NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-728

ANAIS J. ROSARIO

vs.

CARING BEES HEALTHCARE, INC., & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In this case we address whether statements made to private 

individuals by a person alleging sexual harassment constitute 

petitioning activity protected by G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the 

"anti-SLAPP" statute. Anais Rosario claimed that she worked 

briefly for Caring Bees Healthcare (Caring Bees) until being 

assaulted by her supervisor, Jean Karangwa. Rosario made 

statements about Karangwa to private individuals. Nine months 

later, she filed a civil action against Caring Bees and 

Karangwa, and Karangwa filed counterclaims for defamation and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon 

Rosario's statements to the private individuals. Rosario filed 

a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims under G. L. 

1 Jean Paul Karangwa.
2

c. 231, § 59H, and asserted that her statements qualified as 

petitioning activity. A Superior Court judge concluded that her 

statements did not constitute petitioning activity and denied 

the special motion to dismiss. We agree and affirm. 

Background. We summarize the facts from "the pleadings and 

supporting and opposing affidavits." G. L. c. 231, § 59H.

In October of 2017, Caring Bees hired Rosario as a payroll 

and scheduling clerk. Over the next several weeks, Rosario 

allegedly suffered recurrent sexual harassment. According to 

Rosario, Karangwa, who was her supervisor, repeatedly made 

sexual comments to her, sent her an inappropriate video, and 

ultimately assaulted her by "grab[bing] her vaginal area."

Rosario reported these events to three private individuals. 

The day after receiving the video, she told a co-worker that 

Karangwa sent her a "sexually explicit and inappropriate video." 

On the same day of the alleged sex assault, Rosario texted the 

co-worker that "Karangwa had just grabbed her vaginal area." 

Also on that day, Rosario told her mother "what had happened." 

Later that day, Rosario told a second co-worker that Karangwa 

was a "pervert" and a "molester."

Rosario also reported these events to the government. On 

the day of the alleged assault, November 15, 2017, Rosario filed 

an incident report with the Boston Police Department and 

reported that Karangwa sent her sexually charged text messages, 
3

shared the video, and assaulted her. On January 19, 2018, 

Rosario filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission 

Against Discrimination (MCAD) and reported the assault, the 

video, and sexual comments made by Karangwa and others. In May

2018, Rosario withdrew the MCAD complaint and indicated that she 

intended to file a civil action. On July 2, 2018, Rosario filed 

a complaint (later amended) under G.L. c. 151B in the Superior 

Court and alleged Karangwa repeatedly made sexual comments to 

her, sent her an inappropriate video, and ultimately assaulted 

her. Rosario also alleged that she told a co-worker about the 

video and told her mother and a co-worker about the assault.

On August 20, 2018, Karangwa filed counterclaims. He 

alleged that the following statements by Rosario to co-workers 

and her mother constituted defamation and subjected him to 

emotional distress: (1) Karangwa sent her a "pornographic" 

video; (2) Karangwa was a "molester" and a "pervert"; and (3) 

Karangwa "grabbed her vaginal area."

Rosario filed a special motion to dismiss Karangwa's 

counterclaims under G. L. c. 231, § 59H. That statute protects 

a party's constitutional right to petition the government by 

providing a process "to dispose expeditiously of merit less 

lawsuits that may chill petitioning activity." Duracraft Corp.

v. Holmes Prod. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 166 (1998) (Duracraft). 

Rosario argued that the counterclaims constituted such an effort 
4

to chill her petitioning activity. The Superior Court judge 

"[a]ssum[ed] without deciding" that Rosario's pre-litigation 

statements constituted petitioning activity, but the judge 

denied the motion to dismiss because the counterclaims were not 

primarily brought to chill those activities. Rosario appealed. 

In an unpublished memorandum and order, a panel of this 

court vacated the order and remanded the matter to enable the 

judge to assess whether the statements constituted petitioning 

activity. Rosario v. Caring Bees Healthcare, Inc., 97 Mass. 

App. Ct. 1122 (2020). See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167–168, 

quoting G. L. c. 231, § 59H (a party filing a special motion to 

dismiss must first "make a threshold showing through the 

pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are 'based 

on' the petitioning activities alone"). On remand, the judge 

concluded that none of Rosario's statements to private 

individuals constituted petitioning activity under the statute 

and again denied Rosario's special motion to dismiss. Rosario 

now appeals this second denial.

Discussion. Rosario bears the burden of demonstrating that 

her conduct constitutes petitioning activity. Duracraft, 427 

Mass. at 167-168. The governing statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, 

sixth par. Defines "a party's exercise of its right of petition" 

as follows:
5

"[1] any written or oral statement made before or submitted 

to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 

governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral statement 

made in connection with an issue under consideration or 

review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 

any other governmental proceeding; [3] any statement 

reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of 

an issue by legislative, executive, or judicial body or any 

other governmental proceeding; [4] any statement reasonably 

likely to enlist public participation in an effort to 

effect such consideration; or [5] any other statement 

falling within constitutional protection of the right to 

petition government."

Rosario contends that her statements to private individuals 

constitute petitioning activity, or are at least reasonably 

likely to encourage consideration and to enlist public 

participation in her claims to the police, MCAD, and the 

Superior Court. Based upon our "de novo" review of the record 

in this case, we conclude that Rosario has not met her burden of 

demonstrating that her statements to private individuals 

constitute petitioning activity. Haverhill Stem LLC v. 

Jennings, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 631 (2021). See Reichenbach v. 

Haydock, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 572 & n.14 (2017) (explaining 

rationale for standard of review).

"The right to petition a governmental body for redress of a 

grievance is the very essence of petitioning activity." North 

Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 

863 (2009) (North American). "The typical mischief that the 

legislation intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at 

individual citizens of modest means for speaking publicly 
6

against development projects." Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161. 

The objective of SLAPP suits is not to win them, but to 

intimidate people for "reporting violations of law, writing to 

government officials, attending public hearings, testifying 

before government bodies, circulating petitions for signature, 

lobbying for legislation, campaigning in initiative or 

referendum elections, filing agency protests or appeals, being 

parties in law-reform lawsuits, and engaging in peaceful 

boycotts and demonstrations." Id. at 161-162, quoting Pring,

SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 Pace 

Envtl. L. Rev. 3, 5 (1989). While broadly written, the antiSLAPP statute "has its limits." Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 

327, 336 (2005). In order to determine if statements constitute 

petitioning activity under the statute, courts "consider them in 

the over-all context in which they were made." North American, 

452 Mass. at 862. 

At the time she made her statements to her co-workers and 

her mother, Rosario was not engaged in petitioning activity 

under the statute because her statements lacked the "essence of 

petitioning activity" –- contact with the government -- or at 

the very least efforts to "reach governmental bodies" (citation 

omitted). North American, 452 Mass. at 862, 863. See Kobrin, 

443 Mass. at 330 (petitioning involves "seeking from the 

government any form of redress for a grievance"); Garabedian v. 
7

Westland, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 433 (2003) (petitioning 

involves "supplication to higher authority"). Rosario's private 

statements "lacked the characteristics of petition" contemplated 

by G. L. c. 231, § 59H. Garabedian, supra at 432. 

Characteristics of petitioning activity typically include a 

statement, report, complaint, request, or demand to a government 

entity. See, e.g., Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 153

(2009) ("reporting of a rape to police"); Dever v. Ward, 92 

Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 (2017) ("appeals to the police and to 

the courts"); O'Gara v. St. Germain, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 497 

(2017) (reporting "suspected criminal activity to the police"). 

Petitioning may also take the form of filing a lawsuit or taking 

other court action. See, e.g., 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE

Boston, LLC, 477 Mass. 162, 165-167 (2017) (filing complaint 

seeking declaratory judgment, petition for injunctive relief, 

application for criminal complaint); Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 

Mass. 31, 36 (2016) ("application for a harassment prevention 

order"). Petitioning activity may also include statements to 

the government "made outside any formal governmental 

proceedings," North American, 452 Mass. at 862, see, e.g., 

Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 122 (2002) (statements 

to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regarding proposed sale 

of property); Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 545–551 (2001) 

(letter and statements to Federal and State environmental 
8

agencies), or "statements made by one participant in a pending 

governmental proceeding to another in an effort to settle the 

controversy." Plante v. Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 159 

(2005). Rosario has not cited, and we have not found, any 

appellate decision where statements lacking a "supplication to 

higher authority," Garabedian, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 433, or 

efforts to at least "reach governmental bodies," North American, 

452 Mass. at 862, qualify as petitioning activity under G. L. 

c. 231, § 59H.

Rosario contends that her statements to co-workers and her 

mother constitute petitioning activity because they "were 

inextricably connected to the [subsequent] filing of her police 

report, her MCAD charge and, ultimately, this litigation." She 

argues that her statement to a co-worker reporting the assault 

was part of the sexual harassment complaint process under G. L. 

c. 151B; that her statements to another co-worker about the 

video and the touching were calculated to enlist public 

participation and to encourage government review of her claim; 

and that her statement to her mother resulted in her mother 

advising her to file a police report. We conclude that 

Rosario's statements to her co-workers and her mother were 

independent from her subsequent complaints to the government and 

fell outside the scope of petitioning activity under G. L. 

c. 231, § 59H.
9

Rosario suggests that her petitioning activity began before 

her formal report to the MCAD because she attempted to report 

sexual harassment to the co-worker she believed was responsible 

for such complaints pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 3A (b) (1) (v) 

(requiring employers to adopt process for filing sexual 

harassment complaint). Private actions taken in anticipation of 

contacting the government do not automatically constitute 

petitioning activity. See, e.g., Giuffrida v. High Country 

Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 243 (2008) ("letter 

notifying the defendant of intent to take legal action");

Maxwell v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 694 

(2008) (insurance company investigation); Kalter v. Wood, 67 

Mass. App. Ct. 584, 587 (2006) (complaint letter to health 

insurance company). Even if we assume that an internal 

complaint of harassment could in some circumstances be 

petitioning, the record does not support Rosario's suggestion 

that she was making a report in connection with c. 151B. To the 

contrary, the undisputed record shows that the co-worker, an 

office assistant, simply reached out to Rosario after she quit. 

There is nothing in the record indicating that the office 

assistant had any responsibility with respect to sexual 

harassment. Thus, viewing the statements in context, we agree 

with the judge that Rosario did not meet her burden of showing 
10

that she was engaged in petitioning activity when speaking with 

the office assistant.

The private conversation between Rosario and her co-worker 

about the video and the alleged sex assault cannot reasonably be 

construed as an effort to "enlist public participation" or to 

"encourage consideration or review of an issue" in Rosario's 

subsequent petitioning activities. G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The 

same is true for the private conversation between Rosario and 

her mother about the alleged assault. Conduct aimed at 

enlisting public participation or encouraging government action 

requires, at a minimum, a broad appeal or a call to action. 

See, e.g., Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 

141, 150-151 (2017) (statements to newspaper while hospital 

under investigation by Department of Mental Health); Cardno 

ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 485 (2017) (blog post 

part of "ongoing efforts to influence governmental bodies by 

increasing the amount and tenor of coverage around the 

environmental consequences of the [oil] spill"); Office One, 

Inc., 437 Mass. at 117, 122 (leaflets distributed to condominium 

unit owners urging calls to government officials); Wynne v. 

Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 253 (2005) (statements to fire 

department and newspaper); MacDonald v. Paton, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 

290, 295 (2003) (interactive website designed to generate 

interest on issues of concern in town). Rosario's discreet 
11

statements to her mother and co-workers lacked both a broad 

appeal and a call to action. Rosario contends that the nature 

of her statements (sexual harassment and assault) is sufficient, 

by itself, to satisfy the requirements for enlisting public 

participation and encouraging government review. "That a 

statement concerns a topic that has attracted governmental 

attention, in itself, does not give that statement the character 

contemplated by the statute." Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New 

England, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 605 (2005). 

While we agree with Rosario that conferring with loved ones 

(like her mother) can be of critical importance to sexual

assault victims, we disagree that such conversations necessarily 

constitute petitioning activity. In support of the argument 

that the conversation with her mother is petitioning activity, 

Rosario cites Benoit, 454 Mass. at 153. In that case, a minor 

child reported a rape allegation to her parents, and the parents 

assisted her in reporting the allegation to the police. Id. at 

149-150, 153. Criminal charges followed and were ultimately 

dismissed. Id. at 150. The alleged assailant then sued the 

child and her parents. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court 

concluded that the child's report to the police as well as the 

parents' "involvement in their minor daughter's reporting of 

crime to the police plainly comes within the scope of 

petitioning." Id. at 153. Thus, the petitioning activity in 
12

Benoit was the report to the police, not the conversation 

between the child and her parents.

Unlike the situation in Benoit, Karangwa's counterclaims 

did not infringe on any petitioning activity. Karangwa's 

counterclaims expressly limited allegations to Rosario's 

conversations with private individuals and lacked any nexus to 

her appeal to the government. Compare Haverhill Stem, LLC, 99 

Mass. App. Ct. at 628-629, 634 (petitioning activity in Land 

Court and zoning proceedings not implicated by complaint based 

on extortion); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. 290 Auto Body, Inc., 

95 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 518 (2019) (petitioning activity in civil 

action regarding insurance claim not implicated by counterclaim 

"involving alleged unruly assaultive behavior"); Reichenbach, 92 

Mass. App. Ct. at 570, 574 (petitioning activity in opposing 

construction of oceanfront home not implicated by claim of 

"threats, intimidation, [and] coercion"); Garabedian, 59 Mass. 

App. Ct. at 432 (petitioning activity in opposing airport 

expansion not implicated by claim of "harassing" contractor and 

engaging in "intrusive surveillance"); Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 

Mass. App. Ct. 740, 748 (2002)(petitioning activity in opposing 

addition to home not implicated by claim based on "intentionally 

interfering" with right to use property). Because the 

counterclaims here are based on "private interaction" rather 

than an effort to "influence, inform, or even reach a government 
13

body," the judge properly denied the special motion to dismiss. 

Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 518.

Rosario's private statements to individuals do not 

transform into petitioning activity merely because she 

republished some of those statements in a report to the police, 

a complaint to MCAD, and a civil action. "Individuals who 

petition the government are not necessarily free to engage in 

gratuitous publication of the petition elsewhere without 

consequence." Kalter, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 588. See, e.g., 

Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 153 (email to hospital staff not 

petitioning activity though related government investigation 

underway); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 254 (2007)

(statements about an adversary not petitioning activity though 

published during litigation); Burley v. Comets Community Youth 

Ctr., Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 822-824 (2009) (statement to 

private individuals not petitioning activity though similar notrespass letter sent to police and court); Ehrlich v. Stern, 74 

Mass. App. Ct. 531, 540-542 (2009) (posting on website not 

petitioning activity though related to class action lawsuit); 

Global NAPS, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 601, 607 (statement to 

reporter not petitioning activity though communicated during 

pending arbitration appeal). In Kalter, a patient sent 

identical letters to an insurance company, the police, and the 

Division of Professional Licensure (DPL). Kalter, 67 Mass. App. 
14

Ct. 585. The chiropractor, who was the subject of the letters, 

filed a claim against the patient, and the patient claimed the 

letters were protected petitioning activity. Id. We agreed 

that the letters sent to the police and DPL constituted 

petitioning activity, but the identical letter sent to the 

insurance company did not. Id. at 587. The same reasoning 

holds true here. Rosario may have made similar statements to 

private individuals and the government. As in Kalter, 

statements to the government constitute petitioning activity, 

but statements to private individuals, in the "over-all context" 

here, do not. North American, 452 Mass. at 862.

Conclusion. The anti-SLAPP statute "provides its own 

express" definition of petitioning activity Commonwealth v. 

Exxon Mobil Corp., 489 Mass. 724, 727 n.3 (2022). We are bound 

to review Rosario's statements with reference to the plain 

language of the statute, and the "over-all context" in which the 

statements were made. North American, 452 Mass. at 862. Based 

upon that governing standard and the record here, Rosario has 

not met her burden of proving that her statements to private 

individuals constituted petitioning activity under G. L. c. 231,

§ 59H. The order denying the special motion to dismiss is 
15

affirmed. The parties' requests for appellate attorney fees and 

costs are denied.

Order denying special motion 

to dismiss affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Shin & 

Hodgens, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: April 5, 2023.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.