NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARCHIE OVERTON; S. PATRICK 

MENDEL, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16610 

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-02166-EMC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 6, 2020**

Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Archie Overton and S. Patrick Mendel appeal pro se the district court’s 

dismissal of their action under the Federal Motor Carrier Act and California law 

against members of the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”), Uber 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Technologies, Inc., and other defendants. We review de novo the district court’s 

dismissal for failure to state a claim, and we review the denial of leave to amend 

for an abuse of discretion. Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 945 F.3d 1225, 

1228 (9th Cir. 2019); Great Minds v. Office Depot, Inc., 945 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2019). We review de novo the district court’s rulings regarding constitutional 

standing. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. 

denied, 2020 WL 283288 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020) (No. 19-706). We affirm the district 

court’s judgment.

The district court correctly concluded that Overton and Mendel lacked 

Article III standing to seek invalidation of the CPUC’s licensing scheme for 

“transportation network companies,” or “TNCs,” as preempted by the Federal 

Motor Carrier Act. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Article III 

standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.”). First, appellants 

did not sufficiently allege an injury-in-fact in any imminent federal enforcement of 

Federal Motor Carrier Act registration requirements on Uber drivers such as 

themselves. Second, appellants did not show that any federal enforcement would 

be caused by the CPUC. Third, appellants did not plausibly allege that invalidation 

of the TNC statue would redress their alleged harm because, whether or not 

California administers a TNC program, the federal requirements would still exist.
3 

We affirm the district court’s conclusion that 49 U.S.C. § 49505, a Federal 

Motor Carrier Act prohibition against state collection of fees on interstate 

passenger transportation, does not preempt California’s assessment of “PUCTRA” 

fees on passenger carriers pursuant to Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 421, 431. See Cal. 

Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Azar, 940 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2019) (standard for express 

preemption); McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 776 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(standard for conflict preemption). PUCTRA fees are assessed only on intrastate 

transportation, and the Federal Motor Carrier Act applies only to interstate 

transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 13501; Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 424(b).

As to appellants’ claims against the Uber defendants, the district court 

properly held that appellants lacked standing, based on fear of federal prosecution 

or other theories, to allege that Uber was operating as a motor carrier under the 

Federal Motor Carrier Act without registration in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 14707. 

See Planned Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108. The district court also did not err in 

concluding, alternatively, that plaintiffs’ registration claim failed on its merits. 

Uber is not a “motor carrier” required to register under the Federal Motor Carrier 

Act because it does not own, rent, or lease vehicles. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 13102(14), 

13902(a). Further, assuming Uber is a “broker” under the Act, registration is 

required only for brokers for transportation of property, as opposed to 

transportation of passengers. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 13102(2) (defining broker), 
4 

13904(a) (registration requirement applies to “a broker for transportation of 

property”).

The district court properly dismissed Overton and Mendel’s state law claims 

against Uber for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, indemnification, violation 

of California’s Unfair Competition Law, and fraud. Insofar as these claims are

premised on the notion that Uber was operating without proper authority as a 

motor carrier or broker under federal law, they lack merit because appellants failed 

to state a claim that Uber violated the registration requirements of the Federal 

Motor Carrier Act. Insofar as the state law claims are premised on the notion that 

Uber was operating as a TNC or a “transportation charter-party carrier” (“TCP”) 

without proper authority under California law, the claims lack merit because, when 

the district court entered judgment, CPUC Decision 18-04-005, requiring Uber 

Technologies, Inc., to register as a TCP and TNC, was not yet final and nonappealable.

The district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the action 

without leave to amend. See Great Minds, 945 F.3d at 1112.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.