alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law

of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation

of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms

and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 6/18/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

C & D DRILLING COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DEVO GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-1228

(D.C. No. 94-B-178)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before PORFILIO, JONES,** and TACHA, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.
2

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted

without oral argument.

Defendant-appellant Devo General Partnership (Devo) appeals from the district

court’s decision denying Devo’s motion for summary judgment and, instead, granting

plaintiff C & D Drilling Company, Inc. summary judgment against Devo on the fraudulent

transfer claim plaintiff, as a creditor of Devo’s predecessor, Moya Overview, Inc., asserted

against Devo. We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This

court reviews a summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the record in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Carl v. City of Overland Park, 65 F.3d 866, 868 (10th Cir.

1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuinely disputed material

issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). 

Plaintiff’s claims against Moya arose from a 1987 agreement. In this action, plaintiff

asserted claims against Moya for the rescission of the 1987 agreement or, alternatively, for

damages as a result of a breach of that agreement. When Moya failed to file a response, the

district court entered a default judgment against that entity on the contract claims.

Also in this action, plaintiff asserted a fraudulent transfer claim against Devo. In

October 1991, Moya had transferred all of its assets to Devo. Devo does not dispute the

district court’s determination that this transfer was fraudulent. See Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 38-8-105(a) and (b). Rather, Devo asserts that it cannot be liable to plaintiff on the
3

fraudulent transfer claim because the basis of that claim, plaintiff’s underlying contract

claims against Moya, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, notwithstanding the

default judgment entered against Moya on those contract claims. The district court rejected

this argument. Upon review of the record and the parties’ appellate arguments, we find no

reversible error. We, therefore, AFFIRM the decision of the United States District Court for

the District of Colorado.

Entered for the Court

Nathaniel R. Jones

Senior Circuit Judge
# Official Journal C 220/3 Ju

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 220 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 653 June 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 220

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 653 June 2022

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2022/C 220/01 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2022/C 220/02 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Cases where the Commission raises no objections | 15 |

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2022/C 220/01

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

1

2022/C 220/02

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Cases where the Commission raises no objections

15

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
Filed 1/16/14 In re Athena Q. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re ATHENA Q., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. VIRGINIA P., Defendant and Appellant. D064707
(Super. Ct. No. J513950C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sa n Diego County, Jean P. Leonard, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Rive rside Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.2 Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Seni or Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Virginia P. appeals the juvenile court' s denial of her petiti on under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to modify a prior order th at removed custody of her daughter under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1). In support of her petition, Virginia cited as changed circumstances that she "has continued to participate in services comprising [ sic ] of therapy and substance abuse treatment . . . ." The trial court denied Virginia's petition, fi nding that she failed to make a prima facie showing, that she failed to show chan ged circumstances, and that granting the modification would not be in th e minor's best interests. On appeal, Virginia does not assign any spec ific error to the court's order denying her petition. Instead, she merely "joins in and adopts by reference the arguments presented in her opening brief in Appeal No . D064265." Virginia's appeal in case No. D064265 challenged the trial court's de termination that her daughter was not an
Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1921 et seq.). 1 The arguments advanced in Virginia's opening brief in case No. D0642 65 have nothing to

1 We affirmed that determination in an unpublished decision filed December 23, 2013.3 do with the order that she cha llenges in the instant appeal. 2 We therefore conclude that Virginia has abandoned her appeal of the or der denying her petition under section 388. ( Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist . (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700 ["When an issue is unsupported by pe rtinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussi on by the reviewing court is unnecessary."].)
DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:

M C DONALD, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

2 If Virginia intended for us to construe he r current argument to be that a prior error on the ICWA determination rendered void the subsequent denial of her petition to modify, our disposition of her previous appeal disposes of that contention.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

ERIC JACKSON, et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, 

Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:22-cv-825-P

DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

Defendants respectfully notify the Court of the recent decision in Crocker v. Austin, No. 

22-cv-757, 2023 WL 4143224 (W.D. La. June 22, 2023). In that case, seven members of the Air 

Force who had sought religious accommodations exempting them from the Air Force’s COVID19 vaccination requirement challenged that requirement, bringing claims under the First 

Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. See 

id. at *1. As in this case, the defendants in Crocker moved to dismiss the case as moot following 

the enactment of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, 

Pub. L. No. 117-263, 136 Stat. 2395 (2022), and the subsequent rescission of the Air Force’s 

COVID-19 vaccination requirement. See id. at *3–4. On June 22, 2023, the Crocker court granted 

the defendants’ motion, finding that the case was moot, see id. at *5–6, and that the mootness 

exceptions for voluntary cessation, actions capable of repetition but evading review, and collateral 

consequences did not apply, see id. at *6–8. Crocker provides additional support for Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss this case as moot, ECF No. 69.

Case 4:22-cv-00825-P Document 88 Filed 06/26/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1948
2

Dated: June 26, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN M. BOYNTON

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

ALEXANDER K. HAAS

Branch Director

ANTHONY H. COPPOLINO

Deputy Branch Director

/s/ Cody T. Knapp 

CODY T. KNAPP (NY Bar #5715438)

JOHNNY H. WALKER (DC Bar #991325)

Trial Attorneys

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division

Federal Programs Branch

1100 L Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20530

Tel.: (202) 532-5663

Fax: (202) 616-8460

Email: cody.t.knapp@usdoj.gov

Counsel for Defendants

Case 4:22-cv-00825-P Document 88 Filed 06/26/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 1949
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1087 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1087

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent price gouging during 
                               disasters.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 24, 1993

    Mr. Baker of Louisiana introduced the following bill; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent price gouging during 
                               disasters.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Disaster Area Price Gouging 
Prevention Act of 1993''.

SEC. 2. TITLE 18 AMENDMENT.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 41 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 880. Price gouging during disaster
    ``(a) Whoever engages in price gouging in a disaster area shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
    ``(b) As used in this section--
            ``(1) the term `price gouging' means selling a good or 
        service at a price greater than or equal to twice the median 
        price prevailing in the locality just before the disaster, but 
        in computing the price increase for the purposes of this 
        section, a charge for any attendant business risk and other 
        reasonable expenses that result from the disaster shall not be 
        included;
            ``(2) the term `in a disaster area' means in a geographical 
        area with respect to which a declaration that such area is a 
        disaster area--
                    ``(A) has been made by the chief executive of the 
                State in which such area is located; and
                    ``(B) is in effect; and
            ``(3) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia, 
        Puerto Rico, and any other territory or possession of the 
        United States.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 41 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following:

``Price gouging during disaster.''.

                                 <all>
```
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350) The certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of satisfying the
requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and may not be relied upon or used
for any other purposes. In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corporation (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, James G. Bradley, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  1.
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within
the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request. Dated: May 10, 2005
    /s/      James G. BradleyChief Executive Officer The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an
Exhibit to this report and should not be considered filed as a part of this report.
Community

Sponsor Profile

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Address: ________________________________________________________________ 

Home Phone: ________________________ Work Phone _________________________ 

Cell Phone: __________________________ E-mail _____________________________ 

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Name of Spouse: _________________________________________________________ 

Occupation: _________________________ Work Place __________________________ 

Cell Phone: _______________________ E-mail ______________________________

Sponsor’s Organizational Affiliation (clubs, etc.) and/or hobbies: 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Spouse’s Organizational Affiliation (clubs, etc.) and/or hobbies: 

Preferred Countries to Sponsor (please indicate if open to all countries): 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Mini-Biography: 

(please provide a 3-5 sentence mini-bio about yourself and family) 

______________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________ __________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

If you have questions about the Community Sponsor Program, please contact a staff member in 

the International Military Student Office: imso@.ndu.edu

Geri Wilson: (757) 443-6626 

Liz Woodlief: (757) 443-6135 

Blake Traeger: (757) 443-6134 

Syanti Dafoe: (757) 443-6309 

Mailing Address: 

Joint Forces Staff College 

Attn: International Military Student Office 

7800 Hampton Blvd 

Norfolk VA 23511-1702 
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

APPLICATION

COMMUNITY SPONSR PROGRAM
#### HAYS v. STATE.

No. 26185.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 18, 1953.

Reid & Reid, Abilene, for appellant.

Phil W. Davis, Jr., Co. Atty., Aspermont, Hubert Roach, former Co. Atty., pro tern., Jay ton, Robert C. Hamilton, Sp. Prosecutor, Clairemont, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The offense is the possession of whiskey in a dry area for the purpose of sale with two like offenses alleged for enhancement of penalty.

Appellant did not testify. He insists that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

About 10:30 P.M. on April 25, 1952, an officer of the Liquor Control Board and the sheriff went to appellant’s residence with a search warrant. Appellant drove up and entered the house and the officers followed him. After a brief conversation, appellant was asked to take his hand out of his pocket, then Officer Bowman took an unopened pint bottle (upon the trial contents shown to be whiskey) from the pocket where appellant had'his hand. No. whiskey was found in the house.

The witness Bowman testified that immediately after removal of the bottle from appellant’s pocket and while he was holding the bottle the following conversation took place:

> “Kenneth, I said, Looks like you are doing pretty good around here, you got a pretty good Oldsmobile, and he said, ‘Well, I don’t make my living altogether bootlegging.’ He said, T go to the G. I. School.’ He said his car was financed with some finance company.”

Sheriff Frazier testified and gave the following as his version of the conversation :

> “Mr. Bowman told him to take his hands out of his pockets and when he pulled the pint of whiskey, he made the remark to Kenneth, said, ‘Kenneth, you are getting rich bootlegging, driving a new Oldsmobile.’ Kenneth said, ‘Well, I got that Oldsmobile ■ in' the finance company and besides that, I don’t make it all bootlegging, I go to the G. I. School’ ”.

The facts do not authorize the application of the prima facie rule in that “not more than a quart of whiskey” was shown to have been possessed. The burden of .propf was On the state, in order to sustain a conviction, to furnish some evidence that the whiskey in appellant’s possession was possessed for the purpose of sale. Ballew v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 454, 121 S.W. 2d 369.

The trial court, in his charge, limited the jury’s consideration of prior convictions for the purpose only of enhancement of penalty.

The state, without the aid of the prima facie evidence rule, was required to furnish some evidence showing that ap*1004pellant did possess the pint of whiskey for sale. The statement to the officers set out herein was not an acknowledgment of guilt, nor an admission that he possessed same for the purpose of sale. The fact that appellant had the bottle covered by his hand in his pocket does no more than raise a strong suspicion of guilt.

The evidence is therefore insufficient to support the conviction.

The judgment is reversed and remanded.

Opinion approved by the Court.
The Elco Corporation 1000 Belt Line Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44109-2800 • Tel (216) 749-2605 • Fax (216) 749-7462

TSCA EXEMPTION REQUEST LETTER TO US EPA 

## ....., = 

## ...., THE ELCO CORPORATION June 20, 2013 c.... c::: O;;u**~** 

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# .. w 0 Document Control Office (DC0)(7407M) Office of Pollution Control and Taxies (OPPT) U.S. EPA l..t:m,., VOflUUI 1\IUrTlOer 1200 Pennsylvania AvenueNW. Washington

### D.C. :20460 ·· · '' ) I ;-,--.\I i

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### 4Q. Cf8, Part 7P9.5089 ,(Docket #EPA-HQ-OPPT-2009-0112) TSCA Section 4 HPV3 Testing Program The ELCO Corporation Application for Exemption from Testing for CAS#72162-15-3 (1-Decene, sulfurized) Cost Sharing with Dover Chemical Corporation Via Certified Mail: 7004 1160 0003 4669 1873 To Whom It May Concern: 

# 354908

The ELCO Corporation, 100 Belt Line Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44109-2800, hereby applies for an exemption from th,e test rwlerequirements referenced above on the basis that the required testing for 1-Decene, sulfurized (CAS#72162-15-3) is being conducted by another person, the Dover Chemical Corporation, 3676 Davis Road N.W., Dover, OH 44622. The ELCO Corporation has agreed with Dover Chemical to pay a percentage ofthe testing costs incurred by Dover Chemical in conducting the testing. Sincerely,

# ~<4/tLJ,P Thomas 

### W. Steib

. Vice President Manufacturing

. The Elco• Corporation

· (440) 997-6131, ext. 201

tsteib@elcocorp.com

Worldwide Supplier of Spec;;ialty Chemicals Since 1927 

# •WotdNida SupplerofSpeda/tyC/wmicals SJnca 1927 1000 Belt Une Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44109-2800 

# I II 1111

# ~ I

7004 1160 0003 4669 1873 \P,A\LED FROM ZIP CODE L',4C04

Document Control Office (DC0)(7407M) Office of Pollution Control and Toxics (OPPT) U.S. EPA 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington D.C. 20460 

# -**~**

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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lawrence Moore, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Contrary to defendant’s contention, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490). Further, we find no merit in defendant’s argument that the police witness bolstered the identification testimony of the eyewitnesses to the crime. The testimony of the police witness referred not to any identification made by the eyewitness, but to the identification of defendant made by the police witness as he arrived at the scene. The court did not err in admitting the testimony by the fingerprint expert. Defendant’s sentence was not harsh and excessive. (Appeal from judgment of Erie County Court, D’Amico, J.—criminal possession of weapon, third degree.) Present —Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.