UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4838

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

IKE DAVID SIMMONS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior 

District Judge. (5:14-cr-00007-BR-1)

Submitted: May 11, 2015 Decided: May 22, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Seth M. Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CUIRAM:

Ike David Simmons was sentenced to 600 months’ imprisonment 

after pleading guilty to manufacturing child pornography, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (d) (2012). On appeal, 

Simmons raises only one issue: whether the district court erred 

in failing to strike or redact Paragraph 29 of his Presentence 

Investigation Report (“PSR”). We dismiss the appeal.

Paragraph 29 of the PSR contains information concerning 

Simmons’ history of psychosexual treatment. Simmons objected to 

the inclusion of this paragraph on the basis that it could be 

used in a future civil commitment certification hearing under 

the Adam Walsh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012). The district court 

overruled Simmons’ objection, noting that the information in the 

paragraph “had no impact on the advisory guideline range.”

On appeal, Simmons argues that he has a right to privacy in 

the information, and that the Government’s interest in including 

the information fails to overcome this right. The Government 

contends that we should dismiss the appeal as unripe.

Ripeness is a threshold question of justiciability, arising 

out of the “case or controversy” language found in Article III. 

Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 718 F.3d 262, 269 

(4th Cir. 2013). “The issue of ripeness entails an analysis 

considering the fitness of the issues before the court, as well 
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as the hardship that the parties will experience if the court 

withholds consideration of the dispute.” Id. at 270. Ripeness 

is required to prevent the courts “from becoming entangled in 

‘abstract disagreements.’” Id. at 270 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). A claim is unripe “‘if it 

rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as 

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Scoggins, 718 

F.3d at 270 (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 

(1998)).

In United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 

2009), the defendant also raised an objection to the inclusion 

of psychosexual treatment in the PSR on the basis that the 

information could be used in a future civil commitment 

proceeding. The Ninth Circuit noted that Streich did not 

challenge the use of the information at sentencing, nor did he 

challenge the other ways that the Bureau of Prisons might use 

the information. Id. The court classified the fear of civil 

commitment as “the classic example of a ‘contingent future 

event’ that ‘may not happen at all’” and dismissed the appeal as 

unripe. Id. at 932. 

Here, Simmons does not challenge the district court’s use 

of the information at sentencing. Simmons’ concern about the 

inclusion of Paragraph 29 regards the potential use of the 
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information at a possible future civil commitment hearing. As 

Simmons concedes, any such hearing would not occur for

approximately 40 years. Moreover, Simmons will only face civil 

commitment if the Government decides to pursue civil commitment 

and meets its burden to prove by clear and convicting evidence

that Simmons is sexually dangerous. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2012); 

cf. United States v. Legrano, 659 F.2d 17, 18 (4th Cir. 1981) 

(rejecting defendant’s argument that district court erred in 

refusing to strike information from the PSR that might 

jeopardize defendant’s chances in a future parole proceeding, 

noting that there were administrative avenues to challenge the 

PSR’s contents). Thus, Simmons’ claim is the type of 

“contingent future event” that falls within the ripeness 

doctrine.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED