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FILED

7/26/2022 4:53 PM

FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK CITS ESERVE DALLAS co.,TEXAs

JURY DEMAND DC-22-08651 Danitra BFOWn DEPUTY

CAUSE NO. BRITT JACKSON IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,

V. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY; GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; and 298th GATEWAY BUICK GMC, LLC

Defendants. JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION

Britt Jackson files his Original Petition complaining of General Motors, LLC; General Motors Company; General Motors Corporation; and Gateway Buick GMC, LLC (collectively as

“Defendants”) and in support thereof would respectfully show as follows:

I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief between $250,000.00 and $1,000,000.00, excluding

penalties, costs, expenses, and pre-judgment

interest. Plaintiff requeststhis case be governed

under Level Discovery Control Plan.

II. PARTIES

2. PlaintiffBritt Jackson (“Plaintiff or “Britt”)is an individual who resides in Dallas County,

Texas.

3. Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM LLC”)is foreign limited liability company

organized under the laws ofDelaware, with its principal place of business in Detroit, Michigan. It

can be served with process through its registered agent: Corporation Service Company d/b/a CSCPLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION PAGE 0F 11

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Lawyers Incorporating Service Company, 211 E. 7th Street. Suite 620. Austin. Texas 78701.

CITATION IS REQUESTED AT THIS TIME.

4. Defendant General Motors Company (“GM Company”)is foreign for-profit corporation

organized under the laws ofDelaware, With its principal place of business in Detroit, Michigan. It

can be served with process through its registered agent: Corporation System, 350 N. St. Paul

Street. Ste 2900. Dallas. Texas. 75201. CITATION IS REQUESTED AT THIS TIME.

5. Defendant General Motors Corporation (“GM Corp”)is foreign for-profit corporation

organized under the laws ofDelaware, with its principal place of business in Detroit, Michigan. It

can be served with process through its registered agent: Corporation System, 350 N. St. Paul

Street. Ste 2900, Dallas. Texas, 75201. CITATION IS REQUESTED AT THIS TIME.

6. All General Motors defendants are collectively referred to as “General Motors”.

7. Defendant Gateway Buick GMC. LLC (the “Dealership”)is domestic limited liability

company. It can be served through tis registered agent: Brian L. Brown, 4300 S. Georgia, Amarillo,

Texas 79110. CITATION IS REQUESTED AT THIS TIlVIE.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court maintains subject-matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy is in

excess of the minimum jurisdictionallimits of this Court. This Court maintains personal

jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants operate businesses in Texas and committed the

torts at issue in Texas. Venue is proper

in Dallas County, Texas, because Dallas County is the

County in which all or substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim arose. CIV. PRAC.

REM. CODE 15.002.

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IV. BACKGROUND FACTS

9. On August 29, 2020, Plaintiff was sitting behind the Wheel his 2017 GMC Savanna when

the driver’s side roofrail airbag deployed without an algorithm enable. The vehicle was parked at

the time and was not involved in any type of collision. Britt previous purchased the vehicle from

Gateway Buick GMC. At the time of purchase the Dealership expressly represented that the

vehicle was safe, free from defect, and properly manufactured. This expressfactual representation

was incorrect as the van was defective, unsafe, and improperly manufactured. Britt relied on the

representation in purchasing the van and would not have purchased the van had the Dealership told

him the truth about the vehicle.

10. The injury was caused by one or more negligent acts and/or omissions on the part of the

Defendants. The negligent acts were the proximate cause of Plaintiff serious and debilitating

personal injuries. The collision and all damages and injuries resulting from the collision were not

caused nor contributed to by Plaintiffor an innocent third party; but were caused solely by the acts,

wrongs, and/or omissions of the Defendants, which said acts, wrongs, and/or omissions were the

proximate cause of the injuries and damages Plaintiffs sustained.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION

Strict Products Liability

11. Plaintiffincorporate the facts and allegations explained above as iffully set forth herein.

12. General Motors is engaged in the business of assembling, testing, instructing, selling,

distributing, and/or supplying motor vehicles to the public, including the subject vehicle in this

lawsuit.

l3. The Dealership is in the business of selling, distributing, and/or supplying motor vehicles

to the public, including the subject vehicle in this lawsuit.

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14. General Motors and the Dealership placed this vehicle in the stream on commerce Without

properly inspecting the vehicle for dangerous conditions and knew that the ultimate users were not

capable ofinspecting the vehicle for dangerous conditions on their own.

15. The subject vehicle was defective and unreasonable dangerous to the ultimate users when

sold and distributed in the following ways:

a. It failed to operate, as an ordinary consumer would expect;

b. It was designed, manufactured, sold, and/or supplied in an unsafe, unreasonably

dangerous and defective condition that airbag deployed without any algorithm

enabled.

c. It was designed, manufactured, sold, and/or supplied in an unsafe, unreasonably

dangerous and defective condition that airbag deployed without out any contact to

the vehicle.

16. At the time of the subject incident, the subject vehicle was in substantially the same

condition as when it was sold and distributed by Defendants.

17. The Dealership expressly represented that the vehicle was safe, free from defect, and

properly manufactured. This express factual representation was incorrect as the van was defective,

unsafe, and improperly manufactured. Britt relied on the representation in purchasing the van and

would not have purchased the van had the Dealership told him the truth about the vehicle.

18. The subject vehicle was unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable end users, including

Plaintiff.

19. As direct and proximate cause ofthe foregoing conduct ofDefendants, Plaintiff sustained

serious bodily injury. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICESACT

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20. Plaintiff incorporate the facts and allegations explained above as iffully set forth herein.

21. Plaintiff is “consumer” under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”)

because he bought or acquired goods or services.

22. Defendants can be sued under the DTPA

23. Defendants committed one or more ofthe following wrongful acts:

a. Representing that goods or services are of particular standard, quality, or grade or

that goods are of particular style or model, ifthey are not; and

b. Breach ofimplied and express warranties described below

24. Plaintiffrelied on these false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practicesto his detriment.

25. Defendants committed these violations knowingly and intentionally.

26. Defendants’ actions were producing cause of Plaintiffs injuries. BREACH 0F EXPRESS WARRANTY

27. Plaintiff incorporate the facts and allegations explained above as iffully set forth herein.

28. General Motors is the designer, manufacturer, assembler, distributor and/or seller of the

subject vehicle.

29. The Dealership is seller of the subject vehicle.

30. Defendants sold the subject vehicle to Plaintiff.

31. Defendants expressly warranted that its product was safe for ordinary use.

32. Defendants’ affirmations regarding the safety of its productformed basis of the bargain

for Plaintiff, without which the Plaintiffwould not have purchased Defendants’ product.

33. The product did not conform to the Defendants’ affirmations regarding the safety of its

product.

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34. As direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of express warranties, Plaintiff

sustained the injuries and losses described herein.

BREACH 0F IMPLIED WARRANTY 0F MERCHANTABILITY

35. Plaintiff incorporates the facts and allegations explained above as iffully set forth herein.

36. Defendants are the designer, manufacturer, assembler, distributor, and/or seller of the

subject vehicle. Defendants sold the subject vehicle to Plaintiff.

37. Defendants impliedly warranted that its product was merchantable, fit for the ordinary

purpose for which it was sold or used, was of fair average quality so as to pass without objection

in the trade, and conformed to Defendants’ own affirmations regarding the vehicle’s safety features

and overall safe condition.

38. Defendants breached its implied warranty of merchantability, as the product did not

conform to the Defendant’s affirmations regarding the safety features and overall safe condition

of the product, the product was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was sold or used, and

was not of fair average quality so as to pass without objection in the trade.

39. As direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of the implied warranty of

merchantability, Plaintiff sustained the injuries and losses described herein.

BREACH 0F IMPLIED WARRANTY 0F FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE

40. Plaintiff incorporatesthe facts and allegations explained above as iffully set forth herein.

41. Defendants are the designer, manufacturer, assembler, distributor, and/or seller of the

phone. Defendant sold the subject vehicle to Plaintiff.

42. In selling its productto Plaintiff, Defendants, through its agents, servants, employees, and

apparent agents acting Within the scope of their employment, authority, or apparent authority, made representations and promotions concerning the particular purpose to which Plaintiff would

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION PAGE 0F 11

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put

the productto use and knew or should have known of the pafiicular purpose to which Plaintiff

would putthe productto use. Defendants impliedly warranted that the product would be fit for

such particular purpose.

43. As direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of the implied warranty of fitness

for particular purpose, Plaintiff sustained the injuries and losses described herein. NEGLIGENCE

44. Plaintiffs incorporates the facts and allegations explained above as iffully set forth herein.

45. Defendants were negligent

in developing, designing, manufacturing, testing, selling and/or

marketing the subject vehicle.

46. At all times material hereto, the vehicle was in use by Plaintifffor the foreseeable intended

purpose for which it was developed, designed, manufactured, tested, sold, and/or marketed.

Plaintiffwas foreseeable intended user of the vehicle.

47. Defendants owed duty to Plaintiff to use reasonable care in developing, designing, manufacturing, testing, selling, and/or marketing product

free from defects in material or

workmanship that was safe and functional for consumer use and did not pose foreseeable risk of

harm to consumers. Defendants failed to exercise such reasonable care.

48. Defendants owed duty to Plaintiff to adequately warn of the dangersinherent in the use

of the productit developed, designed, manufactured, tested, sold and/or marketed. Defendants

failed to adequately warn consumers of the dangers inherent in its productthat is the subject of

this suit.

49. Plaintiffs damages are the direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ negligence, as

well as that of its agents, servants, employees, and apparent agents acting within and during the

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scope of their employment, authority, or apparent authority. Plaintiff’s damages are not due to

any act or failure on the part of the Plaintiff.

50. Defendants were negligent

in one or more of the following respects:

a. Failing to take appropriate steps to ensure the vehicle’s airbags would not

spontaneously deploy;

Failing to conduct an appropriate inspection of the vehicle; Marketing and selling the vehicle in an unsafe condition;

Failing to provide users of the vehicle with adequate instructions for its safe use;

Failing to provide users of the vehicle with adequate warning concerning its use;

Failing to thoroughly and adequately test the vehicle to ensure that the vehicle’s airbags would not spontaneously deploy;

Designing the phone in such way that it is not apparent

to the user that the vehicles’ airbags would spontaneously deploy;

Failing to discover defects in, and the dangerous condition of, the vehicle;

Failing to remedy the defects in, and the dangerous condition of, the vehicle;

Failing to discover defects in, and dangerous inadequacies of, the instructions and warnings provided with the vehicle;

Failing to properly test, evaluate, inspect, and assemble the vehicle;

Failing to properly design, manufacture, and advertise the vehicle to ensure that it was no unreasonably dangerous;

Failing to warn the public in general, and Plaintiff in particular, of the dangers presented by the use of Defendants’ product;

Failing to exercise due care and act with regard for the safety of those using its products; and

Such other and further acts and/or omissions as may be shown by the evidence at

the trial.

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51. Each of the above-listed acts and/or omissions, taken singularly or in combination, was

proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. The above and foregoing acts and

omissions of Defendants constitute negligence, which was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s

resulting injuries and damages. Nothing Plaintiffdid or failed to do caused or contributed to cause

the occurrence made the basis ofthis suit.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

52. General Motors is also negligent under the doctrine ofRes Ipsa Loquitur.

53. General Motors was under exclusive management and control of the subject vehicle in

question during manufacturing and assembly.

54. Plaintiff did not alter the subject vehicle’s airbag system in any way.

55. Had Defendant General Motors used ordinary care in the manufacturing and assembly of

the vehicle at issue, it would not have deployed its airbags spontaneously.

VI. DAMAGES

6. As result of the injuries sustained by Plaintiff as result of the collision that makes the

basis of this suit, Plaintiff hereby sues for the following items of damage:

a. Physical pain and suffering the past;

b. Physical pain and suffering that Plaintiffwill experience in the future;

c. Mental anguish suffered in the past;

d. Mental anguish Plaintiffwill experience in the future;

e. Medical expensesincurred in the past;

f. Medical expensesthe Plaintiffwill incur in the future;

g. Physical impairment suffered in the past;

h. Physical impairmentthe Plaintiffwill suffer in the future

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i. Property damage; and

j. Loss wages loss of earning capacity in the past and future.

7. By reason of the facts alleged in this petition, Plaintiff has been made to suffer and sustain

at the hands ofthe Defendants damages Within the jurisdictional requirements ofthis Court and in

such an amount as evidence may show proper at the time oftrial.

8. Plaintiff sues all Defendants jointly and severally.

VII. PREJUDGMENT AND POST JUDGMENT INTEREST

9. Plaintiff seeks prejudgment and post judgmentinterest as allowed by law.

VIII. COURT COSTS

60. Plaintiff sues to recover court costs as allowed by law.

IX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

61. Plaintiff demands jury trial and has tendered the appropriate fee.

X. INITIAL DISCLOSURES

62. Defendants must make Initial Disclosures pursuantto Rule 194.2.

XI. RULE 193.7 NOTICE

63. Plaintiff intends to use Defendants’ discovery responses as evidence at trial in accordance

with such right and privileges established by Texas Rule ofCivil Procedure 193.7.

XII. PRAYER

For these reasons, Plaintiffprays that Defendants be cited to appear and answer herein, and

that upon final hearing hereof, Plaintiff has judgment against Defendants for actual damages,

prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and costs. Plaintifffurther prays

for such other and further

relief, at law or in equity, general or specific, that Plaintiff may be justly entitled.

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Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Myles A. Lenz Ramez F. Shamieh

Louisiana State Bar No. 35558

Texas State Bar No. 24066683 New York State Bar No. 5280219 Myles A. Lenz Texas State Bar No. 24092685 myles(a)shamiehlaw.com

SHAMIEH LAW, PLLC

1111 West Mockingbird Lane, Suite 1160 Dallas, Texas 75247 214.389.7333 telephone 214.389.7335 facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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