MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 201 Docket: Cum

- 17

- 150 Submitted

On	B riefs : September	27,	2017 Decided: October	5,	2017

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J., and	ALEXANDER

, MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR
, and HUMPHREY
, JJ.

IN	RE NOAH	B

.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1] The mother of Noah	 B

. appeal s from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District

Court	 ( Portland

, Eggert ,	J. )	 terminating her parental	rights	 to Noah pursuant

to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1) (a) and	 (B)(2) (a),	 (b)(i)

- (ii) (2016)

. 1 She

challenge s the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 judgment and	 the

court’s	 discretionary	 determination	 of the	 child’ s	 best	interest

. Because	 the

evidence	 supports	 the	 court’s	 findings	 and discretionary	 determination,	 w e

affirm	th e	judgment.

[¶2 ] Based on	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record,	 the	 court	 found,	 by

clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 that	 the mother	 is unwilling	 or unable	 to

protect	 the	 child	 from	 jeopardy	 and	 these	 circumstances	 are unlikely	 to

change	within	a	time that is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet his needs and that

1 The	child’s	father consented to	the	termination	of	his	parental	rights	o n	March	6 ,	2017,	and	is not	a	party	to	this	appeal.2
she	 is	 unwilling	 or unable	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 child	 within	 a	 time

reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 his	 needs

. See 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055 (1) (B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii) ; In re	Cameron	B. ,	2017	ME	18,	¶ 10,	154	A.3d	1199

.

The	court also	found	that termination	of the	mother’s	parental rights	is	in	the

child’s	best	interest

. See 22 M.R.S.	§ 4055	(1)(B)(2)(a); In	re	Cameron	B.
, 2017

ME	18,	¶	10,	154	A.3d	1199

. The court based its findings of	parental	unfitness

and its determination	of the	child’s	best	interest on the	 following findings	of

fact :

[The	mother]	has	previously	had	her	parental	rig hts	to	four children	terminated

. .	.	. In	this	case,	on	February	3,	2016,	[the	child ]	was

.	.	. found	to have	petechial	bruising	on	the	right	side	of	his	face

.	.	.	. When	 asked	 about	 the	 injuries,	 [the	 mother] first	 blamed the	father	for	inflicting	them. Once	confronted	with	evidence	that the	father	was	not	available	to	inflict	the injuries	at	the	time	they were	 inflicted,	 she	 admitted	 that	 she	 had	 been	 the one	 who inflicted	them. As	a	result	of	the	injuries,	a	Preliminary	Protection Order	 was	 entered,	 and	 subsequently a	 Jeopardy	 Order was entered

. A Rehabilitation	and	Reunificatio n	plan	was	put	in	place, and	 [the	 mother]	 began	 to	 make	 good	 progress	 with	 that	 plan. Because	 of	 the	 progress	 [the	 mother]	 was	 allowed	 weekly unsupervised	visits with	[the	child]

. .	.	. After	the	third	such	visit [the	child]	returned	to	his	fost er	home	w ith	bruises	on	his	arm

. .	.	. Again	[t he	mothe r] was	asked	about	the	bruises	and denied that she	 had	 inflicted	 them

. .	 .	 . [The	 child] was	 in	 her	 care	 at	 a time	when	 the	injuries	we re	most	likely	 to	 have	 occurred

. [ T he child] told	his	foster	mot her	that his	mother	had	done	it

. .	.	. The3
Court	 finds	 that	 [the	mother]	again	struck	 [the	child]	even	when she	was	progressing	on	her	rehabilitation	and	reunification	plan.

. .	.	.

.	.	. This	is	the	second	time	that	[the	child]	has	been	removed from	 [the	 mot her’s]	 care	 and	 placed	 with	 foster	 parents. He should	 not	 have	 to	 go	 through	 this	 process	 again	 and	 needs	 t o have	permanency	at	this	time.

.	 .	 . He	is	 well	 bonded	 to	 the	members	 of	 his	 foster	 family and	needs	to	move	on	in	that	safe	and	stable	family setting.

.	.	. [¶3 ] The court	 further	 found	that	the child’s “physical	conditions ”	and

“ cognitive	challenges ” make	him	incapable	of “ protecting	himself	from	harm

. ”

The court found that the mother’s “personality	disorder with	narcissistic	and

borderline	traits and	a	history	of	antisocial	features

, ” characterized	by “ rigid ”

thinking

, “ low	tolerance	for	stress

, ” and	a “lower	ability	to	adapt	t o	and	react

to	 novel	 situations

, ” is	 “difficult	 to	 treat	 and	 may	 require	 extensive time	 to

allow	 treatment	 to	 be	 effective .” Due	 to	 the	 mother’s	 condition

, history	 of

abuse ,	 and the	 child’ s high	 needs,	 the	 court	 found that it could	 not	 “allow

placement	 with	 [the	 mother],	 or	 even	 to	 move	 again	 to	 unsupervised	 visits

given	the	risk	that [the	child]	would	again	have	an	injury	inflicted	upon him. ”

The	 court	 stated	 that	 it	 “does	 not	 know	 when	 [the	 mother]	 might	 .	 .	 .	 be

considered	a	safe	placement ” and “ there	is	no	guarantee	that .	.	.	therapy	will

remediate	 [the	mother’s]	problem,	and it	may	 take	a	long	 time,	measured	in4
years,	 to	 f ind	 out	if	 [therapy]	 has	worked. ” Noting that	 “ [ t ] ime	is	measured

from [ the	child’s ] perspective,” the	court	 found that the	mother

— despite	her

effort	 and	 progress

— remains incapable	 of	 providing adequate	 care for	 the

child in	 a	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 his	 needs

. S ee 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1) (B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii); In	 re	 Alexander	 D. ,	 1998	 ME	 207,	 ¶	 18,	 716	 A.2d

222

. [¶4 ]		Given	these	findings and	the	court’s other specific	findings	of	fact,

all	of	which	are	supported	by	competent	evidence	in	the	record, t he	court did

not err in	its determination	of unfitness	n or did	it err	or abuse	its	discretion	in

determining	 that termination	 of	 the mother’s parental	 rights,	 with	 a

permanency	 plan	 of	 adoption, is	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest. 2 See In	 re

Thomas H. ,	2005	ME	123,	¶¶	16

- 17,	889	A.2d	297

.

2 The	mother also argues that the	court	erred because	it considered the ti me the	child	spent in foster	care in a previous child	protection	proceedin g when	making	its	best	interest	determination

. The	mother appears	to	argue that the court	could	only consider the	child’s	time	in	foster	care	from the	 current	 proceeding	 when	 determining	 the	 child’s	 best	interest. In	 fact,	 far	 from	 constituting error,	 the applicable	 statute requires the	 court	 to	 consider	 such	 periods	 of	 separation when determining	if	 terminating	 parental	 rights	is	in	 the	 child’s	 best	interest

. See 22	M.R.S.	 §	 4055(2) (2016) ( “ In deciding	 to	 terminate	parental	rights, the	court	shall	consi der	 the	best	interest	of	 the child	.	.	.	including	.	.	. periods	of	attachment and	separation

. .	.	. ”); see	also In	r e	Jacob	B. ,	2008	ME 168,	¶	 14, 959 A.2d	 734 (“In	 determining	whether	 termination	 of	 parental	 rights	is	in	 the	 child’s best	 interest,	 a	 court	 must	 consider	 many	 factors,	 including	 .	 .	 .	 periods	 of	 attachment	 and separation

. .	 .	 . ”)

. T he court ,	 therefore, did	 not	err by	 considering the	 child’ s t ime in	 foster	 care from	the	previous proceeding

— a period	of	separation	 from	his	mother brought	about	by	her past physical	 abuse

— when it	 determined	 that terminating	 the	 mother’ s	 parental	 rights,	 with	 a permanency	plan	of	adoption, was in	the	child’s	best	inter est. See	In	r e	Jacob B.
, 2008	ME	168,	¶¶ 12

- 14, 959	A.2d	734

.5

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Zack M.	Paakkonen,	Esq.,	Portland	Lega l	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellant	m other

Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta, for	appellee Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Portland	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2016

- 17
F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY