IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 79S02-1711-CR-00687

Kristopher L. Weida

Appellant (Defendant below)

–v–

State of Indiana

Appellee (Plaintiff below)

Argued: December 7, 2017 | Decided: April 12, 2018

Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court, No. 79D01-1602-F5-13

The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 

No. 79A02-1608-CR-01760

Opinion by Justice Goff

Chief Justice Rush, Justice David, Justice Massa, and Justice Slaughter concur.
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Goff, Justice.

Indiana’s Special Probation Conditions for Adult Sex Offenders impose 

significant restrictions on probationers’ conduct, including their internet 

access and use.1 As we increasingly live our lives in cyberspace, probation 

conditions limiting internet use must meet the same criteria as conditions 

that restrict other conduct. First, they must adequately inform 

probationers of what conduct will return them to jail; second, they must 

reasonably relate to the purposes of probation—rehabilitating the 

probationer and protecting the public. Here, Kristopher Weida challenges 

the propriety of two special sex offender probation conditions, arguing 

that they are both unreasonable and unconstitutional. Because we agree 

that one probation condition proves unreasonable as applied to Weida, we 

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court. 

Factual and Procedural History

On March 28, 2015, thirty-four-year-old Kristopher Weida had sexual 

intercourse with his sixteen-year-old niece, K.M. Although Weida and 

K.M. offered police differing versions of the encounter, they agreed on 

some details.2 Both told police that before having sex they looked at 

pictures of K.M. on her cell phone, they viewed other explicit photos on 

Weida’s phone, and K.M. showed Weida a website she found about incest.

Weida also admitted using his phone to google explicit pictures and 

showing them to K.M. The State accordingly charged Weida with Level 5 

 1 In deciding this matter, we noticed the growing trend to lowercase “internet” and write

“website” and “online” as single words. The Chicago Manual of Style §§ 7.80, 7.83, 7.89 (17th ed. 

2017); see also Philip B. Corbett, It’s Official: The ‘Internet’ Is Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016)

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/insider/now-it-is-official-the-internet-is-over.html. Cf.

Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern English Usage 523, 654, 956 (4th ed. 2016). We’ve opted to 

follow this prevailing trend, deviating from it only when quoting the record and Mr. Weida’s 

briefing (which also quoted the record). 

2 Weida and K.M. voluntarily spoke to police and their statements were admitted without 

objection at the sentencing hearing. See Confidential Documentary Exhibits, State’s Exhibit 1. 
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felony incest (Ind. Code § 35-46-1-3) and he pleaded guilty without an 

agreement on sentencing terms. 

Following a sentencing hearing in which Weida and the State each 

presented evidence and argument, the trial court sentenced Weida to three 

years—one year executed in the Department of Correction and two years 

suspended to probation. The court imposed probation conditions, 

including Indiana’s Special Probation Conditions for Adult Sex Offenders. 

Some conditions limited Weida’s internet use. 

Specifically, Condition 8 provided:

You are prohibited from accessing or using certain web sites, 

chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by 

children. You are prohibited from deleting, erasing, or 

tampering with information on your personal computer with 

intent to conceal an activity prohibited by this condition. 

*Required as a condition of probation by IC 35-38-2-2.2(4).

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48 (emphasis in original). Condition 9 

elaborated upon Condition 8, instructing Weida that he could not use a 

social networking website, instant messaging program, or chat room to 

communicate with children. Id.

Condition 26 imposed a broader internet prohibition. It read:

You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service 

through use of a computer, cell phone, iPod, Xbox, Blackberry, 

personal digital assistant (PDA), pagers, Palm Pilots, 

televisions, or any other electronic device at any location 

(including your place of employment) without prior approval 

of your probation officer. This includes any Internet service 

provider, bulletin board system, e-mail system or any other 

public or private computer network. You shall not possess or 

use any data encryption technique or program.
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Id. at 50. The court discussed these provisions during sentencing. 

Referencing Conditions 8 and 9, the court said, “[T]o the extent that you 

need to speak with, or contact your own children, you are able to use a 

networking site or the instant messaging for your children. I’m not going 

to take that away from you.” Tr. at 51, ¶¶ 8-12. Regarding Condition 26’s 

internet access ban, the court reiterated, “[A]gain, you can have access for 

the purpose of contact with your children at any time.” Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.

Weida appealed, raising three arguments. He first argued his three-year 

sentence proved inappropriate considering his character and the nature of 

the offense. He then challenged Conditions 8 and 26 as unreasonable and 

unconstitutional as applied to him because they created sweeping 

prohibitions on internet usage. Finally, Weida challenged Condition 8’s 

prohibition on “certain web sites . . . frequented by children” as 

unconstitutionally vague. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting 

all three arguments. Weida v. State, 83 N.E.3d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

Weida petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the 

Court of Appeals opinion.3 See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 

Standard of Review

Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in fashioning defendants’ probation 

conditions. Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ind. 2010). We will not 

disturb a court’s probation order absent an abuse of that discretion. Bailey 

v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 1999).

A court abuses its discretion when the probation conditions imposed 

are not reasonably related to rehabilitating the defendant and protecting 

the public. Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

(citation omitted). Our review, therefore, centers around whether imposed 

 3 We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals decision rejecting Weida’s 7(B) claim that his 

sentence was inappropriate considering the nature of the offense and his character. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
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probation conditions “reasonably relate to attaining these goals.” Id.

(citation omitted).

However, to the extent a defendant challenges a probation condition on 

constitutional grounds (either a vagueness or as-applied challenge), our 

review is de novo. Cf. Smith v. State, 8 N.E.3d 668, 676 (Ind. 2014). 

Discussion and Decision 

We live in the internet age. The internet, cyberspace, the World Wide 

Web, whatever moniker you choose, pervades our daily lives. For many,

we even carry the internet around in our pockets or purses. Our cell 

phones provide the gateway into cyberspace’s vast domains. Hoosiers 

accomplish life’s most meaningful and mundane everyday tasks with 

cyberspace at our fingertips. We apply for jobs, we file tax returns, we pay 

bills, we attend college, we read the news, we navigate, we communicate, 

we shop—all online. To be sure, most Hoosiers don’t think twice about

googling the answer to a vexing question, or checking the weather online,

or updating their status on social media. And that’s all right—for most 

Hoosiers. But probationers are not most Hoosiers.

When criminal defendants receive probation, they “agree[] to accept 

conditions upon [their] behavior in lieu of imprisonment.” Bratcher, 999 

N.E.2d at 873 (citation omitted). When defendants are sex offenders, those 

probation conditions often include internet restrictions like those imposed 

here. Although probationers “do not enjoy the same constitutional 

protections as law-abiding citizens,” they may not be subjected to vague 

probation terms that require them to acquiesce to unduly intrusive

constitutional violations. Id. Weida calls on us to decide when probation 

conditions limiting internet access become unreasonable or unduly 

intrusive upon a probationer’s constitutional right to free speech.

Defendant Weida levels a multilayered attack against two standard 

probation conditions he received. He initially argues that Condition 8’s 

language prohibiting him from “accessing or using certain web sites . . . 

frequented by children” is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to 

inform him what specific websites are forbidden. Next Weida contends
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that Condition 8 and Condition 26 “create a sweeping Internet ban”—one

that is both unreasonable and unconstitutional. Specifically, he posits the 

conditions fail to reasonably relate to his rehabilitation or public safety. 

He then claims the conditions’ de facto internet ban unduly intrudes on 

his First Amendment right to free speech and is therefore

unconstitutional.

Addressing each argument in turn, we affirm in part, reverse in part 

and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

I. Probation Condition 8 is not unconstitutionally 

vague. 

Probation conditions place restrictions on probationers’ conduct and 

carry significant consequences. Hunter v. State, 883 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (Ind. 

2008). If a probationer violates even one condition, he risks probation 

revocation and return to jail. Given these high stakes, probation 

conditions cannot be vague. They “must . . . describe[] with clarity and 

particularity the misconduct that will result in penal consequences” for 

probationers. Id.

When faced with a vagueness challenge to a probation condition, i.e., 

the condition lacks the requisite clarity and particularity, we employ the

same standard we apply when evaluating penal statutes for vagueness. 

See id. We will find a probation condition unconstitutionally vague “only 

if individuals of ordinary intelligence would not comprehend it to 

adequately inform them of the conduct to be proscribed.” Patton v. State, 

990 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). See also Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

464, 467 (Ind. 2007). Probation conditions, like criminal statutes,

sufficiently inform probationers of restricted actions when they identify 

“the generally proscribed conduct.” Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516 (emphasis 

added). See also Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467. Fastidious specificity is not 

required. In other words, probation conditions “need not list, with 

itemized exactitude, every item of conduct that is prohibited.” Patton, 990 

N.E.2d at 516. 
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When considering a vagueness challenge, we confine ourselves to the 

facts and circumstances of the case before us. Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467. We 

will not allow a probationer “to devise hypothetical situations that might 

demonstrate vagueness.” Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516. What’s more, we take 

the challenged probation provisions or language in context, not in 

isolation. Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467. 

Weida’s vagueness challenge centers around Condition 8, which in 

relevant part provides: 

You are prohibited from accessing or using certain web sites, 

chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by 

children.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48. Isolating the phrase “certain web sites . . . 

frequented by children,” Weida claims Condition 8 lacks the requisite 

clarity and particularity to put him on notice of what conduct is 

prohibited. He therefore argues an explanatory list is necessary to rescue

the condition from vagueness. We take his second point first. 

In proposing an illustrative list to save Condition 8, Weida relies upon

the Court of Appeals opinion in Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 700, 715-16 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. There the contested probation condition 

provided: “You shall not participate in any activity which involves 

children under 18 years of age, such as, but not limited to, youth groups, 

Boy Scouts, Brownies, 4-H, YMCA, YWCA, or youth sports teams, unless 

given permission by the Court.” Id. Like here, the defendant challenged

the condition as unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals observed 

the condition “consists of somewhat vague language that might otherwise 

be inadequate were it not sufficiently clarified elsewhere.” Id. at 716. But 

because the condition “included a list of prohibited activities, including 

‘Boy Scouts, Brownies, [etc.]’” the Court of Appeals “conclude[d] the . . . 

list sufficiently clarifie[d]” the condition. Id.

Here, Weida urges that “[a]bsent a list of examples similar to that 

approved in Collins, Condition 8 must be found unconstitutionally 

vague.” But Collins notwithstanding, our vagueness precedent instructs
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that probation conditions, like criminal statutes, need not include an 

illustrative list of prohibited activities to pass constitutional muster. See

Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467; Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516. Explanatory lists 

might be helpful but are not required. Recall, we do not demand

fastidious specificity from probation conditions. We will not start now. See

Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 75 (Ind. 2012) (stating that to survive a 

vagueness challenge, the contested provision, like a criminal statute, “does 

not need to provide an express or explicit list of prohibited conduct with 

scientific precision, however much we might think it helpful”). 

Turning now to the merits of Weida’s vagueness challenge, we observe

that his argument focuses on specific language from Condition 8, “certain 

web sites . . . frequented by children.” But our longstanding case law 

cautions against reviewing allegedly vague language in isolation rather 

than in context. See State v. Beckman, 219 Ind. 176, 180, 37 N.E.2d 531, 533 

(1941) (“When all parts of the section from which the above quotations are 

taken are read and considered together, it clearly appears that some acts 

constituting reckless disregard for the safety of others are set out with

sufficient certainty to meet the requirements of a valid statute defining a 

crime.”); Crump v. State, 259 Ind. 358, 362, 287 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1972) 

(considering a vagueness challenge to specific language in the larger 

context of the foregoing statutes); Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467 (“To determine 

whether the vagueness doctrine applies, we consider each [challenged] . . . 

term[] not in isolation, but in context.”); Smith, 8 N.E.3d at 677 (evaluating 

a vagueness challenge to the use of “immediately” “within the context of 

Indiana’s reporting statutes”). And so we review this contested probation 

term in the larger context of Condition 8 and Weida’s probation 

conditions as a whole. 

Considering Condition 8’s prohibition on “accessing or using certain 

web sites . . . frequented by children” in the big picture, we understand 

the term to prohibit using websites that allow Weida to contact or 

communicate with children. Indeed, a handful of Weida’s probation 

conditions work together to limit his contact or communication with 

children through any means, internet included. 
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Conditions 7, 8, and 9 specifically address internet contact and 

communication with each condition building upon the next. For example, 

Condition 7 requires Weida to consent to searches of his computer at any 

time. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48. Condition 8 then prohibits him from 

accessing or using the internet to venture into any type of website that 

children regularly use to communicate. Id. After all, Condition 8 groups 

“certain web sites, chat rooms, or instant messaging programs” all 

together. Reading these terms in context leads us to understand that 

Condition 8 prohibits accessing or using internet websites that open the 

door to contact and communication with children. Condition 9 confirms 

that understanding by ultimately imposing the more specific restriction—

no contact or communication with children over the internet, absent a 

written court order. Id.

Other probation conditions prohibit Weida from contacting or 

communicating with children through any medium. 

Condition 20, for example, provides:

You shall have no contact with any person under the age of 16 

unless you receive court approval or successfully complete a 

court-approved sex offender treatment program, pursuant to 

IC 35-38-2-2.4. Contact includes face-to-face, telephonic, 

written, electronic, or any indirect contact via third parties. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 49. Conditions 21 and 22 likewise forbid 

Weida from contacting or communicating with children in person. The 

former provides: “You shall not be present at schools, playgrounds, or day 

care centers unless given permission by the court.” Id. The latter provides:

You shall not participate in any activity which involves 

children under 18 years of age, such as, but not limited to,

youth groups, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Cub Scouts, Brownies, 4-

H, YMCA, YWCA, or youth sports teams, unless given 

permission by the [c]ourt.
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Id. On the whole, we read these conditions to prohibit Weida’s contact and 

communication with children, period.

We further note that probationers are not required to decipher 

probation conditions alone, with no guidance. See United States v. Romero, 

676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1982) (“In addition to the bare words of the 

probation condition, the probationer may be guided by the further 

definition, explanations, or instructions of the . . . court and the probation 

officer.”). Here Weida was not left alone to understand these probation 

conditions on his own. The trial court instructed Weida regarding the 

conditions restricting his internet use. The court told Weida he could use 

the internet for the purpose of contacting and communicating with his 

own children. Tr. at 51, ¶¶ 8-11, 16-17. 

Based on the foregoing, we find that a person of ordinary intelligence, 

reading all the probation conditions in context and receiving instructions

from the court, would understand that Condition 8 forbids him from 

visiting websites that allow him to contact or communicate with children. 

Because Condition 8 provides sufficient clarity and particularity to give a 

person with ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is generally 

proscribed, we hold the condition is not unconstitutionally vague. 

II. Condition 8 is neither unreasonable nor unduly 

intrusive on Weida’s constitutional rights. 

Weida next argues that Condition 8 creates a sweeping ban on the 

internet and is both unreasonable and unduly intrusive upon his First 

Amendment right to free speech. Evaluating Weida’s argument entails a 

two-part analysis. First, using the abuse of discretion standard, we must 

determine whether Condition 8 is reasonably related to rehabilitating the 

probationer and protecting the public. If we find the provisions 

reasonable, we must address Weida’s constitutional argument: that

Condition 8 unduly intrudes upon his First Amendment rights. 
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A. Condition 8’s internet restrictions reasonably relate to 

Weida’s rehabilitation and protecting the public. 

We find that Condition 8 is reasonably related to Weida’s rehabilitation 

and protecting the public. When a defendant commits a sex crime against 

a child, as happened here, it is reasonable to restrict that defendant’s 

access to children through any medium. Restricted access to children 

simultaneously helps the defendant avoid temptation and protects the

public. See Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516; Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 879 (citing 

Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing Condition 8 upon Weida. 

B. Condition 8’s internet restrictions are not unduly intrusive 

upon Weida’s right to free speech under the First 

Amendment.

Likewise, we find that Condition 8 does not unduly intrude on Weida’s 

First Amendment rights. When faced with a challenge that a probation 

condition proves unduly intrusive upon a constitutional right we balance 

three factors:

1. [T]he purpose to be served by probation;

2. [T]he extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding 

citizens should be enjoyed by probationers; and

3. [T]he legitimate needs of law enforcement. 

Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515. We take each factor in turn.

First, as we have already noted there are two purposes for Weida’s 

probation: rehabilitation and public safety. As we explained above, both 

purposes are served by preventing Weida from using the internet to 

contact and communicate with children because Weida committed his 

offense against a child.

Second, it is well-established that probation conditions “may impinge 

upon a probationer’s right to exercise an otherwise constitutionally 

protected right because ‘probationers simply do not enjoy the freedoms to 

which ordinary citizens are entitled.’” Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515 (quoting 
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Purdy v. State, 708 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). We note Condition 8 

does not ban internet access altogether, but only access to websites

children use to communicate. In our view, this limitation does not 

severely curtail Weida’s First Amendment internet activity vis-à-vis the 

average law-abiding citizen. Like normal Hoosiers, he can still use the 

internet to communicate with adults and complete the myriad everyday 

online tasks. 

Third, although the internet played a small role in this crime, we 

acknowledge that Weida did not find or prey upon his victim using the 

internet. Unlike other sexual predators who locate and then lure their 

victims online, he did not carry out the crime using the internet.

Accordingly, the law enforcement need for Condition 8 in this situation

lessens compared to other cases. 

On balance, we find Condition 8 does not unduly intrude upon Weida’s 

First Amendment rights. Consequently, we hold that Condition 8 is 

constitutional as applied to Weida. 

III. Condition 26 is not reasonably related to Weida’s 

rehabilitation and maintaining public safety. 

Weida levels the same multilayered attack against Condition 26—that it

creates a blanket internet ban that is both unreasonable and 

unconstitutional as applied to him. We therefore employ the same 

analysis we previously applied: first deciding whether Condition 26

reasonably relates to rehabilitating Weida or protecting the public; and 

second, if necessary, deciding whether it unduly intrudes upon a 

constitutional right. Condition 26 provides in pertinent part: 

You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service . . . 

without prior approval of your probation officer. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 50. 

To begin, we note that we do not anticipate receiving future challenges 

to Condition 26 like Weida’s present challenge. Since Weida’s sentencing 
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and our hearing this case, the standard Condition 26 underwent 

significant changes. It no longer imposes an expansive internet ban. The 

new Condition 26 now provides: 

You are prohibited from accessing, viewing, or using internet 

websites and computer applications that depict obscene matter 

as defined by IC 35-49-2-1 or child pornography as defined by 

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). You shall not possess or use any data 

encryption technique or program to conceal your internet 

activity. 

Sex Offender Special Conditions (Adult), INDIANA OFFICE OF COURT SERVICES, 

http://www.in.gov/judiciary/probation/files/prob-sex-offender-conditionsadult.pdf (last visited April 12, 2018). Although we see prudence in 

Condition 26’s new, narrower internet restriction, we must still address 

Weida’s arguments as to the old Condition 26 since the court imposed that 

version during his sentencing. 

Weida labels the old Condition 26 a “blanket Internet ban” that 

“requires [him] to contact his probation officer every time he wishes to 

access the Internet.” We feel compelled to explain that Weida is mistaken 

on both points. There is no blanket ban on all internet access for Weida 

here because in the sentencing hearing the trial court expressly granted 

him permission to access the internet at any time for the purposes of 

communicating with his children. Tr. at 51, ¶¶ 16-17 (“Item . . . 26 again, 

you can have access for the purpose of contact with your children at any 

time”). What’s more, we don’t read Condition 26 to demand that Weida 

receive prior approval every time he accesses the internet. “Prior 

approval” does not translate to “single-instance-approval.” For example, 

in the initial meeting the probation officer could grant Weida ongoing 

permission to access the internet to search for jobs, pay bills, or read the 

Wall Street Journal. Weida’s argument reads an onerous requirement into

old Condition 26 that was simply not there. 

Although we disagree with Weida’s characterization of the old 

Condition 26, we agree its restriction on internet access in his case reaches 

beyond reasonableness into unreasonableness. In other words, Condition 
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26’s prior broad prohibition on internet access but for the court’s or the

probation officer’s permission, is not reasonably related to Weida’s 

rehabilitation or maintaining public safety. 

As we said, we live in an internet-saturated society. Cyberspace

presents the primary conduit for information and communication. Given 

the importance and prevalence of the internet in today’s world, we must 

decide when it is reasonable to curtail a probationer’s internet access. Put 

differently, when is an internet restriction reasonably related to the 

probationer’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society, and when does 

it protect the public from future harm?

Our Court of Appeals addressed these questions in several cases in the 

last decade, generally holding that the imposed internet restriction 

reasonably related to the purposes of probation or parole. See Harris v. 

State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 275-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); McVey v. State, 863 

N.E.2d 434, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516-17; Bratcher, 

999 N.E.2d at 879. But recently the Court of Appeals sought additional 

guidance from other jurisdictions, specifically, those courts that consider 

whether the probationer previously used the internet in prior crimes or 

used it in the current crime. Waters v. State, 65 N.E.3d 613, 619-20 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016) (citing United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 72-73 (1st 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Neeley, 675 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658 (W.D. Va. 2009); 

State v. Cornell, 146 A.3d 895, 910-11 (Vt. 2016)), trans. not sought.

In Waters, the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal deviate conduct, 

battery resulting in bodily injury, and strangulation after he attacked a 

woman he took to a bar. Id. at 616. Waters received a twenty-one and onehalf-years sentence, with sixteen years executed and five-and-one-half

years suspended to probation. Id. The trial court imposed similar 

probation conditions to those Weida received here, including an identical 

Condition 26 that broadly prohibited internet access or use. Id. at 619.

Waters challenged 26’s internet restriction, arguing that since he did not 

victimize a child the condition proved unreasonable. Id.

In determining whether Condition 26 reasonably related to Waters’ 

rehabilitation and protection of public safety, the Court of Appeals 

considered whether Waters previously used the internet illegally and 
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whether he used the internet during his current crime. Id. 619-20. Since 

Waters had not misused the internet in his past or present crimes, the 

court determined that the standard broad internet restriction was 

unreasonable. Id. at 620. The court opined a reasonable internet restriction 

would prevent Waters from meeting women or viewing sexually explicit 

materials. Id. The court remanded, instructing the trial court to “impose a 

narrower internet restriction that is more in line with Waters’ conviction 

and ‘issues with women.’” Id.

At first blush, it may appear that Waters charted a new path in 

evaluating whether probation conditions restricting internet use 

reasonably relate to rehabilitating the probationer or protecting the public. 

But it did no such thing. The Waters court applied the well-established 

reasonably-related analysis, but considered new questions based on the 

unique facts presented. We appreciate Waters’ nuanced, fact-specific

approach and apply it now.

Here, the record reveals Weida has no history of misusing the internet 

or using the internet to perpetrate a crime. However, the record does 

show that Weida used the internet shortly before committing incest with 

K.M. He admitted googling explicit photos and showing them to K.M. He 

likewise admitted viewing an incest website before having sex with K.M. 

We cannot ignore that when Weida enjoyed unfettered internet access he 

committed incest. Whether or not he intentionally groomed K.M. for sex, 

there is no doubt the two went from talking, to looking at sexually explicit 

material online, to having sex. But Weida’s troubles recognizing sexual 

boundaries in person and online should not result in a far-reaching, broad

internet ban. A more appropriate internet restriction—one that reasonably 

relates to his rehabilitation and protecting the public—will restrict his 

access to obscene or sexually explicit material. Such a restriction will assist 

him in rehabilitating and avoiding enticement to re-offend yet allow him 

to remain a productive member of our internet-dependent society. He can

still look for jobs, attend classes online, pay bills, read news, and 

otherwise lead a rehabilitated life. We finally note that a narrower internet 

restriction does not sacrifice public safety since Weida will still be

prohibited from accessing material that related to his offense.
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We, therefore, find the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an 

unreasonable probation condition that did not reasonably relate to 

rehabilitating Weida and protecting the public. We remand this matter 

with instructions to impose a reasonable internet restriction in place of the 

old Condition 26. Since we decide this matter on Weida’s 

unreasonableness claim, we need not address his constitutional argument 

that the condition unduly intrudes upon his free speech rights. See JeanBaptiste v. State, 82 N.E.3d 878, 878 (Ind. 2017) (declining to address a

raised issue based upon the longstanding principle of constitutional 

avoidance).

Conclusion 

Because probation conditions restricting a probationer’s internet access 

prohibit what would otherwise be lawful conduct, they cannot be vague; 

they must reasonably relate to the probationer’s rehabilitation and public 

safety; and they cannot unduly intrude upon constitutional rights. 

Believing two probation conditions (namely, Conditions 8 and 26) limiting 

his internet use did not meet these criteria, Weida brought this appeal. We 

now hold that Condition 8 is not vague, unreasonable, or unduly intrusive 

on Weida’s constitutional rights. But Condition 26, as previously written 

and applied to Weida, is unreasonable since it does not reasonably relate 

to his rehabilitation and protecting the public. Accordingly, we affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 79S02-1711-CR-00687 | April 12, 2018 Page 17 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Ball Eggleston, PC

Lafayette, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana 

Monika Prekopa Talbot 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana