In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

Nos. 07-12-0481-CV, 07-12-0482-CV 

________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF N.K., A CHILD 

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M., A CHILD 

 

On Appeal from the 108th District Court 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court Nos. 78,949-E, 80,536-E, Honorable Douglas Woodburn, Presiding 

 

March 25, 2013 

 

OPINION 

 

Before Quinn, C.J., and Hancock and Pirtle, JJ. 

Appellant, Bethany, appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights 

to her two daughters, N.K. and A.M.1 On appeal, Bethany contends the evidence is 

insufficient to support the trial court’s order of termination. We will affirm.

 1 Throughout this opinion, appellant will be referred to as “Bethany,” and the 

children will be identified by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 

Supp. 2012); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The trial court also terminated the parental rights of 

both fathers involved. Neither father has appealed the trial court’s order of termination. 
2

Factual and Procedural History

Bethany is mother to N.K., five years old at the time of trial, and A.M., one year 

old at the time of trial. Bethany lived in a home with her husband Michael, father to A.M. 

and stepfather to N.K. Also living in the home was a friend of the family, Ashley. The 

record reveals the following evidence relating to the investigation and culminating in the 

termination of Bethany’s parental rights.

Initial Investigation

The Department first became involved with the family in August 2010, when it 

began its investigation upon a report of physical abuse and unsanitary living conditions 

in the home. Bethany denied that any physical abuse had occurred but agreed to and 

did clean up the home. During the investigation, caseworker Charles McArthur learned 

of a new report; this one, he described generally, related to concerns of sexual assault 

of N.K. During this same investigation, McArthur also discovered a Craigslist ad for 

babysitting services and for services of a sexual nature, both of which contained 

Bethany’s contact information. Additionally, both Bethany and Michael had taken out 

ads on another website offering sexual services in exchange for money.

Nonetheless, the forensic interview of N.K., as best as could be performed 

considering her tender age, yielded no outcry of sexual abuse, and the SANE exam 

yielded no finding of trauma which would suggest sexual assault. Ultimately, the 

Department concluded that there was insufficient evidence to continue its case at that 

time, and the case was closed.
3

The Second CPS Investigation and the Prostitution Investigation

A year had not passed before the Department again intervened, this time in 

March 2011, when McArthur learned that law enforcement officers had gone to Bethany 

and Michael’s home in furtherance of an investigation into suspected prostitution at the 

premises. McArthur learned that Bethany and Michael were going to be arrested. In 

fact, it did come to pass that Bethany, Michael, and roommate Ashley were arrested. 

N.K. and A.M. were removed and placed in foster care.

Department investigator, Jona Roland, responded to the house the evening of 

the arrests. She testified that N.K. was dirty, exhibited scratches on her face, and was 

not appropriately dressed for the cold weather. Roland also observed that the house 

was “[n]ot a good environment for children”; it was dirty with clothes and food 

everywhere. Roland interviewed Michael in jail during which conversation Michael 

admitted to having participated in the prostitution services with Ashley and Bethany. 

Bethany, on the other hand, denied that prostitution had occurred and described the 

services offered and rendered as “all a massage-type thing.”

However, in an interview with Michael Nelson, an investigator for the Potter 

County District Attorney’s office, Bethany essentially admitted to engaging in prostitution 

from the home. She explained that, before any of her clients would arrive at the house, 

Michael would take the children away and go to a park, a mall, or a restaurant. Bethany 

fully admitted to Detective Jeff Higley of the Amarillo Police Department that she and 

Ashley put their names on Craigslist for “prostitution purposes.”
4

Victor Martinez, another investigator for the Potter County District Attorney’s 

Office, conducted surveillance and undercover work on Michael and Bethany’s home. 

He testified that he observed, “[s]everal different males coming and leaving the 

residence.” These men would arrive at the house, stay for about ten to fifteen minutes, 

and then leave. He observed that Michael, Bethany, or Ashley would sometimes leave 

the home with the children before the men would show up. He could not confirm 

whether the children were ever present in the home when any of the men were there. 

Michael did testify, however, that the children were never present in the home when a 

client arrived. 

Bethany’s History of Criminal Conduct, Domestic Violence, and Drug Abuse

Bethany pleaded guilty to prostitution and was placed on probation. At the time 

of her prostitution conviction, she also remained on probation for a 2006 drug-related 

conviction. The record also reveals a history of domestic violence between Bethany 

and N.K.’s biological father, Richard. Additionally, in an attempt to demonstrate to the 

trial court how protective Bethany is of her children, Michael cited an instance in which 

Bethany once “choked [him] half to death” after she learned that he inadvertently sent a 

text message to an underage female.

Clinical psychologist, William Hoke, Ph.D., who was requested by the 

Department to evaluate Bethany and Michael, testified that Bethany “reported a pretty 

significant” history of drug abuse and had “many years of methamphetamine abuse.” 

He expressed his opinion that she remains chemically dependent and needs to be in a 

drug recovery program for the remainder of her life.
5

Michael’s History, Admission of Inappropriate Sexual Contact with N.K.

In a July 2012 interview with Detective Higley, Michael confessed that, on one 

occasion, “when [N.K.] was about three years old, that he was at home alone with her. 

And he had taken her into the bedroom and placed her hand on his penis and began to 

rub her hand on his penis over his clothes.” Shortly after his confession, Michael 

unsuccessfully attempted suicide by drug overdose. He later recanted his confession of 

sexual abuse of N.K., maintaining that he only confessed to inappropriate touching in an 

effort to assist Bethany in getting the children back. He testified that he made the 

confession based on his understanding of a statement from Bethany’s therapist that it 

would be easier for Bethany to get the children back if someone were to confess to 

“doing something” to N.K. He denied ever sexually abusing either of the girls.

Michael, like Bethany, reported to Hoke a “pretty significant drug history.” He 

admitted to having worked as a prostitute when he lived in California and also testified 

to his history as a victim of sexual abuse, his history of drug abuse, and his criminal 

record, including sexually-oriented offenses. Hoke reported that Michael had been 

incarcerated approximately fifty times.

Gerald Rogers, who performed a full psychological assessment of Michael at the 

Department’s request and who also participated in individual counseling with him, 

testified that Michael had not made the progress necessary for reunification with A.M. 

Rogers characterized Michael as “such a high-risk individual[] that [Rogers] could never 

recommend reintegration at this point.” Rogers added that the children would be at high 

risk if returned to a home in which Michael resided and based his assessment on a
6

number of considerations: 

Well, there’s a number of factors that correlate with re-offending or 

recidivism. One[] is [does he] have an extensive criminal history, which he 

does. Another is to have had one or more victims, which he has had. 

Another would be that he’s been involved in a lot of boundary issues 

where there’s sexual acting out and sexual behaviors. And he’s been 

involved in another case involving his wife of promoting prostitution for 

her.

Bethany’s Testimony Regarding Michael

At trial, Bethany maintained that she never saw Michael act inappropriately with 

the children. In the context of inappropriate contact, Bethany testified that she had no 

concerns related to Michael’s history with sexual abuse; nor did she express any “great 

concerns” that had arisen during their marriage. She went on to characterize Michael 

as a good father with a strong relationship with the girls. Bethany testified that she and 

Michael had no contact but did remain married at the time of trial. She admitted that 

she had made some inquiries into possible couple’s reunification therapy. 

Removal of the Children, N.K.’s Behavioral Needs and Current Placement

At the time of the removal, the Department investigated placement of the sisters 

with family members but were unable to approve either of the two proposed placements 

for a variety of reasons dealing generally with those parties’ involvement in either other 

Department proceedings or criminal matters. Both girls were placed in foster care.

The record demonstrates that N.K. suffered from considerable psychological and 

emotional disturbances prior to and at the time of trial. Charles Lyles is a licensed 

professional counselor who worked with N.K. for fifteen sessions from August 2010 to 

May 2011. He testified that N.K., who was three years old when Lyles began working 
7

with her, would exhibit extreme tantrums in which she would throw things and growl. 

Lyles explained that N.K.’s behavior worsened during her therapy sessions with him and 

she began to demonstrate emotional disregulation, the inability to regulate her feelings 

or emotions. Lyles diagnosed N.K. with adjustment disorder with disturbance of 

emotions and conduct and reported that N.K. did not make progress during therapy. 

Lynn Jennings also provided therapy for N.K. and received reports that N.K. had 

been exhibiting “sexual acting out behavior.” Jennings reported that N.K. consistently 

attempted to touch other people on their chest area and explained to Jennings that 

“Mommy and Daddy said it was okay to touch [Ms. Jennings’s] chest.” Jennings 

diagnosed N.K. with adjustment disorder with disturbance of conduct and mood. 

Jennings explained that N.K. was moved from her first foster home due to sexualized 

behavior and moved from her second foster home due to defiant behavior. N.K. was 

eventually placed in the Children’s Home of Lubbock, a residential treatment center and 

a placement which Jennings considered appropriate in light of N.K.’s behavioral needs 

at the time.

Lyles’s and Jennings’s observations were consistent with those of Danny Pectol, 

a program director at the Children’s Home at Lubbock, where N.K. resided at the time of 

trial. He testified that N.K. had made progress at the home but explained that, upon her 

arrival, she was a deeply troubled child who suffered from severe night terrors and 

whose needs were so acute that they required extra training and extra staffing in order 

to meet them. When N.K. arrived at the home, she was extremely aggressive and wild; 

she bit, hit, scratched, and kicked the staff and other children at the home. She, too, 

would attempt to harm herself by hitting her head against the floor or the wall. When 
8

she started attending school, her aggressive behavior continued, resulting in several 

suspensions for attacking other children, cursing, and screaming. Pectol testified that 

N.K. had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

Pectol described N.K.’s night terrors, episodes during which she would thrash 

about and scream. He testified that the staff had to be specially trained to recognize 

that her night terrors were a PTSD reaction in which she felt she had to defend herself; 

they were trained to refrain from physical contact with her during these terrors unless 

she was engaging in self-harm and to continuously reassure her verbally that she was 

safe. Pectol also testified that, although N.K. has not made an outcry of sexual abuse, 

she exhibited “almost all [the] red flags” as having been a victim of sexual abuse, 

referring to her night terrors, hypervigilance, sexualized behaviors, extreme aggression, 

and tendency to wet and soil herself. He explained, too, that the absence of an outcry 

of sexual abuse would not be abnormal considering N.K’s age.

Pectol testified that N.K. needs to be in a placement with people who are 

specifically trained to work with the child’s needs and have received “real specific 

trauma based and sexually based trainings to make sure that they had down what they 

need for [N.K.].” Pectol explained that, despite her intensive needs, the home remained 

committed to helping N.K. and providing her the stability she needs.

Termination Proceedings

Following the presentation of this evidence in a trial to the bench, the trial court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that Bethany (1) knowingly placed or knowingly 

allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their 
9

physical or emotional well-being, (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the 

children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or 

emotional well-being, and (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that 

specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children 

who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the 

Department for not less than nine months as a result of their removal from the parent 

under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), 

(E), (O) (West Supp. 2012). The trial court further found that termination of Bethany’s 

parent-child relationships with N.K. and A.M. was in the children’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(2). Bethany appeals the trial court’s order, challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support it. 

Standards of Review

The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional 

dimensions. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see Santosky v. Kramer, 

455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). A decree terminating 

this natural right is complete, final, irrevocable, and divests for all time that natural right 

as well as all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers between the parent and child 

except for the child’s right to inherit. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. That being so, we are 

required to strictly scrutinize termination proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 

(Tex. 1980). However, parental rights are not absolute, and the emotional and physical 

interests of a child must not be sacrificed merely to preserve those rights. In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
10

The Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the parent-child relationship 

if the petitioner establishes (1) one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions and (2) 

that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001. Though evidence may be relevant to both elements, each 

element must be proved, and proof of one does not relieve the burden of proving the 

other. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. While both a statutory ground and best interest 

of the child must be proved, only one statutory ground is required to terminate parental 

rights under section 161.001. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). Therefore, 

we will affirm the trial court’s order of termination if legally and factually sufficient 

evidence supports any one of the grounds found in the termination order, provided the 

record shows also that it was in the best interest of the child for the parent’s rights to be 

terminated. See id. 

Due process requires the application of the clear and convincing standard of 

proof in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 

S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(a) (West 2008). 

“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the 

allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2008). 

This standard, which focuses on whether a reasonable jury could form a firm belief or 

conviction, retains the deference a reviewing court must have for the factfinder’s role. In 

re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26. We must maintain appropriate deference to the trial court’s 

role as fact-finder by assuming that it resolved evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding 
11

when reasonable to do so and by disregarding evidence that it reasonably could have 

disbelieved. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266–67.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order terminating 

parental rights, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to 

determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or 

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. See id. at 266. 

“To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court 

conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved 

disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id. In other 

words, we will disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved 

or found to have been incredible. Id. 

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a termination 

order, we determine “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably 

form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the [Department]’s allegations.” In re 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. In conducting this review, we consider whether the disputed 

evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved the disputed 

evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “If, in light of the entire 

record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in 

favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a 

firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. 
12

Applicable Law and Analysis

Predicate Acts or Omissions

Bethany contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support 

a finding of a predicate act or omission that would serve as grounds for terminating her 

parental rights to her children. The Department responds by citing evidence that 

Bethany engaged in prostitution in the family home, failed to maintain a home suitable 

for children, disregarded potential for harm by leaving the children in Michael’s care, has 

an extensive history of methamphetamine abuse, attacked and choked Michael when 

he sent a text message to a girl, and generally made poor decisions throughout the 

pendency of this case which are indicative of her failure to make the necessary changes 

to regain custody of the children. The Department characterizes such evidence as 

sufficient to establish that Bethany (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the 

children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or 

emotional well-being and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with 

persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional wellbeing. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E).

Evidence concerning subsections (D)’s and (E)’s statutory grounds for 

termination is interrelated; therefore, we will consolidate our review of the evidence 

supporting these grounds.2 See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d 763, 770 n.6 (Tex.App.—

 2 Indeed, this Court has observed the interrelated nature of evidence that could support 

these two statutory grounds for termination: “Although the focus of subsection (D) is on 

the child’s living environment and not on the parent’s conduct, parental conduct may 

produce an endangering ‘environment.’” In re D.R.J., No. 07-08-00410-CV, 2009 Tex. 
13

Amarillo 2012, no pet.). Endangerment of the children’s physical or emotional wellbeing is an element of both subsections (D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 

161.001(1)(D), (E). “[E]ndanger” means “to expose to loss or injury; to 

jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). 

Although “‘endanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill 

effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be 

directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Id.; see In re P.E.W., 105 

S.W.3d 771, 777 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (observing that child “need not 

develop or succumb to a malady” in order to prove endangering conditions).

The Texas Supreme Court has reiterated that endangering conduct is not limited 

to actions directed toward the child: “It necessarily follows that the endangering conduct 

may include the parent’s actions before the child’s birth, while the parent had custody of 

older children, including evidence of drug usage.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 

(Tex. 2009); see In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.). A 

parent’s conduct in the home, such as illegal drug use or unlawful conduct, can create 

an environment that endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re 

J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also In re W.S., 

899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (concluding that subsection 

(D)’s “conditions or surroundings” includes both acceptability of living conditions and 

parent’s conduct in home). Indeed, “[i]t is illogical to reason that inappropriate, 

debauching, unlawful, or unnatural conduct of persons who live in the home of a child, 

or with whom a child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home, are not 

 

App. LEXIS 5231, at *7 (Tex.App.—Amarillo July 8, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 

(citing In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 633 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied)).
14

inherently a part of the conditions and surroundings[] of that place or home.” In re 

D.R.J., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5231, at *7 n.5 (quoting In re B.R., 822 S.W.2d 103, 106 

(Tex.App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied)).

In our review, we look not only at evidence regarding the parent’s active conduct, 

but also evidence showing the parent’s omissions or failures to act. In re A.B., 125 

S.W.3d 769, 777 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). Subsection (D) permits 

termination based on a single act or omission by the parent. See id. at 776. A parent’s 

continuation of illegal drug use or other criminal activity, despite knowledge that parental 

rights are in jeopardy, may also serve as evidence of “voluntary, deliberate, and 

conscious conduct” that supports a finding of endangerment under section 

161.001(1)(E). See Robinson v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 89 

S.W.3d 679, 686–87 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the record before us and, perhaps, the 

most obvious development outlined by the evidence: the group’s prostitution activities 

conducted from the family home. The record seems to support the conclusion that the 

group did make efforts to take the children—N.K., A.M., and Ashley’s child—from the 

home before a client would arrive such that the children were not present whenever the 

client was. Nonetheless, the dangers associated with having strangers come to the 

family home to engage in sexual activity in exchange for money are obvious, as Rogers 

recognized: “Well, if you start bringing Johns in or customers for prostitution into your 

home, they know where you live and they may return. And it was very poor judgment.” 

Without question, the fact that Bethany, Michael, and Ashley operated a prostitution 

service from the family home had an impact on the children’s conditions or 
15

surroundings, and risks associated with this criminal activity represent a risk to the 

children’s physical and emotional well-being. Cf. In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 

(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (discussing impact of “continued criminality” as it 

relates to endangerment of child’s well-being). We reiterate that it is not necessary that 

the conduct in question be directed at the children or that the children actually suffer 

injury as a direct result of the conduct. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.

Aside from the risk directly associated with operating a prostitution service from 

the home where the girls lived, Bethany testified that the prostitution operation took an 

emotional and physical toll on her and her ability to act in a motherly capacity:

I started to say that I feel that some of [N.K.’s] behaviors could be the fact 

that I was not emotionally there for her when I was prostituting. And when 

she was – that was at the same time she was going through the change of 

going – having to go to Richard’s house and coming back to mine. And I 

did neglect her emotional needs by not fully being there when she was 

going through that change and fully being there as a mother at that time.

And, while we certainly agree that it was preferable for the children to be taken away 

from the home during any transactions relating to the group’s prostitution endeavors, we 

do note that doing so meant that the children were forced to leave their home at 

whatever hour and for however long the client’s appointment would dictate. Conduct 

which subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and 

emotional well-being of a child. In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex.App.—San 

Antonio 1998, pet. denied). 

Further, we observe that “[a]n environment which routinely subjects a child to the 

probability that she will be left alone because her parents are once again jailed, whether 

because of the continued violation of probationary conditions or because of a new 
16

offense growing out of a continued use of illegal drugs, or because the parents are once 

again committed to a rehabilitation program, endangers both the physical and emotional 

well-being of a child.” Id. Here, Bethany engaged in the prostitution activities from the 

home despite the fact that she was on probation and despite the fact that the 

Department had recently concluded its first investigation; Bethany’s parental rights were 

in jeopardy, and she nonetheless engaged in activity which increased the likelihood that 

she would be separated from the children, either because she was incarcerated or 

because the Department had removed the children. Cf. id. All that being said, the 

record establishes the group’s at-home prostitution operation directly and indirectly 

endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being.

With respect to Michael’s confession of sexual abuse of N.K., it would not appear 

from the record that Bethany was aware of the alleged abuse.3 Her reaction to having 

heard that Michael confessed to having inappropriately touched N.K., however, is rather 

telling. Kaye Renshaw, Bethany’s therapist, testified that when she first confronted 

Bethany with Michael’s confession of sexual abuse of N.K., Bethany responded by 

maintaining that Michael never had the opportunity to do such a thing. According to 

Renshaw, Bethany did not take responsibility for the abuse, nor did she assign any 

responsibility to Michael; instead, Bethany blamed other people. At trial, Bethany 

continued to demonstrate a disbelief of the confession and a disregard for any risk of 

 3 Parenthetically, we add that “it is beyond question that sexual abuse is conduct that 

endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 742 

(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (quoting In re R.G., 61 S.W.3d 661, 667 

(Tex.App.—Waco 2001, no pet.)). Further, evidence of sexual abuse of one child is 

sufficient to support a finding of endangerment with respect to other children. See id. 

Parental knowledge that an actual offense has occurred is not necessary; it is sufficient 

that the parent was aware of the potential for danger and disregarded that risk. See In 

re R.G., 61 S.W.3d at 667–68.
17

abuse that Michael’s confession or N.K.’s behavior might suggest. She, instead, 

characterized him as a good father and his relationship with the girls as strong. Further, 

even though she testified that she and Michael were separated, they remained married, 

and Bethany testified that she had made some inquiries into possible reunification 

therapy with Michael. While it is true that Michael later recanted his confession and 

denied sexually abusing N.K., Bethany’s refusal to acknowledge any degree of risk he 

may pose in light of his confession demonstrates that she remains unable to adequately 

protect her children. Renshaw’s testimony echoed this observation; she considered the 

children at risk if they were returned to Bethany’s care and concluded that Bethany was 

not capable of adequately protecting them. 

Though less developed in the record before us, there is also evidence of 

domestic violence between Bethany and Michael, the most notable instance coming 

from Michael’s testimony that Bethany choked him when he sent a text message to a 

young girl. Abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of a child’s home 

can produce an environment that endangers the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing. In re B.R., 822 S.W.2d at 106.

Based on evidence that Bethany and the two other adults in the home engaged 

in prostitution from the family home for a number of months, especially when considered 

with evidence of violent, unstable, and unsanitary living conditions, Michael’s admission 

of sexual abuse of N.K., and Bethany’s lack of concern about such admission, the trial 

court sitting as finder of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Bethany 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children or placed the children in 

conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-
18

being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1) (D), (E). Considering such evidence in a 

neutral light, the trial court could have arrived at the same conclusion. We conclude 

that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding of a 

predicate act or omission supporting termination of Bethany’s parental rights. See id. 

Best Interest of the Children

Bethany also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 

court’s best interest determination. In support of the trial court’s determination that 

termination of the parent-child relationship was in the children’s best interest, the 

Department directs us to evidence, in addition to the aforementioned endangering 

conduct and conditions, that N.K. has improved in residential care but continues to 

suffer adverse emotional conditions as a result of her home environment and that 

Bethany has not made sufficient progress in terms of personal or psychological growth 

to adequately protect the children as demonstrated by her therapists’ conclusions, 

Bethany’s own testimony, and by her continued poor decision-making skills. 

The Texas Supreme Court has recognized a non-exhaustive list of factors that 

are pertinent to the inquiry whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of 

the child: (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child 

now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the 

future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs 

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the 

plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the 

stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent 
19

which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) 

any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 

367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307 (West 2008) 

(providing extensive list of factors that may be considered in determining child’s best 

interest). In examining the best interest of the child, we may consider evidence that was 

also probative of the predicate act or omission. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. The 

best interest determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, subjective 

facts, and the totality of the evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex.App.—

Amarillo 2011, no. pet). The Department need not prove all nine Holley factors, and the 

absence of evidence relevant to some of those factors does not bar a finding that 

termination is in the child’s best interest, especially in the face of undisputed evidence 

that the parental relationship endangered the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. 

No one Holley factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor may be sufficient to 

support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re A.P., 184 S.W.3d 

410, 414 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)

Here, the record reveals a great deal relating to the current and future emotional 

and physical needs of N.K. She came to the Children’s Home, after having been 

removed from a number of other foster placements, as what Pectol described as a wild, 

aggressive, troubled child. Pectol detailed N.K.’s emotional state and the measures 

implemented at the Children’s Home in order to meet her emotional and physical needs. 

And those needs are many and significant. Pectol explained that N.K. has improved as 

a result of the efforts of the therapeutically trained staff which allow her to feel safer in 

her surroundings whereas Bethany, by all professional accounts, is not equipped to 
20

meet N.K.’s needs. Lyles testified that, based on his observations during therapy, 

Bethany seemed frustrated and unable to cope with N.K.’s behaviors. Simply put, 

Bethany has not made the progress necessary during therapy to recognize or meet the 

special and demanding behavioral and psychological needs of N.K.

Though the record is less developed as to the current needs and placement of 

A.M., we make two observations in response. First, that the record reveals little about 

A.M.’s current foster environment is not fatal to the trial court’s finding that termination 

was also in A.M.’s best interest. See In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 800 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2004, no pet.). Secondly, though much of the evidence relevant to the 

children’s best interest specifically refers to N.K., this same evidence serves to 

demonstrate Bethany’s lack of parenting skills and her inability to provide a suitable and 

protective home, which, of course, applies with equal force to A.M.’s best interest.

Psychological assessments and Bethany’s own testimony highlight her parental 

shortcomings. Renshaw, who performed a psychosexual assessment of Bethany at the 

Department’s request and who also participated in Bethany’s ongoing individual 

therapy, testified that Bethany had not been honest during therapy and had not made 

sufficient progress to allow the children to be safely returned to her care: “[O]ver time, 

Bethany has demonstrated that understanding the difference and recognizing the 

difference between the truth and her fantasy reality is impossible. She has consistently 

reported one thing to me, and the Department has provided evidence in opposition to 

the things that she has told me.”
21

Although, Bethany testified, she and Michael remained separated, Bethany 

admitted that they were still married and that she had discussed with her therapist the 

possibility of couple’s reunification therapy. The very possibility of seeking reunification 

with Michael, when considered in light of the psychological community’s consistent 

assessment of Michael as a high-risk individual, demonstrates a patent lack of 

understanding of the gravity of the risk to the children and a grave underestimation of 

the psychological needs of N.K. in particular. As Rogers explained, Michael is “such a 

high risk individual, that [he] could never recommend reintegration at this point,” and the 

children would be at “high risk” if returned to a home with him. Renshaw considered the 

children at risk if they were returned to Bethany’s care and testified that Bethany is 

incapable of being protective of the children and lacked the motivation to make the 

changes necessary for successful reunification. Ultimately, Renshaw came to the 

conclusion that termination of Bethany’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. 

Bethany’s limited, unimproved parental abilities weigh in favor of the trial court’s arrival 

at the same finding: that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the children’s 

best interest.

Those same parental shortcomings—most notably, her failures to accept 

responsibility and take a protective posture with respect to the girls—demonstrate a 

likelihood that N.K. and A.M. would be in emotional and physical danger if returned to 

Bethany’s care. That is, in addition to Bethany’s inability to develop adequate parenting 

skills, she has held open the possibility that she and Michael might reunite which would, 

on this record, seem to pose an exponential increase in the physical and emotional risk

to the girls whether from Michael directly or as a consequence of Bethany’s poor 
22

decision-making skills. Further, Bethany’s refusal to acknowledge risk or take adequate 

steps to guard the girls against such risk could also serve as an indicator that the 

existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one.

Though Bethany has taken part in therapy and classes made available to her by 

the Department, the consensus among the psychological professionals involved with 

her is that she has not progressed sufficiently. Consistent with Renshaw’s assessment 

that Bethany had failed to make sufficient progress to attain reunification, Dr. Hoke 

testified that Bethany’s prognosis for significant change was limited, though not 

impossible. So, while programs would likely be available to Bethany, the record 

suggests that she may participate in them but may not be gaining the intended benefit 

from them.

With respect to the stability of the home or proposed placement, we have much 

in the record that supports the conclusion that N.K. is in an environment where she 

needs to be: the structured, well-trained, and dedicated care of the Children’s Home. It 

is there where she has shown some improvement and there where she can receive the 

specialized care and treatment her psychological and emotional demands require. Both 

Pectol and Jennings testified that N.K. requires such an environment. In contrast, the 

instability and chaos associated with N.K.’s time in Bethany’s care, Pectol’s testimony 

suggests, would exacerbate N.K.’s problems at that time. In fact, as Pectol explained, 
23

any sudden change in N.K.’s environment would likely cause her regression.4 N.K. 

needs stability, and she can receive such at the Children’s Home.

Pectol also testified to the detailed plans the Children’s Home has designed for 

the continued care of N.K. and its commitment to helping her continue to improve. 

Pectol remained open to the possibility that N.K. could eventually find a home with 

therapeutically trained foster or adoptive parents. However, from Pectol’s testimony, it 

appears the Children’s Home will continue to provide the best care possible for N.K. if 

that scenario never comes to fruition. In contrast, Bethany testified very generally 

regarding her plan to provide for the children: 

To keep my stable employment. I’m hoping that when -- if they were to be 

sent home, I can become a supervisor at my work and that will give me 

much of a pay increase. I plan to – you know, if I need to, apply for 

government assistance, such as food stamps, Medicaid and things like 

that. But that’s only if I feel the need. I have insurance at my work that I 

plan to look into if they’re sent home.

When asked about any special plans designed to meet N.K.’s needs, Bethany 

described plans which were rather vague and tentative, though they did acknowledge 

N.K.’s special needs: “I would – I was actually going to discuss with my lawyer if it was 

possible to get training from the Children’s Home and I would love to – .”

 4 In fact, there is evidence that the instability and chaos of N.K.’s home life was, at a 

minimum, a contributing factor to her psychological conditions. For instance, Lyles

explained his theory on the possible source of N.K.’s behavior:

When I see an extreme emotional disregulation in a three-year-old child, 

that’s an indicator of a very chaotic home environment, physical abuse, 

sexual abuse. There was no evidence of those in our sessions that I 

observed, but extreme emotional deregulation is [an] indicator of a very 

chaotic, unsafe home environment.
24

Having reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, 

we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably formed a firm belief or 

conviction that termination of Bethany’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(2). Likewise, viewing the evidence as a 

whole in a neutral light, a rational trier of fact reasonably could have arrived at the same 

firm belief or conviction. We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient 

to support the trial court’s order terminating Bethany’s parental rights to her two children 

and, accordingly, overrule her sole point of error.

Conclusion

Having overruled the sole issue presented to this Court, we affirm the trial court’s 

orders terminating Bethany’s parental rights to N.K. and A.M.

Mackey K. Hancock

 Justice