IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

JOSEPH KELLY DINGLER, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1821-K-BN 

 § 

ROCKWALL COUNTY COURT #2, § 

 § 

Defendant. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Joseph Kelly Dingler filed a pro se action earlier this year that the 

court construed to assert both habeas and civil claims. See Dingler v. Rockwall Cnty. 

Ct. #2, et al., No. 3:22-cv-1252-D-BH (N.D. Tex.) (Dingler I). So, on July 22, 2022, the 

court in Dingler I entered a notice of deficiency and order observing in part: 

The petition also mentions claims that may arise under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Courts may only consider federal habeas petitions on grounds 

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 

laws. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-87 (1973). The 

petitioner may only raise habeas claims in his amended habeas petition, 

and this case will proceed only as a habeas action. If he is trying to raise 

any other types of claims, including claims under § 1983, they must be 

raised in a separate civil action. The Clerk’s Office has been instructed 

to forward him the forms used in other types of civil actions. Because of 

the filing fee, a separate § 1983 action will only be opened if the 

petitioner files it on the enclosed forms. 

Dingler I, Dkt. No. 11 at 1 (footnote omitted); see also Reed v. Thaler, No. 2:11-cv-93, 

2011 WL 3924171, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011) (Where a litigant “seeks both 

monetary damages, which are primarily available in a civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and release to parole or mandatory supervision, which is available 

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in a habeas corpus action,” he seeks “two forms of relief that cannot be obtained in 

the same suit.”), rec. adopted, 2011 WL 3927746 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2011). 

Dingler filed an amended habeas petition in Dingler I on August 16, 2022. See 

Dingler I, Dkt. No. 15. 

And the civil rights complaint initiating this action appears to assert the claims 

under Section 1983 effectively severed from Dingler I. See Dkt. No. 2 at 1 (referencing 

case number 3:22-cv-1252-D-BH). 

United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred the civil rights complaint 

to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice on its 

own motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Legal Standards and Analysis 

“It is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on its own 

motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 

granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, 

at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th 

Cir. 2006) (citing, in turn, Shawnee Int’l, N.V. v. Hondo Drilling Co., 742 F.2d 234, 

236 (5th Cir. 1984))), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 

763 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019). 

More specifically, a district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to 

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dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” 

Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177 (quoting, in turn, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 

F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)); citation omitted). 

The United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit has “suggested that 

fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to dismiss sua 

sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. 

Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting, in turn, Carroll, 470 F.3d at 

1177)). Accord Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is 

that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure 

employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of 

the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with 

prejudice.” (citations omitted)). 

Notice is provided through these findings, conclusions, and recommendations, 

and the period to file objections to the them (further explained below) affords an 

opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted). 

Dismissal for failure to state a claim under either Rule 12(b)(6) “turns on the 

sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations’ in the complaint,” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 

615 F. App’x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 

Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam)), as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

do not “countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal 

theory supporting the claim asserted,” Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11. 

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Instead, plaintiffs need only “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims 

asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly 

events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Id. at 12 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-

(3), (d)(1), (e)). 

Insofar as Dingler brings civil rights claims against a state court in Rockwall 

County without further factual explanation, judges generally have absolute 

immunity for judicial actions taken within the scope of their jurisdiction, which also 

means that judicial officers are generally immune from suits for money damages. See 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) 

(per curiam); Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2009). 

“Judicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions 

complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken 

in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 

1994). 

“A judge’s acts are judicial in nature if they are normally performed by a judge 

and the parties affected dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 285 

(internal quotation marks omitted). And “judicial immunity is not overcome by 

allegations of bad faith or malice,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284 

(“The alleged magnitude of the judge’s errors or the mendacity of his acts is 

irrelevant.” (citing Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991))). Nor does 

“[d]isagreeing with a judge’s actions” “justify depriving that judge of his or her 

immunity.” Greenlee v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 09-2243-cv-FJG, 2009 WL 1424514, at 

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*2 (D. Kan. May 21, 2009) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 363). 

Dingler fails to allege facts to show that any act taken by the judge presiding 

over the state court named as a defendant was not a normal judicial function nor 

undertaken without jurisdiction. 

His claims against this defendant are therefore barred by judicial immunity. 

And this civil suit should be dismissed with prejudice. 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this action unless, within the time to file objections, 

Plaintiff Joseph Kelly Dingler satisfactorily shows that he can amend his complaint 

to allege a plausible claim over which the Court has jurisdiction. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

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United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: August 22, 2022 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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