IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUBBOCK DIVISION

HART CHESNUTT, LLC

v.

COVINGTON SPECIALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 

5:22-cv-00110

DEFENDANT COVINGTON SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S

NOTICE OF REMOVAL

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Defendant, Covington Specialty Insurance Company

(“Covington”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this Notice of 

Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446 and Local Rule 81.1.

I. BACKGROUND

1. Covington is the Defendant in a civil action pending Cause No. DC-2022-CV0407; Hart Chesnutt, LLC v. Covington Specialty Insurance Company; In the 99th

Judicial District Court of Lubbock County, Texas (hereinafter referred to as the “State 

Court Action”). As required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), An Index of State Documents Filed 

with the Notice of Removal is attached hereto as “Exhibit A,” and true and correct copies 

of all process, pleadings, orders served upon Defendant in the State Court Action are 

attached hereto as “Exhibit B.”

2. On April 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Original Petition (hereinafter referred to as the 

“Petition”) against Defendant Covington in the State Court Action. See, Ex. B-2.

3. The Petition asserts, inter alia, claims for Breach of Contract and violations of the 

Texas Insurance Code against Covington based on the allegation that Plaintiff incurred 

covered damages from a storm event within the applicable policy period of August 17, 

2019 to August 17, 2020 in Lubbock, Texas. See, Ex. B-2.

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4. Plaintiff served Plaintiff’s Petition on Covington through the Texas Secretary of 

State. See Ex. B-2 at ¶5. No return of service has been filed. However, Covington admits 

it received service of the suit on May 16, 2022. See, Ex. E.

5. Accordingly, this Notice of Removal is timely filed within thirty (30) days of May 

16, 2022, the date on which Defendant first received notice of service of process through 

the Secretary of State in the State Court Action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Murphy Bros. 

v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344 (1999) (holding that a defendant’s time to 

remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, not by 

mere receipt of the complaint unattended by formal service); Baum v. Avado Brands, 

Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17955, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999) (holding that where 

service is made on a statutory agent such as the Secretary of State, the thirty-day 

statutory period for removal starts running when a defendant actually receives service).

II. AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

6. In the Petition at Section IV, Plaintiff specifically states that it is seeking 

monetary relief of $250,000 or less. Ex. B-2 at ¶ 6. In Section V of the Petition, Plaintiff 

alleges that Covington forced Plaintiff to incur more than $9,000 in costs to complete its 

own investigation, independent inspection, and analysis of the damage of the storm in 

question, and that Covington underpaid Plaintiff’s claim by approximately $188,765.61. 

Id. at ¶ 15.

7. Thus, it is facially apparent from the Petition that Plaintiff seeks damages in 

excess of $75,000, such that the amount in controversy requirement for diversity 

jurisdiction is satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

III. DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

8. Plaintiff is, and was at the time of the filing of this action, a domestic limited 

liability corporation filed under the laws of the State of Texas with its principal place of 

business in Texas as well. See, Ex. B-2 at ¶ 3.

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9. Covington is, and was at the time of the filing of this action, a corporation 

incorporated under the laws of the State of New Hampshire with its principal place of 

business in Georgia. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1).

10. Thus, there was complete diversity between Plaintiff and Covington at the time 

this action was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

IV. TIME FOR REMOVAL

11. Covington’s notice of removal is timely. Covington has removed this action within 

30 days of receipt service of formal notice of suit – including the citation – which was on

May 16, 2022. Therefore, the deadline for Covington to file this removal is not until June 

15, 2022. Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (The 

Supreme Court, answering the question of whether a defendant must be officially 

summoned to appear in an action before the time to remove begins to run, held that a 

defendant’s time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and 

complaint... [and] not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal 

service.” (emphasis added)).1

1 Additionally, every district court in Texas that has considered the question and dozens of other district 

courts have held that where service is made on a statutory agent such as the Secretary of State, the thirtyday statutory period for removal starts running when a defendant actually receives service, not 

when service is effected upon the Secretary of State. Baum v. Avado Brands, Inc., CIVIL ACTION

NO. 3:99-CV-0700-G, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17955, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999) (emphasis added); see

Simpson v. JIK Cayman Bay Exch. LLC, No. 3:13-CV-3263-B, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30245, at *24-25 

(N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2014) (holding that the time for removal began running when defendant actually 

received notice of the suit, not when the Secretary of State was served with process); Med. Staffing 

Network, Inc. v. Health Care Capital, Inc., No. 3: 04-CV-0794-B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23213, at *4 

(N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2004) (holding that service on a statutory agent is not sufficient service for removal 

purposes); Canyoncreek Communs. Corp. v. Commun. Cable Co., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1523-BF, 

2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20480, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2001) (holding that the proper date from which the 

close of the removal period should be calculated is the day upon which defendants actually received 

service, and not the day that service was effected upon the Secretary of State); Renaissance Mktg. v. 

Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.P.R. 2009) (holding that where service is made on a 

statutory agent such as the Secretary of State, the thirty-day statutory period for removal starts running 

when a defendant receives notice of summons and the complaint); Calderon v. Pathmark Stofres, Inc., 

101 F. Supp. 2d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that where service is made on a statutory agent such as the 

Secretary of State, a defendant’s time to remove runs, not from the date of service on the statutory agent, 

but on the date on which the defendant receives the notice that such service has been made; Cox v. 

Sprung's Transport & Movers Ltd., 407 F.Supp. 2d 754, 756 (D.S.C. 2006) (holding that service upon

statutory agent insufficient to begin period for removal); White v. Lively, 304 F. Supp. 2d 829 (D.C.Va. 

(footnote continued)

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12. Therefore, Notice of Removal is timely filed.

V. REMOVAL IS PROPER

13. Accordingly, the State Court Action satisfied both of the requirements for 

diversity jurisdiction: (1) more than $75,000 alleged in controversy; and (2) complete 

diversity of parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

14. Furthermore, “in keeping with the great weight of the authority on [the] issue,” 

this Notice of Removal is timely, as it comes within thirty days of May 16, 2022, the date 

on which the thirty-day statutory period for removal began running. Baum, 1999 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 17955, at *8.

15. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), venue of the removed action is proper in this Court as 

it is the district and division embracing the place where the State Court Action is 

pending.

16. Therefore, the State Court Action is removable to the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) 

and § 1441(b).

17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Covington will promptly give written notice of 

the filing of this Notice of Removal to Plaintiff and will further file a copy of this Notice 

2004) (finding that the removal period started running with defendant's actual receipt of summons and 

complaint, rather than statutory agent's receipt of suit); Lilly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 672 

(D.C.W.Va. 2002) (holding that the thirty-day clock starts with defendant's actual receipt of notice of the 

suit, not at the time plaintiff served statutory agent); Hibernia Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. U.S.E. Cmty. Servs. 

Group, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D.C. La. 2001) (finding that statutory agents are not actual agents of 

defendants); Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. v. Hall, 14 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that,

where service was properly made on a statutory agent, the removal period began when defendant actually 

received the process, not when the statutory agent received it); Wilbert v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 981 F. 

Supp. 61, 63 (D.R.I. 1997) (finding that "[w]hen a statutory agent is served, the clock for removal does not 

begin ticking as it would if defendant itself had been served but rather starts when defendant receives 

actual notice of the service from the statutory agent."); Pilot Trading Co. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 946 F. 

Supp. 834, 839 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that, where service is effected through a statutory agent, the time 

for removal starts running at the time of defendant's actual receipt of the complaint); Medina v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 519, 520 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that "'the time for removal, in cases in 

which service is made on a statutory agent, runs from receipt of the pleading by the defendant rather than 

the statutory agent.'")(citations omitted); Taphouse v. Home Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 158, 161 (E.D. Mich. 

1995) (holding that the time limit for removal does not begin with service on a statutory agent, but when 

the defendant actually receives the pleading).

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of Removal with the District Clerk of Lubbock County, Texas, where the State Court 

Action was previously pending.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Covington hereby removes the case styled Cause No. 

DC-2022-CV-0407; Hart Chesnutt, LLC v. Covington Specialty Insurance Company;

In the 99th Judicial District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, and respectfully requests 

that this Court assume full jurisdiction of this proceeding for all purposes as if originally 

filed in this Court, including, but not limited to, issuing any orders necessary to stay 

proceedings in the State Court Action. 

Respectfully submitted,

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

/ s / Joelle G. Nelson

JOELLE G. NELSON

Texas Bar No. 24032501

JACQULYN P. JANDRUCKO

Texas Bar No. 24070425

DANIEL A. FERRIS

Texas Bar No. 24125573

Greenway Plaza, Suite 1400

Houston, Texas 77046

Phone: 713.659.6767 

Fax: 713.759.6830 

Joelle.Nelson@lewisbrisbois.com 

Jacqulyn.Jandrucko@lewisbrisbois.com

Daniel.Ferris@lewisbrisbois.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, 

COVINGTON SPECIALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY 

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4892-9706-8834.1 6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 9th day of June, 2022, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document has been served on all known parties and counsel of record 

pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:

Counsel for Plaintiff

Matthew R. Pearson

Jarryd S. Morton

PEARSON LEGAL, P.C.

425 Soledad, Suite 600

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Tel: (210) 732-7766

Fax: (210) 229-9277

Email: mpearson@pearsonlegalpc.com

Email: jmorton@pearsonlegalpc.com

 / s / Jacqulyn P. Jandrucko 

JACQULYN P. JANDRUCKO

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