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103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 292

To approve and encourage the use by the President of any means necessary

and appropriate, including diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade,

and military force, to prevent the development, acquisition, or use by

North Korea of a nuclear explosive device.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 15, 1993

Mr. GILMAN (for himself, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. SOLOMON, and Mr. HYDE) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee

on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

To approve and encourage the use by the President of any

means necessary and appropriate, including diplomacy,

economic sanctions, a blockade, and military force, to

prevent the development, acquisition, or use by North

Korea of a nuclear explosive device.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear

3 Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution’’.

4 SEC. 2. NORTH KOREA’S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NU5 CLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

6 The Congress finds the following:

7 (1) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

8 (in this joint resolution referred to as ‘‘North

9 Korea’’) has for over a decade pursued a program

10 aimed at the development of a nuclear explosive de11 vice.

12 (2) Director of Central Intelligence R. James

13 Woolsey has testified before the Congress that North

14 Korea is the most urgent threat to United States

15 national security in East Asia, that there is a real

16 possibility that North Korea has produced enough

17 nuclear material to build at least 1 nuclear explosive

18 device, and that possession by North Korea of such

19 a device would threaten United States allies in all of

20 Asia as well as United States forces in the region.

21 (3) On December 12, 1985, North Korea be22 came a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

23 of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

24 (4) On December 30, 1991, North Korea and

25 the Republic of Korea reached a bilateral

26 denuclearization agreement forbidding the produc-
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1 tion, possession, or deployment of nuclear weapons,

2 reprocessing facilities, and uranium enrichment fa3 cilities on the Korean Peninsula.

4 (5) Although the bilateral denuclearization

5 agreement between North Korea and the Republic of

6 Korea provided for bilateral inspections of nuclear

7 facilities, North Korea has refused to permit any in8 spections pursuant to that agreement.

9 (6) In belated compliance with its obligations

10 under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu11 clear Weapons, North Korea concluded a Fullscope

12 Safeguards Agreement with the International Atom13 ic Energy Agency on January 30, 1992. This agree14 ment permits the International Atomic Energy

15 Agency to conduct both regular and special inspec16 tions of nuclear sites in North Korea in order to ver17 ify compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera18 tion of Nuclear Weapons.

19 (7) While conducting inspections pursuant to

20 the Fullscope Safeguards Agreement in 1992, the

21 International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered evi22 dence that North Korea has produced more weap23 ons-grade nuclear material than it has reported to

24 the International Atomic Energy Agency.
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1 (8) As part of its investigation of this matter,

2 the International Atomic Energy Agency requested

3 special inspections of two suspected nuclear sites on

4 February 16, 1993.

5 (9) In order to avoid International Atomic En6 ergy Agency inspection of these sites, North Korea

7 on March 12, 1993, announced its intention to with8 draw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

9 Nuclear Weapons.

10 (10) The United Nations Security Council

11 adopted Resolution 825 on May 11, 1993, which

12 called upon North Korea to retract its decision to

13 withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

14 of Nuclear Weapons and fully honor its obligations

15 under that treaty and the Fullscope Safeguards

16 Agreement. Resolution 825 also urged all member

17 states of the United Nations to encourage North

18 Korea to respond positively to the Security Council’s

19 action and to take all appropriate steps vis-a-vis the

20 North Korean government to facilitate resolution of

21 the matter.

22 (11) As urged by Resolution 825, the United

23 States has held a series of meetings with representa24 tives of the North Korean government.
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1 (12) In the context of these meetings, North

2 Korea agreed on June 11, 1993, to suspend its an3 nouncement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the

4 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to hold

5 ‘‘serious discussions’’ with the International Atomic

6 Energy Agency regarding the resumption of inspec7 tions pursuant to the Fullscope Safeguards Agree8 ment, and with the Republic of Korea regarding im9 plementation of the bilateral denuclearization agree10 ment.

11 (13) North Korea’s discussions with the Inter12 national Atomic Energy Agency since June 11,

13 1993, have not resulted in agreement regarding the

14 resumption of inspections, and discussions with the

15 Republic of Korea have not resulted in agreement

16 regarding implementation of the bilateral

17 denuclearization agreement.

18 (14) In the absence of agreement with the

19 International Atomic Energy Agency, no inspections

20 are taking place at the two North Korean nuclear

21 facilities that were the subject of the International

22 Atomic Energy Agency’s special inspections request

23 of February 16, 1993, and North Korea is, as a

24 practical matter, free to pursue the development of

25 a nuclear explosive device.
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1 (15) The current leadership of North Korea

2 has, during the more than 45 years that it has been

3 in power, compiled a record of aggression and law4 lessness, including not only its invasion of the Re5 public of Korea in 1950 triggering the Korean War,

6 but also countless acts of infiltration and subversion

7 in the Republic of Korea and international terrorism

8 beyond the Korean Peninsula.

9 (16) Particularly in view of this history, the de10 velopment or acquisition by North Korea of a nu11 clear explosive device would threaten international

12 peace and security in Asia, not least by requiring

13 Japan and the Republic of Korea to consider devel14 oping or acquiring nuclear devices of their own.

15 (17) The United States is committed to the de16 fense of the Republic of Korea pursuant to the Unit17 ed States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty

18 of 1954, and continues to station approximately

19 37,000 members of the United States Armed Forces

20 in the Republic of Korea.

21 (18) In view of the risks that would be associ22 ated with development or acquisition by North

23 Korea of a nuclear explosive device, President Clin24 ton on July 11, 1993, warned that any use by North
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1 Korea of such a device would be met by decisive

2 United States retaliation.

3 SEC. 3. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW.

4 The Congress finds and declares the following:

5 (1) Self-defense is an inherent right of nations

6 under international law. This right was reaffirmed

7 by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

8 which states ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall

9 impair the inherent right of individual or collective

10 self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a

11 Member of the United Nations, until the Security

12 Council has taken measures necessary to maintain

13 international peace and security.’’.

14 (2) President Kennedy’s statement on October

15 22, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, succinctly

16 explains why the term ‘‘armed attack’’ must be con17 strued broadly with respect to nuclear weapons:

18 ‘‘We no longer live in a world where only the

19 actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient

20 challenge to a nation’s security to constitute

21 maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so de22 structive and ballistic missiles are so swift that

23 any substantially increased possibility of their

24 use or any sudden change in their deployment
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1 may well be regarded as a definite threat to

2 peace.’’.

3 (3) Many international legal scholars have rec4 ognized that when a government begins making

5 preparations to initiate nuclear warfare, particularly

6 when that government has a history of committing

7 unprovoked aggression, those preparations may con8 stitute an ‘‘armed attack’’ within the meaning of Ar9 ticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. As

10 President Kennedy suggested, in the nuclear age

11 ominous changes in the availability or disposition of

12 nuclear weapons can be as much an armed attack as

13 an army crossing a border. Such an armed attack

14 gives rise to the right of self-defense on the part of

15 those against whom the preparations to initiate nu16 clear warfare are directed, including the right to use

17 such force as may be necessary and proportionate to

18 eliminate the threat.

19 (4) This principle of international law was the

20 legal basis for the naval blockade of Cuba ordered

21 by President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Cri22 sis in 1962. It also was the legal basis for Israel’s

23 preemptive strike against the nuclear reactor at

24 Osirak, Iraq in 1981. Both actions defused serious

25 threats to international peace and security. Both il-
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1 lustrate that no state will wait until it is too late to

2 defend itself.

3 (5) In view of the record of aggression and law4 lessness compiled by the current leadership of North

5 Korea over the last 45 years and the determination

6 with which North Korea is pursuing the development

7 of a nuclear explosive device, the President may con8 clude that the threat posed by North Korea’s

9 unsafeguarded nuclear program to such United

10 States allies as Japan and the Republic of Korea

11 and to United States forces in the region is so grave

12 as to warrant unilateral United States action to

13 eliminate the threat.

14 SEC. 4. POLICY DECLARATIONS.

15 The Congress approves and supports—

16 (1) the determination of the President to pre17 vent the development or acquisition by North Korea

18 of a nuclear explosive device;

19 (2) the President’s efforts to induce North

20 Korea to comply fully with its obligations under the

21 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

22 and the bilateral denuclearization agreement with

23 the Republic of Korea, including the obligation to

24 permit fullscope inspections of all suspected nuclear

25 weapons sites; and
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1 (3) the determination of the President to re2 spond appropriately should North Korea obtain a

3 nuclear explosive device and use such device against

4 any ally of the United States.

5 SEC. 5. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES.

6 The Congress approves and encourages the use by the

7 President of any means necessary and appropriate, includ8 ing the use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade,

9 and military force, to prevent—

10 (1) the development or acquisition by North

11 Korea of a nuclear explosive device; or

12 (2) the use by North Korea of such a device

13 against United States forces in the region or against

14 any ally of the United States.

15 SEC. 6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

16 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC REPORTS.—The

17 President shall submit to the Congress periodic reports on

18 the status of efforts to prevent the development or acquisi19 tion by North Korea of a nuclear explosive device. Each

20 such report shall describe the actions taken by the United

21 States pursuant to section 5.

22 (b) WHEN REPORTS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED.—A re23 port shall be submitted pursuant to subsection (a) within

24 60 days after the date of enactment of this joint resolution

25 and every 6 months thereafter until the President certifies
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1 to the Congress that North Korea has ceased its efforts

2 to develop or acquire a nuclear explosive device.

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