* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAMEISHA BEED; et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Public Entity; et al., Defendants - Appellees. No. 08-56137D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01236-GAFPLA

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 2, 2009 Pasadena, California Before: T.G. NELSON, BYBEE and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. Lameisha Beed and Deliah Reynolds brought this action raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law after they were arrested, detained, and strip searched by police officers employed by the City and County of Los Angeles. Beed and Reynolds appeal the district court’s grant of partial judgment on the 

# FILED

NOV 16 2009 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALSpleadings to the County, grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the City, and denial of their motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) after the jury’s ve rdict. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. The district court properly granted partial judgment as a matter of law to the County of Los Angeles and partial summary judgment to the City of Los Angeles on Beed’s state law claim of fals e imprisonment. Neither Beed’s allegations/proposed allegations, viewedas true, nor the evidence on summary judgment, viewed in the light most favorab le to Beed, raise a question of fact as to whether the County’s or City’s employ ees acted unreasonably or with malice in continuing to detain Beed. See Lopez v. City of Oxnard , 254 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560- 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law on Reynolds’ claim for unlawful arrest because the undisputed objective facts establish that probable cause existed for Reynolds’ arrest. See John v. City of El Monte , 515 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Probable cau se is an objective standard and the officer’s subjective intention in exercising his discretion to arrest is immaterial in judging whether his actions were reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.”). The district court properly denied Beed’s and Reynolds’ motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) after thejury’s verdict. Substantial evidence s upports the jury’s verdict that Beed was not unlawfully detained in violation of he r Fourth Amendment rights because, viewed in the light most favorable to the o fficer, the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that the officer’s acti ons were not objectively unreasonable. See Freeman v. City of Santa Ana , 68 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2005); Erdman v. Cochise County , 926 F.2d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 143-47 (1979). Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s verdict that the strip search of Reynolds did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights because, viewed in the li ght most favorable to the officer, the evidence presented at trial demonstrat es that the officer had reasonable individualized suspicion that Reynolds c ould have had drugs hidden on her person. See Act/Up!/Portland v. Bagley , 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993). We have considered and reject all other claims raised on appeal. AFFIRMED.