alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Thomas D. Krohn et al., Respondents, v Berne-Knox-Westerlo Central School District, Appellant, et al., Respondents.

Mercure, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (White, J.), entered November 13, 1989 in Montgomery County, which granted petitioners’ application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

On May 27, 1988, petitioner Thomas D. Krohn was injured when the vehicle he was riding in was involved in an accident with a vehicle owned by respondent Berne-Knox-Westerlo Central School District and operated by its employee. On August 25, 1988, just prior to expiration of the one-year and 90-day Statute of Limitations *(see,*General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]), petitioners made this application for leave to serve a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5). Supreme Court granted the application and the school district appeals.

We affirm. It is our view that Supreme Court acted within its discretion in granting the application. The record establishes that the school district’s vehicle was damaged in the accident and, in fact, towed from the scene, that a police accident report was prepared, and that the school district and, assumedly, its insurance carrier had immediate notice of the accident and an adequate opportunity to investigate it. Moreover, there is no indication that the school district has been prejudiced by the late filing of the notice of claim. Under the *827circumstances of this case, petitioners’ failure to allege a reasonable excuse for the delay is not fatal *(see,*General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; *Matter of Fast v County of Broome,*151 AD2d 930, 931; *Matter of Zbryski v City of New York,*147 AD2d 705, 706, *lv dismissed, and lv denied*74 NY2d 825).

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Mercure, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          693,754
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   922,008
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<INVENTORY>                                      51,361
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              1,707,206
<PP&E>                                        1,747,836
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                2,470,005
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           959,387
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
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<COMMON>                                          3,324
<OTHER-SE>                                    1,480,639
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  2,470,005
<SALES>                                       2,376,591
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<CGS>                                         1,012,834
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 2,152,985
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (3,501)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               15,180
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 220,105
<INCOME-TAX>                                      9,470
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             210,635
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    210,635
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      0.06
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</TABLE>
#### James TUCKER, Appellant, v. STATE, Appellee.

No. 26067.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 26, 1952.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is the unlawful possession of' whiskey for the purpose of sale in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $250 and-60 days in jail.

Accompanying the record is an affidavit in proper form, executed by the appellant,, requesting the dismissal of the appeal.

The request is granted, and the appeal is. dismissed.
#### POWELL v. UNITED STATES COAL & COKE CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Nov. 21, 1951.

G. E. Reams, Harlan, for appellant.

James Sampson, Harlan, for appellees.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This Workmen’s Compensation case involves disability allegedly caused by silicosis. The Board denied compensation on the finding that the employee’s ailment was asthmatic. The circuit court affirmed this order. The claimant has filed a very lengthy brief which covers many different questions. The only real issue before us is whether or not there was substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the Board’s finding of fact. See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Hensley, 314 Ky. 85, 234 S.W.2d 317.

The employee had worked for a number of years as a coal digger and loader. He quit work in June, 1948, because of breathing difficulties. The disability is not in question, and the proof was principally directed to the cause of it. Two doctors testified for the employee. In the opinion of one of them, he was suffering from silicosis. In the opinion of the other, the condition of his lungs indicated that such could *926have been his affliction. The first doctor s opinion was based upon certain hypothetical facts which did not exist, one being that the employee had spent several years operating a motor which would produce silica dust.

Two doctors also testified for the employer, and diagnosed the employee’s condition as having been caused by asthma, from which he had suffered since 1930.

All of the doctors agreed that silicosis is caused by long exposure to dust containing a substantial amount of free silica. The claimant was unable to show that in his place of work he had been exposed to such harmful dust. On the other hand, the employer’s proof tended to rebut this possibility.

The Board’s determination is supported by very substantial evidence. We know of no ground upon which we could reject such evidence and declare that the finding of fact was erroneous.

The judgment is,, affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRAIG BRUCE McKINNEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

RICK MARTINEZ, individually and as an 

officer of Fire Extinguisher Service Center, 

LLC; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15620 

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00448-MMDVPC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 23, 2017**

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges. 

Craig Bruce McKinney appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of 

his action alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 

and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 1 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-15620 

novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal 

based on the applicable statute of limitations). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed McKinney’s action as time-barred

because McKinney failed to file his action within the applicable statute of 

limitations. See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (civil 

RICO claims have a four-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a 

plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury underlying the action);

Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (civil RICO claims were 

not tolled during the pendency of a prior judicial action because the prior judicial 

action was not a perquisite to review in federal court). 

We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. 

See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts 

not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.
Motion for Detention - Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION 

_______________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

PHILLIP CURTIS SPILLMAN (1)

Case No. 3:22-MJ-444-BK

MOTION FOR DETENTION AND MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING

The United States moves for pretrial detention of defendant, PHILLIP CURTIS 

SPILLMAN, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3142(e) and (f). 

1. Eligibility of Case. This case is eligible for a detention order because the case 

involves:

• 10 + year drug offense 

• Serious risk defendant will flee 

2. Reason for Detention. The Court should detain defendant because there are no 

conditions of release which will reasonably assure: 

• Defendant’s appearance as required 

• Safety of any other person and the community 

3. Rebuttable Presumption. The United States will invoke the rebuttable 

presumption against defendant because: 

• Probable cause to believe defendant committed 10+ year drug

offense or firearms offense, 18 U.S.C.§924(c)

Case 3:22-cr-00208-K Document 3 Filed 05/04/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 9
Motion for Detention - Page 2

4. Time for Detention Hearing. The United States requests the Court conduct the 

detention hearing, 

• After continuance of 3 days (not more than 3).

DATED this 3rd day of May 2022. 

Respectfully submitted,

CHAD E. MEACHAM

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/ Phelesa M. Guy

PHELESA M. GUY

Assistant United States Attorney

Texas State Bar Number 00798230

1100 Commerce Street, Third Floor

Dallas, Texas 75242

Telephone: 214.659.8600

Facsimile: 214.659-8809

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on counsel for the 

defendant in accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on May 3, 2022. 

/s/ Phelesa M. Guy

PHELESA M. GUY

Assistant United States Attorney

Case 3:22-cr-00208-K Document 3 Filed 05/04/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § 2:22-CR-00045-Z-BR-1

§

JAMES MARK BISHOP §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

JAMES MARK BISHOP, by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997), has 

appeared before me pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, and has entered a plea of guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment. After 

cautioning and examining JAMES MARK BISHOP under oath concerning each of the subjects mentioned in Rule 11, I 

determined that the guilty plea was knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense charged is supported by an 

independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend that the plea of 

guilty be accepted, and that JAMES MARK BISHOP be adjudged guilty of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) - FAILURE TO REGISTER 

AS A SEX OFFENDER and have sentence imposed accordingly. After being found guilty of the offense by the District 

Judge,

☒ The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) unless the Court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community 

if released.

☐ The Government does not oppose release.

☐ The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release.

☐ I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community if released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c).

☐ The Government opposes release.

☐ The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release.

☐ If the Court accepts this recommendation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the 

Government.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there is a 

substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or (b) the Government has 

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed, or (c) exceptional circumstances are clearly shown 

under § 3145(c) why the defendant should not be detained, and (2) the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released.

Date: June 27, 2022

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its 

service shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States 

District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Case 2:22-cr-00045-Z-BR Document 29 Filed 06/27/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 54
#### Charles H. WYNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 23034.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 6, 1944.

No attorney for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of forgery, and his punishment assessed at two years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

Since the filing of the record in this court, the appellant has presented a written motion, duly verified, stating that he no longer desires to prosecute his appeal, and requesting that the same be dismissed. The motion is granted and the appeal is ordered dismissed.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of SureWest Communications (the “Company”), on Form 10-Qfor the period ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission of the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, as theChief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

1.                  The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 
| Date: October 29,  2009 | By:    | /s/ Dan T. Bessey       |
|------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|                         |   | Dan T. Bessey,          |
|                         |   | Vice President and      |
|                         |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SureWestCommunications and will be retained by SureWest Communications and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

The foregoing certificateis being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit tothe Form 10-Q and shall not be considered filed as part of the Form 10-Q.

 

----
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 6D2023-2611

Lower Tribunal No. CF19-182

_____________________________

DERREK RILEY,

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Highlands County.

Angela J. Cowden, Judge.

August 20, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

NARDELLA and MIZE, JJ., and LAMBERT, B.D., Associate Judge, concur.

Anthony W. Surber, Mulberry, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sonia C. Lawson, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING 

AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § 2:22-CR-00092-Z-BR

§

AUSTIN JAY PRUITT (1) §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

AUSTIN JAY PRUITT (1), by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997), has 

appeared before me pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, and has entered a plea of guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment. After 

cautioning and examining AUSTIN JAY PRUITT (1) under oath concerning each of the subjects mentioned in Rule 11, I 

determined that the guilty plea was knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense charged is supported by an 

independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend that the plea of 

guilty be accepted, and that AUSTIN JAY PRUITT (1) be adjudged guilty of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) -

POSSESSION OF PREPUBESCENT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY and have sentence imposed accordingly. After being 

found guilty of the offense by the District Judge,

☒ The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) unless the Court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community 

if released.

☐ The Government does not oppose release.

☐ The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release.

☐ I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community if released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c).

☐ The Government opposes release.

☐ The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release.

☐ If the Court accepts this recommendation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the 

Government.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there is a 

substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or (b) the Government has 

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed, or (c) exceptional circumstances are clearly shown 

under § 3145(c) why the defendant should not be detained, and (2) the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released.

Date: November 29, 2022

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its 

service shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States 

District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Case 2:22-cr-00092-Z-BR Document 30 Filed 11/29/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 65
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 23

- 00545

- CR

Robert Michael Frazier v. The State of Texas
On Appeal from the 24th District Court of Refugio County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022

- 03

- 6894

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed

. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. September 19 , 2024
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 

 § 

VS. § CRIMINAL NO. 4:22-CR-226-Y 

 § 

GABRIEL VASQUEZ (1) § 

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND ADJUDGING DEFENDANT GUILTY 

The Court has reviewed all relevant matters of record in this case, 

including especially (1) the Consent to Administration of Guilty Plea 

and Allocution by United States Magistrate Judge and (2) the Report of 

Action and Recommendation on Plea Before the United States Magistrate 

Judge. No objections to either have been filed within fourteen (14) 

days of service in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Therefore, 

the Court concludes that the report and recommendation of the magistrate 

judge on the plea of guilty is correct, and it is hereby accepted by the 

Court. Accordingly, the Court accepts the plea of guilty, and defendant 

is hereby adjudged guilty. The defendant’s sentence will be imposed in 

accordance with the Court’s sentencing scheduling order. 

SIGNED September 15, 2022. 

 

 _________________________________ 

 TERRY R. MEANS 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:22-cr-00226-Y Document 37 Filed 09/15/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 104
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CHARLES B. STARKE, JR., §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:22-CV-01950-E (BT)

§

CITY OF DALLAS, et al. §

§

Defendants. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF

THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation in 

this case (Doc. 9). No objections were filed. The District Court reviewed the proposed findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. Finding none, the Court ACCEPTS the 

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge.

SO ORDERED: December 27, 2022.

Case 3:22-cv-01950-E-BT Document 10 Filed 12/27/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 29
Case 3:22-cr-00337-L Document 30 Filed 03/07/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 58