1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

BRAYLON RAY COULTER, §

#23016447, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§ No. 3:22-cv-01384-X (BT)

 v. §

§

CHIEF JUDGE LYNN, et al., §

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Braylon Ray Coulter has filed a “Motion To Reopen” this 

pro se civil rights action. Mot. (ECF No. 29). For the following reasons, 

the Court should deny Coulter’s motion. 

Background

On June 7, 2022, Coulter filed a document in his federal criminal 

case, United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-cr-68-M-1 (N.D. Tex.), which the 

presiding judge determined raised civil rights claims. Accordingly, the 

judge severed those claims into this civil action. A federal jury 

subsequently found Coulter guilty of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). 

Before the judge sentenced Coulter, the undersigned United States 

magistrate judge issued findings and conclusions, recommending the 

Court stay and administratively close this case because it was premature 

Case 3:22-cv-01384-X-BT Document 31 Filed 09/12/23 Page 1 of 6 PageID 279
2

for the Court to determine whether Coulter’s civil rights claims could be 

barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994). Although the Court accepted the magistrate judge’s findings 

and recommendation, Ord. (ECF No. 24), it entered a judgment 

dismissing Coulter’s claims with prejudice on February 14, 2023, J. (ECF 

No. 25). On April 18, 2023, the presiding judge in the criminal case 

entered a judgment sentencing Coulter to 92 months of imprisonment.1

Ten days later, Coulter filed a Notice of Appeal challenging his federal 

conviction and sentence. United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-cr-68-M-1 

(N.D. Tex.) (ECF No. 355). The Court received Coulter’s Motion to 

Reopen on June 2, 2023. (ECF No. 29.)

Legal Standards and Analysis

Coulter moves to reopen his civil case under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b). Mot. 2, 14-16. Under Rule 60(b), a district court may grant 

relief from a final judgment for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) a void 

judgment; or (5) a judgment that has been reversed or otherwise vacated. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(5). The court may also set aside a judgment for “any 

1

 The judgment provides that his sentence will run concurrently to any 

sentence imposed in a related state case and consecutively to any sentence 

imposed in two unrelated state cases. United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-cr68-M-1 (N.D. Tex.) (ECF No. 352). Coulter is presently in state custody 

awaiting disposition of those state charges. See Mot. 2.

Case 3:22-cv-01384-X-BT Document 31 Filed 09/12/23 Page 2 of 6 PageID 280
3

other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). But relief under 

this “catch-all” provision is available “only if extraordinary circumstances are 

present.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Batts 

v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 1995)). The burden of 

establishing at least one of the Rule 60(b) requirements is on the movant, 

and a determination of whether that burden has been met rests within the 

discretion of the court. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 

F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid 

Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). 

Here, Coulter invokes Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that he is entitled to set 

aside the judgment because the court “lacked subject-matter or personal 

jurisdiction, or [ ] it acted inconsistent with due process.” Mot. 16. But 

Coulter’s argument—which is directed at the judgment entered in his 

criminal case—is misplaced. The judgment to be set aside is the Court’s 

judgment in this case, (ECF No. 25), not the judgment in his federal 

criminal case, which is on appeal. Coulter has thus failed to meet his burden 

to establish any of the Rule 60(b) requirements.

Furthermore, to the extent Coulter intends to use this action to bring 

an unreasonable-search-and-seizure claim against the police officer that 

initiated the traffic stop that led to his federal criminal conviction, his claim 

is barred by Heck.2

2

 Coulter argues that there is “a genuine material fact issue” regarding 

Case 3:22-cv-01384-X-BT Document 31 Filed 09/12/23 Page 3 of 6 PageID 281
4

In Heck, the Supreme Court stated:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983 plaintiff must 

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by 

a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486-87. At bottom, “Heck requires the district court to consider 

‘whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be 

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 

sentence has already been invalidated.’” Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 

177 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

Coulter’s claim that the July 15, 2018 traffic stop violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights would imply the invalidity of his conviction. The 

search yielded evidence that the Government used, along with other facts, 

to establish probable cause for charging Coulter with possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 

924(a)(2)—the charge on which Coulter was later convicted. If Coulter 

whether the law enforcement officer “improperly prolonged [the] [July 15, 

2018] traffic stop beyond [the] scope of [the] mission” and violated his 

Fourth Amendment rights. Mot. 3 (ECF No. 29). Coulter further argues that 

the officer lacked “reasonable suspicion” because he thought Coulter was a 

burglar. Id. Coulter concludes that the traffic stop and search of his vehicle 

amounted to little more than a “fishing expedition.” Id.

Case 3:22-cv-01384-X-BT Document 31 Filed 09/12/23 Page 4 of 6 PageID 282
5

could establish that the search and seizure were illegal, his federal 

conviction might be invalid. See Blimline v. Thirty Unknown Emps. of the 

Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 757 F. App’x 299, 302 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) 

(“It is true that a plaintiff's unlawful search and seizure claim undermines 

the validity of a conviction. Thus, it is Heck-barred if evidence that was a 

direct or indirect product of the alleged unlawful search and seizure was 

presented in the plaintiff's criminal conviction proceeding.”); Porter v. 

Richardson, 2006 WL 740992, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2006) (finding 

Heck barred plaintiff's claims of illegal search and seizure because 

plaintiff was convicted of possession of a controlled substance); see also

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 583-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 

plaintiff's falsification-of-search-warrant claim was Heck-barred when 

the seizure produced evidence upon which the charge and conviction were 

based); Fox v. Michigan State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App'x 372, 377 (6th Cir. 

2006) (finding Heck barred illegal search claim where “[t]he search of Fox 

yielded the switchblade, which became the subject of a criminal charge of 

which Fox was convicted”). Coulter’s federal conviction is on appeal to the 

Fifth Circuit, but it has not been invalidated. Therefore, Heck bars 

Coulter’s federal illegal-search-and-seizure claim.

Recommendation 

The Court should DENY Coulter’s Rule 60(b) motion (ECF No. 

29) to reopen this case. 

Case 3:22-cv-01384-X-BT Document 31 Filed 09/12/23 Page 5 of 6 PageID 283
6

SO RECOMMENDED.

September 12, 2023.

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

Case 3:22-cv-01384-X-BT Document 31 Filed 09/12/23 Page 6 of 6 PageID 284