1

Filed 12/6/12



## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HOPE DI CAMPLI

- MINTZ , ) ) Plaintiff and Appellant , ) ) S 1 94501
v. ) ) Ct. App. 6 H034160 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., ) ) S a nta Clara County Defendant s and Respondents

. ) Super. Ct. No. 1

- 07 C V 089159 )

________________________________ ____ )

Government Code 1 section 915, subdivision ( a ) (section 915(a)) , establ ishes the manner of delivery of a claim against the government. It requires that a claim be presented to a local public entity by “[ d ] elive ring it to the clerk, secretary or auditor, ” or by mailing it to one of these officials “ or to the governing body. ”
S ection 915, subdivision (e) (section 915(e) ), further provides that a misdirected
claim “ shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance ” wit h section 915 if “[ i ] t is actually received b y the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity. ” (§ 915(e)(1), i talics added.) Here, t he Court of Appeal h eld that “a claim may substantially comply with the act, notwithstanding failure to deliver or mail it to one of the specified recipients, if it is given to a person or department whose functions include the

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Gover nment Code.2

management or defense of claims against the defendant entity.” W e reject th is judicial expansion of the statutory requirements a nd affirm that a claim must satisfy the express delivery provisions language of the statute

. I. BACKGROUND On April 4, 2006, Dr. Bao

- Thuong Bui and Dr. Abraham Sklar performed
surgery on p laintiff Hope DiCampli

- Mintz at Valley Medical Center (V MC ) , a ho spital owned and operated by the County of Santa Clara ( the County)

. I n the
recovery room , plaintiff complained of pain in her left leg, which appeared bluish
and cold to the touch. An e mergency tomography disclosed that her “left iliac artery” wa s “comp letely interrupted.” Plaintiff was returned to surgery and ultimately discharged

. Later that year, plaintiff went to VMC ‟s emergency department “ in a great deal of pain.” A n emergency room physician told her that another procedure was required because blood vessels had been damaged i n the first surgery

. P laintiff retained counsel who prepared a letter for transmission to V MC , Dr. Bui, and Dr. Sklar, giving “notice, in accordance with Section 364 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that Hope DiCampli

- Min tz will file suit against you for damages resulting from the personal injury of Ho pe DiCampli

- Mintz.” Code of Civil Procedure section 364 requires that a plaintiff give notice of an intent to sue to a health care provider 90 days before filing a negligenc e action. 2 The letter stated that defendants negligently performed surgery, interrupting blood flow to plaintiff‟s leg, then failed to repair the problem. On April 3, 2007 , plaintiff‟s counsel personally delivered cop ies of the letter

to an employee of the medical staffing office in the hospital‟s administration

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 364 is not part of the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.). The notice of intent it mandates is a separate requirement.3

building. The letters were addressed to the Risk Management Department at
V MC, Dr. Bui , and Dr. Sklar. 3 While the letter included a request that it be
forwarded to the re cipient‟s insurance car rier, it did not request that it be
forwarded to any of the statutorily designated recipients denoted in section 915. It is undisputed that the letter was never personally served or presented, n or was it mailed to the county clerk or the clerk of the b oa rd . The parties likewise agree that plaintiff knew V MC was owned and operated by the County. The letter

was later received by the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department by April 6, 2007. 4 On April 23, 2007, Dave Schoendaler at the County ‟s Risk
M anagement Department spoke with plaintiff‟s counsel by telephone. According

to plaintiff‟s counsel , Schoendaler acknowledg ed receipt of the letter ; or ally opined that service on VMC required a tort claim which was late; questioned
whether a tort claim was required as to Dr. Sklar and Dr. Bui and indicated that he

wou ld look into that; stated that p laintiff had an interesting case; mentioned a physical condition that put plaintiff at risk ; and provided the name of the attorney handling the County‟s defense. Schoendaler did not mention that the letter failed

3 Plaintiff‟s counsel also sent duplicate letters by certified mail. 4 Accord ing to the County, the letters were addressed to the “Risk Management Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC.” Plaintiff did not dispute this and added that the letter was also received by the “Santa Clara County Risk Management Department.” At oral argument it was clarified that the

“ Santa Clara County Risk Management Department” and the “Risk Management Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC” are different entities. The “Santa Clara County Risk Management Department” is a department within the County‟s Employee Services Agency and deals with legal claims against the County. The “Risk Management Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC” is responsible for such things as the hospital‟s quality assurance and its c ompliance with regulatory matters. For reasons set forth below, any differences are irrelevant because p laintiff failed to properly present her letter to a statuto rily designated person, nor did any such designee actually receive the letter. (§ 915 (a) & (e).)4

to satisfy section 915 ‟s delivery requirements . Plaintiff never received written notice that her claim was untimely or presented to the wrong party

. On July 2 , 2007, p laintiff filed a complaint naming Dr. Bui, Dr. Sklar, and
V MC as defendants. As described by the Court of Appeal, “ The complaint acknowledged that „ Plaintiff was required to comply with . . . [government claims

s tatutes], ‟ but asserted she was „ excused ‟ from doing so because defend ants „ failed to provide notice to Plaintiff as required by Government Code §§ 910.8, 911, 911.3, and therefore waived any defenses they may have had to the sufficiency of Plaintiff‟s claim (Notice of Intention to Commence Action) as presented.‟ ” 5
On A ugust 29 , 2007, the Coun ty 6 filed an answer denying p lai ntiff‟s allegations and asserting affirmative defenses, including that p laintiff “failed to comply with the provisions of the Califo rnia [Government] Claims Act,” and that her claims were “barred by t he provisions of Government Code §§ 810 through 1000, inclusive.” 7

5 Section 910.8 requires the board of a public entity, or its designee, to give a claimant notice of a defective claim. Section 911 provides if the board fails to provide a notice of insufficiency as required by section 910.8, the defect is wa ived. Section 911.3, subdivisions (a) and (b) require that the board, or its designee give written notice to the claimant that a claim was untimely. Failure to do so waives a timeliness defense. As later discussed, because plaintiff‟s claim was not pres ented to or actually received by the board or a person designated by it, sections 910.8, 911 and 911.3 are not applicable. (See post , pp. 10

- 12.) 6 The Court of Appeal noted that the complaint was never amended to name the County as the proper defen dant, although the parties have acted throughout the proceedings as if it were. The Court of Appeal treated this mistake as a harmless misnomer. (See Plumlee v. Poag (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 541, 547; see also 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleadin g, § 477, pp. 605

- 606; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra , Pleading, § 1219, p. 654.) The parties do not dispute this issue and we need not address it. 7 At some point, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the suit against Dr. Bui and Dr. Sklar, agree ing that at all relevant times they acted within the course and scope of their County employment.5

The Co unty filed a motion for summary judgment , alleging that p laintiff
fail ed to comply with the Government Claims Act beca use her claim was never presented to or received by a statuto rily designated recipient as required by section
915. In opposition , p laintiff argued that she had “ substantially complied ” with the
Government Claims Act on April 3, 2007 , by delivering the letter of intent to the Risk Management Department at VMC . She also alleged that the letter was received by the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department by April 6,
2007 , and that this department was the c ounty department most directly involved with the processing and defense of tort claims against the County.
The trial co urt granted the County‟s summary judgment motion . It held that
the C ounty made a sufficient showing of noncompliance , and that p laintiff could

not avoid summary judgment because she failed to “ raise a reasonable inference
that her claim was actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity within the time prescribed for presentation thereof ” and she also
failed to “ establish waiver and/or equitable estoppel.” The Court of Appeal reversed. It found tha t p laintiff had “ substantially complied ” with the presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. The Court of Appeal rejected other Court of A ppeal cases holding that compliance is deemed satisfied only by actual receipt by the statutorily design ated persons, under section 915(e) (1)

. II. DISCUSSION
A. The Government Claims Act Suits for money or damages filed against a public entity are regu lated by
statutes contained in d ivision 3.6 of the Government Code, commonly referred to

as the Governm ent Claims Act

. We have previously noted that “[s] ection 905 requires the presentation of „all claims for money or damages against local public entities,‟ subject to exceptions not relevant here. Claims for personal injury and6

property damage must be pre sented within six months after accrual; all other claims must be presented within a year. (§ 911.2.) „[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented .

. . until a w ritten claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon .

. . or has been deemed to have been rejected .

. . .‟ (§ 945.4.) „Thus, under these statutes, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entit y bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.‟ [Citation.] ” ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737

- 738 ( City of Stockton ).) Section 905 requires that , subject to exceptions not present here, “all claims for money or damages against local public entities” must be “presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910)” of the Government C ode. “ „L ocal public entity ‟
includes a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State

. . . . ” (§ 900.4.)
Section 915 ( a) provides, “A claim . . . shall be presented to a local public entity by either of the following means: [¶] (1) Deliveri ng it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof. [¶] (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body at its principal office.” S ection 915 (e) (1) clearly and narrowly sets forth how actual receipt may meet the presentation requ irement: “A claim

. . . shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section if , within the time prescribed for presentation thereof, any of the following apply: [¶] (1) It is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity. ” ( I talics added.)
E ven if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts t h at might support a claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied. ( City of Stockton , supra , 427

Cal.4th at p. 738.) “The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an
element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.” ( Del Re al v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 ( Del Real ) , italics added ; Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 ( Shirk )

. ) A goal of the Government Claims Act i s to eliminate confusion and uncertainty resulting from different claims procedures. (Recommendation: Claims Against Public Entities (Dec. 1963) 4 Cal. L aw Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 1008

. ) As w e pointed out in City of Stockton , supra , 42 Cal.4th at
page 738, “ [t] he purpose of the claims statutes is not t o prevent surprise, but „to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] It is well

- settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity‟s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.‟ [Citation.] The claims statutes also „enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabil ities in the future.‟ [Citations.]” Moreover, the intent of the Government Claims Act is “not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against government entiti es. Rather, the intent of the a ct is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly deli neated circumstances.” ( Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776 ; State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1242

- 1243 .) The claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the appropriate publ ic entity. ( Life v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 901 ( Life ).) 8

8 In Shirk , supra , 42 Cal.4th at page 213, we summarized the public policies supporting strict application of the claims presentation requirements: “Requiri ng a
(footnote continued on next page)8

B. Application of the Government Claims Statute Several points are important here

. The County does not dispute that the

content of the letter is sufficient to serve a s a valid claim , nor does it dispute its
timeliness

. Plaintiff does not dispute that the County was t he proper public entity
where her claim should have been presented under section 915(a). T he c ase stands
or fall s on whether presentation of plaintiff‟s letter of intention to someone other
than the statute‟s designated recipients or the actual receipt of notice by a proper recipient , satisfies the prefiling claim requirement.
It is uncontes ted that t he claim was never delivered or mailed to the “clerk,

s ecretary or auditor” as required by section 915(a). Likewise, the “ clerk, secretary, auditor or board ” never actually received the claim. (§ 915(e)(1).) Thus, neither section 915(a)‟s specific requirements for compliance , nor section 915(e)(1) ‟s provis ion deeming actual receipt to constitute compliance , were satisfied. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that there was “ substantial compliance

. ” This was error.

(foot note continued from previous page) [claimant]

. . . to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] [It] also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing boar d to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning. [Citations.] The notice requirement . . . thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public entit ies, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because . . . public entities . . . will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.”9

T he proper construction of section 915 is dispositive

. “In construing any
statute, we first look to its language. [Citation.] „Words used in a statute . . . should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indi cia of the intent of the Legislature

. . . .‟ [Citation.] „If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedie d, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” ( S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.) Also, a statute “ „must be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon application will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity. ‟ ” ( City of Poway v. City of San Diego (19 91) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 858, quot ing DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18.) A court may not, “under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.” ( California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.) Further, “ „[w]e must assume that the Legislature knew how to create an excepti on if it wished to do so

. . . . [Citatio n]‟ ” ( Ibid .)
The Court of Appeal erred by failing to adhere to the plain language of
section 915

. Instead, it rewrote the statute to read as the court believed it should provide.
S ection 915( a ) (1) reflects the Legislature‟s intent to precise ly identif y those who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity. S ection 915 (e)(1) reflects the Legislature‟s intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the10

presentation requirement if the claim is “actu ally received” by a statutorily designated recip ient

. Thus, compliance with section 915 ( e)(1) requires actual receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients . If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply w ith the statute. ( Life , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.) This straightforward construction honors the s tatutory language and is
consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes

. 9 While resort to extrinsic sources is unnecessary, o ur conclusion is c onsistent
with the legislative history. In 1959, the California Law Revision Commission‟s (Commission) report found that there were conflicting claim presentation requirements for public entities throughout the state. The Commission urged that specificit y and uniformity w ere necessary and recommended adoption of uniform procedures for certain claims against public entities. (See Recommendation and Study relating to The Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities (Jan. 1959) 2
Cal. Law Rev ision Com. Re p. (1959) pp. A

- 57 to A

- 62, A

- 122 (1959 Study).)
The Commission repor ted, “ Much unnecessary litigation has been devoted to resolution of technical issues relating to allegedly improper presentation of
claims.

. . . [A recurring question is] whether prese ntation to the wrong official
sati sfies the statute. Avoidance of these problems can be achieved in part by clear identification of the officer to whom such claims are required to be presented and by express au thorization o f mailed notice. In order to av oid doubts and to preclude such purely technical issues from interfering with expeditious handling of claims, however, it is recommended that express provision be made to cure minor

9 We need not determine whether section 915‟s use of the term “clerk” refer s t o the county clerk or the clerk of the board of supervisors . It is undisputed that the claim was not mailed, delivered to, or received by either clerk.11

defects in the manner of service which do not prejudice the public entity. ” ( Id. at p. A

- 122 , fns. omitted .)
The Commission also referred to a New York law providing that, “ „ [I]f service of such notice . . . [is] not in compliance with the provisions of this subdivision, such service shall be deemed valid if such notice is actually received by such person. ‟ ” ( 1959 Study, supra , 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. , at p. A

122 , italics added.) In 1959, the Legislature acted on the Commission‟s
recommendation and added section 714, the predecessor of section 915. 10 (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1 , p. 4136 .) “The scheme in effect today was established in 1963, when the Legislature combined the requirements for claims against local entities with those for claims against the state in part 3 of division 3.6 of title 1 of
the Government C ode. (Stats. 1963, ch. 171 5, pp. 3369, 3372 et seq.)” ( City of
Stockton , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 739, fn. 4.) It is logical to provide that actual receipt satisfies the claim presentation requirement. The goals of the claims statutes are t o provide enti ties with sufficient information to investigate and appropriately resolve claims and to plan for potential liabilities. These goals are satisfied when an adequate claim is actually received by an appropriate entity representative. The Legislature retain s authority to determine which representatives are appropriate. The Court of Appeal cannot

10 Former section 714 provided, “A claim may be presented to a local public entity (1) by deliveri ng the claim to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof within the period of time prescribed by Section 715 or (2) by mailing the claim to such clerk, secretary or auditor or to the governing body at its principal office not later than the last day of such period. A claim shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided herein if it is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or governing body within the time prescribed.” (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136, italics added.)12

override that determination simply because it concludes receipt by others sh ould
be considered sufficient.
T he Court of Appeal placed substantial reliance on Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513 ( Jamison )

. Jamison proves too slender a reed to support the weight of the Court of Appeal‟s expansion. The Jamison holding was later repudiated by its own panel and is in conflict with more recent

a uthority

. Jamison was injured in a traffic collision with a truck owned by the
California Department of Water Resources. His lawyer filed a claim with the Department of Water Resources before filing suit

. ( Jamison, supra,
31 Cal.App.3d at p. 515.) T he trial court dismissed the action for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act . ( Jamison, at p. 515

. ) At the time, section 915, subdivision (c), a prior version of section 915(e), required that notice
be filed with the State Board of Control an d Jamison had failed to do so. ( Jamison , at pp. 515

- 516. ) The Court of Appeal concluded Jamison had substantially complied with the existing statute. It noted that most claim statute
cases dealt with “ substantial compliance ” in disputes over whether the contents or form of the claim was adequate, not whet her the filing was properly presented

. ( Id . at p. 516.) It then reviewed the few California cases involving “the question of filing a proper claim with the wrong governmental department or agency.” ( I bid .)
The Jamison court drew several conclusions : (1) The statutory requirement
is not met when a claim is filed with the wrong entity. ( Jamison , supra , 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) That principle is reflected in Jackson v. Board of
Education (1 967) 250 Cal.App.2d 856, 858

- 860 , which held t hat a requirement to
serve a local board of e ducation is not satisfied by serving the municipality

. (2) If a claim is filed with the proper entity but with the wrong statutory official of that13

entity, the statute is sa tisfied if the claim is actually rec eived by the statutory
officer

. (3) A complete failure to serve any responsible officer of the entity will not constitute substantial compliance. ( Jamison , supra , 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.)
As stated in Redwood v. Stat e of California (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 501, 503

- 504 : “It has been repeatedly held that where the claims statute provides for the person upon whom the claim is to be served . . . service upon another is insufficient.”
The Jamison court went on t o draw a f ourth conclusion that it phrased as follows: “Service upon any responsible official of the entity, but not the statutory officer, is sufficient if the party served has the duty to notify the statutory agent.” ( Jamison , supra , 31 Cal .App.3d at p. 517 .) J amison cited no California authority for this proposition , referring i nstead to case s from Indiana ( Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis (Ind. 1970) 255 N.E.2d 225 ) and the District of Columbia ( Stone v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1956) 237 F.2d 28 [appl ying D.C. law] ). ( Jamison , supra , 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) The Jamison opinion does not reveal
whether th e st atutes at issue in those cases bore any similarity to the California statutory scheme. As justification for importing its fourth conclusion i nto California law, the
Jamison court stated, “Certainly, any responsible officer or employee of a major state agency knows, or should know, that if a substantial claim for damages is presented that it should be forwarded to the Board of Control . In the event the officer or employee actually receiving the claim does not know the proper agency, then a simpl y [ sic ] inquiry to the Attorney General‟s office would result in advice as to the proper agency.” ( Jamison , supra , 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 518.) The court cited no statutory authority supporting the duty it created . Other California appellate courts have refused to follow it . ( Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 761 ; Life , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d 894 .)14

In Life , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d 894, the plaintiff was invol ved in an automobile accident. He was treated by medical staff at the county medical center
that al legedly committed negligence. The p laintiff retained counsel who sent a personal injury claim to the medical center‟s legal department. ( Id . at p. 897.) The legal department was not the proper body to receive the plaintiff‟s claim. The

p laintiff later retained new counsel who filed a late claim with the county board of supervisors. ( Ibid. ) After the county denied the claim as untimely and his applicatio n for leave to present a late claim was also denied, Life filed a complaint against the county alleging medical negligence. ( Life , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.) The county moved for summary judgment on the ground that Life had failed to timely presen t a claim. ( Id . at p. 898.) The Court of Appeal affirmed , holding that Life‟s presentation of the claim to the hospital‟s legal department was insufficient.
C ompliance with section 915 would have occurred only if the misdirected claim
was “ „ actually re ceived by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity. . . . ‟ ” ( Life , at p. 900 .)
The Life court found Jamison unpersuasive because it failed to follow the statutory requirement that a misdirected claim be “ actually received ” b y the designated party. ( Life , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.) The court also
remarked that “

Jamison’s reliance on a public entity‟s internal transmittal of a claim conflicts with section 915, which requires the claimant to file with the appropriate of

ficial or board. ” ( Ibid .) The court persuasively concluded that “[b]y focusing on the duty of a public employee in receipt of a claim to forward the claim to the proper agency, Jamison inappropriately shifts responsibility for filing a claim with the pro per official or body from the claimant to the public entity.” ( Ibid .)15

In Del R eal , supra , 95 Cal.App.4th at page 764 , the claim arose from an
auto mobile accident with a Riverside police officer , Eric Charrette

. Del Real ‟s attorney wrote to Charrette se eking his accoun t of the accident and requesting that
the letter be forwarded to Charrette ‟s insurance company. The city attorney responded to the letter, informing counsel that it represented Charrette and that he would not provide a statement. The lett er also stated that any further contact with Charrette should be made through the city attorney‟s office. ( Ibid. ) Del Real later sued Charrette and the City of Riverside. Defendants moved for summary judgment alleging Del Real failed to satisfy the Gove rnment Claims statutes. Del Real urged in reply that her letter to Charrette constituted a timely claim. She
argue d that “even if the letter was not actually received by the appropriate person or body , it should have been ,” citing Jamison for the proposi tion that Charrette had a duty to transmit the letter to the appropriate recipient. ( Del Real , at p. 770. ) In addition to holding that the letter did not contain the contents of a proper claim, t he Court of Appeal held that because the letter was not pr operly directed it failed to comply with section 915. ( Del Real , supra , 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.) In

re jecting Del Real‟s argument, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated, “we
have reconsidered our earlier decision in Jamison and, as did the court i n Life v. County of Los Angeles , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d at pages 900

- 901, we find that it is at odds with section 915, subdivision (c). We therefore decline to follow it.” ( Ibid. ) We agree with the holdings in Life and Del Real

. T heir application of the compliance doctrine is consistent with the language of section 915 (e)(1) requiring actual receipt by the statutorily designated recipient. Jamison is unpersuasive
because it fails to follow the statutory language specifically identifying who must
actuall y receive a claim. Finding compliance when any agency employee is served exponentially expands the scope of the statute

. B y plac ing a duty on a public employee who receives a misd irected claim to forward it to the proper16

agency, Jamison improperly shif t e d the responsibility for present ing a claim from the claimant to the public entity. ( See § § 910, 915

. ) Moreover, th e County argues persuasively that, in addition to contravening section 915‟s plain language, the Jamison rule creates uncertainty about ho w and where claims must be delivered. Misdirected claims may be received by various departments or employees and forwarded to multiple people and places , making it
dif ficult to determine whether the claims were actually delivered to , or received by , a dep artment or employee charged with the overall managemen t of claims against the county. The question of when a claim is actually received and whether a specific department or employee managed claims against a public entity would
also be fodder for litigatio n. This result is contrary to the Government Claims Act‟s goal of eliminat ing uncertainty in the claims

- presentation requirements. Accordingly, we disapprove Jamison v. State of California , supra , 227 Cal.App.3d
513. The Court of Appeal below further relied on cases decided before the
enactment of section 915 or its predecessor, section 714

. 11 When these cases were decided, claims against the state, local, and municipal gov ernments were governed by numerous state statutes and local ordinances. Recogn izing this Byzantine
claims system, the Legislature standardized the procedure by enacting the
Government Claims Act . In doing so, it replaced more than 150 separate procedures for directing claims against local governmental entities. ( Ardon v. City of L os Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 246.) B ecause of this comprehensive

11 Insolo v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 172; Peters v. City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 419; and Los Angeles Brick & Clay Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 478, 486.17

change in the statutory procedures, the early cases cited by the Court of Appeal are inapposite

. The Court of Appeal also erred by relying on Elias v. San Bernardino County
Flood C ontrol Dist. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 75 , and Carlino v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1533. Th e se cases h o ld
that when the governing body of one public entity is also the governing body of
another public entity, a cla im against the subordinate entity that is delivered to the governing body constitutes substantial compl iance with the claims statute. ( Elias , supra , 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 75

- 77 ; Carlino , supra , 1 0 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1533

- 1 534. Th at is not the case here. 12

12 The Court of Appeal additionally relied on out

- of

- state cases. ( Shehyn v. District of Columbia (D.C. 1978) 392 A.2d 1008; Stone v. District of Columbia, supra, 237 F.2d 28, 29

- 30 [applying D.C. law]; Galbreath v. City of Ind ianapolis, supra, 255 N.E.2d 225; Coghill v. Badger (Ind. Ct.App. 1981) 418 N.E.2d 1201, 1206, fn.3; Hawkeye Bank v. State (Iowa 1994) 515 N.W.2d 348, 350; Webb v. Highway Div. of Oregon State Dept. of Transp. (Or. 1982) 652 P.2d 783, 784.) Plaintiff also cites numerous out

- of

- state cases. ( Finnie v. Jefferson County School District (Colo. 2003) 79 P.3d 1253; Robinson v. Washington County (Me.1987) 529 A.2d 1357; Hansen v. City of Laurel (Md. Ct.Spec.App. 2010) 996 A.2d 882, 891; Kelly v. City of Roch ester (Minn. 1975) 231 N.W.2d 275, 276; Kirkpatrick v. City of Glendale (Mo. Ct.App. 2003) 99 S.W.3d 57; Ferrer v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors (Miss. 1999) 741 So.2d 216; Myears v. Charles Mix County (S.D. 1997) 566 N.W.2d 470; Mount v. City of Ver million (S.D. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 686.) We find these authorities unpersuasive. Neither the Court of Appeal nor plaintiff explain how the claim statutes at issue in these cases were consistent with California‟s Government Claims Act.18 III. DISPOSITION The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. CORRIGAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL

- SAKAUYE, C. J. KENNARD, J. BAXTER, J. WERDEGAR, J. CHIN, J. LIU, J.See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Suprem e Court.

Name of Opinion DiCampli

- Mintz v. County of Santa Clara

__________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XXX 195 Cal.App.4th 1327 Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S194501 Date Filed: December 6, 2012

__________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Santa Clara Judge: William J. Elfving

__________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Campbell, Warburton, Fitzimmons, Smith, Mendell & Pastore, J. Michael Fitzsimmons and Lisa Jeong Cummins for Plaintiff and Appell ant. Cheong, Denove, Rowell & Bennett and John D. Rowell for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Miguel Marquez, County Counsel, Lori E. Pegg, Acting County Counsel, Marcy L. Berkman and Melissa R. Kini yalocts, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents. Stephen D. Underwood; Michael M. Youngdahl and Jordan Sheinbaum for CSAC Excess Insurance Authority, California League of Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae o n behalf of Defendants and Respondents.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Lisa Jeong Cummins Campbell, Warburton, Fitzimmons, Smith, Mendell & Pastore 64 West Santa Clara Street San Jose, CA 95113

- 1 806 (408) 295

- 7701
San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 538

- 2320 Melissa R. Kiniyalocts Deputy County Counsel 70 West Hedding Street, 9th Floor, East Wing San Jose, CA 95110

- 1770 (408) 299

- 5900