*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
TOWING AND RECOVERY PROFESSIONALS OF

CONNECTICUT, INC. v. DEPARTMENT

OF MOTOR VEHICLES ET AL.

(AC 43464)

Elgo, Alexander and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a towing company, appealed to the Superior Court from the

decision of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) granting certain towing and storage rate increases, which were generally less

than what the plaintiff requested in its petition filed pursuant to statute

(§ 14-66 (a) (2)). The plaintiff claimed that the final decision of the

commissioner was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

The court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal, from

which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:

1. The commissioner’s balancing of the relevant statutory and regulatory

factors was within the commissioner’s discretion and the exercise of

this discretion was not unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal; both § 14-66

(a) (2) and the regulation (§ 14-63-36a) governing tow and storage rates

included the word ‘‘may,’’ and provided the commissioner with the

discretion to consider and weigh certain factors as the commissioner

saw fit in order to achieve a just and reasonable result, and, if the

commissioner were required to weigh the factors in a particular manner,

the term ‘‘may’’ would effectively be rendered meaningless, depriving

the commissioner of the discretion vested in the commissioner by the

legislature; moreover, it was not for this court to substitute its own

judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the

evidence or questions of fact.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the commissioner’s decision

was not supported by substantial evidence in the record: in light of the

record and the considerable discretion granted to the commissioner,

and contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the commissioner did in fact

consider implementing a rate increase beyond the Consumer Price

Index; moreover, because the plaintiff merely challenged the manner

in which the commissioner weighed the facts, it asked this court to

retry the case and substitute its judgment for that of the commissioner,

which this court could not do as this court’s review was limited to a

determination of whether the conclusions drawn by the commissioner

from those facts were reasonable.

Argued April 20—officially released June 22, 2021

Procedural History

Administrative appeal from the decision of the named

defendant adjusting certain towing and storage rates

for motor vehicles, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court,

Cordani, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from

which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jesse A. Langer, with whom, on the brief, was Jeffrey

D. Bausch, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Drew S. Graham, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).

James J. Healy, for the appellee (defendant Insurance Association of Connecticut, Inc.).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. This appeal arises from a petition

for an adjustment of towing and storage rates that the

plaintiff, Towing & Recovery Professionals of Connecticut, Inc., filed with the named defendant, the Department of Motor Vehicles (department).1 After the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) granted

certain rate increases, the plaintiff filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court. The court dismissed

the plaintiff’s administrative appeal, and the plaintiff

now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history were found by the Superior Court: ‘‘On October

10, 2017, the plaintiff filed a petition with the commissioner for a declaratory ruling seeking a revision of the

rates established by the commissioner for nonconsensual towing and storage services within the state.2 On

December 6, 2017, the commissioner held a public hearing on the issue of the requested rate increase and

received evidence from the plaintiff and other interested parties. On March 6, 2018, the commissioner’s

hearing officer issued a decision granting certain rate

increases. The rate increases granted were generally

less than the increases requested by the plaintiff. Following the decision, the plaintiff filed a timely administrative appeal on April 23, 2018. Subsequently, on September 28, 2018, the parties requested that [the Superior

Court] remand the matter back to the commissioner for

further consideration. In accordance with the parties’

request, [the] court remanded the matter. On December

12, 2018, the commissioner held the remand hearing.

On February 15, 2019, the commissioner issued his final

decision where he maintained the rate increases provided for in the initial decision.’’ (Footnote added; footnote omitted.)

The plaintiff then brought a second administrative

appeal before the Superior Court, pursuant to General

Statutes § 14-66 (a),3 claiming that the final decision of

the commissioner was not supported by substantial

evidence in the record. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s administrative appeal, and this appeal followed.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

‘‘Our analysis begins with the appropriate standard of

review. [J]udicial review of the commissioner’s action

is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure

Act [(UAPA), General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189],

and the scope of that review is very restricted. . . .

[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires

a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the

agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or

substitute its own judgment for that of the administra-
tive agency on the weight of the evidence or questions

of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view

of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing

its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in

abuse of its discretion. . . .

‘‘The substantial evidence rule governs judicial

review of administrative fact-finding under the UAPA.

. . . An administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis

of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably

inferred. . . . The substantial evidence rule imposes

an important limitation on the power of the courts to

overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . .’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn.

333, 343, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).

The plaintiff presents four claims on appeal. The first

is that the court erred in affirming the legal interpretation of the commissioner that ‘‘[a] regulation is given

less weight than a statute when assessing a petition for

an increase in . . . towing and storage rates.’’ The second is that the court erred in affirming the legal interpretation of the commissioner that ‘‘the cost of a wrecker4

is only a factor if considered with the statutory factor

of [the Consumer Price Index (CPI)].’’ (Footnote

added.) The third is that the court erred in affirming

the decision of the commissioner because it was an

abuse of discretion for the commissioner ‘‘either [to]

ignor[e] . . . or improperly minimiz[e] operating costs

. . . as a factor because of the misconception that a

statutory factor trumps a regulatory factor,’’ and to

‘‘[ignore] undisputed expert evidence, which [was]

beyond [the commissioner’s] specialized knowledge.’’

The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court erred in

affirming the commissioner’s decision to limit the

increase to the CPI because this decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We note that the plaintiff at no point challenges the admissibility of any of

the evidence before the commissioner; it takes issue

only with the manner in which the commissioner

weighed the facts and evidence and applied the relevant

statutory and regulatory factors. Therefore, for ease

and clarity, we resolve the plaintiff’s four claims by

answering these two questions: (1) whether the commissioner’s balancing of the relevant statutory and regulatory factors was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an

abuse of discretion, and (2) whether the commissioner’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence in

the record.

I

The first question is whether the commissioner’s balancing of the relevant statutory and regulatory factors

was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of his

discretion. According to the plaintiff, the court erred

in affirming the commissioner’s legal interpretation
that, in the context of a petition for an adjustment to

towing and storage rates, a regulation is given less

weight than a statute, and that ‘‘the cost of a wrecker

is only a factor if considered with the statutory factor

of CPI.’’ The department counters that the commissioner had the discretion to weigh the statutory and

regulatory factors in determining what constitutes a

just and reasonable rate increase. We agree with the

department.

Section 14-66 (a) (2) provides in relevant part that,

‘‘[i]n establishing and amending . . . rates and

charges, the commissioner may consider factors,

including, but not limited to, the [CPI], rates set by

other jurisdictions, charges for towing and transporting

services provided pursuant to a contract with an automobile club or automobile association . . . and rates

published in standard service manuals. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Section 14-63-36a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part that

in determining what is just and reasonable, ‘‘[t]he commissioner may consider factors such as rates set by

other jurisdictions, towing services provided by contract with automobile clubs and associations, operating

costs of the towing and recovery industry in Connecticut, single source contracts resulting from competitive

bids on behalf of municipalities and business entities,

and rates published in standard service manuals. . . .’’

(Emphasis added.)

To support its position, the plaintiff relies on two

cases decided by our Supreme Court. The first is Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 302 Conn. 464, 474, 28 A.3d 958 (2011),

in which our Supreme Court held that ‘‘[i]t is a basic

tenet of statutory construction that the legislature

[does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . .

[I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is a

purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used

in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous.

. . . Because [e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is

presumed to have meaning . . . [a statute] must be

construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence

or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The second is Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc., 311 Conn. 581, 603, 89 A.3d 841

(2014), in which our Supreme Court held that ‘‘[a]dministrative regulations have the full force and effect of

statutory law and are interpreted using the same process as statutory construction . . . .’’ (Internal quotations marks omitted.) These cases, in fact, undermine

the plaintiff’s position.

According to the plaintiff, the manner in which the

commissioner weighed the relevant statutory and regulatory factors violated the rules of statutory and regulatory construction by rendering certain factors insignificant. The plaintiff further claims that the commissioner
failed to consider undisputed expert evidence, ‘‘presumably based on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutory and regulatory authorities.’’ Given the

inclusion of the word ‘‘may’’ in both the statute and state

regulation, however, the opposite is true. Our Supreme

Court has held that ‘‘the word [may, when used in a

statute or regulation] generally imports permissive conduct and the conferral of discretion.’’ Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 252

Conn. 115, 122, 742 A.2d 1257 (2000). Therefore, both

the statute and the state regulation provide the commissioner with the discretion to consider and weigh the

factors as the commissioner sees fit in order to achieve

a just and reasonable result. This grant of discretion

defeats the plaintiff’s claim in two ways.

First, our acceptance of the plaintiff’s argument

would actually result in the violation of the rules of

statutory and regulatory construction. This is true

because if we were to require the commissioner to

weigh the factors in a particular manner, we would

effectively render meaningless the term ‘‘may,’’ thereby

depriving the commissioner of the discretion that was

vested in the commissioner by the legislature. Second,

it is not the role of this court to ‘‘substitute its own

judgment for that of the administrative agency on the

weight of the evidence or questions of fact.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner

of Motor Vehicles, supra, 254 Conn. 343. This is especially true where, as here, the commissioner had clear

discretion in weighing the factors. Accordingly, we conclude that the commissioner’s balancing of the relevant

statutory and regulatory factors was clearly within the

commissioner’s discretion, and that the exercise of that

discretion was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or illegal.

II

We next consider whether the commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in the

record. According to the plaintiff, the court erred in

affirming the commissioner’s decision to limit the

increase to the CPI because this decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The department counters that the commissioner’s decision was supported by

substantial evidence, and that the rate increase was just

and reasonable. We agree with the department.

The plaintiff claims that ‘‘[t]he record unequivocally

demonstrates that the operating costs . . . associated

with a licensed wrecker service have increased substantially since the [last] [r]ate [i]ncrease. . . . Ultimately,

to be . . . ‘just and reasonable,’ the [commissioner]

must have incorporated wrecker costs (above and

beyond the CPI) into the nonconsensual towing and

storage rates.’’ The plaintiff again attacks the manner

in which the commissioner weighed the facts, without

challenging the facts themselves. This attack fails for

two reasons: first, because the commissioner did in fact
consider implementing a rate increase beyond the CPI,

and second, because, as established previously, ‘‘this

court . . . may [not] retry [a] case or substitute its own

judgment for that of the administrative agency on the

weight of the evidence or questions of fact.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner

of Motor Vehicles, supra, 254 Conn. 343. Because the

plaintiff merely challenges the manner in which the

commissioner weighed the facts, it is asking this court

to retry the case and substitute its judgment for that

of the commissioner. This we cannot do. See id. Our

review is limited to a determination of ‘‘whether the

conclusions drawn [by the commissioner] from those

facts are reasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In light of the record and the considerable

discretion granted to the commissioner, we reject the

plaintiff’s claim and conclude that the commissioner’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The Insurance Association of Connecticut, Inc., is also a defendant in

this action and adopted the brief of the department in this appeal. Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., was a defendant in the administrative appeal before

the Superior Court, but is not a party to this appeal.

2 The plaintiff filed the petition pursuant to General Statutes § 14-66 (a)

(2), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The commissioner shall establish and

publish a schedule of uniform rates and charges for the nonconsensual

towing and transporting of motor vehicles and for the storage of motor

vehicles which shall be just and reasonable. Upon petition . . . the commissioner shall reconsider the established rates and charges and shall amend

such rates and charges if the commissioner, after consideration of the [prescribed] factors . . . determines that such rates and charges are no longer

just and reasonable. . . .’’

3 General Statutes § 14-66 (a) (3) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

aggrieved by any action of the commissioner under the provisions of this

section may take an appeal therefrom in accordance with section 4-183

. . . .’’

General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person who

has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and

who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court . . . .’’

4 A ‘‘ ‘[w]recker’ ’’ is ‘‘a vehicle which is registered, designed, equipped

and used for the purposes of towing or transporting wrecked or disabled

motor vehicles for compensation or for related purposes by a person, firm

or corporation licensed in accordance with the provisions of . . . this chapter or a vehicle contracted for the consensual towing or transporting of one

or more motor vehicles to or from a place of sale, purchase, salvage or

repair.’’ General Statutes § 14-1 (109).