1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

ROBERT (BOB) ROSS, § 

§ 

 Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, § 

§ 

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00343-Y 

§ 

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL § 

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al., § 

 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. § 

REPLY BY APFA IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Defendant/Counterclaimant Association of Professional Flight Attendants (“APFA” or 

“the Union”) respectfully submits this brief in reply to the response (Doc. 52) filed by Plaintiff 

Robert (“Bob”) Ross (“Ross”) in the opposition to APFA’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 

42, 43, 44) seeking enforcement of the arbitration decision adverse to Ross.1

This litigation was initiated by Ross in his attempt to vacate a “final and binding” 

arbitration decision adverse to him, a decision based on charges filed by Union members 

following several days of hearing in which the arbitrator concluded that Ross had committed a 

series of acts of financial misconduct while President of APFA. APFA Brief in Support of 

1

 Ross’s attempt to dispose of APFA’s motion for summary judgment as untimely (Doc. 52-1, 

p. 1), after he had obtained an extension of time from the Court to respond (Doc. 49), is specious. 

See Rule 56(b). (“a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after 

the close of all discovery”), and while this Court’s requirements provide that “[t]he time for 

filing summary judgment motions is set by the Initial Scheduling Order”, the Court’s typical 

Scheduling Order provides only that “[t]he parties file all . . . dispositive motions . . . no later 

than” a set date. This Court has neither required nor ordered that the entry of a Scheduling Order 

is a precondition to filing a motion for summary judgment, thus altering Rule 56(b) which 

permits filing “at any time.” [emphasis added]. 

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Summary Judgment (“APFA SJ Brief") (Doc. 43 at pp. 2-3 and Doc.44, Exh. B, App. 20-43).2

APFA has counterclaimed for enforcement of the arbitration decision (Doc. 8, pp. 32-43).3 The 

Court dismissed Ross’s attempt to vacate the arbitration decision. on October 27, 2022, for lack 

of jurisdiction leaving APFA’s counterclaim to enforce that decision to be resolved. (Doc. 51). 

As we show below, Ross’s response in opposition (Doc. 52) to APFA’s motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. 42) completely ignores the bases for the Court’s recent decision 

dismissing his attempt to vacate the arbitration decision, mischaracterizes the undisputed record 

supporting enforcement of that decision, and fails to address, let alone refute, the very well 

settled axiom of judicial deference to, and enforcement of arbitration decisions which contains 

only a very narrow exception that Ross has not even attempted to claim to exist here.

THE COURT HAS REJECTED ROSS’S PRIMARY ARGUMENTS 

In its Order of October 27, 2022 (“Order”) (Doc. 51) rejecting and dismissing Ross’s 

attempt to vacate the arbitration decision against him, the Court ruled that the charges against 

Ross sustained by the arbitrator were brought by APFA members, not the Union. and therefore 

2 The Arbitrator pointedly observed that “Ross’s testimony was inconsistent and not forthright,” 

that Ross “should be prohibited from serving in any official position for life within the APFA 

organization,” and that he be required to resign from any positions within APFA that he currently 

held. Arbitrator’s Decision and Order (Doc.44, Exh. B at pp 22-24, App. 41-43).

3

 Jurisdiction for APFA’s counterclaim is based on Section 301(a) of the Labor Management 

Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.§185(a), which governs suits for enforcement of contracts 

“between ... labor organizations,” and which the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled includes 

enforcement of union constitutions such as the APFA Constitution pursuant to which the 

arbitration decision was rendered. United Ass’n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 622 

(1981); Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 502 U.S. 93, 99, 101 (1991); Hampton v. Int’l 

Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218154 at *5-6 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (See APFA SJ 

Brief , Doc. 43 at p. 6; Doc. 44, App. 002-03, APFA Constitution, Exh. A at pp. 24-25). 

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did not constitute union discipline cognizable under Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. 

§411(a)(5)

Nevertheless, in his response in opposition to APFA’s motion for summary judgment, 

filed on November 1, Ross has continued to mischaracterize the arbitration decision as 

“discipline” imposed by the Union ignoring the Court’s recent ruling to the contrary (Doc. 51). 

(See Plaintiff’s Mem. in Resp. to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Resp. Mem.”) (Doc. 52-1 

at pp. 4, 7 , 10, 14, 16-17) 

THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 

The facts that are material and determinative of this motion for enforcement of the 

arbitration decision are simply whether the arbitrator’s decision “draws its essence” from the 

governing contract, here the APFA Constitution. (APFA SJ Brief, Doc. 43 at p. 6-7). In his 

response Ross claims that there are five material disputes of fact that preclude summary 

judgment. Pl. Resp. Mem. (Doc. 52-1 at p. 12). These assertions are in error and readily 

disposed of: 

 As noted, Ross expressly conceded in his post-hearing brief to the arbitrator that 

the charges were properly brought before the arbitrator. (Doc. 44, Exh. D, App. 

p. 48) thereby self-refuting the first of his purported “disputed” facts that the 

arbitration was not conducted pursuant to the APFA Constitution Pl. Resp. Mem. 

at 13. (Doc. 52-1). 

 Ross’s second claim, that the arbitrator was somehow not “impartial” because of 

his rulings that Ross disagreed with, is not only devoid of any record evidence but 

is likewise legally inapposite. Pl. Resp. Mem. at 14 (Doc. 52-1). Arbitration 

decisions are subject to judicial review for partiality where the arbitrator can be 

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shown to have a specific interest in the outcome of the case. This Court has 

emphatically rejected claims of “partiality” like Ross’s: 

To establish partiality based on bias, "the party urging vacatur must 

produce specific facts from which a reasonable person would have to 

conclude that the arbitrator was partial to one party." Householder Group 

v. Caughran, 354 Fed. App'x 848, 852 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Weber v. 

Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 

(N.D. Tex. 2006)). The plaintiff may meet this "onerous burden" by 

demonstrating that the alleged partiality is "direct, definite, and capable of 

demonstration rather than remote, uncertain or speculative." Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). Furthermore, the party seeking vacatur must 

demonstrate more than the "mere appearance of bias." Positive Software

Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F. 3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 

2007) (internal quotations omitted). These "'standards for judicial 

intervention [have been] narrowly drawn to assure the basic integrity of 

the arbitration process...'" Kimco Birmingham LP v. Third Creek LLC, 

No. 3:07-CV-1642-O, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, 2010 WL 147942 at 

*4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2010) (quoting Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 

714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983)). The unfavorable rulings that Adams 

alleges from the 2006 arbitration are insufficient to elevate claims of 

partiality during the second arbitration beyond a speculative level.

Adams v. Barnes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61358, 2010 WL 248252 at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. 

2010) (J. Boyle). See also Vantage Deepwater Co. v Petrobras Am. Inc., 966 F.3d 361, 

372-75 (5th Cir. 2020); Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (7th Ed.), at pp. 2-32 

through 2-39 and cases cited therein. 

 Ross’s third asserted factual dispute -- that the arbitrator did not act “within his 

jurisdictional authority” (Doc. 52-1 at 14) -- is not only refuted by review of the decision 

itself but also by Ross himself who took the precisely the opposite position during the 

arbitration process (Doc. 44, Exh. D, App. p. 48). 

 The fourth asserted factual dispute, over the nature of the charges against him (Pl. Resp. 

Mem. at 16 (Doc. 52-1)), is resolved in and by the arbitration decision itself (Doc. 44, 

Exhs. B, C). 

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 Ross’s final attempt to manufacture a dispute of material fact -- over whether APFA was 

a party to the arbitration process (Doc. 52-1 at 16) -- is once again a fiction. The nature 

of the arbitration process is defined by the APFA Constitution and Policy Manual (Doc. 

44, Exh. A, App. 5-10, 13-18), and is described in the arbitrator’s decision (Doc. 44, Exh. 

B at pp. 4-7, App. 23-26). And, as the Court has recently ruled, “The arbitration decision 

Plaintiff seeks to vacate was obtained by two union members, however, and not by the 

union or its officers” Order at p. 2 (Doc. 51).4

THE GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

As Defendants have repeatedly reminded Ross, to no apparent avail, the principle of 

“exceedingly deferential” judicial review of arbitration standards very well settled: 

4

 In addition to the asserted “disputed” facts discussed above, Ross has attempted to introduce 

new evidence relating to the arbitration decision into the record in this case in the form of a 

memo from APFA’s CPA, headed “Confidential Memorandum,” which memo delt with certain 

unrelated payments to Ross under his exit “Transaction Agreement” upon his resignation as 

APFA National President. Pl. Resp. Mem. (See Doc. 52-1, at pp. 4-5, 7, 9-11, 14). This new 

“evidence” should have been directed to the arbitrator during or after the hearing as he retained 

jurisdiction after both his original and supplemental decisions. (See Doc. 44, Ex. B at p.24, App. 

43, and Doc. 44, Ex. C, p. 3, App. 46). 

 As the courts have held, the parties waive their objections by not raising them during the 

arbitration proceedings. Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 

1993) ("[P]arties must be encouraged, nay required, to raise their complaints about the arbitration 

during the arbitration process itself, when that is possible."); Weinberger v. Silber, 140 F. Supp. 

2d 712, 721 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citations omitted) ("If a party does not protest to the arbitrator, 

courts generally will not give him a second chance to do so in a motion to vacate.") Penson Fin. 

Servs. v. Misr. Secs. Int'l, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139581 at *13-14 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (J. Boyle). 

 Moreover, this new “evidence” is a “red herring” that bears, no relation to the charges against 

Ross sustained in the arbitration, as is evident from a review of the charges and the arbitration 

decisions themselves. (See Doc. 44, Ex. B, March 19, 2022 Arbitration Decision, “Issues” at p. 2, 

App. 21, “Discussion and Opinion” at pp. 13-22, App. 32-41, “Conclusion” and “Remedy” at pp, 

23-24, App. 43-43; and Doc. 44, Ex. C, August 24, 2022 Supplemental Decision and Remedy 

Modification at pp. 2-3, App. 45-46). 

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As long as the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the parties' agreement." An 

arbitrator exceeds his [or her] authority when he [or she] acts 'contrary to express 

contractual provisions.'" Kemper Corp. Servs., Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 946 F.3d 

817, 822 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Beaird Indus., Inc. v. Local 2297, Int'l Union, 404 F.3d 

942, 946 (5th Cir. 2005)) and is not merely "his [or her] own brand of industrial justice," 

the award is legitimate. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 

(1987) (quoting Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 596). "An arbitrator exceeds his [or her] 

authority when he [or she] acts 'contrary to express contractual provisions.'" Kemper 

Corp. Servs., Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 946 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Beaird Indus., Inc. v. Local 2297, Int'l Union, 404 F.3d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 

2005)). 

Lalo, LCC v. Hawk Apparel, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 722218, 2022 WL 1173801at *6-7 

(N.D. Tex. 2022) (J. Lindsey). Notably, there are numerous precedents for this axiom cited in 

the Lalo decision -- both federal and state court arbitration decisions, and both traditional labor 

management and non-labor arbitration decisions such as the decision in Lalo itself -- illustrating 

the universality of this legal principle. 

In his response in opposition (Doc. 52) to APFA’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 

42, 43, 44) to confirm and enforce the arbitrator’s decisions, Ross has neither attempted to 

contest this settled legal principle nor even acknowledged it, which is not surprising as it is one 

that sets a legal standard that is impossible for Ross to meet. Not only does the arbitration 

decision itself demonstrate that the relevant provisions of the APFA Constitution were complied 

with, but Ross explicitly conceded that the dispute was properly within the Arbitrator’s 

jurisdiction for resolution under the APFA Constitution(Doc. 44, Exh. D, App. 48). 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above and in the Union’s motion for summary judgment, the 

decision of the arbitrator should be enforced and APFA should be allowed to proceed with an 

application for attorneys fees and/or sanctions. 

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Date: November 9, 2022 Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/ Sanford R. Denison 

SANFORD R. DENISON 

Tex. Bar No. 05655560 

Baab & Denison, LLP 

6301 Gaston Ave., Suite 550 

Dallas, TX 75214 

Tel.: (214) 637-0750 

Fax.: (214) 637-0730 

Email: denison@baabdenison.com 

WILLIAM W. OSBORNE JR.* 

D.C. Bar No. 912089 

Osborne Law Offices P.C. 

5335 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Suite 440 

Washington, D.C. 20015 

Tel.: (202) 243-3200 

Fax: (202) 686-2977 

Email: b.osborne@osbornelaw.com 

Counsel for Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff 

Association of Professional Flight Attendants, and 

Defendants Julie Hedrick and Erik Harris 

*Admitted Pro Hac Vice 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on this 9th day of November 2022 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document was served on the below listed counsel of record for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 

Ross by a means permitted by Rule 5(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”). 

KERRI PHILLIPS 

HEATHER ABREU 

K.D. Phillips Law Firm, PLLC 

5700 Tennyson Parkway, Suite 300 

Plano, Texas 75024 

Phone: (972) 327-5800 

Fax: (940) 400-0089 

Email: kerri@KDphillipslaw.com 

Email: Heather@KDphillipslaw.com 

MICHAEL R RAKE 

Michael R. Rake, Attorney at Law 

PO Box 1556 

Lake Dallas, TX 75065 

Tel.: (940) 498-2103 

Fax: (940) 498-2103 

Email: mrake1@mrakeattorney.com 

/s/ Sanford R. Denison

SANFORD R. DENISON

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