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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SCOTTIE H. GIBSON, §

#201901879, §

§

Petitioner, §

§

v. § No. 3:22-cv-02057-M (BT)

§

DALE S. HANNA, §

§

Respondent. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Scottie H. Gibson, a pretrial detainee at the Johnson County Jail, 

initiated this pro se lawsuit by filing the court-approved form for a complaint 

in a prisoner civil rights lawsuit. Succinctly stated, Gibson alleges that he is 

being unlawfully detained, and his Due Process, Equal Protection, and Sixth 

Amendment rights are being violated. In view of these allegations, the Court 

should construe this action as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 and dismiss it for failure to exhaust state court remedies. See 

Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Dickerson 

v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Pre-trial petitions such as 

Dickerson’s [pre-trial challenges to state charges] are properly brought 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of 

whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present 

status of the case pending against him.”) (footnote omitted).

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I.

Gibson is presently detained in the Johnson County Jail in Cleburne, 

Texas. In his initial filing, he argues that his Due Process rights have been 

violated, and he is being maliciously prosecuted. He further argues that he 

is now subject to an “unlawful detainment.” Pet. 5 (ECF No. 4). Gibson 

contends that one of his court-appointed attorneys, Don Bonner, provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel and violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 

Specifically, Gibson contends that Bonner was appointed on March 9, 2020, 

he advised Bonner that he was ready for trial, and he specifically directed 

Bonner to invoke his rights to a speedy trial. However, Gibson claims that 

Bonner failed to comply with his directions, and the “intentional delay” of 

his trial is a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 

8. Gibson also alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 

the court set his bond at $250,000, which is more than he can afford. As 

relief, Gibson seeks a “monetary settlement,” a declaratory judgment, and 

the “court’s intervention to help [him].” Id. at 6, 13.

II.

A pretrial petition, like Gibson’s, is properly brought under § 2241, 

which applies to a person in custody, regardless of the present status of the 

case pending against that person or whether a court has rendered a final 

judgment. See Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998). But a 

state pretrial detainee must fully exhaust available state remedies before 

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seeking federal habeas relief. See Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225 

(5th Cir. 1987) (addressing a § 2241 filed by a state pretrial detainee). And 

exhaustion under § 2241 requires that a state pretrial detainee fairly present 

his claims to the state courts. Id. at 228. In Texas, this involves submitting 

the factual and legal basis of any claim to the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals (CCA). Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 443 (5th Cir. 1982). An 

exception may exist where there is an absence of available state corrective 

measures available or “exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency” make 

any such process ineffective to protect the petitioner’s rights. See Deters v. 

Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 

114, 118 (1944)).

Here, Gibson cannot demonstrate that he exhausted his state court 

remedies prior to filing his petition. He does not mention the exhaustion of 

his claims in state court. Further, an independent review of the Texas CCA’s 

website reveals that Gibson has filed two writs of prohibition, a writ of 

mandamus, and a motion for leave to file a writ of habeas corpus. However, 

he has not presented his claims to the Texas CCA for review. Consequently, 

his petition should be dismissed.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should construe this action as a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under § 2241 and dismiss Gibson’s 

petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

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Signed October 28, 2022.

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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