Filed 1/15/16 In re Mohammed A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re MOHAMMED A., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B263286

(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THERESA A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Super. Ct. No. DK04171)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Debra Losnick, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County 

Counsel, Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________________________
2

One-year-old Mohammed A. was removed from Theresa A.’s (mother) care after 

she threatened to commit suicide. Mohammed was subsequently declared a juvenile 

court dependent and placed in the custody of Ali M. (father). At the six-month review 

hearing, the trial court terminated jurisdiction and entered a family law order providing 

father physical and legal custody of Mohammed. No visits were ordered for mother. 

Mother appeals. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Petition

On March 11, 2014, the Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department) received a referral alleging that Mohammed was in police custody. Mother 

had thrown father out of the house and then threatened to kill herself. The police had 

detained Mohammed, and mother was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold.

The Department filed a petition alleging that mother “has mental and emotional 

problems including suicidal and homicidal ideation, which renders [her] unable to 

provide regular care of the child.” The Department later amended the petition to add an

allegation that mother “has an extensive criminal history including five felony and four 

misdemeanor convictions” for vandalism, burglary, grand theft and solicitation for 

murder, among other crimes. “Such extensive criminal history . . . endangers the child’s 

physical health and safety and places [him] at risk of physical harm, damage, [and] 

danger.” At the detention hearing on March 18, 2014, the court released Mohammed to 

father and ordered monitored visits for mother.

2. The Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

After several continuances, the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was held 

on September 15, 2014. The court sustained the petition’s allegations against mother and 

ordered family reunification services for her and maintenance services for father.

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Mother was also ordered to participate in counseling and allowed monitored visitation.

2

 

1

“[F]amily reunification services are activities designed to provide time-limited 

foster care services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse, or exploitation, when the child 

cannot safely remain at home, and needs temporary foster care, while services are 
3

3. The Welfare and Institutions Code Section 388 Petitions

In December 2014, the Department reported that social workers had “witnessed 

several emotional outbursts from [mother] . . . .” Father had failed to make Mohammed 

available for two visits and arrived late to a third, and on each occasion mother “was 

extremely angry,” “ma[de] incessant telephone calls to the [social workers] . . . [and] 

engaged in angry yelling . . . .” The directors of a program where mother attended 

parenting classes also reported that mother was “confrontational, inappropriate and 

illogical.”

In January 2015, the Department filed a section 388 petition3asking the court to 

terminate mother’s visitation on the ground that mother “ha[d] consistently demonstrated 

unsafe behavior during monitored visits.” The petition alleged that mother had

repeatedly ignored traffic signals while carrying Mohammed across the street and had

“yell[ed], argu[ed], and harangu[ed] [during many] visits in front of [Mohammed].” The 

petition further alleged that mother repeatedly threatened the monitors during her visits 

with Mohammed. Maternal grandmother, who had been acting as a monitor, said mother 

had threatened to kill her. At a monitored visit at a police station, mother told the social 

workers present that she was “going to post [their] pictures so that everyone will know 

that you are bad people!” Two other social workers reported that mother had “threatened 

 

provided to reunite the family.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16501, subd. (h).) “[F]amily 

maintenance services are activities designed to provide in-home protective services to 

prevent or remedy neglect, abuse, or exploitation, for the purposes of preventing 

separation of children from their families.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16501, subd. (g).)

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and her counsel filed a 

brief under In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835 that raised no issues. We dismissed 

the appeal by order dated June 4, 2015.

3

Section 388 provides that “[a]ny parent or other person having an interest in a 

child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of 

circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or 

set aside any order of court previously made . . . .”
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to publish negative things about them.” Those individuals had subsequently found 

extensive complaints posted about them online, accusing them of child abuse. One social

worker received a text message from mother asking her “if [the social worker] knew what 

[mother] ha[d] done to the other workers” and saying “mother is capable of doing things 

to her.” Mother also threatened her attorney, “saying she knew where he lived, among 

other things, causing him to call 911 for his own safety.”

On January 16, 2015, Mohammed “appeared frightened when he saw . . . mother 

and was crying hysterically.” During the visit, which took place at the Department’s 

office, mother “yell[ed], scream[ed] and ma[d]e threats in the presen[ce] of the child.” 

Mother also told clients and children waiting in the lobby to “look up online for things 

she posted about [the social workers].”

In anticipation of the court’s decision terminating her visitation, mother filed a 

section 388 petition asking the court to continue to allow her monitored visits. The court 

set a hearing on both section 388 petitions and suspended mother’s visits with 

Mohammed pending the hearing.

4. The Review Hearing

On March 24, 2015, the court heard the section 388 petitions and held a six-month 

review hearing pursuant to section 364.

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The court received several of mother’s exhibits 

into evidence but declined to review videos of two 2014 visits between mother and 

Mohammed on the ground “they [we]re too remote in time . . . .” Mother’s psychologist 

testified, stating that mother “exhibited no risk factors” during psychotherapy sessions. 

However, the psychologist also stated she would not be surprised to learn that other 

professionals had described mother as “aggressive, threatening, and inappropriate.” 

After considering the testimony, documentary evidence, and argument, the court 

granted the Department’s section 388 petition terminating mother’s visitation and denied 

mother’s section 388 petition. The court concluded “there is no longer a need for me to 

 

4

Section 364 provides that if an order is made placing a child under the supervision 

of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300 and the child is not removed from the 

physical custody of the parent, the court shall hold a review hearing in six months.
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supervise this case” and terminated jurisdiction, issuing a family law order providing

father full physical and legal custody of Mohammed. No visits were ordered for mother. 

Mother timely appealed.

CONTENTIONS

Mother contends the court erred in (1) declining to admit into evidence the videos 

of mother’s 2014 visits with Mohammed, (2) applying the wrong legal standard at the 

six-month review hearing, (3) failing to make a finding as to whether mother was offered 

reasonable services, and (4) denying mother visitation.

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DISCUSSION

1. Applicable Law

The parties agree that section 361.2 applies here. Section 361.2 provides: “When 

a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine

whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time 

that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 

300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court 

shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would 

be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” 

“Once the juvenile court places a minor with a previously noncustodial parent in 

accordance with [section 361.2] . . . it may order that the previously noncustodial parent 

‘assume custody’ of the minor subject to the supervision of the juvenile court.

(§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) If the court [does so], it ‘may order that . . . services be provided 

to both parents, in which case the court shall determine, at review hearings held pursuant 

to Section 366, which parent, if either, shall have custody of the child.’ (§ 361.2, 

subd. (b)(3).)” (In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281-1282, fn. omitted 

(Jaden E.).) 

 

5 Mother’s brief also contains one sentence arguing that her constitutional rights 

were violated “when [she] was not afforded a hearing on her section 388 petition.” 

However, the court did hold a hearing on mother’s section 388 petition and allowed

mother to present evidence and argument at that hearing. 
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2. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Admit the Videos

Into Evidence

“The trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he court’s ruling will be upset only if there is a clear 

showing of an abuse of discretion.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” 

(In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 121.)

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding the videos of 

her 2014 visits with Mohammed. We do not agree. The court’s decision was based on 

the “remote” nature of those videos, which had been taken a year before the section 388 

hearing. The videos’ relevance was limited by the events that followed, namely mother’s 

conduct during more recent visits. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to admit the videos into evidence.

Mother has also not shown that the court’s decision constituted a miscarriage of 

justice warranting reversal of the court’s visitation order. (In re Nickolas T. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 1492.) Here, there was an abundance of evidence supporting the court’s 

decision to terminate mother’s visitation. Even if the court had reviewed the subject 

videos showing “the positive nature of [mother’s] visitation with [Mohammed],” given

the events following those visits  including mother’s yelling, screaming and threatening 

others in front of Mohammed, mother’s violent threats to others, and Mohammed’s 

frightened reaction to mother  there is no reasonable possibility the court would have 

reached a different decision. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59 [applying the 

“reasonable probability” harmless error test in assessing whether error in juvenile court 

proceeding constituted a reversible miscarriage of justice].)

3. The Court’s Reference to Section 364 Was Harmless Error

Mother contends the court should have conducted the six-month review hearing 

pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), instead of section 364. The Department 

concedes that section 366.21 governed the review hearing, but contends that any error 

was harmless. 
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Section 364 governs the conduct of hearings when a dependent child remains 

placed with the custodial parent. It “is inapplicable when . . . a child has been removed 

from one parent and placed with the other under section 361.2, subdivision (a). 

[Citations.] [¶] . . . [S]ection 361.2, subdivision (b)(3) specifically directs that when a 

child is placed with a noncustodial parent and both parents are ordered to participate in 

services, review hearings must be ‘held pursuant to section 366.’ ” (In re Maya L. (2014) 

232 Cal.App.4th 81, 100 (Maya L.).) Thus, when a child is removed from a custodial 

parent’s care, placed with a noncustodial parent under section 361.2, and both parents are 

ordered to participate in services, section 366.21, subdivision (e) governs the six-month 

review hearing. (Maya L., at p. 101.) Here, it is undisputed that the court removed 

Mohammed from mother’s custody, placed him with father under section 361.2, and 

ordered both parents to participate in services. Therefore, section 366.21, subdivision (e), 

not section 364, governed the six-month review hearing.

Although the juvenile court erroneously referenced section 364 when making its 

ruling at the six-month review hearing, the court did in fact follow the standards set forth 

in sections 366.21, subdivision (e), and 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). Section 366.21, 

subdivision (e) provides, “[i]f the child ha[s] been placed under court supervision with a 

previously noncustodial parent pursuant to Section 361.2, the court shall determine 

whether supervision is still necessary. The court may terminate supervision and transfer 

permanent custody to that parent, as provided for by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of 

Section 361.2.” Subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.2 provides that, if the court places a 

child with the previously noncustodial parent, the court may “[o]rder that the parent 

become legal and physical custodian of the child.”

Here, after hearing the parties’ evidence, the court found that juvenile court 

supervision of Mohammed was no longer necessary and then entered a family law order 

providing father full physical and legal custody of the child. Because the court’s orders 

demonstrate it applied the standards set forth in sections 366.21, subdivision (e), and 

361.2, subdivision (b)(1), any error in referencing section 364 was harmless. (See 

Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 101 [holding the juvenile court’s reference to 
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section 364 at the six-month review hearing to be harmless error where the court found 

there was no longer a need for supervision of the minor and entered a family law order 

providing the previously noncustodial parent with full custody].)

4. The Court Was Not Required to Make a Finding About Whether Mother 

Was Provided With Reasonable Services

Mother contends the court erred in failing to make a finding as to whether she was 

provided reasonable services. Relying on In re Calvin P. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 958

(Calvin P.), mother contends that when a juvenile court has exercised its discretion and 

ordered reunification services to the previously custodial parent while placing a minor 

with a noncustodial parent, the court must decide whether the Department complied with 

that order. However, Calvin P. is inapposite because it involved an order for mandatory 

reunification services pursuant to section 361.5.6

In Calvin P., the minors were removed from father’s custody,

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and both parents 

were provided with reunification services pursuant to section 361.5. (Calvin P., supra, 

178 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.) The court later placed the children with father with family 

maintenance services. (Id. at p. 961.) At the six-month review hearing, the court 

concluded that whether mother had received reasonable reunification services was a moot

issue because the children had been placed with father. (Ibid.) Mother appealed and the 

Court of Appeal held that mother was entitled to reasonable reunification services. (Id. at 

p. 964.) 

Unlike in Calvin P. where reunification services were ordered under section 361.5, 

here the court provided mother with reunification services pursuant to section 361.2, 

subdivision (b)(3). “[C]hild welfare services provided herein pursuant to 

subdivision (b)(3) of section 361.2 [a]re wholly discretionary and analytically distinct 

from the mandatory reunification efforts required by section 361.5. [Citations.]”

 

6

Section 361.5 provides for the provision of reunification services to the parents of 

dependent children.

7

The minors had previously been removed from mother’s custody in a separate 

case.
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(Jaden E., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285.) “Unless an express exemption exists,

reunification services provided pursuant to section 361.5 are mandatory, subject to strict 

timelines, and monitored through periodic court reviews at which parents are admonished 

that failure to participate successfully in reunification efforts could lead to the termination 

of their parental rights. (§§ 361.5, 366.21, 366.22.) [¶] . . . [Section 361.2], however, 

provides an alternate track for minors who are removed from a parent when a previously 

noncustodial parent is available and requests custody of the child.” (Id. at p. 1281.)

Contrary to mother’s assertion, “where . . . a dependent minor is not removed from 

the custody of both parents at the dispositional hearing and services are provided 

pursuant to subdivision (b)(3) of section 361.2 . . . no reasonable services finding need be 

made at the periodic review hearings monitoring that placement.” (Jaden E., supra, 

229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1287-1288, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, here, because the court 

placed Mohammed with father and provided mother with services pursuant to section 

361.2, the court was not required to make a finding at the six-month review hearing that 

mother had received reasonable reunification services. Furthermore, any failure to 

provide adequate reunification services to mother would not have prevented the court 

from terminating jurisdiction under section 361.2. (See In re Janee W. (2006) 

140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455 [“the failure to provide adequate reunification services to the 

other parent does not prevent the court from terminating jurisdiction under section 

361.2”].) 

5. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Terminating Mother’s Visitation

Mother contends the court abused its discretion in terminating her visitation

because she had participated in services, “successfully raised the minor for the first year 

of his life,” and had primarily positive visitation with him during the case. Mother 

challenges both the court’s denial of her section 388 petition and the court’s exit order 

providing no visitation for her.

Section 388 provides that the dependency court may modify a court order if 

circumstances have changed such that it would be in the child’s best interests for a 

modification to be made. “Whether a previously made order should be modified rests 
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within the dependency court’s discretion, and its determination will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.” (In re Michael B. (1992) 

8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1704.) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the 

trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably 

be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision 

for that of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-

319.)

Here, mother’s section 388 petition did not seek to change a “previously made 

order”; it was filed in response to the Department’s petition seeking to terminate mother’s 

visitation and asked the court to continue visitation. As mother’s petition indisputably 

did not show that any existing court order should be modified (but rather only addressed 

an anticipated future court order), the denial of the petition was not an abuse of 

discretion.

We also review the court’s order for no visitation under the abuse of discretion

standard. (In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284.) When the court “terminates 

its jurisdiction,” it “may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, 

the child.” (§ 362.4.) When fashioning “exit orders” under section 362.4, the court must 

look to the child’s best interests. (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.)

Mother was allowed only monitored visitation during the pendency of this case. It 

was during these monitored visits that mother yelled, screamed and threatened others 

while Mohammed was present. The record also demonstrates that just before the court 

suspended mother’s visits, Mohammed appeared frightened of mother and cried 

hysterically when he saw her. It is also relevant that, outside of Mohammed’s presence, 

mother made violent threats to others, including her mother and her attorney. These 

threats must be considered in the context of mother’s conviction of soliciting murder. 

Given mother’s aggressive and violent behavior and Mohammed’s fearful reaction to her, 

the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in Mohammed’s best interests 

that mother not have visits.
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DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

JONES, J.*

 

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.