J-S42032-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: W.H.-O., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: W.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 295 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002549-2015, 

FID: 51-FN-002091-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: W.M.H.-O., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: W.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 297 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000045-2018, 

FID: 51-FN-002091-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2019

Appellant, W.H. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered 

December 19, 2018, that involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his 

biological child, W.H.-O. (“Child”), born August 2015, and from the order that 
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changed the Child’s permanency goal from reunification with Father to 

adoption.

1

 We affirm.

The facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as follows. 

On September 17, 2015, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) obtained a shelter care order for Child, after Mother and Child were 

evicted from the home of Mother’s relatives, where they had been staying. 

On October 26, 2015, Child was adjudicated dependent and committed to the 

custody of the DHS for placement in foster care, and Father was granted twice 

weekly supervised visitation. Order of Adjudication and Disposition – Child 

Dependent, 10/26/2015.

Permanency review hearings were held on January 26 and April 26, 

2016. At the conclusion of the latter hearing, the trial court found that Father 

was incarcerated and had attended only a single visit with Child. Permanency 

Review Order (“PRO”), 4/26/2016. Father was released from incarceration in 

August 2016 and appeared in person at the permanency review hearing on 

September 26, 2016. N.T. at 8, 34; PRO, 9/26/2016. On October 13, 2016, 

Father was referred to the Achieving Reunification Center for housing and 

employment services, but he declined job training and employment 

assistance. Additional permanency review hearings were held on 

December 19, 2016, and January 9 and July 10, 2017.

____________________________________________

1 Child’s mother consented to the termination of her parental rights and has 

not participated in this appeal.
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On September 28, 2017, Father was arrested for aggravated assault, 

possession of a controlled substance, and other offenses and was detained on 

these charges.2 Due to his incarceration, Father did not attend status review 

hearings on October 2 and December 4, 2017. Status Review Order (“SRO”), 

10/2/2017; SRO, 12/4/2017.

On January 17, 2018, DHS filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental 

rights to the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) 

and to change the Child’s permanency goal from reunification with Father to 

adoption. Additional permanency review hearings were held on January 23 

and April 23, 2018, which Father again failed to attend due to his 

incarceration. PRO, 1/23/2018; PRO, 4/23/2018.

On May 3, 2018, Father pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and 

possession of a controlled substance3 and was immediately paroled. On 

May 22, 2018, Father was again arrested, charged with burglary4 and related

offenses, and detained on these charges.5

____________________________________________

2 Docket Number CP-51-CR-0010701-2017.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), respectively.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(ii).

5 At the time of the termination hearing, these charges were still pending. 

Although we cannot consider any facts that were not before the trial court, we 

note that, according to the publicly available docket for Docket Number CP-
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On December 19, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the termination 

and goal change petitions.

6

 DHS presented the testimony of Tamika Palmer, 

a case manager for the community umbrella agency (“CUA”), Turning Points 

for Children; Palmer had been continuously assigned to Child’s case since 

February 1, 2016. N.T. at 6. Palmer testified that Father had no contact with 

her between January 2017 and July 2018 and has never sent Child any cards 

or letters7 and that Child was bonded with her foster mother and would not 

suffer any irreparable harm if Father’s rights were terminated, “[b]ecause 

neither parent[] was actively in her life for the whole three years.” Id. at 28-

33, 35. Palmer also testified that Child has no developmental delays and that 

Child’s foster family has made sure that Child’s medical and dental care is up-

____________________________________________

51-CR-0005221-2018, on February 1, 2019, Father pleaded guilty to the 

burglary charge and was immediately paroled to a treatment facility.

6 At the hearing, Child was represented by a guardian ad litem who was also 

an attorney. See In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 173-75, 180 (Pa. 2017) (courts 

must appoint counsel to represent the legal interests of any child involved in 

a contested involuntary termination proceeding; a child’s legal interests are 

distinct from his or her best interest, in that a child’s legal interests are 

synonymous with the child’s preferred outcome, and a child’s best interest 

must be determined by the court); In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1089-93 (Pa. 

2018) (a child’s statutory right to appointed counsel is not waivable, even 

where the child is too young or nonverbal to communicate his or her 

preference; reaffirming the ability of an attorney-guardian ad litem to serve a 

dual role and to represent a child’s non-conflicting best interests and legal 

interests); In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399-400 (Pa. Super. 2018) (orphans’ 

court not required to appoint separate attorney to represent children’s legal 

interests, so long as children’s guardian ad litem was an attorney and 

children’s legal and best interests did not appear to be in conflict).

7 Palmer stated that Father sent Child “a picture” in 2016. N.T. at 35.
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to-date. Id. at 30-31. When asked if she “believe[d] it’s in the child’s best 

interest to be adopted by her foster parent[,]” Palmer answered affirmatively. 

Id. at 30; see also id. at 39.

At the conclusion of Palmer’s direct examination, DHS entered into 

evidence DHS Exhibits 17 and 19, without objection. Id. at 34-35. As DHS’s 

attorney explained, DHS Exhibit 17 “was a criminal docket pertaining to 

[Father] that was printed from the public record on July 12th, 2018[,]” and 

DHS Exhibit 19 consisted of “certified judgments of conviction pertaining to 

[F]ather . . . with regards to various criminal offenses[.]” Id. Father’s criminal 

record began in 1995, and the longest period of time that Father lasted without 

a new criminal conviction was five years.

Father testified on his own behalf. He admitted that he was incarcerated 

at the time Child “came into care, in the fall of 2015” and “currently” – i.e., at 

the time of the termination hearing. Id. at 52-53. He explained to the court: 

“I got out, Your Honor, and went back.” Id. at 53. His expected release date 

was February 2019,

8 and he planned to enter a drug and alcohol inpatient 

treatment facility in Philadelphia. Id. at 52, 57.

Father admitted that he “really didn’t know” Child. Id. at 55. He stated

that he “missed visits with” Child, because he “was working at the time.” Id.

at 56. He conceded that he has not seen Child “since she was 18 months” old 

____________________________________________

8 As noted above, according to the publicly available criminal docket, Father 

was released as expected in February 2019.
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but added: “I know I’ve been in and out of jail, but I’ve always contacted 

[Palmer] to let her know where I was at.” Id. at 58. When asked if he felt 

he had a bond with Child, Father answered, “Not right now, because I haven’t 

had an opportunity to be with her.” Id. at 59.

At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that it believed both 

Palmer and Father to be credible, id. at 70; it then placed its findings of fact 

and conclusions of law on the record:

What is most compelling is that DHS Exhibits 17 and 19 outline a 

very lengthy criminal record for [F]ather, much of which resulted 

in confinement, dating back to as early as 1995. . . . And, with 

respect to [Child], she has been in care for almost three years 

now, with [F]ather, by his own admission . . ., back and forth in 

jail, coming out – [F]ather’s testimony was that, at one point, he 

was in for a little while, came out for a month, and within a month, 

was back, incarcerated.

This is not the kind of stability that a three year-old child would 

need. And, given the length of [F]ather’s criminal history, and the 

fact that he has been in and out of jail for [C]hild’s entire life and 

even before [Child] was born, this [c]ourt isn’t convinced that the 

conditions that have caused [Child] to be without her father’s 

parental care and control will be remedied, long-term, by [F]ather.

. . .

[B]ack as far as September of 2016 . . . there was no treatment 

recommended for [F]ather in terms of drug and alcohol treatment.

But we are back again with [F]ather, by his own admission, 

indicating that he’s in a drug and alcohol program and trying to 

get himself together, plans to go to an inpatient drug and alcohol 

program, and then a halfway house.

And there’s no guarantee that, throughout the process, [F]ather 

will be able to successfully complete it such that he could reunify 

with [Child], and having been in care three years, this child 

deserves to have some permanency.
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So, [the trial court found] that [F]ather’s own actions are what 

have caused [Child] to be without the care and control that she 

needs of her father. So, that is with respect to 2511(a)(2).

With respect to 2511(b), . . . there was no bond between [F]ather 

and [Child] back in 2016 . . . [a]nd [F]ather has indicated that 

there isn’t a bond with him and [Child] as we sit here today 

because he does not know [Child]. . . .

What’s also concerning to this [c]ourt is that, even if [it] were to 

attribute to CUA a failure to make [Child] available for visits, the 

testimony from [Palmer] is there’s no cards, no letters, no phone 

calls from [F]ather even inquiring about [Child] since his last visit 

with her in October of 2016. . . .

[P]ursuant to 2511(b), . . . it is in [Child]’s best interest to have 

[F]ather’s parental rights terminated so that she can be freed for 

adoption.

Id. at 71-74. The trial court granted the termination petition pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b) and entered an order changing the Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption. N.T. at 71, 73; PRO, 

12/19/2018 (DHS “shall move forward with the goal of adoption”).

On January 17, 2019, Father filed timely direct appeals of both the 

termination decree and the goal change order, along with concise statements

of errors complained of on appeal for both. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The 

trial court entered its opinion on March 20, 2019, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii), 

in which it augmented its analysis for § 2511(b), adding that “Child would not 

suffer any irreparable harm in terminating [Father’s] parental rights, including 

that Father, by his own admission, admits to not knowing the Child and not 

having a bond with the Child.” Trial Court Opinion, filed March 20, 2019, at 2 

(citing N.T. at 30-31, 55-56, 58-59, 73-74).
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Father presents the following issue for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5)?

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)?

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by finding, under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b), that termination of [Father]’s parental rights 

best serves the child’s developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare?

Father’s Brief at 5 (trial court answers omitted).

Preliminarily, we note that Father raises no issues related to the order 

changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption in his 

statement of questions involved. Id. “No question will be considered unless 

it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Father has thus waived all issues related to that 

order.9

We further observe that the trial court clearly stated that it “cannot 

terminate pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. §] 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8), as this child was 

not removed from the care of [her] father but was, in fact, removed from the 

care of [her] mother” and, instead, was “going to terminate pursuant to 

[§] 2511(a)(2).” N.T. at 70-71; see also Trial Court Opinion, filed March 20, 

____________________________________________

9 Assuming Father has preserved any challenge to the goal change order, we 

would conclude that the trial court properly found that “it is in the best interest 

of the Child to change the goal to adoption.” Trial Court Opinion, filed March 

20, 2019, at 2 (citing N.T. at 29-31, 39).
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2019, at 2 n.4 (“the trial court terminated parental rights to Father under 23 

Pa.C.S.[] §[]2511(2) and (b) only” (emphasis in original)). Therefore, we

need not address Father’s second and third issues raised on appeal. See

Father’s Brief at 13-14.10

We consider Father’s remaining issues in light of the following principles:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental 

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the 

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse 

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support 

for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial 

court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision the 

same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must 

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to 

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by 

competent evidence.

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. If competent 

____________________________________________

10 Although Father did not raise any challenges pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1), DHS did bring the termination petition under that subsection as 

well, but the trial court did not rely upon that subsection to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to Child, explaining:

In terms of terminating pursuant to 2511(a)(1), while 

I understand the testimony from CUA [case manager, 

Palmer,] that [F]ather did not visit for any of 2017 or 2018, 

I am not convinced that that is based on [F]ather evidencing 

a settled purpose to relinquish parental care and control. 

. . . So, I’m not going to terminate pursuant to 2511(a)(1).

N.T. at 70-71.
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evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental 

rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act . . .

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. . . .

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. . . .

We need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection 

of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm.

In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921-22 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal quotation 

marks and some internal citations omitted) (some formatting).

As noted above, in the current appeal, the trial court terminated Father’s 

parental rights to Child under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide, in 

relevant part, as follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.
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* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the right of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating 

his parental rights, because “the evidence was not clear and convincing so as 

to establish grounds for termination[.]” Father’s Brief at 10.

11

 Father 

____________________________________________

11 The “Argument” section of Father’s Brief begins with an argument not 

included in his statement of questions involved: “DHS failed to use reasonable 

efforts to assist [Father] in being reunited with [Child].” Father’s Brief at 9.

Father hence has violated Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), which mandates that 

“argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued.” Additionally, “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in 

the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 

2116(a). As Father has not included a challenge to DHS’s “reasonable efforts” 

in his statement of questions involved, we will not consider this argument.

The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate 

rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, 

they represent a studied determination by our Court and its rules 

committee of the most efficacious manner by which appellate 

review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right to judicial review 

as guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of our Commonwealth’s 

Constitution may be properly exercised.

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011).

Assuming this argument were not waived, Father’s challenge to DHS’s 

reunification efforts would still fail, because reasonable efforts at reunification 

are not required to support the grant of a petition for termination of parental 

rights. In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 673-74 (Pa. 2014) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6351(f)); In re J.J.L., 150 A.3d 475, 482-83 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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acknowledges that he “was incarcerated, intermittently, during the time 

[Child] was in care” but argues that “the fact of incarceration alone does not 

provide sufficient grounds for termination of parental rights.” Id. (citing In 

re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Father additionally argues that, 

“once released from prison and having completed his goals regarding 

parenting and drug[s] and alcohol, he would be able to take care of [Child,]” 

and, “[t]herefore, there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the clear and 

convincing requirements . . . to terminate [F]ather’s parental rights.” Id. at 

13. Father thus believes that the trial court erred by terminating his parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). Id. at 12.

Father’s citation to C.S. is ironic, given that the remainder of the 

sentence – and paragraph -- that he chooses not to quote articulates exactly 

why his claim fails:

We agree that incarceration of a parent does not, in itself, provide 

sufficient grounds for termination of parental rights; however, 

an incarcerated parent’s responsibilities are not tolled 

during his incarceration. Parental rights may not be preserved 

by waiting for some more suitable financial circumstance or 

convenient time for the performance of parental duties and 

responsibilities. Further, parental duty requires that the parent 

not yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good 

faith interest and effort, to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances.

761 A.2d at 1201 (emphasis added). In truth, this Court’s discussion of the 

appellant’s circumstances in C.S. is analogous to that of Father’s 

circumstances in the current action:
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We note that, even for the sake of his child, apparently Appellant 

cannot stay out of jail. Further, the trial court concluded, and we 

find that the record supports its conclusion, that despite his 

incarceration Appellant has not made every possible effort to stay 

in touch with his child and to participate, however vicariously, in 

his child’s life.

Id.

Father, by his own admission, likewise has failed to stay out of prison, 

even for Child’s sake. Compare id., with Docket Numbers CP-51-CR0010701-2017 and CP-51-CR-0010701-2017, and N.T. at 8, 34-35, 52-53, 

58, 71-72 (trial court’s observation: “What is most compelling is that DHS 

Exhibits 17 and 19 outline a very lengthy criminal record for [F]ather, much 

of which resulted in confinement, dating back to as early as 1995.”); see also 

PRO, 4/26/2016; PRO, 9/26/2018; SRO, 10/2/2017; SRO, 12/4/2017; PRO, 

1/23/2018; PRO, 4/23/2018.

The trial court also concluded – and we find that the competent evidence 

of record supports its conclusion -- that, despite Father’s incarceration, he has 

not made every possible effort to stay in touch with Child and to participate, 

however vicariously, in Child’s life. Compare C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201, with 

N.T. at 28-35 (Palmer’s testimony that Father has sent no cards or letters to 

Child and has had no contact with Palmer between January 2017 and July 

2018), 73 (trial court found: “there’s no cards, no letters, no phone calls from 

[F]ather even inquiring about [Child] since his last visit with her in October of 

2016”); see also B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (“we are limited to determining 

whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence”).
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As for Father’s argument that, “once released from prison and having 

completed his goals regarding parenting and drug[s] and alcohol, he would be 

able to take care of [Child,]” Father’s Brief at 13, we observe: “Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform 

one’s parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citation omitted). Although the trial court found Father’s testimony to 

be credible, N.T. at 70, including his testimony about his intended release date 

and entry into an inpatient addiction treatment facility, id. at 52, 57, Father’s 

parental rights cannot be preserved while waiting for his release from prison 

and from drug and alcohol treatment. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759. 

Additionally, as the trial court expressed, Father has been “back and forth in 

jail” – “he was in for a little while, came out for a month, and within a month, 

was back, incarcerated”; we thus share the trial court’s concern, based on the 

competent evidence of Father’s criminal record and his own testimony, that 

“the conditions that have caused [Child] to be without her father’s parental 

care and control will be remedied, long-term, by [F]ather.” N.T. at 72; see 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

For these reasons, the trial court did not err nor abuse its discretion in 

finding that the statutory grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) were established through clear and 

convincing evidence. See B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921.
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Father next urges this Court to find that § 2511(b) was not satisfied, 

because (1) “no expert testimony was introduced regarding parental bonds” 

and (2) “neither a bond evaluation nor a parenting capacity evaluation was 

performed.” Father’s Brief at 15 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Father 

thus suggests that termination was improper where “there was little to no 

evidence regarding the bond between” himself and Child. Id.

Father’s contention is identical to the argument raised by the mother in 

In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 

(Pa. 2018), that the trial court “erred by terminating rights without a bonding 

assessment between [the c]hildren [at issue] and [the m]other and [the 

c]hildren and their foster parents.” This Court stated:

the orphans’ court is not required by statute or precedent 

to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by an 

expert. While it may be “wise” to conduct a “bonding evaluation” 

where there is evidence of a bond, in other cases “direct 

observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is 

not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762–63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Furthermore, 

the orphans’ court is free to rely upon the assessments of social 

workers and caseworkers.

Id. at 944-45 (emphasis added) (some internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, contrary to Father’s assertion, see Father’s Brief at 15, the 

trial court did not err by not ordering a formal bonding evaluation performed 

by an expert and, instead, relying upon the assessment of a social case 

manager, Palmer, N.T. at 28-33, 35 – as well as Father’s own testimony, 
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admitting to the lack of bond between himself and Child, id. at 55. See

J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944-45; N.T. at 73.

This Court has further explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by 

the court when determining what is in the best interest of 

the child.

In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider 

the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any 

existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 401 (Pa. Super. 2018) (emphasis added) 

(citations and internal brackets omitted) (some formatting).

In the current action, the trial court found that “there was no bond 

between [F]ather and [Child] back in 2016 . . . [a]nd [Fa]ther has indicated 

that there isn’t a bond with him and [Child] as we sit here today because he 

does not know [Child].” N.T. at 73. The trial court additionally held that 

Child’s foster home “is a stable home for her” and that Child “looks to [her 

foster family] for care, comfort, [and] support.” Id. at 74-75. Thus, for its 

analysis pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), in addition to its bonding 

examination, the trial court also properly considered “intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability” Child has “with the foster parent.” 

G.M.S., 193 A.3d at 401. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports 
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the trial court’s view that the involuntary termination of Father’s parental 

rights will serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare 

of Child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that none of Father’s claims raised 

on appeal merit relief and that the trial court thereby did not abuse its 

discretion, make an error of law, nor rely upon insufficient evidence by 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child. See B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921. 

“If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even 

if the record could also support the opposite result.” Id. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

Decree and order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/16/19