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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0170p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

GOVINDBHAI KANTILAL PATEL; VIDHYABEN PATEL;

RINABEN PATEL; NITINKUMAR GOVINDBHAI PATEL, 

Petitioners, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

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No. 15-3812 

On Petition for Review of a Decision 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

Nos. A072 169 666; A073 039 255; 

A098 516 094; A098 516 095 

Decided and Filed: June 30, 2016*

Before: CLAY, ROGERS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: Michael E. Piston, Michele R. Redburn, PISTON & CARPENTER PC, Troy, 

Michigan, for Petitioners. Julia J. Tyler, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

PER CURIAM. Govindbhai Kantilal Patel, his wife Vidhyaben Patel, and their children 

Rinaben Patel and Nitinkumar Govindbhai Patel petition this court for review of an order of the 

 *

This decision was originally issued as an “unpublished” opinion filed on June 30, 2016. The court has 

now designated the opinion as one recommended for full-text publication. 

>
No. 15-3812 Patel, et al. v. Lynch Page 2 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from the denial of their 

applications for adjustment of status and denying Rinaben Patel’s motion to sever and remand 

her removal proceedings. 

Petitioner Govindbhai Patel has told the government two stories of how he came to this 

country: one, which he maintains here, is that he was smuggled across the border without being 

inspected, and the other, which he told the government in earlier immigration proceedings, is that 

he entered the United States with a fraudulent visa. After the Department of Homeland Security 

charged him with multiple grounds of removability, Govindbhai Patel conceded one of those 

grounds—that he was removable as an alien present without being admitted or paroled—and 

then applied to adjust status under INA § 245(i), a form of relief from removability available to 

him only if he entered without inspection. When the BIA denied his application and his family 

members’ derivative applications for § 245(i) relief because he did not prove that he had, in fact, 

entered without inspection (as opposed to having entered via a fraudulent visa), he cried foul—

how could the BIA simultaneously hold that he is removable because he entered without 

inspection and that he is ineligible to adjust status under § 245(i) because he did not enter 

without inspection? The answer lies in the applicable burdens of proof: Govindbhai Patel bears 

the burden to prove that he satisfies all the requirements for adjustment of status, and his 

decision to concede a charge of removability is not sufficient to meet his burden to affirmatively 

prove that he satisfies § 245(i)’s requirement of having entered the country without inspection. 

The BIA’s denial of his and his family members’ applications to adjust status—with the 

exception of his daughter’s application, which the government agrees must be remanded—was 

therefore not in error. 

 The Patels are natives and citizens of India. In 1994, Govindbhai Patel submitted an 

application for asylum and an application for employment authorization, both of which stated 

that he arrived in the United States at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a visitor on 

December 25, 1993. Vidhyaben Patel also submitted an asylum application, asserting that she 

arrived in New York as a visitor in February 1994 and that her husband had been in the United 

States for two years. In their asylum applications, Govindbhai Patel and Vidhyaben Patel both 

denied traveling through any other country before entering the United States. 
No. 15-3812 Patel, et al. v. Lynch Page 3 

 In 1999, Jogmaya Corporation obtained an alien employment certification from the 

Department of Labor for a bookkeeper position. Jogmaya Corporation subsequently filed an 

immigrant petition for alien worker on behalf of Govindbhai Patel, which was approved in 2004. 

Govindbhai Patel then submitted an application for adjustment of status, in which he stated that 

he arrived in the United States in New York as a B-2 visitor for pleasure on November 25, 1993, 

and that he was inspected by an immigration officer. Counsel’s cover letter reiterated that 

Govindbhai Patel “entered the US on November 25, 1993 as a B-2 visitor.” (AR 735). 

Vidhyaben Patel, Rinaben Patel, and Nitinkumar Patel filed derivative adjustment applications. 

All four Patels filed supplements to their applications seeking adjustment of status under Section 

245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), in which they indicated 

that they entered the United States without inspection. 

In an interview with an immigration officer in 2005, Govindbhai Patel stated under oath 

that he entered the United States in New York with a visa on November 23, 1993. In subsequent 

interviews, however, Govindbhai Patel stated under oath that he entered the United States on 

November 25, 1993, by crossing the border from Mexico to California in a truck with a smuggler 

and that his family members also used smugglers to enter the United States. 

In 2008, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied 

Govindbhai Patel’s application for adjustment of status, as well as his family members’ 

derivative applications. Govindbhai Patel’s “continued conflicting responses” left the USCIS 

“trying to determine when or if [he] might be telling the truth ever.” (AR 817). 

 In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings 

against the Patels by filing notices to appear, charging them with removability as aliens present 

in the United States without being admitted or paroled in violation of INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Appearing before an immigration judge (IJ), the Patels conceded 

removability as charged and sought relief in the form of adjustment of status pursuant to INA 

§ 245(i). The DHS subsequently filed additional charges against Govindbhai Patel, asserting that 

he sought to procure an immigration benefit by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material 

fact in violation of INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and that he was not in 

possession of a valid travel document at the time of application for admission in violation of INA 
No. 15-3812 Patel, et al. v. Lynch Page 4 

§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Govindbhai Patel denied the new charges. 

At a hearing before the IJ, all four Patels testified that they were smuggled into the United 

States—Govindbhai Patel and Vidhyaben Patel from Mexico to California and Rinaben Patel and 

Nitinkumar Patel from Canada to Michigan. 

 After considering the testimony of the witnesses and the documents in the record, the IJ 

denied the Patels’ applications for adjustment of status and ordered their removal to India. The 

IJ found that Govindbhai Patel was not a credible witness based on the inconsistencies in his 

testimony and the documents, including his inconsistent representations about his manner and 

date of entry into the United States, and on his demeanor during his testimony, frequently failing 

to answer questions or delaying his responses. The IJ determined that “the evidence in total 

demonstrates that [Govindbhai Patel] came to the United States with a fraudulent visa” and that 

“he then changed his theory that he came to the United States without inspection so that he could 

qualify for an adjustment under” INA § 245(i). (AR 223). The IJ found that Govindbhai Patel 

failed to satisfy his burden of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status, that the DHS had 

proved removability under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) based on Govindbhai Patel’s concession to 

entering without inspection and under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) based on Govindbhai Patel’s 

entry with a fraudulent visa, and that the DHS had proved the factual allegation that Govindbhai 

Patel willfully misrepresented his manner of entry to the immigration officers who interviewed 

him. 

 The Patels appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. While the appeal was pending, Rinaben 

Patel filed a motion to sever and remand her case, asserting that she had married a lawful 

permanent resident who had filed a petition for alien relative on her behalf. The BIA dismissed 

the appeal and denied Rinaben Patel’s motion. The BIA concluded that the IJ’s adverse 

credibility determination was not clearly erroneous and that, given that determination, 

Govindbhai Patel had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating entry without inspection to be 

eligible for adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245(i). 

 The Patels petitioned this court for review of the BIA’s order. The government filed an 

unopposed motion to the BIA for clarification of its decision, which we granted. On remand, the 

BIA again dismissed the appeal and denied Rinaben Patel’s motion. The BIA determined that it 
No. 15-3812 Patel, et al. v. Lynch Page 5 

was unnecessary to address whether Govindbhai Patel was removable under INA 

§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) because he was removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) based on his 

concession to entering without inspection. The BIA reiterated that the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination was not clearly erroneous and concluded that Govindbhai Patel had failed to carry 

his burden to show his manner of entry into the United States and demonstrate his eligibility for 

adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245(i). 

 This timely petition for review followed. “Where the BIA reviews the immigration 

judge’s decision and issues a separate opinion, rather than summarily affirming the immigration 

judge’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination.” Khalili v. 

Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009). We review questions of law de novo but give 

substantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA and accompanying regulations, 

upholding that interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 

statute.” Id. at 435 (quoting Morgan v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 1053, 1057 (6th Cir. 2007)). Factual 

findings are reviewed for substantial evidence and “are conclusive unless any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 

187, 191 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)). 

Govindbhai Patel applied for adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245(i), which allows 

“an alien physically present in the United States” who “entered the United States without 

inspection” and who is the beneficiary of an application for a labor certification to apply for 

adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1); see Cika v. Holder, 344 F. App’x 208, 216 (6th Cir. 

2009). The application for a labor certification must have been filed on or before April 30, 2001, 

and the alien must have been physically present in the United States on December 21, 2000. 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1). The alien bears the burden of proving statutory eligibility for adjustment 

of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i); Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 

2009). The BIA concluded that Govindbhai Patel had failed to satisfy his burden of proving his 

manner of entry into the United States. Given Govindbhai Patel’s inconsistent representations 

about his manner of entry—initially claiming that he entered with a visitor visa and later 

claiming that he entered without inspection—the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. 
No. 15-3812 Patel, et al. v. Lynch Page 6 

Govindbhai Patel contends that the BIA’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that 

he is removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 

he entered without inspection to establish his eligibility for adjustment of status under INA 

§ 245(i). The BIA stated that this result may appear “somewhat incongruous” but involved a 

proper application of the burdens of proof set forth in the INA and accompanying regulations. 

In a removal case where an alien has been charged as being in the United States without 

being admitted or paroled, as in this case, the DHS must first establish alienage. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1240.8(c). The DHS satisfied this burden when Govindbhai Patel conceded that he was not a 

citizen or national of the United States and that he was a native and citizen of India. “Once 

alienage has been established, unless the respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that he or she is lawfully in the United States pursuant to a prior admission, the 

respondent must prove that he or she is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the 

United States and is not inadmissible as charged.” Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2). Here, 

Govindbhai Patel did not attempt to satisfy this evidentiary burden and instead conceded the 

charge of removability. 

With removability established, Govindbhai Patel then requested relief from removal in 

the form of adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245(i). An applicant for relief from removal 

“has the burden of proof to establish that [the applicant] satisfies the applicable eligibility 

requirements . . . and merits a favorable exercise of discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(i); see

8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.8(d), 1240.11(e). Govindbhai Patel asserted that he was eligible for adjustment 

of status under INA § 245(i) as an alien who “entered the United States without inspection” and 

was the beneficiary of an application for a labor certification. Therefore, Govindbhai Patel had 

the burden of proof to establish that he entered the United States without inspection. The BIA 

determined that Govindbhai Patel’s testimony, which lacked credibility, and the lack of other 

evidence failed to meet this burden. Giving deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA and 
No. 15-3812 Patel, et al. v. Lynch Page 7 

accompanying regulations, we conclude that the BIA’s decision involved a proper application of 

the different burdens of proof.1

The government agrees that remand is necessary with respect to Rinaben Patel’s motion 

to sever and remand in light of the fact that the record shows that Govindbhai Patel’s labor 

certification was filed before April 30, 2001, and was approved. (A.R. 739). 

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review in part and REMAND for 

further consideration of Rinaben Patel’s motion to sever and remand. 

 1

Govindbhai Patel also argues for the first time in his reply brief that he is qualified to adjust status under 

INA § 245(i) as an applicant “who seeks adjustment of status to that of an immigrant under section 1153(b) and is 

not in a lawful nonimmigrant status.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(A)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c). Beyond the 

fact that arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief are waived, see, e.g., Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 

554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010), this argument is unavailing. While it is true that an applicant “who seeks adjustment of 

status to that of an immigrant under section 1153(b) and is not in a lawful nonimmigrant status” may adjust status 

under INA § 245(i), see § 1255(i)(1)(A)(ii) and § 1255(c), such an alien must also be admissible in order to adjust 

status, see § 1255(i)(2)(A). However, if Govindbhai Patel entered with a fraudulent visa, then the fraud would 

render him inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Thus, in order to adjust status under INA § 245(i), he 

needed to prove that he entered without inspection and that he did not enter with a fraudulent visa.