This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-2182

In re the Marriage of:

Christine Lynn Sypnieski,

f/k/a Christine Lynn Holtz, petitioner,

Respondent,

vs.

Kevin Douglas Holtz,

Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2015

Affirmed

Kirk, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court

File No. 18-FA-11-913

Edward R. Shaw, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Thomas C. Pearson, Daniel M. Hawley, Gammello, Qualley, Pearson & Mallak, PLLC, 

Baxter, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Chutich, 

Judge. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KIRK, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s increase of respondent’s parenting time. 

Because we conclude that the district court applied the proper standard and made 

sufficient findings, we affirm.

FACTS

This case arises from the marriage dissolution of respondent-mother Christine

Lynn Sypnieski and appellant-father Kevin Douglas Holtz, the parents of two minor 

children. Under a temporary order filed in October 2012, the district court granted 

mother supervised parenting time, including one four-hour period every other weekend 

and one two-hour period each Tuesday. On March 11, 2013, after a trial on custody and 

parenting time, the district court granted father permanent sole physical and sole legal 

custody of the children subject to mother’s continued supervised parenting time until 

April 13, when it would move to a graduated, unsupervised schedule. On March 27, 

father moved that mother’s supervised parenting time continue indefinitely. The district 

court retracted mother’s graduated, unsupervised parenting time and reinstated a

supervised parenting-time schedule.

In October 2014, mother moved for unsupervised parenting time. Following a 

motion hearing, the district court issued an order awarding mother the following ongoing,

unsupervised parenting time under the “best-interests standard”: (1) two hours every 

Wednesday, and every other weekend, initially from 3:00 p.m. on Friday until 6:00 p.m. 

on Saturday, and, beginning in April 2015, from 3:00 p.m. on Friday until 6:00 p.m. on 
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Sunday; (2) half of all holidays1and school vacation time, with the exception of summer 

vacation; and (3) two seven-day periods in the summer.

Father appeals, arguing that (1) the increase in mother’s parenting time constitutes 

a restriction of his parenting time, requiring application of the endangerment standard 

rather than the best-interests standard, and (2) the district court erred in failing to analyze 

his loss of parenting time due to the increase in mother’s parenting time.2

D E C I S I O N

The district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting-time issues based on 

the best interests of the children and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 

Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). A district court abuses its discretion 

if its findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law. Pikula v. Pikula, 

374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “A district court’s findings of fact underlying a 

parenting-time decision will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Dahl v. Dahl, 

765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 

735 (Minn. 1978)). But determining the legal standard applicable to a change in 

parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de novo review. Anderson v. Archer, 

510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993).

 

1

The district court’s order did not specify which holidays mother would parent the 

children.

2 We note that, although the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to 

remove the supervision requirement in this matter, father is not appealing that removal. 

See In re Welfare of B.K.P., 662 N.W.2d 913, 915-17 (Minn. App. 2003) (remanding to 

district court for evidentiary hearing on issue of removal of supervised parenting-time 

restriction).
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I. The district court properly applied the best-interests standard because the 

increase in mother’s parenting time did not constitute a restriction of father’s 

parenting time.

Parenting-time issues are governed by Minn. Stat. § 518.175 (2014). A district 

court “shall modify” an order granting or denying parenting time “[i]f modification 

would serve the best interests of the child” and “would not change the child’s primary 

residence.” Id., subd. 5(a). However, the district court may not restrict parenting time 

unless it finds that

(1) parenting time is likely to endanger the child’s physical or 

emotional health or impair the child’s emotional 

development; or 

(2) the parent has chronically and unreasonably failed to 

comply with court-ordered parenting time.

Id., subd. 5(b).

A restriction of parenting time under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b), constitutes

a substantial alteration of visitation rights. See Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 4; Lutzi v. Lutzi, 

485 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. App. 1992). A court order that lessens one parent’s 

parenting time is not necessarily a “restriction” of parenting time. Danielson v. 

Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. App. 1986). To determine whether a reduction 

in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the district court should 

consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction. Anderson, 

510 N.W.2d at 4. The intent of the statute is to allow a child to maintain a relationship

with both parents. Clark v. Clark, 346 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. App. 1984), review 

denied (Minn. June 12, 1984).
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This court has previously concluded that a restriction existed where there was a 

slow erosion of parenting time from 14 weeks per year to 5 1/2 weeks per year, without 

good reason. Id. at 385–86. In contrast, we have also concluded that a modification was 

insubstantial where it was caused by a move to a different state and where the parents 

were left with nearly equal parenting time after the change, excluding time when the 

children were sleeping or in school. Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 5; see also Danielson, 393 

N.W.2d at 406, 407 (following removal of children to Montana, change in visitation from 

every other weekend plus alternating holidays to summer visitation of two weeks in 1986, 

three weeks in 1987, and four weeks in 1988 plus visitation in Montana on reasonable 

notice and 24 hours visitation during children’s visits to Montana governed by bestinterests standard); cf. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d at 124 (modification from one week at 

Christmas and an extended summer break of undefined duration to a grant of three 11–

hour days per month and one 11–hour day for Christmas was substantial and constituted a

restriction of parenting time). 

Here, in finding no restriction, the district court described the order as only 

“slightly” increasing mother’s parenting time, and explained that the parties’

circumstances have changed, in that mother “has demonstrated a correction of the 

problems which caused the [c]ourt to reduce her parenting time and to require that it be 

supervised.”

If three hours is considered a half-day (since much of a child’s typical week is 

spent sleeping or in school), mother had the children less than 10 percent of the time 

under the supervised parenting-time order. See Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (for 
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purposes of 25 percent parenting time presumption, allowing calculation of the 

percentage of parenting time using overnights or another method if the parent has 

significant time periods on separate days when the child is in the parent’s physical 

custody but does not stay overnight). Using similar calculations, mother still has less 

than 25 percent of the time under the new order.

The context of the change is very significant in this case. For practical reasons, 

the length of most supervised parenting time is limited. Although the increase in 

mother’s parenting time, and consequent decrease for father, is a sizable mathematical 

change, it does not amount to a restriction in this context because it provides mother with 

a relatively low amount of unsupervised parenting time, and father maintains the vast 

majority of the time with the children. See Dahl, 765 N.W.2d at 124 (holding that the 

rebuttable statutory presumption that a parent is entitled to receive at least 25 percent of 

the parenting time applies to motions for parenting-time modification). Therefore, the 

district court properly applied the best-interests standard to mother’s motion.

II. The district court made sufficient findings regarding father’s loss of 

parenting time due to the increase in mother’s parenting time.

Father argues that the district court erred by failing to calculate the amount of his 

reduction in parenting time or analyze the effect of the reduction on his relationship with 

the children. While caselaw requires consideration of the “amount of the reduction,” 

nothing requires a finding of the specific percentage of time lost or total time lost. See 

Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 4. The district court acknowledged the reduction in father’s 

parenting time and described the increase in mother’s time as “slight.” It also found that 
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the increase in mother’s time was in the best interests of the children, implicitly holding 

that the new schedule would enable a healthy relationship with both parents. Under the 

totality of the circumstances, it appears that the district court’s findings were sufficient.

Affirmed.