1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

RYAN GERARD WALLACE,

#1835438

§

§

§

 Petitioner, §

§

v. § No. 3:22-cv-01796-L (BT)

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

§

 Respondent. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Ryan Gerard Wallace, a state prisoner, submitted a pro se filing 

attacking a state conviction, which the Court construes as a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 

F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

permits a petitioner to seek immediate or earlier release from custody). For 

the following reasons, the Court should transfer Wallace’s petition to the 

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as successive. 

I.

Wallace was convicted of sexual assault of a child in Dallas County, 

Texas, on January 5, 2007. State v. Wallace, Case No. F10-73110-R); 

https://www.dallascounty.org/criminalBackgroundSearch/defendant_det

ail?ln=07 (last visited Sep. 2, 2022); see also Ryan Gerard Wallace v. Lorie 

Davis, Case No. 3:19-cv-2524-K-BN, ECF No. 13 (N.D. Tex.). That same day, 

Case 3:22-cv-01796-L-BT Document 4 Filed 09/02/22 Page 1 of 5 PageID 14
2

Wallace was sentenced to life imprisonment. Wallace, Case No. 3:19-cv2524-K-BN, ECF No. 13. 

On August 29, 2019, Wallace filed his first petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in this Court. Id. The United States magistrate judge recommended 

that the petition be dismissed with prejudice as time barred. Id. On February 

5, 2020, the District Court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation, dismissed the petition with prejudice, 

and denied a certificate of appealability. Id., ECF Nos. 16-18. 

In the current petition, Wallace appears to argue that the Court should 

“vacate [his] void judgement, due to illegal restraint of liberty [sic] 

fundamental error.” Pet. 1 (ECF No. 3). He further argues that “slavery was 

abolished and the slave labels given to those people [sic] term property.” Id.

3. Wallace contends that when slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth 

Amendment, slave labels were also abolished. Id. 4. He further contends that 

“[t]he trial court committed fundamental errors on two seperate [sic] 

occasions.” Id. 5. Wallace suggests that the trial court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction over him. Id. 6. He concludes that the Court should “vacate the 

judgment.” Id. 7. 

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 

limits the circumstances under which a state prisoner may file a second or 

successive application for habeas relief in federal court. ANTITERRORISM AND 

Case 3:22-cv-01796-L-BT Document 4 Filed 09/02/22 Page 2 of 5 PageID 15
3

EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT, Publ. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). To 

raise a claim in a second or successive § 2254 petition, a prisoner must show: 

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the 

evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found him guilty of the 

offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Before 

a petitioner files a successive petition in the District Court, a three-judge 

panel of the Fifth Circuit must determine whether he makes the requisite 

prima facie showing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) and (B).

A petition is deemed successive when it raises a claim that was or 

could have been raised in an earlier petition, or otherwise is an abuse of writ. 

Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2008). However, a 

second petition is not successive when the first petition was dismissed due 

to prematurity or for lack of exhaustion. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 

U.S. 637, 643-46 (1998). This is so because “dismissal of a first habeas 

petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever 

obtaining federal habeas review.” Id. at 645. 

Wallace’s first petition was dismissed with prejudice as time-barred, 

and that was an adjudication on the merits. See In re Flowers, 595 F.3d 204, 

205 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding a second petition to be successive 

where the first petition was dismissed as time barred) (citing In re Cain, 137 

Case 3:22-cv-01796-L-BT Document 4 Filed 09/02/22 Page 3 of 5 PageID 16
4

F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998)). Wallace’s new claims should have and could 

have been addressed in his first petition. Wallace fails to demonstrate that 

his claims were not available to him at that time he filed his first petition in 

August 2019. See Hardemon, 516 F.3d at 275. Rather, it appears the alleged 

errors Wallace raises in his petition were previously known to him. For 

example, he argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. But 

he provides no indication any jurisdictional claim was not available to him 

when he filed his first petition. 

In sum, Wallace raises claims that could have and should have been 

addressed in his initial petition. Therefore, the pending petition is 

successive. The Fifth Circuit has not issued an order authorizing this Court 

to consider Wallace’s successive petition. Wallace must obtain such an order 

before he may file another petition for habeas relief under § 2254. 

III. 

The Court should TRANSFER Wallace’s petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pursuant 

to In re Epps, 127 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1997). 

SO RECOMMENDED 

Signed September 2, 2022.

______________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 3:22-cv-01796-L-BT Document 4 Filed 09/02/22 Page 4 of 5 PageID 17
5

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

Case 3:22-cv-01796-L-BT Document 4 Filed 09/02/22 Page 5 of 5 PageID 18