# IMMC.COM%282021%29527%20final.ENG.xhtml.1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.docx

european flagEUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 2.6.2021 COM(2021) 527 final Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION delivering a Council opinion on the 2021 Convergence Programme of Sweden {SWD(2021) 501 final}
Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION delivering a Council opinion on the 2021 Convergence Programme of Sweden THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 1 , and in particular Article 9(2) thereof, Having regard to the Recommendation of the European Commission, Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament, After consulting the Economic and Financial Committee, Whereas: (1) On 20 March 2020, the Commission adopted a Communication on the activation of the general escape clause 2 of the Stability and Growth Pact. 3 In its Communication, the Commission set out its view that, given the expected severe economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak, the conditions to activate the general escape clause were met. On 23 March 2020, the Ministers of Finance of the Member States agreed with the assessment of the Commission. The general escape clause has granted Member States budgetary flexibility to deal with the crisis. It has facilitated the coordination of budgetary policies in times of severe economic downturn. Its activation allows for a temporary departure from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective of each Member State, provided this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. On 17 September 2020, in its Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy, the Commission announced that the general escape clause would remain active in 2021. 4 (2) On 20 July 2020, the Council recommended Sweden 5 to take all necessary measures, in line with the general escape clause, to effectively address the pandemic, sustain the economy and support the ensuing recovery. It also recommended Sweden to pursue, when economic conditions allow, fiscal policies aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions and ensuring debt sustainability, while enhancing investment. (3) Next Generation EU, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility, will ensure a sustainable, inclusive and fair recovery. Regulation (EU) 2021/241 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility 6 came into force on 19 February 2021. This Facility will provide financial support for the implementation of reforms and investment, entailing a fiscal impulse financed by the EU. It will contribut e to the economic recovery , to the implementation of sustainable and growth-enhancing reforms and investment, notably to promote the green and digital transition s, and it will strengthen the econom ies ’ resilience and potential growth . In turn, it will also help public finances to return to more favourable positions in the near term and will contribute to strengthening sustainab le public finances, growth and job creation in the medium and long term. (4) On 3 March 2021, the Commission adopted a Communication providing further policy orientations to facilitate the coordination of fiscal policies and the preparation of Member States’ Stability and Convergence Programmes. 7 The overall fiscal stance , taking into account national budgets and the R ecovery and Resilience Facility , should remain supportive in 2021 and 2022. At the same time, given the expectation of economic activity gradually normalising in the second half of 2021, Member States’ fiscal policies should become more differentiated in 2022. Member States’ fiscal policies should take into account the state of the recovery, fiscal sustainability and the need to reduce economic, social and territorial divergences. In view of the need to support a sustainable recovery for the EU, Member States with low sustainability risks should gear their budgets towards maintaining a supportive fiscal policy in 2022, taking into account the impact of the Recovery and Resilience Facility . Member States with high debt levels should pursue prudent fiscal policies, while preserving nationally financed investment and making use of grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility to fund additional high-quality investment projects and structural reforms . For the period beyond 2022, fiscal policies should continue to take into account the strength of the recovery, the degree of economic uncertainty and fiscal sustainability considerations. A refocusing of fiscal policies towards achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions , including by phasing out support measures in due course , will contribute to ensuring fiscal sus tainability in the medium term . (5) The Communication of 3 March 2021 also announced the Commission’s view that the decision on the deactivation or continued application of the general escape clause should be taken as an overall assessment of the state of the economy, wit h the level of economic activity in the EU or euro area compared to pre-crisis levels (end-2019) as key quantitative criterion. On the basis of the Commission’s 2021 spring forecast, on 2 June the Commission considered that the conditions to continue to apply the general escape clause in 2022 and to deactivate it as of 2023 were met. Country-specific situations will continue to be taken into account after the deactivation of the general escape clause. 8 (6) O n 30 April 2021, Sweden submitted its 2021 Convergence Programme, in line with Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. (7) In 2020, based on data validated by Eurostat , Sweden ’s general government deficit was 3.1 % of GDP, while general government debt increased to 39 . 9 % of GDP. T he annual change in the primary budget balance amounted to -3 . 8 % of GDP, including discretionary budgetary measures of 3 . 3 % of GDP in support of the economy and the operation of automatic stabilisers . Sweden also provided liquidity support to companies and households ( such as guarantees and tax deferrals , which do not have a direct and immediate budgetary impact ) estimated at 11.5% of GDP .
On 2 June 2021, the Commission issued a report under Article 126(3) TFEU. This report discusses the budgetary situation of Sweden, as its general government deficit in 2020 exceeded the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value. The report concluded that the deficit criterion was fulfilled. (8) The macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is cautious in 2021 and realistic in 2022. Being based on more recent data, the Commission Spring 2021 forecast expects a rate of real GDP growth in 2021 that is higher than the baseline scenario in the 2021 Convergence Programme. (9) In its 2021 Convergence Programme, the government plans a n increase in the general government deficit from 3 . 1 % of GDP in 2020 to 4 . 5 % of GDP in 2021 , while the debt ratio is planned to remain at 39 . 9 % of GDP in 2021 . According to the p rogramme, the change in the primary budget balance in 2021 compared with the pre-crisis level (2019) is set to amount to - 5 . 2 % of GDP, reflecting the discretionary budgetary measures of 5 . 0 % of GDP in support of the economy and the operation of automatic stabilisers . These projections for the general government deficit are higher than in the Commission’s 2021 spring forecast , which expects a faster rebound in economic activity and therefore lower expenditure on crisis support measures, notably to cover temporary unemployment and turnover losses of firms that are heavily affected by the crisis. (10) In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic downturn, Sweden has adopted budgetary measures to strengthen the capacity of its health system, contain the pandemic and provide relief to those individuals and sectors that have been particularly affected. This forceful policy response has cushioned the contraction in GDP, which, in turn, curtailed the increase in government deficit and public debt. Fiscal measures should maximise support to the recovery without pre-empting future fiscal trajectories. Therefore, measures should avoid creating a permanent burden on public finances. When Member States introduce permanent measures, they should properly fund them to ensure budgetary neutrality in the medium term. The measures taken by Sweden in 2020 and 2021 have been in line with the Council Recommendation of 20 July 2020. Some of the discretionary measures adopted by the government in 2020 and 2021, and announced for 2022 do not appear to be temporary or matched by offsetting measures. Beyond the horizon of the Commission’s forecast , i n 2023, the remaining impact of those non-temporary measures is preliminarily estimated at around 1 % of GDP, mainly consisting of several expenditure measures as well as income tax cuts. (11) T he 2021 Convergence Programme does not include any expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility . The Commission’s spring forecast includes revenue from RRF grants in its budgetary projections amounting to 1/ 11 th of the total available grant allocation in 2021 and 2/11 th in 202 2 and assumes a simplified and linear integration of RRF-financed expenditure 9 . (12) The established indicators of fiscal adjustment set out in Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 need to be considered in the context of the current circumstances. First , there is significant uncertainty surrounding output gap estimates . Second , there is a need for fiscal policy to stand ready to rapidly adapt to the evolution of the pandemic , shifting from emergency relief to more targeted measures once health risks diminish . T hird , the current context is characterised by a significant policy response to support economic activity . I n the presence of sizeable transfers from the EU budget (such as those from the Recovery and Resilience Facility), the established indicators do not capture the full impulse provided by fiscal policies to the economy. Against this background , the structural balance do es not appear adequate in the current circumstances. The expenditure benchmark , in turn, needs to be adapted 10 and complemented with additional information in order to fully gauge the fiscal policy orientation . First, similarly to the approach pursed in the assessment of the 2021 Draft Budgetary Plans, temporary emergency measures have been excluded from the expenditure aggregate. These crisis-related temporary emergency measures support health systems and compensate workers and firms for the losses in income due to lockdowns and supply chain disruptions; their reversal by the public authorities is contingent on the return of the public health and economic situation to normality. Second, to assess the overall fiscal stance at the current juncture, the sizeable transfers from the EU budget (such as those from the Recovery and Resilience Facility) should be included in the relevant expenditure aggregate. Therefore, the fiscal stance is then measured by the change in primary expenditure (net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding crisis-related temporary emergency measures) including expenditure financed by grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other EU funds. Going beyond the overall fiscal stance, the analysis also aims at assessing whether national fiscal policy is prudent and its composition is conducive to a sustainable recovery consistent with the green and digital transitions. For that reason, particular attention is paid to the evolution of nationally financed primary current expenditure and investment. (13) In its 2021 Convergence Programme , Sweden ’s general government deficit is planned to decrease to 1 . 0 % of GDP in 2022 , in line with the Commission’s 2021 spring forecast, mainly due to the economic recovery, coupled with the discontinuation of the temporary support measures adopted in 2020 and 2021 . The general government debt ratio is planned to decrease to 37 . 0 % of GDP in 2022 , somewhat below the Commission’s 2021 spring forecast , partly due to valuation effects . Based on the Commision’s forecast, t he overall fiscal stance as defined above – also including the impact on aggregate demand in 2022 from investment financed by both the national and the EU budgets, notably the Recovery and Resilience Facility – is estimated at -0.2 % of GDP 11 . The positive contribution of e xpenditure financed by Recovery and Resilience Facility grants and other EU funds is projected to increase by 0. 1 percentage points of GDP. Nationally financed investment is projected to provide a neutral contribution . 12 Nationally financed primary current expenditure (net of discretionary revenue measures) is projected to provide a n expansionary contribution of 0.1 percentage points of GDP. (14) The quality of Member States’ budgetary measures appear s particularly important. Fiscal structural reforms aimed at improving the composition of national budgets can support potential growth, create much-needed fiscal space and help ensuring fiscal sustainability over the longer term, including in view of climate change and health challenges. On the revenue side, the COVID-19 crisis has reinforced the importance of reforms for more efficient and fairer public revenue systems. On the expenditure side, it has made even more crucial to increase the level and quality of sustainable and growth-enhancing investments, consistent with serving the objectives of enhancing growth potential, economic and social resilience and the gr een and digital twin transition. T he Recovery and Resilience Plan s will allow to improv e the composition of national budgets. (15) According to the programme’s medium-term budgetary plans, t he general government surplus is planned to increase from 0 . 5 % in 2023 to 1 . 0 % of GDP in 2024 . The Programme does not include the information required to estimate the overall fiscal stance in 2023 and 2024. T he current estimate of the 10-year average nominal potential growth is 4 % 13 . However, this estimate does not include the impact of the reforms that are part of the Recovery and Resilience Plan and can boo st Sweden’s potential growth. (16) The general government debt ratio is planned to decrease from 33.7 % of GDP in 2023 to 31.4 % of GDP in 2024. Sweden is considered to face low fiscal sustainability risks o ver the medium term, as per the latest debt sustainability analysis 14 . (17) In view of the currently still exceptionally high degree of uncertainty, the fiscal policy guidance should remain predominantly qualitative. More precise quantified guidance for the later years should be provided in 2022, if the degree of uncertainty has sufficiently declined by then. The Council has assessed the 2021 Convergence Programme and the follow-up by Sweden to the Council Recommendation of 20 July 2020. HEREBY RECOMMENDS SWEDEN TO: 1. In 2022, maintain a supportive fiscal stance, including the impulse provided by the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and preserve nationally financed investment. 2. When economic conditions allow, pursue a fiscal policy aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions and ensuring fiscal sustainability in the medium term. At the same time, enhance investment to boost growth potential
3. Pay particular attention to the composition of public finances, both on the revenue and expenditure side s of the budget, and to the quality of budgetary measures, to ensure a sustainable and inclusive recovery. Prioritise sustainable and growth-enhancing investment , notably supporting the green and digital transition . Give priority to fiscal structural reforms that will help provide financing for public policy priorities and contribute to the long-term sustainability of public finances, including by strengthening the coverage, adequacy, and sustainability of health and social protection systems for all. Done at Brussels, 2.6.2021 For the Council The President
(1) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
(2) The clause, as set out in Articles 5(1), 6(3), 9(1) and 10(3) of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 and Articles 3(5) and 5(2) of Regulation (EC) 1467/97, facilitates the coordination of budgetary policies in times of severe economic downturn.
(3) Communication from the Commission to the Council on the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact , Brussels, 20.3.2020, COM(2020) 123 final.
(4) Communication from the Commission on Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021, Brussels, 17.9.2020, COM(2020) 575 final.
(5) Council Recommendation of 20 July 2020 on the N ational Reform Programme of Sweden and delivering a Council opinion on the 202 0 Convergence Programme of Sweden , OJ C 282, 26.8.2020, p. 177 .
(6)
OJ
L57, 18.2.2021, p.17.
(7) C ommunication from the Commission to the Council on one year since the outbreak of COVID-19: fiscal policy response, Brussels, 3.3.2021, COM(2021) 105 final.
(8) Communication from the Commission on Economic policy coordination in 2021: overcoming COVID-19, supporting the recovery and modernising our economy, Brussels, 2.6.2021, COM(2021)500 final.
(9) See Box 1.2.3 in the Commission European Economic Forecast of spring 2021 .
(10) In particular, the 4-year smoothing of investment used in the expenditure benchmark does not allow assessing properly the fiscal support to the recovery provided by nationally financed investments.
(11) A negative sign of the indicator corresponds to an excess of the primary expenditure growth compared with medium-term economic growth, which indicates an expansionary fiscal policy.
(12) Other nationally financed capital expenditure is projected to provide a neutral contribution.
(13) Estimated by the Commission, f ollowing the commonly agreed methodology .
(14) See Commission Staff Working Document – Statistical Annex providing background data relevant for the assessment of the 2021 Stability and Convergence Programmes ,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip143_en.pdf
.