IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MICHAEL ANTHONY GOODLOE, JR., §

PLAINTIFF, §

§

V. § CASE NO. 3:22-CV-2068-C-BK

§

DALLAS COUNTY COURTS, §

DEFENDANT. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se case was referred to the 

United States magistrate judge for case management, including the issuance of findings and a 

recommended disposition where appropriate. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and 

applicable law, this action should be summarily DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as 

frivolous. 

I. BACKGROUND

On September 16, 2022, Michael Anthony Goodloe, Jr, filed a one-page pro se complaint 

against the Dallas County Courts. Doc. 3 at 1. The complaint is difficult to decipher and the 

allegations clearly irrational. Goodloe never states a cause of action or alleges any coherent, 

plausible facts from which the Court can discern a cognizable cause of action. By way of 

example, Goodloe pleads the following: 

Commercial Lein ported against Ernest White and Amber Givens-Davis 1 1⁄2 years 

ago in the Northern District of Texas. Commercial lien has been ported and has 

matured in toto, which is 27,000,000.00. This is an administrative filing not a keg 

court proceeding. 

Administrative Court proceeding are required only which bear no cost at all. Please 

advice.

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Assumed name form does apply 

Doc. 3 at 1 (errors in original). 

II. ANALYSIS

Goodloe’s complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

1

 This

statute provides inter alia for the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it is 

frivolous or malicious. A complaint is frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless 

legal theory or when the factual contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 

U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The latter category 

encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise 

to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. 

The Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings “must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)

(“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under this most liberal construction, 

however, Goodloe has failed to state a cognizable legal claim or anything that can be construed 

as such. As demonstrated supra, his pleadings a fatally deficient—lacking legal and factual 

bases. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Consequently, Goodloe’s complaint should be dismissed 

with prejudice as factually and legally frivolous.

1 Goodloe’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is deficient. He answers most questions with 

either “0” or “n/a.” Doc. 4. Thus, it is more efficient to dismiss the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2), than to require compliance with the Court’s filing requirements. 

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III. LEAVE TO AMEND

Ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint 

before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As discussed 

herein Goodloe’s apparent claims are fatally infirm. Based on the most deferential review of his 

complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given the opportunity, he could allege cogent and viable 

legal claims. Thus, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances 

would be futile and cause needless delay.

IV. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

The Court takes judicial notice that earlier this year, three of Goodloe’s causes of actions 

were dismissed as frivolous and he was warned that if he continues to file frivolous pro se cases 

in this Court, sanctions and/or a filing bar may be imposed. See Goodloe v. Dallas County 

Courts Principle Agent, No. 3:22-CV-165-X-BT, 2022 WL 1092931, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 

2022); Goodloe v. Parkland Medical Jail Staff, No. 3:22-CV-6-E-BT, 2022 WL 1032501, at *1 

(N.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2022); Goodloe v. U.S. District Court Northern Div., No. 3:22-CV-62-X 

(BT), 2022 WL 4100830, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022). Subsequently, however, Goodloe

filed three more cases, including this one. 

The Federal courts have the inherent authority “to protect the efficient and orderly 

administration of justice and . . . to command respect for the court’s orders, judgments, 

procedures, and authority,” In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993), and sanctions may be 

appropriate when, as here, a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. 

Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)&(c)(1) 

(authorizing sanctions against pro se litigants). Pro se litigants have “no license to harass others, 

clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court 

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dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, 

litigants who abuse the judicial process are “not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the 

normal filing fees—indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period.” Free v. United States, 

879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993).

Based on Goodloe’s filing history and his pattern of filing frivolous actions, he should be 

barred from filing future actions in forma pauperis in this or any other federal Court without first 

obtaining leave of court. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action should be summarily DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Goodloe should be 

BARRED from filing future actions in forma pauperis in this or any other federal court, without 

first obtaining leave of court to do so, and any case filed, removed, or transferred without the 

applicable filing fee, in which he is plaintiff, should not be reviewed by the Court. 

SO RECOMMENDED on September 26, 2022.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific 

written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific 

written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time 

to file objections to 14 days). 

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