UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DOMINIQUE ALEXANDER, et al., §

Plaintiffs, § CIVIL ACTION NO.

§

v. § 3:22-CV-1193-S

§

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, et al., §

Defendants. §

DEFENDANT DALLAS COUNTY’S RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO 

DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ALLEGED AGAINST IT IN 

PLAINTIFFS’ FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND BRIEF

JOHN CREUZOT

CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

Jason G. Schuette

Assistant District Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 17827020

jason.schuette@dallascounty.org

Joseph W. Spence

Assistant District Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 18913500

joseph.spence@dallascounty.org

Barbara S. Nicholas

Assistant District Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 24032785

barbara.nicholas@dallascounty.org

Civil Division

Dallas County Records Building

500 Elm Street, Suite 6300

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: 214.653.7358

Telecopier: 214.653.6134

ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv

I. SUMMARY OF THE MOTION.........................................................................................1

II. BRIEF FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................2

A. Summary of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations ..............................................................2

B. Relevant procedural history .....................................................................................3

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES REQUIRING DISMISSAL.....................................5

A. Applicable legal standards for Rule 12(b)(6) motions.............................................5

1. The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6): does the 

complaint state a valid claim for relief?.......................................................5

2. The Twombly facial plausibility standard requires that a 

complaint plead sufficient non-conclusory facts to permit a 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. ........................................6

B. Governmental liability under § 1983 .......................................................................8

1. Section 1983 governmental liability requires a policymaker, an 

official policy, and legal causation. .............................................................8

2. As a matter of law, the Dallas County Sheriff is the County’s 

final policymaker with respect to law enforcement operations. ..................9

3. A plaintiff relying upon the existence of a governmental 

custom having the force of official County policy must 

sufficiently plead the existence of the offending custom...........................10

4. A plaintiff relying upon a facially constitutional official policy 

must sufficiently plead the existence of policymaker deliberate 

indifference. ...............................................................................................11

5. A plaintiff must sufficiently allege nonconclusory facts that 

permit a reasonable inference of legal causation. ......................................11

C. Count One: Plaintiffs fail to plead facially plausible claims against the 

County for deprivations of First Amendment rights..............................................12

D. Count Two: Plaintiffs fail to plead plausible claims against the County 

for use of excessive force.......................................................................................14

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E. Count Three: Plaintiffs fail to plead plausible claims for unlawful 

seizure or excessive force claims against the County............................................16

1. Plaintiffs’ Count Three claims are redundant of their Count 

One and Count Two claims........................................................................16

2. Despite being allowed a fourth opportunity to amend, Plaintiffs 

still do not plead seizure or excessive force claims against the 

County........................................................................................................16

F. Plaintiffs do not plead a viable § 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the 

County....................................................................................................................18

1. Pleading standards particular to § 1985(3) conspiracy claims...................19

2. Plaintiffs fail to plead a facially plausible § 1985(3) conspiracy 

claim against the County............................................................................21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................25

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Arsenaux v. Roberts,

726 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1982) ................................................................................................ 20

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009).............................................................................................................. 6, 7

Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397 (1997).................................................................................................................. 8

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)........................................................................................................ 6, 7, 20

Bennett v. City of Slidell,

728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984) .............................................................................................. 8, 10

Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,

506 U.S. 263 (1993)................................................................................................................ 19

Cantu v. Moody,

933 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................. 19

Colle v. Brazos County,

981 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................... 9

Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41 (1957).................................................................................................................... 6

Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank,

820 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................. 19

Doerr v. Sisson,

563 F. App’x 291 (5th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................... 12

Doerr v. Sisson,

No. 1:09-CV-00199-GHD, 2013 WL 3340487 (N.D. Miss. July 2, 2013) ............................ 12

Drobot v. Barnes,

No. 3-10-CV-1656-K-BK, 2011 WL 3820252, (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2011) ........................... 15

Drobot v. Barnes,

No. 3-10-CV-1656-K-BK, 2011 WL 3836536, (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2011) .......................... 15

Duncan v. La. State,

No. CV 15-5486, 2016 WL 1448888 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2016)................................. 19, 20, 24

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Dunsmore v. Kenyon,

No. 21-10496, 2022 WL 715490 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022)....................................................... 19

E.G. v. Bond,

No. 1:16-CV-068-C, 2017 WL 129019 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2017).................................. 10, 11

Feliz v. El Paso County,

441 F. Supp. 3d 488 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020)..................................................................... 10

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n,

987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................... 6

Fraire v. City of Arlington,

957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................... 11, 12, 18

Groden v. City of Dallas,

826 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................... 9

Hare v. City of Corinth,

74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... 11

Hartzog v. Hackett,

711 F. App’x 235 (5th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................... 11, 18

Holdiness v. Stroud,

808 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................. 21

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,

495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................... 5

Jackson v. Ford,

544 F. App’x 268 (5th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................. 9

Jackson v. Procunier,

789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................................... 5

Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,

677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................. 5

Lynch v. Cannatella,

810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................................ 19

Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit,

369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 5

Montgomery v. Walton,

759 F. App’x 312 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................... 20, 21, 24

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Peterson v. City of Fort Worth,

588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................. 10

Piotrowski v. City of Houston,

237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................ 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15

Priester v. Lowndes County,

354 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................ 20, 24

Rodriguez v. Parker,

No. 1:15-CV-181-P-BL, 2016 WL 4179799 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2016) ............................... 20

Rodriguez v. Parker,

No. 1:15-CV-181-P-BL, 2016 WL 4184437 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2016)................................. 20

Rodriguez v. S. Health Partners, Inc.,

No. 3:20-CV-0045-D, 2020 WL 2928486 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2020)..................................... 10

Shanklin v. Fernald,

539 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Tex. 2008)................................................................................... 22

Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t,

130 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................... 11, 12, 17

Thompson v. Upshur County,

245 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 11

Turner v. Upton County,

915 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................... 9

Valencia v. Wiggins,

981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................ 15

Way v. Mueller Brass Co.,

840 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................. 19

Webster v. City of Houston,

735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................... 8

Weisshaus v. Teichelman,

No. 2:22-CV-035-Z-BR, 2022 WL 1689443 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2022)................................. 8

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)...................................................................................................................... 19

Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 351.041 .................................................................................................... 9

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RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.............................................................................................................................. 6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................... 1, 5

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)..................................................................................................................... 7

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TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

The Defendant Dallas County, Texas (“the County”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), moves the Court to dismiss the claims alleged against it in Plaintiffs’ Fifth

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 49) (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).

I. SUMMARY OF THE MOTION

Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to § 1983 and § 1985 arising from alleged deprivations of 

their constitutional rights during widespread protests in 2020 connected with the seizure and tragic 

death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Plaintiffs allege generally that law enforcement 

personnel—Dallas Police Department (“DPD”) officers, Dallas County Sheriff’s Department 

(“DCSD”) deputies, and Texas Department of Public Safety (“TDPS”) troopers, in concert with a 

host of other state and federal law enforcement agencies and officials, deprived Plaintiffs of their 

First Amendment rights related to free speech and protest, unlawfully seized and used excessive 

force against Plaintiffs in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and unlawfully conspired to deprive 

Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws, in violation of § 1985(3). Plaintiffs seek compensatory 

and punitive damages, temporary and permanent injunctions, and attorney’s fees and costs.

The County is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 free speech/protest and unlawful 

seizure and excessive force claims because Plaintiffs fail to plead nonconclusory facts sufficient 

to state facially plausible governmental liability claims. More specifically, Plaintiffs fail to plead 

nonconclusory facts that permit a reasonable inference that an official County policy was the legal 

cause of the alleged deprivations of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to assemble, speak, and 

seek redress for grievances, or alleged deprivations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights to be 

free from objectively unreasonable seizures and uses of excessive force.

The County is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) conspiracy claims because 

Plaintiffs fail to plead nonconclusory facts sufficient to state facially plausible § 1985(3) claims. 

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More specifically, Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations do not permit the Court to draw a 

reasonable inference that any County actor—and particularly that a County policymaker—agreed 

to commit an illegal act. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ bare and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy as 

to the County are insufficient as a matter of law to support liability under § 1985(3).

II. BRIEF FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Summary of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations

Plaintiffs allege1that on 1 June 2020, they participated in mass protests in Dallas that 

followed the death of George Floyd on 25 May 2020. Compl. para. 63. Plaintiffs allege that they 

and other protesters gathered to protest peacefully in front of the County’s Lew Sterrett Justice 

Center. Id. While the protest was ongoing, DPD officers (but not DCSD deputies) blocked all of 

the entrances and exits to an identified “garage,” which the County assumes would be one of the 

two multistory parking structures that are adjacent to, or across the street from, the Justice Center. 

Id. para. 64. The protest at the Justice Center morphed into a march toward the nearby Margaret 

Hunt Hill Bridge (“the Bridge”). Id. paras. 2, 65. DPD officers blocked the intersection at the 

westbound entrance ramp to the Bridge (state highway 366). Id. para. 65. The protesters walked 

westward on the Bridge, but were confronted at the West end by officers attired in “riot gear”. Id.

para. 66. The protesters reversed course, but were met by another group of officers, also attired in 

“riot gear,” approaching from the East-side entrance to the Bridge. Id. paras. 66-67. The protesters 

stopped in the middle of the Bridge and chanted. The officers approaching from the East continued 

to advance toward the protesters. Id. para. 68. Officers verbally instructed the crowd to disperse 

1 The County neither concedes nor agrees with all of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, but recites them 

in this motion to provide to the Court essential background information about the nature of the 

factual allegations upon which Plaintiffs base their claims against the County and the other 

Defendants. The County emphatically denies Plaintiffs’ allegations that attempt to assert that the 

County is liable to them.

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and return home, but the protesters were confused about how to follow those instructions. Id. para. 

69. Then generically-described “law enforcement officers” without provocation fired flash-bang 

devices, smoke bombs, tear gas, and “KIPs” (“kinetic impact projectiles”) into the crowd. Id. para. 

70. These officers then seized Plaintiffs by telling them to get on the ground and applying zip-ties 

to Plaintiffs. Id. para. 71. Plaintiffs were held on the Bridge for over two hours before being 

released. Id. para. 72.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint now comprises six counts, four of which are now directed at Dallas 

County:

• Count One: deprivation of rights to assemble, to speak, and to seek redress, 

arising under § 1983

Compl. 32-35 paras. 128-145;

• Count Two: use of excessive force, arising under § 1983

Compl. 35-38 paras. 146-165;

• Count Three: unlawful seizure, arising under § 1983

Compl. 39-41 paras. 166-179; and

• Count Six: conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, arising under § 1985(3)

Compl. 49-50 paras. 250-227.

The County seeks dismissal of all four claims.

B. Relevant procedural history

Plaintiffs filed suit on 6 June 2022 (ECF No. 1). On 13 June 2022, Plaintiffs filed an 

amended version of the complaint (ECF No. 3), which corrected several pages of typographical 

gibberish ASCII-code characters in the original version. Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins was 

served with a summons addressed to the County and a copy of the originally-filed Plaintiffs’ 

Original Complaint (ECF No. 1), but not a copy of the amended complaint, on 16 August 2022. 

On 2 September 2022, the County filed a Rule 12(b)(6)-based motion (ECF No. 8) to dismiss the 

claims alleged against it in the amended complaint, ECF No. 3. On 11 October 2023, Plaintiffs 

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filed their response (ECF No. 17), in which Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that omission of Dallas 

County from the unlawful seizure allegations in Count Four was “inadvertent,” and requested leave 

to amend. See ECF No. 17, at 8 sec. C-1.

In an electronic order entered on 8 February 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to 

amend, terminated the County’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion as moot without prejudice to refiling, and 

ordered Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. See ECF No. 26. Plaintiffs filed an amended 

complaint, albeit confusingly mistitled as “Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint,”2on 28 February 2023 

(ECF No. 28).

In response to ECF No. 28, the County filed another Rule 12(b)(6)-based motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 30). On 25 March 2024, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF 

No. 45) that, inter alia, (1) dismissed with prejudice certain Plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred; (2) 

dismissed with prejudice the claims asserted against the “Roe” DPD officers and “Smith” DCSD

deputies, also based upon expiration of limitations; and (3) granted the County’s motion to dismiss

without prejudice, subject to Plaintiffs filing by 8 April 2024 yet another amended compliant that 

cured the defects in ECF No. 28, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See ECF No. 45, at 19.

Pursuant to that express grant of leave to amend, on 8 April 2024 Plaintiffs filed another

confusingly mistitled “Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint” (ECF No. 46). For the reasons 

explained above, ECF No. 46 was actually Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint. But then, on 9 

April 2024, Plaintiffs filed—without leave of court—yet another “Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

Complaint,” ECF No. 47. Thus, ECF No. 47 was actually Plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint.

Plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint failed to cure obvious ambiguities regarding which 

2 Because ECF No. 3 amended ECF No. 1, ECF No. 3 was Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, 

making ECF No. 28 Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Because of the confusion caused by 

Plaintiffs’ mistitling of their complaints, the County may refer to the complaints by ECF numbers.

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Defendants were being sued for which claims. Therefore, on 11 April 2024, the Court, acting sua 

sponte, entered an Order directing Plaintiffs to file, by 18 April 2024, another amended complaint 

that, inter alia, “clearly and consistently identif[ies] the individuals and/or entities named as 

defendants,” in which “the causes of action must clearly identify which Defendant(s) each claim 

is asserted against.” See ECF No. 48. Plaintiffs filed their Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint, 

ECF No. 49, on 18 April 2024. However, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs sixth bite at the 

apple still fails to plead facially plausible claims against Dallas County.

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES REQUIRING DISMISSAL

A. Applicable legal standards for Rule 12(b)(6) motions

1. The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6): does the complaint 

state a valid claim for relief?

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a claim if the complaint fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

tests the legal sufficiency of the claims as are stated in the complaint, and such a motion must be 

evaluated solely on the basis of the pleadings. Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 

1986). There are two primary considerations for a court’s analysis of the propriety of a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). First, the factual allegations contained in the complaint are to be 

construed in the plaintiff’s favor and all well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true. In re Katrina 

Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. 

Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, conclusory statements 

in a complaint are not to be accorded a presumption of truth. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. 

Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). Therefore, conclusory allegations 

and legal conclusions masquerading as factual assertions are not adequate to prevent dismissal for 

failure to state a plausible claim for relief, and prompt dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is 

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appropriate. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).

Second, the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 

(2007), that the factual allegations in a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations are true. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 

555 (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In other words, it is no longer sufficient 

that relief could be granted under some theoretical set of facts consistent with a complaint’s 

allegations, which was the familiar standard the Supreme Court set out in Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-

46. Rather, under Twombly, plaintiffs must “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable 

to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss made pursuant 

to Rule 12, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

2. The Twombly facial plausibility standard requires that a complaint 

plead sufficient non-conclusory facts to permit a reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable.

The Supreme Court clarified the scope and application of Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009). Iqbal makes clear that the Twombly decision was based upon the Supreme 

Court’s interpretation and application of Rule 8, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 554), which “governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United 

States district courts,’” id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1)). Therefore, Twombly’s (and Iqbal’s) 

requirements apply to Plaintiffs’ allegations against the County.

The legal foundation of this motion is set out in section IV-A of the opinion of the Court 

in Iqbal. In summary, Iqbal held that the following standards shall apply when evaluating the 

sufficiency of all federal complaints:

• The rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555).

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• A complaint must be plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

Plaintiffs plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

• “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555).

• A complaint is insufficient if it merely tenders “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further 

factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Thus, the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)).

The Iqbal Court stated that its decision in Twombly was supported by two principles, from 

which the foregoing standards were derived. “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all 

of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Therefore, and critically, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). Second, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than 

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—‘but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.”)). Therefore, 

Iqbal directs that a court considering a motion to dismiss “can choose to begin by identifying 

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of 

truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Such conclusions are not “well-pleaded” factual allegations, and 

do not plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Dallas County will demonstrate that the 

Complaint fails to meet the facial plausibility test as to all four of the claims pleaded against it.

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B. Governmental liability under § 1983

1. Section 1983 governmental liability requires a policymaker, an official 

policy, and legal causation.

A plethora of cases have expounded upon the standards for imposing liability on governmental entity under § 1983. A governmental entity cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat 

superior. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 568, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of 

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Isolated unconstitutional actions by local 

governmental employees will almost never trigger § 1983 liability. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 

(citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984). Rather, and as the Fifth 

Circuit emphasized in Piotrowski, municipal or local government liability under § 1983 requires: 

(1) “a policymaker”; (2) “an official policy”; and (3) “a violation of a constitutional right whose 

‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Id. These three “attribution principles” differentiate 

“individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly 

identified as actions of the government itself.” Id., quoted in Weisshaus v. Teichelman, No. 

2:22-CV-035-Z-BR, 2022 WL 1689443, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2022) (not published).

The Fifth Circuit reiterated in Piotrowski that, while official policy “is ordinarily contained 

in duly promulgated policy statements, ordinances, or regulations,” it may arise from a custom, 

previously defined by the Fifth Circuit in Webster v. City of Houston as

a persistent, widespread practice of [government] officials or employees, 

which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated 

policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly 

represents [governmental] policy.

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)).

However, it is not sufficient that a plaintiff simply offer the raw assertion that there was a 

custom having the force of governmental policy. Piotrowski requires Plaintiffs to specifically 

identify the official policy (custom) that is alleged to have caused the constitutional harm:

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It follows that that each and any policy which allegedly caused constitutional violations must be specifically identified by a plaintiff, and it must be 

determined whether each one is facially constitutional or unconstitutional.

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579-80.

2. As a matter of law, the Dallas County Sheriff is the County’s final 

policymaker with respect to law enforcement operations.

The first of the three attribution principles for municipal (governmental) liability under 

§ 1983 is the involvement of a final policymaker. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. As the Fifth Circuit 

noted pointedly in Piotrowski, “several Supreme Court cases have discussed the policymaker 

criterion for municipal liability.” Id. at 579.

Although Plaintiffs were not required to plead the identity of Dallas County’s final policymaker pertinent to their claims,3

here Plaintiffs plead that the elected Sheriff, Defendant Marian 

Brown, is “a final policymaker for the Sheriff’s Department.” Compl. para. 28. Plaintiffs are 

correct. As a matter of well-settled law, the pertinent final policymaker for all law enforcement 

operations by Dallas County is the elected Dallas County Sheriff, Sheriff Marian Brown, who 

oversees the operations of the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department. Under settled Texas law, the 

county Sheriff is the chief (final) county policymaker for law enforcement, and the Sheriff’s

directives establish county policy. See, e.g., Turner v. Upton County, 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 

1990) (“It has long been recognized that, in Texas, the county Sheriff is the county’s final 

policymaker in the area of law enforcement . . . by virtue of the office to which the sheriff has been 

elected.”).

4 So, although Plaintiffs were not required to plead the identity of the County’s final 

3 Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff is not 

required to plead the identity of the final governmental policymaker).

4 Nothing has changed in the intervening years since the Fifth Circuit decided Turner. “[I]n Texas, 

‘[t]he sheriff is without question the county’s final policymaker in the area of law enforcement.’” 

Jackson v. Ford, 544 F. App’x 268, 272 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Colle v. Brazos 

County, 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 351.041 (West 2011)); see 

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policymaker with respect to law enforcement operations, their Complaint’s facial plausibility must 

be measured against the nonconclusory facts that Plaintiffs do plead, if any, that would permit a 

reasonable inference of the final policymaker’s involvement—that is, Sheriff Marian Brown’s 

involvement—in the DCSD personnel’s conduct of which Plaintiffs complain.

3. A plaintiff relying upon the existence of a governmental custom

having the force of official County policy must sufficiently plead the 

existence of the offending custom.

The second of the three attribution principles for governmental liability under § 1983 is the 

existence of an official government policy. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. Official policy “usually 

exists in the form of written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but it may also arise in 

the form of a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that 

fairly represents municipal policy.” E.G. v. Bond, No. 1:16-CV-068-C, 2017 WL 129019, at *4 

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2017) (Cummings, J.) (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 

847 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)). As a matter of pleading sufficiency, a plaintiff 

must identify with specificity an actual government policy that led to the injuries alleged. Bond, 

2017 WL 129019, at *4 (“The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s opinion that the law 

requires Plaintiffs to identify an actual policy of the County that led to Plaintiffs’ injuries”) (citing 

Bennett, 728 F.2d at 767). In Bond the allegations of policy were insufficient because “nothing in 

the Amended Complaint identifie[d] any actual training policy (or supervision or discipline policy) 

or practice of the County of Abilene that was defective or that was adopted with deliberate 

also Feliz v. El Paso County, 441 F. Supp. 3d 488, 503 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020) (“Texas law is 

clear that a sheriff is a county’s ‘final policymaker in the area of law enforcement,’ including 

county jails.” (citations omitted)), cited in Rodriguez v. S. Health Partners, Inc., No. 

3:20-CV-0045-D, 2020 WL 2928486, at *14 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2020) (Fitzwater, J.). Thus, this 

Court adheres to the long line of precedent that establishes the county Sheriff as a county’s final 

policymaker for all county law enforcement operations.

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indifference.” Bond, 2017 WL 129019, at *4. This Court’s holding in Bond is entirely consistent 

with Fifth Circuit precedent. See Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th 

Cir. 1997) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must identify an offending policy with specificity).

4. A plaintiff relying upon a facially constitutional official policy must

sufficiently plead the existence of policymaker deliberate indifference.

Absent a facially unconstitutional policy or custom, governmental liability under § 1983

can only arise from a custom having the force of official policy if governmental final policymakers were deliberately indifferent to the “‘known or obvious consequences’ that constitutional 

violations would result” from the custom. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579.

The Fifth Circuit repeatedly emphasizes the extreme level of subjective knowledge and 

knowing disregard embodied in the deliberate indifference standard:

The deliberate indifference standard is extremely high. It requires a plaintiff 

to show that “1) the official was aware of facts from which an inference of 

substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn; 2) the official actually drew 

that inference; and 3) the official’s response indicates the official subjectively intended that harm occur.”

Hartzog v. Hackett, 711 F. App’x 235, 235-36 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur 

County, 245 F.3d 447, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2001)) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649-

50 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also See Estate of Davis, 406 F.3d at 381 (“For an official to act with 

deliberate indifference, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).

5. A plaintiff must sufficiently allege nonconclusory facts that permit a 

reasonable inference of legal causation.

The third of the three attribution principles for government liability under § 1983 is legal 

causation. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. The Fifth Circuit has explained that a § 1983 plaintiff 

must demonstrate a direct causal connection between official government policy and a resultant 

actionable harm. As stated in Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992):

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[A] direct causal connection must exist between the policy and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. This connection must be more than a mere “but 

for” coupling between cause and effect. To form the basis of liability under

§ 1983, a municipal policy must be affirmatively linked to the constitutional 

violation and be the moving force behind it.

Id. at 1281 (footnotes omitted), cited in Doerr v. Sisson, No. 1:09-CV-00199-GHD, 2013 WL 

3340487, at *6 (N.D. Miss. July 2, 2013), aff’d, 563 F. App’x 291 (5th Cir. 2014). Put another 

way, the description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional 

violation cannot be a mere conclusion, but must contain specific facts. Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167.

C. Count One: Plaintiffs fail to plead facially plausible claims against the 

County for deprivations of First Amendment rights.

Whereas in previous iterations of their Complaint Plaintiffs pleaded in Count One claims 

for “FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION[S]” solely against the “City of Dallas Defendants,” 

Plaintiffs now assert those Count One claims against “All Defendants.”5 Despite the change in the 

heading/caption for Count One, the allegations for Count One in the live Complaint are virtually 

identical to the allegations in the prior complaint that this Court found insufficient to state a viable 

claim. Compare ECF No. 28 paras. 106-123 with ECF No. 49 paras. 128-145. Plaintiffs allege 

that only the “City of Dallas Defendants,” or the presumed constituent components of that now 

undefined shorthand reference6—the City of Dallas, and/or DPD chiefs Hall and Garcia—took 

action against Plaintiffs. See Compl. paras. 128-145.

5 Compare the heading/caption for Count One in Plaintiffs’ previous “Second Amended 

Complaint” (ECF No. 28, at 26) with the heading/caption for Count One in the live Complaint 

(ECF No. 49, at 32).

6 As tempted as one might be to assume that Plaintiffs would heed the Court’s explicit directive in 

the 11 April 2024 Order to “clearly and consistently identify the individuals and/or entities named 

as defendants” (see ECF No. 48, at 2), the live Complaint, ECF No. 49, does not define the “City 

of Dallas Defendants.” Instead, the Complaint now defines on page 1 the “City Defendants,” but 

continues to use haphazardly the term “City of Dallas Defendants” that was used in the prior 

complaints and that included the unidentified “John and Jane Roe Dallas Police Officers 1-10,” 

which individuals have now been dismissed. See ECF No. 28, at 1-2.

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The exclusive alleged direct actors were the “City of Dallas Defendants”—properly understood in the context of the live Complaint to be the City of Dallas, DPD officers, and DPD Chiefs 

Hall and Garcia. The only alleged policymaking actor was former DPD Police Chief Hall. The 

only “written and unwritten policies” in play were those of the City of Dallas/DPD. That is to say, 

nowhere in Count One do Plaintiffs allege participation by the “County Defendants” or any of that 

term’s defined constituent parts: 7 the County and the County’s final policymaker, Sheriff Marian 

Brown. See Compl. paras. 128-145. Thus, Count One fails to allege facts that permit a reasonable 

inference of participation by the County in any deprivations of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.

Moreover, even if the Court were somehow to infer participation by DCSD deputies in the 

conduct that Plaintiffs attribute specifically and exclusively to DPD officers, Plaintiffs still entirely 

fail to plead nonconclusory facts that permit a reasonable inference of (a) the existence of an 

identified County/DCSD custom having the force of policy that was the moving force and actual 

cause of any of the First Amendment deprivations alleged, (b) County policymaker deliberate 

indifference, and (c) legal causation. See Compl. paras. 128-145. Therefore, the Complaint fails 

to satisfy any of the three attribution principles of § 1983 liability discussed in Piotrowski: an 

official policy, policymaker involvement, and a direct causal link between the execution of policy 

and the constitutional deprivations alleged. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578-80.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs fail to plead a facially plausible First Amendment claim against 

the County, the Court should dismiss with prejudice the Count One claims as against the County.

7 Plaintiffs again failed to comply with the Court’s explicit directive in ECF No. 49 to “clearly and 

consistently identify the individuals and/or entities named as defendants.” The Complaint does 

not define the “Dallas County Defendants.” Instead, the Complaint now confusingly defines the 

“County Defendants” as “Dallas County, Texas; Dallas County Sheriff Marian Brown (‘Sheriff 

Brown’) in her individual and official capacities; and Dallas County,” see Compl. 1, but continues 

to use the undefined term “Dallas County Defendants” in various places throughout the Complaint. 

The simple task of consistently categorizing and labeling Defendants appears to be out of reach.

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D. Count Two: Plaintiffs fail to plead plausible claims against the County 

for use of excessive force.

Whereas in previous iterations of their Complaint Plaintiffs pleaded in Count Two claims 

for “EXCESSIVE FORCE” exclusively “Against DPD Officer Defendants,” Plaintiffs now assert 

their Count Two claims “Against All Defendants.”8 And, Plaintiffs now define “Law Enforcement 

Officers” to include DCSD deputies (see Complaint paragraph 148, footnote 13), and Plaintiffs’ 

allegations of misconduct in Count Two now embrace more than that of DPD officers. Despite 

the change in the heading/caption for Count Two, and the expanded definition of “Law Enforcement Officers,” the allegations for Count Two in the live Complaint suffer from the same defects 

in pleading of facts to support County § 1983 liability that doom Plaintiffs’ Count One claims.

As in Count One, the only alleged policymaking actor is former DPD Police Chief Hall. 

See Compl. para. 152 (“Former Chief Hall instituted a policy and practice of using excessive force 

against non-threatening, peaceful protesters as a means of intimidation and control.”). Plaintiffs 

do not plead that Sheriff Marian Brown, or any other putative Dallas County final policymaker, 

instituted any policy of using excessive force against peaceful protesters.

Finally, just as with the allegations in Count One, the only policies in play were those of 

the City of Dallas and/or of its police department, and the only policymakers involved were City 

of Dallas officials: the City Council, the Mayor, the City Manager, and Chief Hall. See Compl. 

paras. 162-164. The only specifically identified policy is “the City of Dallas’s de facto unwritten 

policy that allows police to use ‘less-lethal’—but not ‘nonlethal’ ammunition and devices against 

a crowd . . . .” See Compl. para. 163. Only the “City of Dallas Defendants” are alleged to have 

8 Compare the heading/caption for Count Two in Plaintiffs’ previous “Second Amended 

Complaint” (ECF No. 28, at 28) with the heading/caption for Count Two in the live Complaint 

(ECF No. 49, at 35).

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been “deliberately indifferent,” and then only with respect to DPD officer training. See Compl. 

para. 163. And, finally, only the “written and unwritten policies of the City of Dallas” are alleged 

to be the “moving forces” behind the uses of excessive force. See Compl. paras. 164-165.

Thus, even if the Court infers that Plaintiffs have now sufficiently pleaded participation by 

DCSD deputies in the misconduct that Plaintiffs actually attribute specifically to DPD officers, 

Plaintiffs still entirely fail to plead nonconclusory facts that permit a reasonable inference of (a) 

the existence of an identified County/DCSD policy that was the “moving force and actual cause”

of the Fourth Amendment deprivations alleged,9coupled with (b) direct involvement or deliberate 

indifference by a County/DCSD final policymaker. See Compl. paras. 147-161. Therefore, the 

Complaint still fails to satisfy any of the three attribution principles of § 1983 liability the Fifth 

Circuit discussed in Piotrowski: an official policy, a policymaker, and a direct causal link between 

the policy and the constitutional deprivations alleged. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578-80.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs fail to plead a facially plausible Fourth Amendment excessive 

force claim against the County. The Court should dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ Count Two 

claims as against the County.

9 Complaint paragraph 160 asserts violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due 

process in connection with the uses of force: “Defendants’ use of force was inappropriate and 

unwarranted as a use of crowd control for peaceful, non-threating participants in protests, in 

violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.” However, because the 

facts Plaintiffs allege pertaining Plaintiffs’ encounters with law enforcement officers describe uses 

of force against arrestees rather than against pretrial detainees, see Compl. paras. 48-78, the 

protections of the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. 

See, e.g., Drobot v. Barnes, No. 3-10-CV-1656-K-BK, 2011 WL 3820252, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 

28, 2011) (Toliver, M.J.) (not reported), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

3:10-CV-1656-K, 2011 WL 3836536 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2011) (Kinkeade, J.) (“The protections 

of the Fourth Amendment extend to an arrestee until he becomes a pretrial detainee, which occurs 

after (1) the arrest is complete, (2) he has been released from the arresting officer’s custody, and 

(3) he has been in detention awaiting trial for a significant period of time.”) (citing Valencia v. 

Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993)).

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E. Count Three: Plaintiffs fail to plead plausible claims for unlawful seizure 

or excessive force claims against the County.

1. Plaintiffs’ Count Three claims are redundant of their Count One and 

Count Two claims.

In the two complaints that preceded the live complaint, ECF Nos. 28 and 47, Count Four 

was a § 1983 unlawful seizure claim against the “Law Enforcement Defendants.” See ECF No. 

28, at 32, and ECF No. 47, at 39. That claim is now found in Count Three, and is asserted “Against 

All Defendants.” ECF No. 49, at 39. As with Counts One and Two, Plaintiffs fail to plead facts 

that allow a reasonable inference of any of the three Piotrowski attribution principles with respect 

to Dallas County.

To begin, it is difficult to see how what is now alleged in Count Four as “Unlawful Seizure” 

differs in any cognizable way from what is already alleged in Counts One and Two: the use of 

unlawful force to unlawfully restrict protesters’ movements and protesters’ exercise of rights to 

assemble, speak, and petition for redress guaranteed by the First Amendment.10 Thus, Count Three 

is functionally redundant of Counts One and Two. But even if Count Three pleads something substantively distinct, the Count Three allegations fail to plead nonconclusory facts to support County 

§ 1983 liability.

2. Despite being allowed a fourth opportunity to amend, Plaintiffs still

do not plead seizure or excessive force claims against the County.

Even assuming that Count Three pleads claims against Dallas County that substantively 

differ from the claims in Counts One and Two, any such claims are not facially plausible. Plaintiffs 

do not plead facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that a County “official policy” was 

10 Plaintiffs allege in Complaint paragraph 168 that they were “seized by Defendants when 

Defendants prevented Plaintiffs from leaving the Frank Crowley Courts Building following the 

peaceful protest that took place on June 1, 2020.” However, Plaintiffs plead in paragraph 64 that 

“DPD blocked all of the entrances and exits to the garage, so no Plaintiff or other protesters who 

were parked in the garage could leave” (emphasis added).

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the legal cause of any DCSD deputies’ alleged misconduct. That is, Plaintiffs do not plead facially 

plausible wrongful seizure claims against the County because Plaintiffs fail to plead (1) facts 

sufficient to support a reasonable inference of the existence of a persistent and widespread DCSD 

custom having the force of official policy of the unlawful seizure of peaceful protesters, (2) facts 

sufficient to allow a reasonable inference of deliberate indifference to such unlawful seizures by 

the County’s final policymaker, and (3) facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference of legal 

causation, i.e., that a County policy was the “moving force” behind DCSD deputies’ misconduct.

First, Plaintiffs do not adequately plead involvement by DCSD deputies. Rather, Plaintiffs 

allege that “DPD Officers and [Texas Department of Public Safety] DPS Officers” deployed and 

used various less-lethal devices and munitions against the protesters.” Compl. para. 174. There 

is no allegation that DCSD personnel were involved in the misconduct alleged in paragraph 174.

Second, Plaintiffs identify solely City/DPD and DPS policies as having caused the unlawful 

seizures in issue. See Compl. para. 173 (alleging that the “City of Dallas’s and Chief Hall’s failure 

to train, supervise, and discipline its officers or issue corrective instructions after violations were 

brought to light, that caused the unlawful seizures and excessive use of force”); para. 175 (“it is 

the pattern and practice of the City of Dallas and Chief Hall to arrest but not charge protesters as 

a means to suppress First Amendment Rights. . . . . [I]t is also the City of Dallas’s de facto 

unwritten policy for police to use “less lethal” ammunition and devices against a crowd . . . .”).

Plaintiffs do not plead at all—much less with specificity—the existence of a County/DCSD policy 

or custom having the force of policy, as is required by Fifth Circuit precedent. See Spiller, 130 

F.3d at 167 (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must identify an offending policy with specificity).

Third, Plaintiffs fail to plead any facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that the 

County’s final policymaker, whether it be Sheriff Brown or some other unidentified person(s), was 

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deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk that an identified County/DCSD policy would 

lead to the complained-of deprivations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.11 See Compl. 

paras. 167-178.

Fourth, Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to permit a reasonable inference of legal 

causation. This failure inescapably flows from Plaintiffs’ failure to identify a County/DCSD 

policy. A non-existent policy could not possibly have been the “moving force” behind DCSD 

deputies’ actions—actions that Plaintiffs allege were taken by DPD officers and DPS troopers. In 

other words, Plaintiffs do not even plead facts that might establish the “mere ‘but for’ coupling 

between cause and effect” that the Fifth Circuit requires. See Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1281.

For these several reasons, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 seizure claims pleaded against the County in 

Count Three lack facial plausibility, and must be dismissed.

F. Plaintiffs do not plead a viable § 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the 

County.

Plaintiffs also plead that the County is liable under § 1985(3) for a civil conspiracy with 

all of the other Defendants to “(a) deprive, either directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs (and other 

protesters) of the equal protection of the laws, and of equal privileges and immunities under the 

laws; or (b) hinder others from giving or securing equal protection of law to all persons in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).” Compl. para. 221. That claim must fail because Plaintiffs fail to plead 

facts that permit inferences of an agreement to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and of race-based 

animus.

11 Any such allegations would have to be sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that an official 

County final policymaker—presumably Sheriff Marian Brown as a matter of law—1) was aware 

of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn; 2) the 

policymaker actually drew the necessary inferences; and 3) the policymaker’s response indicates 

the policymaker subjectively intended that harm occur. Hartzog, 711 F. App’x at 235-36. Such 

inferences are obviously impossible given the paucity of factual allegations in the Complaint.

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1. Pleading standards particular to § 1985(3) conspiracy claims

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides for a private right of action for the recovery of damages for 

conspiracies “to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of 

equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the 

constituted authorities of any State or Territory the equal protection of the laws.” Here, Plaintiffs 

allege that all of the Defendants conspired to deprive them of their constitutional right to equal 

protection of the laws, in violation of § 1985(3). (Compl. 43 para. 197: “Defendants, in whole or 

part, conspired with each other . . . in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).”)

Claims brought under the equal protection components of § 1985(3) must allege that the 

conspiracy was “aimed at” the denial of equal protection based upon discriminatory animus. Bray 

v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 275 (1993). The Fifth Circuit has made clear 

that a claim under § 1985(3) must include an allegation of race-based or class-based animus. See,

e.g., Cantu v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]n this circuit . . . the only conspiracies 

actionable under section 1985(3) are those motivated by racial animus.”) (citing Deubert v. Gulf 

Fed. Sav. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987)).

In addition to specific allegations that race or class-based animus motivated the conspiracy, 

a plaintiff alleging a § 1985(3) conspiracy must plead more than bare conclusions that the conspiracy existed. “Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under the civil rights statutes must plead the

operative facts showing a prior illegal agreement, and bald allegations of an agreement do not 

suffice.” Dunsmore v. Kenyon, No. 21-10496, 2022 WL 715490, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022)

(quoting Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). See also Duncan v. La. State, No. CV 15-5486, 2016 WL 1448888, at *3 

(E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2016) (citing Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1987)) (same).

To that point, a § 1985(3) plaintiff must allege nonconclusory facts sufficient to suggest an 

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agreement among one or more parties, and the agreement itself must be to violate a plaintiff’s civil 

rights. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified 

point does not show facts adequate” to support a conspiracy). In fact, the same strict requirement 

applies to claims alleging a conspiracy under § 1983. “Conclusory allegations that do not reference specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state a civil rights 

conspiracy claim under § 1983.” Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 315 (5th Cir. 2019)

(per curiam) (citing Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1982)). Rather, a 

plaintiff must plead specific, nonconclusory facts that establish that there was an agreement among 

the defendants to violate his civil rights. See Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (“Allegations that are merely conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not 

suffice” to establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim). Thus, no matter whether pleaded under § 1983 

or § 1985(3), a complaint that does not allege specific facts showing an agreement to violate civil 

rights does not state a facially plausible claim, and must be dismissed.

The case of Duncan v. Louisiana State is highly instructive on this point. In Duncan, the 

court held a complaint was deficient to state a § 1985 claim where the plaintiff merely alleged that 

“Tangipahoa Parish Registrar of Voters John Russell and Tangipahoa Parish Registrar of Voters 

Office did conspire to participate in meetings and discussions and did participate in meetings and 

discussions in which voter identification was discussed or should have been discussed.” Duncan, 

2016 WL 1448888, at *4. Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Parker, No. 1:15-CV-181-P-BL, 2016 WL 

4179799, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

1:15-CV-181-C-BL, 2016 WL 4184437 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2016), this Court granted a motion to 

dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1985(3) conspiracy because the plaintiff did not plead “any facts that 

would suggest a preconceived agreement” to violate the plaintiff’s rights. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit 

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has explained that “[t]he heart of the cause of action accorded by § 1985 is a conspiracy to interfere 

with a person’s civil rights. The essence of a conspiracy is an understanding or agreement between 

the conspirators.” Holdiness v. Stroud, 808 F.2d 417, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1987).

The Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Montgomery v. Walton is similarly enlightening on the 

specificity required to plead a facially sufficient § 1983 conspiracy claim:

As noted above, Montgomery’s amended complaint is disorganized and the 

facts are very loosely tied together. At points in this complaint, 

Montgomery alleges that the defendants “act[ed] in concert,” “agree[d]” to 

plant contraband, and “elicited aid” from each other for the purpose of 

violating his civil rights. Most importantly, although he alleges there was 

an agreement—an agreement to kill or imprison him—these allegations are 

largely conclusory without any identification of time, date, or circumstance.

Cf. Jabary v. City of Allen, 547 F. App’x 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding 

that allegations that local officials “actively conspired with each other” and 

engaged in “several conversations, private meetings, and other 

communications” to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights were insufficient 

under Rule 12(b)(6) to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim). It would appear 

that Montgomery strives to allege an overarching conspiracy by persons 

associated for the purpose of setting him up for the criminal conduct that 

has landed him in prison. . . . Furthermore, there is no alleged common 

motive between Espin and Walton, or among all of the defendants for that 

matter, except a vague and conclusory assertion that they “wanted 

[Montgomery] dead” or imprisoned because he was a threat to Espin.

Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314-15.

In summary, a complaint alleging a civil rights conspiracy claim that fails to plead more 

than raw conclusions that there was an understanding or agreement among the alleged conspirators 

fails to state a facially plausible claim for relief, and must be dismissed.

2. Plaintiffs fail to plead a facially plausible § 1985(3) conspiracy claim 

against the County.

Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) fails, not merely against the County, but in its entirety.

First, Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to reasonably infer actionable race or classbased animus. Here, Plaintiffs plead that the supposed conspiracy was motivated by race or classbased animus, because “[a]lthough not all plaintiffs are black, they were all exercising their First 

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Amendment right to protest in support of the rights of a protected class,” and Plaintiffs chanted 

“‘Black Lives Matter!’” as they were protesting. Compl. para. 223. Those cursory allegations do 

not permit a reasonable inference of race or class-based animus. C.f. Shanklin v. Fernald, 539 F. 

Supp. 2d 878, 887 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (unpublished) (holding that animus toward a protester’s 

message not actionable under § 1985(3)).

Second, Plaintiffs fail to plead nonconclusory facts that permit a reasonable inference of 

an agreement among the alleged conspirators. On that point, it would be generous to call Plaintiffs’ 

factual allegations regarding the County’s supposed involvement in the conspiracy “sparse.” 

Complaint paragraph 224 alleges the bare conclusion of a conspiracy among all of the Defendants 

for the purpose of “depriv[ing] Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws or to prevent or inhibit 

others from giving or securing equal protection to all persons.” However, Plaintiffs do not plead 

any facts that support that conclusion, much less facts that tend to show a specific agreement by 

policymaking Dallas County official—or by any Dallas County officials. Plaintiffs plead that 

Sheriff Brown is a County final policymaker in the sphere of law enforcement (see Compl. para. 

28), but Plaintiffs plead no facts to support a reasonable inference that Sheriff Brown, or any other 

Dallas County policymaking actor for that matter, specifically agreed beforehand with another 

alleged conspirator to deprive any of Plaintiffs of their civil rights.

The bulk of the Complaint’s allegations related to a § 1985(3) conspiracy reside in Count 

Six of the Complaint. Plaintiffs allege:

221. As to each of the above causes of action, by the facts set out herein, 

Defendants, in whole or part, conspired with each other to (a) deprive, either 

directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs (and other protesters) of the equal protection 

of the laws, and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or (b) 

hinder others from giving or securing equal protection of law to all persons 

in violation of 42 USC § 1985(3).

. . . .

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224. The Defendants conspired (1) across separate law enforcement departments and (2) between local police (Dallas Defendants), county Defendants, 

state police, and federal agencies to deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection 

of the laws or to prevent or inhibit others from giving or securing equal 

protection to all persons.

225. The DPD After Action Report and photographs taken by Plaintiffs 

show that County and City Defendants as well as unnamed state actors were 

present at the protests Plaintiffs attended and that they engaged in the same 

actions that violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as the City Defendants.

Paragraphs 211 and 224 plead merely raw conclusions that there was a conspiracy. Paragraph 225

pleads merely that the County Defendants were “present at the protest,” and engaged in allegedly 

unlawful conduct along with City Defendants.

12

 Critically, however, the Complaint contains no 

factual allegations whatsoever that permit a reasonable inference that:

• Sheriff Brown or any other DCSD actors reached an agreement with DPD, TDPS, or 

Federal actors to violate Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights; or

• the Dallas County Commissioners Court, or any other County actors, reached an agreement

with DPD, TDPS, or Federal actors to violate Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights; or

• Sheriff Brown or any other DCSD actors reached an agreement with DPD, TDPS, or 

Federal actors to hinder others from “giving or securing equal rights to all persons”; or

• the Dallas County Commissioners Court, or any other County actors, reached an agreement

with DPD, TDPS, or Federal actors to hinder others from “giving or securing equal rights 

12 The allegations in paragraph 224 strain credulity and lead to nonsensical results. Plaintiffs define 

the “County Defendants” as “ Dallas County, Texas; [and] Dallas County Sheriff Marian Brown 

(‘Sheriff Brown’), in her individual and official capacities.” Compl. 1. In a parallel manner, the 

Complaint defines the “City Defendants” as “The City of Dallas, Texas; City of Dallas Police 

Chief Edgardo ‘Eddie’ Garcia (‘Chief Garcia’) in his individual and official capacities; City of 

Dallas Former Police Chief Ulysha Reneé Hall (‘Chief Hall’) in her individual and official 

capacities.” Id. Notably, the Plaintiffs’ definitions do not include the County’s or the City’s 

respective law enforcement personnel.

Properly read then, paragraph 225 alleges that “the County” and “the City” were “present” at the 

protests, an allegation that can be true only in a metaphysical sense. Further, Plaintiffs allege that 

the City Defendants “engaged in the same actions that violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as 

[did] the City Defendants,” which is nonsensical. Finally, given that Plaintiffs’ definitions of the 

“County Defendants” and the “City Defendants” include Sheriff Brown and Chiefs Hall and 

Garcia, respectively, Plaintiffs apparently allege that Brown, Hall, and Garcia were present at the 

protests and personally deployed less-lethal munitions and devices against Plaintiffs.

Case 3:22-cv-01193-S Document 50 Filed 04/30/24 Page 30 of 32 PageID 869
24

to all persons.”

Thus, Plaintiffs plead no operative facts that suggest a prior illegal agreement, and particularly, no 

facts to suggest that the County’s final policymaker, Sheriff Brown, entered into a prior agreement 

to deprive protesters of their civil rights. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations do not even 

rise to the level of the cursory facts alleged in Duncan, where the plaintiff at least pled that the 

alleged conspirators took part in “meetings and discussions,” Duncan, 2016 WL 1448888, at *4, 

or in Montgomery, where the plaintiff at least pled that there was an agreement to “kill or imprison 

him,” and that the alleged conspirators engaged in “conversations, private meetings, and other 

communications” to formulate the alleged conspiracy. See Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314-15.

Clearly, the Complaint pleads no more than the bare conclusion that Dallas County entered 

into a conspiracy. Plaintiffs provide no specific factual allegations that tend to show an agreement 

to violate Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. That is, Plaintiffs’ allegations “are merely conclusory, 

without specific facts, [and] will not suffice” to establish a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. Priester, 

354 F.3d at 420. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to plead a facially plausible § 1985(3) conspiracy claim

against the County, and the County is entitled to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

WHEREFORE, the Defendant Dallas County, Texas asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’

claims against it as requested herein, and that the Court grant the County all such other and further 

relief to which it is entitled.

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Respectfully submitted,

JOHN CREUZOT

CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

/s/ Jason G. Schuette

Assistant District Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 17827020

jason.schuette@dallascounty.org

Joseph W. Spence

Assistant District Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 18913500

joseph.spence@dallascounty.org

Barbara S. Nicholas

Assistant District Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 24032785

barbara.nicholas@dallascounty.org

Civil Division

Dallas County Records Building

500 Main Street, Suite 6300

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: 214.653.7358

Telecopier: 214.653.6134

ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On 30 April 2024, I filed the foregoing document with the clerk of the court for the U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of Texas. I hereby certify that I have served the document on all 

counsel and/or pro se parties of record by a manner authorized by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

5(b)(2).

s/ Jason G. Schuette

Assistant District Attorney

Case 3:22-cv-01193-S Document 50 Filed 04/30/24 Page 32 of 32 PageID 871