Do e a lso fi le d s uit a g a ins t ano the r e mpl oy e e of the Clin ic , Mic he lle Av e ry , wh o is n ot a 1 pa rt y to t his a pp e a l. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 198 -CV

P at r ic ia B ur de tt , A ppe lla nt

v. John Doe , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN40333 9 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an interlocutory appea l fr o m an orde r deny ing B urdett’s motion for
summa ry jud g me nt o n immun ity g ro un ds
. Th e pla int if f be low , John Do e , f

ile d s uit a g a ins t th e City of Austin and B urdett, both individually and in her official capac ity as an e mploy ee of

the City , for the wr on g fu l di sc los ur e of his HIV- po sit ive status
. After his statutory claims ag ainst the City wer e 1 dismiss ed on the basis that they wer e bar red by g overnme ntal immunit y , Doe r eac hed a se ttlement with the City

and his rema ining c laims a g ainst the City wer e dismiss ed with pr ejudice. B urdett then
asser ted that the ele ction-of- reme dies and settlem en t p ro v isions of the Texas Tort Claims Act (the “ Act”) barr ed Doe ’s claims ag ains t h er a rising out of

the same subjec t matter as Doe ’s suit ag ainst her g overnme nt employ er. See Tex. Ci v. Prac
. & R em . C o de Ann. § 101.106( a), ( c)2

(West 2005). Be cause the Tort Claims Act bar s Doe’s suit ag ainst Bur dett, we rever se t he order of the dis tr ic t c ourt

and re nd e r s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f B ur de tt.
BACK GR OUND Since Marc h of 1997, Doe was a regular patient at the City -run David Powell Clinic, wher e he r ece ived treatment for HIV. He alleg es t hat Burdett, while employ ed as a rec eptionist at the Clin ic , r outin e ly

ha ra sse d a nd dis c ri min a te d a g a inst hi m, and on on e oc c a sio n, int e nti on a lly d i s c l o s e d h i s H IV
- p o s i t i v e s t a tu s b y l o u d l y ye l l i n g h i s tr u e , f u l l n am e a c r o s s th e w a i t i n g r o o ml o b b y. He a lso a sse rt s that Bu

rd e tt an d Mic he lle Av e ry , an oth e r C lin ic e mpl oy e e , p ub lic ly dis c los e d h is f

ull
name and HIV-positive status in a cr owded r estaura nt and wer e over

hear d by sever al people. A fter f i l i n g a f o r m a l c o mp l a i n tw i t ht h e C l i n i c , D o e b r o u g h ts u i ta g a i n s tth e C i ty, B ur d e t t , an d A v e r y,
a lle g ingthe fo llo wi ng c a

us e s of a c tio n: (1 ) a s a g a ins t a ll d e fe nd ants , v iol a tio ns of the Te xas H e a lth
and Sa fe ty Cod e fo r t

he wi llf ul r e le a se or

dis c los ur e of

c on fi de nti a l te st r e sult s; (2) a s a g a ins t a ll de fe nd ants , v iol a tio ns of D oe’s pri vac y ri g hts un de r t

he Te xas C on sti tut ion ; and (3 ) a s a g a ins t Bur dett and Ave ry , the in t en t i o n al i nfliction of emotional distress. Doe sought damag es under section 8 1
. 1 0 4 o f the hea lth and safe ty code, a s well as compe nsatory and punitive damag es for e mo tional distress and hea lth deterioration, declar atory and injunctive re lief, and attorney ’s fe e s and c os ts. I n r e sp on se , th e City a sse rt e d th a t it

wa s im mun e f

r o m D o e ’s statut or

y c la ims be c a

us e the HIV-c onfident i ali ty

provisions of the hea lth and safe ty code did not wa ive its gove rnmental immunit y . After

the district court g rante d the City ’s motion to dis m i s s t h e statutory claims, Doe and the City

settled, and Doe ’s re maining c laims ag ai n s t t h e City wer e dismissed by

ag ree ment3

purs ua nt t o the se ttl e me nt. Th e re a ft e r, B ur de tt mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt a

rguin g that be c a

us e Do e e le c te d to fi le su it a g a ins t he r g ov e rnme nt e mpl oy e r, the Ac t ba rr e d h im f ro m a sse rt ingc la ims ag ainst her a s an employ ee r eg ardingthe same subjec t matter. See id. § 101.106(a) (bar ring rec overy
a g a ins t in div id ual e mpl oy e e wh e n p la int if f f ile s su it a g a ins t g ov e rnme nt e mpl oy e r “ un de r t his chapte r”) . She also maintained that, a s a re sult of Doe’s se ttlement with the Cit y , the Act pr eclude d him from rec overingag ainst her a s an employ ee. See id. § 101 .1 06(c ) ( ba rr ingre c ov e ry

a g a ins t ind ivi du a l e mp lo y e e wh e n s e ttl e me nt i s r e a c he d w ithg ov e rnme nt e mpl oy e r c on c e rn ingc la ims br ou g ht “ un de r thi s c ha

pte r” ). Do e re sp on de d that be c a us e he ha d no t fi le d su it a g a ins t th e C ity under the Act and be cause none of his cla ims arose unde r the Ac t, the s e p ro v i s i o n s had no ef fec t
on his suit ag ainst Bur dett. After a hear ing, the district court denie d Bur dett’s motion for summary judgme nt, and she now a

ppeals. See id. § 54.014(5) (West 2008) (authorizing interloc utory appea l from orde r deny

ing motion for summary j u dg ment based on g overnme nt employ ee or officia l’s
a sse rt ion of immun ity

); see also Newman v. Obe rsteller , 960 S.W .2d 621, 621 (Tex. 1997) (holding that section 101.106 is immunit y statute for pur

poses of sec tion 54.015(5)).
DI SCU SSIO N I n her sole issue on a

ppeal, B urdett cont en d s that the trial cour t erre d in denying her moti onf

o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t b e c a

u s e D o e ’ s c la im s ar e b ar r e d b y s e c ti o n1 0 1
. 1 0 6 o f

the Texas Civi l Practice and Remedie s Code.

We reviewsummary

judgme nts de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v. Do rse tt , 16 4 S
. W
. 3 d 6 56, 661 (Tex. 2005). Bur dett’s motion raises an issue of officia l immuni ty

under the Tort Claims Act that, if applicable , would deprive the court of subj ect- matter jurisdiction. SeeAlthough th e p arties disag ree as to whethe r Doe asser ted a c laim ag ainst the City for 2 violations of his “common law rig ht to privacy , ” i t i s undisputed that Doe plea ded a c ause of action “aga i n s t al l Defe ndants” for violations of his right to privac y under the Texas Consti tution B ill of Rig hts
. After the City was dismiss ed from the suit, and afte r the he aringon and denia l of Bur dett’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, Do e ame nd e d his pe tit ion to as se rt the vio latio n o f p ri va c y c la ims ag ainst only Bur dett and Ave ry . Thus, as Doe conce des, the only live pleadingproper ly

befor e us is D oe’s orig inal petition. Moreove r, like the other courts fac ed with this issue, we c onclude that we 4 Texas De p’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 224 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ). Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of l aw, which we r eview de novo. Id. at 226. L ikewise, de ciding whether D o e ’ s c l a i m s f

a l l u n d e r t h e T o rtC l a i m s A c ti s a m a t t e r o f s t a tu t o r y c o n s tr u c t i o n , w h i c hw e a lso revie w de novo. In reFo rle nz a , 140 S.W .3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2004).

Section 101
. 1 0 6(c) provides, “T he settlement of a claim ar ising unde r this chapter shall immediately

and for ever

bar the claimant from any suit ag ainst or recover y from any

employ ee of the same g overnme ntal unit reg ardingt he same subject matter.” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 10 1. 10 6( c ). Th e re is no dis pute in thi s c a se that Do e se ttl e d his c la ims a g a ins t th e C ity
re gar d i n g t h e same subjec t matter as his cla ims ag ainst Bur dett. The issue is whethe r the settled
c l a i m s ar o s e “ u n d e r t h i s c h a p t e r , ” i
. e . , th e T o rt C l a i m s A c t , th e r e f o r e e n t i t l i n g B ur d e t tt o i m mu n i ty. Doe argues that his claims aga inst the Cit y —violations of the confide ntiality provisions of the health and sa fety

code a nd his rig ht to privac y

under the Texas Consti tution—do not fall under the Tort Claims Act. Bur dett asser ts that while Doe did not bring suit pursuant to a specif ic waive r of immunit y under the Tort Claims Act, his pleading of the tort of inva sion of privac y ag ainst the City imp l i e d l y

i n v o k e d t h e A c t , s u c hth a tth e s e t t l e m e n to f D o e ’ s c l a i m s a g a i n s tth e C i ty ar o se “under this chapter.” 2must look to the plaintiff’s orig inal petition, rather tha n his amended pe tition, i n decidingwhether a tort cl aim was brought ag ainst the City for pur poses of the se ction 101.106 analy sis. See, e .g. , Br own v . KePi ng

Xi e , 260 S
. W
. 3 d 1 1 8 , 1 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ( c o n c lu d in g th a t p la inti f

f ’ s o r ig in a l p e ti ti o n , n o t a

me n d e d p e ti ti o n , is p r o p e r p le a d in g to s c r u ti n iz e in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r d ism iss a l un de r s e c tio n 1 01 .1 06(e ) i s a pp ro pr iate ); Villasan v. O’Rourke , 166 S
. W
. 3 d 752, 762 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2005, pet. denied) (holding that amendingpetition does not a void ma ndatory lang uag e of se ction 101.106(e) wher e dismissal of g overnme nt employ ee is appropriate base d on orig inal petition). 5

We ag ree with Burde tt. Under Mission Con s o l idated Indepe ndent School District

v . G ar c ia , 253 S.W .3d 653 (Tex. 2008), it is clea r t hat “all tort theories alleg ed ag ainst a g overnme nt unit” are broug ht “under

the [Tort Claims Act]” for purposes of section 101.106. See 253 S.W .3d at 6 5 9 (c i t i n g Newman , 960 S.W. 2d a t 622- 23 ). As the Te xas S up re me Court e xpla ine d, “ B e c a

us e the Tort Claims Act is t h e o n l y , albeit limited, avenue f or common-law

rec overy ag ainst the g overnme nt, all tort theories alleg ed ag ainst a g overnme nt unit, whether it is sued alone or tog ether with its employ ees, a

re a ssumed to be ‘unde r the [Act].’” Id. This is the case e ven whe n the plaintiff
asser ts intentional torts or other claims ag ainst the g overnme ntal unit for which the A ct h as not waived immunity
. Id. at 6 5 8 -5 9 (c i t i n g Harris County v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 640 (Tex. 2004) (ap p l yi n g s ec t i o n1 0 1
. 1 0 6 t o b ar p l ai n t i ff ’s cl ai maga i n s tgo v ern m en t al e m p l o y ee ev en th o u gh immun ity wa s n ot w a ive d und e r T or t Cla ims Ac t) ; Dallas County Mental Health &Mental Retardation v. Bossley , 968 S.W .2d 339, 344 (Tex. 1998) (dismissing suit a g ainst employ ee when bo th e mpl oy e e and g ov e rnme nta l unit we re su e d b a se d o n n e g lig e nc e the or ie s th a t w e re no t w ith in Ac t’ s li mi ted wa ive r) ; Liu v . Ci ty of S an An ton io , 8 8 S. W.3 d 7 37 , 7 44 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) (d ism iss ingint e nti on a l to rt c la ims a g a ins t emp loye e wh e n th e g ov e rnme nta l un it ha d a lso be e n s ue d) ; Flores v. Law , 8 S.W .3d 785, 786-87 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,Doe ha s cited no authority , nor have we f ound any , holding that the bill of rig hts of the 3 Texas Consti tution waives a g overnme ntal unit’s immuni ty or cr eate s an implied rig ht of action for i n v as i o no f p ri v ac y

cl ai m s . Hi s as s er t i o nt h a t “ a co n s t i tu t i o n al cl ai mi ni t s el f w ai v es s o v er ei gn immunit y ” and citation to this Court’s decision in Texas State Employe es Union v. Tex as W orkforce Commission , 1 6 S. W.3 d 6 1 ( Te x. Ap p.—Au stin 2 00 0, pe t. ) , is ina pp os ite . In th a t c a se , w e he ld that sov e r e ignimmu

n it y d id n o t b ar a s u it f o r in ju n c ti v e r e li e f

to p r e v e n t a

s tate a g e n c y

from actingoutside of its constitut i o n al and statutory authority
. Id. at 69. Suits for equitable re medies for violation of c onstitut ional r ig hts a r e n o t p r o h ib ited beca

use such r elief is funda

mentally “diffe rent from see king c ompensation for da mag es, or c ompensation in money for a l o s s or injury .” City of Beaumont v . Bouillion , 896 S.W .2d 143, 149 (Tex. 1995). 6 pet. denied) (dismissing medica l malprac tice suit aga i n st employ ee when g overnme ntal unit had
a lso be e n s ue d) ; W

hite v . A nn is , 864 S.W .2d 127, 132 (Tex. Ap p .— Dallas 1993, wr it denied) (dismissing neg lige nt-trainingsuit ag ainst employ ee when g overnme ntal unit was also sued))
.

I t is clear a fter Ga rc ia that beca use Doe soug ht rec overy

from the City for violations of his rig ht t o p ri vacy

under the bill of rights of the Texas Consti tution, his claims wer e brought “under the Act” for purposes of section 101.106. Whil e framed as a constitutional violation, Doe’s
su it s ou g ht d ama g e s f

ro m th e City . A s su c h, his c la im f or dama g e s f

or c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns is
a suit a g ainst the State that invokes the doctrine of sovere ign immunit y . Doe ha s asserte d a cla im for inv as ion of privac y , an intentional tort, see Billings v. Atkinson , 489 S.W .2d 858, 860-61 (Tex. 1973), for which the Tort Claims Act has not waived immuni ty , Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057 (West 2005) (sove reig n immunit y exis ts for int en t i o n al t o rt s). The f act that the Texas Supreme Court has re cog nized that o ur constitution protects per sonal privac y from
unrea sonable g overnme ntal intrusions, see Texas State Employe es Union v. Tex as Dep’t of Me ntal Health & Mental Retardation , 746 S.W .2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987), does not amount to a wa iver of immun ity fo r t he purp os e s o f t

he To rt Cla ims Ac t. There fore , beca use Doe ’s invasion of priva cy 37

claim ag ainst the City

was a claim “a

rising unde r” the Tort Claims Act that was settled, we hold that
se c tio n 1 01 .1 06 (c ) b ars Do e ’s c la ims a g a ins t B ur de tt.
CO NC LU SION Be cause Do e’s suit was br oug ht under the Te x as Tort Claims Act for purposes of
se c tio n 1 01 .1 06 of

the c ivi l pra c tic e and re me die s cod e , the re fo re ba rr ingre c ov e ry

a g a ins t B ur de tt
a s a r e s u lt o f D o e ’ s s e tt le me n t w it h th e Ci ty , w e r e v e r s e th e d is tr ic t c o urt’ s o r d er and rende r
summa ry jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f B ur de tt.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Reverse d and Rende red Filed: De cembe r 17, 2008