IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LATODD DETRAY ALEXANDER, § 

#58348-177, §

Movant, §

§

v. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-1990-K

§ (CRIMINAL NO. 3:19-CR-78-K-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

Respondent. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Movant LaTodd Detray Alexander’s(“Alexander’s”) pro se

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Upon review, 

the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2019 Alexander pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to production 

of child pornography. In 2021, the court sentenced him to 286 months, well below 

the 360-month guideline term of imprisonment. Crim. Doc. 60. Alexander’s direct 

criminal appeal was later dismissed because the appeal waiver barred his claim. Crim. 

Doc. 68. 

Alexander then filed this timely § 2255 motion. Doc. 1. He asserts his sentence 

was substantively unreasonable and his attorney was ineffective. Doc. 1 at 4-8. The 

Government opposes § 2255 relief. Doc. 8. To date, Alexander has not filed a reply.

Case 3:22-cv-01990-K Document 9 Filed 02/20/24 Page 1 of 4 PageID 44
Page 2 of 4

After review of all pleadings and the applicable law, the court concludes that 

Alexander’s claims have no merit. The § 2255 motion should therefore be denied. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Substantively Unreasonable Sentence

Alexander asserts that his sentence is “substantively unreasonable” because the 

court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors at his sentencing, including 

his “remorse, sexually abusive childhood, stable employment, acceptance of 

responsibility and low recidivism.” Doc. 1 at 4. He is wrong. The court was well 

aware of the mitigating factors. Indeed, before sentencing, defense counsel filed a 

lengthy motion for a downward variance detailing the mitigating factors and the 

Government objected. Crim. Doc. 44; Crim. Doc. 47. Then, at the sentencing 

hearing, the court invited defense counsel to “go right into what you have that’s in 

mitigation” and counsel re-emphasized each of the mitigating factors. Crim. Doc. 64 

at 8-28. Because the record conclusively shows that the court was mindful of the 

mitigating factors and considered them, Alexander’s assertion, which consists only of 

unsupported generalizations, fails. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Alexander also contends that his counsel was ineffective. To succeed on an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the movant must demonstrate that counsel’s 

Case 3:22-cv-01990-K Document 9 Filed 02/20/24 Page 2 of 4 PageID 45
Page 3 of 4

performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Failure to establish either 

deficient performance or prejudice defeats the claim. Id. at 697. Moreover, to prove 

prejudice in the sentencing context, the movant must demonstrate that the sentence 

was increased by the deficient performance of defense counsel. Glover v. United States, 

531 U.S. 198, 200, 203-04 (2001).

Alexander contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 

investigate and object to an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) and to the 

application of a five-level pattern-of-conduct enhancement. Doc. 1 at 5, 8. First, the 

court did not impose any enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e), as the 

Government aptly notes. Second, the record confirms that the five-level pattern-ofconduct enhancement in USSG § 4B1.5(b) was proper because Alexander engaged in 

more than two known instances of prohibited sexual conduct with a minor. See

Presentence Report (PSR) ¶¶ 8, 12, Crim. Doc. 32-1; Gov’t Resp. to Sentencing 

Mem., Crim. Doc. 47 at 2-6. See also USSG § 4B1.5 comment n.4(B)(i) (the 

enhancement applies when a defendant is convicted of a covered sex crime, such as 

production of child pornography, and “if on at least two separate occasions, the 

defendant engaged in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor”). Thus, Alexander’s

counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make meritless objections. See 

Case 3:22-cv-01990-K Document 9 Filed 02/20/24 Page 3 of 4 PageID 46
Page 4 of 4

United States v. Preston, 209 F.3d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 2000) (failure to raise a meritless 

objection is not ineffective assistance). 

Relatedly, Alexander alleges that his attorney failed to investigate whether the

§ 4B1.5 enhancement was proper and to advise him of the enhancement’s application 

before he pleaded guilty. Doc. 1 at 5. He also asserts that counsel was ineffective in 

failing to identify any guideline-calculation error. Doc. 1 at 6. Both assertions are 

vague and conclusory and, thus insufficient to plead a Sixth Amendment claim. See 

United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to consider vague 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims). Alexander does not allege, much less show,

what further investigation would have revealed or how knowing about the five-level 

enhancement would have influenced his guilty plea. Nor does he identify any 

conceivable error in the guideline calculation. The court therefore rejects these

fatally vague claims. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

SO ORDERED.

Signed February 20th, 2024.

____________________________________

ED KINKEADE

UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-01990-K Document 9 Filed 02/20/24 Page 4 of 4 PageID 47