IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DRUE ALLEN HOLLIS, I, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00459-O-BP

§

TARRANT COUNTY, § 

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Drue Hollis’s Second Amended Original Complaint, 

filed August 8, 2022. ECF No. 18. On May 31, 2022, Hollis’s case was automatically referred to 

the undersigned pursuant to Special Order 3. ECF No. 5. The same day, the Court granted Hollis 

leave to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis, subject to judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915. ECF No. 7. After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Reed O’Connor DISMISS this case WITH 

PREJUDICE because Hollis fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the

Second Amended Complaint rests on delusional scenarios and an indisputably meritless legal 

theory. 

I. BACKGROUND

From the pleadings, it appears that Hollis suffers from delusions that lead him to believe 

certain actors within the government and the private sector are conspiring against him. He is no 

stranger to the judicial system, having filed multiple lawsuits in this Court over the past year and 

a half. In one previously dismissed case, Hollis sued Tarrant County for violations of the Balanced 

Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Texas Mental Health Code, seeking 

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 1 of 7 PageID 235
2

$6,308,130,000,990.00 in damages. See ECF Nos. 1, 22 in No. 4:21-cv-01142-O-BP. See also

Hollis v. Webber, No. 4:21-cv-1150-P (dismissed without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)) 

and No. 4:22-cv-413-P (dismissed without prejudice); Hollis v. Webber, et al., No. 4:22-cv-32-O 

(dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, including claims against Tarrant County); 

Hollis v. Sweetwater, No. 4:22-cv-cv-432-O (dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C § 1915); 

Hollis v. Rousch, No. 4:22-cv-608-P (dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C § 1915). 

Last week, United States District Judge Mark T. Pittman dismissed Hollis v. Eyes on Camp 

Bowie, P.A., No. 4:22-cv-01043-P, in which Hollis demanded $20,000,000 from the supplier of 

his contact lenses for alleged violations of the Copyright Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1975. See No. 4:22-

cv-01043-P, ECF No. 1 at 1. He also demanded that he be permitted to withdraw the $20,000,000 

from the Court’s Registry to pay his claim. Id., ECF No. 3. In dismissing Hollis’s suit under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915, Judge Pittman also found that Hollis was a vexatious litigant and sanctioned him 

by requiring that he obtain leave of court before filing any additional complaints in the Court. Id., 

ECF No. 15.

In this action, the barely legible Second Amended Complaint does not articulate a viable 

legal claim. Hollis alleges that Tarrant County refused to provide him documents and deprived 

him of his right to a jury trial in an “unknown cause number filed in Tarrant County.” ECF No. 18 

at 2-3. He seeks to recover damages of two trillion, six hundred forty-six billion, three hundred 

million, three hundred thousand dollars ($2,646,300,300.00) and continuing damages of two 

hundred thousand dollars per day from a date that is not explained in a way that the Court can 

understand. Id. at 5.

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 2 of 7 PageID 236
3

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Standard 

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to sua sponte

dismissal if it is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). Frivolous complaints “lack[] an arguable basis either in law or 

in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th 

Cir. 2009). Complaints lack an arguable basis in law when “based on an indisputably meritless 

legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27; Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). To 

state a viable claim, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face” with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Courts apply a relaxed standard to pro se parties 

and liberally construe any pro se pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

Nevertheless, even pro se plaintiffs must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555. 

B. Opportunity to Amend Standard 

“Generally, a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim 

without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.” Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th 

Cir. 1998) (per curiam). But if the Court finds a plaintiff has alleged his or her best case, the Court 

may foreclose the opportunity to amend by dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Jones v. 

Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054). Likewise, an 

opportunity to amend is “unnecessary in cases where the facts alleged are ‘fantastic or delusional 

scenarios’ or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is ‘indisputably meritless.’” Eason v. 

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 3 of 7 PageID 237
4

Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 8-9 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). Therefore, the 

court does not err in dismissing a complaint with prejudice, such that the plaintiff has no 

opportunity to amend, if the complaint’s sole legal basis is “indisputably meritless” or its factual 

constitution is “fantastic or delusional.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Hollis does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. 

As noted above, the Second Amended Complaint contains fanciful allegations and does 

not articulate a coherent legal claim for which the Court could offer redress. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B). Because he appears pro se, Hollis’s pleadings are entitled to more lenient scrutiny 

than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (citation omitted). But no amount of 

liberal construction could manufacture a legally cognizable claim from the Second Amended 

Complaint, which lacks an arguable basis in law because its claims are “clearly baseless, a category 

encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 

U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). 

There is no reading of the largely incoherent Second Amended Complaint that would result 

in a cause of action that Hollis could bring against the County in this lawsuit. He alleges no facts 

that demonstrate a constitutional violation relating to the alleged deprivation of documents. 

Liberally construed, his claim that Tarrant County violated his right to a jury trial is at best a 

collateral attack on a state court judgment in an unknown state court proceeding. Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, this Court cannot entertain such an action that challenges a final state court 

action. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

Nor has Hollis made the allegations necessary to state a claim for deprivation of 

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 4 of 7 PageID 238
5

constitutional rights against Tarrant County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To do so, Hollis must allege 

that there was a custom, policy, or practice that was the moving force behind a constitutional 

violation. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cty., 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Establishing “[m]unicipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a 

policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is 

the policy or custom.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Despite filing 

three complaints in this case, Hollis has not made the showing necessary to hold Tarrant County 

liable for damages. 

Thus, Hollis’s claims are baseless and legally frivolous. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Brewster, 

587 F.3d at 767. Judge O’Connor should dismiss this case sua sponte for failure to state a claim 

on which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (stating courts should dismiss frivolous 

lawsuits, or lawsuits that fail to state a claim, “at any time” such a determination is made); Carroll 

v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding courts may dismiss actions for 

failure to state a claim sua sponte). 

B. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because Hollis’s allegations are 

delusional and based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory.

Courts ordinarily err in dismissing pro se complaints for failure to state a claim without 

first extending an opportunity to amend the pleadings. Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054. In this case, 

Hollis filed two amended complaints. ECF Nos. 9, 18. While Hollis genuinely may believe he has 

been wronged, he does not have a claim for which this Court may offer a remedy. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Though dismissals with prejudice may be harsh in some contexts, the opposite is 

true here. A dismissal of Hollis’s claim with prejudice, such that he cannot amend, is far less harsh, 

as it will close the door definitively on a case that will do nothing but waste his time and resources. 

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 5 of 7 PageID 239
6

Accordingly, Judge O’Connor should dismiss this action with prejudice because it is delusional

and predicated upon indisputably meritless legal theories despite ample opportunities in three 

complaints to state a valid claim for relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Judge O’Connor

DISMISS this action WITH PREJUDICE because Hollis does not state a claim for which relief 

can be granted despite reasonable opportunities to do so. Because Hollis fails to state a claim for 

which relief can be granted, Judge O’Connor also should DENY Hollis’s Motion for Injunction 

(ECF No. 40), Motion for Permanent Injunction (ECF No. 43), Motions for Default Judgment 

(ECF Nos. 11, 13, and 47), and Motion for Judgment (ECF No. 41). 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 6 of 7 PageID 240
7

SIGNED on December 19, 2022. 

____________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:22-cv-00459-O Document 52 Filed 12/19/22 Page 7 of 7 PageID 241