IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

WONGU ANN, § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-01734-N-BH 

 § 

LONE STAR FUND IV (U.S.), L.P.; § 

LONE STAR GLOBAL ACQUISITIONS, § 

LTD.; and JOHN P. GRAYKEN, § 

 Defendants. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the relevant filings, evidence, and applicable law, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Improper Service, filed September 23, 2022 (doc. 8), 

should be GRANTED IN PART, and this action should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery, which is in his response to the 

motion to dismiss, should be DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Wongu Ann (Plaintiff), a citizen of South Korea, brings this declaratory judgment action 

against Lone Star Fund IV (U.S.), L.P. (Partnership), its chairman, John P. Grayken (Chairman), 

and a private equity firm advising it, Lone Star Global Acquisitions, Ltd. (Advisor) (collectively 

Defendants), based on the 2003 acquisition of a South Korean bank, allegedly in violation of South 

Korean laws and regulations. (doc. 3 at 1-4.)2

 He contends that Defendants obtained approval for 

1

 By Special Order 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for full case management, 

including the determination of non-dispositive motions and issuance of findings of fact and recommendations on 

dispositive motions. 

2

 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 1 of 25 PageID 202
2 

the acquisition by making fraudulent misrepresentations to South Korean financial regulators that 

Partnership would become the sole majority shareholder of the bank. (Id. at 1-2, 6-7, 10, 13-14.) 

Instead, it “managed or ran shell nominee investment vehicles in Bermuda” for other investors 

who provided “funds used to acquire a 51% stake in the bank through LSF-KEB Holdings, SCA,” 

a private limited liability company organized under the laws of Belgium. (Id. at 2, 4, 7, 10-12.) 

In 2012, Partnership filed a multibillion-dollar arbitration claim in the International Centre 

for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), alleging that the South Korean government had 

violated the Korea-Belgium-Luxembourg Investment Agreement by unreasonably delaying 

approval to sell Partnership’s shares of the bank, pressuring it to sell at a lower price, and imposing 

unfair taxes on the sale. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ fraudulent representations 

bar Partnership from seeking relief under that agreement, and that “recognition and enforcement 

in South Korea” of any ICSID award will affect South Korean taxpayers, including him, because 

it will be paid with their tax money. (Id. at 3, 8-9.) He seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants 

made fraudulent misrepresentations to South Korean regulators to obtain approval to acquire the 

bank in violation of South Korean law and regulations, so Partnership “was not entitled to submit 

its alleged dispute to ICSID in the first place.” (Id. at 8, 15-16.) 

Plaintiff alleges that diversity jurisdiction over this action exists because Partnership is a 

limited partnership “organized and existing under and by the laws of the State of Delaware[] with 

its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas”; Advisor is a “Dallas-based private equity firm, 

registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission”; and Chairman is the founder of 

page numbers at the bottom of each filing. 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 2 of 25 PageID 203
3 

Partnership and was “responsible for developing, instituting, managing and coordinating all 

aspects” of its investment in the bank. (Id. at 3-4.) 

On September 23, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. (doc. 8.) In support, they filed a declaration by the General Counsel (Counsel) for 

“Lone Star”,3 which states in its entirety: 

1. My name is Rebecca Smith. I am over 18 years of age and am fully competent to make 

this declaration. The facts stated in this declaration are true and correct and, unless 

otherwise stated, within my personal knowledge. 

2. I am the Senior Managing Director and General Counsel for Lone Star. I make this 

declaration in support of Defendants’ concurrently filed Motion to Dismiss. 

3. Defendant [Partnership] is a limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware. 

[Its] general partner is Lone Star Partners IV, L.P. [(General Partner).] [General 

Partner] is an exempted limited partnership organized under the laws of Bermuda. 

[General Partner’s] general partner is Lone Star Management Co. IV, Ltd. [(General 

Partner’s GP).] [General Partner’s GP] is a foreign exempted limited company 

organized under the laws of Bermuda. 

4. [Advisor] is a foreign exempted limited company organized under the laws of 

Bermuda, with its principal place of business in Hamilton, Bermuda. 

5. [Chairman] is a citizen of Ireland. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that 

the foregoing is true and correct. 

(doc. 9 at 4-5.) Plaintiff responded on October 12, 2022, and Defendants replied on October 26, 

2022. (docs. 11-13.) 

3

 The affidavit references several entities which have names that include the term “Lone Star”; it does not 

identify the specific “Lone Star” entity for which Counsel works. (doc. 9 at 4-5.) Notably, Plaintiff’s complaint 

defines “Lone Star” as including all defendants. (doc. 3 at 1.) 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 3 of 25 PageID 204
4 

II. RULE 12(b)(1) 

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. (doc. 8 at 7.) 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges 

a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts 

of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statute, they lack the 

power to adjudicate claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 

(citations omitted). They “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the 

burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 

A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) “may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, 

at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 

546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). A court must dismiss the action if it determines that it lacks jurisdiction 

over the subject matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 

144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 

motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any 

attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “is not a determination of the merits,” and it “does not prevent 

the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, 

considering Rule 12(b)(1) motions first “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely 

dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id.

The district court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 4 of 25 PageID 205
5 

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. 

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion to dismiss based on the 

complaint alone presents a “facial attack” that requires the court to merely decide whether the 

allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true, sufficiently state a basis for subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998). “If sufficient, 

those allegations alone provide jurisdiction.” Id. Facial attacks are usually made early in the 

proceedings. Id. “A facial attack requires the court merely to decide if the plaintiff has correctly 

alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction” by examining the allegations in the complaint, which 

are presumed to be true. Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm’n on the Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.D. Tex. 

Jan. 29, 1998) (citations omitted). 

If the defendants support the motion with evidence, then the attack is “factual” and “no 

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material 

facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” 

Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413. A factual attack may occur at any stage of the proceedings. Menchaca 

v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). “To defeat a factual attack, a plaintiff 

‘must prove the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence’ and 

is ‘obliged to submit facts through some evidentiary method to sustain his burden of proof.’” 

Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1096 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and 

footnotes omitted), aff’d sub nom., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990)). 

Here, Defendants provide Counsel’s sworn declaration. (See doc. 9 at 3-4.) The motion 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 5 of 25 PageID 206
6 

therefore presents a factual attack, and no presumption of truth attaches to Plaintiff’s factual 

allegations.4 He must prove the existence of subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 

evidence through his own evidentiary submissions. See Superior MRI Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d at 504. 

A. Diversity Jurisdiction 

Defendants allege that diversity jurisdiction does not exist. (See doc. 8 at 7.) 

Diversity jurisdiction is proper only when there is complete diversity of citizenship 

between the parties and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive 

of interests and costs”. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Complete diversity” means that a plaintiff may 

not share citizenship with any defendant. Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.3d 1087, 1094 (5th Cir. 1992). 

1. Failure to Allege Citizenship 

Defendants first contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege the citizenship of “any of the 

Defendants”, warranting dismissal. (doc. 8 at 8) (emphasis in original). 

A party asserting diversity jurisdiction must “distinctly and affirmatively” allege the 

citizenship of the parties. Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 

4

 Plaintiff objects to Counsel’s declaration as “conclusory” and because she failed to “affirmatively” show 

that she has personal knowledge of Chairman’s citizenship and that she is “competent to testify to this matter”, as 

required by Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc., 831 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987). (doc. 11 at 23-24.) 

Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s “own cited authority” confirms Counsel’s declaration “meets all necessary 

requirements”, including that her statements are “within [her] personal knowledge”, she is the “Senior Managing 

Director and General Counsel”, and she testified to the places of organization and principal places of business of 

Partnership and Advisory Firm, as well as Chairman’s citizenship. (docs. 9 at 4-5; 13 at 10 n.3.) The Fifth Circuit 

has held that in resolving a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court “has significant authority ‘to weigh 

the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.’” Residents Against Flooding v. 

Reinvestment Zone No. Seventeen, City of Houston, Texas, 260 F. Supp. 3d 738, 754-55 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2017) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Residents Against Flooding v. Reinvestment Zone 

No. Seventeen, 734 F. App’x 916 (5th Cir. 2018). Although Counsel’s declaration did not identify her duties, her 

title supports a reasonable inference that she may provide testimony about Defendants’ places of organization, 

principal places of business, partners, and citizenship. See id.; see also DIRECTTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 

530 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding, in the summary judgment context, that district courts may properly rely on affidavits 

where the affiants’ “personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and 

the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore”). 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 6 of 25 PageID 207
7 

1988) (emphasis in original) (citing McGovern v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 511 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 

1975), and Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) 

(stating that this obligation “cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The “affirmative jurisdictional allegations” 

concerning citizenship must be “‘clear, distinct, and precise’”. MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. 

Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1259). 

“Failure adequately to allege the basis for diversity jurisdiction mandates dismissal.” Stafford v. 

Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Patterson v. Patterson, 808 F.2d 357, 

357 (5th Cir. 1986), and McGovern, 511 F.2d at 654). 

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Partnership is a “limited partnership organized and 

existing under and by the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in 

Dallas, Texas.” (doc. 3 at 3.) “The state where a ... limited partnership is organized and where it 

has its principal place of business does not determine its citizenship for the purpose of § 1332”, 

however. Toney v. Knauf Gips KG, No. CIV.A. 12-638-JJB, 2012 WL 5923960, at *1 (M.D. La. 

Oct. 25, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 12-638-JJB, 2012 WL 5904320 

(M.D. La. Nov. 26, 2012); see Magnolia Mgmt. Corp. v. Quest Rescue Partners-8, L.P., 792 F. 

Supp. 45, 48 (S.D. Miss. May 4, 1992) (“The state under the laws of which a limited partnership 

is organized is irrelevant for diversity jurisdiction purposes.”); MSMM Eng’g, LLC v. Carr, No. 

CV 21-1412, 2022 WL 1320435, at *3 (E.D. La. May 3, 2022) (“[N]either MSMM’s principal 

place of business nor the state under whose laws it is organized determines its citizenship, so these 

facts are insufficient to establish the existence of diversity jurisdiction”). “The citizenship of a 

limited partnership is based upon the citizenship of each of its partners.” Harvey v. Grey Wolf 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 7 of 25 PageID 208
8 

Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 

195-96 (1990) (holding that the citizenship of an unincorporated entity or association, such as a 

partnership, is based upon the citizenship of each of its members)). The complaint does not identify 

Partnership’s partners or allege their citizenship. (doc. 3 at 3.) It therefore fails to sufficiently allege 

its citizenship. See Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 300 F. App’x 259, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (finding that allegations in a notice of removal identifying defendant simply as “a limited 

partnership existing under the laws of the State of New York” without mentioning its partners or 

their respective states of citizenship were “facially insufficient to establish the existence of 

diversity jurisdiction”). 

The complaint also alleges that Advisor is a “Dallas-based private equity firm, registered 

with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission”, but it makes no allegations regarding its 

citizenship. (doc. 3 at 3-4.) Likewise, Chairman’s position and role in Partnership’s investment in 

the bank are alleged, but not his citizenship. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s response concedes that he “failed 

to conduct a thorough pre-suit investigation” into the citizenship of Advisor and Chairman, and 

that he “believed” based on public information that both were U.S. citizens. (doc. 11 at 7, 20.) 

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the citizenship of each defendant, he has failed to 

meet his burden to show diversity of citizenship for purposes of jurisdiction over this action. See 

Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1259 (citing Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 706 F.2d at 636 & n.2). 

2. Lack of Complete Diversity 

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish complete 

diversity because all parties are foreign citizens. (doc. 8 at 7-8.) 

Section 1332 provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 8 of 25 PageID 209
9 

actions where the amount in controversy is met, and the dispute is between: 

(1) citizens of different States; 

(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district 

courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between 

citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted 

for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State; 

(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 

additional parties; and 

(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State 

or of different States. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity is lacking where there are foreign parties on both sides 

of the litigation. Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that diversity 

jurisdiction may not be invoked under § 1332(a)(2) in a lawsuit between aliens)); Giannakos v. 

M/V Bravo Trader, 762 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding that diversity 

jurisdiction does not exist where aliens are on both sides of the litigation); see also Columbraria 

Ltd v. Pimienta, 110 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2000) (finding no diversity 

jurisdiction because there were foreign citizens on both sides but no United States citizen on 

plaintiff’s side, citing the holding in Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 

506 F.2d 757, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1975), that diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(3) exists only in 

suits between citizens of different states with aliens as additional parties). 

Here, it is undisputed that Partnership is a limited partnership organized under the laws of 

Delaware. (doc. 3 at 3-4; doc. 9 at 4.) As noted, its citizenship is based upon the citizenship of each 

of its partners. See Harvey, 542 F.3d at 1079 (citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 195-96). Counsel’s 

declaration states that its general partner, General Partner, “is an exempted limited partnership 

organized under the laws of Bermuda.” (doc. 9 at 4.) Notably, Counsel’s declaration does not state 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 9 of 25 PageID 210
10 

whether Partnership has any partners other than General Partner, identify any other partners, or 

provide any other information from which their citizenship may be determined. In Carden, the 

Supreme Court “rejected the argument that only general partners, and not limited partners, of 

limited partnerships should be considered in determining citizenship”. See Magnolia Mgmt. Corp., 

792 F. Supp. at 48. 

Counsel’s declaration states that General Partner in turn has a general partner, General 

Partner’s GP, “a foreign exempted limited company organized under the laws of Bermuda.” (doc. 

9 at 4.) As with Partnership, the declaration also does not state whether General Partner has any 

partners other than General Partner’s GP, identify any other partners, or provide any other 

information from which their citizenship may be determined. Defendants’ reply, however, states 

that “one of the partners of [General Partner]—[General Partner’s GP]—is also a foreign exempted 

limited company organized under Bermuda law.” (doc. 13 at 9 (emphasis added).) Based on this 

statement, General Partner has partners other than General Partner’s GP whose citizenship must 

also be considered.5

Like limited partnerships, the citizenship of other unincorporated associations or entities is 

determined by the citizenship of all its members. See Harvey, 542 F.3d at 1080. Counsel’s 

declaration does not identify any members of General Partner’s GP. Defendants cite Lear Corp. v. 

Johnson Elec. Holdings Ltd., 353 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that 

5

“‘Although the Carden Supreme Court only addressed single-tiered partnerships, lower courts have 

consistently applied Carden’s holding to multi-tiered partnerships.’” Talon Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Goliath Asset 

Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-205-Z-BR, 2020 WL 7401287, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2020) (quoting Lone Star 

Fund IV(US) LP v. Lee, No. 3:09-CV-1614-B, 2010 WL 1790392, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2010)), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-CV-205-Z, 2020 WL 6689734 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2020). 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 10 of 25 PageID 211
11 

“Bermuda limited companies are considered ‘equivalent in all legally material respects to a 

corporation under state law,’ and thus are ‘citizens’ of both their places of organization and their 

principal places of business.” (See doc. 8 at 9.) Even assuming, without deciding, that the Seventh 

Circuit’s decision in Lear Corp. should be applied here, the declaration does not identify the 

location of General Partner’s GP’s principal place of business, as it does with Advisor, which it 

also describes as a “foreign exempted limited company organized under the laws of Bermuda.” 

(doc. 9 at 4-5.) Nor does it state from where General Partner’s GP operates its business. See Ed & 

Fred, Inc., 506 F.2d at 757-58 (characterizing a limited company “incorporated in and operat[ing] 

its business from Bermuda” as an “alien” for purposes of § 1332(a) (emphasis added)). Defendants 

have provided evidence showing General Partner’s GP is a citizen of Bermuda, although they have 

not shown that it is only a citizen of that country because they have not identified its other members 

and their citizenship, its principal place of business, or the location from where it operates its 

business. They have therefore shown that Partnership is a citizen of Bermuda, although they have 

not shown that it is only a citizen of that country for those reasons, and because they have not 

shown whether it has any partners other than General Partner, identified any other partners, or 

provided any other information from which their citizenship may be determined 

Defendants have also established that Advisor and Chairman are foreign parties. Counsel’s 

declaration states that Advisor is a foreign exempted limited company organized under the laws of 

Bermuda with its principal place of business there, so it is a citizen of Bermuda. The declaration 

also states that Chairman is a citizen of Ireland. 

The only evidence in the record shows that he and Defendants are all foreign parties. 

Plaintiff has failed to show that diversity jurisdiction exists over this action. See Vantage Drilling 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 11 of 25 PageID 212
12 

Co., 741 F.3d at 537-38. 

3. Navarro Framework 

Citing the “Navarro framework”, as applied in Bynane v. Bank of New York Mellon for 

CWMBS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates Series 2006-24, 866 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2017), Plaintiff 

argues that Partnership is the “real party” in interest because he sued it “in its own name and it had 

sufficiently real and substantial control over its [bank] shares,” so only its citizenship matters. (See

doc. at 11 at 8-14.) 

In Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980), the Supreme Court held that “[i]n 

determining diversity jurisdiction, ‘a federal court must disregard nominal or formal parties and 

rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.’” Bynane, 866 F.3d at 

356 (quoting Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461). Navarro addressed whether “the trustees or the trust’s 

beneficial shareholders are the real parties to a controversy when the trustees are named as the 

parties in a lawsuit.” Id. In those circumstances, “‘a trustee is a real party to the controversy for 

purposes of diversity jurisdiction when he possesses certain customary powers to hold, manage, 

and dispose of assets for the benefit of others.’” Id. (quoting Navarro, 446 U.S. at 464). 

In Bynane, the plaintiff argued that under Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 

577 U.S. 378 (2016), which involved a suit against a trust, the district court should have considered 

the citizenship of the trust’s shareholders to determine diversity jurisdiction instead of the trustee’s 

citizenship. Id. at 356-59. The Fifth Circuit found that the Navarro rule controlled because the 

defendant had been sued in its capacity as a trustee and was the real party to the controversy, since 

it had sufficiently real and substantial control over the trust’s assets, and the trustee’s citizenship 

was therefore the relevant inquiry for determining jurisdiction. See id. 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 12 of 25 PageID 213
13 

As the Supreme Court explained in Carden, Navarro considered “whether parties that were 

undoubted ‘citizens’ (viz., natural persons) were the real parties to the controversy”, not whether 

an artificial entity other than a corporation could be considered a citizen for purposes of 

jurisdiction. 494 U.S. at 191. It clarified that although Navarro did discuss the characteristics of a 

state business trust, the discussion was “not at all [] for the purpose of determining whether the 

trust had attributes making it a ‘citizen,’ but only for the purpose of establishing that the 

respondents were ‘active trustees whose control over the assets held in their names [was] real and 

substantial.” Id. The court expressly stated that Navarro “has nothing to do with the [] question” 

of whether an artificial entity other than a corporation may be treated as a citizen, and it rejected 

“the argument by analogy that, just as business reality is taken into account for purposes of 

determining whether a trustee is the real party to the controversy, so also it should be taken into 

account for purposes of determining whether an artificial entity is a citizen.” Id. at 191-192. 

Unlike Navarro and Bynane, this case does not involve either a trust or trustee, but a limited 

partnership. The argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Carden is essentially the argument 

asserted by Plaintiff here. He claims that under Navarro, Partnership is the real party in interest 

because it controls the bank shares, so it should be considered a citizen and only its citizenship 

matters for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Navarro does not support consideration of business 

reality to determine whether an artificial entity such as Partnership is a citizen for purposes of 

diversity jurisdiction. Because it is a limited partnership, not a corporation, Supreme Court 

precedent dictates that Partnership’s citizenship must be determined based on the citizenship of 

each of its partners. See Harvey, 542 F.3d at 1079 (citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 195-96). 

Plaintiff also argues that in Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 2003), 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 13 of 25 PageID 214
14 

the Fifth Circuit “confirmed that Navarro was still the controlling authority” and that courts look 

to the rights and powers a party possessed to determine whether it is the real party to the 

controversy. (See doc. 11 at 11-12.) At issue in Corfield was whether, for purposes of diversity 

jurisdiction, the citizenship of every underwriter subscribing to a Lloyd’s of London insurance 

policy must be considered when the lead underwriter sued only on its own behalf. 355 F.3d at 857. 

After considering the organizational structure of Lloyd’s of London and the unique characteristics 

of its typical insurance policies, the Fifth Circuit concluded that because the underwriter was suing 

only in its individual capacity and was “without question a real and substantial party to the 

controversy” that could be sued individually, the citizenship of the other non-party underwriters 

subscribing to the policy was irrelevant. Id. at 857-65. In so finding, it specifically noted Carden’s 

holding that the citizenship of every partner in a limited partnership must be considered for 

diversity purposes, but it found it inapplicable because of Lloyd’s structure. Id. at 865-66. 

Unlike the structure of Lloyd’s, as discussed in Corfield, this case involves a limited 

partnership. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Corfield, Carden therefore controls. 

4. Russell Exception 

Plaintiff next contends that Carden is distinguishable based on the exception the Supreme 

Court carved out in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933), for an unincorporated 

entity in Puerto Rico. (See doc. 11 at 14-15.) He argues that “where an entity is organized under 

foreign law,” “courts must look to the particulars of the foreign law to determine whether the 

foreign entity has a sufficient legal personality to be considered for the diversity jurisdiction 

analysis, regardless of how [it] may be labeled in the foreign jurisdiction.” (Id. at 15-16.) 

In Russell, the Supreme Court held that “the entity known as a sociedad en comandita, 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 14 of 25 PageID 215
15 

created under the civil law of Puerto Rico, could be treated as a citizen of Puerto Rico for purposes 

of determining federal-court jurisdiction.” Carden, 494 U.S. at 189-90. It noted that Russell was 

the “one exception to the admirable consistency of [its] jurisprudence” declining to treat artificial 

entities other than corporations as “citizens” of the States under whose laws they were created. Id.

at 187-189. The Supreme Court “explained Russell as a case resolving the distinctive problem ‘of 

fitting an exotic creation of the civil law ... into a federal scheme which knew it not.’” Id. at 190. 

It reaffirmed that “at least common-law entities (and likely all entities beyond the Puerto Rican 

sociedad en comandita) would be treated for purposes of the diversity statute pursuant to what 

Russell called ‘[t]he tradition of the common law,’ which is ‘to treat as legal persons only 

incorporated groups and to assimilate all others to partnerships.” Id. 

Carden made clear that the sociedad en comandita in Russell was the “one exception” to 

the rule that artificial entities would not be treated as citizens of the States under whose law they 

were created. It expressly “adhere[d] to [its] oft-repeated rule that diversity jurisdiction in a suit 

by or against the entity depends on the citizenship of ‘all the members’, ‘the several persons 

composing such association,’ ‘each of its members’”. 494 U.S. at 195-96 (citations omitted). It 

reaffirms that because it is a limited partnership, Partnership’s citizenship is based on the 

citizenship of each of its members. See Harvey, 542 F.3d at 1079 (citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 195-

96). Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Partnership is not an entity “organized under 

foreign law”, but rather a domestic limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware. (doc. 

11 at 15.) Plaintiff concedes that “[t]he Supreme Court recognized that the Russell exception was 

rare and probably not applicable if the entity were organized under American law.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show the existence of diversity jurisdiction. 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 15 of 25 PageID 216
16 

B. Standing 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish standing to sue 

under Article III of the United States Constitution, which deprives this Court of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. (doc. 8 at 9-10.) 

 “Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court 

jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 

(1980). “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that [plaintiffs], based on their 

complaint, must establish that they have standing to sue.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 

(1997). Like other jurisdictional requirements, this requirement is “not subject to waiver,” Lewis 

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996), and the Supreme Court “insist[s] on strict compliance” 

with it, Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. 

To satisfy the prerequisites of Article III standing, “[the] plaintiff must have (1) suffered 

an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that 

is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 

338 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). “The plaintiff, as the 

party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements[, and when] a 

case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly... allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” 

Id. (citations omitted); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998) 

(“The triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

establishing its existence.”). While “‘at the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 

resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice’ to establish standing,” Stallworth v. Bryant, 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 16 of 25 PageID 217
17 

936 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560), “[a] federal court is powerless 

to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing,” 

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1990). “[I]f the plaintiff does not carry his burden 

clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the 

dispute, then dismissal for lack of standing is appropriate.” Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 993 

(5th Cir. 2015) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). 

Injury in fact is “the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. 

at 338–39 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show 

that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 

particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 339 (quoting 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A “concrete” injury actually exists, which means it is real and not abstract. 

Id. at 340 (citations omitted). A “particularized” injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and 

individual way.” Id. at 339 (citations omitted). 

The Supreme Court has consistently held that “a plaintiff raising only a generally available 

grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper 

application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly 

benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see also Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5th Cir. 

2000) (“A generalized grievance is a harm shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large 

class of citizens.”) (citation omitted). “On several occasions, [it] has denied federal taxpayers 

standing under Article III to object to a particular expenditure of federal funds simply because they 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 17 of 25 PageID 218
18 

are taxpayers.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006). The “animating 

principle” for the denial is 

that a federal taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury ... is shared with millions 

of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future 

taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no 

basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.” ... This 

logic is equally applicable to taxpayer challenges to expenditures that deplete the 

treasury, and to taxpayer challenges to so-called “tax expenditures,” which reduce 

amounts available to the treasury by granting tax credits or exemptions. In either case, the 

alleged injury is based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on public 

revenues, to which the taxpayer contributes. 

Standing has been rejected in such cases because the alleged injury is not “concrete and 

particularized,” ... but instead a grievance the taxpayer “suffers in some indefinite way in 

common with people generally[.]” 

Id. at 343–44 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486, 487, 488 (1923), and Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 560). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that an arbitration award in Partnership’s favor will affect South 

Korean taxpayers, including him, because it will be paid with their tax money. (doc. 3 at 3, 8–9; 

doc. 11 at 29.) This is precisely the type of generalized injury that the Supreme Court has found is 

not “concrete and particularized”, and that a taxpayer suffers with other taxpayers, for purposes of 

standing. Plaintiff argues that DaimlerChrysler Corp. is inapposite because he is not challenging 

governmental action; he is claiming that the South Korean government was defrauded by 

Defendants. (doc. 11 at 24–26.) This distinction does not change the analysis, however, because 

his “alleged injury is [still] based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on public 

revenues, to which [he as a] taxpayer contributes.” DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 344; see 

Clinton v. Steel Warehouse Co., LLC, No. 3:22-CV-223 DRL-MGG, 2022 WL 873874, at *2 (N.D. 

Ind. Mar. 24, 2022) (holding that taxpayer who alleged injury based on defendants’ fraud on the 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 18 of 25 PageID 219
19 

federal government had failed to allege an injury-in-fact and lacked standing); Henry v. United 

States, No. 22 CV 1091, 2022 WL 18401265, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2022) (finding that taxpayer 

who complained of “a fraud being perpetrated on ‘2.4 Million Taxpayers’” did not have standing), 

on reconsideration in part, No. 22 CV 01091, 2022 WL 18401267 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2022), aff’d, 

No. 22-1841, 2023 WL 334784 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023), reh’g denied, No. 22-1841, 2023 WL 

2050023 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 2023). 

Plaintiff also relies on United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procs. 

(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687, 688 (1973), in which the Supreme Court stated it had “made it clear 

that standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury”; “[t]o deny 

standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would 

mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody.” 

That case involved an association’s challenge to implementation of a new railroad freight rate 

structure on grounds that it would adversely affect the environment in the Washington, D.C. area, 

causing harm to its members who used the natural resources in that area. Id. SCRAP was not a 

taxpayer case, and the Supreme Court has noted its “expansive expression of what would suffice 

for § 702 review under its particular facts has never since been emulated by [the] Court.” Lujan v. 

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990). Even so, the Supreme Court in SCRAP expressly 

found that the plaintiff had “alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished [its 

members] from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be 

affected.” 412 U.S. at 689. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that distinguish him 

from other South Korean taxpayers. 

Plaintiff next relies on Patterson v. Rawlings, 287 F. Supp. 3d 632, 642 (N.D. Tex. 2018) 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 19 of 25 PageID 220
20 

(quoting Ehm v. San Antonio City Council, 269 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 

(citations omitted), in which the court stated that “[a] plaintiff [only] meets the ‘injury’ requirement 

of municipal taxpayer standing if he shows that ‘he pays taxes to the relevant entity’ and ‘tax 

revenues are expended on the disputed practice.’”. In that case, the court found that taxpayer 

standing was lacking “because, at the very least, plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead that tax 

money was spent in connection with” the disputed practice. See id. at 643 (emphasis added). It did 

not hold that simply alleging payment of taxes and expenditure of tax revenues was enough to 

confer standing. 

Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for Article III standing, and his claims are also 

subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on this basis.6

III. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY 

Plaintiff argues that jurisdictional discovery is warranted to establish Partnership’s 

citizenship. (doc. 11 at 16.) 

In the Fifth Circuit, the party opposing dismissal and requesting jurisdictional discovery 

bears the burden of showing its necessity. Davila v. United States, 713 F.3d 248, 264 (5th Cir. 

2013); Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 429 (5th Cir. 2005). It must make a 

preliminary showing of jurisdiction. Fielding, 415 F.3d at 429. A party is “not entitled to 

jurisdictional discovery if the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce 

the facts needed to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.” Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 

6

 Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged or established complete diversity of citizenship or standing, 

it is unnecessary to reach Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss the fraudulent misrepresentation claim 

against Chairman for deficient service of process. 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 20 of 25 PageID 221
21 

341-42 (5th Cir. 2009); see also In re S. Recycling, L.L.C., 982 F.3d 374, 386 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(denying a party’s request to remand for “further factual development” because “[a] plaintiff 

should be ready to present some amount of basic jurisdictional evidence, or at least raise an 

inference that further discovery will uncover such evidence, from the outset of litigation”). A 

district court has broad discretion regarding whether to allow jurisdictional discovery. Wyatt v. 

Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 284 (5th Cir. 1982). 

Initially, Plaintiff has not made a preliminary showing of jurisdiction. Fielding, 415 F.3d 

at 429. His claim that he “believes” that Chairman is domiciled in the United States is insufficient 

to show a need for jurisdictional discovery, especially given Counsel’s declaration that Chairman 

is a citizen of Ireland. See Edmondson v. Cedar Park Health Sys., L.P., No. 1:17-CV-1030-LY, 

2018 WL 4677897, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

A:17-CV-1030-LY, 2018 WL 4701812 (W.D. Tex. July 30, 2018) (concluding that the defendant’s 

affidavit provided the plaintiff the information necessary to evaluate its citizenship, so there was 

no genuine dispute and jurisdictional discovery was not otherwise justified). “[T]he imposition of 

jurisdictional discovery places an undue and unnecessary burden on the parties when the proponent 

of such discovery only supports the request by conjecture, speculation, or suggestion”, and 

jurisdictional discovery should not be granted “when the party requesting such discovery can only 

suggest or speculate that the requested discovery will shed light on or resolve the issues pertaining 

to diversity of citizenship.” NL Indus., Inc. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 558, 566 

(N.D. Tex. 2006); see also Surge Busy Bee Holdings, LLC v. Wiszniewski, No. 3:19-CV-127-L, 

2020 WL 1846781, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2020) (“Mere speculation is not sufficient to support 

a request for further discovery.”); Catalyst Medium Four, Inc. v. CardShark, LLC, No. A-14-CACase 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 21 of 25 PageID 222
22 

1007-SS, 2015 WL 1412591, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff’s “request 

for jurisdictional discovery in the hopes it might, with any luck, reveal jurisdiction is a textbook 

fishing expedition with no basis in the current record or even its own allegations”). 

As for Partnership, Plaintiff has not “identified with particularity the discovery [he] seeks 

or articulated how that information would support [his] jurisdiction[al] arguments” against 

Partnership. Edmondson, 2018 WL 4677897, at *3–4; see also Freeman, 556 F.3d 326, 341-42. 

His proffered facts in support of his request for jurisdictional discovery regarding the alleged 

location of Partnership’s decision-makers in the United States do not go to the citizenship of its 

partners or members. (doc. 11 at 16-18.) Likewise, his proffered facts regarding the ownership of 

the bank shares do not impact the jurisdictional inquiry because, as discussed, Navarro does not 

apply here. Although he alleges that it is “unclear what the legal personalities or attributes of 

[Partnership’s] affiliates and partners, including [General Partner’s GP]”, he claims that 

information is necessary for “determination of diversity jurisdiction under the Navarro

framework.” (Id. at 16.) 

As noted, Defendants have established that Partnership is a citizen of Bermuda, although 

they have not shown that it is only a citizen of that country because they state that General Partner 

has “other partners” in addition to General Partner’s GP whose citizenship they have not identified. 

(See doc. 13 at 9.) They have also not established that General Partner is Partnership’s only partner 

or identified any members of General Partner’s GP and their citizenship or its principal place of 

business or place of operation. (See doc. 9 at 4.) The pro se plaintiff’s allegations that “the 

difficulty encountered by [him] in collecting largely confidential or otherwise publicly unavailable 

information that is uniquely within the knowledge of Defendants underscores the necessity of 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 22 of 25 PageID 223
23 

jurisdictional discovery to confirm the diversity of citizenship in this case”, (doc. 11 at 18), may 

be liberally construed as a claim that they have refused to divulge this information or inform him 

from where it may be obtained, see NL Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d at 565–66. Even so, however, 

he has not shown that he “can develop facts through discovery that would contradict or cast doubt 

on [his] allegations supporting standing.” Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:12-CV2437-D, 2012 WL 5845426, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2012) (noting that the defendant’s challenge 

to the plaintiff’s standing was facial rather than factual). As discussed above, Plaintiff has not 

established that he has standing to sue, and this is “an incurable defect in the complaint” that also 

warrants denial of jurisdictional discovery. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 414. 

Plaintiff has not shown how additional discovery would produce any facts to withstand 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), and his request for jurisdictional discovery should be denied. 

IV. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND 

Notwithstanding their failure to plead sufficient facts, the Fifth Circuit is inclined to give 

pro se plaintiffs several opportunities to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 

Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1995). Courts therefore typically allow pro se

plaintiffs to amend their complaints when the action is to be dismissed pursuant to a court order. 

See Thomas v. Texas, No. 3:17-CV-0348-N-BH, 2017 WL 11496979, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 

2017). A pro se plaintiff may also obtain leave to amend his complaint in response to a 

recommended dismissal. See id. Nonetheless, courts may appropriately dismiss an action with 

prejudice without giving an opportunity to amend when the plaintiff fails to respond to a motion 

to dismiss after being specifically invited to do so by the court, the defendant has specifically noted 

the failure to respond, and the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to amend the complaint. 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 23 of 25 PageID 224
24 

Rodriguez, 66 F.3d at 97. Dismissal with prejudice is also appropriate if a court finds that the 

plaintiff has alleged his or her best case. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Plaintiff has not amended his complaint since he filed his action. Nevertheless, it 

appears that he has alleged his best case because even if afforded an opportunity to amend, it does 

not appear that he can cure the jurisdictional defect. 

V. RECOMMENDATION 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be GRANTED IN PART, and all of Plaintiff’s 

claims against them should be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery should be DENIED. 

SO RECOMMENDED on this 22nd day of August, 2023. 

 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 24 of 25 PageID 225
25 

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT 

 A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and 

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996). 

Case 3:22-cv-01734-N-BH Document 16 Filed 08/22/23 Page 25 of 25 PageID 226