United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2007 Decided December 18, 2007 

 Amended February 15, 2008 

No. 04-3080 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

V. 

SUNDAY YEMI ADEFEHINTI, 

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 

05-3046, 05-3055 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

 (No. 01cr00451-01) 

 (No. 01cr00451-02) 

 (No. 01cr00451-04) 

Charles B. Wayne, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the brief for appellant Sunday Yemi 

Adefehinti. 
2

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant Tayo John Bode. With her on 

the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. 

Jaffee and Shawn Moore, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

entered appearances. 

Michael Alan Olshonsky, appointed by the court, argued 

the cause and filed the brief for appellant Olushola Akinleye. 

Ellen R. Meltzer, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was 

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney. 

Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

 WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Five defendants—

appellants Adefehinti, Akinleye, and Bode, and two others 

(Akinkuowo and Protech Builders)—were tried together for a 

variety of crimes arising out of a scam by which they 

contrived to secure mortgages on items of real property at 

vastly inflated values. The three appellants were convicted on 

counts of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); 

bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and interstate 

transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2314. Adefehinti and Bode were also convicted of money 

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The 

district court sentenced Adefehinti to 74 months in prison, 

Akinleye to 37 months, and Bode to 57 months. 

Adefehinti, Akinleye, and Bode attack their convictions 

on multiple grounds. Adefehinti also challenges his sentence. 

The only claims meriting discussion in a published opinion 

are (1) Adefehinti’s and Bode’s contention that the evidence 
3

was insufficient to convict them of intending to conceal funds, 

an essential element of the money laundering charge, and (2) 

appellants’ claim that the circumstances under which loan 

documents were admitted into evidence compromised their 

rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. We reverse Adefehinti’s and Bode’s money 

laundering convictions but otherwise affirm the judgments in 

all respects. 

* * * 

 Between 1995 and 1999, defendants defrauded banks of 

millions of dollars through real estate and mortgage 

transactions involving properties in Washington, D.C. The 

scheme consisted of a series of fraudulently executed land 

“flips”: defendants bought cheap properties with fake 

identities and then sold them to each other for artificially high 

prices, using bank loans to fund the purchase. Defendants 

fabricated the identity of buyers, providing the straw buyers 

with false employment histories, financial records, and 

addresses. In some cases, the buyers had the names of real 

individuals, but defendants doctored their employment or 

financial histories so that they would qualify for more 

substantial loans; occasionally, defendants would sign the 

name of a real person without his knowledge. At defendants’ 

behest, appraisers lied about the properties’ value, inflating 

the listing price. 

The schemers submitted the fraudulent loan applications 

to banks, which relied on them in making lending decisions. 

On the issuance of loan checks to the straw buyers, the 

defendants distributed the proceeds among themselves. The 

non-existent or unqualified buyers naturally failed to make 

mortgage payments, which eventually led the banks to 

foreclose. 
4

Adefehinti, owner of W.H.V. Realty, served as the real 

estate broker and orchestrated many facets of the scheme. 

Akinleye owned Protech, a company at which some of the 

straw buyers falsely claimed to work, and signed a variety of 

loan documents in other people’s names. Bode, a co-owner 

and officer of Protech, played various roles, helping to 

fabricate the straw buyers’ financial and employment records 

and facilitating the purchase and sale of properties. 

* * * 

Bode’s and Adefehinti’s money laundering convictions 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) turned on their roles in 

allocating the proceeds from the fraudulent sale of a property 

located at 137 Adams Street, N.W. They argue that the 

prosecution failed to offer sufficient evidence of a crucial 

element of such a conviction, namely that they intended to 

conceal the funds in question. In reality, they say, the 

transactions amount to no more than divvying up the joint 

venture’s gains, albeit illegally obtained. We agree. 

To convict a person for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must prove that (1) the 

defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a financial 

transaction; (2) the transaction involved the proceeds of 

unlawful activity; (3) the defendant knew that the proceeds 

were from unlawful activity; and (4) the defendant knew “that 

the transaction [was] designed in whole or in part—(i) to 

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified 

unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); see also 

United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 

1999). Bode and Adefehinti claim that the government failed 

to prove the fourth element of the offense, namely that they 
5

attempted to “conceal or disguise” the fraudulently obtained 

funds. 

The basis of the money laundering convictions was the 

disposition of a settlement check for $41,010, which was 

payable to “Mohamed Massaqudi,” an evidently fictional

seller. The lower left-hand corner of the check stated that the 

check was “for proceeds of settlement of 137 Adams St.” See 

GX 234. The check was endorsed in Massaqudi’s name to 

Bernard Adeola of Image Construction, with a notation of the 

account number of W.H.V. Realty, Adefehinti’s real estate 

company, and was negotiated at NationsBank. Immediately 

thereafter, $8000 was deposited into Bode’s account at 

NationsBank, $16,340 into W.H.V. Realty’s account there, 

$8010 into an unrelated account there, and $7000 was 

received as cash. Adefehinti then wrote checks to Akinkuowo 

on his W.H.V. Realty account for a total of $7000 (one for 

$3000 immediately after the transaction, another for $4000 a 

few days later). 

 The government contends that a reasonable jury could 

conclude that these transactions, originating with a check 

made payable to a fictitious individual, were part of a scheme 

to conceal the fact that these funds were the proceeds of 

fraudulently obtained bank loans. As usual, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 

United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). 

The money laundering statute criminalizes behavior that 

masks the relationship between an individual and his illegally 

obtained proceeds; it has no application to the transparent 

division or deposit of those proceeds. “In its classic form, the 

money launderer folds ill-gotten funds into the receipts of a 

legitimate business.” United States v. Esterman, 324 F.3d 

565, 570 (7th Cir. 2003). Section 1956, enacted as part of the 
6

Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, punishes those who 

“inject[] illegal proceeds into the stream of commerce while 

obfuscating their source.” United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 

921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

It seems clear that, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, 

the necessary intent to conceal requires “something more” 

than the mere transfer of unlawfully obtained funds, though 

that “‘something more’ is hard to articulate.” Esterman, 324 

F.3d at 572. Rather, “subsequent transactions must be 

specifically designed to hide the provenance of the funds 

involved.” United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 843 (7th 

Cir. 1991). Esterman noted that cases in which courts have 

upheld money laundering convictions “have in common the 

existence of more than one transaction, coupled with either 

direct evidence of intent to conceal or sufficiently complex 

transactions that such an intent could be inferred.” 324 F.3d 

at 572. The court’s list of cases that have found laundering is 

instructive: 

Cases concluding that the line has been crossed into the 

“money laundering” territory include United States v. 

Thayer, 204 F.3d 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(funneling illegal funds through various fictitious 

business accounts); United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 

1206, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“elaborate shell game” 

involving multiple inter-company transfers with a variety 

of signatory names); United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 

1374, 1387 (5th Cir. 1995) (“highly unusual” transactions 

involving cashier’s checks, third party deposits, and trust 

accounts used to disguise source of funds); United States 

v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1476-79 (10th Cir. 

1994) (land purchased in name of restaurant to make it 

appear that business was source of wealth and truck 

purchased in wife’s name for stated purpose of deceiving 

IRS); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 858 n.4 
7

(4th Cir. 1992) (reduction in price for sale of house 

combined with under-the-table payment); United States v. 

Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (6th Cir. 1992) (use of 

“front man” and “convoluted financial dealings” to invest 

in emeralds and a charter boat, designed to disguise 

ownership and evade transaction reporting requirements); 

United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1033-37 (10th 

Cir. 1992) (convoluted financial transactions leading up 

to purchase of house, combined with misleading 

statements regarding nature and source of purchase 

money). 

324 F.3d at 572. At the other end of the spectrum are 

“typically simple transactions that can be followed with 

relative ease, or transactions that involve nothing but the 

initial crime.” Id; see also United States v. Olaniyi-Oke, 199 

F.3d 767, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1999). 

The transactions in this matter are of the latter sort. A 

check was negotiated at a bank. A little less than half its 

proceeds ($16,340) were deposited into Adefehinti’s business 

account. Other than $7000 that was received as cash upon 

negotiating the check, the rest was divided among Bode’s 

account and another individual’s. Other than the two checks 

totaling $7000 that Adefehinti addressed to Akinkuowo from 

his W.H.V. Realty account after depositing some of the funds 

there, all the proceeds of the initial check were either cashed 

or went directly into accounts in the name of defendants or 

their associates without passing through any other person’s 

account. 

 Bode’s share was deposited into an account in his own 

name at the bank he frequents. There is no evidence that 

Adefehinti or Bode took steps to disguise or conceal the 

source or destination of the funds. Even assuming the check’s 

original endorsee—Bernard Adeola—was a fictional 
8

character, the funds never entered his account, and the check 

expressly indicated a link to W.H.V. Realty, a firm that could 

easily be tied to Adefehinti. We also note that an FBI agent 

who testified on behalf of the prosecution stated that, in the 

course of his investigation, he never bothered to track down or 

even attempt to contact Adeola or look up his company 

(Image Construction) in Virginia, DC, or Maryland business 

directories. The irrelevance of Adeola was perhaps so 

obvious that the agents saw no point in investing time in his 

pursuit. 

An observer who reads the endorsement on the initial 

check and studies the names and numbers on the subsequent 

deposit slips and checks could discern the money trail with 

ease. The record has no suggestion that the prosecutors and 

law enforcement agents had any difficulty doing so. All the 

transactions conspicuously lack the “convoluted” character 

associated with money laundering. 

During oral argument, the government maintained that 

defendants’ intent to conceal started (and perhaps ended) with 

the deception inherent in making checks payable to straw 

buyers (each of whom, of course, received a check in phase 

two of the transactions, on reselling to a new straw buyer). 

But the proposed analysis would conflate the act of 

fraudulently obtaining money with the act of concealing it—

two different activities which rarely are one and the same. 

See United States v. Seward, 272 F.3d 831, 836 (7th Cir. 

2001) (emphasizing that the “transaction or transactions that 

created the criminally-derived proceeds must be distinct from 

the money-laundering transaction”); United States v. 

Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694, 705 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Money 

laundering criminalizes a transaction in proceeds, not the 

transaction that creates the proceeds.”). Having carried out a 

fraud of which concealment was an integral part, defendants 

cannot be charged with the same concealment a second time, 
9

as if it were the sort of independent manipulation of the 

proceeds required for money laundering. 

 Accordingly, Adefehinti’s and Bode’s convictions for 

money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) cannot 

stand. 

* * * 

Adefehinti (joined by his fellow appellants) argues that the 

district court violated his rights by admitting into evidence 

loan documents based on certificates that the records’ 

custodians provided pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 

902(11). As it appears in the opening brief, the claim appears 

to have two elements: first, that the custodians making the 

certificates lacked knowledge of the propositions they 

certified and that those propositions were altogether 

unsupported; second, that the assertions in the Rule 902(11) 

certificates constituted testimonial evidence within the 

meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-56 

(2004), so that introduction of the loan documents via those 

certificates rather than by live testimony violated defendants’ 

rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. 

The disputed materials are hundreds of loan applications, 

sales contracts, promissory notes, verifications of deposit, 

verifications of employment and similar documents that, 

according to the government, the banks relied upon in 

determining whether to lend money. They were received in 

evidence on the basis of certificates under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 902(11), which permits authentication of “certified 

domestic records of regularly conducted activity” without 

“[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity,” provided that the 

records are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), 

the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and are 
10

accompanied by a certificate meeting the rule’s standards. 

The certificate must contain “a written declaration of [the 

record’s] custodian or other qualified person . . . , certifying” 

that the record 

 (A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the 

matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, 

a person with knowledge of those matters; (B) was kept 

in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and (C) 

was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular 

practice. 

Fed. R. Evid. 902(11). The required assertions are, of course, 

almost exactly the propositions needed for admission of a 

business record under Rule 803(6). 

Here the disputed records were accompanied by 

certificates with assertions tracking Rule 902(11)’s 

specifications. In some instances the certifying custodians 

testified as well. Adefehinti, in his opening brief, alludes to 

the testimony of several witnesses who had provided such 

certificates, claiming that their testimony in fact undermines 

the certificates. Each of the three involves different types of 

documents: (1) a bank official certified the authenticity of 

documents that the bank relied upon in making lending 

decisions; (2) a legal support employee of another bank 

certified the authenticity of checks, deposit slips, and other 

documents related to defendants’ depositing the proceeds of 

their ill-gotten gains; and (3) an operations manager of a title 

company certified the authenticity of certain identifications 

and documents used at closing. The primary focus of 

Adefehinti’s argument, however, is the first category—loansupporting documents. Indeed, this is where his argument is 

strongest, as the way in which the other types of documents 

were created and used more obviously fits the business 
11

records exception. We limit our discussion, then, to the 

certifiers of loan-supporting documents. 

 Frederick Richter, an employee of Standard Federal 

Bank, certified such documents. He testified that he was 

familiar with his bank’s lending process. He explained that, 

for each loan, the bank would receive a set of documents from 

a mortgage broker—documents that the bank would rely on in 

extending loans and that it would store once a loan was made. 

We now turn to the specific claims. 

Alleged absence of support for assertions in the Rule 

902(11) certificates. Adefehinti points to Richter’s testimony 

on cross-examination, which he believes shows that Richter 

(and, by implication, the multiple non-testifying bank officials 

who certified loan-supporting documents) was plainly not 

qualified to make the assertions required by Rule 902(11). 

For example, counsel brought out from Richter that his 

knowledge of the role of specific documents was not based on 

familiarity with the specific transaction but rather on 

knowledge of the bank’s processes and relationship with 

mortgage brokers, and on the fact that the documents were in 

the bank’s files. Apart from that knowledge, and from 

material in the documents themselves (such as dates and 

signatures), he had no way of knowing when, how, or by 

whom a document was initially created, or when it initially 

came into the bank’s possession. 

Assuming the non-testifying certifiers had no more 

knowledge of the documents’ creation than did Richter, there 

are two arguable weaknesses in the factual basis underlying 

the certificates. First, the certifying officials had no direct 

knowledge of the circumstances under which the records were 

made in the sense of being incorporated into the bank’s 

records. Second, the bank certifiers could not competently 

address the original creation of the records; that had occurred 
12

in the course of the mortgage brokers’ business. That being 

so, appellants question whether the certifiers could 

legitimately assert (as required by the rule) that the records 

were “made at or near the time of the occurrence of the 

matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a 

person with knowledge of those matters.” Fed. R. Evid. 

902(11) (emphasis added). 

Neither weakness is fatal to the admissibility of the 

documents. To lay an adequate foundation under Rule 

902(11) (or under Rule 803(6), which Rule 902(11) extends 

by allowing a written foundation in lieu of an oral one), the 

“custodian [of the records] need not have personal knowledge 

of the actual creation of the document.” United States v. 

Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Phoenix 

Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also 

United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992) 

(holding that a toll receipt incorporated into a business’s 

records qualified as a business record, despite the fact that its 

custodian had no knowledge of the toll receipt’s preparation, 

because the receipt had been so embedded in the company’s 

business records to allow such an inference of authenticity). 

Further, several courts have found that a record of which a 

firm takes custody is thereby “made” by the firm within the 

meaning of the rule (and thus is admissible if all the other 

requirements are satisfied). We join those courts. Thus 

United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 986 (5th Cir. 1990), 

found that there was “no requirement that the [business] 

records be created by the business having custody of them,” 

so that insurance company custodians could lay an adequate 

foundation for admitting records compiled by those 

companies from the business records of hospitals. To the 

same effect is United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1333 (9th 

Cir. 1993), which accepted documents under Rule 902(11) 

(such as certificates of title and odometer statements) that 
13

were maintained by an automobile dealership in the regular 

course of business though not originated by the dealership. 

See id. at 1333-34 (reviewing similar cases); Matter of Ollag 

Construction Equipment Corporation, 665 F.2d 43, 46 (2d 

Cir. 1981) (finding that “business records are admissible if 

witnesses testify that the records are integrated into a 

company’s records and relied upon in its day-to-day 

operations,” and noting that relevant financial statements were 

completed at bank’s request and were of a type that the bank 

regularly used to make decisions whether to extend credit); 

United States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 

1977) (holding that freight bills, though drafted by other 

companies, were business records of a shipping company 

because they were “adopted and relied upon by” the shipping 

company). Compare United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 

1287-88 (11th Cir. 2002), where the court found no clear error 

in the district court’s finding that certain documents created 

by defendant and his associates lacked indicia of reliability, 

and thus no abuse of discretion in exclusion of such 

documents, notwithstanding the custodian’s testimony as to 

her employer’s maintenance of the documents. 

Before leaving this topic we must briefly discuss a claim 

that appears only in Adefehinti’s reply brief—a brief in which 

the opening brief’s two-page Rule 902(11) argument burgeons 

into seven pages. Normally, we would not address a claim 

originating in the reply brief. See e.g., Carter v. George 

Washington University, 387 F.3d 872, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 

United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 

1992); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 

1983). But appellants’ new issues shed light both on what we 

have just held and on appellants’ next theory—the claim that 

the assertions contained in the 902(11) certificates were 

testimonial and could thus, under the Confrontation Clause, be 

introduced only in the form of live testimony. 
14

Adefehinti’s reply brief contends that the government 

offered the loan-supporting documents “to demonstrate that 

defendants made false statements in those exhibits to the 

lenders and others.” Adefehinti Reply 3. And, in a creative 

but perplexing formulation, it says that “the alleged false 

statements contained in the 500 exhibits were most definitely 

offered for the truth—the ‘truth’ of their falsity.” Id. 

The first claim is comprehensible but flatly wrong. 

During a bench conference at which defense attorneys 

objected to the admission of six loan-related documents, the 

judge decided to accept the documents into evidence with the 

explicit understanding that the prosecution could not offer 

them as evidence of the truth or falsity of their contents: The 

documents and the financial information represented in them, 

he said, “are being offered to demonstrate the basis on which 

the lender made its decision to loan money.” 10/2/03 PM Tr. 

8 (emphasis added). Further, the prosecution and court 

explicitly recognized that the government needed evidence 

completely independent of the bank documents to show both 

(1) the defendants’ role in causing the false statements’ 

presence in those documents, as well as in submitting the 

documents to the banks, and (2) the falsity of the statements. 

See, e.g., 10/2/03 PM Tr. 4, 12. Adefehinti has not even 

attempted a sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack on the 

government’s proof of those elements of its case. 

As best we can translate the argument that the government 

offered the documents “for the ‘truth’ of their falsity,” 

Adefehinti means to say that the government used them to 

prove that the defendants caused the false assertions to be 

made. As we have seen, that is simply not the case. The 

government offered several dozen witnesses, all of whom the 

defense had an opportunity to cross-examine, to show that 

defendants were responsible for the false assertions in the loan 

documents. And it provided completely independent evidence 
15

that the names, phone numbers, addresses, work information, 

citizenship status, financial information, and other 

representations of those signing the various loan documents 

were false and could be traced to defendants—the sufficiency 

of which, again, Adefehinti does not contest. 

We now return to the underlying requirements for 902(11) 

authentication. The opening clause of Rule 803(6)’s business 

records exception defines the sort of document involved: 

[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in 

any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 

diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 

information transmitted by, a person with knowledge. 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). It then imposes the well-known 

requirements relating to the document’s being kept in the 

regular course of business. In this case, where the documents 

were “made” by the banks in the sense of being acquired, used 

and filed by them, the “knowledge” requirement is clearly 

satisfied if, as the certificates indicated, the persons in charge 

of the documents’ acquisition, use and filing had knowledge 

of the circumstances in which the acquisition, use and filing 

occurred. We need not address the question of the requisite 

knowledge when the record is offered for the truth of the 

propositions it contains, e.g., that a particular piece of 

property could properly be appraised at the stated value. See 

S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

7051, 7063. 

Alleged Confrontation Clause violation in substitution of 

Rule 902(11) certificates for live testimony. Adefehinti argues 

that the district court’s procedure denied him his Sixth 

Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the 

numerous declarants who executed the certificates. We note 

Adefehinti does not argue that the court ever thwarted any 
16

effort to call any of the certifying custodians to the stand, and 

we have found no such ruling. Affirmatively, the contention 

is that “witness affidavits in the form of Rule 902(11) 

certificates fit squarely within the Supreme Court’s definition 

of [testimonial] hearsay” in Crawford. See Adefehinti Br. 13. 

Adefehinti maintains that the certificates are “solemn 

declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of 

establishing or proving some fact” and are “affidavits,” which 

the Supreme Court classified as belonging to the “core class 

of ‘testimonial statements.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 

Our disposition of this issue is simplified by the parties’ 

joint acceptance of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United 

States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006). Starting from 

Crawford’s explicit conclusion that business records “by their 

nature were not testimonial” at the time of the Founding, 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, the Ellis court extended that 

principle to evidence laying the foundation for such records’ 

admission: “Given the records themselves do not fall within 

the constitutional guarantee provided by the Confrontation 

Clause, it would be odd to hold that the foundational evidence 

authenticating the records do[es].” 460 F.3d at 927. 

Adefehinti seeks not to reject but to distinguish Ellis. But he 

does so on grounds that we have already rejected—the 

argument that, in light of Richter’s elucidation of the meaning 

and basis of the certificates, the documents did not qualify as 

business records at all. 

We note in this connection that Rule 803(6) provides an 

explicit exception: otherwise qualifying documents are 

admissible “unless the source of information or the method or 

circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” 

Rule 902(11) provides a procedural device for applying this 

exception (and perhaps others) to certificates, requiring 

advance notice by a party planning to offer evidence via 

902(11) certificates in order “to provide an adverse party with 
17

a fair opportunity to challenge them.” In an appropriate case 

the challenge could presumably take the form of calling a 

certificate’s signatory to the stand. So hedged, the Rule 

902(11) process seems a far cry from the threat of ex parte

testimony that Crawford saw as underlying, and in part 

defining, the Confrontation Clause. 

In any event, as the Rule 902(11) certificates here were 

used only to admit documents acceptable as business records 

under Rule 803(6), and as the appellants neither attack nor 

successfully distinguish Ellis, we find no error. 

* * * 

 We vacate Adefehinti’s and Bode’s money laundering 

convictions for the reasons stated and remand for such resentencing as may be appropriate, and otherwise affirm the 

judgments of the district court in their entirety. 

 So ordered.