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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

DOMINIQUE ALEXANDER, CARVELL 

BOWENS, CYRUS CEZAR, DAMON 

CRENSHAW, DAJAI FIELDS, CYNTHIA 

FLORES, TRACY FOSTER, JASMIN 

GALVAN, DEBBIE KIM, ALEXIS 

MCKINNEY, LAPREA PIERCE, AMY 

SMITH, LAKEISHA SMITH, NATHAN 

TINDALL, ELISEO VALDEZ, COURTNEY 

WADLOW, CNAYA WARREN, SARAH 

SHIRLEY, JOSEPH ADAMS, KRISTA 

ADAMS, JANE AND JOHN DOE BRIDGE 

PLAINTIFFS 1-10

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CIVIL CAUSE NO.

3:22-cv-1193

Plaintiffs, §

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vs. §

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CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS; JOHN AND 

JANE ROE DALLAS POLICE OFFICERS 1-

10; DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; JOHN 

AND JANE SMITH SHERIFF’S DEPUTIES 

1-10; 

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Defendants. § JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFFS’ ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

COME NOW, Dominique Alexander, Carvell Bowens, Cyrus Cezar, Damon Crenshaw,

Dajai Fields, Cynthia Flores, Tracy Foster, Jasmin Galvan, Debbie Kim, Alexis Mckinney, Laprea 

Pierce, Amy Smith, Lakeisha Smith, Nathan Tindall, Eliseo Valdez, Courtney Wadlow, Cnaya

Warren, Sarah Shirley, Joseph Adams, Krista Adams and Jane and John Doe Bridge Plaintiffs 1-10

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and bring this civil action against: The City of Dallas, Texas; City of

Dallas Police Chief Edgardo “Eddie” Garcia (“Chief Garcia”) in his individual and official 

capacities; City of Dallas Former Police Chief Ulysha Reneé Hall (“Chief Hall”) in her individual 

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and official capacities; and City of Dallas John and Jane Roe Police Officers 1–10 in their 

individual and official capacities (the “DPD Officer Defendants,” and together with the City of 

Dallas, Chief Garcia, and Chief Hall, the “City of Dallas Defendants”); Dallas County, Texas; 

Dallas County Sheriff Marian Brown (“Sheriff Brown”), in her individual and official capacities; 

Dallas County John and Jane Smith Sheriff’s Deputies 1-10 in their individual and official 

capacities (the “Sheriff Deputy Defendants,” and together with Dallas County, Sheriff Brown, the

“Dallas County Defendants”); and The State of Texas; the Texas Department of Public Safety

(“DPS”); DPS Director Steven McCraw in his individual and official capacities; and John and 

Jane White State Troopers 1- 10 in their individual and official capacities (the “State Trooper 

Defendants,” and together with the State of Texas, DPS, and DPS Director Steven C. McCraw, the

“State of Texas Defendants”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department Of Homeland 

Security, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, United States National Guard; 

John and Jane Black Federal Agents 1-10 in their individual and official capacities (“Federal 

Defendants”) and for cause would show the Court the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the wake of the brutal and unjustified May 25, 2020 killing of George Floyd by police

officers in Minneapolis, Minnesota, hundreds of thousands of Americans took to public streets 

and forums to protest police brutality and racial inequality. Dallas was no exception, with peaceful protests 

occurring across the city, beginning on May 29, 2020, and continuing throughout the remainder 2020 (the 

“2020 Protests”). Undeterred by the factthat police officers’ use of excessive force was the very subject of 

the demonstrations and protests, City of Dallas Police Department (“DPD”) officers repeatedly used 

extreme and unconstitutional methods, and lethal force against these crowds, targeting peaceful, nonthreatening protesters and bystanders with tear gas, smoke bombs, flash-bangs, pepper balls, mace, and 

what are known as “kinetic impact projectiles,” or “KIPs.” Upon information and belief, deputies from the 

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Dallas County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”) and troopers from the Texas Department of 

Public Safety (“DPS”) also engaged in similar conduct against protesters and bystanders in coordination 

with and/or at the direction of the City of Dallas Defendants. Officers also unlawfully detained, seized, teargassed and smoke-bombed protesters simply because they exercised their First Amendment rights.

2. Dominique Alexander, Carvell Bowens, Cyrus Cezar, Damon Crenshaw, Dajai 

Fields, Cynthia Flores, Tracy Foster, Jasmin Galvan, Debbie Kim, Alexis Mckinney, Laprea 

Pierce, Amy Smith, Lakeisha Smith, Nathan Tindall, Eliseo Valdez, Courtney Wadlow,Cnaya 

Warren, and Jane and John Doe Bridge Plaintiffs 1-10 (collectively “Plaintiffs) peaceably 

attempted to exercise their First Amendment rights by participating in the 2020 Protests in Dallas, 

Texas on June 1, 2020. However, on that day, Plaintiffs became victims of the very same 

unjustified police brutality which the ongoing 2020 Protests opposed. Specifically, Plaintiffs were

unlawfully detained on Margaret Hunt Bridge in violation of their constitutional rights and were

harmed when DPD Officer Defendants, Sheriff Deputy Defendants, and/or State Trooper 

Defendants, and/or Federal Agent Defendants fired tear gas canisters at them, shot them with rubber 

bullet KIP’s, and seized and restrained them for hours (“Bridge Incident”).

3. This is a civil action for relief for violations of Plaintiffs’ civil rights and harm 

they sustained as a result ofthe acts and omissions by Defendants. Defendants, both individually and 

collectively, were responsible for the excessive use of force against Plaintiffs and their resulting 

physical injuries, and for violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These injuries are the direct result of official 

policies of the respective city and county law enforcement agencies, the State of Texas, U.S.

Federal Agencies, and failures by the same and their current and former leadership to implement

and enforce policies and standards that ensure their officers, deputies, and troopers know and are 

trained in the constitutional limits of force against civilians, particularly those exercising their First 

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Amendment rights.

II. PARTIES

PLAINTIFFS

4. Plaintiff Dominique Alexander is an individual resident of the Northern District of Texas 

and can be served through the undersigned counsel of record.

5. Plaintiff Carven Bowens is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can 

be served through the undersigned counsel of record.

6. Plaintiff Cyrus Cezar is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be 

served through the undersigned counsel of record.

7. Plaintiff Damon Crenshaw is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and 

can be served through the undersigned counsel of record.

8. Plaintiff Cynthia Flores is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can 

be served through the undersigned counsel of record.

9. Plaintiff Tracy Foster is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas

and can be served through the undersigned counsel of record.

10. Jasmin Galvan is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

11. Debbie Kim is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

12. Alexis Mckinney is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be 

served through the undersigned counsel of record.

13. Laprea Pierce is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

14. Amy Smith is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

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through the undersigned counsel of record.

15. Lakeisha Smith is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

16. Nathan Tindall is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

17. Eliseo Valdez is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

18. Courtney Wadlow is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be 

served through the undersigned counsel of record.

19. Cnaya Warren is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

20. Sarah Shirley is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

21. Joseph Adams is an individual resident in the Northern District of Texas and can be served 

through the undersigned counsel of record.

22. Krista Adams is an individual resident of the state of Utah and can be served through the 

undersigned counsel of record.

23. Jane and John Doe Bridge Plaintiffs 1-10 are individual residentsin the Northern District of 

Texas who were participated in the “Bridge Incident” and can be served throughthe undersigned 

counsel of record.

DEFENDANTS

24. Defendant the City of Dallas, Texas is a political subdivision of the State of Texas and 

funds, operates, and controls DPD. The City of Dallas, along with the Dallas City Council, Chief 

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Garcia, and Former Chief Hall, are (or were) responsible for implementing DPD’s budget, policies, 

procedures, practices, and customs, and for the acts and omissions challenged by this suit. DPD 

under the direction of the Dallas City Council, Chief Garcia, and Former Chief Hall, is also 

responsible for preventive, investigative, and enforcement services for all citizens of the City of 

Dallas. Defendant the City of Dallas may be served with process by serving the Dallas City 

Attorney, Christopher J. Caso, at 1500 Marilla Street, Room 7DN, Dallas, Texas 75201; Phone 

(214) 670-3519 or Fax: (214) 670-3519.

25. Chief Edgardo “Eddie” Garcia is the Chief of Police of DPD and a final policymaker for 

DPD, with the authority for setting policies, including training of DPD Officers. Chief Garcia may 

be served with process by serving the Dallas City Attorney, Christopher J. Caso, at 1500 Marilla

Street, Room 7DN, Dallas, Texas 75201; Phone (214) 670- 3519 or Fax: (214) 670-3519.

26. Between 2017 and 2020, Defendant Former Chief Ulysha “Renee” Hall was the Chief of

Police of DPD and a final policymaker for DPD, with the authority for setting policies, including 

training of DPD Officers. See Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 637 (5th Cir. 2019) (the Fifth

Circuit “[has] previously found that Texas police chiefs are final policymakers for their 

municipalities.”). Chief Hall was also the supervisor for the DPD Officer Defendants at all times 

relevant in this complaint. Upon information and belief, Chief Hall is a resident of Maryland and 

may be served with process wherever she may be found.

27. Defendants John and Jane Roe Officers 1-10 are certain individuals whose identities are 

presently unknown to Plaintiffs but who, upon information and belief, were at all relevant times DPD 

Officers and were acting in such capacity. Defendants John and Jane Roe 1-10 are responsible for the acts

and omissions challenged by this lawsuit. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to substitute the true names 

and capacities of the Defendants John and Jane Roe 1-10 when ascertained during this litigation.

28. Defendant Dallas County, Texas is a political subdivision of the State of Texas, and funds,

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operates, and controls the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department. Dallas County, along with Sheriff 

Brown, is responsible for implementing the Sheriff’s Department’s budget, policies, procedures, 

practices, and customs, and for the acts and omissions challenged by this suit. The Sheriff’s

Department, under the direction of Dallas County and Sheriff Brown, is also responsible for 

preventive, investigative, and enforcement services for all citizens of Dallas County. Dallas 

County may be served with process the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department at 133 N. Riverfront 

Blvd., LB-31, Dallas, TX 75207.

29. Sheriff Brown is the Dallas County Sheriff and a final policymaker for the Sheriff’s 

Department, with the authority for setting policies, including training of the Sheriff’s Deputies. 

Sheriff Brown may be served with process by serving County Judge Clay Jenkins, 411 Elm Street, 

# 200, Dallas, Texas 75202; Phone (214) 653-7949.

30. Defendants John and Jane Smith 1-10 are certain individuals whose identities are presently 

unknown to Plaintiffs but who, upon information and belief, were at all relevant times Sheriff’s 

Deputies and were acting in such capacity. Defendants John and Jane Smith 1- 10 are responsible 

for the acts and omissions challenged by this lawsuit. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to

substitute the true names and capacities of the Defendants John and Jane Smith 1-10 when 

ascertained during this litigation.

31. At all times pertinent, all Defendant Police Officers, Sheriff Deputies, State Troopers and 

Federal agents (collectively “Law Enforcement Officers”) were acting with the consent and under 

the direction of Defendants City of Dallas and Chief Renee Hall.

III. JURISDICTION

32. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

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33. Federal jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

34. The Court has general personal jurisdiction over the City of Dallas Defendants and the

Dallas County Defendants by virtue of their citizenship and residence in Dallas County, Texas, as 

well as their continuous and systematic contacts with the State of Texas. Defendant the City of

Dallas is a municipality incorporated in the State of Texas. Defendant Dallas County is a county in

the State of Texas. Upon information and belief, the DPD Officer Defendants and Sheriff’s Deputy 

Defendants are residents of the State of Texas.

35. The Court has general personal jurisdiction over the State of Texas Defendants by virtue

of their citizenship and residence in the State of Texas, as well as their continuous and systematic 

contacts with the State of Texas.

36. Furthermore, the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the City of Dallas 

Defendants, the Dallas County Defendants, the State of Texas Defendants, and Chief Hall because 

Plaintiffs’ claims against them arise out of or relate to a contact between them and the State of 

Texas. The DPD Officer Defendants, Sheriff Deputy Defendants, State Trooper Defendants, and 

Federal Agent Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiffs during protests in Dallas, Texas, 

acting on orders and policies promulgated by Chief Hall and City of Dallas policymakers.

Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Dallas Defendants, the Dallas County Defendants, the State of 

Texas Defendants and Chief Hall arise from that occurrence and Defendants’ contact in the state 

of Texas.

IV. VENUE

37. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

38. Venue in the Northern District of Texas-Dallas Division is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

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1391 and 28U.S.C. § 1367 asthe incidentsthat give rise to thisComplaint occurred in Dallas, Texas, 

within the Northern District of Texas.

V. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

39. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

40. All conditions precedent have occurred or have been performed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c).

VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The 2020 Protests in Dallas, Texas.

46. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

47. On Monday, May 25, 2020, an unarmed Black man named George Floyd was murdered 

by an officer of the Minneapolis Police Department. The events of Mr. Floyd’s arrest and murder 

were captured on video by multiple bystanders as well as individual officers’ body cameras. 

Peaceful protests and demonstrations soon followed through the United States, including in Dallas,

Texas.

48. Undeterred by the fact that excessive police force was the very subject of these nationwide 

demonstrations, videos, photos, and reports of police brutality on massive scales at these protests

arose in the weeks immediately following Mr. Floyd’s death. Here in Dallas, DPD Officers,

Sherriff’s Deputies, and State Troopers repeatedly used extreme and lethal force against these 

crowds during the 2020 Protests, targeting peaceful, non-threatening protesters with tear gas, 

smoke bombs, flash-bangs, pepper balls, mace, and ammunition that are known as “kinetic impact 

projectiles,” or “KIPs.”

49. KIPs, which include so-called “rubber bullets” or “sponge bullets,” are often used by 

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American police forces to control crowds. The manufacturers, distributors, and sellers of these

projectiles—and the police departments that use them against their own citizens—praise these 

bullets as being “nonlethal” or “less lethal.” They are not. In fact, the fatality, morbidity, and 

significant risks of injuries from KIPs have been well documented, and KIPs kill approximately 

three percent of all people they strike. Regardless, in cities across the country, including Dallas, 

police departments attempted to quell participation in the 2020 Protests by firing KIPs into crowds, even 

though five decades of evidence shows such weapons candisable, disfigure, and even kill.

50. In addition to pepper balls, KIPs, and tear gas, law enforcement agencies around the

country, including DPD, have used an increasingly violent technique referred to as “kettling,” 

wherein police officers block off streets and push or “corral” a group of protesters into a small 

area, like a bridge or city block, to restrict their movement. Thereafter, the police officers move in

on the protesters to detain the individuals, arrest the individuals, or allow them to leave through an 

exit controlled by police.6 In several instances, officers have held the protesters for hours without

food, water or accessto restrooms, and unnecessarily used tear gas,smoke bombs, rubber bullets, or 

other tactics against the kettled individuals in an attempt to “control” or “subdue” the crowd.

51. Also, known as “trap and detain,” this highly controversial technique routinely results in

increased tensions between police and protesters who have been trapped in a small area. Originally 

developed as a military tactic, kettling was initially deployed by military forces in combat to 

subdue their opponent on the battlefield. Today, however, police departments use this same tactic 

against protesters, who in many cases are peacefully exercising their constitutional rights.

52. Moreover, kettling results in the violation of the constitutional rights of peaceful protesters 

and other innocent bystanders, who are often swept up by police in their attempt to “control” the 

crowd. Rather than identify and single out the few bad actors, if any, officers engaged in kettling 

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indiscriminately target individuals in a general vicinity and subject them to the same antagonistic 

and even violent treatment, regardless of their individual conduct or participation in the protest.

Kettling therefore infringes on individuals’ First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights, as protesters and other bystanders are wrongfully detained, arrested, and/orsubjected to

unreasonable searches, seizures, and excessive force while exercising their constitutional rights.

53. In the immediate days after Mr. Floyd’s death, federal courts in several cities, including 

Portland, Denver, and Oakland began issuing injunctive relief to prohibit law enforcement 

agencies from using so-called “less lethal” crowd control tactics on peaceful protesters, such as 

rubber bullets and tear gas.

54. The first Dallas protest in the aftermath of Mr. Floyd’s death was on May 29, 2020. On 

that day, and for hundreds of days after, peaceful protestors gathered in downtown Dallas to 

demonstrate against police brutality and racial inequality. Although a small minority of individuals 

present at the scene of the first weekend of protests engaged in destructive activity, including 

property destruction, those individuals’ behavior was profoundly overshadowed by the thousands 

of otherwise non-violent, non-threatening demonstrators who peaceably exercised their First 

Amendment rights.

55. Nonetheless, during the 2020 Protests, DPD and other law enforcement departments

working with them and/or at DPD’s direction (and invited by DPD and Former Chief Hall) directed 

extreme riot control tactics towards entire groups of protesters posing no harm to officers or anyone 

else. Dressed in riot gear and driving armored vehicles, DPD and those working with them kettled

protestors, deployed riot control devices against ordinary citizens and journalists alike, without 

regard to whether the circumstances justified it, and shot “less lethal” weaponry at peaceful

citizens.

56. During the first seven days of demonstrations in Dallas, DPD Officers and those working 

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with them, including but not limited to the Sheriff’s Deputies and State Troopers, and Federal Agents 

repeatedly used extreme and lethal force against crowds, directly targeting peaceful, non- threatening 

protestors with KIPs, tear gas, smoke bombs, and other riot control devices that the City of Dallas and

Chief Hall praise as “less lethal.” In particular, DPD and those working with them and/or at their direction 

used pepper balls and a type of KIP called 40mm eXact iMpact extended range “sponge” bullets—often 

referred to as “rubber bullets”—against protestors, bystanders, and journalists in order to suppress their

First Amendment rights, without regard to constitutional limits.

57. Chief Hall defended her decision and orders to shoot protesters with tear gas— a chemical 

weapon banned in war—during the 2020 Protests in Dallas. Hundreds of reports of peaceful 

protesters, journalists covering protests, and bystanders bleeding and suffering from unwarranted 

levels of force employed by law enforcement threaten to chill participation in ongoing 

demonstrations in Dallas.

58. When DPD Officers and those working with them could not keep protestors moving in the 

direction they wanted, they called for additional officers with KIPs or tear gas in order to kettle 

protestors or alter their direction of travel. DPD Officers and those working with them regularly 

called for the use of tear gas to control the direction in which protestors were traveling. DPD 

Officers and those working with them often reported they could not kettle protestors exercising 

their First Amendment rights without the use of gas. DPD Officers and those working with them 

specifically used tear gas for the specific purpose of kettling crowds that were not apparently 

posing any direct or imminent threat.

59. DPD Officers and those working with them were instructed to rush into crowds that were

simply moving down the street in order to prevent them from continuing their protests. DPD 

Officers specifically reported that pepper ball rounds worked “very well” to disburse protestors 

who were “agitated” but not apparently posing any threat.

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60. Upon information and belief, during the course of the 2020 Protests and specifically during

the May 30, and June 1, 2020 protests in which Plaintiffs participated, Sheriff Deputy Defendants 

fired tear gas into crowds of protestors exercising their First Amendment rights when they did not 

pose a direct threat to any officers or property.

61. Based on the DPD’s After Action Report on the George Floyd Protest, several other law

enforcement agencies played an active role in the events taking place on May

30, 2020 to June 1, 2020. On information and belief, Sheriff Deputy Defendants and State

Trooper Defendants (and others) also engaged in the challenged behavior, specifically kettling and 

shooting Plaintiffs with rubber bullet KIPs without provocation or justification, which violated 

their constitutional rights and resulted in injuries to one or more of the Plaintiffs.

62. Plaintiffs and other non-threatening people present at the first weekend of 2020 Protests in 

Dallas from May 30 to June 1, 2020, suffered and continue to suffer from injuries caused by

Defendants.

B. The Bridge Incident

63. On Monday, June 1, 2020, all Plaintiffs gathered for a peaceful protest in front of Lew 

Sterrett Justice Center to exercise their First Amendment rights and voice their concerns regarding 

recent instances of police brutality.

64. While the rally was ongoing, DPD blocked all of the entrances and exits to the garage, so 

no Plaintiff or other protesters who were parked in the garage could leave. After the rally at Lew 

Sterrett Plaintiffs began marching along with other protesters.

65. When the crowd’s march reached the intersection with the roadway leading to the Bridge,

they found that DPD positioned themselves and had stopped traffic so that protesters would enter 

the westbound ramp onto the Bridge as all other sides of the intersection were blocked by police. As the 

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Plaintiffs proceeded onto the Bridge, none received any instruction not to go on to the Bridge or a 

warning that they would be arrested or detained for doing so. Protesters were told by law enforcement to 

“continue moving” but were never warned not to walk up the ramp to the Bridge.

66. As the peaceful protest continued, protestors were met by a line of law enforcement officers 

dressed in riot gear coming from the west side of the Bridge. The protesters including Plaintiffs, 

turned around to try to exit the bridge from the direction which they had entered.

67. However, upon trying to vacate the bridge the protestors were met with another line of law 

enforcement officers in riot gear who blocked their exit from the bridge.

68. Upon meeting the officers at the east end of the bridge, protestors stopped and peacefully 

stood while chanting. They put their hands in the air and chanted “Hands up! Don’t shoot!” As the 

officers continued to advance eastward toward the protesters, they began to kneel with their hands 

up and continued to chant “Hands up! Don’t shoot!”

69. Then, all of the street lights on the Bridge simultaneously went out, which caused confusion

and agitation amongst the protesters. During this commotion, law enforcement gave the protesters 

instructions to disperse and proceed home. Law enforcement officers did not, however, instruct

the protesters asto how and in which direction they should disperse. Because the protesters were in 

the middle of the Bridge and surrounded by law enforcement officers on both sides who were 

blocking the protesters’ means of exiting, the Plaintiffs, along with hundreds of other protesters 

were trapped with nowhere to go and no way to comply with the officers’instructions.

70. After several minutes of confusion, and without provocation, law enforcement officers 

began firing into the crowd of protesters using pepper balls, flash-bangs, smoke bombs, tear gas, and KIPs 

causing protesters to run for cover on the Bridge.

71. As a result of the pepper balls, smoke bombs, and tear gas, Plaintiffs were disoriented and 

unable to see. Which they were disabled, Law enforcement officers then closed in on Plaintiffs 

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and them to get on the ground and advised that they were all being arrested. Law enforcement

began to zip tie the Plaintiffs who were either sitting or laying down on their stomachs flat on the 

ground. Some had even been injured by the “less lethal ammunition” deployed by law enforcement

officers.

72. Plaintiffs were held unconstitutionally for over two hours on the Bridge before being finally 

released by law enforcement.

73. The law enforcement officers had kettled Plaintiffs on the bridge. They began to tell the 

protestors to get on the ground and advised that they were all being arrested and began to zip tie 

the protestors who were laying down on their stomachs flat on the ground.

74. At no point did any Plaintiff pose a threat of serious harm to any member of law 

enforcement or engage in criminal activity. Even when zip tied, Plaintiffs did not actively resist or 

attempt to evade by flight. Despite this, as a result of Defendants’ policies and practices, however, 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated.

75. DPD Officers, Sheriff’s Deputies, State Troopers, and Federal Agents would eventually 

detain approximately 674 protesters on the Bridge at the end of the march from the Frank Crowley 

Courts Building downtown that was, by all accounts, entirely peaceful.

76. The only violence on the Bridge came from DPD Officers, Sheriff’s Deputies, State 

Troopers, and Federal Agents who fired so-called “less lethal” rubber bullets, along with pepper 

balls, smoke bombs, and tear gas, at nonthreatening, kneeling demonstrators who had been kettled

by police. Assessing the incident the next day, Chief Hall said, “I strongly believe we made the right 

decisions to deter and disperse the large crowd on the bridge.”

77. But the DPD Officers Defendants, Sheriff Deputy Defendants, and State Trooper 

Defendants did not “deter” or “disperse” the crowd and instead deliberately prevented participants 

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from leaving by kettling them onto the Bridge.

78. The conduct of DPD Officers, the Sheriff’s Deputies, State Troopers, and Federal Agents 

particularly toward peaceful protestors, shows that Defendants are present at protests not simply 

to prevent property damage and keep the public safe but rather to retaliate against citizens for

exercising their constitutional rights. Indeed, DPD Officers, Sheriff’s Deputies, State Troopers, and 

Federal Agents and those working with them were and are dressed and armed to use violence 

against protestors, demonstrators, and bystanders. It is evident through their militaristic, 

indiscriminately violent conduct toward peaceful protesters, bystanders, press—and as widely 

captured on video— that Defendants were not present to serve a public safety role, but instead to 

dominate the protesters.

C. The City of Dallas uses KIPs and other “less lethal” force in a deadly manner—

even when it violates the City of Dallas’s own written polices and the U.S. Constitution.

79. KIPs—often called “rubber,” “sponge,” or “foam” bullets—describe a category of 

ammunition used commonly in crowd-control settings, and include pepper balls. Some KIPs are

made of hardened foam or plastic, often containing a rigid or metal core. Others are “beanbag” type 

rounds, and others may be composed of rubber or wood.

80. Regardless of their composition, these projectiles are shot out of guns at speeds comparable

to that of a typical bullet, and when they hit their target, they can maim, blind, or even kill. Although

police departments often use KIPs in crowd control because they claim they are allegedly 

“nonlethal” or “less lethal,” research shows they cannot be used safely. At close range, they can break 

bones, fracture the skull[,] and explode the eyeball. If they hit the face, they can cause permanent damage 

and disability. And even at long distances, they have unpredicted trajectories, they bounce, and they’re 

quite indiscriminate. In fact, some police departments prohibit KIP usage between 6 and 165 feet:

81. An independent 2017 study found that these projectiles have caused significant morbidity 

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and mortality during the past 27 years, much of it from penetrative injuries and head, neck and 

torso trauma Given their inherent inaccuracy, potential for misuse and associated health 

consequences of severe injury, disability and death, KIPs do not appear to be appropriate weapons 

for use in crowd-control settings.

82. That is why law enforcement experts are warning that rubber bullets should be used only 

to control ‘an extremely dangerous crowd. And medical experts have stated ”Shooting them into 

open crowds is reckless and dangerous.”

83. DPD purchased 40mm eXact iMpact extended range “sponge” bullets, confirming that DPD

acquired KIPs. Yet, even though DPD has been purchasing them since at least 2013, the City of

Dallas has never had any specific written policy regarding the use of sponge bullet or other KIPs 

fired from 40mm “Stinger” launchers. The City of Dallas was aware of the risk of severe injury 

from these sponge bullets. And DPD Officers have shown time and time again that they have never

been properly trained—and, on information and belief, have never been trained at all— on when 

and how the use of these weapons is permitted by the United States Constitution. Yet DPD Officers

and those working with them continue to use these extreme, deadly weapons against passive 

protestors never posing the immediate risk of serious harm the U.S. Constitution requires before 

officers may consider using deadly force.

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84. These egregious abuses during the 2020 Protests are not the first time the City of Dallas 

and Former Chief Hall discovered—and then ratified—officers’ use of “less lethal” ammunition 

against peaceful protesters. After DPD Officers used pepper balls on a non- threatening crowd 

during the September 2018 protests following Botham Jean’s murder by then- DPD Officer Amber 

Guyger, it became evident that the City of Dallas knew its officers violated written policies on the 

use of “less lethal” force and were untrained in the proper use of those weapons for crowd control.

85. Like the 2020 Protests, none of the Botham Jean-related protestors were threatening any 

physical violence or property damage when they were shot with pepper balls— a direct violation 

of the DPD’s General Orders prohibiting officers from using pepper balls unless the crowd was 

“threatening unlawful property damage or physical force.” Indeed, Chief Hall admitted that she

was concerned when she learned police fired the ammunition with no “immediate threat to the 

public” to justify their use under the General Orders. “The day after the protest, one of many after 

Jean’s Sept. 6 death, Police Chief U. Renee Hall called for a review of the pepper- ball incident.”

In a written statement, Chief Hall admitted she had knowledge of the excessive force: “I am 

concerned to learn of reports that one of our officers deployed potentially several pepper balls

during a demonstration last night. I have asked our investigative unit to conduct a full review. The

use of pepper balls is governed by our General Orders, and they are only to be utilized if instructed 

to do so by the on-scene commander or if there is an immediate threat to the public. I plan to meet 

directly with the leadership of the demonstration to address their concerns.”

86. But Former Chief Hall took no action against the officers and instead reinforced the 

practice. Upon information and belief, no Internal Affairs investigation was ever conducted into

that incident, nor was any additional training, supervision, or discipline ordered or provided

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to DPD Officers regarding the use of pepper balls or the use of force as a means of crowd control 

in a protest setting after the 2018 Botham Jean demonstrations and before the 2020 Protests.

87. The DPD General Orders governing the use of pepper balls at the time classified pepper 

balls “as hard empty hand control on the DPD Response Continuum,” which requires a subject to

exhibit only “defensive resistance,” not the “aggravated aggression” required for deadly force. That 

policy, 902.0, further stated that pepper balls “[m]ay be used as saturation to disperse unruly or 

rioting crowds threatening unlawful property damage or physical force.” The orders further state 

that “[t]he Pepper Ball System Area Saturation will not be used on subjects who are passively 

resisting or who are not posing a physical threat to persons/property to include persons fleeing the scene.”

88. None of the officers involved nor Chief Hall ever suggested the protesters were threatening 

unlawful property damage or physical force, or that they ever did more thanpassively resist, as the

policy required. The only stated reason for shooting pepper balls at the crowd was “to keep 

protesters back” as the crowd turned onto Cadiz Street headed for the Dallas Police Association

office.

89. Nevertheless, the preliminary report of the incident review concluded that the use of the 

pepper ball gun “was ‘consistent’ with the department’s general orders.” The report also found 

that the officer seen on video firing the ammunition was not certified to use the gun at the time, 

and that his “certification on the gun had been expired for a year.” And, although Chief Hall did 

not know the day after the incident whether the officer was instructed to use the weapon by the onscene commander, the report found that a sergeant had instructed officers “to deny the crowd 

access to Cadiz Street.” Ultimately, “the incident was treated as minor by the department.”

90. By approving of the use of pepper balls against a crowd that did no more than passively 

resist—and never threated to damage any property or use physical force—the City of Dallas 

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ratified the use of “less lethal” ammunition that directly violated the DPD General Orders. The 

Jean incident showed not only that officers not qualified to use less lethal ammunition are 

instructed to do so anyway, but that even when that unqualified officer predictably usesthe weapon 

in a way that violates written policy, City of Dallas officials simply deny that the policy says what 

it says. And even though the Jean incident made it plain that officers were in need of training to 

use these “less lethal” guns for crowd control only in ways actually “consistent” with the City of 

Dallas’s policies, the City of Dallashas never given officers training on the matter. Therefore, the 

City of Dallas’s de facto policy improperly and unconstitutionally allows police to use “less lethal” 

ammunition against non-threatening crowds, including non-threatening protestors.

91. Despite knowing that officers were not trained to follow the City of Dallas’s written

policies regarding pepper balls, and having ratified the custom of using such extreme force against 

non-threatening protestors as official policy, the City of Dallas chose to purchase and arm officers 

with another form of “less lethal” ammunition without enacting any general order to ensure the 

constitutional use of the weapon, or even providing officers any training in how to do so. It was

obvious that “the highly predictable consequence of not training” DPD Officers was that they 

“would apply force in such a way that the Fourth Amendment rights of [citizens] were at risk.” 

Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 461 (5th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 235 F.3d 944 (5th 

Cir. 2000). The City of Dallas has an established pattern and practice of usingexcessive, potentially 

lethal force to disperse non-violent peaceful crowds and protestors in Dallas.

92. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall knew from the Jean protests that officers were not trained 

on the proper use of “less lethal” pepper ball KIPs for crowd control when the City of Dallas 

contracted to use “sponge rounds.” But instead of training officers accordingly, the City of Dallas added 

another “less lethal” KIP to officers’ arsenal. Even though the “sponge” bullets are even more harmful than

pepper balls, the City of Dallas ignored the increased danger they pose to citizens by providing officers no 

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additional training on how to use the sponge bullets. And at no time has the City of Dallas, Chief Garcia, 

or Former Chief Hall established a general order or written policy specific to the more dangerous sponge 

bullets and corresponding weapons.

93. The City of Dallas can hardly be surprised that when groups gathered again in Dallas in 

2020 to peacefully protest that DPD Officers would again use “less lethal” munitions to control 

the crowd—ignoring whether the crowd posed any actual threat of harm, let alone an immediate 

threat of serious harm to persons. When DPD Officers and those working with them trapped

Plaintiffs and the hundreds of peaceful protesters on the Bridge on June 1, 2020, the crowd that

police fired directly into—like crowds in the Jean incident—had not and did not riot and never 

threatened property damage or physical force, as journalists on the scene and video footage ofthe 

events confirm.

94. The weapons DPD Officers and those working with them used to control non- threatening 

crowds of protestors during the 2020 Protests are even more lethal than claimed. The protestors on 

the Bridge on June 1, 2020, not only knelt and raised their hands, but they were also retreating. 

Some protesters even turned their backs and began running away from the advancing officers. 

Still, police stalked and kettled protesters down the Bridge and again shot pepper balls and KIPs 

directly at protesters, without provocation. The Jordan Family tried to leave, but were prevented 

from doing so by law enforcement before they were then kettled onto the Bridge.

95. When faced with plain instances of DPD Officers and those working with them violating 

the constitutional limits of force and the City of Dallas’s own written policies, the City of Dallas 

and Chief Hall have encouraged and defended the practice, deterring protesters from attending future 

protests. In doing so, the City of Dallas and Chief Hall reaffirmed the City of Dallas’s official unwritten

policy and practice of using excessive, potentially deadly, force against non-threatening, peaceful protesters

as a means of intimidation and control, and to prevent citizens like the Jordan Family from exercising their 

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constitutional rights.

96. On its face, however, the City of Dallas’s own use of force policy recognizes that treating 

KIPs and pepper balls as anything less than deadly force is unconstitutional. In the 2016 General 

Orders, the City of Dallas’s Response Continuum Policy 901.04 on “Levels of Control” expressly 

defines “deadly force” as: “Deadly Force: The use of physical control that will cause death or 

serious bodily injury.” The policy then mandates that “Deadly Force will only be employed in 

accordance with the Department’s Deadly Force Policy (refer to Section 906.00).” As explained

above—and as Plaintiffs experienced firsthand—KIPs and pepper balls cause serious bodily injury. 

Thus, pepper balls and KIPs from the 40mm launcher should have been defined as deadly force 

according to the City of Dallas’s other policies. And because the U.S. Constitution bars officers from 

using deadly force except where there is an “immediate threat” of harm to the officer or others, by not 

classifying KIPs and pepper balls as deadly force, the City of Dallas’s policies on those “less lethal” 

weapons are facially unconstitutional.

97. Furthermore, by failing to train DPD Officers and others working with them to use pepper 

balls and KIPs shot from the 40mm launcher in accordance with the City of Dallas’s deadly force 

policy—and indeed, actively training officers to use the devices where deadly force would be 

prohibited by the U.S. Constitution and the City of Dallas’s own policy—the City of Dallas has 

established that its unwritten policies on KIPs and Pepper balls are unconstitutional.

D. Amid the ongoing 2020 Protests and the Bridge incident in Dallas and nationwide, 

Defendants refused to acknowledge failures.

98. In the days after the incidents that injured Plaintiffs, Former Chief Hall confirmed what so

many citizens and Plaintiffs have long known: the City of Dallas’s current use of force policies are 

insufficient to “address challenges between law enforcement and communities of color.” Public 

outrage over the June 1, 2020 Bridge incident prompted Dallas residents to demand Chief Hall’s 

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resignation. When Mayor Eric Johnson asked her “Where would you say the buck stops in the

Dallas Police Department?” Hall replied: “It stops with me.” Former Chief Hall has not recanted

her statement defending officers’ actions at the Bridge under the guise of “protect[ing] protesters 

from vehicular injury on a roadway still open to traffic.” Tellingly, after arresting protestors on the 

Bridge (purportedly for obstructing a highway or for violating the curfew ordinance; protesters 

were not clear why they were being arrested), Former Chief Hall dropped all charges—but only 

after demonstrators were successfully intimidated and deterred from exercising their First 

Amendment rights and only after Plaintiffs and hundreds of others were unconstitutionally seized, 

held, and injured by Defendants.

99. In what has been called “the worst city council meeting Dallas has witnessed in a decade,” 

Dallas Mayor Eric Johnson grilled Chief Hall about the incident on the Bridge and challenged her 

claim that officers did not tear gas protestors. “Hall said tear gas was not fired, that it was smoke.

She said she ordered the SWAT team to not fire tear gas. Mayor Johnson then wanted to know the 

chemical breakdown in the smoke. She could not say. Councilman Adam Medrano said he 

believed Chief Hall’s order to not fire tear gas was disobeyed, because the reactions of those on 

the Bridge was so violent. He demanded that she determine who violated her order.” Across 

America, cities continue to announce plans to consider significant changes in police protocol and,

indeed, whether to limit the extent and funding of police departments as a whole. “A growing 

number of people suffering serious injuries in Dallas, Austin and across the nation from plastic, rubber and

wooden bullets are raising new questions about how and when police officers use these weapons.” On June 

9, 2020, Austin’s police chief “banned the use of these weapons for crowd control purposes after a 20-yearold black man, a Latino teenager and a pregnant woman were critically injured.”

100. Under this constant pressure, Chief Hall announced on Thursday, June 4, 2020, that she

“had instituted a new general order compelling members of the department — both sworn and nonCase 3:22-cv-01193-S Document 28 Filed 02/28/23 Page 23 of 47 PageID 370
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sworn—‘to either stop, or attempt to stop, another employee when force is being inappropriately 

applied or is no longer required.’” Then on Monday, June 8, 2020, Chief Hall officially banned 

chokeholds and “said next week the Dallas Police Department will institute a policy requiring 

officers to announce warnings before shooting.” Chief Hall said DPD would institute a policy 

requiring police to announce warnings before shooting, “to release more dash cam and body cam 

videos as well as order a review all use of force policies.” Yet, the policies enacted thereafter still 

do not address the use of KIPs and other riot control devices as general “crowd control” or the use 

of kettling against peaceful protestors.

101. On July 22, 2020, Dallas independent news media Central Track reported that DPD had 

apparently completed its “Preliminary After-Action Report” on the first four days of the 2020 

Protests (which DPD calls the “Protests for Equality”) as early as June 12, 2020. After the report 

was leaked by a City Hall employee, Central Track published it on July 22, 2020.

102. On August 14, 2020, DPD released its final “George Floyd Protests After Action 

Report” (the “After-Action Report”). The After-Action Report reveals several notable 

details about the first four days of protests:

a. DPD admits that “during a review of the use of force and through the recognition that

existing General Orders were vague on the deployment of less- than-lethal projectiles 

during crowd control incidents, General Orders 902.02 and 908.04 were created to ensure 

Pepperball launchers and 40mm Less Lethal “Stingers” are not deployed into crowds in the future”;

b. The report also makes “clear mention about the use of teargas on the protesters arrested 

on the bridge on June 1,” despite Chief Hall’s continued denial that tear gas was used;

c. DPD estimates that SWAT officers deployed at least 335 projectiles from the 40mm 

launcher, 36 Pepper balls, and 30 tear gas canisters, while claiming that DPD patrol officers 

used 68 Pepper balls and 40mm KIPs;

d. It is likely that those estimates are low, given that DPD admits it was not fully tracking 

the police resources it was expending, noting that many officers were “freelancing,” which 

the report then describes as “the spontaneous reaction to an observed need for action.” The 

report notes that such officer activity “made tracking police resources extremely difficult.”

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e. Tragically, the report admits that “the standard operating procedure of creating a 

highly visible officer presence for managing crowd control incited the emotions of the

protests”;

f. Reportedly, the efforts by DPD cost taxpayers “$920,000 in salaries and overtime,

$377,000 in goods, equipment and services, and $215,000 in vehicle usage and damage.”

103. Although the City of Dallas, for the first time, recently enacted a policy regarding the 

“40mm ‘Stinger’ Less Lethal Launcher System,” the new policy makes plain that DPD still Roes 

not hold officers’ use of KIPs to a lethal force standard. For instance, the policy permits officers 

to fire KIPs using the 40mm launcher at a suspect who is “not actively aggressive.” But under the 

Use-of-Force Continuum, deadly force is not permitted even against someone who is actively 

aggressive; “aggravated aggressive” conduct is required. The policy Roes not even demand that

the suspect pose an actual danger at the time, but rather, allows officers to fire KIPs at a suspect 

who is “moving to an area that is potentially more dangerous to himself or others.” Ultimately, the 

policy requires no “immediate” threat of harm to shoot the KIPs directly at a person. However,

none of these policies address the real problem here: the City of Dallas refuses to hold “less lethal”

KIPs and pepper ballsto the standard forlethalforce, even though they cause serious injuries and even death.

104. Upon information and belief, to date, neither the City of Dallas nor Chief Hall terminated 

any of the Jane or John Roe Police Officers, or any other DPD Officers present or working during 

the 2020 Protests, nor have they required that these officers be disciplined, have additional 

supervision, or undergo additional training. By doing so, the City of Dallas and Chief Hall ratified 

and tacitly approved of their conduct.

105. Upon information and belief, to date, the Dallas County Defendants, State of Texas 

Defendants nor Federal Defendants have terminated any of the John and Jane Smith Sheriff’s 

Deputies, John and Jane White State Troopers, present or working during the 2020 Protests, nor 

have they required that these Deputies or Troopers be disciplined, have additional supervision, or 

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undergo additional training. By doing so, the Sheriff Brown, DPS, and DPS Director Steven C. 

McCraw ratified and tacitly approved of their conduct.

VII. CAUSES OF ACTION

A. FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION

COUNT ONE – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(City of Dallas Defendants)

106. Plaintiffs by reference incorporate and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as though 

fully stated herein.

107. Plaintiffs engaged in constitutionally protected acts of observing, recording, or 

participating in events of public interest, including public demonstrations and expressing their 

political views. Plaintiffs will continue to do so in the future.

108. In 2018, Former Chief Hall admitted that she knew “less lethal” ammunition was being 

used against peaceful protestors who were not threatening to commit property damage or physical 

violence but encouraged and defended the practice because it dispersed the crowds.

109. The actions of the City of Dallas Defendants, the suppression of a peaceful demonstration 

and the viewpoint it represented—and the actions of Chief Hall in ordering such suppression—

deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to freedom

ofspeech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 

The City of Dallas Defendants deliberately violated well-established protections for the exercise 

of speech and assembly in public places.

110. The City of Dallas Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for engaging in constitutionally 

protected activity and for the content and viewpoint of their expressions. The City of Dallas 

Defendants’ and Chief Hall’s retaliation is part of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct 

that is highly likely to continue absent relief.

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111. The City of Dallas Defendants’ violent actions were not a reasonable regulation of the time, 

place, or manner of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment protected activity. These actions were not justified 

by a compelling—or even substantial—government interest justifying the infringement of 

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Even assuming, arguendo, that there had been a compelling 

government interest in protecting against property damage or clearing streets of protestors, theCity

of Dallas Defendants’ actions toward Plaintiffs and the groups of protesters were not narrowly 

tailored to serve that government interest in a lawful manner.

112. Plaintiffs reasonably fear the continued indiscriminate use of KIPs and deployment of

chemical agents by Defendants without warning. Plaintiffsfurther reasonably fear unlawful seizure 

and excessive force through the firing of flash bang grenades, KIPs and other projectiles, and other 

means if Plaintiffs and protesters continue to engage in constitutionally protected activity.

113. These acts would chill a reasonable person from continuing to engage in a constitutionally 

protected activity. These acts did, in fact, chill Plaintiffs from continuing to observe and record

some events of public interest and to participate in peaceful protests. TheCity of Dallas Defendants 

acted with reckless or callous indifference to the constitutionally protected rights of Plaintiffs.

114. It was the City of Dallas Defendants’ custom and policy, as well as the City of Dallas 

Defendants’ failure to train and supervise DPD Officers and issue corrective instructions after 

violations were brought to light, that caused the First Amendment retaliation.

115. The City of Dallas Defendants’ continued failure to supervise and train DPD Officers with 

respect to the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights 

of Plaintiffs.

116. Dallas has a long history of violating First Amendment rights of protesters, 

117. Defendant City of Dallas and/or Defendant Hall are liable for the constitutional violations 

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described herein because the violations arose from a persistent, widespread pattern or practice of 

falsely arresting and charging peaceful protestors with false charges.

118. The pattern of similar constitutional violations against Plaintiffs and other protesters that 

occurred during the 2018 and 2020 Protests demonstrates the deliberate indifference of the City of 

Dallas Defendants to the rights of Plaintiffs and other protesters.

119. Further, given the multiple constitutional violations documented above, the need for more 

supervision or training was so obvious, and the inadequacy of the training and supervision so likely 

to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the City of Dallas Defendants demonstrated 

their deliberate indifference to the need for such training and supervision.

120. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were violated when they were deliberately targeted and 

shot with KIPs, pepper balls, tear gas, flashbang grenades, and smoke during the course of their 

protest activities.

121. Plaintiffs reasonably fear further retaliation in the future if they continue to observe, 

record, or participate in constitutionally protected activity.

122. The City of Dallas Defendants intentionally and with reckless disregard caused the injury

of Plaintiffs by means of the DPD Officer Defendants’ use of physical force to suppress free speech, 

which was instructed or authorized by Chief Hall. These actions or omissions were the direct result 

of the City of Dallas’s written and unwritten policies.

123. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the City of Dallas Defendants

while acting under color state law, Plaintiffs were deprived of their First Amendment rights to 

freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government for a redress of

grievances.

B. EXCESSIVE FORCE

COUNT TWO – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against DPD Officer Defendants)

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124. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as though 

fully stated herein.

125. At all times alleged herein, DPD Officer Defendants were sworn police officers with the 

DPD, and acting under color of law.

126. At all relevant times alleged herein, no citizen, officer, or bystander was in imminent fear 

for their life or in fear of the Plaintiffs causing them serious bodily injury.

127. At all relevant times alleged herein, Plaintiffs never threatened to harm any property.

128. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs possessed the right to be free from excessive force.

129. Former Chief Hall instituted a policy and practice of using excessive force against nonthreatening, peaceful protesters as a means of intimidation and control.

130. The DPD Officer Defendants used unreasonable force when Plaintiffs did not pose an 

imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the DPD Officer Defendants or any other person during 

the relevant time alleged herein.

131. The DPD Officer Defendants further used objectively unreasonable force when Plaintiffs 

did not pose any threat of harm to property during the relevant time alleged herein.

132. Using physical force such as KIPs—including rubber, sponge, or pepper bullets— against a 

non-threatening individual is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Given the gross 

disparity between the need for force and the level of pain and injury inflicted, the DPD Officer 

Defendants’ use of force was also malicious and intentional

133. Plaintiffs’ right to be free from the use of excessive force is clearly established and has 

been for decades. Plaintiffs committed no crime, posed no threat to anyone’s safety,and did not 

resist the DPD Officer Defendants or fail to comply with a command.

134. Officers must undertake risk assessment and de-escalation, including warning before using 

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force that can kill.

135. The force used by the DPD Officer Defendants was objectively unnecessary, excessive, 

and unreasonable under the circumstances, as Plaintiffs did not pose an immediate threat to the 

safety of the DPD Officer Defendants, and the use of such excessive force was unjustified. Rather, 

the DPD Officer Defendants embarked on a willful, malicious, reckless, and outrageous course of

conduct that wasintended to cause and, in fact, did cause Plaintiffsto suffer:

(1) physical injury; (2) extreme and severe mental and emotional distress, agony, and anxiety; 

and (3) deprivations of their constitutional rights.

136. The DPD Officer Defendants did not need to fire KIPs at a non-threatening peaceful crowd, 

let alone at Plaintiffs—who had tried to leave the protests and were prevented from doing so by 

DPD Officers and those workingwith them. Moreover, the use of KIPs bullets was unwarranted and 

excessive to the articulated need of dispersing protesters from the Bridge and from downtown Dallas, and 

excessive to the purported needs of effectuating arrest or crowd control.

137. Likewise, the DPD Officer Defendants’ use of force was inappropriate and unwarranted as 

a use of crowd control for peaceful, non-threating participants in protests, in violation of the 

Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.

138. Moreover, no reasonably competent official would have concluded that the actions of the 

DPD Officer Defendants described herein would not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. In 

other words, no reasonably prudent police officer under similar circumstances could have believed 

that the conduct of the DPD Officer Defendants was constitutionally permissible or that the 

treatment of Plaintiffs was reasonable, particularly under the egregious circumstances of using 

force against Plaintiffs who did nothing to warrant using any force at all.

139. As a result of these violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the injuries they 

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sustained as result of the DPD Officer Defendants’ actions while acting under color state law, 

Plaintiffs seek compensation as set forth more specifically in the section of this Complaint entitled

“Damages.”

C. EXCESSIVE FORCE

COUNT THREE – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Against Defendant City of Dallas)

140. The City of Dallas is liable for all damages suffered by the Plaintiffs pursuant to Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 704 (1978) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on an official 

policy or custom of DPD of which the City Council, the City Manager, the Mayor, and Chief Hall

all had actual or constructive knowledge and which was a moving force behind the constitutional 

violations alleged herein.

141. The excessive force used by the DPD Officer Defendants is the direct result of the City of 

Dallas’s de facto unwritten policy that allows police to use “less lethal”—but not “nonlethal” –

ammunition and devices against a crowd, including against protesters who are not immediately

threatening serious physical injury. The City of Dallas has known, since at least the 2018 protests

following Botham Jean’s death, of the obviousrisk that KIPs would cause the type of constitutional 

violations and physical injuries that Plaintiffs have suffered. And the City of Dallas has used 

sponge/rubber bullet KIPs since at least 2013. Yet the City has never developed any written or

unwritten policy regarding the constitutional use of the KIPs and, thus, it was highly predictable that

DPD Officers would continue to violate protesters’, bystanders’, journalists’, and citizens’ (like 

Plaintiffs) constitutional rights usingsponge/rubber and other KIPs. Accordingly, the City of Dallas

Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the complete lack of training, or completely 

inadequate training, they have given DPD Officers on these “less lethal” forms of ammunition.

142. The written and unwritten policies of the City of Dallas, therefore, are the moving forces 

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behind the constitutional violations inflicted on Plaintiffs through the excessive force of the DPD 

Officer Defendants.

143. As a direct and proximate cause of the DPD Officer Defendants’ use of excessive force

while acting under color state law, Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer severe injuries 

including, but not limited to, emotional distress and physical pain and suffering.

D. UNLAWFUL SEIZURE

COUNT FOUR – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Law Enforcement Defendants)

144. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as though 

fully stated herein.

145. Plaintiffs were seized by the Law Enforcement Officer Defendants when LE Officers 

prevented Plaintiffs from leaving the Frank Crowley Courts Building following the peaceful 

protest that took place there on June 1, 2020.

146. Plaintiffs were further seized by the LE Officer Defendants when Officers willfully,

through the use of force and threat of arrest, chemical agents, KIPs and other projectiles, “kettling,” 

and other riot control tactics, terminated Plaintiffs’ freedom of movement.

147. The LE Officer Defendants committed these acts without forewarning or justification and, 

as a result, the LE Officer Defendants’ acts were objectively unreasonable and constituted 

unlawful seizure and excessive force.

148. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs did not commit a crime.

149. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs did not pose a threat to any of the LE Officer Defendants, 

to Plaintiffs themselves, or to any other person.

150. It was the City of Dallas’s custom and policy, as well as the City of Dallas’s and Chief 

Hall’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline its officers or issue corrective instructions after 

violations were brought to light, that caused the unlawful seizures and excessive use of force.

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151. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated when they were deliberately targeted 

and shot with KIPs, pepper balls, tear gas, flashbang grenades, and pepper spray during the course 

of Plaintiffs’ lawful protests and presence at the protests. Because DPD Officers actively 

threatened Plaintiffs with these “less lethal” weapons throughout their encounters with DPD, 

Plaintiffs were not free to leave without such physical force being used against them.

152. Plaintiffs reasonably fear further retaliation in the future in violation of the Fourth

Amendment if they continue to observe, record, or participate in constitutionally protected activity.

153. It is the pattern and practice of the City of Dallas and Chief Hall to arrest but not charge 

protesters as a means to suppress First Amendment rights. As explained above, it is also the City 

of Dallas’s de facto unwritten policy for police to use “less lethal”—but not “nonlethal”—

ammunition and devices against a crowd, including against protesters who are not immediately 

threatening serious physical injury.

154. It is also the City of Dallas’ policy, whether written or de facto, to employ kettling 

techniques against peaceful protesters in order to dominate, control, and unlawfully seize 

protesters. DPD Officers are trained to operate in formation “in order to disperse or control an 

unruly crowd.” Specifically, DPD Officers are trained to operate in Mobile Field Force Units to 

“remove those involved citizens who are agitating the crowd” by facing the crowd in a line and to 

utilize “flanking movements” to change the Mobile Force Unit’s forward motion toward crowds. 

DPD Officers are also specifically trained that, when employing a Mobile Field Force, “[c]rowds 

must be allowed an avenue of departure[.]” Yet no such avenue of departure was available on June 

1, 2020.

155. In its After Action Report, DPD indicted that its modifications of standard responses to 

“unlawful assemblies” required “officers to create paths for dispersing crowds without creating an 

opportunity for increased confrontation.” DPD stated that its officers “were close enough to create 

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direction, without being so close as to create a target.” These statements are, at the very least, 

inconsistent with DPD Officer Defendants’ actions on the Bridge.

156. These written and unwritten policies of the City of Dallas, therefore, are the moving forces 

behind the unconstitutional seizures suffered by Plaintiffs in violation of their Fourth Amendment 

rights.

157. As a direct and proximate result of the LE Officer Defendants’ acts and omissions while 

acting under color state law as stated above, Plaintiffs were deprived of their Fourth Amendment 

rights and suffered injuries and damages.

E. FAILURE TO SUPERVISE OR DISCIPLINE

COUNT FIVE – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Defendant City of Dallas)

158. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as though 

fully stated herein.

159. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall are directly responsible for supervising police officers in 

the use of physical and lethal force and for disciplining police officers for using force that violates 

City of Dallas policies or the Unites States Constitution.

160. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall knew at least as early as 2018 that DPD Officers were 

using KIPs like Pepper balls as a means of crowd control for non-threatening protestors in violation 

of the DPD General Orders and the United States Constitution. But the City of Dallas and Chief 

Hall deliberately chose not to supervise DPD Officers to ensure they were only using KIPs within 

constitutional limits. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall also failed to discipline officers who used 

KIPs against non-threatening protesters or to discipline officers who used KIPs in a manner that

violated the General Orders and the Constitution. Instead, Chief Hall further authorized the unsafe 

use of KIPs and authorized the further use of the ammunition on peaceful, non-threatening,

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protestors, as a means of crowd control and to deter the exercise of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment 

rights. This constituted deliberate indifference toward the outrageous and reckless use of force.

161. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall also knew of the risks associated with the 40mm eXact 

iMpact extended range sponge round, including incapacitation, and significant injury. But the City of Dallas

and Chief Hall also failed to take disciplinary action in response to the unlawful use of KIPs against nonthreatening crowds protesting the death of George Floyd in 2020. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall also 

failed to take disciplinary action in response to officers using KIPs for crowd control in an unlawful manner 

that was likely to cause serious injuries and, possibly, death.

162. Although the City of Dallas has used sponge and/or rubber bullet KIPs since at least 2013,

and the City of Dallas issued General Orders for less lethal Pepper Ball KIPs by 2016 at the latest,

the City of Dallas and Chief Hall have never issued General Ordersregarding sponge and/or rubber 

bullet KIPs. Likewise, Chief Hall and the City of Dallas ratified the use of Pepper Ball KIPs against 

non-threatening protestors in violation of those General Orders. Upon information and belief, to 

date, none of the DPD Officer Defendants have been terminated, disciplined, required to have 

additional supervision, or required to undergo additional training. Accordingly, given that Chief 

Hall did not discipline or supervise virtually all of the DPD Officers who used sponge and/or 

rubber bullet KIPs or pepper balls against Plaintiffs and other non-threatening protesters, it is

reasonable to infer that in the eyes of the City of Dallas and Chief Hall, the officers’ illegal conduct 

actually conformed with the City of Dallas’s policy.

163. These written and unwritten policies of the City of Dallas are, therefore, the moving forces 

behind the violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

164. As a direct and proximate result of the DPD Officer Defendants’ acts and omissions while 

acting under color state law as stated above, Plaintiffs were deprived of their Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights and suffered injuries and damages.

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F. FAILURE TO TRAIN

COUNT SIX – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Defendant City of Dallas)

165. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as though 

fully stated herein.

166. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall are directly responsible for training on the use of firearms 

with regard to lethal and allegedly less lethal impact weapons, the manner of use, distance of use, 

and use of force continuum.

167. Chief Hall had direct supervisory and policymaking responsibilities for police officers in 

the use of physical and lethal force.

168. Chief Hall knew of the risks associated with the 40 mm eXact iMpact extended range

sponge round but failed to institute any training with regard to the range and risks of certain 

incapacitation, or significant injury.

169. Chief Hall and the City of Dallas knew that as of 2018, DPD Officers were using KIPs and 

pepper balls as a means of crowd control for non-threatening protestors in violation of DPD 

General Orders and the U.S. Constitution. But Chief Hall and the Dallas City Council deliberately 

chose not to train DPD Officers regarding the threat level necessary to justify using the pepper 

balls or other KIPs against a crowd within constitutional limits on the use of force. Instead, Chief

Hall further authorized their use and authorized the further use ofsuch ammunition toward peaceful,

non-threatening protestors as a means of crowd control and to deter the exercise of Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment rights. This constitutes deliberate indifference and outrageous and reckless use of

force.

170. The City of Dallas, the Dallas City Council and Chief Hall also knew of the risks associated 

with the 40mm eXact iMpact extended range sponge round, including incapacitation, and

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significant injury. But the City of Dallas and Chief Hall also failed to train officers in the threat 

level necessary to justify using the sponge bullet KIPs against crowds within the constitutional limits on

the use of force. The City of Dallas and Chief Hall also failed to train officers to use KIPs in manners 

unlikely to cause serious injuries and death.

171. Even after the abuses of pepper ball KIPs in 2018, Chief Hall, the City of Dallas and the

Dallas City Council ratified the use of pepper ball KIPs against non-threatening protestors in

violation of applicable DPD General Orders and the U.S. Constitution. The City of Dallas, the 

Dallas City Council, and Chief Hall actually knew or should have known that their approach has 

failed to prevent unconstitutional conduct by DPD Officers. The City of Dallas, the Dallas City 

Council, and Chief Hall’s continued approval of using KIPs in violation of DPD General Orders 

and the U.S. Constitution demonstrates the conscious disregard the City of Dallas and Chief Hall 

have for the consequences of their actions.

172. The need for training officers in how to use KIPs lawfully—particularly where no training 

has been provided—could hardly have been more obvious to the City of Dallas, the Dallas City 

Council, or Chief Hall since at least the unlawful use of KIPs against crowds in the 2018 protests

following Botham Jean’s death. Absent such training, it was highly predictable that DPD Officers 

would continue to violate Plaintiffs’ and other protesters’ constitutional rights. Accordingly, the 

City of Dallas, the Dallas City Council, and Chief Hall were deliberately indifferent to the complete 

lack of training, or completely inadequate training, they have given DPD Officers.

ALLEGED POLICIES, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES LEADING TO VIOLATIONS OF 

PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS

173. Defendant Officers, acting under color of law and acting pursuant to customs, practices 

and policies of The City of Dallas and DPD in regards to unlawful detention/false arrest, as 

authorized and/or ratified by the City, deprived Plaintiff of rights and privileges secured to him by 

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the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by other laws 

of the United States. 

174. By failing to provide proper training in the elements of criminal charges, including 

disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, the DPD and City exhibited deliberate indifference to an 

obvious need for training. With respect to the claims made the basis of this lawsuit, the City's 

failure to train its employees in a relevant respect reflects a deliberate indifference to the rights of 

the city's inhabitants and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

175. 47. Defendant City of Dallas and DPD under the direction of the Dallas City Council 

developed and maintained a policy of deficient training of its police force in understanding the 

elements of criminal charges and First Amendment rights. 

176. 48. Any reasonably trained officer would not take a person into custody without 

probable cause that they were committing a crime. 

177. 49. The City and DPD's failure to provide adequate training to its police officers 

regarding elements of criminal charges and First and Fourth Amendment rights reflects deliberate 

indifference by of the City and reckless and conscious disregard for the obvious risk that officers 

would unconstitutionally arrest and detain citizens and violate First Amendment rights made the 

violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, a reasonable probability. 

178. Plaintiff would show that Defendant Officers' actions were the result of, or within the scope 

of, wrongful and reckless customs, policies, practices and/or procedures for which the City knew 

or should have known that conduct such as that evidenced in the instant case was likely to occur, 

but never provided the requisite and proper training that would have prevented it. 

179. Upon information and belief, Defendant City, acting through official policies, practices, 

and customs, and with deliberate, callous, and conscious indifference to the constitutional rights 

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of Plaintiff, failed to implement the policies, procedures; and practices necessary to provide 

constitutionally adequate protection to Plaintiff and implemented policies, procedures, and 

practices which were the moving force behind the violation of his constitutional rights. 

180. For instance, the following conduct, policies, and customs, inter alia, by Defendants 

violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights: 

a. The City's failure to adequately train its officers on the Texas criminal code elements 

of charges and First and Fourth Amendment rights; 

b. DPD’s failure to properly supervise Defendant Officers to assure that they did not 

violate citizens’ rights. 

c. DPD's failure to discipline or terminate officers for non-compliance with policy; 

181. The City of Dallas also had a duty to properly supervise its police officers to assure that 

they comply with the law and do not violate citizen rights.

182. Defendant failed to properly supervise its officers. 

183. Plaintiff was arrested without any resistance from the Chief of Police. Instead of 

supervising and assuring that DPD officers did not violate citizens’ rights, the Dallas Chief of 

police simply sat idly by as the violations occurred.

184. The City's failure to properly train/supervise/discipline its police officers regarding the 

elements of criminal charges and First and Second Amendment rights was the proximate cause of 

the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights

185. These written and unwritten policies of the City of Dallas are the moving forces behind the 

violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

186. As a direct and proximate result of the City of Dallas and Chief Hall’s acts and omissions 

while acting under color state law as stated above, Plaintiffs were deprived of their Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights and suffered injuries and damages.

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G. PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

COUNT SEVEN – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Against City of Dallas Defendants)

187. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

188. Additionally, and in the alternative, Plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunctive relief 

against the City of Dallas Defendants.

189. Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable injury as a result of the City of Dallas Defendants’ 

conduct, and the failure to grant permanent injunctive relief will result in further irreparable injury.

The violation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm, particularly where the First

Amendment is concerned.Loss of First Amendmentfreedoms—even forminimal periods of time—

constitutes irreparable injury. As demonstrated herein, the actions of DPD Officers and those 

working with them, authorized and directed by the City of Dallas, the Dallas City Council and

Chief Hall, have had the effect of blocking demonstrators, bystanders, and press from fully

exercising their First Amendment rights. Additionally, the City of Dallas Defendants’ actions chill 

Plaintiffs’ prospective exercise of their rights.

190. The City of Dallas Defendants’ tactics also caused and continue to cause irreparable harm 

under the Fourth Amendment. It is well-established that using deadly force against a person who 

Roes not pose an immediate threat of serious harm violates that person’s Fourth Amendment right 

to be free from excessive force. Firing weapons that—although allegedly “less lethal” than firearm 

rounds are nonetheless still lethal—constitutes excessive force when used against people who pose 

no immediate threat of serious harm at the time. Plaintiffs and other protesters, bystanders, and

press will continue to face excessive deadly force unless the City of Dallas Defendants and those 

working with them are enjoined from using such weapons against people who pose no immediate threat of 

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serious harm at the time.

191. The City of Dallas Defendants’ policies and practices have been overbroad and 

underinclusive: rather than focus on arresting, DPD Officers and those working with them have 

hurled canisters of tear gas and smoke at entire crowds of peaceful protesters and indiscriminately 

fired KIPs at individual protesters not involved in any conduct that posed an immediate threat of 

serious harm at the time. The use of such excessive deadly force is not “narrowly tailored” and 

necessary for keeping roadways clear or for preventing property destruction—neither of which are 

compelling. Thus, the City of Dallas Defendants’ policies and practices do not survive strict 

scrutiny. Further, since the City of Dallas Defendants’ force is directed squarely at suppressing 

free expression—and restricts First Amendment freedoms far more than necessary to prevent an 

immediate threat of serious harm at the time—the policies and practices also fail intermediate 

scrutiny. The City of Dallas Defendants’ actions also violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition 

on excessive force and the First Amendment rights at stake strengthen that claim. The City of 

Dallas Defendants’ authorization of the use of allegedly “less lethal” weapons against protestors, 

bystanders, and press as a means of “crowd control,” absent any imminent threat of serious harm 

to anyone, is inherently excessive, and violates the Fourth Amendment.

192. Remedies available at law are inadequate to fully compensate for Plaintiffs’ injuries

because the loss of their First and Fourth Amendment constitutional rights constitutes an irreparable

harm. Furthermore, permanent injunctive relief is necessary to ensure that future harm is not 

inflicted on Plaintiffs and others seeking to exercise their constitutional rights in Dallas. Without

permanent injunctive relief to prevent the City of Dallas Defendants’ and those working with them

from using these tactics on crowds or people not posing an immediate threat of serious harm at the 

time in the future, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will be chilled from exercising their constitutional 

rights and could potentially incur additional physical injuries caused by the City of Dallas Defendants.

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193. Considering the balance of hardships between Plaintiffs and the City of Dallas Defendants, 

a remedy in equity is warranted. Plaintiffs’ injuries and the likelihood of future injuries to Plaintiffs 

and other peaceful protesters similarly situated outweigh any damage that the injunction will cause

Defendants. The DPD Officer Defendants’ use of allegedly “less lethal” devices to control crowds 

during protests harms not just the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit but many similarly situated people 

seeking to exercise their First Amendment rights, including members of the press. Rather than

develop a narrowly tailored policy to deal with the scarce few disruptive protesters, the City of

Dallas Defendants have chosen an overbroad one: punish all protesters (as well as the press who 

cover their demonstrations and bystanders who may be nearby) with chemical weapons such as 

tear gas, smoke bombs, flash-bangs, pepper balls, mace, and KIPs such as rubber, sponge, and 

foam bullets—among other riot-control weapons and techniques— rather than specifically deal

with any individual persons who pose an immediate threat of serious harm at the time. Whatever 

interest the City of Dallas Defendants might have in preventing property destruction or keeping 

roadways safe Roes not and cannot justify continuing to deploy lethal weapons against peaceful

protesters. Finally, the City of Dallas and Chief Hall both agreed to the entry of an Agreed 

Preliminary Injunction in a related case, indicating that the balance of hardships here Roes, in fact,

weigh in favor of Plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunctive relief.

194. Permanent injunctive relief would also best serve the public interest. It is always in the 

public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights. Because the City of Dallas

Defendants have pursued and continue to pursue a policy of excessive force against peaceful

protesters in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights, Plaintiffsrequest that the Court issue an 

order permanently enjoining the indiscriminate use of this “less lethal” force on people who pose no 

immediate threat of serious harm at the time.

195. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief to prohibit the City of Dallas 

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Defendants, and all DPD Officers from:

a. using “less lethal” weapons, such as tear gas, smoke bombs, flash bangs, pepper balls, 

mace, and other chemical agents in connection with protests: (a) against any protesters, 

bystanders, civilians, or members of the press, who are not posing any immediate threat of 

serious harm to anyone, or (b) using such devices or chemical agents for purposes of 

controlling peaceful crowds;

b. firing or deploying KIPs into a crowd for any purpose; and

c. using kettling or other similar methods to unconstitutionally seize or detain people 

peacefully exercising their constitutional rights.

H. CONSPIRACY

COUNT EIGHT – 42 U.S.C. § 1985

(Against City of Dallas Defendants, Dallas County Defendants, State of Texas Defendants 

and Federal Defendants)

196. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

197. As to each of the above causes of action, by the facts set out herein, Defendants, in whole 

or part, conspired with each other to (a) deprive, either directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs (and other 

protesters) of the equal protection of the laws, and of equal privileges and immunities under the

laws; or (b) hinder othersfrom giving orsecuring equal protection of law to all persons in violation 

of 42 USC § 1985(3).

198. The City of Dallas Defendants, the Dallas County Defendants, the State of Texas 

Defendants, and Federal Defendants conspired (1) across separate law enforcement departments 

and (2) between local police (DPD Officer Defendants), county sheriff’s deputies (Sheriff Deputy 

Defendants), state police (State Trooper Defendants) and federal agencies (Federal Agent 

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Defendants) to deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws or to prevent or inhibit others 

from giving or securing equal protection to all persons.

199. The DPD After Action Report and photographs taken by Plaintiffs show that Sheriff 

Deputy Defendants and State Trooper Defendants were present at the protests Plaintiffs attended 

and that they engaged in the same actions that violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as the DPD 

Officer Defendants.

200. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts in furtherance of their conspiracy 

while acting under color state law, Plaintiffs were deprived of their Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights and suffered injuries and damages.

VIII. DAMAGES

201. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

202. In whole or in part, as a result of some or all of the above actions or omissions of 

Defendants, Plaintiffs have and continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of these violations. 

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions and omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered and 

will continue to suffer severe pain of mind and body, emotional dress, physical manifestations of 

emotional distress, and humiliation. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and

omissions, Plaintiffs were prevented and will continue to be prevented from participating as 

activists and peaceful protesters with regard to causes that directly impact their lives and the lives 

of their friends, families, and communities.

203. Defendants' acts and/or omissions were a proximate cause of the following injuries suffered 

by Plaintiffs:

a. Actual damages;

b. Pain and suffering and mental anguish suffered by Plaintiffs;

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c. Loss of quality of life;

d. Where applicable, exemplary and punitive damages as well as reasonable attorneys' 

fees and costs of court;

e. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable laws, Plaintiffs should be 

awarded reasonable attorney's fees for the preparation and trial of this cause of 

action, and for its appeal, if required;

f. Prejudgment interest; and

g. Post judgment interest.

204. Plaintiffs seeks unliquidated damages in an amount that is within the jurisdictional limits 

of the court.

IX. PUNITIVE/EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

205. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.

206. Additionally, and in the alternative, the conduct of Defendant Law Enforcement Officers 

were done with malice.

207. In the alternative, the DPD Officer Defendants’, the Sheriff Deputy Defendants’, and the 

State Trooper Defendants’ heedless and reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights, safety, and welfare 

constitutes more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or misjudgment. Instead, the 

DPD Officer Defendants, the Sheriff Deputy Defendants, and the State Trooper Defendants acted

with reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights, safety, or

welfare of others. Defendants had actual, subjective awareness of the risks of injury or illegality 

involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious, reckless, or callous indifference to the rights, 

safety, or welfare of others, including Plaintiffs.

208. Such unconscionable conduct goes beyond ordinary negligence, and as such, Plaintiffs 

requests punitive and exemplary damages to deter this type of conduct in the future. In the 

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alternative, such heedless and reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights, safety and welfare is more 

than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence or misjudgment. Such unconscionable conduct

goes beyond ordinary negligence, and as such Plaintiffs requests punitive and exemplary damages

are awarded against Defendant Officers in a sum which is within the jurisdictional limits of this

court.

X. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

209. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) andother 

applicable provisions or in equity. As such, Plaintiffs requests the Court to award costs and 

attorney fees incurred in Plaintiffs’ prosecution of this litigation.

XI. TRIAL BY JURY

210. Plaintiffs have paid a jury fee and demands trial by jury.

XII. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs pray that Defendants be cited to appear 

and answer herein; that upon final trial hereof Plaintiffs has and recovers judgment from 

Defendants; actual damages, exemplary damages, pre-judgment interest at the legalrate; interest 

on said judgment at the legal rate; costs of court; and such other and further relief, both general 

and special, at law and in equity, to which Plaintiffs may show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Kim T. Cole

KIM T. COLE

Texas State Bar No. 24071024

K. COLE LAW, PLLC 

11450 U.S. Highway 380 

Cross Roads, Texas 76227 

(214) 702-2551 (phone) 

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(214) 602-5342 (fax) 

kcole@kcolelaw.com

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

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