96-143

 No. 96-143

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

ROBERT HENRY BONE,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

 v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Respondent and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Blaine,

 The Honorable John Warner, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 William F. Hooks (argued), Appellate Defender Office,

 Helena, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;

 John Paulson (argued), Assistant Attorney General;

 Helena, Montana

 Mark Harshman, Blaine County Attorney,

 Chinook, Montana

 Heard: April 15, 1997

 Submitted: April 22, 1997

 

 Decided: August 28, 1997

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Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

 On March 11, 1987, Robert Bone was charged in the Seventeenth Judicial District

Court, Blaine County, with the offenses of deliberate homicide, in violation of 

45-5-

101(1) and -102(1)(a), MCA (1985), and, deliberate homicide by accountability, in

violation of 45-2-302(3) and 45-5-101(1) and -102(1)(a), MCA (1985). On April 13,

1987, Bone entered pleas of guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement. The

District Court sentenced Bone to two concurrent terms of 100 years at the State 

Prison,

with two consecutive terms of two years each for the use of a weapon during the

commission of the offense. Bone submitted a petition for post-conviction relief to 

the

District Court, which was denied. Bone appeals the District Court's denial of his

amended petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

 The issues on appeal are as follows:

 1. Are the District Court's findings of fact concerning Bone's claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel supported by substantial evidence in the record, 

and did

the court correctly apply the appropriate legal standards in review of these claims?

 2. Did the District Court err in concluding that the court's guilty plea 

colloquy

was adequate?

 3. Did the District Court err in concluding that Bone was not denied his 

rights

to due process and access to the courts?

 4. Did the District Court err in concluding that Bone was not prejudiced by 

the

violation of the attorney-client privilege?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 In late February 1987, Bone was arrested on the charges of deliberate homicide

and deliberate homicide by accountability for the deaths of Bernadette and Richard

Cowan. After his arrest, Bone remained in custody throughout the proceedings. The

District Court appointed Mark Suagee, a contract public defender, to represent Bone 

in

March 1987.

 Suagee first met with Bone on March 2, 1987. During this meeting, Suagee was

informed of Bone's prior criminal history, his family history, and of Bone's 

treatment by

a Havre psychiatrist, Dr. Earle. Suagee obtained an authorization and release from 

Bone

to obtain information from Dr. Earle.

 Suagee spoke with Dr. Earle and viewed his records before Bone authorized

entering a plea. Suagee ascertained from Dr. Earle's records that Bone had 

previously

undergone a psychiatric evaluation at the Montana State Hospital in 1977. Suagee 

also

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learned from Dr. Earle that Bone was receiving prescription medications for 

"depression"

and auditory hallucinations. These medications included the prescription drugs 

Haldol,

Norpramin, and Desyrel. Suagee relied upon Dr. Earle to inform him of any changes

made in the medications given to Bone while he was in custody. 

 Suagee stated that at the time he represented Bone he was aware of the decision

in Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, under which

Bone would have been entitled to seek the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in

"evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. 

Suagee

testified that he talked with Dr. Earle regarding Bone's mental competency and from

those conversations he had developed no "articulable concern" that there was a 

problem

with Bone's competency to stand trial. Suagee did not seek an additional mental

evaluation or the appointment of a psychiatrist to aid in the preparation of Bone's 

defense.

 In Suagee's deposition, he stated that he believed the presence or indicia of

premeditation ruled out mitigated deliberate homicide as a viable or possible 

defense. 

The charge of mitigated deliberate homicide was referred to by the county attorney 

in the

sense of being a "crime of passion." Suagee aggressively sought a plea bargain on 

the

lesser offense of mitigated deliberate homicide; however, the county attorney 

steadfastly

refused to consider this, as he believed he had a strong case for deliberate 

homicide. 

 The prosecutor informed Suagee very early on that the State would seek the death

penalty for Bone if he went to trial and was convicted. Suagee spoke with other 

attorneys

who had experience with capital cases and he familiarized himself with the applicable

law. Suagee did not believe that Bone would be sentenced to death in light of the

mitigating evidence, but did advise Bone that he could not absolutely rule out the

possibility of a death sentence in light of the existence of statutory aggravating

circumstances.

 Bone appeared in the District Court with Suagee for the first time on March 11,

1987. He did not enter a plea to the charges, as the arraignment was continued to 

April

13, 1987. During the period between his initial appearance and March 18, 1987, 

Suagee

discussed with Bone a plea agreement which would include a 100-year sentence on the

charges. The State agreed not to request the death penalty or seek any restrictions 

on his

eligibility for parole in return for this plea of guilty. On March 18, 1987, Bone 

stated

he was ready to enter a plea of guilty. The State, however, required a videotaped

statement before the county attorney was willing to absolutely consummate the plea

agreement. Bone provided this videotaped statement on March 18 prior to entering 

into

the written plea agreement. At the time the statement was given and the plea 

agreement

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was entered into, Suagee was aware that Bone was taking prescription medications,

although he was unaware of the side effects of those medications.

 On April 13, 1987, Bone appeared in court for his arraignment and entered his

pleas of guilty. Bone informed the court that he had been taking prescription 

medication

but said that it did not affect him mentally or influence his actions in court. 

Bone also

stated that he felt he had been adequately represented by counsel. In its plea 

colloquy,

the District Court did not affirmatively discuss the possibility with Bone that he 

could be

found guilty of mitigated deliberate homicide at trial. The court did not 

specifically

discuss the mental states of purposely or knowingly. The District Court accepted 

Bone's

pleas of guilty and ordered preparation of a pre-sentence report. On July 6, 1987, 

the

District Court sentenced Bone to a term of 100-years imprisonment on each charge to 

run

concurrently, with an enhancement of two years on each count for use of a weapon, to

run consecutively. The court file was sent to the Sentence Review Division in August

1987. 

 In October 1987, Bone sent the District Judge a letter in which he alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel and asked to withdraw his guilty pleas. Bone 

wrote in

this letter that his counsel did not advise him of all of his rights and that he 

felt he should

have had the opportunity to have a thorough mental evaluation to determine his mental

capacity. The District Court directed copies of this letter to be sent to Mark 

Suagee so

that he could respond to Bone's allegations. The District Court entered an order on

November 19, 1987, in which it noted that the file had been sent to the Sentence 

Review

Division and that Bone's post-conviction claims could not be considered until the 

matter

was returned to the District Court. Suagee filed an affidavit on January 11, 1988,

discussing his representation of Bone. The District Court file was returned to the 

court

by the Sentence Review Division on January 18, 1988. In March 1988, Bone wrote

another letter to the District Court inquiring as to his case status and asking the 

court to

render a decision "so I can continue with this action if need be."

 The District Court directed Suagee to file a supplemental affidavit. In a file

memorandum, the court stated its intention to "enter an Order closing out this case

without the necessity of a hearing as allowed by statute." No order of dismissal was

entered. Suagee filed his supplemental affidavit on April 18, 1988. 

 On September 17, 1991, Bone wrote to the clerk of court and inquired again as

to the status of his case. On April 3, 1992, Bone filed a petition for postconviction relief

with this Court. The State responded to this by moving to dismiss the petition on 

the

ground that the petition for post-conviction relief was still pending before the 

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Seventeenth

Judicial District Court. This Court dismissed the petition to allow the District 

Court to

issue a final order.

 On July 14, 1992, Bone filed in the District Court a motion to amend the 

petition

for post-conviction relief, together with the amended petition and supporting 

documents. 

After receiving no response for four months, Bone filed with this Court a petition 

for writ

of mandamus or supervisory control in which he requested that the District Court be

ordered to assume jurisdiction and address his petition. On December 10, 1992, the

District Court entered an order on the petition for post-conviction relief and 

appointed

counsel for Bone.

 The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on June 3, 1993. Counsel for Bone

moved to substitute the District Court Judge and continue the hearing date. The

Honorable John Warner accepted jurisdiction and the hearing was continued. Bone was

granted leave without objection by the State to file an amended petition. 

 The evidentiary hearing was held on August 21 and 22, 1995. Dr. Joseph Rich,

M.D., a board certified psychiatrist, testified by deposition as to the nature and 

effect of

the prescription medication Haldol, which Bone was taking at the varying rate of one 

to

five pills daily while incarcerated. Daniel Donovan, a criminal defense attorney, 

testified

as an expert witness for Bone. He stated that in his expert opinion Suagee provided

deficient representation contrary to the requirement for effective representation as

mandated by state and federal constitutional provisions. Also testifying at the 

hearing

were Mark Suagee, Don Ranstrom (the former county attorney who prosecuted the case

for the State), family members of Bone, Bone's jailer prior to his sentencing, and 

Robert

Bone himself. The court, after considering the evidence and the testimony presented 

at

the evidentiary hearing, filed an order denying the amended petition for postconviction

relief on March 4, 1996. Bone appeals from this order. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 We review a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief to

determine whether the district court's findings are clearly erroneous and whether its

conclusions of law are correct. State v. Baker (1995) 272 Mont. 273, 280, 901 P.2d 

54,

58. When reviewing the district court's findings of fact to determine if they are 

clearly

erroneous, we apply the following criteria first set forth in Interstate Production 

Credit

Ass'n v. DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287: (1) the Court will

determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence; (2) if the 

findings

are supported by substantial evidence, the Court will determine if the trial court 

has

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misapprehended the evidence; and (3) if the findings are supported by substantial 

evidence

and that evidence has not been misapprehended, this Court may still find "a finding 

is

'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of the 

record

leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed." 

Vernon Kills on Top v. State (Mont. 1996), 928 P.2d 182, 197-98, 53 St. Rep. 1197,

1210.

 The District Court concluded, based upon its findings of fact, that Bone did not

receive ineffective assistance of counsel. We review claims of ineffective 

assistance of

counsel under the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 

668,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d. 674. The two-prong test set forth in Strickland was

adopted by this Court in State v. Boyer (1985), 215 Mont. 143, 695 P.2d 829. 

 The first prong of the Strickland test is to determine whether counsel acted 

within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 U.

S.

at 687. A defendant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the

action which he challenges might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 

466 U.S.

at 689. Counsel's trial tactics and strategic decisions not only are entitled to 

great

deference when reviewed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but they 

cannot

be the basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Gonzales

(1996), 278 Mont. 525, 532, 926 P.2d 705, 710; State v. Sheppard (1995), 270 Mont.

122, 128, 890 P.2d 754, 757. This Court has recently held that non-strategic 

decisions

are not accorded great deference but are only accorded slight deference if based on

professional deliberation. Hans v. State (Mont. 1997), 54 St. Rep. 654. We further

stated in Hans that "[n]on-strategic decisions not based on professional 

deliberation, or

those that stem from neglect or ignorance, are accorded no deference." Hans, 54 St.

Rep. at 659.

 The second prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show that 

counsel's

deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deny the defendant a fair 

trial. In

order to show prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability

that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have 

insisted on

going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 

L. Ed.

2d 203, 210. This Court has utilized the Strickland standard when reviewing claims 

of

ineffective assistance of counsel in petitions for post-conviction relief. Lester 

Kills On

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Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32, 49, 901 P.2d 1368, 1379.

ISSUE 1

 Are the District Court's findings of fact concerning Bone's claims of 

ineffective

assistance of counsel supported by substantial evidence in the record, and did the 

court

correctly apply the appropriate legal standards in review of these claims?

 Bone first contends that the District Court erred in failing to consider the 

testimony

of his expert legal witness, Daniel Donovan. Donovan, a criminal defense attorney, 

was

called by Bone to testify. He stated that, in his expert opinion, Suagee provided 

deficient

representation. Bone argues that this testimony should have been accorded conclusive

weight as it was uncontroverted, unchallenged, and unimpeached. The District Court 

did

not specifically mention Donovan in its findings and conclusions. The State asserts 

that

although the District Court did not mention Donovan specifically, the court did 

consider

his testimony and the court's order addresses the substance of Donovan's opinion 

given

at the evidentiary hearing, thus there is no reversible error.

 Donovan based his conclusion that Suagee's representation was deficient 

primarily

on the basis that Suagee failed to obtain the assistance of a psychiatrist and/or

psychologist to evaluate Bone with respect to the question of his fitness to proceed 

or his

ability to assist in his own defense, as well as to his mental state at the time of 

the

offense. Donovan stated that he was concerned with the effect the medications had on

Bone's ability to discuss the case and make judgments concerning the case. In 

addition,

Donovan testified that he believed there should have been some exploration factually 

to

determine whether Bone was under the influence, control, or domineering effect of his

co-defendant, Lloyd Wilson, which might have provided an alternative defense theory

centering on the lesser included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide.

 The State did not present an expert to counter Donovan's testimony, but did 

crossexamine Donovan as to the bases for his opinion. On cross-examination, the State 

further

questioned Donovan about the materials he reviewed in this particular case. Donovan 

had

previously explained on direct examination that he had reviewed the following 

materials:

the amended petition, response to the amended petition, answers to petitioner's 

request

for admissions, answers to petitioner's first set of interrogatories, the 

application for leave

to file information, the information, the written sentencing judgment, the 

transcript of the

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April 13, 1987, change of plea hearing, the transcript of Suagee's deposition, the

deposition of Dr. Rich, other deposition exhibits, and notes from Suagee's file. 

The State

noted in its cross-examination that Donovan did not review the videotape of Bone's

statements and had never spoken with Bone directly and, therefore, apart from 

Suagee's

deposition, Donovan had no direct information about the decision which Suagee reached

concerning the mental evaluation of his client. On cross-examination, the State also

elicited Donovan's admission that obtaining a mental evaluation could be a doubleedged

sword which has the potential for hurting the defense. 

 This Court has observed that uncontradicted credible evidence generally cannot 

be

disregarded by a court or jury; however, the trier of fact is not bound by expert 

opinion

evidence. State v. Swazio (1977), 173 Mont. 440, 568 P.2d 124. We have previously

held that "the interpretation of an expert witness's opinion and the amount of weight

given to that opinion compared to the other evidence presented is within the 

province of

the trier of fact." State v. Trask (1988), 234 Mont. 380, 385, 764 P.2d 1264, 1267. 

Bone contends that the District Court refused to consider or mention Donovan's

testimony. The failure to specifically cite or discuss Donovan's testimony in the 

court's

order does not necessarily support the contention that the court did not take the 

testimony

into consideration when reviewing the evidence regarding ineffective assistance of

counsel. Although the State did not specifically rebut each of the contentions 

raised by

Donovan, the record does include other evidence presented on the issue of whether

Suagee's performance was deficient by failing to obtain a mental evaluation or 

otherwise

failing to investigate the effects of the medication taken by Bone, or the influence 

and

control of Bone by his co-defendant, Lloyd Wilson. The amount of weight and

credibility given to Donovan's testimony was within the confines of the District 

Court's

discretion. There is no evidence that the court failed to consider Donovan's 

testimony,

only that it did not specifically mention Donovan in its order. This failure to 

cite to the

testimony of an expert witness in the court's findings and conclusions does not 

constitute

reversible error when there is other evidence present in the record upon which the

District Court relies. Furthermore, the field of expert testimony in this instance, 

namely

the competency of trial counsel, is a body of knowledge that is certainly not 

foreign to

an experienced trial judge. 

 Bone next argues that the District Court's findings of fact relative to 

counsel's

failure to conduct an appropriate investigation are not supported by the record. 

Bone

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contends that the record does not support the District Court's findings that Suagee

properly investigated the following issues: (1) the effects of the anti-psychotic 

medication;

(2) Bone's competency to enter a plea agreement and the possibility of obtaining a 

mental

health evaluation; (3) the availability of the lesser offense of mitigated deliberate

homicide; and (4) the possibility of the imposition of the death sentence.

 As we have previously stated, counsel's trial tactics and strategic decisions 

are

entitled to great deference when reviewed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel,

but non-strategic decisions are only accorded slight deference if based on 

professional

deliberation, and no deference if the non-strategic decisions stem from neglect or

ignorance. Gonzales, 278 Mont. 525, 926 P.2d 705; Hans, 54 St. Rep. 654.

 Bone argues that Suagee failed to adequately investigate the effects of the

antidepressant and antipsychotic medications that Bone was being given and that Bone

was prejudiced by this failure. He asserts that the District Court's findings are

erroneously focused on factors which excused this failure to investigate and that the

findings are inaccurate as well as incomplete.

 The court did not specifically address Suagee's admitted failure to 

investigate. The

record provides that Suagee was aware from his first meeting with Bone that Bone was

taking prescription medication. Suagee was not aware of the effects of these 

medications

nor of the amount of medication Bone was actually taking. He testified as to his

awareness at the evidentiary hearing:

Q: [BY HOOKS] Were you aware at the time when Mr. Bone decided to

plead and at the time that he actually entered his plea that Haldol can cause

problems with one's concentration, can effect short-term memory, can

impair or affect the executive functions of the brain which include abstract

thinking, judgment, analytical thinking, can cause the person who is on

Haldol to become sedated, can make them much more passive, and can

make them susceptible to domination of others, and that Haldol is a drug

of a type very similar to the drug the Russians use to medicate their

political dissidents to keep them quiet?

A: [BY SUAGEE] Is the question am I or was I aware of that?

Q: Were you aware at the time Mr. Bone decided to plead guilty, or at the

time that he did formally go into court and plead guilty, of the side effects

of Haldol as I've just articulated them to you?

A: I can't really say that I was.

Q: Were you aware at the time that Mr. Bone appeared in court and

entered his guilty pleas, that he was on Haldol at the time?

A: Yes.

Q: Were you aware that at the time or at a period of time, about two

weeks prior to the entry of a plea, if Haldol had been increased from one

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5 milligram pill a day to five 5 milligram pills a day according to the jail

logs?

A: No I wasn't aware of that.

 

Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, pp. 219-20.

 The failure of counsel to investigate the effects of the medication that Bone 

was

taking, specifically the effects of the strong antipsychotic drug Haldol, was not a 

strategic

decision. The failure to investigate was not based on professional deliberation but

stemmed from neglect or ignorance by counsel and thus is accorded no deference by 

this

Court. 

 The court cited Bone's remorse as justification for not investigating the 

nature of

the prescription medication. The record is very clear that Bone was remorseful and

anxious to enter a plea and that Bone's desire to plead guilty was not blindly 

acquiesced

to by counsel. However, this remorse expressed by his client does not excuse 

counsel's

duty to investigate the amount and effects of the medication his client was taking. 

"The

duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to 

the

lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty." 

Harris

by and through Ramseyer v. Blodgett (W.D. Wash. 1994), 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1255

(quoting from the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980). Bone may

have been remorseful and may not have had any distinct physical manifestations

indicating adverse side effects; however, this does not excuse counsel from asking

Bone's psychiatrist what effects the medication might have on Bone's analytical 

abilities. 

Nor does it excuse Suagee's failure to determine how heavily medicated his client was

at the time Bone was considering entering a plea of guilty to deliberate homicide and

deliberate homicide by accountability. Counsel's failure to investigate the nature, 

effects,

and amounts of Bone's medication constitutes deficient representation under the 

Strickland

test for ineffective assistance of counsel.

 Having determined that counsel's representation was deficient in this area we 

must

next inquire whether counsel's performance prejudiced Bone by applying the second

prong of the Strickland test. Bone asserts that the evidence relative to the 

effects of the

medication Haldol demonstrates that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to

investigate. The State argues that the District Court's findings upon which it 

concluded

the Haldol did not adversely affect Bone and, therefore, the failure to investigate, 

resulted

in no prejudice to Bone and are not clearly erroneous, as they are supported by

substantial evidence in the record.

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 The District Court considered the testimony of the psychiatrist, Dr. Rich, who

established that Haldol has been shown to interfere with the executive functions of 

the

brain. The court found that there can be negative side effects from Haldol on a 

person's

judgment. The court further determined, however, that the evidence did not 

demonstrate

that the Haldol had a negative effect on Bone. The court based its findings on the

videotaped statements made by Bone, and on Bone's demeanor and appearance at the time

his pleas were entered. The District Court noted that it was factually clear that 

Bone was

able to comprehend his situation and that the videotapes demonstrated that Bone was

lucid, responsive, and capable of making intelligent responses. The court also 

noted that

Bone himself testified that the prescription medication did not affect him at all 

mentally. 

 It is also noteworthy that Dr. Rich did not examine the videotape before giving 

his 

opinion. The District Court was not persuaded by Dr. Rich's testimony of the 

potential

effects of the medication when the court was able to evaluate Bone's demeanor and

responses on the videotape. The court therefore concluded that there was no 

objective

evidence that the medication negatively affected Bone's ability to make a rational

decision. The court concluded that the evidence in the record which demonstrates 

that

Haldol can have an affect on a person's analytical capabilities did not necessarily 

support

the contention that it affected Bone's capabilities. The court did not accept Dr. 

Rich's

opinion as it applied to Bone. 

 Unlike the deficient performance test, "evaluation of prejudice is not limited 

to a

contemporaneous assessment, i.e., viewing the facts as of the time of counsel's 

conduct

without the use of hindsight." Whitmore v. Lockhart (8th Cir. 1993), 8 F.3d 614, 622

(citing Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364, 113 S. Ct. 838, 122 L. Ed. 2d 

180.) 

 This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when the 

issue

relates to the credibility of the witness or the weight given to certain evidence. 

State v.

Blake (1995), 274 Mont. 349, 352, 908 P.2d 676, 678; State v. Flack (1993), 260 Mont.

181, 189, 860 P.2d 89, 94. There is substantial evidence in the record to support 

the

District Court's findings as they relate to the effects of Haldol on Bone. Based 

upon

these findings, Bone cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but

for Suagee's error in failing to investigate the possible effects of Haldol, Bone 

would not

have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. 52. 

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 Bone's next interrelated contentions are: first, there is no support in the 

record for

the court's determination that "[c]ounsel's investigation, and his performance in 

assessing

whether petitioner, although medicated, was competent to enter a plea agreement, was

sufficient"; and second, that the court erred in concluding that counsel's 

performance was

not deficient when he failed to obtain a mental health evaluation for his client.

 Bone claims that there was simply no investigation by his attorney into his 

medical

status. His attorney did not request a mental evaluation, even though he was aware 

of

the decision in Ake, 470 U.S. 68, which provides that a criminal defendant is 

entitled

to an appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in the evaluation, preparation, and

presentation of a defense. Bone further points to the testimony of Dr. Rich, who 

testified

that he would have advised an attorney representing an individual who presented such 

as

Bone to undertake a comprehensive investigation into his mental status. Bone urges 

that

his counsel's failure to investigate his mental and emotional status, where the 

record was

replete with evidence of mental dysfunction, constituted deficient performance which

seriously prejudiced him. 

 The District Court acknowledged the negative effects of the drug Haldol which

were described by Dr. Rich. The court noted, however, that the negative effects of

Haldol on a person's judgment, although medically possible, are not always present. 

There was no testimony or other evidence presented in this case that Haldol, in fact,

negatively impaired Bone's judgment at the time he entered into his guilty plea. 

Bone

responds, however, that such proof is very difficult to produce under the 

circumstances

and imposes an unfair burden upon a defendant. However, we note that neither Dr. 

Rich

nor Mr. Donovan interviewed Bone or examined the five-hour-long video tape which

represented three separate statements which Bone gave to authorities in the presence 

of

his attorney. In contrast, the District Court relied heavily on the video tape in 

reaching

its conclusion and evaluated the expert testimony in light of Bone's recorded 

visual and

verbal presentation. 

 It is also important to note that Suagee realized that Bone was under the care 

of 

a personal psychiatrist during the time period that he made these critical 

decisions. In

fact, Suagee obtained Bone's psychiatric records. Suagee was also aware of the

procedure for obtaining a mental evaluation and to the entitlement that one be 

provided

for him under the guidelines of Ake. Suagee gleaned nothing from Bone's appearance,

demeanor, and ability to communicate that would indicate that he was not competent to

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enter a plea or that an evaluation was necessary. More importantly, Dr. Earle did 

not

suggest that Bone was incompetent or that a further evaluation was indicated. The 

record

supports the District Court's conclusion that Bone decided to plead guilty in order 

to

unburden his conscience. His attorney testified that he was very remorseful about 

his

actions and wanted to plead guilty almost from the beginning. It was apparent to the

District Court that Bone had taken a firm stance on the entry of his plea of guilty 

and 

there was no reasonable probability that, even had his attorney obtained an 

evaluation,

he would have rejected the plea agreement and insisted on going to trial. Bone made 

an

agreement with the State which avoided the death penalty, as well as a recommendation

on any restrictions on his eligibility for parole, apart from a dangerous offender

designation. The court found that the preserved video tape was excellent evidence 

of the

petitioner's understanding of the proceedings and the benefits of the plea 

agreement, as

well as an indication of Bone's ability to assist his attorney in his desire to go 

forward

with the guilty pleas. We conclude that the District Court's findings on this issue 

are

supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise clearly erroneous.

 Bone next argues that counsel used an inaccurate definition or standard to 

advise

his client on the available lesser offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. Bone 

asserts

that Suagee advised him according to an outdated and incorrect theory regarding the

availability of the lesser offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. Bone alleges 

that

counsel misconstrued this defense as being limited to a "crime of passion." 

 At the time the offenses occurred, 45-5-103(1), MCA (1985), provided that

mitigated deliberate homicide was a homicide committed "under the influence of 

extreme

mental or emotional stress for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." 

Mitigated deliberate homicide at the time was a lesser-included offense of deliberate

homicide. State v. Gratzer (1984), 209 Mont. 308, 315, 682 P.2d 141, 145. 

 The record indicates that a reference to mitigated deliberate homicide as a 

"crime

of passion" was made by Ranstrom, the county attorney, and discussed with counsel in

that context. 

Q: [BY HOOKS] And you felt a crime of passion was a requisite for

mitigated deliberate homicide?

A: [BY RANSTROM] Not necessarily, but that was one of the things that

I was using to show that you have some kind of an emotional state there,

and I don't recall the exact wording of the offense, but that operating in a

reasonable person's mind that would allow you to be found guilty of the

lesser included offense of mitigating, of which I think has been changed

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now, I don't think it's any longer a lesser included.

Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, p. 108.

Q: [BY PAULSON] Now, your recollection is that the defendant, Mr.

Bone, indicated an interest in pleading guilty fairly early on in the

proceedings against him. Do you have any recollection now of early

conversations with Mr. Suagee about possible plea dispositions in the case?

A: [BY RANSTROM]: Well, I think, as is reflected in one of the, on of

those exhibit letters, Mr. Suagee had very persistently argued with me and

approached me about the possibility of his client being considered for a

mitigated deliberate homicide charge rather than the straight deliberate

homicide, and in the numerous discussions we had on that point, I kept

coming back to the fact that, first of all, I felt that we could prove, if we

went to a jury, that this was an extremely premeditated type of crime. . .

. [M]itigated deliberate homicide required the kind of mental state where

you would be acting under a sort of duress, a mental duress that would

keep you from making rational decisions, and it would be something,

something akin to a crime of passion, and I told him, I said I just don't see

that kind of thing in this case. 

Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, pp. 88-90. 

 There is also evidence in the record that counsel believed that factors of

premeditation heavily affected the determination of whether mitigated deliberate 

homicide

was a viable defense:

Q: In your opinion, did the presence of indicia of premeditation rule out

mitigated deliberate homicide as a viable or possible defense?

A: [BY SUAGEE] That is probably a good description of it.

Q: So if there is premeditation, you can't have mitigated deliberate

homicide?

A: You have mitigated deliberate homicide if you have your other things. 

I know, one, I am not the lawyer I think I am now, then, and it was

always a combination of what he was going to do, wanted to do, telling me

to do. On the other hand, my assessment of how the mitigation fit with

what the evidence of mitigation was. I think what I said in response to a

question a while ago, probably the best description, my best memory of this

is I told him, and I felt like I am not going to try to talk you out of this,

and they aren't going to come down. So it is go to trial, or take more

time, which wasn't going anywhere.

Q: Maybe I wasn't clear. I am not concerned for purposes of this

question, with what Mr. Bone wanted to do, but, in your opinion, at the

time did the evidence that you believed existed of premeditation rule out

mitigated deliberate homicide as a viable defense?

A: That is really the way I remember looking at it.

Suagee Deposition, pp. 74-75.

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 Section 45-5-103, MCA (1985), was adapted from the Model Penal Code 

210.3. This statutory version of the Model Penal Code provision eliminated 

traditional

notions of manslaughter. The notes for the revised 45-5-103, MCA (1985), commented

that the section "seeks . . . to avoid many of the definitional problems which 

pervaded

the traditional approach to manslaughter by eliminating the terms 'malice,' 'heat of

passion,' 'sudden provocation,' and by changing the title of the offense." 

Annotator's

Notes. The commentary to the Model Penal Code version also sets forth that:

[the] difficulty with the premeditation-and-deliberation formula as the

distinguishing criterion of capital murder is that, taken seriously, it would

rest decision on the fact of disturbance, without attention to its cause. That

probably is why the premeditation-deliberation formula has been so

generally nullified in practice.

Commentary, p. 50.

 The record demonstrates that the prosecutor and Suagee may have referred to

mitigated deliberate homicide as being akin to a crime of passion. The record, 

however,

does not establish that counsel was misinformed or that he misinformed Bone as to the

lesser included offense. The use of the phrase "crime of passion" to explain 

mitigated

deliberate homicide may not encompass all the subtleties contemplated by the Model

Penal Code and other states' interpretations of the Model Penal Code, nevertheless it

conveys the substance of the offense. See Hans, 54 St. Rep. at 661. The record does

not conclusively establish that the only factor and evidence which Suagee relied 

upon for

ruling out the lesser included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide was the 

evidence

of premeditation. The weight of the evidence of premeditation would be a 

consideration

of counsel in determining whether or not a jury could be convinced that Bone did not

have the necessary mental state to commit deliberate homicide and instead was under 

the

influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there was a reasonable

explanation. The advice given by Suagee to Bone regarding mitigated deliberate

homicide was not a strategic decision by counsel to be accorded great deference, but 

the

advice did not stem from neglect or ignorance and thus is accorded the slight 

presumption

of falling within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Although the

record does demonstrate that counsel may have used the comparison of a crime of 

passion

to describe the lesser included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide, it does not

establish that counsel and his client did not understand the substance of the 

offense and

its requirements under Montana law at the time the offenses were committed. We hold

that counsel did not base his advice to Bone regarding the lesser offense of 

mitigated

deliberate homicide on an incorrect definition or a misunderstanding of this 

offense. We

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therefore do not find counsel's performance to be deficient in this regard and do 

not need

to address the second prong of the Strickland test.

 Bone's final argument under his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

that

Suagee failed to undertake an adequate investigation into death penalty law and that 

he

failed to properly advise Bone with regard to the likelihood that the death sentence 

would

be imposed on conviction of the offenses as charged. The State claims that the 

District

Court's findings and conclusions holding that Suagee had adequately advised his 

client

on this issue are not clearly erroneous, as they are supported by substantial 

evidence in

the record.

 The court found that the record demonstrated that counsel did discuss the death

penalty and its application to Bone's case with other attorneys who had experience 

with

capital cases. This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Suagee

testified that he discussed the death penalty with other attorneys and that he 

researched

the death penalty law. Although counsel did not speak with anyone who was an expert

on the death penalty, the record provides that he was familiar with the death 

penalty law

and was aware that it could be imposed. 

 Bone argues that there was a wealth of mitigating evidence and if counsel had

properly investigated the death penalty law he would have developed this mitigating

evidence and presented it to the State. He asserts that it would have precluded the

State's pursuit of the death penalty. This contention, however, is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. 

 We conclude that the District Court's findings relative to counsel's 

investigation

of the death penalty are supported by substantial evidence in the record and are not

otherwise clearly erroneous. The District Court was correct in its conclusion that

Suagee's performance in this area did not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err in concluding that the court's guilty plea colloquy 

was

adequate?

 Bone asserts the District Court erred when it did not specifically inform him 

of the

possibility that he could be found guilty of the lesser offense of mitigated 

deliberate

homicide at the time the court accepted his plea. He claims this error, along with 

the

court's failure to discuss the mental states of purposely and knowingly, invalidated 

his

guilty pleas. The District Court has acknowledged, and the transcript confirms, 

that the

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court did not affirmatively inquire as to whether Bone was aware that if he went to 

trial

on deliberate homicide he would have the right to present evidence of mitigation, 

and if

the jury accepted his version of the offense he could be convicted of the lesserincluded

offense. 

 At the time of entry of pleas by Bone, the controlling precedent was State v. 

Azure

(1977), 175 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d 179. In Azure, we held that the applicable statute

imposed upon the court the "duty to determine that the accused understands the charge

to which he is pleading guilty, before that plea may be accepted." Azure, 175 Mont. 

at

193, 573 P.2d at 182. We noted that in the handling of the motion to withdraw the 

plea,

the defendant and the State limited their discussion to the record of the 

arraignment and

to whether the record disclosed that the defendant had a clear understanding of the

charge. We determined that this was insufficient, as the court must consider the 

record

itself. 

 The District Court did not affirmatively inquire whether Bone understood that by

purposely or knowingly causing the death of Richard and Bernadette Cowan he may have

committed either deliberate homicide or mitigated deliberate homicide. It is 

indisputable,

however, from the entire record that Bone was informed of the possibility of the

lesser-included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. The record demonstrates 

that

Bone had a full understanding of the precise kind of homicide to which he pled. The

District Court's conclusion of law that the guilty plea colloquy was adequate is 

supported

by the evidence and is a correct interpretation of the law.

 ISSUE 3

 Did the District Court err in concluding that Bone was not denied his rights to 

due

process and access to the courts?

 Bone argues that the lengthy delay by the court in resolving his petition for

post-conviction relief constitutes a due process violation because it resulted in 

prejudice

to his case. Bone asserts that he was prejudiced as his memory and Suagee's were

dimmed by the passage of years. Furthermore, he contends that the memories of every

nonexpert witness who testified at the evidentiary hearing have faded over the past 

eight

years and that at least two potential witnesses were unavailable for the long-delayed

evidentiary hearing.

 The District Court acknowledged that the trial court failed to rule upon Bone's

petition for post-conviction relief in a timely fashion. The District Court 

concluded,

however, that there was no indication in the record that even if Dr. Earle had been

available to testify, he would have testified that Bone was incapable of 

understanding the

proceedings and assisting in his defense at the time he entered his guilty pleas. 

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The State

argues that this is a correct conclusion and that Bone was not prejudiced by Dr. 

Earle's

absence at the evidentiary hearing. 

 Bone argues that this Court should apply the same rationale regarding a delay to

his post-conviction relief as it has to a direct appeal. In State v. Black (1990), 

245 Mont.

39, 798 P.2d 530, we held that a delay in the processing of a direct appeal can rise 

to the

level of a due process violation only upon a showing of prejudice to the defendant. 

We

held that to prove a due process violation a defendant must show that: "1) he is 

'unable

to present an adequate appeal because of the delay, or 2) that he will be unable to 

defend

adequately in the event a retrial is ordered.'" Black, 245 Mont. at 47, 798 P.2d at 

535

(citing State v. Hall (Vt. 1984), 487 A.2d 166, 171). We stated that delay alone is 

not

adequate to raise a due process concern absent some proof of prejudice occasioned by 

the

delay. 

 Bone argues that the four-year delay attributable to the District Court 

resulted in

prejudice to him, therefore, denying his rights to due process and access to the 

courts. 

This Court also stated in Black, however, that petitions for post-conviction relief 

are

collateral attacks which are civil in nature. Black, 245 Mont. at 43, 798 P.2d at 

532. 

 We conclude that the District Court correctly decided that the petitioner has 

not

been denied meaningful access to the courts under Article II, Section 16, of the 

Montana

Constitution, or denied due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution, and Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution. The 

District

Court noted that the unavailability of witnesses Dr. Earle and Lisa Adams did not

compromise Bone's due process rights. Both of these witnesses testified at Bone's

sentencing hearing. The long time interval between the filing of Bone's petition 

and

ultimate hearing is certainly unusual. However, the District Court noted that all 

of the

necessary evidence was still available to make a fair and complete evaluation of 

Bone's

claims. 

 ISSUE 4

 Did the District Court err in concluding that Bone was not prejudiced by the

violation of the attorney-client privilege?

 This Court reviews a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether 

the

court's interpretation is correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 

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271

Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686.

 Bone argues that the District Court failed to make any express determination 

that

Bone's attorney-client privilege was violated and that it was incorrect in 

concluding that

regardless of whether or not there was a violation, there was no prejudice. The 

State

contends that the District Court reached a correct conclusion and properly considered

Suagee's affidavits in regard to the established procedure as set forth in this 

Court's

holding in Petition of Gillham (1985), 216 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 1019.

 In Gillham, we noted that a post-conviction petitioner opens the door to those

portions of his revelations to his attorney that affect his claims and may no longer 

object

on the ground of privilege. We held that the proper procedure for convicted persons

filing petitions based in whole or in part on the grounds of ineffective assistance 

of

counsel was to apply to this Court for an order "preserving such responding attorney

from charges of discipline or malpractice for revealing necessary confidential 

information

from such convicted person." Gillham, 216 Mont. at 282, 704 P.2d at 1021.

 The trial court requested Suagee to respond to Bone's allegations. In spite of 

the

procedure set forth in Gillham, Suagee responded to the allegations by filing his

affidavits. The trial court, however, did not rule on the petition and the District 

Court

that did rule on the petition specifically stated that it also did not rely upon the

preliminary findings on this issue. The District Court concluded that Bone was not

prejudiced in any way by the failure to secure an order from this Court, as no 

reliance

was placed on the earlier affidavits. Under the facts of this case we agree that 

the failure

of the Attorney General in first obtaining an order from this Court does not 

constitute

prejudicial error to Bone. 

 We hereby affirm the District Court's denial of Bone's amended petition for

post-conviction relief.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting.

 I concur as to issues number two, three and four. I dissent as to issue number

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one.

 The Court concludes that the failure of Bone's counsel to obtain a mental

evaluation did not amount to ineffective representation. I disagree. Under Ake v.

Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 66, Bone was

entitled to the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in the "evaluation, 

preparation, and

presentation of the defense." Although mental evaluations are not necessary in every

criminal proceeding, State v. Langford (1991), 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936, Bone's

medical history was such that, in my opinion, counsel was deficient in not obtaining 

an

evaluation. 

 In State v. Long (1986), 223 Mont. 502, 726 P.2d 1364, we addressed a claim that

counsel had been ineffective for failing to request an examination of the defendant's

mental and physical health. We stated:

 There is no evidence in the record that the issue of mental disease or defect

 should have been pursued nor is there any indication in the trial transcript

 that defendant was not capable of understanding the proceedings or unable

 to assist counsel in his own defense.

 Defendant argues that trial counsel erred by failing to require that

 defendant undergo physical and mental examinations in preparing the

 defense and prior to sentencing. This argument imposes an unacceptable

 burden on defense attorneys by requiring them to exercise diagnostic skills

 beyond their training. In this case the record suggests nothing that would

 evidence that defendant was suffering from mental disease or defect.

Long, 726 P.2d at 1370. In contrast to the situation in Long, where there was no

suggestion that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease, in this case 

counsel

for Bone, without exercising diagnostic skills beyond his ken, could and should have 

seen

the need for a mental evaluation. The following facts, which were either known or

available to counsel, all pointed to the need for a mental evaluation: 

 1. Despite the potential for imposition of the death penalty, Bone was 

expressing

remorse and indicating a desire to plead guilty. 

 2. Bone had previously undergone a mental evaluation. 

 3. Bone was under the treatment of a psychiatrist (Dr. Earle) during the period

in which plea negotiations were being conducted. Counsel conceded that he could not

recall any specific dialogue with Dr. Earle in which he asked if Bone were competent:

"I really can't remember a specific exchange where either he [Dr. Earle] asked me or 

I

asked him if he thought he [Bone] was competent." 

 4. Both the earlier evaluation and Dr. Earle's evaluation indicated that Bone 

was

suffering from mental problems. 

 5. Bone was taking antidepressant and antipsychotic medications at the time of 

the

plea negotiations. 

 6. Bone had a history of prior mental health hospitalizations and treatment. 

 7. Bone had a history of post-traumatic stress disorder, a family history of 

mental

illness, and a history of being abused. 

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 8. Bone had a history of long-standing drug and alcohol abuse. 

 Finally, and most significantly, since counsel was aware that there was an

eyewitness to Bone's participation in the murders, Bone had no factual defense to the

charge. Thus, his only potential defense would be the possibility of a finding of 

mental

disease or defect. 

 Bone's expert, Assistant Federal Defender Dan Donovan, testified that, in light 

of

the above factors, counsel should have obtained an evaluation of Bone's fitness to 

proceed

and his mental state at the time of the offense and that the failure to do so 

constituted

deficient representation. I agree. 

 The Court does note that Donovan conceded on cross-examination that a mental

evaluation can be a double-edged sword which has the potential to hurt the defense.

Although the court no longer requires that mental evaluations requested by the 

defense

be filed with the court, Smith v. McCormick (9th Cir. 1990), 914 F.2d 1153, prior to

the 1990 decision in Smith, Montana law required that evaluations be filed with the 

court. 

Hans v. State (Mont. 1997), ___ P.2d ___, 54 St.Rep. 654, 663-64. A defendant

requesting an evaluation prior to Smith ran the risk of having to disclose an 

unfavorable

evaluation; hence, the "double-edge." However, even in the context of Bone's 1987 

plea,

I do not see the "double-edged" aspect as defeating the ineffective assistance of 

counsel

argument. Bone's counsel was confronted with a client who was expressing remorse and

a desire to enter a plea of guilty rather than proceed to trial. With that as a 

point of

reference, counsel had nothing to lose by obtaining a mental evaluation. Even if the

evaluation were unfavorable, Bone would be none the worse off. He would have merely

eliminated mental disease as a possible defense, and he could proceed to enter a 

plea as

previously planned. Thus, under the circumstances, the possibility that the 

evaluation

may have been unfavorable and filed with the court did not relieve counsel of his

obligation to pursue an evaluation in the first instance. 

 Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d. 674,

requires that not only must counsel's performance be deficient, but the performance 

must

have prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. In order to show 

prejudice

in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 

would

have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 

366, 88

L.Ed.2d 203. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694.

 In finding no prejudice, the District Court concluded that the videotape of 

Bone's

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pre-plea statement was excellent evidence of his understanding of the proceedings as 

well

as an indication of his ability to assist and his desire to go forward with the 

guilty plea. 

This Court affirms the District Court's conclusion. One's demeanor, however, is not

dispositive on the issue of competency. Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.

Ct.

836, 15 L.Ed.2d 1815. Bone's history of mental problems, head injuries, medications

and drug problems are so numerous and pervasive that it was incumbent upon the court

and counsel to look beyond mere demeanor and examine Bone's true mental condition. 

 Prejudice in the present case is established by counsel's admission that, "I 

think

that the question of what his mental state was, with the advantage of hindsight, 

with the

advantage of all of these proceedings, there were clearly a lot of things going on 

with

him, and if I was doing it again, yes, I might have done more along that line." This

admission pertains directly to the question of prejudice. This District Court erred 

in

holding that the court cannot evaluate the issue through hindsight, thereby 

attaching no

significance to counsel's admission. The rule is that courts should avoid hindsight 

in

evaluating whether counsel's performance was deficient (i.e., the first prong of

Strickland). This admonition does not apply to the second prong of Strickland; that 

is,

was the defendant prejudiced by the deficient representation? "[E]valuation of 

prejudice

is not limited to a contemporaneous assessment, i.e., viewing the facts as of the 

time of

counsel's conduct without the use of hindsight." Whitmore v. Lockhart (8th Cir. 

1993),

8 F.3d 614, 622. 

 Defense counsel's admission, albeit in hindsight, that he would have done things

differently creates a reasonable probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the

outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. The factors enumerated above clearly

placed Bone's competency at issue, and the question of mental disease or defect 

should

have been pursued. Given the eyewitness testimony of Lisa Adams, Bone had no factual

defense to the charge. Thus his only possible defense was mental disease or 

defect. In

the absence of a mental examination, counsel had no basis for determining whether 

such

a defense would be viable. Had counsel explored the viability of a defense of mental

disease or defect, there is a reasonable probability that Bone would have proceeded 

to

trial rather than enter a guilty plea. That probability amounts to prejudice. I 

would

reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. 

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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 Justice James C. Nelson and Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., join in the foregoing

dissent.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

 /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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