MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2017 ME	201

Docket: Cum-17-150

Submitted

On	Briefs: September	27,	2017

Decided: October	5,	2017

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J., and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and HUMPHREY,	JJ.

IN	RE	NOAH	B.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 The	 mother of	Noah	 B. appeals from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	

Court	 (Portland,	Eggert,	J.)	 terminating	her parental	rights	 to	Noah pursuant	

to	 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and	 (B)(2)(a),	 (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).

1 She

challenges the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 judgment and	 the	

court’s	 discretionary	 determination	 of	the	 child’s	 best	interest.	 	Because	 the	

evidence	 supports	 the	 court’s	 findings	 and discretionary	 determination,	 we	

affirm	the	judgment.

[¶2]	 Based on	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record,	 the	 court	 found,	 by	

clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 that	 the	 mother	 is unwilling	 or unable	 to	

protect	 the	 child	 from	 jeopardy	 and	 these	 circumstances	 are unlikely	 to	

change	within	a	time	that is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	his needs and that

 1		The	child’s	father	consented to	the	termination	of	his	parental	rights	on	March	6,	2017,	and	is	

not	a	party	to	this	appeal.		
2

she	 is	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 child	 within	 a	 time	

reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 his	 needs.	 See 22	 M.R.S.	

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In	re	Cameron	B.,	2017	ME	18,	¶	10,	154	A.3d	1199.	

The	court also	found	that termination	of	the	mother’s	parental rights	is	in	the	

child’s	best	interest. See 22 M.R.S.	§ 4055	(1)(B)(2)(a); In	re	Cameron	B.,	2017	

ME	18,	¶	10,	154	A.3d	1199. The	court	based	its findings of	parental	unfitness	

and	its	determination	of	the	child’s	best	interest on the	 following	findings	of	

fact:

[The	mother]	has	previously	had	her	parental	rights	to	four	

children	terminated . .	.	.	

In	this	case,	on	February	3,	2016,	[the	child]	was	.	.	.	found	to	

have	petechial	bruising	on	the	right	side	of	his	face .	.	.	.

When	 asked	 about	 the	 injuries,	 [the	 mother] first	 blamed	

the	father	for	inflicting	them. Once	confronted	with	evidence	that	

the	father	was	not	available	to	inflict	the	injuries	at	the	time	they	

were	 inflicted,	 she	 admitted	 that	 she	 had	 been	 the one	 who	

inflicted	them. As	a	result	of	the	injuries,	a	Preliminary	Protection	

Order	 was	 entered,	 and	 subsequently	 a	 Jeopardy	 Order	 was	

entered.	 A Rehabilitation	and	Reunification	plan	was	put	in	place,	

and	 [the	 mother]	 began	 to	 make	 good	 progress	 with	 that	 plan.	

Because	 of	 the	 progress	 [the	 mother]	 was	 allowed	 weekly	

unsupervised	visits	with	[the	child] . .	.	.	After	the	third	such	visit	

[the	child]	returned	to	his	foster	home	with	bruises	on	his	arm. .	.	.	

Again	[the	mother] was	asked	about	the	bruises	and denied

that she	 had	 inflicted	 them. .	 .	 .	[The	 child]	was	 in	 her	 care	 at	 a	

time	when	 the	injuries	were	most	likely	 to	 have	 occurred. [The	

child]	told	his	foster	mother	that his	mother	had	done	it . .	.	. The	
3

Court	 finds	 that	 [the	mother]	again	struck	 [the	child]	even	when	

she	was	progressing	on	her	rehabilitation	and	reunification	plan.	

.	.	.	.	

.	.	.	This	is	the	second	time	that	[the	child]	has	been	removed	

from	 [the	 mother’s]	 care	 and	 placed	 with	 foster	 parents.	 He	

should	 not	 have	 to	 go	 through	 this	 process	 again	 and	 needs	 to	

have	permanency	at	this	time.

.	 .	 .	He	is	 well	 bonded	 to	 the	members	 of	 his	 foster	 family	

and	needs	to	move	on	in	that	safe	and	stable	family	setting. .	.	.

[¶3]	 The court	 further	 found	that	the	child’s “physical	conditions”	and

“cognitive	challenges” make	him	incapable	of	“protecting	himself	from	harm.”	

The court found	that	the	mother’s “personality	disorder with	narcissistic	and	

borderline	traits and	a	history	of	antisocial	features,” characterized	by “rigid”

thinking, “low	tolerance	for	stress,” and	a “lower	ability	to	adapt	to	and	react	

to	 novel	 situations,” is	 “difficult	 to	 treat	 and	 may	 require	 extensive time	 to	

allow	 treatment	 to	 be	 effective.” Due	 to	 the	 mother’s	 condition, history	 of	

abuse,	 and	 the	 child’s high	 needs,	 the	 court	 found	 that	 it	 could	 not	 “allow	

placement	 with	 [the	 mother],	 or	 even	 to	 move	 again	 to	 unsupervised	 visits	

given	the	risk	that	[the	child]	would	again	have	an	injury	inflicted	upon	him.”

The	 court	 stated	 that	 it	 “does	 not	 know	 when	 [the	 mother]	 might	 .	 .	 .	 be	

considered	a	safe	placement” and	“there	is	no	guarantee	that	.	.	.	therapy	will	

remediate	 [the	mother’s]	problem,	and	it	may	 take	a	long	 time,	measured	in	
4

years,	 to	 find	 out	if	 [therapy]	 has	worked.”	 Noting that	 “[t]ime	is	measured	

from	[the	child’s] perspective,” the	court	 found	that	the	mother—despite	her	

effort	 and	 progress—remains incapable	 of	 providing adequate	 care for	 the	

child in	 a	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 his	 needs.	 	 See 22	 M.R.S.	

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii);	 In	 re	 Alexander	 D.,	 1998	 ME	 207,	 ¶	 18,	 716	 A.2d	

222.

[¶4]		Given	these	findings and	the	court’s	other specific	findings	of	fact,	

all	of	which	are	supported	by	competent	evidence	in	the	record, the	court	did	

not	err	in	its	determination	of	unfitness	nor	did	it	err	or	abuse	its	discretion	in	

determining	 that	 termination	 of	 the	 mother’s parental	 rights,	 with	 a	

permanency	 plan	 of	 adoption, is	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest.2 See	 In	 re	

Thomas H.,	2005	ME	123,	¶¶	16-17,	889	A.2d	297.

 2 The	mother also argues	that	the	court	erred because	it considered the time	the	child	spent	in	

foster	care in a previous	child	protection	proceeding when	making	its	best	interest	determination.

The	mother	appears	to	argue	that	the court	could	only	consider	the	child’s	time	in	foster	care	from

the	 current	 proceeding	 when	 determining	 the	 child’s	 best	interest.	 In	 fact,	 far	 from	 constituting	

error,	 the applicable	 statute	 requires the	 court	 to	 consider	 such	 periods	 of	 separation when	

determining	if	 terminating	 parental	 rights	is	in	 the	 child’s	 best	interest. See 22	M.R.S.	 §	 4055(2)	

(2016) (“In	deciding	 to	 terminate	parental	rights, the	court	shall	consider	 the	best	interest	of	 the	

child	.	.	.	including	.	.	.	periods	of	attachment and	separation . .	.	.”); see	also	In	re	Jacob	B.,	2008	ME	

168,	¶	 14,	959	A.2d	 734 (“In	 determining	whether	 termination	 of	 parental	 rights	is	in	 the	 child’s	

best	 interest,	 a	 court	 must	 consider	 many	 factors,	 including	 .	 .	 .	 periods	 of	 attachment	 and	

separation . .	 .	 .”).	 	The	 court,	 therefore, did	 not	err	by	 considering	the	 child’s	time in	 foster	 care	

from	the	previous proceeding—a period	of	separation	 from	his	mother brought	about	by	her	past	

physical	 abuse—when it	 determined	 that terminating	 the	 mother’s	 parental	 rights,	 with	 a	

permanency	plan	of	adoption,	was in	the	child’s	best	interest.	 See	In	re	Jacob B.,	2008	ME	168,	¶¶	

12-14,	959	A.2d	734.
5

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Zack M.	Paakkonen,	Esq.,	Portland	Legal	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellant	mother

Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	

the	Attorney	General,	Augusta, for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Portland	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2016-17

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY