Filed 7/11/13 P. v. Miffin CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

ERIC W. MIFFIN, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B242671 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA390431) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Craig Richman, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. 

Matthews and Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 
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 Eric W. Miffin appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction 

by jury on three counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and one count of 

receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).)1

 On appeal, he challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the receiving stolen property count. He 

also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of his ability to 

pay attorney fees. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the stolen 

property count and that appellant forfeited his challenge to the imposition of 

attorney fees by failing to object in the trial court. We therefore affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Prosecution Evidence

Burglary Counts 

 Appellant’s fingerprints were found at the scene of the following three 

residential burglaries. 

 On November 30, 2010, around 8:00 p.m., Lilian Romero returned to her 

home in Los Angeles after a three-hour absence and found her front door and 

kitchen window open, broken furniture, and several missing items, including 

$5,200 cash, a coin collection, and jewelry. 

 On June 2, 2011, Omar Barrios and his father left their home in Los Angeles 

around 7:00 p.m. When Barrios returned around 11:00 p.m., there was a hole in 

the front door, and a Sony stereo and money were missing from his father’s 

bedroom. 

 On July 25, 2010, Isidoro Castelan left his home in Los Angeles around 

11:00 a.m. and returned around 9:30 p.m. When he returned, he found that his 

 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

front door and window had been broken. He discovered that a computer, 

documents, jewelry, and money were missing. 

 Receiving Stolen Property

 On August 29, 2011, Jose Linares, who was 15 years old at the time of trial, 

went out to eat with his family. They left their home in Los Angeles around 8:00 

p.m., locking the doors and windows, and returned around 9:00 p.m. When they 

returned, they found the home in disarray and saw that the security bars on his 

bedroom window were open. The family’s Sony PlayStation Portable (PSP) had 

been stolen. 

 Los Angeles Police Department Detective Christopher Marsden arrested 

appellant on October 27, 2011. When Detective Marsden searched appellant’s car, 

he found approximately 35 pawn shop receipts in the trunk of the car. Eleven of 

the receipts were from Charles Jewelry. One pawn receipt showed that appellant 

pawned a Sony PSP on August 31, 2011. Detective Marsden went to the pawn 

shop, located the Sony PSP, and discovered that it contained a photograph of 

Linares, depicting him holding a diploma from his school. 

Defense Evidence

 Appellant presented no evidence. 

Procedural Background

 Appellant was charged in an amended information with three counts of first 

degree residential burglary and one count of receiving stolen property. It was 

further alleged that appellant had served seven prior prison terms pursuant to 

section 667.5, subdivision (b), and that he had suffered one strike for purposes of 
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the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and one prior 

conviction of a serious felony under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). 

 The jury found appellant guilty on all four counts. Appellant admitted the 

prior strike, and the prosecution chose not to proceed on the remaining priors. The 

court granted appellant’s Romero motion (People v. Superior Court (Romero)

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and struck the strike as to two burglary counts and the 

receiving stolen property count (counts 2, 3, and 4), but denied it as to the 

remaining burglary count (count 1). The court sentenced appellant to a total of 16 

years 4 months. 

DISCUSSION

 Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the receipt of 

stolen property count. He also contends that insufficient evidence supports the 

finding of his ability to pay $110 in attorney fees. 

I. Stolen Property Count

 “On appeal, an appellate court deciding whether sufficient evidence supports 

a verdict must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence – which 

we repeatedly have described as evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value – from which a reasonable jury could find the accused guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 996-

997, italics deleted.) 

 “We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor 

of the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the 

evidence. [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial 

evidence is involved. [Citation.] It also applies when determining whether the 
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evidence is sufficient to sustain a jury finding on a gang enhancement. [Citations.] 

Reversal is unwarranted unless “‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

substantial evidence to support [the conviction].”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mendez

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 56.) 

 “Under section 496, subdivision (a), the elements of receiving stolen 

property are (1) stolen property; (2) knowledge that the property was stolen; and 

(3) possession of the stolen property. [Citation.]” (People v. King (2000) 81 

Cal.App.4th 472, 476, fn. omitted.) Appellant contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the finding that he knew the property was stolen. We 

disagree. 

 “‘[P]roof of knowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property 

raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendant’s 

knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial 

that only “slight” additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to 

permit a finding of guilty. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 

Cal.App.4th 975, 985 (Reyes).) 

 There is no dispute that Linares’ Sony PSP was stolen and that appellant 

pawned it only two days later. Thus, only slight additional corroborating evidence 

is needed to support the conviction. (Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 984-

985.) 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the conviction, we have no trouble 

concluding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding that appellant knew 

the Sony PSP was stolen. The Sony PSP had a photograph of Linares holding a 

middle school diploma. In addition, there were approximately 35 pawn shop 

receipts in appellant’s car when he was arrested, including the receipt for Linares’ 
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Sony PSP. Finally, evidence appellant had committed burglaries on three separate 

occasions tended to prove that he knew that the Sony PSP he pawned was stolen. 

 Appellant argues that the evidence supporting the burglary counts was not 

cross-admissible as to the receiving stolen property count. His argument, however, 

consists of only one sentence, and he does not support his claim with any legal 

analysis or citation to the record. It is therefore forfeited. “‘[I]t is appellant’s 

burden to affirmatively show error. [Citation.] To demonstrate error, appellant 

must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and 

citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.]’ 

[Citation.] ‘Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority 

other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate 

review.’ [Citation.]” (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 

1457.) 

II. Ability to Pay Attorney Fees

 At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $110 attorney fee on appellant, 

pursuant to section 987.8. Under section 987.8, the court must make a 

determination, either express or implied, that the defendant has the ability to pay 

defense costs. (People v. Prescott (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1476; People v. 

Verduzco (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1421.) Appellant contends that the 

imposition of the fee was erroneous because the trial court did not hold a hearing 

or make an explicit finding regarding his ability to pay. 

 Although appellant correctly points out that the record does not indicate that 

the trial court made any findings regarding his financial ability, he did not raise this 

contention below. Respondent concedes in its brief that appellant did not forfeit 

his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his ability to pay 
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attorney fee, relying on People v. Pacheco (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 

(Pacheco). However, after briefing was complete in this case, the California 

Supreme Court disapproved Pacheco in People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 

589 (McCullough). 

 In Pacheco, the defendant claimed on appeal that the trial court erroneously 

imposed several fees, including an attorney fee under section 987.8, without 

determining his ability to pay the fees. Although he had not objected to the 

imposition of the fees in the trial court, the appellate court held that he was not 

required to do so in order to assert his claim on appeal. (Pacheco, supra, 187 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) Because the trial court did not make a finding, either 

express or implied, about the defendant’s ability to pay the fee, the court held that 

the order directing payment of attorney fees was erroneous. (Id. at pp. 1398-1399.) 

 In McCullough, the California Supreme Court disapproved Pacheco and 

held that a defendant who failed to object to the imposition of a booking fee under 

Government Code section 29550.2 had forfeited his right to challenge it on appeal. 

(McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 591, 599.) Similar to section 987.8, 

Government Code section 29550.2, subdivision (a) requires the court to determine 

a defendant’s ability to pay before ordering payment. (Id. at pp. 592-593, 599.) 

The court reasoned that the determination of a defendant’s ability to pay a fee was 

a factual issue that required the development of the record below. (Id. at p. 597.) 

A defendant who failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence when the fee 

was imposed accordingly did not have the right to raise it on appeal. (Ibid.) 

 Similar to the imposition of a booking fee at issue in McCullough, the 

imposition of an attorney fee requires factual determinations regarding the 

defendant’s ability to pay. We therefore rely on McCullough to conclude that 
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appellant forfeited his right to challenge the fee by failing to raise it at the time the 

fee was imposed. 

DISPOSITION

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 WILLHITE, Acting P. J. 

 We concur: 

 MANELLA, J. 

 SUZUKAWA, J.