The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of 1 South Dakota, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-2842

_____________ Cheryl D. Christopher, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court from the * Western District of Missouri. Adam's Mark Hotels, a division of * HBE Corporation, * * Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: January 13, 1998 Filed: March 5, 1998

_____________ Befo re BOWMAN, MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and JONES, Distric t 1 Judge.

_____________ BOWMAN, Circuit Judge. Cheryl Christopher sued Adam's Mark Hotels seeking damages for employment discrim ination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12213 (1994 & Supp. I 1995), and for intentional and negligen t infliction of emotional distress under Missouri state law. Adam's Mark moved forThe Honorable Sarah W. Hays, United States Magistr ate Judge for the Western 2 District of Missouri.

-2- summary j udgment, and the District Court granted the motion. Christopher no w 2 appeals. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

I.

We must vie w the record in the light most favorable to Christopher, th e nonmoving party, and give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Miller v. National Cas. Co. , 61 F.3d 627, 628 (8th Cir. 1995). Christopher applied for a sales secretary position at Adam's Mark in Kansas City, Missouri on May 10, 1995. Sh e submitte d a resume and employment application indicating that she possessed a Master's Degree in Computer Science, that she was highly skilled and experienced in the use of WordPerfect (the word processing program utilized at Adam's Mark), and that she had taught WordPerfect at the college level. Christopher was interviewed the same day she applied but did not identify herself as an individual with a disability at the time. She was hired that day for the position.
Christoph er

reported for work the next day, May 11, 1995. Christopher too k part in Adam's Mark's orientation program, at which she was as ked to complete several fo rms. One was a Supplemental Information Form, which contained questions about medical condition and history. In response, Christopher wrote that she h ad experienced a bip olar breakdown and that she had been hospitalized for bipolar dysfunction. The supplem ental form was placed in Christopher's personnel file in accordance wit h company procedures.-3-

After orientation, Christopher reported to the sales department where she began on-the-job training with Lisa Lambertson, the sales secretary Christopher was t o replace. The training was to consist of Lambertson working side-by-side wit h Christopher. On th is first day in the sales office, Christopher admitted to Lambertson that she was not familiar with the WordPerfect function keys. When asked to execute
a merge and set up a banner using WordPerfect, Christopher indicated she did no t know ho w to perform these tasks. Christopher struggled with locating and openin g do cuments, saving documents, and closing documents. At one point durin g Christoph er's training, Ann Windsor, Christopher's immediate supervisor, pulled up a bla nk form for Christopher to work on. Christopher told Windsor that the form wa s difficult to use and that one of her first priorities would be to change the office system. Christophe r

admited in her depostition that she acted combatively during her brie f emp loyment

at Adam's Mark. Prior to her termination, however, no one tol d Christopher that she was having performance problems.

Just a f ew days after Christopher's employment began, Windsor recommended that Christopher be terminated. Sometime after Christopher's or ientation but before her te rmination, Windsor reviewed Christopher's personnel file. Based upon Windsor' s recommendation, Don Russell, Directo r of Human Resources, agreed that Christopher should be terminated. It was Russell's practice to review employees' files prior t o terminating them. On May 17, 1995, Russell terminated Christopher.

II.

We revie w de novo a decision to grant summary judgment. See Hase v

. Misso uri Div. of Employment Sec. , 972 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 508 U.S. 906 (1993). Sum mary judgment is appropriate when the movant establishes "that there are no material facts in [genuine] dispute and that, as a matter of law, th e movant is entitled to judgment." Oldham v. West , 47 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 1995). We proceed with cautio n when deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate in-4-

employment discrimi nation cases because intent is usually a central issue. See Gill v. Reorganize d Sch. Dist. R-6, Festus, Mo. , 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1994). Thi s caut ionary approach, however, "cannot and should not be construed to exempt" from summary judgment employment discrimination cases involving intent. Krenik v

. County of Le Sue ur , 47 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1995). If there is no genuine issu e about the employer's discriminatory intent, to the extent intent is material, the n summary judgment may be appropriate.
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating "against a quali fied individual wit h a disability because of [that] disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualifie d indi vidual with a disability is a person "with a disability who, with or withou t reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employmen t position." Id. § 12111(8).

To establish a claim of intentional discrimination under th e ADA, we employ the burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnel l Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973). See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc. , 85 F .3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1996). First, the plaintiff mu st establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plain tiff "must show that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; [that] she is qu alified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonabl e accommodation; and [that] she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability." Webb v. Mercy Hosp. , 102 F.3d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1996). After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
so me legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802. Then, i n order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the employer's stated rea son was in fact pretextual. See id. at 804. This requires proof that th e employer 's articulated reason for the adverse employment action was false and tha t discrimination was the real reason. Se e St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).-5-

Viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Christopher, and for purposes of this appeal, we do not quarrel with the District Court's conclusion that sh e estab lisheda prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. As to the firs t element , whether Christopher is "disabled," the parties argue whether her bipola r disor der meets the definition under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (definin g disability). We have in the past, however, assumed without deciding that bipola r disorder constitutes a disability sufficient to mak e out a prima facie case. See Birchem v. Knights of Colu mbus , 116 F.3d 310, 313-14 (8th Cir. 1997). As to the second and third elements, whether Christopher was qu alified to perform the essential functions of the job and whether Christopher suffered adverse employment action because of he r disabili ty, Christopher contends that she was qualified to perform the secretarial jo b and that Adam's Mark terminated her employment due to her bipolar disorder. Like the District Co urt, we will assume that Christopher has established the elements required to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.

Adam's Mark, however, is able to satisfy its burden in the next step of ou r inquiry by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Christopher' s termination. Adam's Mark asserts that Windsor believed that Christopher lacked the skills she represented on her resume; tha t Christopher was unable or unwilling to learn the duti es of her job; and that Christopher was combative, resentful, and resistan t tow ards her supervisors and co-workers. Adam's Mark thus has rebutted th e presumption of discrimination raised by Christopher's prima facie case.

The burden shifts back to Christopher to show that Adam's Mark's articulate d
reasons are a pretext for discrimination. As evidence of pretext, Christopher firs t alleges that Windsor admitted it normally takes three weeks to train a new secretary, but that Christopher had worked for less than one week when she was terminated. The record shows, however, that Windsor actually said it may take up to three weeks t o understand the company's terminology and routing proce dures, but that new secretaries are expected to be proficient in word pr ocessing skills when they start work. Windsor-6-

testified that she felt Christopher "had misrepresented her skill level to the point that [Christopher] was unable to do the job." Windsor Dep. at 62- 63. Christopher also had admitted that she was not familiar with the basic word processing function keys, and Lamber tson had observed Christopher's difficulties opening, saving, and closin g documents.
Christopher next alleges that prev ious sales secretaries began the same job with less experience than she had, and Adam's Mark therefore afforded them more training. She contends she should have been offered additional training, notwithstanding he r experience. The evidence shows, however, that Christopher r eceived the same training
as did t he previous secretaries--the secretary whom Christopher was to replace , Lambertson, sat at Christopher's side and gave her computer instruction. This wa s exactly how Lambertson had been trained. Moreover, Lambertson testified that sh e t o ld Christopher that WordPerfect tutorials and computer manuals were available for her use and that she reminded Christopher there was a template above the function keys explaining their usage.

Christo pher

next contends that Adam's Mark had worked with and give n additional time to other secretaries with performance p roblems in an attempt to salvage th eir employment. Russell did acknowledge that Adam's Mark had worked with one secretary in the sales department who had exhibited performance problems. Russel l went on to testify, however, that the secre tary's performance problem was more one of routing paper

work than a deficiency in technical word processing skills. Russell also added that, unlike Christop her, the secretary showed a commitment to learn, improve, develop, and progress.
Finally , as evidence of pretext Christopher points to the fact that Windso r examined Christopher's personnel f ile within the first few days of her employment and th atthe disclosure of her disability was contained therein. Apparently Windso r requested Christopher's file because she was questionin g Christopher's computer skills.-7-

Even if we assume arguendo that Windsor did become aware of Christ opher's disability when s he looked in the file, Christopher has failed to point to any evidence that he r termina tion was a result of Windsor's discovery. Mere knowledge of a disabilit y cannot be sufficient to show pretext; otherwise, summary judgment for an employe r
wo uld be appropriate only in cases where the employer is completely unaware of the plaint iff's disability. Because knowledge of the plaintiff's disability is an essentia l element of an

ADA employment discrimination claim of the sort brought here, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112, a plaintiff who could prove such knowledge would have ipso facto a submissible case o f pretext. This defies logic and cannot be what Congress intended.
Christopher argues that in granting summary ju dgment the District Court did not appl y the correct standard. We disagree. "[A] trial judge [is allowed] to decide on a motion for summary judgment th at the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination even though the plaintiff may have created a factual dispute as to the issue of pretext." Rothmeier v. Investment Advisors, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1328, 1335 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the District C ourt correctly applied the Rothmeier standard and determined that Christopher had failed to create a submissible case as to pretext. We agree with the District Court that Christopher's eviden ce is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discriminati on. We therefore affirm the order of the District Court granting summary judgment to Adam's Mark.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.