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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MIRASOLES PRODUCE USA, LLC, § 

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1240-E

§

SANCHEZ FARMS and ELIZABETH §

RAYAS, § 

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Mirasoles Produce USA, LLC has filed a motion for attorneys’ fees 

and costs, see Dkt. No. 29, which United States District Judge Ada Brown has 

referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation, see Dkt. No. 31.

For the following reasons, the motion should be granted in part and denied in 

part.

Background

This is a trust enforcement action under the Perishable Agricultural 

Commodities Act (“PACA”). See Dkt. No. 1; 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c). 

The Court entered default judgment against Defendants Sanchez Farms and 

Elizabeth Rayas and granted Mirasoles leave to file a motion for attorneys’ fees. See 

Dkt. No. 27.

Mirasoles then filed the pending motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. See Dkt. 

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No. 29.

Legal Standards

Where, as here, a party seeks to recover attorneys’ fees as authorized by 

contract,

[r]easonable attorneys’ fees are determined through a two-step process. 

The district court must first calculate the lodestar – the number of 

hours reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in 

the community for similar work. The lodestar is presumed reasonable, 

but the court may then enhance or decrease it after considering the 

twelve Johnson factors. [T]he most critical factor in determining a 

reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’

[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an 

award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly 

rates. But once calculated, the party seeking modification of the 

lodestar under the Johnson factors bears the burden.

Fessler v. Porcelana Corona De Mex., S.A. DE C.V., 23 F.4th 408, 415-16 (5th Cir. 

2022) (cleaned up).

And the Court also may use its own expertise and judgment to make an 

appropriate independent assessment of the hourly rates charged for the attorneys’

services. See Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th 

Cir. 2004); Vanliner Ins. Co. v. DerMargosian, No. 3:12-cv-5074-D, 2014 WL 

1632181, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014) (noting that the Court is an expert on the 

reasonableness of attorneys’ fees).

Further, “[i]f a party does not object to particular billing entries as 

inadequately documented, the court is not obligated sua sponte to sift through fee 

records searching for vague entries or block billing. It is a common practice for courts 

to address only those potentially inadequate entries brought to the court’s attention.”

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Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-cv-953-D, 2015 WL 3999171, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 

1, 2015).

The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service 

properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney as a result of taking 

the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time 

limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8) the monetary amount 

involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

attorneys; (10) whether the case is undesirable; (11) the nature and duration of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See

Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989).

The undersigned recognizes that the analysis set forth above, and particularly 

the interplay of the lodestar analysis and the Johnson factors, may have been called 

into question by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Perdue v. Kenny A., 

559 U.S. 542 (2010). See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552-53; S&H Indus., Inc. v. Selander, 

No. 3:11-cv-2988-M-BH, 2013 WL 6332993, at *2-*3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2013).

But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a subsequent 

published opinion, rejected the argument “that Perdue clearly disfavors applying the 

Johnson factors to determine a fee award and instead requires the use of only the 

lodestar.” Combs v. City of Huntington, Tex., 829 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2016). The 

Court of Appeals explained that

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[w]e agree that Perdue requires courts to first calculate the lodestar; 

indeed, this has long been our practice. See, e.g., League of United Latin 

Am. Citizens No. 4552 (LULAC) v. Roscoe Ind. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 

1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The method by which the district court 

calculates an attorneys’ fees award is well established. The district 

court first calculates the ‘lodestar.’ “). But Perdue does not, as Combs 

contends, make it impermissible to then consider any relevant Johnson

factors. Perdue cautions against the sole use of the Johnson factors to 

calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee but nowhere calls into question the 

use of relevant Johnson factors to make this determination. Indeed, 

Perdue expressly allows adjustments “in those rare circumstances in 

which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that 

may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.” 559 U.S. 

at 554....

And though the lodestar is presumed reasonable, it may be adjusted 

where it “does not adequately take into account a factor that may be 

properly considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Perdue, 559 U.S. 

at 554.... Perdue, consistent with the Court’s frequent pronouncements, 

explains that lodestar enhancements are to be rare....

In sum, the district court should begin by calculating the lodestar: the 

reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable rate. The district 

court may then determine whether any other considerations counsel in 

favor of enhancing or decreasing the lodestar. In light of the “strong 

presumption” that the lodestar represents a sufficient fee, 

enhancements must necessarily be rare. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553-54.

Id. at 393-95; see also Rodney v. Elliot Sec. Sols., L.L.C., 853 F. App’x 922, 924 (5th 

Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

Perdue, then, did not change the proper method for calculating attorneys’ fees 

awards in the Fifth Circuit. The analysis below will consider the necessary factors 

when determining the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded.

And, in the end, this Court “must provide a reasonably specific explanation for 

all aspects of a fee determination.” Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 741 (5th 

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Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). So “rulings on fee awards need not be so excruciatingly 

explicit that those decisions consume more paper than did the cases from which they 

arose.” Saldivar v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 675 F. App’x 429, 432-33 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(per curiam) (cleaned up). Instead, this Court’s “analysis [must be] complete enough 

for [the Fifth Circuit] to review whether the [C]ourt has used proper factual criteria 

in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.” Id. (cleaned up).

Analysis

PACA does not expressly require an award of attorneys’ fees. But the PACA 

trust provision states that PACA trust assets must be held for the benefit of all 

unpaid sellers “until full payment of the sums owing in connection with such 

transactions has been received” by the sellers. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2) (emphasis 

added).

The Fifth Circuit interprets the phrase “sums owing in connection with” as 

allowing an award of attorneys’ fees related to collection efforts when such fees are 

included in the sales contract between the PACA buyer and seller. See Iscavo 

Avocados USA, L.L.C. v. Pryor, 953 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Coosemans 

Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo, 485 F.3d 701, 709 (2d Cir. 2007); Middle Mountain 

Land & Produce, Inc. v. Sound Commodities, Inc., 307 F.3d 1220, 1222-24 (9th Cir. 

2002) (discussing plain meaning and legislative history of statute)).

According to the Fifth Circuit, the phrase “sums owing in connection with” is 

“broad” and “unambiguously encompasses not just the contract price for the 

delivered agricultural commodities but also all sums the buyer owes in connection 

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with that transaction.” Id. “Attorneys’ fees a seller incurs in seeking to collect on an 

unpaid invoice are necessarily incurred in connection with the transaction 

memorialized by the invoice. And when the seller agrees to pay those fees in the 

same invoice, the fees are ‘owed in connection with’ the transaction.’” Id. at 319-20.

Mirasoles’ unpaid invoices provide for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs:

Buyer agrees to pay interest of 1 1⁄2% per month on the unpaid balance 

and all collection costs including attorney’s fees shall be considered 

sums owed in connection this transaction under PACA trust.

Dkt. Nos. 13-2 and 21.

And, so, Mirasoles has established a contractual right to recover its attorneys’

fees and costs under PACA.

Mirasoles seeks an award of $19,058.75 in attorneys’ fees, which represents 

48.25 hours of attorney work at a $395 hourly rate, and $734.30 in costs for 

attempting to collect the unpaid amounts over a twenty-two month time period from 

May 2022 through February 2024.

The request for attorneys’ fees and costs is supported by the Declaration of 

Mark A. Amendola. See Dkt. No. 30 at 3-5. Mr. Amendola is Senior Litigation 

Counsel in the law firm of Martyn and Associates Co. in Cleveland, Ohio. He has 35 

years of experience. Since 1996, he has limited his practice to federal court litigation 

representing corporate clients who have trust claims under PACA.

Mr. Amendola’s Declaration is supported by billing records that include a 

narrative of the work done and the number of hours that it took to complete the 

work. See id. at 7-24. Mr. Amendola explains that more time than usual was 

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expended serving the defendants with the summons and complaint because 

defendants were transient between and within produce terminals in Dallas. He also 

states that significant time was spent on tasks to comply with the Court’s March 28, 

2023 Order, including obtaining revised proofs of service from the process server, 

renewing the request for entry of judgment, and re-filing the motion for default 

judgment.

The undersigned finds that the legal services rendered in this case were 

reasonable and necessary. 

Mr. Amendola states that his hourly rate is consistent with or below rates 

charged by other attorneys with his years of experience as a practicing attorney in a 

specialty field of federal court litigation.

The undersigned finds that the requested rates are reasonable and within the 

market rate for attorneys handling this type of litigation in the Dallas area. 

The undersigned therefore finds the appropriate lodestar here to be calculated 

as Mirasoles requests for an award of $19,058.75 in attorneys’ fees.

Mirasoles also seeks an award of $734.30 in costs. 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) permits a district court to provide 

costs, other than attorney’s fees, to the ‘prevailing party.’” Mercer v. Patterson-UTI 

Drilling Co., L.L.C., 717 F. App’x 400, 406 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). And, in this 

circuit, the “rule is that: Unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules, or a court order 

provides otherwise, costs – other than attorney’s fees – should be allowed to the 

prevailing party.” Vital v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 685 F. App’x 355, 360 (5th Cir. 

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2017) (per curiam) (cleaned up); see also Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 

586 (5th Cir. 2006) (“There is a strong presumption under Rule 54(d)(1) that the 

prevailing party will be awarded costs.”).

28 U.S.C. “§ 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d).” Crawford 

Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987). Section 1920 provides that

a judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily 

obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any 

materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of 

interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special 

interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 1920.

The United States “Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts may only 

award those costs articulated in section 1920 absent explicit statutory or contractual 

authorization to the contrary.” Cook Children’s Med. Ctr. v. The N. Engl. PPO Plan 

of Gen. Consolidation Mgmt. Inc., 491 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). 

“Taxable costs are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses as is 

evident from [28 U.S.C.] § 1920” and “are a fraction of the nontaxable expenses 

borne by litigants for attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators,” such that 

“costs almost always amount to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in 

connection with a lawsuit.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 

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2006 (2012) (cleaned up). In short, “taxable costs are limited by statute and are 

modest in scope.” Id. The Court “may decline to award the costs listed in the statute 

but may not award costs omitted from the list.” Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 

F.3d 877, 891 (5th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up).

Mirasoles seeks costs for process server fees, local counsel, filing fees, 

photocopies, postage, PACER, and computerized docket research. The requested 

costs for process servers ($130), local counsel ($154.40) and computerized docket 

research ($13.20) are not included in costs recoverable under Section 1920. And, so, 

the requested amount of $734.30 should be reduced by $297.60 ($130 + $154.40 +

$13.20) and Mirasoles should be awarded $436.70 in recoverable costs. 

Recommendation

The Court should grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff Mirasoles Produce 

USA, LLC’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [Dkt. No. 29] and award Plaintiff 

$19,058.75 for attorneys’ fees and $437.60 for costs, for a total recovery of attorneys’

fees and costs of $19,495.45.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. ‘ 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge=s findings, conclusions, and 

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recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge 

is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party 

from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge 

that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 

See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass=n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: July 16, 2024

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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