erations during WWII. The Small Wars
Manual articulated the lessons learned
in what many consider the precursor
to counterinsurgency doctrine. U.S.
involvement in Vietnam started as
a military advisor effort, yet unlike
COIN and the Small Wars Manual,
advising doesn’t have a Marine Corps
doctrine.

First published in 1940, the Small
Wars Manual found resurgence 60 years
later when Marines began training for
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.°
The Small Wars Manual provides TTP
(tactics, techniques, and procedures)
in the following areas: logistics, initial
operations, infantry patrols, mounted
detachments (to include tactical load
for a mule), convoys, river crossings,
disarmament of population, armed
native organizations, military govern-
ment, and elections. The Army/Marine
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(FM 3-24) was published in 2006.7
Ir’s authors relied upon the Small Wars
Manual, Counterinsurgency Warfare:
Theory and Practice (1964), Mao Ze-
dong’s On Guerilla Warfare (1965), and
other counterinsurgency texts written
in the last century.8 While the Ma-
rine Corps developed small wars and
COIN doctrine, training, and employ-
ing military advisors have several inter-
pretations. The Marine Corps needs
to determine the role of the military
advisor. History shows what training,
priorities, and doctrine should be. Now
is the time to ensure we establish the
training necessary to groom the next
generation of advisors.

Lessons learned in the Banana Wars
and WWII were relearned in Viet-
nam. Marine Corps doctrine was well
suited for conventional warfare while
slow to adapt to counterinsurgency
and advising.” The Covan Associa-
tion (Vietnamese word for “friend”)
offered many resources and experts to
discuss training and challenges associ-
ated with military advising. This As-
sociation includes retired Marines: Gen
‘Walt Boomer, LtGen Paul K. VanRiper,
BGen Tom Draude, Col Marsh Carter,
Col Bill Warren, and a dozen other ad-
visors who have recommended sources
and confirmed research. Their input
validated the assumption that military

Marine Corps Gazette * October 2017

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advising is cyclical. Initial advisors of
a new conflict improvise training and
those in a mature environment arrive
at training priorities that have been ef-
fective in previous conflicts. From their
input, I captured trends on advisor se-
lection and training to include: proven
combat leadership experience; first-aid,
language, culture, and enemy weapons
familiarization;!° expertise plus team
role; CAP (combat advising platoon);
combat tour length of advisors: 1 year;
and MATA (military assistance training
advisor).

Military advising cross-
es cultural, language,
and training barriers.

Proven combat leadership experience.
Proven combat leadership is preemi-
nent—a lieutenant with no concept of
combat should not make his debut as a
combat advisor. He should deploy first
and, if successful under fire, become
an advisor. Credibility is everything.
Vietnam advisors understood the im-
portance of leveraging credibility while
frequently advising senior Vietnamese
officers. War experience was the cre-
dential that mattered most.

First-aid, language, culture, and
enemy weapons. The core skills that
made Vietnam military advisors suc-
cessful were priorities during training.
Unfortunately, language and cultural
training were not standardized, and
some advisors deployed without first
learning to speak Vietnamese. They
were at a disadvantage immediately.
Those who received language training
were far more confident and competent.
Reviewing the experience of Korean
War advisors shows the importance of
language in culture. KMAG (Korea
Military Advisory Group) recognized
the challenge as

communication between a highly
skilled and competent group of tech-
nicians on one hand and an eager and
willing, yet often uneducated and un-
trained people on the other.!!

The Marine Corps utilized an 11-week
Vietnamese language training program
at DLI (Defense Language Institute)
in Monterey, CA;!? however, not all
advisors attended formalized language
training. Many only received rudimen-
tary training in language survival skills
before deployment. It was not uncom-
mon for last minute assignments to force
an advisor to bypass language training
and head straight to Vietnam.

Expertise plus team role. Everyone on
the team must be an expert at something.
Everyone was also cross-trained. In the
event the expert was unavailable, an
alternate must accomplish the mission.
Along with individual and team experts,
acommand relationship (modeled after
KMAG from Korea) was developed for
Vietnam. The MAU (Marine advisor
unit) reported to the MAC-V (Military
Assistance Command-Vietnam).!3 This
command relationship was built around
the advisors. Conventional units had a
separate chain of command. The advi-
sors brought order out of confusion by
articulating the context of South Viet-
namese military leadership.!4

CAP (combat advising platoon). A
platoon imbedded within a single village
protects the people while ensuring their
development and friendliness toward
US. efforts. The villages that had CAPs
were effectively influenced to support
South Vietnam. Viet Cong were gradu-
ally pushed back from these areas. This
technique was additionally successful
as VSO (village stability operations) in
Afghanistan from 2009 to the present
day.!5

Combat tour length of advisors: 1 year.
By the time an advisor builds credibil-
ity and rapport, his tour ends and a
new advisor replaces him. This lack of
time together leads to a degradation in
continuity of progress. One year may
be a difficult assignment, but it leads
to more effective advising effort.!

MATA. Marine advisors trained at
Fort Bragg, NC, learned from Army
Special Forces. The MATA (Military
Assistance Training Advisor) course of
instruction was tailored for Vietnam.
The sentiment among Marine advisors
was that this course contained some
of the best training they had prior to
deployment. A review of the course cur-

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IpEAs & Issues (IRREGULAR WARFARE) :

to prepare military advisors, there must
be a greater sense of permanence. The
improvements include the creation of a
supplemental MOS, Commandant of
the Marine Corps directed language in
command and promotion board pre-
cepts giving credit for advisor experience,
the creation of MCSCG (Marine Corps
Security Cooperation Group), and re-
investment of experienced advisors.

First, the Marine Corps established
a foreign security force advisor “free”
MOS on 23 September 2014,34 which
allows the tracking of military advisors.
A free MOS is a critical skill additional
duty. Proven advisors can be assigned to
training or policy billets where advisor
advocacy is desired. Additionally, they
serve as advisors as additional require-
ments arise.

Second, promotion boards are goy-
erned by law and select “the best and
most fully qualified”5> candidates. The
Secretary of Navy provides guidance
through precepts, which highlight
critical shortfalls for consideration for
promotion boards. Command selec-
tion boards are informed by precepts
articulated by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. In both cases, there is
an acknowledgement of skills demon-
strated by military advisors. Assignment
of advisors is balanced against critical
billets such as battalion or squadron op-
erations or executive officer. The com-
mander’s dilemma is who to deploy with
the unit and who to deploy externally
(as an advisor). Board precepts ensure
proven combat performance is consid-
ered analogous to critical billets within
an individual’s MOS.

Finally, upon successful deployment,
advisors blend back into the landscape.
There are opportunities to re-invest ad-
visors. My assessment is that ATCs were
ad-hoc organizations requiring tempo-
rary assignment from operating forces.
Their utility and efficiency grew rap-
idly from 2004-2014. Lessons learned
and relearned from previous conflicts
climbed an initial sharp learning curve.
To ensure momentum, some of our best
advisors need to be assigned to ATC
or ATG. Some should serve in MEF,
Division, Wing, and Group level G-3
or G-7 staffs. PCS opportunities could
also include MCSCG or HQMC.

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Recommendations

Does the Marine Corps and its mili-
tary advisor venture get the respect it
deserves? The Marine Corps needs to
build an advisor network that ties to-
gether the network of relationships and
know-how of those who have done it.
A few recommendations explain a path
to break the cycle of re-learning.

Appoint leaders with proven advisor
experience. The Marine Corps needs
to ensure the right teachers/mentors
run the advisor training schools and
organizations. There needs to be ad-
visor growth opportunities through
colonel and representation as general.
Blunt, candid, seasoned advisors who
have thrived in the darkest and most
dangerous places need a home in the
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps needs
to ensure advisor training is properly
maintained. Successful advisors should
be reinvested into roles that keep their
experiences relevant. Many have been
advisors but few really understand it.
Though not a primary skillset, the few
who have done it well should be called
upon to do it again. OAGs (operational
advisory groups) ensure the interests of
discrete fields or warfighting functions
have a venue. There are air, ground, lo-
gistics, artillery, and ANGLICO OAGs,
why not establish an SEA OAG led by
a seasoned military advisor?

Get the right operations officer. The
caretakers of MCSCG, ATG, ATC, and
EOTG need to understand the mission
of the advisor and provide counsel to
the SFA OAG. G-3 and G-7 staffs also
need to look holistically at grooming
advisors and keeping the plan on track.

Honor your past. Knowing history
and language of those you will advise
follows the same logic. Lessons learned
are the flash backs of a Marine Corps
doctrine for military advisors. The
Small Wars Manual introduced doctrine
for the advising and counterinsurgency
lessons of the Philippines and the Ba-
nana Wars. It’s time to do the same with
Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
combat military advisor efforts and pub-
lish a doctrine for advisors.

Learn to speak the language. Emphasis
on conversational speaking and a ba-
sic knowledge of alphabet, grammar,
and sentence construction are optimal.

DOD grants for academic institutions,
such as SDSU and CCCC give the Ma-
tines the tools they need. An arrange-
ment where the schools could teach on
Marine bases and installations would
reduce the TAD costs. Make foreign
languages a priority in the Marine
Corps. Cultivate relationships with
universities that can tailor language to
emerging mission sets. Create advisor
opportunities at MARSOC and SO-
COM. Keep resident knowledge keen
while putting successful advisors where
they can influence the next generation
of advisors.

Move the family to where it can do
the most good. The MCSCG (Marine
Corps Security Cooperation Group)
and ATG (Advisor Training Group)
were established as dedicated security
cooperation organizations. Advisor
training is coordinated through MC-
SCG and validated through Block IV
training at ATG. MCSCG’s mission is

execute and enable Security Coopera-
tion (SC) programs, training, plan-
ning, and activities in order to ensure
unity of effort in support of USMC
and Regional Marine Component
Command (MARFOR) objectives
and in coordination with the operat-
ing forces and MAGTF(s).

In this capacity, MCSCG serves as
the Marine Corp’s school house and
training center for advising efforts.
MCSCG should remain as the intel-
lectual center for military advising.>°
MCSGG is staffed with former advi-
sors and ensures throughput for security
cooperation advising efforts. Re-locate
to Twentynine Palms to ensure a con-
stant role for ATG, which stood down
in 2014. Fort Story, VA, (current home
of MCSCG) doesn’t have the training
ranges and practical integration of hard
and soft skills available at Twentynine
Palms. Moving MCSCG and increas-
ing its scope to the ATG mission offers
the merger of culture and hard skills in
one location.

Conclusion

SFA advising has proven its utility
in Marine Corps counterinsurgency
operations for over 120 years. SFA is
addressed as a new idea each time we

Marine Corps Gazette * October 2017

9/5/17 8:44 AM


IpEAs & Issues (IRREGULAR WARFARE) :

Operations Command).* As SOF ca-
pabilities expanded, both the Army and
the Marine Corps trained ISF (Iraqis
Security Forces). While both Services
faced similar challenges, the depth of
this discussion specifically reflects Ma-
rine Corps equities.

After completing advisor training
with three separate teams, I shared
and compared observations with oth-
er advisors, trainers, and both division
and MEF staffs. I learned my obser-
vations are not unique—many advi-
sors, trainers, and G-3/G-7 staffs had
similar insight. When I MEF hosted
the first annual Tri-MEF cross-leveling
conference, 13 to 14 April 2015, advi-
sor training trends were presented to
LtGen David H. Berger (I MEF), Lt-
Gen John E. Wissler (III MEF), and
MajGen William D. Beydler (II MEF).
Their EOTG (Expeditionary Opera-
tions Training Group) directors, who
ensure advisor training, concurred that
stabilizing advisor training throughput
was a Marine Corps-wide issue. I dis-
cussed ideas that this article highlights
with them. There is an enthusiasm and
realization that SFA training needs a
permanent home. The Marine Corps
is a learning organization, one that
improves every year it provides advi-
sor training. In 2007, Richard Cavag-
nol pointed out that 50 years ago, the
Marine Corps had a “lack of coherent
and integrated strategy for training,
deploying, and supporting” military
advisors. I interviewed 15 Vietnam-
era advisors and inquired about advi-
sor training concerns. Specifically, I
asked, “What training was effective?”
and, “What training do you wish you
had received?TM My conclusion: nascent
conflicts start with rudimentary advisor
training. Organizationally, the Marine
Corps responds and re-learns how to
train advisors after each major conflict.
The next conflict should train advisors
quicker, with the wisdom of the past
based on doctrine, not forgotten ideas.
Iraq and Afghanistan advisor training,
similar to Vietnam, started slow, re-
discovered history of previous advisors,
and eventually produced veterans and
developed effective training. Why re-
learn if you could start at a proven level
of performance?

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According to my observations, initial
advisors focused on hard skills (weap-
ons, radios, and first aid). Soft skills
(negotiation, language, and culture)
didn’t receive as much attention. Lan-
guage consisted of parroting a few key
memorized phrases. Advisor team lead-
ers were allotted “white space” to fill in
what they thought was important. Since
this effort was a new venture, instruc-
tors and advisors didn’t know what was
important. Without a doctrine or real-
ization that proven concepts existed, the
neophyte ATCs (advisor training cen-
ters) provided their best effort. Feedback
from deployed advisors shaped the focus
of following teams. Eventually, advisor
instruction had expanded to include AF
ghanistan bound teams. Their instruc-
tion included lane training for counter-
IED, convoy operations, advanced first
aid, small arms, crew-served and foreign
weapons training, and greater language
and culture experiences. A formalized
process developed at home station ATC
(primarily staffed by 1stMarDiv and
2dMarDiv) led to a TECOM (Training
and Education Command) validated
Block IV capstone exercise at ATG (ad-
visor training group) in Twentynine
Palms, CA. The formal nature and
articulated standards evolved quickly
and improved every year.

After 10 years of learning and im-
proving SFA advisor preparation, the
Marine Corps closed ATG. Experienced
advisors returned to their parent unit,
and institutional expertise was lost. In
August 2014, a requirement to send
advisors to Iraq emerged. Although
the training architecture had been dis-
mantled, I MEF and II MEF did their
best to provide advisor training. I was a
recently-deployed advisor, now working
in I MEF G-3, and provided a voice to
emerging challenges. My counterparts
in II MEF reported similar frustrations
and challenges. The 2014 Iraq advi-
sor teams (I MEF and II MEF) leaned
heavily on residual advisor training ex-
perience resident in MEF G-7’s EOTG.
Teams following them would have a
skeleton crew of experienced advisors.
Once the limited experience transfers,
advisors will again “start from scratch,”
just as the beginning of the Iraq and
Vietnam efforts did. This cycle can

stop. Policy makers must consider a per-
manent advisor structure, established
on pre-existing expertise and training
facilities. Advisor know how will be
costly to recreate later.

The cost of advisor teams training
includes time to develop training ex-
pertise. Adding advisor training does
not happen overnight. The investment
starts with selecting the right people
to teach as well as serve as advisors.
Selection includes Marines who have
demonstrated the capacity to train,
mentor, and advise others from differ-
ent cultures under stressful conditions.
While selecting the right person may be
a challenging metric to achieve, a useful
analogy illustrates the perils of improper
military advisor selection. The Godfather
Doctrine is proposed as a solution to
codify Marine Corps advisor training.

Military advising crosses cultural,
language, and training barriers. Ad-
vising is conducted independently in
austere, dangerous environments. Advi-
sors are often surrounded by treachery
and conflicting values. An individual
who is too quick or too slow to make
a decision will fail as an advisor. The
Marine Corps must identify and assign
the culturally astute and patient to the
advisor mission.

Older Than Amphibious doctrine
The Marine Corps was a small wars
force long before it became a proponent
of amphibious doctrine (1930s) and a
successful large-scale land force (1950s).
The Marine Corps is justifiably proud of
its amphibious contributions to W WII
and the Korean War. While landing on
opposed beaches was innovative and
effective, the Marine Corps first made
a reputation as trainers, advisors, and
as a force to quell resistance to U.S. in-
terests. COIN (counterinsurgency) and
military advising gave Marine Corps
legend to names like Chesty Puller, Dan
Daly, and John Ripley.
Understanding what enabled the
Marine Corps to ensure military ef-
fectiveness of nascent or re-emerging
governments is applicable to future
conflicts. The Marine Corps effectively
advised in the Philippines, Caribbean,
and Central America (Banana Wars),
laying the groundwork for special op-

Marine Corps Gazette * October 2017

9/5/17 8:42 AM


IpEAsS & Issues (IRREGULAR WARFARE)

riculum showed a methodical examina-
tion of culture, geography, government,
weapons, tactics, and navigation.!7 The
most important attribute of their train-
ing was that the instructors had previous
combat advising experience in Korea or
Indochina.!®

Many Things Are Different, But Many
Are The Same

Many lessons learned by Vietnam
advisors have been re-learned in recent
conflicts.!9 While these best practic-
es were not widely known, the skills
quickly became apparent and wer
corporated into training and readiness.
History shows us a similar conclusion
was reached during previous advising
efforts. The relearned or rediscovered
best practices include experience, hard
and soft skills, selection of advisors,
and a balance of combat mindset and
diplomatic ability. Combat advising is
not the same as conventional fighting.
Regional experience is also critical. Mili-
tary advisors need both hard skills and
soft skills. Recent advisors have added
a few tools. Picking the right talent for
tours as advisors remains a consistent
area for improvement. While it is neces-
sary to select experienced combat vet-
erans, it’s equally important to ensure
the selectee has patience, creativity, and
an understanding of the views of the
people he is training. Combat mindset
while serving as a military diplomat is
another way of articulating a balance of
negotiation skills with a sense of force
protection. “Blue on green” (where the
military trainees assaulted their trainers
or supporting military) attacks from
2010 to 2013 highlighted the balance of
cultural awareness and making oneself
hard to kill.?°

Division and MEF staffs need to
provide articulate advisor training re-
quirements and ensure integration into
operational objectives. Picking the right
Marine for the job is important, as is
building a team. SFA ATs (SFA advi-
sor teams) are especially effective when
built around a core of individuals who
already know each other.?! Before as-
sembling a team from the same battal-
ion or regiment, SFA AT requests are
initiated by MARFOR commanders.
Requests are vetted, scrutinized, and

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1&ls_1017.indd 64

Currently, advisor training is conducted by the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
Prior to the advisor team’s deployment. (Photo by Cp! Melanie A. Kilcline.)

reviewed by MARFORCOM (Ma-
tine Forces Command). Manning
documents identifying rank and MOS,
presented by line number, grouped by
team, with report date for training are
assigned to operational units to execute
their Title 10 Responsibilities (train,
man, and equip).

Insight from WWII Marine 2d
Raider Battalion holds true in that
initiative, resourcefulness, control of
small groups ... specific orders few,
but strictly enforced ... and advisors
should be encouraged to think for
themselves.22

Afghanistan’s COM ISAF Security Force
Assistance Guide proposed the following
characteristics enhance an advisor's abil-
ity to adapt and thrive in a foreign cul-
ture: rank, age, and technical expertise;
empathy, flexibility, and perceptiveness;
open-mindedness, tolerance for ambi-
guity; self-reliance; tolerance for differ-
ence, ability to accept and learn from
failure, and a sense of humor; ability to
work in transactional environment; and
patience to include knowing when it is
right to step away.23 This offers insight
to what makes an individual successful
as an advisor. Traditionally, MEFs task
subordinate billets to their major sub-
ordinate commands to fill. The vetting
process requires a lieutenant colonel-

level battalion or squadron commander
to validate an individual’s fitness for
service as an advisor. My experience
training military advisors suggests that
the commander's exposure to military
advising has a direct effect on who is
nominated to advise. Commanders who
had been advisors or worked with ad-
visors had a better appreciation of the
skills needed. One criticism is that the
best candidates aren’t always selected,
rather those who the command can do
without. It’s a non-standard assignment
that takes individuals away from their
primary responsibilities. Fortunately,
the Commandant of the Marine Corps
has included language in promotion
and command board precepts to reward
those who have been advisors.

In order to put the right person to the
right job, there needs to bea panel, con-
sisting of commanders and former mili-
tary advisors to ensure only the “right
Marine” becomes an advisor. The right
Marine should be: a creative thinker, a
hustler, well read, and an intellectually-
curious risk taker who looks at organiza-
tional success over personal interests.?4
Advisors thrive in the gray area. Iraq
advisor Seth Folsom, who authored Jn
the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team
at War, argued the difficulty of being an
advisor is meeting American objectives
while addressing the culture of “what's

Marine Corps Gazette * October 2017

96/17 7:26 AM |


fight a war. Training the next generation
of advisors will take time to regener-
ate corporate knowledge. It’s time to
institutionally accept and codify SFA
doctrine. The Marine Corps needs to
establish SFA advisor doctrine to ensure
the success of those that follow.

Notes

1. LTC Remi Hajjar, USA, “What Lessons Did
We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Ad-
vising After 9/112,” Military Review, (Online:
November-December 2014), available at www.
armyupress.army.mil/military-review.

2. MajGen Paul E. Lefebvre, MARSOC Pub
1, MARSOF, (Camp Lejeune: Marine Corps
Forces Special Operations Command Camp
Lejeune, May 2011), available at heeps://www.
marsocfoundation.org.

3. Richard Cavagnol, “Lessons from Vietnam:
Essential Training of Marine Advisors and
Combined Action Platoon Personnel,” Marine
Corps Gazette, (Online: March 2007), available
at heeps://www.mca-marines.org.

4, The following covans provided insight that
validated Vietnam era experiences or my ob-
servations from more recent conflicts: Gen
Walt Boomer, USMC(Ret); LtGen Paul Van
Riper, USMC(Ret); MajGen Tom Draude,
USMC (Ret); Col Marsh Carter, USMC (Ret);
Col Bob Fischer, USMC(Ret); Col C. Sean
Del Grosso, USMC (Ret); Col Carl Fischer,
USMC (Red); Col Bill Warren, USMC (Rev);
Col Regan Wright, USMC (Ret); Col Bill Sy-
molon, USMC (Ret); Col Klink, USMC; LtCol
Dave Henderson, USMC (Ret); LtCol Ed Tip-
sus, USMC(Ret); Don Bosper; Zach Martin;
William Whorton; and Carlos Flores.

5. Headquarters Marine Corps, FMFRP 12-15,
Small Wars Manual, (Washington, DC: 1990).

6. Ibid.

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, FM 3-24, Coun-
terinsurgency, (Washington, DC: 2006).

8. GEN David H. Petreaus and Gen James F.
Amos, The U.S. Army & Marine Corps Coun-
terinsurgency Field Manual, (Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2007).

9. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a
Knife, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2002).

10. Arthur J. Hoen, “The Design of Cross-Cul-

Marine Corps Gazette « October 2017

| | lals_1017.indd 67

tural Training for Military Advisors,” (presenta-
tion, Division of Military Psychology, 74th An-
nual Convention of the American Psychological
Association, New York City, September 1966).

11, Robert K, Sawyer, “Military Advisors in
Korea: KMAG in Peace and War,” Army Histori-
cal Series, (Washington, DC: 1962, reprinted
1970).

12. Don Bonsper, Vietnam Memoirs Part 2: My
Experiences as an Advisor with the Viernamese
Marine Corps, (New York: AroSage Publish-
ing, 2015).

13. Gerald Turley, The Easter Offensive: The Last
American Advisors in Viet Nam, 1972, (Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985).

14. Ibid.

15. Bing West, The Village, (New York, NY:
Pocket Books, 2003).

16, Personal interview between author and Col
Jeff Kenney, II MEF EOTG (Expeditionary Op-
erations Training Group) Director 2014-2015,
in November 2015.

17. U.S. Army Special Warfare School, S731-
179 MATA Handbook for Vietnam, (Fort Bragg,
NC: 1966).

18. Personal interview between author and
MajGen Tom Draude, USMC(Ret), on 14
September 2015.

19. CPT Wesley Moerbe, USA, “Early Mistakes
with Security Forces Advisory Teams in Af
ghanistan,” Military Review, (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: May-June 2013).

20. Nick McDonnell, “Green on Blue: A Be-
trayal of American Troops in Afghanistan,”
Time, (Online: June 2013), available at hetps:/1
world.time.com.

21. Personal interview between author and Col
Sean Del Grosso, USMC(Ret), on 13 Septem-
ber 2016.

22. Leo J. Dougherty, Counterinsurgency and
the Marine Corps: Volume 1, the First Coun-
terinsurgency Era, 1899-1945, (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland & Company, 2015).

23. Gen Joseph F. Dunford, [SAF Security
Force Assistance Guide 2.0, (Kabul, Afghani-
stan: NATO ISAF (International Security As-
sistance Force), 2014).

24, Trends from interviews of Vietnam, Iraq,
and Military advisors. Eighteen Advisors from

the Covan Association were interviewed from
September 2015 to February 2016. When
asked, “What makes a good advisor?” multiple
responses from separate advisors could be sum-
marized as “creative thinker, hustler, well-read
and intellectually curious risk-taker who looks at
organizational success over personal interests.”
These traits were repeated independently by
over half or the respondents.

25. Seth Folsom, In the Gray Area: A Marine
Advisor Team at War, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2011).

26. Owen West, The Snake Eaters: Counterin-
surgency Advisors in Combat, (New York, NY:
Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2012).

27. Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China
War, 1950-54,” in The China Quarterly, (United
Kingdom: March 1993).

28. Lien-Hang Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
2012).

29, David McCabe, “Iran Has Sent Over 1,000
Military Advisers to Fight ISIS in Iraq,” The
Hill, (Online: December 2014), available at
hetp://thehill.com.

30. Personal interview between author and Bill
Whorton, Silver Star Recipient (Vietnam), on
15 September 2015.

31. Personal interview between author and
LtCol Steve Coast, I MEF ATC Operations
Officer 2013-2015, on 23 November 2015.

32. Ibid.
33. Kenney interview.

34, Headquarters Marine Corps, MARADMIN
472/14, Approval of the Foreign Security Force
(FSF) Advisor Free MOS and Processor Experi-
ence Track Designation, (Washington, DC: 23
September 2014).

35. Department of the Navy, SecNav Precept
Convening Fiscal Year 17 U.S. Marine Corps
Colonel Promotion Selection Board, (Washington,
DC: 24 August 2015).

36. John A. Nagl, “A New U.S, Military Would

Bean Army of Advisers,” The New York Times,
(Online: July 2014), available at hetp://www.

nytimes.com.
usijme

www.mca-marines.org/gazette 67

9/6/17 7:15 AM


azette

Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

OCTOBER 2017 Vol. 101 No. 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

Lead Article: |
21st Century

Logistics 12
LtGen Michael G. Dana

MajGen O.P. Smith 11
Staffs, Lejeune Leadership Institute
& Marine Corps History Division
A Vision for Future
“Smart Logistics” 23
LtCol Howard Marotto, et. al

Amazon on

the Battlefield 29
Maj Micheal R. Graham &
IstLt James R.R. Van Eerden

The MARSOC Lens 40
Col Paul Bertholf
The Marine Corps

Design Methodology 73
Staff, MSTP

A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

9/8/17 9:17 AM

| | Cover_1017.indd 1


in it for me?” of those he advised.2> One
such advisor who thrived in this gray
area was LtCol Bob “Ogre” McCar-
thy who was assigned as a PTT (Police
Transition Team) in Habbiniyah, Iraq.
He was stern, demanding, and cultur-
ally astute. His Arabic skills allowed
direct engagement with the Iraqi police,
and his understanding of Arabic culture
facilitated leveraging decision makers.
When an Iraqi police officer arrived
at Camp Coolie holding his bleeding
and unconscious daughter, Ogre knew
exactly what to do. McCarthy took the
girl to the field hospital and explained
her kinship (granddaughter) to a pow-
erful sheik. The field hospital made an
exception to treating the Iraqi civilian
and her recovery boosted Ogre’s influ-
ence with the Iraqis.76

An advisor board ensures a balance of
the commander's observations of their
troops and discerning eye of former ad-
visors who know what the job entails.
Commanders understand the strengths
and weaknesses of their organizations
and can appreciate developmental needs
of Marines in their charge. The balance
between commanders and former advi-
sors selecting future advisors is worthy
of additional consideration.

The Cost of War Versus The Cost of
Preventing Wars

Iraq’s current security challenges
reflect the resolve of military advisors
from Iran. Iran advisors had different
objectives for Iraqi government than
those espoused by the U.S. led coalition.
There is a historical comparison: The
NVA (North Vietnamese Army) was
trained by the CMAG (Chinese Mili-
tary Assistance Group),?7 mirroring ef-
forts of the American MAAG (Military
Advisory Assistance Group).?8 More
recently, Iran has sent over 1,000 mili-
tary advisors to train Shiite and Kurdish
fighters against ISIS.?? Iran’s advisor
cflont allows them to shape their nar-
rative. China, Russia, France, and the
United Kingdom have all used military
advisors to train foreign military forces.
Significant opportunity to invest in ad-
vising is available.

Military advisors require training
that is unique from conventional mili-
tary training. I MEF and II MEF have

Marine Corps Gazette « October 2017

| | lls 1017.indd 65

benefitted from a DOD grant for criti-
cal language acquisition. Specifically,
SDSU (San Diego State University)
and CCCC (Coastal Carolina Com-
munity College) provide professional
instruction in Arabic, Dari, and Pashto
for deploying military advisors. The fo-
cus of these programs is conversation,
validated by performance on the OPI
(oral proficiency interview). OPI success
determines conversational competence.
Professional linguists and cryptolo-
gists are evaluated through the DLAB
(Defense Language Aptitude Battery),
which determines reading and com-
prehension competence. The testing
difference is an important distinction.
Advisors need to converse and train-
ing should focus on conversation, not
reading comprehension.?° As long as
the program is endorsed, entire advisor
teams or designated advisors on each
team are immersed in 5 to 7 weeks of
language training.>!

The JIED-DO (Joint Improved Ex-
plosives Device-Defeat Organization)
sponsors intensive “lane-training” for
conventional forces, including military
advisors. The training is regionally tai-
lored, teaching individuals and teams
how to identify, avoid, and mitigate
IEDs. Since military advisors are often
outside the wire, their understanding
of these TTP is critical to their suc-

Vie 3
cee a ee

lesson. (Photo by Cp! Melanie A. Kilcline.)

cess. Similar to the language grant,
this is a DOD funded program and
greatly improves the survivability of
advisors.

ATC funding varies by MEF to
include focus on advanced medical
training (live tissue), pre-deployment
site survey, foreign weapons training,
negotiation, and tailored individual/
team training. The cost per team ranges
from $500 to $900,000. ATG ex-
penses are close to $2 million per team
and 60 percent of that budget is the
international role players. In order to
provide a realistic training validation,
native speaking role players are assigned
“acting roles” as local chief of police,
mayor, mullah, or military leadership.
The advisor teams interact and apply
their learning in an environment that
reflects the local culture, language,
custom, and TTP experienced in pro-
jected deployment environment. After
factoring DOD sponsored funding, the
Marine Corps is responsible for the cost
of approximately $3 million per team.

Changing a Culture: Ensuring Rel-
evance for Military Advisors
Combat military advising is fre-
quently treated as a temporary solution
to a larger problem. In order to prevent
the cyclical process of learning, forget-
ting, and relearning the effective ways

Ole: coe Lio

We need to find a way to keep advisor training permanent without constantly “restarting” the

www.mea-marines.org/gazette 65

9/5/17 8:43 AM


| | Table Contents_1017.indd 1

October 2017
Volume 101 Number 10

azette

Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

re - IDEAS AND ISSUES
Logistics
12 21st Century Logistics LtGen Michael G, Dana
16 Embracing Change in Our Logistics
Enterprise LtCol Randy Hodge, et. al
20 Establishing a Career MAGTF Logistics
Operations Course Maj Leo Spaeder
23 A Vision for Future “Smart Logistics” LtCol Howard Marotto, et. al
26 Continuous Process Improvement LtCol Erik Smith &
Capt James Knight
29 Amazon on the Battlefield Maj Micheal R. Graham &
f IstLt James R.R. Van Eerden
40 Cover Article 33 Medical Simulation in the Marine Corps LT Shannon Smithson
Marines experiment with C-ULS at 38 Intelligence Requirements for LCEs Maj Benjamin D. Ortiz
Camp Pendleton. (Photo by Set Saluader 40 The MARSOC Lens Col Paul Bertholf
f Morena) 44 Logistics Staff Trends Capt Matthew Morse &
CWO3 Chadwick Pearson
DEPARTMENTS 50 Medical Operations LCDR David Klimaski
3 Editorial 54 Buying out Bureaucracy Maj Benjamin D. Lawless
4 Special Notices
6 tenes Irregular Warfare
10 Chase Winners 56 A Three Front War John W. Kiser
11 MajGen O.P. Smith 61 The Godfather Doctrine LtCol Douglas G. Lucio
83 Books 68 Irregular Warfare Maj Matthew Peterson
86 TDG . ; wet?
SB UderwaAaerues 73 The Marine Corps Design Methodology ; Staff, MAGTY Trng Program
88 Writers’ Guidelines a Commentary on Marines United
79 Socializing the Network Capt Justin Gray, et. al
WEB EDITION
‘Available at www.mca-marines.org/gazette
Increasing Seabasing Maj Robert Barber &
MAJ Christopher Wolfe
The Future of Marine Corps Logistics LTC Barbara Haines &
LtCol James A. Jones
Reinforcing the Castle Capt Cameron M. Allen, et. al
Physical Network Analysis Maj William P. Sumprion
In God We Trust, All Others Use Data CWO4 Robert J. Toole
A Cold Weather LCE Maj Mark Wlaschin
Bringing the War to Their Neighborhood Capt Timothy M. Bagnell
Putting the First Team on the Field Gil Barndollar &
R. Sam Long
83 Book Review Ancient Wars of the 21st Century LtCol Michael D, Reilly

‘The Marine Corps Gazette (ISSN 0025-3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will advance knowl-
‘edge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at addicional mailing offices. * OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the
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9/5/17 8:03 AM


The Godfather

Doctrine

SFA (security force assistance) training—
an offer the Marine Corps can’t refuse

ourteen years into the “Long

War,” and the Marine Corps

risks forgetting lessons learned

and relearned in blood. The
Marine Corps needs to archive or in-
stitutionalize military advisor training
before the knowledge base disappears.
Upon looking to the past for answers, a
repetitive cycle appeared—initial advi-
sors into a conflict relied on impromp-
tu training to ready themselves, and
those who deployed in a mature cam-
paign were more thoroughly prepared.
To gauge advisor training efficiency,
military advisors from Vietnam to Af
ghanistan were interviewed. Interviews
focused on training: What was effec-
tive? What was not? Advisor insights
from 1965 reflect similar concerns to
those deploying in 2016. In 40 to 50
years, will Marine Corps military advi-
sor programs reflect lessons learned and
codified in doctrine, or will we again
start from scratch? Currently, there isn’t
an advisor training doctrine. There are,
however, SOPs, MARADMINs (Ma-
rine Corps administrative reports), Ma-
rine Corps orders, course curriculums,
journals, books, and articles that can
provide definitions and explanations for
SFA. Doctrine, to the magnitude of the
Small Wars Manual for COIN, does not
exist for SFA. The Godfather Doctrine
for Military Advisors, formalization of
advisor training and advisor selection,
is proposed as a starting point to build
SFA doctrine. History, similarities, cost,
cultural change, and recommendations
articulate where the Marine Corps has
been and where it ought to focus in the
future should be captured, recorded,
and documented.

Marine Corps Gazette * October 2017

1&ls_1017.indd. 61

by LtCol Douglas G. Luccio

>LtCol Luccio is an Artillery Officer with the Foreign Security Force Advisor free-
MOS. He is currently assigned as a Military Instructor, Joint Forces Staff College,

National Defense University, Norfolk, VA.

Effective training methods must be employed by

Both effective and ineffective train-
ing methods are fresh in the minds of
Iraq and Afghan advisor veterans.!
Vietnam veterans recall, quite vividly,
what prepared them to be effective ad-
visors and what training could have
improved. The Marine Corps needs
to reach out to the Korean and Viet-
nam advisors before their experience is
lost to time. Some things are constant
and should be archived and codified
as insights through military advisor
doctrine.

U.S. advisors, (Photo by Sgt lan Leones.)

After the initial 2003 success of U.S.
forces in Iraq, policy makers realized
that SOF (special operations forces),
specifically U.S. Army SF (Special Forc-
es), were in higher demand than were
available. There was a need to train Iraqi
Army, police, border guards, and port
authorities. The solution was to train
conventional forces to serve as advisors,
freeing up SF to maintain its capacity
in UW (unconventional warfare). In
2006, the Marine Corps established
MARSOC (Marine Forces Special

www.mea-marines.org/gazette 61

9/5/17 8:41 AM