-1-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

AUSTIN BROWN AND KAYLYNN §

BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS § 

NEXT FRIEND OF K.B., A MINOR §

§

Plaintiffs, §

v. §

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-00717

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; §

MARRIOTT HOTEL SERVICES, INC.; §

RYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES, §

INC.; OPRYLAND HOSPITALITY, LLC; §

RHP PROPERTY GT, LP; RHP §

OPERATIONS GT, LLC; AND CHARLES §

PACIONI §

§

Defendants. §

NOTICE OF REMOVAL

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, defendants, Marriott International, Inc.; Marriott 

Hotel Services, Inc.; Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc.; Opryland Hospitality, LLC; RHP 

Property GT, LP; RHP Operations GT, LLC; and Charles Pacioni (“defendants”) hereby give 

Notice of Removal of this civil action from the 153rd Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, 

Texas, to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth Division)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1332. In support thereof, defendants state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq., this civil action is removed from the 153rd Judicial 

District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, where this matter is pending under Cause No. 153-

334663-22; Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown, Individually and as Next Friend [sic] of K.B., A 

Minor vs. Marriott International, Inc., et al. (the “State Court Action”). 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 1 of 16 PageID 1
-2-

II. NATURE OF THE SUIT

This is a lawsuit alleging personal injury from a chair collapsing at the Gaylord Texan 

Resort and Convention Center. See Plaintiffs’ Original Petition [Dkt. 1-3] at ¶¶ 17-25. Plaintiffs 

allege that on July 24, 2020, the chair minor child, K.B., was sitting in. collapsed, causing injuries. 

Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiffs, individually, and as next friends of K.B., brought negligence and gross 

negligence claims against Marriott International, Inc.; Marriott Hotel Services, Inc.; Ryman 

Hospitality Properties, Inc.; Opryland Hospitality, LLC; RHP Property GT, LP; and RHP 

Operations GT, LLC in the 153rd Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. Id. at ¶¶ 26-

32.

Plaintiffs also brought negligence and gross negligence claims against Charles Pacioni, a 

Marriott Hotel Services employee and the General Manager of the Gaylord Texan Resort & 

Convention Center. See Ex. A, Declaration of C. Pacioni [Dkt. 1-2] at ¶ 2. Mr. Pacioni is a Texas 

citizen. Plaintiffs’ Original Petition [Dkt. 1-3] at ¶ 10.

III. TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL

Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit by filing their Original Petition on July 14, 2022. 

a. Defendant, Charles Pacioni, was served at his home on July 19, 2022 [Dkt. 1-14]; 

b. Defendant, Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., was served on July 19, 2022 through its 

registered agent, CT Corporation [Dkt. 1-16]; 

c. Defendant, Marriott International, Inc., was served on July 19, 2022 through its 

registered agent, CT Corporation [Dkt. 1-17]; 

d. Defendant, Opryland Hospitality, LLC, was served on July 19, 2022 through its 

registered agent, CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service [Dkt. 1-18];

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 2 of 16 PageID 2
-3-

e. Defendant, RHP Operations GT, LLC, was served on July 19, 2022 through its 

registered agent, CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service [Dkt. 1-19]; 

f. Defendant, RHP Property GT, LP, was served on July 19, 2022 through its 

registered agent, CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service [Dkt. 1-20]; anf

g. Defendant, Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc., was served on July 19, 2022 

through the Texas Secretary of State [Dkt. 1-21]. 

This removal is timely because it is filed less than 30 days after defendants were served. 

28 U.S.C. § 1446. 

IV. BASIS FOR REMOVAL JURISDICTION

As set forth more fully below, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1332, which confers original jurisdiction “of all civil actions where the matter in controversy 

exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens 

of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The claims are pled based upon Texas law. Diversity 

jurisdiction exists because defendant Charles Pacioni, a citizen of Texas, has been improperly 

joined or is a nominal party.

V. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

Removal of this action is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1441(b) because this 

action involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 

and there is complete diversity between the real parties in interest. Plaintiffs Austin Brown and

Kaylynn Brown are not citizens of the same states as defendants Marriott International, Inc.; 

Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. (hereafter “Marriott Defendants”); Ryman Hospitality Properties, 

Inc.; Opryland Hospitality, LLC; RHP Property GT, LP and RHP Operations GT, LLC (hereafter 

“Ryman Defendants”). Although Employee Defendant, Charles Pacioni is a citizen of the same 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 3 of 16 PageID 3
-4-

state as plaintiffs, Pacioni’s citizenship should be disregarded because he is improperly joined in 

the State Court Action. 

A. The Amount In Controversy Requirement is Satisfied.

In order to determine whether jurisdiction is present in a removed action, the claims set 

forth in the State Court petition are considered as of the date of removal. See Wisconsin Dep’t of 

Corr. v. Schacht, U.S. 381, 391 (1998). The amount in controversy “demanded in good faith in 

the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (c)(2).

Texas law does not require plaintiffs to demand a specific monetary amount. Rather,

plaintiffs must set forth a claim for relief falling within one of five prescribed categories of

monetary relief. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 47. Therefore, where the petition does not include a specific

monetary demand, the removing party must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412

(5th Cir. 1995). This requirement is met if: (1) it is apparent from the face of the petition that the

claims are likely to exceed $75,000.00, or, alternatively, (2) the defendant sets forth “summary

judgment type evidence” of facts in controversy that support a finding of the requisite amount.

Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).

In the case at bar, it is apparent from the face of Plaintiffs’ Original Petition that the amount 

in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. Plaintiffs’ Rule 47 disclosure of monetary relief affirmatively 

pleads they are seeking monetary relief in excess of $1,000,000. See Ex. B [Dkt. 1-3] at ¶ 11. 

Furthermore, the nature of plaintiffs’ alleged injuries makes it apparent from the face of the Petition 

that plaintiffs’ claims are likely to exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 

25. Therefore, plaintiffs’ Original Petition makes it apparent that the amount in controversy 

exceeds the statutory minimum. See Thelander v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 3:14-CV-02650-

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 4 of 16 PageID 4
-5-

P at *8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2014). Because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, 

removal on the basis of diversity should be allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 

B. Plaintiffs, the Marriott Defendants. and the Ryman Defendants are 

Completely Diverse. 

The citizenship status of the real parties in interest is completely diverse.

1. Plaintiffs, Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown, Are Citizens of Texas.

Plaintiffs Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown are natural persons, so their citizenship for 

diversity purposes is determined by “where [they are] domiciled, that is, where [they have] a fixed 

residence with the intent to remain there indefinitely.” Margetis v. Ray, No. 3:08-CV-958-L, 2009 

WL 464962, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 

553, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

“Evidence of a person’s place of residence” serves as “prima facie proof of his domicile,” 

Hollinger v. Home State Mut. Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing 

Preston I, 485 F.3d at 799). However,

[i]n determining a party’s domicile, the Court must address a variety of factors 

including the places where the litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays 

taxes, owns real and personal property, has driver’s and other licenses, maintains 

bank accounts, belongs to clubs and churches, has places of business or 

employment, and maintains a home for his family.

Dulfer v. Seton Healthcare, Inc., No. A-11-CV-911-LY, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176581 

*5, 2012 WL 6212833, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2012) and Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 251 (5th 

Cir. 1996)).

Defendants state and allege herein that plaintiffs Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown are 

residents, citizens, and domiciliaries of the State of Texas. Plaintiffs’ Original Petition alleges 

plaintiffs Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown are citizens of Texas. See Ex. B [Dkt. 1-3] at ¶¶ 2, 

3. Further, following a diligent search of public records, defendants additionally state that 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 5 of 16 PageID 5
-6-

plaintiffs Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown, jointly own real property, pay taxes, and maintain a 

home in the State of Texas. Further, both Austin Brown and Kaylynn Brown maintain Texas 

driver’s licenses and own vehicles registered with the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles. 

Finally, defendants are not aware of any residency, citizenship, or domiciliary by plaintiffsin either 

Maryland, Delaware, or Tennessee. Because plaintiffs reside in Texas, plaintiffs are a citizens of 

Texas for diversity purposes.

2. Marriott International, Inc. is a Citizen of Delaware and Maryland.

Plaintiffs allege at Paragraph 4 the “Defendant Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”), is 

a corporation registered to conduct business in Texas and conducts a substantial amount of 

business in Texas on a continuous and systematic basis.” Ex. B [Dkt. 1-3] at ¶ 4. However, for the 

purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is considered a citizen of (1) every U.S. state and 

foreign state where it is incorporated and (2) the U.S. state or foreign state where it has it principal 

place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(1). Defendant Marriott International, Inc. alleges herein, 

at the time this action was commenced, Marriott International, Inc. was, and still is, a corporation 

formed in the State of Delaware with its principal place of business located in Bethesda, Maryland. 

Accordingly, Marriott International, Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and Maryland for the purposes 

of evaluating diversity.

3. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. is a Citizen of Delaware and Maryland.

Defendant Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. alleges herein, at the time this action was 

commenced, Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. was, and still is, a corporation formed in the State of 

Delaware with its principal place of business located in Bethesda, Maryland. Accordingly, 

Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and Maryland for the purposes of evaluating 

diversity.

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 6 of 16 PageID 6
-7-

4. Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc is a Citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

Defendant Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. alleges herein, at the time this action was 

commenced, Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. was, and still is, a corporation formed in the State 

of Delaware with its principal place of business located in Nashville, Tennessee. Accordingly, 

Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee for the purposes of 

evaluating diversity.

5. Opryland Hospitality, LLC is a Citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

Plaintiff alleges in Paragraph 7 of their Original Petition that Opryland Hospitality, LLC is 

a “limited liability company registered to conduct business in Texas and conducts a substantial 

amount of business in Texas on a continuous and systematic basis.” Ex. B [Dkt. 1-3] at ¶ 7. The 

citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of each member of the 

entity. See Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 2008). Further, 

when one of the LLC’s members is an artificial entity comprised of additional entities, the

appropriate test for citizenship involves “tracing their citizenships down the various organizational 

layers where necessary. . . .” Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2009); see

also Hicklin Eng'g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 347-48 (7th Cir. 2006). As demonstrated below, 

Opryland Hospitality, LLC is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee:

(1) The sole member of Opryland Hospitality, LLC is RHP Hotels, LLC, a limited 

liability company.

(2) The sole member of RHP Hotels, LLC is RHP Hotel Properties, LP, a limited 

partnership.

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 7 of 16 PageID 7
-8-

(3) RHP Hotel Properties, LP is comprised of two partners: general partner, RHP Partner, 

LLC, a limited liability company, and limited partner, Ryman Hospitality Properties, 

Inc., a corporation. 

(4) The sole member of RHP Partner, LLC is Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. 

(5) Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with is principal place 

of business in the State of Tennessee.

Accordingly, Opryland Hospitality, LLC is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

6. RHP Property GT, LP is a Citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

For the purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, the partnership itself is considered a 

citizen of every state in which a general or limited partner is a citizen. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 

494 U.S. 195-96, 110 S. Ct. 1015, 1021, L. Ed.2d 157 (1990); Bankston v. Burch, 27 F.3d 164, 

166 (5th Cir. 1994). As demonstrated below, RHP Property GT, LP is a citizen of Delaware and 

Tennessee: 

(1) RHP Properties GT, LP is comprised of two partners, Opryland Hospitality, LLC, 

general partner, and RHP Property GT, LLC. As discussed in Paragraph 19 supra, 

Opryland Hospitality LLC is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee.

(2) The sole member of RHP Property GT, LLC is RHP Hotels, LLC, a limited liability 

company.

(3) The sole member of RHP Hotels, LLC is RHP Hotel Properties, LP, a limited 

partnership.

(4) RHP Hotel Properties, LP is comprised of two partners: general partner, RHP Partner, 

LLC, a limited liability company, and limited partner, Ryman Hospitality Properties, 

Inc., a corporation. 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 8 of 16 PageID 8
-9-

(5) The sole member of RHP Partner, LLC is Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. 

(6) Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with is principal place 

of business in the State of Tennessee.

Accordingly, RHP Property GT, LP is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

7. RHP Operations GT, LLC is a Citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

As demonstrated below, RHP Operations GT, LLC is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee:

(1) The sole member of RHP Operations GT, LLC is Ryman Hotel Operations HoldCo, 

LLC.

(2) The sole member of Ryman Hotel Operations HoldCo, LLC is RHP Hotels, LLC.

(3) The sole member of RHP Hotels, LLC is RHP Hotel Properties, LP, a limited 

partnership.

(4) RHP Hotel Properties, LP is comprised of two partners: general partner, RHP Partner, 

LLC, a limited liability company, and limited partner, Ryman Hospitality Properties, 

Inc., a corporation. 

(5) The sole member of RHP Partner, LLC is Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. 

(6) Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with is principal place 

of business in the State of Tennessee.

Accordingly, RHP Operations GT, LLC is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee. 

VI. IMPROPER JOINDER

Plaintiffs’ claims against Charles Pacioni, a citizen of Texas, are improper and Pacioni was 

only sued in an attempt to defeat diversity jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiffs have no viable claim 

against Charles Pacioni under Texas law and therefore, the Court should disregard Pacioni as a 

non-diverse defendant. 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 9 of 16 PageID 9
-10-

A. Standard of Review

The improper joinder of a defendant who is a citizen of the forum state or to defeat diversity 

cannot prevent removal. See Illinois C. R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 316, 30 S. Ct. 101, 54 L. 

Ed. 208 (1909); see also Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Resources, Ltd., 

99 F.3d 746, 751 (5th Cir. 1996). The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating improper 

joinder. Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003). Improper joinder can be established in 

two ways: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to 

establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R. 

R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004)(citing Travis, 326 F.3d at 646-47). Under the later 

method, the Court determines whether the plaintiff has “any possibility of recovery against the 

party whose joinder is questioned. If there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the 

state law might impose liability on the facts involved, there is no [improper] joinder. This

possibility, however, must be reasonable, not merely theoretical.” Travis, 326 F.3d at 648 (quoting 

Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 

2002))(emphasis original)(quotations omitted).

Generally, a district court engages in “a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the 

allegations of the complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim under state law 

against the in-state defendant.”Ticer v. Imerium Inc. Co., 20 F.4th 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 2021). But 

in cases “in which a plaintiff has stated a claim, but has misstated or omitted discrete facts that 

would determine the propriety of joinder . . . the district court may, in its discretion, pierce the 

pleadings and conduct a summary inquiry.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Such an inquiry “is 

appropriate only to identify the presence of discrete and undisputed facts that would preclude 

plaintiff’s recovery against the in-state defendant.” Id. at 573-74.

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 10 of 16 PageID 10
-11-

In International Energy Ventures Management, L.L.C. v. United Energy Group, Limited, 

the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the state or federal pleadings standard applies to the issue of 

improper joinder holding that a federal court must apply the federal pleading standard used for 

addressing a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 818 F.3d 193, 208 (5th Cir.

2016). Moreover, a district court may look to evidence outside the pleadings in determining a 

fraudulent joinder claim. Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995).

B. Texas Law Concerning Individual Liability for Employee Managers Performing 

Duties in the Scope of Employment.

Texas recognizes two types of premises liability cases: negligent activity cases and 

premises defect cases. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992). In a negligent 

activity case, the injury must occur “as a contemporaneous result of [an] activity itself, rather than 

by a condition created by [an] activity.” Id. When the injury occurs as a result of a premises 

condition, rather than as a contemporaneous result of an activity, the appropriate jury submission 

is based on premises defect. Id.

In the case at bar, all of plaintiffs’ claims center on the allegation there was a chair that was 

unsafe, and that the condition of the chair was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs 

globally plead that “defendants” failed to inspect, maintain, repair, or warn guests about the alleged 

condition of the chair. In a premises condition case, the duty to exercise reasonable care to reduce 

or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm belongs solely to the possessor who owns, occupies or 

controls the premises. See Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 8 S.W.3d 634, 635 (Tex. 1999). 

Absent an independent duty of care, Texas has never imposed a similar duty on employees that it 

places on the owner or occupier.

“[I]ndividual liability arises only when the officer or agent owes an independent duty of

reasonable care to the injured party apart from the employer’s duty.” Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552,

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 11 of 16 PageID 11
-12-

562 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996)). An example of

such an independent duty is an agent’s “duty of reasonable care to the general public” when

operating a vehicle in the course of his employment. Leitch, 935 S.W.2d at 117. When an agent

simply carries out a duty that the employer owes, however, he cannot be individually liable for

breaching that duty. See id. at 118. This is because “[c]orporations can . . . only act through

individuals.” Tri, 162 S.W.3d at 562. Although Leitch was a case arising in the employeremployee context, the Texas Supreme Court has extended its holding to encompass negligence

and premises liability cases. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. 2005). Therefore, plaintiffs 

can only recover from Pacioni if he owed a duty of care independent of the duty Marriott Hotel 

Services, his employer, owed to plaintiffs.

Courts in the Northern District of Texas have routinely held removal is proper where an

employee is sued, solely by virtue of the employee’s position as a manager or supervisor, finding

in the absence of an independent duty of care, the employee owed no duty. See Guerrero v. 

Frankel Family Trust, No. 3:21-cv-2273-L; 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101253, 2022 WL 2053178 at 

*9, 10 (N.D. Tex., June 7, 2022) (denying motion to remand, finding employee defendants owed 

no independent duty of care and were improperly joined); Varela v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 

4:18-cv-00953-A, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34366 *5-6, 2019 WL 1041335 (N.D. Tex. March 4, 

2019) (denying remand, finding plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief against store 

manager and dismissing claims against manager); Fulford v. Lowes Home Ctrs., No. 5:18-cv00152-C, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 245082 *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2018)(denying remand, finding 

no authority to pinpoint independent duty on employee defendant who was improperly joinded); 

Fugitt v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-02145-B; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156884 *11 (N.D. 

Tex. Nov. 19, 2015)(finding employee store manager did not owe an independent duty of care and 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 12 of 16 PageID 12
-13-

denying remand); Stange-Schmidt v. Home Depot U.S.A., No. 4:11-cv-0023-A, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 171941 *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2011) (finding store manager did not owe invitee an 

independent duty of care, sua sponte dismissing claims against store manager, and denying 

remand); Lindsey v. Walmart Sores, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-01587-L, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126134 

*21-22, 2010 WL 4860789 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2010) (finding store manager was improperly 

joined and denying remand “[t]he duties that Plaintiff contends were breached were those of WalMart, and any breach by [the employee] would constitute breach by Wal-Mart acting through its 

agent or employee”); McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 3:15-CV-518-L, 2015 WL 4920013, at 

*4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015) (same); Peters v. Corona, No. 3:18-CV-1918-B, 2018 WL 6019809, 

at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2018) (same). 

Charles Pacioni does not, and did not, at the time of the alleged incident, own, occupy or 

lease the Gaylord Texan Resort & Convention Center. Ex. A, Declaration of C. Pacioni [Dkt. 1-

2] at ¶ 5. Charles Pacioni, in his role as General Manager for the Gaylord Texan, does not 

personally employ any of the individuals who work at the Gaylord Texan. Id. Mr. Pacioni did not 

select the chairs and furniture for use in the hotel lobby seating area and does not personally clean, 

inspect, maintain or repair chairs and furniture in the hotel’s lobby area. Id. at ¶4. Mr. Pacioni was 

not directing or supervising any of the employees in the area where plaintiffs claim K.B. was 

injured. Id. Mr. Pacioni does not know how the chair was positioned at the time of the incident or 

what caused the legs of the chair to allegedly collapse. Id. In fact, Charles Pacioni was not even 

present on the hotel premises at the time the incident occurred. Id. at ¶ 3. 

Plaintiffs’ Original Petition pleads no fact or allegation that would create a plausible claim 

for relief against Charles Pacioni. Because Charles Pacioni owes plaintiffs no independent duty of 

reasonable care, his joinder in this action is improper. As such, this Court should dismiss and/or 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 13 of 16 PageID 13
-14-

disregard Pacioni as a party to this lawsuit and retain jurisdiction in this matter based on the 

diversity of plaintiffs and the Marriott and Ryman defendants. 

VII. ALL OTHER PREREQUISITES FOR REMOVAL ARE SATISFIED.

This Notice of Removal is filed within 30 days of defendants’ receipt and service of 

Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.

The State Court Action was filed in Tarrant County, Texas. Accordingly, this action is 

properly removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth 

Division, which is “the district and division embracing the place where [the state court] action is 

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(2) (listing the counties within the Fort 

Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) and Local Rule 81.1 require a copy of all process, pleadings, and 

orders served upon the removing defendant in the State Court Action (Cause No.153-334663-22) 

to be included with this Notice of Removal. See Dkt. 1-7 through 1-34. Defendants have obtained 

from the Tarrant County District Court Clerk the following papers and have attached them as 

exhibits hereto: 

A. Index of all documents filed in the State Court Action [Dkt. 1-1].

B. Docket Sheet in the State Court Action [Dkt. 1-6].

C. Copies of all process, pleadings and orders filed in State Court [Dkts. 1-7 through 1-

34].

D. Defendants are filing with this Notice of Removal a completed Civil Cover Sheet [Dkt. 

1-4], a Supplemental Civil Cover Sheet [Dkt. 1-5], and separate Signed Disclosure 

Statements and Certificates of Interested Persons. 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 14 of 16 PageID 14
-15-

E. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), a Notice to Adverse Party of Removal to Federal 

Court, together with this Notice of Removal and all exhibits attached hereto, will be 

served on counsel for plaintiff and will be filed with the Tarrant County District Clerk.

F. The filing fee has been paid to the United States District Court Clerk.

G. This Notice of Removal is filed subject to and without waiver of any defenses or 

objections to Plaintiffs’ Original Petition as allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure or by any applicable law. By filing this Notice of Removal, defendants do 

not waive, and specifically reserve the right to assert any defenses and/or objections, 

which defendants may be qualified to assert. Defendants reserve the right to amend or 

supplement this Notice of Removal or otherwise should plaintiffs challenge the 

allegations in a motion to remand or other filing.. Defendants retain the right to 

supplement the jurisdictional allegations by affidavit, declaration. 

H. Defendants further reserve the right to answer or present other defenses or objections 

afforded under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within seven (7) days pursuant to 

FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(2)(C).

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, pursuant to and in conformance with the 

statutory requirements, defendants Marriott International, Inc.; Marriott Hotel Services, Inc.; 

Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc.; Opryland Hospitality, LLC; RHP Property GT, LP; RHP 

Operations GT, LLC; and Charles Pacioni remove this action from the 153rd Judicial District Court 

f Tarrant County, Texas. Defendants further pray that this Honorable Court sustain removal of 

this action and for all other relief to which defendants may be justly entitled. 

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 15 of 16 PageID 15
-16-

Respectfully submitted,

MONTEJANO LAW FIRM, PLLC

By:

JACQUELINE MONTEJANO

State Bar No. 24027402

Jackie@MontejanoLaw.com

2626 McKinney Ave. Suite 300

Dallas, Texas 75204

214-919-7791 (direct)

877-545-8990 (main)

877-545-8989 (fax)

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.;

MARRIOTT HOTEL SERVICES, INC.;

RYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES, INC.;

OPRYLAND HOSPITALITY, LLC;

RHP PROPERTY GT, LP;

RHP OPERATIONS GT, LLC; AND

CHARLES PACIONI

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On August 17, 2022, the foregoing document was electronically submitted with the clerk 

of the Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing 

system of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record 

electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).

 s/ Jacqueline Montejano

Jacqueline Montejano

Case 4:22-cv-00717-O Document 1 Filed 08/17/22 Page 16 of 16 PageID 16