1 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

WESLEY K. ADDISON, 

 (Tarrant No. 0677713), 

 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-518-P 

 

BEDFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT 

of PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

 

 OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

 UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e)(2)(B) 

The case is before the Court for review of pro-se-inmate/plaintiff Wesley 

K. Addison (“Addison”)’s operative pleadings under the screening provisions of 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). After conducting that review, the Court 

finds that all Addison’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed under 

authority of these provisions. 

 BACKGROUND

Addison initiated this case with the filing of a civil-rights complaint form. 

Compl.1-5, ECF No. 1. In order to clarify Addison’s claims, the Court ordered 

him to answer the Court’s particular questions in the form of a more definite 

statement. Ord. for More Definite Statement (MDS). ECF No. 8. Addison filed 

answers to the Court’s order in a more definite statement. MDS, ECF No. 9. 

In the complaint, Addison named as defendants the “Bedford Department 

of Public Safety,” and the “Bedford Police Arresting Officers.” Compl.3, ECF 

No. 1. As to these defendants, Addison initially recited legal conclusions, “False 

Arrest, Police Misconduct,” False Imprisonment,” and “Excessive Force.” Id. In 

his Statement of Claims section, Addison wrote: 

August of 2020, Plaintiff was stopped by Bedford Police Officers 

for a violation of a traffic law that he did not commit. During the 

traffic stop the Bedford Police Officers conduct was unlawful and 

the officers use of force was unreasonable violating Plaintiff’s 

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Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force as the 

officers threatened him with stun gun causing his life to be in 

danger from being hit by ongoing traffic. Plaintiff was unarmed 

and placed no safety risk. Police Officers lacked probable cause to 

believe that a traffic violation had occurred [and] therefore lacked 

reasonable suspicion to initiate that traffic stop. Plaintiff states 

claims for False Arrest, Excessive Use of Force, Police 

Misconduct. 

Compl.4, ECF No. 1. For relief in this case, Addison wrote that he seeks for the 

Court “to grant $300,000 for the mental suffering results caused from the 

unlawful arrest. Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and humiliation by reason of 

being incarcerated.”

Id. at 4. 

In his more definite statement, Addison provided a detailed factual 

recitation of having been seen by Bedford police officers in a Bedford, Texas, 

Valero station, only to then be detained by those officers after he left and walked 

at the crosswalk of a major intersection. MDS 1-2, ECF No. 9. Addison alleges 

the officers stopped him and later accused him of evading arrest “when evidence 

shows that plaintiff had no intentions of fleeing from officers.” Id. at 2. He 

contends he was in fear of his life as one of the officers “pulled up running 

towards [him] threatening to tase the plaintiff.” Id. Addison alleges he fell on the 

ground “where cars travel putting [his]life in danger.” Addison alleges the 

officers, who later got Addison to consent to a search, had no probable cause to 

detain him. Id at 3. 

Addison acknowledged in the more definite statement, that he was housed 

awaiting resolution of several pending charges. Id at 4. Those charges include 

those that arose from the arrest: manufacturing/delivery of a controlled substance 

4 grams to 200 grams; evading arrest; and possession of marijuana. Id. 

In response to the Court informing Addison that the Bedford Police 

Department likely did not have its own jural existence, Addison noted in his more 

definite statement that he sought to name the City of Bedford, Texas. Id. at 6. In 

answer to the follow up question as to the basis for his municipal liability claim 

against the City of Bedford, however, Addison provided no additional facts of any 

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custom or policy. Id. at 6. 

As to the failure to name the individual officer defendants, Addison noted 

that he did not know the names and due to limited resources in the Tarrant County 

Jail. Id. at 6-7. Finally, in response to the Court’s question as to whether he 

sustained any physical injury, Addison wrote “there was no physical injury during 

this event only legal, personal and malicious injuries.” Id. at 7. 

 LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) 

Plaintiff Addison is an inmate who has been permitted to proceed in forma 

pauperis. As a part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Congress 

enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires a district court to review a complaint 

from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity, officer, or employee as 

soon as possible after docketing. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a). Because Addison 

is proceeding in-forma-pauperis, his complaint is also subject to screening under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A provide for sua sponte

dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails 

to state claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1915A(b) and 

1915(e)(2)(B).. 

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or 

in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable 

basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 

327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or 

delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. A complaint fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To avoid dismissal 

for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and 

conclusions” nor “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” 

suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.

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 ANALYSIS

A. Bedford Police Department of Public Safety No Jural Existence

City of Bedford, Texas-No Claim of Municipal Liability 

As noted above, Addison named as a defendant the “Bedford Police 

Department of Public Safety.” Compl,3, ECF No. 1. After the Court explained to 

Addison the doctrine of jural existence in the Order for an MDS, however, 

Addison answered that he sought to state his claims only against City of Bedford, 

Texas. MDS 6, ECF No. 9. Thus, Addison has abandoned his claims against the 

Bedford Police Department of Public Safety and that defendant must be 

dismissed.

Addison alternatively names the City of Bedford, Texas. Id. Although a 

city or county is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, a municipal 

government may not be held liable “unless action pursuant to official municipal 

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v. New York City Dept. 

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The Supreme Court, in Monell v. 

New York City Department of Social Services, emphasized that a local 

government entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior 

basis:

[T]herefore . . . a local government may not be sued under § 1983 

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it 

is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether 

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly 

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 

government entity is responsible under § 1983.

Id. at 694. Thus, to the extent Addison claims that the City of Bedford is 

responsible to him due to the actions of the police officers, as this claim is 

essentially a claim that the City of Bedford is responsible on a vicarious liability 

or respondeat superior basis, such claim is without legal merit.

Instead of vicarious liability for the actions of government employees, § 

1983 liability attaches against a local government entity only “if the governmental 

body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be 

subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011) 

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 

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(1989) (liability “only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional 

violation at issue”) (emphasis in original). An official municipal policy “includes 

the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, 

and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” 

Prince v. Curry, 423 F. App’x 447, 450 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick, 563 

U.S. at 60.) 

The Court directed Addison to provide any “facts of a custom or policy . . 

. that relates to your harm.” Order for MDS 3, ECF No. 8. Addison did not 

provide any responsive information asserting any kind of facts against the City of 

Bedford. Thus, Addison has provided no facts to support any claim that the City 

of Bedford could be liable to him for a violation of constitutional rights on the 

facts as stated. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) Limitation on Monetary Damages if no 

Physical Injury

When Addison filed this action on a prisoner complaint form, he invoked 

the Court’s federal question jurisdiction by seeking relief against the government 

defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of 

action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Livadas 

v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It “afford[s] redress for violations of 

federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms.” Id. Addison’s claims under § 

1983 against all defendants seek compensatory monetary damages for violations 

of constitutional rights. Compl.4, ECF No. 1; MDS 7, ECF No. 9. As a part of the 

PLRA, Congress placed a restriction on a prisoner’s ability to recover 

compensatory damages without a showing of physical injury: “[n]o Federal civil 

action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody 

1. “Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, 

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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without a prior showing of physical injury . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Addison 

alleges violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution. MDS 3, ECF No. 9.

This physical injury requirement has long been recognized as applying to 

claims under the Eighth Amendment. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665-

66 (5th Cir. 2001); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999); Siglar 

v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997). The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequently held that § 1997e(e) applied to claims 

under the First Amendment as well, noting “it is the nature of the relief sought, 

and not the underlying substantive violation, that controls: Section 1997e(e) 

applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional 

violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries nonrecoverable, absent physical injury.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F. 3d 371, 375 (5th 

Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has rejected an inmate’s claim that § 1997e(e) does 

not apply to a Fourth Amendment claim arising from a strip search, emphasizing 

that in Geiger the court noted that “1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions,” 

and noting that “[r]egardless of [Plaintiff’s] invocation of the Fourth Amendment, 

his failure to allege any physical injury preclude his recovery of any 

compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries suffered.” Hutchins v. 

McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). 

Other courts have held that an inmate’s claims for compensatory damages 

for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment, without 

showing physical injury, are barred by § 1997e(e). See Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 

F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2014) (Fourteenth Amendment); Allen v. Holden, No. 10-

0753-JJB-DLD, 2012 WL 3902401, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 15, 2012), rep. and 

rec. adopted, 2012 WL 3901954 (Sep. 7, 2012) (Fourteenth Amendment); 

Rogers, v. Newman, No. 5: 04-cv-193 DCB-JCS, 2006 WL 1520298, at * 1 (S.D. 

Miss. Apr. 7, 2006) (Fourteenth Amendment); see also Schaller v. United States, 

No. 3:10-cv-444-WS-EMT, 2011 WL 7052267, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2011), 

rep. and rec. adopted, 2012 WL 136007 (Jan. 17, 2012) (Fifth Amendment). 

Courts in this circuit have recognized that § 1997e(e) bars a Plaintiff from 

seeking monetary damages to compensate for emotional or mental injury, absent a 

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showing of physical injury in other contexts. See generally Logan v. Honeycutt, 

No. 12-156-JJB-SCR, 2012 WL 3903501, at *3 (M.D. La. July 24, 2012) (holding 

that Plaintiff’s failure to allege that he sustained a physical injury as a result of 

alleged retaliation prohibits him from recovering compensatory damages pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), rep. and rec. adopted, 2012 WL 3903452 (Sep. 7, 

2012); Hodge v. Stadler, No. 04-0965, 2006 WL 1560754, at *3 (E.D. La. May 

24, 2006) (“Arguably, it may seem counterintuitive that a prisoner’s damage 

claim for a purely nonphysical form of retaliation would be barred unless he can 

show a physical injury suffered in connection with the claim. Nevertheless, this 

Court finds that is in fact the result mandated by the decision of the United States 

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (2005)”).

Addison has not alleged any physical injury. In the complaint, he 

expressly seeks $300,000 for the mental suffering results caused from the 

unlawful arrest.” Compl.4, ECF No. 1. But in response to the Court’s question in 

the order for more definite statement concerning whether he sustained any 

physical injury, Addison wrote: “there was no physical injury during the event 

only legal, personal, and malicious injuries.” MDS 7, ECF No. 9. Applying the 

above cited holdings to the instant case, no matter the substantive constitutional 

violations asserted by Addison against the Defendants, the failure to allege 

physical injury bars his claims for recovery of any compensatory monetary 

damages. Thus, Addison’s claims for compensatory monetary damages are barred 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

C. Younger Abstention 

With regard to Addison’s remaining factual allegations against the 

unnamed individual defendants, the Court notes that, under the Younger

abstention doctrine, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state 

criminal proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances not shown 

here. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-52 (1971); see also Louisiana 

Deb. and Lit. Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1489-1490 (5th 

Cir. 1995). Abstention is required under the Younger doctrine when: (1) 

state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings 

involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford 

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adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional challenges. See Middlesex 

County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); 

see also Louisiana Deb. and Lit. Ass’n, 42 F.3d at 1490. As to Younger’s 

application to ongoing criminal prosecutions, this Court should abstain 

expect in the most extraordinary circumstances and on a clear showing of 

both great and immediate harm. See Burgett v. State of Texas, No. 7:04-

CV-227-R, 2005 WL 473680, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2005) (collecting 

cases); see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 

All prerequisites for abstention under Younger are met in this case. 

There are ongoing state judicial criminal proceedings. “The state has a 

strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws.” DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 

F,2d 11171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984). Addison has a full opportunity to raise 

constitutional challenges in the ongoing state prosecution, on direct appeal 

in the event of a conviction (s), or through a state habeas writ challenging 

his detention or conviction. See DeSpain, 731 F2d at 1176; see also Kugler 

v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (“ordinarily a pending state 

prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for 

vindication of federal constitutional rights”). The Court will therefore 

abstain from jurisdiction over Addison’s remaining claims. See generally 

Phillips v Dallas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:16-CV-1680-D, 2017 WL 

658749, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2017) (finding that claims of unlawful 

arrest against the Dallas Police Department should be dismissed under the 

Younger abstention doctrine), rep. and rec. adopted, 2017 WL 635086 

(N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2017). Thus, the Court concludes that Addison’s claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the remaining defendants must be 

dismissed. 

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CONCLUSION and ORDER

It is therefore ORDERED that all plaintiff Wesley K. Addison’s 

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C.§§ 

1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). 

SO ORDERED this 8th day of May, 2023.

______________________________ 

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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