NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

SHARALYN M. STURA, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0602 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR201800955 

The Honorable Krista M. Carman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee 

Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan PLC, Scottsdale

By Stephen L. Duncan

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 11-30-2023
STATE v. STURA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

G A S S, Chief Judge:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

¶1 Sharalyn M. Stura filed this appeal in accordance with Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). 

Stura’s counsel searched the record and identified no arguable, nonfrivolous question of law. Counsel asks this court to review the record for 

fundamental error. This court allowed Stura to file a supplemental brief in 

propria persona. She has not. Finding no error in the record, we affirm Stura’s 

convictions and sentences.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court views the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury’s verdict and resolves all reasonable inferences against 

Stura. See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230 ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3 A uniformed state trooper responded to a vehicle blocking 

traffic. Upon arrival, the trooper discovered Stura in the driver’s seat, tied 

to the steering wheel. Stura told the trooper a home invader kidnapped her 

from her house. She expressed concerns about the victim, who she said also 

was at the house during the home invasion. The trooper called the dispatch 

center, and the center sent an officer to Stura’s house for a welfare check. 

Another officer took Stura to the hospital.

¶4 Meanwhile, at the residence, yet another officer discovered 

the victim’s body in a bed. The victim had a gunshot wound to his left 

temple. That officer also found a pair of belts looped together and a 

bloodied knife near the bed.

¶5 Afterthe hospital cleared Stura to leave, she went to the police 

station with a different officer so she could answer more questions. From 

then on, several officers began interacting with Stura. One officer gave Stura 

food and water. At which point, the officers left Stura alone in the 

interrogation room for about two hours and forty minutes. A detective 
STATE v. STURA

Decision of the Court

3

returned to the room and asked Stura about the kidnapping and home 

invasion. By then, Stura had spent ten hours in the presence of various 

police officers. Stura repeated the story she told at the hospital, and after 

thirty minutes of further questioning, the detective read Stura her Miranda

rights. The detective continued to interrogate Stura for about two more

hours, when Stura altered her account and confessed to having shot the 

victim.

¶6 A grand jury indicted Stura on three counts: first-degree 

murder, tampering with physical evidence, and false reporting. Stura 

moved to suppress her confession at the police station, arguing her 

statements were involuntary and unlawfully obtained.

¶7 After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied 

Stura’s motion to suppress. The superior court said, under the totality of 

the circumstances, the police did not coerce Stura’s statements.

¶8 The jury found Stura guilty on all three counts. The superior 

court sentenced Stura to natural life in prison for first-degree murder, one 

year for tampering with physical evidence, and six months for false 

reporting. The court imposed consecutive sentences for each count and

gave Stura 1,635 days of presentence incarceration credit.

¶9 This court has jurisdiction over Stura’s timely appeal under 

article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 

13-4033.A.1.

ANALYSIS

¶10 This court has read and considered counsel’s brief, fully 

reviewed the record for reversible error, and identified none. See Leon, 104 

Ariz. at 300; State v. Flores, 227 Ariz. 509, 512 ¶ 12 (App. 2011). The superior 

court conducted all the proceedings in compliance with the Arizona Rules 

of Criminal Procedure.

¶11 Stura was present for, and represented by counsel at, all 

critical stages of the proceedings. See State v. Bohn, 116 Ariz. 500, 503 (1977); 

State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 104 (1990). The superior court properly 

impaneled fourteen jurors: twelve plus two alternates. See A.R.S. 

§§ 21-102.A, 13-752.M. The record shows no evidence of jury misconduct. 

The superior court properly instructed the jury on the elements of each 

charged offense, the State’s burden of proof, and Stura’s presumed 

innocence. The jury returned a unanimous verdict, which the superior court 

confirmed by polling the jury. Additionally, the superior court allowed 
STATE v. STURA

Decision of the Court

4

Stura to speak at sentencing, and the sentence imposed was within the 

statutory guidelines. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.9, 26.10(c)(1); A.R.S. §§ 13-

702, -752.A.

I. Denial of Motion to Suppress

¶12 When reviewing the superior court’s decision to deny Stura’s 

motion to suppress, we noted the delay in advising Stura of her Miranda

rights after she was at the police station, and perhaps while in custody. The 

police are required to provide a Miranda warning to individuals in custody.

See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). To determine whether 

someone is in custody when questioned by a law enforcement officer,

courts consider the totality of circumstances. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 

318, 322 (1994). At bottom a court must determine “whether there was a 

formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated 

with a formal arrest.” Id. (cleaned up). And, whether a reasonable 

individual would perceive themselves as being under a level of police 

custody associated with a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 

442 (1984).

¶13 Stura may have been in custody when she arrived at the 

police station and the police locked her in an interrogation room. The police 

restricted her from making calls and completely isolated her from her 

family and friends. Also, the focus of police questioning shifted from 

kidnapping to Stura’s relationship with the victim. The police questioned

Stura for ten hours before reading her the Miranda rights.

¶14 In the pursuit of justice, the better practice is for interrogating 

officers to administer Miranda warnings sooner rather than later. Cf.

McClure v. State, 803 N.E.2d 210, 214 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting, despite 

holding that Miranda warnings were not a prerequisite to the admission of 

a statement the defendant made in the back of a police car, it would be “best 

practice” in a similar situation “to advise the defendant of the Miranda

warnings when he is initially placed in custody.”); State v. Schultz, 212 P.3d 

150, 155–56 (Kan. 2009) (explaining that “the wisest course” for officers 

taking the defendant into custody would have been to read Miranda

warnings as soon as they restricted his free movement and before they 

began to ask questions). That said, the officers’ testimony here suggests they 

perceived Stura as a victim rather than as a suspect for most of the ten 

hours. And it is unclear precisely when they began to perceive Stura as a 

suspect.
STATE v. STURA

Decision of the Court

5

¶15 The purpose of the Miranda warning is to protect the privilege 

against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Here, 

the officers learned of the victim’s murder as soon as they arrived at Stura’s 

house. They concealed their knowledge of the murder from Stura as they 

questioned her for ten hours. Further, the officers continuously questioned 

Stura until she changed her story. In the pursuit of justice, hindsight 

supports as preferable the practice of administering the Miranda warning to 

Stura at an earlier stage. That simple act would have ensured Stura 

understood her rights during the interrogation.

¶16 Though the ten-hour delay drew our attention, we conclude 

the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding her statements 

admissible.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm Stura’s convictions and sentences.

¶18 Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Stura’s 

representation in this appeal have ended. Unless counsel finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court in a petition for 

review, defense counsel need only inform Stura of the outcome of this 

appeal and her future options. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 

(1984).

¶19 Stura has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if 

she wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 31.21(b)(2)(A). This court, on its own motion, also grants Stura 30 days 

from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona motion for 

reconsideration. See id.