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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DEMON REESE, #21041939, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:22-cv-01002-N (BT)

§

TRISTON ROBERTSON, et al., §

 Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Demon Reese, a pretrial detainee at Dallas County Jail, 

brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court 

granted Reese leave to proceed in forma pauperis but did not issue process 

pending judicial screening. As explained below, the Court should stay and 

administratively close this case. 

Background

Reese is currently charged with aggravated assault on a public servant 

arising from a shooting on February 22, 2019. (ECF No. 10.) In this lawsuit, 

Reese claims that he did not shoot at anyone, rather Dallas Police 

Department (DPD) Officer T. Roberson shot at him. Therefore, he seeks a 

public apology from the DPD, media coverage of “the truth,” mental health 

assistance, and monetary compensation for the time he has spent behind 

bars. Id. at 5. 

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Legal Standards and Analysis

A.

Reese’s complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part: 

The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, 

a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress 

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify 

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) 

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

suit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b). And under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court 

may summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes 

the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 

is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

B.

Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a federal court generally 

should abstain from exercising jurisdiction when doing so would interfere 

with an ongoing state criminal prosecution. “[T]he Younger doctrine 

requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits 

when three conditions are met: (1) the federal proceeding would interfere 

with an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding’; (2) the state has an important 

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interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff 

has ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional 

challenges.’” Bice v. Louisiana Public Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 

457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). 

All three conditions for Younger abstention are met here. First, 

criminal judicial proceedings are currently pending against Reese in Dallas 

County. Second, “[t]he state has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal 

laws.” DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984); see also 

Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(explaining that, “[u]nder Younger and its companion cases, a federal 

district court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a suit when state 

criminal proceedings are currently pending against the federal plaintiff”) 

(citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 41)). And third, Reese will have the opportunity 

to raise constitutional challenges in the ongoing state prosecution, on direct 

appeal in the event of a conviction, or through a state habeas writ 

challenging his detention or conviction. See DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1176; see 

also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (“ordinarily a pending state 

prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for 

vindication of federal constitutional rights”).

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While all three conditions of Younger are met, the Court may refuse 

to abstain if an exception applies. Bice, 677 F.3d at 716 n.3 (the exceptions 

are: (1) the state court proceeding was brought in bad faith or for the purpose 

of harassing the federal plaintiff; (2) the state statute is “flagrantly and 

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, 

sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an 

effort might be made to apply it”; or (3) application of the Younger 

abstention doctrine has been waived) (quoting Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 

388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004)). But no exception applies here. The Court 

should therefore abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Reese’s claims.

To the extent Reese seeks monetary compensation for the time he has 

spent in jail, the Fifth Circuit has held Younger does not apply to claims for 

monetary damages. See Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 

1994) (citing Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 

1988)). But, still, “a court should stay proceedings in a § 1983 case brought 

by a [criminal defendant awaiting trial] until the related pending criminal 

case is resolved.” Gross v. Normand, 576 F. App’x 318, 319 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(per curiam) (citing Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995)); 

see also Boyd v. Farrin, 575 F. App'x. 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 

(“[T]he proper course of action is for a district court to stay the claims for 

damages pending the outcome of the state proceedings, such that they can 

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move forward without interference”) (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 

193, 202 (1988)). 

Conclusion

The Court should stay and administratively close this case and 

instruct Reese (1) he must file a motion to reopen the case within 60 days 

after entry of judgment in his state criminal court case, and (2) the failure to 

do so will result in the dismissal without prejudice of this case for failure to 

prosecute and/or comply with a Court order under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b). 

SO RECOMMENDED.

November 7, 2022. 

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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