Notice of Removal – Page 1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

_____________________________________ 

AMERICAN ACCESS CASUALTY 

COMPANY, As Subrogee of Maribel 

Rodriguez, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

 Defendant. 

 

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-2135 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL 

Please take notice that defendant United States Postal Service (USPS) hereby 

removes the action pending as Cause No. CV2-22-0218 in the Justice Court of Rockwall 

County, Texas (Precinct 2), to the Dallas Division of the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Texas, and as support would respectfully show as follows: 

1. Cause No. CV2-22-0218 was commenced upon the filing of an original 

petition by plaintiff American Access Casualty Company against USPS. In the petition, 

American Access alleges that its insured sustained damages in the amount of $6,893.33 

in an automobile collision with a vehicle driven by a USPS employee. American Access 

states that it compensated its insured for the loss and now seeks a recovery against USPS 

as a subrogee. 

2. This action is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which 

authorizes the removal of any “civil action . . . commenced in a State court” against 

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“[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or person acting under that 

officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual 

capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office.” This removal provision 

applies in this case because USPS is a component of the executive branch of the United 

States government. See 39 U.S.C. § 201. 

3. The purpose of the section 1442(a)(1) removal provision is to protect the 

lawful activities of the federal government from undue state interference. See 

Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405–06 (1969). Unlike the general removal 

statute, which must be “strictly construed in favor of remand,” Manguno v. Prudential 

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002), “[t]he Supreme Court has 

stated that § 1442(a)(1) is to be construed broadly and ‘should not be frustrated by a 

narrow, grudging interpretation,’” Humphries v. Elliot Co., 760 F.3d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969)). A case may be 

removed even if a federal question arises as a defense rather than as a claim apparent 

from the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. See Jefferson County, Ala. v. 

Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). 

4. Removal of this case is proper under section 1442(a)(1) because USPS is 

named as a defendant and the petition alleges that the automobile collision between 

American Access’s insured and the USPS employee occurred in the course and scope of 

the USPS employee’s employment. 

5. Further, although the text of the statute does not specifically require it, there 

is caselaw suggesting that removal under section 1442(a)(1) should only occur when the 

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defendant can assert a “colorable federal defense.”1 See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 

121, 136 (1989). Here, though, the Court need not resolve whether a colorable federal 

defense must be asserted, because even if this requirement is assumed to apply, USPS is 

asserting at least one such defense: the defense of sovereign immunity. “The basic rule 

of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the 

consent of Congress.” Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). American 

Access is seeking damages against USPS arising out of an automobile accident, but has 

not identified any statute authorizing such suit nor has it pleaded any facts showing that 

some waiver of sovereign immunity applies to its claim. See Freeman v. United States, 

556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the plaintiff bears “the burden of 

showing Congress’s unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity” (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)). Additionally, the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction applies 

such that even after the case is removed to federal court, the jurisdictional defect arising 

from American Access’s unauthorized attempt to sue a federal defendant in state court 

continues to exist and requires dismissal. See, e.g., Martin v. Hyundai Translead, Inc., 

1

 Courts are divided on whether this requirement should apply when the removing defendant is the 

government or a federal agency itself (as opposed to a natural person who is removing the case as a 

federal officer). Compare Guggenberger v. Starkey Labs., Inc., No. 16-2021, 2016 WL 7479542, at 11 

n.13 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2016) (explaining that such a showing is required in the Eighth Circuit but 

explaining that there “appears to be a circuit split on the issue”), with City of Cookeville v. Upper 

Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 389–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that because 

Mesa’s requirement of a colorable federal defense was tied to the words “under color of office” in the 

statute, federal agencies need not provide a colorable federal defense because “under color of office” 

language applies only to federal officers or agents), and City of Jacksonville v. Dep’t of Navy, 348 F.3d 

1307, 1313 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that “it remains to be decided whether the requirement of a 

federal defense also applies to removal by the United States or one of its agencies” but declining to decide 

because the removing entity asserted the federal defense of sovereign immunity). 

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No. 3:20-CV-2147-K, 2020 WL 6701806, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2020) (dismissing 

claims against a federal agency originally filed in state court); Jones v. Dallas Veterans 

Hosp., No. 3:18-CV-1306-G, 2018 WL 6048017 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2018) (magistrate 

judge’s recommendation) (same), adopted, 2018 WL 6042895 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 

2018). This serves as a second colorable federal defense supporting removal. 

* * * * 

This case is subject to removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and a removal 

is hereby timely effected. USPS reserves all defenses and will answer or otherwise 

respond to the petition in due course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(2). 

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Respectfully submitted, 

CHAD E. MEACHAM 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 

/s/ Brian W. Stoltz 

Brian W. Stoltz 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Texas Bar No. 24060668 

1100 Commerce Street, Third Floor 

Dallas, Texas 75242-1699 

Telephone: 214-659-8626 

Facsimile: 214-659-8807 

brian.stoltz@usdoj.gov 

Attorneys for Defendant 

United States Postal Service 

Certificate of Service 

On September 26, 2022, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with 

the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the 

electronic case filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all parties 

electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

5(b)(2). 

/s/ Brian W. Stoltz 

Brian W. Stoltz 

Assistant United States Attorney 

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