COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Beal es and Senior Judge Annunziata

SHAMECA JACKSON v. Record No. 0320-09-3
ROANOKE CITY DE PARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM ROBERT JACKSON, SR. SEPTEMBER 1, 2009 v. Record No. 0793-09-3
ROANOKE CITY DE PARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE William D. Broadhurst, Judge (Rena G. Berry, on brief), for Shameca Jackson. Shameca Jackson submitting on brief. (David W. Steidle, on brief), for Robert Jackson, Sr. Robert Jackson, Sr. submitting on brief. (William M. Hackworth, City Attorney; Heather P. Ferguson, Assistant City Attorney; Diana M. Perkinson, Guardian ad litem for the minor children; Perkinson and Perk inson, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on briefs.

Shameca Jackson (mother) and Robert Jackson, Sr. (father) appeal a decision terminating their parental rights to their children. Mother and father argue that the trial court erred in finding that there was sufficient eviden ce to terminate their parental rights to their children. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence pr oved that mother and fath er have three children. 1 On January 30, 2007, the Roanoke City De partment of Social Serv ices (DSS) received a ch ild protective services (CPS) complaint that mother lacked the capacity to take care of th e children and that father had a substance abuse problem. When a CPS worker came to the house, mother admitted having post-partum depressi on and was taking medication. Fa ther admitted using crack cocaine for twenty-two years. The CPS worker requested that he take a drug test, but he refused. The CPS worker, mother, and father developed a safety plan and agreed that mother would not be left alone with the children. On February 1, 2007, the c ourt entered a preliminary child protective order, which required father and mother to submit to random drug and alcoho l testing, complete substance abuse assessments and psychological evaluations, cooper ate with any recommen ded treatment, fully cooperate with DSS, allow DSS access to the children and the home, and provide appropriate supervision for the children at all times. Subsequently, father twic e tested positive for cocaine, and mother tested negative for both drugs and alcohol. Despite the safety plan and the preliminary protective order, mother wa s alone with the children on multiple occasions. On February 13, 20 07, the court entered an emergenc y removal order because of the parents’ failure to follow the previous order. The CPS complaint against mother and father was founded at a Level One based on physical neglect a nd inadequate supervision for all three children.

1 At the time of the initial complaint, the children were approximately two years old, one year old, and one month old.- 3 - Once the children were in DS S’s custody, DSS required moth er and father to seek and maintain appropriate and stable housing, attend scheduled visitations, cooperate fully with DSS and any other service provider, and provide for the fina ncial support of her child ren. Mother also was required to participate in parentin g classes and demonstrate the skills learned in that class. Father also was required to maintain stable employment and income, complete a substance abuse assessment and participate in any recommended tr eatment, and participate in anger management class. Neither parent wa s able to meet these goals. They co uld not maintain stab le and appropriate housing. At the time of the trial, both were in homeless shelters. Father did not visit his children regularly, and when he di d, there were concerns about his intera ctions with them. Mother visited regularly; however, there were concerns about her inte ractions with the childr en. Mother frequently needed the assistance of a DSS st aff member to help her manage a ll three children. Father did not follow through with the s ubstance abuse treatment and repeatedly tested positive for cocaine from February 2007 through April 2008. Father al so did not complete the Domestic Violence Alternatives Program. On February 28, 2007, mother underwent a psychological ev aluation by Dr. Klair Mundy. Dr. Mundy concluded that mother “does not have the cognitive capacity, nor the personality style, that would be conducive to providing her children with a safe and secure home environment on her own. She would need constant 24-hour care and intervention to assist her in that capacity.” At trial, Dr. Mundy did not believe that her conclusion would change in the n ear future. In September 2008, mother was hospita lized in a psyc hiatric facility. DSS provided mother and father with nume rous services, including bus passes, housing lists, financial assistance for rent and electric bills, and referrals to service providers for parenting classes, psychological evaluations, anger management classes, and substance abuse assessments. Mother also was refe rred to a mental health su pport worker, who transported her to appointments,- 4 - took her to the YMCA to exercise, assisted in managing her medication and nutrition, and was available for daily telephone contact. On June 23, 2008, the juvenile and domestic relations district court terminated the parental rights of mother and father. Both parents appeal ed, and on January 9, 20 09, the trial court heard evidence and argument from the parties. On Janu ary 21, 2009, the trial court entered an order terminating the parents’ parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) an d 16.1-283(C). Mother and father timely noted their appeals.
ANALYSIS “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted). When considering termination of parental ri ghts, “the paramount c onsideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463.- 5 - The trial court termin ated mother’s and father’s pare ntal rights based on Code § 16.1-283(B) 2 and 16.1-283(C)(2). 3 Mother and father both argue that the evidence was insufficient to terminate their parental rights. One of the reasons that the children entered fo ster care was because of mother’s failure to adequately supervise and parent her children. She was unable to prepare the youngest child’s formula. She admitted having problems with post-partum depression and was taking an anti-depressant. During the initial home visit, the CPS worker noticed that mother was unable to supervise her two oldest children, who tipped over the baby in her seat and caused her to fall. When mother visited the children, she needed assi stance from the DSS staff to help her attend to the children’s basic needs. Dr . Mundy testified that mother ha d severe limitations and needed assistance from others in order to function on a da ily basis. Dr. Mundy also was concerned that mother’s need to have someone in her life was so great that she put that need above her safety

2 Code § 16.1-283(B) states a parent’s pa rental rights may be terminated if: 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his lif e, health or de velopment; and 2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be subs tantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe retu rn to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate the parent or parents by any pub lic or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilita tive agencies prior to the child’s initial placement in foster care.

3 Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) states that a person ’s parental rights may be terminated if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end.- 6 - and her children’s safety. For example, moth er did not recognize the problems and danger with having father, who had substance abuse problems, in the house with the children. Dr. Mundy also concluded that mother’s limitations were not likely to improve anytime in the future. The children also entered foster care because of father’s substance abuse problem. Father admitted that when he was using drugs, he was more concerned with himself and his needs than those of his children. His drug probl em affected his ability to main tain employment. At the time of the hearing in the trial court, father was unemployed. Father failed numerous drug tests while the children were in foster care. In Novemb er 2008, father entered a Salvation Army Program, but he had not been drug screened si nce his entry into the program. “[S]ubsection B [of Code § 16.1-283] ‘speaks prospectively’ and requires the circuit court to make a judgment call on th e parent’s ability, following a fi nding of neglect or abuse, to substantially remedy the underlying problems.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 270-71, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow , 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)). The trial court noted that mother was unable “to correct the problems that she faces” and that fath er “has not been able to get rid of that addiction within a reasonable period of time.” [S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that cr eated the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated fa ilure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services. Id. at 271, 616 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting Winslow , 40 Va. App. at 562-63, 580 S.E.2d at 466). DSS provided numerous services to the parent s and required that the parents meet several goals. However, neither mother nor father was able to meet DSS requirements. They did not have adequate and stable housing. From February through August 2007, they had six residences.- 7 - DSS helped them obtain a one-be droom apartment in March 2008, but they were evicted in September 2008. Since September 2008, they lived in homeless shelters. Father did not have stable employment, and he had not completed the Domestic Violence Alternatives Program. Although mother regularly visited the children, fa ther did not. DSS had concerns about both parents when they visited their children. The trial court found that mother tried to remedy her problems, but “given her mental, emotional condition and mental defi ciency,” the trial court did not “have any reasonable expectation of sufficient improvement to a level that would enab le her to be a fit parent .” Likewise, the trial court found that despite the serv ices offered by DSS an d father’s efforts at the Salvation Army Program, father had not improved his situation su bstantially because “he’s either been unable or unwilling, certainly unwillin g to comply within a reas onable period of time to correct these issues.” The trial court found that “the ci rcumstances of the parents respectiv ely are [not] going to change in any time reasonably.” “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capa ble of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). At the time of the hearing, the children had be en in foster care for approximately two years. The two older children had severe speech delays when they entere d foster care, but they have improved and all of the children are doing well in foster care. The evidence was sufficient to terminate the parental rights of mother and father.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reas ons, we affirm the trial court’s rulings. Affirmed.