed of over one hundred thousand dollars in revenues to date.

b. Service discontinuation. The new Final Rule harmed Defense Distributed 

by causing a substantial business interruption—service providers ceased 

doing business with Defense Distributed—that cost Defense Distributed 

tens of thousands of dollars to remedy.

c. Attorney’s Fees. The new Final Rule harmed Defense Distributed by 

forcing Defense Distributed to pay for legal services necessary to ensure 

compliance with the changed “firearm” definition.

3. Irreparable harm

56. The new Final Rule irreparably harms Defense Distributed by causing the financial 

injuries listed about in amounts that are very, very substantial. 

87 The new Final Rule irreparably harms Defense Distributed by damaging Defense 

Distributed’s reputation and goodwill in its business community. Amongst Defense Distributed’s 

customer base, the new Final Rule causes both substantial confusion about product identities and 

an erroneous fear of criminal liability—both of which result in losses of income, as well as good 

will and reputation, that can never be fully recovered. 

57. The new Final Rule irreparably harms Defense Distributed by infringing Defense 

Distributed’s constitutional rights, including the Second Amendment right to keep and bear Arms 

and the Fifth Amendment Due Process right to be free from unconstitutionally vague criminal 

proscriptions.

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58. The new Final Rule irreparably harms Defense Distributed by forcing Defense 

Distributed to incur compliance costs that will never be recovered.

59. The new Final Rule irreparably harms Defense Distributed by inflicting so much 

monetary harm as to threaten Defense Distributed’s existence. If not stopped, the Agencies’ 

promulgation of the new Final Rule will likely cause an income deprivation so severe that Defense 

Distributed discontinues the business of dealing in non-firearm frame and receiver items. Even if 

a federal firearms license were maintained, Defense Distributed cannot avoid the existential risks 

because most of its business involves the interstate shipment of articles directly to purchasers, 

which if considered “firearms” are not allowed even with an FFL. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2). 

60. Effective vindication of Defense Distributed’s rights requires that the Agencies be 

enjoined from enforcing the new Final Rule against both Defense Distributed itself and Defense 

Distributed’s customers, whose concern over civil and criminal penalties must be alleviated to 

provide Defense Distributed the relief it is due.

C. The new Final Rule harms SAF’s members. 

61. The new Final Rule directly, substantially, and irreparably harms SAF members 

that (a) legally own at least one firearm purchased from a federal firearms licensee, (b) reasonably 

desire to manufacture their own firearm for lawful self-defense at home by, inter alia, acquiring 

from firms like Defense Distributed articles defined for the first time ever as “firearms” by the new 

Final Rule, and (c) would do so imminently if not for the new Final Rule’s promulgation. 

62. Because of the new Final Rule, SAF members can no longer commercially

purchase, possess, or otherwise acquire from firms like Defense Distributed the articles defined 

for the first time ever as “firearms” by the new Final Rule—e.g.,, “unfinished” frames and 

receivers and frame and receiver “parts kits”—that SAF members would use to manufacture their 

own firearms for self-defense at home. Furthermore, the New Final Rule’s vagueness exerts a

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chilling effect on SAF members, who cannot reasonably determine what the law deems punishable 

and cannot reasonably determine how it will be administered.

63. It is no answer to say that SAF members might pay slightly more to acquire the 

articles in question from federal firearms licensees in compliance with the new Final Rule. Such 

a requirement is legally unconstitutional, since under Bruen there is no historical tradition of 

imposing such licensing schemes. And such a requirement is factually impracticable, since the 

new Final Rule’s onerous regime makes it uneconomical for a sufficient number of licensees to 

deal in “unfinished” frames and receivers and/or frame and receiver “parts kits.” Furthermore, the 

costs of complying with these unjustifiable extra acquisition steps (e.g., FFL transfer fees) are 

themselves harms that the law deems irreparable. 

V. Causes of Action 

A. Count One: APA § 706(2)(A), (C)—Statutory Contradiction

64. Defense Distributed & SAF incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

65. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), as well as “in excess 

of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

66. By promulgating the new Final Rule, the Agencies committed a final agency action 

that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” § 

706(2)(A), as well as “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 

statutory right,” § 706(2)(C), because the new regulatory “firearm” definition is inconsistent with 

the statute at issue. Instead of further defining “firearm” in accordance with the Gun Control Act, 

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the New Rule redefines “firearm” in contradiction of the Gun Control Act. It does so in at least 

two respects:

a. First, in 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c), the new Final Rule exceeds the statute by 

defining the terms “frame” and “receiver” to include a “partially complete, 

disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver.” That exceeds the statute 

because the Gun Control Act defines “frame” and “receiver” to mean an 

actual “frame” and “receiver”; it does not let “frame” be defined to mean 

an unfinished non-frame article that may become a frame if and only if

additional processes sufficiently alter its material constitution; and it does 

not let “receiver” be defined to mean an “unfinished” non-receiver article 

that may become a receiver if and only if additional processes sufficiently 

alter its material constitution. Nor does it let the statute cover what used to 

be an actual “frame” or “receiver” but is no more due to disassembly.

b. Second, in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, the new Final Rule exceeds the statute by 

defining the terms “frame” and “receiver” to include a “weapon parts kit.” 

That too exceeds the statute because the Gun Control Act defines “frame” 

and “receiver” to mean an actual “frame” and “receiver”; it does not let 

“frame” be defined as a kit of non-frame articles that may become a frame 

if and only if additional processes sufficiently alter its material constitution; 

and it does not let a “receiver” be defined as a kit of non-receiver articles 

that may become a receiver if and only if additional processes sufficiently 

alter its material constitution. 

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B. Count Two: APA § 706(2)(A)—Failure to consider

67. Defense Distributed & SAF incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

68. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

69. By promulgating the new Final Rule, the Agencies committed a final agency action 

that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” § 

706(2)(A), because the Agencies failed to consider all of the relevant factors and data. Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“the 

agency must examine” “relevant factors” and “relevant data”). In particular, the Agencies 

promulgated this rule without considering the Second Amendment factors and data made relevant

by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022). Under Bruen, the 

Agencies had to strictly (without means-ends scrutiny) consider whether “the regulation is 

consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2126-32. Yet no 

such legally-correct inquiry occurred. The Agencies did not consider whether the new Final Rule 

“addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century,” and if so only 

whether there is a “lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem.” Id. 

Nor did the Agencies consider whether “earlier generations addressed the societal problem,” and 

if so only whether they “did so through materially different means.” Id. The Agencies instead 

infected their Second Amendment analysis with the presumptions of legality and means-ends 

scrutiny that Bruen invalidates. Compare 87 Fed. Reg. 24,676-24,677 (relying on “compelling 

governmental interests” and “presumptively lawful regulatory measures”), with Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 

at 2126 (“Heller and McDonald do not support applying means-end scrutiny in the Second 

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Amendment context. Instead, the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation 

is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.”).

C. Count Three: APA § 706(2)(A), (C)—Delegation

70. Defense Distributed & SAF incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

71. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), as well as “in excess 

of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

72. No delegation in fact: By promulgating the new Final Rule, the Agencies 

committed a final agency action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law,” § 706(2)(A), as well as “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 

or limitations, or short of statutory right,” § 706(2)(C), because the “major questions” doctrine

shows that Congress did not in fact delegate to these Agencies the task of further defining the Gun 

Control Act’s “firearm” term. See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). Congress must 

“speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of ‘vast economic and political 

significance.’” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324, (2014). The task of defining the 

Gun Control Act’s “firearm” term is a decision of vast economic and political significance. Yet 

no statute clearly delegates it. The supposed delegation therefore did not occur in fact.

73. Unconstitutional delegation: By promulgating the new Final Rule, the Agencies 

committed a final agency action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law,” § 706(2)(A), as well as “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 

or limitations, or short of statutory right,” § 706(2)(C), because the nondelegation doctrine stopped

Congress from delegating the task of further defining the Gun Control Act’s “firearm” term to the 

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Agencies. See Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446, 461 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The two questions we must 

address, then, are (1) whether Congress has delegated power to the agency that would be legislative 

power but-for an intelligible principle to guide its use and, if it has, (2) whether it has provided an 

intelligible principle such that the agency exercises only executive power.”). The power at issue—

the power to define the Gun Control Act’s keystone “firearm” term”— would be legislative power 

but-for an intelligible principle to guide its use. Yet Congress did not, in Gun Control Act’s 

“firearm” definition or anywhere else, supply the Agencies with an “intelligible principle” to guide 

that definitional power’s use. As such, Congress’s supposed delegation to the Agencies’ of a 

power to further define the Gun Control Act’s “firearm” term is unconstitutional.

D. Count Four: APA § 706(2)(A), (C)—Change of position

74. Defense Distributed & SAF incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

75. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), as well as “in excess 

of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

76. Unexplained change of position: By promulgating the new Final Rule, the 

Agencies committed a final agency action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law,” § 706(2)(A), as well as “in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,” § 706(2)(C), because the New 

Rule commits major changes without adequate explanation. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 

Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) (“Unexplained inconsistency in agency policy is a reason for 

holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice.” In 

particular, even though the New Rule expressly repudiates the Agencies’ prior position taken in 

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multiple determinations, see 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,741 (“Prior determinations by the Director that a 

partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, including a parts kit, was 

not, or did not include, a “firearm frame or receiver” under § 478.11, or “frame or receiver” under 

§ 479.11, as those terms were defined prior to April 26, 2022, shall not continue to be valid or 

authoritative after that date.), no adequate explanation for that major change exists.

E. Count Five: APA § 706(2)(B)—Right to Keep and Bear Arms

77. Defense Distributed & SAF incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

78. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “contrary to constitutional right, 

power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 

79. The Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States forbids laws 

abridging the individual right to keep and bear Arms. 

80. By promulgating the 2022 “Frame and Receiver” Rule and thereby redefining the 

Gun Control Act’s keystone “firearm” term, the Agencies subjected Defense Distributed & SAF 

to an unconstitutional abridgement of Second Amendment rights. The Agencies’ new Final Rule

infringes the individual right to make and acquire Arms, which is part and parcel of the right to 

keep and bear Arms, and is inconsistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. 

As such, it is an unconstitutional abridgement of Second Amendment rights. See N.Y. State Rifle 

& Pistol Ass'n, v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022). 

F. Count Six: APA § 706(2)(B)—Due Process Clause

81. Defense Distributed & SAF incorporate the preceding paragraphs.

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82. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “contrary to constitutional right, 

power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 

83. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States forbids deprivations 

of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Clause’s vagueness doctrine is violated 

by criminal laws that either deny defendants fair notice of what is punishable or invite arbitrary 

enforcement by lack of standards. The 2022 “Frame and Receiver” Rule does both

84. The new Final Rule violates the vagueness prohibition by defining “frame” and 

“receiver” to include a “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, 

including a frame or receiver parts kit, that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, 

restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). Those 

inherently amorphous terms—especially “readily,” even as defined by 27 C.F.R. § 478.11—

present an unconstitutional level of vagueness that denies citizens fair notice of what is punishable.

85. The new Final Rule also violates the vagueness prohibition by defining “frame” 

and “receiver” to sometimes include “a forging, casting, printing, extrusion, unmachined body, or 

similar article,” depending on whether or not it has “reached a stage of manufacture where it is 

clearly identifiable as an unfinished component part of a weapon (e.g., unformed block of metal, 

liquid polymer, or other raw material).” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). Those inherently amorphous 

terms—especially “clearly identifiable”—present an unconstitutional level of vagueness that 

denies citizens fair notice of what is punishable.

86. The new Final Rule also violates the vagueness prohibition by providing that, 

“[w]hen issuing a classification, the Director may consider any associated templates, jigs, molds, 

equipment, tools, instructions, guides, or marketing materials that are sold, distributed, or 

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possessed with the item or kit, or otherwise made available by the seller or distributor of the item 

or kit to the purchaser or recipient of the item or kit.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c). Those inherently 

sweeping and standardless terms violate the vagueness doctrine by inviting arbitrary enforcement.

VI. Requests for Relief

87. Defense Distributed and SAF request a judgment in their favor as to all claims 

against the Agencies awarding them all relief they are entitled to.

88. Defense Distributed and SAF request a judgment holding Definition of “Frame or 

Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022), unlawful.

89. Defense Distributed and SAF request a judgment setting aside Definition of 

“Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022).

90. Defense Distributed and SAF request a judgment permanently enjoining the 

Agencies’ enforcement of Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 

Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022).

91. Defense Distributed requests a preliminary injunctions enjoining the Agencies’ 

enforcement of Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 

24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022), against Defense Distributed.

92. SAF requests preliminary injunction enjoining Agencies’ enforcement of 

Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 

2022), against SAF’s members.

93. Defense Distributed & SAF request a judgment against the Agencies that awards 

Defense Distributed & SAF their costs, including reasonable attorney fees.

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Respectfully submitted,

BECK REDDEN LLP

By /s/ Chad Flores

Chad Flores

cflores@beckredden.com

Texas Bar No. 24059759

Nicholas M. Bruno

nbruno@beckredden.com

Texas Bar No. 24097432

Zachary T. Nelson

znelson@beckredden.com

Texas Bar No. 24127240

1221 McKinney St., Suite 4500

Houston, Texas 77010-2010

Telephone: (713) 951-3700

Facsimile: (713) 951-3720

Counsel for Defense Distributed and

The Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of this submission was served on all counsel of record 

by the Court’s CM/ECF system in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on 

December 23, 2022.

/s/ Chad Flores

Chad Flores

Case 4:22-cv-00691-O Document 143 Filed 12/23/22 Page 29 of 29 PageID 2299