IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER RUSANOWSKY, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§ 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1132

§

THE CITY OF DALLAS, SGT. ROGER §

A. RUDOLF, Individually and in §

his official capacity as a Dallas Police §

Department Police Officer, §

§

Defendants. §

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

CONDUCT LIMITED DISCOVERY

CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS

Christopher J. Caso

City Attorney

/s/ J. Cheves Ligon .

J. Cheves Ligon

Senior Assistant City Attorney

Texas State Bar No. 24070147

john.ligon@dallas.gov

7DN Dallas City Hall

1500 Marilla Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: 214-670-3519

Facsimile: 214-670-0622

Attorneys for Defendants

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. SUMMARY OF MOTION................................................................................................1

II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES.............................................................................1

III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891 (5th Cir. 2019).................................................................. 4, 6

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)........................................................................................... 2

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) .............................................................................................. 5

Brown v. Bridges, No. 12-CV-4947-P, 2015 WL 11121361 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015 ................. 8

Brown v. Bridges, No. 3:12-CV-4947-P, 2014 WL 2777373 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2014).............. 9

Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.2001) ............................................................................... 6

Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2021) .......................................................... 4

Carswell v. Camp, No. 21-10171, 2022 WL 17335977 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022).......................... 2

Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2008)............................................................................... 3

Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................ 7

Eagle Railcar Servs.-Roscoe, Inc. v. NGL Crude Logistics, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-0153-BL, 2018 

WL 2317696 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2018) .............................................................................. 8, 9

Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307 (5th Cir.2001)....................................................................... 6

Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2004)............................................................ 5, 6

Harper v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 3:14-CV-2647-M, 2017 WL 3674830 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 

2017) ......................................................................................................................................... 9

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2015).................................................................. 12

Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., No. 3:17-cv-2021-BN, 2019 WL 1957997 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 

2019) ....................................................................................................................... 5, 10, 18, 19

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) ..................................................................................... 5

Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ 4

Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................. 3

Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1992)............................................................................ 6

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Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2019)....................................................................... 4

Nance v. Meeks, No. 3:17-cv-1882-L-BN, 2018 WL 5624202 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2018) ............ 4

O’Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 F. App’x. 741 (5th Cir.2009) .................................................................. 7

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) ............................................................................. 15

Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 2007)............................................................................. 6

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)..................................................................................... 2

Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) ............................................................................... 14

Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364 (5th Cir.2001) .................................................................................. 5

Roe v. Johnson Cnty., Texas, No. 3:18-CV-2497-B-BN, 2021 WL 321967 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 

2021) ......................................................................................................................................... 3

Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 2018)................................................................................ 7

Seastrunk v. Entegris, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2795-L, 2017 WL 6406627 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2017)9

Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2019)............................................................ 3

Whittington v. Maxwell, 455 F. App’x. 450 (5th Cir.2011)............................................................ 7

RULES

Fed.R.Civ.P. rule 26(b)................................................................................................................. 10

N.D.Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1................................................................................................................... 8

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TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Defendants City of Dallas (the “City”) and Sgt. Roger A. Rudloff (“Sgt. Rudloff”) file 

this their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery (Doc. no. 30, 

“Motion”) and would respectfully show the Court as follows:

I. SUMMARY OF MOTION

Plaintiff seeks leave from this Court to propound the type of onerous, open-ended 

discovery that qualified immunity is specifically designed to prevent. Rather than propose limited

discovery narrowly tailored to the salient facts upon which this Court will need to determine 

whether Sgt. Rudloff violated clearly established law, Plaintiff improperly requests permission to 

open Sgt. Rudloff and the City to early discovery – much of which is objectionable even by Rule 

26(b)’s broad standard.

Given that (1) Plaintiff violated this Court’s Local Rules by never conferencing on the 

Motion; (2) Plaintiff was not only present during the entirety of the events at issue but, as his 

Complaint illustrates, actually documented them in real time; and (3) none of his requested 

interrogatory requests or requests for production meet the Fifth Circuit’s standards for qualified 

immunity discovery, his Motion should denied.

II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims related to his arrest sound in alleged violations of his First 

and Fourth Amendment rights. See generally, Doc. no. 1. The gravamen of his claims is that he 

was arrested and charged with a crime, without probable cause, in retaliation for taking 

photographs of Sgt. Rudloff (and other law enforcement officers) unlawfully arresting protestors 

during the 2020 George Floyd protests. Id. ⁋⁋ 24-28. 

Sgt. Rudloff has pled the defense of qualified immunity. See Doc. no. 23. 

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials 

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accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, (2009). The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of 

whether the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based 

on mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, (2004) (KENNEDY, J., 

dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978), for the proposition 

that qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or 

one of law”).

As the Fifth Circuit has recently reminded litigants, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly 

made clear that ‘the driving force’ behind qualified immunity is ‘a desire to ensure that 

insubstantial claims against government officials will be resolved prior to discovery,’ and it has 

‘stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in 

litigation.’” Carswell v. Camp, No. 21-10171, 2022 WL 17335977, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022)

(quoting, 555 U.S. at 231 (emphasis in original)).

Qualified immunity is as an immunity not just from liability, but from suit. See,

e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualifiedimmunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of 

disruptive discovery.’” (citation omitted)). The unique burdens Plaintiff faces to defeat the 

immunity continue at summary judgment, where “[a] good-faith qualified immunity defense alters 

the usual summary judgment burden of proof,” such that, although the evidence remains viewed 

“in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating 

that a defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 

389 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant 

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is not entitled to qualified immunity by establishing two prongs – one factual, “whether the facts, 

taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show the officer’s conduct violated a federal 

constitutional or statutory right,” Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 718 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations 

omitted), reversed on other grounds, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam) – and one legal, “whether the 

defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time 

of the incident,” Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2008).

As this Court has noted, “[b]efore considering a summary judgment motion, discovery may 

be necessary to rule on the first prong, but no discovery is necessary to rule on the second.” Roe v. 

Johnson Cnty., Texas, No. 3:18-CV-2497-B-BN, 2021 WL 321967, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 

2021) “And courts can—and often do—decide that a defendant is entitled 

to qualified immunity on the second prong alone.” Id. (citing Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 

904 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Knowing or reckless false statements in a warrant affidavit are not to be 

condoned. But Arizmendi has not persuaded us that Gabbert’s actions were then illicit by clearly 

established law.”)

The burden in showing Sgt. Rudloff violated clearly established law is high. See,

e.g., Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 2021) (Under the clearly-established 

prong, “‘the dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 

established.’ [So, t]he plaintiff must identify controlling precedent that makes the unlawfulness of 

the officer’s conduct sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would have understood his conduct 

violated that right.” (quoting Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874-75 (5th Cir. 2019); 

citing Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2020))).

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“So, to put it plainly, even if the plaintiff can establish a constitutional violation, if he 

cannot carry his burden as to the clearly-established prong, game over. The Court will dismiss the 

plaintiff's action on qualified immunity grounds.” Roe, 2021 WL 321967 at *2.

Discovery may sometimes be necessary in this process, but it is always to be circumscribed. 

Accordingly, while “a court’s qualified immunity inquiry at [the summary judgment] stage 

requires that the Court ‘accept the plaintiff's version of the facts (to the extent reflected by proper 

summary judgment evidence) as true,’” Nance v. Meeks, No. 3:17-cv-1882-L-BN, 2018 WL 

5624202, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 

(5th Cir. 2004); (citations omitted), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 5620469 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018), 

an “attempt to obtain any evidence that may support a version of the facts that may defeat summary 

judgment on qualified immunity does not fit within the limited scope of a discovery request 

‘narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim,’ ” because 

“open-ended requests – to uncover any facts, as opposed to specific questions of fact, that may be 

helpful to [a plaintiff's] version of events – fail to advance . . . the ‘careful procedure’ set forth” 

by Fifth Circuit case law. Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., No. 3:17-cv-2021-BN, 2019 WL 

1957997, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2019) (citations omitted).

The sole issue in Sgt. Rudloff’s qualified immunity defense will be whether he had 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. Simply, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures—only those that 

are “unreasonable.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 

(1979); Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir.2001) (explaining people enjoy the 

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constitutional right to be free from false arrest without probable cause); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 

185, 189 (5th Cir.2001) (noting the same).

The Fifth Circuit has held that probable cause exists “when the totality of the facts and 

circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for 

a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” 

Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Spiller v. Tex. City, 130 F.3d 

162, 165 (5th Cir.1997)). To establish probable cause, a reasonable person standard is used. Id. 

To prevail on a section 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must prove that Sgt. Rudloff 

did not have probable cause to arrest him. Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 

2007); Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 656. “Probable cause is established by facts and circumstances 

within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 

caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, 

or is about to commit an offense.” Arizmendi, 919 F.3d at 897. The Fifth Circuit has, notably and 

cogently for this case, cautioned that “[i]n making a determination of probable cause, we do not 

require a police officer to be perfect, nor do we want him always to err on the side of caution out 

of the fear of being sued.” Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Fifth Circuit has found whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor, or whether 

the offense was committed in the officer’s presence, is of no importance. Sam v. Richard, 

887 F.3d 710, 715 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2018). Rather, “[w]ith regard to pretrial confinement, ‘[t]he sole 

issue [under the Fourth Amendment] is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested 

person pending further proceedings,’” and finding illegal detention claim could stand where there 

was a factual dispute over the existence of probable cause. Whittington v. Maxwell, 455 F. App’x. 

450, 458–59 (5th Cir.2011) (citation omitted); see also O’Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 F. App’x. 741, 

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745 (5th Cir.2009) (“ ‘[T]o prevail in a § 1983 claim for false arrest,’ ... [a]s applied to the qualified 

immunity inquiry, the plaintiff must show that the officers could not have reasonably believed that 

they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for any crime.” (citations omitted)). As the Fifth 

Circuit has summarized:

The Court notes that to prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim, the plaintiff bears the 

burden to show that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest him. 

Probable cause is found “when the totality of facts and circumstances within a 

police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable 

person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” 

The police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his

position could have believed that in light of the totality of the facts and 

circumstances of which the police officer was aware, there was a fair probability 

that the [individual] had committed or was committing an offense. “Fair 

probability” for purposes of probable cause requires more than a bare suspicion, 

but less than a preponderance of evidence. Even if the police officer reasonably but 

mistakenly determined that probable cause existed, he is entitled to immunity. 

Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752, 764 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub 

nom. Hunter v. Cole, 196 L. Ed. 2d 397, 137 S. Ct. 497 (2016), and opinion reinstated in part, 905 

F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added.)

A. Plaintiff Never Conferenced with Defendants Regarding This Motion.

As a preliminary matter, the Motion does not contain a certificate of conference. Under 

this Court’s Local Rules, conferencing is almost always required. N.D.Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(a). Eagle

Railcar Servs.-Roscoe, Inc. v. NGL Crude Logistics, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-0153-BL, 2018 WL 

2317696, at *14 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2018) (“The local rules of this Court, furthermore, require 

parties to confer before filing non-dispositive motions unless ‘a conference is not possible.’”)

(citing N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(a)). In addition, “[e]ach motion for which a conference is required 

must include a certificate of conference indicating that the motion is unopposed or opposed,” and 

if the “motion is opposed, the certificate must state that a conference was held, indicate the date 

of conference and the identities of the attorneys conferring, and explain why agreement could not 

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be reached.” See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(b)(1) and (2). When “a conference was not held, the 

certificate must explain why it was not possible to confer, in which event the motion will be 

presumed to be opposed.” See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(b)(3). 

“Conference requirements ‘encourage resolving discovery disputes without judicial 

involvement.’” Brown v. Bridges, No. 12-CV-4947-P, 2015 WL 11121361, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 

30, 2015) (quoting Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 456, 459 

(D. Kan. 1999) ), modified in part on other grounds, 2015 WL 12532137 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 

2015). Such requirements are “part and parcel of the ethical rules governing attorneys and the court 

rules governing all parties, including pro se parties, that require all parties to engage in meaningful 

discussions in an attempt to resolve matters without court intervention.” Brown v. Bridges, No. 

3:12-CV-4947-P, 2014 WL 2777373, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2014) (citing Dondi Props. Corp. 

v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 289-90 (N.D. Tex. 1988)).

This Court has repeatedly found that failure to confer is an adequate reason to deny a 

discovery motion. See, e.g., Eagle Railcar Servs.-Roscoe, Inc., 2018 WL 2317696, at 

*17; Seastrunk v. Entegris, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2795-L, 2017 WL 6406627, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 

15, 2017); Harper v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 3:14-CV-2647-M, 2017 WL 3674830, at *13 (N.D. 

Tex. Aug. 25, 2017). As this Court has noted, in general, “conferring on the matters raised in 

the motion could very well eliminate the need for the motion or, at the very least, limit the issues 

to be resolved by the Court.” Eagle Railcar Servs.-Roscoe, Inc., 2018 WL 2317696, at *17.

Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, production of voluminous documents and answers to numerous 

interrogatories. Docs. no. 30-1-4. Per Local Rule 7.1(h), parties are required to conference prior to 

seeking the Court’s intervention in discovery disputes. Plaintiff never attempted to conference 

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regarding any of the requested discovery matters contained therein, and thus no efforts were made 

to narrow the disputed matters prior to reaching this Court through the instant Motion.

As such, Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied.

B. Plaintiff’s Requests Seek General Discovery, Not Information Tailored to Sgt. 

Rudloff’s Qualified Immunity Defense.

Plaintiff proposes propounding four separate discovery requests, including a set of 

interrogatories and requests for production to both the City and Sgt. Rudloff. (Doc. no. 30-1-4.) 

The Motion – and proposed discovery – all fail to narrowly tailor discovery to the qualified 

immunity issues necessary for this Court to decide whether Sgt. Rudloff is entitled to dismissal.

First, Plaintiff’s original sin, which mars all of his discovery requests: application of the 

incorrect standard. The Motion cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule 26(b)(1) for the 

proposition that Plaintiff is entitled to the broad discovery he seeks. Mot. pp. 1-2. In denying a 

motion for leave to conduct limited discovery for a converted motion for summary judgment 

regarding qualified immunity, this Court seized on a plaintiff’s similar efforts:

Tellingly, in the motion for leave, Plaintiffs argue that, “[s]hould” witnesses 

identified in response to the requested discovery “have information that contradict 

sworn statements of Defendants and their co-workers, such information would 

certainly fall with the scope of discoverable information” under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). But Rule 26(b)(1) defines what is relevant very broadly. 

That rule’s “broad scope of relevance” far exceeds the scope of discovery allowed 

prior to the Court's resolution of a qualified immunity defense.

Hutcheson, 2019 WL 1957997, at *3–4 (citations omitted.)

Second, unlike a section 1983 case where a decedent’s estate brings suit and the decedent’s 

heirs were not present at the precipitating event, Plaintiff was present during the entirety of the 

events on which his lawsuit is premised. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he is a journalist who 

was attempting to cover the 2020 protests and “documented” protestors who were present on I-35. 

Doc. no. 1, ⁋⁋ 17-20. After reaching a grassy area by the highway, Plaintiff “witnessed officers 

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begin to make a series of arrests,” and took photographs of same – several of which are in his 

Complaint. Id. pp 6-7. The basis of Plaintiff’s claims are his allegations that after taking the 

photographs, Sgt. Rudloff falsely arrested and charged Plaintiff in retaliation for his capturing what 

he claims was police misconduct. Id. ⁋⁋ 24-28. Multiple photographs in Plaintiff’s Complaint 

explicitly show Plaintiff (1) directly adjacent to the allegedly unlawful arrests; and (2) in 

communication with a mere feet-away Sgt. Rudloff. Id. pp. 9; 11-12. As such, Plaintiff is in the 

same position as Sgt. Rudloff to speak to the issues surrounding his arrest. He can, without the 

benefit of discovery, detail exactly where he was and what he was doing at the time of his arrest.

Plaintiff is also in the unique position of having documented the events with his own camera and 

thus has pictorial recordings of what transpired. If Plaintiff’s versions of events sufficiently 

contradict Sgt. Rudloff’s, then he can create a fact issue and survive summary judgment on 

qualified immunity. If his testimony and documentary evidence cannot, he will fail to overcome 

his high burden.

Regardless, as seen below, the requested discovery is far outside what is required for the 

question of whether there was probable cause at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and charge. Forcing 

Sgt. Rudloff and the City to respond to these capacious requests would deprive them of “[o]ne of 

the most salient benefits of qualified immunity,” “protection from pretrial discovery.” Hinojosa v. 

Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2015).

(i) Plaintiff’s Requests to Sgt. Rudloff far exceed any qualified immunity issues 

and delve into general discovery matters.

Plaintiff’s proposed interrogatories to Sgt. Rudloff involve absolutely no inquiries into the 

qualified immunity questions this Court confronts. Plaintiff instead seeks sworn responses for 

these three interrogatories:

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1) Describe your duties and responsibilities as a Sergeant with the Dallas Police 

Department.

2) Describe your employment history for the ten years prior to your hiring by the Dallas 

Police Department.

3) Identify all lawsuits in which you are or have even been a Defendant, by case name, 

docket number, and court.

Doc. no. 30-4 (emphasis added).

These inquiries do not involve whether Sgt. Rudloff had probable cause to detain and arrest 

Plaintiff and charge him with a crime but are meant to – at best – uncover background information 

on Sgt. Rudloff’s general employment and legal history. How, for example, Sgt. Rudloff’s decade 

of employment prior to his joining the Dallas Police Department factors into whether he violated 

clearly established law on the day in question is inexplicable. Further, Plaintiff’s “duties and 

responsibilities as a Sergeant” have no bearing on whether Plaintiff’s actions would have possibly 

caused a reasonable person to believe a crime had been committed. Lastly, Sgt. Rudloff’s lawsuit 

history is completely irrelevant to whether Plaintiff’s May 30, 2020 arrest was in violation of the 

clearly established law of that timeframe. Whether Sgt. Rudloff has a spotless record or a 

disturbing one is of no import. 

Similarly, all the proposed requests for production likewise delve into general discovery 

issues – and most likely, even areas outside of the broad scope of Rule 26(b)(1) during full-blown 

discovery:

1. All documents identified in your Initial Disclosures. 

2. All documents in your possession which pertain to the incidents described in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. 

3. All documents which pertain to your Texas Peace Officer License, including 

documents pertaining to trainings, certifications, and courses completed to maintain 

your license. 

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4. For the time period May 25, 2020 to the present, all communications sent or 

received by you on official and personal accounts and devices (including social 

media accounts) which use any of the following keywords: 

a. Rusanowsky 

b. protest 

c. “George Floyd” 

d. photographer

e. media 

f. press 

g. BLM 

h. “black lives matter” 

5. All documents in your possession which pertain to any investigation conducted 

by the Dallas Police Department, or any disciplinary action taken against you 

during your career in law enforcement. 

Doc. no. 30-3 (emphasis added).

Revealingly, to take just one example, under Plaintiff’s proposed requests, a recent text 

from a high school friend to Sgt. Rudloff’s personal phone regarding “media” coverage of recent 

elections, stock prices, or even the Dallas Mavericks would be responsive. Similarly, an email to 

a family member about the hiring of a “photographer” for an upcoming reunion would be as well. 

The process alone of reviewing all personal devices and media accounts to search for this 

information is staggering and yet any production would shed no light on whether Sgt. Rudloff had 

probable cause to arrest and charge Plaintiff on the day at issue. 

Further, Plaintiff seeks documentation regarding Sgt. Rudloff’s entire career. Request 

number 3, for example, would require production of Sgt. Rudloff’s training and certifications 

spanning over two decades. The City requires recruits to complete 36 weeks of training – much of 

which involves becoming certified under Texas laws to become a peace officer – and a further 24 

weeks of field training, as well as vast amounts of continuing training throughout officers’ careers. 

None of this factors into whether Sgt. Rudloff violated clearly established law on the day of 

Plaintiff’s arrest. Yet, producing same would entail enormous efforts.

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Further, information regarding Sgt. Rudloff’s past alleged misdeeds or the inquiries into 

same is little more than impeachment evidence. Even if Sgt. Rudloff had committed countless 

errors, or even intentional bad acts, prior to his arrest of Plaintiff, such information would be 

irrelevant to the inquiry of probable cause. 

Lastly, Plaintiff’s request for “all documents in your possession which pertain to the 

incidents described in Plaintiff’s complaint” is open-ended in the extreme and would include even 

privileged materials. While perhaps relevant to impeachment or part of Plaintiff’s broader case 

against Sgt. Rudloff, such a request is not tailored to the issue at hand.

(ii) Plaintiff’s Requests to the City likewise far exceed any qualified immunity 

issues and delve into general discovery matters.

Plaintiff’s lawsuit named the City as a Defendant. See generally, Doc. no. 1. The City, 

while the employer of Sgt. Rudloff during the 2020 protests, is not one and the same with him. As 

stated in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986), “while Congress never questioned its 

power to impose civil liability on municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its 

constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige municipalities to control the 

conduct of others.” The Court has consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory 

of respondeat superior. See, e.g. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 81 (1985) (plurality 

opinion). Sgt. Rudloff’s actions, therefore, cannot bind the City in all but a few, narrow 

circumstances. Plaintiff’s discovery, however, effectively ignores this and seeks not only materials 

related to Sgt. Rudloff, but many other areas touching on the City’s record. The City’s Motion to 

Dismiss is fully briefed and awaiting ruling. Docs. no. 15; 18; 22. Per this Court’s August 30, 2022 

Order, all discovery is stayed except as to qualified immunity – and even then only with Court 

approval. Doc. no. 23, ⁋ 2. Discovery against the City is therefore stayed. The City objects, 

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therefore, to any discovery propounded against it at all. The City requests the Court deny Plaintiff’s 

Motion as it concerns the City. 

Even still, as seen below, Plaintiff seeks general information from the City unrelated to any 

of the qualified immunity issues at hand.

As with Sgt. Rudloff, Plaintiff’s proposed interrogatories to the City are inquiries into 

matters completely unrelated to whether Sgt. Rudloff is entitled to qualified immunity:

1.Identify all individuals who were Defendant Rudloff’s direct superiors and 

subordinates on May 30, 2020. 

2. Identify all law enforcement personnel—by name, badge number, and position—

employed by agencies other than the Dallas Police Department who responded to the 

events on and proximate to IH-35 at the Dallas Protests on May 30, 2022.

3. Identify each instance of a complaint, investigation, or inquiry—whether formal or 

informal, through official or unofficial means—raised against Defendant Rudloff while 

employed with the Dallas Police Department.

Doc. no. 30-2 (emphasis added).

Request one seeks information regarding Sgt. Rudloff’s “superiors and subordinates” on 

the day of the incident. It does not limit the inquiry to any issues related to Plaintiff’s arrest, 

whether these individuals witnessed the arrest, or were part of any investigation. The only possible 

purpose Plaintiff has in identifying these individuals is for propounding discovery on them, all in 

the hopes that they may have information regarding Plaintiff’s arrest. Even still, Plaintiff’s Motion 

did not seek leave to serve discovery on any of these individuals, and would thus require Plaintiff 

to return to the Court to seek leave yet again. These interrogatories are general discovery, not 

qualified immunity discovery.

Request two seeks voluminous, irrelevant information about agencies other than the Dallas 

Police Department’s response to the largest protest in City history. Hundreds of law enforcement 

personnel were involved in responding to the protests – many of which turned violent – all through 

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the City, and I-35 specifically, on the day in question. Whether, say, individuals from the FBI or 

Garland Police happened to be involved in the response to the protests has no bearing on whether 

Sgt. Rudloff had probable cause to arrest and/or charge Plaintiff. Likewise, what their specific 

names and badge numbers are have no bearing on whether Sgt. Rudloff had probable cause to 

arrest Plaintiff. Even assuming the City had all of this information – which is certainly does not in 

any straightforwardly searchable format currently known – then this information would necessarily 

lead to a months-long fishing expedition of identifying these individuals and propounding 

discovery on them, all in the hopes that they may have information regarding Plaintiff’s arrest.

Plaintiff would again be required to return to this Court to seek leave to propound additional 

discovery on these individuals. This is general discovery, not qualified immunity discovery.

Request three again seeks generalized information about Sgt. Rudloff’s past. Whether Sgt. 

Rudloff had committed prior misdeeds has no bearing on whether he arrested Plaintiff without 

probable cause. 

Plaintiff’s requests for production to the City fare no better that the interrogatories. Plaintiff 

seeks the following:

1. All documents identified by Defendant City of Dallas in its Initial Disclosures. 

2. All documents in the Dallas Police Department’s custody pertaining to Plaintiff 

Christopher Rusanowsky.

3. All communications of any City entity and/or Dallas Police Department personnel 

related to Plaintiff Christopher Rusanowsky. 

4. All body camera footage or other video or audio recordings from Dallas Police 

Department officers who were present on and proximate to IH-35 at the Dallas Protests 

on May 30, 2020. 

5. All documents contained in Defendant Rudloff’s personnel file, including any F-5 

reports, as maintained by the Defendant City of Dallas and Dallas Police Department. 

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6. All documents related to the Defendant City of Dallas’s rules and/or procedures for 

training Dallas Police Department officers on the policing of protests, mass arrests, and 

interacting with members of the press. 

7. All documents reflecting any directives or guidance issued by the Dallas Police 

Department to its personnel after George Floyd’s death and in preparation for the Dallas 

Protests. 

8. All documents related to Defendant City of Dallas’s criminal investigation or 

disciplinary investigation into Defendant Sgt. Rudloff due to his conduct at the Dallas 

Protests on May 30, 2020. 

9. All incident reports or narratives authored or submitted by Dallas Police Department 

officers present on and proximate to IH-35 at the Dallas Protests on May 30, 2020. 

10. All transcripts or recordings of interviews conducted by the Dallas Police 

Department, or any City entity, with Dallas Police Department officers who were 

present on and proximate to IH-35 at the Dallas Protests on May 30, 2020.

Without belaboring the requests one-by-one, each request seeks comprehensive 

information about either (1) the City’s policies; (2) the broader events of May 30, 2020; or (3) Sgt. 

Rudloff’s record. All are impermissible.

As to the City’s policies, the information sought has no bearing on whether Sgt. Rudloff 

violated clearly established law. Whether the City adequately trained its employees and put 

appropriate policies in place regarding mass arrests relates to the City’s municipal liability. Even 

assuming Sgt. Rudloff misbehaved due to inadequate training, which he did not, whether probable 

cause existed to arrest Plaintiff is an entirely different matter. These requested materials are 

irrelevant.

As to Plaintiff’s broad requests related to the day of the incident, these “open-ended 

requests – to uncover any facts, as opposed to specific questions of fact, that may be helpful to [a 

plaintiff's] version of events – fail to advance the . . . ‘careful procedure’ set forth” by Fifth Circuit 

case law. Hutcheson, 2019 WL 1957997, at *3 (citations omitted). The amount of material Plaintiff 

seeks – such as “[a]ll transcripts or recordings of interviews” of the many law enforcement officers 

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responding to one of the 2020 protests’ most active scenes is staggering. Despite the Motion’s 

implication that the City has all records of the protests in some format wherein the City can easily 

search for relevant records, the chaotic events of May 30, 2020 – June 1, 2020 left behind 

thousands of pages of materials, countless body-worn camera records, reports, and physical 

evidence that cannot simply be handed over with any degree of certainty the materials would be 

fulsome and fully responsive. Instead, Plaintiff seeks vast universes of materials which would 

require a burdensomely extensive effort on Defendants’ part.

Lastly, as discussed above, any records of Sgt. Rudloff’s prior employment history and any 

investigations are irrelevant to his qualified immunity defense.

III. CONCLUSION

The defense of qualified immunity is in no small part designed to prevent fishing 

expeditions in discovery. The vast amounts of information and documents Plaintiff requests cannot 

be characterized as “limited discovery that is narrowly tailored to uncover facts that the Court 

needs to rule on that defense.” Hutcheson, 2019 WL 1957997 at *2. 

The Motion should be denied. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on December 12, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the 

clerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF electronic 

case filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system will send a “Notice of Electronic 

Filing” notification to all case participants registered for electronic notice, including all pro se

parties and/or attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service 

of this document by electronic means. 

s/ J. Cheves Ligon 

Senior Assistant City Attorney

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