NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATT P. JACOBSEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, LLC; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-16341 

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00017-MMDWGC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. 

Matt P. Jacobsen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims challenging foreclosure 

proceedings on his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review de novo a district court’s dismissal based on res judicata, Stewart v. U.S. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-16341 

Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and we may affirm on any ground

supported by the record, United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 992 (9th 

Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s action as barred by res 

judicata because Jacobsen’s claims were raised or could have been raised in his 

prior federal actions between the parties or their privies that resulted in a final 

judgment on the merits. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (“The 

preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common 

law.”); Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (federal claim preclusion “applies when there is 

(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or 

privity between the parties” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

To the extent that certain of Jacobsen’s claims could not have been raised in 

the prior federal actions, dismissal of those claims was proper because Jacobsen 

failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s August 19, 2019 postjudgment order denying Jacobsen’s motion for injunctive relief because Jacobsen 

failed to file an amended or separate notice of appeal of that order. See Whitaker v. 
3 19-16341 

Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2007) (appellant generally must file a 

separate notice of appeal or amend a previously filed notice of appeal to secure 

review of a post-judgment order).

Jacobsen’s motion to accept the late filed reply brief (Docket Entry No. 28) 

is granted. The Clerk will file the reply brief submitted on November 6, 2020.

Appellees’ motion to cancel the lis pendens (Docket Entry No. 29) is denied 

without prejudice to renewing this motion before the district court. 

AFFIRMED.