Office of Debt Manageme

Fiscal Year 2012 Q1 Report
Table of Contents

I. Fiscal

A. Quarterly Tax Receipts p. B. Receipt Base Levels p. C. Ten Largest Outlays p. D. Treasury Net Non-marketable Borrowing p. E. Cumulative Budget Deficits by Fiscal Year p. F. Deficit and Borrowing Estimates p. G. Budget Surplus/Deficit with OMB Forecast p. 

II. Portfolio Metrics

A. Historical and Projected Net Marketable Borrowing p. B. Wei

ghted Avera

ge Maturit

y of Marketable Debt p. 

C. Recent and Future Portfolio Composition by Issuance Type p. D. Recent and Future Maturity Profile p. 

III. Demand

A. Bid-to-Cover Ratios p. B. Investor Class Auction Awards p. C. Foreign Awards at Auction p. D. Primary Dealer Awards at Auction p. 
Section I:

Fiscal
Quarterly Tax Receipts

100%150%

50%

% Change

0%

Year over Year 

-50%

-100%

Dec-01

Mar-02

Jun-02

Sep-02

Dec-02

Mar-03

Jun-03

Sep-03

Dec-03

Mar-04

Jun-04

Sep-04

Dec-04

Mar-05

Jun-05

Sep-05

Dec-05

Mar-06

Jun-06

Sep-06

Dec-06

Mar-07

Jun-07

Sep-07

Dec-07

Mar-08

Jun-08

Sep-08

Dec-08

Mar-09

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun10

Corporate Taxes Non-Withheld Taxes (incl SECA) Withheld Taxes (incl FICA
Receipt Base Levels

(12-Month Moving Average)

100 120 

80 40 60 

$ bn

20 

-

Dec-01

Mar-02

Jun-02

Sep-02

Dec-02

Mar-03

Jun-03

Sep-03

Dec-03

Mar-04

Jun-04

Sep-04

Dec-04

Mar-05

Jun-05

Sep-05

Dec-05

Mar-06

Jun-06

Sep-06

Dec-06

Mar-07

Jun-07

Sep-07

Dec-07

Mar-08

Jun-08

Sep-08

Dec-08

Mar-09

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep10

Individual Income Taxes include withheld and non-withheld. Social Insurance Taxes include FICA, SECA, RRTA, UTF DepositsRUIA. Other includes excise taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties and miscellaneous receipts.

Individual Income Taxes Corporation Income Taxes Social Insurance Taxes 
Ten Largest Outlays for FY 2011

900

1000

600700800300400500

$ bn

0

100200

Health and

Human Services Social Security Administration efense-Military

Treasury

Agriculture

Labor

eterans Affairs Transportation ce of Personnel Management

HSADeVT

OfficM
Q1 Levels of Ten Largest Outlays

200250150

n

100

$ b

0

50

Health and uman Services Social Security Administration efense-Military

Treasury

Agriculture

Labor

eterans Affairs Transportation ce of Personnel Management

HuSADeVeT

OfficM

Q1 FY 2011 Q1 FY 2012
Treasury Net Non-Marketable Borrowing

203010

-10

0 $ bn

-20-30

Q2-02

Q3-02

Q4-02

Q1-03

Q2-03

Q3-03

Q4-03

Q1-04

Q2-04

Q3-04

Q4-04

Q1-05

Q2-05

Q3-05

Q4-05

Q1-06

Q2-06

Q3-06

Q4-06

Q1-07

Q2-07

Q3-07

Q4-07

Q1-08

Q2-08

Q3-08

Q4-08

Q1-09

Q2-09

Q3-09

Q4-09

Q1-10

Q2-10

Q3-10

Q4-10

Fiscal Quarter

Foreign Series State and Local Govt. Series (SLGS) Savings Bonds
1,400

Cumulative Budget Deficits by Fiscal Year

1,200

800

1,000

600

$ bn

200400

0

October ovember ecember

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

NoDeF

FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
FY 2012-2014 Deficit and Borrowing Estimates 

Primary 

Dealers* CBO** 

Estimates as of: Jan-12 Aug-11 FY 2012 Deficit Estimate 1,127 973 FY 2013 Deficit Estimate 899 623 FY 2014 Deficit Estimate 737 380 FY 2012 Deficit Range 1,000-1,275FY 2013 Deficit Ran

ge 580-1,120

FY 2014 Deficit Range 85-1,037

FY 2012 Marketable Borrowing Range 1,025-1,275FY 2013 Marketable Borrowing Range 635-1,120*Based on primary dealer feedback on January 23, 2012. Deficit estimates are averages. **Current law, prior to any Joint Committee actions or sequester.***Deficit projections from September 2011 – “Living Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”.
Budget Surplus/Deficit with OMB Forecast from Septemb

2011 – “Livin

g Within Our Means and Investin

g in the Futu

0

500

g g

-500

0

-1,000 -2,000-1,500-2,500 

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Fiscal Year

Projection

OMB Surplus/Deficit in $ bn-(L) OMB Surplus/Deficit as a % of GDP-(R
Section II:

Portfolio Metrics
Historical and Projected Net Marketable Borrowing Assum

All Issuance Remains Constan

t

1,787

1,483

1,104

1,500 2,000 

787

1,064

965 898

748

1,000 

684

466

525

352

500 

$ bn

0 

(500)

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

End of Fiscal Year

TIPS 7/10/30 2/3/5 Bill OMB D fi it P j ti

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. Assumes current issuance sizes for Bills, Nominal Coupons and TIPS; along with 

reinvestment. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based on market ZCIS levels. No attempmatch future financing needs. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011, “Living Within Our Means and Inv

Future”. Data labels represent net borrowing numbers in billions.

TIPS 7/10/30 2/3/5 Bills OMB Deficit Projections
Historical and Projected Net Marketable Borrowing Assumin

Issuance Remains Constant $ Billion Issuance Remains Constant, $ Billion

End of Fiscal 

Y Bills 2/3/5

7/10/30 TIP

S Net 

B

orr

owin

g

OMB 

Year P j 

s /3/5 / 0/30

S Net o o g

Proje

2008 532 106 109 40 787 2009 503 732 514 38 1,787 2010 (204) 869 783 35 1,483 

2011 (311) 576 751 88 1,104 

2012 65 131 790 77 1,064 1,2013 0 134 737 93 965 82014 0 85 744 70 898 4

2015 0 (28) 708 69 748 52016 0 94 534 56 684 52017 0 54 354 58 466 52018 0 69 393 63 525 42019 0 40 256 57 352 52020 0 (2) 227 26 251 52021 0 (30) 197 2 169 5

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. Assumes current issuance sizes for Bills, Nominal Coupons and TIPS; along with reinvestment. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based on market ZCIS levels. No attemp

match future financing needs. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011, “Living Within Our Means and Inv

Future”. Data labels represent net borrowing numbers in billions.
Weighted Average Maturity of Marketable Debt

758085

hs)

6570

e Maturity (Month

505560

Weighted Average

4045

W50

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

Calendar Year

Historical Adjust Nominal Cou

pons to Match Financin

g Needs

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011, 

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.

jp g
Recent and Future Portfolio Composition by Issuance 

T

ype, Percen

t

80%90%

100%

y

60%70%80%

folio

30%40%50%

% of Portf

10%20%

0%

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

End of Fiscal Year

Bills Nominal Cou

pons TIPS (princi

pal accreted to 

projection date)

p (p p p j )

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.
Recent and Future Portfolio Composition by Issuance Type, P

End of 

Fiscal Year Bills Nominal Coupons

TIPS (principal 

accreted to 

projection date)

2006 21 3%. 69 5%. 9 2%.2007 21.6% 68.1% 10.3%2008 28.5% 61.4% 10.0%2009 28.5% 63.6% 7.9%2010 21 1%. 71 9%. 7 0%.2011 15.4% 77.3% 7.3%2012 14.1% 78.7% 7.3%2013 13.1% 79.3% 7.7%2014 12 5%. 79 4%. 8 1%.2015 12.0% 79.5% 8.5%2016 11.4% 79.8% 8.8%2017 11.0% 79.9% 9.1%2018 10 6%. 80 0%. 9 4%.2019 10.2% 80.1% 9.7%2020 9.8% 80.4% 9.8%2021 9.5% 80.9% 9.7%

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011, 

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.
Recent and Future Maturity Profile, $ Billion

14,000 16,000 18,000 10,000 12,000 

n

6,000 8,000 

$ b

2,000 4,000 

0 

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

End of Fiscal Year

< 1

yr [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 5) [5, 7) [7, 10) >= 10

yr

y [, ) [, ) [, ) [, ) [, )

y

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.
Recent and Future Maturity Profile, $ Billion

End of 

Fiscal Year < 1yr [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 5) [5, 7) [7, 10) 

2007 1,582 664 342 551 276 499 2008 2,151 710 280 657 318 515 2009 2,702 775 666 970 540 691 2010 2,563 1,143 872 1,310 918 881 2

011

2,621 1,273 1,004 1,527 1,146 1,086 

2012 2,824 1,458 1,160 1,923 1,255 1,139 2013 3,002 1,570 1,182 2,123 1,400 1,181 2014 3,114 1,518 1,467 2,177 1,361 1,133 2015 3,063 1,843 1,426 2,273 1,489 1,098 2016 3 395, 1 825, 1 505, 2 322, 1 532, 1 081, 2017 3,370 1,967 1,541 2,500 1,427 1,221 2018 3,512 1,971 1,609 2,594 1,474 1,252 2019 3,516 2,036 1,803 2,458 1,615 1,368 2020 3,602 2,265 1,760 2,546 1,631 1,344 2021 3,811 2,281 1,627 2,751 1,686 1,370 

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011, 

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.
Recent and Future Maturity Profile, Percent

80%90%

100%

60%70%30%40%50%10%20%

0%

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

End of Fiscal Year

< 1

yr [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 5) [5, 7) [7, 10) >= 10

yr

y [, ) [, ) [, ) [, ) [, )

y

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.
Recent and Future Maturity Profile, Percent

End of Fiscal

Year < 1yr [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 5) [5, 7) [7, 10) 

2007 34.8% 14.6% 7.5% 12.1% 6.1% 11.0% 2008 40.4% 13.3% 5.3% 12.3% 6.0% 9.7% 2009 37.9% 10.9% 9.3% 13.6% 7.6% 9.7% 2010 29.7% 13.2% 10.1% 15.2% 10.6% 10.2% 2011 26 8%. 13 0%. 10 3%. 15 6%. 11 7%. 11 1%. 2012 25.8% 13.3% 10.6% 17.5% 11.4% 10.4% 2013 25.4% 13.3% 10.0% 18.0% 11.8% 10.0% 2014 25.3% 12.3% 11.9% 17.7% 11.1% 9.2% 2015 23.8% 14.3% 11.1% 17.7% 11.6% 8.5% 2016 25.2% 13.5% 11.2% 17.2% 11.4% 8.0% 2017 24.0% 14.0% 11.0% 17.8% 10.2% 8.7% 2018 24.1% 13.6% 11.1% 17.8% 10.1% 8.6% 2019 23.3% 13.5% 12.0% 16.3% 10.7% 9.1% 2020 23 0%. 14 4%. 11 2%. 16 2%. 10 4%. 8 6%. 2021 23.4% 14.0% 10.0% 16.9% 10.4% 8.4% 

Portfolio & SOMA holdings as of 12/30/2011. To match OMB’s projected financing needs for the next 10 years, nominal coupon 

3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year) were adjusted by the same percentage. OMB deficit projections are from Table S-1 of September 2011, 

Within Our Means and Investing in the Future”. The principal on the TIPS securities were accreted to each projection date based ZCIS levels. This scenario does NOT represent any particular course of action that Treasury is expected to follow. Instead, it is indemonstrate the basic trajectory of average maturity absent changes to the mix of securities issued by Treasury.
Section III:

Demand
Bid-to-Cover Ratios for Treasury Bills

5

5.5

6

4

4.5

Ratio

3

3.5

4

Bid-to-Cover

2

2.5

1.5

Dec-01

Dec-02

Dec-03

Dec-04

Dec-05

Dec-06

Dec-07

Dec-08

Dec-09

10

4-Week (13-week moving average) 13-Week (13-week moving average)26-Week (13-week moving average) 52-Week (6-month moving average)
2-, 3-, and 5-Year Bid-to-Cover Ratios for Nominal Securiti

(6-Month Moving Average)

3.43.6

3

3.2

atio

2.62.8

Bid-to-Cover R

2 22.4

2

2.2

Mar-09

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

Jun-11

Sep-11

M

J

S

D

M

J

S

D

M

J

S

2-Year 3-Year 5-Year
Bid-to-Cover Ratios for 7-, 10-, and 30-Year Nominal Securit

(6-Month Moving Average)

3.23.4

3

atio

2.8

Bid-to-Cover R

2.42.62.2

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

Jun-11

Sep-11

J

S

D

M

J

S

D

M

J

S

7-Year 10-Year 30-Year
Bid-to-Cover Ratios for TIPS

3

3.52.5

Ratio

2

Bid-to-Cover 

1.5

1

Dec-99

Dec-00

Dec-01

Dec-02

Dec-03

Dec-04

Dec-05

Dec-06

Dec-07

Dec-08

Dec-09

5-Year 10-Year (6-month moving average) 20-Year 30-Year
Investor Class Auction Awards: Bills

Calendar Year 2011

Other

4.1%

Foreign & 

International 

11.0%

Investment 

Funds 

15.8%

Primary Dealers

59.1%

Other Dealers & 

Brokers 

9.9%

Excludes SOMA add-ons. “Other” includes categories that are each less than 2%, which include Depository Institutions, Individu

and Insurance. 
Calendar Year Change in Bill Auction Awards by Invest

Class

5%

10%

0%

Change

-10%

-5%

Calendar Year

-15%-20%

Primary 

Dealers

Other Dealers

& Brokers 

Investment 

Funds 

Foreign & 

Excludes SOMA add-ons.

O

2011 less 2010 2011 less 2009 2011 less 2008 2011 less 2007 2011 less 2006
Investor Class Auction Awards: Investor Class Auct

Other

1.0%

Investor Class Auction Awards:

2-, 3-, and 5-Year Nominal Securities

Calendar Year 2011

Other

0.7%

Investor Class Auct

7-, 10-, and 30-Year Nom

Calendar Yea

Foreign & 

International 

1.0%

Foreign & 

I t ti l 

22.6%

International 

24.4%

Primary 

Dealers

Investment 50.6%

Funds 

15.0%

Investment 

Funds 

Other Dealers 

& Brokers 

10.8%

Other 

Dealers & 

Brokers 

7.0%

Funds 

22.3%

Excludes SOMA add-ons. “Other” includes categories that are each less than 2%, which include Depository Institutions, Individu

and Insurance. 
Calendar Year Change in 2-, 3-, 5-Year Nominal Securities 

Auction Awards b

y Investor Class

10%15%

0%5%

Change

-10%

-5%

Calendar Year

-20%-15%

Primary 

Dealers

Other Dealers

& Brokers 

Investment 

Funds 

Foreign & 

2011 less 2010 2011 less 2009 2011 less 2008 2011 less 2007 2011 less 2006

Excludes SOMA add-ons.
Calendar Year Change in 7-, 10-, and 30-Year Nominal Securi

Auction Awards b

y Investor Class

10%15%

-5%

0%5%

r Change

-15%-10%

Calendar Yea

-30%-25%-20%

Primary

Dealers

Other Dealers

& Brokers 

Investment 

Funds 

Foreign & 

2011 less 2010 2011 less 2009 2011 less 2008 2011 less 2007 2011 less 2006

Excludes SOMA add-ons.
Investor Class Auction Awards: TIPS

Calendar Year 2011

Foreign & 

Other

1.4%

International 

13.0%

Primary Dealers

47.1%

Investment 

Funds 

35.8%

Other Dealers & 

Brokers 

2.7%

Excludes SOMA add-ons. “Other” includes categories that are each less than 2%, which include Depository Institutions, Individuand Insurance. 
Calendar Year Change in TIPS Auction Awards by In

Class

10%15%

5%

ar Change

-5%

0%

Calendar Ye

-10%-15%

Primary 

Dealers

Other Dealers

& Brokers 

Investment 

Funds 

Foreign & 

O

2011 less 2010 2011 less 2009 2011 less 2008 2011 less 2007 2011 less 2006

Excludes SOMA add-ons.
Foreign Awards of Treasuries at Auction, $ Billion

160180200120140

ward ($bn)

80

100

onthly Private Aw

4060

Mo

0

20

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

Jun-11

Foreign includes both private sector and official institutions.

J

S

D

M

J

S

D

M

J

Bills 2/3/5 7/10/30 TIPS
Foreign Awards of Bills at Auction, Percent

20%25%15%

n Investors

10%

warded to Foreig

5%

% A

0%

un-09

ep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

un-10

ep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

un-11

Excludes SOMA add-ons. Foreign includes both private sector and official institutions.

Ju

S

D

M

Ju

S

D

M

Ju
Foreign Awards of Nominal Coupons at Auction, Percent

40%45%50%30%35%

n Investors

20%25%

warded to Foreign

10%

% A 15%w

0%5%

un-09

ep-09

ec-09

ar-10

un-10

ep-10

ec-10

ar-11

un-11

Excludes SOMA add-ons. Foreign includes both private sector and official institutions.

Ju

Se

De

Ma

Ju

Se

De

Ma

Ju

2/3/5 7/10/30
Foreign Awards of TIPS at Auction, Percent

20%25%15%

n Investors

10%

warded to Foreig

5%

% A

0%

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

Jun-11

Excludes SOMA add-ons. Foreign includes both private sector and official institutions.

J

S

D

M

J

S

D

M

J

5-Year 10-Year 20-Year 30-Year
Primary Dealer Awards at Auction, Percent

65%70%

d

55%60%

Amount Awarde

45%50%

Total Competitive

35%40%

% of T

30%

Jun-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

Jun-11

Sep-11

4

/13

/26-Week (13-week movin

g avera

ge) 52-Week (6-month movin

g avera

ge)

/ / ( g g) ( g g)

2/3/5 (6-month moving average) 7/10/30 (6-month moving average)TIPS (6-month moving average)
U S T R E A S U R Y F L O A T I N G R A T E N O T E S

S T R I C T L Y P R I V A T E A N D C O N F I D E N T I A L

February 2012
The demand backdrop 1

FRN issuance – motivation and estimated benefits 8

Choice of reference indices and sample structures 19

E S U

1

S T R E A S U R Y F L O A T I N G R A T E N O T
The demand backdrop for US Treasuries – whether FRNs or fixed rate debt –

should benefit from a structural decline in the stock of high quality assets

 Using market-based risk assessment provides

a useful view of the altered investment

environment

 The stock of bonds issued by sovereigns

with 5Y CDS spreads below 100bp has

fallen sharply since 2007, excluding the

US (whose CDS spread is below 50bp)

 In other words, US sovereign debt is now

Total debt outstanding for G-10 countries with 5Y CDS

spreads less than 100bp, as of end-2007 and end-2011; USD

bn

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

United States

United Kingdom

Netherlands

Japan

Italy

Germany a higher fraction of the “higher quality”

sovereign debt universe, likely resulting

in a supportive demand backdrop for US

Treasuries

Note: Sweden and Switzerland were excluded due to lack of data. For end-2011, Canada

data is as of March 2011, and Japan data is as of September 2011. For European

sovereigns, we assume that the amount of bills and non-domestic bonds outstanding is

unchanged between 2007 and 2011.

-

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

End-2007 End-2011

Germany

France

Canada

Belgium

T

2

H E D E M A N D B A C K D R O P
Within the US fixed income markets, the share of Treasuries is growing while the

share of other high-quality assets is falling

Net issuance for various fixed income products by year ; $bn

300

800

1300

1800

2300 ABS Net of Fed Purchases

BABS

Agency MBS Net of Fed & TSY

Purchases

AGY Net of Fed Purchases

Financial Corps(ex ABS)

T

3

H E D E M A N D B A C K D R O P

-1200

-700

-200

2

0

0

0

2

0

01

2

0

0

2

2

0

0

3

2

0

0

4

2

0

0

5

2

0

0

6

2

0

0

7

2

0

0

8

2

0

0

9

2

010

2

011E

2

012

F

Financial Corps(ex ABS)

Non-Financial Corps

TSY Net of Fed Purchases/Sales

Net Fixed Income Supply ex Fed & TSY

purchases/sales
Will the Basel III LCR requirements trigger increased demand for US Treasuries

in general and FRNs in particular?

 Market analysts estimated a Liquidity Coverage Ratio of 57% for 30 large bank holding

companies, resulting in a gross shortfall of about $500bn - $1Tn depending on mitigation

actions undertaken

 While Treasury floaters would be attractive for LCR purposes, the net demand for FRNs

due to LCR provisions is likely to be modest

 Treasury floaters are likely to yield less than liquid assets currently held by banks

(fixed rate Treasuries/Agencies/Agency MBS).

 While Treasury floaters would be lower duration than current alternatives, many

banks are efficient duration hedgers and may be able to achieve higher returns net

of hedging cost using the current mix of assets

 With the Fed currently paying banks 25bp on excess reserves, banks are likely

ignore Treasury floaters unless the yield at least matches IOER.

 Also, certain regulatory capital implications of Basel III provisions related to AOCI could,

on the margin, incentivize banks to buy FRNs over fixed rate debt

 However, this is one factor among several driving asset selection, and we expect the

net preference for FRNs over fixed rate debt to be rather modest

T

4

H E D E M A N D B A C K D R O P
Implementation of Dodd Frank’s central clearing provisions will also create some

modest net new demand for high quality collateral such as US Treasuries

Growth of value of total reported and estimated collateral,

2000-2010; $bn

 About 82% of gross credit exposure appears

collateralized already—full implementation of DoddFrank could cause demand for collateral to rise by

about $650bn

 However, this does not directly translate into increased

demand for Treasuries—the ISDA margin survey also

indicates that Treasuries and Agencies make up only

about 6% of collateral, which is predominantly

composed of cash

 Thus, the incremental demand for USTs due to

increased collateral requirements stemming from the

implementation of Dodd-Frank’s central clearing 491

707 854 922 924

1470

2649

2150

1984

437

719

1017

1209 1329 1335

2126

3957

3151

2934

1000

2000

3000

4000

Reported Estimated

implementation of Dodd-Frank’s central clearing

provisions could turn out to be modest.

 Caveat – it is possible that the move to hold

collateral in custodial accounts rather than on a

bilateral basis could lower returns on cash and

alter the fraction of USTs in the mix. An increase

in this fraction could result in considerable

demand for USTs

 In addition, the fraction of cash relative to overall

collateral could decline as short-term rates rise,

leading to higher fractions of other assets such

as USTs

 Here again, any such incremental demand will

not discriminate between FRNs and fixed-rate

securities

Source: ISDA Margin Survey 2011

Value of collateral received and delivered by respondents,

$mn

Collateral

received Percent

Collateral

delivered Percent

Cash 877,552 81% 715,444 80%

Government securities 106,697 10% 154,821 17%

US 38,606 4% 48,409 5%

EU 22,943 2% 66,705 7%

UK 10,948 1% 13,414 1%

Japan 21,005 2% 17,438 2%

Other 13,196 1% 8,854 1%

Others 100,699 9% 29,143 3%

Total collateral 1,084,949 899,408

138 145 289

491

200 250

437

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

T

5

H E D E M A N D B A C K D R O P
Money market investors have been increasing Treasury holdings recently thanks

to a plunge in supply ex-Treasuries ...

 Money fund AUM is modestly lower over the past four years, but money

market supply has shrunk by 18%

 MMMF’s are significant holders of Treasury and Agency securities

 MMMF’s hold about $400bn in Treasury and Agency securities each

for combined $800bn, representing about 1/3 of AUM

 In addition, repo holdings backed by Treasury securities and Agency

securities (including Agency MBS) are approximately $150bn and

$250bn, respectively

 Preference for T-bills and Agency discount notes, but funds do own

coupon securities including about $125bn in Agency FRNs with

maturities 2 years or less

 There could be demand for Treasury floaters yielding more than Tbills, but MMMF preference is likely under 2 year final maturity

 Other significant money market investors not bound by rule 2a-7 may have

Estimate of MMMF Treasury and agency securities

holdings, $bn

 Other significant money market investors not bound by rule 2a-7 may have

interest in Treasury floaters as a substitute for lower yielding bank deposits,

money market fund shares, fixed-rate Treasuries and agencies, or other

money market instruments.

 Securities Lending operations of custodial banks. Historically

buyers of floating rate ABS, corporates and agencies with maturities

out to 3 years. Market analysts have estimated total investments by

these securities lenders exceed $1tn, of which floaters currently

account for about $200bn

 State and local governments. Commonly invest operating and other

funds in Treasuries, Agencies and MMMF shares.

 The mortgage GSEs. Actively invest excess cash by selling Fed

funds, investing in Treasuries and repo and time deposits with a

limited number of financial institutions. Treasury floaters with yields in

excess of the Fed funds rate could be attractive.

 Corporate cash. The recent growth of US corporate cash balances

has led to growth in bank deposits, MMMF and other liquid investment

strategies. For many firms, Treasury floaters could be an easy to use

alternative to these investments.

2a-7 Taxable MMF AUM vs. Money Market Supply,

$bn, cumulative since 2007 year-end

Source: iMoneyNet, Crane Data, J.P. Morgan

Note: Agency securities holdings includes discount notes and floating rate notes.

Source: iMoneyNet, J.P. Morgan, Bloomberg

T

6

H E D E M A N D B A C K D R O P
 Over the past 2 years, declining supply of T-Bills and Agency obligations have forced

short-term liquidity investors into credit products such as CP/CDs, and any new supply

would likely be well received

 However, in the longer term, regulation of money-market funds could alter their appeal to

investors, subsequently altering their demand profile for any floating rate note issuance.

 One offset – to the extent that money market regulation could cause assets to flow

into short-term bond funds, those funds could in turn emerge as a demand source for

FRNs

... but while this could be an initial tailwind, it is unlikely to be a long-term positive

for demand

T

7

H E D E M A N D B A C K D R O P
FRN issuance – motivation and estimated benefits 8

The demand backdrop 1

Choice of reference indices and sample structures 19

E S U

8

S T R E A S U R Y F L O A T I N G R A T E N O T
 Treasury terms out debt in order to reduce debt rollovers as well as the uncertainty regarding future debt

service costs. Thus, extending the average maturity of outstanding Treasury debt is most beneficial when

current term rates are low and/or the risk of large future changes in Treasury rates are at risk to the upside.

 Term Treasury yields are a composite of three things

 Expectations of the future path of the Fed Funds rate

 Sovereign credit spreads, and

 Term premium

 By replacing T-Bill issuance with nominal fixed rate Treasury issuance, the Treasury locks in:

Revisiting the case to term out debt maturities

I T S

 By replacing T-Bill issuance with nominal fixed rate Treasury issuance, the Treasury locks in:

 The current path of the expected increase in Fed Funds (currently benign)

 Current credit costs as reflected in the current sovereign CDS credit spread (currently low)

 The current yield curve term premium (currently low)

F

9

R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
FRNs can help reduce the debt roll-over burden, without paying the yield curve

term premium, but at the expense of retaining exposure to rising interest rates

and credit costs

 By issuing FRNs with a term of (say) 2 years, Treasury can capture the low funding costs of T-bills,

while effectively terming out issuance and reducing roll-over requirements

 As an example, monthly issuance of (say) $10bn of 2-year FRNs raises $240bn over two years,

and increases the rollover burden by $10bn/month once the auction cycle is fully phased in (i.e.,

after two years)

 Issuing an equivalent $240bn of securities by increasing 3 and 6 month bill offerings could boost

the monthly roll-over requirement by $40-80bn.

 However, by choosing to substitute T-Bill issuance with FRNs rather than with fixed rate debt of

I

similar maturity, the Treasury: T S

 Does not lock in a future path of short rates, and instead takes on that risk in exchange for

not paying the (usually positive) interest rate risk premium priced into the curve

 It does lock in term funding, and thus takes advantage of its currently low sovereign CDS

spread.

 However, it may retain exposure to a widening in its sovereign CDS spread if its floating debt

costs are indexed to some benchmark that is affected by it (e.g., T-bill yields)

F

10 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
The benefits of issuing Floating Rate Notes versus fixed-rate debt

Trailing hypothetical savings (relative to a 2Y fixed rate note)

from issuing a 2Y FRN indexed to 6-month T-bill yields at a zero

spread, versus the trailing change in the fed funds rate over the

2-year period

Trailing hypothetical savings (relative to a 5Y fixed rate note)

from issuing a 5Y FRN indexed to 6-month T-bill yields at a zero

spread, versus the trailing change in the fed funds rate over the

5-year period

-6

-4

-2

0

2

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Change in Fed Funds Rate (2yr)

%

Savings of Issuing FR

N

2yr - 6mo 2yr Change in Fed Funds

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1 0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

Change in Fed Funds Rate (5yr)

%

Savings of Issuing FR

N

5yr - 6mo

5yr Change in Fed Funds

I T S

 FRNs allow Treasury to term out its funding while lessening average funding costs in the long run

 Given typically positive term premium in the yield curve, the realization of short rates over a fixed term

(say, 2- or 5-years) will on average be lower than the ex-ante term rate

 Thus, issuing FRNs—assuming the issuance spread is not too high, and assuming that FRNs substitute

for fixed rate notes—can produce cost savings on average. This has historically been the case, as shown

in the charts above

 Last, to the extent that UST FRNs draw in new incremental demand from investors who cannot hedge the

interest rate risk in fixed rate Treasuries, this should result in an aggregate benefit to Treasury

4

6-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Change in Fed Funds Rate (2yr)

%

Savings of Issuing FR

N

2

3

4-2.0

-1.0

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Change in Fed Funds Rate (5yr)

%

Savings of Issuing FR

N

F

11 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
Savings depend less on the choice of the reference rate index, and more on the tenor

of issuance that FRNs will replace - issuing FRNs instead of Bills will yield maturity

extension benefits but not cost reduction

 FRNs – whether indexed to bill yields or an overnight

index such as fed funds or GCF – would have

historically produced largely similar cost savings

 Charts alongside show that the rolling differential

between GC/fed funds with respect to bills is stable

and relatively small. Thus, savings from issuing

FRNs might be expected to be less dependent on the

choice of index

 Savings with respect to rolling bill issuance would

be expected to be negative; the price of terming out

3-month T-bill yield and ex-post 3-month average of GC index

(GCFRTSY Index) versus cost/savings of floater

0

5

10

15

20

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25 3M T-bill yield (%; left axis)

3M avg GC (%; left axis)

Differential (bp, right axis)

I T S

be expected to be negative; the price of terming out

debt while still paying short term rates will be

reflected in the spread over bill yields that Treasury

will need to pay on an FRN, which is discussed later.

3-month T-bill yield and ex-post 3-month average of effective

Fed funds (FEDL01 Index) versus cost/savings of floater

-50.00

Oct 09 Feb 10 May 10 Aug 10 Dec 10 Mar 11 Jun 11 Sep 11

-5

0

5

10

15

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

Oct 09 Feb 10 May 10 Aug 10 Dec 10 Mar 11 Jun 11 Sep 11

3M T-bill yield (%; left axis)

3M avg FF (%; left axis)

Differential (bp, right axis)

F

12 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
Estimating the forward-looking benefits to Treasury from FRN issuance

 Three factors determine the costs/savings of FRNs versus fixed-rate debt

 The pricing spread – e.g., what fixed spread over (say) floating 3-month bill yields Treasury

pays to issue a par priced FRN

 The level of interest rate risk premium at time of issuance

 The Fed’s monetary policy stance—savings are likely to be greater when the change in the

funds rate is negative, and especially when such change is more negative than the

expectations priced into forwards

I

 The first of these – pricing spreads – will likely not be onerous enough to materially reduce the T S The first of these – pricing spreads – will likely not be onerous enough to materially reduce the

savings from issuing FRNs

 Even if FRNS are initially less liquid, market participants will likely arbitrage away any

significant differences from the spread implied by fixed rate note asset swap levels, thanks

to a highly developed interest rate derivatives market

 Experience in other fixed income product sectors that have fixed rate notes as well as

FRNs suggests that this is historically true

F

13 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
A closer look at yield curve term premium

 Term premium itself may be thought of as being composed of two parts

 the cost of maturity extension, as well as

 the premium for the privilege of fixing funding costs, which we may think of as just the

interest rate risk premium

 We may estimate the former by looking at the asset swap spread of term Treasury debt over

Bills – e.g., if 2Y notes swap to 3M bill yields + 8bp to term, then 8bp represents the cost of

maturity extension

I

 In near-zero rate regimes, we may estimate the interest rate risk premium via cap costs T S In near-zero rate regimes, we may estimate the interest rate risk premium via cap costs

 It is reasonable to assume that the risk to short-rates is one-sided, there is similarity

between the cost of an at-the-money cap on short rates (expressed in yield terms) and the

portion of term premium attributable to the uncertainty in short rates

 Estimation is subject to basis risks, since the cap market is based on Libor and not OIS

forwards; Libor cap costs likely overestimate interest rate risk premium currently, because

of higher Libor rate volatility

 FRNs will incur the costs associated with maturity extension, while saving on interest rate risk

premium (relative to issuing term debt)

F

14 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
Is this the best time in the cycle for FRN issuance from Treasury’s perspective?

Estimated interest rate risk premium* by maturity; bp of yield Rolling 2-year savings from issuing a 2-year FRN linked to

6-month T-bills relative to issuing fixed-rate notes versus 2Y

interest rate risk premium; bp of yield

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110 2Y

3Y

5Y

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240 Trailing cost savings

Savings attributable to term premium

I T S

 Current levels of interest rate risk premium are low, and the risk to the expected path of policy rates is likely asymmetrically

biased higher

 The Fed’s commitment to low rates until late-2014, as well as its new communications policy of projecting a path for

the funds rate, have already lowered interest rate risk premium, and this is unlikely to rise for several years.

 Given de minimis monetary policy rates currently, the next move by the Fed is only likely to take the funds rate higher

 With interest rate risk premium currently near all time lows, savings are likely to be marginal

10

Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 20

40

Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12

* Estimated as the cost of an at-the-money cap on short rates, in yield terms. This is premised on the notion that in near-zero policy rate regimes, the one-sided nature of policy rate

risk makes interest rate risk premium comparable to cap costs.

F

15 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
What about the cost – where might Treasury FRNs price?

Estimated pricing spread on a hypothetical 2Y FRN linked to

3M Treasury bills*; bp

 Regardless of the choice of floating rate index used to

specify the coupons in any potential FRN issued by

Treasury, it is useful to consider the par priced FRN

spread-over-bills for purposes of analysis

 I.e., if the basis swap market is used to transform

the FRN into a floater linked to bill yields, what

would the pricing spread be for a par priced FRN

at time of issuance

 This represents the direct “cost” incurred by

Treasury, for the sole purpose of terming out its

debt

0

5

10

15

20

25

Estimated pricing spread; bp

Average = 11.7

I T S

 It is reasonable to assume that this will not fall

below zero; should it do so, Treasury has a strong

incentive to issue FRNs in place of T-bills

 The chart alongside shows the hypothetical pricing

spread, if FRNs were to price at the same asset swap

spread as a maturity matched fixed rate Treasury note.

This is a reasonable estimate of where FRNs might price

-5

0

Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12

* Assumes that FRNs will price at the same asset swap level as a maturity

matched bullet Treasury.

F

16 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
A stylized illustration of the relationship between pricing spreads and the

attractiveness to Treasury

A schematic illustration of the attractiveness of issuing FRNs from Treasury’s perspective, for various pricing spreads

(versus a T-bill floating index)

Not attractive

Attractive

FRNs deliver maturity extension at a higher

cost than term fixed-rate debt

FRNs still deliver savings from term premium

but give some of it back for the privilege of

Likely pricing

spread = bills +

maturity extension

premium

Bills + maturity

extension premium

+ interest rate risk

premium

I T S

Very attractive

FRNs deliver maturity extension as well as

cost savings relative to term debt or rolling

bills

Bills + 0

but give some of it back for the privilege of

extension

premium

F

17 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
The impact of FRN issuance on the weighted average maturity of Treasury debt

will likely be relatively modest in the initial years

 We consider 3 stylized issuance policies: Treasury issues

FRNs at the expense of reduced issuance in (i) T-bills, (ii)

matched maturity fixed rate issuance, or (iii) a reduction in

fixed rate coupon Treasury issuance in proportion to current

gross issuance

 Replacing matched maturity fixed rate debt does not alter

WAM, but the other two policies will alter WAM

 Issuing FRNs wholly at the expense of bills will have

the greatest impact on WAM

 Assumes $50bn in annual FRN issuance beginning in

May 2012 ($25bn in 2s, $15bn in 3s and $10bn in 5s),

which is increased to $100bn annually by 2014

Base case: matchedmaturity nominal coupon

sizes are reduced to issue

floaters

Bill issuance is

reduced to issue

floaters

Nominal coupon sizes

are reduced

proportionally across the

maturity stack

Sep-12 63.4 63.5 63.4

Sep-13 65.4 65.5 64.8

Sep-14 68.3 68.6 67.1

May-15 70.0 70.3 68.4

Projected WAM in different scenarios; months

Date

Note: The base case assumes that coupon sizes are unchanged while net bill issuance adjusts

as the budget deficit increases/decreases. Also, FRN issuance is assumed to occur at the

expense of maturity matched fixed rate coupon issuance .

I T S

Historical and projected WAM of marketable Treasury

debt based on scenarios #1 and #2 in table above

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

Dec 80 Nov 87 Sep 94 Aug 01 Jun 08 May 15

Base case/

matchedmaturity

nominals

All from

bills

 The increase in WAM is likely to be modest even if

done wholly at the expense of T-bills

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Dec 94 Jan 99 Feb 03 Mar 07 Apr 11 May 15

Base case/

matched

maturity

nominals

All from

bills

Historical and projected share of T-bills as %ge of

marketable Treasury debt based on scenarios #1 and #2

in table above

F

18 R N I S S U A N C E – M

O T I V A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T E D B E N E F
Choice of reference indices and sample structures 19

The demand backdrop 1

FRN issuance – motivation and estimated benefits 8

E S U

19

S T R E A S U R Y F L O A T I N G R A T E N O T
The majority of the Agency floater market is linked to Libor or Fed funds

Distribution by original

maturity (years)

 About $153bn of Agency floaters are outstanding

currently, which is about 7.2% of the total Agency

debt market

 Most of these structures reference Libor or Fed

funds as an index

 Demand for floaters linked to Libor and FF

may be due in part to the deep and liquid

derivatives markets based on these

indices, allowing for efficient hedging of

risks

Distribution by underlying

benchmark type

1M Libor 64.8%

FF Effective 25.9%

3M Libor 5.4%

Prime rate 2.8%

3M T-bill 0.7%

CPI 0.1%

Distribution by reset

frequency

Monthly 64.9%

Daily 28.6%

0-1 0.2%

1-2 16.7%

2-3 75.5%

3-4 4.9%

4-5 0.3%

5-6 1.5%

6-7 0.1%

7-8 0.0%

8-9 0.0%

10-11 0.1%

12-13 0.1%

T U

15-16 0.4%

R E S

risks

 These indices have disadvantages too –

exposure to banking system credit risk (in

the case of Libor), and the Fed funds

effective rate is distorted by IOER and

related inefficiencies

Daily 28.6%

Quaterly 5.6%

Weekly 0.7%

Semi-annually 0.2%

15-16 0.4%

20-21 0.1%

>30 0.2%

FNMA, FHLMC and FHLB floaters outstanding; $bn

125

98

123

152

70

45

137

318

267

250

214

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 C

20 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T
The corporate floater market is also predominantly linked to Libor as an index rate

Distribution by original

maturity (years)

Distribution by underlying

benchmark type

Distribution by reset

frequency

0-1 3.42%

1-2 23.46%

2-3 34.89%

3-4 1.86%

4-5 13.76%

5-6 2.03%

6-7 5.24%

7-8 1.50%

8-9 0.28%

3M Libor 96.10%

1M Libor 3.38%

FF Effective 0.38%

6M Libor 0.09%

Prime Rate 0.04%

3M T-bill 0.01%

High grade corporate floaters outstanding*; $bn

256

444

509

392

267 300

350

400

450

500

550

T U R E S

frequency 8-9 0.28%

9-10 12.02%

10-11 0.22%

11-12 0.24%

19-20 0.63%

12-13 0.03%

28-29 0.00%

29-30 0.32%

30-31 0.09%

Quarterly 96.13%

Monthly 3.39%

Daily 0.42%

Semi-annually 0.05%

Weekly 0.01%

* Includes only index-eligible floaters. (Floaters with <$300mn outstanding and less than

one year to maturity are excluded.)

256

212 216

200

250

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

C

21 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T
Possible Options for a Reference rate index

T U R E S

Index

Decrease

Treasury's

rollover risk

Diversify

Treasury's

funding

costs

Reduce

basis risk

in the

system

Already

used in

existing

markets

Will likely

appeal to retail

investors

Will likely

appeal to

money market

investors

Additional Notes

LIBOR yes partially yes yes yes yes

Provides for a variety of reset frequencies from overnight to 12-month.

More attractive to some investors as more closely linked to their

liabilities. Subject to banking system funding pressures. Diversification

benefits will be somewhat limited, since issues around sovereign credit

concerns would likely also result in higher LIBOR. Nonetheless, with

only 3 US banks in the USD Libor panel, some degree of

diversification is likely.

Typically indexed to weekly auction clearing rates. Treasury could

also explore daily resetting to secondary/ constant maturity T-bills data

released by the Fed, but this could reduce transparency. Would

enable frequent resets keeping price of floater close to par and thus

making it more attractive to investor types that value price stability such

C

22 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T

T-bills yes no yes yes yes yes

making it more attractive to investor types that value price stability such

as money market funds. Will be of interest to investors who typically roll

T-bills. While this market exists, very small percentage of Agency and

Corporate FRNs are linked to T-bills (0.7% and 0.1% , respectively).

Changes in Bill auction schedule would result in changes in floaters in

which resets are linked to bill auctions. Not significantly different than TBills, risking cannibalization of T-Bill demand.

Fed

funds eff.

rate

yes yes yes yes partially yes

Daily resets. Would enable daily resets keeping price of floater close to

par and thus making it more attractive to investor types that value price

stability such as money market funds. Predictably low in current rate

environment. Subject to changes in the Fed's monetary policy. Future

of Fed Funds market is uncertain, as future of GSEs and Fed chosen

policy tool is uncertain.

Fed

funds

target

yes yes no no yes yes

A highly visible rate, but would will be hard to hedge given basis risk

with tradable markets.

GCF

repo rate yes no yes no partially yes Could enhance Repo market itself. Could decrease demand for repoproduct and indirectly for nominal Treasuries.
Comments on structural characteristics of FRNs

 Issuance in the existing floater market has been concentrated in maturities 5-years and in. More than 92%

of the Agency market and 61% of the corporate floater market were issued with an original maturity of less

than 3-years.

 Having a more frequent reset frequency will result in lower interest rate duration and thus lower price vol,

and could be more desirable to investors seeking stable value assets. Daily and Monthly resets are more

typical in Agency FRNs, while quarterly resets are more typical in Corporate FRNs

 Treasury should floor coupons payments at zero

 This does note necessarily mean a zero floor on observations of the floating index rate. For instance,

a note paying semiannual coupons, with daily accruals could result in negative observations on one or

more days between coupon payment dates. Only the ultimate coupon payment needs to be floored at T U R E Smore days between coupon payment dates. Only the ultimate coupon payment needs to be floored at

zero

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23 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T
Choice of index rate and final maturity could also be a determinant of incremental

demand for the product

 Depending on final maturity there could be significant demand

for a Treasury Floater Indexed to either overnight fed funds or

GC Repo, primarily from Money-market funds and liquidity

portfolios.

 Demand for an FRN linked to either of these indices would

likely be driven by:

 2a-7 Money Market Funds (if the contingent final

maturity is less than 397 days)

 Corporate Treasury accounts not set-up to trade repo

 Investment funds / Foreign accounts looking for a high

quality floating rate asset

1-week average of GCF Treasury index versus 1-week

average of par amount traded;

% $bn

50

100

150

200

250

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30 Index level Par amount traded

T U R E S

quality floating rate asset

 The basis between GCF and fed funds is small on a smoothed

basis, so returns on an FRN linked to either would likely be

similar

 Both indices are amenable to daily resets, which would produce

very low interest rate duration risk (but not spread duration),

and thus lower price volatility. However, ratings agency

guidelines favor indices that are more than 95% correlated to

either fed funds or Libor, possibly making fed funds a better

choice

0.00 50

Nov 09

Feb 10

May 10

Aug 10Nov 10

Feb 11

May 11

Aug 11Nov 11

GC Index (GCFRTSY Index) versus effective Fed funds

(FEDL01 Index); 1-week moving average; %

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12

GC index

Fed funds

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24 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T
Description of a sample 2Y FRN linked to 6M T-bill yields

Characteristics

 Maturity: 2-years

 Coupon: Floating

 Payment Frequency: SemiAnnual

 Reference Index: The average

auction yield of 6-mo T-bill

Auctions during reference period

Hypothetical annualized funding cost for a 2-year Treasury FRN linked

to 6-month T-bill yields versus actual 2-year Treasury yield; %

2

3

4

5

6

Hypothetical annualized funding costfor 2Y FRN linked to 6M Tbills

2YTreasury yield

T U R E S

 Day Count: Act / Act

0

1

Aug 01Dec 01

Apr 02

Aug 02Dec 02

Apr 03

Aug 03Dec 03

Apr 04

Aug 04Dec 04

Apr 05

Aug 05Dec 05

Apr 06

Aug 06Dec 06

Apr 07

Aug 07Dec 07

Apr 08

Aug 08Dec 08

Apr 09

Aug 09Dec 09

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25 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T
Description of a sample 2Y FRN linked to the overnight fed funds and GCF

rate indices

GC Index Floater Characteristics

 Maturity: 2-years

 Coupon: Floating

 Payment Frequency: Semi-Annual

 Reference Index: GCFRTSY <Index>

 The Index is the weighted average interest paid

each day on General US Treasury Collateral in the

dealer to dealer repo market.

 Average current daily volume is approximately

$150bn.

Average Fed funds Floater Characteristics

 Maturity: 2-years

 Coupon: Floating

 Payment Frequency: Semi-Annual

 Reference Index: FEDL01 <Index>

 The index represents the volume-weighted

average of interest rates at which depository

institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to

other depository institutions overnight.

 Day Count: Act / Act

T U R E S

$150bn.

 Day Count: Act / Act

Day Count: Act / Act

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26 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T
Conclusions

 The demand backdrop is currently favorable for US Treasuries, but it is prudent for Treasury to consider broadening its

issuance strategy to draw in more incremental demand

 Floating Rate Notes issued by Treasury are one such avenue, and could be attractive to money funds, investors seeking bonds

with low duration risk, and possibly banks seeking to mitigate the accounting effects of some of the Basel III provisions

 That said, any such incremental demand is likely to be modest in the near term

 The current timing does not appear ideal, although initiating an issuance program now could allow Treasury to position itself to

capitalize on a more favorable market environment

 Term premium in the yield curve is currently at all time lows, and the risk to the path of the funds rate is biased

asymmetrically towards higher rates since further Fed easing is not possible

 However, initiating a program now could help position Treasury for a future environment marked by higher term premia

T U R E S

 The choice of a floating rate index must balance the need for simplicity and transparency with the need to diversify Treasury’s

funding risk

 Indexing to T-bills offers simplicity and transparency, but does not fully diversify funding cost risk

 GCF offers the prospect of daily resets and very low duration risk, but is a more complex choice that is mostly unknown

to retail investors

 Libor offers simplicity & transparency, but this index creates exposure to banking sector credit for Treasury

 Indexing to average Fed funds rate offers simplicity and transparency, overnight reset frequency, and a viable

derivatives market for risk management. In addition, a reasonably well developed FRN market exists in other sectors. Its

appeal to retail investors needs to be further studied

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27 H O I C E O F R E F E R E N C E I N D I C E S A N D S A M P L E S T R U C T