[Cite as In re T.S. , 2021-Ohio-2171.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY

In the Matter of: : Case Nos. 21CA1130 21CA1131 T.S., Jr. : 21CA1132 C.H. 21CA1134 D.H. : DECISION AND Dependent Children. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

_______________________________________________________________ _______ APPEARANCES: Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant M.H. Christina M. Strasel, Kroener Hale Law Firm, Batavia, Ohio, for appellant T.S., Sr. C. David Kelley, Adams County Prosecutor, and Anthony J. Hurst, Assistant Adams County Prosecutor, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.

_______________________________________________________________ _______ Hess, J. {¶1} M.H. appeals from judgments of the Adams County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division entered in three cases granting perman ent custody of her sons, T.S., Jr., C.H., and D.H. to Adams County Children’s Services ( “ACCS”). T.S., Sr. appeals from the permanent custody judgment with respect to his son, T.S., Jr. We sua sponte consolidated the appeals for purposes of decision. {¶2} The trial court properly granted permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), which required a determination by clear and convincing evidence that the children had been in the temporary custody of ACCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that it is in the best intere st of the children to grant ACCS permanent custody. There is no dispute that the children were in the temporary custody of ACCS for the requisite amount of time. M.H. and T.S ., Sr. challenge whetherAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 2

the best interest requirement was satisfied, but ACCS presented competent and credible evidence upon which the trial court reasonably could h ave formed a firm belief that a grant of permanent custody to ACCS was in the best inter est of the children. T.S., Sr. also challenges the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) that T.S., Jr. could not be placed with M.H. within a reasonable time; however , that finding was unnecessary because R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) does not apply in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶3} On January 8, 2019, ACCS filed complaints in three cases allegi ng that T.S., Jr. (then age 9), D.H. (then age 11), and C.H. (then age 12) were dependent children. M.H. (“Mother”) is the mother of the children. The children have different fathers. The complaints alleged that the children had missed a substantial amount of

school due to homelessness and that Mother was incarcerated due to an outstanding warrant for contributing to the unruliness of a minor for not s ending the children to school. The complaints alleged the children did not have a gua rdian or custodian to care for them and requested a disposition of temporary custody to ACCS. ACCS also sought ex parte temporary custody orders, which the trial court granted and later continued after an emergency hearing. {¶4} Mother appeared for the adjudicatory hearing but none of the fa thers did. Mother admitted that the children were dependent, and a magistr ate adjudicated them as such, continued temporary custody with ACCS, and ordered ACC S to “create and implement an acceptable case plan with a goal of reunification. ” The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision. Mother and T.S., Sr. appeared for th e dispositional hearingAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 3

and consented to a disposition of temporary custody to ACCS. A magistrate ordered that disposition, and the trial court adopted that decision. F ollowing semi-annual review hearings in September 2019 and March 2020, the children remaine d in the temporary custody of ACCS. {¶5} In April 2020, ACCS moved for permanent custody pursuant to R.C

. 2151.413(A), R.C. 2151.413(B), 1 R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The permanent custody hearing took place on July 1, 2020, and J anuary 8, 2021. Makayla Miller, an ongoing case worker for ACCS, testified that in December 2018, ACCS received a report about the children. Due to homelessness issues, ACCS did not locate Mother until she was arrested on an outstanding warrant for contributing to the unruliness of a minor for failing to send the children to schoo l. At the time of her arrest, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines, amphetamines, and oxycodone. On January 8, 2019, ACCS filed dependency complaints and obtained temporary custody of the children, and on January 28, 2019, it implemented Mother ’s case plan. {¶6} Mother’s objectives were to complete parenting classes, complet e a mental health assessment, complete a drug and alcohol assessmen t and treatment, obtain and maintain stable income and housing, and visit the ch ildren. Miller testified that as of the first day of the permanent custody hearing, Moth er had not started parenting classes. She had completed a mental health assessmen t; no mental health treatment was recommended. Mother had completed a drug and alco hol assessment but not treatment. She had begun treatment at BrightView in May 2020 (her third

1 ACCS’s citation to R.C. 2151.413(B) appears to be a typographi cal error as that provision applies to orphaned children. ACCS may have intended to cite R.C. 2151.41 3(D)(1) as that section generally requires a public children services agency to move for permanen t custody when a child has been in the agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a conse cutive twenty-two-month period.Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 4

attempt at treatment since November 2019) and had an estimated completion date in September 2020. From January 2019 to February 2020, Mother had ten positive drug tests and one presumptive positive test from a time she claimed that she could not urinate. After that, she had eight negative tests. Mother cla imed she had been working at a fence company since August 2019, but ACCS’s attempt to ver ify the employment

was unsuccessful. Mother had moved five times since ACCS initi ated the cases and was living with her former boyfriend/claimed boss in an RV whic h was not suitable for

the children. She told Miller that she would be able to move in to a suitable rental property in a few days. Mother had attended only 23 of 56 sched uled visits with the children but talked to them on the phone weekly. {¶7} Miller testified that between th e first and last day of the per manent custody hearing, Mother completed parenting classes and consistently vi sited the children. The visits went “very well,” and the children were bonded with Moth er. Mother did not have any more positive drug tests but did not complete drug and alco hol treatment; BrightView extended her treatment because she missed several co unseling sessions. Mother still did not have stable housing. In August 2020 she mo ved in with some friends, and in October 2020, she returned to the RV that was n ot suitable for the children. On December 23, 2020, she applied to rent a trailer a nd requested help with the deposit and rent. ACCS pledged $1200. Because the trailer needed repairs, Mother did not move in before the last day of the permanent cus tody hearing, but the trailer was supposed to be ready that day. Miller had not seen the trailer and did not know how long Mother would need to prepare it for the children or if she could maintain

it without ACCS’s financial assistance. Miller testified that A CCS never receivedAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 5

verification of Mother’s employment with the fence company but did verify that since November 29, 2020, she had been working 24-40 hours a week at K roger on the third shift. Mother suggested her new boyfriend or sister could watc h the children while she worked. However, her boyfriend had felony convictions, prior s ubstance abuse issues, and was unfamiliar to the children, and her sister had an open children’s services case. {¶8} Miller testified that ACCS added T.S., Sr. to the case plan in May 2019, and his objectives were to complete parenting classes, complete a drug and alcohol assessment and treatment, obtain and maintain stable housing an d income, and visit the children. He was at the STAR Community Justice Center from August 19, 2019, to December 18, 2019. While at STAR, he completed parenting class es and participated in drug and alcohol treatment. However, he did not follow up wi th aftercare through probation after his release from STAR, and his probation was re voked. He was incarcerated on June 18, 2020, and his earliest possible releas e date was in May 2021. As a result, he did not have stable housing or income. T.S., S r. sent T.S., Jr. three

letters while at STAR and had three face-to-face visits with hi m between March and December 2019. They seemed to get along well, but Miller was n ot aware of any contact after the June 2020 incarceration. T.S., Sr. has two o ther children who are T.S., Jr.’s half-siblings. ACCS has permanent custody of them—one by permanent surrender and one through a permanent custody proceeding. Miller testifi ed that the fathers of C.H. and D.H. had no contact with ACCS or their sons during the pendency of the

cases. {¶9} In addition, Miller testified that when ACCS initially got temp orary custody, it placed the children in the same foster home. D.H. remained in that home, his fosterAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 6

parents were approved to adopt, and they were interested in ado pting him. In March 2019, ACCS moved C.H. to the Wilson Children’s Home due to beha vior issues. In June 2019, ACCS placed him in his current foster home, and his foster parents had been approved to adopt and were interested in adopting him. In October 2019, ACCS moved T.S., Jr. to a different foster home due to behavior issu es, and his foster parents had been approved to adopt and were considering adopting him. Miller testified that the children visit each other once a week at ACCS, and two of the c hildren have had visits outside of ACCS because their foster parents know each other. Miller testified that the children want to continue their relationship, and that no relat ives were interested in taking them. {¶10} Dawn Grooms, a foster care and adoption specialist with ACCS, t estified that each child had been placed in a suitable foster home with adoption approval and had a bond with his foster parents. She testified that the chil dren were bonded with each other and Mother; they loved Mother, worried about her, an d wanted her to “get her life together.” Grooms testified that if the children were adopted, they would be in separate homes and there would not be a legal requirement for c ontinued contact among them. {¶11} C. Nicholas Ring, the children’s guardian ad litem, recommended that the court deny the permanent custody motion. He testified that Mot her and the children loved each other, that the children were “very bonded with each other,” and that he was concerned a grant of permanent custody and adoptions would resu lt in them being separated and unable to contact each other. He believed the ch ildren could be reunified with Mother in a reasonable time.Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 7

{¶12} Mother testified on the last day of the permanent custody heari ng and indicated that she hoped to move that day. She was prepared to furnish her new home with assistance from others and pay a utility deposit. Mother admitted she had not had a valid driver’s license for over two years but had still been driving. She had paid a reinstatement fee and planned to get an SR-22 (a certificate of insurance) “today after court” so she could complete the other requirements to get her license back. Mother testified that her work super visor expressed a willingness to l et her change shifts to be with the children, and if that did not happen, she would have t o find a babysitter. Mother claimed that in the past, she falsely tested positive for metha mphetamines and amphetamines due to a prescription blood pressure medication, a nd she claimed to have had a prescription for oxycodone. Mother wanted more time to try to reunify with the children, and the parties stipulated that the children wish ed to be reunited with her. {¶13} T.S., Sr. testified that he was serving a sentence at the Londo n Correctional Institution. He testified that after his release from STAR, he made some effort to have contact with T.S., Jr. Their last in-person vis it was around the end of 2019. T.S., Sr. asked the court to keep the children together or let them stay in contact

with each other. {¶14} The trial court granted ACCS’s motion for permanent custody. C iting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), the court found the parents had abandoned th e children, and citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the court found the children had been i n the temporary custody of ACCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The court also found that it was in the children’s best interest to grant ACCS permanent custody and

stated:Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 8

In determining the best interest of the children, the Court has considered the factors enumerated in O.R.C. 2151.414(D) and (E) and specif ically the custodial placement of the children and the interaction and interrelationship of the children and the parents and the child ren and the foster caregivers of the children. Further, the Court has cons idered the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and fi nds that such placement cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the Agency. In addition, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(2), the court found that “ the children cannot and should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable amoun t of time.” II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶15} Mother presents one assignment of error in her appeals: “The tr ial court abused its discretion when it granted permanent custody of the children to [ACCS].” {¶16} T.S., Sr. presents two assignments of error: I. The trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing ev idence that the child T.S., Jr. could not be safely placed with either parent w ithin a reasonable amount of time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2). II. The trial court erred in finding that permanent custody is in the best interest of T.S., Jr. For ease of discussion, we will address the assignments of erro r out of order.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review {¶17} “A reviewing court will not rever se a trial court’s judgment in a permanent custody case unless it is against the manifest weight of the ev idence.” In re C.S. , 4th Dist. Pike No. 19CA899, 2019-Ohio-5109, ¶ 21. This court has e xplained “To determine whether a permanent custody decision is against t he manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable infe rences, consider the credibilit y of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving evidentiary confl icts, the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest mi scarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial orde red.” [ In reAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 9

T.J. , 4th Dist. Highland Nos. 15CA15 and 15CA16, 2016-Ohio-163,] ¶ 25, citing Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20. In reviewing evidence under this standard, w e defer to the trial court’s determinations of matters of credibility, whi ch are crucial in these cases, where demeanor and attitude are not reflected well by the written record. Eastley at ¶ 21; Davis v. Flickinger , 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). In a permanent custody case the dispositive issue on appeal is “whether the [juvenile] court’s findings * * * were supported b y clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.H. , 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 43; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “Clear and convinci ng evidence” is “that measure or degree of proof which is more tha n a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases and w hich will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conv iction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus; State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. Avon Lake , 149 Ohio St.3d 273, 2016-Ohio-5725, 74 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 14. “[I]f the children services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably c ould have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re R.M. , 2013-Ohio-3588, 997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).

Id. at ¶ 21-22. B. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) {¶18} The trial court indicated that ACCS was entitled to permanent c ustody under both R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), w hich state: (1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court det ermines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by c lear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the chi ld to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the mot ion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:

* * * (b) The child is abandoned.

* * *Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 10

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *. {¶19} Mother asserts she did not abandon the children, but she and T. S., Sr. do not dispute that the children were in the temporary custody of ACCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. So regardless of wheth er R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) applies, we must affirm the permanent custody award under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) unless the trial court’s best interest determ ination is against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶20} Mother challenges the best interest determination in her sole a ssignment of error in each of her appeals, and T.S., Sr. challenges it in his second assignment of

error. Mother asserts that there is evidence that she and the children have appropriate interactions, that the children love and worry about her, and t hat the children wish to live

with her. Mother also asserts that there is evidence the child ren have a close relationship with each other, that it is in their best interest to stay together, and that the only realistic way that can happen is if they are returned to h er. Mother admits she “got off to a slow start working her case plan” but asserts that she made “a drastic improvement” after the first day of the permanent custody heari ng. She asserts that by the final hearing date, she had tested negative for drugs for a lmost a year, was in treatment at BrightView, had stable employment, had completed p arenting classes, was regularly visiting the children, and was prepared to move into and furnish a home. Mother highlights the guardian ad litem’s opinion that reunific ation efforts should continue to keep the children together. T.S., Sr. asserts that T.S., Jr. “has a close and bonded relationship with his family, and in particular Mother a nd his siblings” and thatAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 11

based on the guardian ad litem’s testimony, it is in the best i nterest of T.S., Jr. for Mother to have additional time to reunify with the children to ensure ongoing sibling

contact. {¶21} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) governs the best interest determination and provides: In determining the best interest of a child * * * the court sha ll consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the c hild has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children service s agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-mon th period * * *; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement a nd whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of t his section apply in relation to the parents and child. No one factor has “greater weight or heightened significance.” In re C.F. , 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 57. “Instead, the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest det ermination.” In re Z.M. , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 18CA3856, 2019-Ohio-2564, ¶ 24. {¶22} In its judgment entries granting permanent custody, the trial c ourt indicated it had considered the statutory factors. The court d id not engage in a specific analysis of each factor, but the parties did not request findin gs of fact and conclusions of law. “Under these circumstances ‘we ordinarily presume that the trial court appliedAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 12

the law correctly and affirm if some evidence in the record sup ports the court’s judgment.’ ” In re M.R.J. , 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 18CA17, 2019-Ohio-2755, ¶ 35, quoting In re E.S. , 4th Dist. Pickaway Nos. 17CA16 & 17CA17, 2018-Ohio-1902, ¶ 30

. 1. Interactions and Interrelationships of the Children {¶23} There is no evidence that C.H. or D.H. have a bond with their f athers. There is some evidence T.S., Jr. has a bond with T.S., Sr. but there is no evidence of any contact between them after December 2019. There is evidenc e that the children are bonded with Mother and each other. However, there is also evidence each child has a bond with his foster parents and that their foster parent s are interested in adoption. If that occurs, it is possible the children would no t have continued contact

with each other. 2. Wishes of the Children {¶24} The children wish to be reunited with Mother. 3. Custodial History {¶25} Before ACCS instituted these actions, the children were in the custody of Mother. Since ACCS instituted these actions in January 2019, t he children have been in the temporary custody of ACCS. Therefore, at the time of th e permanent custody hearing, the children had been in the temporary custody of ACCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. 4. Legally Secure Permanent Placement {¶26} The Ohio Revised Code does not define the phrase “legally secur e permanent placement”; however, “this court and others have gene rally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment where a c hild’s needs will beAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 13

met.” In re M.B. , 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56. “A legall y secure permanent placement is more than a house with four walls. Rathe r, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in saf ety with one or more dependable adults who will prov ide for the child’s needs.” Id. {¶27} Competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to ACCS. During the first 17 months Mother had a case plan, she made little progress on it. She did make progress on her case plan during the next six months. However, by the end of the permanent custody hearing, which was two years after the children’s removal, she had not completed d rug and alcohol treatment, had verifiable employment for less than six weeks (w hich she drove to without a valid driver’s license), and had never obtained and m aintained stable housing. {¶28} The trial court could have determined that giving the children the permanency and stability they need, rather than continuing to h old them in custodial limbo while Mother attempts to achieve full compliance with her case plan, would better serve the best interest of the children. “[T]he permanent cust ody statutes do not contemplate leaving children in custodial limbo for an extended period of time while a parent attempts to establish that the parent can provide the ch ild with a legally secure permanent placement.” In re Z.M. , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 18CA3856, 2019-Ohio-2564, ¶ 34. “[K]eeping children in limbo is not in their best interests .” Id

. 5. Factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (E)(11) {¶29} R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) and (E)(11) are relevant in this case. R.C

. 2151.414(E)(10) applies when “[t]he parent has abandoned the ch ild.” R.C.Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 14

2151.011(C) provides that for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, “a child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days. ” R.C. 2151.011(C). There is evidence that this presumption of abandonment applies with r espect to the fathers of C.H. and D.H., who had no contact with their sons between Janua ry 2019 and January 2021, and with respect to T.S., Sr. due to his lack of contact with his son after December 2019. The presumption does not appear to apply with r espect to Mother. Although Miller testified that Mother did not consistently visi t the children between January 2019 and July 2020, Mille r did not testify to the amoun t of time between visits, and she testified that Mother talked to the children on the pho ne weekly. {¶30} R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applies when “[t]he parent has had parenta l rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child * * *, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child. ” There is evidence that T.S., Sr. had his parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to one of T.S., Jr.’s half-siblings and that T.S., Sr. cannot provide a legally secur e permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of T.S., Jr. 6. Totality of the Circumstances {¶31} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s best interest finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. AC CS presented competent and credible evidence upon which the trial court reas onably could haveAdams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 15

formed a firm belief that a grant of permanent custody to ACCS was in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the trial court properly gra nted ACCS permanent custody of the children under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), and we ov errule Mother’s sole assignment of error in her appeals and T.S., Sr.’s second assig nment of error. C. R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) {¶32} In his first assignment of error, T.S., Sr. contends the trial court erred when it found T.S., Jr. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time pursuant to “R.C. 2151.414(A)(2).” T.S., Sr. asserts that Moth er “made significant progress towards her case plan goals,” the guardian ad litem te stified the children could be reunified with her within a reasonable time, and reunificati on would “maintain T.S., Jr.’s close and bonded relationship with his parents and siblin gs.” {¶33} T.S., Sr.’s citation to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) appears to be a typ ographical error. R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) does not address the topic of place ment with the parents within a reasonable time. Moreover, the trial court cited R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) when it found that “the children cannot and should not be placed with t he parents within a reasonable amount of time.” {¶34} R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) states: With respect to a motion made pursuant to division (D)(2) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the court shall grant permanent custody of the child to the movant if the court determines in accordance w ith division (E) of this section that the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with e ither parent and determines in accordance with division (D) of this s ection that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. (Emphasis added.) {¶35} R.C. 2151.413(D)(2) states:Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 16

Except as provided in division (D)(3) of this section, if a court makes a determination pursuant to division (A)(2) of section 2151.419 of the Revised Code, the public children services agency * * * required to develop the permanency plan for the child under division (K) of section 2151.417 of the Revised Code shall file a motion in the court t hat made the determination r equesting permanent custody of the child. (Emphasis added.) {¶36} R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) sets forth circumstances in which a court “ shall make a determination that the agency is not required to make reasona ble efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, eliminate the c ontinued removal of the child from the child’s home, and return the child to the child’ s home.” {¶37} It was not necessary for the trial court to consider R.C. 2151. 414(B)(2) or make a determination whether the children could not be placed w ith a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents. Th e trial court did not make a determination under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) that reasonable effor ts were not required, ACCS did not file its motion for permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(D)(2), and ACCS did not request permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414( B)(2). Moreover, we have already determined that the trial court properly grante d permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). “It is well-established that und er the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive tw enty-two-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or sh ould not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.” In re N.S.N. , 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9, 2015-Ohio-2486, ¶ 52. Therefore, any erro r the trial court made in finding T.S., Jr. could not be placed with Mother withi n a reasonable time was

harmless.Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 17

{¶38} Even if such a finding had been required, T.S., Sr.’s argument does not consider that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), if a trial court de termines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more statutorily enumerated fac tors exist as to each of the child’s parents, it must find the child cannot be placed wi th either parent within a

reasonable time or should not b e placed with either parent. Th e factors include: (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s ho me and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts b y the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initia lly caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing t he child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall c onsider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, an d other social and rehabilitative services and ma terial resources that were ma de available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental c onduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.

* * * (10) The parent has abandoned the child. R.C. 2151.414(E). Although the trial court did not specificall y cite these provisions, it found that “the parents have failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed outside the ch ildren’s home and that the parents have abandoned the child[ren].” T.S., Sr.’s argume nt does not address these findings. {¶39} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule T.S., Sr.’s first assign ment of error. IV. CONCLUSION {¶40} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.Adams App. Nos. 21CA1130, 21CA1131, 21CA1132, and 21CA1134 18

JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENTS ARE AFFIRMED and that appella nts shall pay the costs. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court d irecting the Adams County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this jud gment into execution. Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pu rsuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________________ Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a fin al judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.