IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sixto Rolando Trinidad a/k/a :

Sixto Trinidad Rodriguez and :

Raquel Correa Garcia h/w :

 :

v. : No. 1282 C.D. 2020

 : Submitted: March 7, 2022

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: March 30, 2022

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (DOT) 

appeals from the November 2, 2020 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County (common pleas), which dismissed DOT’s Motion for a Writ of 

Possession (Motion) without prejudice, citing a federal order temporarily halting 

residential evictions. The Motion sought possession of condemned property 

previously owned by Appellee Sixto Rolando Trinidad a/k/a Sixto Trinidad 

Rodriguez and Raquel Correa Garcia h/w (Condemnees). In common pleas’ opinion

issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a), common pleas explained that the Order was not final and did not satisfy 

any exception for collateral orders. On appeal, DOT argues that the Order is an 

appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, 

Pa.R.A.P. 313. DOT further asserts that common pleas erred in dismissing the 
2

Motion because it satisfied the requirements under the Eminent Domain Code1for 

obtaining possession of a condemned property, it paid the estimated just 

compensation to Condemnees, and the cited federal order halting residential 

evictions was inapplicable because the condemned property was commercial, not 

residential. Because we determine that the Order is a final appealable order and that 

common pleas erred in dismissing the Motion where DOT paid the estimated just 

compensation and the federal order halting residential eviction was inapplicable, we 

reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 2019, DOT filed a 

Declaration of Taking under Section 302(a)(1) of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 

Pa.C.S. § 302(a)(1), condemning a commercial property owned by Condemnees and 

located at 4226-4238 North 5th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the Property). 

Condemnees used the Property for commercial purposes as a tire shop. Notice of 

the condemnation was served on Condemnees on March 27, 2019. Condemnees did 

not file preliminary objections to the Declaration of Taking but did file a Petition for 

Appointment of Viewers (Petition) to ascertain just compensation for the taking of 

the Property. Common pleas granted the Petition on September 11, 2019, and 

appointed a Board of Viewers (Board). 

On August 21, 2019, DOT filed a Petition to Deposit Estimated Just 

Compensation “to assure [DOT’s] possession of the condemned property . . . under 

Section 307 of the Eminent Domain Code,” 26 Pa.C.S. § 307. (Original Record 

(O.R.) Item 7, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 43a-44a.) Common pleas issued an 

order on September 12, 2019, permitting DOT to deposit the estimated amount of 

1

26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106.
3

just compensation and prorated taxes, totaling $151,867.67, into an interest-bearing 

account. Condemnees then filed a Petition to Release the Estimated Just 

Compensation, which common pleas granted on December 19, 2019, ordering the 

release of the $151,867.67 directly to Condemnees. While preparing for the Board 

hearing, DOT obtained an updated appraisal, which resulted in an increased

appraised value of $194,000 for the Property. As such, DOT issued Condemnees a 

check for $42,132.33, the difference between the updated appraised value and the 

original value of $151,867.67. 

On August 24, 2020, DOT filed the Motion with common pleas, asserting that,

despite not filing preliminary objections and the payment and release of the 

estimated just compensation, Condemnees had not vacated the Property. DOT 

sought, pursuant to Section 307(a) of the Eminent Domain Code, for common pleas 

to quiet title and issue a writ of possession against Condemnees. Condemnees filed 

a response opposing the Motion, arguing DOT had not fully compensated them for 

the condemnation of the Property and that they were waiting for the Board’s decision

before vacating. While the Motion was pending, on August 17, 2020, the Board held 

a hearing on the matter, later determining in its subsequent October 5, 2020 report 

that damages amounted to $230,000. DOT then appealed the Board’s decision. 

Common pleas entered the Order dismissing the Motion without prejudice on 

November 2, 2020. In the Order, common pleas cited to “85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 

4, 2020),” the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention’s Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to 

Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 (Federal Residential Eviction Halt), which 

temporarily halted residential evictions from September 4, 2020, through December 
4

31, 2020. (O.R. Item 18, R.R. at 91a n.1.) DOT filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 

which common pleas denied. DOT appealed to this Court.2 

At common pleas’ direction, DOT filed a Concise Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In its 1925(a) opinion, common pleas explained that

the “Order was not a final, appealable [o]rder and did not meet any of the exceptions 

for interlocutory appeals under Pa.R.A.P. 313.” (1925(a) Opinion (Op.) at 2.) 

Noting that DOT “ha[d] not lost any of its rights and the Motion [] was dismissed 

without prejudice so as to be refiled at an appropriate time,” common pleas requested 

that this Court remand the matter “for a proper adjudication on the Motion.” (Id.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Parties’ Arguments

On appeal, DOT argues that common pleas’ Order denying the Motion is an 

appealable, collateral order. DOT maintains that the November 2, 2020 Order is 

immediately appealable because the right to possession is an independent issue that

is “separable [from] and collateral to the main cause of action” that involves

Condemnees’ claim for full compensation, and the right to possession is a right too 

important to be denied immediate review because DOT’s highway project, which is 

contingent on possession of the Property, will be delayed thereby affecting the safety 

of the public. (DOT’s Brief (Br.) at 9-11.) DOT points out that this “project involves 

contracts and schedules with third parties” and, “[w]ithout immediate possession, 

[]DOT is at risk of violating [those] contracts” and “significantly delay[ing] the 

2

“Our scope of review in an eminent domain case is limited to whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, an error of law was committed, or the findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence.” In re Condemnation of 30.60 Acres of Land, 572 A.2d 242, 244 n.4 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1990).
5

project.” (Id. at 12.) Given that it could take years for DOT’s appeal of the Board’s 

decision concerning the full compensation to resolve, and as DOT will be unable to 

“recoup any losses from delays and increased costs,” DOT argues that any loss 

resulting from the delay is irreparable and, therefore, common pleas’ Order is an

immediately appealable collateral order. (Id. at 11-12.) 

On the merits, DOT asserts that it is entitled to possession of the Property

pursuant to Sections 302(a) and 307 of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 302(a), 307, and common pleas erred in denying the Motion. In particular, 

because it has already paid Condemnees “the amount of just compensation as 

estimated by” DOT, and there have been no allegations or evidence that DOT “acted 

with fraud or palpable bad faith in making payment of or offering estimated just 

compensation,” which is all that is required for obtaining possession, DOT submits 

that the Order should be reversed. (Id. at 13-14 (quoting 26 Pa.C.S. § 307(a)(1)(i))

(citing Redevelopment Auth. of Wilkes-Barre v. Serafin, 404 A.2d 440, 442 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1979)).) Finally, DOT maintains common pleas erred in relying on the 

Federal Residential Eviction Halt here because the Property is commercial, not 

residential. Accordingly, DOT requests this Court to reverse common pleas’ Order 

denying the Motion.

In response, Condemnees maintain that common pleas properly denied the 

Motion because they have not been paid full compensation for the value of the 

Property and common pleas’ Order is supported by substantial evidence and the law. 

Given that DOT has appealed the Board’s decision, Condemnees submit that 

common pleas did not err in dismissing the Motion without prejudice, and that DOT 

may file another motion for writ of possession if it so chooses. 
6

B. Analysis

1. Appealability of the Order

Common pleas determined that the Order is not a final order or an appealable, 

collateral order. The general rule is that “an appellate court’s jurisdiction extends 

only to review of final orders.” Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass’n, 977 A.2d 1121, 

1124-25 (Pa. 2009) (citing Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(a),

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) (“[A]n appeal may be taken as of right from any final order.”)). 

Final orders include those that: (1) “dispose[] of all claims and of all parties,” (2) are 

entered as final orders, or (3) are orders defined as final as to petitions under the Post

Conviction Relief Act.3 Pa.R.A.P. 341(b), (c), (f). 

Conversely, a collateral order is defined as an order that is (1) “separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action where [(2)] the right involved is too 

important to be denied review and [(3)] the question presented is such that if review 

is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313(b), Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). The collateral 

order doctrine thus permits appellate review “of a narrow class of orders which 

address claims of right ‘separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 

action, too important to be denied review[,] and too independent of the cause [of 

action] itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case 

is adjudicated.’” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1125 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)) (second alteration in original). Our Supreme Court 

has construed the collateral order doctrine narrowly in order to avoid piecemeal 

litigation and the consequent protraction of litigation. Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129 (citing 

Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 107 A.2d 854, 855 (Pa. 1954)). In reviewing whether an 

3

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9542-9546.
7

order is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the “threepronged test must be applied independently to each distinct legal issue over which 

an appellate court is asked to assert jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 313.” Rae, 977 

A.2d at 1130. Accordingly, we turn to the three prongs of the collateral order 

doctrine: (1) separability; (2) importance; and (3) irreparable loss. 

a. Separability

This Court has stated that “[a]n order is separable if it does not affect the 

merits of the main cause of action.” Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth. v. Gladstone, 

999 A.2d 1248, 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citation omitted). “As to separability, 

[our Supreme] Court has adopted a practical analysis recognizing that some potential 

interrelationship between merits issues and the question sought to be raised in the 

interlocutory appeal is tolerable.” Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 

433 (Pa. 2006). Accordingly,

[s]o long as the issue is conceptually distinct from the merits, that is, 

where, even if practically intertwined with the merits, it nonetheless 

raises a question that is significantly different from the questions 

underlying the party’s claim on the merits, it is separable from the main 

cause of action.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 791 (Pa. 2014) (alterations, quotations, 

and citations omitted) (alteration added).

Here, the order before this Court is common pleas’ Order denying DOT’s 

Motion that sought possession of the Property. DOT asserts that this order is 

separate from the ongoing litigation concerning DOT’s appeal from the Board’s 

decision, which concerns the value of full compensation for the taking of the 

Property. Section 307(a)(1)(i) of the Eminent Domain Code provides: 
8

The condemnor, after the expiration of the time for filing preliminary 

objections by the condemnee to the declaration of taking, shall be 

entitled to possession or right of entry upon payment of or a written 

offer to pay to the condemnee [of] the amount of just compensation 

as estimated by the condemnor.

26 Pa.C.S. § 307(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). As Section 307(a)(1)(i) plainly states, 

the right to possession of a condemned property is an issue concerning only whether 

“the amount of just compensation as estimated by the condemnor” has been paid 

or offered to be paid in writing to the condemnee. Id. (emphasis added). Here, there 

is no dispute that the amount of just compensation as estimated by DOT has been 

paid to Condemnees. Thus, under the Eminent Domain Code, the issue of the right 

to possession remains “significantly different from the questions underlying” the 

issue of full compensation, Williams, 86 A.3d at 781. Accordingly, for the purpose 

of the collateral order doctrine, we are satisfied that the issue of the right to 

possession “does not affect the merits of the main cause of action” and, therefore, is 

separable. Gladstone, 999 A.2d at 1254.

b. Importance

Turning to the second prong of the collateral order doctrine, the right involved 

must be too important to be denied review. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). “[I]t is not sufficient 

that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights 

deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” 

Geniviva v. Frisk, 725 A.2d 1209, 1213-14 (Pa. 1999). Specifically, “before 

concluding an issue satisfies the test’s second prong . . . [,] we consider whether the 

right is important compared to the ‘costs of piecemeal litigation’ and the ‘efficiency 

interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.’” Rae, 977

A.2d at 1129 (quoting Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 552 (Pa. 1999)).
9

We recognize that there is a relationship between granting possession of 

condemned property to the condemnors where the condemnors have condemned a 

property, initiated statutory taking procedures, and satisfied Section 307(a)(1)(i)’s 

requirements for possession and the longstanding public policy favoring eminent 

domain taking for public use. Our Supreme Court has explained:

The theory of eminent domain comes from the absolute right of the 

sovereign to take property for public use. All title interests must be 

included in the taking. It would be unthinkable that outstanding 

interests or rights in the land should remain in others after 

condemnation; to permit such interests to remain would materially 

interfere with the completion of the purposes for which the government, 

or those acting for it or in [it]s right, have taken the property through

eminent domain. It is therefore a matter of public policy that 

condemnation operates against all interests directly connected with the 

title of land, including all unrecorded equities or hidden interests 

indirectly connected with or growing out of such titles.

Briegel v. Briegel, 160 A. 581, 582 (Pa. 1931). Further, there is a separate public 

policy against “restrain[ing] one in the use or control of property in which he alone 

is interested.” In re Decker’s Estate, 46 A.2d 218, 219 (Pa. 1946). Considering the 

interrelated policy issues between the government’s absolute right to take property 

for public use, a condemnee’s right to just compensation for that taking and 

subsequent divestment of all interests in the property thereafter, and a condemnor’s 

right to make use of property for public use to which it has established a legal right 

to possession thereof, we agree with DOT that this issue “involve[s] rights deeply 

rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Geniviva, 

725 A.2d at 1213-14. As compared to the “costs of piecemeal litigation” and “the 

efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule,”

Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129, this Court is satisfied that these policy considerations are

likewise important and justify immediate appellate review where DOT has 
10

established its right to possession and alleges that it has been effectively restrained 

in the use and control of the Property to the detriment of the public due to common 

pleas’ Order denying its Motion. Accordingly, the issue raised in the Order meets 

the importance prong of the collateral order doctrine.

c. Irreparable Loss

“The remaining prong of the collateral order doctrine requires us to consider 

whether . . . if the review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will 

be irreparably lost.” Ben, 729 A.2d at 552. In examining this prong, we ask 

“whether a right is ‘adequately vindicable’ or ‘effectively reviewable.’” Geniviva, 

725 A.2d at 1213 (quoting Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 

878-79 (1994)). In sum, we must determine whether the lower court’s ruling “cannot 

be undone.” Ben, 729 A.2d at 552. We have explained:

This question cannot be answered without a judgment about the value 

interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final 

judgment requirement. For instance, the substantial cost a party would 

incur in defending a claim may equate to an irreparable loss of a right 

to avoid the burden entirely.

Com. ex rel. Kane v. Philip Morris, Inc., 128 A.3d 334, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) 

(quotations and citations omitted). In Pridgen, the Supreme Court held that an order

denying summary judgment in a case concerning statutory claims under the General 

Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA)4satisfied the irreparable injury prong 

because the appellants, comprised of aviation manufacturers sued in relation to a 

fatal aviation accident, established that they would “incur in defending th[at] 

complex litigation at trial on the merits . . . a sufficient loss,” particularly where the 

4

49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40130.
11

public interest is involved. 905 A.2d at 433. Because the United States Congress 

had created an interest in freedom from tort claims under GARA, this interest 

weighed in favor of allowing an immediate appeal in order to avoid such sufficient 

losses that would incur should the appellants be forced to try a case properly 

disposed of on summary judgment. Thus, in analyzing this prong, our Supreme 

Court considered the interest at stake, the ultimate and proper legal result of the 

merits issue, the costs that the party would incur if an appeal was not immediately 

available, and the ability of the party to recoup those costs in that event. Id. at 433-

34.

If we were to determine that the Order dismissing the Motion is not 

immediately appealable, the practical effect would require DOT to wait to obtain 

possession of the Property until the culmination of its appeal from the Board’s 

decision concerning the proper amount of full compensation for the condemnation. 

DOT asserts that absent the ability to take control of the Property, its highway project 

will be continually delayed, resulting in the violation of contracts with third parties 

and no avenue through which it could pursue any claims to recoup for any such 

violations or costs from delay. Additionally, DOT alleges harm to the traveling 

public as a result. Considering that DOT has established its legal right to possession

discussed further below, and that if DOT is required to litigate its appeal of the 

Board’s decision concerning the full value of compensation before gaining 

possession of the Property, it and the public would suffer losses due to waiting for 

the ultimate disposition in that litigation, we are satisfied that the substantial costs

that DOT would incur here would not be “adequately vindicable,” Geniviva, 725 

A.2d at 1213, and, effectively, “c[ould] not be undone,” Ben, 729 A.2d at 552, if 

review were delayed. Similar to incurring a loss for defending a meritless claim at 
12

trial, Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433, DOT would incur losses due to delays and violations 

of contracts with third parties if it is forced to litigate its appeal from the Board’s 

decision prior to taking possession of the Property. Accordingly, the Order satisfies 

the irreparable loss prong. 

Finally, we are satisfied that allowing an appeal from common pleas’ Order 

denying the Motion is consistent with our concern not only for judicial economy but 

for “judicial accuracy.” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1130 (emphasis in original). “[A]s a 

general rule, an appellate court is more likely to decide a question correctly after 

judgment, where it may consider the claim in the context of a complete adjudication 

and a fully developed record.” Id. (citation omitted). While this maxim typically 

holds true for most appeals, the one before us appears to be an exception to such

rule. The remaining litigation between the parties concerning DOT’s appeal from 

the Board’s decision on the amount of full compensation that is owed has no bearing 

on the issue of whether DOT is currently entitled to possession of the Property, and 

there is nothing that the record of that appeal could supplement this Court in deciding 

the issue before us. Accordingly, in this narrow instance, the Order meets the prongs 

for the collateral order doctrine and is immediately appealable as of right.

2. Merits

Having determined that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we turn to its 

merits. DOT asserts that common pleas erred in denying the Motion because DOT 

paid Condemnees $194,000 in estimated just compensation, there were no 

preliminary objections filed, and there were no allegations or evidence of fraud or 

bad faith. We agree. Section 307(a)(1)(i) of the Eminent Domain Code provides: 

The condemnor, after the expiration of the time for filing preliminary 

objections by the condemnee to the declaration of taking, shall be 
13

entitled to possession or right of entry upon payment of or a written 

offer to pay to the condemnee [of] the amount of just compensation 

as estimated by the condemnor.

26 Pa.C.S. § 307(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Concerning the authority of a trial court 

to set aside a condemnor’s declaration of estimated just compensation, this Court 

has explained:

Only fraud or palpable bad faith in making the declaration, described 

by clear averments of facts in the condemnee’s pleading and thereafter 

proved by clear, precise[,] and indubitable evidence will justify the 

employment by the trial court of the powers we now hold they possess 

to set aside the condemnor’s declaration, to appoint an impartial 

appraiser[,] and to enter judgment in favor of the condemnee.

In re Condemnation by City of Phila. of Leasehold of Airportels, Inc., 398 A.2d 224, 

229 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). In Airportels, a condemnee tendered possession of a 

condemned property and petitioned for an order compelling the condemnor to pay 

just compensation. The condemnor, however, estimated the just compensation at 

zero dollars. The condemnee challenged a condemnor’s estimation of just 

compensation because it was far less than the condemnee’s expectations and the 

valuations by condemnee’s appraisers. We explained that the amount determined to 

be a condemnor’s estimation of just compensation is only reviewable by the trial 

court where there are such allegations and evidence of fraud or bad faith. Applying 

this approach to a matter involving a writ of possession, in Serafin, we explained 

that where the condemnee alleges such facts and provides evidence thereto, “then 

and only then should the trial court refuse to issue the writ of possession.” 404 A.2d 

at 442. Accordingly, absent allegations and proof of fraud or bad faith, a trial court 

errs in denying a writ of possession where a condemnor’s estimated just 

compensation has been paid to and accepted by a condemnee.
14

It is undisputed that Condemnees did not file preliminary objections to the 

Declaration of Taking. Further, it is undisputed that DOT paid, and that 

Condemnees accepted, “the amount of just compensation as estimated by [DOT].” 

26 Pa.C.S. § 307(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added); (O.R. Item 7; R.R. at 43a-55a). Indeed, 

the record shows, and Condemnees do not dispute, that DOT paid them the initial 

$151,867.67 in estimated just compensation and then paid an additional amount, for 

a total of $194,000, following an additional appraisal. Nonetheless, Condemnees

maintain that DOT is not entitled to possession of the property until full 

compensation is paid, as determined by the Board. However, this position is not 

supported by the plain language of Section 307(a)(1)(i), which conditions the right 

of possession only on the payment of “the amount of just compensation as 

estimated by the condemnor.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 307(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, Condemnees have made no allegations of fraud or bad faith in the 

calculation of that just compensation that would permit common pleas to deny the 

Motion. Airportels, 398 A.2d at 229; Serafin, 404 A.2d at 442. Accordingly, 

because DOT paid, and Condemnees accepted, the amount of just compensation as 

estimated by DOT, common pleas lacked authority to deny the Motion.

Further, we agree with DOT that common pleas erred in referencing the 

Federal Residential Eviction Halt to justify dismissing the Motion, as it only 

pertained to residential evictions. 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (“The Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention . . . temporarily halt residential evictions.”) (emphasis 

added). The Property here, however, was not residential but commercial, with 

Condemnees operating a tire store thereon. As such, the Federal Residential 

Eviction Halt did not apply to the Property. Accordingly, common pleas erred in 

dismissing the Motion.
15

III. CONCLUSION

Based on our determinations that the Order was an appealable, collateral 

order, that DOT established its right to possession of the Property by paying 

Condemnees the estimated just compensation for the condemnation, and that the 

Federal Residential Eviction Halt was inapplicable to the commercial Property, 

common pleas erred in dismissing the Motion. Accordingly, we reverse.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sixto Rolando Trinidad a/k/a :

Sixto Trinidad Rodriguez and :

Raquel Correa Garcia h/w :

 :

v. : No. 1282 C.D. 2020

 :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

NOW, March 30, 2022, the November 2, 2020 Order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas), dismissing the Department of 

Transportation’s Motion for Writ of Possession, is REVERSED, and this matter is 

REMANDED to common pleas to issue the Writ of Possession to the Department 

of Transportation in accordance with the above-captioned opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge