If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MORRIS DAVIS, EMMY GILLEN, JOSHUA 

MARKOWSKI, LINDSAY MATTHEWS, 

GABRIELLA PAGAN, LAURA RAYSON, 

SHANNON SMITH, NEIL MEDDAUGH, 

STEPHAN BARBER, DEVIN BROWN, 

DOMINIQUE HARRISON, GEORGIA 

HORNBROOK, TIFFANY HUMPHRIES, 

TIMOTHY JACKSON, THOMAS LOCKETT, 

ANTHONY MAGAHEE, MARK MILLER, 

ARETHA WARE, SHARETA WATSON, 

LATICE WILLIS, ADAM YOUNG, and EMEKA 

AGU, also known as EMEKA EGU,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

June 25, 2019

v No. 344284

Wayne Circuit Court

BOYDELL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., 

DENNIS KEFALLINOS, also known as 

DIONYSIOS KEFFALINOS, FORT ROSA 

PROPERTIES, LLC, IRON STREET 

PROPERTIES, LLC, GRAND LOFTS, LLC, 

LAFAYETTE LOFTS, INC., and WOODWARD 

BUILDING PLAZA, INC.,

LC No. 16-011635-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

MICHAEL BYRD, MARK CAMAJ, NORMA 

DICKERSON, DANIELLE HARGO, CHRYSSA

HUNLOCK, RICHARD JORDAN, KEVIN 

RIEDEL, KIMBERLY FISHER, TWOQUALA 

STEVENS, KENNARD GOFORTH, DIONNE 

MCKISSACK, JENNEE PIPPEN, and BENNIE 

SCOTT, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-2-

v No. 344729

Wayne Circuit Court

BOYDELL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., 

DENNIS KEFALLINOS, also known as 

DIONYSIOS KEFFALINOS, BOYDELL 

BUILDING, LLC, BOYDELL COMPANY, INC., 

WOODWARD BUILDING PLAZA, INC., 

GRAND LOFTS, LLC, IRON STREET 

PROPERTIES, LLC, GRAND HOLDINGS, LLC, 

FORT ROSA PROPERTIES, LLC, and 

LAFAYETTE LOFTS, INC.,

LC No. 16-015807-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

CHARLES ALONGI, NAMIR ARMSTRONG, 

WILLIAM BARKSDALE, RANDI BRANDT, 

DUANE CROONS, KENNETH GREEN, 

ROBERT HOWINSKI, NICO KROHN, 

BRANDON PATTON, SHANEE LANDFAIR, 

LAWRENCE MARTIN, CHRISTOPHER 

RATCLIFF, JEFFREY RICHARDSON, 

BRENDA SHELTON, ANGELA THORNTON, 

DARYL THORNTON, BOGDAN VESPAN, 

EDWANNA WHITE, and EDITH WOOLEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 344731

Wayne Circuit Court

BOYDELL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., 

DENNIS KEFALLINOS, also known as 

DIONYSIOS KEFFALINOS, BOYDELL 

BUILDING, INC., BOYDELL COMPANY, INC., 

WOODWARD BUILDING PLAZA, INC., 

GRAND LOFTS, LLC, IRON STREET 

PROPERTIES, LLC, GRAND HOLDINGS, LLC, 

FORT ROSA PROPERTIES, LLC, and 

LAFAYETTE LOFTS, INC.,

LC No. 17-005162-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and O’BRIEN and LETICA, JJ.
-3-

PER CURIAM.

In Docket Nos. 344284, 344729, and 344731, plaintiffs1 appeal by leave granted2 the trial 

court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants.3 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the 

trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendants because the trial court 

erroneously held that the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq., 

barred plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred by failing to give 

plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints after it granted summary disposition to 

defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.

Plaintiffs were tenants and former tenants in defendants’ residential rental buildings 

located in Detroit, Michigan beginning in 1997. Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated the 

MCPA by fraudulently entering into residential leases with plaintiffs without obtaining 

certificates of compliance that would permit them to do so. Docket Nos. 344284, 344729, and 

344731 were consolidated at the trial court level and defendants moved for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10) on the ground that the MCPA did not apply. Plaintiffs 

responded and argued that the MCPA did apply and that if the trial court granted summary 

disposition to defendants it should also permit plaintiffs to amend their complaints. The trial 

court granted summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and refused to 

consider plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaints because plaintiffs failed to file a written

motion to amend and proposed amended complaints. This appeal followed.

Plaintiffs first argue that the MCPA applies to their residential leases with defendants. 

We disagree.

A trial court’s summary disposition ruling is reviewed de novo. Walters v Nadell, 481 

Mich 377, 381; 751 NW2d 431 (2008). 

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint. All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed 

in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) 

may be granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a 

 1 We will refer to the plaintiffs from Docket Nos. 344824, 344729, and 344731 collectively as 

“plaintiffs” throughout this opinion except in instances in which it is necessary to differentiate 

plaintiffs by their appellate docket number or individually.

2 Davis v Boydell Development Co, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

August 30, 2018 (Docket No. 344284); Byrd v Boydell Development Co, Inc, unpublished order 

of the Court of Appeals, entered August 30, 2018 (Docket No. 344729); Alongi v Boydell 

Development Co, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 30, 2018 

(Docket No. 344731).

3 We will refer to the defendants from Docket Nos. 344824, 344729, and 344731 collectively as 

“defendants” throughout this opinion except in instances in which it is necessary to differentiate 

defendants by their appellate docket number or individually.
-4-

matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. When 

deciding a motion brought under this section, a court considers only the pleadings. 

[Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted).]

“Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.” City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone, 

270 Mich App 627, 630; 716 NW2d 615 (2006). When the language of a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, this Court “will apply the statute as written and judicial construction is not 

permitted.” Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247; 802 NW2d 311 (2011).

“The MCPA prohibits certain unconscionable, deceptive or unfair acts, practices, or 

methods in the conduct of trade or commerce.” De Bruyn Produce Co v Romero, 202 Mich App 

92, 110; 508 NW2d 150 (1993). The MCPA defines “trade or commerce,” in relevant part, as 

“the advertising, solicitation, offering for sale or rent, sale, lease, or distribution of a service or 

property.” MCL 445.902(g). Thus, the MCPA applies to the rental of real property. See id; De 

Bruyn Produce, 202 Mich App at 110 (holding that the MCPA “defines ‘trade or commerce’ to 

include the rental of real property.”). The MCPA does not apply, however, to “[a] transaction or 

conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting 

under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” MCL 445.904(1)(a). When 

determining whether this exception applies to a particular case, “the relevant inquiry is whether 

the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific 

misconduct alleged is prohibited.” Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203, 210; 732 

NW2d 514 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). When broken down into its individual parts, 

“ ‘[s]pecific’ means ‘having a special application, bearing, or reference; explicit or definite,’ ”

and “ ‘[a]uthorize’ means ‘to give authority or formal permission for; sanction.’ ” Id. at 212-213 

(footnotes omitted). Finally, “[t]he party claiming the exemption bears the burden of proving its 

applicability.” Id. at 208.

The Housing Law of Michigan, MCL 125.401 et seq., states that “[u]nits in multiple 

dwellings or rooming houses shall not be occupied unless a certificate of compliance has been 

issued by the enforcing agency.” MCL 125.529. The Housing Law of Michigan also grants 

municipalities the authority to “designate a local officer or agency which shall administer the 

provisions of the act.” MCL 125.523. The Housing Law of Michigan additionally states that it 

“does not preempt, preclude, or interfere with the authority of a municipality to protect the 

health, safety, and general welfare of the public through ordinance, charter, or other means.” 

MCL 125.534(8). Thus, the Housing Law of Michigan permits municipalities to designate an 

officer or agency to administer its provisions and it does not interfere with a municipality’s 

ability to pass its own ordinances to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. 

See MCL 125.523 and MCL 125.534(8).

Detroit Ordinances § 9-1-35(d)(11) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he director of the 

buildings and safety engineering department, or his or her authorized local officials or designees, 

shall conduct inspections to obtain compliance with this article based upon” the Housing Law of 

Michigan and “any other applicable law or provision in the 1984 Detroit City Code regulating 

the maintenance, occupancy, and use of buildings, premises, or structures.” The city of Detroit 

has also passed ordinances regulating when landlords of residential buildings must obtain 

certificates that permit them to rent their properties to tenants after inspection by the Buildings 
-5-

and Safety Department. See Detroit Ordinances, § 9-1-81 (“The owners or agents of rental 

property shall register all such dwellings with the buildings and safety engineering department 

and obtain a certificate of registration as provided for in this section.”); Detroit Ordinances, § 9-

1-82 (“It shall be unlawful for a rental property required to be registered pursuant to section 9-1-

81 of the 1984 Detroit City Code to be occupied without a certificate of compliance issued by the 

buildings and safety engineering department . . . .”). Detroit Ordinances §§ 9-1-19 and 9-1-20 

control the penalties a landlord incurs for violations of the Detroit Property Maintenance Code, 

which encompasses Detroit Ordinances §§ 9-1-81 and 9-1-82. See Detroit Ordinances, §§ 9-1-

19 and 9-1-20. Thus, the city of Detroit has passed ordinances, through the authority granted to 

it by the Housing Law of Michigan in MCL 125.523 and MCL 125.534(8), governing the 

certificates landlords must obtain before they can rent residential property and means to address 

violation of the regulations.

Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated the MCPA by failing to disclose to plaintiffs that 

defendants did not have certificates of compliance for their residential rental properties.4 The 

city of Detroit, however, passed ordinances governing when landlords of residential rental 

properties must obtain certificates of compliance and the penalties a landlord faces for failing to 

do so. See Detroit Ordinances, §§ 9-1-19, 9-19-20, 9-1-81, and 9-1-82. Landlords in Detroit are 

not permitted to rent residential property without a certificate of compliance. See Detroit 

Ordinances, § 9-1-82(b) (establishing that residential rental property must have a certificate of 

compliance before it can be occupied). Furthermore, the Housing Law of Michigan grants 

municipalities, like Detroit, the authority to enforce its provisions through such ordinances. See 

MCL 125.523 and MCL 125.534(8). Thus, the general transaction of whether a landlord in 

Detroit may rent his or her residential property without a certificate of compliance is specifically 

addressed by Detroit’s ordinances. See Liss, 478 Mich at 212-213. Finally, as stated above, 

when determining whether the MCPA’s “specifically authorized” exception applies to a given 

case “the relevant inquiry is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, 

regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited.” Id. at 210. The general 

transaction of a landlord leasing residential property in Detroit is specifically authorized by 

Detroit’s ordinances and, therefore, the MCPA does not apply to the circumstances of this case 

even though “the specific misconduct alleged,” leasing residential rental property without first 

obtaining certificates of compliance, is prohibited by Detroit’s ordinances. See id. The trial 

court, therefore, did not err by granting summary disposition to defendants because the MCPA 

does not apply in the circumstances of this case. See MCL 445.904(1)(a); Liss, 478 Mich at 212-

213.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that MCL 455.902(g), which defines “trade or commerce” under 

the MCPA, and MCL 445.904(1)(a), which establishes the MCPA’s “specifically authorized” 

exception discussed above, show that the Legislature intended for the MCPA to apply to 

 4 We note that plaintiffs refer to these certificates as “certificates of occupancy,” but that the 

Housing Law of Michigan, MCL 125.529, and Detroit Ordinances § 9-1-82 only reference 

certificates of compliance. Thus, we use the term “certificates of compliance” throughout this 

opinion.
-6-

plaintiffs’ claims. The Legislature is “presumed to intend the meaning that the statute plainly 

expresses.” Universal Underwriters Ins Group v Auto Club Ins Assn, 256 Mich App 541, 544; 

666 NW2d 294 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the statutory 

interpretation canon of in pari materia “provides that laws dealing with the same subject . . . 

should if possible be interpreted harmoniously.” SBC Health Midwest, Inc v City of Kentwood, 

500 Mich 65, 74 n 26; 894 NW2d 535 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted; alteration in 

original). MCL 455.902(g) and MCL 455.904(1)(a) are both parts of the MCPA and, therefore, 

should be interpreted harmoniously when possible. See id. As discussed above, MCL 

455.902(g) establishes the scope of the MCPA by defining “trade or commerce.” This Court has 

previously held that “trade or commerce” under the MCPA applies to the rental of real property, 

De Bruyn Produce, 202 Mich App at 110. As similarly discussed above, however, MCL 

445.904(1)(a) establishes that the MCPA does not apply to “specifically authorized” transactions 

and conduct. See MCL 445.904(1)(a). This Court has applied the “specifically authorized” 

exception from MCL 445.904(1)(a) to conduct covered by MCL 455.902(g) in the past. See 

Liss, 478 Mich at 212-215 (holding that residential home builders are included in “trade or 

commerce” for purposes of the MCPA, but that the MCPA did not apply because the defendants’ 

conduct was specifically authorized). Thus, MCL 455.902(g) and MCL 445.904(1)(a) do not 

conflict, but instead work together to define the scope of the MCPA.

Finally, plaintiffs alleged that defendants committed fraud by failing to disclose their 

alleged lack of certificates of compliance when renting their properties to plaintiffs. When a 

plaintiff alleges fraud, he or she must meet the heightened pleadings standards of MCR 

2.112(B)(1), which provides that “in allegations of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.” “Generally, fraud is not to be 

presumed lightly, but must be clearly proved, and must be proved by clear, satisfactory and 

convincing evidence[.] It is for these reasons that our court rules create an enhanced burden to 

plead fraud with particularity.” State ex rel Gurganus v CVS Caremark Corp, 496 Mich 45, 63 n 

40; 852 NW2d 103 (2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). When determining the 

claims a plaintiff has actually alleged in his or her complaint, however, “[i]t is well settled that 

the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking 

beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim.” Adams v Adams, 276 

Mich App 704, 710-711; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaints that defendants committed fraud by failing to 

disclose their alleged failure to obtain certificates of compliance before renting their properties to 

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ complaints, however, failed to include additional specific information or 

allegations. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaints failed to meet the heightened pleading 

requirements to allege fraud. See Gurganus, 496 Mich at 63 n 40. Additionally, when read as a 

whole, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaints was not that defendants committed fraud. Rather, 

the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaints was that defendants failed to obtain certificates of 

compliance, not that they committed fraud by failing to disclose this alleged failure to plaintiffs. 

See Adams, 276 Mich App at 710-711. Plaintiffs’ fraud allegations amount to nothing more than 

creative pleading and an attempt to have the MCPA apply to their claims against defendants. As 

such, plaintiffs’ fraud allegations are unpersuasive and were not sufficiently pleaded. See 

Gurganus, 496 Mich at 63 n 40; Adams, 276 Mich App at 710-711. 
-7-

Plaintiffs’ second argument is that the trial court erred by refusing to consider their 

request to amend their complaints. We disagree.

“The grant or denial of leave to amend pleadings is within the trial court’s discretion” and 

“[t]his Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding leave to amend unless it 

constituted an abuse of discretion that resulted in injustice.” PT Today, Inc v Comm’r of Office 

of Fin & Ins Servs, 270 Mich App 110, 142; 715 NW2d 398 (2006) (citation omitted). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the decision resulted in an outcome falling outside the range of 

principled outcomes.” Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 325-326; 760 NW2d 503 (2008). 

“A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Jawad A Shah, 

MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 208; 920 NW2d 148 (2018), oral 

argument on the application gtd 503 Mich 882 (2018). Additionally, the interpretation and 

application of court rules present questions of law to be reviewed de novo using the principles of 

statutory interpretation. Lamkin v Engram, 295 Mich App 701, 707; 815 NW2d 793 (2012). 

As an initial matter, defendants’ argument that plaintiffs waived the issue of whether they 

should be permitted to amend their complaints is unpersuasive. “A waiver is a voluntary and 

intentional abandonment of a known right.” Braverman v Granger, 303 Mich App 587, 608; 844 

NW2d 485 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs requested leave to amend 

the complaints in their response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition. As such, they 

did not waive the issue of whether they could amend their complaints. See id.

When a trial court grants a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), 

(C)(9), or (C)(10), it “must give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings pursuant to 

MCR 2.118, unless the amendment would be futile.” Shah, 324 Mich App at 209 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also MCR 2.116(I)(5) (“If the grounds asserted are based on 

subrule (C)(8), (9), or (10), the court shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their 

pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before the court shows that 

amendment would not be justified.”). An amendment to a pleading “is futile if it merely restates 

the allegations already made or adds allegations that still fail to state a claim.” Lane v 

KinderCare Learning Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697; 588 NW2d 715 (1998).

Under MCR 2.118(A)(2), a party may amend a pleading by leave of the court and such 

“[l]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Shah, 324 Mich App at 209 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Motions to amend should only be denied for 

“the following particularized reasons: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive on the 

part of the movant, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, 

(4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or (5) futility 

of the amendment.” Lane, 231 Mich App at 697. Delay alone, however, “does not warrant 

denial of a motion to amend.” Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 659; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). 

[A] trial court may find prejudice when the moving party seeks to add a new 

claim or a new theory of recovery on the basis of the same set of facts, after 

discovery is closed, just before trial, and the opposing party shows that he did not 

have reasonable notice, from any source, that the moving party would rely on the 

new claim or theory at trial. [Id. at 659-660 (footnote omitted).]
-8-

“The trial court must specify its reasons for denying leave to amend, and the failure to do so 

requires reversal unless the amendment would be futile.” PT Today, 270 Mich App at 143.

Under MCR 2.118(A)(4), a motion to amend a complaint must be made “in writing.” 

MCR 2.118(A)(4). This Court examined the writing requirement of MCR 2.118(A)(4) in Lown v 

JJ Eaton Place, 235 Mich App 721; 598 NW2d 633 (1999). In Lown, the defendant moved for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and, the “plaintiff anticipated that she would be 

seeking leave to amend her complaint” in her response to the defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition. Lown, 235 Mich App at 725. The plaintiff orally requested leave to amend her 

complaint at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, but the trial court 

denied the plaintiff’s request at the same hearing and granted summary disposition to the 

defendant. Id. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request to amend the 

complaint because the plaintiff’s “request to amend was oral, and [the] plaintiff never offered 

any written amendments.” Id. at 726. As such, the plaintiff failed to comply with MCR 

2.118(A)(4), which requires amendments to be in writing. MCR 2.118(A)(4); Lown, 235 Mich 

App at 726. Furthermore, by characterizing the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint as 

oral, this Court implicitly held that the plaintiff’s statement in her response to the defendant’s 

motion for summary disposition that she would seek leave to amend did not fulfill MCR 2.118’s 

requirements. See Lown, 235 Mich App at 725-726. The importance of the submission of a 

written proposed amended complaint has since been reiterated in Anton, Sowerby & Assoc, Inc v 

Mr C’S Lake Orion, LLC, 309 Mich App 535, 551; 872 NW2d 699 (2015), in which this Court 

held that “[i]f a plaintiff does not present its proposed amended complaint to the court, there is 

no way to determine whether an amendment is justified.”

The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8). In 

such a situation, a trial court must give a party an opportunity to amend its pleadings. Shah, 324 

Mich App at 209. Plaintiffs, however, failed to file proposed amended complaints or written

motions to amend their complaints. Instead, like the plaintiff in Lown, plaintiffs stated that they 

“would seek leave to amend” in their response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition if 

the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants. Plaintiffs failed to pursue the issue 

further and did not file proposed amended complaints or motions to amend the complaints with 

the trial court. Because plaintiffs failed to file motions to amend the complaints and proposed 

amended complaints with the trial court, they failed to comply with MCR 2.118(A)(4). See 

Lown, 235 Mich App at 725-726. Additionally, because plaintiffs failed to present proposed 

amended complaints to the trial court, the trial court had “no way” to determine whether 

plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaints were justified. See Anton, 309 Mich App at 551.

Plaintiffs additionally argue that it would be unreasonable to require them to move to 

amend their complaints before the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants because 

plaintiffs could not have known that such an action was necessary until after the trial court 

granted summary disposition to defendants and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs, however, failed to 

cite any legal authority to support this argument and this Court may consider the argument 

abandoned. Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 220; 761 NW2d 293 

(2008). Even if plaintiffs’ argument that they had no reason to know they should have moved to 

amend their complaints before the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants was not 

abandoned, however, it would still fail. 
-9-

Plaintiffs may file motions to amend their complaints when they respond to a defendant’s 

motion for summary disposition. See, e.g., Sharp v City of Lansing, 238 Mich App 515, 517-

518, 523; 606 NW2d 424 (1999) (the defendant moved for summary disposition and, as that 

motion was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint). Furthermore, plaintiffs 

may also file motions to amend their complaints after a trial court grants summary disposition to 

defendants. See, e.g., Jackson v White Castle Sys Inc, 205 Mich App 137, 139, 142-143; 517 

NW2d 286 (1994) (after the trial court granted summary disposition to the defendant, the 

plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint with a motion for reconsideration). Thus, 

plaintiffs could have filed motions to amend their complaints either before or after the trial court 

granted summary disposition to defendants. Plaintiffs’ choice to solely pursue an MCPA claim 

was strategic; their decision to not proactively amend their complaints proved to be a bad 

strategy, but that does not mean that this Court’s established rule requiring plaintiffs to file 

motions to amend their complaints is unreasonable. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaints.

Because plaintiffs failed to move to amend their complaints we need not address whether 

the trial court should have granted plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaints on the merits. 

We note, however, that if plaintiffs had moved to amend their complaints the trial court should 

have granted their motion to amend their complaints. Detroit’s ordinances did not necessarily 

bar plaintiff’s proposed claims that defendants breached Truth in Renting Act, MCL 554.631 et 

seq., and the warranty of habitability. As such, the request to amend plaintiffs’ complaints was

not necessarily futile. We note, however, that without a proposed amended complaint we lack 

the information necessary to determine whether plaintiffs’ amended complaints would have been 

futile. Furthermore, plaintiffs did not move to amend their complaints in bad faith and if the trial 

court granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints it would not have prejudiced defendants 

because the parties were not on the eve of trial, which was scheduled to begin almost three 

months after plaintiffs’ request to amend. See Weymers, 454 Mich at 659-660. Finally, because 

this was the first and only time that plaintiffs requested leave to amend their complaints, 

plaintiffs’ request necessarily was not a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed.” See Lane, 231 Mich App at 697. As such, if plaintiffs had properly moved 

to amend their complaints the trial court should have granted them leave to do so.

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Anica Letica