UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

NATHANIEL KING,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00929-P

DFW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 

No. 20. Having considered the briefing and evidence of record, the Court 

concludes the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19), Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File Supplementary Declaration (ECF No. 30), 

Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 32), and Defendant’s Motion in 

Limine (ECF No. 39) are DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Nathaniel King was hired by Defendant DFW International 

Airport Board (“DFW”) in February 2016 as a Civilian Security Officer 

(“CSO”). At the time of his hiring, King notified DFW he was being 

treated for the following conditions at the Veteran’s Administration: 

sciatica, herniated discs in his lower back, degenerative disc disorder, 

arthritis in both hips, arthritis in both knees, and flat feet. In February 

2017, King requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 

(“FMLA”) for one week. He did so again in November 2017 for a period 

of one week. 

On November 14, 2019, King requested short-term disability leave 

retroactive to November 9th through Matrix Absence Management, Inc. 

(“Matrix”). Matrix was DFW’s contracted third-party administrator for 

review and decisions on employee leaves of absence as well as requests 

for accommodations. Upon his return from short-term leave on January 

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13, 2020, King possessed a list of restrictions affecting his duties. DFW

then temporarily assigned King to a CSO post at the E Dock under 

DFW’s Modified Duty Policy upon the determination that this was the 

only place King could work with his restrictions. CSOs are typically 

assigned to work various posts around the airport on a rotating schedule 

that varies by shift. There are a total of 25 posts that a CSO can be 

assigned to on any shift, depending on the needs of the airport. After a 

few weeks at this new post, King requested that he be moved to a more 

administrative position, a request which DFW denied. 

In April 2020, King surpassed the sixty-day limit that DFW has for 

employees to work under modified duty. He was then informed that he 

needed to reapply for short-term disability with Matrix, as his 

restrictions had not changed and the duration of time he would need 

these restrictions was uncertain. On April 20, 2020, King reapplied, but 

was denied by Matrix on June 18, 2020, due to “inadequate medical 

documentation.” During this process, King also took steps to obtain a 

“reasonable accommodation” for his disabilities. On August 25, 2020, 

DFW and King partook in a virtual interactive meeting to discuss King’s 

accommodation request. The attendees at this meeting were King, Carl 

Young, a HR Representative, Mark Young, a Risk Management

Representative, Timm Richardson, a Matrix Representative, and Barry 

Stevens, Senior Manager of Airport Security. At the meeting, Stevens 

informed King that he could not be reassigned to a slower post because 

all CSOs were expected to work any post depending on the needs of the

airport. DFW eventually denied King’s request for accommodation and 

encouraged him to scan the online job portal for any positions he 

believed he might be qualified for. 

On September 21, 2020, King appealed Matrix’s June 18, 2020 denial 

of his application for short-term disability leave. Later, on November 4, 

2020, Matrix reversed their initial decision to deny King short-term 

disability leave and King was granted leave retroactive to April 25, 

2020. DFW’s short-term disability policy allows a maximum of 180 days 

of leave within a twelve-month period. Considering King used sixty-five

days of leave during his first stint (November 9, 2019 – January 13, 

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2020), he received 115 days of leave under his successful appeal. This 

l80-day clock expired on August 19, 2020.

1

DFW terminated King on December 11, 2020 for exhausting the 

maximum 180 days of short-term leave allowed within a twelve-month 

period.

On October 17, 2022, King filed suit against DFW where he claims

he has been discriminated and retaliated against based upon his 

disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. DFW now 

moves for summary judgment on all of King’s claims. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence 

presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of 

the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 

(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248. 

Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,” 

and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be 

counted.” Id. In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate, 

the Court views evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 

Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir. 

2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only 

consider those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)–(3); 

see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting 

summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the 

Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant; 

the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence 

1 Since the granting of leave was retroactive, there was no way to know 

the date of expiration until after the November 4, 2020 reversal by Matrix.

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supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 

404–05 (5th Cir. 2003). 

ANALYSIS

DFW seeks summary judgment on each of King’s claims: disability

discrimination and retaliation. The Court addresses the discrimination 

claim first and then proceeds to the retaliation claim. 

A. ADA Disability Discrimination.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits 

discrimination by employers against qualified individuals on the basis

of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The ADA was designed to remove 

barriers that prevent otherwise qualified individuals from enjoying 

employment opportunities available to persons without disabilities. See 

Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996). A 

person is disabled under the ADA if he: (1) has a physical or mental 

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 

activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as 

having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA 

Amendments Act of 2008 made it “easier for people with disabilities to 

obtain protection under the ADA.” Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., 

Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016).

There are two avenues available for an employee to show ADA 

discrimination with respect to termination: (1) the employee can present 

direct evidence; or (2) they can rely on circumstantial evidence and then 

shift the burden to the employer to provide explanation. See McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973). Given that “direct 

evidence is rare” and has been defined by the Fifth Circuit as evidence 

which “if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption,” it 

is not often that there is proof of any direct discrimination in a 

discrimination claim. Clark v. Champion Nat'l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 

579 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). Since King makes no 

claim of direct discrimination in this case, the Court analyzes King’s 

discrimination claim under the second, burden shifting test in 

McDonnell Douglas.

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1. Discrimination Claim. 

Under McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie discrimination 

claim under the ADA, King must show “(1) [he] has a disability, or was 

regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified for his [CSO job]; and (3) he 

was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his 

disability.” Weems v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F. Supp. 3d 719, 727

(N.D. Tex. 2017) (internal citations omitted). If King can satisfy these 

factors, a presumption of discrimination arises, and DFW must then 

demonstrate a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action.” Id. Upon articulating any supposed nondiscriminatory reasons for the action, the burden shifts back to King to 

produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that the “employer’s 

articulated reason is pretextual” Id.

First, King must show that he was disabled. DFW does not dispute

this factor. See generally ECF Nos. 21 and 31. For this reason, the Court 

focuses on the latter two prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test and 

assumes, for the sake of ruling on this summary judgment motion, that 

King has a disability.

Second, King must show that was qualified for his CSO job. Courts 

have held that, in order to be considered a qualified individual, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate he can “perform the essential functions of 

the job despite [his] disability,” or be able to perform the essential 

functions of the job given a “reasonable accommodation” by the 

employer. Stephens v. Big Spring Herald, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-123-H, 2021 

WL 3030064 at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2021) (Hendrix, J.). In 

determining whether a job function is essential, courts owe deference to 

an employer’s position description, but this deference is not absolute, 

and it is important to determine what actual functions the employer 

requires employees to perform. Id.

DFW asserts that King cannot satisfy this second element of his

prima facie case. DFW sets forth as evidence a list of the essential 

functions of the CSO position. These essential duties are as follows:

• Climb into, out of, and search under vehicles;

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• Work in awkward positions such as kneeling, stooping, or 

squatting;

• Drive to locations on DFW Airport property, including the 

Air Operations Area;

• Sit for extended periods of time; and

• Walk for extended periods of time.

ECF No. 22 at 6.

Now, in juxtaposition, King presents the list of physical limitations 

from his reasonable accommodation form, with support from his doctor,

that he claims would allow him to perform the essential duties of his 

position. They accommodations are as follows:

• Adjust physical activities: 30 minutes out of vehicle every 2 

hours;

• No sitting or standing more than 5x per 30 minutes;

• Cannot lift heavy items more than 5x per hour;

• If needed to walk for more than an hour, 15 minutes of rest is 

needed per hour; 

• No standing more than 20 minutes per hour;

• Allow use of elevator or limit stair use to once per 2 hours.

ECF No. 23 at 70.

Throughout the litigation, there has been much discourse from both 

parties as to what qualifies as “extended” and whether, under the 

accommodations requested by King, he would still be able to perform the 

essential functions of the job despite his disability. See ECF Nos. 19-1, 

21, 27, 28, 31. It is the Court’s viewpoint that this arises to the level of

a dispute of material fact. The Court acknowledges that King does not 

retort when Mark Young tells him “It does not appear that [King’s] 

restrictions from [King’s] doctor will allow [King] to do the essential

functions of your job.” ECF No. 22 at 205. Instead, King simply responds

“Okay” and asks if there are other positions that would be willing to 

accommodate him. Id. However, the Court need not address whether 

King was able to perform the essential functions of the job despite his 

disability because his prima facie discrimination claim fails on its face 

as he does not satisfy the third prong of McDonnel Douglas.

Third, even if the Court assumes that King could have performed the 

essential functions of the job despite his disability (it does not), King 

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would still need to show that he was subject to an adverse employment 

decision on account of his disability. See Weems F. Supp. 3d at 727. He 

fails to do so. 

To satisfy the third prong of McDonnell, King must proof of a causal 

connection between an adverse employment action and his disability. 

See Rodriguez v Eli Lilly & Co. 820 F3d 759, 765 (5th Cir. 2016). King 

claims it was an adverse employment decision for DFW to terminate him 

as well as for DFW to not reassign him to different position. See ECF 

No. 27 at 24–27. There is no question that King faced an adverse 

employment decision when he was terminated, but where he falls short 

is in presenting how his administrative termination was due to his 

disability. The reason King was administratively terminated was that 

he exhausted the total amount of leave he was allotted in a twelvemonth period. See ECF No. 22 at 44, 66. Irrespective of his disability, or 

any other reason, once he used his 180 days of leave, he was going to be, 

and was, terminated.

Turning to his other supposed adverse employment decision, King 

attests DFW could have reassigned him to any number of positions that 

he allegedly applied for between August and November 2020, but they 

chose not to because of his disability. See ECF No. 1 at 6–7. King claims 

this allowed for his 180 days of leave to lapse and for him to be 

administratively terminated. Id. Put shortly, King claims that DFW’s 

failure to reassign him was also an adverse employment decision 

because it was done on account of his disability and ultimately led to 

him being administratively terminated. While King asserts he applied 

for jobs that he was qualified for which could have prevented his 

administrative termination, he provides no support for the notion his

disability played a factor in him not being chosen for any of the positions.

See ECF No. 27 at 21–22. Further, DFW argues, and the Court is 

inclined to agree, King did not submit applications for positions to be 

considered for reassignment. See ECF No. 21 at 18–20. King claims that 

he applied for positions through Carl Young via email, and that he did 

not have access to the portal to apply for new positions. See ECF No. 27-

1 at 174–76; ECF No. 27 at 22. But King used the portal to apply for jobs 

before he was hired at DFW and after he was administratively 

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terminated. See ECF No. 27-1 at 293–96. During these time periods 

King would seemingly not have access to the portal under the logic he

expounds upon in his briefing—that he cannot access the portal from his 

home computer. See id. at 174. In fact, of the 40+ official applications

King submitted, exactly zero were submitted between August 25, 2020

and December 11, 2020, the dates King would need to be searching for 

reassignment. See id. at 293–96. 

Further, taking arguendo that King did not have access to the portal 

between August 2020 and December 2020, there is nothing in the record 

showing he made any effort to try to gain access to the portal. See id. at 

174–76. This is particularly perplexing given it seems clear he knew he 

needs access to the portal to apply given his ex-ante and post-hoc

applications. Specifically, it seems conspicuous that King could not 

apply through the portal since he was not at his office, but then

miraculously gained access to said portal just weeks after his 

termination, when he submitted an application on December 27, 2020. 

Id at 294. Accordingly, King has failed to show how not being reassigned 

to a new position before his leave lapsed was an adverse employment 

decision due to his disability, since he never submitted any actual 

applications to be considered. And even if the emails he sent Carl Young 

were treated as applications, he did not expound on how he was 

adequately qualified or how any decision to not hire him was on account 

of his disability and not a decision on merit. See id. at 324–31; Cortez v. 

Raytheon Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding 

employer has no duty to reinstate plaintiff or help him be rehired by 

notifying him of open positions). Since King has failed the third prong, 

he has failed to prove he has a prima facie case for discrimination under 

McDonnell Douglas. 

* * *

Even if King was able to make a prima facie case, if DFW is able to 

demonstrate a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action,” then the burden shifts back to King to produce 

evidence that employer’s reason is pretextual. Weems 260 F. Supp. at

727. King must offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 

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material fact “either (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is 

instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the 

defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, 

and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic 

(mixed-motive alternative).” Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 

305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). As addressed above, King’s administrative 

termination, while an adverse employment action, was based solely on 

DFW’s non-discriminatory and neutral leave policy which King had 

violated upon exhausting his 180 days. See ECF No. 22 at 44, 66. Rather 

than offer any specific facts to establish that this reasoning is 

pretextual, King simply calls DFW’s explanation “unworthy of 

credence.” ECF No. 27 at 26. Thus, King is unable show any pretextual

reasons for DFW administratively terminating King for violating the 

policy, as the policy was non-discriminatory and applied neutrally. See 

Diggs v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 742 F. App’x. 1, 5 (5th Cir. 

2018) (holding evidence that a leave policy was applied differently to 

Plaintiff is needed if a pretextual reason is to be applied to a termination

under the policy).

DFW’s supposed reason for not reassigning King to a new position 

was because he simply did not apply for any positions through the 

standard process of the online portal. See ECF No. 21 at 23–24. This 

once again is a non-pretextual reason for not reassigning King. King 

cannot be reassigned when he never properly applied to be reassigned. 

The Court does not find King’s argument that he submitted applications 

through his emails to Carl Young convincing, as it is clear that he was 

aware of the application process and, even if he lacked access to the 

portal, made no efforts to communicate with DFW that he lacked access 

in order to submit applications. See ECF No. 27-1 at 324–31. At one 

point, Young even tells King he needs to “apply for these [jobs] through 

the normal process.” Id. at 324. Even assuming arguendo that he 

submitted applications through his sporadic emails to Young, he offers 

no reason or proof as to why he was not hired on account of his disability 

for any of the positions he claims he applied to. See id. generally. It is 

well-settled that DFW has no obligation to reassign King because he 

expresses a desire to be reassigned. See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox 

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Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding employer has no 

obligation to accommodate disabled Plaintiff by reassigning him to a 

new position); Cortez, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 526. King still needs to show 

how him not being reassigned was discriminatory on account of his 

disability, which he fails to do. It is also worth noting that all the denial

letters from DFW that King presents were from positions he submitted

applications for after December 11, 2020. See ECF No. 27-1 at 510–27; 

ECF No. 27-1 at 293–96. These have no bearing on whether DFW was 

deliberately trying to avoid reassigning King because they were all 

positions he applied for after he had been terminated. Therefore, King 

is unable to provide evidence that DFW’s reason for administratively 

terminating him and not reassigning him was pretextual.

For these reasons, there is no genuine dispute of material fact 

regarding King’s discrimination claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Mr. King’s 

discrimination claim.

B. ADA Retaliation Claim.

King also brings claims for retaliation under the ADA. See ECF No. 

1 at 7. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, and avoid summary 

judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in an 

activity protected by the ADA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected act 

and the adverse action. See Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 

298, 304 (5th Cir. 2020).

First, King must show that he engaged in a protected activity under 

the ADA. It is undisputed that making requests for reasonable 

accommodations under the ADA constitutes engaging in protected 

activity. See Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 

2007) (holding that an employee claiming retaliation for requesting 

reasonable accommodations established a prima facie case of retaliation 

under ADA). King did that here. See ECF No. 27-1 at 3–7. 

Second, King must show he suffered an adverse employment action. 

King’s termination serves as an undisputed adverse employment action 

here. See ECF No. 22 at 66. However, King also claims he faced and 

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adverse employment action in DFW refusing to reassign him to a 

different position that could accommodate his disabilities. See ECF No. 

27 at 27–28. The Court does not consider DFW’s alleged refusal to 

consider King’s alleged applications an adverse action because, as the 

Court has explained, under DFW policy and through King’s apparent 

understanding, King did not apply through the online portal during the 

period in which he would need reassignment to avoid termination. Thus,

DFW could not reassign him because he never submitted any 

applications. Further, DFW had no obligation to reassign King simply 

because he asked to be reassigned. See Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810.

Third, King must show there was a causal connection between his 

request for reasonable accommodations and his termination. Here, King 

claims his termination was due to his short-term disability leave 

expiring, a result of having his request for reasonable accommodations

denied by DFW. See ECF No. 1 at 6–7. Therefore, King’s prima facie case 

for retaliation turns on whether King would not have been terminated 

but for his request for accommodations. Lyons, 964 F.3d at 304. For the 

reasons stated below, the Court does not believe there is such 

connection.

Courts routinely hold that a prima facie case can be made if an 

employee has proof that the protected activity was followed shortly by 

an adverse action. See, e.g., Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 

F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that temporal proximity alone, 

when very close, can in some instances establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation). King does not make the argument that temporal proximity 

alone is enough to establish his case for causal connection, likely because 

the Fifth Circuit has held that a period of five months cannot itself

sustain an inference of causal connection. See Raggs v. Miss. Power & 

Light Co., 278 F. 3d 463, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff 

submitted his request for accommodation in July 2020 and was 

terminated in December 2020, a period of five months. See ECF No. 27-

1 at 3–7 and ECF No. 22 at 44. A period of time which this Circuit has 

deemed insufficient to sustain an inference of causal connection. See 

Raggs, 278 F. 3d at 471–72. 

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King argues that DFW intentionally did not grant his 

accommodations so his 180-day leave quantity would exhaust and he 

would be terminated. See ECF No. 27 at 25–26. This argument falls 

short as King presents no facts or proof to support such as accusation. It 

is merely presented as a conclusion: DFW did not accommodate King 

because they wanted his 180 days to exhaust and for him to be 

terminated. The Court is not convinced. First, DFW is not responsible 

for granting short-term disability, Matrix is, so the ability for 

gamesmanship with King’s leave in order to have him terminated is 

outside of their control. See ECF No. 22 at 39–40. Second, throughout

the process, DFW was advising King to apply for different positions, an 

action which he chose not to do through the correct channels. Id. at 206–

07. King simply has not shown a causal connection between his request 

for accommodations and his administrative termination beyond stating 

mere conclusory allegations. These types of arguments are not sufficient

to defeat a summary judgment motion. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 

1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996); also Holmes v. N. Tex. Health Care Laundry 

Coop. Ass'n, 304 F. Supp. 3d 525, 539 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (Lindsay, J.).

* * *

Taking arguendo that King established a prima facie case for 

retaliation, DFW must then present a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for terminating King’s employment. Lyons, 964 F.3d at 306. King 

then must show that DFW’s given reason is not the actual reason and 

was just a façade to discriminate against him based on his disability. Id.

Like his discrimination pretextual argument, other than calling the 

reason “unworthy of credence,” and a conclusory statement that DFW 

should have assisted King in being hired for a new position, King 

provides no facts or evidence as to why King’s administrative 

termination was pretextual. ECF No. 27 at 31. Given DFW’s leave policy 

is neutral and non-discriminatory and King did not submit any official 

applications nor provided any actual basis for why he was qualified for 

any of positions he sent sporadic emails about, it makes sense King’s 

only pretextual argument is conclusory. See Diggs, 742 F. App’x. at 5;

Cortez, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 526. As such, his arguments fail and the Court 

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GRANTS DFW’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to King’s 

retaliation claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) should be and hereby is 

GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(ECF No. 19), Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplementary 

Declaration (ECF No. 30), Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 32), 

and Defendant’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 39) are DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED on this 6th day of October 2023.

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