NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

TAMANIKA LA KRIESE WHITE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 12-0570

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2011-007261-004

The Honorable Kristin C. Hoffman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Myles A. Braccio

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Thomas K. Baird

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WHITE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Appellant, Tamanika La Kriese White, appeals from her 

conviction and sentence for attempt to commit sexual assault and sexual 

assault. White argues the superior court should not have denied her 

challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 

2d 69 (1986), to the State’s peremptory strikes of male jurors. See J.E.B. v. 

Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 

(1994) (Batson challenges extended to gender). We review the denial of a

Batson challenge for clear error. See State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 404,

¶ 43, 306 P.3d 48, 61 (2013). For the following reasons, we disagree with 

White and affirm the superior court’s denial of White’s Batson challenge. 

¶2 “A Batson challenge involves three steps: (1) The defendant 

must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor 

must offer a [gender]-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court 

must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful [gender]

discrimination.” Id. at ¶ 44 (quoting State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, 285,

¶ 12, 283 P.3d 12, 16 (2012)).

¶3 Here, the State used all six of its peremptory juror strikes to 

dismiss male jurors. Following the State’s strikes, White made a timely 

Batson challenge contending the State exercised its strikes in a genderdiscriminatory manner. The superior court implicitly found that White 

had made a prima facie showing of discrimination by asking the State for

gender-neutral reasons for the strikes. After the State explained the basis 

for the strikes, the superior court rejected White’s Batson challenge. The 

superior court thus implicitly determined that White had not carried her 

burden of proving purposeful gender discrimination.

¶4 White argues the superior court erroneously found the State 

offered gender-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. We disagree. 

“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [non-moving party’s] 

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed” nondiscriminatory. Felder 

v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 215 Ariz. 154, 168, ¶ 74, 158 P.3d 877, 891 (App. 
STATE v. WHITE

Decision of the Court

3

2007) (alteration in original) (applying rule in context of race-based Batson

challenge). The reasons given by the State were not inherently 

discriminatory, or “[i]mplausible or fantastic.” See id. at ¶ 75 (citation 

omitted).

¶5 The State struck Juror 20 because it believed he had acted as 

though he did not want to be there. At the beginning of the voir dire

process, Juror 20 initially claimed a work-scheduling hardship; but when 

the court noted the juror’s company paid for juror service, he quickly 

backed off his hardship claim.

¶6 The State struck Jurors 4, 38, and 42 because they had served 

on prior juries in criminal cases that had found the defendant not guilty or 

guilty of a lesser-included offense. Moreover, the State struck Juror 4 

because his family members had been convicted of various crimes.

¶7 The State struck Juror 25 because he appeared to be 

attempting to be comical. When asked if he was married, the juror said he 

did not “have a husband or a wife,” and the prosecutor subsequently 

indicated he could not tell whether the juror was joking or offering some 

sort of “view of [] society.” And, the State struck Juror 26 because he had 

been charged with possession of marijuana and burglary.

¶8 Finally, White argues that some of the stricken jurors had 

similarities with non-stricken jurors. White, however, did not raise this 

comparison analysis during voir dire. Both our supreme court and “the 

United States Supreme Court ha[ve] warned that ‘a retrospective 

comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very 

misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial.’” Medina, 

232 Ariz. at 404, ¶ 48, 306 P.3d at 61 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 

472, 483, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1211, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008)). Because White did 

not raise this argument in the superior court, the State did not have an 

opportunity to offer distinctions between similarly situated jurors. 

Similarly, the superior court did not have an opportunity to compare the

jurors who were stricken with those who remained on the panel. Because

neither the State nor the superior court had an opportunity to compare 

similarly situated jurors, we decline to engage in a comparison analysis

not raised during voir dire. See id. at 405, ¶ 49, 306 P.3d at 62.
STATE v. WHITE

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

rejection of White’s Batson challenge.