MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 DALLAS DIVISION 

MARTHA F. LARA., § 

 § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-01923-N 

 § 

QUIKTRIP CORPORATION; § 

QUIKTRIP WEST, LLC; § 

AL-MADINAH PETROLEUM; § 

AND T.J., § 

 § 

 Defendants. § 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 This Order addresses Defendants QuikTrip Corporation (“QT”); QuikTrip West, 

LLC; Al-Madinah Petroleum, Inc; and T.J.’s motion for summary judgment filed on July 

24, 2023 [10]. Plaintiff Martha Lara failed to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. The Court concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and grants 

the motion for summary judgment. 

I. ORIGINS OF THE MOTION 

 This case arises out of a slip-and-fall incident that occurred in a QuikTrip in 

Garland, Texas. On July 21, 2020, Lara entered the women’s restroom, slipped on water, 

and fell, hitting her back and right arm. Defs.’ App. Ex. A 8 [11-2]. Lara filed a lawsuit 

against Defendants alleging that Defendants’ failure to warn or timely remedy the 

hazardous condition of the wet floor was the proximate cause of her injuries. Id. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 2 

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Though 

Lara provides no response to Defendants’ motion, summary judgment cannot be granted 

“merely because it is unopposed.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 

2010). The moving party still must meet its initial burden of informing the Court of the 

basis for its belief that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), or show that “there is an absence of evidence necessary to prove 

a specific element of the case.” Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 17 F.3d 636, 644 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (citing id. at 322–23). 

 A party bringing a no-evidence motion must go beyond “mere conclusory 

statement[s]” to satisfy its burden under Celotex. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 

326, 335 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “go 

beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Vedol v. Jacobs Ent., Inc., 436 F. App’x 409, 410 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(unpub.) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Failure by 

the nonmovant to file a substantive response constitutes failure to carry that burden. Id. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 3 

III. THE COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL CLAIMS

A. Lara’s Negligent Activity Claim 

 Under Texas law a plaintiff is limited to a premises liability cause of action when 

she alleges that she was injured by a condition of the premises, rather than an activity 

contemporaneously conducted by the defendants. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 

264 (Tex. 1992) (person injured by condition created on the property can only recover 

under premises liability theory); H.E.B. Grocery v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. 

1992) (same). Lara’s claims center on the “condition” of the floor being wet, which caused 

her to slip and harm herself. Lara admits that no employees were present, so there was no 

contemporaneous action by Defendants which contributed to the injury. Defs.’ App. Ex. 

B 22. There is no genuine issue of material fact on Lara’s negligent activity cause of action 

and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim as a matter of law. 

B. Lara’s Premises Liability Claim 

 1. All Defendants Remain Proper Defendants – Defendants argue that QT is the 

only proper defendant because it is the only entity in possession, operation, control, and 

management of the bathroom where the incident occurred. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. 

J. 1, 2, & 7 [11]. Defendants argue entities QuikTrip West, LLC and T.J. neither owned 

nor occupied the store where the incident took place, but Defendants provide no evidence 

to support this assertion. See id. at 11. Additionally, Defendants argue that Al-Madinah 

Petroleum, Inc., the entity that owned the store, leased the premises to QT and generally a 

landlord has no duty to a tenant’s invitees for dangerous conditions on leased premises 

which are not under the landlord’s control. Id. at 12. Again, Defendants offer no evidence 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 4 

to support the claim that Al-Madinah had no control over the premises where Lara’s 

incident occurred. See id. at 11-12. Without adequate summary judgment evidence of 

QT’s sole operation and control of the bathroom where Lara fell, Defendants’ argument 

that QT is the only proper defendant does not satisfy Celotex’s demand to provide more 

than conclusory statements. 

 2. Lara Offers No Evidence to Prove Essential Elements of the Products Liability 

Claim – Where a negligence claim is predicated on a theory of premises liability, as is the 

case here, an invitee must prove that (1) a condition of the premises created an unreasonable 

risk of harm to the invitee, (2) the owner knew or reasonably should have known of the 

condition, (3) the owner failed to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from danger, 

and (4) the owner’s failure was a proximate cause of injury to the invitee. Fort Brown 

Villas III Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. 2009). To satisfy 

the third element, the premises owner or occupier has a duty “to make safe or warn against 

any concealed, unreasonably dangerous, conditions of which the landowner is, or 

reasonably should be, aware but the invitee is not.” Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d at 203 

(emphasis added). It follows that “[t]here is no duty to warn when the risks are matters 

‘within the ordinary knowledge common to the community.’” Hirabayashi v. N. Main 

Bar-B-Q, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (quoting 

Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991)). Only 

concealed hazards that the landowner knows or should know exist and the invitee does not 

will give rise to a premises owner’s duty to warn. See Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 5 

v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. 1999); Bill’s Dollar Store, Inc. v. Bean, 77 S.W.3d 

367, 369 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Lara admitted that she saw 

that the floor was wet prior to her fall. Defs.’ App. Ex. G 41. Lara does not contradict this 

admission in the record.

 As for the “notice” element, Lara offers no evidence that Defendants knew or should 

have known of the condition of which Lara complains. For a premises owner or operator 

to have “actual knowledge” of a condition, the owner or operator must have known that 

the hazard existed, but negligently failed to cure it. See generally Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 

264. Lara admits she is not aware of any statements by any employee suggesting that 

Defendants were aware of the water on the floor prior to the Incident. Defs.’ App. Ex. G 

34; Defs.’ App Ex. B 20-21. Lara does not contradict this admission in the record. In the 

absence of proof of actual knowledge, “constructive knowledge” can be established by 

showing that the condition existed long enough for the owner or occupier to have 

discovered it upon reasonable inspection. CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 

102–03 (Tex. 2000); Wal-Mart stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). 

Texas law is clear that when there is no “temporal” evidence to establish constructive 

notice, the plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof on the “notice” element. See WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. 2002); Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d at 936. 

Lara admitted she had no knowledge regarding the length of time the water was on the 

floor prior to her fall. Defs.’ App. Ex. G 35. Lara provides no evidence in the record to 

contradict this admission. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 6 

 Last, even if Defendants owe a duty to warn, Lara offers no evidence that 

Defendants failed in that duty. Defendants argue that there was clear signage that 

adequately warned her about the wet floor. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 4-6. 

Screenshots of video camera footage of the QuikTrip show that yellow warning signs were 

placed directly outside the bathroom when the incident occurred. Defs.’ App. Ex. E 30. 

Lara fails to controvert that the signage was an exercise of ordinary care to protect an 

invitee from danger. 

CONCLUSION

 Because Lara has not provided any evidence to establish essential elements of her 

premises liability claim, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

 Signed October 2, 2023. 

 ___________________________ 

 David C. Godbey 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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