[Cite as State v. Clemons, 2022-Ohio-4395.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 111561

v. :

MONIQUE CLEMONS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; 

 AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 8, 2022

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-21-660495-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Eamonn McDermott, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

Noelle A. Powell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant, Monique Clemons, appeals the terms of her 

sentence to community-control sanctions. Pursuant to Loc.App.R. 16(B), plaintiff-
appellee, state of Ohio, concedes this error. After a thorough independent review of 

the record and law, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

This incident stems from a traffic stop where Clemons was found to 

have a loaded, concealed, and readily available handgun in her possession. A 

Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Clemons on three counts: having weapons 

while under disability (Count 1), carrying a concealed weapon (Count 2), and 

improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle (Count 3). 

Clemons accepted a plea deal and entered a guilty plea to Count 2 and 

agreed to forfeit the weapon to the Cleveland Police Department. Counts 1 and 3 

were nolled. The trial court ordered Clemons to comply with a presentence 

investigation prior to sentencing. 

During her sentencing hearing, Clemons was sentenced to communitycontrol sanctions for a period of five years. At issue in this appeal is the following 

portion of the trial court’s order, pertinently ordering: 

Do not patronize any location where drugs and/or alcohol are sold, 

served, or used. This includes but is not limited to restaurants, bars, 

sporting venues, concerts, family weddings, backyard barbeques, 

private parties, political events, etc. 

The defendant must submit to random testing. When requested, the 

defendant must know the hours of the lab and when specimens are 

taken. The Defendant has a grace period of testing positive for 

marijuana till 05/28/2022.

You must attend a 12-step program meeting every day for 90 days, 

thereafter, Sundays off and every other day Monday-WednesdayFriday or Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday, not three times a week. 
Must have a same-sex sponsor within 30 days and must give his/her 

name and number to your probation officer. Sponsor must have 10 

years of sobriety. No family, friends, or relatives allowed. 

From this order, Clemons assigns a single assignment of error for our 

review: 

When there was no connection between the crime for which Ms. 

Clemons was being sentenced and substance use the trial [court] 

abused its discretion in prohibiting Ms. Clemons from any place or 

event in which alcohol is being consumed; requiring the random testing 

of Ms. Clemons for alcohol or drug consumption; and requiring Ms. 

Clemons’ participation in AA. 

II. Law and Analysis

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) enables a trial court to impose a community-control 

sanction in lieu of a prison sentence. When sentencing a felony offender, the trial 

court may impose community-control sanctions that are residential, nonresidential, 

and financial so long as they are authorized by R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, and 2929.18. 

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). Additionally, “[t]he court may impose any other conditions of 

release under a community control sanction that the court considers appropriate 

* * * .” R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). 

Because the statute allows broad discretion in imposing communitycontrol conditions, we review community-control conditions for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Minarik, 2018-Ohio-3586, 112 N.E.3d 550, ¶ 75 (8th Dist.), 

citing State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 10. 

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted 

way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. 
Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an 

abuse “‘“implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable.”’” State v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 135, 

quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), 

quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 

Community-control conditions must reasonably relate to the goals of 

community control: “‘rehabilitation, administering justice, and ensuring good 

behavior.’” State v. Mahon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio-295, ¶ 7, 

quoting Talty at ¶ 16. In State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990), 

the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a test for determining whether community-control 

conditions reasonably relate to these goals. The trial court must consider whether 

the condition is (1) reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some 

relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to 

conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the 

statutory ends of probation. Id. “All three prongs of the Jones test must be satisfied 

for the reviewing court to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” 

Mahon at ¶ 8, citing State v. White, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-1027, 2015-Ohio3844, ¶ 10. Further, the conditions “‘cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily 

impinge upon the [offender’s] liberty.’” Talty at ¶13, quoting Jones at 52. 

Clemons argues that the second factor of the Jones test is not met 

because the crime from which this sentence was imposed, carrying a concealed 

weapon, is not a drug or alcohol related offense. Clemons also notes that pursuant 
to the first factor, drug- and alcohol-based community-control conditions are 

irrelevant to her rehabilitation. Finally, Clemons also argues that under the third 

factor, there is nothing in the record suggesting that her substance use is related to 

her current or future criminality. 

In response, the state filed a notice of conceded error stating that

the [s]tate recognizes also that the second prong of the Jones test is not 

satisfied because the prohibition against alcohol, random drug testing, 

and AA participation is not related to [a]ppellant’s conviction of 

attempted carrying a concealed weapon. Further, [a]ppellant’s lack of 

criminal history (no prior adult felony convictions) did not establish 

that she had a substance abuse issue. Therefore, [a]ppellee joins 

[a]ppellant’s request to reverse, and remand to trial court for further 

proceedings.

Pursuant to the second Jones factor, this court, in Mahon, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio-295, noted that several Ohio courts require some 

nexus between an offender’s crime and drug and/or alcohol use or abuse to uphold 

community-control conditions. Id. at ¶ 9, citing Strongsville v. Feliciano, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 96294, 2011-Ohio-5394; accord State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 111173, 2022-Ohio-3233, ¶ 12. 

In Mahon, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of 

telecommunications device. The terms of his community control forbade him from 

using drugs or alcohol and attending any place or function where alcohol or drugs 

were sold, used, or served. This court ultimately found that these conditions did 

not satisfy the Jones test because the conditions were totally unrelated to the crime 

for which he was convicted, stating that “[t]he record contains no mention 
whatsoever of drugs or alcohol having been involved in the incident for which 

Mahon was convicted.” Id. at ¶ 11. 

In Feliciano, the defendant was convicted of domestic violence. The 

terms of his community control included random drug and alcohol testing. After 

applying the Jones test, this court reversed, reasoning that “[t]he present record is 

devoid of any indication that appellant’s crime was related to alcohol or drug use 

* * *.” Feliciano at ¶ 11. 

In Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111173, 2022-Ohio-3233, the 

defendant was convicted of criminal nonsupport. His community-control terms 

forbade him from going anywhere where drugs and/or alcohol are sold, served, or 

used. This court reversed, reasoning that “there is no nexus between Brown’s 

conviction for criminal nonsupport and a prohibition on being near alcohol. 

Neither indictment here contains any reference to drugs or alcohol, and our review 

of the record reveals no connection between alcohol and Brown’s convictions.” 

Brown at ¶ 13. 

In the instant matter, the record indicates that Clemons had a small 

amount of marijuana in her possession at the time that the officers found the 

weapon. Officers searched the vehicle and did not find any additional marijuana

or drugs. Despite this, the underlying indictment did not include any charges 

relating to the marijuana. Further, nothing in the record substantiates that 

Clemons’s possession of the gun had any nexus to her possession of this small 

amount of marijuana.
The record also indicates that this offense bears no relation to 

alcohol. Consistent with this court’s holdings in Mahon, Feliciano, and Brown, we 

find that the prohibitions pertaining to alcohol including not patronizing any 

establishment where alcohol is used, sold, or served, and attending 12-step 

program meetings are not reasonable under the second factor of the Jones test. 

The failure to meet this factor is dispositive of this appeal.

We also note that despite Clemons possessing a small amount of 

marijuana, the record does not indicate that Clemons has any substance abuse 

issues suggesting that she needs rehabilitation. The following exchange occurred 

at sentencing: 

THE COURT: * * * Okay. So according to what you told our 

investigator, you stopped drinking at one point but you’ve gone back to 

drinking, correct?

[CLEMONS]: I just drink socially. I stopped drinking for most of my 

adult life actually. 

THE COURT: And you used marijuana, correct? 

[CLEMONS]: Not so much anymore.

THE COURT: But if you test positive for alcohol or any drug that is not 

properly prescribed for you, you will be violating my probation.

(Tr. 22-23.)

Further, Clemons’s presentence investigation report indicates that 

she struggled with alcohol use before turning 18 and completely abstained from 

alcohol between ages 18 through 31. She now drinks socially and does not feel it 
poses a problem. The record supports this, and the state concedes that Clemons 

does not appear to have a substance abuse problem. 

We also note that it does not appear that drugs or alcohol play a role 

in Clemons’s current or future criminality. This is her first adult felony. Clemons 

was adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile matter from 2006 on robbery and assault 

charges. Three months prior to this case, she was charged with having weapons 

while under disability, but the case was dismissed. Her own explanation at 

sentencing was that 

[CLEMONS]: Well, actually I was wrongfully identified as someone 

else. Apparently some girls — some women, they robbed a liquor store 

in Independence. I look nothing like them. One was extremely light 

and one was extremely darker. I was only there for like three hours. 

(Tr. 21.)

The record before us does not indicate that the instant matter bore 

any relation to drugs and/or alcohol. Even though a small amount of marijuana 

was found in Clemons’s possession, it is not clear that the marijuana bears any 

relationship to her possession of a weapon, and the underlying indictment did not 

include any charges relating to Clemons’s marijuana possession. We further note 

that the record does not establish that Clemons has a substance abuse problem 

warranting rehabilitation and, further, the small amount of marijuana does not 

appear to relate to the criminal conduct nor does it appear to pose a risk for future 

criminality. 
III. Conclusion

Clemons’s sole assignment of error is sustained because factor two of 

the Jones test was not met. Further, the state concedes the error in full. We vacate 

the portions of the sentencing entry requiring Clemons to refrain from patronizing 

places and events where drugs and alcohol are served, sold, and used; submit to 

random drug and alcohol testing; and attend 12-step program meetings and retain 

a sponsor.

Judgment reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR