IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

MICHAEL GEOFFREY PETERS, § 

TDCJ No. 2019190, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2213-L-BN 

 § 

TEXAS DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 

GREG ABBOTT, and KEN PAXTON, § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Michael Geoffrey Peters, a Texas prisoner, was not convicted and 

sentenced by a state court in this district and is incarcerated at TDCJ’s Stringfellow 

Unit, a prison outside this district. He nevertheless filed in this district a pro se civil 

rights complaint, alleging that he was wrongly convicted and seeking $3.3 billion in 

damages. See Dkt. No. 2. Peters also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP). See Dkt. No. 3. And United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay referred 

Peters’ complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial 

management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should summarily deny the IFP motion and dismiss 

this action with prejudice under prior sanctions entered by the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Texas or, in the alternative, the Court should 

dismiss this action without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) unless, within the 

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time to file objections to this recommendation or by some other deadline established 

by the Court, Peters pays the full filing fee of $402.00. 

First, earlier this year, Chief Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the Southern District 

of Texas observed that 

Peters is no stranger to the federal courts, having had no less than 15 

cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim on 

which relief can be granted. Based on Peters’ history of frivolous and 

abusive litigation, this court entered an order precluding him from 

“filing any new case in this District unless he first obtains written 

permission from a Judge of this District.” Peters, et al. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 

Civil No. H-22-59 (S.D. Tex. March 21, 2022). Despite this preclusion 

order, Peters filed his current case without obtaining such written 

permission. To the extent that this filing could be construed as seeking 

such written permission, it is denied. Given Peters’ record of filing 

frivolous and abusive lawsuits and the clearly spurious nature of his 

current complaint, this court will not grant Peters permission to proceed 

with this action. 

Peters v. Hohl, Civ. A. No. H-22-1672, 2022 WL 2047375, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 

2022) (dismissing the complaint with prejudice, denying IFP motion under Section 

1915(g), and certifying that any appeal would not be taken in good faith under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)). 

“[T]he judicial system is generally accessible and open to all individuals.” 

Kaminetzky v. Frost Nat’l Bank of Hous., 881 F. Supp. 276, 277 (S.D. Tex. 1995). 

But “district courts have an obligation to protect the orderly administration of 

justice and prevent abuse of the court’s process by frivolous and vexatious litigants[, 

which means p]ro se litigants have ‘no license to harass others, clog the judicial 

machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.’” 

Ruston v. Dall. Cnty., Tex., No. 3:07-cv-1076-D, 2008 WL 958076, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

Apr. 9, 2008) (quoting Farguson v. MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 

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1986)). 

Consistent with this obligation, courts in this district routinely “honor[] 

sanctions imposed by other federal district courts in Texas” against prisoner and nonprisoner vexatious litigants alike. Roy v. Ass’n Comm. to Elect Rev. Dr. Kamal K. Roy, 

No. 3:08-cv-327-N, 2008 WL 1970945, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2008). 

In general, the court retains the inherent authority to curb 

abusive litigation. Federal courts in Texas will honor sanctions imposed 

by other federal district courts in Texas against a prisoner litigant. See

MISC. ORD. 48 (N.D. Tex.); Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of action based on enforcing other 

district’s sanction order); Schmidt v. Van Buren, 243 F. App’x 803 (5th 

Cir. June 13, 2007) (unpublished per curiam) (noting district court’s 

enforcement of sister court’s sanction orders). 

“In cases involving litigious, non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs, the 

distinction between prisoner and non-prisoner litigants is one without a 

difference for Misc. Ord. 48 purposes.” Sparkman v. Charles Schwab & 

Co., Inc., et al., 3:07cv1457-B (N.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2008) (enforcing 

multiple sanctions and orders of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 

District of Texas against non-prisoner pro se litigant). 

Id. (enforcing “the sanction order of the Western District of Texas pursuant to Misc. 

Ord. 48” against a non-prisoner pro se plaintiff, dismissing action with prejudice, and 

barring plaintiff “from filing any future civil actions in any court in the Northern 

District of Texas without first seeking leave of court”); see also Sheehan v. State of 

Tex., No. 3:05-cv-1318-K, 2005 WL 2036686, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2005) (“The 

proper administration of justice requires that courts [honor sanctions orders imposed 

by other federal courts as] to prisoner and nonprisoner litigants alike.” (citations 

omitted)). 

The Court should therefore honor the sanctions previously imposed against 

Peters by the Southern District of Texas and thereby summarily deny his IFP motion 

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and, consistent with Chief Judge Rosenthal’s June 2022 order, summarily deny leave 

to proceed IFP and dismiss this action with prejudice. 

In the alternative, Peters is barred from proceed IFP under Section 1915(g). 

That is, prisoners (like Peters) may not proceed IFP if, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, they have filed three or more civil actions or appeals in 

federal court that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a 

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Peters is subject to this three-strikes bar. See Peters v. Hohl, 2022 WL 2047375, 

at *1; see also, e.g., Peters v. Texas, No. 20-40583, 2022 WL 622326 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 

2022) (per curiam); Peters v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, No. 4:21-CV-3039, 2021 WL 

4319662 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) (cataloguing 11 qualifying dismissals) 

The only exception to this bar is when the prisoner is “under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But, in order to meet the “imminent 

danger” exception, “the ‘threat or prison condition [must be] real and proximate.’” 

Valdez v. Bush, No. 3:08-cv-1481-N, 2008 WL 4710808, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2008) 

(quoting Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003)). “Allegations of past 

harm do not suffice – the harm must be imminent or occurring at the time the 

complaint is filed.” Id.; see also McGrew v. La. State Penitentiary Mental Health Dep’t, 

459 F. App’x 370, 370 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“The determination whether a 

prisoner is under ‘imminent danger’ must be made at the time the prisoner seeks to 

file his suit in district court, when he files his notice of appeal, or when he moves for 

IFP status.” (citing Baños v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1998))). 

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A prisoner must also “allege specific facts” to support the imminent-danger 

exception. Valdez, 2008 WL 4710808, at *1. “General allegations that are not 

grounded in specific facts which indicate that serious physical injury is imminent are 

not sufficient to invoke the exception to § 1915(g).” Id. (quoting Niebla v. Walton Corr. 

Inst., No. 3:06-cv-275-LAC-EMT, 2006 WL 2051307, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 20, 2006)). 

The “specific allegations” must therefore reflect “ongoing serious physical 

injury” or “a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious 

physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). For example, 

as to allegedly inadequate medical care, use of “the past tense when describing” 

symptoms (which should be corroborated by medical records or grievances) does not 

allege imminent danger. Stone v. Jones, 459 F. App’x 442, 2012 WL 278658, at *1 (5th 

Cir. Jan. 31, 2012) (per curiam). 

And there must be a nexus between the claims made and the imminent danger 

alleged. See Stine v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons Designation & Sentence Computation 

Unit, No. 3:13-cv-4253-B, 2013 WL 6640391, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013) (citations 

omitted), aff’d, 571 F. App’x 352 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 

As Peters’ current civil action falls under the three-strikes provision, he may 

not proceed without the prepayment of fees unless he shows that he is subject to 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. But his complaint lacks substantive 

factual allegations to show that he currently is in imminent danger of serious physical 

injury as to overcome Section 1915(g). 

So, if the Court elects not to enforce the Southern District’s prior sanctions, the 

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Court should bar Peters from proceeding IFP under Section 1915(g). See Adepegba v. 

Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Considering his allegations, insofar as Peters was not convicted or sentenced 

by a state court in this district and is not incarcerated in this district, venue may not 

be proper in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). But transfer of this case would not 

be in the interest of justice for the reasons set out above. See id. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a). 

Nor does the improper venue statute protect Peters from his choice of the 

wrong venue. See Olberding v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953) (“[A] 

plaintiff, by bringing the suit in a district other than that authorized by the statute, 

relinquishe[s] his right to object to the venue.”).1

Recommendation

The Court should summarily deny Plaintiff Michael Geoffrey Peters leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss this action with prejudice under prior 

sanctions entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Texas or, in the alternative, the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice 

1 Cf. Utterback v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 716 F. App’x 241, 244 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(per curiam) (“When a case is filed in the wrong venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) instructs 

district courts either to dismiss or, ‘if it be in the interest of justice,’ to transfer to a 

district where venue is proper. Section 1406(b) adds that ‘[n]othing in this chapter 

shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who 

does not interpose timely and sufficient objection to venue.’ Like personal 

jurisdiction, venue is ‘designed to protect the defendant against the risk that a 

plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial.’ Therefore, ‘a plaintiff, by 

bringing the suit in a district other than that authorized by the statute, 

relinquishe[s] his right to object to the venue.’ Where defendants waive their 

objection to venue, as they did in this case, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) affords plaintiffs no 

relief.” (citations omitted)). 

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) unless, within the time to file objections to this 

recommendation or by some other deadline established by the Court, Peters pays the 

full filing fee of $402.00. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: October 7, 2022 

 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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