[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Maney, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8799.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-8799

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MANEY.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Maney, Slip Opinion No. 

2017-Ohio-8799.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 

including failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, 

knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a 

disciplinary matter, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice—One-year suspension, with six months stayed and 

conditions. 

(No. 2016-1494—Submitted May 2, 2017—Decided December 6, 2017.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2015-074. 

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Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Thomas Patrick Maney Jr., of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0029042, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983. 

{¶ 2} In a December 1, 2015 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, 

alleged that Maney violated several professional-conduct rules by neglecting a 

single client’s matter, failing to reasonably communicate with the client about the 

status of his case, and submitting false statements and evidence during the ensuing 

investigation. 

{¶ 3} Based on the parties’ stipulations and Maney’s hearing testimony, a 

panel of the Board of Professional Conduct found that he committed all the charged 

misconduct and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 

one year with six months stayed on conditions. The board adopted the panel’s 

findings and recommendation. 

{¶ 4} Maney objects to the board’s report, arguing that the panel denied him 

due process by refusing to admit his counselor’s report into the record and striking 

his former counsel’s closing argument as untimely filed. For the reasons that 

follow, we overrule Maney’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and 

misconduct, and suspend Maney from the practice of law in Ohio for one year with 

six months stayed on the conditions recommended by the board. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 5} The parties stipulated and the board found that in October 2013, 

Patrick Baker retained Maney to represent him in a collection proceeding filed 

against him in the Franklin County Municipal Court. Maney answered the 

complaint later that month and attended a pretrial hearing. He did not, however, 

respond to the plaintiff’s discovery requests or motion for summary judgment or 

forward the documents to Baker. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and entered a $3,061.35 judgment against Baker on June 12, 
January Term, 2017 

3

2014, and the court—not Maney—notified Baker of that judgment. The judgment 

was later stayed after Baker filed bankruptcy. 

{¶ 6} When relator sent Maney a letter of inquiry regarding Baker’s 

grievance, Maney knowingly lied in his response. He falsely stated that he had sent 

letters to Baker informing him of the status of his case, that he had given Baker the 

plaintiff’s discovery requests, and that he had asked Baker to respond to those 

discovery requests on numerous occasions. In fact, he had done none of those 

things. Maney also gave relator copies of five letters that he claimed to have sent 

to Baker, though he later admitted that he fabricated those letters in an effort to 

conceal his neglect and abandonment of Baker’s interests in the underlying 

litigation. In addition, Maney attempted to deflect blame away from himself and 

toward his client by telling relator that he should have withdrawn from the 

representation when Baker did not respond to his letters (that he never sent), but 

that he had hoped Baker would eventually respond and provide sufficient 

information for him to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Maney 

perpetuated those lies during an April 27, 2015 telephone conversation with relator. 

{¶ 7} Relator confronted Maney in July 2015 and told him that his story was 

not believable, because Baker was adamant that his case had been neglected and 

the letters Maney had purportedly sent to Baker were directed to an address where 

Baker did not reside during the representation. At that point, Maney said, “[Y]ou 

got me,” and he admitted that he had lied and fabricated documents during the 

investigation. 

{¶ 8} During Maney’s April 2016 deposition testimony, he testified that he 

realized that he had “bungled” Baker’s case when he received a copy of the 

grievance. He further admitted that he had put Baker’s file on a shelf and forgotten 

about it. While he asserted that he had no good-faith basis on which to oppose the 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, he acknowledged that he had failed to 

satisfy his continuing duty to communicate with his client. 
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{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the board agreed that Maney’s conduct 

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 

representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of a matter), 8.1(a) (prohibiting knowingly making a false 

statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 

or misrepresentation). The board also found that Maney violated Prof.Cond.R. 

8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice) by failing to communicate with Baker or respond to the 

plaintiff’s discovery requests and motion for summary judgment in Baker’s case 

and by lying and submitting fabricated evidence during relator’s investigation. 

{¶ 10} We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 

Sanction 

{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), any other relevant 

factors, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. 

{¶ 12} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 

that Maney acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and that he submitted false 

statements and evidence during the disciplinary process. See Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(B)(2) and (6). 

{¶ 13} In mitigation, the parties stipulated and the board found that Maney 

did not have a prior disciplinary record, that he had cooperated with relator and the 

board in all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the formal complaint, and that 

he had submitted 14 letters from individuals attesting to his good character and 

competence as an attorney. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (5). 

{¶ 14} Maney testified that he began drinking “way too much” sometime 

between April and July 2012. He claimed that his drinking caused or contributed 
January Term, 2017 

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to the lies that he told relator and that it continued until April 22, 2016—two days 

after his deposition—when he sought assistance from the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 

Program (“OLAP”). The board acknowledged that Maney voluntarily entered into 

a two-year OLAP contract that required him to attend 90 Alcoholics Anonymous 

meetings in 90 days and no less than three meetings per week thereafter. Pursuant 

to that contract, he was evaluated by and began treatment with a professional 

counselor. And on August 8, 2016, OLAP reported that Maney was in compliance 

with his contract. 

{¶ 15} The board found, however, that Maney had neither satisfied nor 

claimed to have satisfied all of the factors required to qualify his substance-use 

disorder as an independent mitigating factor. Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) provides that 

a substance-use disorder will qualify as a mitigating factor when an attorney 

demonstrates the following: (a) the diagnosis of a disorder by a qualified healthcare 

or chemical-dependency professional, (b) the disorder contributed to cause the 

misconduct, (c) certification of successful completion of an approved treatment 

program, and (d) a prognosis from a qualified healthcare or chemical-dependency 

professional that the attorney will be able to return to the competent, ethical, and 

professional practice of law. 

{¶ 16} The board afforded some mitigating effect to Maney’s alcoholism, 

noting that we sometimes afford some mitigating effect to a contributing mental or 

substance-use disorder in the absence of evidence of each of those factors, see, e.g., 

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Lemieux, 139 Ohio St.3d 320, 2014-Ohio-2127, 11 

N.E.3d 1157, ¶ 36, 39 (affording some mitigating effect to attorney’s diagnosed 

chemical dependency given evidence of his sustained period of compliance with an 

OLAP contract and ongoing treatment); Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony, 138 Ohio 

St.3d 129, 2013-Ohio-5502, 4 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 13 (affording some mitigating effect 

to diagnosed pathological gambling disorder given evidence of attorney’s existing 
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OLAP contract, commencement of psychological treatment, and participation in 

Gamblers Anonymous). 

{¶ 17} The parties did not stipulate to a recommended sanction and agreed 

to submit posthearing briefs in lieu of closing arguments by September 6, 2016. 

Relator recommends that Maney be suspended from the practice of law for six 

months. But Maney did not file a posthearing brief or seek an extension of time to 

do so before the deadline passed. Although he filed a motion for leave to file his 

brief the day after it was due, the panel chairperson overruled that motion and struck 

the untimely tendered brief from the record. 

{¶ 18} Of the five cases the board considered in determining the appropriate 

sanction for Maney’s misconduct, it found Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 

Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, and Butler Cty. Bar Assn. v. 

Derivan, 81 Ohio St.3d 300, 691 N.E.2d 256 (1998), to be most instructive. 

{¶ 19} Like Maney, Broeren neglected a client’s case and later fabricated 

correspondence in an attempt to conceal his neglect. As aggravating factors, we 

found that Broeren failed to timely respond to the ensuing disciplinary 

investigation, though he eventually cooperated, failed to acknowledge all of his 

misconduct, and caused financial harm to a client. Id. at ¶ 23. Mitigating factors 

included the absence of a prior disciplinary record and evidence of Broeren’s good 

character and professional reputation apart from his misconduct. Id. Finding that 

the mitigating factors did not outweigh Broeren’s attempt to conceal his misconduct 

by submitting false evidence, id., we suspended him from the practice of law for 

six months and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,000 to his client, id. at ¶ 23, 28. 

{¶ 20} We likewise suspended Derivan from the practice of law for six 

months for failing to file a client’s case before the applicable statute of limitations 

and attempting to exonerate himself by manufacturing and submitting false 

documents to the certified grievance committee. Derivan at 301-302. 
January Term, 2017 

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{¶ 21} Citing Maney’s neglect of his client’s legal matter and “his extensive 

and prolonged attempts” to cover up his neglect by fabricating evidence and 

submitting it to relator, and affording some mitigating effect to his substance-use 

disorder, the board recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 

one year with six months stayed on conditions. 

Objections

{¶ 22} Maney objects to the board’s recommended sanction and argues that 

the board committed two procedural errors that substantially impaired his defense 

and deprived him of due process. 

{¶ 23} First, Maney asserts that the board erred by refusing to either admit 

into evidence or permit him to proffer an e-mail from his counselor that “could have 

satisfied” the remaining criteria to qualify his substance-use disorder as a mitigating 

factor. Second, he argues that the board unduly punished him by prohibiting his 

former counsel from filing his posthearing brief one day after the established 

deadline. 

{¶ 24} “[D]ue process requirements in attorney-discipline proceedings have 

been satisfied when the respondent is afforded a hearing, the right to issue 

subpoenas and depose witnesses, and an opportunity for preparation to explain the 

circumstances surrounding his actions.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 129 

Ohio St.3d 60, 2011-Ohio-2902, 950 N.E.2d 177, ¶ 76, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. 

v. Acker, 29 Ohio St.2d 18, 20, 278 N.E.2d 32 (1972). 

{¶ 25} In this case, the board has afforded Maney all the process that he is 

due. The hearing in this case was originally scheduled on May 13, 2016. But on 

April 1, 2016, the panel chairperson granted the parties’ joint motion to extend the 

discovery deadline to permit time for the parties to depose Maney and relator’s 

witnesses. 

{¶ 26} At Maney’s April 20, 2016 deposition, he testified that he had no 

problems with drugs or alcohol. Just three weeks later—and five days before his 
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scheduled disciplinary hearing—Maney disclosed that he had entered into an 

OLAP chemical-dependency contract and stated his intention to call an OLAP 

representative as a witness at his upcoming hearing. Following those belated 

disclosures, the panel chairperson delayed Maney’s disciplinary hearing for three 

months. 

{¶ 27} One day before the August 16, 2016 hearing, the parties stipulated 

to the authenticity and admissibility of a report detailing Maney’s compliance with 

his OLAP contract and of a letter from an attorney who agreed to serve as Maney’s 

mentor. Those exhibits were admitted to the record at the hearing. But the parties 

did not stipulate to the admissibility of the e-mail that Maney now claims is 

essential to his defense. Nor did Maney’s counsel depose Maney’s counselor or 

call him as a witness—though he had ample opportunity to do so. Therefore, we 

find that the panel chairperson properly excluded the e-mail on the grounds that it 

was hearsay. 

{¶ 28} In addition, Maney, through his counsel, failed to comply with the 

deadline established for the submission of posthearing briefs in this matter. “[I]t is 

well established that failure to follow procedural rules can result in forfeiture of 

rights,” and due process does not require us to afford Maney a second chance to 

argue his case. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122, 679 N.E.2d 1099 

(1997). Therefore, we overrule Maney’s objections. 

{¶ 29} Having reviewed the record evidence, we are not persuaded that the 

outcome of this case would be any different if Maney successfully demonstrated 

that his substance-use disorder qualified as an independent mitigating factor. In 

fact, we have previously imposed a one-year suspension with six months stayed on 

conditions on an attorney who filed several fraudulent documents in court—despite 

proof of that attorney’s recently diagnosed mitigating mental disorder. See Warren 

Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vardiman, 146 Ohio St.3d 23, 2016-Ohio-352, 51 N.E.3d 587, 

¶ 7-8, 14, 21. The recommended sanction is even more appropriate in this case 
January Term, 2017 

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given that OLAP’s August 8, 2016 report suggests that approximately four months 

before his disciplinary hearing, Maney was diagnosed with three mental disorders 

in addition to his substance-use disorder. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. 

Fonda, 138 Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-Ohio-850, 7 N.E.3d 1164, ¶ 31 (finding that just 

over three months of treatment was not a sustained period of successful treatment 

for purposes of establishing a mitigating mental disorder); Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Anthony, 138 Ohio St.3d 129, 2013-Ohio-5502, 4 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 13 (finding that 

three-month period between execution of OLAP contract and panel hearing was 

insufficient to establish sustained period of successful treatment for gambling 

addiction). 

{¶ 30} Given his misconduct, the applicable aggravating and mitigating 

factors, and the sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct, we agree 

that a one-year suspension with six months stayed on the conditions recommended 

by the board is necessary and appropriate in this case. 

{¶ 31} Accordingly, we suspend Thomas Patrick Maney Jr. from the 

practice of law for one year with six months stayed on the conditions that he remain 

in compliance with his existing OLAP contract, engage in no further misconduct, 

and pay the costs of these proceedings. If Maney violates any condition of the stay, 

the stay will be lifted and he will serve the entire one-year suspension. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and

DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

O’NEILL, J., dissents. 

_________________ 

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, 

for relator. 

Charles J. Kettlewell, L.L.C., and Charles J. Kettlewell, for respondent. 
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