* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50476

(Summary Calendar)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES PAUL QUINLAN,

also known as Joe Quentin,

also known as Jim Quinlan,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-96-CR-79-ALL-DB

July 14, 1998

Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Follo wi ng hi s conviction and sentence for various offenses involving child pornography, James

Paul Quinlan appeals the district court’s partial denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. Quinlan

contends that the search warrant, as drafted and executed, constituted an illegal general warrant and

that, as a result, all evidence seized during the December 15, 1995 search of his home should have2

been suppressed. Quinlan further argues that the search cannot be justified on the alternative ground

that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.

This court reviews the district court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress evidence seized

pursuant to a search warrant for clear error and its ultimate determination of reasonableness under

the Fourth Amendment de novo. United States v. Hill , 19 F.3d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1994). Quinlan

urges that the warrant lacked the required specificity to meet the Fourth Amendments’s requirement

of particularity with regard to the items to be seized. S ee U.S. Const. Amendment IV. “The Fourth

Amendment prohibits issuance of general warrants allowing officials to burrow through a person’s

possessions looking for any evidence of a crime.” U nited States v. Kimbrough

, 69 F.3d 723, 727 (5th

Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1547 (1996). A warrant must particularly describe the place to

be searched and the things to be seized. I d

. This court has underscored that the test requires a court

to determine if the description in the warrant would permit an executing officer to reasonably know

what items are to be seized. United States v. Beaumont , 972 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing

Steele v. United States , 267 U.S. 498, 503-04, 45 S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757).

The district court in the instant case specifically found that Postal Inspector Sheila Ryan’s sixpage affidavit wa s made part o f t he warrant by express language on the face of the warrant. The

district court further concluded that, if anything, the warrant was too narrowly drawn. We disagree.

Our review of the warrant indicates that it fails the Fourth Amendment’s particularity test because,

although there was a supporting affidavit which provided specific information regarding the items to

be seized, the warrant does not incorporate the affidavit by express language. See Beaumont , 972

F.2d at 561.

The warrant in the instant matter contains a general statement that “property that constitutes3

evidence of the commission of a criminal offense and/or contraban d, the fruits of a cri m e, and/or

things criminally possessed” may be seized. The B eaumont court held that “where a warrant contains

only the barest of generalized statements the particularity requirement is satisfied by reliance on an

affidavit when the affidavit is incorporated by reference into the warrant.” 972 F.2d at 561. The

particular warrant at issue in this case indicates that an affidavit was submitted by Ryan and that the

magistrate judge who approved the warrant accepted the affidavit as evidence of probable cause. The

warrant does not, however, reference the affidavit in any way as a restriction on the items subject to

the search warrant. Moreover, it does not impliedly incorporate the affidavit since the affidavit was

not even attached to it at the time it was executed.

Nevertheless, the admissibility of the evidence seized at Quinlan’s residence may be upheld

on the alternative ground that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in the instant

case. See

, e.g.

, United States v. Shugart

, 117 F.3d 838, 845-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 118 S.Ct.

433 (1997); Beaumont

, 972 F.2d at 562; see also Matter of Jones

, 966 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1992)

(this court can affirm on any ground supported by the record). An officer may rely on the validity

of a warrant so long as the warrant is supported by more than a “bare bones” affidavit. See United

States v. Cisnero s , 112 F.3d 1272, 1278 (5th Ci r. 1997). Because the parti es do not contest the

inspectors’ belief that the warrant was valid, the issue is “ ‘wh ether there was an obj ecti vel y

reasonable basis for t he [inspectors’] mistaken belief.’ ” B eaumont

, 972 F.2d at 562 (quoting

Massachusetts v. Sheppard

, 468 U.S. 981, 988, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3428, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)). The

government points out that the executing inspectors testified that they had reviewed Ryan’s affidavit

as well as its attachment—which list ed with specificity the items to be seized from Quinlan’s

residence—prior to the search. Inspectors Ryan and Ross specifically stated that they were guided4

in their search by the items listed in the attachment. When questioned about why he seized certain

items, Inspector Sifuentes testified that he felt the items fell within the purview of the affidavit and

its attachments.

Because the instant case is virtually identical to Shug art and B eaumont

, we follow the

reasoning set forth in those opinions. A probable cause determination was made by the magistrate

judge; Ryan’s affidavit provided specific information of the objects of the search; Ryan was t he

execut ing officer as well as the affiant; the other inspectors had reviewed the affidavit and t he

attachment and knew that the items to be seized were enumerated therein; and the warrant easily

could have been made valid by the insertion of the phrase “see attached affidavit” along with attaching

the affidavit to the warrant. See Shugart , 117 F.3d at 845-46; Beaumont , 972 F.2d at 562. Under

the facts of this case, the officers’ good-faith reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable.

See Massachusetts v. Sheppard

, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). The goodfaith exception therefore applies in the instant case to uphold the admissibilit y of the evidence seized

as a result of the December 15, 1995 search of Quinlan’s residence. Accordingly, the district court’s

order partially denying Quinlan’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.