IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 DALLAS DIVISION 

DARRON LASHAWN COLLIER, ) 

 ID # 02159257, ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 3:22-CV-300-S-BH 

 ) 

TY BURNES, et al., ) 

 Defendants. ) Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the pro se prisoner plaintiff’s complaint, 

received on November 29, 2021 (doc. 1), should be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 29, 2021, Darron LaShawn Collier (Plaintiff), a prisoner currently 

incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Telford Unit, brought this suit under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against two narcotics officers of the Terrell Police Department (Officers) for alleged 

violations of his civil rights. (See doc. 1.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 21, 2016, Officers, along with other unnamed officers, 

“executed a ‘no-knock’ entry and searched [sic] of Plaintiff’s home while Plaintiff and girlfriend 

was [sic] still in bed.” (Id. at 4; see also doc. 15 at 2-3.) The warrant “was alleged to have been 

executed on 12-19th-2016 [sic].” (doc. 1 at 4.) “The action resulted in the arrest” that led to his 

2017 conviction and sentence to 18 years’ imprisonment in Cause Nos. 16-50798-422-F in the 

422nd District Court of Kaufman County, Texas.2 (Id.; see also doc. 15 at 6.) According to 

1

 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for full case management. 

2

 Plaintiff also references Cause No. 16-50797-422-F in the 422nd District Court of Kaufman County, Texas. (See 

doc. 15 at 6.) His girlfriend is the only defendant in that criminal case. 

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Plaintiff, “without the unconstitutional conduct of the named defendant(s) [sic]/Forney Police 

Officers, Plaintiff insist [sic] that he would have either served out his remainder of the prior 

sentence (13 months) or attend [sic] the substance abuse program, which he would not have been 

deprived of his liberty for an [sic] lengthly [sic] amount of time (18 yrs.) through an illegal search.” 

(doc. 15 at 10.) He also claims he would not “have lost his vehicles while either serving the 

remainder of his prior sentence (13 months) or attending a substance abuse program which would 

last approximately 90 days.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff appears to sue both Officers in their individual capacities and the second Officer 

in his official capacity; he seeks information about eight other officers who were allegedly 

involved in the search, as well as monetary relief. (See id. at 10-11.) 

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING 

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner 

seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to 

preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th 

Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is also subject 

to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte

dismissal of the complaint, or any part of it, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 

is immune from such relief. 

 A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on 

an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim that falls under the rule announced in 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), “is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at 

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issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.” Hamilton v. 

Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir.1996). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009).

III. SECTION 1983 

Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of his rights. That statute 

“provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Livadas v. 

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It “afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well 

as of constitutional norms.” Id. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that 

show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United 

States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 

436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005). 

A. Heck Bar 

Initially, many of Plaintiff’s claims appear to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994). It provides that to recover damages for an allegedly “unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction 

or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 

on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determinations, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. Because the issues in this case are appropriate 

for early and final determination, however, consideration of whether Heck bars any of Plaintiff’s 

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claims is not required. See, e.g., Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 462 n.6 (5th Cir. 

1998) (when an action raises an issue of immunity, the court to the extent it is feasible to do so 

should determine that issue as early in the proceedings as possible); Smithback v. 265th Judicial 

Dist. Court, No. 3:01-CV-1658-M, 2002 WL 1268031, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2002) (accepting 

recommendation that “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks relief unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or sues 

individuals or entities who are not proper parties under § 1983, it also seems appropriate to have 

an early determination of those issues”).

B. Statute of Limitations 

Courts “may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte.” Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 

153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999). “[W]here it is clear from the face of a complaint filed in forma pauperis

that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, those claims are properly 

dismissed” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 

1993); accord Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Federal courts look to the law of the forum state to determine the length of the statute of 

limitations applicable in § 1983 cases. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The general 

statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state provides the applicable 

limitations period. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). Texas has a 

two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, so Plaintiff had two years from the date 

his claims accrued to file suit. Id.; accord Hatchet v. Nettles, 201 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 2000). 

While state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law determines the 

accrual date. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Generally, a claim accrues when the plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action,” or 

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“when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

“Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run ‘the moment the plaintiff 

becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know 

that he has been injured.’” A plaintiff’s awareness encompasses two elements: “(1) 

The existence of the injury; and (2) causation, that is, the connection between the 

injury and the defendant’s actions.” A plaintiff need not know that she has a legal 

cause of action; she need know only the facts that would ultimately support a claim. 

Actual knowledge is not required “if the circumstances would lead a reasonable 

person to investigate further.” 

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (internal citations omitted); Walker, 550 F.3d at 414. Plaintiff’s claims 

accrued, and the limitations period began to run, when he knew or had reason to know of the injury 

that is the basis of his action. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Here, Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to a warrantless no-knock search at his residence 

on December 21, 2016. Based on evidence obtained during the search, he was convicted of 

manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, more than one 

gram but less than 4 grams, and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment on September 11, 2017. See 

State v. Collier, No. 16-50798-422-F (422nd Dist. Ct., Kaufman Cty., Tex. Sept. 11, 2017). 

Because he was aware of the alleged unconstitutional search when it occurred on December 21, 

2016, his causes of action accrued on that date. He did not file his complaint until almost three 

years after the two-year statute of limitations expired. His claims are therefore barred by the statute 

of limitations, absent equitable tolling.3 

 The applicable limitations period may be equitably tolled in appropriate circumstances. 

See Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998). “Because the Texas statute of 

3

 Even assuming for purposes of this complaint only that Plaintiff’s complaint and responses to the magistrate judge’s 

questionnaire could be liberally construed to allege causes of action that did not accrue until he was convicted and 

sentenced on September 11, 2017, based on evidence obtained during the alleged unconstitutional search, he still did 

not file his complaint until over two years after the two-year limitations period expired. 

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limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, Texas’ equitable tolling principles also control.” Id. 

“[W]hen state statutes of limitation are borrowed, state tolling principles are to be the ‘primary 

guide’ of the federal court. The federal court may disregard the state tolling rule only if it is 

inconsistent with federal policy.” FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations 

omitted). Equitable tolling preserves a plaintiff’s claims where strict application of the statute of 

limitations would be inequitable. Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1995). 

However, federal law requires that litigants diligently pursue their actions before equitable tolling 

becomes available. See Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on 

other grounds by Richards v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 2013); Covey v. Arkansas 

River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989) (“equity is not intended for those who sleep on their 

rights”). Equitable tolling is appropriate in cases where a plaintiff is actively misled by the 

defendant or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights. See Rashidi v. Am. 

President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Here, Plaintiff appears to argue that the applicable limitations period “started perhaps, at 

the time of the incident or within the Plaintiff’s filings of his last Court hearing(s) [sic] which was 

either the criminal proceeding (11.07 writ of habeas corpus/2254 writ of habeas corpus/forfeiture 

claim) etc.,” and that “it is to Plaintiff’s knowledge that he had 5 yrs. to file (if so [sic] chooses) 

his 1983 civil action.” (doc. 15 at 4.) As discussed, the applicable limitations period is two years 

from the date his claims accrued, and his claims accrued when he knew or had reason to know of 

the injury that is the basis of his action, i.e., the alleged unconstitutional search on December 21, 

2016, which allegedly resulted in his current incarceration. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576;

Gonzales, 157 F.3d at 1020. Plaintiff also appears to argue that he has diligently pursued his rights 

by filing a civil action against Officers and others in the United States District Court for the District 

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of Columbia in November 2021, and that “some extrordiniary [sic] circumstances (full 

address/capicity [sic]) on proof of service existed.” (doc. 15 at 5.) He fails to explain or allege 

any facts to show how a November 2021 action filed at approximately the same time as this § 1983 

action, or “address/capicity [sic]” issues relating to proof of service warrant equitable tolling, 

however. He therefore fails to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling, and his 

complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. A complaint that is barred by the statute of 

limitations is frivolous and fails to state a claim. See Pantoja v. Fort Worth Texas Police Dep’t, 

543 F. App’x 379, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of time-barred 

complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim). 

IV. HABEAS RELIEF 

In his responses to the magistrate judge’s questionnaire, Plaintiff challenges the state 

conviction under which he is currently incarcerated, arguing that the offense conduct “led to 

nothing more than a violation of his parole and that he . . .was subject to serving the remainder of 

his prior sentence of 13 months[ ] or attending substance abuse program,” and that his guilty plea 

in the underlying criminal case “was due to violating his parole not the law.” (doc. 15 at 9; see 

also id. at 10.) 

Where a party seeks relief in federal court from the fact or duration of confinement, as here, 

the claim “is cognizable only in federal habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 

n.14 (1973). A prisoner cannot challenge the fact or duration of confinement in a civil rights 

action. Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487). 

Accordingly, to the extent he seeks habeas relief in this civil rights action, any such claims are not 

cognizable outside of a federal habeas corpus action, and they should be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim. 

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V. RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff’s complaint, received on November 29, 2021 (doc. 1), should be DISMISSED

with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as frivolous and for failure to state 

a claim. This dismissal will count as a “strike” or “prior occasion” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g).4 

SIGNED this 8th day of August, 2023. 

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT 

 A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis 

for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996). 

4

 Section1915(g), which is commonly known as the “three-strikes” provision, provides: 

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 

under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained 

in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

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