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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

THEOTIS LEE HODGE, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § 2:22-CV-200-Z-BR

§

D. ZIMMERMAN, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Before the Court is a Motion for an Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF 

32) and Request for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF 51) (collectively, the “Motions”) filed 

by Plaintiff Theotis Lee Hodge. After considering the Motions, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

that both Motions be DENIED for the reasons set forth herein.

Factual Background

In October 2022, Plaintiff filed this Complaint pro se while a prisoner at the Allred Unit of 

the TDCJ. He alleges in his Amended Complaint that Defendants violated his constitutional rights 

by not following proper procedures in addressing a grievance he filed while incarcerated at the 

Clements Unit. The grievance is based on a disciplinary charge that Plaintiff contends is 

unfounded. He also states in his Amended Complaint that he seeks to assert a claim under the 

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) but does not allege any facts 

supporting this cause of action. In the Motions, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent 

disclosure to third parties of the underlying disciplinary charge. He states that he is to be considered 

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for parole after 35 years, and he seeks to “prevent the defendants from disclosing an 

unconstitutional[ly] inadequate disciplinary charge, or its report to any party, especially[] to the 

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles that will consider his parole options in October or late 

November 2023.” (ECF 51).

Legal Analysis

A. Standard for Injunctive Relief.

Plaintiff seeks a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and a Preliminary Injunction 

preventing disclosure of the contested disciplinary charge. “An injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy and should not issue except upon a clear showing of possible irreparable injury.” Lewis v. 

S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976). To obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiff must 

establish: (1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that 

irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs 

the threatened harm to the non-movant; and (4) that the granting of the preliminary injunction will 

not disserve the public interest. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

“must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a 

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted.” Id. If Plaintiff fails to satisfy 

any one of the four factors, injunctive relief will not issue. See, e.g., May v. Wells Fargo Home 

Mortg., No. 3:12-CV-4597-D, 2013 WL 2367769, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2013). 

Whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief “is within the discretion of the court, but it 

is an extraordinary remedy that should only be granted if the movant has clearly carried its burden.” 

John Crane Prod. Sols., Inc. v. R2R & D, LLC, 861 F. Supp. 2d 792, 794 (N.D. Tex. 2012). The 

decision to grant injunctive relief “is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.” Miss. 

Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). 

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B. Plaintiff Does Not Show a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

Plaintiff’s Motions fail at the outset because he cannot show a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits of his claims.1 Allegations of inadequate processing of a grievance do not 

give rise to a constitutional violation. An inmate “does not have a federally protected liberty 

interest in having these grievances resolved to his satisfaction. As this claim relies on a legally 

nonexistent interest, any alleged due-process violation arising from the alleged failure to 

investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th 

Cir. 2005); see also Jenkins v. Henslee, No. 3-01-CV-1996-R, 2002 WL 432948, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

March 15, 2002) (“An inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to a grievance procedure. 

Hence any alleged violation of the grievance procedure does not amount to a constitutional 

violation”)(citing Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) and Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 

1422 (7th Cir. 1996)). Thus, Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood that he will succeed 

on the merits of his claim that Defendants violated his civil rights by failing to respond properly 

to the grievance at issue herein.2

Even assuming that the underlying disciplinary charge is unfounded, disclosure of such 

allegedly improper charge to the parole board also does not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, 

because he has no constitutional right to parole. Under Texas law, prisoners may become eligible 

1Although his RLUIPA claim is not addressed the Motions, the Court finds that Plaintiff also has not alleged 

facts showing his entitlement to relief under RLUIPA in his Amended Complaint due to the complete 

absence of factual allegations supporting this assertion.

2To the extent the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint together out of an 

abundance of deference to Plaintiff’s pro se status, it appears the Complaint’s allegations regarding the 

impropriety of the prison disciplinary charge would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey since the charge 

apparently has not been overturned. A state prisoner’s § 1983 action “is barred (absent prior invalidation)—

no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state 

conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily 

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).

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for release either on parole or under a mandatory supervised release program. See Madison v. 

Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). “Parole” is the “discretionary and conditional release 

of an eligible prisoner ... [who] may serve the remainder of his sentence under the supervision and 

control of the pardons and paroles division.” Id. Because it is entirely speculative whether a 

prisoner will be released on parole, “there is no constitutional expectancy of parole in Texas.” Id. 

at 768. See also Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1995) (“It follows that because Orellana 

has no liberty interest in obtaining parole in Texas, he cannot complain of the constitutionality of 

procedural devices attendant to parole decisions.”; Mayabb v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 863, 871 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (“We also find that Mayabb has no constitutional right to parole.”). Therefore, any 

detrimental effect caused by consideration of the allegedly improper disciplinary proceeding 

cannot support a constitutional claim because Plaintiff has no constitutional right to parole.

Therefore, because Plaintiff has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure and no 

constitutional right to parole, he cannot show that he has a substantial likelihood of success on the 

merits of his claims such that injunctive relief would be proper. Because Plaintiff fails to meet the 

first requirement for injunctive relief, the Court need not consider the remaining three elements. 

See May v. Wells Fargo, 2013 WL at *1.

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the United States Magistrate Judge hereby recommends that 

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF 32) and Request 

for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF 51) be DENIED.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of these Findings, Conclusions 

and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

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IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. 

ENTERED November 13, 2023.

* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the 

event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is 

fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the 

signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by 

electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the 

fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the 

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections 

with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A 

party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds 

of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal 

conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district 

court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en 

banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS 

Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 

F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).

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