IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-11104

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RAMON MONTANEZ GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:13-CR-82

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ramon Montanez Gonzalez (Gonzalez) was indicted for conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 

methamphetamine and possession with the intent to distribute 500 grams or 

more of methamphetamine. Gonzalez moved to suppress all evidence arising 

from his stop and arrest in Abilene, Texas. The district court conducted the 

bench trial and the suppression hearing together. The district court denied 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 28, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-11104

2

the motion to suppress finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 

stop Gonzalez and question him based on the reliable information from a 

confidential informant (CI), the corroboration of the CI’s information, and the 

totality of the circumstances involving the towing of Gonzalez’s car when it 

could be driven. The district court then found Gonzalez guilty on both counts 

of the indictment.

Gonzalez argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress because the law enforcement officers did not have the reasonable 

suspicion of criminal conduct necessary to justify an investigatory stop. We 

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 429 (5th 

Cir. 2005). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 574 (5th Cir. 2008).

“An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief 

investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that 

criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 

2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is 

measured in light of the totality of the circumstances and must be supported 

by particular, articulable, and objective facts. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 

266, 273 (2002); United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994) 

(en banc). Reasonable suspicion may be based on the collective knowledge of 

law-enforcement officers, so long as the officers were in communication with 

one another. United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007).

Gonzalez argues that officers who stopped him could not have relied on 

the CI’s information because they had no actual knowledge of its credibility 

and, therefore, did not possess all of the facts needed to form a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity. Gonzalez argues that Ibarra requires that a 

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No. 14-11104

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single officer must be fully aware of all of the facts needed to justify an 

investigatory stop before that officer is able to share the information with the 

arresting officer. Although this is one situation in which the collectiveknowledge doctrine applies, the doctrine is not limited to this circumstance. In 

United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 962 F.2d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1992), the case on 

which Ibarra rests, we held that probable cause could be formed from the 

information in the possession of the arresting officers added to the information 

possessed by the other officers with whom they were in communication. As the 

district court determined using this additive approach, specific and current 

information provided by a reliable informant was corroborated by officers in 

the field and was sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. See United States 

v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir. 1999). The denial of the motion to 

suppress was not erroneous. See Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 841.

The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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