Agenda – November 2017 Refunding

Treasury Dealer Meetings – October 26 - October 27, 2017

Dealer ___________________

To allow more time for discussion, please e-mail your responses prior to 12:00 PM on Monday, October 23, 2017 to 

Debt.Management@treasury.gov and NY.QTR@ny.frb.org. Even if you are not scheduled to meet with Treasury officials this 

quarter, your responses are still appreciated. 

I. Marketable Borrowing Estimates

Central

Estimate

Range that would not 

surprise you

Low/High

October-December 2017 /

 Ending Cash Balance /

January-March 2018 /

 Ending Cash Balance /

FY 2018 Total Net Marketable Borrowing 

FY 2019 Total Net Marketable Borrowing /

FY 2020 Total Net Marketable Borrowing /

II. Budget Deficit and Growth Estimates 

FY 2018 /

FY 2019 /

FY 2020 /

Real GDP(4Q/4Q % Chg) CY2017

Real GDP(4Q/4Q % Chg) CY2018

Nominal GDP(4Q/4Q % Chg) CY2017

Nominal GDP(4Q/4Q % Chg) CY2018

III. Quarterly Note and Bond Issuance Estimates

3-year note (Nov/Dec/Jan) / / / / - / /

10-year note (Nov) /

10-year note reopening (Dec/Jan) / / - /

30-year bond (Nov) /

30-year bond reopening (Dec/Jan) / /

2-year note (Nov/Dec/Jan) / / / / - / /

5-year note (Nov/Dec/Jan) / / / / - / /

7-year note (Nov/Dec/Jan) / / / / - / /

10-year TIPS reopening (Nov)

5-year TIPS reopening (Dec)

10-year TIPS (Jan)

2-year FRN reopening (Nov/Dec)

2-year FRN (Jan)

IV. Bill Issuance Estimates

52-week bill size (Nov/Dec/Jan) / / / / - / / 

Total change in bills outstanding 11/17 - 1/18 /

Total change in bills outstanding FY 2018 /

CMB issuance Nov‘17 – Jan ‘18 (size/date) / / / /

Discussion Topics

1. Please discuss your latest economic and fiscal forecasts for FY2018 and FY2019. Do you believe the current financing 

schedule is well-suited to meet Treasury’s financing needs though the end of FY2018? FY2019? 

2. Globally, many central banks have pursued extraordinary monetary policies in an effort to achieve their mandates. Please 

comment on the prospects for normalization of monetary policy around the globe. What will be the impact on demand for 

US Treasury securities and term premiums for various tenors if and when central banks other than the Fed begin 

normalization of policy? Will these impacts be transitory or structural? What, if anything, should Treasury do with 

regard to issuance in response to these potential changes? Please elaborate. 
3. Technological innovations continue to drive changes in the intermediation of Treasury securities. Please comment on the 

evolution of business models of various market participants and greater use of technology across the financial 

industry. How are the dealer-to-dealer space and the dealer-to-client space evolving? How are market participants 

changing behavior in response to these changes? What are the impacts on liquidity? Looking out over the next 5 to 10 

years, comment on how these changes might impact the Treasury auction process and the provision of liquidity in the 

secondary market. 

Part 2:

The Treasury Department’s Office of Debt Management (ODM) would like your perspectives on current Treasury auction sizes. 

This information would be used to help test ODM’s debt-issuance modeling assumptions, and does not reflect potential policy 

decisions. We appreciate your participation in a similar survey conducted in May 2017, and the aggregate response can be found 

online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/quarterly-refunding/Pages/dealer-agenda-survey.aspx.

For each of the 14 securities that Treasury currently issues regularly and occasional CMBs, we would be interested in your views 

on the following matters: 

1) All else equal, what is the minimum auction size, per auction, needed to maintain benchmark liquidity? Specifically, 

what is the smallest auction size (weekly for bills, monthly for coupons) necessary to support “on-the-run” issue liquidity 

in the secondary market?

2) All else equal, what is the maximum auction size, per auction, that could be issued without causing “significant yield 

deviations” from current fair value? This fair value could, for example, be as measured by your spline, or other 

analytical models.

3) All else equal, what is the maximum change in auction size (+/- X $billions) that can be implemented between two 

consecutive new issuances without causing “significant yield deviations”?

 

If you have any questions, please contact Dave Chung at 202-622-1053. Please complete and submit the table below to 

DebtManagement@treasury.gov or Won.Chung@treasury.gov by 12:00 Noon ET on Monday October 23, 2017.

Thank you very much for your continuing collaboration.

Tranche Minimum Auction Size 

needed to maintain 

Benchmark Liquidity 

($bil)

Maximum Auction Size that 

could be issued without causing 

significant yield deviations from 

fair value ($bil)

Maximum change 

(+/-) in auction 

size between new 

issuances ($bil)

Bills

CMB

4-week

13-week

26-week

52-week

Coupons

2-year

3-year

5-year

7-year

10-year

30-year

TIPS

5-year

10-year

30-year

FRNs

2-year

Additional Comments: