UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v.

DANIEL BARRON JR. d/b/a ALLAROUND HVAC SERVICES, 

Defendant. 

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Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1682-X

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The United States sued Daniel Barron Jr., d/b/a All Around HVAC Services, 

for failing to properly pay its employees’ wages due under the Fair Labor Standards 

Act. Barron never answered the complaint, and the clerk entered a default. Having 

already obtained the clerk’s default on liability, the United States now seeks a default 

judgment against Baron that includes a damages award [Doc. 15]. For the reasons 

below, the Court GRANTS the motion for default judgment. 

I. Background

The U.S. Department of Labor investigated and determined Barron failed to 

properly pay employees the wages due under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the 

“Act”). Barron signed a Form WH-56, agreeing to pay employees the wages due. But 

Barron failed to pay $3,909.89 of the wages due. The United States then sued for 

that amount as liquidated damages and seeks interest, non-payment penalties, and 

administrative costs (totaling $6,145.28 as of May 12, 2022). 

After the United States filed this suit, it served Barron with the complaint and 

summons. Barron neither appeared nor answered. The United States then obtained 

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a clerk’s default. And then it moved for a default judgment to assess damages. Baron 

never responded to this motion.

II. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides that, in proceedings not 

involving a certain sum:

the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A default 

judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if 

represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary 

who has appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is 

sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its 

representative must be served with written notice of the application at 

least 7 days before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings or 

make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial—

when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:

(A) conduct an accounting;

(B) determine the amount of damages;

(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or

(D) investigate any other matter.

A default requires a court to accept as true a plaintiff’s well pled allegations in a 

complaint.1 

In determining whether to enter a default judgment, courts conduct a two-part 

analysis. First, courts examine whether a default judgment is appropriate under the 

circumstances.2 Relevant factors (called the Lindsey factors) include: (1) whether 

1 See, e.g., Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 499 (5th Cir. 2015) (a 

complaint is well pled when “all elements of [a] cause of action are present by implication”); In re 

Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It is universally understood that a default operates as a 

deemed admission of liability.”).

2 Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).

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disputes of material fact exist; (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice; 

(3) whether grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether the default was 

caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect; (5) the harshness of a default 

judgment; and (6) whether the court would be obliged to grant a motion from the 

defendant to set the default judgment aside.3 Second, the Court assesses the merits 

of the plaintiff’s claims and whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings.4

III. Application

The Court deems the facts on liability to be admitted and finds Barron not to 

be incompetent or a minor. While Rule 55 allows for hearings, it does not command 

them. Here, the United States served Barron a copy of the motion for default 

judgment, notifying him of his duty to respond. He has yet to respond. The United 

States’s motion is supported by an affidavit showing mathematical certainty for the 

damages requested. As a result, a ruling without a hearing is proper.

A. Procedural Appropriateness of Default Judgment

The Court now turns to the six Lindsey factors. First, there are no material 

facts in dispute because Barron did not file any responsive pleading. Second, 

regarding substantial prejudice, Barron’s failure to respond could bring adversarial 

proceedings to a halt and substantially prejudice the United States, but not itself. 

Third, Barron’s continual failure to respond or participate in this ligation clearly 

establishes grounds for the default. Fourth, regarding mistake or neglect, there is no 

3 Id.

4 Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). 

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reason to believe Barron is acting under a good faith mistake or excusable neglect. 

Fifth, regarding the harshness of a default judgment, the judgment would grant a 

remedy the Fair Labor Standards Act expressly allows—liquidated damages.5 Sixth, 

regarding whether the court would grant a motion to set aside the default, the 

pleadings, the lack of response, and, consequentially, the failure to plead a 

meritorious defense indicate a lack of good cause for the Court to set aside the default 

judgment. Thus, the Court concludes a default judgment is appropriate under these 

circumstances.

B. Sufficiency of the Complaint

Next, the Court must assess the merits of the United States’ claim considering

its complaint. Although Baron, by virtue of his default, is deemed to have admitted 

the United States’ well-pled allegations, the Court must nonetheless review the 

complaint to determine whether it established a viable claim for relief.6 Section 16(c) 

of the Act allows the government to supervise the settlement of unpaid back wage 

claims on behalf of employees and bring an action to recover these amounts as well 

as an equal amount of unpaid back wages as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). 

The complaint alleges that after an investigation the government determined that 

Baron owed unpaid back wages to his employees under the Act and negotiated a 

settlement for Barron’s employees in which Barron signed an agreement to pay two 

of its employees back wages totaling $3,909.89 by March 20, 2020. The complaint 

5 29 U.S.C § 216(b).

6 Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.

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also alleges that the terms of this agreement were that if Baron didn’t pay the 

employees as agreed, then the amount owed would be payable to the government. 

Thus, the United States has shown that Barron owed unpaid back wages of $3,909.89

under the Act they remain unpaid.

C. Statute of Limitations

When determining the amount of damages to award to the plaintiff in the final 

default judgment, the Court must decide whether to apply the statute of limitations 

applicable to Fair Labor Standards Act claims. Statute of limitations is ordinarily an 

affirmative defense the defendant must plead to avoid waiver.7 Nonetheless, a court 

is well within its authority to apply the statute of limitations when calculating 

damages in an Fair Labor Standards Act default judgment.8 However, the Fair Labor 

Standards Act’s statute of limitations is not jurisdictional.9 Because the statute of 

limitations does not implicate the Court’s ability to adjudicate matters outside the 

time period, and the defendants effectively waived the affirmative defense by 

choosing to not participate in this case, the Court will not sua sponte apply the 

limitations period here. Here’s why: if Barron cared to show up and defend this suit 

7 McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129 (1988).

8 See Bell v. Able Sec. & Investigations, 2011 WL 2550846, at * 2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2011) 

(Lindsay, J.) (entering default judgment in Fair Labor Standards Act action but limiting award of 

damages to three-year period for willful violation rather than awarding damages for entire period of 

employment).

9 Cf. Biziko v. Horne, 2020 WL 7022384, *2–3 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020) (determining that the 

“enterprise” element of the FLSA is not jurisdictional because it contains no jurisdictional language). 

The FLSA statute of limitations, contained in 19 U.S.C. § 255, similarly lacks jurisdictional language. 

And “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should 

treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Id. at 3 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 

U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the statute of limitations is not 

jurisdictional here.

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but did not raise the limitations defense, he would be on the hook for the entire 

amount in dispute. If instead he failed to show up but the Court raised the limitations 

defense at default, that incentivizes defendants to default and let the Court do their 

lawyering for them. The Court will therefore award damages for the entire time the 

government seeks employment.

D. Damages

At the time of the complaint, Barron owed $3,909.89 in unpaid back wages as 

shown in the agreement, to which was added 1) $169.25 in interest (representing 

interest of 2% that accrues at $0.22 per day); 2) $496.18 in non-payment penalty 

(representing a 6% penalty that accrues at $0.64 per day); and 3) additional 

administrative fees of $1,569.96—totaling $6,145.28 plus any interest and 

nonpayment penalties until the judgment, plus costs. The default judgment motion 

seeks this amount, plus an additional $3,909.89 as liquidated damages to the United 

States, plus any interest at $0.22 per day, and nonpayment penalties at $0.64 per day

until the judgment, plus costs and post-judgment interest.

Accordingly, the Court awards to the United States:

1. $3,909.89 in unpaid back wages;

2. $278.19 in interest ($233.53 in interest from May 9, 2022 to March 8, 

2023 and $44.66 of interest for the 203 days from March 9, 2023 to today

representing interest of 2% that accrues at $0.22 per day); 

3. $818.92 in non-payment penalty (representing a 6% penalty that 

accrues at $0.64 per day, which is $689.00 from May 9, 2022 to March 

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8, 2023 and $129.92 for the 203 days from March 9, 2023 to today); 

4. $3,909.89 in liquidated damages; and

5. additional administrative fees of $1,569.96.

The total monetary damage award to the United States is $10,486.85. The 

United States provided its own affidavit detailing these calculations. Taken as true, 

these allegations are sufficient to establish the amount of unpaid wages, liquidated 

damages, interest, penalty, and administrative fees. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion for 

default judgment against Barron. The Court awards the United States damages in 

the total amount of $10,486.85. By separate order, the Court will issue a final 

judgment. The Court further ORDERS the United States to file a motion to recover 

attorney’s fees within 14 days of the issuance of the final judgment if it seeks 

attorney’s fees. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of September, 2023. 

___________________________________ 

BRANTLEY STARR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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