UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

JUANITA RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff, 

v. No. 4:22-cv-0930-P

JONATHAN GRANADO,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is defendant Jonathan Granado’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, contending that he is entitled to the affirmative 

defense of qualified immunity. ECF No. 32. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from the shooting death of Estevan Ramirez. On 

September 3, 2021, Officer Jonathan Granado was taking the night shift 

at the Lake Worth Police Department headquarters. Around 2:00 a.m., 

Officer Watson, a fellow officer on patrol, radioed in to request back-up 

for a high-speed chase. Granado immediately left the department to join 

the chase. 

En route, Watson radioed to Granado that the vehicle’s occupants 

had been involved in more than one drive-by shooting, and that they 

were considered armed and dangerous. At some points, the chase 

through the western Fort Worth area exceeded 120 miles per hour. The 

vehicle drove into oncoming traffic multiple times, deactivated its 

headlights and taillights in an effort to evade detection, drove through 

residential areas at dangerous speeds, and even continued the chase 

after striking a curb and nearly totaling the vehicle. 

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The chase stopped in a residential area in White Settlement, across 

the street from a populated gas station. When the vehicle came to a stop, 

four of its occupants exited and immediately fled on foot in separate 

directions. Granado next observed Ramirez exit the vehicle with a pistol

in his hand. Granado ordered Ramirez to the ground, and Ramirez did 

not comply. Granado then observed Ramirez drop his gun and 

immediately pick it back up. 

Granado then drew his service weapon and shouted to the other 

officers that “[Ramirez] has a gun!” Ramirez moved toward Officer 

Watson and the two began a physical altercation. As Ramirez 

approached Watson, Granado fired his first shot, but stopped when 

Ramirez attempted to break Watson’s hold—to prevent accidentally 

hitting Watson. Watson then pushed Ramirez away and attempted to 

draw his own service pistol. Granado rapidly fired multiple rounds, 

hitting Ramirez, and stopped again as soon as he perceived Ramirez was 

disabled. The entire altercation—from stopping the chase to shooting

Ramirez—took about eight seconds. Officers attempted CPR on Ramirez 

until medical personnel arrived at the scene. Ramirez later died of his 

gunshot wounds at a local hospital.

Plaintiff sued, alleging that Granado and the Lake Worth Police 

Department unconstitutionally employed deadly force while attempting 

to apprehend Ramirez, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Granado filed 

the instant motion for summary judgment asserting the affirmative 

defense of qualified immunity. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the 

evidence presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

242–43 (1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect the case’s outcome. 

Id. at 248. Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are 

material,” and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will 

not be counted.” Id. 

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When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the 

Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 

See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170, 1173 (5th 

Cir. 2013). In conducting its evaluation, the Court may rely on any 

admissible evidence of record, but it need only consider those materials 

cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)–(3). And the Court need not 

mine the record to find evidence to support the non-movant; the burden 

falls on the movant to simply show a lack of evidence supporting the 

nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404–05 (5th 

Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS 

To establish a claim for the excessive use of force, a plaintiff must 

show: (1) an injury; (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of 

force that was clearly excessive; and (3) that the excessiveness of the 

force was clearly unreasonable. Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 492 (5th 

Cir. 2016). 

But government officials performing discretionary functions—

functions requiring independent judgment apart from a ministerial 

task—are generally shielded from suit if their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Ramirez v. 

Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021). “The protection of 

qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government 

official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based 

on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009). When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden 

rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is 

inapplicable. Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133. 

To defeat an assertion of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show: 

(1) the violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the 

right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

violation. Id.; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The district court may address 

either prong first. Id. To be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the 

right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. 

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Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). For purposes of qualified immunity, 

the reasonableness of the official’s conduct and the clarity of the right in 

question are merged into one question. Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133–34.

Because the dispositive inquiry is whether Granado’s use of deadly 

force at the scene was justified, the Court will focus on the second prong 

first. 

Generally, an officer’s use of deadly force is constitutionally 

reasonable “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the 

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or 

others.” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2022)

(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). Accordingly, “if the 

suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to 

believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or 

threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used 

if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has 

been given.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.

Plaintiff’s argument rests on the contention that Granado’s bodycamera footage shows him firing the disabling rounds at Ramirez at the 

moment Ramirez turned away and appeared to flee. ECF No. 40 at 16. 

This, coupled with Granado’s exasperated statement: “did he have a 

gun?” immediately following the shooting, is what Plaintiff contends

creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of 

Granado’s action, hinging on whether Granado actually knew Ramirez 

had a weapon. Id.

But the Court must judge the reasonableness of an officer’s actions 

“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 402 

(5th Cir. 2006). And to only judge the split second of the shooting 

manipulates the facts out of context. Plaintiff contends that Ramirez 

was not physically pointing the gun at officers when Granado shot him, 

but that overlooks the fact that Ramirez had just dropped and picked up 

his gun during a physical struggle to break free from another officer (i.e. 

avoid apprehension). ECF No. 34 at 31. This after a dangerous highspeed chase with armed-and-dangerous suspects who officers had 

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probable cause to believe were responsible for multiple drive-by 

shootings. Id. at 39. To the extent Plaintiff relies on Granado’s 

statement: “did he have a gun?” immediately following the shooting, that 

assertion is belied by the weight of summary judgment evidence 

contrarily showing that officers already confirmed that Remirez had a 

gun as soon as he stepped out of the vehicle. 

Thus, a reasonable officer at the scene would have had probable 

cause to believe that the suspects in the vehicle were involved in crimes 

“pos[ing] a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or 

others.” Crane, 50 F.4th at 463. In this light, where a suspect re-engages 

an officer’s attempts at apprehension by picking up his firearm while

physically breaking free from another officer, “deadly force may be used 

if necessary to prevent escape.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.

CONCLUSION 

Because Granado’s use of deadly force was constitutionally 

reasonable under the circumstances of Ramirez’s apprehension, 

Granado is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Granado’s 

motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 32), is GRANTED. This case 

is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

SO ORDERED on this 9th day of August 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

REGINALEA KEMP,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:23-cv-00841-P

REGIONS BANK ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File 

Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion 

and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.

______________________________________________ 

Mark T. Pittman 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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