UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

PAUL MUHIRWA GITWAZA,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00434-P

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Muhirwa Gitwaza’s Application for 

Attorney Fees. ECF No. 53. After review of the Motion and case law, the 

Court determines that the Motion should be and is hereby DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the Parties’ familiarity with the background facts 

and procedural history of this case. See ECF No. 52. The Court will 

therefore limit its discussion of the background facts and procedural 

history to what is necessary to decide the instant motion.

The Court found that Mr. Gitwaza had demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he possessed the requisite good 

moral character for naturalization. He was originally denied

naturalization by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”). Following the Court’s Order, Mr. Gitwaza filed the present 

motion for attorney’s fees to which the Government responded. The 

Motion is thus ripe for review.

ANALYSIS

The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) mandates that federal 

courts award fees to the prevailing private party “unless the court finds 

that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

Under EAJA, the “position of the United States” includes both “the 

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position taken by the United States in the civil action” and “the action 

or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” Id.

§ 2412(d)(2)(D). Thus, the Government’s stance encompasses the 

decisions made by USCIS as well as its litigation position defending the 

agency action. W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting Sylejmani v. Barr, 768 Fed. App’x 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2019)).

The Government bears the burden of demonstrating that its position 

was “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce 

v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Courts must evaluate the 

Government’s position under the totality of the circumstances, meaning 

that “if the Government’s position as a whole was reasonable, a 

prevailing party may not recover EAJA fees even though some of the 

Government’s actions or arguments were without merit.” W.M.V.C., 926 

F.3d at 210.

In this case, the Government’s position was substantially justified. 

To determine reasonableness, the Court looks to “objective indicia”—

such as whether the case resolved through a settlement, “the stage in 

the proceedings at which the merits were decided,” and whether the 

agency has suffered “a string of losses” advancing the same legal 

argument—which are relevant but not dispositive. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 

568–69. For instance, if a case resolves factually against the 

Government on summary judgment, then that is a significant factor 

weighing against substantial justification “because the burden on the 

party resisting a summary judgment motion is so minimal.” E.E.O.C. v. 

Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1994). Conversely, the fact 

that a plaintiff’s claim survives the Government’s summary judgment 

motion is “insufficient” to establish that the Government’s position was 

unjustified, even if the case later settles before trial. Nat’l Org. for 

Marriage, Inc. v. United States, 807 F.3d 592, 598 (4th Cir. 2015); accord 

Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 960 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[F]act 

disputes that preclude summary judgment do not establish that the 

moving party’s position is not substantially justified.”).

In this case, the Parties did not reach a settlement, which supports 

the justification of the Government’s position. Cf. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 

568–69. The merits were decided after a bench trial, further indicating 

that the Government’s position was reasonable. Although Gitwaza 

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survived the Government’s summary judgment motion, that does not by 

itself establish that the Government’s position was not substantially 

justified. See Kaffenberger, 314 F.3d at 960. Additionally, Gitwaza’s own 

summary-judgment motion was denied, indicating that his entitlement 

to naturalization was not so easily decided. The final decision in 

Gitwaza’s favor at the bench trial, based on a preponderance of the 

evidence, does not equate to a finding of no substantial justification. See 

id. The Court’s ultimate conclusion was a close one—in the end finding 

that the testimony of Mr. Gitwaza, combined with the sparse evidence 

presented by the Government, resolved in favor of Mr. Gitwaza. At no 

point has the Court regarded the Government’s position as unjustified.

Furthermore, USCIS’s position in denying Mr. Gitwaza’s 

naturalization was also substantially justified. The agency reasonably 

concluded that the circumstances and facts available about the matters 

leading to Gitwaza’s disorderly conduct plea cast sufficient doubt on his 

moral character and that he failed to show extenuating circumstances. 

The agency recognized that the disorderly conduct conviction was not 

automatically disqualifying and applied the “catch-all” provision, 

requiring consideration of whether Gitwaza committed any “unlawful 

acts” reflecting poorly on his moral character and whether extenuating 

circumstances existed. ECF No. 48 at 4–6. As this Court noted, “the 

circumstances surrounding Gitwaza’s arrest and subsequent plea do 

raise questions concerning his moral character that must be addressed.”

ECF No. 52 at 4. While the Court ultimately found Mr. Gitwaza’s 

testimony credible and determined he met the burden for 

naturalization, the positions taken by USCIS and the Government were 

substantially justified in his original denial, and the Government’s 

subsequent defense of that denial.

CONCLUSION

In order to avoid the awarding of attorney’s fees under EAJA, the 

Government must show that the actions of the USCIS and Government 

were substantially justified throughout this case and before. As 

explained above, they have done so. For that reason, the Court must 

DENY Mr. Gitwaza’s Motion for Attorney Fees. ECF No. 53.

SO ORDERED on this 9th day of August 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

REGINALEA KEMP,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:23-cv-00841-P

REGIONS BANK ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File 

Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion 

and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.

______________________________________________

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATED DISTRICT JUDGE

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