### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Ma rch 16, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Will iam H. Staffor d, J r., United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern * District of F lorida, sitting by desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 02- 1240 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 98-02607 -CV -JTC -1 JAM ES P. COTTON, JR., GERALD EICKHOFF, Pl ai nti ff s- Appe lle es Cro ss -Ap pe ll an ts , ve rs us MASSAC HUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, a Ma ss ach us et ts Co rp or at io n, D ef en dant- Appe llant Cro ss -Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 16, 200 5) Before TJO FL AT and AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judges, and ST AF FO RD , D istrict * Judg e.Be cause we r ever se on this gr ound, we do not addr ess Mass Mutual’s additional 1 argume nts . 2 TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: D ef en dant M as sa chuse tts Mu tua l L if e In sur an ce Co
. appe al s th e j udgm en t of the district court in favor of the plaintiffs, Jam es Cotton and Gerald E ickhoff,
o n th e i r c l a i m f o r b r e a c h o f

f i du c i a ry du t y u n d e r

th e E mp l o ye e R e t i r e me n tI n c o me Security Ac t (E RISA ), 29 U. S. C. §§ 10 01 et seq. T he district court entered j udgm en t f

or the pla int if

fs a ft er str iki ng M as s M utu al ’ s answ er and e nte ri ng a default as a sanction for discovery violatio ns. O n appeal, Ma ss Mutual m akes thr ee arg um en ts: f

ir st, that the e ntr

y of ade fa ult w as an a buse of dis cr et ion ; se co nd, that the w el l- ple ad ed f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns i n th e am en de d c om pla int f ai l t o es ta bli sh l ia bil ity und er E RI SA ; and, thi rd , that the dis tr ic t c ourt i m pe rm iss ibl y aw arded individ ualized, e xtra-contractual dam ages that are not available und er E RI SA
. W e ag re e w ithMa ss M utu al that the a m en de d c om pla int f ai ls t o e sta

bli sh liabilityunder ER ISA
. Ac cordingly , w e re verse and rem and with instruction s that the plaintiffs’ ER ISAclaim s be dism issed with prej udice. A s we explain in Part II , inf ra , the pla int if

fs are una ble to es ta

bli sh l ia bil ity und er E RI SAbe ca

use Ma ss Mutual sim

ply is not a fiduciary

for any purpose related to the m iscondu ct they al le ge . I nde ed , a s w e expla in i n P ar t I II , inf ra , our r ev ie wle ad s us to co nc lud e 1Ma ss M utu a l ma int a ins that H ill iard , M art in, and the oth e r f

or me r c o- de fe nd ants in t

his 2 c a se we re no t it s le g a l a g e nts , b ut r athe r w e re sim ply ind e pe nd e nt a g e nts a

uth or ize d to se ll M a ss Mutual products. We assume that they wer e in fa ct Mass Mutual ag ents. 3 that this was never re ally an E RISAcase at all, that it never shou ld have been lit igate d inf

ed er al c ourt, and tha t the pla int if fs ’ m oti on t o r em an d sh oul d have been granted at the outset. In P art IV , infr a, we briefly address the other dis co ve ry -r el at ed

sanc tio ns tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt i m pose d init s or de r en te ri ng a de fa ult
. I. Af ter enter ing a default, the district court adopted as true the w ell-pleaded fa ct ua l a lle ga tio ns c ont ai ne d inthe a m en de d c om pla int
. O ur

state m en t of

the c as e is , in tu rn , dra wn p rimaril y fro m th e d is tri ctco ur t’s s umm ary of th es e al le ga ti on s. Co tto n and E ic khof

f w er e ex ec uti ve of

fi ce rs of BE I H old ing s, I nc . ( now known a s A ME RS CO , I nc . ). I n 19 82, Co tto n and E ic khof f en te re d in to a

“ W ea lth -O p D ef

er re d C om pe nsatio n A gr ee m en t” w ithBE I. U nde r the a gr ee m en t, BE I ag re ed

to pay Co tto n and E ic khof

f, or the ir be ne fi ci ar ie s, $25 0, 000 an nua lly fo r fi fte en y ears be gi nn in g a t ag e 6 5 o r up on th ei r de at h. InD ec em be r 1986 , Ma ss M utu al a ge nts Ro na ld H ill iard and G ar y Mart in 2 pr op os edarra ng em en ts be twee n C ot to n a nd BEI an d b et ween Eick ho ff an d B EI
w he re by BE I an d th e em

plo y ee w oul d sp lit

pr em ium s and d eath b en ef it pr oc ee ds4

on a pe rm an en t whol e lif

e ins ur an ce pol ic y

iss ue d onthe e m

plo y ee . U nde r the p r o p o s a l , B E I w o u l dp a y a l l p r e mi u ms o n e a c h p o l i c y. Ap o rt i o n o f th e p r e mi u ms would be taxable as com

pensation to Cotton and Eickhoff, while the r em ainder
w oul d be tr eate d a s lo an s f ro m BE I to C ott on and E ic khof f. A cc or din g to the pr opos al , the c as h va lue of e ac h w hol e lif

e pol ic y w oul d c ont inu e to g ro wunt il it
w oul d c ove r the annua l pr em ium paym en ts—

that i s, unt il the pr em ium s w oul d

“ vanis h. ” T his w as pr oj ec te d to oc cur af te r onl y se ve n y ears in E ic khof

f’ s c as e an d on ly te n y ears in Co tto n’ s c as e. C ott on and E ic khof f ar e re qui re d to r ep ay

the portio n of

the pr em ium s tr eate d a s lo an s a t a c er ta in t im e fr om

the c as h va lue of the policies. T his was re ferr ed to as the “ rollout.” A t the rollout, the cash values of th e p ol ic ie s wi ll be reduc edby the am ou nt of p rem iu m s re pa idto th e em pl oyer. Ba se d onthi s pr opos al , Co tto n, E ic khof f, and B E I ag re ed

to es ta bli sh wha t the
am ended com

plaint and th e district court ref er to as the “ Split-Dollar E m ploy ee W el fare Ben efi t Pl an Sp on so redby A MRESC O, Inc .” A s part of the plan, Ma ss M utu al iss ue d tw o w hol e lif e ins ur an ce pol ic ie s to Cotton in ear ly

1987
. Ea ch had a fac e am ount of $5,715,500 and a stated annual prem ium of $119,697. Eic khoff was a lso iss ued two policies, one of w hich was la te r div ide d in to tw o, le av ing him w iththr ee pol ic ie s, one w ithaf ac e am ount

of $5, 327, 500 an d astate d annua l pr em ium of $76 , 426, one w ithaf

ac e am ount

of5

$3, 350, 729 an d astate d annua l pr em ium of $48 , 079, and o ne w ithaf ac e am ount of $1,976,771 and a stated annu al prem ium of $28,376. BE I and its successor, A MRE SC O , pa id the pr em ium s onthe pol ic ie s. In 1990, the plan’s prim ary objec tive was c hanged to u se the insurance pol ic ie s a s th e pr im ar

y sourc e of r et ir em en t i nc om e fo r the pla int if fs and t o provide greater ca sh and pay out valu es by com m itting BE I to continue to p ay pr em ium s f

or a ddi tio na l pe ri ods of

ti m e— se ve nte eny ears , be gin nin g in199 0, in Cotton’s ca se, and eight een y ears, also beginn ing in 1990 , in E ickhoff’ s case. In return, Co tt on an d Ei ckho ff rel ie ve d B EI of it s o bl ig at io ns un de r th e “ W eal th -Op D ef er re d C om pe nsatio n A gr ee m en t. ” T he pla int if fs c la im that i n m ak ing the se am en dm en ts the y

r el ie d su bst an tia lly

on the pol ic y

pr oj ec tio ns M as s M utu al and its a ge nts pr ovi de d, a s w el l a s th e ag en ts’ sim ilar or al r ep re se ntatio ns. T he se analy ses proje cted significant death benefits and cash surrender values and annual
re tir em en t i nc om e of

$25 0, 000. In199 2, Co tto n and E ic khof f too k ou t su

bst an tia l l oans a ga ins t the ir pol ic ie s. C ott on b or

ro w ed $91 0, 000, and E ic khof

f bor ro w ed $57 1, 000—

the
m axim um am ount s the two w ere perm itted to bo rrowagainst their policies. T hey al le ge that the y

did so i n r el ianc e uponr ep re se ntatio ns m ad e by Ma ss M utu al and its a ge nts that the pol ic ie s w er e suf fi ci en tly str ong an d ha d su ff

ic ie nt v al ue toMass Mutual also denies that Ale x ander & A lexander wa s its age nt; ag ain, thoug h, we 3 a ssume that it

wa s. 6 supp ort the loans whil e sti ll ge ne ratin g r et ir em en t i nc om e af te r the r oll out . C ott on and Eickhoff a lso changed th e policies’ divid end opti on at this ti m e so that div ide nds w oul d be use d to pay int er es t and p ri nc ipa l onthe loans r athe r than to p u r c h a s e a d d i t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e , a s h a db e e n th e c a s e p r e v i o u s l y. InF eb ru ar

y 199 6, A le xande r & A le xande r Be ne fi t S er vic es , anothe r Ma ss Mutual agent, notified Cotto n and Eickhoff that the policy illustration s provid ed 3 in D ec em be r 1995 ove rs ta te d th ei r pol ic ie s’ c as h surr en de r va lue s and d eath be ne fi ts b ec au se the y

did not take int o a cc ount

the r oll out

—i
. e. , the r ep ay

m en ts due A MR E SC O in 2006 in Co tto n’ s c as e an d in200 7 inE ic khof f’ s c as e. T he pla int if fs a lle ge that i llu str at ion s pr ovi de d to the m in 1986 , 199 0, 199 2, 199 3, and 1994 inc lud ed

the sam e er

ro r. Whe re as ana ly se s pr ovi de d in199 4 and 1 995 pr oj ec te d de ath be ne fi ts o f se ve ra l m ill iondol lars and annua l r et ir em en t i nc om e of at least $200,000, new analy ses predict that Cotton wouldrec eive only nom inal retirem ent incom e and death benefits of less than $600 ,000, and that Eickhoff would rece ive virtually

no retirem ent incom e and death benefits of no m ore than $1, 000, 000. Mo re ove r, the ne wana ly se s pr oj ec t tha t C ott on and E ic khof f w ill have to pay

post-rollou t prem ium s in order to keep the policies in force. In otherThis scena rio, unfortunately , is not uncommon. Vanishing pr emium plans are a produc t 4 of the soar ing inter est rate s of the late 1970s a nd ear ly 1980s. Duringthis ti me, “the e conomics of tr a dit ion a l w ho le lif

e ins ur anc e po lic ie s turn e d unattr a c tiv e ” be c a us e the po lic ie s g e ne ra lly “ e arn e d a ra te of re tur n b a se d o n th e ave ra g e int e re st r ate of the pr e do min ate ly

fi xed -r ate secur ities in the company ’s investment portfolio, which g ener ally had intere st rates that we re much lower

than the rates then ava ilable to consumers.” Daniel R. F ischel & Robert S. Sti llman, The L aw a

nd Economics of V anishingPremium L ife Insuranc e, 22 De l. J . Corp. L . 1, 5 (1997). Th e ind us tr y re sp on de d to thi s p he no me no n b y of fe ri ngc on sume rs se ve ra l ne w ty pe s o f i nte re stse ns iti ve po lic ie s. Th e se ne w p oli c ie s d if fe re d f ro m tr a dit ion a l w ho le lif

e ins ur anc e in t

hat th e ir returns w ere based on c urre nt interest rates rathe r than the inter est and dividend income produce d by the insuranc e compa

ny ’s historical investments. I d. at 5-6. The vanishingpremium plan wa s one common pay

ment option for these ne w ty pes of policies; Profe ssors Daniel R. F ischel and Rob e rt S. St ill man d e sc ri be the e c on omi c s o f i ts r ise and fa ll a s f oll ow s: In a va nis hin gpr e miu

m pl an, the po lic y

ho lde r p ay s h ig he r- tha

n- no rm a l pr e miums in the ear ly

y ear s of the policy . By

makinghighe r pay

ments in early

y ear s, a highe r fr action of pr emium dollars is distribut ed into the policy ’s saving s acc ount (i .e ., a c c umu latio n f

un d) , a llo wi ngthe c a shva lue of the po lic y

to a c c umu late faster . The g oal of a

vanishingpremium plan is to set premiums at a leve l where , afte r a c erta in number of year s, enoug h cash va lue has a ccumulate d within the policy so that future a dminist rative a nd insurance costs can be paid out of the acc umulation fund, with no further out- of-poc ket pay ments by the policy

holder. In the mid-1980s, when the ne w policies we re ma rkete d most ag g ressively , the assumption of most vanishing pre mium “illus trations” wa s that no further out- of -p oc ke t pr e miums w ou ld b e re qu ir e d a ft e r f ive or te n ye ars . Vanishingpremium plans have not worked out a s initi ally contemplated. F or many , v anis hin gpr e miums h ave no t va nis he d. Th e pr ima

ry c a us e of thi s problem has be en low intere st rates. . . . Althoug h rate s rose to as hig h as twelve pe rc e nt i n th e mid -1 98 0s , th e e arl y 19 90 s r e fl e c te d a

low of thr e e pe rc e nt. Th e se decliningrate s upset the ec onomics of vanishingpremium plans. With t he economy -wide de cline in intere st rates, intere st-cre dit rates have also dropped a nd c a shva lue ha s n ot gro wn a s a ssume d in

the ini tia l il lus tr atio ns . In ma ny c a se s, cash va lue in vanishingpremium plans has be come insuff icient to pay

expected future insura

nce a nd administrative costs. As a r esult, many consumers who boug ht insurance on a vanishing -pre mium basis will soon be for ced to make additional out-of-poc ket pre mium pay ments or else ha

ve their insura

nce terminated or

death be nefits re duced. I d. at 7-8 (f

ootnotes omitt ed). 7 w or ds, pr em ium s have not “ vanis he d. ” I n a ddi tio n, the pla int if fs a lle ge that M as s 4 Mut ua l ( a) c onc ea le d th e ex ist en ce of “ m oda l pe na lti es ” that r es ult ed f ro m the ir8

em ploy er pay ing prem ium s on a m onth ly rather than annual basi s; (b) used
m ethods of

a llo catin g pr em ium

paym en ts b etw ee n in co m e to the pla int if fs and loans from

their em ploy er that w ere less favorable to the plaintiffs than tho se used in p oli cy pr oj ec tio ns; ( c) und er state d th e pol ic ie s’ se nsi tiv ity to ch an ge s inint er es t
an d di vid en d r at es ; and ( d) ge ne ra lly obs cure d a ct

ua l po lic y pe rf orm an ce by
co nsi ste ntl y

pr es en tin g r ep orts i n di ff er en t and m isl ea din g f

orm at s. InA ugus t 19 98, Co tto n and E ic khof f fi le d su it in the S upe ri or Co urt of D ek al b C ounty , G eo rg ia
. T he state -c ourt c om pla int a sse rt ed state -l awc la im s of inno cent m isrepresentation, negligent m isrepresentation, fr aud, and prom issory
es top pe l and s ough t e qui ta ble r el ie f re qui ri ng the de fe ndants to en sur e that the ir pol ic ie s pe rf

orm ed a s de sc ri be d inpol ic y

ana ly se s. A ll de fe ndants —i
. e. , Ma ss Mut ua l, Mart in, H ill iard , A le xande r & A le xande r, and s ev er al oth er a lle ge d M as s Mut ua l a ge nts —j oin ed

in re m ovi ng the c as e to f ed er al c ourt onthe the or

y that the pla int if fs ’ c la im s w er e co m

ple te ly pr ee m pte d by E RI SA
. T he pla int if

fs m ove d to
re m an d th e ca se to state c ourt, arg uin g th at the c la im s w er e not

c om ple te ly preem pted because the policies and agreem ents did n ot consti tute an ER ISAplan
an d b ecau se th e co m

pl ai nt di d n ot see k re li ef av ai labl e u nd er ERIS A. On May 1999 , the district court denied the plaintiffs’ m otion to rem and. I t fi rs t he ld tha t an E RI SAplan e xis te d un de r the te st e sta bli she d inD onov anv.These E RI SA sections are at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)( 1)(b) , (a) (2), a nd (a) (3). 5 9 D ill ing ha m , 688 F . 2d 1 367, 137 1 ( 11th C ir
. 198 2) ( enbanc ). R el y ing pr im ar ily on our decision in Engelhardt v. Paul Rever e L ife Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 19 98 ), itals o h el d t ha t t he co m pl ai nt so ug htrel ie f av ai labl e u nd er ERIS A. As such, it determ ined that the plain tiffs’ state-lawclaim s wer e com pletely preem pted
so th atrem ov al ba se d o n fe de ral qu es ti on juri sd ic ti on was p erm is si bl e. In a subsequent o rder, the court granted the plaintiffs’ m otion to file an
am ended com

plaint asserting claim s under ERI SA
. The plaintiffs’ am ended
c o mp l a i n ta s s e rt e df

o u r E R I S A c l a i ms : a§ 5 0 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( B ) c l a i m t o e n f o r c e th e t e rms of the plan, a§ 50 2( a) (2 ) cl ai m f or br ea chof

f idu ci ar y duty , a§ 50 2( a) (3 ) cl ai m for appropriate e quitabl e re lief, and a claim under the ER ISAfeder al com m on law 5 doctrine of equitable estopp el. The am ended complaint also reasserted the statelawc la im s th at

c om pr ise d th e pla int if

fs ’ or igi na l c om

pla int
. T he sam e day

the pla int if fs f ile d th e am en de d c om

pla int , the y

a lso f ile d am oti on t o c om

pe l M as s Mutual to prod uce a num ber of item s that they

claim ed Mass Mutual had im pr ope rl y w ith he ld i n r es pons e to l eg iti m at e dis co ve ry r eque sts , nam el y , the
com puter softwar e and data used to produ ce the var ious p olicy analy ses presented to the m and, in ge ne ra l, a ll doc um en ts i ssu ed or in ef fe ct dur ing the pr ec ed ing fourteen y ears or so that in anyway relate d to the sale or prom otion of, or policiesF e d. R. C iv. P. 3 7( b) (2 ) p ro vid e s in re le va nt p art : 6 I f a pa rty . . . fails to obey

an orde r to provide or

permit discover

y , including a

n or de r m a de un de r s ub div isi on (a ) o f t his ru le
. . . , the c ourt

in whic h th e a c tio n is pendingmay

make suc h order s in reg ard to the f ailure a s are just, and among o th er s th e f

o l l o wi n g:

. . . . (C) An orde r strikingout pleading s or par ts thereof , . . . or dismissing the a c tio n o r p ro c e e din gor

any pa rt the re of , o r r e nd e ri nga

jud g me nt b y

de fa ult a g a i n s tth e d i s o b e d i e n tp arty;

. . . . In li e u o f a

ny of the fo re g oin gor de rs or

in a dd iti on

the re to, the c ourt

sh a ll require the par

ty failingto obey

the orde r or the attorney

advisingthat party

or both to pay

the re asonable expenses, including attorney ’s fe es, ca used by the failure , unless the cour

t finds that the failure was substantially justified or that oth e r c ir c ums tanc e s ma

ke an a wa rd of e xpe ns e s unju st. 10 or pr ac tic es r eg ar din g, any

Ma ss M utu al spl it- dol lar w hol e lif e ins ur an ce plan or policy and also, m ore particularly , the specif ic ty pe of plan sold to them
. In
re spon se , Ma ss M utu al arg ue d th at thi s in fo rm at ionw as not dis co ve ra

ble be ca use it w as r el ev an t on ly , if

a t a ll, to the pla int if

fs ’ c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d—and, the re fo re , no l onge r via

ble —st at e- lawc la im s. A t a he ar ing on F eb ru ar

y 11, 200 0, the c ourt gr an te d th e m oti on t o c om pe l. T his or de r, how ev er , did

not put an e nd t o di sc ove ry -r el at ed dis put es , and i n July 2000 , the plaintiffs m oved for sanctions again st Mass Mutual un der Fe d. R. Civ. P . 37(b), claim ing th at Mass Mutual had failed to com ply with the com

pel 6
or de r. T ha t sam e day , the y a lso f ile d abr ie f in r es pons e to M as s M utu al ’ s m oti on for sum m ary j udgm ent in which they

appear to have abandoned all of their statelawc la im s. I n aD ec em

be r 28, 200 0 or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that M as sIn J une of 2001, the court de nied Mass Mutual’s motion to set aside the def ault under 7 Fe d. R. Civ. P . 55(c)
. 11 Mut ua l ha d “ ac te d inba d f

ai th and a buse d th e dis co ve ry

pr oc es s” by

“ de lay [i ng] the pr oduc tio n of

r es pons ive doc um en ts, onl y to pr oduc e the m

sub se que ntl y

in a pie ce m ea l f

as hio n; f ai l[ ing ] to pr oduc e know le dge ab le [ Fe d R
. Ci v. P . ] 30( b) (6 )
re pr es en ta tiv es ; and atte m pt[ ing ] to co nc ea l a

his tor y of vanis hin g pr em ium lit igatio n. ” T he c ourt f

urthe r de te rm ine d th at

Ma ss M utu al ha d “ en ga ge d ina syste m at ic effo rt t o frus tra te Pla in ti ffs leg it im at e at te m pt s at di sc ov ery an d . . . failed to obey ” the ear lier com pel order. T he court found that th ese violations had pr ej udi ce d th e pla int if

fs be ca use —de spi te br ing ing the dis put e be fo re the c ourt on tw o se parate oc ca sio ns—the pla int if fs ha d y et to re ce ive the r el ev an t i nf orm at ion to whic h th ey

w er e en tit le d and h ad

inc ur re d th e tr oubl e an d e xpe nse of tr av el ing outsi de the state to depose unq ualified Rule 30(b)(6) w itnesses. Finally , the c ourt de te rm ine d th at

im posi ng s an ct ion s le ss s ign if ic an t than ade fa

ult w oul d no t suf fi ci en tly de te r fu tur e lit igants f

ro m e nga gin g insim ilar co nduc t. A s su ch , it
or de re d, a m ong oth er

thi ngs, that M as s M utu al ’ s answ er be str ic ke n and a

de fa ult
en t er ed ag ai n s ti t , a n dth at Ma s s Mu tu al p ay al l re as o n ab l e c o s t s an dat t o rn ey’s fees incurr ed by

the plaintiffs in conn ection with litigatio n against Mass Mutu al since the Februar

y 11 com pel order. 7On cr oss-appe al, the plaintiffs c ontest the district court’s de termination that the policy 8 projec tions were ne ither plan doc uments nor summary plan desc riptions (SP Ds). Howe ver, the pr oje c tio ns c e rt a inl y

are no t pl an d oc ume nts of the ty pe de sc ri be d in

ERI SA § 40 2( b) , 2 9 U .S. C. § 1102(b), a s they

do not (1) “pr ovide a pr ocedur e for establishing a

nd car rying out a

funding policy ,” (2) “desc ribe . . . the ope ration and a dminist ration of the pla n,” (3) “provide a proc edure for a mending[t he] plan” or “ for identify ing the persons who ha

ve author ity

to amend the plan,” or (4) “spec ify

the basis on which pa

y ments are made to and f

rom the plan.” See, e.g ., Cinelli v. Sec. Pac. Corp., 61 F .3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor a re the y “other instrument[ s] under which the plan w as established or is operate d.” ERI SA § 104(b)(2) , 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2); see , e.g ., Fa ircloth v. Lundy

PackingCo., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996) (“ the languag e ‘othe r

12 InMay 200 1, the pla int if

fs se ttl ed w itha ll de fe ndants oth er than M as s Mut ua l and c la im s a ga ins t the m w er e ac co rd ing ly

dis m iss ed
. On O ctober 3, 2001, following a bench trial held to exam ine the legal suf fi ci en cy of the a m en de d c om

pla int ’ s w el l- ple ad ed

f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns and t o ad dr es s th e iss ue of

dam ag es , the dis tr ic t c ourt i ssu ed an op ini on d et ai lin g it s fi ndi ngs of

f ac t and c onc lus ion s of

law . F ir st, the c ourt r ej ec te d th e pla int if fs ’ claim under ER ISA§ 502(a)(1)(B ), which perm its a beneficiar y “ to recover be ne fi ts d ue to him und er the te rm s of

his pla n, to en fo rc e his r igh ts unde r the te rm s of the plan, and t o c lari fy

his r igh ts t o f

uture be ne fi ts unde r the te rm s of the plan. ” T he c ourt de te rm ine d th at the vari ous pol ic y

pr oj ec tio ns p re se nte d to the plaintiffs wer e neither “plan docum ents” nor “ summ ary plan description s”; rather, the onlysuch docum ents at issue were the insurance agree m ents and ins urance pol ic ie s. A nd b ec au se the se doc um en ts w er e cl ear an d un am big uous , the re w as no plan te rm that ne ed ed

to be “ cl ar if

ie d” or “ en fo rc ed
. ” T he re fo re , the pla int if fs ’ § 8instruments under which the plan is established or ope rate d’ enc ompasses for mal or leg al documents under

which a pla

n is set up or manag ed”) . The policy projec tions do not gover

n plan mana g e me nt, ame ndme nt, or a dmi nis tr atio n; r athe r, the y sim ply pr oje c t f utu re be ne fi t le ve ls based on c erta in economic a ssumptions . There fore , they are not plan documents and pr ovide no ba sis fo r a

§ 5 02 (a )( 1) (B ) c la im unle ss t he y c an q ua lif y a s summa

ry pla n d e sc ri pti on s. In H ic ks v. F le min gCos ., 96 1 F .2 d 5 37 (5 th C ir . 1 99 2) , th e F if th C ir c uit he ld t hat to qu a lif y a s a summa ry pla n d e sc ri pti on

a do c ume nt m

us t “ c onta in[] a ll o r s ub sta nti a lly a ll cate g ories of infor

mation require d under 29 U .S.C. § 1022(b) and the DO L ’s re gulations at 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3.” H icks, 961 F.2d at 542; accor d Palmisano v. Allina Health Sy s., Inc., 190 F .3 d 8 81 , 8 87 -8 8 ( 8th

Cir . 1 99 9) ; Pis c iotta

v. Te le dy ne Ind us ., Inc ., 91 F .3 d 1 32 6, 13 29 -3 0 ( 9th Cir. 1996) (“[I ]tis undisputed . . . that neither . . . booklet conta ined all twelve of the re quired statutory elements. Ac cording ly , the district court c orre ctly conclude d . . . that, as a matter of law, the booklets did not constitute SPDs.”); see a lso Coleman v. Nationwide L ife Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 62 n.3 ( 4th Cir. 1992) (“ERI SA provides a leng thy , detailed list of what must be included in a summary

plan desc ription. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). An ag ree ment to provide a descr iption of ‘the main bene fits and re quirements’ c annot be r easona bly reg arde d as the equivalent of

the summary

plan desc ription, which the statute re quires to be f ar br oader

in scope and de ta il. ” ). Th e Th ir d Ci rc uit a pp e ars to h old

that a dd iti on a l f

a c tor s ma y be re le va nt t o th is issue, but it does ag ree that a docume nt that is mi ssing sig nificant statutorily require d information is unlikely

to qualify

as an SPD. See Gr idley

v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F .2d 1310, 1316- 17 (3d Cir. 1991). One district court, in contra st, has stated,

We do not believe that Cong ress intende d to exclude from the ter m “summary

plan desc ription” eve ry

document which la cks some of the information re qu ir e d in

se c tio n 1 02 2( b) . Rathe r, any do c ume nt a

pla n d ist ri bute s to its p art i ci p an t s wh i ch co n t ai n s al l o r s u b s t an t i al l y

al l o f t h e i n fo rm at i o nth e a v er age pa rt ic ipa nt w ou ld d e e m c ru c ia l to a kn ow le dg e a

ble un de rs ta

nd ingof his be ne fi ts under the plan shall be de emed a summary plan desc ription. Koche ndorfe r v. Rockdale Sash and Trim Co., 653 F. Supp. 612, 615 (N.D . I ll. 1987). We have pe rhaps sug g ested that we would adopt the majority view stated in Hic ks, but we have ne ve r u

ne qu ivo c a lly

sa id s o. In A lda

y v. Conta ine r C or

p. of Am ., 90 6 F .2 d 6 60 (1 1th Cir. 1990), we c oncluded that a benef it summ ary

booklet did “not fulfill the require ments . . . set out at 29 U.S.C. § 1022” was not an SPD. Alday , 906 F.2d at 665. The plaintiff ther e ar gued that Koche ndorfe r’s broa der SPD definition was the c orre ct one, but “[w]ithoutendorsingthe holding in Koc hendorf

er,” we simply

noted that the bene fit summary booklet “har dly

rea che[d] the le ve l of

sp e c if ic ity re qu ir e d b y

the Ko c he nd or fe r c ourt .” I d. at 66 5 n .1 4. We c an d o th e same here . The district cour

t corre ctly

conclude d that the policy projec tions at issue are “ mere ly
. . . informal communications” that “do not satisfy any of the re quirements found in 29 U.S.C. § 1022” (e mphasis added) . Acc ording ly , they do not qualify

as summary

plan desc riptions under Hicks, Gridley , or Koc hendorf er. 13 50 2( a)(1 )(B) cla im

fai le d a s a m at te r of

law.On a pp e a l, M a ss M utu a l c onte sts a ll f our o f t he se de te rm inatio ns . 9 14 Se co nd, the c ourt a ddr es se d th e pla int if fs c la im und er E RI SA§ 50 2( a) (2 ) claim “ for appropriate r elief” based on Mass Mutu al’ s alleged breach of f iduciary dutyunder ER ISA§ 409(a), 29 U .S .C. § 1109 (a). A ccepting the am ended
co m pla int ’ s w el l- ple ad ed

f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns a s tr

ue , it c onc lud ed

( a) that the plaintiffs sou ght relief on behalf of the plan, (b) that Mass Mutual wa s a fiduciary
w ithr es pe ct

to the pla

n, ( c) that M as s M utu al ha d br ea ch ed af idu ci ar y duty to the plan, and (d) that such breac h had caused a loss to th e plan. A s such, it concluded 9 th atth e am en de d c om

pl ai nt est ab li sh edli ab il it y un de r § 5 02 (a)( 2)
. O n th e iss ue of

dam ag es , the c ourt or de re d M as s M utu al to re sto re annua lly the “ m issin g” death benefits and cash surrender values—i.e ., the differ ence be tw ee n th ose sho w n inthe 199 0 il lus tr at ion s and the c ur re nt p oli cy

va lue s—l es s an y portio n of

the m iss ing va lue s a ttr ibu ta ble to (a ) the 199 0 c hange s inthe div ide nd o pti on, ( b) the 199 2 lo an s, or ( c) c hange s indiv ide nd s ca le s/i nte re st
rate s. T he c ourt r ea sone d th at the a dj ustm en t f

or div ide nd s ca le /in te re st r at e ch an ge s w as ne ce ssary

be ca use Co tto n and E ic khof

f “ w er e know le dge ab le busi ne ssm enw ho t ook ana ct ive r ole in m oni tor ing the pr ac tic es gov er nin g th e Plan and understoo d that the interest rates and scales w ouldfluctuate over tim e. ” T he part ie s w er e dir ec te d to dr af t and f ile an in j unc tio n r equir ing Ma ss M utu al to15

pay dam ages in accordance with the order. Thi rd , th e co ur t ad dr es se d t he pl ai nt iff s cl ai m forrel ie f un de r ERISA § 502( a) (3 ), w hic h pe rm its be ne fi ci ar ie s to br ing sui t “ (A ) to e nj oinany a ct or pr ac tic e w hic h vi olate s any pr ovi sio n of

thi s su bc ha pte r or the te rm s of

the plan, or (B ) to o bta in o the r ap pr opr ia te e qui ta ble r el ie f (i ) to r edre ss s uc h vi olatio ns o r (i i) to e nf or ce any pr ovi sio ns o f thi s su

bc ha pte r or the te rm s of

the plan. ” T he Su pr em e Co urt ha s de sc ri be d § 5 02( a) (3 ) as a“ sa fe ty ne t, of fe ri ng a ppr opr ia te equitable relief f

or injurie s caused by

violatio ns that § 50 2 does no t elsewher e ad equa te ly

r em edy . ” V ar ity

Co rp . v. H ow e, 516 U . S. 489 , 512 , 116 S
. Ct
. 106 5, 1078 , 134 L . E d. 2d 1 30 ( 1996 ). I n K at z v. Co m pr eh en siv e Pl anof

G ro up Insurance, 197 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1999), we held that a plaintiff who has an available claim

under another subsectio n of § 502(a) cannot proceed under § 502( a) (3 ), and, m or eo ve r, that “ the a va ila bil ity of an a de qua te r em edy

und er the law. . . doe s no t m ean, nor doe s it guarante e, an a dj udi catio n inone ’ s f av or . ” I d. at 1089. In other w ords, a plaintiff who can state a cognizable claim under either (a )( 1) (b ) or

( a) (2 ) m ay

not a lso r el y on the ( a) (3 ) “ sa fe ty

ne t” e ve n if

he is ult im at el y

una ble to pr ev ai l un de r both ( a) (1 )( b) and ( a) (2 ). R el y ing on K at z, the di st ric t co ur t h el d t ha t t he pl ai nt iff s’ (a)(3 ) cl ai m

was b arre d a s a m at te r of law. Finally , the district court addressed the plaintiffs’ feder al com m on law16

equitable estop pel claim
. “ This circ uit has created a very narrowcom

m on law doc tr ine und er

E RI SAf or e qui ta ble e sto ppe l. I t i s on ly

a va ila ble w he n ( 1) the pr ovi sio ns o f the plan a t i ssu e ar e am big uous , and ( 2) r ep re se ntatio ns are m ad e w hic h c onst itu te an or al int er pr et at ionof

the a m big uity . ” I d. a t 10 90 ( ci ta tio ns om itted). A s it had already determ ined that the term s contained in the plan doc um en t w er e not

a m big uous , the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t the pla int if fs w er e not entitled to recover under this do ctrine. A lth oughthe c ourt’ s or de r inc lud ed w ha t i t thoug ht w er e “ str ai ght fo rw ar d” ins tr uc tio ns r eg ar din g th e ca lc ulatio n of dam ag es , the part ie s c oul d no t a gr ee a s to how the order w ouldbe im plem ented. T hus, after

the plaintiffs filed a proposed inj unc tio n and M as s M utu al f ile d e xte nsi ve obj ec tio ns t o it , the part ie s e nde d up ba ck be fo re the c ourt f

or anothe r he ar ing on the iss ue of dam ag es . S hortly the re af te r, the c ourt i ssu ed

asho rt or de r re qui ri ng M as s M utu al to re sto re to the plan th e ro llo ut am ount s—i
. e. , the a m ount s th e pla int if fs ’ e m plo y er is due to be
re pa id unde r the ins ur an ce a gr ee m en ts. T his appe al f oll ow ed
. II. T o e sta bli sh l ia bil ity f or abr ea chof

f idu ci ar y duty und er any of the pr ovi sio ns o f E RI SA§ 50 2( a) , apla int if f m ust f ir st s howthat the de fe ndant i s in fa ct af idu ci ar y w ithr es pe ct

to the plan. B ak er

v. Bi g S tar D iv. of

the G rand17

U nio n C o. , 893 F . 2d 2 88, 289 ( 11th C ir
. 198 9) ( “ non- fi duc iari es c an not be he ld liable under ERI SA ”). ER ISAprovides th at
a pe rs on i s af

idu ci ar y w ithr es pe ct

to the plan to the e xte nt ( i) he ex er ci se s any

dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity or dis cr et ion ar

y c ontro l re spe ct ing m an ag em en t of suc h pl anor

e xe rc ise s any

auth or ity or co ntr ol r es pe ct ing m an ag em en t or dis posi tio n of

it s a sse ts, ( ii) he re nde rs inv es tm en t a dvi ce f or af ee or oth er c om pe nsatio n, dir ec t or ind ir ec t, w ithr es pe ct

to an y m one y s or

oth er pr ope rty of suc h pl an , or ha s any auth or ity or r es pons ibi lity

to do s o, or

( iii ) he ha s any dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity or dis cr et ion ar

y r es pons ibi lity

in the adm ini str at ionof

suc h pl an . E RI SA§ 3( 21) (A ), 29 U
. S. C. § 10 02( 21) (A ). S ign if ic an tly , und er

thi s de fi nit ion , a p art y is a fi du ci ary on ly “ to th e ex te nt ” th atitpe rfo rm s a f id uc ia ry fun ct io n. As such, fiduciary

status un der E RISAis not an “ all-or-nothing concept,” and “ a court
m ust ask whether a per son is a fiduciary with re spect to the particular activity at issue.” Colem an v. N ationwide Ins. C o., 969 F.2d 54, 61 (4th Cir. 1992 ). H ere, al tho ugh “ Ma ss M utu al ha s c onc ed ed that i t i s af

idu ci ar y f or the li m ite d purp ose of m ak ing de ath be ne fi t de te rm inatio ns unde r the pol ic ie s, ” it m ai nta ins that the
am ended com

plaint fails to establis h that it is “ a fiduciary for any other purpose” (brief p.43). The questio n whether a party is an ER ISAfiduciary

is a m ixed que sti on o f lawand f

ac t. I n th is c as e, be ca

use the dis tr ic t c ourt a cc ep te d a s tr ue al l of the a m en de d c om

pla int ’ s w el l- ple ad ed

f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns, the re are no

“ finding s of fac t” in the ordinary sense. Our r eview of

the district court’ s legal18

co nc lus ion s is de nov o, and w e ac co rd no d ef er en ce to its le ga l ana ly sis
. R ei chv. Lancaster, 55 F.3d 1034, 1045 (5th Cir. 1995 ). The district court concluded that the plainti ffs had sufficiently alleged that Ma ss M utu al w as w eari ng i ts f idu ci ar y ha t whe n th e al le ge d m isc ondu ct oc curr ed : T he f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns i n th e Co m pla int c le ar ly state that M as s Mut ua l and i ts a ge nts he lpe d e sta bli sh the P lan and “ adm ini ste re d, m an ag ed and c ontro lle d [ the ins ur an ce pol ic ie s go ve rn ing the P lan] since they

we re f irst issued.” Mass Mutual retained “ discretionary au tho ri ty to adm ini ste r[ , ] m an ag e an d c ontro l” pol ic y a sse ts. I t a lso ex er ci se d di sc re tio nary

auth or ity w ithr es pe ct

to plan m an ag em en t and adm inistration
. Finally , Ma ss Mutual and it s agents provi ded pol ic y pr oj ec tio ns u

pon w hic h P la int if

fs r el ie d. D . Ct
. O p. a t ¶

41 ( quot ing F ir st A m . Co m pl. ) (c itatio ns o m itt ed ). A s ar es ult of the dis co ve ry

sanc tio ns the dis tr ic t c ourt i m pose d, it a cc ep te d a ll of

the w el lple ad ed f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns i n th e am en de d c om pla int a s tr ue . B ut e ve n a ssu m ing fo r the pur

pose of thi s a ppe al that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s sanc tio n w as appr opr ia te , the
am en de d c om

pla int doe s no t st at e a se t of

f ac ts unde r w hic h M as s M utu al is a fiduciary for the purposes of this case. Ther efore, we m ust reverse. The passage f

rom the district court’ s opin ion reprinted above su m m arize s the plaintiffs’ basic allegations regarding Mass Mutu al’ s fiduciary status. In other
wor ds , th e am en de d c om pl ai nt si m pl y reci te s p or ti on s o f th e st atut ory de fin it io n. T he pla int if

fs arg ue that this is en oughto es ta bli sh M as s M utu al ’ s f

idu ci ar y statusIn B onne r v . Ci ty of Pr ic ha rd , 6 61 F .2 d 1 20 6, 12 09 (1 1th Cir .1 98 1) (e n b anc ), thi s 10 c ourt a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 19 be cau se th e fac tu al all eg at io ns of t he ir a dm it te d c om pl ai nt are d eem edad m it te d. But while a def

aulted defendant is deem ed to “ adm it[] the plaintiff’ s well- pleaded al le gatio ns o f fa ct , ” he “ is n ot h el d to a dm it fa ct s th at are not w el l- ple ad ed

or to adm it co nc lus ion s of

law . ” N ish im at su C onstr. Co
. v. H oust on N at ’ l B an k, 515 F. 2d 1 200, 120 6 ( 5thCi r. 197 5)
. T he re fo re —a ga in, a ssu m ing f or the sake of

the 10 argum ent that a default w as an appropriate sanction—althou gh Mass Mutu al “ m ay not c ha lle nge the suf

fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce , [ it] is en tit le d to c ont es t the
su ffi ci en cy

of t he co m

pl ai nt an d i ts all eg at io ns to supp or t t he jud gm en t.” Id
. Pl ai nti ff s a lle ge that M as s M utu al ( a) “ sol d P oli ci es and h el pe d e sta bli sh the Plan,” (b) “ adm inistered, m anaged, and controll ed such Policies,” ( c) e xercised dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity ove r plan a sse ts, and ( d) “ ex er ci se d di sc re tio nary auth or ity with respect to plan m anagem ent and adm inistration .” Sim ple allegations th at Ma ss M utu al f

al ls w ith in the statut or

y de fi nit ionof

f idu ci ar y , how ev er , are not we ll-pleaded factual a llegations sufficient to establish liab ility in the wake of

an en tr y of de fa ult
. I nde ed , be ca

use the pla int if

fs do n ot o the rw ise e xpl ai n f ro m w he nc e thi s di sc re tio n c am e or howspe ci fi ca lly

Ma ss M utu al “ adm ini ste re d,
m an ag ed , and c ontro lle d” the plan, the ir a lle ga tio ns are r ea lly

no m or e than a20

co nc lus or y a sse rt ionthat M as s M utu al is anE RI SAf idu ci ar y . T hus, the pla int if

fs ’

“ we ll-pleaded factual a llegations ” re garding Mass Mutu al’ s fiduciary status are not w el l- ple ad ed

f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns at a ll; r athe r, the y are m er el y

the pla int if

fs ’
ow n c onc lus ion s of

law , w hic h M as s M utu al is not de em ed to ha ve a dm itt ed

a s a re sul t of de fa ult
. C f. O xf

or d A sse t M gm

t. v. Jahari s, 297 F . 3d 1 182, 118 8 ( 11th Cir. 2002 ) (“ [O n a m otion to dism iss,] [t] he plaintiff’ s factual allegations are
ac ce pte d a s tr

ue . . . . H ow ev er , . . . le ga l c onc lus ion s m as que ra din g a s f ac ts w ill
no t p rev en t d is m is sa l.”)
.

“ Sim ply urging th e purchase of its products does no t m ake an insurance
co m pany an E RI SAf

idu ci ar y w ithr es pe ct

to tho se pr oduc ts. ” A m . F ed ’ n of U nio ns L oc al 102 H ea lth& W el fare F und v. E qui ta ble L if e A ssuranc e So c’ y , 841 F.2 d 6 58 , 66 4 (5 th Cir . 19 88 ). Thi s i s al l t ha t t he pl ai nt iff s h ere r eal ly alle ge . Specifica lly , they

allege that in 1987 they

purchased a set of Ma ss Mutual life ins ur an ce pol ic ie s a s am eans o f fundi ng the spl it- dol lar plan. T he y c la im that the purchase wa s the result of a presentation by Martin and Hilliar d that projec ted that the policies would y ield subs tantial retirem ent and death benefits and that prem ium s would “ vanish” within ten y ears. T hey allege that in 1990 the plan was
am en de d and tha t the y

r el ie ve d B E I of

it s ob lig at ion s to the m

und er ase parate deferr ed com

pensation agree m ent in exchange for BE I’ s prom ise to pay addition al21

pr em ium s un de r the plan. T he y c la im that i n m ak ing thi s de ci sio n th ey a ga in relied on analy ses prepared by Martin and Hilliar d. T hen, in 1992, the plaintiffs too k ou t su

bst an tia l l oans a ga ins t the pol ic ie s—i nde ed , the y bor ro w ed a ll that the pol ic ie s pe rm itt ed
. T he y a lle ge that the y

did so “ in r el ianc e on the r ep re se ntatio ns of Mass Mutual and its agents that the Policies we re suffic iently strong and h ad suf fi ci en t va lue to supp ort the loans whil e sti ll ge ne ratin g su bst an tia l r et ir em en t incom e af ter rollout.” Finally , they claim that even after

1992 , Ma ss Mutual
co nti nue d to pr ovi de ina cc ur at e or m isl ea din g po lic y

ana ly se s sh ow ing that the plan w as c ont inu ing to pe rf orm a s pr oj ec te d. T hus, r ed uc ed to the siz e of

ape a, thi s c as e is r ea lly

about c la im s of f ra ud and m isrepresentation in the sale of som e life insurance policies. T he plaintiffs attem pt to m atch these allegations with ERI SA ’ s definition of a f iduciary , but they
ar e una ble to do s o. Ma ss M utu al ha s ne ve r ex er ci se d di sc re tio nary auth or ity or co ntr ol o ve r plan m an ag em en t or the a dm ini str at ionof

plan a sse ts b ec au se the de ci sio ns t o purc ha se , a m en d, and b or ro wa ga ins t the pol ic ie s w er e m ad e by the pla int if fs the m se lve s. C as es hol din g th at ins ur er s li ke Ma ss M utu al are not E RI SAf idu ci ar ie s are num er ous. S ee , e . g. , F la cc he v. S un L if e A ssuranc e Co
. of Can. , 958 F . 2d 7 30, 733 -3 5 ( 6thCi r. 199 2) ( ins ur er did not a ct a s af idu ci ar y by supp ly ing annui ty

c ontra ct s to f

und a plan and p er fo rm ing m ini ste ri al se rv ic es f or22

the plan) ; C onso l. Be ef

I nsus . , I nc . v. N . Y . L if

e In s. Co
. , 949 F . 2d 9 60, 965 ( 8th Ci r. 199 1) ( ins ur er

w as not a ct ing a s af

idu ci ar y w he n, thr oughit s a ge nt, it “ sim ply sol d .
. . annui tie s” and “ did not r ec om m en d sp ec if

ic inv es tm en ts b ey ond its pr oduc ts” ); G al la ghe r Co rp . v. Ma ss. Mu tua l L if e In s. Co
. , 105 F . S upp. 2d 8 89, 893-97 (N .D . I ll. 2000) (insurer did not act as a fiduciary by persuading an
em plo y er to pur ch as e its w hol e lif

e ins ur an ce pol ic ie s to f

und a pr oto ty

pe plan it designedand provid ing record-keeping and actuarial services to the plan); Fe chter v. Conn. G en. L ife Ins. Co., 800 F. Supp. 182, 196-206 (E. D. Pa. 1992 ) (insurer did no t act as a

fiduciary by suppl y ing fundassets and actuarial c alculations); A sso cs . in A dol es ce nt P sy ch ia tr y v. H om e L if

e In s. Co
. of

N . Y . , 729 F . S upp. 1162 , 119 1 (N . D . I ll. 198 9) ( ins ur er w as not a ct ing an af

idu ci ar y be ca use “ al l [ it] did w as ta lk the plans i nto buy ing it s in sur an ce pr oduc ts a s am eans o f fundi ng retirem ent benefits” and “ design . . . the prototy pe plan [the em

ploy er] adopted”) aff’d 9 41 F.2d 56 1 (7 th Cir . 19 91 ); B oz em an v. Pro vi de nt Nat’l As su ran ce Co ., 1992 W L 328 804, a t *1 -4 ( W . D . T en n. 199 2) ( ins ur er did not a ct a s af idu ci ar y by
su pp lying an nu it y

co nt ract s t o fu nd a pl an an d g iv in g a ctua ria l ad vi ce). The plaintiffs ar gue that they have alleged that Mass Mutual did m ore than j ust sell its insurance products to th e plan because it (a long with various alleged ag en ts and d el eg at ee s) w as a lso r es pons ibl e fo r al loc at ing pr em ium paym en ts23

betwee n the portion counted as loans from their em ploy er and the po rtion treated as incom e to them , analy zing pol icy perform ance, and com

m unicating with them regarding policy

perform ance. T he perform ance of such m inisterial poli cy -related
se rv ic es , how ev er , doe s no t r en de r anins ur er suc h a s M as s M utu al af idu ci ar y if it does not otherwise occ upy that status. See , e .g. , G allagher, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 895- 96; F ec hte r, 800 F . S upp. a t 20 4- 06. N or doe s th e pe rf

orm an ce of

m ult ipl e duties, none of which in and of itself cre ates fiduciary status, render one a fi duc iary . S ee , e . g. , Bo ze m an , 199 2 W L 328 804, a t *4 ( re j ec tin g th e sugg es tio n

“ that a ‘ package deal’ of services and produ cts, none of w hich separately cre ates fi duc iary status , ne ce ssari ly

be tok en s an unusua l de gr ee of inf lue nc e be ca

use of th ei r va rie ty andnu m

be r”). Moreover, the plaintiffs’ claim s that Mass Mutual acted fraudulently , e ven if t ru e, do no t al te r th e fac t t ha t t he y ha ve fai le d t o a ll eg e fac ts fro m whi ch we could in fer that Mass Mutual is in fac t a fiduciary
. “ Congress too k a functional ap pr oa ch to de fin in g a n ERI SA fid uc ia ry .” Fech te r, 80 0 F . Sup p. at 20 5. Ther efore, while “ [w ] rongful m otivatio n and condu ct” is cer tainly relevant once a pla int if f de m onstrate s th at

ade fe ndant i s af

idu ci ar y w ithr es pe ct

to the plan, it

isIn their brief s to this court, the plaintiffs point us to no case that sug g ests that an insurer 11 perf ormingfunctions akin to those per formed by Mass Mutual is an ERI SA fiduciary . Instead, the y re ly so le ly on the de fa ult and argue that “ the ana ly sis wh e the r a pe rs on is a fi du c iary is inh e re ntl y fa c tua l” and

that “ Ma ss M utu a l lo st i ts o pp or tun ity to m ake
. . . f

a c t- ba se d a

rgume nts ” by committing the discove ry violations that led to the default. In holding that Ma ss Mutual is not a fi du c iary , h ow e ve r, we ne e d o nly loo k to the ame nd e d c omp la int and pla n d oc ume nts ; it

is, the re fo re , unn e c e ssa

ry fo r u s to make any

fa c t- ba se d d e te rm inatio ns . 24 “ ins uf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh f idu ci ar y r es pons ibi lity ” to b eg in w ith
. I d. A nd, 11 fi na lly , be ca

use the pla int if

fs have not

sho w n th at

Ma ss M utu al it se lf

e ve r ha d any fi duc iary duty w ithr es pe ct

to the plan, the ir

a ddi tio na l a lle ga tio n th at , “ [d ] ur ing
re le vant t im es , Ma ss M utu al de le ga te d c er ta in d isc re tio nary

auth or ity ” is a lso of no h el p. Insum , be ca

use the pla int if

fs c an not e sta bli sh tha t M as s M utu al is a fiduciary for any purpose that is relevant to th e m iscondu ct they allege, they cannot recover under E RISA§ 502(a). III . O ur de te rm inatio n th at

Ma ss M utu al is not

af idu ci ar y f or any pur pose im pli cate d by

the a m en de d c om

pla int is re inf or ce d by our a ddi tio na l c onc lus ion that the pla int if

fs ’ or igi na l st at e- lawc la im s w er e not c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d; thus,
re m ova l w as im

pr ope r, a s f

ed er al que sti on j ur isd ic tio n w as la ck ing , and the pla int if fs ’ m oti on t o r em an d sh oul d have be engr an te d a t the out se t. O n a ppe al ,Th is i s n ot s ur pr isi ng . It w a s Ma ss M utu a l w ho re mov e d th e c a se , a nd pr e suma bly it 12 continues to pref

er f eder al cour

t and ERI SA law to state cour t and state law . And althoug h they or ig ina lly mov e d to re mand

the c a se to s tate c ourt , th e pla int if fs no w h ave a

jud g me nt i n th e ir favor that they would like aff

irmed. 25 neither party

has raised this issu e. O rdinarily , if rem oval was im

proper, the c ourt 12 lacks subject m atter j urisdictio n and m ust raise the issue sua spo nte and then dism iss on that ground , see Rem bert v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 133 1, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000 ) (“ As a federa l court of lim ited jurisdiction, w e m ust inq uire into our sub

j ect
m atter j urisdictio n sua spo nte even if the parties have not challenged it.”) ; however, because the post-rem oval am ended com plaint asserted claim s under E RI SA , w e ha ve j ur isd ic tio n e ve n if r em ova l w as ini tia lly

im pr ope r, se e Pe gr am

v. H er dr ic h, 530 U . S. 211 , 215 n. 2, 120 S
. Ct
. 214 3, 214 7 n. 2, 147 L . E d. 2d 1 64 (2 000) ( “ [T he pla int if

f] doe s no t c ont es t the pr opr ie ty of r em ova l be fo re us, and
we take no posit ion on whether or not the case w as properly rem oved. .
. . [ The]
am en de d c om

pla int a lle ge d E RI SAvio la tio ns, ove r w hic h th e fe de ra l c ourts h av e j ur isd ic tio n, and w e the re fo re have j ur isd ic tio n r eg ar dle ss o f the c or re ctne ss o f the
rem oval.”); see also Gr

ubbs v. G en. E lec. Cre dit Corp., 405 U.S . 699, 700, 92 S. Ct. 1344 , 1346, 31 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (holdi ng that when a district court has j urisdictio n at the tim e it enters j udgm ent “ the validityof the rem oval procedureThus, once the plaintiffs asser ted ERI SA claims, the district court had subje ct matter 13 jurisdiction over the c ase e ven thoug h the re moval itself was improper . As a re sult, italso had jur isd ic tio n to e nte r d isc ov e ry sanc tio ns a g a ins t Ma ss M utu a l.

26 fo llo w ed m ay not be r ai se d f

or the f ir st t im e on a

ppe al ”)
. W e none the le ss

13 ad dr es s th is i ssu e he re be ca use it he lps to cl ar if

y that M as s M utu al w as not we aring its fiduciary

hat when it allegedly

m isled the plaint iffs re garding future be ne fi ts unde r the ir

pol ic ie s. U nde r 28 U
. S. C. § 14 41, ade fe ndant m ay r em ove astate -c ourt c as e to fe de ra l c ourt on ly

if the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have ha d j ur isd ic tio n ov er the c as e ha d it be enbr ough t the re or igi na lly
. A s th is c as e w as or igi na lly f ile d, div er sity j ur isd ic tio n w as la ck ing be ca use both pl ai nti ff

s and f our of the se ve n de fe ndants we re c itizens of Geor gia. T herefor e, if the ca se wa s rem ovable it m ust have been because the plaintiffs’ claim s “ arise under” f ederal law f

or the purposes of federal que sti on j ur isd ic tio n. S ee 28 U
. S. C. § 13 31. B ut b ec au se the or igi na l c om pla int asserted only

state-lawclaim s, this case a lso do es not arise under feder al law unde r the or din ar

y ope ratio n of

the w el l- ple ad ed

c om pla int r ule
. S ee K em

p v. In t’ l B us. Ma ch
. Co rp . , 109 F . 3d 7 08, 712 ( 11th C ir
. 199 7) ( “ A c as e doe s no t ari se unde r fe de ra l l awunl es s af ed er al que sti on i s pr es en te d onthe f ac e of the pla int if f’ s c om pla int
. ”)
. T he re fo re , if

the c as e ar ise s un de r fe de ra l l aw , it m ust be because it falls w ithin the special category of feder al question j urisdictio n created27

by the doctrine of com

plete preem

ption . “ Under that doctrine, Congress m ay preem pt an area of lawso com

pletely that any com plaint raising claim s in that area is n ec es sari ly

f ed er al in ch ar ac te r an d th er ef or e ne ce ssari ly

pr es en ts a

ba sis f or fe de ra l c ourt j ur isd ic tio n. ” I d. “ Co ngr es s ha s a cc om pli she d th is ‘ co m

ple te pr ee m pti on’ in [E RI SA§ 50 2( a) ] , w hic h pr ovi de s th e ex cl usi ve c au se of a ct ionf or the r ec ove ry

of be ne fi ts g ove rn ed

by an E RI SAplan. S ta te lawc la im s se ek ing relief available under [§ 502(a)] are rec haracte rized as E RISAclaim s and therefore

‘ arise under’ feder al law .” Id. (citations om itted). T his c ourt’ s c le ar es t st at em en t of the E RI SAc om

ple te pr ee m

pti on r ule is found in Butero v. Roy al Macc abees L ife Insurance Co., 174 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 1999 ), w he re w e expla ine d th at c om ple te pr ee m

pti on exists on ly

when the plaintiff is seeking relief that is available und er [E RISA§ 502(a)]
. Regardless of the m erits of the plaintiff’ s actual cl ai m s ( re ca st a s E RI SAc la im s) , r el ie f is ava ila ble , and the re is com plete preem

ption , when four elem ents are satisfied. First, there m ust be ar el ev an t E RI SAplan. S ec ond, the pla int if f m ust have standin g to sue un der that plan. T hird, the defe ndant m ust be an ER ISAentity
. Finally , the c om plaint m ust seek com

pensatory relief ak in t o th at

a va ila ble und er [ § 50 2( a) ] ; o ft enthi s w ill be ac la im f or be ne fit s due un de r a p la n. Id
. a t 12 12 ( int er

na l c itatio ns and quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ). C om

ple te pr ee m

pti on is thus narr ow er

than “ de fe nsi ve ” E RI SApr ee m pti on, w hic h br oa dly

“ supe rs ed e[ s]
an y an d a ll Sta te laws in so far a s t he y . . . rel at e to an y

[ERISA] pl an .” ERISA §ERI SA § 51 4( b) (2 )( A) , 2 9 U .S. C. § 11 44 (b )( 2) (A ), e xemp ts “ any law o f a ny State 14 which re gulates insuranc e, banking , or sec urities” fr om § 514(a)’ s broad ( defe nsive) pre emption provision. In Ervast v. F lexi ble Products Co., 346 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 2003), w e sug g ested that claims based on suc h laws “mig ht appropriately be complete ly

pree mpted, but defe nsive pree mption may

not apply .” I d. at 1013 n.7. In other wor ds, if a cla im is completely pree mpted un de r B ute ro ’s fo ur -p art

te st, the c a se may

be re mov a

ble e ve n th ou g h § 51 4( b) (2 )( A) e xplic itl y provides that ERI SA does not provide a de fense to the state-law claim; in such a c ase, the fede ral c ourt sim ply ha s juri sd ic tio n o ve r t

he state -l aw c la im. In th e same fo otn ote in E rv a st, we a lso e xpla ine d: Def

ensive pre emption may

not be a pr ere quisite for complete pree mption, but they usually co-e x ist. Naturally , if a c laim were for the r ecove ry or clar ification of be nefits under an ERI SA plan, then the cla im will “relate to” the plan. . . . [T] he “r elate to” analy sis and the law inter pretingsuch ca

n[] inform the iss ue fa c inga

c ourt that mu st d e te rm ine wh e the r s tate law c la ims are c omp le te ly pree mpted, howeve r, complete pree mption is not depende nt on the exis tence of defe nsive pree mption. Moreover, a decision re g ardingcomplete pr eemption does not decide the issue of def ensive pre emption. As we stated de fensive pr eemption is a substantive issue that must be decide d by a cour t with competent jurisdiction. I d. (citations omitted). This discussion of the relationship between c omplete and de fensive pree mption is also consistent with Buter o’s more g ener al statement that c laims that are 28 514(a), 29 U .S .C. § 1144 (a) (em phasis add ed). T herefor e, a state-law c laim m ay be defensively

preem pted und er § 514(a) but not com pletely preem pted und er § 502( a)
. I n su chac as e, the de fe ndant m ay a sse rt pr ee m pti on a s ade fe nse , but pr eem pt io n wi ll no t p ro vi de a ba si s fo r rem ov al to fed eral co urt. A lth oughw e ad dr es s c om ple te pr ee m

pti on i n th is P ar

t, w e w ill a lso dis cu ss several defe nsive preem

ption cases. T hese cases ar e helpful because claim s that
are com pletely preem pted are a lso defensivelypreem pted. Buter o, 174 F.3d at 1215 ( “ If the pla int if

f’ s c la im s are [ co m

ple te ly pr ee m pte d] , the n th ey

are a lso de fe nsi ve ly

pr ee m pte d. ”)
. T hus, if

it appe ar s th at

ac la im is not e ve n de fe nsi ve ly pr ee m pte d, the n it

w ill not be c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d e ith er . A s su ch , de fe nsi ve

14completely pree mpted are also defe nsively pree mpted; it si mply

explains, first, that itis not ne c e ssa ry fo r a c ourt a dd re ssi ngc omp le te pr e e mpt ion to d e c ide wh e the r a

c la im i s d e fe ns ive ly pree mpted in order to de cide the c omplete pre emption issue, and, sec ond, that a fe dera l court’s order rema nding a case to state court ba sed on the inapplica bility of the c omplete pre emption do c tr ine le ave s o pe n th e qu e sti on wh e the r t he pla int if

f’ s c la ims are ne ve rt

he le ss d e fe ns ive ly pree mpted. 29 pr ee m pti on c as es m ay

inf orm the c om ple te pr ee m

pti on ana ly sis
. “ T he c om ple te preem ption and defensive preem ption doctrines are ver

y com plicated and the cases
ar e num er ous. T he f

ac ts o f the ins tant c as e do n ot f al l ne at ly int o any c at eg or y of
ca se lawthat a llo w s f

or an e as y or qui ck answ er to be f ound f ro m E le ve nthCi rc uit
cas e la w.” W il so n v . Com an , 28 4 F . Sup p. 2 d 1 31 9, 1 34 1 (M .D. Ala. 20 03 ). Ther efore, we will start by briefly review ing ou r significant decisions in this area in section A. In section B, w e w ill applythose cases to the facts of this case. A. InBu te ro , the de fe ndant i nsur er iss ue d ali fe ins ur an ce pol ic y to the husb and of the plaintiff (Butero) through his em ploy er; howe ver, som etim e af ter the pol ic y ’ s pu ta tiv e ef

fe ct ive da te , the de fe ndant r em itt ed a ll pr em ium s pa id b y the e m plo y er and i nf orm ed it that i ts r eque st f

or c ove ra ge w as de nie d and tha t no policy existed. Buter o’ s husb and died that sam e day , her claim for benef its und er the pol ic y w as de nie d onthe gr ound that no pol ic y

e xis te d, and s he f

ile d su it in state c ourt a ga ins t the ins ur er and an in sur an ce a ge nt a lle gin g br ea chof c ontra ct , bad faith ref

usal to pay , and fraud in the indu cem ent. T he defendants then30

rem oved the case to federa l court, arguing th at the state-lawclaim s wer e com pletely preem pted. O n Butero’ s m otion to rem and, the district court held that the c la im s a ga ins t the a ge nt w er e not pr ee m pte d, and the y

w er e se ve re d and
re m an de d; h ow ev er , it

he ld tha t the c la im s a ga ins t the ins ur er w er e co m

ple te ly and de fe nsi ve ly

pr ee m pte d and a cc or din gly

dis m iss ed

the m w ith out pr ej udi ce to Bu te ro ’ s r igh t t o f

ile ac om pla int statin g c la im s un de r E RI SA
. S ee Bu te ro , 174 F. 3d at 12 10- 11. On appeal, Butero challenged the district court’ s disp ositio n of her state-law cl ai m s a ga ins t the ins ur er . A ft er statin g th e co m

ple te pr ee m

pti on r ule se t ou t ab ove , w e he ld tha t he r cl ai m s w er e co m ple te ly and d ef en siv el y pr ee m pte d and accordingly

aff irm ed. As to the third elem ent of com plete preem

ption—whether the defendant is an ERI SAentity —we concluded that th e insurer w as a fiduciar y be ca use “ [i ] t c oul d ‘ co ntr ol .
. . the paym en t of be ne fi ts’ and the ‘ de te rm inatio n of [t h e p l ai n t i ff

’s ] ri g h t s ’ un d er[t h e p l an ].” Id . a t1 2 1 3 (q u o t i n g Mo rs t ei n v . Na t ’l In s. S er vs. , I nc . , 93 F
. 3d 7 15, 723 ( 11th C ir
. 199 6) ( enbanc ))
. A s to the f ourth el em en t—

w he the r the pla int if

f se ek s r el ie f av ai la

ble und er § 50 2( a) —w e fi rs t not ed that “ w e ha ve he ld tha t c la im s a ga ins t an in sur er f or f ra ud and f ra ud i n th e ind uc em en t t o purc ha se apol ic y are in es se nc e cl ai m s ‘ to r ec ove r be ne fi ts d ue to [the be ne fi ci ar

y ] und er the te rm s of

the plan, ’ ” an d w e the n c onc lud ed that the31

plaintiffs’ addition al claim s for bad faith re fusal to pay and breach of c ontract es se nti al ly

sou ght the sam e thi ng—

paym en t of

ali fe ins ur an ce be ne fi t. B ute ro , 174 F.3d at 1213 (quoting ER ISA§ 502(a)(1)(B )). In iti al ly , w e not e tw o im

portant d ist inc tio ns b etw ee n B ute ro and the ins tant ca se . F ir st, the ba sis of

the pla int if

f’ s c as e in B ute ro w as the ins ur er ’ s de ci sio n in its c ap ac ity

a s an E RI SA

e nti ty not to pay ade ath be ne fi t. H er e, in co ntr as t, Ma ss Mut ua l e m pha siz es , and w e ag re e, that i t i s an E RI SAf idu ci ar y f or the pur pose of
m ak ing de ath be ne fi t de te rm inatio ns o nly , and the pla int if fs do n ot c ha lle nge any decision no t to pay

benefits under the term s of the plan. Rather, they allege that Mass Mutual ind uced them to purchase and m aintain vanish ing prem ium life ins ur an ce pol ic ie s a s asourc e of r et ir em en t i nc om e an d de ath be ne fi ts b y m isr ep re se nti ng the le ve l of be ne fi ts those pol ic ie s w oul d pr ovi de
. I n othe r w or ds, the pla int if

fs ’ dis put e is w ithMa ss M utu al the se lle r of ins ur an ce pr oduc ts, not Ma ss M utu al the E RI SAf idu ci ar y . T he se co nd d ist inc tio n, w hic h is r el at ed to the first, is that while Butero’ s claim wa s one for benefits due under the term s of an ER ISAplan, Cotton and Eickhoff claim a loss based on th e differ ence betw een Mass Mutual’ s alleged m isrepresentations—perhaps th e m ost im portant of which pr ed at e the f

orm at ionof

the plan it se lf

—and the te rm s of

the pla n. T hus, w hil e Bu te ro ’ s st at em en t tha t “ cl ai m s a ga ins t an in sur er f or f ra ud o r fr au d inthe32

ind uc em en t t o purc ha se apol ic y are in es se nc e cl ai m s ‘ to r ec ove r be ne fi ts d ue to [the be ne fi ci ar

y ] und er the te rm s of

the plan, ’ ” id. , doe s, a s on e dis tr ic t c ourt i n this circuit recently

put it, “ im

m ediately draw [] this court’s attention ,” we agree w iththat c ourt tha t this ge ne ra liz at ionsho uld not be auto m at ic al ly

e xte nde d to
c a s e s i n w h i c h th e p l a i n t i f f ’s c l a i ms d o n o t

a c tu a l l y s e e kb e n e f

i t s u n d e r th e t e rms of the plan. W ilson v. Com an, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1319 , 1334 (M. D. Ala . 2003). In Morstein v. N ational Life Insurance Co. , 93 F. 3d 71 5 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc ), the pla int if

f (M or ste in) , the pr es ide nt/ sol e share hol de r of asm al l bu sin es s, pur ch as ed

he al th i nsur an ce f

or he rs el f an d he r onl y

e m plo y ee f ro m an in de pe nde nt ins ur an ce a ge nt. A cc or din g to the c om pla int , Mo rs te in t old

the a ge nt tha t any pol ic y that di d no t c ove r an y

pr ee xis tin g c ondi tio n w oul d be una cc ep ta ble , and the ag en t as su redhe r th atth e p ol ic y sh e p ur ch as edwou ldco ve r al l s uc h c on di ti on s. Over a y ear later, however, the insurer denied a claim for benef its und er the policy fo r the r ea son that i t w as ba se d onan un dis cl ose d pr ee xis tin g c ondi tio n. Mo rs te in then sued th e agent and the insurer in state court for negligence, m alfea sance, m isrepresentations, and breach of contract; in response, the defe ndants rem oved the case to fe deral court under the com plete preem

ption doctrine. T he district
co urt the n de nie d M or ste in’ s m oti on t o r em an d and g rante d th e de fe ndants ’
m otion s for sum

m ary j udgm ent on the grou nd that all of Morstein’s state- law33

claim s wer e both com

pletely and defensively

preem pted. Morstein therea fter volu ntarily

dism issed her claim s against the ins urer and appealed the dist rict
co urt’ s gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the a ge nt. I d. a t 71 6- 17. O n a ppe al , w e re ve rs ed

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r gr an tin g th e ag en t’ s m oti on for sum m ary j udgm ent and held that Morstein ’ s state-lawclaim s against him we re not pr ee m pte d. I d. a t 72 2- 74. I n so hol din g, w e re lie d pr im ar ily on the F if

th Circuit’ s decision in Per

kins v . T im e Insurance C o., 898 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990 ), which held that
a cl ai m that an in sur an ce a ge nt f ra udul en tly ind uc ed an in sur ed

to surrender covera ge under an existing policy , to participate in an E RI SAplan w hic h di d no t pr ovi de the pr om ise d c ove ra ge , ‘ re la te s to ’ that plan on ly

indirectly
. A state law claim of that genre, which does not a ff ec t the r el at ion s am ong the pr inc ipa l E RI SAe nti tie s ( the em ploy er, the plan fiduciaries, the plan, and the beneficiar ies) as su ch , is no t p reem

pt edby E RISA. Id
. a t 47 3. T he F if

th C ir cu it in P er

kin s r ea sone d—and w e ag re ed —tha t C ongr es s did not int en d to “ im

m uni ze a ge nts f

ro m pe rs ona l l ia

bil ity f or the ir sol ic itatio n of pot en tia l part ic ipants in anE RI SAplan pr ior to its f orm at ion
. ” Mo rs te in, 93 F
. 3d at 722 ( quot ing P er

kin s, 898 F . 2d at 47 3)
. W e the re fo re he ld tha t “ w he n astate lawc la im br ough t a ga ins t a

non -E RI SAe nti ty

doe s no t a ff

ec t r el at ion s am ong pr inc ipa l E RI SAe nti tie s a s su ch , the n it is not pr ee m pte d by E RI SA
. ” Mo rs te in, 93 F
. 3d at 72 2 ( em

pha sis a dde d)
. T his inc lud ed Mo rs te in’ s c la im s, a s th e34

d e f e n d an ta g e n t

p l a i n l y wa s n o tan ER I S A e n t i t y. InMo rs te in, w e al so e xpl ai ne d w hy w e tho ught

it unl ike ly that C ongr es s int en de d to pr ee m

pt the ty pe of c la im s a t i ssu e in tha t c as e: [E ] co nom ic im

pa ct a lon e is n ot n ec es sari ly

e noug h to pr ee m

pt a state law . T he re fo re , the pos sib ili ty that i nsur an ce pr em ium s w ill be hig he r or that i nsur an ce w ill be m or e dif fi cu lt to o bta in b ec au se ind ep en de nt a ge nts w ill have le ss i nc en tiv e to s el l i nsur an ce to em pl oyers wh os e em

pl oyee be ne fit pl an s wi ll be go ve rn edby E RISA, doe s no t pr ovi de ar ea son to p re em pt s ta te law s th at

pla ce li ab ili ty

on ag en ts f or f ra ud. T he se sam e ag en ts c ur re ntl y f ac e the thr eat of

state tort c la im s if

the y m ak e fr au dul en t m isr ep re se ntatio ns t o in div idu al s an d e nti tie s no t go ve rn ed by E RI SA
. T o ho ld the se a ge nts accountable in the sam e w ay when m aking representations abo ut an E RI SAplan m er el y

le ve ls the play ing f

ie ld. Allowing preem

ption of a f

raud claim

against an indiv idual in su ran ce ag en t wi ll no t s erv e Co ng res s’s p ur po se forERISA. . . . Co ngr es s e na ct ed

E RI SAto pr ote ct

the int er es ts o f em

plo y ee s and other beneficiarie s of em

ploy ee benefit plans. To im m unize ins ur an ce a ge nts f

ro m pe rs ona l l ia

bil ity f or f ra udul en t m isr ep re se ntatio n r eg ar din g E RI SAplans w oul d no t pr om ote thi s obj ec tiv e. I f E RI SApr ee m pts abe ne fi ci ar

y ’ s po te nti al c au se of action for m isrepresentation, em ploy ees, beneficiar ies, and em ploy ers ch oosi ng am ong vari ous plans w ill no l onge r be able to re ly on the re pr es en ta tio ns o f the ins ur an ce a ge nt r eg ar din g th e te rm s of the plan. T he se e m plo y ee s, w hom

Co ngr es s so ught

to pr ote ct , w ill f

ind the m se lve s un ab le to m ak e inf orm ed c hoi ce s r eg ar din g ava ila ble benefit plans where state lawplaces the duty on agents to d eal hone stl y w ithappl ic an ts. Id
. a t 72 3- 24 ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). T his r ea soni ng c anbe appl ie d to the ins tant c as e as w el l. A ft er

a ll, the pla int if

fs a lle ge that M as s M utu al , li ke the ind ep en de nt ag en t i n M or st ei n, m ad e m is rep res en ta ti on s i n t he sal e o f an in su ran ce p ol ic y .See e.g ., Vos v. Fa rm Bur eau L ife Ins. Co., 667 N.W. 2d 36, 46-55 (I owa 2003) 15 (upholdingthe denial of

class ce rtification of va

nishing pre mium claims because the state-la w misrepre sentation claims ra ised too many individualiz ed questions of fa ct); B anks v. N.Y. L ife Ins . Co ., 73 7 So . 2 d 1 27 5, 12 83 (L a . 1 99 9) (h old ingthat th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in cer tifying a vanishingpremium class a ction beca use the state- law misrepr esentation claims raised t o o m an y i n d i v i d u a l i z e d i s s u e s ) ; V ar a c a l l o v . M a s s . M u t . L i f e In s . C o . , 7 5 2 A
. 2 d

8 0 7 (N . J. Super. A.D. 2000) (orde ringclass ce rtification of va nishing pre mium poli cy

holders’ state -law fra ud claims); Gaidon v. Gua rdian L ife Ins. Co., 725 N.E. 2d 598, 608 (N.Y. 1999) (holdingthat vanishingpremium sales pra ctices, a s pled, “fa ll[ ] wit hin the purview” of the state de ceptive business prac tices statute but do “not constitute a ‘ misrepre sentation or mater ial omission’ nece ssary to sustain a cause of ac tion for fra ud”). 35 And w hen an insu rer is not acting in its capacity as an E RISAentity , w e can see no r ea son that C ongr es s w oul d have sou ght to im m uni ze it f ro m li ab ili ty f or f ra ud
or sim ilar state -l awtor

ts. F or c ondu ct suc h a s th at

a lle ge d by

the pla int if

fs , ins ur er s c ur

re ntl y f ac e the thr eat of

sui t un de r state lawby

non -E RI SAe nti tie s. 15 T o ho ld the m

a cc ount ab le in thi s c ont ex t, the re fo re , “ m er el y le ve ls the play ing field,” and any

indirect econom ic im

pact such claim s m ay

have on plans g overned by ERISA is no t b y

it se lf s uf fic ie nt to est ab li sh co m

pl et e p reem

pt io n. Id . at 7 23
. In de ed , j ust

li ke the j udgm en t a ga ins t the ind ep en de nt i nsur an ce a ge nt i n Mor ste in, aj udgm en t a ga ins t M as s M utu al w ill have no d ir ec t e co nom ic im pa ct on an y E RI SAplan. Fi na lly , E nge lhardt v. P au l R ev er e L if e In sur an ce Co
. , 139 F . 3d 1 346 (1 1th Ci r. 199 8) , w hic h a ddr es se d bo th d ef en siv e an d c om

ple te pr ee m

pti on, is re le vant he re . T he re , the pla int if

f (E nge lhardt) dis cl ose d gl au co m a as apr ee xis tin gFor clar ity , the statement of E ng elhar dt’s fac ts give n in the textis somewhat simplified. 16 After the ca se wa s removed to f eder al cour

t, Eng elhar dt moved to remand his fr aud cla im and also amende d his complaint to bring a separ ate ERI SA claim. Duringdiscovery , Paul Revere dis c ov e re d a

me mo s up po rt ingEn g e lha rd t’ s c la im a

nd the re fo re te nd e re d p a st d isa bil ity be ne fi ts, which Eng elhar dt acc epted. Paul Reve re a lso offer ed to discuss the possibilit y of re imbursing En g e lha rd t f or re a so na ble c os ts a

nd atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e re wa s n o f or ma l se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, ho we ve r. Pa

ul R e ve re the n mo ve d f

or summa ry jud g me nt o n b oth

of En g e lha rd t’ s c la ims , arguing that the parties ha d settled the ERI SA claim and that the f raud c laim was pre empted. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a g re e d th at th e pa

rt ie s h a d r e a c he d a

“ de fa c to s e ttl e me nt” of

the ERI SA c la im and ac cording ly

dismiss ed it (althoug h it also retained jur isdiction over the issues of attorney ’s fee s and the prope r intere st rate on the ba ck bene fits). The district cour t concluded, how ever , that th e fr a

ud c la im w a s n ot c omp le te ly pr e e mpt e d a

nd the re fo re g ra

nte d E ng e lha

rd t’ s mo tio n to rema nd that portion of the ca se to state cour t. Specifica lly , the district court c oncluded that beca use Eng elhar dt was not a “ benef iciary” and the ref

ore la cked sta

nding to sue under ERI SA. See Eng elhar dt, 139 F.3d at 1348- 50. 36 conditi on in h is application for disability insurance through his em ploy er. A fter
re vie w ing E nge lhardt’ s a ppl ic at ion , the ins ur er

( Pa ul R ev er e) r eque ste d th at he sig n an am en dm en t t o th e pol ic y e xc lud ing dis ab ili ty

r el at ed to “ ei the r or

both ey es . ” E nge lhardt, how ev er , ins ist ed that on ly gla uc om a- re la te d di sa

bil ity sho uld be e xc lud ed
. T he ind ep en de nt a ge nt who s old the pol ic y

a gr ee d th at

the e xc lus ion shou ld b e so i nte rp re te d, and P au l R ev er e se nt E nge lhardt a le tte r co nf

irm ing the
sam e. When Engelhardt suffer ed a detached r etina, how ever, Paul Rever e re lied on the exclusi on to d eny

his claim for benef its. E ngelhardt then su ed Paul Rever e in s ta te c ourt f

or f ra udul en t i nduc em en t, and P au l R ev er e re m ove d th e ca se to federa l court under the com plete preem

ption doctrine. T he district court granted E nge lhardt’ s m oti on t o r em an d, c onc lud ing that c om ple te pr ee m

pti on d id n ot ex ist
. S ee id. a t 13 48- 50. 16O na p p e a l , w e n o t e d

an“ i n t e r n a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y” i nth e d i s tr i c tc o urt ’ s o r d e r
— s p e c i f i c a l l y, be tw e e n, on

the on e ha

nd , it s d e te rm inatio n th at E ng e lha rd t la c ke d s tand ingto s ue un de r E RI SA and, on the other , its ex erc ise of jurisdiction over the ERI SA claim. We expl ained that ther e wer e two wa

y s that the district court could have re solved the jurisdictional issue: First, it might have he ld that Eng elhar d’s fra ud claim was not c ompletely pree mpted, which would have meant that it lacked jurisdiction over that claim as we ll as the subsequently added E RI SA claim. Alternatively , it might have f ound that the state-la

w claim wa s completely

pree mpted, which wo uld have g ive n it

jurisd ic tio n o ve r b oth

c la ims . B y

e xer c isi ngjur isd ic tio n o ve r t he ERI SA claim and then de terminingin essence that it lacked jurisdiction over the whole c ase f

rom the start, howeve r, the district cour t improperly

“mer g ed these options.” I d. at 1350 n.3. As we e xpla ine d, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s (e rr on e ou s) “ c on c lus ion
. . . th at E ng e lha

rd t la c k[e d] st and ingto b r i n ganE R IS Ac l a i ms h o u l d h av e l e d [ i t ] t o c o n c l u d e th atc o mp l e t e p r e e mp t i o n[ d i d ] n o ta p p l y . . . and that the state law fr audulent induce ment claim was thus not re movable to fe dera l court.” I d. 37 On appeal, we rever sed and held th at E ngelhardt’s state- law claim wa s co m pl et el y an d d efen si ve ly preem

pt ed . On th e d efen si ve pre em pt io n i ss ue , we dis tin gui she d M or ste in a s f oll ow s: “ [u ] nli ke the ind ep en de nt i nsur an ce a ge nt and agency in Morstein, Paul Re vere is an E RISAfiduciary , and thu s an ‘ ER ISA
en tity , ’ be ca

use it ha d th e ex cl usi ve auth or ity to de te rm ine e lig ibi lity

f or be ne fi ts unde r the plan and t o r ev ie wde nie d c la im s. ” I d. a t 13 52. W e the n e la bor at ed on thi s di sti nc tio n: Engelhardt’ s suit “ affe cts the relations am ong p rincipal ER ISA en tit ie s a s su ch ” an d “ re la te s to ” anE RI SA plan f or anum be r of reasons. F irst, a s noted abo ve, E ngelhardt’s suit is against an ERI SA en tity . S ec ond, P au l R ev er e ha d a ssu m ed it s r ole a s an E RI SAe nti ty an d [ the ] E RI SAplan ha d be ene sta bli she d be fo re , a lbe it onl y sho rt ly before, Paul Rever e m ade its alleged m isrepresentations to an in di vi du al reg ard in g t he sco pe of c ov erag e u nd er t he ERISA p la n. T hir d, the im

pe tus f or E nge lhardt’ s su it w as P au l R ev er e’ s de ci sio n in its r ole a s an E RI SAe nti ty to de ny E nge lhardt’ s c la im

f or be ne fi ts unde r the E RI SAplan. A lth oughE nge lhardt i nit ia lly a tte m pte d to38

ch al le nge the de nia l thr oughP au l R ev er e’ s a ppe al s pr oc es s, Eng el ha rd t u lt im at el y

ab an do ne d t ha t ap pr oa ch an d fi le d t hi s l aws ui t. Fourth, as a

result of docum ents produ ced during the dis covery process, P aul Revere determ ined that its d enial of benefits w as im proper and decided to pay Engelhardt the E RISAbenefits he had be ense ek ing a ll al ong. Id. at 1352 -53 (em

phasis add ed) (f

ootn ote om itted) (quotin g Morstein, 93 F.3d at 72 2) . Thu s, we em

ph as iz edth atth e su itwas b et ween ERISA en ti ti es “ as su ch ,” that P au l R ev er e “ as sum ed it s r ole a s an E RI SAe nti ty ” pr ior to the a lle ge d f

ra ud, and that the suit wa s really about Paul Revere’ s denial of benefits “ in its role as an ER ISAentity .” Id. In other w ords, w e did not si m ply establish th at Paul Re vere wa s an ER ISAentity

at som e point or for som e purposes; rather, we em phasized t h a tEn g e l h a r d t ’s c o mp l a i n ta l l e g e dmi s c o n du c tb y P au l R e v e r e i n th a tc ap a c i t y. Having determ ined that Engelhardt’ s suit related to an ERI SAplan and was thu s de fe nsi ve ly

pr ee m pte d, w e al so h el d th at

it w as c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d f or t h r e e r e a s o n s : F i r s t , th e p a rt i e s w e r e “E R I S A e n t i t i e s w h o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e c a me str ai ne d w he n P au l R ev er e de nie d E nge lhardt’ s c la im f or be ne fi ts unde r the E RI SAplan” —i
. e. , “pr ec ise ly the ty pe s of part ie s w ho C ongr es s in te nde d to litigate und er § 1132(a)” and “ precisely the ty pe of disput e that the statute wa s i n t e n d e dt o r e s o l v e . ” I d
. a t1 3 5 3
. S e c o n d , En g e l h a r d t ’s c l a i m wa s “ e s s e n t i a l l y a ch al le nge to Pa

ul R ev er e’ s r ef

usa l t o pay

be ne fi ts. ” I d. a t 13 54. T hir d, E nge lhardt39

did not se ek to re sc ind

his c ontra ct

but ins te ad sou ght be ne fi ts a lle ge dly

ow ed him
u n d eri t s t er m s . Id . Th u s , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt h ad ju ri s d i ct i o n o v erEn g el h ar d t ’s state -l awc la im

and s houl d have dis m iss ed it a s pr ee m pte d un de r § 51 4. Thus, a gain, w e did not rely sim ply on Paul Revere ’ s general status as an

“ ER ISAentity .” Rather , w e though t it necessary to show that Paul Revere wa s ac tin g inthat r ole w he n th e al le ge d f ra ud t ook pla ce and whe n it sub se que ntl y de nie d E nge lhardt’ s c la im f or be ne fi ts, and w e not ed

that the dis put e co nc er

ne d a denial of benefits under an ER ISAplan. I n contrast, in the instant case, w e agre e that M as s M utu al is not

af idu ci ar y f or any pur pose oth er

than m ak ing be ne fi t de te rm inatio ns, a

f unc tio n th at

is not a t i ssu e in this law sui t. T hus, it w as not ac tin g “ in i ts r ole a s an E RI SAe nti ty ” at the ti m e the pla int if

fs a lle ge that i t fraudulently

induced them

to buythe vanishin g prem ium life insurance policies at iss ue he re . A s su ch , thi s law sui t do es not se em to “ af fe ct []
. . . r el at ion s am ong principal ERI SAentities as such” but in stead aff ects only the relationship b etwe en t w o p o l i c yh o l d e r s an dth e i r i n s u r e r . I d
. a t1 3 5 2
. No r i s th e s u i t“ e s s e n t i a l l y a ch al le ng e to [a] refu sa l t o p ay be ne fit s” un de r an ERISA p la n. Id . at 1 35 4. Be ne fi ts h av e not

y et be co m e due und er

the pol ic y , and f

ro m the pla int if

fs ’ perspective the problem

is that the term s of the policy them selves do no t m atch Ma ss M utu al ’ s e ar lie r re pr es en ta tio ns.40

Moreover, as noted above, the E ngelhardt court also relied on th e fa ct that

“ Paul Rever e had assum ed its role as an E RISAentity and [the] ER ISAplan had been established before, a lbeit onl y shortly before, Paul Rever e m ade its alleged
m isr ep re se ntatio ns. ” I d. a t 13 52. A lon g th es e lin es , in Fr an kli n v. Q H G of G ad sde n, I nc . , 127 F . 3d 1 024 (1 1thCi r. 199 7) , w e co m m en te d th at , “ unl ike the circum stances in Morstein, [the plaintiff and the defe ndant] w ere ER ISAentities at the tim e the alleged fr audulent m isrepresentations were m ade.” Id. at 1029. In Bu te ro , how ev er , w e de sc ri be d F rankl in’ s c om m en t a s am er e “ sugg es t[ ion ] in dicta .
. . that an insurance com pany allegedly oblig ated to pay

benefits under a plan is no t considered an ERI SAentity if the com

plaint alleges pre-policy

fra ud.” Butero, 174 F.3d at 1213 n.3. Furtherm ore, we expressed som e “ doub t that E RI SAstatus c anbe so c le an ly sw itc he d onand o ff

” w he n apla int if

f cl ai m s to be due be ne fi ts unde r anE RI SAplan, and the ins ur er ’ s de ci sio n de ny ing tho se b en ef i t s wa s p l ai n l y m ad e i n i t s fi du ci ary cap ac i t y. Id . We a g re e w i t h Bu t er o ’s state m en t tha t a

pla int if f cannot a voi d c om

ple te pr ee m

pti on s im ply by a lle gin g pre-policy

fra ud on ly
. (T he plaintiffs here, of course, allege that
m isrepresentations were m ade both before and after the plan was e stablish ed.) H ow ev er , w e do thin k th at the f ac t tha t m isc ondu ct

is al le ge d to have be gun at a tim e w hen the defendant could n ot pos siblyhave been acting as an E RISAIn its order de nying the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, the district c ourt noted that “the 17 rec ord . . . indicate s that other executive of fice rs of B EIobtained similar bene fits from other sim ila r p oli c ie s wri tte n b y

Ma ss M utu a l.” Th is f

ind ingre lie d o n a

n a ff ida vit su bmi tte d b y

Ma ss Mutual that the district court later struck in its order imposingsanctions under Fe d. R. Civ. P . 37. On appe al, the plaintiffs a rgue that this aff

idavit was not only

stricken, but wa s also false, a nd that th e pla

n is a tw o- be ne fi c iary

pla n th at c ov e rs the pla int if

fs on ly . M a ss M utu a l, i n c ontr a st, argues that the a ffidavit wa s acc urate and that the plan e x tends to other B EIexecutive offic ers. In a ny e ve nt, we no te that ne ith e r t he c onte ste d a ff

ida vit no r M a ss M utu a l’ s Me mor and um i n Opposition to P laintiffs’ Motion to Remand lists a policy with an ef

fec tive date pr ior to those of the pla int if

fs ’ p oli c ie s. Thus , e ve n if the pla n c ov e rs pe rs on s o the r t

ha n th e pla int if

fs , w e a ssume that the plaintiffs we re the first participa nts in the plan and that the plan be g an on the e ffe ctive date of the first policies they

purcha sed. This distinguishes this case from Eng lehar dt beca use the plan in that case was c reated bef ore the alleg edly

fra udulent misrepre sentations wer e made . See Eng elhar dt, 139 F.3d at 1353 n.7. 41 fiduciary at least suggests th at the suit m ay not be against th e insurer-quaf i du c i a ry. 17 Fr an kli n and H al l v. Bl ue Cr oss /B lue S hie ld o f A la
. , 134 F . 3d 1 063 (1 1th Ci r. 199 8) , a lso r equir e br ie f m en tio n, but , a s adis tr ic t c ourt i n th is c ir cu it re ce ntl y concluded, their analy ses are not altog ether consistent with Butero, and they are the re fo re le ss h el pf

ul t o us he re . S ee ge ne ra lly W ils on, 284 F . S upp. 2d at 13 30- 42. I n F rankl in, the pla int if f (F rankl in) a lle ge d th at

she a cc ep te d apos iti on w ith the de fe ndant h ospi ta l onthe c ondi tio n th at he r husb an d w oul d c ont inu e to r ec ei ve the sam e hom e nur sin g c ar e pr ovi de d un de r he r fo rm er e m plo y er ’ s pl an . T w o- plu s y ears la te r, how ev er , the hos pit al inf orm ed F rankl in tha t i t w as dis co nti nui ng coverage f

or hom e nursing care; in doing so, it re lied on a clause in the plan that
reser ved to it th e right to reduce or ter m inate coverage at any

tim e. Franklin then42

sued in st ate court, alleging that th e hospital fraudulentl y induced to leave her form er e m

ploym ent by

prom ising to provid e the sam e level of hom e nursing care providedby

her for m er e m ploy er’ s plan. T he hospi tal rem oved the case to federa l court under the com

plete preem

ption doctrine, and the dis trict court denied Fr an kli n’ s m oti on t o r em an d and u lti m at el y e nte re d sum

m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the hos pit al on the gr ound that F rankl in’ s st at e- lawc la im s w er e co m ple te ly and de fe nsi ve ly

pr ee m pte d. F rankl in, 127 F . 3d at 10 26- 27. O n a ppe al , w e af

fi rm ed
. T his r es ult

is co nsi ste nt w ithBu te ro : the hos pit al , in i ts r ole a s an E RI SAf

idu ci ar y , dis co nti nue d be ne fi ts unde r anE RI SAplan, and Fr an kli n, abe ne fi ci ar

y , r es pond ed

by f ili ng a law sui t tha t e sse nti al ly

sou ght to recover benefits under the term s of that plan—that is, she soug ht “ com pensatory rel ie f ak in to th atav ai labl e u nd er § 11 32 (a).” But ero , 17 4 F .3dat 1 21 2. Fr an kli n’ s ana ly sis , how ev er , f oc use d a lm ost

e nti re ly on § 514 ’ s de fe nsi ve preem ption test—that is, w hether the plaintiff’ s state-lawclaim s “ related to” an E RI SAplan. S ee F rankl in, 127 F . 3d at 10 27- 29. T he F rankl in c ourt di d be ginit s analy sis correctly

by rec ogni zing that “ the j urisdictio nal issue . .
. turns on whether the plaintiffs are see king relief that is available under [E RISA§ 502(a)] ,” id. at 1 0 2 8 ( qu o t i n g Ke mp , 1 0 9 F . 3 da t7 1 2 ) , b u tth e r e s to f th e o p i n i o n a d dr e s s e s o n l y § 514’s “ relate to” standard. A nd, afte r noting th at a “ state lawrelate s to anIn s uc h a c a se , th e c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th at st ate -l aw c la ims are no t de fe ns ive ly 18 pree mpted would have no r es judicata eff ect be cause the cour

t would simpl y

dismiss for lac k of su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n. Th e de fe ns ive pr e e mpt ion ana ly sis wo uld

sim ply a ssi st t he c ourt in its complete pree mption analy sis. 43 emp l o yee b en ef

i tp l an ‘if i th as a c o n n ec t i o n wi t h o r r ef er en ce t o s u ch a p l an ,’” Fr an kli n, 127 F . 3d at 10 28 ( quot ing N . Y . Co nf er en ce of Bl ue Cr oss & Bl ue S hie ld Pl an s v. T rave le rs I ns. Co
. , 514 U . S. 645 , 656 , 115 S
. Ct
. 167 1, 167 7, 131 L . E d. 2d 6 95 ( 1995 )) , the c ourt he ld tha t the pla int if f’ s st at e- lawc la im s w er e co m ple te ly pr ee m pte d be ca use the y ha d su cha“ dir ec t c onne ct ionto the a dm ini str at ionof
m ed ic al be ne fi ts unde r anE RI SAplan, ” Fr an kli n, 127 F . 3d at 10 29. This analy sis is no t consist ent with Butero’ s com plete preem

ption rule,
w hic h ho lds that a

state -l awc la im

is co m ple te ly pr ee m pte d on ly w he re a ll fo ur

“ el em en ts ” o f co m

pl et e p reem

pt io n a re p res en t. Bu te ro , 17 4 F .3dat 1 21 2. Bu te ro , m or eo ve r, e xpl ic itl y r ec ogni ze s th at

state -l awc la im s m ay

be de fe nsi ve ly pr ee m pte d un de r § 51 4 bu t st ill not c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d un de r § 50 2—tha t i s, that defensive preem

ption is broader than com plete preem

ption
. Id. Thus, if

a co urt de te rm ine s th at

state -l awc la im s are not

de fe nsi ve ly

pr ee m pte d, it ne ce ssari ly fo llo w s th at

the y are not c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d. B ut the c onve rs e is n ot tru e, so 18
a co urt c an not

hol d th at state -l awc la im s are c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d si m ply be ca use th ey “ rel at e to ” an ERISA p la n.44

InH al l, the pla int if

f (H al l) a lle ge d th at

the de fe ndant i nsur er

( Bl ue Cr oss ) assured her that although known preexisting conditio ns would no t be covered dur ing the f

ir st 2 70 d ay s of

he r ne wm ed ic al plan, any oth er c ondi tio n th at

aro se dur ing the pe ri od w oul d be c ove re d; h ow ev er , w he n H al l r equir ed sur ge ry to re m ove an ov ar ian m as s duri ng the 270 -d ay pe ri od, Bl ue Cr oss de nie d he r cl ai m ev entho ugh the m as s w as not akno w n pr ee xis tin g c ondi tio n. H al l the n f ile d su it in s ta te c ourt, a sse rt ing thr ee f ra ud- re la te d c la im s, and B lue Cr oss r em ove d onthe ba sis of c om ple te pr ee m

pti on. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d H al l’ s m oti on t o r em an d, and granted Blue Cross’ s m otion to dism iss, holdin g that Hall’ s claim s wer e de fe nsi ve ly

and c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d. H al l, 134 F . 3d at 10 64. O n a ppe al , w e af

fi rm ed
. T his r es ult

is al so c onsi ste nt w ithBu te ro : B lue Cross, in its role as a fiduciary , denied a c laim for benef its und er the ter

m s of an E RI SAplan, and H al l, abe ne fi ci ar y , r es pond ed

by f ili ng a law sui t tha t e sse nti al ly soug ht benefits und er the ter m s of that plan—that is, she soug ht “ com pensatory rel ie f ak in to th atav ai labl e u nd er [ERI SA § 5 02 (a)].” Bu te ro , 17 4 F .3dat 1 21 2. T he c ourt, how ev er , r el ie d pr im ar ily on F rankl in, and i ts ana ly sis f oc use d e nti re ly on § 114 4’ s de fe nsi ve pr ee m pti on s tandard
. S ee H al l, 134 F . 3d at 10 65- 66. T hus, H al l and F rankl in r ea chr es ult s th at are c onsi ste nt w ithBu te ro , but the y e m plo y ana ly se s th at

are inc onsi ste nt w iththe r ule it e sta bli she d. I n W ils on45

v. Co m an , 284 F . S upp. 2d 1 319 (M
. D . A la
. 200 3) , the c ourt a ddr es se d th is inconsi stency

at length and conclud ed (a) that while Buter o “ provides th e proper standard f or ana ly zi ng the que sti on o f co m ple te pr ee m

pti on i n th e E le ve nth Circuit,” (b) that standard is in direct conflict w ith Franklin, and (c) “ since Fr an kli n is an e ar lie r pane l de ci sio n . . . , und er the pr ior pane l r ule , ” he w as bound to f oll owF rankl in and n ot B ute ro . I d. a t 13 29. W e ag re e that the ana ly sis of Fr an kli n, the e ar lie r ca se , c onf lic ts w iththat of

Bu te ro , the la te r one , but w e do n ot thi nk tha t the pr ior

pane l r ule obl ige s us to fo llo wF rankl in. T he r ea son is tha t our pr e- Fr an kli n c as es are c onsi ste nt w ithBu te ro . F or e xa m ple , in K em

p v. I nt’ l B us. Ma ch
. Co rp . , 109 F . 3d 7 08 ( 11th C ir
. 199 7) , w e he ld tha t the c om ple te pr ee m

pti on questio n “ turns on whether the plaintiffs are se eking relief that is available under [§ 502 (a )] ” an d th at

“ [a ] n or din ar

y E RI SApr ee m

pti on d ef en se , e ve n if

va lid , is not e noug h to c re at e fe de ra l qu es tio n j ur isd ic tio n, ” an d w e an al y ze d th e co m ple te pr eem pt io n i ss ue wit ho ut refe ren ce t o § 51 4’s “ rel at e to ” st an da rd . Id. at71 1- 14
. In de ed , in de cl ini ng the de fe ndant’ s in vit at ionto re ac h th e de fe nsi ve pr ee m pti on issue, w e explained, “ W e cannot decide w hether the plaintiffs’ claim s relate to an E RI SAplan . . . be ca

use w e ha ve no j ur isd ic tio n ov er thi s c as e. T he de fe nse of
or din ar y E RI SApr ee m

pti on, by it se lf , doe s no t c re at e fe de ra l qu es tio n j ur isd ic tio n. ” I d. a t 71 4 ( em pha sis a dde d)
. S im ilarl y , in Br ow n v. Co nn. G en .46

L if e In s. Co
. , 934 F . 2d 1 193 (1 1thCi r. ), w e dis tin gui she d de fe nsi ve pr ee m pti on under § 514 and com

plete preem

ption under § 502 (a). See id. at 1195-96; id. at 1197 -9 9 ( John son, J. , dis se nti ng)
. A nd i n our m ost r ec en t c om

ple te pr ee m

pti on ca se ( iss ue d a ft er

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n inW ils on) , w e ag ai n he ld tha t a cl ai m is not c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d un de r § 50 2( a) sim

ply be ca use it is de fe nsi ve ly preem pted und er § 514; indeed, we specifically stated that “ the district court erred in d ec idi ng the [ co m

ple te ] pr ee m

pti on i ssu e by

appl y ing the de fe nsi ve pr ee m pti on an al y si s.” Erv as t v . Fle xi bl e Pro du ct s C o., 3 46 F.3d 10 07 , 10 13 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ). T hus, w e ar e not

bound b y

the ana ly se s of

F rankl in and H al l; rathe r, w e w ill appl y the c om ple te pr ee m

pti on r ule se t ou t i n B ute ro .

B. I n th i s s e c t i o n , w e s t a t e b r i e f l y w h a ti s l i k e l y c l e a r

a tth i s p o i n t : T h e c l a i ms of th e p la in ti ffs in th is cas e are un li ke th os e o f pl ai nt iff s i n p as t ca se s i n wh ic h we ha ve he ld c om

ple te pr ee m

pti on t o a ppl y be ca use the y “ do[ ] not a ff ec t . . . r el at ion s am ong p rincipal ER ISAentities . .
. as such,” P erkins, 898 F.2d at 473, or c oncern Ma ss M utu al ’ s c ondu ct

in its c ap ac ity

a s an E RI SAf

idu ci ar y . N or do the pl ai nt iff s “ se ekco m

pe ns at ory rel ie f ak in to th atav ai labl e u nd er [§ 50 2( a)],” Bu te ro , 174 F . 3d at 12 12, be ca use the y se ek dam ag es ba se d onf

ra ud i n th e sa le of in su ran ce p ol ic ie s, n ot be ne fit s al le ge d t o b e due un de r th e te rm s o f th e p la n i ts el f.Wil son was in many respe cts similar to the instant case. The re, the plaintiff (Wilson) 19 had obtained life insurance from Southern Insuranc e. The defe ndants, L oy al Amer ican L ife Insuranc e and its ag ents, persua ded her to switch to a L oy al Amer ican policy offe red through her e mpl oye r a s p art

of a pla n g ov e rn e d b y

ERI SA. Wils on

a lle g e d th at L oya l A me ri c an f a ile d “ to advise he r that her

exis ting policies w ould remain in ef fec t and that she would c ontinue to owe premiums on [t hem].” As a re sult, she stopped makingpay ments to Sout hern, Southern be g an de du c tin gpr e miums f

ro m th e po lic ie s’ a c c umu late d c a shsurr e nd e r v a lue , a nd sh e ult imate ly suffe red a loss due to the depletion of the c ash value built up in t hose policies. She also a lleg ed L oy al Amer ican “ failed to a dvise her that the new policies pr ovided lesser benef its, but for a highe r p re mium be c a

us e of he r a g e ” and

“ c omm itt e d f

ra ud in m isr e pr e se nti ngthe le ng th o f t ime that surre nder c harg es would be a pplicable to her

L oy al Amer ican policy ,” as w ell as the amount of those cha

rg es. Wilson, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1328-29. Ba sed on this description of Wilson’s complaint, we agree that her c ore c laim was that 47 Be ca use of the se dif fe re nc es , thi s c as e pr ove s to be an e xc ep tio n to our ge ne ra l r ule of thum b th at “ cl ai m s a ga ins t an in sur er f or f ra ud o r fr au d inthe ind uc em en t t o purc ha se apol ic y are in es se nc e cl ai m s ‘ to r ec ove r be ne fi ts d ue to [th e b en efi ci ary] un de r th e te rm s o f th e p la n.’” Id . at 1 21 3 (q uo ti ng ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B )). “ From

the Butero opinio n, it is apparent that [the plaintiff in that
ca se ] sou ght

to re co ve r ins ur an ce be ne fi ts that sh e be lie ve d sh e w as e nti tle d to a s a re sul t of [ he r husb an d’ s] de ath. ” W ils on, 284 F . S upp. 2d at 13 34. I n c ontra st, Co tto n and E ic khof

f ar e “ ve ry

m uc h a liv e” and are “ not

se ek ing a ct

ua l de ath be ne fi ts” f

ro m Ma ss M utu al
. I d. “ Ine sse nc e, ” the y are sui ng M as s M utu al f or it s

“ alleged fra

udul ent and neglig ent conduct, which ca used [them ] to suffer
ec onom ic los se s. ” I d. a t 13 36. “ Wha t [ the y ] are not sui ng . . . f

or is a re fu sa l t o pay benefits under the term s of the .
. . life insurance policies .
. . . This fa ct dis tin gui she s th e ins tant c as e fr om Bu te ro . ” I d. ( em

pha sis a dde d)
. I t a lso 19L oya l A me ri c an “ c a us e d h e r t o s uf

fe r e c on omi c los s, ne ith e r i n th e fo rm of a de nia l of be ne fi ts nor in a de nial of rig hts under her policy , but in the fac t that she was wor se off economica lly

afte r . . . ag ree ing to pur chase the L oy al Amer ican policy . . . . In essenc e, [she soug ht] damag es for an ag ree ment that she ente red into base d on alleg edly false r epre sentations, but not for the ac tual death be nefits of he r policy .” I d. at 1329. The district c ourt stated that it would have he ld that such a state -law c laim is not completely pree mpted under B utero, but fe lt its elf bound to re ach the opposite result under

Fr anklin’s ana ly sis. As we explain above, F ranklin’s a naly sis was not co n tro l l i n g. In concludingthat the state-la w claim wa s not completely pree mpted under B utero, the district court found Towne v. National L ife of V ermont, Inc., 130 F . Supp. 2d 604 (D. Vt. 2000), to b e pe rs ua siv e . In T owne , a s p art of a pla n g ov e rn e d b y

ERI SA, the pla int if

fs purc ha se d who le lif e ins ur anc e po lic ie s f

ro m a Natio na l L if

e a g e nt. Th e y

a lle g e d th at th e a g e nt “ int e nti on a lly dece ived them about the nature of the Plan in order to induce them to invest in it .” I d. at 606. Specifica lly , they

claimed that he misrepre sented the e ffe ct of a decision to withdraw f

rom the plan. The district c ourt held that such a claim was not c ompletely pree mpted beca

use the plaintiffs did not seek re lief ava ilable under ERI SA § 502(a). T hat is, they did not seek any benef it described in the pla

n itself. “Rather , they

claim[ed] s imply

that [National L ife] fr a ud ule ntl y c on c e a le d th e te rm s and

c on dit ion s o f t

he
. . . Pl an in

or de r t o in du c e the m to inv e st in it, and they

[sought] onl y

to be re turned to the status quo prior to their a doption of the Plan.” I d. at 608. 48 distin guish es it from

cases such as E ngelhardt, Fr anklin, and Hall, because in eac h of tho se c as es the pla int if

f w as a ct ua lly c ont en din g to be due abe ne fi t tha t c oul d be ide nti fi ed

w ith in the te rm s of

his or he r pol ic y

—nam el y , adis ab ili ty

be ne fi t (E ngelhardt), hom e nursing care ( Franklin), and reim bursem ent for healthcar e ex pe ns es (Hal l). More im portant with respect to the E RISAclaim s at issue here, our case law in this are a supp orts o ur

c onc lus ionthat M as s M utu al w as not a ct ing in its fiduciary capacity for any purpose relevant to the plaint iffs’ § 502(a) claim s. I n Bu te ro , E nge lhardt, F rankl in, and H al l, the re w er e ac tua l de ci sio ns d en y ing be ne fi ts unde r the r el ev an t pl an . Whe n an in sur er m ak es suc h ade ci sio n, it is49

pla inl y w eari ng i ts f

idu ci ar y ha t, and the be ne fi ci ar

y m ay c ha lle nge the c or

re ctne ss of the de ci sio n a cc or din g to the te rm s of the E RI SAplan. H er e, in co ntr as t, a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or

re ct ly c onc lud ed , the te rm s of

the plan do cum en ts “ ar e cl ear an d
unam big uous , ” an d th e pla int if fs are not e nti tle d to r el ie f unde r the m . N or do the ir al le gatio ns, if

pr ope rl y c hara ct er iz ed

and unde rs too d, se ek

r el ie f unde r the plan or challenge any

action by Mass Mutual in its fidu ciary capacity
. This disting uishes the c as e fr om

tho se in w hic h w e re as one d th at the pla int if

f w as e sse nti al ly ch al le ng in g a n i ns ur er’s d en ia l o f be ne fit s. T he pla int if

fs c la im s are ins te ad

m or e lik e tho se a sse rt ed

a ga ins t the ind ep en de nt i nsur an ce a ge nt i n M or ste in. W e ar e, of c our se , aw ar e that M as s Mutual is in m any

respects diffe rent fr om

such an agent and would be consi dered a fiduciary

for som e purposes, but, as w e explain above, fiduciary status un der E RI SAis a func tio na l c onc ep t, and i n th is c as e Ma ss M utu al w as pe rf orm ing a func tio n si m ilar to tha t pe rf orm ed by the a ge nt i n M or ste in o r pr of es sio na ls who pr ovi de d m ini ste ri al plan- re la te d se rv ic es in oth er c as es . T he re fo re , it

w as not
w eari ng i ts f

idu ci ar y ha t i n any

sit ua tio n r el ev an t t o th is l aw sui t. T hus, w hil e the
ca se doe s inone se nse a ff ec t r el at ion s am ong part ie s w ho are E RI SAe nti tie s, it

“ do es no t af

fect
. . . rel at io ns am on g t he pri nc ip al ERISA en ti ti es . . . as su ch .” Perkins, 898 F. 2d at 473
. Moreover, j ust as in Morstein, the plaintiffs’ state-law50

cl ai m s, if pr ove n, sho uld

have onl y

ha d an in dir ec t e co nom ic im pa ct on any E RI SAplan, and a llo w ing state -l awc la im s a ga ins t M as s M utu al on the sam e ba sis that the y are pe rm itt ed

out sid e of

the E RI SAc ont ex t “ m er el y le ve ls the play ing fie ld .” Mo rs te in , 93 F.3d at 7 23
. IV. When it denied th e plaintiffs’ m otion to rem and, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ state-lawclaim s wer e com pletely preem pted. A s a technical m atter,

“ a de ci sio n r eg ar din g c om ple te pr ee m

pti on d oe s no t de ci de the iss ue of de fe nsi ve pr ee m pti on” be ca

use “ de fe nsi ve pr ee m

pti on i s asub stanti ve iss ue that m ust be de ci de d b y

a co ur t wi th co m

pe te nt juri sd ic ti on .” Erva st , 34 6 F .3dat 1 01 3 n .7. T hus, if adis tr ic t c ourt r em an ds t o st at e co urt c la im s th at are not c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d, the de fe ndant m ay

sti ll atte m

pt t o r ai se E RI SA§ 51 4 pr ee m pti on a s a de fe nse in the state c ourt. A s apr ac tic al m atte r, how ev er , be ca use de fe nsi ve p re emp t i o n i s s i g n i fi ca n t l y b ro ad erth an co m p l et e p re emp t i o n , ad i s t ri ct co u rt ’s de te rm inatio n th at

ac la im is co m ple te ly pr ee m pte d do es r es olv e the de fe nsi ve pr ee m pti on i ssu e. A s w e he ld i n B ute ro , “ [i ] f the pla int if f’ s c la im s are [ co m

ple te ly pr ee m pte d] , the n th ey

are a lso de fe nsi ve ly

pr ee m pte d. ” 174 F . 3d at 12 15. T hus,
w e ag re e w ithMa ss M utu al that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r de ny ing the pla int if fs ’
m oti on t o r em an d is inc onsi ste nt w ithit s su bse que nt d ec isi on a llo w ing the m to fi le51

ana m en de d c om

pla int a sse rt ing a ll of

the sam e state -l awc la im s. Ma ss M utu al arg ue s th at

a ll of the dis co ve ry

r eque sts that ul tim at el y

le d to dis co ve ry sanc tio ns r el at ed

sol el y to the state -l awc la im s. T he re fo re , the arg um en t goes, the ear lier order to com pel was itself an abuse of discretion. When a district
co urt i m pose s sanc tio ns unde r Fe d. R. Ci v. P . 37( b) , “ the pr opr ie ty of [ the sanctions ] depends in large part on the propriety of the ear lier com

pel order. ” Chuda sam a v. Ma zd a Mot or Co rp . , 123 F . 3d 1 353, 136 6 ( 11th C ir
. 199 7)
. T hus,

“ [i] n evaluating whether a district court abuses its discretion when it im poses se ve re sanc tio ns u

pon a party

that vi olate s an or de r, w e be lie ve that an im portant fact oris whet he r th e en try of t ha t o rd er was it se lf a n abu se of d is cret io n.” Id. This is not to say , how ever, that sanctions based on erroneous dis covery orders
w ill ne ve r be uph el d. “ Be ca use w e expe ct

li tig an ts t o ob ey

a ll or de rs , e ve n th ose the y be lie ve w er e im

pr ovi de ntl y

e nte re d, sanc tio ns w ill ve ry of te n be sus ta ine d, part ic ularl y

w he n th e inf

irm ity of the vio la te d or de r is n ot c le ar and the sanc tio ns im pose d are m ode rate . ” I d. a t 13 66 n
. 34. InChuda sam a, w e not ed

that a “ [f ] ai lur e to c onsi de r an d r

ule on s ign if

ic an t pretrial m otion s before issuing d ispos itive orders can be an abuse of discretion.” Id
. a t 13 67. W e al so i nstru ct ed that “ [f ] ac ia l c ha lle nge s to the le ga l su ff ic ie nc y of a cl ai m or d efen se . . . sh ou ld
. . . be res ol ve d b efo re d is co ve ry be gi ns ,” id .,52

es pe ci al ly w he n th e ch al le nge d c la im w ill sig nif

ic an tly e xpand the sc ope of allowable discovery , id. at 1368. T his is so because ever y claim has the potential to e nlarg e the sc ope and c ost of dis co ve ry . I d. “ If

the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss es a nonm er ito ri ous cl ai m

be fo re dis co ve ry

ha s be gun, unn ec es sary

c ost s to the lit igants and t o th e co urt sy ste m c anbe avoi de d. ” I d. G ive n th e re la tio nshi p be tw ee n c om

ple te and d ef

en siv e pr ee m

pti on, it w as an a buse of dis cr et ionf

or the district court to delay

ruling on Mass Mutual’ s challenges to the plain tiffs’ statelaw claim s. I ndeed, the court declined to resolve this iss ue not on lywhen the statelawc la im s r ea

ppe ar ed in the pla int if

fs ’ a m en de d c om

pla int , but

a lso w he n M as s Mu tu al rai se d i t ag ai n i n t he co nt ex t o f th e la te r m ot io n t o c om pe l. Tha t we disagree w ith the dis trict court’ s initial rulin g that the state-law claim s wer e co m ple te ly pr ee m pte d do es not

a lte r our ana ly sis in thi s P ar

t. W e as sum e the
correc tness of that ruling for the purpose of addressing the court’s c om pel order
an d or de r im

posi ng s an ct ion s, sin ce tho se or de rs w er e en te re d onthe a ssu m pti on that the pla int if

fs ’ state -l awc la im s w er e, in fa ct , c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d. T he default sanction is, of course, m ooted byour determ ination that the plaintiffs cannot establish liabilityunder ER ISA , but the order r equiring Mass Mutu al to pay
a part of the pla int if

fs ’ r ea sona

ble c ost s and atto rn ey s f

ee s r em ai ns and s houl d be
rev is it edon rem an d.53

E ve n if the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ai lur e to r ule on M as s M utu al ’ s pr ee m pti on defense to the state-lawclaim s was an abuse of discretion, we do not thinkthat
ne ce ssari ly

m eans tha t the c om

pe l or de r w as a lso an a

buse of dis cr et ion
. A lth ough Ma ss M utu al ha s r ep eate dly a sse rt ed that the dis co ve ry

r eque sts that l ed

to the
com pel order re lated only

to the state-lawclaim s, the plaintiffs deny that this was the c as e, and i t do es not

appe ar that the dis tr ic t c ourt e ve r expli ci tly a gr ee d w ith Mass Mutual that the ERIS A c laim s did no t by them selves justify

the com pel
or de r. I f Ma ss M utu al ha d be enw eari ng i ts f idu ci ar y ha t f or any pur pose r el ev an t to the pla int if

fs ’ a lle ga tio ns, the m at er ia l c ove re d by the c om pe l or de r co uld

have been relevant to the plaintiffs’ breac h of fiduciary duty claim s. T he central theory of the se c la im s is that “ [l ] y ing is inc onsi ste nt w iththe duty of loy al ty ow ed by a ll fiduciaries and codified in section 40 4(a)( 1) of E RISA .” V arity Corp. v. H owe, 516 U . S. 489 , 506 , 116 S
. Ct
. 106 5, 107 5, 134 L . E d. 2d 1 30 ( 1996 ) (quot ing Pe or iaU nio n S toc k Y ar ds C o. v. P en n M ut. L if e In s. Co
. , 698 F . 2d 3 20, 326 ( 7th Ci r. 199 7) ). I n th e dis tr ic t c ourt, Ma ss M utu al arg ue d th at the onl y doc um en ts relevant to the such a claim are form al plan docum ents and perhaps any inform al d o cu m en t s th at th e p l ai n t i ff s ac tu al l y re v i ew ed . We t h i n kth at Ma s s Mu tu al ’s view of the discovery

relevant to such a claim

is too narrow. While it is true that the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d have r es olv ed the pla int if

fs ’ § 50 2( a) (1 )( B) c la im

sol el y by54

refe rence to the plan do cum ents, the plaintiffs’ breac h of fiduciary duty theory j ust if ie d a ddi tio na l di sc ove ry

int o w he the r Ma ss M utu al int en tio na lly de fr au de d or
m isl ed the m and thus br ea ch ed

the f idu ci ar y “ duty of loy al ty . . . c odi fi ed

in section 404 (a)( 1) of E RISA .” I n Va r i t y, f

o r e x a mp l e , § 5 0 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) l i a

b i l i t y wa s p r e mi s e do n th e f i du c i a ryem plo y er ’ s “ fa lse ly

opt im ist ic f

or ec as ts a bout it s ne wve nture ’ s pr ospe ct s f or suc ce ss, ” w hic h w er e int en de d to pe rs ua de it s e m plo y ee s th at

the y w oul d no t underm ine the security

of their benefits by

transfer ring to the newly

form ed
su bs id ia ry . Varit y , 51 6 U.S. at 53 7, 1 16 S. Ct. at 10 89 (Tho m as , J., di ss en ti ng ). T o e sta bli sh tha t the f

or ec as ts w er e in f

ac t “ fa lse ly

opt im ist ic , ” the V ar ity plaintiffs apparently

introduced evid ence that m anagem ent itself expected the new subs idi ar y to fa il an d so ught

to co nvi nc e the m

to sw itc h e m

plo ym en t sp ec if

ic al ly so tha t the c om

pany c oul d r id i tse lf

of it s E RI SAobl igatio ns t o th em . S ee V ar ity Corp. v. How e, 36 F.3d 746, 748-50 (8th Cir. 1994 ). T o prevail on a sim ilar the or y in thi s c as e, the pla int if

fs w oul d have ne ed ed

to showthat M as s M utu al , acting in its fidu ciary

capacity , pre sented falsely optim istic poli cy

illustration s that it es se nti al ly

kne wove rs ta te d th e be ne fi ts tha t the pol ic ie s c oul d be e xpe ct ed to produce. W e express no opin ion as to what exactly the plaintiffs would have had to sho w to prevail on such a claim , but w e do not see how they could have even55

be gun to d o so w ith out

dis co ve ry

r eg ar din g th e m ethodo log ie s, a ssu m pti ons, and d at a M as s Mu tu al u s ed t o p ro du ce th e p o l i cy i l l u s t ra t i o n s an dMa s s Mu tu al ’s int er na l c om m uni catio ns r eg ar din g th e m ar ke tin g and e co nom ic s of

vanis hin g pr em ium pol ic ie s. Fr om the r ec or d and the or de rs be low , it is dif fi cu lt to d isc er

n th e pr ec ise ba sis of the c om pe l or de r. B ec au se the dis tr ic t c ourt a ppare ntl y tho ught that a ll of the or igi na l st at e- lawc la im s c oul d surv ive e ve n th oughc om ple te ly pr ee m pte d, it never clar ified whether

the com pel order re lated to the thos e claim s, the new ER ISAclaim s, or both. O n rem and, the district court should revisit this iss ue. If,
as Ma ss M utu al c ont en ds, the pla int if fs ha d e ve ry

thi ng the y

ne ed ed to pr oc ee d on a V arity /Peoria Union -ty

pe breach of fiduciary

duty claim , then the com

pel order
m ust have related solely

to the no lo nger viable (under the district court’ s order de ny ing the pla int if

fs ’ m oti on t o r em an d) state -l awc la im s and w as an a buse of dis cr et ionbe ca

use the f ai lur e to d ism iss tho se c la im s w as it se lf an a buse of discretion. T he question whether a finding of com

plete preem

ption com

pelled an ad di ti on al fin di ng of d efen si ve pre em pt io n was a st rai gh tfo rwardqu es ti on of l aw, an d th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n no t t o answ er it c an not be j ust if ie d. T hus, if

the court’ s decision n ot to decide sign ificantly increased the burden of discovery , then
an y sig nif ic an t sanc tio ns i t i m

pose d w er e anabuse of

dis cr et ionbe ca

use “ the56

inf irm ity of the vio la te d or de r” in that c as e w oul d be “ cl ear. ” Chuda sam a, 123 F. 3d at 136 6 n.34. I f, however, as the plaintiffs’ claim , the c om pel order re lated
n o to n l y t o th e s t a t e - l a wc l a i ms b u ta l s o t o th e b r e a c h o f f i du c i a ry du t y c l a i ms under ERI SA , then it w as not an abuse of discretion, at least to the extent that was j ust if ie d by the E RI SAc la im s. A nd i f the c om pe l or de r w as not

it se lf an a buse of dis cr et ion , the n sanc tio ns f or aw ill fu l, “ ba d f

ai th” vio la tio n of

it w oul d be w el l
w ith in the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s “br oa d di sc re tio n to f as hio n a ppr opr ia te sanc tio ns f

or vio la tio n of

dis co ve ry

or de rs . ” Ma laute a v. S uz uki Mo tor Co
. , 987 F . 2d 1 536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993). V. For the fore goin g reasons, w e RE VE RSE the j udgm ent of the district court in f av or of the pla int if

fs und er E RI SA§ 50 2( a) (2 ). B ec au se the pla int if fs c an not es ta bli sh tha t M as s M utu al is anE RI SAf idu ci ar y f or any pur pose r el ev an t t o th ei r amen d ed co m

p l ai n t , a l l ER IS A c l ai m s s h o u l db e d i s m i s s ed wi t h p re ju d i ce . We V A CA T E the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r im posi ng s an ct ion s un de r Fe d. R. Ci v. P . 37( b)
an d R E MA

N D w iththe ins tr

uc tio n th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d c onsi de r w ha t, if
an y , sanc tio ns are appr opr ia te in lig ht o f thi s op ini on.