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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

R.O. BROOKS FRESHWADDA, §

§

 Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1637-K-BN

§

VILLAS AT GREEN VALLEY, §

§

 Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate 

judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b) and a standing order of 

reference from United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade. See Dkt. No. 27.

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks confirmation of an alleged arbitration award 

pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9. See Dkt. No. 1-5. The undersigned concludes the case 

should be dismissed because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Background

Plaintiff R. O. Brooks Freshwadda entered an Apartment Lease Agreement 

with Defendant Villas at Green Valley on April 16, 2020, for an apartment located in 

Henderson, Nevada. See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 18-1 at ¶ 4 and Ex. A (Dkt. No. 

18-1 at 5-19) (Lease Agreement).

The lease agreement does not have an arbitration clause. 

Paragraph 21 of the lease agreement provides that Defendant had the right to 

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“regulate the time, manner, and place of parking cars, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, 

boats, trailers, and recreational vehicles by anyone” and to “have unauthorized or 

illegally parked vehicles towed ... if [the vehicle] ... has no current license plate or no 

current registration and/or inspection sticker...” See Dkt. No. 18-1 at 3, 7. Plaintiff 

contends that Defendant breached the agreement by having his vehicle towed on 

December 18, 2021, because it was improperly registered. See Dkt. No. 1 at 11. 

Plaintiff then unilaterally took the following steps, to which Defendant did not 

respond and which Plaintiff alleges resulted in a purported arbitration award. 

On January 17, 2022, Plaintiff sent Defendant a Notice of Breach of 

Contract. See id. at 10-13. The notice stated that “[a]ll claims and disputes arising 

under or relating to this [Lease] Agreement are to be settled by binding arbitration 

in the state of Texas or another location mutually agreeable to the parties.” See id. at 

11. It also stated that Defendant “is granted” one hour from receipt of the notice to 

return Plaintiff’s property to him, and, if does not do so, it will be assessed a fee of 

$250,000 per fifteen minutes until the property is returned. See id. Plaintiff also sent 

Defendant an invoice for $250,000. See id. at 12.

On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff sent Defendant a Second Notice of Breach of 

Contract. See id. at 14-15. In the notice, Plaintiff informed Defendant that the time 

to cure had expired, that it was in default because it had not responded to the first 

notice of breach, and that it was now liable for $720,000,000 in damages based on 

the formula stated in the first notice of breach. See id. at 14.

On June 2, 2022, Plaintiff sent Defendant a Notice of Default. See id. at 16-17. 

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Plaintiff informed Defendant that he had contacted Stratford Arbitration & 

Mediation Corporation to arbitrate the dispute and the arbitration hearing was 

scheduled for June 20, 2022, unless Defendant objected by June 7, 2022. See id. at 

16. 

On June 8, 2022, Plaintiff sent Defendant another Notice of Arbitration. See 

id. at 18-20. Plaintiff informed Defendant that the dispute was set for arbitration via 

Zoom before Stratford Arbitration & Mediation Corporation on June 20, 2022. See id. 

at 18. The notice further stated that Defendant’s failure to respond constituted an 

act of “tacit agreement” not only to arbitrate the dispute, but also 

Respondent agrees to the jurisdiction, and venue of the arbitration 

outfit, and agrees to submit the contract and its controversy, and 

yourself to the jurisdiction, and venue thereof, and agree to be bound by 

its ruling and orders. 

Id.

An arbitration award purports to have been issued by Stratford Arbitration & 

Mediation Corporation on June 20, 2022. See id. at 8-9. The document states that an 

arbitration hearing was conducted via Zoom on June 20, 2022, at 133 S. Scott Street, 

Burleson, Texas, which Defendant did not attend. The arbitration panel opined that 

Defendant was in breach of contract; that, because of some undefined relationship,

Defendant had a duty to respond to Plaintiff’s notices; and that Defendant neglected 

that duty by failing to respond or attempting “to make amends.” See id. at 8-9. The 

panel found Defendant “in willful breach of contract and liable for damages.” Id. at 9. 

Using the $250,000-per-fifteen-minutes formula, it determined that Plaintiff’s total 

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damages were $720,000,000.00. See id. But, because “such a large award could or 

would have negative repercussions on the tenants residing at the Villas of Green 

Valley,” the panel awarded Plaintiff $200,002,083.00 in damages, which includes 

filing fees and attorneys’ fees. Id.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against Defendant on June 22, 

2022, seeking confirmation of the purported arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 9. 

See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-5. He asks the Court to confirm the arbitration award as a 

summary judgment and to enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of 

$200,002,083.00. See id. at 5.

In its responsive motion, Defendant contends the Court does not have subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 18.

The undersigned now concludes that the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction.

Legal Standards

The federal courts' jurisdiction is limited, and federal courts generally may 

only hear a case if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of 

citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The Court “must 

presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” 

Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). “If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

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Analysis

I. The FAA, standing alone, does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

A party filing a motion under the FAA to confirm an arbitration award must 

allege facts showing an independent jurisdictional basis for the Court to consider 

that motion because the FAA, by itself, bestows no federal jurisdiction. See Hall St. 

Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581-82 (2008); Andrew v. Talbot, 883 

F. App’x 473, 474 (10th Cir. 2021) (“The Federal Arbitration Act does not confer 

subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts absent an independent jurisdictional 

basis.”). Stated differently, “[a] district court has no authority to resolve a motion to 

confirm an arbitration award under § 9 of the FAA if the arbitration claims would 

not otherwise be subject to federal jurisdiction absent the arbitration agreement.” 

Brett-Andrew: House of Nelson v. Jackson, Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-00069-H-BU, 

2020 WL 8458834, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2020) (dismissing similar complaint by 

another Plaintiff seeking to confirm arbitration award for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction). “Such independent bases include diversity of citizenship under 28 

U.S.C. § 1332 or federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Quezada v. 

Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Moses 

H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 26 1, 26 n.32 (1983)). 

Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of when a

district court may assert jurisdiction over a request to confirm or vacate an arbitral 

award under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. See Badgerow v. Walters, ___U.S. ___, 

142 S. Ct. 1310, 1314, 212 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2022). The Supreme Court concluded that 

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“Section 9 and 10 applications conform to the normal – and sensible – judicial 

division of labor: The applications go to state, rather than federal, courts when they 

raise claims between non-diverse parties involving state law.” Id., 142 S. Ct. at 1321. 

Although the underlying dispute “may have originated in the arbitration of a 

federal-law dispute[,]” “the underlying dispute is not now at issue.” Id. “Rather, the 

application concerns the contractual rights provided in the arbitration agreement, 

generally governed by state law.” Id. “And adjudication of such state-law contractual 

rights [ ] typically belongs in state courts.” Id. at 1321-22.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 9 

because it states, in part, that if no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, 

then an application to confirm an arbitration award may be made to the United 

States court in and for the district where the award was made, and the purported 

arbitration award was made at the arbitrators’ office in Johnson County, Texas. See

Dkt. No. 1 at 1. But Plaintiff fails to allege an independent jurisdictional basis for 

federal subject matter jurisdiction. 

II. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to allege federal question jurisdiction exists.

Federal question jurisdiction exists in all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To 

determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists, courts apply the 

“well-pleaded complaint” rule. The well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that 

federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the 

plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 

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392 (1987); Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011). “Most 

directly, and most often, federal jurisdiction attaches when federal law creates the 

cause of action asserted.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 

578 U.S. 374, 383 (2016). Therefore, if the Court finds a federally created cause of 

action on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, the Court may exercise 

federal question jurisdiction over the claim.

Plaintiff asserts a claim based solely on the FAA, and, as discussed above, 

that is not sufficient. He fails to allege facts asserting his claim is based on any other 

federal law. 

III. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to allege diversity jurisdiction exists.

Subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only when there is 

complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the matter in controversy 

exceeds $75,000. See Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th 

Cir. 2014). “Complete diversity requires that all persons on one side of the 

controversy be citizens of different states than all persons on the other side.” Harvey 

v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 

1332). The party invoking jurisdiction under § 1332 is responsible for showing that 

the parties are completely diverse. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 612 F.2d 

507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 

1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The burden of proving that complete diversity exists rests 

upon the party who seeks to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction.”). 

Plaintiff states only that the parties are not residents of Texas, but he makes 

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no allegations about the citizenship of either party. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 5. Thus, he 

fails to allege that diversity jurisdiction exists. 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge 

is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party 

from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge 

that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 

See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: December 30, 2022

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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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