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The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: 

Channels and Implications for Policy

Arvind Krishnamurthy

Northwestern University and NBER

Annette Vissing-Jorgensen

Northwestern University, CEPR and NBER

Second Annual Roundtable on 

Treasury Markets and Debt Management 

November 15, 2012
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Objective:

Various QE policies have reduced a wide-spectrum of interest 

rates

 What are the channels through which QE affects rates?

Understanding channels is important:

 Evaluate the effectiveness of a given QE policy

 Conditions when policy may or may not work
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Summary:

Variants of policies:

 Purchase long-term Treasuries; Purchase Agency MBS

 Fund by selling short-term Treasuries, or increasing 

reserve balances

We find:

 Purchasing long-term Treasuries has limited benefit, and 

may even be detrimental

o “Moneyness” of Treasuries  Contracting money

 Purchasing Agency MBS lowers private borrowing rates

 Need to be careful in interpreting interest reductions 

because there are many channels at play.
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“Moneyness” of Treasuries

 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (Journal of Political Economy, 

2012): Evidence of a clientele-demand for safe/liquid long-term 

Treasuries (1925-2009) 
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Safety premium on bonds with near-zero default risk implies very 

steep relation between price and expected default rate near zero. 

Steeper with lower supply of Treasuries.

Default Probability

Price

CCAPM Value: Price = E[M * Risky Payoff]

Baa Rating
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QE decreases supply of long-term safe assets: 

Treasury and agency bonds (agency MBS has significant prepayment 

risk which means that it is unlikely to meet clientele safety demands)

Predictions:

i. QE involving Treasuries and agencies lowers the yields on 

very safe assets 

ii. But limited spillover: has no effects on lower-grade debt 

such as Baa bonds or bonds with prepayment risk such as 

MBS.

iii. Need to be careful in interpreting the fall in Treasury 

interest rates!

iv. Also need to be careful in evaluating welfare effects
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Event-study across QE announcement dates

QE1 purchase magnitudes and event dates:

1. November 25, 2008: Initial LSAP announcement

Buy up to $100B of agency debt, up to $500B of agency MBS

2. December 1, 2008: Bernanke speech

3. December 16, 2008: FOMC statement

4. January 28, 2009: FOMC statement 

Fed may expand agency and agency MBS purchases and is

evaluating Treasury purchases

5. March 18, 2009: FOMC statement

Increase agency purchases up to $200B, agency MBS up to 

$1.25T, and buy up to $300B of longer-term Treasuries.

Purchase of Long-Term Treasuries, Agencies, Agency-MBS
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QE2 purchase magnitudes and event dates:

1. August 10, 2010: FOMC statement

''the Committee will keep constant the Federal Reserve's 

holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting 

principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgagebacked securities in longer-term Treasury securities.''

Prior to this announcement, market expectations were that the 

Fed would let its MBS portfolio run off.

2. September 21, 2010: FOMC statement

''maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments''

“The Committee will continue to monitor the economic outlook 

and financial developments and is prepared to provide 

additional accommodation if needed to support the economic 

recovery [...]” (emphasis added)
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The “additional” was read by many market participants as 

indicating new stimulus by the Fed, and particularly an 

expansion of its purchases of long-term Treasuries (e.g.

Goldman Sachs commentary on 9/21/2010).

Purchase of Long-Term Treasuries only
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Changes in yields using event-study methodology:
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Channels for reductions in interest rates:

(1) “Signaling”: QE signals lowers expected future fed funds rate

Portfolio-balance channels:

(2) Duration risk premium

(3) Prepayment/mortgage specific risk

(4) Liquidity premium

(5) Moneyness/safety of Treasuries

In the interest of time, I will omit discussion of expected inflation 

effects, effects on inflation uncertainty, credit risk.
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(1)Signaling channel:

 QE announcements may have changed market expectations about 

future short rates (and 12/16/2008, 3/18/2009 statements 

mention keeping Fed funds rate low). 

 Prediction: QE signals lower future short rates. This affects all 

securities of similar duration the same.

 Approach 1 (upper bound): Look at changes in longest Fed Funds 

futures, assume they apply to all medium and long rates.

 Approach 2: Use schedule of Fed Funds futures to work out how 

much the Fed funds rate cycle shifted forward in time. Calculate 

implied effect on each maturity bond.
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Table 4. Federal Funds Futures Yield Changes

 Approach 1:

QE1, 2-day: 40 bps of decline at mat≥2 years due to signaling.

QE2, 1-day: 11 bps of decline at mat≥2 years due to signaling.
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Figure 3. Yield Curves from Fed Funds Futures, pre- and post QE1 

Event Days
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Figure 5. Yield Curves from Fed Funds Futures, pre- and post QE2 

Event Days
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 Approach 2: Forward shift in rate cycle

QE1: 6.3 months (evaluated from March 2010 point)

QE2: 3.2 months (evaluated from July 2012 point)

Implied change in rates: Expectations term for a T-year bond:

 [ 

] 

 

 

∫ 

 

 

 

 

Suppose that QE policy signals: Rate is going to be held at 

 

 for the next X months, and thereafter follow the path 

indicated by 

 

 

 (i.e. shift rate hike cycle later by X months). 

 [ 

] 

 

 

∫ 

 

 

 

 

 

Use 

 

 =4% for 10- and 30-year bonds

Use 

 

 =3.5% for 5-year bonds
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QE1 signaling effects:

35 bps for 5-yr bond, 20 bps for 10-yr bond, 7 bps for 30-yr bond

QE2 signaling effects using 3.2 months: 

18 bps for 5-yr bond, 12 bps for 10-yr bond, 4 bps for 30-yr bond

 Benchmark numbers to keep in mind:

QE1: 35 bps

QE2: 10 bps 
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(2) Duration risk premium channel:

 In QE, government is buying long-duration assets from private 

sector → Reduction in market price of duration risk. 

 Predictions:

i. QE decreases yields on all long-term nominal assets, 

including Treasuries, corporate bonds, and mortgages.

ii. The effects are larger effects for longer duration assets.

 Is there spillover? Pre-payment risk premium reduction affects 

long MBS more (not for QE2). 

 So use corporate bonds to isolate duration risk channel. Adjust 

yield changes for CDS changes (i.e. macro default risk changes) 

+signaling. 
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QE1: No evidence of duration risk premium effect

 No change in CDS-adj. yields of Baa and lower, beyond signaling

 Intermediate>Long for corporates

 Also, in other tables, 30 year>10 year for all types of bonds.
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QE2: No clear evidence of duration risk premium effect

 CDS-adj. yields of Baa and lower bonds down and MBS down by 

about the amount of the signaling effect

 Intermediate>Long
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(3) MBS prepayment risk premium channel:

 Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) present theory and 

evidence that mortgage prepayment risk carries a positive risk 

premium. 

 Requires pre-payment risk to be borne by subset of investors to get 

substantial effects (segmented MBS market).

 Predictions:

i. In QE1 MBS rates fall by more than the signaling effect

ii. In QE2, which does not involve MBS purchases, MBS rates 

fall only by the signaling effect. 
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QE1: Excess of 35bps (signaling) = prepayment risk effect

QE2: Prepayment risk premium channel is zero, as expected. Signaling

of 10bps fully accounts for effects.
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More on prepayment risk channel: 9/21/2011 GNMA 30yr
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Asset One-day change in Yield

1-year Treasury +2 basis points (bps)

3-year Treasury +7 bps

7-year Treasury -3 bps

10-year Treasury -7 bps

15-year MBS -7 bps

30-year MBS -23 bps

Source: Federal Reserve, Bloomberg (MBS is 

average of current coupon of GNMA, FNMA, 

FHLMC).
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9/13/2012: GNMA 30 year
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(4) Liquidity channel:

 QE involves purchasing long-term securities and paying by 

increasing reserve balances which are likely more liquid → 

Reduction in price premium of liquid assets (yield increase).

 Prediction: The liquidity effect raises yields on liquid assets
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QE1: Strong liquidity effect. Yields on Treasuries (more liquid) fall 

less than yields on agencies (less liquid). 10 yr Agency-Treasury 

spread falls 200-107=93 bps

QE2: No liquidity effect – but markets are much more liquid
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(5) Moneyness/safety of Treasuries

 QE decreases supply of long-term safe assets: Treasury and agency 

bonds (agency MBS has significant prepayment risk which means 

that it is unlikely to meet clientele safety demands)

 Predictions:

v. Safety-channel implies that QE involving Treasuries and 

agencies lowers the yields on very safe assets 

vi. Safety-channel has no effects on lower-grade debt such as 

Baa bonds or bonds with prepayment risk such as MBS.

Best place to isolate this effect: Agency bonds - these are affected 

by signaling, but not pre-payment risk (we tabulate non-callable 

agency bonds), or default (was taken over by govt. pre-QE1).
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Agency yield reduction due to safety effect (netting out signaling):

QE1:

At least 200 bps-35 bps=165 bps for the 10 yr agency

At least 150 bps-35 bps=115 bps for the 5 yr agency

QE2: 

At least 17 bps-12 bps=5 bps for the 10 yr agency

At least 17 bps-18 bps=-1 bps for the 5 yr agency

 Effect also for Treasuries, but these are also affected by 

liquidity issues (working in the opposite direction)

 QE1 evidence for corporate bonds also consistent with a safetyeffect for higher-grade corporate bonds. Aaa, Aa and A-rated 

bonds CDS-adjusted fall by about 75 bps, i.e. more than can be 

explained by signaling, and more than for lower-grade 

corporates.
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Summary:

Signaling channel: For all bonds

 QE1: 20-40 bps at the 10 yr horizon, 35-40 bps at 5 yr horizon

 QE2: 8-12 bps at the 10 yr horizon, 11-18 bps at 5 yr horizon

Duration risk premium channel: Doesn’t seem important

Pre-payment risk premium channel: For MBS

 QE1: At least 48 bps for the 15 yr MBS, 67 bps for the 30 yr MBS.

 QE2: Pre-payment risk premium channel is zero, as expected.

Moneyness/Safety channel: For agencies and Treasuries

 QE1: At least 165 bps for the 10 yrs, 115 bps for the 5 yrs

 QE2: At least 5 bps for the 10 yrs, 0 bps for the 5 yrs

Inflation channel: 

 QE1: 10-year expected inflation up 96-146 bps

 QE2: 10-year expected inflation up 5-16 bps
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Policy implications:

(1) It matters what you buy

 MBS purchases in QE1 crucial for lowering MBS rates and likely 

driver of lower corporate credit risk and thus corporate yields.

 We have examined other QE involving MBS and have found 

similar effects

 Treasuries-only QE in QE2 has disproportionate effect on 

Treasuries and agencies relative to MBS and corporates. 
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(2) Treasury effect may be detrimental

 We think the world is one where Treasury rates are low 

because of a global scarcity of safe assets

 Treasury rates are not true “riskless” benchmark rates; they 

are lower because of moneyness/safety demand

 Friedman rule

oSocial cost of money creation = 0 = opportunity cost

oProvide more of the scarce Treasuries

oLong-term Treasuries have high premia compared to 

Treasury bills

oOptimal policy is reverse of the Fed’s Treasury QE
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(3) Signaling played a non-negligible role

 So perhaps some of the QE effect may have been achievable 

through forward guidance, without balance sheet risk.