2 1

- 6076 Singh v. Garland BIA Christensen , IJ

A 20 8 374 248 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT


## SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ” ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON A NY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 1 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 2 Square, in the City of New York, on the 2 2 n d d a y of A u g u s t , two thousand 3 twen ty

- t hree

. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 JON O. NEWMAN, 7 DENNY CHIN, 8 MICHAEL H. PARK, 9 Circuit Judges. 10

_____________________________________ 11 12 SARABJIT SINGH , 13 Petitioner , 14 15

v. 21

- 6076 16 NAC 17 MERRICK B. GARLAND , UNITED 18 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19 Respondent

. 20

_____________________________________ 21 22 FOR PETITIONER : Deepti Vithal , Esq. , Richmond Hill , NY

. 232 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton , Acting Assistant Attorney 1 General ; Sabatino F. Leo , Assistant Director; 2 Corey L. Farrell , Trial Attorney, Office of 3 Immigration Litigation, United States 4 Department of Justice, Washington, D C. 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 6
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED , ADJUDGED , and 7

DECREED that the petitio n for review is DENIED

. 8

Petitioner Sarabjit Singh , a native and citizen of India , seeks review of a 9
January 26 , 202 1 decision of the BIA affirming a May 8 , 2018 decision of an 10
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of 11
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)

. In re Sarabjit 12
Singh , No. A 208 374 248 (B.I.A. Jan. 26 , 202 1 ), aff’g No. A 208 374 248 (Immig r . Ct. 13

N.Y. C. May 8 , 2018 ). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 14
and procedural history. 15
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the 16

BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales , 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005); X ue Hong Yang v. 17
U.S. Dep’t of Just

. , 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 18

review are well es tablished. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative 19
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 203 compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions , 891 F.3d 67, 76 1
(2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination “under the substantial 2
evidence standard”). 3
The IJ may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances , . . . base a 4
credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the 5
applicant or witness, . . . t he consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s 6
written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and 7
considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the 8
internal consistency of each such statement, the cons istency of such statements 9
with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such 10
statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 11
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant f actor.” 8 U.S.C. 12
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 13
the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact

- finder could 14
make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 15
167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao , 891 F.3d at 76. “Where the IJ’s adverse 16
credibility finding is based on specific examples of inconsistent statements or 17
contradictory evidence, a reviewing court will generally not be able to conclu de 184 that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.” Xiu Xia Lin , 534 1
F.3d at 166 ( cleaned up ). “ E ven where the agency relies on discrepancies or 2
lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the 3

claim, the c umulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential.” Hong 4

Fei Gao , 891 F.3d at 77 (quotation marks omitted). “A petitioner must do more 5
than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 6

he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact

- finder would be compelled to credit his 7
testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 8
omitted). 9
Singh claimed that members of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Akali Dal 10
Badal parties attacked him in February and April 2015 and threatened to kill him 11
if he did not leave the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar party (“Mann Party” or 12
“SADA”)

. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibilit y 13

determination. 14
The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s statements 15

in his affidavit and his hearing testimony , as well as his failure to corroborate his 16

medical treatment, the fact that he omitted discussion of his medical treatm ent in 17

his affidavit, the fact that his father omitted it in his letter, and the contradiction 185 between Singh’s testimony and a letter from a Mann Party official

. See 8 U.S.C. 1
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 2

First, Singh made inconsistent statements about his interaction with the 3
police after alleged attacks by rival party members in February 2015. H is 4
affidavit says that the “[p]olice inspector asked his constable to push me out of the 5
police station” and the “[p]olice inspector and constable were very rough and aloof 6

with me.” In contrast, he testified about three, not two officers and that he did 7

not know the ranks of the officers who threw him out of the station. He explained 8

that he did not know the ranks of the of ficers, but that they wore the uniforms of 9
regular policemen. Singh argues that this was not a discrepancy , and that the IJ 10
improperly relied on word usage. This explanation is plausible, but so too is the 11
IJ’s contrary conclusion

. We thus defer to the IJ’s choice between two permissible 12

views of the evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 F.3d 160, 167

- 68 (2d Cir. 2007) 13
(holding that we defer to the factfinder “[w]here there are two permissible views 14

of the evidence” even where a “ contrary in ference ” would be “more plausible or 15

more natural” (quotation marks omitted) ). 16

Moreover, other inconsistencies and omissions bolster the adverse 17
credibility determination. Singh testified that he went to the village doctor after 186 the first attack because he had scratches and internal injuries, and the doctor gave 1
him balm and medication; then, after the second attack, he again went to the 2
village doctor and received balms a nd medications. His affidavit , however, does 3
not mention treatment by a doctor at all, and his father’s letter says “[m]y wife 4

treated him with home remedies after . . . both harms.” The IJ reasonably relied 5
on these discrepancies. Although omissions ar e generally less probative than 6
inconsistencies, the affidavit identified injuries and other actions taken after the 7

attack , so it would have been natural to mention medical treatment obtained 8
between the attack and going to the police . A nd Singh’s father ’s letter not only 9
omitted treatment by a doctor but inconsistently stated that Singh’s mother treated 10

him. See Hong Fei Gao , 891 F.3d at 78

- 79 (holding that omissions are generally less 11
probative than direct inconsistencies but that the probative value o f omission s 12

turns on whether those “facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been 13
expected to disclose”). 14
Moreover, because Singh’s credibility was in question as to his alleged 15
medical treatment, the IJ reasonably relied on the absence of corroborating medical 16

documentation. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 17
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 187 appli cant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 1
question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales , 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Singh’s father’s 2
letter did not corroborate either the medial treatment or Singh’s explanation that 3

his father had tried to obtain medical evidence, but the doctor did not keep 4

records. 5
In addition, Singh testified that no one else in his family had problems with 6
the local administration or rival political groups; but he submitted a supporting 7

letter from a Mann Par ty official that states, “Due to his involvement in our party 8
activities [Singh] and his family had problems with local administration and other 9
political groups

. S o , [] Singh was forced to flee the country.” Singh argues that 10
the agency should not have relied on this letter because he submitted it to show 11
the treatment of Sikhs and Mann Party members, not to document his own claim. 12

In Amardeep Singh v. Garland , an IJ discredited the petitioner partially because a 13
letter from a Mann Party official omitte d the fact that the petitioner had visited the 14
party official. 6 F.4th 418, 429 (2d Cir. 2021). We found agency error because the 15
purpose of the letter “was to report on the brutal treatment that Sikhs and 16
members of SADA receive in India,” and the party official “was not in a position 17
to attest to the veracity of [the petitioner’s] account of his beatings, and did not 188 undertake to do so.” Id . But Amardeep Singh addressed a letter that did not 1
purport to document the petitioner’s personal claim; in cont rast, here

— while the 2
letter talks about the general mistreatment of party members

— the letter is specific 3
to Singh, discusses his father’s membership in the party, and states that Singh and 4
his family had problems with rival parties, thereby directly contra dicting Singh’s 5
testimony that he was the only member of his family to have problems with the 6
local administration and political groups. 7

In sum, in light of the various inconsistencies and omissions, the record does 8
not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s decision

. See Xiu Xia Lin , 534 9

F.3d at 165

- 66; Biao Yang , 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination 10
is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because all 11

three forms of relief were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. 12

Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156

- 57 (2d Cir. 2006). 13
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED

. All pending 14
motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED

. 15

FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe , 17 Clerk of Court 18