DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 1

FP 48676092.1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

Sonya L. Chapman, §

Plaintiff, §

 § Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-2188-D-BN

v. §

 § (Consolidated with No. 3:23-cv-799-D-BN)

ADT LLC, §

Defendant. §

DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

The Court should grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint and Brief in Support (“Motion to Dismiss”) [Doc. 39] and dismiss all causes of action 

alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) [ECF No. 27] with prejudice. In 

support, Defendant ADT LLC (“ADT”) shows the following:

I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

As a preliminary matter, Chapman’s argument that ADT’s Motion to Dismiss should be 

denied based on the Court’s observation in its Order of Re-Reference [ECF No. 22] that her earlier 

pleadings “arguably state at least one plausible discrimination claim” is misplaced. Order of ReReference at 1. See Response at 6, 12, 28. The Court’s order did not find that Chapman had actually

alleged a plausible claim of discrimination—only “arguably”—and observed her pleadings “are still 

largely conclusory[.]” Order of Re-Reference at 1.

II.

REPLY

Chapman’s Response fails to identify any well-pleaded facts or arguments against dismissal 

of her claims in the Complaint and thus ADT’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted. As it has been 

repeatedly noted, FED. R. CIV. P. 8 does not mandate that a complaint contain detailed factual 

allegations, but it must allege more than mere labels and conclusions to survive dismissal under FED.

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 1 of 9 PageID 581
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 2

FP 48676092.1

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In essence, a 

complaint must contain sufficiently specific allegations that “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. While well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be accepted as 

true, the Court is not required to “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” 

and “[t]eadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements” will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In essence, to meet Iqbal’s 

plausibility standards, Chapman’s Complaint must plead “factual content allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

663. Chapman’s Response fails to provide any meaningful basis to show her Complaint raises any 

plausible claims and thus ADT’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

A. Chapman’s Complaint fails to allege a plausible basis for her allegations of disparate 

treatment and retaliation.

i. Disparate Treatment

Chapman’s Response fails to identify any well-pleaded facts in her Complaint capable of 

demonstrating a plausible claim under Title VII or Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Plaintiff 

makes only conclusory statements that she experienced disparate treatment during her employment 

with Defendant—Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth absolutely no facts linking disparate treatment she 

was allegedly subjected to with a characteristic protected under Title VII or Chapter 21. See Raj v. 

Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (dismissal proper where plaintiff “did not 

allege any facts, direct or circumstantial, that would suggest [defendant]’s actions were based on 

[plaintiff]’s race or national origin or that [defendant] treated similarly situated employees of other 

races or national origin more favorably”).

While she alleges that she was the “only African American employee discharged during onthe job training for unprofessional behavior and inability to perform[,]” Complaint at 68, Chapman 

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 2 of 9 PageID 582
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 3

FP 48676092.1

does not identify any well-pleaded, non-conclusory allegations that show individuals outside of her 

protected category received more favorable treatment. See Fields v. Kelley, 2023 WL 6299858, at *3 

(N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6300701 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 

26, 2023) (noting that discrimination based on race “must allege facts, direct or circumstantial, that 

would suggest the employer’s actions were based on the plaintiff’s race or national origin or that the 

employer treated similarly situated employees of other races or national origin more favorably”) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). Chapman’s Complaint merely lists a series of non-African 

American individuals who sought support—she does not allege any well-pleaded facts that show any 

of these individuals received more favorable treatment than she did under nearly identical 

circumstances (notably her unprofessional behavior and inability to perform). See Fields, 2023 WL 

6299858, at *4 (discrimination claim failed where plaintiff “fail[ed] to plausibly show that the other 

manager counts as a required comparator, an individual of a different race than [plaintiff] under 

nearly identical circumstances who was treated more favorably”) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Similar pleading deficiencies apply to the other grounds of discrimination Chapman alleges 

in her Complaint. For example, Chapman alleges that ADT engaged in sex discrimination because 

she was terminated while a male employee received a promotion “while admitting to asking 

questions during or after training” without providing any specificity as to how the male employee 

was similarly situated under nearly identical circumstances. Complaint at 10. Moreover, Chapman’s 

allegations that ADT “allowed all of the female training class to be promoted without incident when 

they had the same or similar questions and issues with the training materials”—contradict any 

plausible basis for sex discrimination. Id. See Chambliss v. Entergy Corp., 2023 WL 7114669, at 

*10 (E.D. La. Oct. 27, 2023) (“[b]eing treated differently than another employee in the same 

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 3 of 9 PageID 583
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 4

FP 48676092.1

protected class does not create an inference of discrimination . . . [the] appropriate comparator 

requires Plaintiff to establish that a similarly situated employee not in his protected class was treated 

differently in nearly identical circumstances”). Chapman’s age discrimination claim fails to make a 

plausible case of age discrimination—the Complaint notes “two white females over age 40” and one 

“white male over the age of 40” who she alleges received different treatment but not allege any wellpleaded facts regarding comparators under 40 years old who received more favorable treatment 

under nearly identical circumstances. Complaint at 10, 15.

And Chapman’s hostile work environment claim fares even worse, as it is merely based on 

conclusory statements such as her contention that “the work environment was hostile and that the 

environment altered the conditions of her employment.” Complaint at 18. The Complaint fails to 

allege any well-pleaded facts that would allow the Court to make the reasonable inference that ADT 

is liable forsuch discrimination—indeed, Chapman’s allegations are merely her contentions, beliefs, 

or speculation. Id. But Chapman’s subjective belief that she was discriminated against based upon 

her race, gender, age, or national origin is insufficient to create an inference of discrimination.

Vasquez v. Nuences Cty., Tex., 551 F. App’x 91, 94 (5th Cir. 2013).

Fundamentally, Chapman alleges no well-pleaded facts that link any alleged disparate 

treatment by ADT with her membership in a protected class. See Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 

F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff “did not allege any facts, direct or 

circumstantial, that would suggest [defendant]’s actions were based on [plaintiff]’s race or national 

origin or that [defendant] treated similarly situated employees of other races or national origin more 

favorably”).

ii. Retaliation

Despite asserting a claim for retaliation, Chapman’s Complaint alleges no well-pleaded facts 

showing that she engaged in “protected activity” by either (1) opposing any practice made an 

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 4 of 9 PageID 584
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 5

FP 48676092.1

unlawful employment practice under Title VII or Chapter 21, or (2) making a charge, testifying, 

assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII 

or Chapter 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055; see also Grimes v. Tex. Dep’t of 

Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). Far from complaining 

about unlawful conduct, Chapman’s allegations in her Complaint focus on her disagreement with 

ADT’s actions:

Plaintiff did not gain the favor of Defendants during training. Plaintiff did not agree 

with the Defendants not allowing her to take notes during training thus singling her 

out. Plaintiff expressed her disagreement to not taking notes by asking to take notes 

when Defendants gave instructions, thus singling her out. Plaintiff did not agree with 

the Defendants making false negative performance reviews, thus singling her out.

Complaint at 18 ¶ 22. As noted previously, however, complaining about treatment without a 

connection to an unlawful employment practice under Title VII or Chapter 21 is simply insufficient 

to state claim for retaliation. See, e.g., McKinney v. Bolivar Medical Center, 341 Fed. App’x. 80 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (confirming summary judgement dismissal of retaliation claim where the plaintiff did not 

engage in protected activity). Importantly, Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to establish the requisite causal 

connection between any protected activity and any adverse employment action she suffered. See 

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).

Despite the argument in her Response that she “contends the causal connection to her 

treatment and ultimately her termination is linked to her opposition to the treatment based on her 

race, sex, and age[,]” Chapman’s Complaint lacks any well-pleaded facts that shows ADT was even 

aware of Chapman’s purported protected activity, thus dismissal is warranted. See Baker v. Univ. of 

Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 3:19-CV-3020-K-BH, 2023 WL 4214933, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2023), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-CV-3020-K-BH, 2023 WL 4208038 (N.D. Tex. June 

27, 2023) (“at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is ‘required to allege facts permitting at least an 

inference of her employer’s knowledge of her protected conduct in order to establish the required 

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 5 of 9 PageID 585
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 6

FP 48676092.1

causal link between her conduct and the alleged retaliation’” (quoting Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 

990 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2021)).

iii. Disparate Impact

Contrary to her assertion in the Response, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any facts in 

connection with her purported disparate impact theory. See, e.g., Complaint at 52 ¶ 61 (alleging in 

connection with her cause of action for disparate impact that she “contends Defendants knowingly, 

willfully, and maliciously conspired to terminate her for reason of causing her harm”).

B. Dismissal of Chapman’s Constitutional, Statutory, and State Law Claims is warranted.

i. Constitutional Claims

While appearing to address ADT’s reasons for dismissal of her constitutional claims, 

Chapman appears to simply reference a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (which fails to state a claim 

for the same reasons identified above in connection with her Title VII/Chapter 21 claims). 

Chapman’s Response fails to identify any well-pleaded facts supporting her remaining claims for 

“procedural and substantive Due Process rights guaranteed under the United States and Texas 

Constitutions” including under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by showing ADT is a “state actor” or that any 

exceptions to the state action requirement apply. See Motion to Dismiss at 13-15. Indeed, Chapman 

expressly admits that she has “not provided any precedence to support her 1st amendment right to 

free speech, unfair advantage and unjust enrichment.” Response at 17.

ii. State Law Claims

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Chapman’s Response fails to respond to ADT’s argument that her claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress fails to state a claim because it is a “gap-filler” tort and the gravamen 

of her claim is covered by other common-law or statutory torts, such as her claims for race, age, and 

sex discrimination, retaliation, and defamation, among others. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. 

Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (intentional 

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 6 of 9 PageID 586
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 7

FP 48676092.1

infliction of emotional distress has no application where the tortfeasor “intends to invade some other 

legally protected interest, even if emotional distress results”). Moreover, Chapman’s Complaint fails 

to allege sufficient facts regarding the purported extreme or outrageous conduct by ADT, simply 

stating in a conclusory manner that ADT “repeatedly acted without regard to the conduct of [its] 

actions” and its “conduct was outrageous.” Complaint at 61 ¶¶ 143-144.

Negligence

Chapman’s argument regarding her negligence claim in the Response illustrates precisely 

why dismissal is proper under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6): “Plaintiff asserted ‘Defendants’ were 

negligent and neglected to prevent harm.” Response at 22. Chapman’s Complaint does not allege any 

well-pleaded facts regarding ADT’s duty, breach thereof, or damages proximately caused by ADT’s 

purported negligence—the classic threadbare recitation of the elements (incomplete at that) that 

Iqbal forbids.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678. See also D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 

(Tex. 2002) (elements of negligence include legal duty owed, breach thereof, and damages 

proximately caused because of the breach of a duty).

Interference with Plaintiff’s Expectancy and Unjust Enrichment

Chapman’s Response appears to judicially admit that she cannot support her claims for 

interference with expectancy or unjust enrichment, thus these claims should be dismissed. See 

Complaint at 17 (Chapman’s admission that “she has not provided any precedence to support her 1st 

amendment right to free speech, unfair advantage and unjust enrichment”).

Wrongful Termination/Breach of Contract

While her Response appears to clarify that the Complaint’s wrongful termination claim is 

based on contract, Chapman simply fails to plead sufficient allegations to overcome the presumption 

of at-will employment under Texas law or that ADT unequivocally indicated a definite intent to be 

bound to not terminate her employment except under clearly specified circumstances or conditions. 

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 7 of 9 PageID 587
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 8

FP 48676092.1

See Midland Judicial Dist. Cmty. Supervision and Corr. Dep’t v. Jones, 92 S.W. 3d 486, 488 (Tex. 

2002); Crow v. Rockett Special Util. Dist., 17 S.W. 3d 320, 327 (Tex. App.— Waco 2000, pet. 

denied) (employer’s policy did not overcome at-will presumption where it did not “specifically and 

expressly curtail” employer’s right to terminate employees).

Defamation

Chapman’s Response fails to address ADT’s argument that the Complaint fails to state a 

claim for defamation because it is lacks sufficiently well-pleaded facts as to the defamatory content 

or publication thereof as required under Texas law. See Mason v. Integra Peak Mgmt. Inc., 821 Fed. 

App’x. 382, 383 (5th Cir. 2020) (dismissal of defamation appropriate because, among other things, 

plaintiff failed to make “any plausible allegations that [the] communications were false”).

III.

OTHER RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE

In her Response, Chapman requests that the Court permit her to join other parties and appears 

to ask the Court to strike ADT’s Motion to Dismiss. Response at 6-7. Although it seems unlikely that 

her Response is the appropriate vehicle, Defendant opposes any such relief sought by Chapman. 

Indeed, ADT contends that Chapman has failed to make the requisite showing for relief under FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(f), Rule 19, or Rule 20 and as such the relief should be denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Court should grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, dismiss all 

claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint in their entirety with prejudice, and grant any further relief 

to which the Court finds Defendant is justly entitled.

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 8 of 9 PageID 588
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT—Page 9

FP 48676092.1

Respectfully Submitted,

 /s/ Brent Sedge

Brent Sedge

Texas Bar No. 24082120

FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP

500 North Akard Street, Suite 3550

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: (214) 220-9100

Facsimile: (214) 220-9122

bsedge@fisherphillips.com

Stephen J. Roppolo

Texas Bar No. 00797939

FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP

910 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000

Houston, TX 77002

Telephone: (713) 292-0150

Facsimile: (713) 292-0151

sroppolo@fisherphillips.com

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

ADT LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with FED.R. CIV. P. 5(b), I certify that I filed Defendant’s Reply in Support of 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with the Clerk for the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Texas on November 2, 2023, using the Court’s Electronic 

Case Filing system. The Court’s system will send a “Notice of Electronic Filing” to all counsel of 

record. I further certify that I served Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint on November 2, 2023, via email and first-class mail on:

Ms. Sonya Chapman (snychpmn@gmail.com)

1533 Honey Trail,

Glenn Heights, TX 75154

Plaintiff (Pro se)

 /s/ Brent Sedge

Brent Sedge

Case 3:22-cv-02188-D-BN Document 50 Filed 11/02/23 Page 9 of 9 PageID 589