IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JOHN D. WILLIAMS, §

#20431-045, §

PETITIONER, §

§

V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-01894-S-BK

§

WARDEN RIVERS, §

RESPONDENT. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, Petitioner John D. Williams’ pro se 

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was referred to the United States 

magistrate judge for case management, including the issuance of findings and a recommended 

disposition where appropriate. As detailed here, the petition should be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Williams pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Missouri to (1) Conspiracy to Manufacture and Distribute Methamphetamine, and (2) Aiding and 

Abetting the Creation of Substantial Risk of Harm to Human Life while Manufacturing 

Methamphetamine (“Aiding and Abetting offense”). Doc. 12 at 18. He was sentenced to 300 

months’ imprisonment, followed by a 10-year term of supervised release. Doc. 12 at 19. After 

his successful completion of a residential drug abuse treatment program (“RDAP”), the Bureau 

of Prisons (“BOP”) deemed Williams ineligible for the early release incentive. Doc. 4 at 1–2. 

This determination was based on the BOP’s categorization of his Aiding and Abetting offense as 

a violent crime under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(iii). Doc. 4 at 1–2.

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After exhausting his administrative remedies, Williams filed this petition for writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the BOP’s determination. Doc. 3 at 5; Doc. 

4. Respondent opposes § 2241 relief. Doc. 11. Williams has filed a reply. Doc. 13.

Upon review, the Court finds that (1) Williams has no protected liberty interest in the 

RDAP early release benefit, and (2) the BOP properly determined that he is ineligible for the 

early release incentive. Therefore, Williams’ petition lacks merit and should be denied. 

II. ANALYSIS

Because Williams contests the BOP’s determination that he is ineligible for the RDAP 

early release incentive under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), he appears to be raising a due process 

claim. To demonstrate a due process violation, Williams must show that “he had a ‘liberty 

interest’ that the prison action implicated or infringed.” Richardson v. Joslin, 501 F.3d 415, 418 

(5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976)). He cannot do so. 

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that neither the Due 

Process Clause nor any federal statute or regulation creates a liberty interest in receiving a 

sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B). Handley v. Chapman, 587 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 

2009) (“In granting eligibility for early release, the BOP has broad discretion that precludes the 

possibility of a liberty interest in early release under § 3621.”); Richardson, 501 F.3d at 420

(same). “Without a liberty interest, there is no procedural due process claim.” Handley, 587 

F.3d at 281. Williams’ due process claim therefore fails.

Williams also argues that the BOP erred in classifying his Aiding and Abetting offense as 

a violent crime, due to its resemblance to a recently repealed statute—the residual clause of the 

Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—and the Supreme Court’s 

recent opinion in Borden v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). Doc. 4 at 2–3. 

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Williams’ argument lacks merit. The BOP’s definition of nonviolent offense, as outlined in its 

policy statement, does not hinge on the “crime of violence” definition in the ACCA but on the 

BOP’s broad discretion to define “nonviolent offense.” Thus, the definitions are not analogous.

1

 

See Gonzales v. Tombone, 1997 WL 803000, 132 F.3d 1455, at *2 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997)

(unpublished per curiam) (“[T]he definition of ‘crime of violence’ in the sentencing context is 

not binding in the context of interpreting the early release statute.” (citing Venegas v. Henman, 

126 F.3d 760, 763-65 (5th Cir. 1997))). Likewise, Borden, and its predecessor Johnson v. United

States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015), are inapposite.

Further, the BOP has significant discretion to determine eligibility for the RDAP and 

early release incentives. See Lopez v Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 238-41 (2001) (the BOP “has the 

authority, but not the duty,” to reduce a term of imprisonment upon the successful completion of 

the RDAP and § 3621(e)(2)(B) “categorically denies early release eligibility to inmates 

convicted of violent offenses”). The BOP’s decision to deny Williams’ early release benefit was 

based on the classification of his Aiding and Abetting offense as one of the “Criminal Offenses 

That are Crimes of Violence in All Cases” in the BOP’s program statement. Doc. 12 at 40, 44. 

This categorization is a permissible interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) and aligns with 

the statute’s purpose—to reduce recidivism and uphold the punitive and deterrent effects of 

harsh sentencing for violent offenders. See Venegas, 126 F.3d at 763 (holding Congress vested 

1 Compare 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(iii) (“As an exercise of the Director’s discretion, the 

following categories of inmates are not eligible for early release: Inmates who have a current 

felony conviction for . . . [a]n offense that, by its nature or conduct, presents a serious potential 

risk of physical force against the person or property of another[.]”), with 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“The term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a 

term exceeding one-year ... that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another[.]”).

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considerable discretion in the BOP to determine what offenses constitute a violent offense as 

long as it is based on a “permissible construction of the statute” (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 

U.S. 50, 61 (1995))). 

Finally, as previously noted, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated here. Denying the 

early incentive benefit to Williams only results in him “serv[ing] the remainder of his sentence 

under typical circumstances rather than imposing a punishment qualitatively different from the 

punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a crime.” Flowers v. Brown, 

NO. 1:17-CV-460, 2021 WL 1143783, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2021) (citing Handley, 587 F.3d 

at 281), R. & R. adopted, 2021 WL 1134272 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2021). 

III. CONCLUSION

Williams’ habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should be DENIED, and this 

case should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

SO RECOMMENDED on September 15, 2023.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific 

written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific 

written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 

1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file 

objections to 14 days).

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