Filed 8/21/23 In re N.L. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re N.L. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F085845

(Super. Ct. Nos. JD142610-00, 

JD142611-00)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales 

Norris, Judge.

Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
2.

INTRODUCTION

J.M. (mother) and T.L. (father) are the parents of daughter N.L. (born 

February 2016) and T.L.J. (born November 2018) (collectively, the children). Father 

appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating his parental rights pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 He contends the Kern County 

Department of Human Services (department) and the court failed to comply with the 

inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) 

and related California law because ICWA notice was defective as it identified father by 

the wrong last name.

2

 The department concedes error occurred and agrees to a limited 

remand.

For the reasons discussed herein, we accept the department’s concession of ICWA 

error. Consistent with our decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.) and 

In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.), we conclude “the error is prejudicial 

because neither the [department] nor the court gathered information sufficient to ensure a 

reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the 

first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([In re] A.R. 

[(2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252–254 [(A.R.)].) Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the 

juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion, as set forth herein.” (K.H., at p. 591; accord, E.C., at 

pp. 157–158.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even 

though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are 

preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
3.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

On October 22, 2021, the department filed petitions on behalf of the children 

pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The petitions contained an “Indian Child 

Inquiry Attachment” (ICWA-010(A)) for each child stating mother gave no reason to 

believe the children were or could be Indian children. However, the day before the 

petition was filed, mother was asked if she had Indian ancestry and she stated she heard 

the family had “ ‘Indian in them,’ ” but could not provide further information. 

On October 25, 2021, mother filed a “Parental Notification of Indian Status” 

(ICWA-020) form stating she was or could be a member of, or eligible for membership in 

a federally recognized Indian tribe, but wrote “unsure” in the line designated for the 

tribe’s name. That same day the juvenile court held a detention hearing in which mother 

was present. The court stated it received mother’s ICWA-020 form and conducted an 

inquiry. Mother stated she believed she could have Indian ancestry. The court asked if 

anyone in her family was enrolled or eligible for enrollment in a tribe and mother 

responded, “I don’t think so honestly.” She heard she had Cherokee and Blackfoot

ancestry from maternal grandfather and maternal great-grandfather. She said maternal 

grandfather was still alive and provided his name. She said she could try to get a hold of 

him, but she did not speak to him much. She did not have his address or phone number 

but said she could try to obtain it. The court directed her to gather the information and 

provide it to her social worker. As far as maternal great-grandfather, she said she did not 

speak to him at all. She said maternal grandmother might have information and provided 

her name and phone number. The court told her to provide maternal grandmother’s 

address to the social worker. She clarified she believed she had Cherokee ancestry 

through her father’s side and Blackfoot ancestry through her mother’s side. The court 

3 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we restrict our facts to those 

bearing on that issue or helpful for clarity.
4.

reserved as to ICWA. The court found a prima facie case had been established and 

ordered the children detained from mother. 

Jurisdiction and Disposition

The jurisdiction report stated a paralegal was assigned to complete an ICWA 

inquiry with mother. When the paralegal spoke to mother, she reported she did not know 

anything about her possible Cherokee and Blackfoot ancestry and that the paralegal 

would need to speak to maternal grandmother. She provided her name and phone 

number. She also provided maternal grandfather’s name but did not have his contact 

information. The paralegal then attempted to make telephone contact with maternal 

grandmother, but was unsuccessful. She left a voicemail requesting a call back and sent a 

text message stating the same. 

On December 7, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing where father made his first appearance. The court conducted an 

ICWA inquiry with father. It acknowledged receiving father’s ICWA-020 form in which 

father reported he believed he had Indian ancestry with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribes. 

He informed the court that his great-grandmother on his mother’s side (i.e., paternal 

great-great-grandmother) told him “she was half Cherokee half Choctaw.” He provided 

paternal grandmother and paternal great-great-grandmother’s names. However, paternal 

great-great-grandmother had passed away. The court asked if paternal grandmother 

would have more information and father reported she would not because she is an 

alcoholic and there was no one else who would have “too much” of that information. He 

said paternal cousin T.W. would have a little more information and provided her phone 

number. He could not provide contact information for paternal grandmother because she 

did not own a cell phone and was homeless. The court reserved making an ICWA 

finding as to father. The court found the allegations in the petition true and continued the 

disposition hearing. 
5.

In December 2021 and January 2022, the department’s paralegal contacted, or 

attempted to make contact with, several family members to conduct ICWA inquiries, 

including maternal grandmother, paternal grandfather, and paternal great-grandparents. 

The paralegal was able to speak with maternal grandmother and paternal grandfather who 

both provided familial information. 

On January 11, 2022, the department sent “Notice of Child Custody Proceeding 

for Indian Child” (ICWA-030) forms on behalf of the children to the Blackfeet, 

Cherokee, and Choctaw tribes. The notices listed father’s name incorrectly by listing his 

middle name as his last name. The department subsequently received responses from the

tribes stating the children were not enrolled members or eligible for membership. 

On February 28, 2022, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing and found 

there was no reason to believe or know the children were Indian children and, therefore, 

ICWA did not apply. The court ordered the children detained, ordered the parents 

participate in reunification services, and set a six-month status review hearing. 

Six-Month Status Review

The status review report stated the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply, and 

no new information had been provided. On September 28, 2022, at the six-month status 

review hearing, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 

hearing. 

Section 366.26

The section 366.26 report stated no new ICWA information had been received. 

On January 26, 2023, the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Father subsequently 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 
6.

DISCUSSION

I. ICWA

A. Legal Principles

“ ‘ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state 

court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation’ 

[citations], in furtherance of ‘federal policy “ ‘that, where possible, an Indian child should 

remain in the Indian community’ ” ’ [citations]. ‘ICWA establishes minimum federal 

standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children 

from their families’ [citations], and ‘[w]hen ICWA applies, the Indian tribe has a right to 

intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.’ ” (K.H., supra,

84 Cal.App.5th 566, 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138, 

fn. omitted.)

“ ‘In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive provisions of 

ICWA.’ [Citations.] The Legislature’s ‘primary objective ... was to increase

compliance with ICWA. California Indian Legal Services (CILS), a proponent of the 

bill, observed that courts and county agencies still had difficulty complying with ICWA 

25 years after its enactment, and CILS believed codification of [ICWA’s] requirements 

into state law would help alleviate the problem. [Citation.]’ ” (K.H., supra, 

84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138–139.)

“ ‘In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance. 

[Citation.] Following the enactment of the federal regulations, California made 

conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions 

Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry requirements. [Citations.] Those changes 

became effective January 1, 2019 ....’ [Citation.] Subsequently, the Legislature 

amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), to define ‘reason to believe,’ effective 

September 18, 2020.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596, fn. omitted; accord, 

E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)
7.

1. Summary of Duties of Inquiry and Notice

“[W]hether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe 

is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the [department] nor 

the court plays any role in making that determination. [Citations.] ‘ “Because it typically 

is not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate 

certain inquiries to be made in each case.” ’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596; 

accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.)

“In California, section 224.2 ‘codifies and elaborates on ICWA’s requirements of 

notice to a child’s parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the 

[Bureau of Indian Affairs].’ ” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.) California 

law imposes “an affirmative and continuing duty [on the court and the county welfare 

department] to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300 ... may be 

or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)

“The [state law] duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not 

limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any 

information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “If a child is 

placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to 

[s]ection 306[,] ... the county welfare department ... has a duty to inquire whether that 

child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, 

legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest 

in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may 

be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Additionally, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the 

court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or 

has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to 

inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know 

the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
8.

“If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved 

in a proceeding—that is, if the court or social worker ‘has information suggesting that 

either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership 

in an Indian tribe’—then the court or social worker ‘shall make further inquiry’ regarding 

the child’s possible Indian status as soon as practicable.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 

81 Cal.App.5th 984, 999 (Ezequiel G.), citing § 224.2, subd. (e).) “Further inquiry 

‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Interviewing the parents, 

Indian custodian, and extended family members[;] [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services[; and] [¶] (C) Contacting the 

tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information 

regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ” (Ezequiel G., at 

p. 999.)

“If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the [department] shall 

provide notice to the relevant tribes and agencies in accordance with section 224.3, 

subdivision (a)(5).” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999, citing § 224.2, 

subd. (f).) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory 

criteria is met—i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or 

parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or 

either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or 

citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (Ezequiel G., at p. 999, citing § 224.2, subd. (d).)

County welfare departments “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a 

detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all 

information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how 

and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new 
9.

information is received, that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)4

B. Standard of Review

“The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on 

two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the 

evidence.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, 

E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no 

reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether 

any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., at 

p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.) Second, “[t]he juvenile 

court must ... find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence ....’ ” (K.H., 

at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.)

Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh 

the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” 

[Citation.] The determinations should “be upheld if ... supported by substantial 

evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court 

might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations.] The 

standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and 

weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [citation], and ‘an appellate court should 

accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial 

evidence in the record’ [citation]. ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make 

credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” (K.H., 

supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)

The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately 

discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’ 

4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
10.

various factors in assessing whether the [department’s] inquiry was proper and adequate 

within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the [department] acted with 

due diligence.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re Caden C. (2021)

11 Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; Ezequiel G., supra, 

81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review 

the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. (K.H., at 

p. 601; accord, E.C., at pp. 143–144; Ezequiel G., at pp. 1004–1005.)

“ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial 

evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. 

A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal 

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” 

[Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the 

facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial 

court[.]” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of 

determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to 

be very pronounced.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C., supra, 

85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 143–144.)

“Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is 

deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to 

determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ [Citations.] Where the material 

facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether 

ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, 

E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) 
11.

C. Analysis

1. Summary of ICWA Inquiry and Notice 

In the present case, both the department and the juvenile court conducted ICWA 

inquiries with mother and father. Mother claimed Indian ancestry with the Cherokee and 

Blackfoot tribes, and father claimed ancestry with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribes. The 

department then sought out extended family members whom mother and father had 

provided contact information for to conduct inquiries with them. The department spoke 

with maternal grandmother and paternal grandfather, who both provided familial 

information. Thereafter, the department sent notice to the Blackfeet, Cherokee, and 

Choctaw tribes. However, the notice incorrectly listed father’s name by identifying his 

middle name as his last name. The tribes sent responses stating the children were not 

Indian children. The court found ICWA did not apply. Father argues the defective notice 

renders it meaningless and he was prejudiced as a result of the error. The department 

concedes it conducted an inadequate inquiry. 

In K.H. and E.C., we addressed ICWA error at the inquiry stage. There, we 

explained our decision not to follow the approaches articulated by other appellate courts 

for determining whether ICWA error requires reversal and concluded that the Supreme 

Court’s decision in A.R. supplies the appropriate framework for assessing prejudice in 

this context. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607–608, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) Applying the standards 

we articulated in K.H. and E.C., as we will discuss below, we agree with the parties and 

conclude the department’s error is prejudicial and remand for the department to conduct a 

proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry is necessary.
12.

2. The Department and Juvenile Court Erred

As previously mentioned, “[i]f the court[ or the department] has reason to believe 

that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information 

to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court [or the 

department] shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, 

and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “There is reason 

to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, social 

worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the child 

or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (Id., 

subd. (e)(1).)

Thereafter, “[i]f there is reason to know ... that the child is an Indian child, the 

party seeking foster care placement shall provide notice in accordance with 

[section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5)].” (§ 224.2, subd. (f).) “If there is reason to know the 

child is an Indian child, but the court does not have sufficient evidence to determine that 

the child is or is not an Indian child, the court shall confirm, by way of a report, 

declaration, or testimony included in the record that the [department] or other party used 

due diligence to identify and work with all of the tribes of which there is reason to know 

the child may be a member, or eligible for membership, to verify whether the child is in 

fact a member or whether a biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for 

membership.” (§ 224.2, subd. (g).) “Notices must include the identifying information for 

the child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, to the extent known.

(§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) As a best practice, they should also contain ‘all available 

information about the child’s ancestors, especially the ones with the alleged Indian 

heritage.’ ” (In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 742.)

Here, the department’s notice was defective, a point the department does not 

dispute. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was not 
13.

supported by substantial evidence, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of discretion. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

3. Prejudice

“Where, as here, the deficiency lies with [the department’s] duty of [...] inquiry 

and a juvenile court’s related finding of ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due 

diligence’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the error is one of state law ([In re] Benjamin M., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742). Under the California Constitution, ‘[n]o judgment shall be set 

aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of 

the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of 

pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of 

the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error 

complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)” 

(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 151.)

“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must 

clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of 

justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage 

of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it 

reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but 

for the error.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–607; accord, E.C., supra, 

85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 151–152.)

However, in A.R., the Supreme Court “recognized that while we generally apply a 

Watson[5]likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a merits-based outcome-focused 

test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant 

harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an 

outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome misplaces 

5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.
14.

the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect.” 

(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics omitted.)

As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation ....’ ” 

(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or 

protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra, 

85 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California 

statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the 

child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings’

[citation], and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which 

the court’s ICWA determination will rest.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at pp. 152–

153.) Yet, “while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden 

of gathering information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the 

claim of error for the first time on appeal.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at p. 153.) 

Further, the ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, 

not with a parent, the department, or the juvenile court. (K.H., at p. 590; accord, E.C., at 

pp. 139–140.) “[W]here the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to 

determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not 

been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only 

effective safeguard.” (K.H., at p. 610, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252–254; 

accord, E.C., at p. 155.) 

Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is 

conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded. The court is instructed to ensure the 

department conducts “ ‘a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under section 224.2, 

subdivision[s] (b) [and (e)], and document its inquiry in the record in compliance with 

rule 5.481(a)(5).’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, 

84 Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) “ ‘This should not be interpreted as requiring an exhaustive 

search for and questioning of every living relative of [the children]’ but ‘[w]e leave that 
15.

determination for the juvenile court in the first instance because it is better positioned to 

evaluate the evidence provided by the [d]epartment. So long as the court ensures the 

inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose 

underlying ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual 

foundation upon which to make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’ ” (Ibid.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed, 

and the matter is remanded to the court with directions to order the department to comply 

with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivisions (b) 

and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made 

consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court 

shall vacate its existing orders and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related 

California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA findings

shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the court’s orders are affirmed.