Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JAMES W. MCNEW GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Greenfield, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

MARJORIE LAWYER-SMITH

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

COLBY R. MCKNELLY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 30A05-1307-CR-378

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Richard D. Culver, Judge

Cause No. 30C01-1212-MR-1947

August 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PYLE, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Colby McKnelly (“McKnelly”) appeals his convictions and sentence, after a bench 

trial, for murder1and Class C felony battery with a deadly weapon.

2

 On appeal, 

McKnelly argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting 

testimony violating Rule 404(b) of the Indiana Rules of Evidence, that his convictions are

not supported by sufficient evidence, and that his sentence is inappropriate and should be 

revised pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Finding that the State did not commit 

prosecutorial misconduct, that sufficient evidence supports his convictions, and that his 

sentence is appropriate in light of his character and the fact that McKnelly stabbed and hit 

the victim a total of fifty-four (54) times, we affirm McKnelly’s convictions and 

sentence.

We affirm and remand.

3

ISSUES

1. Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in the 

presentation of its evidence.

2. Whether sufficient evidence supports McKnelly’s convictions.

3. Whether McKnelly’s sentence is inappropriate.

 

1

INDIANA CODE § 35-42-1-1.

2

I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2012).

3 Both parties direct our attention to an error in the Abstract of Judgment. The recitation of McKnelly’s 

battery charge reads as “Battery Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury,” even though the trial court convicted 

him of battery by means of a deadly weapon. (App. 290). The Indiana Code citation for both is the same, 

and the trial court said during trial and at sentencing that McKnelly was guilty of battery by means of a 

deadly weapon. We remand solely for the purpose of correcting the Abstract of Judgment to read 

“Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon” rather than battery resulting in serious bodily injury. 
3

FACTS

In December 2012, McKnelly and Jessi Parsons Freeman (“Freeman”) were dating 

and living together. On December 23, 2012, McKnelly and Freeman went shopping and 

later went to the home of Steven Rogers (“Rogers”). McKnelly and Freeman stayed at 

Rogers’s house for about an hour before they all left to buy food and alcohol. All three 

then went back to McKnelly’s house.

At McKnelly’s house, everyone was drinking, listening to music, and playing 

pool. At some point, McKnelly and Freeman began to argue, and McKnelly struck 

Freeman. She then hid from McKnelly so that she could later sneak out of the house. 

McKnelly found Freeman and dragged her back into a bedroom. Eventually, they both 

went to sleep. At 4 A.M., McKnelly woke Freeman up and told her that he wanted to go 

to the home of Chris Cave (“Cave”). McKnelly and Freeman drove to Cave’s house, 

which was a few blocks away. Rogers did not go to Cave’s house and stayed at 

McKnelly’s. 

When McKnelly and Freeman arrived at Cave’s home, McKnelly told Freeman 

that he “hope[d] there’s no kids in there because [he’s] going to kill everybody.” (Tr. 

620). McKnelly sent a text message to Cave, and Cave responded that he did not want 

any company. Raymond Kalchthaler (“Kalchthaler”) was staying with Cave and was 

also friends with McKnelly. McKnelly called Kalchthaler, and Kalchthaler went outside 

to meet McKnelly and Freeman. When Kalchthaler exited the house, Freeman left the 

car and walked toward McKnelly’s house. McKnelly and Kalchthaler got in the car and 

followed her.
4

Once they arrived at McKnelly’s house, McKnelly turned into the driveway, got 

out of the car, and began arguing with Freeman. Kalchthaler exited the car and walked 

toward a gas station, as he did not want to be involved in their argument. McKnelly told 

Freeman to go in the house, and she refused. McKnelly then got behind Freeman in an 

effort to push her towards the house. At some point while pushing Freeman toward the 

house, McKnelly cut her elbow with a knife. Freeman again told McKnelly that she did 

not want to go in the house and that she wanted to leave. McKnelly told Freeman that if 

she left, he would kill her. 

Kalchthaler came back to McKnelly’s house soon afterward, and saw Freeman on 

a bed crying and holding her arm. Kalchthaler testified that he felt very uneasy walking 

through the house, that “the atmosphere was heavy,” and that “[he] felt like it was almost 

directed toward [him].” (Tr. 320). McKnelly and Kalchthaler went outside to the front 

porch. Freeman came outside and asked Kalchthaler for a cigarette, and McKnelly told 

her to go back in the house. Rogers was in the kitchen eating, and Freeman told him that 

McKnelly had cut her. McKnelly told Rogers that Freeman had jumped out of the car 

and that her injuries were road rash. McKnelly took Freeman to the bathroom and put 

gauze and a bandage around her elbow wound. While doing so, McKnelly told Freeman 

that she “saved [Kalchthaler’s] ass.” (Tr. 626). 

After bandaging the wound, McKnelly told Freeman that he was going to kill 

Rogers. Freeman asked McKnelly why and told him that they should take Rogers home 

instead. Rogers was walking through the house when McKnelly began saying 

disparaging remarks about himself. According to Freeman’s testimony, Rogers told 
5

McKnelly “there’s nothing wrong with you dude.” (Tr. 627). Rogers then tried to give 

McKnelly a hug, but McKnelly stabbed him in the chest. Rogers grabbed a knife that 

was nearby and stabbed McKnelly. The two fought, and McKnelly got behind Rogers 

and stabbed him over fifty (50) times in the back of his head, neck, and back. Eventually 

the men stopped fighting and stumbled through the living room of the house. Rogers 

took out his cell phone and, according to Freeman, called his grandmother to “tell her 

bye.” (Tr. 631). McKnelly grabbed the phone from Rogers and hit him on the head with 

a thick, metal flashlight at least four times. Freeman and McKnelly left Rogers in the 

house and fled in McKnelly’s car. Freeman drove McKnelly to his mother’s home, and

told her not to tell his mother what had happened and to say he had acted in self-defense. 

Freeman dropped McKnelly off at his mother’s house. She then went to her parents’ 

house and asked her father to call 911. Officers went to McKnelly’s house and found 

Rogers, who had died from his injuries. 

On December 27, 2012, the State charged McKnelly with murder, Class B and 

Class C felony criminal confinement, Class C felony battery, Class D felony intimidation, 

and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. McKnelly waived his right to a jury trial, 

and the trial court held a bench trial June 11, 2013. Before the trial began, the State 

dismissed several charges and went forward on the murder and felony battery charges. 

McKnelly testified on his own behalf and stated that Rogers started the fight by stabbing 

him in the chest. McKnelly further testified that he was afraid for his life and was 

defending himself from Rogers. The trial court found McKnelly guilty of both charges 

and set the matter for sentencing on July 29, 2013.
6

At sentencing, the trial court found that the circumstances of the murder, 

McKnelly’s criminal history, and his lack of remorse were aggravating factors. The trial 

court did not find any mitigating circumstances and sentenced McKnelly to sixty-five 

(65) years executed on his conviction for murder and eight (8) years executed for the C 

felony battery conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for 

an aggregate term of seventy-three (73) years executed in the Department of Correction. 

McKnelly now appeals. We will include additional facts as necessary.

DECISION

McKnelly argues that his convictions should be overturned because the State 

committed prosecutorial misconduct and because of a lack of sufficient evidence 

supporting his convictions. He also claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offenses and his character.

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct

McKnelly claims that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting 

testimony that violated Rule 404(b) of the Indiana Rules of Evidence. In reviewing a 

properly preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we must first determine whether 

the prosecutor’s conduct was improper. Newsome v. State, 686 N.E.2d 868, 875 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1997). If we determine the conduct was improper, we must then determine 

whether, under all of the circumstances, the prosecutor’s misconduct placed the 

defendant in a position of grave peril. Id. In deciding whether the defendant was placed 

in grave peril, we consider the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the factfinder’s decision. Id. 
7

“[A]n appellate claim of prosecutorial misconduct presented on appeal in the 

absence of [a] contemporaneous trial objection will not succeed unless the defendant 

established not only the grounds for prosecutorial misconduct but also the additional 

grounds for fundamental error.” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ind. 2002). 

Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception that allows a defendant to avoid 

waiver of an issue. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006). Fundamental error 

makes “a fair trial impossible or constitute[s] clearly blatant violations of basic 

elementary principles of due process . . . presen[ting] an undeniable and substantial 

potential for harm.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002). 

McKnelly points to four instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, but only 

objected to three. He essentially argues that all four instances of misconduct were 

attempts to “destroy his credibility” with the improper introduction of prior bad acts, 

wrongs or other criminal activity in violation of Rule 404(b). (McKnelly’s Br. 10). 

McKnelly complains about the following two exchanges: 

Q Can you describe your interactions with the Defendant after you met 

him?

A Uh, well me and Colby never really got [along] until like at the very 

end, I thought, you know we was [all right]. I know uh, we’ve had 

an incident about, because I smacked his girlfriend’s ass, you know, 

can I say that?

Q Sure.

A I smacked her.

Q Speak up please.
8

A I smacked his girlfriend’s butt when I didn’t know that was his 

girlfriend. I had uh, I found, I heard that he said that uh, some things 

about that, said he was going to kill me. Uh, I confronted him on 

that, he pulled a knife out on me once and on uh, when that 

happened...

BY ATTORNEY TOMPKINS: Your Honor, objection. Move to strike. I 

would ask the State to caution the witness against uncharged misconduct.

(Tr. 252-53). The second alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct was as follows: 

Q Okay. What were you guys talking about in the vehicle?

A Uh, nonsense about uh, some methamphetamine uh, ...

BY ATTORNEY TOMPKINS: Your Honor, objection. Uncharged 

misconduct, I’m going to have to move to strike that portion of the 

answer.

BY THE COURT: Respond or move on Mr. Spears.

BY ATTORNEY SPEARS: Uh, the response, uh, just move on.

(Tr. 309-10).

In reviewing these exchanges, both answers were given in response to otherwise 

proper questions. Because the State did not specifically ask questions to illicit the abovementioned testimony, no prosecutorial misconduct took place. See, e.g., Ratliff v. State, 

741 N.E.2d 424, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (No misconduct on the State’s part where the 

questions asked “did not seek inflammatory or clearly improper answers, nor did the 

testimony establish any elements of the charged crimes”), trans. denied. 

McKnelly also alleges that the State elicited “impermissible 404(b) testimony 

from Charity Reier (“Reier”) regarding a prior argument between McKnelly and 

Freeman” a few days before McKnelly cut Freeman and killed Rogers. (McKnelly’s Br. 
9

9). McKnelly objected to the following answer from Reier describing an incident 

between Freeman and himself: 

A few days prior to that uh, Jessi was going out to eat with a friend and 

when she had got back she had wanted to leave again, or with her. . . . And 

[Freeman and McKnelly] started to argue and they left my house walking. . 

. . Colby and Jessi started to argue and they left walking. . . . Uh, and me 

and Ashley picked her up at uh, Shane’s Tattoo shop here in Greenfield. . . . 

Ashley had went in to get Jessi uh, they ran out to the car. . . . And when 

they were coming out to the car Colby was running down the street and 

kicked the car when, or hit it or kicked it.

(Tr. 345-46) In response to McKnelly’s objection, the State responded that “the case law 

is where there’s a relationship that has conflict or there’s been witnessed conflict[,] it can 

come in based on the fact that there’s confrontation between the victim and the defendant 

to show relationship as well as the motive.” (Tr. 344-45).

Indeed, in Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), we stated that

“[n]umerous cases have held that where a relationship between parties is characterized by 

frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant’s prior assault and confrontations with the 

victim may be admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for 

committing the crime.” Again, where the State’s question was not improper and the 

testimony elicited was admissible, no prosecutorial misconduct took place. See Ratliff, 

741 N.E.2d at 430.

Finally, McKnelly alleges prosecutorial misconduct when the State elicited

testimony from Freeman about McKnelly hitting her earlier in the evening of December 

23:

Q Okay. Once you’re inside what did you all do?
10

A Drank, listen to music, they played pool.

Q How were they getting along at that point?

A Fine.

Q What happens next?

A Me and Colby get into it.

Q Okay, you get in a fight with Colby?

A Yes.

Q Verbal argument?

A Started verbal and I said I wanted to leave. I was texting Charity.

Q Okay.

A He hit me.

(Tr. 614). However, McKnelly did not make a timely objection. Therefore, he 

must establish “not only the grounds for prosecutorial misconduct but also the 

additional grounds for fundamental error.” Booher, 773 N.E.2d at 818. Because 

Freeman’s testimony is admissible under Iqbal, McNelly has not established either 

prosecutorial misconduct or fundamental error. Accordingly, the State did not 

commit prosecutorial misconduct in any of the instances McKnelly alleges. 

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

McKnelly argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. 

Specifically, McKnelly claims that he presented a valid claim of self-defense, that the 

State failed to rebut his claim, and that we should disregard Freeman’s testimony under 

the “incredible dubiosity rule.”
11

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of selfdefense in the same manner as any sufficiency claim in that we neither reweigh the 

evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 

(Ind. 2002). We will not overturn a conviction if there is sufficient evidence of probative 

value to support the conclusion of the trier-of-fact. Id. “A valid claim of self-defense of 

oneself or another person is legal justification for an act that is otherwise defined as 

criminal.” Id. at 800. To present a valid claim of self-defense, a defendant must show 

that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or 

participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily 

harm. Id. The amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be 

proportionate to the urgency of the situation. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). When a person uses more force than is reasonably necessary under 

the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished. Id. A defendant’s 

conviction, despite a claim of self-defense, will not be reversed unless no reasonable 

person can say that the State negated the claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Mariscal v. 

State, 687 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. 

Here, McKnelly argues that his self-defense claim is valid because he testified, 

contrary to Freeman’s assertion, that Rogers stabbed him first. This is simply a request 

that we discount Freeman’s testimony. We decline to do so. See Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 

801. In addition, the State’s case-in-chief, particularly the coroner’s report, provides

sufficient circumstantial evidence rebutting McKnelly’s claim of self-defense. The report 

details at least fifty (50) stab or laceration wounds to Rogers. Seventeen (17) of those 
12

wounds were to his back. The trial court could easily infer that McKnelly was the 

instigator or that the force he used against Rogers extinguished his self-defense claim.

McKnelly further argues that we should disregard Freeman’s testimony based on 

the “incredible dubiosity rule” because her testimony varied greatly from her deposition 

and that of other witnesses. Under the incredible dubiosity rule, this Court may impinge 

upon the responsibility of the fact-finder to judge the credibility of witnesses when 

confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly 

uncorroborated testimony. Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 

We may reverse a defendant’s conviction where a sole witness presents inherently 

improbable testimony and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence. Id. 

However, application of this rule is rare, and the standard to be applied is whether the 

testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person 

could believe it. Id.

McKnelly’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced because the rule 

“applies only when a witness contradicts [herself] in a single statement or while 

testifying, not to conflicts between multiple statements.” Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 

356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Indeed, Freeman’s testimony may have varied 

from that of Kalchthaler, McKnelly, and her deposition, but these variations did not 

render her testimony at trial incredibly dubious. The record reveals that Freeman’s 

testimony at trial provided more details but that her general assertions of what happened 

that evening were consistent. Furthermore, McKnelly’s convictions are not merely 

supported by Freeman’s testimony but by additional circumstantial evidence, such as the 
13

Coroner’s report. Therefore, McKnelly’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule fails, 

and sufficient evidence supports his convictions.

3. Inappropriate Sentence

Finally, McKnelly claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character 

and the nature of the offenses. He suggests that we should revise his sentence to the 

advisory term for murder, which is fifty-five (55) years, and the advisory term for Class 

C felony battery, which is four (4) years. He also suggests that the convictions should 

run concurrently.

Rule 7(B) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure gives this Court the power 

to revise an inappropriate sentence in light of the nature of the offense and character of 

the offender, giving due consideration to the trial court’s decision. The defendant must 

persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 

(Ind. 2006). Under Rule 7(B), we seek “to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify 

some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the 

sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Whether a sentence is 

inappropriate ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of 

the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Id. at 1224. 

In determining whether a sentence is appropriate, we first look to the advisory 

sentence provided by statute. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. The sentencing statute for 

murder provides a sentencing range between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, 
14

with an advisory sentence of fifty-five (55) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3. The sentencing 

range for Class C felony battery is between two (2) and eight (8) years, with an advisory 

sentence of four (4). I.C. § 35-50-2-6(a).4

As to McKnelly’s character, his criminal history, including juvenile adjudications, 

which are not far removed from his adult convictions, is extensive.5 As a juvenile, 

McKnelly has adjudications for criminal mischief, possession of paraphernalia, driving 

under the influence of alcohol in Clay County, Illinois, and child molesting. As an adult, 

McKnelly has convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and disorderly 

conduct in Clay County, Illinois, two convictions for battery, domestic battery, resisting 

law enforcement, criminal mischief, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, operating a 

vehicle having never received a license, and sexual battery. As an adult and a juvenile, 

McKnelly has had his probation revoked, resulting in incarceration at the Department of 

Correction. Two of his misdemeanor convictions were pending at the time of the present 

case, and he was charged with and convicted of battery in another cause while in custody 

awaiting trial. 

Regarding the nature of the murder, McKnelly argues that it is not among the 

“worst of the worst” because of a lack of significant premeditation and that Rogers 

 

4 Effective July 1, 2014, our General Assembly amended and reclassified the offense of battery with a 

deadly weapon from a Class C felony to a Level 5 felony with a new sentencing range of one (1) to six (6) 

years, with the advisory sentence now being three (3) years. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-6(b). However, 

because this offense was committed before the reclassification scheme took effect, we apply the previous

sentencing scheme.

5 Where not specified, the adjudications or convictions took place in Indiana.
15

instigated the fight.6 We disagree. The evidence most favorable to the conviction shows 

that McKnelly planned to kill Rogers and told Freeman how he was going to do it. 

Rogers was simply trying to console a supposedly distraught McKnelly. McKnelly 

responded by brutally stabbing Rogers multiple times and then beating him with a metal 

flashlight. The stab wounds were so numerous that the Coroner had difficulty reporting

an accurate count. Rogers’s demise at the hands of McKnelly was especially brutal.

Given McKnelly’s criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the 

murder, McKnelly’s sentence is not inappropriate.

Affirmed and remanded.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.

 

6 Though McKnelly asks us to revise his battery sentence, he makes no specific argument why we should.