1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JOSEPH DINGLER, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:22-cv-01942-K (BT)

§

TERRY GARRETT, et al., § 

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Joseph Dingler, an inmate at Rockwall County Jail, filed this 

pro se civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dingler did not pay the filing fee. 

Having screened Dingler’s complaint, the undersigned recommends the 

Court DISMISS the complaint as barred by the three-strikes provision of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), precludes a prisoner from bringing a civil action 

in forma pauperis if on three or more prior occasions, while confined as a 

prisoner, he filed civil actions or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous, 

malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 

261, 265 (5th Cir. 2017). Section 1915(g) “comports with the PLRA’s effort 

‘to filter out the bad claims filed by prisoners and facilitate consideration of 

the good.’” Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 

Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1762 (2015)). 

Case 3:22-cv-01942-K-BT Document 3 Filed 09/02/22 Page 1 of 3 PageID 6
2

Dingler has accrued three strikes under § 1915(g). Before filing his 

complaint in this case, and while he was incarcerated as a prisoner, Dingler 

filed at least three other civil cases that were dismissed as frivolous or for 

failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Dingler v. Bowles, 113 

F. App’x 6, 7 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (finding the dismissal of the 

plaintiff’s appeal counted as one strike under § 1915(g), and he accumulated 

two additional strikes in Dingler v. Bowles, No. 04-10130 (5th Cir. June 22, 

2004)). Because Dingler has accrued three strikes, § 1915(g) precludes him 

from proceeding in this action in forma pauperis unless he alleges that he is 

in “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing the 

complaint. See Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 1998) (per 

curiam). To meet the imminent danger requirement of § 1915(g), the threat 

must be “real and proximate.” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th 

Cir. 2003); see also Banos, 144 F.3d at 885 (Under § 1915(g), the court “must 

determine if danger exists at the time the plaintiff seeks to file his complaint 

or notice of appeal IFP”) (emphasis in original). Allegations of past harm 

are insufficient to show imminent harm because the harm alleged must 

constitute “genuine emergencies” where “time is pressing.” Heimermann v. 

Litscher, 337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Banos, 144 

F.3d at 885 (finding the prisoner had “not alleged, much less established, 

that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time that his 

notice of appeal was filed”). 

Case 3:22-cv-01942-K-BT Document 3 Filed 09/02/22 Page 2 of 3 PageID 7
3

Here, Dingler does not allege that he was in imminent danger of 

serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint. He is therefore 

barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under § 1915(g). 

Recommendation

The Court should DISMISS this civil action as barred by the threestrikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Such dismissal is with prejudice to 

the refiling of an in forma pauperis complaint raising the same claims as 

presented here, but without prejudice to the refiling of this complaint with 

full payment of the $402.00 filing fee.

Signed September 2, 2022. 

______________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by 

statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file 

objections to 14 days).

Case 3:22-cv-01942-K-BT Document 3 Filed 09/02/22 Page 3 of 3 PageID 8