____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 27, 2001
 

MICHIGAN COALITION OF STATE
 

EMPLOYEE UNIONS,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

and
 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED


AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE &


AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
 

OF AMERICA (UAW) and LYNDA


TAYLOR-LEWIS,
 

Intervening


Plaintiffs-Appellees,


v	 No. 115579
 

MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
 

Defendant-Appellant.
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
 

TAYLOR, J.
 

This case presents the question whether a party alleging
 

a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the provision of the
 

Michigan Constitution related to the state civil service
 
system, must make a particularized showing of irreparable harm
 

to obtain a preliminary injunction against the alleged
 

violation. We conclude that such a showing is required as one
 

condition of obtaining a preliminary injunction. Accordingly,
 

we vacate the preliminary injunction entered by the circuit
 

court in this case in its entirety. Notably, we are not
 

considering the question whether an actual constitutional
 

violation, which could be remedied by entry of a permanent
 

injunction, has occurred.
 

I. Factual and Procedural Background
 

This case arises from the adoption by defendant Civil
 

Service Commission on May 8, 1997, of amended Civil Service
 

Rule 4-6, with a stated effective date of June 1, 1997. While
 

the details of this rule are not important to our analysis,
 

the rule generally governs circumstances in which state
 

agencies subject to civil service regulation are allowed to
 

contract and pay for personal services from persons who are
 

not state civil service employees and procedures to be
 

followed in that regard. The rule contains two provisions
 

that have been alleged by plaintiffs to be violative of Const
 

1963, art 11, § 5.1

 First, there is a “preauthorization”
 

1
 Section 5 generally governs the responsibilities and


duties of defendant Civil Service Commission. Central to the
 

present case is the last paragraph of this constitutional


provision, which states:
 

(continued...)
 

2
 
provision that would allow a state agency to authorize
 

disbursements for any services on a preapproved list without
 

submitting a specific request for approval to the Civil
 

Service Commission. Second, the amended rule would add a new
 

provision for “decentralized approval” of contracts and
 

payments for personal services rendered by persons other than
 

state civil service employees in certain situations.
 

In June 1997, the trial court granted plaintiffs a
 

preliminary injunction that prohibited the Civil Service
 

Commission “from implementing, executing, enforcing, or in any
 

way giving effect” to Civil Service Rule 4-6. Critical to the
 

issue presently before this Court, the trial court opined in
 

its oral ruling on the preliminary injunction motion that a
 

showing of “some particularized injury or damage” was not
 

necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction against an
 

alleged violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5. The trial court
 

stated that “if a violation of [§ 5] occurs, my reading is
 

that would be irreparable harm, not just to the Plaintiffs,
 

but to every citizen of the state.” 


1(...continued)


No payment for personal services shall be made
 

or authorized until the provisions of this
 

constitution pertaining to civil service have been


complied with in every particular. Violation of
 

any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or


observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus


proceedings brought by any citizen of the state.
 

3
 
In July 1998, the Court of Appeals granted defendant’s
 

application for leave to appeal from the issuance of the
 

preliminary injunction, and eventually affirmed in part and
 

reversed in part.2 The Court of Appeals opined that the
 

“decentralized approval” subrule of Civil Service Rule 4-6 was
 

“facially unconstitutional”3

 and that the trial court did not
 

2
 While we recognize that the order of the Court of


Appeals granting leave also stayed further proceedings in the


trial court, over a year passed between the issuance of the


preliminary injunction and that Court of Appeals order. It is
 

undisputed that, during this entire period from June 1997 to


July 1998, the preliminary injunction remained in effect.


While there may be reasons to explain the delay, it does seem


troubling that the parties were subjected to such a long


period of uncertainty and that a preliminary injunction


against an officially promulgated governmental rule remained


in effect for so long without any decision on the merits. We
 

are today issuing proposed changes to the Michigan Court Rules


to establish limitations on the period in which a preliminary


injunction may be in effect pending final resolution of a


case. The proposed changes to the court rules are attached as


an appendix to this opinion.
 

3 We note that the Court of Appeals later in its opinion


seemed to disavow reaching a final or ultimate conclusion on


the constitutional issues:
 

For purposes of reviewing the preliminary


injunction only, we determine that the trial court


properly concluded that plaintiffs were likely to


prevail on their constitutional challenge to the


“decentralized approval” procedure, although it


incorrectly determined that they will likely


prevail in their constitutional challenge to the


preapproval provision. . . . We stress, however,


that our analysis of these issues is for the


purpose of ruling on the propriety of the
 

preliminary injunction only. When the matters are
 

tried, the actual determinations of all plaintiffs’


claims must initially be made by the trier of fact


(continued...)
 

4 
abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiffs were likely to
 

prevail on that provision. 236 Mich App 96, 102; 600 NW2d 362
 

(1999). However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
 

“preauthorization” provisions of the challenged civil service
 

rule were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial
 

court abused its discretion by enjoining those provisions.
 

236 Mich App 103-105.4
 

Central to the present issue, the Court of Appeals
 

rejected defendant’s position that plaintiffs should not have
 

been granted any preliminary injunction whatsoever because of
 

their failure to show irreparable harm. The Court of Appeals
 

stated:
 

Defendant next argues that no injunction


should have been ordered where plaintiffs failed to


demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable


injury if the injunction was not issued. It argues
 

that “[a] bare allegation of a constitutional
 

violation fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.”
 

We disagree because Const 1963, art 11, § 5


specifically provides that “[v]iolation of any of


the provisions hereof may be restrained or
 

observance compelled by any citizen of the state.”


As a matter of first impression, we believe that


this language is a constitutional declaration that


a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, in itself,


amounts to irreparable harm supporting injunctive


relief. [236 Mich App 106 (emphasis added).]
 

3(...continued)


in the trial court. [236 Mich App 104-105.]
 

4
 Given that plaintiffs have not filed a cross-appeal,


the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion reversing part of


the trial court’s preliminary injunction is not before us for


review.
 

5
 
While it may have been more clearly stated, the emphasized
 

language indicates that “a bare allegation of a constitutional
 

violation” is sufficient to show irreparable harm. In other
 

words, the Court of Appeals concluded that a showing of
 

irreparable harm to a particular party is not required for a
 

preliminary injunction against an alleged violation of § 5.
 

We granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal,
 

“limited to the issue whether a showing of irreparable harm is
 

required to justify a preliminary injunction against an
 

alleged violation of section 5.” 463 Mich 925 (2000).
 

II. Analysis
 

We review a trial court’s grant of injunctive relief for
 

an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Holly Twp v Dep’t of
 

Natural Resources, 440 Mich 891 (1992) (explaining that
 

“granting of injunctive relief is within the sound discretion
 

of the trial court, although the decision must not be
 

arbitrary and must be based on the facts of the particular
 

case”).
 

Ordinarily, the first requirement that a party must meet
 

to request a trial court to grant any type of relief,
 

including an injunction, is that the party have “standing” to
 

request the relief. This means that a party is normally
 

required to have a sufficiently concrete interest in bringing
 

a case that it can be expected to provide effective advocacy.
 

6
 
 

Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68; 499 NW2d 743 (1993).
 

Said another way, standing has been described as a requirement
 

that a party ordinarily must have a substantial personal
 

interest at stake in a case or controversy, as opposed merely
 

to having a generalized interest in the same manner as any
 

citizen. House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 572; 506
 

NW2d 190 (1993).5 Recently, we have described it even more
 

5
 Justice Powell, in his concurrence in United States v
 

Richardson, 418 US 166, 192; 94 S Ct 2940; 41 L Ed 2d 678


(1974), articulated reasons for the requirement of standing,


apart from assuring effective advocacy in a particular case:
 

[W]e risk a progressive impairment of the


effectiveness of the federal courts if their
 

limited resources are diverted increasingly from


their historic role to the resolution of publicinterest suits brought by litigants who cannot


distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all


citizens. The irreplaceable value of the power [of


judicial review] articulated by Mr. Chief Justice


Marshall lies in the protection it has afforded the


constitutional rights and liberties of individual


citizens and minority groups against oppressive or


discriminatory government action. It is this role,


not public esteem for the federal courts and has


permitted the peaceful coexistence of the
 

countermajoritarian implications of judicial review


and the democratic principles upon which our
 

Federal Government in the final analysis rests.
 

The considerations outlined above underlie, I


believe, the traditional hostility of the Court to


federal taxpayer or citizen standing where the


plaintiff has nothing at stake other than his


interest as a taxpayer or citizen. It merits
 

noting how often and how unequivocally the Court


has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert


the Judiciary into an open forum for the resolution


of political or ideological disputes about the


(continued...)
 

7
 
succinctly by indicating that the concept of standing
 

ordinarily requires that a party have “an interest distinct
 

from that of the public.” Lee v Macomb Co, 464 Mich ___; ___
 

NW2d ___ (2001).
 

It is this requirement that unquestionably is targeted by
 

§ 5 when it provides that “[v]iolation of any of the
 

provisions hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by
 

injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of
 

the state.” Plaintiffs further contend, however, that more
 

than this was targeted by § 5's language; that not only did
 

these words eliminate usual standing requirements, but they
 

also should be read to mean that the usual requirement that no
 

preliminary injunction should issue unless the plaintiff could
 

5(...continued)


performance of government.
 

In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court


observed in Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349; 116 S Ct 2174; 135
 

L Ed 2d 606 (1996):
 

The requirement that an inmate alleging a


violation of Bounds [v Smith, 430 US 817; 97 S Ct


1491; 52 L Ed 2d 72 (1977),] must show actual


injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of


standing, a constitutional principle that prevents


courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to


the political branches. It is the role of courts
 

to provide relief to claimants, in individual or


class actions, who have suffered, or will
 

imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role


of courts, but that of the political branches, to


shape the institutions of government in such
 

fashion as to comply with the laws and the
 

Constitution.
 

8
 
demonstrate a showing of irreparable harm was eliminated.
 

It is important to be clear that the present appeal
 

involves only the requirements for preliminary injunctive
 

relief, an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes granted
 

before a case is even decided on the merits. It is beyond
 

reasonable dispute that a trial court has the authority, and,
 

in appropriate cases, the duty, to enter permanent injunctive
 

relief against a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Sharp
 

v Lansing, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001) (discussing
 

availability of injunctive relief against a constitutional
 

violation). Moreover, the plain language of § 5 provides that
 

“[v]iolation of any of the provisions here may be restrained
 

or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings
 

brought by any citizen of the state.” Thus, it is plain that
 

any Michigan citizen may bring an action in a state trial
 

court against an alleged violation of § 5 and that, if the
 

trial court in ruling on the merits of the case at its final
 

resolution concludes a violation has occurred, that violation
 

may be remedied by appropriate injunctive or mandamus relief
 

such as a permanent injunction. The only question we are
 

considering is whether a plaintiff may also obtain a
 

preliminary injunction against the alleged constitutional
 

violation before the case is even decided on the merits
 

without making a particularized showing of irreparable harm.
 

9
 
To evaluate plaintiff’s position regarding the
 

requirements for a preliminary injunction in the present
 

context, it is appropriate to begin our analysis by
 

considering the historical background of Const 1963, art 11,
 

§ 5.
 

It is generally accepted that the state’s modern civil
 

service system had its genesis in the 1936 Report of the Civil
 

Service Study Commission. Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil
 

Service Comm, 408 Mich 385, 397; 292 NW2d 442 (1980). That
 

commission issued “a 94-page ringing condemnation of the
 

longstanding ‘spoils system’, or ‘patronage system’[6] of state
 

personnel practices and detailed recommendations for the
 

6
 The report provided the following description of the


prior “spoils system” of state employment:
 

The spoils system presupposes the existence of


government jobs to be filled with loyal party


workers who can be counted on not to do the state
 

job better than it can be done by others, but


rather to do the party work or the candidate work


when elections roll around. The state office
 

buildings are nearly empty during political


conventions, and state money has always been used—


indirectly of course—to enable state employees to


move about the state and keep political fences in


repair.
 

It is impossible to estimate the loss to the


state of this kind of political activity, but the


most inexperienced know that the amount is
 

considerable. Not only is the regular work of the


state interrupted or interfered with, but its


services and funds are put at the disposal of


political parties. [Id. at 397 n. 10]
 

10
 
 

enactment of legislation to establish a state civil service
 

system.” Id. The following year, the Legislature enacted
 

civil service legislation in 1937 PA 346.
 

However, the bulk of the civil service reforms enacted in
 

1937 were gutted during the next regular session of the
 

Legislature in 1939 when, “obviously dissatisfied with reform
 

that had been wrought, the newly elected anti-civil service
 

Legislature adopted a group of bills designed primarily to
 

destroy the civil service system which had just been
 

established. . . .” Council No 11, supra at 399.7 Fed up,
 

the response of the people of the state in 1940 was to place
 

on the ballot and pass a constitutional amendment,8 described
 

formally as Const 1908, art 6, § 22. This amendment included
 

provisions that defined the state employees to be included in
 

the state civil service, provided for the composition and
 

7
 Among other provisions, the 1939 legislation reduced


the scope of the state classified civil service, reduced the


appropriation for the Civil Service Commission, and provided


increased employment preferences for former state employees.
 

8 As this Court explained in Council No 11, supra at 400­

401:
 

Finally, in 1940, apparently dissatisfied with


four years of political maneuvering and legislative


advance and retreat on the civil service system


issue, the people of Michigan adopted a
 

constitutional amendment establishing a
 

constitutional state civil service system,


superseding the 1939 legislation.
 

11
 
duties of the Civil Service Commission, and, in language that
 

has been continued in our present Michigan Constitution in
 

§ 5, provided that “[v]iolation of any of the provisions
 

hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive
 

or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the state.”
 

Const 1908, art 6, § 22.
 

Given this background, we then must ask what exactly was
 

it that the people would have understood they were doing in
 

passing this amendment, because it is this understanding that
 

is the key to its meaning. In particular, it is this inquiry
 

that will answer our question with respect to how expansively
 

the citizens can be understood to have changed the rules, not
 

only regarding standing, but also the rules regarding the
 

irreparable injury requirements for securing a preliminary
 

injunction.
 

To begin this probe, basic doctrines regarding
 

constitutional construction are useful to recall. Initially,
 

of course, if the language of a constitutional provision is
 

plain, it is that meaning we give to it. As was stated in
 

Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 184; 521
 

NW2d 499 (1994), we examine how constitutional language was
 

“understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption.”
 

This is straightforward. Yet, what if the constitutional
 

language had no plain meaning, but rather is a technical legal
 

12
 
term or a phrase of art? In answering this, the great
 

constitutional law scholar and member of this Court in the
 

nineteenth century, Justice Thomas M. Cooley, said that in
 

construing technical legal terms used in a constitution “we
 

must suppose these words to be employed in their technical
 

sense.” 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 132).
 

Paying heed to this rule, this Court applied this principle to
 

the technical legal phrase “assistance of counsel” in People
 

v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994):
 

[T]he phrase “assistance of counsel,” by


necessity, will not be defined in great detail in


the constitution. Nevertheless, it is one of many


terms that has “acquired a well-understood meaning,


which the people must be supposed to have had in


view in adopting them.” [Id. at 310, quoting 1


Cooley, supra at 132.]
 

In a similar vein, this Court observed in Walker v Wolverine
 

Fabricating & Mfg Co, Inc, 425 Mich 586, 596-597; 391 NW2d 296
 

(1986), that one method of interpreting constitutional
 

language that is “in no way a part of the common vocabulary”
 

(which would surely apply to the phrase “injunctive
 

proceedings”) is to “survey contemporaneous judicial decisions
 

and legal commentaries for evidence of a consensus within the
 

legal community regarding the meaning of a term.” This, then,
 

is the rule: if a constitutional phrase is a technical legal
 

term or a phrase of art in the law, the phrase will be given
 

the meaning that those sophisticated in the law understood at
 

13
 
the time of enactment unless it is clear from the
 

constitutional language that some other meaning was intended.9
 

Let us then examine what was understood in the law in
 

1940 by the phrase “injunctive proceedings.” The traditional
 

rules governing “injunctive proceedings” were well established
 

by 1940 including a requirement of a showing of irreparable
 

injury to the person or entity seeking the injunction as a
 

condition for obtaining a preliminary injunction or, as it was
 

often termed at the time, an interlocutory injunction.
 

Indeed, a 1905 treatise on injunctions provided that an
 

interlocutory injunction will not be allowed “where the injury
 

which will result from the invasion of that right is not
 

irreparable.” 1 High, Injunctions (4th ed), § 22, p 367.
 

Discussion of this point in Michigan case law predating 1940
 

also indicates that a showing of irreparable harm is a
 

requirement for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See
 

9
 It is noteworthy that the Michigan Legislature has


expressly adopted the same basic principle in connection with


the interpretation of its work, statutes, namely, that common


words and phrases are to be understood in conformity with


their common meaning, but that technical words and phrases


should be interpreted in accordance with their technical


meaning:
 

All words and phrases shall be construed and


understood according to the common and approved


usage of the language; but technical words and


phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar


and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be


construed and understood according to such peculiar


and appropriate meaning. [MCL 8.3a.]
 

14
 
Baltic Mining Co v Houghton Circuit Judge, 177 Mich 632, 643;
 

144 NW 209 (1913), where this Court indicated that a
 

preliminary injunction may be granted “if it appears that
 

there is a real and substantial question between the parties,
 

to be investigated in a court of equity, and, in order to
 

prevent irremedial injury to the complainant, before his
 

claims can be investigated, it is necessary to prohibit any
 

change in the conditions and relations of the property and of
 

the parties during the litigation” (citation omitted).
 

Similarly, in B Siegel Co v Wayne Circuit Judge, 183 Mich 145,
 

154; 149 NW 1015 (1914), this Court stated that, for a
 

landlord to obtain a preliminary injunction against structural
 

changes to a building, it was necessary to show an
 

“irreparable injury by reason of the damage done to the
 

freehold through changes in the building impairing its
 

structural safety.”10
 

10 Notably, other cases predating the adoption of the 1940


constitutional amendment that do not expressly state that a


showing of irreparable harm is a requirement for obtaining a


preliminary injunction nevertheless include language


indicating that such a requirement was commonly understood to


exist within the legal community. For example, in Grand
 

Rapids E R Co v Calhoun Circuit Judge, 156 Mich 419, 421-422;


120 NW 1004 (1909), this Court found no abuse of discretion in


a circuit court’s decision to dissolve a preliminary


injunction where the circuit court concluded that the action


sought to be enjoined would not cause irreparable injury to


the moving party. Similarly, Heliker v Heliker, 184 Mich 657,


659; 151 NW 757 (1915), noted that a preliminary injunction


against cutting trees on a parcel of land was issued after the


(continued...)
 

15
 
Thus, it is clear that in 1940 it was beyond dispute in
 

the legal community that a party needed to make a
 

particularized showing of concrete irreparable harm or injury
 

in order to obtain a preliminary injunction. Moreover, there
 

is no basis to conclude that the requirements to secure a
 

preliminary injunction changed in any pertinent way between
 

the adoption of the amendment in 1940 and the adoption of its
 

successor, § 5, in the present Michigan Constitution in 1963,
 

or even up to this day. The requirement of a showing of
 

irreparable harm remains as it did a century ago. In our
 

latest statement on this issue in Michigan State Employees
 

Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 157-158; 365
 

NW2d 93 (1984), this Court reiterated the requirement of a
 

showing of irreparable harm as a prerequisite for a
 

preliminary injunction, explaining that it was a requirement
 

for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to demonstrate
 

“that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if a
 

preliminary injunction is not granted.”11
 

10(...continued)


filing of a complaint alleging “loss and irreparable injury to


the inheritance and great damage to the complainant.”
 

11 We note that Michigan State Employees Ass’n also arose
 

in the civil service context. In the course of reversing a


preliminary injunction granted in favor of a discharged civil


service employee, this Court noted that its “holding addresses


the required showing of irreparable injury necessary to


support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Id. at
 

(continued...)
 

16
 
Accordingly, we conclude that a particularized showing of
 

irreparable harm was, and still is, as our law is understood,
 

an indispensable requirement to obtain a preliminary
 

injunction. Moreover, the people, in causing the Michigan
 

Constitution to be amended in 1940, evidenced no desire, as
 

they had done with standing, to modify the traditional rules
 

that had pertained with regard to this requirement for a
 

preliminary injunction. Therefore, when considering the
 

request for a preliminary injunction in this matter, the trial
 

court and the Court of Appeals were in error in granting any
 

preliminary injunction without a showing of concrete
 

irreparable harm to the interests of a party before the Court.
 

We underscore, in accordance with the limited grant of
 

leave in this case, that we are concerned only with the
 

requirements for a preliminary injunction. This opinion
 

expresses no view about the proper resolution of the merits of
 

this case, i.e., whether Civil Service Rule 4-6 is violative
 

11(...continued)


135. This Court stated that such a preliminary injunction


“should issue only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at
 

166.
 

The Court also outlined that, in addition to the required


demonstration of irreparable harm to the moving party in the


absence of a preliminary injunction, a trial court should


consider (1) harm to the public interest if such an injunction


is issued; (2) whether harm to the applicant absent such an


injunction outweighs the harm it would cause to the adverse


party, and (3) the strength of the moving party’s showing that


it is likely to prevail on the merits. Id. at 157-158.
 

17
 
in whole or in part of § 5.
 

III. Response to Dissent
 

Contrary to the possible implication of the dissent, this
 

opinion does not preclude the ability to obtain any injunctive
 

relief when the Civil Service Commission acts in violation of
 

§ 5. Nothing of the sort has happened. This appeal does not
 

involve what relief is available when, after a hearing on the
 

merits, the court is confronted with whether to issue a
 

permanent injunction. Rather, we are concerned with the
 

preliminary injunction, an injunction that is sought before
 

the parties have had their day in court. Then, in that
 

situation and that situation alone, the petitioner must
 

demonstrate irreparable injury. This is utterly
 

unexceptional. It has, indeed, been our law, as this opinion
 

has taken pains to point out, unvaryingly since Michigan
 

became a state. It is, we believe, the law in every other
 

state of the union as well.
 

Thus, the dissent is incorrect in describing our approach
 

as being “to completely destroy the power of ‘any citizen’ to
 

compel constitutional compliance.” Post, p 10. Nothing in
 

this opinion restricts, in any way, the authority of a trial
 

court to grant appropriate relief, including entry of a
 

permanent injunction, if a Michigan citizen establishes an
 

actual violation of § 5 when a case is decided on the merits.
 

18
 
Rather, pursuant to the plain language of § 5 stating that
 

“[v]iolation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained
 

or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings
 

brought by any citizen of the state, ”any Michigan citizen may
 

bring suit to challenge an alleged violation of this provision
 

of the Michigan Constitution without meeting ordinary standing
 

requirements. Further, if the trial court decides the merits
 

of the case in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court may
 

then enter a permanent injunction or other appropriate relief
 

against the violation–even in the absence of irreparable harm
 

to any person. This is because § 5 expressly provides the
 

authority to restrain a violation of its provisions. Thus, if
 

a trial court, in resolving the merits of a case, determines
 

that a violation of § 5 has actually occurred, the trial court
 

necessarily has authority to grant injunctive or mandamus
 

relief against the violation. However, by definition, a
 

decision on a preliminary injunction is made before there is
 

even a determination of the merits of a case. This opinion
 

merely reaffirms that a plaintiff alleging a violation of § 5
 

may not obtain preliminary injunctive relief, which in the
 

ordinary course of things would be addressed before a
 

constitutional violation has been established, without meeting
 

the traditional requirements for this extraordinary relief.
 

Further, we are not “implying that irreparable harm must
 

19
 
have already occurred in order for [preliminary] injunctive
 

relief to be available.” Post, p 6. Rather, as stated
 

earlier, we recognize that a preliminary injunction may be
 

appropriately entered if it is demonstrated that “the
 

applicant will suffer irreparable injury” absent the
 

preliminary injunction (and the other appropriate
 

prerequisites to the grant of a preliminary injunction are
 

met), p 17, quoting Michigan State Employees Ass’n, supra. In
 

other words, a trial court may properly grant a preliminary
 

injunction if a party shows that it will otherwise imminently
 

suffer irreparable harm and the other proper grounds for such
 

relief are satisfied.
 

Finally, unlike the dissent, we see nothing
 

“inconsistent,” post, p 13, n 7, in recognizing that any
 

Michigan citizen has “standing” to challenge an alleged
 

violation of § 5, but that a party doing so must make a
 

particularized showing of irreparable harm in order to obtain
 

a preliminary injunction against the alleged violation. As we
 

have discussed, the plain language of § 5 necessarily requires
 

the courts to allow any Michigan citizen to challenge an
 

alleged violation of this constitutional provision and to
 

obtain relief if an actual violation is found when the case is
 

resolved on the merits. However, a preliminary injunction
 

before there is a decision on the merits—and, thus, before it
 

20
 
can be said that a violation of § 5 has been established in
 

court—is an extraordinary type of relief available only with
 

a showing of irreparable harm. It is no more “inconsistent”
 

to draw this distinction than it is to recognize that there
 

are multitude of suits between private litigants in which both
 

sides obviously have standing to litigate the case, but
 

neither has any basis to obtain a preliminary injunction
 

against the other.
 

IV. Conclusion
 

We conclude that the lower courts erred in viewing a
 

particularized showing of irreparable harm as unnecessary to
 

obtaining a preliminary injunction against an alleged
 

violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5. In other words, we read
 

nothing in § 5 that would suggest that, in the civil service
 

realm, the actions of the government are any more susceptible
 

to preliminary injunctive relief than are the actions of any
 

other private or public entity. Pending the resolution of a
 

suit claiming a violation of § 5, a party to such a suit may
 

obtain a preliminary injunction only after satisfying all the
 

requirements traditionally required for this extraordinary
 

relief. Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion
 

by granting a preliminary injunction in the present case in
 

the absence of such a showing. Thus, we reverse the Court of
 

Appeals in part, vacate the preliminary injunction entered by
 

21
 
the circuit court in this case in its entirety, and remand
 

this case to the circuit court for any appropriate proceedings
 

consistent with this opinion.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with
 

TAYLOR, J.
 

22
 
___________________________ 

01-XX
 

Proposed Amendments of


Rules 3.310, 7.208, and 7.213


of the Michigan Court Rules
 

On order of the Court, this is to advise that the


Court is considering amendments of Rules 3.310, 7.208, and


7.213 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determining whether


the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or


rejected, this notice is given to afford any interested person


the opportunity to comment on the form or the merits of the


proposal. We welcome the views of all who wish to address the
 

proposal or who wish to suggest alternatives. Before adoption


or rejection, this proposal will be considered at a public


hearing by the Court. The Clerk of the Court will publish a


schedule of future public hearings.
 

Publication of this proposal does not mean that the


Court will issue an order on the subject, nor does it imply


probable adoption of the proposal in its present form.
 

[The present language would be amended as indicated below.]
 

Rule 3.310 Injunctions
 

(A) Preliminary Injunctions.
 

(1) - (4) [Unchanged.]
 

(5)	 If a preliminary injunction is granted, the


court shall promptly schedule a pretrial


conference. The trial of the action on the
 

merits must be held within 6 months after the
 

injunction is granted, unless good cause is


shown or the parties stipulate to a longer


period. The court shall issue its decision on
 

the merits within 56 days after the trial is


completed.
 

(B) - (I) [Unchanged.]
 

Rule 7.208 Authority of Court or Tribunal Appealed From
 

(A)	 Limitations. After a claim of appeal is filed or leave


to appeal is granted, the trial court or tribunal may not


set aside or amend the judgment or order appealed from
 

23
 
except
 

(1)	 by order of the Court of Appeals, 


(2)	 by stipulation of the parties, 


(3)	 after a decision on the merits in an action in
 

which a preliminary injunction was granted, or
 

(4)	 as otherwise provided by law. 


In a criminal case, the filing of the claim of appeal


does not preclude the trial court from granting a timely


motion under subrule (B).
 

(B) - (I) [Unchanged.]
 

Rule 7.213 Calendar Cases
 

(A) - (B) [Unchanged.]
 

(C) Priority on Calendar. The priority of cases on the


session calendar is in accordance with the dates of the
 

clerk’s notice to the parties, except that precedence shall be


given to interlocutory criminal appeals, child custody cases,


and interlocutory appeals from the grant of a preliminary


injunction.
 

(D) - (E) [Unchanged.]
 

Staff Comment: The proposed amendments of Rules


3.310, 7.208, and 7.213 were announced by the Supreme Court in


Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v Michigan Civil
 

Service Commission, Docket No. 115579 (decided July , 2001).


The amendments would require trial courts to expeditiously


decide actions in which preliminary injunctions have been


granted, and would allow them to proceed even if the Court of


Appeals has granted interlocutory leave to appeal. Similarly,


if the Court of Appeals granted leave to review entry of a


preliminary injunction on an interlocutory basis, that court


would be required to give priority to resolution of the


appeal.
 

The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the


bench and bar and is not an authoritative construction by the


Court. 


24
 
_____________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________ 

Publication of this proposal does not


mean that the Court will issue an order
 

on the subject, nor does it imply


probable adoption in its present form.


Timely comments will be substantively


considered, and your assistance is
 

appreciated by the Court. 


A copy of this order will be given to the secretary


of the State Bar and to the State Court Administrator so that
 

they can make the notifications specified in MCR 1.201.


Comments on this proposal may be submitted in writing or


electronically to the Supreme Court Clerk by November 1, 2001.


P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or
 

MSC_clerk@jud.state.mi.us. When submitting a comment, please


refer to File No. 01-XX.
 

25
 
____________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

MICHIGAN COALITION OF STATE
 

EMPLOYEE UNIONS,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

and
 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED


AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE &


AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
 

OF AMERICA (UAW) and LYNDA


TAYLOR-LEWIS,
 

Intervening


Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 

No. 115579
 

MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE
 

COMMISSION,
 

Defendant-Appellant.
 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
 

The majority provides interesting commentary on the civil
 

service system. Yet, it skims only the surface of the issues
 

necessary to the resolution of this case, and while seeming to
 

address a narrow issue, leaves behind a rule that could limit
 
the power that the people have reserved in themselves.1 In my
 

view, Const 1963, art 11, § 5 clearly preserves the power of
 

the people to restrain the actions of the Civil Service
 

Commission whenever the provisions of the constitution are not
 

complied with. I agree with the courts below that a showing
 

of a constitutional violation may constitute irreparable harm
 

to every citizen of this state, and that each citizen may not
 

only bring injunctive or mandamus proceedings, but also has a
 

meaningful opportunity to obtain relief. Further, I would
 

hold that Const 1963, art 11, § 5 does not limit the class of
 

citizens who may obtain relief in the form of a preliminary
 

injunction. Therefore, I dissent.
 

I
 

The majority spends pages upon pages discussing the
 

accepted maxim of constitutional construction that the
 

constitution should be given the meaning intended by the
 

people. Additional pages are dedicated to establishing that
 

the existence of irreparable harm is traditionally a
 

precondition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
 

1
 Despite its attempts to leave the issue narrow,


however, the majority expands its opinion to include
 

discussion of Michigan’s Rules of Court. Because of how the
 

majority decides this case, the opinion is not affected by the


proposed court rule incorporated into the majority’s appendix.


My comments about the substantive propriety of the court rule


will be reserved for discussion as part of the standard


procedure for implementing court rule changes.
 

2
 
Yet, the majority’s observations are somewhat puzzling since
 

neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals held that
 

Const 1963, art 11, § 5 eliminates the requirement that
 

irreparable harm must be shown. To the contrary, the courts
 

below held that a constitutional violation may cause
 

irreparable harm.
 

The majority errs at the outset by determining that the
 

rule that irreparable harm must be shown somehow forms a basis
 

for vacating the preliminary injunction issued by the trial
 

court. Yet, though I agree with the majority that
 

irreparable harm must be shown, I believe that the majority is
 

simply wrong in basing reversal on the theory that “when
 

considering the request for a preliminary injunction in this
 

matter, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in error
 

in granting any preliminary injunction without a showing of
 

concrete irreparable harm to the interests of the parties
 

before the Court.” Slip op at 18. Rather, both courts
 

explained why irreparable harm to the parties would exist in
 

this case and clearly found there to be a clear likelihood of
 

success on the claim of a constitutional violation. The trial
 

court in fact discussed the issue at great length and the
 

trial court opinion reveals that the court understood the
 

requirements of a preliminary injunction. The following
 

excerpt unequivocally shows that the trial court validly
 

3
 
exercised its discretion and found concrete irreparable harm
 

to the interests of the parties before the Court:
 

Irreparable harm, there has been a zealous


plea by the Commission, Counsel for the Commission


that these Plaintiffs have to show, as I hear the


argument, some particularized harm. Given that
 

none of their positions are immediately scheduled


to be eliminated, they cannot make that showing.
 

* * *
 

I understand the Plaintiffs claim, assert


their positions are affected, but as I view this


case, they stand before this Court as citizens of


this state, who challenge the conduct of the


Commission in light of its constitutional
 

obligations. And, unless I read this
 

constitutional language as having no meaning


whatsoever, a part of Article 11, Section 5 of the


1963 Constitution says very clearly violation of


any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or


observance compelled by injunction, injunctive or


mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the


state. No qualification there.
 

And, that clearly means does somebody have to


show some particularized injury or damage as a


result. I don’t think so. Because, every citizen
 

of this state is entitled [to] have a civil service
 

system that works, that does the state’s business
 

and does it fairly, does it honestly, does it
 

economically, and we’re all affected. So to that
 

extent, to the extent that any contract is entered
 

to [sic] in violation of this constitutional
 

provision, that any position is abolished in
 

violation of the constitutional provision, every
 

citizen of this state is damaged. And, I believe


that I am obligated here to effectuate that
 

language certainly, that language takes precedence


over . . . some of these other holdings.[2]
 

I mean, we need to keep in mind . . . this
 

came about because the Legislature did not act
 

2
 Citations omitted.
 

4
 
sufficiently in the view of Michigan citizens to


protect their interest in having a strong system of


merit in selecting public employees, but in effect


allowed, and apparently had been present for many,


many years, a spoils system. And so, they weren’t


just satisfied to make changes and create [Const


1963, art 11, § 5], they said not only are we


making changes, we are going to empower any citizen


of this state by an action, essentially, at any


time to assure that this provision is complied


with.
 

So in effect, if a violation of this occurs,
 

my reading is that would be irreparable harm, not
 

just to the Plaintiffs, but to every citizen of
 

this state and the Plaintiffs or someone else, the
 

citizens of Bay City or the factory workers of
 

General Motors Corporation can file an action to
 

bar this unlawful, alleged unlawful activity. And
 

in this case, I’m satisfied that there is a


sufficient showing the citizens would be harmed,


because it appears that at least one or more of the


provisions of Article 11, Section 5 are not
 

complied with under the rules as proposed.


[Emphasis added.]
 

This language demonstrates that the trial court’s holding was
 

not that plaintiffs are relieved from showing irreparable
 

harm, but that a constitutional violation irreparably harms
 

every individual in this state. In other words, the harm
 

resulting in an art 11, § 5 context does not flow from an
 

action taken by the Civil Service Commission against a
 

specific individual as would be the case under the
 

commission’s view. Instead, the harm flows from the violation
 

itself, and flows to each individual citizen.
 

The majority holds that any citizen may obtain permanent
 

injunctive relief after a constitutional violation occurs, but
 

5
 
that a citizen may not obtain a preliminary injunction to
 

enjoin the probable harm that could result from a
 

constitutional violation. The majority correctly recognizes
 

that the derogation of a constitutional right has been held to
 

be irreparable harm for the purposes of determining injunctive
 

relief. Slip op at 9-10. Thus, the type of injury wrought by
 

a constitutional violation can clearly be irreparable. The
 

majority’s error lies in implying that irreparable harm must
 

have already occurred in order for injunctive relief to be
 

available. The fundamental flaw in this logic is that the
 

point of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
 

quo ante and prevent the harm from occurring until a decision
 

may be rendered on the merits. In other words, preliminary
 

injunctive relief is designed to meet the threat of a future
 

wrong. 42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions, § 2, § 10. In any event,
 

an applicant seeking preliminary injunctive relief need only
 

establish a likelihood of success on the merits. See MSEA v
 

Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).
 

Further, by precluding preliminary relief in cases where
 

a citizen alleges that irreparable harm will result if a
 

constitutional violation is allowed to occur, the majority
 

essentially rewrites the constitution as providing that
 

“violation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained
 

or compelled by any citizen seeking permanent injunctive or
 

6
 
mandamus relief.” However, the constitution is not so
 

limited. It allows any citizen to compel observance or
 

restrain violations through injunctive or mandamus
 

proceedings. As the majority aptly points out, Michigan has
 

long recognized the availability of preliminary injunctions.
 

Those injunctions are necessarily issued through injunctive
 

proceedings.
 

Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals recognized
 

that irreparable harm to every citizen occurs simultaneously
 

with a constitutional violation. It wrote:
 

Defendant next argues that no injunction


should have been ordered where plaintiffs failed to


demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable


injury if the injunction was not issued. It argues


that “a bare allegation of constitutional violation


fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.” We
 

disagree because Const 1963, art 11, § 5
 

specifically provides that “violation of any of the


provisions hereof may be restrained or observance


compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings


brought by any citizen of the state.” As a matter
 

of first impression, we believe that this language


is a constitutional declaration that a violation of
 

Const 1963, art 11 § 5, in itself, amounts to


irreparable harm supporting injunctive relief.[3]
 

[236 Mich App 96, 106; 600 NW2d 362 (1999).]
 

In light of these statements by the courts below, I
 

believe it clear that the problem the majority finds is not
 

with the failure to address the existence of irreparable harm,
 

3
 The Court of Appeals did say that an “additional”


showing of irreparable harm was unnecessary, but it first


found that the threatened harm would be irreparable because of


the alleged constitutional violation.
 

7
 
but with the idea that the irreparable harm caused by a
 

violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5 may be remedied by
 

preliminary injunctive proceedings brought by any citizen
 

rather than only by citizens affected in some way peculiar
 

from the rest of the populace. I agree with the courts below
 

and believe that the majority’s approach is contrary to the
 

language and purpose of the constitution.
 

II
 

The majority acknowledges that the lower courts stated
 

that a constitutional violation amounts to irreparable harm,
 

but nonetheless concludes that neither court required a
 

finding of the requisite irreparable harm. Specifically, the
 

majority writes:
 

Critical to the issue presently before this


Court, the trial court opined in its oral ruling on


the preliminary injunction motion that a showing of


“some particularized injury or damage” was not
 

necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction


against an alleged violation of Const 1963, art 11,


§ 5. The trial court stated that “if a violation
 

of [§ 5] occurs, my reading is that would be


irreparable harm, not just to the Plaintiffs, but


to every citizen of the state.” Slip op at 3-4.
 

Similarly, with respect to the Court of Appeals opinion, the
 

majority writes:
 

While it may have been more clearly stated,


the emphasized language indicates that “a bare


allegation of a constitutional violation” is
 

sufficient to show irreparable harm. In other
 

words, the Court of Appeals concluded that a


showing of irreparable harm to a particular party


is not required for a preliminary injunction
 

8
 
against an alleged violation of § 5. [Slip op at 6,


emphasis added.]
 

While I agree with the majority that the courts below said
 

that a constitutional violation is equivalent to irreparable
 

harm, I do not agree with the conclusion that the courts “in
 

other words” implied that harm to an individual party need not
 

be shown. Rather, in my view, the courts below “in other
 

words” said that every individual citizen is irreparably
 

harmed by a constitutional violation. I am at a loss to
 

understand how the Court’s statement that these plaintiffs
 

would suffer irreparable harm can simultaneously be a
 

conclusion that the plaintiffs need not show that they
 

themselves would suffer irreparable harm. The majority makes
 

the mistake of reading the trial court opinion as providing
 

that any citizen can bring suit by saying, “I can bring suit
 

for all of us, because society as a whole is harmed by a
 

violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5.” In my view, the trial
 

court decision actually provides that a violation of Const
 

1963, art 11, § 5 injures each citizen individually. As such,
 

every citizen may institute injunctive or mandamus
 

proceedings. Thus, under the trial court opinion, any
 

plaintiff bringing suit would be constitutionally authorized
 

to allege “I will be hurt individually because of the
 

9
 
violation.”4
 

Interestingly, the majority concludes:
 

[S]tanding has been described as a requirement


that a party ordinarily must have a substantial


personal interest . . . as opposed merely to having


a generalized interest in the same manner as any


citizen. . . . It is this requirement that
 

unquestionably is targeted by § 5 when it provides


that “violation of any of the provisions hereof may


be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive


or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of


this state.” Slip at 7-9. 


Despite the fact that the aforementioned constitutional
 

language mentions neither standing nor the requirements for a
 

preliminary injunction, the majority reaches the conclusion
 

that particularized injury is suspended for the purposes of
 

coming before the Court, but once there, particularity is
 

reintroduced in association with the requirement that
 

irreparable harm be shown. In other words, under the
 

majority’s approach, anyone can come before the court to seek
 

an injunction, but if the person cannot show the type of
 

particularized harm that would normally be required for
 

standing purposes, then they cannot obtain relief in the form
 

of a preliminary injunction. The effect of such an approach
 

is to completely destroy the power of “any citizen” to compel
 

constitutional compliance.
 

4
 In any event, this issue relates to the question of


standing, as will be further explained.
 

10
 
The constitutional language does not provide only that
 

injunctive proceedings may be brought by any citizen. It
 

additionally says that a violation may be restrained or
 

observance compelled by any citizen. Yet, under the majority
 

view, only a citizen whose job will be adversely affected by
 

a decision of the commission may restrain the violation by
 

preliminary injunctive proceedings. Thus, in the context of
 

preliminary proceedings, the protection afforded to “any
 

citizen” of this state effectively becomes a protection
 

afforded to a limited class of citizens. I cannot support an
 

approach that allows all citizens with valid legal claims
 

regarding a constitutional violation to institute legal
 

proceedings, but which nullifies the purpose of those
 

proceedings by making preliminary injunctive relief per se
 

unavailable to a large percentage of those citizens despite
 

the contrary purpose and language of our constitution.
 

I believe that the problem created by the majority
 

approach stems in part from the fact that the majority injects
 

particularity into its analysis of irreparable harm, rather
 

than limiting the question of particularity to the standing
 

context. The generally accepted analysis used in preliminary
 

injunction cases considers four factors: 


harm to the public interest if an injunction


issues, whether the harm to the applicant in the


absence of a stay outweighs the harm to the
 

opposing party if a stay is granted; the strength
 

11
 
of the applicant’s demonstration that the applicant


is likely to reveal on the merits; and
 

demonstration that the applicant will suffer
 

irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is


not granted. [MSEA v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421


Mich 152; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).]
 

The focus of the four-factor analysis is on the type of injury
 

rendered by the issuance or nonissuance of an injunction. In
 

the context of issuing injunctions, irreparable injury has
 

special meaning under the law. The injury is traditionally
 

defined in terms of whether the injury can be repaired by
 

means other than through the issuance of an injunction.5
 

Although it is true that the MSEA test and the tests
 

applied in various cases cited by the majority refer to
 

injuries to the “plaintiff” or to the “complainant,” the
 

references are fairly unremarkable since it is always the
 

complainant who seeks redress of an injury. Also, in an
 

injunction case involving subject matter not governed by a
 

constitutional provision such as Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the
 

complainant will have had to prove particularity in order to
 

establish standing. What is remarkable, however, is the fact
 

that the majority offers no authority for the proposition that
 

a plaintiff must show that the harm he suffers is somehow
 

5
 For example, Black’s law dictionary provides the


following explanation, “‘Irreparable injury’ justifying an


injunction is that which cannot be adequately compensated in


damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money.”


Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 786.
 

12
 
irreparable in a different way than it is irreparable to any
 

other plaintiff. The reason, in my view, is that the
 

“requirement that a party ordinarily must have a substantial
 

personal interest at stake in a case or controversy as opposed
 

merely to have a generalized interest in the same manner as
 

any citizen,”6 pertains to standing and not to the question
 

whether a party will suffer irreparable harm.7 Here, Const
 

1963, art 11, § 5 specifically confers standing on all
 

citizens.
 

For all these reasons, I believe that the majority
 

opinion is erroneous and that its reasoning fails to support
 

its conclusion. I prefer the reasoning and holding of the
 

trial court. I would, therefore, affirm the recognition by
 

the courts below that irreparable harm may be established by
 

6
 Slip op at 6-7.
 

7 As was recently recognized by a majority of this Court
 

in Lee v Macomb Co, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001), the


type of particularized harm referenced by the majority is


clearly a requirement of the standing doctrine. As noted
 

previously, no similar particularity requirement is required


as part of the irreparable harm inquiry. However, even if I


agreed with the majority that particularity is required in the


context of irreparable harm, as explained at length in this


opinion, I believe it is inconsistent to conclude that the


people of the state of Michigan intended to suspend the


requirement of particularized harm for the purpose of allowing


citizens to enter the courtroom door, but nonetheless those


citizens must afterward show the very type of particularized,


concrete harm suspended for standing purposes in order to


receive a preliminary injunction.
 

13
 
proof of a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, and hold that
 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
 

WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
 

14