ORDER – PAGE 1 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 DALLAS DIVISION 

CHANTOVIA JACKSON, § 

 § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1687-N 

 § 

CHICK AND SEAFOOD, INC., et al., § 

 §

 Defendants. § 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 This Order addresses Defendant Chick and Seafood, Inc.’s (“CSI”) motion to 

dismiss the complaint [7].1

 Because the complaint fails to state a claim to relief against 

CSI that is plausible on its face, the Court grants the motion but allows Jackson leave to 

replead. 

I. ORIGINS OF THE MOTION

 This case arises out of a dispute regarding CSI’s termination of Plaintiff Chantovia 

Jackson. Jackson is an African-American female.2

 Compl. ¶ 2 [1]. Jackson worked at 

various locations of Henderson Chicken in the Dallas-Fort Worth area between 2014 and 

2021. Id. ¶ 9. CSI owns a Henderson Chicken franchise located on Camp Wisdom Road 

in Dallas, Texas. Id. ¶ 7. Jackson worked at the Camp Wisdom location of Henderson 

Chicken from 2018 to 2021. Id. ¶ 9. While working at the Camp Wisdom location, Jackson 

1

 The motion and this Order address only Plaintiff’s claims against CSI. 

2

 For purposes of this Order, the Court accepts the well-pleaded allegations of the 

Complaint as true. 

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suffered both racial and sexual harassment. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. The owner and store manager 

used slurs and derogatory language towards African-Americans in front of Jackson. 

Id. ¶ 11. On different occasions, they also grabbed her buttocks and placed money in her 

bra. Id. ¶ 12. Jackson reported this behavior to the owner and Linda Henderson, the 

franchisor of Henderson Chicken. Id. ¶ 14. The owner fired Jackson, explaining that she 

complained too much. Id. ¶ 15. Jackson filed suit against CSI and Linda Henderson for 

claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII as well as retaliation under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981. CSI now moves to dismiss Jackson’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. RULE 12(B)(6) LEGAL STANDARD 

 When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether 

the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 

42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court 

must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the 

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v. 

Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial 

plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true 

and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. 

Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must provide “more than 

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ORDER – PAGE 3 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that 

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). 

III. THE COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Jackson Has Not Pleaded Administrative Exhaustion 

Title VII prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] any individual or otherwise 

discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 

or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Aggrieved parties pursuing civil claims must 

first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 

296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Although filing of an EEOC charge is not a 

jurisdictional prerequisite, it ‘is a precondition to filing suit in district court.’”) (citation 

omitted). If the EEOC dismisses this charge, it must “notify the person aggrieved and 

within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the 

respondent named in the charge.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A plaintiff has 90 days from 

receipt of the right to sue letter to file a lawsuit. Duron v. Albertson's LLC, 560 F.3d 288, 

290 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 

 Jackson has not pleaded any facts regarding administrative exhaustion in her 

complaint. In her response to CSI’s motion, Jackson explains that she filed a charge of 

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discrimination with the EEOC on June 28, 2021. Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss 7 [12]. But 

stating this fact in her response is not sufficient; Jackson must plead the facts related to 

administrative exhaustion, including the receipt of a right to sue letter, in her complaint. 

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (A viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). Accordingly, CSI is entitled to dismissal on 

this ground. 

B. Jackson Has Not Properly Pleaded CSI’s 

 Status as an Employer Under Title VII 

 To establish that CSI is an employer for purposes of Title VII, Jackson must show 

that CSI has fifteen or more employees and engages in an industry affecting 

commerce. Muhammad v. Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep't, 479 F.3d 377, 380 

(5th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). “Title VII’s ‘15-or-more-employees 

requirement,’ although not jurisdictional, is ‘the threshold number of employees for 

application of Title VII [and] is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.’” Mejia v. 

Ayala, 2021 WL 3930090, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 

U.S. 500, 504, 516 (2006)). “[S]uperficially distinct entities may be exposed to liability 

upon a finding that they represent a single, integrated enterprise: a single employer.” 

Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1983). Four factors must be 

considered in the integrated enterprise analysis: “(1) interrelation of operations, (2) 

centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common 

ownership or financial control.” Id. 

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ORDER – PAGE 5 

 Jackson has not alleged enough facts to determine whether CSI fits the definition of 

an employer under Title VII. Jackson argues that all employees of Henderson Chicken 

franchises, as part of an integrated enterprise, should count towards the 15-employee 

requirement of Title VII. In her complaint, Jackson states that [a]ll of the Henderson 

Chicken franchises’ operations are interrelated, with centralized control of labor relations, 

including transferring employees between and among the franchises.” Compl. ¶ 8. She 

further alleges that Linda Henderson participates in management, oversight, and controls 

the financial affairs of franchisees. Id. But these allegations are conclusory and do not 

suffice to infer that all employees of Henderson Chicken count towards the 15-employee 

requirement. Jackson must allege specific facts demonstrating the interrelated nature of 

CSI and Henderson Chicken. See, e.g., Hawkins v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 2021 WL 149021, 

at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (holding that termination of subsidiary’s employees upon 

acquisition, sharing of headquarters and executive-level employees, approval of all 

personnel decisions, setting of budgets, and collection and distribution of earnings 

demonstrated centralized control of labor relations, common management, and financial 

control).3

 Accordingly, CSI is entitled to dismissal on this ground. 

3

 Jackson does not necessarily need to plead this set of facts. Rather, there must be greater 

specificity in her allegations; it would be conclusory to say that Henderson Chicken and 

CSI share financial control, but a specific allegation would be that a single executive 

approves and disburses payroll for all franchises. This allegation alone would likely not 

be enough, but several specific allegations taken together, as in Hawkins, may satisfy the 

integrated enterprise analysis. 2021 WL 149021, at *2. 

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ORDER – PAGE 6 

CONCLUSION

 Because Jackson has not pleaded administrative exhaustion or CSI’s employer 

status under Title VII with sufficient particularity, the Court grants the motion to dismiss. 

The Court grants Jackson leave to amend her pleadings within thirty (30) days of the date 

of this Order in a manner consistent with this opinion. If she does not so amend, the Court 

will dismiss her claims against CSI with prejudice without further notice. This Order does 

not affect Jackson’s claims against Linda Henderson. 

 

 Signed December 12, 2022. 

 ___________________________ 

 David C. Godbey 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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