* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### FEB 25 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DELOIS C. ANTWINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-5060 (D.C. No. 97-CV-41-J) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Claimant filed an application for disability insurance benefits on December 20, 1994, alleging disability since Novemb er 15, 1992, because of pain in her back, neck, right shoulder, and hips. Claim ant’s insured status expired on March 31, 1995, so in order to be entitled to benef its, she must have shown that she was disabled by that date. Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that claimant was not disabled. Pursuant to the sequential analysis, see Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (detailing five-step analysis), the ALJ found that claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work, with certain limitations resulting from her physical con dition and pain. The ALJ elicited testimony from a vocational expert and, ba sed on that evidence, found that there were a significant number of jobs that c laimant could perform, given her exertional and non-exertional limitations. The Appeals Council denied claimant’s request for review, and, therefore, the ALJ’s denial of benefits stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291. Our task is to review the Commissioner’s decision to se e whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied in reaching that decision. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 388 (10th Cir. 1995).-3-

“Substantial evidence is adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Id. at 388-89. On appeal, claimant argues that the ALJ did not pro perly evaluate her physical impairments and did not properly consider the vocational impact of her impairments in finding that she could perform a sig nificant number of light work jobs. Claimant also argues that the hypothetical questions the ALJ posed to the expert did not accurately reflect her impairments, and, therefore, the ALJ’s finding that there were a significant number of job s claimant was able to perform was error. Into both of these arguments on appeal, claimant incorporates the contention that the ALJ improperly discounted treat ing physician opinions in favor of the consulting physician’s opinion. We wi ll not consider this facet of claimant’s argument because the issue was not presented to the district court. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). After thorough review of the record, we hold that i t contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding thatclaimant is not entitled to benefits and that the correct legal standards were applied in reaching the decision.1 The parties consented to proceed before a United St ates Magistrate Judge,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). -4- We affirm the Commissioner’s decision for substanti ally the reasons stated in the district court’s order of February 6, 1998. 1 AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

James E. Barrett Senior Circuit Judge