United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-2527

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County of Mille Lacs,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

First National Bank, of Milaca,

Intervenor Plaintiff,

v.

Melanie Benjamin, individually and

officially as Chief Executive, Mille

Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians;

Herb Weyaus, individually and

officially as Secretary/Treasurer,

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa

Indians; Sandra Blake, individually

and officially as District

Representative, Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians; Marvin Bruneau,

individually and officially as District

Representative, Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians; Harry Davis,

individually and officially as District

Representative, Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians,

Defendants - Appellees,

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State of Minnesota; State of South

Dakota, 

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 Appeals from the United States 

 District Court for the District 

 of Minnesota.
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Amicus on Behalf of * 

Appellant. * 

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No. 03-2537

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County of Mille Lacs,

Plaintiff,

First National Bank, of Milaca,

Intervenor Plaintiff - 

 Appellant,

v.

Melanie Benjamin, individually and

officially as Chief Executive, Mille

Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians;

Herb Weyaus, individually and

officially as Secretary/Treasurer,

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa

Indians; Sandra Blake, individually

and officially as District

Representative, Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians; Marvin Bruneau,

individually and officially as District

Representative, Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians; Harry Davis,

individually and officially as District

Representative, Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians,

Defendants - Appellees,

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State of Minnesota, * 

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Amicus on Behalf of * 

Appellant. * 

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Submitted: October 24, 2003

Filed: March 9, 2004

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Before RILEY, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

County of Mille Lacs ("County") and the First National Bank of Milaca

("Bank"), appeal from an order of the district court dismissing their action seeking to

determine the legal status of the boundaries of the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa

Indians ("Band") reservation. We affirm. 

I.

The facts for this case extend back nearly 170 years. The district court opinion

described them well, and we will not recapitulate them all. County of Mille Lacs v.

Benjamin, 262 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Minn. 2003). Relevant to this appeal, the

appellants brought suit in federal court seeking declaratory relief regarding the

boundary status of the Mille Lacs Indian Reservation. The County and the Bank

contend that the reservation's boundary status is a critical issue to many residents in

Mille Lacs County. The Bank alleges that the reservation's boundary status must be

defined because the Band's assertion of regulatory authority over parts of the

reservation's territory has had a negative effect on the value of the Bank's security

interests. In the Bank's view, the Band's allegations of ownership and jurisdiction to

parts of the reservation have harmed the Bank's economic interest. 
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The County contends that the uncertainty of the reservation's boundaries is

detrimental to the County's ability to enforce laws and building and environmental

permits that are directly dependent on the reservation's boundaries. 

At the close of initial discovery, the Band moved for summary judgment on the

following grounds: standing, ripeness, sovereign immunity, and indispensable party.

The district court granted the Band's motion after determining that neither the Bank

nor the County had standing to question the legal status of the reservation's

boundaries. Also, the court determined that the present dispute was not ripe for

adjudication. On May 7, 2003, the district court, in granting the Band's motion for

summary judgment, dismissed the claim with prejudice. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, the County and the Bank argue that they have suffered both

threatened injury and present harms to their ability to plan and conduct business.

Specifically, they allege numerous harms, including: greater regulatory oversight by

the EPA, limits on county and state regulatory authority, and expansion of the reach

of tribal authority. Lastly, the appellants contend that the district court erred in

dismissing the suit with prejudice because the dismissal was based on jurisdictional

grounds. We consider each argument in turn.

II.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment based on standing de

novo. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S. Dakota Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2003)

(citing Nat'l. Fed'n. of the Blind of Mo. v. Cross, 184 F.3d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1999).

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence "in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Oti Kaga, Inc., 342 F.3d at 877 (citing

Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962–63 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
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A. Standing

Federal courts only have jurisdiction to hear actual cases and controversies.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions

that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." North Carolina v.

Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). The controversy must be definite and concrete,

touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Nat'l Fed'n of

the Blind of Mo., 184 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added). A party must satisfy

constitutional standing requirements for its case to proceed to adjudication. Id. A

party has standing to bring a claim if it has suffered some actual or threatened injury.

"The controversy requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act is synonymous

with that of Article III of the Constitution." Carson v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 931, 933 (8th

Cir. 1983) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1974); Cass

County v. United States, 570 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1978)). In order to demonstrate

standing, a plaintiff must "demonstrate that he has suffered [an] injury in fact, that the

injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely

be redressed by a favorable decision." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)

(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992); Valley Forge

Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,

471–472 (1982) (internal citations omitted)). 

"The essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and an action

seeking other relief is that in the former no actual wrong need have been committed

or loss have occurred in order to sustain the action." Horne v. Firemen's Ret. Sys. of

St. Louis, 69 F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Fisher-Otis Co.,

496 F.2d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 1974)). The County and the Bank argue that they have

standing because they have suffered threatened injury caused by the Band's alleged

ownership of certain parts of the Mille Lacs Indian Reservation. We disagree. 
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We give a district court's decision to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action

unique and substantial discretion. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491

(1942); Horne v. Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, 69 F.3d 233, 236–37 (8th

Cir. 1995). Here, the district court correctly concluded that the appellants lacked

standing. 

The Bank alleged in its complaint that the Band's assertion of regulatory

authority over property in which the Bank holds a security interest reduced the value

of its collateral. Specifically, the Bank alleges that, if imposed, the Band's enactments

could impact federal banking laws and the Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code

thereby directly affecting the Bank's operations. Also, the Bank noted that the Band

owns a nearby financial institution that competes directly with the Bank. The Bank

provided affidavits of lenders expressing concern whether clear title to their property

can be obtained in the disputed area. The Bank also provided letters from residents

stating that they would not have purchased property within the boundaries of a

reservation and that they would not have built a home within the boundaries of a

reservation. These statements of concern, however, do not establish an injury in fact.

At best, they reflect speculative harms based upon the assumed future intent of the

Band. 

The County has failed to establish standing. We agree with the Band that the

County has been unable to point to any definite controversy that exists from the

Band's purported expansion of tribal jurisdiction over the disputed portion of the

reservation. The County presented no evidence that its ability to enforce state or local

law on the reservation has been usurped or even affected by the Band's alleged

intentions. In order to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has

suffered an injury or a threatened injury. Neither the County nor the Bank has shown

that it is in immediate danger of sustaining threatened injury traceable to an action of

the Band. Therefore, they are unable to demonstrate standing. Furthermore, because

there is no actual "case or controversy" before our Court, the ripeness issue is moot.
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B. Dismissal

The district court issued its summary judgment with prejudice. A district court

is generally barred from dismissing a case with prejudice if it concludes subject

matter jurisdiction is absent. Ahmed v. United States, 147 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir.

1998) (citing Johnson v. Boyd-Richardson Co., 650 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1981)

("Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and thus such a dismissal should be

without prejudice")); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir.

1995). Because the district court dismissed solely on jurisdictional grounds, dismissal

with prejudice is premature. We reverse this portion of the judgment and direct that

the district court enter judgment without prejudice.

III.

In conclusion, we affirm the district court's dismissal for lack of standing.

However, we reverse the district court's decision to dismiss the complaint with

prejudice. The appellant's motion to supplement the record is denied.

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