-1 -

UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - : ADEL E COBB S, : CASE NO. 1:08-CV-1634 : Plaintiff, : : vs. : OPI NI ON : [R esolving Doc. No. 11 ] BL UEMERCURY, I

NC., et al
. , :

: De fe nd ants
. : :

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - J AMES S. GW I

N, UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE: Plaintiff Adele Cobbs filed suit under the Fam i l y an d M edical L eave Act (F ML A) a nd District of C olumbia Family and Medic al L eave Act (D CFML A) a lleg ing that her for mer e mploy er De fe nd ant B lue me rc ur

y , Inc . r e ta liate d a g a ins t he r a nd int e rf e re d w ithhe r r ig hts un de r t he A c ts. Def endants B luemerc ury , I nc. and its Chief Execut i v e Of fice r Mar la B eck a

nd Chief Oper ating Offic er Bar

ry Be ck (collectively “B luemerc ury”) move for summ ary judgme nt on all claims. [ Doc. 1 1 .] Plaintiff Cobbs partially opposes the motion. [ Doc. 14 .] Defenda nts have re plied. [ Doc. 16
. ] F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , th e Court G RA NT S Def endants’ motion for summary judgme nt on all Plaintiff’s claims. I. Bac kgr ound Fr om April 2007 unt i l h er t er m ination in J uly 2008, Plaintiff Cobbs worked at De fenda nt B lue me rc ur

y , a larg e c os me tic s re ta il c ha in wi th sto re s in se ve ra l state s. Duri ng he r f if te e n- month
e mpl oy , Co bb s was in

ju re d in tw o n on -w or

k- re late d c ar a c c ide nts ; bo th r e qu ir e d h e r t o mi ssCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

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-2 - signific ant work. Cobbs say s Blueme rcur y interfe red w ith her rig hts and terminated he r in r e taliation for her taking protec ted leave
. Responding, Bluemercury says it gave Cobbs all the lea ve she ne eded and terminated her

as part of a c ompany-wide reduc tion in force. De fe nd ant B lue me rc ur

y e mpl oy e d Pl a int if

f C ob bs a s a

n a c c ounts -p ay a

ble c oo rd inator

a t it s District of Columbia headqua rters. Cobbs’s job in v o l ved posting invoices in Blue merc ury ’s
acc ounting softwa

re, r econc iling che cks, and communicating with ve ndors. [Adele Cobbs Dep. 9:7- 22 , Apr . 8 , 2 00 9. ] Whe n Co bb s st art e d in Ap ri l 20 07 , B lue me rc ur

y wa s e xpand inga t a

ra pid c lip
an d Cobbs worked longhours

— often 9:00 am to 7:30 pm. [C obbs Dep. 12:17-20.] At its peak, Bluemercur

y employ ed thre e ac counts pay able c oordinators

— Adele Cobbs, Victor ia Korsc h, and M i ch ae l Shafa

— and an a ccounts pa

y able mana g er

— Ann Washington. [ Do c . 1 4 at 5
. ] Blue merc ury ’s controller, Be rnie L ocra ft, oversa w the entire acc ounts pay able de partment. [ Doc. 14 a t 5
. ] Fr om the get -go, C obbs suffer ed ser ious non-work-r elated illnesses a nd injuries. I n J une 20 07 , s ix we e ks a ft e r s he sta rt e d w ithB lue me rc ur

y , Co bb s mi sse d tw o d ay s to have a larg e a bs c e ss draine d and re moved. [Cobbs Dep. 26:11-16.] L ater that month, Cobbs injured her ne ck and ba ck in a car accide nt and mi ssed t hree work da y s. [ Do c . 1 4 at 2 ; C o b b s D e p . 2 8 : 1 7
- 2 4
. ] A n d i nJ u l y, Aug ust, and September 2007, Cobbs missed severa l work day s to treat “inter nal medicine” and cold/flu issues. [C obbs Dep. 29:2 - 31:14, 32:18-25.] At t h e time of these ailments, Cobbs had not worked the r equisite one y ear to qualify

for FMLA and DC FMLA statutory leave . Nonethele ss, Blueme rcur y voluntarily

g rante d Cobbs’s reque sts for time off and acc ommodated her in severa l way s. [C obbs Dep. 22:6-11.] For e x ample, C o b b s h adn o ty et ac cr u e d s i ck -l ea v e t i m e, b u tBl u em er cu ry al l o we d h er t o t ak e t i m e o ff

u s i n g aCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-3 - combination of paid-va cation and unpa id leave, at her c hoosing. [Cobbs Dep. 30:1-10, 34:1-13.] Mo re ov e r, ins te a d o f d oc kin g he r p ay fo r m iss e d ho ur s, B lue me rc ur y a dju ste d Co bb s’ s st art ingtim e to acc ommodate her

car -ac cident-r elated phy sical thera py three to five day s per we ek. [Cobbs Dep. 29 :2 - 32 :22 ; 37 :7- 13 ; 39 :6- 24 .] B lue me rc ur y vo lun tari ly

a c c omm od a te d Co bb s f

or te n mo nth s unti l her A pril 2008 one-y ear

anniver sary

when she qualified for

sta t u t o ry l ea v e. C ontent with her schedule and B luemerc ury ’s ac commodations, Cobbs c o n t inued to take voluntar y leave afte r her anniver sary

and did not formally

reque st FML A or DCF ML A leave . [C obbs Dep. 40:7-12.] I n May 2008, while still attending phy sical thera py related to the first accident, Cobbs hurt her ne ck and a

rm in a second car acc ident. [C obbs Dep. 38:12-14.] Cobbs say s she appr oache d her second- level super

visor Be rnie L ocra ft and a sked for an additional four or five da y s off but L ocra ft said no: [C obbs]: [W ]hen the s econd acc ident occur red, I told him how much tim e my doctor rec ommended me to re m ai n o u t of the off ice, a nd he said that wa s not acc eptable, that I wo uld have to c ome in. An d so what I did is I c a me in. Iha d th e do c tor a dju st the date s th a t he ini tia lly

ha d me out of

the of fi c e so that I c ou ld wo rk , so that I c ou ld be ther e. . . . Q: And so the doctor sa id y ou wer e medica lly able to g o back to wor

k? [Cob bs ]: He sai d y ou

c an g o, but y ou ’r e g oin g to h a ve to w e ar t his br a c e and

thi s arm is g oin g to s til l ha

ve to sta y in t he sli ng , a

nd y ou ’r e jus t g oin g to h a ve to l imi t what y ou can do. Q. Ok ay . A nd

the c omp any

a c c e pte d you

ba c k und e r t

ho se c on dit ion s? [Cob bs ]: Ye s. [Cob bs De p. 89 :7- 90 :2. ] Re sp on din g , B lue me rc ur y sa y s Co bb s d id n ot n e e d th e se da y s o ff be c a us e it allowed he r to work in a ne ck bra ce a nd arm sling . [ Do c . 1 1- 1 at 7 .] Bluemerc ury did, however , continue to g rant Cobbs intermittent leave so she could attend phy sical thera py . [ Do c . 1 4 at 3
. ]Case No. 1:08-CV- 01634

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-4 - After her se cond ca

r ac cident, B luemerc ury say s Cobbs’s unpla nned absenc es beca

me more fre quent. In turn, it asked her to submit a dis ability cer tificate and a medica l treatment plan. [Cobbs Dep. 49:19 - 51:21; Ann Washing ton Dep. 44:9-19, Apr . 29, 2009.] Genera lly , Bl u em ercury and Cobbs ag ree d that Cobbs would attend phy sical t hera py in the m orning and arrive to work be tween 12:00 and 1:00 pm and stay until 9:00 or 10:00 pm . [C obbs Dep. 54:1-5; 139:2-3.] Cobbs failed to arr ive by 1:00 pm some day s. As a re sult, Cobbs ’s s u p er v i s o r Ann Was hin g ton

re pr ima nd e d h e r f

or tard ine ss: (1 ) Jun e 6, 2008 - Ta

rd ine ss: Ad e le , you

have e xce ss d a ily

tard ine ss. Th e la st medical a ppointment submi tted was for J une 3, 2008. Your repor ting Manag er ha s no schedule of medica l a

ppointments nor an expected time of a rrival. Ade le y ou are late da ily wi tho ut a n excu se , ve rb a l or wr itt e n. Yo ur arr iva l ha s e xten de d p a st 2 p. m.

. . . (2) June 26, 2008 - Tar diness: We need you to come to work on time. As y ou know, y ou came into work today at 1:30 pm. After submitting your medica l appointment sc he du le to u s y ou

c omm itt e d to arr ive by

12 :00 no on , b ut no t later tha n 1 :00 pm. Your a rrival tim es h av e ex cee ded that time re cently . Your a rrival time has e ven e xten de d p a st 2 pm. Yo u n e e d to imm e diate ly imp ro ve y our o n ti me arr iva l. [ Doc. 14- 9
. ] Cobbs say s t hat in the wake of her second c ar a ccide nt Blueme rcur y ’s manag ement beg an to hara ss her. Cobbs alleg es that: (1) A nn Washington scr utiniz ed insig nifica n t d etails of her pe rf or manc e and

un de rv a lue d h e r; (2 ) Marl a B e c k, B lue me rc ur y ’s CEO , d id n ot s pe a k to he r at a ll when she came into the office ; (3) B arr y Be ck, B luemerc ury ’s COO, questioned he r seve ral times in f ront of her cowor

kers as to how long she would need to be in a cast; (4) Ba rr y Be ck s t opped socializing with her; a

nd (5) B arr

y Be ck ca ncelled he r par

king pa ss. [Cobbs D ep. 64:17 - 76:17.] As a re sult of this harassment, Cobbs con t i n u es , she fe lt pressured to f org o a sche duled phy sical thera py session beca

use the ther apist’s offic e was unusually busy that day and it was c lear

that sheCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

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-5 - could not rec eive ther apy

and ar rive at work by

1:00 pm. [Cobbs De p. 76:24 - 80:7, 80:18 - 81:19.] Blue merc ury ’s forme r Vice President of Human R esourc es say s that she had to re mind Bar ry Be ck sever al times that Pl aintiff Cobbs had the r ight to take FMLA and DCF ML A leave . [ Doc. 14 at 10 .] This former

employ ee a lso say s that, in her opini on, Ba rry Be ck was frustrated with Cobbs and “ha d doubts as to whether or not [Cobbs] neede d the time that she was taking .” [ Doc. 14 at 11
. ] B e c k de nie s that he hara sse d Cobb s and say s h e “ jus t w ante d to un de rs tand ho w l on g [he r t

re a tme nt] would last, and [] Ithink it was our rig ht to do so, to understand that.” [Ba rry Be ck De p. 8:2-15, Apr. 9, 2009.] On J uly 1, 2008, Cobbs joined a pending l aw s u i t ag ainst Blueme rcur y alleg ing that the Def endants owe d her and other employ ees ove rtime wag es. [Cobbs Dep. 60:1-5.] On J uly 3 Cobbs formally reque sted intermittent FMLA and DCFMLA l eave . [C obbs Dep. 71:21 - 72:3.] A wee k later, B luemerc ury

fired he r. [Cobbs Dep. 102:11-23.] Ag a ins t th is b a c kd

ro p, B lue me rc ur

y its e lf wa s h e mor

rh a g ingmon e y . B lue mer c ur y los t “more than $2 million” in 2007 and 2008 was “ looking wor se.” [Be ck De p. 68:1-10.] Defenda nt Ba rry Be ck say s “we wer e g oing bankrupt, and still fac e that proble m [ today ].” [ Be ck De p. 69:2-3.] As a re sult, in May

2008 Blue merc ury

decide d that a reduc tion in for ce w as nec essar y . [ Doc. 11- 1
a t 7 .] B e c k d e te rm ine d th a t tw o o f the thr e e a c c ounts pa y a ble c oo rd inator

po sit ion s w e re re dund ant, but did not himself selec t which coor dinators to terminate. [ Do c . 1 1- 1 at 7 .] I nstead, B eck a sked controller B ernie L ocra ft to rank e ach c oordinator ba sed on per formanc e. [ Do c . 1 1- 1 at 8
. ] L ocra ft deter

mined that Michae l S h i fa w wa s by far his best employ ee. H e g ave Plaintiff Cobbs his second-hig hest ranking , and Kor sch his third. Q. And whe n y ou say

that Mr. S hifaw was t he best, by far the best of t he group, onCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

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-6 - wh at o b j ec t i v e c ri t er i a w er e y o ure l yi n g? [L oc ra ft ]: We did

n’ t ha ve ob je c tiv e c ri te ri a . It w a s b a se d o n a re vie w o f h is d a ily perf ormanc e. . . . Q. Can y ou identify

for me toda

y exactly what fa ctors you relied on . . . ? [L ocra ft]: I looked at whe ther they wer e caug ht up with the vendors that they work on. Mike was alway s caught up. He wa s doing ma y be 10 or 15 pe rce nt more work in a g iven time than the other s were doing. He wo u l d ask for additional work, vo luntari ly

re qu e st w or

k to ke e p h im b us y , b e c a

us e he wa s su ff

ic ie nt. [ Do c . 1 4 at 7
. ] On J une 16, 2008 B arr

y Be ck ema iled CEO Marla B eck sug g esting Blue me r cury lay off e ight employ ees, including Cobbs a nd Korsch. [ Doc 11 -3 at 6 .] I n making his termination
rec ommendations, Ba

rry Be ck re lied entirely

on L o cr af

t ’s ra nkings: “ [L ocra ft] tol d me that Mike Shifaw had se t the standard, a nd he [perf

o rm ed ] ab o v e the r est. Today [S hifaw is] running the depar tment himself . . . [ s]o clearly our dec ision was corr ect.” [Barr y Be ck De p. 61:12-17; 63:2-4.] Blue merc ury

terminated Cobbs, Korsh, and six other employ ees on J uly 11, 2008. [ Doc 11- 3
a t 3
. ] C o b b s f

i l e d t h e i n s t an t s u i t o n S e p t e mb e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 8 a l l e g i n g : ( 1 ) F M LA r e t a l i a t i o n ; ( 2 ) F M LA interfe renc e; (3) D CFML A re taliation; (4) DCFML A i nterfe renc e; and ( 5) DC Minimum W ag e Ac t reta liation. [ Doc. 1
. ] II. Legal Stand ard 1. Summary J

udgment Un de r F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 56 (c ), summa ry jud g me nt i s p ro pe r “ if

the ple a din g s, the discover

y and dis closure materials on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of la w.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also Tao v. Free h , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994)
.Case No. 1:08-CV- 01634

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-7 - Under the s ummary judgme nt standard, the moving pa rty bear s the “initial responsibility of informing the dist ri ct co u rt of the ba sis for [it s] m otion, and identifying those portions of the ple a din g s, d e p o s i t i o n s , a

n s w e r s t o i nte rr og a tor ie s, and a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s which [it] believe[s] demonstrate the abse nce of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Celotex Corp. v. Cat re tt , 4 7 7 U
. S. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1986)
. I n response , the non-moving party must “g o bey ond the pleading s and by [i ts] own aff idavits, or depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, ‘de signate’ spec ific fa cts showing that there is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. a t 3 24 (i n t er n al citations omitt ed). Al t h o u gh a court should draw all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is insufficient t o bar summar y judgme nt. See A nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc

. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) . To be mate rial, the fac tual asser

tion must be ca

pable of aff ectingthe sub s tantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the iss ue mus t be su

pp or te d by su ff

ic ie nt ad mis sib le e vid e nc e that a re a so na ble tr ie r- of

-f a c t c ou ld find for the nonmoving pa rty
. Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1242- 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
. “Mer e alleg ations or d en i al s in the adver se par ty ’s pleading s are insufficient to def eat a n otherwise pr oper motion for summar y judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Call aghan , 938 F. S u p p . 4 6 , 49 (D.D.C. 1996) . I nstead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibilit y of identifying t

h o s e p o rtions of the re c or d th a t de mon str a te the ab se nc e of a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, t he burd e n s hif

ts t o the non-movant to “come f orwa rd with ‘spec ific fa cts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial .’ ” Id. at 587 (c i t i n g Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l). III. Discussion A. Plain tif f’ s D C M ini mu m W

age Ac t R e tal iat ion Cla imCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-8 - I n Count V of her c omplaint, Pl aintiff Cobbs say s Blueme rcur y fired her because she joined
a p en d i n g l aw s uit alleg ing that the Def endants owe d her ove rtime wag es. [ Doc. 1 at 13
. ] Inthe instant moti on, Blue merc ury say s it f irst learne d Cobbs had opted into the lawsuit two wee ks after Ba rry Be ck had se lected C o bbs for ter mination. [ Do c . 1 1- 1 at 9 .] R esponding , Cobbs

“ a c kn ow le dg e s th a t in

dis c ov e ry

De fe nd ants pr od

uc e d su c h pr oo f a s to c on vin c e he r t hat th is c la im
w a s d u e to b e d is mi s s ed.” [ Do c. 14 at 29 .] A c c or din g ly , th e Court g ra nts summa

ry jud g me nt t o De fe nd ants on

Pla int if f’ s D C Mi nim

um Wa g e Ac t r e ta liatio n c la im. B. Plaintiff ’s FMLA and DCFMLA Retaliation Clai ms I n Counts I and I I Iof her complaint, Pl aintiff Cobbs say s Blueme rcur y terminated he r be c a us e sh e too k F MLA a

nd DC F MLA l e a ve to atte nd ph y sic a l the ra

py and do c tor ’s a

pp ointme nts
. Responding, B luemerc ury say s Cob b s ’s termination was pa rt of a pla

nned re duction in force
. Be cause Cobbs has not adduce d sufficie nt evi d ence to cre ate a materia l fac t or law issue on he r
re ta liatio n c la ims , th e Court g ra nts summa

ry jud g me nt t o D e fe nd ants
. Courts interpret the F ML A and the DCFMLA similarly
. Se e W ind e r v . E rste , 511 F. Supp. 2d 160, 184 (D.D.C. 2007)
. B oth Ac ts ma ke it unl awf ul f or a c ov e re d e mpl oy e r t o r e ta liate a g a ins t employ ees f

or exercisingrig hts protec t ed under the Acts’ r espec tive provisions, which are , for prese nt purposes, cote rminous. See29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) ; D.C.Code 32-507(a )
. The Court ana ly

zes Cobbs’s retaliation claims ac cording to t he McD onnell Douglas framework. See Glekle n v. De mocratic Congressional Campaign Comm., Inc. , 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (c i t i n g McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 4 1 1 U. S
. 792 (1973) ). Un de r t his framework: (1) Cobbs must establish a prima facie case that Blue merc ury terminated he r in violation of the Ac ts; (2) if Cobbs meets that burden, the burden shifts to B luemerc u ry t o articulate aCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-9 - leg itimate, non-Acts-violatingrea son for he r termination; and (3) if B luemerc ury meets its burden, the burde n shifts back to Cobbs to produce substantial evidence that Blue merc ury ’s proff ere d rea son is mere ly a pre text for ter

minating he r. See B utler v. District of Columbia Housi ng Finance Age ncy , 593 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65 (D.D .C. 2009)
. To establish a

prima facie case , Cobbs must show: (a) she eng ag ed in protecte d activity ; (b) sh e su ff e re d a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n; a

nd (c ) t he p rot ect ed a c tiv ity

and the a dv e rs e employ ment action we re c ausally connec ted. SeeW

inder , 511 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (noting also that the eleme nts of a pr im a fa c ie case are the same unde r both Acts). I n this case, at the pr im a fa c ie stag e Defenda nts only contest the c ausation ele ment. Straight to the point, Bluemer cury asks: Why would we voluntar ily acc ommodate Plaintiff for a y ear and then t e r m i n a t e h e r

s h o rt l y a f t e r s h e w a s F M L A an d

D C F M L A p r o t e c t e d ? [ Doc. 11- 1 at 14, 16
. ] Mo re ov e r, B lue me rc ur

y c on tin ue s, it e lim inate d Cob bs ’s po sit ion a s pa rt of a pla nn e d r e du c tio n in fo rc e . Res po nd ing , Cobb s sa y s th e lay of

fs are a su bte rf ug e fo r r e ta liatio n b e c a

us e B lue me rc ur

y did not utili ze any

objective or measura

ble criteria when it ranke d Shifaw, Cobbs, and Korsc h. [ Doc. 14 at 22-25 .] C obbs adds that Ann Washingt o n , Be rry Be ck, and Ma

rla B eck ha

rasse d her a

bout taking leave just weeks bef ore she was fir ed. [ Doc. 14 at 22-25
. ] A planned r eduction in forc e nec essitated by business conditions is a leg itimate rea son for terminating an employ ee. See Kak eh v. U nited Planning Org. , 5 3 7 F. Supp. 2d 65, 74 (D.D.C. 2008) . Blue merc ury , a cosme tics retailer , was not i mmune to 2008’s global recession. I ndeed, B arr y B e c k s ay s the c omp any wa s (and sti ll is) te e te ri ng on ba nk ru ptc y . [B e c k D e p. 69 :2- 3. ] To c ut c os ts, B e c k id e nti fi e d tw o r e dund ant a c c ounts pa y a ble po sit ion s and

a sk e d B e rn ie L oc ra ft

to r ank his subo rd i n at es. L ocra ft ranke d Michae l Shifaw first. With t his information in hand, Ba rry Be ckCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

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-1 0- terminated Plaintiff Cobbs and Kor sch. To t h i s en d, Plaintiff Cobbs say s a jury must decide whe ther L ocra ft’s ra nking sy stem

“ s u b je c ti v e a n d u n qu an ti f

ia b le
. . . .” [ Do c 14 at 19 .] In s up po rt , Co bb s c ite s o ut- of -C ir c uit decisions for the sug g estion that Blueme rcur y is under some duty

to identify

“objec tive or
measura ble” criter ia on how it r anked Shifaw, Cobbs, and Korsc h. See R ichmond v. O NEOK , 120 F.3d 205, 209 ( 10th Cir. 1997) ; Bo hl v . H ay sfe ld , 2 0 0 8 WL 3200639, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug . 5, 2008) ; Hillman v. Hamilton College , 1998 WL 166827, at *9 (N.D .N.Y. Apr . 9, 1998)
. C an d i d l y, tho se c a se s h ave no thi ngto d o w iththe c aus ati on e le me nt o f C ob bs ’s pr im a fa c ie case . Se e Bo hl
v . H ay sfe ld , 2008 WL 3200639, at *6 (c on sid e ri ng ir re g ula ri tie s in e mpl oy e r’ s e va luatio n p ro c e ss in p re te xt an a ly sis ); Hillman , 1998 WL 166827, at *9 (s a me ); R ichmond , 120 F.3d at 209 (consider ing doc umentation of plaintiff’s poor perf ormanc e in pre text analy sis). Objectively

measura ble or not, L ocra ft consider ed Shifaw to be head- and-shoulder s above Cobb s an d Ko rs ch : “He was doingmay be 10 or 15 pe rce nt more work in a g iven time than the
o t h e r s w e r e d o i n g . H e w o u l d a s k f o r a d d i t i o n a l w o r

k , v o l u n t ar i l y r e qu e s tw o r k t o k e e p h i mb u s y, beca use he was eff

icient.” [ Doc . 14 at 7 .] Moreover, Cobbs does not alleg e that L ocra ft, the supervisor who a ctually ranke d her, r etaliated a g ainst her. ( Unlike C o bbs’s other thre e superiors

— Ann Washington, Ba rry Be ck, and Ma

rla B eck

— all of whom Cobbs say s hara ssed her .) Thus, whateve r animus Cobbs’s othe r super visors may

have ha d, these individuals did not influence the eve nhanded e valuation which led to Cobbs’s termination. On this evidence , a re asonable jury could only

conclude that Blue merc ury ’s staff reduc tion to st ave of

f b an k ru p t cy

cause d Cobbs’s termination. Acc ording ly , Cobbs f ails to satisfy the third prongof her pr im a fa c ie case . The Court the re fo re g ra

nts summa

ry jud g me nt t o D e fe nd ants on Pla int if f’ s r e ta liatio n c la ims
.Case No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-1 1- Finally , even if there wer e a materia l issue reg arding causation, Bluemer cury has ar ticulated a non-discr iminatory

explanation for terminatingPlaintiff Cobbs and Cobbs ha s failed to show that De fe nd ants ’ r e a so n is pr e te xtua l. D e fe nd ant s’ mot ion pr ov ide s ampl e e vid e nc e of a le g iti mate motive for Pl aintiff’s ter

mination

— a re duction in force
. Se e Go ss v . G e or geW as hingto n U

niv e rsi ty , 942 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) . A g a in, Cob bs c on te nd s th a t th e lay of fs are pr e te xt an d f

a ult s Be rnie L ocra ft for usinga subj ective and unquantifiable rankingsy stem. But, with no evidenc e that L ocra ft was influe nced b y a fo rbi dden conside ration, the Court will not “judg e the wisdom of a corpor ation’s business dec isions.” Id . (quotation omitted). The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to a dduce suf

ficient e vidence from wh i ch a re asonable jury could infer

that Blue merc ury ’s reduc tion in force w as a pr etext for reta liation.

C. Plainti ff’s FMLA and DCFMLA Interferenc e Claims I n Counts I Iand IV of he r complaint, P laintiff Cobbs say s Defe ndants interfe red w ith her ability to take FMLA and DCFMLA leave
. Specifica lly , Cobbs a lleg es that the Def endants de nied her f our or f ive day s leave afte r her second car acc ident and hara ssed her into mis sing a schedule d phy sical thera

py session. Responding, Blueme rcur y say s Cobbs did not need leave after her se cond
car acc ident and denie s that it pressured Cobbs into missi ng thera py . Be cause Cobbs has not suffe red a cog nizable loss under the Ac ts, the Court gr ants summary judgme nt to Bluemer cury on Cobbs’s int e rf e re nc e c la ims
. I n o rd e r t o suc c e e d on h e r F MLA a nd DC F MLA i nte rf

e re nc e c la ims , Co bb s mu st p ro ve bo th that Blue merc ury i n t er fe red with her exercise of protec ted rig hts and that the interf ere nce c aused prejudice
. Mc

Fa dd e n v . B all ar d, Sp ah r, An dr e ws &Inge rso ll , LLP , 611 F.3d 1, 7 ( D.C. Cir. J une 29, 2010)
. An employ er inter fer es with protec ted rig hts when it interfe res with, re strains, or denie sCase No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-1 2- the exercise of

any rig ht provided by

the Acts. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) ; D. C
. C o d e § 32-507
. Prejudice exis ts w here an employ ee loses compensation or benef its by rea son of the vi o l at i o n, sustains other monetary

losses as a dire ct re sult of the violation, or suffer s some loss in employ ment status remedia

b l e t h ro u g h appropr iate equitable relief
. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) ; D.C. Code § 32-509(b) (6) (allowingalso conseque ntial damag es). Employ ers can be held liable both f or deny ing the ir employ ees statutory leave and also for interfe ring with their exercise of those rig hts, short of an outrig ht denial. See M cFadde n , 611 F.3d
a t 7
. I n McFadde n , the plaintiff said he r employ er ha rass ed h er fo r t ak i ng too much leave to take
car e of her dependa

nt husba nd. Id
. As a re sult, she claims, she took less time off than she was entitled to and had to pay

someone to take car e of her husba nd. Id . T he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Cir c uit made c lear

that the pl aintiff needed only to show that her employ er interfer ed with her ex erc ise of protec ted rig hts and that she suff ere d monetary

losses as a dire ct re sult of the violation. Id
. I n this case , Cobbs has failed to show that Blue merc ury denied he r protec ted leave afte r her
se c on d c ar a c c ide nt. To be sure , at th e tim e of Cob bs ’s May

20 08 a c c ide nt, Co bb s was a F M L A /D CF M L A e li g ib le e mp lo y ee. 2 9 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) ; D.C. Code § 32-501 . Howeve r, Cobbs prese nts no evidenc e that her second-a ccide nt injuries qualified a s a “se rious health condition that makes the e mploy ee una ble to perf

orm the func tions of the position of such employ ee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(a)(1) (D) ; D.C. Code § 32-503
. Cobbs doe s not a lleg e, for example, that he r injuries requ i re d h o s p i talization or render ed her unable to wor

k. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a) -(b) . I ndeed, Cob bs ’s ph y sic ian s a id “ y ou c an g o [to wo rk ], but y ou ’r e g oin g to have to we ar thi s bra c e and thi s arm is going to stil l have to stay in the sling, a

nd y ou’re just goingto have to limit what y ou can do.” Under these limitations, Bluemerc ury allowed Cobbs to work.Case No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-1 3- The Ac t s at t em p tt o p ro v i d e e mp l o y ee s wi t h“r ea s o n ab l e l ea v e, ” w i t h o u tco mp l et el y i gn o ring the leg itimate “demands of th e wo rk p l ace.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(1)- (2) . Considering Blue merc ury ’s accommodations and C obbs’s doctor’s acc ord, Defenda nts’ reque st that Cobbs show up to work wa s rea sonable. Ac cording ly , Plaintiff’s alleg ation that Def endants denied he r protec ted le a ve is w ith out me ri t. As to Cobbs’s claim t hat Defenda nts hara ssed her into missing phy sical thera py , the Court will assume arguendo th a

t D e fe nd ants int e rf

e re d w ithCob bs ’s ri g hts un de r t he Ac ts . See M

cFadde n , 61 1 F .3 d a t 7 (proc eeding direc tly to prejudice prong ). For damag es, C obbs say s she “suf fer ed and will continue to suffer

loss of wag es and be nefits, loss of employ ment opportuni t i es and care er advanc ement, and da

mag e to her

profe ssional reputation” be cause of B luem erc ury ’s interfe renc e. [ Doc 1 .] As ex plained in the Court’s re taliation analy sis above, howe ver, t h er e is no causa l
connec tion between Cobbs’s pr otected le ave a nd Blue merc ury ’s dec ision to t er m inate her
. See McFadde n , 6 11 F .3 d at 7 (re quiring a “c ausal re lationship” betwee n employ er ’s i n terfe renc e and employ ee’ s harm). Thus, Cobbs ca nnot establish pr e

jud ic e fr om l os t or

dim ini sh e d w a g e s. Finally , Cobbs does not claim that Blueme rc u r y ’ s s u p p o s e d in te r f e r e n c e c a used her additional medical e x penses or

conseque ntial damag es. In McFadde n , the employ ee had t o hire a car etake r for her husband afte r her employ er dissuaded her from taking leave
. Id. I n this case, howe ver, Cobbs does not alleg e that she “ sustain[ ed] other monetary losses as a dire ct re sult of the violation, such as the cost of providing care.” 2 9 U
. S
. C
. § 2 6 1 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( i ) ( II) . After a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d inc lud inga

c omp le te re vie w o f C ob bs ’s de po sit ion , th e Court is u na ble to f ind any dama g e s c a

us a lly
re late d to B lue me rc ur

y ’s a lle g e d interf

eren c e . T he Court

the re fo re g ra

nts summa

ry jud g me nt t o De fe nd ants on

Pla int if f’ s in te rf e re nc e c la ims
.Case No. 1:08-CV- 01634

G w i n , J.

-1 4- IV. Conclusion Viewingthe ev idence provided by both parties, in the lig ht most favorable to the Plaintiff, t h e C o u rtf

i n d s t h e P l a i n t i f

f f a i l s t o m e e t h e r b u r d e n o f p r o o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g F M LA / D C F M LA reta liation and interfe renc e on the part of the Defenda nts. The Court finds that no dispute in ge nuine issue of mater ial fac t or law e x ists in t his case, entitling the De fenda nts to summ ary

judgme nt. For the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e Court G RA NT S Def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt. A sepa rate Orde r shall issue this date.

Date d: Oc tob e r 2 7, 20 10 s/ Jame s S. Gwin J A M E S S
. G W IN UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE