# Quadrennial Defense Review Report

February 2010

## CONTENTS

PREFACE i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii

INTRODUCTION 1

DEFENSE STRATEGY 5
A Complex Environment 5
America’s Interests and the Roles of Military Power 9
U.S. Defense Objectives 11

REBALANCING THE FORCE 17
Defend the United States and Suppo rt Civil Authorities at Home 18
Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations 20
Build the Security Capacity of Partner States 26
Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments 31
Prevent Proliferation and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 34
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace 37
Guiding the Evolution of the Force 39
Sizing and Shaping the Force 41

Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure, FY 2011 – 15 45

TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE 49

Wounded Warrior Care 49
Managing the Deployment Tempo 50
Recruiting and Retention 51
Supporting Families 52
Keeping Faith with the Reserve Component 53
Developing Future Military Leaders 54
Developing the Total Defense Workforce 55

STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS 57
Strengthening Key Relationships Abroad 57

The Role of U.S. Defense Posture 62
Strengthening Interagency Partnerships 69REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS 73 Reforming Security Assistance 73
Reforming How We Buy 75
Institutionalizing Rapid Ac quisition Capability 80
Strengthening the Industrial Base 81
Reforming the U.S. Export Control System 83
Crafting a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy 84

A DEFENSE RISK MA NAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 89
Operational Risk 90
Force Management Risk 92

Institutional Risk 93
Future Challenges Risk 94
Strategic, Military, and Political Risk 95

CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD 97

CHAIRMAN’S ASSESSMENT OF 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 99i Quadrennial Defense Review Reportii Quadrennial Defense Review Reportiii Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our

nation’s interests.

In executing these respon sibilities, we must recogn ize that first and foremost, the United States is a nation at war. In Afghanistan, our forces fight al ongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and the Ta liban. In Iraq, U.S. mil itary personnel advise, train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a re sponsible transition and drawdown. Above all, the United States and its allies and partners rema in engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world.

Furthermore, as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeply
intertwined with the fate of th e broader international system—a syst em of alliances, partnerships,
and multinational ins titutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty years. The U.S. military must therefore be prepare d to support broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good.

With these realities in mind, the 2010 Quadr ennial Defense Review advances two clear objectives. First, to further rebalance the capa bilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars, while building the capa bilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further reform the Department’s institutions and proce sses to better support the urgent needs of the warfighter; buy weapons th at are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.

The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to the security environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually examine its approach—from objectives to capabil ities and activities to re sources—to ensure its best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform.

A Complex Environment
The United States faces a complex and uncertain se curity landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The distribution of glob al political, economi c, and military power is becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the wo rld’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will co ntinue to shape an in ternational system that is no longer easily
defined—one in which the United States w ill remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iv Quadrennial Defense Review Report Globalization has transformed th e process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to acquire ad vanced technologies. As technological innovation and global information flows accelerate, non-stat e actors will continue to gain influence and capabilities that, during the past century, remained largely the purview of states.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destru ction (WMD) continues to undermine global security, further complicating efforts to sustai n peace and prevent harmful arms races. The instability or collapse of a WM D-armed state is among our most troubling concerns. Such an occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapon s, and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a dire ct physical threat to the United States and all
other nations.

Other powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security environment. Rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interpla y may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.

America’s Global Role

America’s interests are inextricably linked to th e integrity and resilience of the international system. Chief among these interests are security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values,
and an international order that promotes cooperative action.

Consistent with the President’s vision, the United States will advance these interests by strengthening our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power, engaging abroad on the basis of
mutual interest and mutual respect, and promoting an
international order that advances our interests by reinforcing the rights and responsibilities of all nations.

America’s interests and role in the world requir e armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the common good. The United States remains the only nati on able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances. This un ique position generates an obligation to be President Barack Obama holds a briefing on Afghanistan wit h senior national security leaders including Vice President Joseph Biden, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and the Joint Chiefs of St aff in the Situation Room at the White House on Oct. 30, 2009. Official White House photo by Pete Souza.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

v Quadrennial Defense Review Report responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determin ation, and circumstance have provided.

Defense Strategy
In order to help defend and advance our national interests, the Department of Defense balances resources and risk among four priority objective s: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These prio rities shape not only considerations on the capabilities our Armed Forces need but also the aggregate capacity required to accomplish their missions now and in the future. Our approach to achieving them must evolve and adapt in response to a changing security environment.

Prevail in today’s wars: We must ensure the success of our forces in the field—in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world. Along with our allies and partners, we have renewed efforts to help the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and
eliminate its safe havens within both nations. In Iraq, years of effort have helped enable that government to take the lead in protecting its people and providing essential services. As the responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presenc e proceeds, U.S. forces will continue to play important roles advising, training, and supporting Iraqi forces. El sewhere, U.S. forces work with partners and allies to locate and dismantle terrorist networks.

In the near term to midterm, substantial number s of U.S. forces will li kely be operating in Afghanistan and U.S. forces in Iraq will cont inue a responsible drawdown. These efforts will substantially determine the size and shape of majo r elements of U.S. military forces for several years. In the mid- to long term, we expect there to be enduring operational requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies.

Prevent and deter conflict: America’s enduring effort to adv ance common interests without
resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the internationa l system. Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrat ed use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and ec onomic tools of statecraft, to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. Such an approach also requires working closely with our allies and partners to leverage e xisting alliances and create conditions to advance

common interests.

Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, an d naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-a ccess weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enabled by cyber and space ca pabilities and enhanced by U.S. capabilities to deny adversaries’ objectives through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD, a resilientEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

vi Quadrennial Defense Review Report infrastructure, and our global basing and posture. Until such time as the Administration’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nucl ear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.

While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in c urrent wars, the Department’s prevent-and-deter activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States; preventing the emergence or reemergence of trans national terrorist threats, including Al Qaeda; and deterring other potential major adversaries. In the future, as our forces tra nsition into a period of lessintensive sustained operations, the Department’s fo rce planning assumes an ability to undertake a broader and deeper range of pre vent-and-deter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a whole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners.

Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies: If deterrence fails and adversaries challenge our interests with the thre at or use of force, th e United States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S. national in terests. Not all contingencies will require the involvement of U.S. military forces, but the Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a wide ra nge of contingencies, which include supporting a response to an attack or natural disaster at home, defeating aggression by adversary states, supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing se rious internal threats, and preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.

In the mid- to long term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepa re to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlap ping time frames. This includes maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors, but we must take seriously the need to plan for the broadest possi ble range of operations—from homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in multiple and unpredictable combinations.

Operations over the past eight years have stressed the ground fo rces disproportionately, but the future operational landscape could also portend significan t long-duration a ir and maritime campaigns for which the U.S. Arme d Forces must be prepared.

Preserve and enhance th e All-Volunteer Force: Years of war have significantly stressed our military personnel and their families. Given the continuing need for substantial and sustained deployments in conflict zones, the Department must do all it can to take care of our people— physically and psychologically. For too long, the health of the All-Volunteer Force, the civilian workforce that supports it, and the processes by which the Department provides needed equipment and platforms have been underemphasiz ed priorities. The prolo nged wartime period since 2001 has greatly elevated their importance, and the consequences of failure have accordingly become more serious. To reflect the urgency that the Depart ment’s leadership placesEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

vii Quadrennial Defense Review Report on these issues, the QDR has striven to include them as core components of our policy, planning, and programming considerations.

Our preserve-and-enhance efforts will focus on tran sitioning to sustainable rotation rates that protect the force’s long-term health. The Departme nt plans that in times of significant crisis, U.S. forces will be prepared to experience high er deployment rates and briefer dwell periods for up to several years at a time and/or to mobili ze the Reserve Component. This will typically be necessary if the United States is engaged for long periods in more than one large operation, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department will also expand its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) to augment the m ilitary effort as required.

These four priority objectives are at once timel y and enduring. They capture the Department’s key priorities and drive considerations about th e size and shape of America’s Armed Forces now and in the future. Successfully balancing them re quires that the Department make hard choices on the level of resources require d as well as accepting and managing risk in a way that favors success in today’s wars.

Rebalancing the Force
In order to successfully protect and advance U.S. interests while balancing the priority objectives outlined above, the QDR makes a series of re commendations aimed at helping to rebalance
America’s Armed Forces to better enable success in the following missions critical to protecting and advancing the nation’s interests. Required fo rce enhancements were identified by examining ongoing conflicts as well as the performance of the current and planned force through combinations of scenarios spanning the range of plausible future challenges. Significant enhancements were directed in the following key mission areas:

Defend the United States and supp ort civil authorities at home: The rapid proliferation of destructive technologies, combined with potent ideologies of violent extremism, requires sustaining a high level of vig ilance against terrorist threats. Moreover, state adversaries are acquiring new means to strike targets at greater distances from their borders and with greater lethality. The United States must also be prepare d to respond to the full range of potential
natural disasters.

The QDR directs a series of enhancements, including:

 Improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces;

 Enhance capabilities for domain awareness;

 Accelerate the development of standoff radiol ogical/nuclear detection capabilities; and

 Enhance domestic capabilities to counte r improvised explosive devices (IEDs).EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

viii Quadrennial Defense Review Report Succeed in counterinsurgency, stabilit y, and counterterrorism operations: The United States must retain the capability to conduct la rge-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments. In order to ensure that America’s Armed Forces are prepared for this complex missi on, it is vital that the lessons from today’s
conflicts be further institutionaliz ed in military doctrine, training , capability development, and operational planning.

QDR initiatives include:

 Increase the availability of rotary-wing assets;

 Expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);

 Increase key enabling assets for special operations forces (SOF);

 Increase counterinsurgency, stability operat ions, and counterterrorism competency and capacity in general purpose forces;

 Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and

 Strengthen key supporting capabili ties for strategic communication.

Build the security capa city of partner states: Since the end of World Wa r II, DoD has worked to build the security capacity of allied and partner st ates and to ensure that the Armed Forces of the United States have ample opportunities to train with and learn from counterpart forces. As ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq make cl ear, these dimensions of U.S. defense strategy have never been more important.

Key QDR initiatives in this mission area include:

 Strengthen and institutiona lize general purpose force ca pabilities for security force

assistance;

 Enhance linguistic, region al, and cultural ability;

 Strengthen and expand capabilities fo r training partner aviation forces;

 Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training; and

 Create mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner
forces.

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by pote ntially hostile nation-state s. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to pr ovide security in key regions.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ix Quadrennial Defense Review Report In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibi lity of conflict.

The QDR directs the following enhancements:

 Expand future long-range strike capabilities;

 Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;

 Increase the resiliency of U.S. forw ard posture and base infrastructure;

 Assure access to space and the use of space assets;

 Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;

 Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and

 Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.

Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction: The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat. As the ab ility to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterrence of such th reats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understandin g potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning fo rces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.

Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense directs the following:

 Establish a Joint Task Force Elimination He adquarters to plan, train, and execute WMDelimination operations;

 Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents;

 Enhance nuclear forensics;

 Secure vulnerable nuclear materials;

 Expand the biological threat reduction program; and

 Develop new verification technologies.

Operate effectively in cyberspace: The security environment demands improved capabilities to counter threats in cyberspace. In the 21st cen tury, modern armed forces simply cannot conduct effective high-tempo operations without re silient, reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace. DoD must actively defe nd its networks.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

x Quadrennial Defense Review Report DoD is taking several steps to stre ngthen capabilities in cyberspace:

 Develop a more comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace;

 Develop greater cyber expertise and awareness;

 Centralize command of cyber operations; and

 Enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments.

Guiding the Evolution of the Force
In combination and over time, the initiatives described in the QDR are designed to significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U.S. interests in both the near and longer term. In addition to better preparing our own forces for the future, these initiatives will improve the Department’s ability to build the capability an d capacity of partners.

Changes directed under the QDR can be broadl y characterized by the following trends:

 U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective an d sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone an d in concert with partners.

 U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, ev en as they add capabilities an d capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid grow th in sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions.

 U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range, flexibility, and multimission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilitie s. We will also enhance our air forces’ contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding within our broader inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces.

 The United States will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces and will enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support assets in the general purpose forces.

 The capabilities, flexibility, and robustne ss of U.S. forces across the board will be improved by fielding more and better enab ling systems, including ISR, electronic attack capabilities, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyber defenses.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xi Quadrennial Defense Review Report Of course, many of these enhancements will be costly. The QDR report describes some of the
tradeoffs that DoD’s leaders have identified to enable the rebalancing of U.S. military capabilities. More such tradeoffs co uld be necessary in the future.

Early in the QDR and as part of the process of compl eting DoD’s budget submission for FY 2010, the Secretary took action to direct reso urces away from lower-priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be a ddressed, both within that budget and in the years that follow it. Those decisions includ ed ending production of the F-22 fighter, restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Future Combat Systems programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, and stretching out procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier. The Air Force is substantially reducing its fleet of older fourth-generation fighter aircraft.

In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to shut down production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, havin g completed the planned procurement of those aircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and to extend the life of existing command ships, canc el the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled the Department to redirect resources into th e high-priority areas outlined above.

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet ce rtain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the fo rce, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future oper ating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in un derperforming programs an d activities, divestiture, technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that
more resources can be devote d to filling these gaps.

Taking Care of Our People

America’s men and women in uniform constitute the Department’s most important resource. Multiple long deployments are taking a significant toll on our people and their families, and the Department remains focused on their health and welfare. As part of this focus, the QDR has elevated theneed to preserve and enhance the AllVolunteer Force and included this priority in our force planning and in our strategy U.S. Army Sgt. Noel Rodriguez shares a moment with his two daughters—Emily, left, and Noemi, right—and wife Lily during a homecoming at Victory Field, Calif., Aug. 18, 2009. U.S. Army photo by Cpl. Nicole Lavine.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xii Quadrennial Defense Review Report deliberations. In order to better take care of ou r people, the Department is focusing on several
fronts.

Wounded warrior care: Our wounded, ill, or injured service members deserve every opportunity to return to active duty following their recovery, or to make a seamless transition to veteran status if they cannot be returned to ac tive duty. Apart from prevailing in current conflicts, caring for our wounded warriors is our highes t priority, and we will work to provide them top-quality care
that reflects their service and sacrifice. The Department is improving the treatment of our wounded warriors in many ways, which include:

 Increasing funding for wounded warrior ini tiatives across the Mili tary Departments;

 Improving health benefits and adding additio nal personnel for wounded warrior support programs; and

 Broadening the scope and quality of informa tion sharing between the Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs to strengthen co ntinuity of care and benefits delivery for military members.

Managing the deployment tempo: Doing everything possible to better manage a complex deployment tempo is an important aspect of th e Department’s commitment to our personnel and families. We must strive to provide them and their families with greater clarity and predictability regarding current and planned deployments. To this end, the Department continues to work toward increasing time spent between deployments to two years at home for every one deployed for the Active Component and five years demobilized for every one year
mobilized for Guard and Reserve units.

Recruiting and retention: Our recruiting efforts are long-term investments that can yield generational gains. In this cha llenging wartime environment, the De partment continues to meet its recruiting and retention goals. The Depart ment must continue developing innovative programs to attract qualified young men and wome n into the Armed Forces, and to retain them. Examples of recent efforts include:

 Revising bonus policies to al low the Military Departments to pursue innovative ways to retain quality personnel; and

 Offering more flexible ways for military pers onnel to serve, by implementing programs designed to better enable transitions between Active and Reserve Component service.

Supporting families: We have a critical and enduring obligation to better prepare and support families during the stress of mult iple deployments. Access to robust single member, spouse, child, and youth services is no longer a desirable option, but necessary, as these are services essential to
maintain the health of the All-Volunteer Force. Examples of recent efforts include:EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xiii Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Increasing resources devoted to institutio nalizing service member and family support programs across the Department;

 Replacing or renovating a majority of DoD Educational Activity schools by 2015; and

 Continuing efforts of the Military Depa rtments to improve family and community support services.
Developing future military leaders: The Department will continue its work to ensure that
America’s cadre of commissioned and noncommission ed officers are prepared for the full range of complex missions that the future security en vironment will demand. DoD will continue to place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and th e building of partner capacity skill sets in its profe ssional military education and career development policies. Examples
of efforts in this area include:

 Building expertise in foreign langua ge, regional, and cultural skills;

 Recognizing joint experience whenever and where ver it occurs in an officer’s career; and

 Ensuring that the Department’s educational institutions have the right resources and faculty that can help prepare the ne xt generation of military leaders.

Developing the total defense workforce: The demands of a complex and uncertain security environment require the Department to assess whether it posse sses the right workforce size and mix of military, government civilian, and contractor personnel. As part of these efforts, DoD will take the following steps:

 Improve the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce , which provides deployable civilian experts to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters; and

 Work to reduce the number of support service contractors, thereby helping to establish a balanced workforce that appropria tely aligns functions to th e public and private sector.

Strengthening Relationships
Achieving the Department’s stra tegic objectives requires close co llaboration with counterparts at home and with key allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense relationships, the United States not only helps avert crises but al so improves its effectiveness in responding to them. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national security—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—the nation can ensure that the right mix of expertis e is at hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and to thwart potential threats. The Department will take the following steps:EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xiv Quadrennial Defense Review Report Strengthening key relationships abroad: America’s power and influence are enhanced by sustaining a vibrant network of defense allia nces and new partnerships, building cooperative approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international institutions such as the United Nations. Recogn izing the importance of fostering and improving military and defense relations with allies and pa rtners, the Department continues to emphasize tailored approaches that build on shared interests and common approaches.

Evolving U.S. global defense posture: The United States is a global power with global responsibilities. Including operations in Af ghanistan and Iraq, approximately 400,000 U.S. military personnel are forward-sta tioned or rotationally deployed around the world. The United
States will continue to tailor its defense posture to enhance other states’ abilities to solve global security problems, and to address challenges i ncluding ongoing conflicts , the proliferation of nuclear technology and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and maintaining secure access to the global commons.

Improving unity of effort: The Department remains committed to further improving a whole-ofgovernment approach to national security challenge s. From improving our partnership with the Department of State in conflict zones, to our enduring relationship with America’s intelligence community, to supporting civil authorities at home throug h our partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense will closel y cooperate with other U.S. departments and agencies to better pro tect and advance America’s interests.

Reforming How We Do Business

Years of war have demanded that America’s Armed Forces rapidly innovate and adapt—the Department’s institutional base must do the sa me. The QDR highlights several issues requiring particular attention.

Reforming security assistance: Despite the recognition that our se curity is increasingly tied to building partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pa ce. America’s security
assistance efforts remain constrain ed by a complex patchwork of auth orities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain long-term efforts. The Department is working to improve its internal e fforts, ensure that urgent warfighter needs are met—through such means as the Commander’s Em ergency Response Program, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and the Iraq Security Fo rces Fund—and work with interagency partners to create new and more responsive mechanisms for security assistance.

Reforming how we buy: The conventional acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to fit the needs of the many systems that req uire continuous changes and upgrades—a challenge that will become only more pressing over t ime. The Department will improve how it matches requirements with mature technolo gies, maintains disciplined systems engineering approaches,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xv Quadrennial Defense Review Report institutionalizes rapid acquisition capabilities, and implements more comprehensive testing. We must avoid sacrificing cost and schedule for pro mises of improved performance. Our efforts must also include reforming the U.S. export con trol system for the 21st century, and spurring continued improvements in the provision of ra pid logistical support to our forces abroad.

Strengthening the industrial base: America’s security and prosperity are increasing linked with the health of our technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic advantage well into the future, the Departme nt requires a consistent, realis tic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capab ilities of the defense technology and industrial bases—a strategy
that better accounts for the ra pid evolution of commercial techno logy, as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.

Reforming the U.S. exp ort control system: Today’s export control system is a relic of the Cold War and must be adapted to address current thre ats. The current system impedes cooperation, technology sharing, and interope rability with allies and partne rs, hindering U.S. industrial competitiveness. The Department will work with interagency partners and with Congress to ensure that a new system fully addresses the threats the U.S. will face in the future.

Crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy: Climate change and energy will play significant roles in the future security environment. The Department is developing policies and plans to manage the effects of climate change on its operating environment, missions, and facilities. The Department already performs en vironmental stewardship at hundreds of DoD installations throughout the United States, workin g to meet resource efficiency and sustainability goals. We must continue incorporating geostrategi c and operational energy considerations into force planning, requirements deve lopment, and acquisition processes.

Balancing for a Complex Future
The priorities advanced in the QDR, couple d with both the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets reflect the Secretary’s consistent emphasis on ensuring the Department does everything possible to enable success in today’s wars while prepa ring for a complex and u ncertain future. This QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: f irst, to establish the Department’s key priority objectives, provid ing context and recommendations regarding capability development and investment portfolio s; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several year s of the Department’s work. The QDR thus se rves as a critical capstone document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America’s men and women in uniform today, and building the policy and programmatic foundation for security in the years to come.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xvi Quadrennial Defense Review Report Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure

Taking into account the demands of a dyna mic and complex security environment, the requirements of U.S. defense strategy, th e need for enhancements to key capabilities across a wide range of missions, and the need for forces with sufficient aggregate capacity to meet the criteria laid out above, DoD has determined that U.S. forces, for the duration of the FY 2011–15 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), will conform to the general parameters outlined below. Where ranges of force elements are provided,
these reflect variations in force leve ls that are planned across the FYDP.

Department of the Army:

4 Corps headquarters 18 Division headquarters 73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve Component [RC]), consisting of: 40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) 8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) 25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) 21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC) 15 Patriot battalions; 7 Terminal High A ltitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries

Department of the Navy:

10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings 84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatants and Aegis Ashore 14 – 28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships) 29 – 31 amphibious warfare ships 53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines 126 – 171 land-based intelligence, surveilla nce, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft (manned and unmanned) 3 maritime prepositioning squadrons 30 – 33 combat logistics force ships (+1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)) 17 – 25 command and support vessels (including Joint High Speed Vessels, 3 T-AKE Class dry cargo/ammunition ships, 1 mobile landing platform) 51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels

The formations and platform types shown here gene rally encompass only the major combat elements of each of the military departme nts. Nuclear forces, which will be detailed in the report of the Nuclear Posture Review , are not shown here.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xvii Quadrennial Defense Review Report Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure (continued)

3 Marine expeditionary forces 4 Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC) 11 infantry regiments 4 artillery regiments 4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups , 7 rotary-wing groups , 4 control groups, 4 support groups) 4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments) 7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements

Department of the Air Force:

8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft) 30 – 32 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivale nts (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent) 10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wingequivalent) 5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft) 6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 prima ry mission aircraft per wing-equivalent) 3 command and control wings and 5 fully oper ational air and space operations centers (with a total of 27 primary mission aircraft) 10 space and cyberspace wings

Special Operations Forces:

Approximately 660 special operations teams (i ncludes Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special operations teams, Air Force specia l tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments [OADs]) 3 Ranger battalions 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobi lity and fire support pri mary mission aircraft

The above parameters rightly reflect the heavy demands being placed on portions of the force by today’s wars. As these demands evol ve, so too may the appropriate size and mix
of forces.xviii Quadrennial Defense Review Report1 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense conducted the 2010 Quadrennial Defe nse Review (QDR) from February 2009 through January 2010.

From the outset, this QDR aimed at advancing tw o objectives. The first was to further rebalance the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and institutionalize successful wartime innovations to better enable success in today’s wars while ensurin g that our forces are prepared for a complex future. Not only will the outcome of the conflic ts in Afghanistan and Iraq shape the security environment for decades to come, but the character of these wars—with enemies hiding among populations, manipulating the information en vironment, and employing a challenging mix of tactics and technology—will be an important part of the future spectrum of conflict. The second objective was reform: For too long we have been slow to adapt our institutions and processes to support the urgent needs of our men and women in harm’s way. From strategy and policy development to personnel and acquisition processes, it is imperative to further reform how we do
business.

This QDR was strategy-driven. It began with an assessment of the emerging security environment and the many ways in which the U.S. Armed Forces may be called on to protect and advance the nation’s interests. The Depa rtment used the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the strategic precepts of the President’s fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense budget as touchstones for this assessment. It then worked closely with the White House, other departments and agencies, and key allies to refine its approach, ensuring consistency with the President’s national security priorities and the Administrati on’s major security reviews.

These efforts made clear that the United States and its allies and partners face a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state acto rs, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other destructive technologies, and a series of en during and emerging socioeconomic trends will continue to pose profound challenges to international order.

America’s leadership in this world requires a who le-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power. Agile and flexible U.S. military forces with superior capabilities across a broad spectrum of potential operations are a vital component of this broad tool set, helping to advance our nation’s interests and s upport common goals. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large- scale combat operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an obligation to be responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determinatio n, and circumstance have provided.INTRODUCTION

2 Quadrennial Defense Review Report To help defend and advance our national inte rests, the Department of Defense must balance resources and risk among four priority objective s: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve
and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.

In balancing resources and risk, the QDR recogn ized the current fiscal challenges facing the
United States and made difficult tradeoffs whe re these were warranted. The QDR’s goals in
these four areas are well funded in the FY 20 11 budget, providing sufficient resources to successfully execute the full range of mi ssions called for in our strategy.

In order to determine the mix of military capabilities best s uited to supporting the nation’s defense strategy, the QDR was an alytically grounded. The Secret ary, advised by other senior civilian and military leade rs within the Department, reviewed, modified, and endorsed a set of scenarios that the QDR used to help evaluate current and potential future forces. The analysis also focused heavily on assessing the needs of commanders and forces in the field today, principally in Afghanistan and Iraq, in order to en sure that the Department’s leaders had a clear picture of the demands of ongoing operations.

The QDR analysis strongly suggested that the De partment must further rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities to better support the following six key missions:

 Defend the United States and s upport civil authorities at home;

 Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;

 Build the security capacity of partner states;

 Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;

 Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and

 Operate effectively in cyberspace.

Although these missions do not encompass the to tality of ways in which our Armed Forces serve, they are areas of particular need that re quire attention today and into the future.

Through the QDR, the Department developed and evaluated proposa ls for addressing gaps and shortfalls in the capabilities of the force. Once these proposa ls were vetted and their costs determined, the Secretary issued planning g uidance to DoD compone nts. This QDR guidance drove the development and review of the FY 2011 budget proposal and th e Department’s Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) FY 2011–2015. In some cases the resulting investments serve as a down payment on capabilities that may not come to fruition for several years.INTRODUCTION

3 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Beyond directing specific shifts in the capabilit ies required to accomplish the above missions, the QDR also considered the aggregate military capacity needed to pre vail in a series of overlapping operations of varying character and intensity . The QDR force-sizing and force-shaping construct
differentiates between current commitments and plausible future requirements, and forms the basis for determining the appropriate type and range of the main elements of U.S. force structure necessary to meet the needs of the defense strategy.

It is evident that years of war have imposed co nsiderable strain on the All-Volunteer Force. Multiple long deployments are taki ng a significant toll on our p eople. Given the requirements of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other operations, th e Department remains deeply committed to constantly assessing the health of the force. We will do all we can to ensure that our people are as prepared as possible for their wartime service whil e working to lessen the burden shouldered by our personnel and their families—the most important pillar of America’s defense.

Part of the Department’s obligation to defend and advance U.S. interests while taking care of our people is the imperative to re form how it does business. The Department is working to help build a whole-of-government approach to the provis ion of security assistance, improving our defense acquisition and logistics processes to better support our perso nnel in harm’s way, strengthening our technology and industrial bases to facilitate innovation, and crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy challenges.

Given the complex security environment and the ran ge of missions, capabilities, and institutional reforms necessary to protect and advance U.S. in terests, the QDR highlights the importance of revitalizing defense relationships w ith allies and partners in key r egions. An important element of revitalizing key relationsh ips is the need to craft an approa ch to the U.S. defense posture that emphasizes cooperation with allies and partners and retailoring military forces, facilities, and defense agreements across regions.

This QDR benefited from extensive engagement w ith key stakeholders. As the QDR generated insights and interim findings, these were shared with and reviewed by a wide range of experts, both within DoD and beyond. Over the cours e of the review, QDR staff consulted with and briefed congressional staff as well as represen tatives of allied and other governments. DoD officials also engaged with their counterparts el sewhere in the U.S. government to further the kind of integrated security approaches long advocat ed by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. For example, Defense leaders and staff worked closely with the Departments of State and Homeland Security, as well as the Intelligence Community, as they undertook their Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review respectively, sharing insights regarding analysis, key missions, capabilities, an d plans in overlapping issue areas.INTRODUCTION

4 Quadrennial Defense Review Report This QDR report and the preceding months of de liberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department’s key priority object ives, providing context and recommendations regarding capability developmen t and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The QDR thus serves as a critical capstone document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America’s men and women in uniform today, and building the policy and programmatic foundation for security in the years to come.5 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## DEFENSE STRATEGY

A Complex Environment

The United States faces a series of challenges and opportunities at a time of significant change in the international system. More than eight years of war in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and against Al Qaeda and its allies have demanded sustaine d sacrifice from America’s men and women in
uniform.

In addition to ongoing conflicts, the United St ates faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the SovietUnion or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts. The rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, the spread of weapons of mass destructio n and other destructive enabling technologies, and a series of enduring and emerging trends pose profound challenges to international order.

The United States must demonstra te steadfast engagement to addre ss these global challenges and capitalize on emerging oppor tunities. We must display a continued willingness to commit substantial effort to strengthen and reform the international order and, in concert with our allies and partners abroad, engage in cooperative, purposeful action in the pursuit of common

interests.

Current Operations

The United States remains a nation at war. The outcome of today’s conflicts will directly shape the global security environment for decades to come, and prevailing in current operations constitutes the Department’s top priority.

The United States, along with our allies and partners, has renewed its efforts to help the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and
eliminate safe havens within both nations. By the end of 2010, approximately 100,000 American Soldiers from Company A, Special Troops Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, perform an air assault into a village inside the Jowlzak valley in the Parwan province of Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Scott Davis.DEFENSE STRATEGY

6 Quadrennial Defense Review Report military personnel will be fighting alongside alli ed and partner forces to deny Al Qaeda safe
haven and reverse the Taliban’s momentum. Reco gnizing that victory in Afghanistan ultimately lies with its people, U.S. and allied forces are fo cused on securing key population centers, training competent Afghan security forces, and partnering with them as they fi ght for their country’s
future.

Our efforts in Afghanistan are inextricably lin ked to our partnership with Pakistan—one based on mutual interest and respect. The United St ates is committed to strengthening Pakistan’s capacity to target those extremis ts who threaten both countries, and our military partnership is strengthened as we cooperate to eliminate terrorist safe ha vens. Though our partnership with Pakistan is focused urgently on confronting Al Qaeda and its allies, America’s interest in Pakistan’s security and pros perity will endure long af ter the campaign ends.

While the epicenter of the terrorist threat to the United States is rooted in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the war against Al Qaeda and its allies continues around the world. We have become more adept at disrupting terrorist networks; neve rtheless, our terrorist adversaries continue to learn and adapt, posing an enduring threat to th e security of America and its allies and partners. Recognizing that sustainable success requires the patie nt and persistent application of all elements of U.S. and international power, we will continue to employ military force as necessary to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies.

In Iraq, years of effort and a critical shif t toward a population-cent ered counterinsurgency strategy have helped enable the Iraqi government to take the lead in protecting its people and providing essential services. A sovereign, just, an d accountable Iraqi state capable of sustaining national unity can serve as a long-term U.S. pa rtner, and will buttress America’s strategic goals and those of its allies. As the responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presence proceeds, U.S. forces will continue to play important roles advising, training, and supporting Iraqi forces.

The demands of these ongoing operations have strained America’s Armed Forces, and many of our personnel have served multiple tours in Afgh anistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Recognizing these strains, and as described in further detail in this report, the Department ha s elevated the need to preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force in our policies, force planning, and budget priorities.

Key Geopolitical Trends
In addition to fully appreciating the influence that ongoing conflicts will have on the shape of the future security environment, the Department of Defense must remain cognizant of underlying dynamic global forces and trends that will signif icantly alter the contours of the international

system.DEFENSE STRATEGY

7 Quadrennial Defense Review Report The distribution of global political, economic, an d military power is shifting and becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will continue to reshape the inte rnational system. While the United States will remain the most powerful actor, it must increasingly cooperate with key allies and partners to build and sustain peace and security. Whether an d how rising powers fully integrate into the global system will be among this century’s defini ng questions, and are thus central to America’s

interests.

The continued growth and power of non-state actors will remain a key feature of the
environment. Globalization has transformed th e process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to develop and acquire advanced technologies. As technological innovation and gl obal information flows accele rate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence and capabilities that, during the previous century , remained largely the purview of states.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to undermine global security, complicating efforts to sustain peace an d prevent harmful arms races. Even as the United States and Russia make progress in reduci ng the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, other nations are pu rsuing nuclear weapons programs. 1 Moreover, Al Qaeda and other
terrorist networks have demonstrated an interest in WMD. Perhaps most troubling would be the instability or collapse of a WMD-a rmed state. This could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, and could quic kly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and all other nations.

A series of powerful cross-cutting trends, made more complex by the ongoing economic crisis, threatens to complicate international relations an d make the exercise of U.S. statecraft more difficult. The rising demand for resources, rapid urb anization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or
exacerbate future conflicts.

Shifting Operational Landscape
Lessons from ongoing conflicts and assessments of the likely security environment point to a challenging operational landscape for America’s A rmed Forces. Perhaps more than ever before, the United States requires joint military forces able to function and succeed across a wide geographic and operational spectrum. Moreover, military forces must be capable of working effectively with a range of civi lian and international partners.

1 The challenges associated with nuclear weapons in th e current and projected security environment are outlined in the Department’s Nu clear Posture Review.DEFENSE STRATEGY

8 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Three features of the current and expected operational landscape are most pressing.

First, the continued dominance of America’s Armed Forces in la rge-scale force-on-force warfare provides powerful incentives for adversaries to emplo y methods designed to offset our strengths. We see this dynamic at work today. From non- state actors using highly advanced military technology and sophisticated information opera tions to states employing unconventional technologies, our current adversaries have shown that they will tailor thei r strategies and employ their capabilities in sophisticated ways.

The term “hybrid” has recently been used to capt ure the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the bl urring between traditional categories of conflict.
While the existence of innovative adversaries is not new, today’s hybrid approaches demand that U.S. forces prepare for a range of conflicts. These may involve state adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts and high-end ca pabilities traditionally associated with states.

We must also anticipate the employment of ot her novel methods. Future adversaries may use surrogates including terrorist and criminal netw orks, manipulate the information environment in increasingly sophisticated ways, impede access to energy resources and markets, and exploit perceived economic and diplomatic leverage in order to complicate our calculus. Because such approaches may be difficult to detect or predict, the ability of our forces to rapidly innovate and adapt will become
even more critical.

Second, as other po wers rise and as non-state actors become more powerful, U.S. interests in, and assured access to, the global commons will take on added importance. The global commons are
domains or areas that no one state controls but on which all rely. They constitute the connective ti ssue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are contingent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea, as
well as information transmitted unde r the ocean or through space.

A series of recent trends highlight growing challenges to stability throughout the global commons—from cyberspace attacks abroad and netw ork intrusions here at home, to increased piracy, to anti-satellite weapons tests and the grow th in the number of space-faring nations, to U.S. Navy Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Athena Stovall, scans the network on her computer for intr usions during a cyber war training course at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center in Pearl City, Hawaii. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spec. 3rd Class Michael A. Lantron.DEFENSE STRATEGY

9 Quadrennial Defense Review Report the investments some nations are making in system s designed to threaten our primary means of projecting power: our bases, our sea and air a ssets, and the networks that support them.

Prudence demands that the Department prepare for possible future adversaries likely to possess and employ some degree of anti-access capability—the ability to blunt or deny U.S. power projection—across all domains. Given the prolifera tion of sophisticated weapons and technology, smaller states and some non-state actors may be able to acquire and employ longer-range and more precise weapons. Future adversaries will likely possess sophisticated capabilities designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.

Finally, the changing international environment w ill continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency an d severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states. These states are of ten catalysts for the growth of radicalism and extremism. In some cases they are nuclear- armed or are critically important to enduring
American interests. Over the course of the next seve ral decades, conflicts are at least as likely to result from state weakness as from state strength. 

### America’s Interests and the Roles of Military Power

America’s interests are inextricably linked to th e integrity and resilience of the international system. Chief among these interests are security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values, and an international order that promotes cooperative action.

Consistent with the President’s vision, the Unite d States will advance these interests by strengthening our domestic foundation and integra ting all elements of national power, engaging
abroad on the basis of mutual interest and mutua l respect, and promoting an international order that advances our interests by reinforcing the rights and responsibilities of all nations.

America has been steadfast in supporting liberty, freedom, and open access to markets and ideas. The United States can lead only when others trust it to carry forward their best interests, to listen to their concerns, and to uphold the norms and values of the international community.

The United States remains committed to exercisi ng mutual respect and leadership within the architecture of a just and effect ive international system. America’s enemies fear its ability to build consensus against tyranny. Pursuing and underw riting a strong international order is an undertaking that benefits all nations, none more than the United States. This principle will guide the Department’s interactions with the interna tional community, and it frames our approach to defending the American people and promoting their interests.

America’s interests and role in the world require Armed Forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our national interests and the common good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scaleDEFENSE STRATEGY

10 Quadrennial Defense Review Report operations over extended distances. This un ique position generates an obligation to be responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determin ation, and circumstance have provided.

The role of the Department of Defense is to fi eld, sustain, and employ the military capabilities needed to protect the United States and its allies and to advance our interests. In order to fulfill this role, the Department must continually assess how America’s Armed Forces are evolving in relation to the wartime demands of today and the expected character of future challenges.

Strong regional allies and partners are fu ndamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required.

As a global power, the United States has a broad ra nge of tools for advancing its national interests described above. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation, diplomacy, economic development and engagement, and the power of America’s ideas and values. When absolutely necessary, the United States and its allies have shown the willingness and ability to resort to force in defense of our interests and the common good.

Whenever possible, the United States will use forc e in an internationally sanctioned coalition with allies, international and regional organ izations, and like-minded nations committed to these common principles. America’s Armed Forces will retain the ability to act unilaterally and decisively when appropriate, maintaining joint, a ll-domain military capab ilities that can prevail across a wide range of contingencies.

Despite those who disregard the rules of the interna tional system, the United States must remain
a standard-bearer in the conduct of war. The United States will maintain and support international norms by upholding the Geneva Conventions and by providing detainees and prisoners of war the rights and protections a fforded to them under international law.

The evolution of modern warfar e has brought significant advance s in technology. The increasing precision, persistence, and auto nomy of unmanned systems hold great promise. As these systems grow in capability and number, we must ensure that our policies on use of force advance accordingly.

Any decision to commit U.S. forces to hostile environments should be based on a consideration of U.S. and allied interests, including treaty comm itments, and the likely costs and expected risks of military action. America’s men and women in uniform should never be put at risk absent a clear mission and a realistic and sufficiently re sourced plan to succeed. Our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen constitute o ur most critical strategic and most treasured resource. They deserve the unfli nching support of a nation that clearly understands, from theDEFENSE STRATEGY

11 Quadrennial Defense Review Report outset, why the All-Volunteer Force has been placed in harm’s way and what risks and costs come with the use of military force. 

### U.S. Defense Objectives

In order to defend and advance our national in terests, the Department of Defense must balance resources and risk among four priority objective s: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These object ives reflect a strategic approach that can evolve and adapt in response to a changing security environment.

Prevail in Today’s Wars
In today’s conflicts, as in the past, America must ensure the success of its forces in the field.

Prevailing against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan requires a comprehensive approach employing all elements of national power. Focusing our resources to protect the population of Afghanista n, our military and civilian efforts align with the following objectives:

 Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the United States, our NATO allies and contributing partners, and Afghanistan’s security forces;

 Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communication;

 Disrupting the Taliban outside secured area s and preventing Al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;

 Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF);

 Increasing the size and capability of the ANS F and employing other local forces selectively to begin transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan government by July 2011; and

 Building the capacity of the Afghan gov ernment, particularly in key ministries.

Achieving these objectives requires a renewed international and whole-of-government effort, including the commitment of an additional 52,000 Am erican military personnel to Afghanistan since January 2009 for a total U.S. force of ap proximately 100,000, with substantial increases in allied and partner commitments. The number of deployed forces and the challenging terrain make it imperative that the De partment focus on rapidly increa sing the number and quality of the key enablers—fixed- and rotary-wing lift, aerial delivery, unmanne d aerial systems, and a range of other combat support and combat servic e support assets, as these are critical to success.DEFENSE STRATEGY

12 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Prevailing in this conflict also requires focused a ttention on increasing the ability of U.S. forces to train and partner, especially in combat, with Afghan army and police forces. The next section of this report addresses these issues in detail.

In Iraq, U.S. forces are working to
transition efforts from combat to stability operations. U.S. forces will continue to implement the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement by transitioning enduring functions primarily to the Iraqi government, with some activities shifting to the U.S. Embassy and other international organizations.

Integral to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and consistent with presidential guidance, U.S. forces in Iraq continue to execute a responsible drawdown. By August 31, 2010, U.S.
forces will have transitioned from combat and counterinsurgency activities to a more limited focus on training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations, providing force protection for U.S. mi litary and civilian perso nnel and facilities, and supporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts. U.S. forces also continue to provide key enablers to the Iraqi Security Forces, who have assumed the lead for security responsibility in Iraq.

Further drawdown activity will occur in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement to redeploy all U.S. forces by December 31, 2011. The pace of the drawdown will be commensurate with Iraq's improving security while providing U.S. commanders sufficient flexibility to assist the Iraqis with emerging cha llenges. Even as U.S. forces are redeployed, the United States will continue to pursue sustained political engagement and regional diplomacy.

The continuing fight against Al Qaeda and its a llies in Afghanistan and elsewhere will demand continued vigilance and determination. Prevailing against this multifaceted enemy requires an extensive array of tools for ready and effec tive military, intellige nce, diplomatic, and law enforcement action. These capabi lities must be dedicated, re sponsive, and appropriately resourced to prevail against an adaptive adversary . The defense contribution to this effort takes two basic forms: a highly capable network of special operations and intelligence capabilities designed to seek out, identify, and eliminate Al Qaeda’s leadership, dismantle its networks, and A merican and Iraqi soldiers exit a helicopter during partnered air assault training, carried out by Iraqi commandos and scouts of 1st Iraqi Army Division and paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (Advise and Assist Brigade), at Camp Ramadi, Iraq, on Nov. 15, 2009. DoD photo by Spc. Michael J. MacLeod, U.S. Army.DEFENSE STRATEGY

13 Quadrennial Defense Review Report erode its effectiveness; and an enduring effort to build the security capacity of key partners around the world, where improved local and regional capability and capacity can reduce the size and number of Al Qaeda’s safe have ns and prevent their regeneration.

Prevent and Deter Conflict
America’s enduring effort to advance
common interests without resort to
arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the international system. Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. Such an approach also requires working closely with our allies and partners to leverage existing
alliances and create conditions to
advance common interests.

The Department defends the United States from dire ct attack, deters potential adversaries, fosters regional security, and assures access to the glob al commons by pursuing the following efforts:

 Assisting partners in developing and acquiring the capabilities and systems required to improve their sec urity capacity;

 Enhancing U.S. capabilities to train, advise, and assist partner-nation security forces and contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations;

 Maintaining awareness of the global environment to identify potential threats and emerging opportunities;

 Supporting U.S. diplomatic and development efforts to foster a range of governance efforts and to counter radicalization, includin g working with civilian a gencies on security assistance and police training programs;

 Extending a global defense posture composed of joint, ready forces forward-stationed and rotationally deployed to prevail across all do mains, prepositioned equipment and overseas facilities, and international agreements; Sgt. Eric Petersen and British Army Maj. James J.M. Driscoll, discuss operations in Garmsir City Distri ct, Helmand Province, Afghanistan during a relief-in-place. U.S. Ma rine Corps photo by Cpl Alex C. Guerra.DEFENSE STRATEGY

14 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Contributing to an appropriately sized and shap ed portfolio of homeland defense and civil support capabilities integrated with U.S. homeland security activities;

 Protecting critical DoD infrastructure, i ncluding in space and cyberspace; and

 Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at the lowest levels consistent with U.S. and allied interests as we pursue the peace and security of a world free of nuclear

weapons.
Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments will demand tailored approaches to deterrence. Such tailoring requires an in-depth understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and decision making of potential adversaries, whether they are in dividuals, networks, or states. Deterrence also depends on integrating all aspects of national power.

The United States is positioned with capabilities across all domains to deter a wide range of attacks or forms of coercion against the Unite d States and its allies. Until such time as the Administration’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved , nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on th e United States, and on our allies and partners. Deterrence also depends on land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weapon ry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challeng es posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enabled by cyberspace and space capabi lities, and enhanced by U.S. capabilities to deny adversaries’ objectives through ballistic mi ssile defense and counter-WMD, resilient infrastructure (including command and control systems), and global basing and posture. The United States is strengthening its appr oach to deterrence in multiple ways.

 The Department of Defense continues to im prove its ability to attribute WMD, space, and cyberspace attacks in order to hold aggre ssors responsible and deny them the ability to evade detection in new domains or use proxies.

 To reinforce U.S. commitments to our allies and partners, we will consult closely with them on new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued
commitment to extend our nuclear deterren t. These regional architectures and new capabilities, as detailed in the Ballistic Mi ssile Defense Review and the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.

 America’s resilience—robustness, adaptability , and capacity for rapid recovery—is an important dimension of our deterr ent posture. So too is Americ a’s ability to assist allies in responding to both attacks and natural disasters.DEFENSE STRATEGY

15 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  The United States will work with like-minded nations to foster norms regarding behavior
in domains where an attack on one nation ha s consequences for all—especially in space and cyberspace.

Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succ eed in a Wide Range of Contingencies
If deterrence fails and adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force, the United States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S. national interests.

The range of plausible future challenges is sign ificant; DoD requirements to deal with such challenges include the following:

 Defeating Al Qaeda and its allies;

 Supporting a national response to attacks on, or natural disasters in, the United States;

 Defeating aggression by adversary states, i ncluding states armed with advanced anti-access capabilities and/or nuclear weapons;

 Locating, securing, or neutralizing weapons of mass destruction, key materials, and related
facilities in the context of a loss of control of such weapons or mate rials, and thwarting the potential for a non-state adversary to acquire them;

 Supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing threats from terrorist and insurgent groups;

 Protecting American citizens in harm’s way overseas;

 Conducting effective operations in cyberspace; and

 Preventing human suffering due to mass atroc ities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.

These types of challenges are not necessarily disti nct. Indeed, our future operational environment is likely to entail complex combinations of mul tiple challenges. As described earlier, America’s potential adversaries are likely to employ a hybrid mix of approa ches and capabilities if and when they choose to oppose the United States, its allies , or its partners. As will be outlined in the next section, U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to provide the maximum possi ble versatility for the broadest plausible range of conflicts.

Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force
In order to succeed in today’s wars and prepare for the future, the Department of Defense must ensure the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force, its most precious military resource. This will require policies that sustain the rota tion base, provide care for our people—service members and their families—in peace and conflict, and adapt as required by the environment.DEFENSE STRATEGY

16 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Years of war have significantly stressed our military personnel and their families. Although a strong sense of purpose and demonstrated operational excellence are shared across all Services and ranks,
indicators of strain on the force— from retention levels in key
commissioned and noncommissioned officer ranks, to increased rates of combat stress and substance abuse, and to even more tragic outcomes
such as increased levels of suicide and
divorce—are cause for concern. Given the continuing need for substantial and sustaine d deployments in conflict zones, the Department
must do all it can to take care of our people—physically and psy chologically. The health of the All-Volunteer Force depends on substantial and enduring efforts to track and improve physical and mental health, readiness, family support, an d leader development programs across the force.

Now and for several years upon completion of oper ations we must reset equipment lost through combat and the strain of today’s wars. In many cases, this process wi ll not require wholesale replacement of our current generation of military platforms. Rather, it will necessitate more practical and efficient procurement processes an d programs and hard choices about our future capability needs. Toward this en d the Department must continue to elevate the importance of its acquisition efforts and work to reform what and how we buy. From ensuring greater responsiveness and integrity in the acquisition process, to enhancing resource allocation decisions, to improving cost an alysis and program execution, the Department will work to meet its obligation to provide our forces with the ca pabilities they need when they need them while exercising good fiscal stewardship.

For too long, the health of the All-Volunteer Forc e, the civilian workforce that supports it, and the processes by which the Department provides needed equipment and platforms have been underemphasized priorities. The prolonged wartime period since 2001 has greatly elevated their importance, and the consequences of failure have accordingly become more serious. To reflect the urgency that the Department’s leadership pl aces on these issues, the QDR has striven to include them as core components of our po licy, planning, and programming considerations. U.S. Sailors assigned to Navy Recruiting Command Great Lakes, Division 929, stand in formation for the Janesville, Wis. Memorial Day Celebration on May 25, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Mass Communication Spc. Gary Ward.17 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## REBALANCING THE FORCE

This QDR has explicitly linked force planning, which determines the overall size and capabilities of the Armed Forces, to the priori ty objectives of the defense stra tegy: prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to succeed in a wide range of contingencies, both near- and longer-term; and preserve and enhance the forc e. The QDR developed in sights regarding the ways in which the capabilities of U.S. forces should evolve by evaluating al ternative future forces in a diverse set of scenarios, which depicted a wide range of plausible challenges that might call for a response by U.S. military forces. The Department also assessed lessons learned from ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Collectively, these assessments helped inform decisions affecting capabilities in six key mission areas:

 Defend the United States and s upport civil authorities at home;

 Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;

 Build the security capacity of partner states;

 Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;

 Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and

 Operate effectively in cyberspace.

Analysis focused on identifying gaps in capabili ties and shortfalls in capacity that programmed forces might encounter in executing these missi ons over the near-term, midterm-, and longer term. Insights regarding those gaps and shortf alls helped focus efforts to improve the “fit” between programmed forces and the demands that may be placed on them in future operations. Those efforts have resulted both in specific initiatives to address gaps and shortfalls and in guidance intended to shape the evolution of the force and its capabilities over the longer term.
Some initiatives involve investme nts in new or existing systems. Others involve creating new units within the force to perform functions th at are in high demand. Still others involve adjustments to training, do ctrine, or force posture. 2 These choices require managing a degree of risk over time and across components—a later section of this report details DoD’s risk management framework.

2 By congressional direction, DoD has conducted reviews of U.S. nuclear strategy and forces, ballistic missile defense, and space assets and operatio ns in addition to the QDR. The fi ndings of these reviews are being reported separately, but key insight s were drawn on for this report.REBALANCING THE FORCE

18 Quadrennial Defense Review Report QDR analyses pointed emphatically to two overarchi ng conclusions. The first is that U.S. forces would be able to perform their missions more effectively—both in the near-term and against future adversaries—if they had more and better ke y enabling capabilities at their disposal. These enablers include rotary-wing airc raft, unmanned aircraft systems, in telligence analysis and foreign language expertise, and tactical communications networks for ongoing operations, as well as more robust space-based assets, more effective electronic attack systems, more resilient base infrastructure, and other assets essential for effe ctive operations against future adversaries.

The second theme to emerge from QDR analyses is the importance of ensuring that U.S. forces are flexible and adaptable so that they can confron t the full range of challenges that could emerge from a complex and dynamic security environmen t. Together, these insights helped inform the Department’s leaders as they made choices regarding the evolution of the force.

The remainder of this section provides an ov erview of initiatives emerging from the QDR. They are grouped according to the six mission area s listed above. As they reach fruition, these
initiatives will accelerate the evolution of ou r Armed Forces toward a mix of activities and capabilities better suited to the demands of the em erging security environment. Even so, many of these steps should be regarded as down payments that will be followed by further reforms and rebalancing actions that will continue beyond the current FYDP. 

### Defend the United States and Support Civil Authorities at Home

The first responsibility of any government and its defense establishment is to protect the lives and safety of its people. Because th e United States benefits from favorable geography and continental size, direct attacks against the country itself ha ve been rare throughout our history. However,
events since the terroris t attacks of September 11, 2001, remind us that the rapid proliferation of destructive technologies, combined with potent ideologies of violent extremism, portends a future in which all governments will have to main tain a high level of vigilance against terrorist threats. Moreover, state adversaries are acquiring ne w means to strike targets at greater distances from their borders and with greater lethality. Fi nally, the United States must also be prepared to respond to the full range of potential natural disasters.

The experiences of the past several years have deep ened the realization that state- and non-state adversaries alike may seek to attack military and civilian targets within the United States. Protecting the nation and its people from such threats requires close synchronization between civilian and military efforts . Although many efforts to protect the United States are led by other federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the role of the Department of Defense in defending the nation agai nst direct attack and in providing support to civil authorities, potentially in response to a ve ry significant or even catastrophic event, has steadily gained prominence.REBALANCING THE FORCE

19 Quadrennial Defense Review Report When responding to an event within the United States, the Department of Defense will almost always be in a supporting role. DoD can receive re quests to provide federal assistance through two avenues: first, through DHS as the lead fe deral agency, or second, through a governor’s request under U.S. Code Title 32 authorities.

To ensure that the Department of Defense is prepared to provide appropriate support to civil authorities, the QDR examined the sufficiency of the programmed fo rce and sought to identify capability enhancements that were of highest priority fo r the future. Key initia tives resulting from
this assessment include efforts to:

 Field faster, more flexi ble consequence management response forces. The Department has gained important experience and learned va luable lessons from its efforts to field specialized consequence management response fo rces for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives events (CBRNE). Given the potential for surprise attacks within the United States, the Departm ent will begin reorganizing these forces to enhance their lifesaving capabili ties, maximize their flexibility, and reduce their response times. First, the Department will begin restructuring the original CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), to increa se its ability to respond more rapidly to an event here at home. To address the poten tial for multiple , simultaneous disasters, the second and third CCMRFs will be replaced with smaller units focused on providing command and control and communications capabilities for Title 10 follow-on forces. Complementing the evolution of the first CCM RF, the Department also will draw on existing National Guard forces to build a Hom eland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. These ten HRFs will provide a regional response capability; focu s on planning, training and exercising; and forge strong links between the federal le vel and state and local authorities.

 Enhance capabilities for domain awareness. The Department of Defense and its interagency partners must be able to more comprehensively monitor the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential direct threats to the United States. Such monitoring provides the U.S. homeland with an extended, layered in depth defense. This
effort includes enhanced coordi nation with Canada for the defense of North America as well as assisting Mexico and Caribbean partner s in developing air and maritime domain awareness capacities. Special attention is req uired to develop domain awareness tools for the Arctic approaches as well. In coordinatio n with domestic and international partners, DoD will explore technologies that have the potential to detect, track, and identify threats in these spheres to ensure that capabilities can be deployed to counter them in a timely fashion. For example, the Department is working with DHS and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) through a joint technology ca pability demonstration program to explore new technologies to assist in the detection of tunnels. Thi s technology can support U.S.REBALANCING THE FORCE

20 Quadrennial Defense Review Report authorities conducting domestic missions and also help meet the needs of forces operating

overseas.

 Accelerate the development of standoff radi ological/nuclear detection capabilities. DoD will improve its ability to detect radiological and nuclear material and weapons at a distance. Developing and fielding these sens ors will make possible more effective widearea surveillance in the maritime and air a pproaches to the United States, and will help address the challenge of locating and securin g nuclear weapons and materials during overseas contingencies.

 Enhance domestic counter-IED capabilities. To better prepare the Department to support civil authorities seeking to counter potential threats from domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs), DoD will assist c ivil authorities with counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and capab ilities developed in recent operations. 

### Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations

The wars we are fighting today and assessment s of the future security environment together
demand that the United States retain and enha nce a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN), stab ility, and counterterrorism (CT) operations in environments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega-cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral regions. In some cases, it may be in the U.S. interest to help strengthen weak states, including those faci ng homegrown insurgencies and transnational
terrorist and criminal networks or those that ha ve been weakened by humanitarian disasters. Moreover, there are few cases in which the U.S. Armed Forces would engage in sustained largescale combat operations without th e associated need to assist in the transition to just and stable governance. Accordingly, the U.S. Armed Forces w ill continue to require ca pabilities to create a secure environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in providing essential governm ent services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and supplying humanitarian relief.

In order to ensure that America’s Armed Fo rces are prepared for these complex and taxing missions, it is vital that the lessons from today’s conflicts be further inst itutionalized in military doctrine, training, capability de velopment, and operational plannin g. Stability operations, largescale counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism op erations are not nich e challenges or the responsibility of a single Military Department, but rather require a po rtfolio of capabilities as well as sufficient capacity from ac ross America’s Armed Forces and other departments and agencies. Nor are these types of operat ions a transitory or anomalous phenomenon in the security landscape. On the contrary, we must expect th at for the indefinite future, violent extremist groups, with or without state sponsorship, will co ntinue to foment instability and challenge U.S. and allied interests. Our enemies are adaptive and will develop systems and tactics that exploitREBALANCING THE FORCE

21 Quadrennial Defense Review Report our vulnerabilities. For example, IEDs have b een used effectively against U.S. and other counterinsurgency forces and have become the we apon of choice of some enemies. We must assume that the IED threat will evolve and pe rsist even as better countermeasures are developed.

Since 2001, U.S. forces have become far more pro ficient in operations against insurgents and terrorist groups and in helping partners to provide security to populations threatened by such groups. U.S. forces will need to maintain a hi gh level of competency in this mission area for decades to come. Accordingly, the Department is continuing to grow capabilities for critical counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrori sm operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. To institutionalize the lessons lear ned over these years, DoD has made and will continue to make substantial changes to pers onnel management practices, professional military education and training programs, an d career development pathways.

Operational innovation and adaptability have al ways been hallmarks of the American Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Coast Guardsman. O ur experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere has tested our forces and they are again proving their mettle. The Department and supporting defense industry must continue to adapt, accommodating both longer timelines for operations and engagements, and shorter ones for fielding new tactics and capabilities against highly adaptive adversaries. They must be as re sponsive, flexible, and mission-focused as the forces they are supporting.

The QDR has placed special emphasis on ensuring that the men and women fighting today’s conflicts have the tools and resources they n eed to succeed. Accordingly, The Secretary has
directed that investments be increased in certain capabilities that have been in consistently in high demand and have proven to be key enablers of tactical and operational success. Successful COIN, stability, and CT operations are necessarily the products of strategies that orchestrate the activities of military and c ivilian agencies, as well as those of indigenous governments and partner states. Enhancements to the capabilities and capac ity of the U.S. Armed Forces, then, are being pursued in the context of continued growth in the capabilities of other U.S. agencies and in the contributions of allied and partner governments.

Chief among these enhancements are the following:

 Increase the availability of rotary-wing

assets. Vertical lift has been indispensable to successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As operations in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan grow U.S. Army Spc. Justin Slagle returns to Forward Operating Base Lane in a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter after an air assault mission in the Zabul province of Afghanistan, Oct. 15, 2009. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Tia P. Sokimson.REBALANCING THE FORCE

22 Quadrennial Defense Review Report in scope and intensity, more rotary-wing lift capacity will be ne eded to ensure that coalition and Afghan forces can be transport ed and resupplied at remote outposts and effectively cover their areas of responsibili ty. Demand for these capabilities will remain high in the future as distributed U.S. fo rces conduct CT, COIN, and foreign internal defense operations elsewhere. Among other st eps, the Army and U.S. Special Operations Command will add a company of upgraded cargo helicopters (MH-47G) to the Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment. In a ddition, the general purpose forces will take steps, including the expansion of pilot training, to make selected vertical lift assets more readily accessible to forces in forward theate rs of operations. The Na vy, for example, will dedicate two helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval special warfare units. For its part, the Army will reorganize remaining separate Active Component formations to form an additional (12th) Active Component combat aviation brigade, and will create a 13th Active Component combat aviation brigade to help meet global demand for these assets.

 Expand manned and unmanned aircraft system s (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Long-dwell UASs, such as the Predator, Reaper, and other systems, have proven to be invaluable for monitoring activities in contested areas, enhancing situational awareness, protecting our forces, and assisting in targeting enemy fighters. In FY 2010, the Department made a commitment to grow to a capacity of
50 sustained orbits of Predator/Reaper by FY 2011. The
Air Force is on track to achieve this goal and will continue to expand the force to 65 orbits by FY 2015. The Army is expanding all classes of UASs, including the accelerated production of the Predator-class Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAS. The Navy is introducing sea-based UASs. And DoD is exploring ways to enhance the effectiveness of its fleet of ISR aircraft by developing innovative sensor technologies, support infrastructures, an d operating concepts.

 Expand intelligence, analysis, and targeting capacity. Forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have developed new and more effect ive means for rapidly processing, exploiting, and fusing information from a wide array of sources and disseminating this information to U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Stephanie Hughes, an M Q

-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle weapons loader assigned to the 432nd A ircraft Maintenance Squadron, reviews loading procedures during weapons loading traini ng at Creech Air Force Base, Nev., April 22, 2009. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Larry E. Reid Jr.REBALANCING THE FORCE

23 Quadrennial Defense Review Report operators at the tactical level. We have also learned that information sharing with allied and partner forces can be cri tical to success. These approaches have yielded significant improvements in our ability to understand ins urgent and terrorist networks and to target key elements. The Department is adding trained manpower and critical supporting systems, including communications architect ures, to support these approaches and to match planned increases in co llection capacity. The added ca pabilities will support both special operations forces and general purpose forces and will enhance the effectiveness and precision of counterinsurgency oper ations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 Improve counter-IED capabilities. The Department will continue to place great emphasis on defeating the evolving threat of IEDs. Doing so necessitates a multipronged approach that includes synchronizing counte r-IED efforts Department wide, providing specialized training, attacking the networks that make and deploy IEDs, and defeating
the devices themselves. Airborne electronic warfare (EW) assets in particular have been in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan in the fight against IEDs and will be valuable in
future conflict environments as well. In order to increase coverage over these battlefields,
the Air Force will continue to
field additional EW capabilities, which will include fielding one additional
C-130 aircraft outfitted in the EW configuration; the Navywill procure additional E/A18Gs; and the Marine Corps
will extend the service lives of
EA-6B EW aircraft. In addition, many of the
enhancements listed previously, especially in ISR and intelligence analysis, will contribute to our forces’ ability
to counter IED networks.

 Expand and modernize the AC-130 fleet. AC-130 gunships have been invaluable in supporting operations against insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. These units have therefore been in heavy dema nd even as a portion of the fleet approached the end of its service life. Beginning in FY 2012 the Air Force will convert 16 new C-130J aircraft to the gunship configuration; older model AC-130s will be retired. These changes will simultaneously modernize the fleet and enla rge it from 25 to a total of 33 aircraft. U.S. Air Force crew chief Airman 1st Class Raheem Crockett guides a mine-resistant ambush protected ve hicle as it’s loaded onto a C-17 Globemaster III in Iraq, Dec. 1, 2009. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Tony R. Ritter.REBALANCING THE FORCE

24 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Increase key enabling assets for SOF. As the Department continues to expand special operations forces, the QDR recognized the need to invest in enabling capabilities commensurate with programmed growth. Spec ial operations forces require general purpose enablers to meet increasing demand for special operations and to maximize their operational effectiveness. As noted above, the Department is replacing and modernizing the gunship inventory to provid e close air support and force protection. Additionally, the Department is increasing the number of organic combat support and combat service support assets available to both Army and Na val special operations forces units. These assets include logisticians, communications a ssets, information support specialists, forensic analysts, and intelligence experts.

 Increase COIN, stability operations, and CT competency and capacity in general purpose forces. Our assessment of security trends points clearly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility to operate among diverse populations, with a wide range of partners, and in a variety of operating environments. By FY 2013 the Army will conv ert a heavy brigade combat team (BCT) to the Stryker configuration. As resources be come available and future global demands become clearer, the Department may convert several more BCTs. Our assessment of the future operating environment also suggests that increasing capacity for maritime operations in coastal and riverine environmen ts will be appropriate. Therefore, beginning in FY 2011, the Navy will add a fourth riveri ne squadron to its force structure and will invest in service life extension programs for its coastal patrol craft.

 Expand civil affairs capacity. Ineffective governance can create areas that terrorists and insurgents can exploit. Circumstances are ripe for violent ideologies to spread among a population when governments st ruggle to provide basic services, justice and security, or
the conditions for economic opportunity. Civil affairs forces address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public
education and information. Because of their linguistic and U.S. Navy Lt. Rasha Hanna, a dent al officer from Steubenville, O h io, interacts with Iraqi chi ldren during a Female Ci vil Affairs Mission to a school in Abu Tiban, Iraq. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. Kevin W. Williams.REBALANCING THE FORCE

25 Quadrennial Defense Review Report cultural skills, civil affairs pers onnel often serve as liaisons to reduce friction between our military forces and the civilia n population. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed high demands on existing civil affairs forces, which were he avily concentrated in the Reserve Component. The Department has begun to readjust that balance. The FY 2010 budget invested in the first active duty civil affairs brigade to support general purpose forces. The Army will continue to in crease civil affairs capacity organic to USSOCOM. The Department is also explorin g ways to better integrate civil affairs functions with complementary stability operat ions activities, such as those of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Human Terrain Teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently launched an initiative to develop and deploy a cadre of regionally aligned experts proficient in COIN doctrin e and relevant language skills, and also culturally attuned to the Afghanistan-Pakistan r egion. These skills are essential to effective intelligence gathering, engagement, and communication, and hence are central to the success of our overall strategy. Language training is the cornerstone of this program and by January 2010, several hundred students will ha ve received language instruction in Dari
and Pashto. These numbers will continue to grow. To gain maximum value from the Department's investment in training this cadre of military and civilian personnel, participants will rotate between U.S.- and theater-based key staff and leadership positions to provide necessary expertise in suppo rt of U.S. operations in the region.

 Strengthen key supporting capabili ties for strategic communication. As part of the U.S. government's integrated civilian-military efforts to interact effectively with a variety of audiences and stakeholders, DoD will continue to improve key capabilities that support strategic communication. Effective strategic communication requires close collaboration across interagency lines at all stages, an d DoD works particularly closely with the Department of State to support State’s co re role in communicating with foreign governments and international publics. Effe ctive strategic commun ication also requires the orchestration of multiple lines of operation. Chief among these are policy implementation, force employment, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and public diplomacy and engagement. Together , the effects of these activities support national objectives. Strategic communicatio n is essential in COIN, CT, and stability operations, where population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success, and where adversaries often enjoy the advantage of greater local knowledge and calibrate their activities to achieve sophisticated information objectives. Elsewhere in this report, we have noted a number of current Department initiatives to improve language and cultural capabilities and to increase educ ational and training programs that prepare our people to work in and among foreign populations. We see these efforts as among theREBALANCING THE FORCE

26 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Department's most important investment s in support of effective strategic

communication.

The President's forthcoming report to Con gress on U.S. government strategic
communication will outline a common vision of interagency collaboration in this area and define the Administration’s position on this i ssue. At DoD, we will examine capabilities to better access and produce knowledge on complex social communication systems and on the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of populations and stakeh olders. We will also assess our current understanding of the direct and ind irect effects of potential actions and signals on perceptions, attitudes and beliefs, and we will formulate and deliver timely and culturally attuned messages. Fi nally, we will ensure that we can shape and coordinate the
activities of our forces in s upport of our over all strategy.

In addition to bolstering the Armed Forces’ ability to conduct COIN, stability, and CT operations, these investments will improve capacity for peacekeeping operations. These
investments will also facilitate unconventional warfare operations or conventional military operations against state or non-state adversaries. 

### Build the Security Capacity of Partner States

Since the United States assumed the role of a le ading security provider after the end of World War II, DoD has worked actively to build the defens e capacity of allied and partner states. Doing so has also given the U.S. Armed Forces oppo rtunities to train with and learn from their counterparts. These efforts further the U.S. ob jective of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order. Security cooperation activiti es include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) an d financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at profe ssional military schools, techni cal exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In today’s complex and interdependent security environment, these dimens ions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important. U.S. forces, therefore, wi ll continue to treat the building of partners’ security capacity as an incr easingly important mission.

Within the range of security cooperation activiti es, the most dynamic in the coming years will be security force assistance (SFA) missions: “h ands on” efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protec ting their resources and territories. In order to ensure that improvements in partn er security forces are sustained, the Department must seek to enhance the capabilities and capacity of security institutions, such as defense ministries, that support fielded forces.REBALANCING THE FORCE

27 Quadrennial Defense Review Report As we place greater emphasis on building the capac ity of our partners, our efforts will continue to be informed by our long-term determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is manifested in human rights vetting and other co ntrols that shape our efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist foreign forces and partner secu rity institutions. America’ s efforts to build the capacity of our partners wi ll always be defined by support for healthy civil-milita ry relations, respect for human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of international humanitarian law, and the professionalization of partner military forces.

These SFA activities can help enable host-country participation in coalition stability operations and multilateral peacekeeping operations that improve regional security. Working in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies and allied military forces to strengthen the security institutions of partner nations will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts to defeat terrorist groups around the world.

Terrorist groups seek to ev ade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and undergoverned areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied interests. Where appropriate, U.S. forces will work with the military forces of partner nations to strengthen their capacity fo r internal security, and will
coordinate those activities with those of othe r U.S. government agencies as they work to strengthen civilian capacities, th us denying terrorists and insurgents safe havens. For reasons of political legitimacy as well as sh eer economic necessity, there is no substitute for professional, motivated local security forces pro tecting populations threatened by insurgents and terrorists in
their midst.

U.S. forces have been training, advising, and assi sting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they can more effectively uphold the rule of law and control and defend their territories against
violent non-state actors. In these contested en vironments, partnered COIN, in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces , is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat operations against insu rgents. These partnered host-nation units have the advantage of knowing the terrain, language, an d local culture. Partnering with U.S. forces in return allows them to train and learn by doing. Capt. Commander Laurentiu Chirita, left, with the Romanian Ministry of Defense, receives a preflight briefing from U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Scott Bridgers, the safety officer of the 169th Fighter Wing, South Carolina Air National Guard, before an orientation flight at the M

cEntire Joint National Guard Base (JNGB), S.C. Aug. 18, 2008. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Master Sgt. Edward E. SnyderREBALANCING THE FORCE

28 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale counteri nsurgency campaigns. By emphasizing host-nation leadership and employing modest numbers of U. S. forces, the United States can sometimes obviate the need for larger-scale counterinsu rgency campaigns. For ex ample, since 2002 U.S.
forces have trained and advised elements of th e Philippine armed forces working to secure areas of the southern Philippines that had been a haven for the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization and other terrorist elements. Over the past eight ye ars, U.S. forces and their Philippine counterparts have trained together and worked to understand the organization and modus operandi of the adversary. As their equipment and skills have impr oved, Philippine forces have patrolled more widely and more frequently, bringing se curity to previously contested areas.

This model is being applied elsewhere to good ef fect. U.S. forces are working in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Colombia, and elsewhere to provide training, equipment, and advice to their host-country counterparts on how to better seek out and dismantle terrorist and insurgent networks while providing security to populations that have been intimidated by violent elements in their midst. For example, over the past ten years, U.S. advisors have helped Colombia to enhance its land, air, and maritime capabilities and improve the professionalism of its security forces. The results of these efforts, when co mbined with U.S. economic and governance assistance, have included the demobilization of some 50,000 members of illegal armed groups
and a dramatic reduction in terrorist incident s since 2002. Around the world, the United States Coast Guard also deploys international training teams to partner nations, providing technical training and consulting services in maritime law enforcement, marine safety and environmental protection, small boat operations and mainte nance, search and rescue, port security, and infrastructure development.

Many governments facing active or latent threat s from violent extremist groups would welcome tailored advisory assistance from the United States . As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and make progress toward building stability in Afghanistan, mo re capacity will be available for training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces in other parts of the globe. In some countries, the United States will provide this training directly. In others, it will facilitate cooperation among regional partners and international organizations. A lthough special operations forces will be able to meet some of this demand, es pecially in politically sensitive situations, U.S. general purpose forces will need to be engaged in these efforts as well. The deploying unit s will require specialized training and preparation for these operations.

Key QDR initiatives to support this missi on area include the following:

 Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabi lities for security force

assistance. All four Services provide specialized tra ining to individuals and groups deploying abroad to train and advise the security forces of partner na tions. In anticipationREBALANCING THE FORCE

29 Quadrennial Defense Review Report of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. defense strat egy and operations, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps wi ll add more than 500 personnel to their train-the-trainer units for general purpose fo rces. The Air Force will also expand its regionally oriented contingency response gro ups (CRGs). The intentio n is for these units to steadily grow to the point at which the ir staffs can sustain specialized expertise in regions and countries of greatest importance and regularly detach experts to accompany units deploying to training missions abroad. In addition, the Air Force will field light mobility and light attack aircra ft in general purpose force units in order to increase their ability to work effectively with a wider range of partner air forces. Finally, the investments in airborne ISR and in green and brown wate r maritime capacity described above will also contribute to U.S. capacity for security force assistance missions.

 Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability. Operating in partnership with hostnation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign language skills and regional and cultural knowledge. Today’s operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change. For these reasons, the Department is investing $33 million in expanded language training centers to fund ten language train ing detachments to support general purpose forces in ongoing operations. The Departme nt is also adding $14 million for language, regional expertise, and culture training for special operations forces. Beginning in FY 2011, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center will increase the capacity of its Foreign Language Immersion Program. The Department will continue to adapt existing language programs and policies, and, through such programs as the Minerva Initiative, to develop the intellectual capital necessary to meet the challenges of operating in a changing and complex environment. The Department will also continue to refine its processes for generating requirements, managing existing resources, providing stra tegic direction and setting priorities, and resourcing language and regional expertise needs. As forces draw down from Iraq and, later, Afghanistan, the Military Departments will regionally align some portion of their U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Patrick Kelly (left), with India Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, uses an interpreter to speak with Afghan men during a patrol through the village of Sahtut, Afghanistan, on Dec. 25, 2009. DoD photo by Lance Cpl. Chad J. Pulliam, U.S. Marine Corps.REBALANCING THE FORCE

30 Quadrennial Defense Review Report general purpose forces, including those cond ucting security force assistance, to take advantage of investments in foreign langua ge training and regional knowledge.

 Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces. Today, the Department meets only half of the current de mand for training partner aviation forces. In order to address this persistent shortfall, st arting in FY 2012, DoD will double its current capacity to provide such training. This enha ncement will include the purchase of light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force’ s 6th Special Operations Squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces such airc raft might be appropriate. Also in FY 2012, two non-U.S. helicopters will be acquired to support the unit’s activities. Providing training to partner aviation forces is an ar ea that QDR analysis suggests will continue to grow. Toward that end, the Department will al so seek authorities and resources to enable the Army to sustain and expand its ability to train partner fo rces to operate and maintain helicopters used by partner states.

 Strengthen capacities for mi nisterial-level training. As noted above, the Department recognizes that in order to ensure that enhancements developed among security forces are sustained, the supporting institutions in partn er nations must also function effectively. This ministerial training mission is being co nducted in Iraq and Afghanistan today by military officers, contractors, and members of the Department’s Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW). In FY 2010, the Department launched two formal programs, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DI RI) and the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MODA) program, to strengthen U.S. defens e reform efforts in key countries and improve the preparation of DoD civilian advisors for such missions. The Department anticipates that the CEW, DIRI, and MODA programs will continue to develop and expand in support of both whole-of-gover nment approaches and broad U.S. government objectives in reforming the security sector.

 Create mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel. SFA missions in recent years have repeatedly encountered de lays in transferring cr itical end items to partner state forces that were ready to employ them. The De partment is exploring options for expediting the acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces.

 Strengthen capacities for trai ning regional and international security organizations. The Department will improve its capacity for enabling the United Nations and other multinational peacekeeping efforts, from the training and equipping of soldiers and police in their home countries to their deployment/employment and sustainment as peacekeepers. In addition to undertaking bilate ral activities designed to boost contributing nation capacity, the Department will work to en hance the capacity of United Nations and regional organizations’ peacekeeping field operations.REBALANCING THE FORCE

31 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

### Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments

U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend agains t, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions. Anti-access strategi es seek to deny outsid e countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant U.S. capabilities to project power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnership s could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasi ng the possibility of conflict.

In the future, U.S. forces co nducting power projection opera tions abroad will face myriad challenges. States with the means to do so are acquiring a wide range of sophisticated weapons and supporting capabilities that, in combinatio n, can support anti-acce ss strategies aimed at impeding the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and blunting the operations of those forces that do deploy forward.

North Korea and Iran, as part of their defiance of international norms, are actively testing and fielding new ballistic missile systems. Many of th ese systems are more accurate and have greater ranges than the Scud-class missiles used by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. As the inventories and capabilities of such systems continue to grow, U.S. forces deployed forward will no longer enjoy the relative sanctuary that they have had in conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Air bases, ports of debarkation, logistics hubs, command cent ers, and other assets essential to high-tempo military operations co uld be at risk.

As part of its long-term, comprehensive military mo dernization, China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballisti c and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly ca pable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities , advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs, raising a numb er of legitimate questions regarding its longterm intentions.

U.S. power projection forces also confront growing threats in other domains. In recent years, a number of states have acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles, quiet submarines, advanced mines, and other systems that threaten naval oper ations. In addition to these weapons, Iran has fielded large numbers of small, fast attack craft designed to support “swarming” tactics that seek to overwhelm the layers of defenses deploye d by U.S. and other nations’ naval vessels.

U.S. air forces in future conflicts will enco unter integrated air defenses of far greater sophistication and lethality than those fielde d by adversaries of the 1990s. Proliferation of modern surface-to-air missile systems by Russia an d others will pose grow ing challenges for U.S.REBALANCING THE FORCE

32 Quadrennial Defense Review Report military operations worldwide. Several states have the capability to disrupt or destroy satellites that provide surveillance, communications, po sitioning, and other functions important to military operations. And non-state actors such as Hezbollah have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles and man-portable air defense systems from Iran.

Because of their extreme lethality and long-term effects, nuclear weapons are a source of special concern, both for the United States and for its allies and partners in regions where adversary states possess or seek such weapons. If regional adversaries succeed in fielding even small arsenals of nuclear weapons, the security dynamics of key regions could be severely complicated. Even as we strive to prevent proliferation, we must take steps to hedge against its possibility. Accordingly, DoD will continue to enhance U.S. capabilities for deterring and preventing the use of nuclear weapons and their means of deliv ery. In addition, the United States, its allies, and its partners will undertake consultations on policies and postures to prevent proliferation and credibly deter aggression.

DoD is taking steps to ensure that future U.S. fo rces remain capable of protecting the nation and its allies in the face of this dynamic threat en vironment. In addition to ongoing modernization efforts, this QDR has directed the following further enhancements to U.S. forces and capabilities: 3

 Develop a joint air-sea battle concept. The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concep t for defeating adversaries ac ross the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land , space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power pr ojection operations.

 Expand future long-range strike capabilities. Enhanced long-range strike capabilities are one means of countering growing threats to forward-deployed forces and bases and ensuring U.S. power projection capabilities. Building on insights developed during the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordere d a follow-on study to determine what

3 The Nuclear, Space, and Ballistic Mi ssile Defense reviews have develope d additional initiatives to enhance capabilities relevant to meeting these challenges. Those in itiatives are described in these respective reports. The Missile Defense Agency is examining the utility of airborne infrared sensors mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles to detect an d track ballistic missiles.REBALANCING THE FORCE

33 Quadrennial Defense Review Report combination of joint persistent surveilla nce, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best support U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades. Findings from that study will inform decisions that shape th e FY 2012-17 defense program. A number of related efforts are underway. The Navy is in vestigating options for expanding the capacity of future Virginia-class attack submarines for lo ng-range strike. It is also slated to conduct field experiments with prototy pe versions of a naval unmanned combat aerial system (N-UCAS). The N-UCAS offers the potential to greatly increase the range of ISR and strike operations from the Navy’s carrier fl eet. The Air Force is reviewing options for fielding survivable, long-range surveillance an d strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize the bomber force. The Navy and the Air Force are cooperatively assessing alternatives for a new joint cruis e missile. The Department also plans to experiment with conventional prom pt global strike prototypes.

 Exploit advantages in subsurface operations. The Navy is increasing funding for the development of an unmanned underwater vehicle that will be capable of a wide range of
tasks.

 Increase the resiliency of U.S. forwar d posture and base infrastructure. In key regions,
U.S. forces will need to have access to ne tworks of bases and supporting infrastructures that are more resilient than today’s in the face of attacks by a variety of means. The Department is studying options to increase the resiliency of bases in selected theaters and
will consult with allies and fund these as promising initiatives are identified through analysis. Appropriate steps will vary by region but will generally involve combinations of measures, including hardening key facilities against attack, redundancy and dispersal concepts, counterintelligence, and active defe nses, complemented by long-range platforms for ISR and strike operations.

 Assure access to space and the use of space assets. The Department, through the implementation of priorities fr om the Space Posture Review, wi ll explore opportunities to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground infrastructure. The Department will broaden and d eepen relationships with other nations and private firms to create mutually beneficial partnerships to share capabilities, systems, technology, and personnel, while ensuring that we also protect sensitive sources and methods. Working both bilaterally and multilate rally, the Department will promote spaceflight safety. Air Force investments in space situational awaren ess will support U.S. efforts by enhancing the ability to attribute actions in space and ga in greater understanding of events in space. Ongoing implementation of the 2008 Space Prot ection Strategy will reduce vulnerabilitiesREBALANCING THE FORCE

34 Quadrennial Defense Review Report of space systems, and fielding capabilities for rapid augmentation and reconstitution of space capabilities will enhance the overa ll resiliency of space architectures.

 Enhance the robustness of key C4ISR capabilities. In concert with improving the survivability of space systems and infrastructure , U.S. forces will require more robust and capable airborne and surface-based systems to provide critical wa rtime support functions. In particular, airborne ISR assets must be m ade more survivable in order to support operations in heavily defended airspace. The Department is also exploring options for expanding jam-resistant satellite communicat ions and for augmenting these links with long-endurance aerial vehicles that can serve as airborne communications relay platforms.

 Defeat enemy sensor and engagement systems. In order to counter the spread of advanced surveillance, air defense, and strike systems, the Department has directed increased investments in selected capabilities for electronic attack.

 Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad. In consultation with allies, the Department is examin ing options for deploying and sustaining selected forces in regions facing new challenges. For example, selectively homeporting additional naval forces forward could be a cost-effective means to strengthen deterrence and expand opportunities for maritime security cooperatio n with partner navies. The Department will conduct regional and global reviews of U.S. defense posture to identify key posture priorities that require consultation with allies and constituents. 

### Prevent Proliferation and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological , and radiological capabilities among state and non-state actors can threaten our ability to defend U.S. and allied interests, promote peace and security, ensure regional stability, and protect our citizens. Further , the use of a nuclear weapon or a biological attack would have global ramifi cations. Preventing the proliferation and use of such weapons is therefore a top national priority for which many federal ag encies have important responsibilities. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdic t, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterrence of such threats and defense against th em can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, sec uring and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, monitoring and tracking lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.REBALANCING THE FORCE

35 Quadrennial Defense Review Report For these reasons, the Department will expand capabilities to counter WMD threats, strengthen interdiction operations, refocus intelligence requirements,
enhance and extend international partnerships to thwart proliferation, and support cooperative threat reduction efforts, such as the
Administration’s new
international initiative to secure
all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide. In addition, to deter adversaries considering the use of chemical or biological weapons, the Department will enhance efforts to develop counte rmeasures, defenses, an d mitigation strategies.

Further, the Department must prepare to contain WMD threats emanating from fragile states and ungoverned spaces. Success in this area will hinge on the ability to prevent and respond to global WMD crises, such as situations in which re sponsible state control of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials is not guaranteed. Faced w ith such emergencies, the Department will require the ability to locate and secure WMD and WMD-related components, as well as interdict them on land, on sea, or in the air.

Geographic containment of areas of concern will be necessary to ensure that WMD and related
materials do not fall into the hands of hostile actors—a concept of operations that will involve U.S. forces, interagency capabilities, and the coop eration of regional powers and coalition forces. Effectively responding to WMD-armed threats will require an integrated, layered defense network in multiple geographic environments. This could include areas inside the state of concern, along the state’s borders, in global tran sshipment lanes, in the approaches to the United States, and in the United States itself. Such an integrated, layered defense is essential to preventing an attack before it occurs, as well as re sponding to an attack should prevention fail. In addition, these preparations can help deny state and non-state adversaries the benefits they seek through actual or threatened use of WMD by raising the costs and risks of such an attack.

Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the following initiatives be
undertaken: M embers of a joint U.S. and Australi an navy boarding team conduct a security sweep aboard USNS Walter S. Diehl (T- A O 193), Oct. 29,
2 009, during a boarding exercise in the South China Sea as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI ) exercise Deep Sabre II. DoD photo by Communication Spc. 2nd Class Seth Clarke, U.S. Navy.REBALANCING THE FORCE

36 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters. In order to better plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operatio ns, the Department is establishing a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headqua rters with increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, an d coordination capabilities.

 Research countermeasures and d efenses to non-traditional agents. The globalization of the world’s chemical industry, coupled with scien tific breakthroughs, increases the possibility of non-traditional chemical agents being used against U.S. and allied forces. The Department, with interagency partners, is increasing the resources for research and development of technologies to meet and defeat these emerging threats.

 Enhance nuclear forensics. Improving our ability to attrib ute nuclear threats to their source can help deter aggressors from considering the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter state and non-state actors that may pro vide direct or indirect support of nuclear terrorism and prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification and apprehension of an attacker. Research is un derway to identify new means by which we can arrive more quickly at reliable technical nuclea r forensic assessments. Improving the ability
to determine the source of material used in a nuclear attack will s trengthen deterrence.
Additional resources will enhance DoD’s air and ground sample collection mission as well as augmenting current laboratory assessment ca pabilities. In this regard, the Department is examining new platforms for conducting nucl ear/radiological air and ground sampling.

 Secure vulnerable nuclear materials. Preventing a radiological or nuclear attack by a terrorist organization begins by ensuring the security of all weapons-usable material at the source and promoting stringent nuclear security practices for both civilian and defense facilities across the globe. In support of th e President’s Global Lockdown Initiative, DoD is working with interagency partners to identi fy countries that could benefit from site upgrades, security training facilities, and th e disposition of weapons-grade materials.

 Expand the biological threat reduction program. Countries that have the infrastructure and capability to report and track the spread of an outbreak of disease are able to save more lives. Detecting, diagnosing, and determ ining the origin of a pathogen will enable U.S. authorities to better respond to future disease outbreaks and identify whether they are natural or man-made. Accordingly, we are expanding the biological threat reduction program to countries outside the former Soviet Union in order to create a global network for surveillance and response.

 Develop new verification technologies. In order to support a robust arms control, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation a genda, new technologies for verification and monitoring will be necessary to ensure full co mpliance from all parties. DoD is developingREBALANCING THE FORCE

37 Quadrennial Defense Review Report new initiatives to build the specialized te chnological solutions n eeded to support these
efforts. 

### Operate Effectively in Cyberspace

Our assessments of conflict scenarios involving state adversaries pointed to the need for improved capabilities to counter threats in cyberspace —a global domain within the information environment that encompasses the interdepende nt networks of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet and te lecommunication networks. Although it is a manmade domain, cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space. 4 There is no exaggerat ing our dependence on DoD’s information networks for command and control of our forces, the intelligence and logistics on which they depend, and the weapons technologies we develop and field. In the 21st century, modern armed forces simply cannot cond uct high-tempo, effective operations without resilient, reliable information and communicatio n networks and assured access to cyberspace.

It is therefore not surprising that DoD’s i nformation networks have become targets for adversaries who seek to blunt U.S. military oper ations. Indeed, these networks are infiltrated daily by a myriad of sources, rang ing from small groups of individuals to some of the largest countries in the world. For example, criminals may try to access DoD’s healthcare systems in order to obtain personal information to perpetrate identity theft. Terrorists may seek to disrupt military networks and systems to cause chaos an d economic damage. Foreign intelligence or military services may attempt to a lter data in DoD databases to hi nder our military’s ability to operate effectively. DoD must acti vely defend its networks.

This is no small task. DoD currently operates more than 15,000 different computer networks across 4,000 military installations around the world. On any given day, there are as many as seven million DoD computers and telecommunic ations tools in use in 88 countries using thousands of warfighting and support applicatio ns. The number of pote ntial vulnerabilities, therefore, is staggering. Moreover, the speed of cyber attacks and the an onymity of cyberspace greatly favor the offense. This adv antage is growing as hacker tool s become cheaper and easier to employ by adversaries whose skills are growing in sophistication.

We must therefore be constantly vigilant and prepare d to react nearly instantaneously if we are to effectively limit the damage that the most sophisticated types of attacks can inflict. In this environment, the need to develop strategies, policies, authoritie s, and capabilities for DoD to manage and defend its information networks is manifest.

4 The man-made nature of cyberspace distinguishes it from other domains in which the U.S. armed forces operate. The Administration will continue to explore the implications of cyberspace’ s unique attributes for policies regarding operations within it.REBALANCING THE FORCE

38 Quadrennial Defense Review Report DoD is taking a number of steps to streng then its capabilities in the cyberspace:

 Develop a comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace. A Department-wide comprehensive approach will help build an en vironment in which cyber security and the ability to operate effectively in cyberspace are viewed as prior ities for DoD. Strategies and policies to improve cyber defense in depth, resi liency of networks, and surety of data and
communication will allow DoD to continue to have confidence in its cyberspace operations. A central component of this a pproach is cultural and organizational: The Department will adapt and improve operational planning, its networks, its organizational structures, and its relationships with intera gency, industry, and international partners. New operational concepts, such as dynamic ne twork defense operat ions, could enhance effectiveness by enabling more rapid actions and more comprehensive actions to protect
DoD’s networks.

 Develop greater cyberspace expertise and awareness. The Department will redouble its efforts to imbue its personnel with a greater appreciation for the threats and vulnerabilities in the cyber domain and to give them the s kills to counter those threats and reduce those vulnerabilities at the user and system adminis trator levels. DoD can no longer afford to have users think of its information technologi es and networks as simply the benign
infrastructure that facilitates their work. Us ers and managers must be held accountable for ensuring network security and for implementin g best practices. DoD is also growing its cadre of cyber experts to protect and defend its information networks and is investing in and developing the latest technolo gies to enable our forces to operate in cyberspace under a wide range of conditions, including in contested and degraded environments.

 Centralize command of cyberspace operations. In an effort to organize and standardize cyber practices and operations more effectivel y, the Department is standing up U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, to lead, integrate and better coordinate the day-to-day defense, pro tection, and operation
of DoD networks. USCYBERCOM will direct the operation and defense of DoD’s information networks, and will prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum cyberspace military operations . An operational USCYBERCOM will also play a leading role in helping to integrate cyber operatio ns into operational and contingency planning. In addition, DoD is training cyber experts, e quipped with the latest technologies, to protect and defend its information networks. Essential to the success of this new approach will be the capabilities and growth of the Se rvice components that are stood up to support

USCYBERCOM.

 Enhance partnerships with ot her agencies and governments. Freedom of operation in cyberspace is important and DoD must have the capabilities to defend its own networks.REBALANCING THE FORCE

39 Quadrennial Defense Review Report However, the interdependence of cyberspace means DoD networks are heavily dependent on commercial infrastructure. Just as it does in conducting many of our missions, DoD needs to collaborate with other U.S. departm ents and agencies and international partners both to support their efforts and to ensure our ability to operate in cyberspace. This
mutual assistance includes information shar ing, support for law enforcement, defense support to civil authorities, and homeland defe nse. In particular, DoD will strengthen its cooperation with DHS, which leads the nati onal effort to protect federal information

systems. 

### Guiding the Evolution of the Force

In combination and over time, the QDR initiative s described above will significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U. S. interests in both the near-and longer-term future. In addition to better preparing our own fo rces for the future, these initiatives will improve the Department’s ability to build the capability and capacity of partners. Changes directed under the QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:

 U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.

 U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet
the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions.

 U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range, flexibility and multimission versatility in
order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities.
We will also enhance our air forces’ contribution s to security force assi stance operations by fielding within our broader inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces. The F

- 3 5 Lightning II will provide the Air Force, Navy, USMC, and U.S. alli es and partners with highly-advanced, multirole, fifth generation capabilities. Photo courtesy of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.REBALANCING THE FORCE

40 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  The United States will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces and will enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support assets in the general purpose forces.

 The capabilities, flexibility, and robustne ss of U.S. forces across the board will be improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyber
defenses.

Our assessment of ongoing and potential future military operations identified a significant number of possible shortfalls in the capabilities or capacity of programmed U.S. forces. In some cases, opportunities exist to re medy these shortfalls by investing in new systems or additional force structure. In other cases, no readily availa ble solutions are at hand but greater investments in research and development or concept explora tion are warranted. Of course, many of these enhancements will be costly. Some of the tradeoffs that DoD’s leaders have identified to enable the rebalancing of U.S. military capabilities are described below. More such tradeoffs could be necessary in the future.

Early in the QDR and in the course of the proc ess of completing DoD’s budget submission for FY 2010, the Secretary took action to direct reso urces away from lower-priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be a ddressed, both within that budget and in the years that follow it. Those decisions includ ed ending production of the F-22 fighter, restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Army’s Future Combat Systems programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, and stretching out the procurement of a new class of aircraft carr ier. The Air Force is substantially reducing its fleet of older fourth-generation fighter aircraft.

In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to conclude production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, havin g completed the planned procurement of those aircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and to extend the life of existing command ships, canc el the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled the Department to redirect resources into th e high-priority areas outlined above.

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet ce rtain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the fo rce, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future oper ating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in un derperforming programs an d activities, divestiture,REBALANCING THE FORCE

41 Quadrennial Defense Review Report technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that
more resources can be devote d to filling these gaps.

In some capability areas, meeting emerging cha llenges will call for the development of wholly new concepts of operation. Confronting sophistica ted anti-access challenges and threats posed by nuclear-armed regional adversaries will pose partic ularly difficult problems. In recognition of the dynamism of the threat environ ment and advances in unmanned technologies, the Department will be examining future operationa l needs in several capability ar eas, including ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, joint forcible en try, and information networks and communications. Assessments of programmed forces in these areas will center on iterative, inte ractive war games, in which force planners, operators, and technical expe rts can explore alternative strategies and operational concepts in an environment that tests forces against an intelligent, adaptive adversary. Insights gained from these efforts will inform future investments in research and development and, over time, will help decision make rs to further rebalance future forces. 

### Sizing and Shaping the Force

The considerations outlined above relate to the capabilities that U.S. forces will need in order to accomplish their missions now and in the future. Force planning also requires that decisions be made about the aggregate capacity of the force: that is, how many operations should the force be able to accomplish simultaneously if called upon, and what types of operations could be necessary? This force-sizing and force-shaping co nstruct is a key part of defense strategy that provides a yardstick by which to gauge the sufficiency of current and future forces. It is informed by the needs of the nation, assessments of thre ats and challenges that could confront the United States and its allies, the operat ional and force management requirements of the force, and a sense of the overall level of resources that may be available and appropriate for the defense of the
nation and its interests. It is derived from the de fense objectives articulated earlier in this report:

 Prevail in today’s wars;

 Prevent and deter conflict;

 Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and

 Preserve and enhance the force.

Given the current and projected security environm ent, our Armed Forces must, in aggregate, be capable of conducting a broad range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected critical infrastructure, and other national interests. This includes the potential requirement to conduct multiple concurrent operations, including large-sc ale combat operations, in disparate theaters. Any lesser capability would present the risk that the nation might be unable to defend importantREBALANCING THE FORCE

42 Quadrennial Defense Review Report interests while its forces were undertaking a sing le large-scale operation. Such a possibility would increase the risk of aggression by other potential adversaries.

Largely for this reason, past defense reviews have called for the nation’s armed forces to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts in overlapping time frames. These have been characterized as conflicts against state adversa ries, typically employing conventional military forces. This QDR likewise assumes the need for a robust force capable of protecting U.S. interests against a multiplicity of threats, includin g two capable nation-state aggressors. It breaks from the past, however, in its insistence th at the U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations, from ho meland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions, to the conflicts we are in and the wars we may someday face.

In short, U.S. forces today and in the years to come can be plausibly challenged by a range of threats that extend far beyond the familiar “major regional conf licts” that have dominated U.S. planning since the end of the Cold War. We have learned through painful experience that the wars we fight are seldom the wars that we would have planned. For instance, in Iraq and Afghanistan, two theaters in which we are engage d simultaneously, we have seen that achieving operational military victory can be only the first step toward achi eving our strategic objectives.

Because America’s adversaries have been adopting a wi de range of strategies and capabilities that can be brought to bear against the United States an d its forces, allies, and interests, it is no longer appropriate to speak of “major regional conflicts ” as the sole or even the primary template for sizing, shaping, and evaluating U.S. forces. Rath er, U.S. forces must be prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of diffe rent circumstances. Ensuring flexibility of the whole force does not require ea ch part of the force to do everything equally well. Not all challenges pose the same degree of threat to natio nal interests, rely on U.S. military capabilities equally, or have the same chance of occurrenc e. Operations may also vary in duration and intensity for maritime, air, ground, space, an d cyber forces. The QDR thus employed several scenario combinations to represent the range of likely and/or significant challenges anticipated in the future and tested its force capacity against them.

Combinations of scenarios assessed in the QDR included the following:

 A major stabilization operation, deterring an d defeating a highly capable regional aggressor, and extending support to civil authorit ies in response to a catastrophic event in
the United States. This scenario combination particularly stressed the force’s ability to defeat a sophisticated adversary and support domestic response.REBALANCING THE FORCE

43 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened alert posture for U.S. forces in and around the United States. This scenario combination particularly stressed the force’s combined arms capacity.

 A major stabilization operation, a long-duration de terrence operation in a separate theater, a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission, and extended support to civil authorities in
the United States. This scenario combination particularly stressed elements of the force most heavily tasked for counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

QDR force analysis also tested the force’s ability to sustain robust levels of engagement overseas through forward stationing and routine rotational deployments. Successfully achieving any of the core missions of the U.S. Armed Forces requires stro ng security relationships with a host of allies and partners—relationships best enabled and ma intained through both a long-term presence abroad and sustained, focused interactio ns between U.S. and partner forces.

In all of the scenario sets it tested, the Depart ment assumed ongoing U.S. military engagement in presence and deterrence missions. The Department ’s force planning assumes that over time
forces can be redirected from mo st prevent-and-deter activities in order to meet more pressing operational needs.

The types of contingencies that U.S. forces will actually be called upon to conduct in the future will certainly extend beyond the range of these examples. Reality is always less clear-cut and less predictable than our planning paradigms. For this reason, DoD’s force planning stresses the importance of fielding forces that are versatil e and that, in aggregate, can undertake missions across the full range of plausible challenges.

Force-Sizing Construct
Based on its assessment of the ability of U.S. forc es to meet the types of demands outlined above, the Department developed a force-sizing construct to guide components in their resource allocation decisions. Whereas QDRs have often emphasized shaping the force beyond the fiveyear time frame, this QDR, of necessity, had to fo cus intensively on present conflicts as well as potential future needs. Our force-sizing construct therefore takes into account the realities of the current operational environment. In order to shape the force of the future, however, the construct also establishes sizing criteria for the midterm (5–7 year s) and long term (7–20 years). To ensure a tight coupling of strategic ends to means, the QDR force-sizing construct is defined according to the priority objec tives of the defense strategy.

Prevail

For the near- and midterm future, substantial number s of U.S. forces will likely be operating in Afghanistan and U.S. forces in Iraq will contin ue a responsible drawdown in accordance with that nation’s wishes and as Iraqi forces take on greater roles for providing security. These effortsREBALANCING THE FORCE

44 Quadrennial Defense Review Report will substantially determine the size and shape of major elements of U.S. military forces for several years.

Even following the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq and the transition to greater Afghan leadership in providing security, th ere will continue to be endu ring operational requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies. Nevertheless, we anticipate that less
of the force will be dedicated to these mission s. Our force planning thus assumes greater force availability for the remaining three priority objectives in the midterm to long term.

Prevent and Deter
While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in prevai l efforts, the Department’s prevent-and-deter activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States, preventing the emergence or reemergence of trans national terrorist threats, including Al Qaeda; and deterring other potential major adversaries.

As our forces transition into a period of less-inte nsive sustained operations, the Department’s force planning assumes an ability to undertake a broadened and deeper range of prevent-anddeter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a whole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners. The Department’s e fforts to deter threats to U.S. territory indepth and prevent the growth or reemergence of transnational terrorist movements will continue and may grow in some areas. Our planning assume s even greater force ava ilability for efforts to deter other would-be aggressors through forwar d presence and sustained operations to build partnership capacity.

Prepare
Even as it works to prevail in current overseas operations, our force planning requires the U.S. military to prepare for significant new challenges. This includes defending the United States and supporting civil authorities in the event of an emergency. It also includes the requirement to deter potential challengers in times of crisis and, if necessary, defeat their threats to U.S.
and allied interests.

In the midterm to long term, U.S. military forc es must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in multi ple theaters in overlapping timeframes. Such operations include suppo rting civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in the United U.S. Navy Engineman 2nd Class Kpaku Palay prepares for deployment to critical coastal and inshore areas of Iraq and Kuwait with a simulated escort of a high value asset transiting San Diego Bay, Nov. 7, 2008. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spc. 1st Class R. J ason Brunson.REBALANCING THE FORCE

45 Quadrennial Defense Review Report States, deterring and defeating state and non-state aggressors, and conducting large-scale stability operations. Operations over the past eigh t years have stressed the ground forces disproportionately, but the fut ure operational landscape could also portend significant longduration air and maritime campaigns for which th e U.S. military must be prepared. The QDR
scenario combinations described earlier in this section provide insight into the potential number and size of overlapping operations for which U.S. military forces must plan to prepare.

Preserve and Enhance
The Department must always be vigilant in its management of the All-Volunteer Force. U.S. forces are second to none, and the health and vitality of the force is especially critical in light of the stresses being generated by today’s missions. The Department will be prepared to manage the risks of significant new military missions that may arise during this time, which may require shifts in current operations or further mobilization of the Reserve Component.

Even as the United States transitio ns its role in Iraq and, late r, Afghanistan, the Department’s force planning assumes a taxing op erational environment. Our pre serve-and-enhance efforts will focus on transitioning to sustainable rotation rates that protect the force’s long-term health. The Department plans that in times of significant crisis, U.S. forces will be prepared to experience higher deployment rates and lower dwell times for up to several years at a time and/or mobilize the Reserve Component. This will typically be the ca se if the United States is engaged for long periods in more than one large operation, su ch as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department will also expand its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to augment the military effort as required. 

### Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure, FY 2011 – 15

Taking into account the demands of a dy namic and complex security environment, the requirements of U.S. defense strategy, the need for enhancements to key capabilities across a wide range of missions, and the need for forces with sufficient aggregate capacity to meet the criteria laid out above, DoD has determined that U.S. forces, for the duratio n of the FY 2011–15 Future Years Defense Program, will conform to the general parameters outlined below. Where ranges of force elements are provided, these reflect variati ons in force levels that are planned across the FYDP. Our judgment with regard to the overall ca pacity of the force reflects in part the heavy demands being placed on portions of the force by ongoing operations. As those demands evolve, so too might the appropriate size and mix of forc es. In addition, in assessing the force’s shape and size, the Department made pruden t assumptions regarding the l ikely contribution both of American civilian agencies and of key allies and partners to current and future operations.REBALANCING THE FORCE

46 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Department of the Army:

4 Corps headquarters 18 Division headquarters 73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve Component [RC]), consisting of: 40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) 8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) 25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) 21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC) 15 Patriot battalions; 7 Terminal High A ltitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries

Department of the Navy:

10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings 84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatants and Aegis Ashore 14 – 28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships) 29 – 31 amphibious warfare ships 53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines 126 – 171 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft (manned and unmanned) 3 maritime prepositioning squadrons 30 – 33 combat logistics force ships (+1 Mobile Landing Platform [MLP]) 17 – 25 command and support vessels (including Joint High Speed Vessels, 3 T-AKE Class dry cargo/ammunition ships, 1 mobile landing platform) 51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels 3 Marine expeditionary forces 4 Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC) 11 infantry regiments 4 artillery regiments 4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups , 7 rotary-wing groups , 4 control groups, 4 support groups) 4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments) 7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements

Department of the Air Force:

8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft) 30 – 32 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalent s (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wingequivalent)REBALANCING THE FORCE

47 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 pr imary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent) 5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft) 6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 prima ry mission aircraft per wing-equivalent) 3 command and control wings and 5 fully operatio nal air and space operations centers (with a total of 27 primary mission aircraft) 10 space and cyberspace wings

Special Operations Forces:

Approximately 660 special operations teams (i ncludes Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics team s, and operational aviation detachments [OADs]) 3 Ranger battalions 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobi lity and fire support pri mary mission aircraft

The formations and platform types shown here generally encompass only the major combat elements of each of the military departments. Nucl ear forces, which will be detailed in the report of the Nuclear Posture Review, are not shown he re. Neither are most of the noncombat and “enabler” elements that play such crucial roles in supporting effective operations in complex environments. Selected mobility resources, includ ing sealift, prepositioning, and airlift assets, are listed above. The capacity of these force elemen ts was tested and validated in the Department’s Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016.

The absence from this section of some elements of the force is in no way a reflection of their relative importance. As noted at the beginning of this section of the report, supporting and enabling capabilities are vital to effective operations and they will be resourced accordingly. But the purpose of listing the buildin g blocks shown above is to provide a summary portrayal of the
main force elements around which the rest of the force is built.

The Department will continue to strive to ensu re a proper balance between the overall size of U.S. combat forces, the capabilities and capac ity of key support elements and enablers, and investments in sustained and new capabilities that will be needed by forces called on to carry out future missions. As noted above, in this dynamic security environment U.S. forces must continue to adapt. America’s Armed Forces have a long history of devising creative solutions to new challenges and this spirit of innovation will be essential as we further evolve and rebalance the force in the years to come.48 Quadrennial Defense Review Report49 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

America’s men and women in uniform constitute the Department’s most important resource. Prevailing in today’s wars while working to prevent future conflict depends on the Department’s ability to create and sustain an all-volunteer force that is trained and resourced to succeed in the wide range of missions we ask them to execute. Ye ars of war have imposed considerable strain on the force. Multiple long deploymen ts are taking a serious toll on our people and their families, and the Department remains focused on their health and welfare. As part of this focus, the QDR has elevated the need to preserve and enhance th e All-Volunteer Force and included this priority in our force planning and our strategy deliberatio ns. From the care of our wounded warriors, to family support, to the recruiting and retention of personnel, we must tend to the health of the All-Volunteer Force, for it constitutes th e foundation of our national defense.



### Wounded Warrior Care

Apart from working to prevail in ongoing conflicts, caring for our wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will strive to provide them the top-quality physical and psychological care that befits theirservice and sacrifice. Providing worldclass care and management, benefit delivery, and standardization of services among the Military Departments and federal agencies continues to be the focus of the Department’s most senior leadership. Our wounded, ill, or injured service members deserve every opportunity to return to active duty following their recovery, or to make a seamless transition to veteran status if they cannot be returned to active duty. The De partment is working to improve the treatment of our wounded warriors in many ways, which include:

 Improving health benefits for military member s and their families by increasing funding in FY 2011 to provide more than 1000 addi tional personnel fo r Wounded Warrior Support, continuing the imple mentation of a military hea lth system enterprise-wide U.S. Army Sgt. Saul Martinez intercepts a passed ball during an intramural wheelchair basketball game between soldiers from the A rmy Warrior Transition Unit and Marines from the Marine Wounded Warrior Battalion–West detachment at Naval Medical Center San Diego in California on Jan. 14, 2009. DoD photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Jake Berenguer, U.S. Navy.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

50 Quadrennial Defense Review Report approach to prioritizing requirements for modern izing treatment facilities, and increasing overall health care funding by 9 percent from FY 2010.

 Establishing Centers of Excell ence for the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of military eye injuries, including those related to trauma tic brain injury, hearing loss and auditory system injuries, and traumatic extr emity injuries and amputations.

 Increasing funding and attention to wo unded warrior initiatives across the Military Departments, including the Army’s $530 million investment in the construction of six Wounded Warrior Complexes and twenty Soldie r Family Assistance Centers, as well as the Marine Corps’ Wounded Warrior Regimental Headquarters and Wounded Warrior Battalions; increasing the number of A ir Force Recovery Care Coordinators; and expanding the Navy’s Safe Harbor program , which reviews, evaluates, and provides a range of assessment, support, and treatment programs to Active and Reserve Sailors and
their families.

 Establishing a single Disability Evaluation S ystem that creates a simpler, faster, and more consistent process for determining whether wounded, ill, or injured service members may continue their military service or sh ould transition to veteran status.

 Broadening the scope of information sharin g between the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, to support stro nger continuity of care and benefits delivery for military members. Within five years, the Virtual Li fetime Electronic Record will enhance the availability of administrative and health i nformation to DoD, VA, and third-party health providers, better ensuring seamless health care through active service and beyond.

 Creating innovative policies, processes, and programs aimed at ensuring continuity in mental health care and counseling services fo r military personnel as they transition from one duty station to another, or trans ition from military to veteran care.

 Working with the Department of Health an d Human Services, the Department will place 200 Public Health Service mental health prof essionals in the military health system. 

### Managing the Deployment Tempo

Ensuring time at home station between deploym ents and honoring our commitment to release service members at the end of their service obligations remain among the most tangible
demonstrations of commitment to our service members and their families. Years of conflict requiring long and numerous deployments have imposed significant strain on our uniformed men and women—physically and psychologically.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

51 Quadrennial Defense Review Report The Department strives to prov ide service members and their fam ilies with greater clarity and predictability regarding current and planned deployments. Between deployments, we must everything possible to give our pers onnel sufficient time to recover.

 Our near-term planning objective for the Ac tive Component remains two years at home station for every one year deployed. Our objective for mobilization of Guard and Reserve units remains five years demobilized for every one year mobilized. To day’s global demands will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized more frequently than this standard, however. Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of national need, so we must as k more of the Reserve Component.

 The status of U.S. forces in Korea is cha nging from being forward-deployed to being forward-stationed with family members. When fully implemented, this change will enable forces to deploy from Korea, helping to expand the pool of available forces for global contingencies. 

### Recruiting and Retention

Our recruiting efforts are longterm investments that can yield generational gains. After more than five years of the most challenging recruiting
environment since the 1973 inception of the All-Volunteer Force, the Department succeeded in meeting its recruiting and retention objectives in 2009. Nevertheless, in coming years, we will face additional challenges to our ability to attract qualified young men and women into the Armed Forces. Among them are a large and growing proportion of youth who are ineligible to serve in the military fo r medical, criminal, ethical, or physical reasons. We will also be challenged to recruit personne l with specialized skills in such areas foreign languages, medicine, and compu ter network operations.

While we continue to employ a mix of programs an d incentives to recruit quality personnel, we are also focused on retaining those with valu able operational experience. Examples of recent efforts to improve retention include: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates sh akes the hand of a Marine recruit in training at the Edson Firing Range on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., on Jan. 7, 2008. Camp Pendle ton is the Corps' largest West Coast expeditionary training facility, enco mpassing more than 125,000 acres o f Southern California terrain. DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

52 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Revising our bonus policies to allow the Milita ry Departments to purs ue innovative ways to retain quality personnel. For example, th e Marine Corps helps ensure retention of combat-experienced Marines through the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program.

 Employing more flexible ways for personnel to serve, by implementing programs designed
to better enable transitions from Active and Reserve Component service. For example, the Navy is developing a career intermission pilot program that, when implemented, could allow an active Sailor to join the Selected Re serve for a period of time before returning to active duty, providing better options for wo rk-life balance and ca reer flexibility. 

### Supporting Families

We have a critical and enduring obligation to better prepare and support families during the stress of multiple deployments. Robust single member, spouse, child, and youth services are no longer desirable options, but are services essential to
maintain the health of the AllVolunteer Force. Programs such as quality education for children, expanded child care, outreach to
Guard and Reserve members and families, accessible family support assistance, referrals for counseling, financial education and training, pre-teen and t een programs, and access to training certification opportunities for spouses all provide lifelines of support for service members and their families stationed around the globe. Examples of o ur efforts to improve and renew family support programs include:

 Increasing the resources devoted to instit utionalizing service member and family support programs across the Department—a 41 percent increase in FY 2011 from FY 2010.

 Replacing or renovating 106 of 192 Department of Defense Educational Activity (DoDEA) schools by 2015.

 Normalizing the stationing of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea from unaccompanied to accompanied tours, which will result in nearly 5,000 service members and families being forward-stationed on the peninsula. The Department’s long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Jonathan Mackey reunites with his son during the homecoming of the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain in San Diego, Calif., July 30, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Daniel Barker.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

53 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Continuing efforts of the Military Depa rtments to improve family and community support services. For example, the Marine Cor ps is hiring dedicated civilian family
readiness officers for all active and reserve ba ttalion-level units, and the Army and Navy are implementing new programs to increase family support for reserve personnel.

 Building on the authorization contained in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which allows DoD to compensate military memb ers whose families care for them during recovery from catastrophic medical conditio ns. We are assessing the adequacy of this compensation and developing recommen dations based on the findings. 

### Keeping Faith with the Reserve Component

Achieving the defense strategy’s objectives requ ires vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunte er Force. Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operat ional capacity—available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Preventing an d deterring conflict will likely necessitate thecontinued use of some elements of the Reserve Component—especially those that possess highdemand skill sets—in an operationa l capacity well into the future.

Over the past eight years, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contrib utions to ongoing operations. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to em ploy National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fu lfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas. For example, the National Guard often serves at the forefront of DoD operations. The associated incentive structur e within the Reserve Component must be used to create easier access to those capabilities that are routinely in high demand.

At the same time, within this operational reserve, our nation must have a force generation model that provides sufficient strategic depth. As th e operational environment allows, the Department will seek ways to rebalance its reliance on th e Reserve Component to ensure the long-term viability of a force that has both s trategic and operational capabilities.

Effective use of the Reserve Component also he lps preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force by increasing its capacity and expanding the rang e of capabilities it pro vides. Using the National Guard and Reserves in this way will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better ensure the right mix and availability of e quipment, provide more efficient and effective use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve Components. Today’s
National Guard and Reserve men and women volunteer knowing that they will periodically serve on active duty. They also serve expecting to be judiciously used, given meaningful work to do, and provided the right training and equipment to complete the mission. The Department will work to meet these expectations.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

54 Quadrennial Defense Review Report The Reserve Component has untapped capabilit y and capacity. Over the coming year, the Department will conduct a compre hensive review of the future ro le of the Reserve Component, including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces. 

### Developing Future Military Leaders

The Department will continue to
work to ensure that America’s
cadre of commissioned and
noncommissioned officers are prepared for the full range of complex missions that the future security environment will likely demand. Too often, a focus on weapons acquisition programs and
overall force structure crowd out needed attention concerning how the Military Departments generate, train, and sustain their leaders. As part of our commitment to ensure that tomorrow’s leaders are prepared for the difficult missions they will be asked to execute, DoD will place special emphasis on stability operations, counteri nsurgency, and building partner capacity skill sets in its profe ssional military education and career development policies. Examples
of DoD efforts in this area include:

 Building expertise in foreign language, regional , and cultural skills. We will continue our emphasis on enhancing these skills in general purpose force officers during pre-accession training. Given the inherent link between language and cultural expertise and mission success, this area requires continued focus.

 Recognizing joint experie nce whenever and wherever it occurs in an officer’s career. Until recently, wartime servic e in combat zones—where joint an d multinational operations are common—was not recognized as fulfilling the requirements of joint service for purposes of promotion. Reserve Component officers will also have the opportunity to have their joint experiences recognized to earn the same qualifications as their Active Component

counterparts.

 Recognizing the critical role that profession al military education plays in the development of military officers, the Department will work to ensure that all its educational institutions are resourced and staffed with the right mix of civilian and military experts who can help prepare the next generation of leaders. Given the continuing need to develop military Thirty-one U.S. military members take the oath of allegiance before f

riends and family during a U.S. mili tary naturalization ceremony in the Pentagon courtyard, Sept. 10, 2009. DoD photo by First Class Petty Officer Molly A. Burgess, U.S. Navy.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

55 Quadrennial Defense Review Report leaders who can work effectively with a range of civilian counterparts, we will also look to expand opportunities for milita ry officers to attend civilian graduate institutions. 

### Developing the Total Defense Workforce

The Department is facing mission requirements of increasing scope, variety, and complexity. To ensure the availability of needed talent to meet future demands, we are conducting a
deliberate assessment of current and future workforce requirements. This effort will ensure that the Department has the right workforce size and mix (military/civilian/contractor) with the right competencies. This assessment will be enterprise-wide, enabling the Department to better recruit and retain personnel with the most-needed skills.

As part of these efforts, the Department is workin g to better employ the talents of our civilian personnel to meet today’s challenges. For example, the Secretary of Defense has created the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), which will provide deployable civilian experts to support efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other contingencies. Specifically, the CEW is designed to enhance DoD’s ability to work alongside and help build the capacity of partner defense ministries, in so doing reflecting the importance of civilian oversight. By the end of FY 2011, at least 90 percent of the deploying CEW perso nnel will have access to standardized predeployment training. A parallel effo rt is under way to synchronize civilian and military leadership training, with the goals of ensuring common prof essional training and ed ucation between senior executive service (SES) and flag officers and incr easing joint capability for deployment of SES personnel. As we continue to implement the CEW, the Department will ensure that those who participate are given the benefits and support prog rams required to facili tate their assignments
abroad.

The services provided by contractors will continue to be valued as part of a balanced approach that properly considers both mission requirem ents and overall return. In keeping with the Administration’s goal of reducing the governme nt’s dependence on contractors, the Department introduced its in-sourcing initiative in the FY 2010 budget. Over the ne xt five years, the Department will reduce the number of support se rvice contractors to their pre-2001 level of 26 percent of the workforce (from the current level of 39 percent) and replace them, if needed, with Civilians from the Department of Defense's Executive Leadership Development Program learn how to properly wear the Interceptor Body Armor with the help of so ldiers from 2nd Battalion 9th Infantry Mar. 25, 2009 at Rodrig uez Live Fire Complex. U.S. A rmy Photo by Sgt. Scott Kim

.TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

56 Quadrennial Defense Review Report full-time government employees. These efforts will help establish a balanced total workforce of military, government civilians, and contractor personnel that more appropriately aligns publicand private-sector functions, and results in better value for the taxpayer.57 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

Achieving the Department’s strategic object ives requires close collaboration with key counterparts at home and with allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense relationships, the United States not only helps av ert crises but also improves its effectiveness in responding to them. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other instruments of statecraft—including diplomacy, development, la w enforcement, trade, and intelligence—the nation can ensure that the right mix of expertis e is at hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and to thwart potential threats. The Department will therefore strengthen its relationships with allies and like-minded partners, develop its supporting gl obal defense posture, and build close and sustained relationships with U.S. government agencies and other critical
actors at home. 

### Strengthening Key Relationships Abroad

Sustaining existing alliances and creating new partnerships are cen tral elements of U.S. security strategy. The United States cannot sustain a stable international system alone. In an increasingly interdependent world, challenges to common inte rests are best addressed in concert with likeminded allies and partners who share responsibil ity for fostering peace and security. America’s national security and defense strategies depend on strong foreign ties, including a vibrant network of defense alliances and partnerships adapted to this challenging era. Building and sustaining such networks and partnerships will require effective strategic communication. We will need to improve our ability to understand the concerns, percep tions, and attitudes of foreign governments and populations, as well as the ways in which our words and actions may affect allies and partners. Thoughtful engagement, co mmunication, and collaboration with allies and partners who share our interest in foste ring peace and security remain essential.

Central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partnership, which is underpinned by the bilateral relationships betw een the United States and the governments of Europe. We will continue to work with this community of like-minded nations, whether by engaging with allies still shaping their democrac ies after decades of living in the shadow of the Soviet Union, building on the benefits of Fre nch reintegration into NATO’s military structure, or addressing new security issues such as those arising in the Arctic region. Our shared history and interests with the United Kingdom have created a steadfast bond, strengthened in recent years through operations together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

The United States is committed to the North Atla ntic Treaty Organization, the cornerstone of transatlantic security since the beginning of the Cold War. NATO is c ritical to ensuring the security and stability of Europe by addressing a br oad range of security issues both inside andSTRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

58 Quadrennial Defense Review Report outside NATO’s treaty area. We will work to en sure a strong NATO that provides a credible Article 5 security commitment, deters threats to Alliance security, has acce ss to U.S. capabilities such as the phased, adaptive approach to European missile defense to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and takes on new threats such as cyberspace attacks. The U.S. relationship with the European Union, together with the NATO-E U relationship, has become even more important in recent years in projecting the full force of transatlantic power. The need for NATO to develop its own comprehensive civil-military a pproach, as well as greate r cooperation with the EU and other international organizations, is es pecially evident in Afghanistan, where every NATO ally and the EU are contributing to the international effort—including personnel contributions to the International Security Assist ance Force—to disrupt, di smantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and eliminate its safe havens.



### Nations Contributing Personnel to the International Security Assistance Force

Albania* Denmark* Latvia* Romania*

Armenia Estonia* Lithuania* Singapore

Australia Finland Luxembourg* Slovakia*

Austria France* Macedonia Slovenia* Azerbaijan Georgia Montenegro Spain* Belgium* Germany* Netherlands* Sweden Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece* New Zealand Turkey* Bulgaria* Hungary* Norway* Ukraine

Canada* Iceland* Poland* United Kingdom*

Croatia* Ireland Portugal* United States*
Czech Republic* Italy* * NATO Members

The countries of Eurasia are positioned to improve Europe’s energy security, support international efforts in Afghanistan, and play criti cal roles in countering transnational threats, including extremism, weapons proliferation, and illicit trafficking. Yet the region contains
unresolved conflicts that inhibit the ability of many of its countries to counter these threats. The United States is working with its NATO allies an d partners to promote peaceful resolutions to protracted conflicts and to build our partners’ security capacity, support their defense reform efforts, and facilitate their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The United States and Russia share many intere sts—including countering proliferation and confronting terrorism. We are working with Moscow to develop a new START Treaty—an important step in the President’ s initiative toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The new START Treaty will further reduce both nations’ nuclear arsenals while maintaining importantSTRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

59 Quadrennial Defense Review Report treaty-monitoring provisions. We will seek out op portunities to work with Moscow on emerging issues, such as the future of the Arctic and th e need for effective missile defense architectures designed to protect the region from external th reats. At the same time, the United States will continue to engage with Russia’s neighbors as fully independent and sovereign states.

The foundation of our presence in Asia remains our historical treaty alliances. These alliances have helped maintain peace and stability for mo re than sixty years, particularly through the continued presence of capable U.S. forces in th e region, and we remain steadfastly committed to the security commitments embodied in these ag reements. The regional and global security environments are more complex today, howeve r. Global peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction operations; nonproliferation acti vities; missile defense cooperation; and energy security initiatives are all critical issues for regi onal defense cooperation. This emerging security landscape requires a more widely distributed and adaptive U.S. presence in Asia that relies on and better leverages the capabilities of o ur regional allies and partners.

In Northeast Asia, DoD is working closely with key allies Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to implement our agreed-on plans and shared visions to build a comprehensive alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope; realign our force postures; restructure allied security roles and capabilities; and strengthen our
collective deterrent and defense capabilities. These changes will firmlyposition these alliances for the 21stcentury security landscape and ensure their enduring strength, readiness, and
resilience for the future. In the Pacific Rim, we are deepening our partnership with Aust ralia, an alliance that stretches beyond Asia to provide essential cooperation on a wide range of global security challenges. In Southeast Asia, we are working to enhance our long-standing allian ces with Thailand and the Philippines, deepen our partnership with Singapore, and develop new strategic relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, to address issues such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and support to humanitarian assistance operations in the r egion. The United States is also encouraging the continued development of multilateral institutions and other integrated approaches to regional security affairs. U.S. Air Force M aj. Miralba Fernandez-Covas works closely with South Korean air force officers Maj. Kim Heonjoong and 1st Lt. Cho Sungmin during Exercise Key Resolve/Foal Eagle, Mar. 17, 2009, at Osan Air Base, South Korea. U.S. Air Force photo by Staf f Sgt. Benjamin Rojek.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

60 Quadrennial Defense Review Report China’s growing presence and influence in regional and global economic and security affairs is one of the most consequential aspects of the ev olving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. In particular, China’s military has begun to develop new roles, missions, and capabilities in support of its grow ing regional and global interest s, which could enable it to play a
more substantial and constructive role in inte rnational affairs. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that pla ys a greater global role. The United States welcomes the positive benefits that can accrue from greater cooperation. However, lack of transparency and the nature of China’s military development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond. Our relationship with China must th erefore be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. The United States and China should sustain op en channels of communication to discuss disagreements in order to manage and ultimately redu ce the risks of conflict that are inherent in any relationship as broad and complex as that shared by these two nations.

As the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase, it is assuming a more influential role in global affairs. This gr owing influence, combined with democratic values it shares with the United States, an open pol itical system, and a commitment to global stability, will present many opportunities for cooperatio n. India’s military capabilities are rapidly improving through increased de fense acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift. India has already established its worldwi de military influence through counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief effo rts. As its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The United States also recognizes that Pakistan is at the geopolitical crossroads of South and Central Asia, giving it an important regional role in security and stability. Extremism, economic instability, resource scarcity, and illicit traffickin g all imperil Pakistan’s fu ture. A secure, stable
Pakistan is vital to U.S. nationa l security, the region, and the world. For these reasons, the United States has committed to a long-term strategi c partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interests and joint efforts. We will work with Pakistan to strengthen its capacity to combat extremism, and we will pr ovide substantial resource s to support Pakistan’s democracy and development.

The United States has a substantia l interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean region as a whole, which will play an ever more i mportant role in the global economy. The Indian Ocean provides
vital sea lines of communication that are essentia l to global commerce, international energy security, and regional stability. Ensuring open ac cess to the Indian Ocean will require a more integrated approach to the region across military and civilian organizations. An assessment thatSTRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

61 Quadrennial Defense Review Report includes U.S. national interests, objectives, and posture implications would provide a useful guide for future defense planning.

Stability in the Middle East remains critical to U.S. interests. As we strive toward a comprehensive peace in the region between Israel and its neighbors, the closeness of our defense relationship and cooperation with Israel will cont inue. Enduring U.S. security cooperation with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Ar abia, Yemen, and the Gulf States continues to strengthen partner capabilities to counter extremism and othe r regional threats, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles. A persistent Al Qaeda th reat will necessitate expanded counterterrorism cooperation with regional partners, includin g in countering terrorist financing, disseminating anti-extremist messages, and protecting critical i nfrastructure. A variety of maritime security challenges, including piracy, smuggling, and huma n trafficking, will require greater participation in regional maritime security or ganizations in order to protect vital sea lines of communication.
We will also continue to work with our Middle East partners to develop a regional architecture that broadens and improves interoperable air and mi ssile defenses. Finally, as our forces continue their drawdown from Iraq, the United States remains committed to developing a strategic partnership that promotes peace and pros perity in Iraq and the region.

The United States will continue working with Af rican partners to help foster stability and prosperity throughout the continent. The need to assist fragile, post-conflict states, such as Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan, and failed states such as Somalia, and transnational problems, includ ing extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, and narcotics trafficking, pose significant challenges. America’s efforts will hinge on partnering with African states, other international allies and partners, and regional an d subregional security organizations to conduct capacity-building and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism, and address humanitarian

crises.

The United States will continue
to work toward a secure and democratic Western Hemisphere by developing regional defense partnerships that address
domestic and transnational
threats such as narcoterrorist organizations, illicit trafficking,
and social unrest. We will continue to work closely with Mexico to improve our cooperative approach to border security, enhance defense capacity Canadian soldiers from the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 24, depart a U.S. Navy la nding craft, air cushion and deploy onto Mayport Beach, Fla., April 25, during Partnership of the Americas (POA) 2009. POA is an annual joint e x ercise that focuses on enhancing interoperability between U.S. Mari nes and partner-nation Marines. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Chief Warrant Officer Keith A. Stevenson.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

62 Quadrennial Defense Review Report for coordinated operations, and address other issues. The Department will also enhance defense relationships and continue to work with Canada in the context of regional security, increased interaction in the Arctic, and combat operatio ns in Afghanistan. The United States remains committed to building a strong partnership w ith Brazil—the hemisphere’s second largest economy and second most populous democracy—on all regional issues and global security

concerns. 

### The Role of U.S. Defense Posture

The United States is a global power with glob al responsibilities. I ncluding operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately 400,000 U.S. military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally deployed every day around the world to help sustain U.S. capacity for global reach and power projection. There are three key elemen ts to our defense posture: forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, an d equipment; a supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and a series of treaty, access, transit, and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and key partners.

Our experience of operating as part of multinatio nal coalitions in long-duration conflicts has demonstrated the importance of continually fost ering long-term relationships with allies and partners. For operations in Iraq and Afghanis tan, our relationships both with those nations contributing forces and with those enabling transit of logistical support have proved vital.

The Department must ensure that our overseas posture adapts and evolves in ways that respond to— and anticipate—changes in the international security environment. The persistence of conflict, the diffusion of power around the world, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons technologies, and rising complexity in sea, air, space and cyberspace domains pose new security challenges that require innovative adjustments to our defense posture. To ward this end, we will seek a new architecture of cooperation, one that generates openings for the United States to work together with allies and partners on shared regional and global security opportunities and challenges. The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) transits the Pacific Ocean while an SH-60B Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the Helicopter Anti-S ubmarine Squadron Light (HSL) 51 conducts flight operations in the background on Nov. 18, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Sp ecialist 3rd Class Charles Oki.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

63 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Toward a Cooperative and Tailored Posture
In a future marked by continued globalization and enduring transnational threats, the United States and its allies and partners will face a mu ltiplicity of shared challenges and opportunities. This dynamic security environment calls for a coop erative and tailored approach to our global defense posture.

The United States will seek to strengthen or add cooperative measures to address shared regional and global security concerns where U.S. interests al ign with those of our allies and partners. Such an approach recognizes that the United States ca nnot effectively manage these security challenges on its own, nor should it attempt to do so.

Viewing defense posture through a cooperativ e lens, the Department will support development of—and capitalize on—the specialization and e xpertise of allies, partn ers, and other U.S. government agencies. The United States will work w ith our allies and partners to effectively use limited resources by generating efficiencies and syn ergies from each other’s portfolios of military capabilities, thereby enhancing our collective ab ilities to solve global security problems. The presence of U.S. military forces overseas can be a powerful catalyst for promoting multilateral approaches and regional security architectures that serve both U.S. and partner states’ interests.

Our approach to defense posture be gins at home, with significant government collaboration in its development, articulation, and execution. Global defense posture is a key means of communicating U.S. foreign and security poli cy and thus must be closely coordinated throughout the national security community.

The United States will also apply a regionally ta ilored approach in determining the posture of its forces. A tailored defense posture reflects unique regional political and security dynamics by bringing into harmony the right combination of forward-stationed and rotational forces and capabilities, prepositioned equipment and ba sing infrastructure, and relationships and agreements. It calibrates the U.S. presence in each region to best support ongoing and future operations, respond to crises, and prevent and dete r threatening activities. It also recognizes that augmenting our overseas presence is not always the most effective method to achieve our strategic objectives.

The Department will be guided by the followi ng principles in making future defense posture
decisions.

First, forward-stationed and rotationally deploye d U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required. The long-term presence of U.S. forc es abroad reassures allies and partners of our commitment to mutual security relationships, generates enduri ng trust and goodwill with host nations, and increases regional and cultural exper tise in the force. We ca nnot simply “surge” trust and relationships on demand.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

64 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Second, our defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence that assures allies and partners of our commitments with th e need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, emerging threats, and global security needs in distant theaters.

Third, the United States will balance the need fo r assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication. For example, generating and sustaining a defense posture to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan has proved difficult. To meet this and similar challenges, we will seek innovative wa ys to add strategic depth to our posture network and prioritize the development and maintenance of enduring relationships with trusted partners that serve mu tual security interests over the long term.

Fourth, America’s defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation. Forward stationing and rotational deployment of U.S. forces are designed to contribute to regional security and will be enha nced, lessened, or reshaped as necessary to reassure allies and partners and strengthen deterr ence. The United States will work closely with allies and partners to maintain an appropriate ly tailored military presence that serves a
constructive role in mainta ining regional security.

Fifth, our defense posture will continuously ada pt to changes in the strategic environment. Deliberate, ongoing assessment of national inte rests, military requirements and the strategic environment should guide U.S. global defense posture planning. In the emerging security environment, the United States will tailor its defense posture to address challenges such as insurgency and terrorism, the pro liferation of nuclear technology and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and the maintenance of secure access to the global

commons.
Regional Posture Perspectives
The United States will emphasize the following priorities in adaptin g and developing its global defense posture over the next five years:

 Reaffirm our commitment to Europe and NATO, including through the development of European missile defense capabilities;

 Work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region;

 Balance ongoing operations, crisis response , and prevent-and-deter activities in the development of a strategic defense posture in the broader Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia; and

 Support partnership capacity-building efforts in key regions and states.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

65 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Europe
The security of Europe has been
central to American national interests for much of the past century. The American defense posture in Europe has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War as legacy forces and basing structures transformed into a lighter, more flexible, and more deployable forward posture. Maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in Europe serves to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners; promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Cauc asus, and Black Sea regions; demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies; builds trust and goodwill among host nations; and facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual se curity interests both inside and outside the

continent.

Working with allies and partners, the United St ates will therefore ensure a European defense posture network that advances U.S. interests an d communicates its commit ment to the security of NATO allies. Pending the review of NATO’s Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S. assessment of our European defense posture networ k, the United States will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters fo rward-stationed on the continent. The United States will also begin the deployment of a revised U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe and an enhanced forward-deployed naval presence in th e region to support this initiative and enable increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security.

The Pacific
The United States has been a Pacific power for mo re than a century. The vast distances of the Pacific and the low density of U.S. basing and infrastructure there place a premium on forwardstationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces. We s eek to sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual secu rity interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region, while also promoting cont ributions by our allies and partners to global security. Toward this end, we will augment and adapt our forward presence, which reassures allies of the U.S. commitment to their security. At the same time, we will encourage our allies and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular multilateral security cooperation within the region to build trust, increase transparenc y, and reduce the risks of crisis or conflict. Several military participants in th is year’s Combined Endeavor are recognized during the closing ceremony at Willem Lodewijk Van Nassaukazerne, Zoutkamp, the Nether lands, Sept. 17, 2009. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

66 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Specifically, the United States will work with allies and partners to continue to adapt its defense presence as necessary to maintain regional stability and assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea. We will augment regional deterrence and rapid response capabilities and seek opportunities to build the capacity of our Asian partners to respond more effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and
natural disasters.

With Japan, we will continue to implement th e bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam, the westernmost sovereign territory of the United States, into a hub for security activities in the region.

The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. and combined force posture on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities and long-term capacity for regional and global defense cooperat ion. Doing so includes continuing to advance
the ROK’s lead role in the combined defense of its territory, together with the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK military in 2012.

We intend to improve the resiliency of U.S. forc es and facilities in th e region in order tosafeguard and secure U.S., allied, and partner assets and interests in response to emerging antiaccess and area-denial capabilities. In addition, we will explore opportunities for a more forwarddeployed presence that supports increased multil ateral cooperation on maritime security and enhanced capabilities for assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace. For instance, the Security Framework Agreement and cooperativ e basing with Singap ore are essential to supporting U.S. forces deployed in Asia.

Finally, the United States seeks to develop a dditional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific that respond to the need for constant readiness of U.S. forces to carry out joint operations, particularly in the area s of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security; the scarcity of available land and facilities in the Pacific; and the potential for The Seawol f

-class atta c k submarine USS Connecticu t (SSN 22) is under way in the Pacific Ocean on Nov. 17, 2009, with an HH-60H Sea Hawk helicopter from the Charger s of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron (HS) 14. In the background are the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga ( DDH 181). U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spc. 1st C lass John M. Hageman.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

67 Quadrennial Defense Review Report leveraging U.S. engagement with allied and pa rtner militaries to build multilateral security relationships and operational capacity among the countries of the region.

The Greater Middle East
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have significantly increased the U.S. presence in the greater Middle East as well as in Central and South Asia. Th e urgency of these operations caused the Department to priori tize changes in defense posture needed for near-term operational capability. It is time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests through the medium to long te rm. An emphasis on long-term relationships and
shared interests with allies and partners will clarify our extended commitment to the region’s security, enhance the resiliency of our defense posture, and improve our collective ability to carry out current operations while preparing for contingency response.

The United States will therefore manage a responsible force drawdown in Iraq and support an orderly transition to a more normal diplomatic and ci vilian presence.
We will also maintain the current level of access and develop alternatives in support of operations in Afghanistan while expanding access elsewher e in the region to prepare for contingency requirements, steps that will include reduci ng the vulnerability of our infrastructure. Furthermore, we will ensure that our near-term in vestments in infrastructure and capabilities to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanis tan are consistent with long-term goals for the region.

Working with allies and partners, the United States will reshape its defense posture to assure partners of a credible, long-term commitment to mutual security relationships and to deter regional actors from aggression while balancing that requirement against the regional sensitivity to a large, long-term U.S. force presence. We w ill also support a regional security architecture focused on strengthening defense capabilities and posture networks and on advancing regional stability and security. M embers of the Ninawa Provincial Re construction Team meet with the staff of the Qayara Medical Clinic in Qayara, Iraq, on Dec. 1, 2009. DoD photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Rufus Hucks, U.S. Navy.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

68 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Africa

In Africa, the United States will continue to ma intain a limited rotational military presence to help build partner security capa city, including for peacekeeping operations; generate regional security cooperation opportunities; and foster the development of constructive African civilmilitary relations. All such efforts to build partner capacity w ill pay special attention to thedynamics associated with civilmilitary relations in host countries and will emphasize the principles of civilian control and respect for dignity, rule of law, and professionalism. The expanse of Africa and the light U.S. footprint there highlight the importance of en route infrastructure to support defense
activities in theater.

The United States will work with allies and partners to enhance a defense posture that supports contingency response by improving our relationships and access agreemen ts with African allies and partners, improving preexisting African-owned infrastructure, and explori ng innovative opportun ities for logistical
collaboration with African militaries. We also strive to share facilities and cooperate more closely with European allies in our efforts to help Afri can states build capacity and to prepare for contingency response.

The Western Hemisphere
Our defense objectives within the Western Hemisphere do not require a robust forward presence. We will retain a limited presence while seeking to improve relationships with regional states and militaries in pursuit of common hemispheric security goals. Ou r defense posture in the Western Hemisphere will support in teragency capabilities to address critic al issues including control of illicit trafficking, detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, border and coastal security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In North America, the United States will maintain the defense posture required for missi on assurance, consequence management, support for civil authorities, strategic di spersal, and homeland defense. Staff Sgt. Andre Amantine of 2nd Battalion, 18t h Field Artillery Regiment, out of Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, salutes Sgt. 1st Class Cary Adams during a 15-week counterterrorism course, June 16, 2009, at Camp Kasenyi, Uganda.
M

ore than 100 Ugandan soldiers graduat ed from this course. DoD photo by Master Sgt. Loren Bons er, U.S. Air Force.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

69 Quadrennial Defense Review Report To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida. We also seek to develop new cooperative partnerships and bolster current partnerships with key nations in the hemisphere, particularly in the maritime domain, and encourage closer partnerships in undertaking multilateral security initiatives. 

### Strengthening Interagency Partnerships

Just as maintaining America’s enduring defens e alliances and relationships abroad is a central facet of statecraft, so too is the need to co ntinue improving the De partment of Defense’s cooperation with other U.S. departments and age ncies. Years of war have proven how important it is for America’s civilian agencies to possess the resources and authorities needed to operate alongside the U.S. Armed Forces during complex contingencies at home and abroad. As our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have sh own, sustainable outcomes require civilian development and governance experts who can help build local civilian ca pacity. Although the U.S. military can and should have the expertise and capacity to conduct these activities, civilian leadership of humanitarian assistance, development , and governance is essential. The Department will retain capabilities designed to s upport civilian author ities as needed.

A strong and adequately resourced cadre of civilians organized and trained to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. military personnel during a varie ty of possible contingencies is an important investment for the nation’s security. This is an ur gent requirement for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will remain an enduring need in the future security environment—both to prevent crises and to respond to them.

America’s civilian instruments of statecraft were allowed to atrophy in the post–Cold War era, and the lack of adequate civilian capacity has ma de prevailing in current conflicts significantly more challenging. Unfortunately, despite a grow ing awareness of the need and real efforts throughout the government to address it, adequate civilian capacity will take time and resources to develop and is unlikely to materialize in the near term. The Department will therefore continue to work with the leadership of civilian agencies to support the agencies’ growth and their operations in the field, so that the appr opriate military and civi lian resources are put forth to meet the demands of current contingencies. The Department will continue to build on the U.S. Army Spc. Brent Nailor pa sses out humanitarian aid meals to women and children in Port-a u-Prince, Haiti, Jan. 16, 2010. DoD photo by Fred W. Baker III.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

70 Quadrennial Defense Review Report lessons learned from examples such as the Provin cial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, and work toward improving a whole-of-government approach.

Just as the U.S. military is not the most appropriate in stitution to lead capacity-building efforts
to enhance civilian institutions overseas, so the Department of Defense should likewise act in support of civil authorities here at home. The Department of Defense su pports the Department of Homeland Security, and other federal civilian agencies, as part of a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach to both domestic sec urity and domestic incident response. It is essential that DoD improve its capabilities fo r contributing to civilian-led activities and operations, supporting “unity of effort” in homeland security. The Department continues to work closely with its interagency partners, in particular the Department of Homeland Security, to build capacity vertically from the federal level down to the loca l level, and horizontally across the federal government. DoD also values its engagem ent with stakeholders in the private sector, with nonprofit organizations, and with other elements of the public.

As part of this effort to build capacity at the national level, the Department seeks to develop a more comprehensive approach to assessing its o wn preparedness capabilities and to contribute to the development of domestic capabilities acro ss the interagency. Developing an integrated strategy for DoD preparedness would better align ongoing DoD efforts with broader initiatives by interagency partners now under way.

While national consequence management plans and capabilities have been significantly improved in recent years, plans and policies focused on preventing imminent events
inside the United States are less well developed. On a daily basis, federal, state, and local authorities are together engaged in a wide range of ongoing prevention activities, and these regular interactions are very
effective. It is less clear how these different organizations will and should interact if there are strong and credib le indications of an imminent attack about which little is known. The Department of Defense plans to work closely w ith its interagency partners to better understand the challenges associated with preventing future attacks, including clarifying U.S. Airmen assigned to the 304t h Rescue Squadron, Portland Air National Guard Base, Ore., talk wearing gas masks before entering an area to recover simulated inju red civilians during an exercise simulating the detonation of a "dirty bomb" near Portland. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman John Hughel.STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

71 Quadrennial Defense Review Report federal roles and responsibilities as well as iden tifying what additional technical capabilities may be needed, particularly in the areas of wide-area search, interdiction, and attribution of attacks.

Finally, the Department of Defense will con tinue to advocate for an improved interagency strategic planning process that makes optimal use of all national instrume nts of statecraft. The complexity of 21st century conflicts demands th at the U.S. government significantly improve interagency comprehensive assessments, an alysis, planning, and execution for whole-ofgovernment operations, including systems to monito r and evaluate those operations in order to
advance U.S. national interests. One solution is to allocate additional resources across the government and fully implement the National Sec urity Professional (NSP) program to improve cross-agency training, education, and professional experience opportunities. This will help foster a common approach to strategic and opera tional planning and implementation, improving prospects for success in future contingencies.72 Quadrennial Defense Review Report73 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

A centerpiece of this defense strategy is its focus on reforming how th e Department operates. Our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and th e projections of a com plex future environment demand more agile, innovative, and strea mlined processes and institutions. As past administrations have learned, successful reform in these areas is difficult, and ongoing efforts are at different stages of maturity. The Department’s persistence in these areas over the next several years will be critical to prevent reversion to old ways of doing business— approaches that inhibit our forces in the field. The QDR focused on four specific issues where reform is imperative: security assistance, defense acquisition, the defe nse industrial base, and energy security and climate change. 

### Reforming Security Assistance

U.S. security is inextricably tied to
the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity. The value of programs to build partner capacity extends well beyond conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq—indeed, as outlined earlier in the report, conducting such efforts before conflicts become serious can help mitigate them or even prevent them in the first place. Despite anincreased emphasis on the capacitybuilding mission over the past few years, America’s efforts remain constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period.

Although security assistance is not new, what ha s fundamentally changed is the role that such assistance can play in providing security in today’s environment. Threats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will increasingly featur e challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and extends security to areas we cannot reach
alone. U.S. Army Capt. Michael Harrison and Pakistani army Capt. Fahad discuss continued cooperation and in formation sharing along the Nawa Pass, a border separating Afghanistan's Kunar province and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Matthew C. Moeller.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

74 Quadrennial Defense Review Report In part because our security assistance arch itecture was designed to support long-term relationships to help resist a Cold War adver sary, processes for making decisions and getting
resources to the field can take months or—m ore often—years. As a result, there has been constant pressure to develop special legisl ative and procedural workarounds. We have an enduring need to build future coalitions and help partners address their own indigenous challenges, and we need the right tools positioned beforehand rather than having to respond from scratch to each contingency or systemic failur e. We have historically underinvested in these capabilities; now is the time to build on lessons learned and institutionalize them to better position the United States for a complex future.

Many of our authorities and structures assume a neat divide between defense, diplomacy, and development that simply does not exist. For exam ple, well-trained security forces are of limited utility, or indeed can even be counterproductiv e, without the institutional systems and processes to sustain them or the governa nce and regulatory frameworks to hold them accountable to civilian oversight and the rule of law. We have ga ined a new appreciation of the security sector— which includes the defense and criminal justice sectors, government management and oversight bodies, and civil society—as a system of syst ems that demands interagency partnerships. Developing the security sector requires compr ehensive, whole-of-government programs and activities, but the current patchwork of authorities incentivizes piecemeal, stovepiped approaches. Solving this problem will require the recognition w ithin our government that security is a shared responsibility and that our programs and processes must reflect that reality.

Many adjustments to improve security sector assi stance have been limited in scope, duration, and resources. As a result, the combatant commanders lack sufficient tools to support their theater campaign plans and their assigned mission to b uild partner capacity. These missions may require DoD to play a lead or supporting role, in coordina tion with relevant U.S. civilian agencies, and may range from the wholesale reconstitution of sec urity forces within a major stability operation, to fulfilling urgent train-and-e quip requirements for a partner confronting serious security challenges, to supporting civilian agencies in the rebuilding of a state’s capacity to deliver essential services to vulnerable popula tions and provide access to justice.

The United States has developed so me important tools to meet many of its most pressing needs, and is taking steps to lay the groundwork fo r additional reforms. In 2009, the Administration worked with Congress to create the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and extend Section 1206 “Global Train-and-Equip” authority to suppo rt coalition operations—facilitating increased contributions to Afghanistan. The Department is also pursuing efforts to build the ministerial capacity of partners in order to sust ain their operational investments.

Equally significant, the Administration has in the past year initiated a comprehensive review of security sector assistance, overseen by the Na tional Security Council. This review will identifyREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

75 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and elevate security assistance i ssues for senior leadership, and it will examine related roles, missions, authorities, and resources.

The Department of Defense continues to make key internal adjustments as well. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has launched a global review of security cooperation manning to ensure that our manpower reflects requirements. The Department is taking steps to improve the process of implementing foreign military sale s to make the requirements, definition, and procurement processes more efficient. The Milita ry Departments have made strides toward improving doctrine, education, and training for U. S. service personnel engaged in these activities.

But we can and must do more. The Department is also exploring how to make changes to our personnel, organizations, and processes to deve lop and track qualified personnel for capacitybuilding activities, and develop critical enablers su ch as language, regional, and cultural skills. We are also reviewing our organizations and processe s, identifying the capabilities necessary to improve how requirements are defined and to dete rmine the balance of such capabilities required both at the combatant commands and in supporting DoD organizations.

The Department will continue to work with it s interagency partners and with Congress in developing new and innovative approaches to reforming security sector assistance. Some warfighter needs are urgent, and meeting them should proceed alongside broader reform efforts. Of particular importance are the Commander’s Emer gency Response Program, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, whose continued funding is critical to success in Iraq and Afghanistan. To enhance fl exibility, the Departme nt’s Global Train-andEquip authority has now been extended to coalit ion activities. Further, to avoid procurement and contracting delays, the Departme nt will take steps to establis h a Defense Coalition Acquisition Fund, which would allow the U.S. government to maintain an inventory of items commonly needed by partners. The Department will also seek authority to e xpedite support services for the provision of training and equipment—accelerating and improving the delivery of equipment to partners—when it is in our national security interest to do so.

Preventing conflict, stabilizing crises, and building security sector capacity are essential elements of America’s national security approach. Success in convincing partners to pursue shared national security objectives, often at great political and physical risks, ultimately depends on proving that the United States is a reliable partner. We must recognize that security sector assistance is a resource-intensive mission that requires focused, efficient, and predictable funding as well as adequate authorities to provide the right assist ance at the right time to the right people. 

### Reforming How We Buy

Another pressing institutional challenge faci ng the Department is acquisitions—broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services an d manage the taxpayers’ money. Today, theREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

76 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Department’s obligation to defend and advance America’s national interests by, in part, exercising prudent financial stew ardship continues to be encumber ed by a small set of expensive weapons programs with unrealistic requirements, cost and schedule overruns, and unacceptable performance.

Over several decades and across multiple administr ations, the Pentagon’s acquisition system has developed four major problems that hamper our ability to acquire c ritical platforms and capabilities in a timely manner and at acceptable cost.

First, the requirements for new syst ems are too often set at the fa r limit of curre nt technological boundaries. Such ambition can sometimes help produce breakthrough developments that can significantly extend America’s technological edge. But far too often the re sult is disappointing initial performance followed by chronic cost and schedule overruns. The Department and the nation can no longer afford the quixotic pursuit of high-tech perf ection that incurs unacceptable cost and risk. Nor can the Department afford to chase requirements that shift or continue to increase throughout a program’s life cycle.

Second, the Pentagon’s acquisition workforce has b een allowed to atrophy, exacerbating a decline in the critical skills necessary for effective oversi ght. For example, over the past ten years, the Department’s contractual obligations have nearly tripled while our acquisit ion workforce fell by more than 10 percent. The Department also has great difficulty hiring qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years th e Department has operated with vacancies in key acquisition positions averaging fr om 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force. There remains an urgent need for technicall y trained personnel—cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition managers— to conduct effective oversight.

Third, our system of defining requirements an d developing capability too often encourages reliance on overly optimistic co st estimates. In order for the Pentagon to produce weapons systems efficiently, it is critical to have bu dget stability—but it is impossible to attain such stability in DoD’s modernization budgets if we continue to underestimate the cost of such systems from the start. We must demand cost , schedule, and performance realism in our acquisition process, and hold industry and ourselve s accountable. We must also ensure that only essential systems are procured, particularly in a resource-constrained environment. There are too many programs under way. We cannot afford ever ything we might desire; therefore, in the future, the Department mus t balance capability portfolios to be tter align with budget constraints and operational needs, based on priorities assigned to warfighter capabilities.

Fourth, effective and efficient delivery of logistic al support to our men and women in the field is an enduring priority and an area where contin ued improvements must be made. DoD is working to improve the integration of joint logistics to provide operational commanders with the flexibility and sustainability requir ed to better support unity of effort within the joint force andREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

77 Quadrennial Defense Review Report between multinational, interagency, and nongovernmental elements. Wartime innovations in logistics rules, tools, and processes havehelped support high levels of longterm deployments, and has enhanced operational freedom of
action. The combatant commanders and military departments are integrating operational contract support (OCS) into the adaptive planning process and institutionalizing common operational contracting approaches to provide more responsive su pport for current operations an d pre-planned, rapidly deployable contracted support for future contingencies. U. S. Transportation Command is spearheading efforts to improve distribution servic e levels across the full spectrum of operations in order both to improve end-to-end supply cha in velocity and to reduce supply chain costs, ultimately providing better support for our people in harm’s way.

To help in overcoming these challenges and to institutionalize ongoing innovations, President Obama signed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) into law on May 22, 2009. The goal of this important new statute is to improve acquisition outcomes in the Department, with specific emphasis on majo r defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major automated information systems (MAISs). In signin g the act, the President stated that the legislation is designed to “limit cost overruns befo re they spiral out of control. It will strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing official s who will be charged with closely monitoring the weapons systems that we’re purcha sing to ensure that costs are controlled.” The law also will substantially improve the oversi ght of major weapons acquisition programs, while helping to put MDAPs on a sound footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in the early phases of the acquisition process. To achieve these goals and to improve how we acquire and field critical capabilities for today’s wars and tomorrow’s challenges, th e Department is undertaking a far-reaching set of reforms.

Developing our people: To operate effectively, the acquisit ion system must be supported by an appropriately sized cadre of ac quisition professionals with th e right skills and training to successfully perform their jobs. To address personne l deficiencies, we will increase the number of acquisition personnel by 20,000 positions by 2015. We will continue to significantly enhance Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gate s meets with plant workers during a tour of an aircraft production facility in Fort Worth, Tex., on Aug. 31, 2009. DoD photo by Cherie Cullen.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

78 Quadrennial Defense Review Report training and retention programs in order to bols ter the capability and size of the acquisition
workforce.

Ensuring integrity in the acquisition process: Since early decisions and estimates greatly influence a program’s eventual success or failure, the Depa rtment is focusing on strengthening the front end of the acquisition process. We will ensure that all major progr ams are subjected to an early and clear definition of approved requirements base d on a rigorous assessment of alternatives. To reduce technical risk, we will conduct a comprehensive design review, including independent reviews, to certify that the technologies involved are sufficiently mature before any program can progress to the costly final phase—engineer ing and manufacturing development. We will use competitive prototypes, when doing so is cost-effec tive and in the interest of national security objectives. As we subject our acquisition proc ess to more rigorous assessment, we must be mindful that in some cases the Department must accept some risk in order to field a capability that is needed for ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere.

Bolstering cost analysis: The Department is undertaking several in itiatives to strengthen our cost analysis capabilities in line with the goals of rece nt legislation. We are i ncreasing our reliance on independent analyses in order to ensure that de cisions on acquisition and logistics programs are
based on the most realistic cost estimates possible. We are expanding the Department’s independent cost assessment capabilities and ar e modernizing the cost and price analysis training that DoD personnel receive. To strengthen our co st databases and make costs more visible, we are improving contractor dat a reporting of actual costs, early systems engineering and development planning, earned value management, and pricing information. The more robust data gleaned from contractor reports will enab le more continuous monitoring of program execution and facilitate improvements in the requirements-establishment and contracting processes of the Department. Finally, we w ill improve the transparency of cost estimates, establish a more rigorous quality assurance program, and report annually to Congress on the Department’s cost- es timating activities.

Improving program execution: Beyond ensuring that acquisition efforts begin on the right track, the Department must also continue to strengthen the execution phase of weapons development programs by pursuing several avenues:

 Begin to employ fixed-price development co ntracts more frequently when appropriate.

 Constrain the tendency to add requirements to programs by employing the Configuration Steering Boards previously endorsed by Congress.

 Demonstrate critical technologies and prove concepts by creating competitive prototypes prior to initiating engineering an d manufacturing development.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

79 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  Certify technology maturity through inde pendent reviews and technology readiness

assessments.

 Develop more accurate technical baselines by applying disciplined systems engineering throughout the life cycle.

 Conduct realistic integrated testing to iden tify system problems as early as possible. When necessary, so as not to slow the fielding of urgently needed systems, the Department will conduct fielding in parallel with testing to a ssess safety and identify system capabilities and
limitations.

 Better align profitability with performance by linking contract fee structures with contractor performance, rigorously examining se rvice-based contracts to ensure that fees are properly earned, eliminating the use of no-bid contracts whenever possible, and ensuring that multiyear contract s are limited to instances in which real, substantial savings are accrued to the taxpayer.

 Achieve effective life cycle cost managemen t by employing readiness-based sustainment strategies, facilitated by stable and robust government-industry partnerships.

In short, we need to match requirements with mature technologies, ma intain a disciplined systems engineering approach, integrated with compre hensive testing, and avoid sacrificing cost and schedule for promises of improved performance.

Lowering military health systems cost: The Department spends about $50 billion annually for health care for active duty personnel, their depend ents, and retirees. More than half of this care is bought from the private sector. In addition, s upplies and medical equipme nt are purchased from the private sector to support mi litary treatment facilities and de ployed medical forces around the world. DoD continues to review the costs of providing health care in an effort to identify
efficiencies that can reduce co st growth while sustaining hig h-quality care. Such efficiencies include the following:

 Implementing targeted initiatives to recover overpayments and fraudulent, abusive, or wasteful payments from healthcare providers.

 Standardizing medical/surgical supply chain s. The Department should develop and implement leading private-sector supply chain processes to obtain the best medical products at the best prices.

In addition to the health care efficiencies identi fied above, the Department intends to continue to develop health care initiatives for the 2012 Program Review that will improve the quality and standard of care, while reducing growth in overa ll costs. These initiatives will be fully aligned with the military health system’s “Quadrupl e Aim”—a simultaneous balance of increasedREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

80 Quadrennial Defense Review Report readiness, improved health of th e population we serve, enhanced patient experience of care (including quality, access, and reliability), and re sponsibly managed per capita cost of care—as
described in the Military Health System Strategic Plan

. In sum, the Department must work to further reform how it does business and eliminate those challenges that hinder our success: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process , parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, unnecessary budget churn and instability, and sometimes adversarial relationships within th e Pentagon and with other parts of the government. We will continue to work within the Department and w ith Congress to improve our acquisition and procurement processes in order to better meet our obligation to be good stewards of the AllVolunteer Force and of the investments that all Americans make to ensure our common defense. 

### Institutionalizing Rapid Acquisition Capability

America’s current and future adversaries will make innovative use of readily available emerging and commercial technologies and employ asymmetric tactics to disrupt the superiority of U.S. military power. The QDR outlines a number of enhancements to rebalance the fo rce consistent with defense priorities and to better prepar e our forces for the challenges ahead.

The Department must not only prepare for those threats we can anticipate, but also build the agile, adaptive and innovative structures capable of quickly identifying emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary priorities to rapidly field capabilities that will mitigate those gaps.

Reforming how we buy the goods
and services that will enable U.S. forces to succeed is critical, but acquisition is only part of the process that delivers urgently needed capability to the field. The ability to quickly respond to urgent needs involves three main components: de ciding what you need (requirements), providing adequate resources to buy it (p rogramming and budgeting), and assessing alternatives and executing a solution (acquisition). In addition to acquisition improvem ents, the Department needs a means to quickly prioritize and quantify re quirements and to ensure that the resources are available to enable rapid fielding of ca pabilities inside of the Department’s Planning Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) cycle. All components must ensure U.S. Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Tyreek Hayward lays coil to rewind a motor in the machine shop aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman, Nov. 9, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Robert Winn.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

81 Quadrennial Defense Review Report that throughout the process, appropriate priority is placed on delivering timely and sufficient capabilities to meet the urgent needs of operational commanders.

To prepare the Department for the complex threats that will surely emerge in the future, we need to make our “deliberate” processes more agile and capable of responding to urgent needs. During periods of conflict, in the traditional risk area s of cost, schedule, and performance, “schedule” often becomes the least acceptable risk.

Through robust analysis employing a variety of approaches, our research and development community must continually assess the threat of emerging and commercially available technology and ensure that our technology needed to counte r these threats is mature before they materialize in a disruptive way. 

### Strengthening the Industrial Base

In order for the Department of Defense to develo p, field, and maintain high-quality equipment, it must rely on a robust and capable defense indu stry. Indeed, America’s industrial capacity and capability made victory in World War II possib le, maintained the technological edge against the Soviet Union, and today helps ensure that our mil itary personnel in harm’s way have the world’s best equipment and are supported by modern logistics and information systems; thus our technological advantage must be closely monitored and nurtured.

Unfortunately, the federal government as a who le and the Pentagon in particular have not adequately addressed the changes both within the industry and in the Department’s needs in the current strategic environment. The result has been that America’s defense industry has
consolidated and contracted ar ound 20th-century platforms rath er than developing the broad and flexible portfolio of systems that today’s security environment demands.

Remedying the outdated—for decades, largely hands-off—attitude toward the U.S. defense industrial base cannot be done quickly, and cha nge will require a long-t erm approach undertaken in partnership with industry and Congress. The range of products and services on which our forces depend requires that th e Department develop a more soph isticated relationship with the industrial base, one that takes into account the rapid evolution of commer cial technology, as well as the unique requirements of the Department.

Whenever possible and appropriate, the Department w ill rely on market forces to create, shape, and sustain industrial and technological capabiliti es, but we must be prepared to intervene when absolutely necessary to create and/or sustain competition, innovation, and essential industrial capabilities.

For too long the defense industry has been viewed as a monolithi c sector of the economy whose key players are made up of only the select few that are established milita ry industrial providers.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

82 Quadrennial Defense Review Report This simply is not true. The goods and services on which the Department relies reach far more deeply into the overall U.S. economy. Although some unique items are pr oduced solely for the Department, these items themselves often rely on a complex and integrated supply chain of product providers that, if strained at the second , third, and even fourth tiers, would jeopardize the ability of even the seemingly pure military industrial providers to co ntinue to support our
forces.

Many of the defense industries’ jobs that require the most irreplaceable skills reside within nonprime suppliers. Many of these small, highly specialized companies depend on the major suppliers and their unique requirem ents for their very survival. The cascading effects on them of decisions that the Department makes at the overall programmatic level must be better understood—to ensure that critical lower-tier pr oviders have the capacity to respond to these decisions, to ensure the continued supply of critical subcomponents to our defense industrial base, to ensure that critical skills are not lost, and to protect our national security from the risk of using compromised supply chains.

Moreover, the financial community has an important, and often overlooked, role to play in maintaining the health of our industrial base. From the small technology start-ups that seek venture funding to pursue new products and syst ems, to the debt markets that provide capital support as programs mature and evolve, the Departme nt must ensure that we do not take this access to capital for granted and must work to fo rm a more transparent view of our requirements and long-term investment plans.

Likewise, although innovations unique to national security often occur within the “pure-play” defense industrial base, the vast majority of i nnovative and revolutionary components, systems, and approaches that enable and sustain our te chnological advantage reside in the commercial marketplace, in small defense companies , or in America’s universities.

Therefore, the Department will wo rk to establish requirements an d pursue specific programs that take full advantage of the entire spectrum of the industrial base at our disposal: defense firms, purely commercial firms, and the increasing ly important sector of those innovative and technologically advanced firms and institu tions that fall some where in between.

The Department will also work to adopt a more integrated approach that can improve our ability to identify potential single points of failure or co ncern earlier in the acq uisition process, and will establish a more comprehensive and, when approp riate, interagency approach to industrial policy
and industrial base issues.

Our engagement with industry does not mean th e Department of Defense will underwrite sunset industries or prop up poor busi ness models. It does mean that the Department will create anREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

83 Quadrennial Defense Review Report environment in which our industries, a foundation of our nation’s strength, can thrive and compete in the global marketplace.

As we take steps to revitalize our defense industria l base, we also recognize the value of our allies and their defense industrial capacities. We will co ntinue to value our allies’ capabilities, ensure that when they bid on U.S. contracts that they are treated fairly, just as we expect our firms to be treated fairly in international competitions, an d deepen our collaborative effort to innovate against 21st century threats.

In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advanta ge well into the future, the Department and our nation require a consistent , realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense indust rial base. Toward this end, the Department is committed to being more forward leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base— refocusing our efforts on our future needs, not just our past performance; working much more closely with the Services to foster an integrat ed approach to the overall industrial base; and placing transparency and dialogue with indu stry at the forefront of our agenda. 

### Reforming the U.S. Export Control System

Today’s export control system is a relic of the Cold War and must be adapted to address current threats. The current system impedes cooperation, te chnology sharing, and in teroperability with allies and partners. It does not allow for adequate enforcement mechanisms to detect export violations, or penalties to deter such abuses. Moreover, our overly complicated syst em results in significant interagency delays that hinder U.S. industrial competitiveness and cooperation with
allies.

The United States has made continuous increm ental improvements to its export control system, particularly in adding controls against the prolifer ation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The United States has also been a leader in international export controls, creating and improving the multilate ral regimes made up of U.S. allies and trading partners that control what is exported to countries of concern to the United States. The regimes also have become a global control standard via United Na tions Security Council resolutions. They help ensure that key technologies and items available in numerous countries are controlled in order to prevent their acquisition by actors who would use them contrary to U.S. and allied interests.

However, the current system is la rgely out-dated. It was designed when the U.S. economy was largely self-sufficient in developing technologies and when we controlled the manufacture of items from these technologies for national secu rity reasons. Much of th e system protected an extensive list of unique technologies and items that , if used in the development or production of weapons by the former Soviet Union, would pose a na tional security threat to the United States.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

84 Quadrennial Defense Review Report The global economy has changed, with many countries now possessing advanced research, development, and manufacturing capabilities. Mo reover, many advanced technologies are no longer predominantly developed fo r military applicatio ns with eventual transition to commercial uses, but follow the exact opposite course. Yet, in the name of controllin g the technologies used in the production of advanced conventional weap ons, our system continues to place checks on many that are widely available and remains de signed to control such items as if Cold War economic and military-to-commercia l models continued to apply.

The U.S. export system itself poses a potential na tional security risk. It s structure is overly complicated, contains too many redundancies, and tries to protect too much. Today’s export control system encourages foreign cu stomers to seek foreign suppliers and U.S. companies to seek foreign partners not subject to U.S. export cont rols. Furthermore, the U.S. government is not adequately focused on protecting those key technol ogies and items that should be protected and ensuring that potential adversa ries do not obtain technical data crucial for the production of sophisticated weapons systems.

These deficiencies can be solved only through fundamental reform. The President has therefore directed a comprehensive review tasked with identifying reforms to enhance U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic security intere sts. Reform efforts must reflect an inherently interagency process as current expo rt control authorities rest w ith other departments. Similarly, meaningful reforms will not be possible without congressional involvement throughout the process. The Department of Defense has a vital stak e in fundamental reform of export controls, and will work with our interagency partners and Congress to ensure that a new system fully
addresses the threats that the United States will face in the future. 

### Crafting a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy

Climate change and energy are two key issues that will play a significant role in shaping the future security environment. A lthough they produce distinct types of challenges, climate change, energy security, and economic stability are inex tricably linked. The actions that the Department takes now can prepare us to respond effectively to these challenges in the near term and in the
future.

Climate change will affect DoD in two broad ways. First, climate change will shape the operating environment, roles, and missions that we unde rtake. The U.S. Global Change Research Program, composed of 13 federal agencies, reported in 2009 that climate-related changes are already being observed in every region of the world, including the United States and its coastal waters. Among these physical changes are increases in heavy downp ours, rising temperature and sea level, rapidly retreating glaciers, thawing permafrost, lengthenin g growing seasons, lengthening ice-free seasons in the oceans and on lakes and rivers, earlier snowmelt, and alterations in river flows.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

85 Quadrennial Defense Review Report Assessments conducted by the intelligence commun ity indicate that clim ate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will i ncrease the spread of disease, an d may spur or exacerbate mass migration.

While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to re spond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. In addition, extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defense support to civil
authorities for humanitarian assist ance or disaster response both within the United States and overseas. In some nations, the military is the only institution with the capa city to respond to a large-scale natural disaster. Proactive engagemen t with these countries can help build their capability to respond to such events. Working closely with relevant U.S. departments and agencies, DoD has undertaken environmental se curity cooperative initiatives with foreign militaries that represent a nonthreatening way of building trust, sharin g best practices on installations management and operations , and developing response capacity.

Second, DoD will need to adjust to the impacts of climate change on our facilities and military capabilities. The Department already provides environmental stewardship at hundreds of DoD installations throughout the
United States and around the world, working diligently to meet resource efficiency and sustainability goals as set by
relevant laws and executive orders. Although the United States has significant capacity to adapt to climate change, it will pose challenges for civil society and DoD alike, particularly in light of the nation ’s extensive coastal infr astructure. In 2008, the National Intelligence Council judged that more th an 30 U.S. military installations were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising se a levels. DoD’s operational readiness hinges on continued access to land, air, and sea training and test space. Consequently, the Department must complete a comprehensive assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate change on its missions and adapt as required. A t Fort Carson, Colo., the Army partnere d with a local energy provider in an enhanced-use lease. The energy provider built a photovoltaic solar array on top of a closed landfill. That site now provides energy to some 540 homes. U.S. Army photo.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

86 Quadrennial Defense Review Report In this regard, DoD will work to foster efforts to assess, adapt to, and mitigate the impacts of climate change. Domestically, the Department will leverage the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program, a joint effort among DoD, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop climate change assessment tools. Abroad, the Department will increase its investment in the Defense Environmental International Cooperation Program not only to promote cooper ation on environmental security issues, but also to augment international adaptation efforts. The Department will also speed innovative energy and conservation technologies from labo ratories to military end users. The Environmental Security and Technology Certification Program us es military installations as a test bed to
demonstrate and create a market for innovativ e energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies coming out of the p rivate sector and DoD and Depart ment of Energy laboratories. Finally, the Department is improvin g small-scale energy efficiency and renewable energy projects at military installations through our En ergy Conservation Investment Program.

The effect of changing climate on the Department's operating
environment is evident in the
maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in
the decades ahead which will permit seasonal commerce and transit presents a unique opportunity to work collaboratively
in multilateral foru ms to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region. In that effort, DoD
must work with the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. To support cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strong ly supports accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.

As climate science advances, the Department will regularly reevaluate climate change risks and opportunities in order to develop policies and plans to manage its effects on the Department’s operating environment, missions, and facilities. Mana ging the national security effects of climate Personnel from the University of Washington's Applied Physics Laboratory prepare to recover a torpedo from under the ice on March
2 0, 2009. DoD photo by Mass Communication Spec. First Class Tiffini M. Jones, U.S. Navy.REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

87 Quadrennial Defense Review Report change will require DoD to work collaboratively, through a whole-of-government approach, with both traditional allies and new partners.

Energy security for the Departme nt means having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. Energy efficiency can serve as a force multiplier, because it increases the range and endurance of forces in
the field and can reduce the number of combat fo rces diverted to protect energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and conventional attacks and disruptions. DoD must incorporate geostrategic and opera tional energy considerations in to force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes. To addre ss these challenges, DoD will fully implement the statutory requirement for the energy effi ciency Key Performance Parameter and fully
burdened cost of fuel set forth in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. The Department will also investigate alternative concepts for improving operational energy use, including the creation of an innovation fund administered by the new Director of Operational Energy to enable components to compete for fund ing on projects that advance integrated energy
solutions.

The Department is increasing its use of renewable energy supplie s and reducing energy demand to improve operational effectiveness, reduce gree nhouse gas emissions in support of U.S. climate change initiatives, and protect the Department from energy price fluctuations. The Military Departments have invested in noncarbon powe r sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass energy at domestic installations and in vehicles powered by alternative fuels, including hybrid power, electricity, hydrogen, and compress ed national gas. Solvin g military challenges— through such innovations as more efficient gener ators, better batteries, lighter materials, and tactically deployed energy sources—has the potentia l to yield spin-off tech nologies that benefit the civilian community as well. DoD will partne r with academia, other U.S. agencies, and international partners to research, develop, test, and evaluate new sustainable energy technologies.

Indeed, the following examples demonstrate the br oad range of Service energy innovations. By 2016, the Air Force will be postured to cost-competitively acquire 50 percent of its domestic
aviation fuel via an alternative fuel blend th at is greener than conventional petroleum fuel. Further, Air Force testing and standard-se tting in this arena paves the way for the much larger commercial aviation sector to follow. The Army is in the midst of a significant transformation of its fleet of 70,000 non-tactica l vehicles (NTVs), including the current deployment of more than 500 hybrids and the acquis ition of 4,000 low-speed electric vehicles at domestic installations to help cut fossil fuel usa ge. The Army is also exploring ways to exploit the opportunities for renewable power generation to support operational needs: for instance, the Rucksack Enhanced Portable Power System (REPPS). The Navy commissioned the USS Makin
Island , its first electric-drive surf ace combatant, and tested an F/A-18 engine on camelina-basedREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

88 Quadrennial Defense Review Report biofuel in 2009—two key steps to ward the vision of deploying a “green” carrier strike group using biofuel and nuclear power by 2016. The Marine Corps has created an Expeditionary Energy Office to address operational energy risk, and its Energy Assessment Team has identified ways to achieve efficiencies in today’s highly ener gy-intensive operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to reduce logistics and re lated force protection requirements.

To address energy security wh ile simultaneously enhancing mission assurance at domestic facilities, the Department is fo cusing on making them more resilient. U.S. forces at home and abroad rely on support from installations in th e United States. DoD will conduct a coordinated energy assessment, prioritize critic al assets, and promote investme nts in energy efficiency to ensure that critical installations are adequately prepared for prolonged o utages caused by natural disasters, accidents, or attacks. At the same time, the Department will also take steps to balance energy production and transmission with the require ment to preserve the test and training ranges and the operating areas that are needed to maintain readiness.89 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## A DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

The depth, scope, and scale of activities that th e Department of Defense undertakes every day are unparalleled. From employing forces in operat ions around the world, to providing education, health care, and housing for our people, to researching, developing, testing, and fielding new technologies, the Department has a unique set of global responsibilities.

As described earlier, defense strategy requires making choices: accepting and managing risk is thus inherent in everything the Department does . Although difficult, risk management is central to effective decision-making and is vital to ou r success. For our nation, it can mean the difference between victory and defeat; for our men and women in uniform and their families, such decisions have life-and-death consequences. That is why the Department is focused so centrally on rebalancing our capabilities and reforming our institutions to better enable success in today’s wars while preparing for a wide range of contingencies.

Effectively managing risk across such a vast en terprise is difficult; th e range and volume of component activities and competencies defy simple identification, categorization, and aggregation of risk. Moreover, a dynamic securit y environment requires the Department to be
flexible and diminishes the value of formulaic ri sk assessments. Taken together, the challenges associated with measuring risk and performance re legate the use of quan titative metrics to an important but supporting role: in any risk a ssessment, DoD necessarily places a premium on informed judgment at all echelons of command.

In assessing risk for this QDR, the Departme nt used a multidisci plinary approach. The assessment reflects updated thinking on best practices, which increasingly not only draws on quantitative analysis, but also re lies on informed judgments, expert opinions, and the use of scenarios. The Department ensured that its risk assessment was strategy dr iven. Our efforts were informed by recent risk identification e fforts conducted by various components of the Department, including the DoD Inspector Gene ral and by the Government Accountability
Office. 5

5 The GAO produces an annual list of high-risk management issues in the U.S. government, and in 2009 eight applied to DoD: supply chain management, weapon systems acquisition, contract management, financial management, business systems modernization, support infrastructure management, approach to business transformation, and the Personnel Security Clearance Program. The DoD Inspector General summary of management and performance challeng es for FY 2009 also identified eight risk areas for the Department: financial management; acquisition process and contract management; joint warfighting and readiness; information assurance, security, and privacy; health care; equipping and tr aining Iraqi and Afghan security forces; the nuclear enterprise; and the Am erican Recovery and Reinvestment Act.A DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

90 Quadrennial Defense Review Report As a framework to organize its assessment, th e 2010 QDR used risk categories, described below, that have been employed since 2001:

 Operational risk: the ability of the current force to execute strategy successfully within acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs. Consideration of operational risk requires assessing the Department’s ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near term.

 Force management risk: our ability to recruit, retain, train, educate, and equip the AllVolunteer Force, and to sustain its readiness and morale. This requires the Department to examine its ability to provide trained and ready personnel in the near term, midterm, and long term.

 Institutional risk: the capacity of management and business practices to plan for, enable, and support the execution of DoD missions. It encompasses the ability to develop effective and efficient organizations and proce sses over the near term, midterm, and long

term.

 Future challenges risk: the Department’s capacity to execute future missions successfully, and to hedge against shocks. Here most consider ation is given to the Department’s ability to field superior capabilities and sufficient capa city to deter/defeat emerging threats in the midterm and long term.

Ongoing efforts to rebalance the joint force, including those taken during the course of this QDR, help better position DoD not on ly to prevail across a range of missions but to do so in the challenging current and likely future security environment. However, existing and emerging issues could complicate the Department’s ability to execute the defense strategy. Therefore, on the basis of an enterprise-wide review, this QDR ri sk assessment identifies those key shortfalls or complex problems that threaten the Departme nt’s ability to successfully execute its priority objectives, and that consequently require the su stained attention of DoD’s senior leadership. 

### Operational Risk

Key issues that pose risk to operational mission s in the near term include providing sufficient enabling capabilities, building partnership capa city, and securing DoD systems in cyberspace.

A failure to provide sufficient enablers would co nstrain ongoing operatio ns in multiple ways and would constitute particular risk to achieving the ne ar-term goals of prevailing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Key capability enablers are currently stre ssed and will remain so in the near- to midterm environment because they play a critical and potentially growing role in ongoing operations. Examples detailed previously includ e intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), vertical lift and associated logistics assets, electronic warf are, and language and culture skills, along withA DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

91 Quadrennial Defense Review Report special operations forces enablers. DoD contin ues to work toward filling persistent gaps. Drawing on the results of the QDR’s analysis, the Department has identified enabling capabilities that are useful in a wide range of operations and intends to make continued investments in them. But despite these efforts to reduce stress on enablers across the FYDP, this risk could worsen over time given the projected demands in the future security environment.

Allies and both international and interagency part ners are critical to success in meeting today’s security challenges. Overseas, the inability or u nwillingness of international partners to support shared goals or provide access wo uld place additional operational risk on U.S. forces and would threaten our ability to prevail in current or future conflicts. Building the de fense capacity of allies and partners and ensuring that the
U.S. Armed Forces are able to effectively train and operate with foreign militaries is a high-priority mission. As the emphasis on developing the capability of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects, conducting security force assistance (SFA) operations is an increasingly critical element of building partnership capacity. In anticipation of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. strategy and operations, the Department is institutionalizing general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance; enhancing language, regional, and c ultural abilities; streng thening and expanding capabilities for training partner aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training; and creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel. Working with interagency partners and with Congress, DoD is also exploring how to improve the ways in which security assistance funds are authorized and overseen w ithin the executive branch to
enhance their effectiveness in s upporting national security goals.

A failure by the Department to se cure its systems in cyberspace wo uld pose a fundamental risk to our ability to accomplish defense missions today and in the future . Attacks in cyberspace could target command and control systems and the cy berspace infrastructure supporting weapons system platforms. To ensure unfettered access to cyberspace, DoD mission-critical systems and networks must perform and be resilient in the face of cyberspace attacks. The recent U.S. Navy Chief Explosive Ordnan ce Disposal Technician Kenneth Simpson, right, discusses disposal techniques with Philippine Chie f Inspector Eric Maniego, with th e National Police Maritime Group Special Reaction Unit, at Crow Valley, Philippines, March 25, 2 009. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spec. 2 nd Class Aaron Burden.A DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

92 Quadrennial Defense Review Report establishment of U.S. Cyber Command is a critic al step forward. In addition, the Department is taking steps to identify missio n-critical command and control systems and networks, examining how best to further protect them, and explo ring ways to develop operational approaches and logistics that better address potent ial vulnerabilities. The Departmen t is also actively participating in a broader interagency approach for securing cyberspace, including the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). To en sure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly trained and equipped to counter this threat, the Department must develop and maintain the ability to accurately assess the performance of netwo rk-enabled information systems in realistic
threat environments. 

### Force Management Risk

Key issues in force management include suppo rting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, providing health care to DoD personnel, and ensuring the proper mix and roles of the Active Component and Reserve Component.

The scale and duration of concurrent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are placing a
considerable strain on individual service members and their families, on the overall health of the All-Volunteer Force, and on our ability to rese t and reconstitute it. Because it has been engaged in war for eight years, the Department has been unable to maintain desired deployment to dwell ratios. In the near term to midterm, this hi gh operational tempo requires DoD to pay extra attention to the well-being of our service members, their families, and institutions. The Department is continually meas uring rates of suicide and divorce, among a range of other indicators, to identify strains on the health of the force. DoD assesses these data against national benchmarks and Service-specific trends. Although th e Department is curren tly meeting its targets for recruitment and retention, for instance, we continue to closely monitor these numbers. The drawdown in Iraq, coupled with increased requirements in Afghanistan, will dictate the pace of
movement toward more sustainable dwell rates. Demand for support, however, is an enduring
need that will not end with withdrawal of servic e members from combat. It is critical that an extensive, institutional ized system of support fo r the All-Volunteer Forc e be strengthened and sustained. The Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, which seeks to place equal importance on mental and physical fitness, is one initiative toward that end. Similarly, the Marine Corps’ Combat Operational Stress Control Program aims at equipping leaders with the skills to identify and address signs of stress. In the midterm to long term, the Department’s new force-sizing construct and its approach to planning and executing operations will seek to better
account for the demands made on the All-Volun teer Force by long-d uration operations.

Over the long term, rising costs and continuing pressures threaten the Department’s approach to providing high-quality health care to members of the U.S. Armed Forces, veterans, and their dependents. Although achievement of this objec tive is not at immediate risk, an increasingA DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

93 Quadrennial Defense Review Report number of military health system users, steady co st shares/co-pays, and congressionally mandated benefit increases have all increased the Depa rtment’s health care costs well beyond the programmed budget. Continued engagement in long -duration operations and a growing number of veterans approaching 65 years of age will fu rther increase DoD costs. DoD continues to identify efficiencies that can reduce cost growth while sustaining high-quality care.

The critical contribution made by the Reserve Component in recent years—currently 25 to 30 percent of U.S. Central Command forces—has led to increased capability and heightened readiness. Significant reductions in use of the RC following the drawdown in Iraq and efforts to reset the force will necessitate a thorough assessment of RC readiness and future roles. The Department has already initiated se veral studies examining issues associated with employing the RC on a routine, rotational basis as part of the total operational force, changing the AC/RC mix, and/or changing the role of the RC. Drawing on this work, the Department will explore the potential to redefine the role of the RC for both domestic and overseas operations.



### Institutional Risk

Key issues that pose institutional risk includ e reforming general acquis ition processes, optimizing information technology acquisition processes, and maintaining the defense industrial base.

Shortcomings in the acquisition process put the Depa rtment at risk of being unable to deliver the capabilities it needs, when it needs them, and at acceptable costs, and these potential failures in
turn threaten the successful execut ion of military operations. The Department’s acquisition and support processes have rightly received consistent criticism for delays, cost growth, an overstretched workforce, and other inefficiencies . Given the importance of a healthy acquisition process, we must not embark on programs with a rtificially low cost estimates, immature designs and technology, fluid requirements, excessive te chnical authority certification requirements, unstable budgets, and unsustainable procurem ent profiles. The Decemb er 2008 release of DoD Directive 5000.02, “Operation of th e Defense Acquisition System,” seeks to mitigate key risks associated with the acquisition process. The De partment will closely tra ck implementation of new policies instituted by the directive aime d at ensuring more rigorous assessment of alternatives, competitive prototyping, more frequent and effective program reviews, the prevention of requirements creep, independent a ssessment of “technology readiness,” and better methods of testing and evaluation. We must also ensure that the Department is able to rapidly create prototypes and field new capabilities, maxi mizing its ability to meet warfighter needs and leverage technological advantages. By 2015, the Department also plans to hire 20,000 new acquisition professionals, filling 9,000 new jobs and 11,000 converted contractor positions.

The Department’s deliberate acquisition process is especially poorly suited for keeping pace with innovations in information technology (IT). The inab ility to acquire powerful IT solutions in an economical manner hampers the Department’s efforts to use information as a force multiplier toA DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

94 Quadrennial Defense Review Report ensure and enhance agility, flexibility, responsi veness, and effectivene ss. This results in an enduring missed opportunity to be nefit more fully from DoD, interagency, and international IT capabilities. The Department must reform th e IT acquisition process, drawing on successful commercial practices, with a view to accelerating the acquisition cycle.

The Department’s need for a robust defense industrial base with a ppropriate levels of competition, innovation, and industrial capacity represents another area of institutional risk. Since World War II, the U.S. defense industry has consolidated and contracted around 20th century platforms. The U.S. defense industry is , accordingly, not well-positioned to meet the Department’s 21st century requirements. This create s risk that extends not only to the relatively small number of major, establis hed providers of defense platforms but also to a much larger community of product providers. Working closely with international partners and industry, the Department will strive to bett er ensure that its future re quirements can be met. Such an approach should not, however, include underwriting sunset industries or sust aining poor business models—courses of action that simply exacerbate risk to the equippin g of the U.S. military. 

### Future Challenges Risk

Preceding sections highlighted numerous cha llenges and opportunities in the security environment. Other major issues that pose future challenges include managing uncertainty about the future environment and science and technology (S&T) trends.

Difficulties in anticipating the na ture of the future security enviro nment create the risk that the Department may not be adequately prepared for th reats that materialize over the midterm to long term. To better hedge against the uncertain ty inherent in long-term defense planning, the Department drew on a wide range of analyse s—including the use of multiple scenarios and combinations of scenarios—to inform its ju dgments for this QDR. DoD also benefited from analysis on the likely future security environme nt produced by the U.S. intelligence community. DoD intends to further refine this analytic pr ocess, making it more iterative and adaptive, and leveraging the results of experimentation and a lternative futures analysis to enhance efforts to manage future risk.

A number of factors related to research and deve lopment will, over time, generate increased risk to America’s technological edge. As global research and development (R&D) investment increases, it is proving increasi ngly difficult for the United Stat es to maintain a competitive advantage across the entire spectrum of defense techno logies. Even at current, relatively robust levels of investment, the DoD S&T program is struggling to keep pace with the expanding challenges of the evolving security environment an d the increasing speed and cost of global technology development. The Departm ent’s options for managing risk with respect to S&T must be synchronized with efforts by other agencies as well as the private sector. The health of the U.S. R&D base is well beyond the mission of an in dividual department; it is also driven byA DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

95 Quadrennial Defense Review Report commercial and academic interests beyond the d irect influence of DoD spending. To assure future technology competence, the Department w ill continue to be a leading proponent of education standards and opportunities relevant to the technology re quirements to enhance national security. The Department will consider the scope and po tential benefits of an R&D strategy that prioritizes those ar eas where it is vital to mainta in a technological advantage. This effort will be coupled with further work to a ssess how best to work with the academy and industry, as well as key intern ational allies to leverage breakth roughs and avoid duplication. 

### Strategic, Military, and Political Risk

In the face of ongoing war and a range of pressing current and future challenges, the United States requires a defense strategy and portfolio of military resources that can help protect and
advance the nation’s interests. To create and maintain the right mix of forces and military capability, the Department must make hard, strategy-informed choices. To do so, it must determine where to invest additional resources and where to accept and manage a degree of operational, force management, institutional and future challenge risk over the near and longerterm. These judgments inform our broader consider ation of strategic, milita ry, and political risks, as required by Title 10 legislation.

In the 2010 QDR risk assessment, strategic risk co nstitutes the Department’s ability to execute the defense priority objectives in the near term, midterm, and long term in support of national security. Military risk encompasses the ability of U. S. forces to adequately resource, execute, and sustain military operations in the near- to mi dterm, and the mid- to longer term. In the international context, political risk derives from the perceived legitimacy of our actions and the resulting impact on the ability an d will of allies and partners to support shared goals. In the domestic context, political risk relates to public support of national stra tegic priorities and the associated resource requirements in the near term, midterm, and long term.

This QDR identified areas of weakness in our de fense program, presented options to mitigate them, and made recommendations on where and how to rebalance the Department toward our most pressing challenges. The risks identified in this section will requir e sustained leadership attention in order to ensure that they ar e successfully managed and mitigated. The QDR risk assessment concludes that the Department is positioned to successfully balance overarching strategic, military, and political risk between the near to midterm and the mid- to long term, as well as across the full range of military missi ons required to protect and advance national

interests.96 Quadrennial Defense Review Report97 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

## CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD

This QDR report and the preceding months of de liberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department’s key priority ob jectives, providing st rategic context and recommendations on key capability development and investment priorities; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The QDR serves as a capstone instituti onal document, shaping how th e Department of Defense will support America’s military personnel today, while building the policy and programmatic foundation that will enable the next generation to protect the American people and advance their

interests.

The challenges facing the United States are imme nse, but so are the opportunities. This QDR clarified the Secretary’s priority objectives for th e Department: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. Th e Secretary has been clear, and this report reaffirms the need to manage risk prudently acro ss these objectives in favor of prevailing in today’s wars—it has outlined in detail how the Department intends to further rebalance its capabilities and reform its ins titutions in order to do so.

Strategy-driven, this QDR provided an assessment of the strategic environment, America’s national interests and global role, the role of U.S. military power, and a comprehensive description of the Department’s strategy and the implications for capability development, key policies and authorities, and our key defense relationships at home and abroad.

This report will be used to shape and influence a series of ongoing processes and reviews that provide direction to Department of Defense comp onents. The strategic an d investment priorities described in this report reflect the Secretary’s intent as the Department continues to reform and rebalance the U.S. military to better enable success in today’s wars while preparing for
tomorrow’s threats.98 Quadrennial Defense Review Report99 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review100 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review101 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review 

## CHAIRMAN’S ASSESSMENT OF 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The QDR identifies initiatives and areas for focu s that address my top priorities: improving stability and defending our vital interests in the Middle East and South Asia, remaining good stewards for the health of the force, and balancing global strategic risk.

Winning Today’s Fight: Vital Intere sts in the Middle East and South Asia
The QDR places appropriate priority on our mission to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda globally and particularly in Afghanistan and Pakista n, and to prevent it from threatening America
and our allies in the future. We must continue to find new ways to meet the pressing needs of our forces engaged in these import ant operations as we complete a responsible drawdown in Iraq and implement the new strategy in Afghanistan.

The QDR supports investment in many critical enable rs that have been pers istently short in our inventory. Examples include rotary wing airc raft, unmanned aerial systems, counter-improvised explosive device capabilities, Special Operatio ns Forces, Civil Affairs, language and cultural expertise, and capabilities that will enable incr eased Security Force Assistance activities. The QDR also recognized the need to expand ou r electronic warfare capabilities and enhance intelligence and information operations capabilit ies. These key capabilities, as well as new technologies being explored, support flexible and effective forces for today’s fight and contribute to our readiness for operations across th e full range of milita ry operations.

I remain concerned about the nuclear ambitions and confrontational postures of Iran and North Korea. The QDR emphasizes the Pr esident’s focus on engagement and reinforces our efforts to work with allies and partners to prevent global nu clear proliferation, regardless of origin. At the same time, it addresses the need for investme nt in developing appropriate counter-WMD measures and consequence management responses. It also calls for expanding our capabilities to detect and secure uncontrolled weapons of mass destruction and related materials, as well as the
need to enhance nuclear forensics – both of which are vital to our national interests.

I applaud the QDR’s focus on rapidly providing our warfighters with essential capabilities, and I
am convinced that innovative commercial techno logy solutions and streamlined developmental efforts can and will be applied to ongoing operations.

Health of the Force
I emphatically support the QDR’s focus on preservin g and enhancing the all-volunteer force as the foundation of our military. The men and wo men of our Armed Forces, as well as their families, are America’s greatest strategic assets, and as such, we must do all we can to preserve102 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review their quality of service and honor their commitment. As we finish well in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we have the opportunity to begin resetting and reconstituting our units and, as dwell time increases, reduce stre ss on our service members and their families.

The QDR advocates important initiat ives for improving the health of the force. These initiatives will enhance warrior and survivor care and pro vide a single medical record for our service members throughout their lives. The QDR reinfo rces the urgency to increase research and treatment for a broad range of injuries, especially the signature wounds of Post Traumatic Stress and Traumatic Brain Injuries. Increased rates of combat stress, substance abuse, and suicide point to a force that is under a high degree of pressure from repeated long deployments and limited time at home. Reducing deployment time and increasing time at home, as appropriate for each component, are important for reintegrating our service members returning from a combat environment to routine activities at home. Though the force has remained incredibly resilient over the course of eight years of war, we must prioritize programs that sustain re siliency such as: child ca re facilities, quality education for children, 24/7 family support assist ance, outreach to Guard and Reserve members and their families, and referrals for non-medical counseling. By emphasizing the emotional, social, spiritual and family aspects of fitness, these health-of-the-force investments will pay dividends in national security to day and well into the future.

The Reserve Component plays a vital role in meeting our defense missions and in enabling us to manage stress on the active force. In short, we could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces. I applaud the QDR report’s commitment to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Reserve Component policies. In that review, it is important that we consider th e proper balance of maintaining the operational capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an integrated force to meet requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of
the active force.

I also strongly endorse the QDR’s efforts to addr ess joint force readiness for the full range of challenges we face. The focus is on building jo int force capability and capacity for irregular U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff reenlists ten soldiers assigned to 2/5 Stryker Brigade stationed at Forward Operating Base Frontena c in Kandahar, Afghanistan, December 17, 2009. DoD photo by Mass Communication Spec. 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley.103 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review warfare without compromising our conventional an d nuclear superiority. Although we have always retained sufficient capacity and capability to address the en tire spectrum of threats, an aggressive and sustained tempo of operations has necessitated prioritizing training and readiness for current missions over other types of operatio ns. With the drawdown in Iraq and appropriate time and resources provided for reset and reconstitution of the force, our readiness and availability to counter multiple, wide-ranging cha llenges will increase and we will move toward desired goals for force rotation. Many elements of the joint force will remain in high demand in the near term, and will continue to reset in stride between deployments. We must continue our progress towards a properly balanced force.

Reset and prepositioned stock replacement are two crucial issues for maintaining readiness. We need to reset equipment that is lost in combat and repair or replace equipment degraded by wear and tear, with full restoration not expected until years after OIF and OEF are completed. Ensuring funding for related activities, such as depo t operations, is essential for maintenance of the force. And the enormity of the equipment and unit reset challenge, as we withdraw from Iraq and increase efforts in Afghanistan, will requ ire continuous review of our joint requirements and timelines. In the mid to long term, it is impera tive that we have a robust industrial base with sufficient manufacturing capabili ty and capacity to preserve our technological edge and provide for the reset and recapital ization of our force.

Properly Balance Global Strategic Risk

My assessment of risk in the QDR is based on a realistic understanding of the security environment which remains complex, dynamic, and uncertain. While defense analysis identifies trends, it is problematic to predict the time, place, and nature of future challenges. The QDR force planning construct is properly focused on ba lancing capabilities to fight today’s wars with those needed to counter future potential adversaries. It enables us to build a ready and agile force with sufficient capacity and capability to defeat adversaries across the range of military operations. And finally, it places priority on o ur ability to defend the homeland and support civil
authorities.

We expect to be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions and environments. The QDR gives solid direction on developing capab ilities that counter the proliferation of antiaccess and area-denial threats, which present an increased challenge to our maritime, air, space, and cyber forces. Our national strategy also depe nds on our ability to rapidly project forces and resupply globally, giving us th e ability to provide our operational commanders with forces and logistics superiority when and where needed. F urthermore, while we have better organized our forces to operate in the cyber domain, the QDR highlights the need to break down institutional barriers and ensure our cyber capabilities receive the support necessary to properly provide our104 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review national security. In addition, the QDR initiate d important efforts to explore requirements involving long-range strike capabilities, enha ncing the protection of our valuable assets, accelerating the development of unmanned systems across components, and improving our integrated missile defenses. The QDR reinforces developing fl exible and adaptable regional
deterrence which includes missile defense.

I fully support the QDR’s increased emphasis on the important roles of our interagency and international partners in achieving our desired end states and helping to balance global risk. No one – and certainly no one military – can do it alone. We must strive to develop a better understanding of the roles, missions, and authorities of departments and organizations within the U.S. government and to minimize friction and duplicative efforts. This concern is particularly acute in the areas of cyber, space operations, an d homeland security where the interests of many government departments intersect. Although our joint force mus t retain the capacity to act decisively when appropriate, we prefer to part ner and work with others in major operations across a wide range of contingencies. Building the capacity of our partners to deter and prevent conflict makes them more capable of providing assistance as we address common threats together. Increasing the capacity of our partne rs and increasing the sharing of information are important national security investments. If partner s are unable to build the needed capability or capacity, however, our joint force must be able to shoulder the security burden when directed.

I strongly agree with the QDR’s vision of a global ly engaged force that supports the development of security forces and conducts necessary operatio ns against violent extremists around the world, in addition to other operations. To meet this goal, we must maintain appropriate force levels and expertise. This will require allocation of suffi cient resources to maintain the correct balance of capabilities and capacity w ithin the joint force. As we a pply resources, we will prioritize readiness and capability over capacity.

The QDR assessed regional posture requirements measured against global strategic and policy expectations. This approach leverages key capabili ties, that are prepositioned, rotational, and forward-stationed, to maximize the benefits of pre sence in a region while ensuring the capability to meet warfighting demands globally. This tail ored approach to force posture assures allies and deters potential aggressors, while maintaining a ppropriate force levels in the continental United States to support critical defens e and civil support missions at home and for expeditionary global response. Our strategy supports the development of a tailored posture in the broader Middle East and Central and South Asia, promotes a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region, and reaffirms our commitment to NATO and Europe.

Conclusion
U.S. Armed Forces can perform the missions call ed for in the QDR. Within this mission set, two strategic imperatives require ou r immediate attention. First, we must disrupt, dismantle, and105 Chairman’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan while acting against its global affiliates, and prevent its capacity to threaten the United States and ou r allies. Second, we must continue to prevent and deter conflict in strategically important r egions, including those involving Iran and North
Korea. Our success in these and other mission s depends upon obtaining sufficient, timely funding to reset the force and restore readiness and a responsible withdr awal from Iraq.

Managing risk under the new QDR force planning construct requires further analysis, including new scenarios to test joint concepts of oper ation and force mixes and the development of associated operational and strategic assumptions . Our planning and assessment efforts will vary the size, duration, and simultaneity of operations and account for associated policies and goals for force rotation, disengagement, and access to the Reserve Component.

Overall, the QDR provides an accurate depiction of our future national se curity requirements. Our challenge as a nation will be to properly resource these priorities.