## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . A P - 76, 183

I N R E M O R R I S W A Y N E SIM O N , R el at or

v. LE NA L EV ARI O, 2 0 4 J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT TH O F D A LL A S C O U N TY , R e s ponde nt

ON P E T I T I ON F OR A WRI T OF P RO HI B I T I ON I N C A U SE N O . F - 08- 54622- Q F R O M T H E 204 TH J UDI CI AL DI S TRI CT CO URT O F DALLAS CO UNTY P RI CE , J ., del i vere d t he opi ni on of t he C ourt i n w hi ch M E Y E RS , W OMACK , J OHNS ON , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . K ELL ER , P .J ., co n cu rr ed in th e r esu lt . O P I N I O N T h e re lato r w a s in d icte d in D a llas C o u n ty f o r t h e o f f e n se o f c a p ital m u rd e r. T h e S tate el ect ed nott o s eek t he dea t h penal t y . D ur i ng pr et r i al pr ocee di ngs , t he r el at or “i ndi cat ed t hat [ h e ] se e k s to p re se n t th e tes tim o n yo f a m e n tal h e a lth e x p e rt in re g a rd s to [ h is] m e n tal s tateSimon - 2

1 Application for Writ of Prohibition, at 2. 2 The re lief that the re lator see ks is more in the natureof a writ of mandamus than a writ of prohibition, since he would haveus “u n d o” an “ acc omplished judicial act.” State ex re l. W ade v. Mays , 6 89 S.W. 2d 89 3, 89 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ). Th at be ingthec a se (a nd un lik e thec a se wi th respe ct to writs of prohibition), we c ould simpl y have dismissed the a

pplication for f

ailure to pre sent it first to the appropriate cour t of appe als. Padilla v. McDanie l , 1 22 S.W. 3d 80 5, 80 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). Re g ard le ss o f whe the r w e c ha ra c te ri ze i t a s a

writ o f p ro hib iti on

or a writ o f m and amus , ho we ve r, wewi ll d isp os e of there lator ’s a

pp lic atio n a g a ins t hi m on ano the r b a sis
. a n d th e v o lu n tar in e ss o f h is c o n f e ss io n .” In re s p o n se , the S tate f iled a m o tio n se e k in g to 1 have t he r el at or eval uat ed by i t s ow n ps y chi at r i c exper t s o t hati t coul d be pr epar ed t o r ebut any exper t t es t i m ony t he r el at or m i ght offe r i n a pr et r i al s uppr es s i on hear i ng or att r i al
. T he t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ’ s m o t i o n , o r d e r i n g t h e r e l a t o r t o s u b m i t t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n b y a St at e- des i gnat ed expe r t
. T he St at e’ s exper t w as s peci fi cal l y o rder ed nott o i nt er r ogat e t he

re lato r a b o u t th e f

a c ts o f th e o f f e n se itse lf

a n d n o t to re v e a l th e re su lts o f h is e x a m in a tio n to t h e p r o s e c u t o r s u n l e s s a n d u n t i l t h e r e l a t o r ’ s e x p e r t s h o u l d t e s t i f y. T he r el at or has now fi l ed an a ppl i cat i on for w r i t of pr ohi bi t i on i n t hi s C our t , s eeki ng
r el i ef f r om t he t r i al cour t ’ s or der s ubj ect i ng hi m t o exami nat i on by t he S t at e’ s exper t
. T he 2

r el at or ar gues t hatt he t r i al cour t ’ s or deri m pi nges upon hi s Fi ft h and Four t eent h A m endment

r i ght t o be fr ee fr om compel l ed s el f- i ncr i m i nat i on. H e ar gues t hatt he aut hor i t i es ci t ed byt he St at e i n s uppor t of t he t r i al cour t ’ s or der ar e fac t ual l ydi s t i ngui s habl e fr om hi s cas e, and t hat none expr esslyp erm it s the ex am ination b ya S tat e’s e x p ert un d er the circu m stan ce s p r es ent ed her e. B eca us e w e fi nd t hatt he r el at or has fai l ed t o sati sfy at leastone of t he cr i t er i a for obt ai ni ng ext r aor di nar yr el i ef, w e denyhi s appl i cat i on.Simon - 3

3 The standa

rds for ma

ndamus and prohibition relief areessenti al l y th e s am e. Sta tee xre l. W ade v. M ays , 689 S.W .2d 893, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 4 Id . at 89 8- 99 ; Ex parte Chi , 256 S.W .3d 702, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 5 E.g., De Leon v . Aguilar , 127 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 6 Sta te e x re l. Y ou ng v . Six th J

ud ic ial Di str ic t Co ur t of

Ap pe als , 2 3 6 S. W. 3 d

2 0 7 , 2 1 0 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Buntion v. Harmon , 827 S.W .2 d 9 4 5 , 9 4 7 , 948 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Stated another

way , an ac t may

be re g arde d as “ministerial” when the fac ts are undisputed a nd, g iven tho se un dis pute d f

a c ts, “ thelaw c le arl y

sp e lls out the duty to be pe rf or me d .
. . wi th s uc h c e rt a int y that nothing is left t o the exercise of discretion or judgment.” State ex re l. Healey v. Mc Means , 884 S
. W
. 2 d 7 7 2 , 7 7 4 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Te x as De pt. of C orre c tio ns v . D ale hite , 623 S.W .2d 420, 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)).

S TANDA RD FOR EX TRAO RDI NAR Y RELI EF T h e tra d iti o n a l tes t f

o r d e ter m in in g w h e th e r m a n d a m u s o r p r o h ib iti o n re lief is appr opr i at e r equi r es t he r el at or t o es t abl i s h t w o t hi ngs . Fi r s t , he must s how t hat he has no 3

a d e q u a te re m e d y a t law to re d re ss th e h a rm th a t h e a lleg e s w ill e n su e if th e a c t h e w ish e s to prohibi t i s car ri ed o ut. S econ d, he m ust show t hat t he act he seeks t o co m pel or pro h ib it 4 does not i nvol ve a di s cr et i onar yor j udi ci al d eci s i on. I f t he r el at or fai l s t o s at i s fyei t her 5

a s p e c t o f t h i s t wo - p a r t t e s t , t h e n r e l i e f s h o u l d b e d e n i e d
. As t o t h e l a t t e r r e q u i r e me n t , we have s ai d t hati t i s s at i s fi ed i f t he r el at or can s how he has “a cl ear ri ght t o t he r el i ef

s ought ”–t hati s t o s ay , “w hen t he fac t s and ci r cumst ance s di ct at e but one r at i onal deci s i on”

u n d erunequi vocal , w el l

- s et t l ed ( i
. e. , f r o m e x t a n t s t a t u t o r y , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , o r c a s e l aw sources) , and cl earl ycon t rol l i ng l egal pr i ncipl es. 6 W h il e a tr ial cour t has a mi ni s t er i al dut yt o r ul e upon a mot i on t hati s pr oper l yandSimon - 4

7 State ex re l. Curry v. Gray , 726 S.W .2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 8State ex re l. Rosenthal v. Poe , 98 S.W .3d 194, 199 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 9 State ex re l. W

ade , su pra , at 898. 10 942 S.W .2d 602, 609-12 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997). t i m el ypr es ent ed t o i t for a r ul i ng, i n gener al i t has no m i ni s t er i al dut yt o “r ul e a c er t ai n w ay on t hatm ot i on. ” B yt hi s w e mean t hat m andamus or pr ohi bi t i on w i l l not l i e t o “compel t he 7
t r i al cour t ‘ t o r ul e a c er t ai n w ay ’ on an unce r t ai n and uns et t l ed i s s ue t he r es ol ut i on of w hi ch in v o lv e d a f

a ir a m o u n t o f

d isc re tio n .” In sh o rt, i t is im p ro p e r to o rd e r a trial c o u rt to

8

exer ci s e i t s j udi ci al ( as oppos ed to i t s m i ni s t er i al ) funct i on i n a par t i cul arw ayunl es s t he

r el at or has a “c le arr i ght t o t he r el i ef s ought , ” i
. e. , t he l aw he i nvokes i s defi ni t e, unambi guous , and unques t i onabl y appl i es t o t he i ndi s put abl e fac t s of t he ca s e. E ven w hen t he fa ct s ar e undi s put ed, t he ext r aor di nar ym echa ni s m of a w r i t of pr ohi bi t i on or m andamus

w il l no t l ie t o reso lve “ a h o tl yco n test ed u n sett led ‘q u esti o n o f law ’[.] ” 9 AP P LI CAT I ON OF LA W TO F ACT For t he pr opos i t i on t hati t s houl d be al l ow ed t o have i t s exper t exami ne t he r el at or , t he St at e i nvoked ouropi ni on i n L a g ro n e v . S ta te . T h e r e la to r a rg u e s th a t Lagrone is 10 d istin g u ish a b le b e c a u se th e re , the d e f e n d a n t p ro p o se d to in tro d u c e e x p e rt tes tim o n yw ith

r es pectt o t he i s s ue of f ut ur e dange r ous nes s i n a ca pi t al cas e in w h ich the St at e s ought t he deat h penal t y . T he St at e r es ponds t hatt he par t i cul arfac t ual cont extm at t er s l i t t l e— t heSimon - 5

11 W ar d v . S tate , 2007 WL1492080 (Tex. Crim. App., No. AP-74 , 6 9 5 , d el i vere d May 23, 2007) (not designated f

or publication). 12 998 S.W .2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 13 W ar d, su pra (slip op. at 6). pr i nci ple is t he s ame, namel y , t hatonce a cr i m i nal defe ndantcons t r uct i vel yt es t i fi es by

s ubm i t t i ng t o an exa m i nat i on i n s uppor t of hi s ow n t es t i fy i ng exper t ’ s opi ni on, he has w ai ved his F i ft h an d F ou rt eenth A m end mentpr i vi l e ge a ga i ns ts el f-i ncri m i nati on , and so m ust cho ose eit h er to su b m itto an ex am ination b ythe S tat e’s ex p ert a s w ell o r else h av e h is ow n ex p ert’s t es t i m onyexcl uded fr om evi dence
. I n s uppor t of i t s ar gum ent , t he S t at e ci t es t hi s C our t ’ s unpubl i s hed opi ni on i n W ard

v . S ta te . T her e w e unani m ous l yhel d, ci t i ng Lagrone and C h a m b e rla in v . S ta te , t hatt he

11 12 oper at i ve pr i nci pl e w as one of w ai verof t he Fi ft h and F our t eent h A m endment pr i vi l ege, and t hat i t w as not l i m i t ed to t he fa ct ual cont ext of rebut t i ng exp ert t est i m on y from t he d efen se
w i t h respect t o fu t ure dan gerousn ess. W e art i culat ed the pri ncipl e t hu s: [I ] f a defenda nt br eaks hi s s i l ence t o s peak t o hi s ow n ps y chi at r i c expe r t and i nt r oduces t hatt es t im o n y w hi ch i s bas ed on s uch i nt er vi ew , he has con st ruct i velyt aken t he st and and w ai ved his fi ft h am end m ent ri gh t t o refuse to su b m it to th e stat e’s p sy ch iat ri c e x p erts. T h e f o cu s is on the d ef

en d an t’ s c h o ic e to b r e a k h is s ilen c e . * * * T h e iss u e is w h e th e r th e p sy c h iatric t es t i m ony he i nt ended t o i nt r oduce w as bas ed on hi s ow n par t i ci pat i on i n t he ps y chi at r i c t es t i ng and exa m i nat i on. 13 Focus i ng on t he w ai ver , w e hel d t hat t he hol di ng of Lagrone a p p lied e q u a llyto p sy c h iatric evi dence i n m i t i gat i on of t he dea t h penal t y . “The nat ur e of t he ps y chi at r i c t es t i m onyt o beSimon - 6

14 Id . (slip op. at 7). 15 In his brief in support of his application for writ of prohibition, the relator argues that, in the no n- de ath- pe na lty

c onte xt, w e sh ou ld n ot r e g ard theState ’s int e re st i n r e butti ngde fe ns e ps yc hiatr ic te sti mony to b e su ff

ic ie ntl y c omp e lli ngto o utweigh th e a c c us e d’ s c on sti tut ion a l privi le g e a g a ins t self-inc rimination. Brie f in Support of Application for Writ of Prohibition, at 4-10. Even a ssuming that such a ba lancingapproa ch is consistent with the constructive w aiver principle wehave art ic ulate d in

our c a se law (a p ro po sit ion that is at le as t

debata ble ), and that w e might t e ntativ e ly agreethat the balanc e should tip in the relator’ s favor , his cont ention amounts to no more than an argument for why

the unsettled question should ultim ately be re solved in his fav o r. Thereis no statute or cour

t opinion that yet say s so, as the relator’s counsel conce ded (“I have not f

ound any law on it one way

or the other”) at the hearing on the State’s m o t i o n . T h e re lator’s a rgument falls fa

r short of establishingthe nec essar y “cle ar right” to relief. pr es ent ed i s i m m at er i al

— t hati t i s bei ng pr es ent ed byt he defe ndant i s enough t o t r i ggert he

ru le.” W e d e e m e d th is p rin c ip le su f f icie n tlyu n re m a rk a b le th a t w e d id n o t ev e n se e f it t o 14 des i gnat e ouropi ni on for publ i cat i on. W e do notnow r el yon our unpubl i s hed opi ni on i n W ardfor t he pr opos i t i on t hatt he t r i al cour t di d not er r t o gr antt he St at e’ s m ot i on for i t s ow n ps y chi at r i c exa m i nat i on i n t he fac t ual cont extof t hi s non- deat h capi t al pr os ecut i on. B ut w e do r egar d i t as ampl e evi dence t hatt he i s s ue i s
— atbes t

— an “uns et t l ed” l egal ques t i on. I f w hatw e s ai d i n Lagrone i s not l i m i t ed i n pr i nci pl e t o t he t ype of ps y chi at r i c evi dence pr es ent ed at t he puni s hm entphas e of

a deat h- penal t y cas e, i t m ay not be l i m i t ed i n pr i nci pl e t o t he puni s hm entphas e of a capi t al

m ur derdeat h- penal t yt r i al , or even t o deat h- penal t ycas es atal l
. A ccor di ngl y , w e ca nnot s ay undert he ci r cumst ance s of t hi s cas e— and par t i cul ar l yi n vi ew of t he t i ght r est r i ct i ons t he trial co u rt im p o se d o n th e S tate in its o rd e r— th a t th e re lato r h a s e sta b lish e d a c lea r rig h t to b e ins u lat ed fro m ex am ination b ya S tat e’s p sy ch iat ri c ex p ert. In g ran ti n g the S tat e’s 15Simon - 7

16 The trial c ourt had both s ub j ec t matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the pe rson, we pr e sume, by vi rtue of

theind ic tme nt— at le a st there lator do e s n ot a

rgue oth e rw ise . Und e r s ome circ umstances, wehave obse rved, even a trial court with ge nera l jurisdiction may lack au tho rit

yto take a cer tain acti o n, and sometimes that lack of authority will render

its purported ac tion “void.” Sta tev . M oo re , 2 2 5 S
. W
. 3 d 5 5 6 , 5 6 8 n . 4 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ), ci t i n g Da v is v . S tate , 956 S.W .2d 555, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We have oc casiona lly grante d extraordinary relief when a trial court with g ener al jurisdiction has nevertheless acted in the absence of authority
. E.g. , Stearnes v. Clint on , 780 S.W .2d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (trial judge who presided ove r ca pital murder trial lacke d “the inher ent power” to re move cour t-appointed c ounsel under th e ci rcumstances and there fore acte d “without authority”; there fore , his order removing counsel from the case was subject to mandamus relief

). A trial court has no discretion to a ct wher e it lac ks authority
. But that is not there lator ’s argume nt h e re . T he re lator argue s th at w e sh ou ld n ot r e g ard theState ’s int e re sts in re b utt al as we i ghty

en o u ghi nth e p ro ce d

ura l p o s ture o f th i s ca s e t o trump h i s co n s t i tut i o n al p ri v i l ege absent ex press legislation t o implement an order such as the one a t issue here , see note 15, an te , and thus challeng es the c orre c tne ss of thetria l c ourt ’s ru lin g . He ne ve r e xpre ssl y argue s, ho we ve r, that, in the absenc e of spe cific le g islation, the trial court categ orica lly lacke d au th o ri ty t o rule on the State’s motion. Indeed, his a rgument seems to conc ede that a trial cour t may grant such a motion (as did the tria l courts in Lagrone , Cha mb e rla in , and W ar d ) s o l o n g as the balanc e betwe en the State’s intere st and his constituti onal privileg e ultimately tips in the State’s f

avor. 17 State ex re l. W

ade , su pra , at 897 (e mphasis added)
. m o tio n in th is c a se , the trial c o u rt e x e rc ise d a m a n if e stlyju d icia l (a n d n o t a m in iste ria l) funct i on. Such an “a ccompl i s hed j udi ci alact ” i s not s ubj ectt o t he ext r aor di nar yr emedy

16 of pr ohi bi t i on. 17 F or t his reas on , w e den yt he rel i ef t hat t he rel at or seeks.

D el i ver ed: N ovember 18, 2009 P ub l i sh