[PUBLISH]

 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10398

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00033-DHB-BKE

TERI LYNN HINKLE,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,

MIDLAND FUNDING, L.L.C., 

ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.,

Defendants – Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

_________________________

(July 11, 2016)

Before HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and MORENO,

* District Judge.

 * Honorable Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge for the Southern District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Teri Lynn Hinkle appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Midland Credit Management, Inc., Midland Funding, L.L.C., and Encore Capital 

Group, Inc. (collectively Midland1

), for claims asserted by Hinkle under the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Hinkle claims that 

Midland erroneously attributed debts to Hinkle, reported the debts to Experian, 

Equifax, and TransUnion credit reporting agencies (the CRAs), and failed to 

properly verify the debts when Hinkle disputed their validity. The district court 

held that no reasonable jury could find that Midland violated the FCRA or the 

FDCPA with respect to Hinkle. We reverse and remand as to Hinkle’s claims

under § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. We affirm as to all other claims.2

I. BACKGROUND

A consumer debt is created when an entity such as a bank, a credit card 

company, or a cell phone provider (an “original creditor”) extends credit to a 

 1 Midland Credit Management and Midland Funding are wholly-owned subsidiaries of 

Encore Capital Group. Midland Funding is a debt buyer that purchases charged-off debt 

accounts. Midland Credit Management is a debt collector that specializes in servicing debt 

accounts purchased by Midland Funding.

2 We conclude that all other claims, including but not limited to claims under § 1681b of 

the FCRA and §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692g of the FDCPA, are dismissed, waived, abandoned, or 

lack merit. The undisputed facts of this case are sufficient to resolve the controlling issues on 

appeal. We therefore make no determination as to whether the district court erred in admitting 

the affidavit of Angelique Ross to authenticate documents Midland relied on at summary 

judgment.

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consumer. The consumer must then make payments on the debt in accordance 

with the terms of her contract with the original creditor. See Federal Trade 

Commission, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry, 2013 WL 

419348, at *10 (Jan. 2013) (hereinafter “FTC Report”). Should a consumer fall

behind on her payments, the original creditor will eventually be entitled to “charge 

off” the debt as severely delinquent. See id. at *12. Charged-off debt is deemed 

uncollectable and treated as a loss for accounting purposes. LeBlanc v. Unifund 

CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.5 (11th Cir. 2010). But charging off a debt 

does not diminish the legal right of the original creditor to collect the full amount 

of the debt. See id. (“[C]harged off debt is not forgiven.”); FTC Report, 2013 WL 

419348, at *14 (describing measures taken by original creditors to collect chargedoff debts).

Once a debt has been charged off, there are two ways an original creditor 

can recoup its losses. First, the original creditor may continue attempting to collect 

the debt itself—either by utilizing internal collections staff, see FTC Report, 2013 

WL 419348, at *14, or by contracting with a third-party agent (a “collection 

agency”) willing to collect the debt on behalf of the original creditor, see, e.g., 

Westra v. Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 826 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Alternatively, the original creditor may choose to sell the debt to a third-party 

purchaser (a “debt buyer”) at a discounted price based on the reduced likelihood of 

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collection. FTC Report, 2013 WL 419348, at *18. When an original creditor sells 

a debt, the original creditor relinquishes its right to collect the debt and transfers 

that right to the debt buyer. See id. at *11-14. This allows the original creditor to 

wash its hands of the debt while still recouping a fraction of its losses on the 

secondary debt market. Id. at *11.

The buyer of a debt on the secondary debt market enjoys essentially the 

same prerogatives as did the original creditor. The debt buyer may attempt to 

collect the debt itself—internally, or by hiring a collection agency—or the debt 

buyer may resell the debt to another debt buyer. Id. When the initial buyer of a 

debt is unable to collect, the buyer can recoup a fraction of its losses by including 

the debt in a portfolio of uncollected debts and selling it down the line to another 

debt buyer (a “down-the-line buyer”) at an even deeper discount. See id. at *3, 

*15. The down-the-line buyer can, in turn, choose whether to engage in collection 

activities or to sell the debt further down the line. Id. at *15. Debts that have been 

repeatedly bought and sold in this manner are sometimes referred to as “junk

debts.” See, e.g., Osinubepi-Alao v. Plainview Fin. Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 

87 (D.D.C. 2014); Bodur v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 829 F. Supp. 2d 246, 255 

(S.D.N.Y. 2011). They are often sold “as is,” in the form of electronic data, and 

without “account-level documentation” such as applications, agreements, billing 

statements, promissory notes, notices, correspondence, payment checks, payment 

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histories, or other evidence of indebtedness.3

 FTC Report, 2013 WL 419348, at 

*3-4, *28-29.

This case involves two such “junk debts,” the GE/Meijer and T-Mobile 

accounts, both of which Midland purchased “as is,” without account-level 

documentation, after a down-the-line journey from one debt buyer to another. On 

September 24, 2008, Midland acquired a debt account originating with GE/Meijer 

in the amount of $357.56 attributable to “Terri Hinkle.” Midland purchased this 

debt from AIS Services, L.L.C. (AIS), another buyer of charged-off consumer 

debt. The account was sold “as is” save for a limited warranty by AIS that the

information associated with the account was “materially true and accurate to the 

best of [AIS’s] knowledge.” Midland acknowledged in the purchase agreement 

that the account “may be [an] unenforceable debt[] and may have little or no 

value.” The only documentation Midland received was a data file containing 

electronically-stored information about the debt such as the amount of the debt, the 

name of the original creditor, the charge-off date, and the personal information 

 3 This is done to lower transaction costs and facilitate the quick sale of low-value debts. 

See FTC Report, 2013 WL 419348, at *21-22. But the lack of account-level documentation can 

prevent debt buyers from litigating disputed debts on the merits. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-

70-115(5) (prohibiting a “debt buyer” from “bringing suit or initiating an arbitration proceeding 

against [a] debtor” without “reasonable verification of the amount of the debt allegedly owed by 

the debtor [including] a copy of the contract or other document evidencing the consumer debt”); 

Henggeler v. Brumbaugh & Quandahl, P.C., LLO, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1187 (D. Neb. 2012) 

(denying a motion to compel arbitration because a debt buyer failed to demonstrate that “a valid 

agreement to arbitrate exists” and “submitted only a generic cardmember agreement from Chase 

Bank” that was “unsigned”).

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associated with the debt. Although Midland did not receive any account-level 

documentation, the purchase agreement required AIS to assist Midland in 

acquiring documentation from the original creditor if necessary to respond to 

consumer disputes.4

A week after acquiring the GE/Meijer account, Midland sent a collection 

letter to the address on file stating that the current balance of the debt was $395.81 

and offering to settle the debt for $237.49. On October 13, 2008, Midland received 

a payment for the settlement amount. The record does not reflect who made this 

payment. On November 17 and December 15, 2008, Midland reported to the 

CRAs that the debt belonged to Hinkle and was “assigned to internal or external 

collections.” On December 22, 2008, Midland zeroed out the account and marked 

it paid in full. Midland reported the account to the CRAs as “paid in full” in 

January, February, and March of 2009. Thereafter, Midland ceased reporting the 

account. The CRAs marked the account “paid” but continued to show that it had 

been in “[c]ollection as of Dec 2008, Nov 2008.” 

Hinkle claims that she did not pay the GE/Meijer debt and in fact did not 

receive any correspondence from Midland regarding the GE/Meijer account. 

 4 The purchase agreement requires AIS to contact the original creditor upon Midland’s 

written request and, to the extent account-level documentation is “reasonably available and 

provided to [AIS],” provide copies to Midland. The purchase agreement specifically permits 

Midland to invoke this right “after the Closing Date . . . in order to respond to [consumer] 

inquiri[es].”

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Hinkle became aware of the GE/Meijer account in May 2011, when she obtained 

her credit report and discovered that Midland had erroneously attributed the 

account to her. On September 6, 2011, Hinkle filed a dispute with the CRAs 

explaining that the GE/Meijer account did not belong to her. The CRAs notified 

Midland of the dispute, stating: “Consumer states inaccurate information” and 

“[c]laims true identity fraud, account fraudulently opened.” The CRAs instructed 

Midland to “Verify Name, address, SSN, Dates and Balance.” Additionally, on 

October 20, 2011, Hinkle sent Midland a written “Demand for Validation of Debt,” 

reiterating that she had never had an account with GE/Meijer. Midland did not 

take action on Hinkle’s dispute because it had already marked the account paid and 

ceased to report it to the CRAs.

On December 6, 2011, Midland acquired a debt originating with T-Mobile in 

the amount of $300.80 attributable to “Teri Hinkle.” Midland purchased this debt 

from Debt Recovery Solutions, L.L.C. (DRS), also a buyer of charged-off 

consumer debt. Like the GE/Meijer account, the T-Mobile account was sold with 

limited warranties as to its accuracy or collectability.

5 The only documentation 

Midland received was a data file containing electronically-stored information about 

the debt. Also like the GE/Meijer account, the T-Mobile account was sold without

 5 DRS warranted “[t]o the best of [its] knowledge” that the information associated with 

the account was “true, complete, accurate and not misleading.” The purchase agreement also 

contains a warranty that the information DRS was providing to Midland consisted of “[DRS’s] 

own business records regarding the Accounts.”

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any account-level documentation. The purchase agreement required Midland to 

obtain “express written authorization” from DRS before requesting account-level 

documentation from the original creditor. DRS promised to “act on behalf of 

[Midland] as an intermediary” between Midland and the original creditor to 

investigate inquiries regarding the T-Mobile account, but the parties disagree 

regarding whether the purchase agreement permits Midland to invoke that promise 

after closing.

On December 21, 2011, Midland sent a collection letter to Hinkle offering a 

10% discount to resolve the debt. On December 28, 2011, Midland called Hinkle 

in an attempt to reach settlement. Hinkle orally disputed the debt, informing

Midland that the account did not belong to her. Midland recorded the dispute as 

“FRAUD/ID THEFT . . . CONSUMER SAID THAT SHE DOESN’T OWE 

THAT BILL.”

On February 5, 2012, Midland sent Hinkle a letter advising her that it was 

investigating her dispute and telling her that “[a]s part of our investigation . . . it 

would be helpful to have a copy of any documentation you may have that supports 

your dispute.” Apart from this letter, however, Midland did not take action on the 

December 28, 2011, dispute. Internal Midland records note that, notwithstanding 

its disputed status, Hinkle’s account was “OK to work” because the dispute was 

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“outside validation period. Consumer needs to send proof.”6

 In February 2012, 

Midland began reporting to the CRAs that the debt was “assigned to internal or 

external collections.” When Midland made these reports, it flagged the debt as 

“[d]isputed.” On July 5, 2012, Hinkle obtained a copy of her credit report 

reflecting these designations.

On July 13, 2012, Hinkle disputed the T-Mobile account with the CRAs. 

The CRAs notified Midland of the dispute on July 20, 2012. Midland was advised: 

“Dispute Type 1-Not his/hers. Verify Name, address, SSN, Dates and Balance.” 

Upon receipt of this request, Midland verified the debt by double-checking the 

information it had reported to the CRAs against its own internal records. These 

records consisted of the same electronically-stored information Midland received 

from DRS when it purchased the debt. Midland did not request account-level 

documentation from DRS or T-Mobile.

On July 21, 2012, Midland sent Hinkle another letter asking her to provide

documentation supporting her dispute. Hinkle responded to Midland on July 26, 

2012, reiterating that neither the T-Mobile account nor the GE/Meijer account 

belonged to her and requesting validation of “ANY ALLEGED ACCOUNT WITH 

Teri Lynn Hinkle.” She told Midland that she could not furnish Midland with 

 6 The phrase “validation period” is a reference to § 1692g of the FDCPA, which requires 

a debt collector to validate a debt when a consumer disputes the debt in writing within a certain 

period of time. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

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“ANYTHING” because “I do not have that alleged account.” Hinkle also advised 

Midland that she intended to sue Midland for violations of the FCRA and FDCPA. 

Midland continued to report the T-Mobile debt as “assigned to internal or external 

collections” through March 2013.

Proceeding pro se, Hinkle filed this lawsuit on April 30, 2013. During 

discovery, Hinkle requested documents and written discovery responses from 

Midland, but she did not take any depositions. The trial court advised Hinkle that 

she should seriously consider “tak[ing] some depositions,” but Hinkle chose not to 

do so. At the close of discovery, Midland filed a motion for summary judgment 

relying on the documents it produced to Hinkle during discovery. The district

court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Midland on all counts. 

Hinkle appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

“viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc., 764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th 

Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. “[T]he dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is 

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such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Hinkle argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Midland on her claim that Midland violated § 1681s-2(b) of 

the FCRA. The FCRA requires CRAs and entities that furnish information to 

CRAs (“furnishers” or “furnishers of information”) to investigate disputed 

information. When a consumer disputes information with a CRA, the CRA must

“conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed 

information is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). As part of this 

investigation, the CRA is required to notify the person or entity that furnished the 

information that the information has been disputed. Id. § 1681i(a)(2). Upon 

receipt of this notice, the furnisher of information must: (1) “conduct an 

investigation with respect to the disputed information”; (2) “review all relevant 

information provided by the [CRA]” in connection with the dispute; and (3) 

“report the results of the investigation to the [CRA].” Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1). Should 

the investigation determine that the disputed information is “inaccurate or 

incomplete or cannot be verified,” the furnisher must “as appropriate, based on the 

results of the reinvestigation promptly . . . modify[,] . . . delete [or] permanently 

block the reporting” of that information to CRAs. Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). The 

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CRAs must also delete or modify the information based on the results of 

reinvestigation. Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i).

When the CRAs informed Midland that Hinkle disputed the GE/Meijer and 

T-Mobile accounts, Midland conducted an investigation that consisted—at most—

of (1) double-checking the information it had reported to the CRAs against its own 

electronic-data files; and (2) sending Hinkle a letter telling her that “it would be 

helpful to have a copy of any documentation you may have that supports your 

dispute.”7

 The district court held that these two measures amounted to sufficient 

investigation under § 1681s-2(b) on the facts of this case. Hinkle contends that 

§ 1681s-2(b) requires down-the-line buyers to investigate mistaken-identity 

disputes by verifying the identity of the alleged debtor against account-level 

documentation (not just against electronic-data files). She argues that because

Midland failed to obtain such documentation in response to Hinkle’s dispute, a

reasonable jury could find that the investigation Midland conducted was

insufficient to satisfy § 1681s-2(b).

 7 Midland suggests on appeal that it did not take action on the GE/Meijer dispute because 

by the time the dispute was filed in 2011 it had already marked the account paid and ceased to 

report it to the CRAs. We are unaware of any provision in the FCRA that relieves furnishers of 

their obligations under § 1681s-2(b) once they are no longer actively reporting the disputed 

account. As it makes no difference to the result, we assume for the purposes of this opinion that 

Midland at least reviewed its internal records when it received a dispute notice regarding the 

GE/Meijer account. Cf. Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hat are 

considered the ‘facts’ [at summary judgment] may not turn out to be the ‘actual’ facts if the case 

goes to trial.”)

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The scope of the duty to investigate under § 1681s-2(b) is an issue of first 

impression in the Eleventh Circuit. The FCRA does not specify the nature and 

extent of the “investigation” a furnisher of information must conduct under 

§ 1681s-2(b). The structure of the statute, however, suggests that the duty of a 

furnisher under § 1681s-2(b) is a component of the larger reinvestigation duty 

imposed by § 1681i(a) on CRAs themselves. See id. § 1681s-2(b)(2) (requiring 

furnishers to complete their investigation and report its results “before the 

expiration of the period . . . within which the [CRA] is required to” resolve the 

dispute). We have previously stated that § 1681i(a) imposes “a duty . . . to make 

reasonable efforts to investigate and correct inaccurate or incomplete information 

brought to its attention by the consumer.” Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 

Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991). Given the interrelated nature of 

§§ 1681s-2(b) and 1681i(a), we conclude that “reasonableness” is an appropriate 

touchstone for evaluating investigations under § 1681s-2(b). See Chiang v. 

Verizon New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2010); Gorman v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2009); Westra, 409 F.3d at 827; 

Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2004).

We emphasize that what constitutes a “reasonable investigation” will vary

depending on the circumstances of the case and whether the investigation is being 

conducted by a CRA under § 1681i(a), or a furnisher of information under 

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§ 1681s-2(b). See Chiang, 595 F.3d at 38 (“[W]hat is a reasonable investigation by 

a furnisher may vary depending on the circumstances.”); Gorman, 584 F.3d at

1160 (“[T]he reasonableness of an investigation depends on the facts of the 

particular case . . . .”). Whether a furnisher’s investigation is reasonable will 

depend in part on the status of the furnisher—as an original creditor, a collection 

agency collecting on behalf of the original creditor, a debt buyer, or a down-theline buyer—and on the quality of documentation available to the furnisher. See, 

e.g., Johnson, 357 F.3d at 431 (reasoning that a jury could find a § 1681s-2(b)

violation where the original creditor ended its investigation before “consult[ing]

underlying documents such as account applications”). The facts of this case 

require us to determine whether a reasonable jury could find that Midland—a 

down-the-line buyer with “as is” purchase agreements and no account-level 

documentation—fell short of the reasonable investigation standard when it relied 

on internal records to verify the identity of an alleged debtor. 

Section 1681s-2(b) contemplates three potential ending points to 

reinvestigation: verification of accuracy, a determination of inaccuracy or 

incompleteness, or a determination that the information “cannot be verified.” See

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Midland argues that once it compared the 

information the CRAs possessed with its own internal records and confirmed a 

match, it was entitled to report the accounts as having been “verified.” Hinkle 

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argues that the records Midland possessed were insufficient to verify the accounts

and that, absent additional proof, Midland should have reported the results of its 

reinvestigation as “cannot be verified.” We agree with Hinkle that Midland is not 

entitled to summary judgment under § 1681s-2(b) on the facts of this case.

Our analysis begins with the plain text of § 1681s-2(b), which requires 

furnishers of information to either “verif[y]” disputed information by means of 

“investigation,” or inform the CRAs that the information “cannot be verified.” Id. 

As the FCRA does not define “verify” or “investigation,” we must look to the 

ordinary meaning of those terms. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511, 

128 S.Ct. 2020, 2024 (2008)) (“When a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary 

meaning.”); United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (“To 

ascertain ordinary meaning, courts often turn to dictionary definitions for 

guidance.”). The ordinary meaning of “verification” is: (1) “evidence that 

establishes or confirms the accuracy or truth of something”; (2) “the process of 

research, examination, etc., required to prove or establish authenticity or validity”; 

(3) “a formal assertion of the truth of something, as by oath or affidavit”; and 

(4) “a short confirmatory affidavit at the end of a pleading or petition.” Haddad v. 

Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 758 F.3d 777, 782-83 (6th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Random House Unabridged Dictionary 2113 (2d ed.1993). 

“Verify” has a similar meaning in the legal context. See Black’s Law Dictionary

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1793 (10th ed. 2014) (“verify vb. (14c) 1. To prove to be true; to confirm or 

establish the truth or truthfulness of; to authenticate. 2. To confirm or substantiate 

by oath or affidavit; to swear to the truth of.”). Finally, the term “investigation” is 

defined as “[a] detailed inquiry or systematic examination” or “a searching 

inquiry.” Johnson, 357 F.3d at 430 (quoting Am. Heritage Dictionary 920 (4th ed.

2000); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1189 (1981)). 

These definitions support the conclusion that § 1681s-2(b) requires some 

degree of careful inquiry by furnishers of information. In particular, when a 

furnisher does not already possess evidence establishing that an item of disputed

information is true, § 1681s-2(b) requires the furnisher to seek out and obtain such 

evidence before reporting the information as “verified.” See id. at 431 (reversing 

summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find a violation of § 1681s2(b) where the furnisher “d[id] not look beyond the information contained in the 

[internal data file] and never consult[ed] underlying documents such as account 

applications”); cf. Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1160 (observing that a claim for failure to 

investigate “is properly raised when a particular credit report contains a factual

deficiency or error that could have been remedied by uncovering additional facts”). 

The requirement to uncover additional facts will be more or less intensive 

depending on what evidence the furnisher already possesses. For instance, a debt 

buyer with account-level documentation or more comprehensive warranties from 

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its predecessor debt buyer might be in a completely different position than 

Midland.

Section 1681s-2(b) does not impose an unduly burdensome investigation 

requirement on furnishers; rather, it presents them with a choice regarding how 

they handle disputed information. The first option is to satisfy § 1681s-2(b) by 

conducting an investigation, verifying the disputed information, and reporting to 

the CRAs that the information has been verified. Verification might be 

accomplished by uncovering documentary evidence that is sufficient to prove that 

the information is true. See Johnson, 357 F.3d at 431. Or it might be 

accomplished by relying on personal knowledge sufficient to establish the truth of

the information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (summary judgment affidavit); Fed. 

R. Evid. 602 (trial testimony). When a furnisher reports that disputed information 

has been verified, the question of whether the furnisher behaved reasonably will 

turn on whether the furnisher acquired sufficient evidence to support the 

conclusion that the information was true. This is a factual question, and it will 

normally be reserved for trial. See Westra, 409 F.3d at 827 (“Whether a 

defendant’s investigation is reasonable is a factual question normally reserved for 

trial.”).

The second way for a furnisher to satisfy § 1681s-2(b) is to conduct an

investigation and conclude, based on that investigation, that the disputed 

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information is unverifiable. Furnishers can avail themselves of this option if they

determine that the evidence necessary to verify disputed information either does

not exist or is too burdensome to acquire. Having made such a determination,

furnishers are entitled to cease investigation and notify the CRAs that the 

information “cannot be verified.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). When a 

furnisher reports that disputed information “cannot be verified,” the question of 

whether the furnisher complied with § 1681s-2(b) will likely turn on whether the 

furnisher reasonably determined that further investigation would be fruitless or 

unduly burdensome.

8

 The final way to satisfy § 1681s-2(b) is to conduct an 

investigation and conclude that the disputed information is “inaccurate or 

incomplete.” Id. 

This framework reflects the fact that §1681s-2(b) is designed not only to 

exclude false information from credit reports, but also to prevent the reporting of

unverifiable information.9

 When a furnisher determines that disputed information

is false or “cannot be verified,” the furnisher must notify the CRAs of this result 

pursuant to § 1681s-2(b)(1). The furnisher must also “as appropriate, based on the 

 8 The present case involves a report of “verified” and thus does not require us to delineate 

a standard for cases involving a report of “cannot be verified.” We emphasize, however, that by 

characterizing § 1681s-2(b) as presenting a furnishers with a “choice” we do not mean to suggest 

that furnishers have complete discretion to cease investigation and report accounts as “cannot be 

verified.”

9 Any other reading would render meaningless the “cannot be verified” option in § 1681s2(b)(1)(E). See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e must 

construe [a] statute to give effect, if possible, to every word and clause.”).

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results of the reinvestigation promptly . . . modify[,] . . . delete [or] permanently 

block the reporting” of that information to CRAs. Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). What 

“the results of the reinvestigation” require may vary depending on the nature of the 

disputed information. But when a furnisher is unable to verify the identity of an 

alleged debtor, we are persuaded by the parallel structure of §§ 1681s and 1681i 

that the appropriate response will be to delete the account or cease reporting it

entirely. See id. § 1681i(d) (“Following any deletion of information which is 

found to be inaccurate or whose accuracy can no longer be verified [the CRA 

shall] furnish notification that the item has been deleted . . . to any person 

specifically designated by the consumer . . . .” (emphasis added)). Similarly, when 

a CRA receives notice that an account is unverifiable, it must “promptly delete that 

item of information from the file of the consumer.” See id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i). 

Lest this result appear too strict, we hasten to observe that even though a furnisher 

that ends an investigation without verifying a disputed account must cease 

reporting the account to CRAs, § 1681s-2(b) does not require the furnisher to cease 

dunning or otherwise attempting to collect the debt. The requirement to delete or 

modify the offending information is limited to the credit-reporting context. See id.

We are not the only circuit court to recognize this framework. In Johnson, 

the Fourth Circuit considered whether a bank reasonably investigated a dispute 

alleging that the consumer was not a co-obligor but merely an authorized user on a 

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credit card account. 357 F.3d at 431. The bank investigated whether the consumer

was a co-obligor by “(1) confirming that the name and address listed on the 

[dispute] were the same as the name and address contained in [its computerized

data file], and (2) noting that [the data file] contained a code indicating that [the 

consumer] was the sole responsible party on the account.” Id. The bank “d[id] not 

look beyond the information contained in the [data file] and never consult[ed]

underlying documents such as account applications.” Id. The Fourth Circuit held 

that “[b]ased on this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that [the bank]

acted unreasonably” when it reported to the CRA that the disputed information was 

“verified.” Id. The bank argued that its reliance on computerized data was 

reasonable because it had destroyed any account-level documentation pursuant to a 

document retention policy. Id. at 432. But the court rejected this argument, 

explaining that a reasonable jury could find that the bank should have “at least

informed the credit reporting agencies that [it] could not conclusively verify” the 

disputed information. Id.

The reasoning of Johnson is doubly persuasive in the case of a down-theline buyer like Midland. Faced with a mistaken-identity dispute, Midland 

investigated the dispute by confirming that the identifying information possessed 

by the CRAs was the same as the identifying information contained in its internal 

data files. The information contained in the data files was obtained from AIS and 

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DRS—not from the original creditors—and was the same information Midland had 

reported to the CRAs in the first place. Midland did not attempt to consult 

account-level documentation to confirm that the “Terri Hinkle” and “Teri Hinkle” 

who incurred the debts in 2005-2006 were the same “Teri Lynn Hinkle” it was 

dunning six years later. A reasonable jury could find that such a cursory 

investigation was unreasonable on the facts of this case. A jury could find that the 

documentation Midland reviewed was insufficient to prove that the GE/Meijer and 

T-Mobile accounts belonged to Hinkle and that Midland therefore had a duty to 

report the accounts as “cannot be verified.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). A

jury could also find that because Midland retained the right to seek account-level 

documentation through its agreements with AIS and DRS, Midland behaved 

unreasonably when it reported the accounts as “verified” without first exercising 

those rights.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Westra does not persuade us otherwise. 

That case affirmed summary judgment in favor of a collection agency “collecting 

on behalf of [an original creditor],” holding that the agency conducted a reasonable 

investigation when it relied on internal records to verify a disputed debt. Westra, 

409 F.3d at 826-27. Upon notification that an account “did not belong to” the 

alleged debtor, the collection agency verified the “name, address, and date of birth” 

on the account—just as Midland did in this case—“and sent the [dispute] back to 

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[the CRA].” Id. at 827. But Midland is not a collection agency “collecting on 

behalf of [the original creditor].” Id. at 126. Although Westra does not discuss the 

reliability of the internal records at issue, it is reasonable that, as an agent of the 

original creditor, the Westra defendant could more reasonably rely on its internal 

records than can Midland. Midland is a down-the-line buyer that purchased the

GE/Meijer and T-Mobile accounts “as is,” with no account-level documentation, 

and only after the accounts had changed hands repeatedly in the secondary debt 

market. Although AIS and DRS warranted that the electronically-stored 

information Midland received was correct “[t]o the best of [their] knowledge,” 

they made no warranties as to whether the personal information associated with the 

debts was obtained from the original creditor or compiled at a later time by way of 

background checks, internet research, or other means.10 There is no way to know 

how many times the information Midland furnished to the CRAs changed hands or 

was altered before finding its way to Midland. Because Westra involved a 

collection agency in a direct relationship with the original creditor, it has little 

persuasive value in the instant case.

Midland advances two arguments in support of its contention that the facts 

of this case warranted less-extensive investigation. Midland first argues that the 

 10 For example, the purchase agreement for the T-Mobile account warrants that the data 

file purchased “constitutes [DRS’s] business records,” was “made or compiled” by DRS, and 

was recorded either by a person “with knowledge of the data entered” or by a person “who 

caused the data to be entered.”

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act of sending a letter to Hinkle shifted the burden to Hinkle to substantiate her 

dispute. The letter in question stated that “[a]s part of our investigation . . . it 

would be helpful to have a copy of any documentation you may have that supports 

your dispute.” Midland argues that when Hinkle failed to support her dispute by

sending Midland a police report or a signed fraud affidavit, Midland was entitled to 

cease its investigation and inform the CRAs that the debts were accurate and had 

been “verified.” Although the failure to respond to a letter requesting assistance 

might be relevant to a jury’s determination of whether Midland was entitled to 

report the debt as “verified”—as evidence, for example, that Hinkle’s dispute was

disingenuous—we are unprepared to say that it is dispositive at summary 

judgment. Midland cites nothing in the FCRA that permits a furnisher to shift its

burden of “reasonable investigation” to the consumer in the case of a § 1681s-2(b)

dispute. And even if there were a scenario in which burden shifting were 

appropriate, that result would make little sense in a case like this one—a mistakenidentity dispute in which the furnisher is in a far better position than the alleged 

debtor to confirm the actual owner of the account. In any event, the letter at issue 

in this case did not inform Hinkle that she was required to send documentation. 

Rather, the letter suggested that “it would be helpful” if she did so. A reasonable 

jury could find that Midland acted unreasonably when it conditioned further 

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investigation on a response from Hinkle without informing Hinkle of that 

requirement.

Midland also argues that its investigative burden was less extensive because 

the notice of dispute it received from the CRAs stated only that the GE/Meijer and 

T-Mobile accounts were “[n]ot his/hers.” See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157 (“The 

pertinent question is . . . whether the furnisher’s procedures were reasonable in 

light of what it learned about the nature of the dispute from the description in the 

CRA’s notice of dispute.”); Westra, 409 F.3d at 827 (“[The] investigation in this 

case was reasonable given the scant information [the furnisher] received regarding 

the nature of [the] dispute.”). Although we agree that whether an investigation is 

reasonable will depend on what the furnisher knows about the dispute, we reject 

the proposition that a furnisher may truncate its investigation simply because the 

CRA failed to exhaustively describe the dispute in its § 1681i(a)(2) notice. See 

Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157 n.11 (explaining that although “the notice determines 

the nature of the dispute to be investigated” it does not “cabin[] the scope of the 

investigation once undertaken”). When a furnisher has access to dispute-related 

information beyond the information provided by the CRA, it will often be

reasonable for the furnisher to review that additional information and conduct its 

investigation accordingly. Here, the CRAs notified Midland variously that Hinkle 

“states inaccurate information,” “[c]laims true identity fraud, account fraudulently 

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opened,” and disputes the accounts as “[n]ot his/hers.” They further instructed 

Midland to “[v]erify” the information reported. Midland was also aware of the 

basis for dispute because Hinkle herself told Midland repeatedly that the 

GE/Meijer and T-Mobile accounts did not belong to her. A jury could find that 

these communications were enough to convey to Midland that the basis of dispute 

was mistaken identity or fraud.

Midland finally asserts that we should affirm the district court on the 

alternate basis that Hinkle cannot prove a “willful” violation of § 1681s-2(b). But

a reasonable jury could find that Midland either knowingly or recklessly reported 

debts as “verified” without obtaining sufficient documentation to support that 

determination. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56-57, 127 S. Ct. 

2201, 2208 (2007) (holding that liability for “willfully” failing to comply with the 

FCRA extends not only to acts known to violate the FCRA, but also to the reckless 

disregard of a statutory duty). First, the fact that Midland negotiated clauses in the 

purchase agreements requiring the sellers to assist with obtaining account-level 

documentation supports the conclusion that Midland knew it might need such 

documentation to “verify” disputed accounts. Second, the record supports an 

inference that the system Midland uses to verify information is automated and does

not incorporate review by Midland employees capable of analyzing disputed

accounts and initiating requests for account-level documentation where 

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appropriate. A reasonable jury could find that Midland adopted such a system with 

reckless disregard for the fact that it would result in perfunctory review in 

contravention of the FCRA. We therefore hold that a reasonable jury could find 

that Midland willfully violated § 1681s-2(b) when it reported the GE/Meijer and TMobile accounts as “verified” without obtaining sufficient documentation that the 

debts in fact belonged to Hinkle.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred in 

dismissing Hinkle’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). We reverse and remand 

as to § 1681s-2(b). We affirm dismissal of all other claims.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

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