UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4016

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM NEIL THOMPSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00009-RLV-DCK-1)

Submitted: April 24, 2018 Decided: May 16, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, Joshua B. 

Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

William Neil Thompson pled guilty in 2013 to possessing a firearm as a convicted 

felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012), and was originally sentenced to 15 years’ 

imprisonment. On remand from this court, Thompson received a 110-month sentence 

resulting from a two-level upward departure in his total offense level. Thompson 

appeals.

Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether 

Thompson’s prior North Carolina conviction for common law robbery was properly 

counted as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) 

§ 4B1.2 (2016), and whether his sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. 

Thompson has filed a pro se supplemental brief also claiming that his robbery conviction 

was improperly counted as a crime of violence because the district court looked to his 

underlying conduct, in violation of Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limiting 

sentencing court’s inquiry into prior convictions based on guilty pleas).

We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the 

Guidelines range[,] under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the procedural 

and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining procedural 

reasonableness, this court considers whether the district court properly calculated the 

defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an 

appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, 
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selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to explain sufficiently the 

selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. Only after determining that the sentence is procedurally 

reasonable does this court consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.

In reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, this court must “consider 

whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose 

such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing 

range.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). If a court’s deviation from the Guidelines range “is a 

substantial one, . . . [this court] must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning offered by 

the district court in support of the sentence. The farther the court diverges from the 

advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.” 

United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although an above-Guidelines-range sentence carries no presumption of 

reasonableness on appeal, “a sentence outside the Guidelines carries no presumption of 

unreasonableness.” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008). A district court 

is permitted to depart upwardly from the Guidelines range based on the inadequacy of a 

defendant’s criminal history category when “reliable information indicates that the 

defendant’s criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the 

defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other 

crimes.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), p.s.
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With these standards in mind, we find that Thompson’s sentence is procedurally 

and substantively reasonable. First, the district court properly counted Thompson’s prior 

common law robbery conviction as a predicate offense for sentencing enhancement 

purposes. See United States v. Gattis, 877 F.3d 150, 154-60 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 

2018 WL 1278447 (Apr. 16, 2018) (No. 17-8044) (holding that North Carolina common 

law robbery constitutes “robbery” as enumerated in the amended version of USSG 

§ 4B1.2(a)(2)). Second, we find that the district court’s decision to increase Thompson’s 

total offense level by two levels was supported by the record. In accordance with Anders, 

we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform 

Thompson, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Thompson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was 

served on Thompson. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED