B e c a us e we a dd

re ss r e la tor s in

the c on te xt of

the dis tr ic t c ourt pro c e e din g s, we re fe r t o 1 them collectively

as “D efe ndants.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00509 -CV

In r e G e ne r al M ot or s C or por at ion , C he vr ole t M ot or Di vis ion and Austin Chevrolet, Inc. d/b/a Mun day Chevrolet/G eo

OR IG IN A L PR OC E E D IN G FR OM T R A V IS C OU N T Y

O P I N I O N
This or igina l pr ocee ding involves the duration of the district court’s plena ry power
over a suit that was inadver

tently dismis s ed fo r wa

nt of prosec ution while the suit was abate d in the district court. The suit ha d been a bated to allow a

n administrative proc eedingto take plac e to resolve c erta in issues that were predic ates to t h e d i s t ri ct court acquiring jurisdiction over all of t h e cl ai m s an d i ssues in the suit. The suit was inadver tently dismiss ed in 2003 during the per iod of abatement and while the administrative proc eedingwas still pending. O ver f our y ear s l at er, in 2007, the trial court vacate d the i nadver tent order of di smissal and reinstated t he sui t. Relators Gene ral Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division and Austin C h evrolet, I nc. d/b/a Munday Chevrolet/Geo seek a

writ of mandam u s compelling the district court to vac ate the 2007 or der 1 that v ac at ed the district cour t’s 2003 order

of dismissal for want of

prosec ution, contending thatThe Motor Ve hicle B oard w as abolished in 2005. See A c t o f M a y 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 , 7 9 th L eg ., 2 R.S., ch. 281, § 7.01, sec. 2301.002(2) , (10), 2005 Te x . Gen. L aws 778, 839. 2 the 2007 orde r attempting to vacate the pre vious dismi ssal is void because i t wa s i s s ued af ter the
e xpir a tio n o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ple na

ry po we r. We c on dit ion a lly g ra nt t he wr it.
F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

Re sp on de nt L a ndmark , a Che vr ole t ve hic le de a le rs hip , f ile d th e un de rl y ingsu it
a g a ins t G M and

Mund a y in 19 98 , a lle g ingthat th e y de fr a ud e d L a ndmark

of its ri g ht t o p ro te st Mund ay ’s 19 93 de a le rs hip a pp lic a tio n, lob bie d the le g isl a tur e in b a d f a ith , a nd dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t L andmark

in t he a llo c a tio n o f C he vr ole t’ s “ mos t pr of ita ble ” ve hic le s. The unde rly ing disput e relates bac k to a 1993 administrative proc eeding befor e the Te x as De partment of Transportation’s Motor Vehicle B oard. See A ustin Chevrolet, Inc
. 2 v. Motor Ve hicle Bd. , 2 1 2 S
. W
. 3 d 4 2 5 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n 2 0 0 6 , p et
. d en i ed ). I n t h at p ro ce ed i n g, Munday filed an application for a new fra nchised motor vehicle deale r’s license, a nd L andmar

k filed a prote st to the a

pplication. GM intervene d on Munday ’s behalf , and af ter a pre- hear ing c onfer ence
and so me dis c ov e ry , th e B oa

rd sc he du le d a hea

ri ng on the me ri ts. B e fo re the he a ri ngon the me ri ts, L andmar k dismiss ed its protest, ostensibly beca use it ha d rea ched an ag ree ment with GM reg arding its concer ns about the Chevrole t dealer ship that Munday proposed to open in Houston. Munday then obtained the lice nse to opera te its new Chevrole t dealer ship. I n 1 99 7 , M u

n d a y f i l e d a n a p p l ic a tio n w iththe B oa

rd se e kin g to r e loc a te his de a le rs hip from F M 1960 to a proposed site on I H-45, a distance of less than a mil e. L andmar k did not approve of this relocation. Howeve r, L andmar k was not in a position to protest the reloc ation of Munday ’s3

deale rship beca

use of an amendment to the Texas Motor Vehicle Commi ssion Code (the “Code” ), which provide d that “the r elocation of a dea lership is not subject to protest by a fr anchised deale r

. . . i f t h e p r o p o s e d

r e l o c a t i o n i s n o tf

a rt h e r t h a n o n e m i l e f

r o m t h e s i t e f

r o m w h i c h t h e d e a l e r s hip is being reloc ated.” See Act of Ma y 22, 1997, 75th L eg ., R.S., ch
. 6 3 9 , § 26, sec. 4.06( e)( 1), 1997 Tex. Gen. L aws 2185, 2197, repeale d by Act of May 22, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1421, § 13, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aw s 4 5 7 0, 5020 (cur rent ve rsion at Tex. Occ. Code A nn. § 2301.652(c) (1) (West 2004)). L a

ndmark fi le d th is l a ws uit

se e kin g dama g e s f

or br e a c h o f a duty

of g oo d f a ith
and fa ir de a lin g , v iol a tio n o f t

he De c e pti ve Tra de Pr a c tic e s A c t, f ra ud and c on sp ir a c y

a g a ins t GM, and for

fra ud and conspira cy

ag ainst Munday . I n its suit , L andmar k claimed that it had been misled by Def endants into dismissi ng the prote s t o f Munday ’s orig inal application, that GM ha d lobbied the leg islature to amend the C o d e in bad faith to L andmar k’s detriment, a

nd that GM
unrea sonably

discriminated ag ainst L andmar k in t h e al l o cation of c erta in vehicles a fter Munda y op e ne d its Ch e vr ole t de a le rs hip in H ou sto n. L a ndmark ’s pe tit ion a lle g e d s pe c if

ic a lly tha t it s c la ims ag ainst GM (under

the DTPA and f

or bre ach of

a dut y o f good faith and f air de aling ) we re ba sed on alleg ed violations of the Code. The fra ud claim in the orig inal petition is not based on a violation of the Code. The district cour t entere d an unopposed

o r d e r o f a b a te ment of the suit in Aug ust 2001,
re fe rr ingtw o is su e s to the B oa rd that th e c ourt

a nd th e partie s c on c lud e d w e re fu nd a me nta l to L andmar k’s claims and w ere within the “primary jurisdiction” of the B oard:There is no dispute that the dismi ssal of t he case for want of prosec ution was inadver tent 3 on both the part of the district court and L andmar k. A routine motion to retain would have preve nted the dismissal, and the Def endants a cknowledg e that the motion would have b een unopposed. Howe v er , s u ch a routine motion will not be filed unless the af fec ted litigant is aw are that the D WO P p r o c e s s is h a

p p e n in g . D u e to n o f

a u lt o f th e ir o w n , L a n d ma r k ’ s la w y e r s wer e unaw are that the DWOP process was occur ring
. Def endants’ counsel, howe ver, did re ceive the notice. The y knew L andmar

k’s lawy ers had failed to r espond, and acknow ledg ed at oral argum en t t h at t hey discovere d at the time of the or igina l dismissal that the rea son for the failure was that L andmar k’s notice had be en sent to t h e wr o n g ad dress. F our y ear s of litigation betwe en the pa rties in the administrative proc eedingfollowed, including an appe al to this Court and a petition for revie w to the Te xas Sup re me Court , wi tho ut a ny dis c los ur e by the De fe nd a nts to L a ndmark , th e B oa rd , th is C ourt , or the Te x as Supreme Court that the unde rlying suit—for which th e ad m i n i s trative proc eeding wa s a pr e dic a te —h a d b e e n d ism iss e d. Th e Pe tit ion e rs a sse rt that th e y ha d n o d uty to reve al to any one that the unde rly ing c ase ha d been dismissed. While the point at whi ch a l i t i g ant bec omes ob lig a te d to dis c los e su c h a fa c t to a n op po sin g pa rt y may be de bata

ble , fa ili ng to dis c los e the re a lity of the pr oc e dura l po sture of the lit ig a tio n to the tr ibu na ls in the pr oc e ss of he a ri ngth e di spute 4 (1 ) I f L a ndmark

ha d no t wi thd

ra wn its pr ote st of

the lic e ns e a

pp lic a tio n at is su e in W ill iam F. Mu nd

ay d/b /a Bi ll Mu nd

ay Che v ro le t/G e o, Ap

pli c an t v . L an dmark Chevrolet Corp., Protestant and Gene ral Motors Corpor ation, Intervenor , befor e the Texas D epar

tment of Transpor

tation, D ivision of Mot o r T ransportation; Docke t No. 93-094, under § 4.06(c) of the Te x as Motor Vehicle Commi ssion Code (“ Cod e ” ) w ou ld L a ndmark have ob ta ine d a

fi na l or de r d e nyingthe l ic e ns e application? (2) Did GM violate Code § 5.02 by unrea sonably discriminating be tween or among L andmark

a nd Mund a y in t he a llo c a tio n o f S ub ur

ba ns and Ta ho e s, be g inn ingwi th Munday ’s initial allocation in 1994 and extending throug h J anuar y of 1997?
On Ap ri l 2 , 2 0 0 3 , wh i l e t h e a d m i n i s t ra tive proce eding befor e the B oard w as o n -go i n g, the district c ourt inadver tently sent notice to the parties of its intent to dism i s s t h e a b ated district court suit for wa

nt of prosec ution. The noti ce that the case wa s subject to dismiss al for w ant of prose cution (“D WOP”) unless a motion to retai n wa s fi led was r ece ived by counsel for

the De fe nd ants . H ow e ve r, be c a us e of a fa ilure of the DWO P sy ste m in

the dis tr ic t c le rk ’s of

fi c e to n ote a cha ng e of a ddress, c ounsel for L andmar k did not rece ive the notice. Consequently , L andmar k 3is a

no the r ma tte r. Th e fa ilure to dis c los e the a c tua l pr oc e dura l po sture of the c a se to t

he tr ibu na ls consideringthe ca se—par ticularly i n briefingto this C ourt discussing w hat would or would not happen w hen the ( then nonexist ent) district cour t case was una

bated a nd litigated is a

source of c on c e rn wh e n tr e me nd ou s res ou rces are be inge xpe nd e d b y bo th t he lit ig a nts and

the jud ic iary

to resolve w hat amounted to hy pothetical questions. However, the propriety of the De fenda

nts’ tactica l decision not to disclose the dismissal to L andmar k or the var ious tribunals hearingthe litigation and the ef fec t of t he Defenda

nts’ repr esentations/om issions befor e thos e tribunals does not bear on the resolution of t he jurisdi ctional i ssue before us. Whether t he Defenda nts responde d appropr iately or inappropriately

to their discovery

of the mistake in the DWOP proce ss does not impact the duration of th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ple na ry po we r t o e nte r t

he 20 07 or de r v a c a tin g the 20 03 or de r o f d ism iss a l. This is true whether

the 2003 dismissal was proper , improper, inadve rtent, or de liberate
. 5 did not respond to the DWOP notice or file a motion to reta in. Wit hout a motion to reta i n o r a ny response from the parties, the routine DWOP proce ss continued, and the c ourt dismissed the case for want of pr osecution on May 13, 2003. L andmar

k, being unawa

re that the ca se had be en dismissed, did not challeng e the or der of dismiss al by

filing a motion to re i n s t at e the case, a motion for new tria l, any

motion that would have ex t ended the district court’s plena ry power , an appe al, or a bill of review. Meanw hile, the admini strative procee ding before the B oard c ontinued. The B oard iss u ed a fi n al order

in Dece mber 2004. GM a nd Munday

soug ht judicial reviewof the B oard’ s final order
. This Court aff irmed the B oard’ s order

in J une 2006. See A ustin Chevrolet , 212 S.W .3d at 439

. The supre me cour t declined r eview, a

nd this Court’s mandate issued on Mar ch 27, 200 7, bring ing the administrative proc eedingbefor e the B oard to c onclusion.

L andmar k filed a motion to lift the abateme nt of the dist ri ct co u rt suit on May 10, 20 07 , n e arl y

fo ur y e a rs a ft e r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

dis mis se d th e su it fo r wa

nt of pr os e c uti on . Som e tim e afte r the filing of the motion to lift the a batement a

nd befor e the he aringon the motion, L andmar k discovere d that the suit had bee n dismiss ed for want of pr osecution in May 2003. At the hea ring on6

the m otion to li ft the abatement, held on Jul y 3, 2007, L andmar

k asser ted that the 2003 orde r of dismiss al was void be cause i t wa s en t ered while the c ase w as abated and while r elated issues
ov e r w hic h the B oa

rd ha d excl us ive jur isd ic tio n we re sti ll pe nd ing be fo re the B oa rd . A g re e ingwi th L andmar k, on J uly

1 2 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e district cour t lifted the abatement, found that its 2003 order of dismiss al was “ null and void,” and va cate d it. The district court expressly found that t h e sui t had been “ inadver

tently included on a list of ca ses dismissed for wa nt of prosec ution.” De fe nd a nts seek a wri t of m a nd a mus to c omp e l th e dis tr ic t c ourt to v a c a te its 2007 order

vacating the 2003 order of dismiss al. They contend that the 2003 order of dismissal was a fina l judgment a

nd that the 2007 orde r is void beca use it was ent er ed after the e x piration of the district court’s plena

ry power . L andmar

k contends that the 2003 order of di smissal may be vac ated by the district court a s void at any time beca

use the district cour

t lacke d jurisdiction to dis miss the
case for wa

nt of prosec ution at a time that the B oard ha d exclusive jurisdiction o v er c laims in the
su it a nd the lit ig a tio n b e fo re the B oa rd inv olv ingtho se c la ims wa s n ot f ina l.
P lenary P ower of District Court

I f a c a se is dis mis se d for wa nt of pr os e c uti on , a

pa rt y se e kin g re ins ta te me nt m

us t f ile
a ver ified motion to reinstate within thirty day s afte r t he date on which the order of di smissal was sig ne d. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 65 a (3 ); In re M ontemayor , 2 S.W. 3d

54 2, 54 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 1999, orig . proce edin g). I n the abse nce of a ver ified motion to reinstate, the trial c ourt’s plena ry jurisdiction ex pires thirty day s after

the date on w hich the cour t signe d the order of dismissal. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 65 a (3 ); Montemay or , 2 S.W .3d at 545 ( citing McConnell v. M ay , 800 S.W .2d 194, 194 (Tex. 1990) (orig
. proce eding )). There is a n exception to this rule if a pa rty lear ns of the orde r ofThis exception is inapplicable here beca use L andmar

k lear ned of the 2003 dismis sal order 4 more than nine ty

day s after

it was signe d. L andm ar k was not in a position to make such filing s beca use it was unaw are of 5 the dis mis sa l. 7 dismiss al more tha

n twenty but less than ninety

day s after it was signe d. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); Te x. R. A

pp . P. 4. 2. I n s uc h a

n even t, the thi rt

y -d a y pe ri od be g ins ru

nn ingon the da y the pa rt y
rec eives a ctual noti ce or acquir es actual knowledg e of the order, but in no event doe s the thirty -day period be g in to run more than ninety day s after the order i s signe d. In re Lynd Co. , 195 S.W .3d 682, 6 8 5 n . 2 (T ex . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Levit v. Adams , 850 S.W .2d 469, 4 70 (Tex. 1993)). Thus, even if a 4 party does not r ece ive actua l notice or acquir e ac tual knowledg e of the entry of an or der dismissing
a ca se for want of pr osecution, the trial c ourt’s plena ry powe r over the case ends no later than the 120th da y afte r the order of dismiss al is signed. Id
. After the t rial court loses jurisdiction over the
case , a voidable or der ma y be cor rected throug h the ordinar y appellate proce ss or bill of review , but it is not subject to c ollatera l attack. See, e .g. , Re iss v . R e iss , 118 S.W .3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003); Ke nd zio rsk i v . S au nd e rs , 191 S.W .3d 395, 409 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). The orde r of dismissal that was sig ned on May 13, 2003, is the starting point for de termining when the district c ourt’s plena ry powe r o v er t h e dis missed lawsuit ex pired. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 3 06 a (1 ); In re Be nn e tt , 960 S.W .2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1997)
. No motion to reinstate the suit, or any

other motion that would have e x t en ded the district cour t’s plenar y power , was filed wi thi n th ir

ty da y s o f t he date that the dis tr ic t c ourt sig ne d the 20 03 or de r of dis mis sa l. See Te x. R.

5 Civ. P . 165a(3) , 329b. Thus, on J une 12, 2003—the thirtieth day afte r the district cour

t signe d t h e o r d e r
—t h e o r d e r

o f d i s m i s s a l b e c a m e f

i n a l a n d t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s p l e n a r y p o w e r e x p i r e d
. IfThe likely rea son for de ciding not to file a bill of revie w is the unfortu n ate fact that 6 L an d m ar k did not discover the e rrone ous order of dismissal until just over four y ear s had passe d from the date the orde r wa s entere d. 8 the 2003 order of dismiss al is a final order , the district c ourt could not se t a side the orde r except by bill of revie w beca

use the court’s ple nary

power expired. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3), 329b( d), (f ). L andmar k did not file a bill of revie w. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(f). 6
Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Enter Order of Dismissal

L andmar k argues t h at i t was unnec essar y to attack the or der of

dismiss al by

bill of revie w bec ause the 2003 orde r o f d i smissal is voi d for lac k of subject- matter jurisdiction in the district court. Ac cordingto L andmar k, the di strict court ha d no jurisdictional power to dismiss the
case for wa

nt of prosec ution until the proc eedingbefor e the B oard w as final. L andmar k argues that it w ou ld o nly

be a t th a t po int

tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a c qu ir e d ju

ri sd ic tio n o ve r a ll of the c la ims pending in the district court suit. See Mi dd le ton v . M ur ff , 689 S.W .2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985) (noting exception to Tex
. R. Civ. P. 329b(f)’ s bill of review r equire ment for c ases in which c ourt rende ring jud g me nt h a d “ no juri sd ic tio na l po we r” to d o s o) ; see also Subaru v. D avid Mc David Nissan , 84 S.W .3d 212, 227 (Tex. 2002) (conc luding that tria l court lac ked jurisdict i o n to “try ” dama g es
a ttr ibute d to vio la tio ns of mot or ve hic le c omm iss ion

c od e ); In re Texas Mut. Ins. Co. , 157 S.W .3d 75 , 8 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 04 , o ri g . p ro c e e din g ); Me tro Te mp s, In c . v . Te x as W or k e rs’ Com p. In s. Fa c ili ty , 949 S.W .2d 534, 535 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1997, no pet.). L andmar k’s theory is that since the 2003 orde r of dismissal was void, the district cour t’s lawsuit was neve r ac tually dismiss ed
and the su it i s, in f

a c t, s til l pe nd ingin d istri c t c ourt . U nder th is vie w, the dis tr ic t c ourt ne ve r l os t9

p l e n ar y p o w e r o v e r t h e s u i t b e c a u s e t h e o r d e r p u r

p o rt i n g t o d i s p o s e o f t h e c a s e w a s o f n o e f f e c t
. In such a situation, L andmar k contends, it is suf

ficient to point out the voidness of the 2003 orde r of dismiss al to the district court, have the district court acknow ledg e that the order is void, and continue litigating the suit as if the order of dismiss al had not ha ppened. This w ould me an that all void case

dis po sit ive or de rs or

jud g me nts do no t have to be a pp e a le d, a tta c ke d by bil l of re vie w, or

c oll a te ra lly attacke d. The attack on the order could be acc omplished by having the district c ourt simply re- open
or re instate the orig inal cause number at any time. The Te x as Supreme Court a ddresse d the question of whe n and how void trial c ourt orde rs m ay

be attac ked in McEwe n v. Harrison , 345 S.W .2d 706 (Tex. 1961). McEwe n involved a trial c ourt’s orde r vac ating a def ault judgme nt for lac k of ser vice of proce s s m o re t han a y ear afte r the c ourt’s plena

ry power expired. I n an opini on by Chief J ustice Calver t, the supreme c ourt
rec og nized two ty

pes of void judg ment s : (1 ) t h ose in which the tria l court possessed the “jurisdictional power ” to render the judgment de spite the fac t that there ma y have be en an e rror

or defe ct that made the judgme nt void, and (2) those i n wh i ch the c ourt did not even possess the “jurisdictional power ” to hea r the c ase a

nd rende r judg ment at all. 345 S.W .2d at 710. The c ourt held that wher e the trial court had jurisdictional power to act, the judg ment was subjec t to rule 329b
an d a f te r p le n a r y p o w e r e xp ir e d c o u ld o n ly b e d ir e c tl y a tt a c k e d b y b il l o f r e v ie w. See id . On ly wher e a c ourt did not hav e “jur isdictional power” to hear the ca se at a ll could a judg ment by the court be direc tly

attacke d by

other mea

ns. The McEwe n court noted that if a county court re ndere d judgme nt in a suit for divorce or for title to property , these would be examples of judgme nts render ed by a cour t without the juri s dictional power to hear or re nder judg ment in the case at all and10

potent ially

subject to direc t attack other than by appea l or bill of review
. See id. at 709-10. Sig nif ic antl y , th e su

pr e me c ourt

a lso po int e d o ut th at th e c ourt s r e nd e ri ngsu c h ju dg me nts wo uld have no jur isdictional power to ente rtain or r ule on a bill of revie w attacking the judg ment. See id.
a t 71 0. Thus , whe re c ourt s do not ha ve the jur isd ic tio na l po we r t o e nte rt a in t he c a se a t a ll, lit ig a nts would not have a cce ss t o t h e remedy contemplated by

rule 329b, a

nd would nece ssarily

need a differ ent re medy . The supre me cour t went on to hold in McEwe n that wher e a judgme nt is void due to l a c k o f se rvi c e or

la c k o f v a lid

se rv ic e , s uc h v oid

jud g me nts wo uld

be e xamp le s o f j ud g me nts that are within the court’s jurisdictional powe r to r ender and, conseque ntly , that are subject to attack in the trial court a fter the expiration of t he trial court’s plenary power only by way of a bill of re view due to the oper ation of rule 329b. See id.

This Court addresse d a similar issue in Newso m v. B allinger I.S.D. and conc luded that a judg ment can be come f inal for t h e p u rp o s es o f appeal eve n if it is void. 213 S .W.3d 3 7 5 , 3 7 9 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n 2 0 0 6 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g In re Vlasak, 141 S.W .3d 233, 237-38 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, orig
. proce eding ). The nece ssary corollar y to f inality , as noted by the this Court in Newsom , is that the district court’s plena ry power has a te rmination date unde r the rules of c ivil procedure reg ardle ss of whether a judgment that is final on its fac e is void. Id . We a lso pointed out that the Texas Supreme Co u rt h ad expressly disapproved of

the proposition that “if a judgme nt rende red by

a trial c ourt is void it m ay be set a side by

that court at any

time.” Middleton , 689 S.W .2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985). I n addition, we obser ved:
The ve ry purpose of

limit ing a

trial court’ s plenary

power over a proce eding is to forec lo s e t h e possibili ty of a suit continuing indefinitely

even thoug h a fina l judgment ha s been obta ined.11

Newsom , 213 S.W .3d at 379. Only judgme nts that a re both void and outside the jurisdictional power of the c ourt are subject to being set aside by the trial cour

t at any time. This disti nction betwee n judgme nts within a c o u rt ’s “jurisdictional powe r” a nd those not within a court’s “ jurisdictional power” has bee n rea ffirme d by the Texas Supreme Court
on sever al occ asions. Se e Ma pc o, In c . v . F

orre st , 7 95 S.W. 2d

700, 70 3 (T e x. 19 90 ); Middleton

v . M ur ff , 6 89 S .W .2 d 21 2, 21 3 ( Te x. 19 85 ); De e n v . Ki rk, 508 S.W .2d 70, 72 (Tex. 1974). There fore , the question here become s: “Did the trial cour t have the jurisdictional power to re nder the 2003 orde r of dismiss al? ” I f so, the order beca me final—eve n if void or

voidable—and is subjec t to the require ments of rule 329b limiting a ny direc t attack to a bill of re view. We hold that t h e d istrict court, albe it following standing DWOP procedure s in a
case that should not have bee n dismiss ed for want of prosec ution and would not have been dismissed if p r o p e r n o ti c e h a d

b e e n s e n t, w a s w it

h in it s ju r is d ic ti o n a l p o w e r

to e n te r th e 2 0 0 3 o r d e r

of dismiss al. As noted pre viously , the district c ourt abate d the case to give the Motor Vehic le B oard the opportunity

to decide c erta in issues. I n its orde r of abate ment, the district c ourt made a finding that the B oard ha d “primar y jurisdiction” over the i s s u es re fe rr ed to it. This finding ha s not been challeng ed—although L an d m ark arg ues that, in fac t, the Boa rd had e x clusive jurisdiction over these issues. Reg ardle ss of whethe r one vie ws the M o t o r Ve h i cl e B oard’ s jurisdiction over the claims ref err ed by the district to the Boa

rd as “ primary

jurisdiction” or “e x clusive jurisdiction,” the district court had the jurisdictional power to dismiss both those claims and the claims pending in the district court that we re not re fer red to the B oard. I f the Boa rd’s jurisdiction was primary jurisdiction as found by

the district court, the district c ourt had c oncurr ent jurisdictional power with the B oardA collater al attac k is an attempt to avoid the binding f orce of a judg ment in a proc eeding 7 no t i n s ti tute d

f o r th e p u r p o s e o f c o r r e c ti n g , mo d if

y in g , o r v a c a ti n g th e ju d g me n t, b u t i n o rder to o b ta in s o me s p e c if

ic r e li e f a g a in s t w h ic h th e ju d g me n t c u r r e n tl y s ta n d s a s a b a r. B r o w n i ng v. Prostok , 165 S.W .3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). Only a void judg ment may be collate rally

attacke d. Id . Her e, L andmar

k soug ht to have the order va cate d by the trial cour

t that entere d the orde r in the same proc eedingin which the orde r wa s entere d. This proce eding is not a collatera l attack. 12 with respe ct t o those claims. Se e Cas h A m. In t’ l I nc . v . B e nn e tt , 3 5 S
. W
. 3 d 1 2 , 1 8 ( T e x . 2 0 0 0 )
. If the B oard’ s jurisdiction o v er t h e spec ified cla ims was exclusive, the district court had the jurisdictional power to dismiss any claims within the ex clusive j urisdiction of t he B oard in fa vor of the B oard a s well as any

other pe nding c laims that were not w ithin the jurisdiction of the B oard, e ven if doing so mistakenly

or er roneously
. See In re Entergy Corp. , 142 S.W .3d 316, 321-22 (Te x . 2004) (c i t i n g Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 221). Under either theory , the district c ourt h ad t h e j u ri s dictional power to dism iss t h e claims , and its order of dismissal was subject to bec oming f inal under the rules of c ivil procedure
.

Since it had jurisdictional power to enter the 2003 o rd er of dismissal, when the dis tr ic t c o u rt l o s t p le n a r

y p o w e r o v e r th is s u it u n d e r th e r u le s o f c iv il p r o c e d

u r e , it lo s t t h e p o w er to alter its order

of dismissal as a part of that lawsuit. When ple nary power expired, the unappe aled order of dismissal was final re g ardle ss of whethe r i t was void, voidable, or va lid. Such an order may be subjec t to direct attac k by appea l, attack by a timely bill of review, or

possibly collater al attac k. 7 Howeve r, it is not subj ect to si mply being re- examined, modified, or vac ated by the trial cour

t if the tr ia l c ourt we re to b e c on vin c e d— a t so me la te r d a te be y on d its ple na ry po we r—

that the or de r w a s, in f a c t, e ith e r v oid or vo ida

ble
. Suc h ord e rs a nd jud g me nts a re fi na l for the purp os e s of the laws uit in which they

are enter ed, and ma

y not be cor

rec ted, modified, or va cate d by the trial cour

t bey ond13

applicable deadlines f

or direc t attack by

appea l or bill of re v i ew . Consequently , we hold that the May 2003 order of di smissal was withi n the t rial court’s jurisdictional power and is subject to the require ments of rule 329b.
The Aba te m e nt

L a ndmark a lso a rgue s th a t any

a c tio n ta ke n b y th e di st ric t c ourt

wh ile the laws uit
wa s a bate d a nd the a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g on goin g wa s a le g a l nu lli ty . T his a rgume nt i s a
c or oll ary to, bu t di sti nc t f

ro m, L and mar k’s co nte nti on that th e 20 03 or de r o f d ism iss a l is vo id beca use the dist ri ct co u rt lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit. This arg ument is based on the proposition that once a court e nters an or der of

abate ment, the cour

t is li mited in the actions it m ay take un til the c ourt

un -a bate s or re-inst a te s th e c a se . A ke y a sp e c t of

thi s argume nt i s the contention that ce rtain ac tions by the cour t during an a b at ement—including dismissal for
wa nt o f p ro se c uti on

—a re no t on ly

po te nti a lly

e rr or , a n ab us e of dis c re tio n, or

oth e rw ise re ve rs ibl e by direc t attack, but are l egal nullities in the sense that they are void much like an ac tion by a c ourt wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n to a c t. L a ndmark ba se s th is a

rgume nt on th ree cou rt of a pp e a ls de c isi on s in vo lvi ng tr ia l court a c tiv iti e s dur ing pe ri od s of ab a te me nt i n w hic h th e c ourt s o f a pp e a ls decla red the actions in question to be “leg al nullities” or void. See A mrhein v. La Made leine, Inc

. , 206 S.W .3d 173, 174-75 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2006, pe t. denied) ( concluding that t ri al court erre d by enter ing summar

y judgme nt on deemed a dmissions wh en the re quests for a dmission had be e n s e rv e d w hil e c a se wa s a bate d) ; In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., I nc ., 969 S.W .2d 522, 527 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 98 , o ri g . p ro c e e din g ) ( ho ldi ngthat tr ial c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in fa iling to abate ca se base d on plaintiffs’ fa ilure to provide pr e-suit notice re quired14

by Residential Construction L iability Act and, the ref

ore, a ny orde rs enter ed by

court during statutorily -re quired a

batement pe riod wer e void) ; Lum be rm e ns Mu t. C as . Co . v . G ar

za , 777 S.W .2d 198, 199 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.) (holdin g t h at t ri al court erre d by enter ing
or de r c omp e lli ngpr od

uc tio n o f d oc ume nts ba se d o n d isc ov e ry requ est s th a t w e re se rv e d w hil e
case was a

bated)
. De fe nd a nts re sp on d th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ha d ju risd ictiona l po we r t o d ism iss the lawsuit and that the c ases on whic h L andmar k relies do not apply
. We ag ree . I n Lumbermens , the Corpus Christi C ourt of Appe als conc luded that a wor kers’ co m p en sation car

rier w as under
no ob lig a tio n to re sp on d to c e rt a in d isc ov e ry re qu e sts be c a

us e it h a d been ser

ve d w hil e the su it
was a bated f or the a ppeal of the under ly ing c ompensation ca se. 777 S.W.2d at 198-99. The c ourt he ld t hat th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc retio n by com pe lli ngthe c a rr ie r’ s p ro du c tio n o f d oc ume nts based on discove ry

reque sts propounded wh i l e t h e case was a bated. The Lumbermans c ourt did not find that the trial cour t’s order was void. Id . at 19 9. I t found on ly tha t “ the dis c ov e ry

re qu e sts in th[ e] case w ere a leg al nullity .” Id
.

Unlike Lumbermens , Kim ba ll did not involve a party ’s abrog ation of an a batement order
. Kim ba ll

a dd re sse d th e tr ia l c o u

r t ’ s n on c omp lia

nc e wi th t he Re sid e nti a l Co ns tr

uc tio n L ia bil ity Ac t ( RCL A) by

re fu sin g to g ra

nt a statut or ily

re qu ir ed abat eme nt. 96 9 S. W.2 d at 52 4. B e c a us e the ca se wa s g overne d by the RCL A and be cause the plaintiffs fai l ed t o fi l e a response to the mot ion to a bate , th e F ourt e e nth

Court of Ap pe a ls i n H ou sto n c on c lud e d th a t th e c a se sh ou ld have be en automatica lly

abate d. Id . at 5 27. Although the trial court in Kim ba ll never enter ed an order of abate ment, the Court added a broad state ment attributed to Lumbermens , decla ring that15

“any action take n by

the court or t he parties during the [nonex istent] abate ment is a leg al nullity .” Id . This statement is an infer en t i al l ea p fr o m the actua l ruling in Lumbermens , w hic h f ound on ly t h a t t h e d i s c o v e r

y r e qu e s t s p r o m u l g a t e d b y a p a rt y w e r e a l e g a l n u l l i t y ( i.e. wer e of no c ompulsive eff ect) , not an orde r or a ction of the c ourt. Com pa re id ., with Lumbermens , 777 S.W .2d at 199. The infe renc e in Kim ba ll

—stating that any

action by the cour t during an abatement is a nullity

—is then quoted in Am rh e in , in w hich the Dallas Court of Appea ls rever sed a tria l court’s summary judgme n t o n d eeme d admissions because the admissions were serve d and the judg ment enter ed while the c ase w as abated for ba nkruptcy proce eding s. Am rh e in , 206 S.W .3d at 174-75; see also Amrhe in v. La Madeline, Inc ., No. 05-00-00790- CV , 2 001 Tex. App. L EXI S 4843, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July

20, 2001, pet. denied) (not desig nated f or publication) ( clar ifying that L a Made line serve d reque sts for admission subsequent to abate ment).

None of these cases addresses the situation prese nted here. None of them involves a fina l order that is challeng ed af ter the e x piration of the tria l court’s plena ry power . None o f the appellate courts in Am rh e in , Kim ba ll , or Lum be rm e ns c on c lud e d that the tr ia l c ourt s la c ke d s ub je c tm at t er jurisdiction. More over, ne ither Am rh e in , Kim ba ll , nor Lum be rm e ns p e rt a i n s t o t h e h y b r id claims resolution proce ss for cla ims brought unde r the Code or conce rn an e ntity

like the Board, which is power less to awa rd dama g es for

any Code-base d violations. Se e Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 224 (n oti ngthat B oa

rd c a nn ot a wa rd dama g e s f

or Cod e -b a se d v iol a tio n b ut m on e tary re dr e ss i s ava ila

ble from trial c ourt).

L a ndmar k’s ar g ume nt t

hat any a c tio n b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt

duri nga bate me nt i s a nullity runs counter to a number of case s holding that a varie ty of actions by trial court s d uring16

periods of abate ment are permissible, including : (1) joinder of parties, se e DeChe c a v . D iag no sti c Ctr . H os p ., 852 S.W .2d 935, 938 n.5 (Tex. 1993) ; ( 2) nonsuit a nd approva l of ag ree d judgme nt, see United Oil &

Minerals, Inc.v . Costil la Energy, I nc ., 1 S.W.3 d 840 , 846 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 1999, no pet.); an d (3 ) au thorization for parties to proc eed by ag ree ment on matters that ar e
c o n tr ar y to a b a te me n t or der, s ee P arker v . Three Rive rs Flying Serv., I nc ., 220 S.W .3d 160, 163 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) . Simi larly , the dismissal of a claimant’ s case for wa nt of prosec ution during a

bankruptc y

stay has been a ffirme d, without any question of the cour

t’s power to act. Mon tgo me ry

W ar d &Co. v . D e nto n Co un ty Ap prais al D ist ., 13 S.W .3d 828, 829-30 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2000, pet. denied).
Or de r of D ism iss al N otNul lit y P e r Se

Although we ag ree with the results in Kim ba ll (fa iling to enter an a batement r equire d by the RCL A was a

n abuse of

dis cr et i on) and Amrhein (ente ring a summary judgme nt based on deeme d ad m issions t hat wer e ser ved duringa bankr

uptcy stay was e rror ), we disag ree wi th L andmark ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f t he se c a se s to me a n th a t any action by t he trial c ourt during an abatement is a nullity per se . W h i l e a ca s e is abated, ce rtain ac tion by the par ties—such
a s p ro po un din g dis c ov e ry reques ts or sett inghe a ri ng s— may be ine ff e c tiv e . It is a lso po ssi ble that cer tain action by the t rial court during the period of an abatement might c onstitut e er ror or an abuse of discretion that is subject to revie w or reve rsal. Howeve r, abatement does not nullify ever y subsequent ac ti on by

the par ties or the cour

t. See D e Chec a , 8 52 S.W. 2d a t 93 8 n .5 ; Parker , 22 0 S. W.3 d at 16 3; Costil la Energy , 1 S.W. 3d a t 84 6; se e als o M

on tgo me ry

W ar d &Co ., 13 S.W .3d at 829-30 (af

firming trial court’s dismi ssal of case for want of prosecution during bankruptc y stay ).17

Nor doe s abate ment, by

itself, deprive the cour

t of its power to ac t. Wh et h er a n act by the cour t during abate ment is error is a diffe rent que stion. The trial c ourt was pr evente d from adjudicating L andmar k’s damag e claims, not beca use the c ase w as abated, but beca use of the B oard’ s rig ht to make initial findings with re spect to Code-base d alleg ations. The Te x as Supreme Court ha s rec og niz ed a hy brid claims-re solution pr oc e ss f or Cod e -b a se d v iol a tio ns tha t g ive s th e B oa

rd the e xclu siv e ri g ht t o d e c ide iss ue s o r c la ims that implicate the Code but re serve s to the trial court a ny adjudication of da m age s b as ed on the violations found by

the B oard. Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 224. Thus, under the hy brid-cla ims resolution proce ss expl ained in Su ba ru , until L andmar k obtained final finding s on the Code-base d issues that
wer e ref err ed to the Boa

rd, the district court could not try the damag es attributable to the Code -base d claims. See id. at 227.

Moreove r, until L andmar k exhausted its adminis trative re medies, the district court lacke d the ability

to adjudicate a

ny of L andmark’s claims, eve n though one of them—the fr aud claim—was plead ed only as a c ommon-law tort. Althoug h common-law torts a re not within the Boa rd’s e x clusive j u ri s diction, resolution of the two issues re fer red to the B oard ma

y have de te rm ine d a

n e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t

he fr a ud c la im: wh e the r L a ndmark su sta ine d a n in jur y a s a re su lt of the De fenda

nts’ alleg ed re prese ntations. Se e J oh ns on v . B re we r &Pr itc ha rd , P .C. , 73 S. W .3d 193, 211 (Tex. 2002) (stating six elements of a ction for f ra u d : “( 1 ) t hat a mate rial re prese ntation was made ; (2) the r epre sentation was f alse; (3) when the r epre sentation was made , the speaker kne w it was false or made it reckle ssly without any

kn o wl ed ge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the spe aker

made the r epre sentation with the intent that the other pa rty should act upon it; (5) the18

party acte d in relianc e on the repr esentation; and ( 6) the pa rty there by suffe red injury” ( quoting In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W .3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001))).

When a par

ty has some cla ims that are r equire d to be pre sented to an administrative ag ency along with additional claims that t h e agenc y has no authority

to adjudicate, a

nd when the deter mination of those additional claims depe nds partly on the re solution of an issue that the ag ency does have authority

to adj u dicate, the district court lac ks jurisdiction to consider such additional
c la ims un til a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me d i e s h a ve be e n e xha us te d f or the c la ims that th e a g e nc y ha s a uth or ity to adjudicate. In re Texas M ut. Ins. Co. , 1 57 S.W. 3d

a t 82 ; Metro Temps, Inc

. , 949 S.W .2d at 535. Thus, beca

use the B oard’ s findings on the re fe rr ed i ssues may also be de terminative of w hether L andma rk can ma intain its claim of fraud, the district court lac ked jurisdiction to adjudicate that
c omm on -l aw c la im unti l L a ndmark e xha us te d it s a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s. Howeve r, the fact that the dist rict cour t lacked jur isdiction to adjudicate L andmar k’s claims until a ct i on had bee n taken by the B oard doe s not compel the conc lusion that the d i strict court’s or der of

dismiss al is void. As the supreme c ourt explained in Su ba ru , when the tr ia l court la c ks su

bje c t- ma tte r jur isd ic tio n be c a us e a n ag e nc y ha s e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n o ve r c e rt a in claims, the trial cour

t should dism iss those claims without prejudice
. Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 227. I f th e im p e d im e n t t o th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s ju r is d ic ti o n o v e r

c e rta in Co d e - b a s e d

c la im s c a n b e cure d by awa iting fina l determination of matter s that are within the administrative ag ency ’s exclusive jurisdict i o n , the claims may be abated. Id . at 228. Acc ording ly , even w hen the tria l court lac ks subject-matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate ce rtain cla ims that a re within the administrative ag ency ’s exclusive jurisdiction, t he cour t stil l has the powe r to either a bate or dismiss those claims. See id.19

a t 22 7- 28 ; se e als o Ho us ton Mu n. Em plo y e es Pe ns ion Sys. v. Ferre ll , 248 S.W .3d 151, 158 (Tex. 2007) (“Courts alway s have jurisdiction to deter mine their own jurisdiction.”). The de cision to a bate or dis mis s in

thi s si tuatio n w a s w ith in t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis c re tio n. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did not divest itself of this discretion by enter ing the order

of abatement. The district c ourt reta ined the p o w e r t o d i s m i s s t h e c l a i m s
— e v e n t o d i s m i s s t h e m i n a d v e rt e n t l y. L andmar k’s ar g ument, that beca use t h e d i strict court lac ked subjec t-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate L andmar k’s Code-ba sed cla ims, the district court orde r o f d is mi s s a l i s v o id,
ru ns c ounte r t o th e e sta

bli sh e d r ule that a c ourt ha s th e po we r t o d e te rm ine its ow n ju ri sd ic tio n a

nd to take the a ppropriate action of dismiss ing claims over which it doe s not have jurisdiction. See R oyal In de p. Sc h. Di st. v . R ag sd ale , 273 S.W .3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008, no pet.). L andmar k’s view would mean that e very order of dismissal entere d by

a cour t without subj ect- matter j u ri s d i ction over the claims in the ca se is void. Such orders of dismiss al ar e not, of c ourse, void. See State v . Morales , 8 69 S.W. 2d 94 1, 94 9 (T e x. 19 94 ) (“ Whe n a c ourt la c ks jur isd ic tio n, its on ly leg itimate choice is to dismiss.”). Courts must an d d o h av e the powe r to dismiss l awsuits even wh e n— pa rt ic ula rl y wh e n— the y la c k ju ri sd ic tio n ove r the su

bje c t matt e r of

the su it. Th e iss ue in t

his
case is, “Does the district c ourt somehow divest itself o f this power by enter ing a

n order of abate ment rathe r than an order of dismiss al? ” I f the c ourt has the powe r to rec onsider the a batement and re instate the ca se, then the c ourt mus t al so have the power to rec onsider the a

batement a

nd dismiss th e c a s e . T h is is tr u e e v e n th o u g h th e c o u rt d o e s n o t h a v e th e p o w e r to a d ju d ic ate the claims in the ca se. Onc e ag ain, a c ourt’s ac tion i n d i s m i s sing a case for wa

nt of prosec ution may or may n o t b e e r r o r , b u t it is n o t a v o id a c t o r a n u ll it y s im p ly b e c a u s e th e c a s e h a s b een a

bated20

by the court. The c ourt reta ins the power to dismiss claims over whic h it does not have jurisdiction and ca ses t h at i t believes—how ever err oneously

or inadve rtently

—have not be en prose cuted wi th s uf fi c ie nt d ili g e nc e . When the lit ig a nts be lie ve the c ourt ha s tak e n s uc h a n a c tio n in a dv e rt e ntl y
or imp ro vid e ntl y , th e law r e qu ir e s th e lit ig a nts to t a ke so me act io n to c omp la in a bo ut t his wi thi n c e rt a in ti me li mi ta tio ns . T he se tim e lim itatio ns are jur isd ic tio na l. T he fa c t th a t a pa rt y may fail to ac t within the tim e co n s t ra i n t s due to no rea l fault of their ow n does not alter the jur isd ic tio na l ana ly sis
.
Tr ialCo ur t’ s P owe r to Di sm iss

We are unpersua ded by L andmar

k’s ar g ument that the district court ha d the power to dismi ss L andmar

k’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, but lacke d power to dismi ss them for
wa nt o f p ro se c uti on . E ve ry

c ourt ha s p ow e r, in t

he a bs e nc e of statut or y pr oh ibi tio n, to dis mis s a su it for wa nt of prosec ution. Bev il v. Johnson , 3 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d 8 5 , 8 7 (T ex . 1 9 5 7 ) ( qu o t i n g First Nat’l Bank v. Fox , 39 S.W .2d 1085, 1086 (Tex. 1931)). A c ourt’s powe r to dismiss fo r wa n t of prosec ution arises f rom two source s: (1 ) rul e 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure, a nd (2) the c ourt’s inhere nt power. Vi lla rre al v . S an An ton io T

ru c k & Eq uip ., 994 S.W .2d 628 , 6 3 0 (T ex . 1999). A trial court may

dismiss under r

ule 165a whe n any

party seeking aff

irmative relief fails to appea r for
any hear in g o r tr ia l of

wh ic h th e pa

rt y ha d n oti c e or

wh e n a c a se is n ot d isp os e d w ith in t he tim e standards promulgated by the s upreme court. Tex. R. Civ. P . 165a(1) , (2). Additionally , common law vests the tria l court with inhere nt power, i n d ep en d ent of the r ules of proc edure , to move its docket by

dismiss ing c ases that a

re not prose cuted with due dilig ence . Villarreal , 994 S.W .2d at 630; Rizk v. M

ayad , 603 S.W .2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1980).21 The di s t ri ct co urt’s powe r to enter the orde r of dismissal in this case does not conflict with Su ba ru beca use dis m i s s al i s o n e of the limit ed ac tions that the court may take whe n
a claimant’s failure to e x haust administrative reme dies deprive s the court of s u b j ect- matter jurisdiction. Se e Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 227-28. Whil e the dism issal terminated the suit, it did not pr e jud ic e L a ndmark ’s ri g ht t o r e -f ile a ft e r i t e xha

us te d it s a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s. F ur the rm or e , it does not conflict with the pur pose of the e x haustion of admini strative remedies re quirement, whic h is to ensure that de cisions on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the desig nated a uthority are made by that desig nated a

uthority
. See University of T ex. Sw. Me d. Ctr. v. Loutz enhiser , 140 S.W .3d 351, 361-62 (Te x . 2004). The c hall en ged order of dismissal did not rely on the re solution of any issue that the B oard ha d exclusive authority to adjudicate. Cf

. Metro Temps , 949 S.W .2d at 535. The dismiss al, enter ed befor e the Boa rd had c ompleted its fact f inding, is ana logous to the dismiss al of a

suit for want of pr osecution by a state district c ourt whil e l i ab ility issues
are pending in fede ral c ourt. I n Freeport Operators, Inc. v . Home I nsurance Co. , Fr eepor

t Operators challe n ged t h e dismissal of its declaratory judgme nt action, which soug ht a deter mination of Home Insuranc e’s liability under its policy for damag es related to a mar ine collision. 666 S.W .2d 566, 567 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1984, no writ). Fr ee p o rt Oper ators had not r ece ived prior notice of the di smissal, but l ater rec eived notification by

mail. Id . Home Insuranc e def ended the cour t’s dismiss al, asserting that the case failed to prese nt a jus ticiable contr oversy beca use it was depende nt on the issue of liability that was still unresolved in the fe dera l lawsuits. Id
. Af fi rm ingthe dis mis sa l of

the su it, the c ourt

state d th a t a

de te rm inatio n o f H ome I ns ur anc e ’s lia

bil ity un der its po lic y

fo r d a ma g e s o n a

n unli tig a te d, c on tin g e nt c la im w a s n ot a22

ju s ti c ia b le qu e s ti o n b e c a

u s e th e c a s e s in v o lv in g li a b il it y f r o m th e ma

r in e c o ll is io n h ad not bee n finally decide d in fede ral court. Id. at 5 6 8 (c i t i n g Ruth v. Impe rial Ins. Co. , 579 S.W .2d 523, 525 (T e x. Civ . App .—Ho us ton [14t h D ist .] 19 79 , n o w ri t) ). Th e c ourt a lso no te d that the dis mis sa l di d
n o tp re j u d i ce Fr ee p o rt Op er at o rs wi t h re gar d t o re fi l i n g:
I t is clear that where there is no m at u re issue f or litigation the trial court lac ks jurisdiction. I t lo g ically follows that a dismissal for wa nt of prosec ution by

the trial court of

a suit, over whic h it lacks jurisdic tion, cannot oper ate a s a bar to that su it i n a no the r c ourt , w he re a nd

wh e n ju ri sd ic tio n p ro pe rl y

e xists
. Id. at 568. Her e, simil arly , L andmar k asser ts that the district c ourt dismissed a suit with claims that the c ourt la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to a dju dic a te wh ile the B oa rd pr oc e e din g s we re pe nd ing
. Ho we ve r, it does not follow that the district cour t l ac ked powe r to dismiss t he ca se for want of pr osecution
mere ly beca use it could not y et adjudicate the Code-ba sed dama g es cla ims. Nor did the order of dismiss al bar

L andmar k from proc eedingwhen the jur isdictional impediment was remove d. Apply in g th e f

o r e g o in g a

u th o r it ie s to th e a ll e g a ti o n s in L a n d ma r k ’ s p e ti ti on, we conclude that the district c ourt had the power to dismiss L andmar k’s suit for wa

nt of prosec ution, ir re sp e c tiv e of

wh e the r t he dis mis sa l or de r w a s in a dv e rt e nt o r e rr on e ou s.
P resum ption of

Validity of

Order of Dism issal A prope rly

executed orde r of dismissal is a judgme nt. Stewar t v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, Inc ., 870 S.W .2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1994). Even if this ca se is viewed a s a sort of c oll a te ra l a tta c k o n th e 20 03 dis mis sa l or de r, c oll a te ra l a tta c ks on fi na l jud g me nts a re g e ne ra lly dis a llo we d be c a

us e it is the po lic y of the law to g ive fi na lity to the jud g me nts of th e court s.23

Browning v. Prostock , 165 S.W .3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2005). I n a collate ral attack, the judg ment that is assailed is presumed va lid. Ste war t , 870 S.W .2d at 20. The judg ment’s re citations control over the re st of the re cord, a

nd extrinsi c evide nce c annot be used to establish a lac k of jurisdiction. Narvaez , 1 27 S.W. 3d

a t 31 7; Shacke lford v. Barton , 156 S.W .3d 604, 606 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2004, pet. denied) . Moreove r, “[w]hen rec itations in a judgment a re i n s u fficient to affirmatively show the cour t’s jurisdiction, a p re s u m p t ion in favor of jurisdiction prevails so long as the re citations do not aff

i rm at i v el y s how a lac k of jurisdiction.” Foreness v . Hex amer , 971 S.W .2d 525, 531 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pe t. denied) ( holding that pa rty m ak i n g co llatera l attack ha d burden of showing from four corne rs of judgme nt that court did not have subjec t-matter jurisdiction to issue
or de r) ; Huffstutl ar v. Koons , 789 S.W .2d 707, 710 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no wr it).

I n th is c a se , th e re c itatio ns in t he May 13 , 2 00 3 o rd e r o f d ism iss a l do no t a ff ir ma tiv e ly sh owthat th e dis tr ic t court la c ke d ju

ri sd ic tio n to e nte r t

he dis mis sa l. T hu s, the pr e su mpt ion in favor of t he dis trict court’s jurisdiction pre vails. Se e Fo re ne ss , 971 S.W .2d at 531; se e als o S ub ar u , 8 4 S
. W
. 3 d at 219 (stating pre sumption i n favor of subject- matter jurisdiction of Te x as cour ts of g ener al jurisdiction).
Co ur t’ s Or de r Va c at ing Di sm iss al O r de r Is V oid

Be cause the 2003 orde r of d i s m issal of L andmar k’s claims wa s not void, it was not subject to being vacated by the district court a fter e x piration of the c ourt’s plena ry power . See Te x. R. C iv. P. 3 29 b( f) ; Universal Unde rwrit ers Ins. Co. v. Fe rguson , 471 S.W .2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1971) (discussing void nunc pro tunc or der) ; Love v. State Bank &Trust Co. , 90 S.W .2d 819, 821 (Tex. 1936). The 2007 or der at issue here rese mbles the order in Love , w hic h r e ins ta te d a c a se24

a ft e r t he e xpir a tio n o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ple na

ry po we r bec aus e th e c a se ha d b e e n “ ina dv e rt e ntl y and throug h mistake included by the cour t upon a list of cases t o b e d i s m i s s ed for want of prosec ution.” 90 S.W .2d at 821. The Court stated:
I f it be conc eded that this [ inadver tent dismiss al] were tr

ue, neve rtheless the situation pr e se nte d a ty

pic a l c a se fo r bil l of re vie w, wh ic h is de sig ne d to fu rn ish re lie f a g a ins t jud g me nts e nte re d a s a

re su lt o f f ra ud , a c c ide nt or mis take
. Th e mos t that c a n b e sa id in favor o f def

endant in er

ror is that a judg ment had bee n enter ed ag ainst him by mis t ake. Abill of review w as undoubtedly the prope r re medy , as the que stion of whether or not such jud gm ent was the result of a mistake should have be en dete rm i n ed by

proof, a fter notice , and should not rest solely upon the re cital c on ta ine d in

a su bs e qu e nt o rd e r o f t

he c ourt
. Id . Her e, as in Love , the district court’s f inding c once rn i n g t h e rea son for the issuanc e of the notice of dismissal was not base d on any evidenc e prese nted to the court, a nd the orde r attempting to vacate the prior dismissal was e ntere d afte r the c ourt lost plenary power to do so. The 2007 orde r wa s entere d afte r the e x piration of the district cour t’s plenar y power and purpor

ts to vacate a fina l order e ntere d over f our y ear s ear lier: “I t is therefor e ORDERED that the Orde r of Dismissal of May 13, 2003, insofar as it dismisses this c ase for want of pr osecution is VACATED.” See Tex. R. C iv. P. 165a( 3), 329b(f ). Mandamus relief is prope r whe n a trial c ourt issues an orde r afte r the e x piration of its plenary power . In re Brook

shire Groce ry Co. , 250 S.W .3d 66 , 6 8 ( Te x. 20 08 ) ( or ig . p ro c e e din g ); I n r e S o u th we s te r n B e ll Tel. C o. , 35 S.W .3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig . proce eding ) (holding that order s issued after expiration o f t rial cour

t’s plenar y p o w e r a r e v o i d a n d c o n s t i tu t e a

b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n ) ; s ee also Estat e of Howley v . Haberman , 87 8 S. W.2 d 1 39 , 1 40 (T e x. 19 94 ) ( pe r c ur iam) (c on c lud ingthat ma nd amus re lie f i s a

pp ro pr ia te25

w h e ntr ia l c o u rt e r

r o n e o u s ly r e in s tate s c a s e a f

te r e xp ir a tion

o f c o u rt’ s p le n a r

y ju r is d ic ti o n )
. We conclu d e th a t o n Ju ly 1 2 , 2 0 0 7 , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt la c k e d ju r is d ic ti o n to v a c a te it s f

in a l o r d e r of dismiss al enter ed on May 13, 2003, and that the 2007 or der is void.
Conclusion We conditionally g rant re lators’ pe tition f o r writ of ma

ndamus and dire ct the district court to vac ate its J uly 12, 2007 “Or der Vac ating Orde r of Dismissal.” The writ will issue only if the district court doe s not comply with this opi nion. See Tex. R. App. P . 52.8.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Waldrop and He nson Filed: August 28, 2009