IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

CHAUNCIL-DANIELLE, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2176-L-BN 

§ 

KENNETH S. HARTER, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Chauncil-Danielle, who does not provide a last name but does allege 

that she is “a woman on the land of the Texas Republic,” filed a pro se Petition for 

Injunction based on an alleged trespass. Dkt. No. 3; see id. at 1 (“The causal agent of 

trespass is Deprivation of Rights under color of law by Administering Property 

without right resulting in removal of time, happiness and invasion of privacy [Cf. 

First, Fourth and Fifth of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 

(1789)].”) 

United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay referred this lawsuit to the 

undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) 

and a standing order of reference. 

After reviewing the complaint, the undersigned questions whether there is 

subject matter jurisdiction and, given the circumstances of this case, enters these 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should 

dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

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These findings and conclusions provide Plaintiff notice as to the jurisdictional 

deficiencies. And the ability to file objections to the undersigned’s recommendation 

that this case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (further explained below) offers 

Plaintiff an opportunity to establish (if possible) that the Court does indeed have 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

Legal Standards 

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 

(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); see 

also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within constitutional bounds, 

Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.”); 

Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Federal courts 

are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack 

the power to adjudicate claims.”). 

They must therefore “presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 

and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the 

federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Correspondingly, all federal courts have an independent duty to examine their own 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-

84 (1999) (“Subject-matter limitations ... keep the federal courts within the bounds 

the Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter 

delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest 

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level.” (citations omitted)). 

Plaintiff chose to file this lawsuit in federal court and, by doing so, undertook 

the burden to establish federal jurisdiction. See Butler v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 

762 F. App’x 193, 194 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[A]ssertions [that] are conclusory 

[ ] are insufficient to support [an] attempt to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.” 

(citing Evans v. Dillard Univ., 672 F. App’x 505, 505-06 (5th Cir. 2017) (per cuiam); 

Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2001))). 

And, if Plaintiff does not, this lawsuit must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, 

the court must dismiss the action.”). 

Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction 

depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established 

argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 

1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 

636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 

929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, 

parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ 

in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)). 

Under their limited jurisdiction, federal courts generally may only hear a case 

if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of citizenship exists between 

the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. 

In cases invoking jurisdiction under Section 1332, each plaintiff’s citizenship 

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must be diverse from each defendant’s citizenship, and the amount in controversy 

must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b). 

This amount “is determined by the amount of damages or the value of the 

property that is the subject of the action.” Celestine v. TransWood, Inc., 467 F. App’x 

317, 319 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). 

And, “[f]or diversity purposes, state citizenship is synonymous with domicile. 

A change in domicile requires: ‘(1) physical presence at the new location and (2) an 

intention to remain there indefinitely.’” Dos Santos v. Belmere Ltd. P’ship, 516 F. 

App’x 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Preston v. 

Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., 485 F.3d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In 

determining diversity jurisdiction, the state where someone establishes his domicile 

serves a dual function as his state of citizenship.... Domicile requires the 

demonstration of two factors: residence and the intention to remain.” (citing Stine v. 

Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954))). 

“The basis for diversity jurisdiction must be ‘distinctly and affirmatively 

alleged.’” Dos Santos, 516 F. App’x at 403 (quoting Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 

F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2009)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit has therefore held “that a ‘failure to adequately allege the basis for diversity 

jurisdiction mandates dismissal.’” Id. (quoting Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 

803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991)). 

Under Section 1331, federal question jurisdiction “exists when ‘a well-pleaded 

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complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 

plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question 

of federal law.’” Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)); see also

In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A federal question exists ‘if 

there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of 

federal law.’” (quoting Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 

(5th Cir. 1995))). 

The “‘creation’ test ... accounts for the vast bulk of suits under federal law.” 

Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257 (citation omitted). But 

“a federal court [is also] able to hear claims recognized under state law 

that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus 

justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a 

federal forum offers on federal issues.” That is to say, “federal 

jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) 

necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable 

of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state 

balance approved by Congress.” 

Perez v. Se. SNF, L.L.C., No. 21-50399, 2022 WL 987187, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 

2022) (per curiam) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 

545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005), then Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258). 

Discussion 

Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a basis for diversity. Most apparent, there 

is not complete diversity based on the allegations, which reflect that Texas residents 

(all with addresses in either Dallas or Addison, see Dkt. No. 3 at 3) appear on both 

sides of this dispute. 

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And no facts alleged raise a substantial, disputed question of federal law. Nor 

do the well-pleaded allegations reflect that there is federal jurisdiction over a state 

law claim. 

“The applicable test for determining jurisdiction on the face of the pleadings is 

not whether the plaintiffs could actually recover, but whether the federal claim 

alleged is so patently without merit as to justify the district court’s dismissal for want 

of jurisdiction.” Suthoff v. Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp., 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 

Unit A Feb. 1981) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 

59 (1978)). 

Put another way, “[s]ome claims are ‘so insubstantial, implausible, ... or 

otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” Atakapa 

Indian de Creole Nation v. Louisiana, 943 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)). 

And “a complaint that alleges the existence of a frivolous or insubstantial 

federal question is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a federal court.” Raymon 

v. Alvord Indep. Sch. Dist., 639 F.2d 257, 257 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (citing 

Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 

528, 538-39 (1974)); see also Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 565 F.2d 

338, 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (a claim “must be more than frivolous to support federal 

question jurisdiction”). 

In sum, a complaint that simply points to a federal law – such as an 

amendment to the United States constitution or a federal statute, see Dkt. No. 3 at 1 

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(citing, among other federal authority, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act) – does not provide for subject matter jurisdiction under Section 1331 

where, like here, the complaint lacks factual allegations showing how the federal law 

applies to a plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S. Air Force, 566 F.2d 957, 958 (5th 

Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Nowhere in his complaint, or elsewhere in the record, did 

appellant allege discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin, a prerequisite to relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. Accordingly, this 

statute did not furnish the court below with subject matter jurisdiction.”); Mitchell v. 

Clinkscales, 253 F. App’x 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough Mitchell 

argues that Clinkscales is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell does not allege facts 

demonstrating that Clinkscales acted under color of state law; thus, Mitchell failed 

to plead and establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal 

question. [And t]he district court was required to dismiss the complaint.” (citation 

omitted)); Harrington v. City of Shiner, Tex., No. 6:20-cv-00039, 2021 WL 4503013, at 

*5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Harrington failed, not in stating conclusory or vague 

facts to support his Section 1983 claim, but in showing that the Section 1983 claim 

was not frivolous, insubstantial, or patently without merit given the facts that he did

allege. Thus, the district court concluded that the claim did not raise a federal 

question given the lack of a foundation for the Section 1983 claim – that is, an alleged 

constitutional rights violation – as well as the lack of any factual allegations that 

could even imply the applicability of the statute.” (discussing prior dismissal by the 

court; citations omitted)).

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Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: October 6, 2022 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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