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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

DELAWARE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 

OF NEW YORK, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RETIREMENT VALUE, LLC, 

Defendant. 

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Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00275-L 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Delaware Life’s Response relies on immaterial “discrepancies” rather than any genuine 

issues of material fact regarding the death of the insured, Lilly Segal. As a matter of law, 

Delaware Life is obligated to pay the death benefits owed on the Segal Policies, and this Court 

should enter the declaratory judgment requested by Retirement Value. 

A. The Inzlicht-Sprei Declaration Negates Any Question Regarding Lilly Segal’s Death 

Retirement Value seeks judgment declaring that plaintiff Delaware Life must pay the 

death benefits on the Segal Policies owned by Retirement Value and insuring the life of Lilly 

Segal. In support, Retirement Value submitted a declaration from Ms. Segal’s treating physician, 

Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei, who personally identified Ms. Segal upon her death at her son’s home 

address—the same one disclosed in the Segal Policies. Inzlicht-Sprei Dec., App. 76-77. Dr. 

Inzlicht-Sprei also confirmed that the death certificate he signed for Ms. Segal reflected her legal 

name that had been changed to Sprinta Berger. Id., App. 79. The additional evidence submitted 

by Retirement Value supports and confirms Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei’s personal knowledge. Based upon 

those undisputed material facts, this Court should grant summary judgment and declare that the 

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decedent Sprinta Berger was Lilly Segal, the insured in the Segal Policies, and that Delaware 

Life must pay the death benefit under each of the Segal Policies to Retirement Value. 

B. “Discrepancies” Regarding Personal Identifying Information Create No Genuine 

Issue of Material Fact Regarding Lilly Segal’s Death 

Delaware Life does not dispute the eyewitness account of Lilly Segal’s treating physician 

or even attempt to cast doubt on her death or identity as Sprinta Berger. It instead argues it was 

justified in seeking declaratory relief based upon the evidence available when it filed this lawsuit 

and discusses five purported “discrepancies” regarding Ms. Segal’s birth date, social security 

number, date of death, and address. But none of those discrepancies is material to Delaware 

Life’s obligation to pay the death benefits here. “A fact issue is ‘material’ for purposes of 

summary judgment if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Levy Gardens 

Partners 2007, L.P. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 706 F.3d 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2013); 

Markel Ins. Co. v. S.T.C.G., Inc., 737 F.Supp.2d 626, 630 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“Facts are 

considered ‘material’ if they ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’”) 

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Those discrepancies, one of 

which Delaware Life resolves on its own, neither controvert the material fact that the insured 

under the Segal Policies is deceased nor would change that fact even if resolved. 

The discrepancies between the birth dates and social security numbers reflected in the 

Segal Policies on the one hand, and the verified complaint and final judgment for the name 

change and the death certificate on the other, are immaterial to establishing the insured’s death. 

Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei resolved any doubt that the insured is deceased. He confirmed that Sprinta 

Berger, as identified in the death certificate, was Lilly Segal, the mother of Herman Segal, who 

resided at 4115 Quentin Rd, Brooklyn, NY 11234. Inzlicht-Sprei Dec., App. 76-77, 79. That 

information is not disputed by Delaware Life and matches the insured’s other identifying 

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information provided in the Segal Policies: that Herman Segal was the original owner of the 

Segal Policies; that his “Relationship to Insured” was “son”; and that he resided at the same 

address that Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei confirmed was Herman Segal’s home—where Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei 

also pronounced Ms. Segal’s death. Espinoza Dec., App. 30, 64. Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei’s 

identification of Sprinta Berger/Lilly Segal thus confirms that she is the insured under the Segal 

Policies regardless of any remaining discrepancies. 

For those same reasons, the fact that the social security number used by Sprinta Berger 

appears to belong to an individual who is reportedly alive and residing in Florida in no way 

refutes Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei’s eyewitness account regarding Lilly Segal’s death. That social 

security number is irrelevant, and after accounting for all the other evidence, simply suggests that 

Lilly Segal used a number that was not hers when she changed her name to Sprinta Berger. 

Delaware Life also claims a discrepancy between the date of Ms. Segal’s death provided 

in telephonic notice to Delaware Life’s administrator and the date of death listed in Sprinta 

Berger’s death certificate. Yet Delaware Life admits that it required a death certificate for “Due 

Proof of the Insured’s Death.” Wilkosky Decl., ¶ 9. A telephonic notification thus is immaterial 

to either the death claim or the fact of death. Again, Dr. Inzlicht-Sprei confirmed that the death 

certificate issued for Sprinta Berger is also for Lilly Segal. 

Lastly, Delaware Life’s claim that the address listed in the verified complaint and final 

judgment for the name change and the death certificate has no known connection to either Lilly 

Segal or Sprinta Berger also is immaterial. This discrepancy falls in the same category as the 

social security number; it fails to refute eyewitness testimony that Lilly Segal died and her death 

certificate was issued in the name of Sprinta Berger. Delaware Life fails to demonstrate a 

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genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Lilly Segal’s death and its corresponding 

obligation to pay the death benefits owed on the Segal Policies. 

Accordingly, Retirement Value respectfully requests this Court to grant summary 

judgment and declare that: 

1. Lilly Segal, the named insured in the Segal Policies, is the same person as 

Sprinta Berger with the date of birth of March 26, 1926; 

2. Lilly Segal, the named insured in the Segal Policies, is the deceased 

individual identified in the Death Certificate attached to the Inzlicht-Sprei 

Declaration; 

3. Lilly Segal is deceased with a date of death of November 7, 2018 as set 

forth in the Death Certificate attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration 

provided by Eli Inzlicht-Sprei, M.D; and 

4. Delaware Life is obligated to pay Retirement Value the stated death 

benefits of the Segal Policies. 

Retirement Value also requests that the Court dismiss Delaware Life’s competing 

declaratory judgment claim, and requests such other and further relief to which it may show itself 

justly entitled. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

BROWN FOX PLLC 

By: /s/ Charlene C. Koonce

Charlene C. Koonce 

Texas Bar No. 11672850 

charlene@brownfoxlaw.com 

8111 Preston Road, Suite 300 

Dallas, TX 75225 

Tel. 214.327.5000 

Fax. 214.327.5001 

Attorneys for Defendant 

Retirement Value, LLC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1)(B), as amended, no certificate of service is necessary, 

because this document is being filed with the Court’s electronic-filing system. 

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