J-S57016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K.T., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.M., MOTHER

No. 700 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order February 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000592-2014

_____________________________________________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K.T., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.M., MOTHER

No. 701 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order February 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000593-2014

_____________________________________________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.M.T., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.M., MOTHER

No. 702 EDA 2015
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Appeal from the Order February 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000594-2014

_____________________________________________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K.T., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.M., MOTHER

No. 703 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order February 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000595-2014

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2015

E.M. (Mother) appeals from the decrees entered on February 12, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that terminated her 

parental rights to her four children following a voluntary relinquishment 

proceeding. Concomitantly, counsel for Mother has filed a petition for leave 

to withdraw as counsel and an Anders1 brief. The two issues identified in 

the Anders brief are (1) whether counsel was ineffective, and (2) whether 

the court erred in failing to consider whether a natural bond exists between 

child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

____________________________________________

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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necessary and beneficial relationship. Based upon the following, we affirm 

and grant the petition for leave to withdraw.2

The trial court has aptly summarized the facts of this case as follows:3

The dates of birth of the children are: K.T. on [], 2007, K.T. on 

[], 2008, S.T. on [], 2012 and K.T. on [] 2006.

On November 15, 2012, DHS [Philadelphia Department of 

Human Services] received a Child Protective Services (CPS) 

[report] alleging that K.T.’s (d.o.b. []-08) hands and feet were 

____________________________________________

2

In light of the Supreme Court’s admonishment of this Court in regard to 

delays in Fast Track cases, see In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 261 n.21 (Pa. 

2013) (stating that “repeated delays” were not fully explained), we note that 

the above-listed, consolidated cases were delayed for panel listing because 

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas sent the certified record to 

this Court well past the due date.

The certified records in the above-captioned cases were originally due 

April 13, 2015. Appointed counsel had filed praecipes to discontinue the 

appeals at 694, 696, 697, and 698 EDA 2015, which were counseled appeals 

that were apparently duplicative of the above-captioned, pro se appeals. By 

Order dated March 31, 2015, this Court remanded to the trial court for a 

period of thirty days to determine whether appointed counsel should be 

permitted to withdraw and if appointment of new counsel was necessary. 

On April 27, 2015, the trial court indicated it had permitted original counsel 

to withdraw, and had appointed new counsel to represent Mother. 

Thereafter, in May and June, despite inquiries from this Court to the trial 

court concerning return of the record, this Court did not receive the certified 

record until June 12, 2015.

As a result, the briefing schedule for these cases was delayed by 

nearly two months, due solely to the overdue records. Furthermore, in filing 

the Anders brief, appointed counsel initially failed to provide this Court with 

a requisite copy of the letter sent to Mother explaining her rights, which 

further delayed the listing of the appeals. 

3 The birth dates of the minor children have been redacted except as to year 

to protect the privacy of the children. 
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bound with duct tape, his hands were taped behind his back, and 

a rope was tied around his waist and attached to a shelf in the 

bathroom closet of the family’s home. A photograph had been 

taken of the scene. Maternal grandmother had removed the child 

from the situation. The report was indicated.

On November 15, 2012, DHS visited the home. Mother and 

maternal grandmother stated that they were unaware who had 

bound the child. The child stated that he was bound and placed 

in the closet by the Mother.

On November 15, 2012, DHS obtained an [O]rder of Protective 

Custody (OPC) for the children and placed them in foster care. 

Two of the children were placed in the home where they are still 

residing and the other two were placed in the same home on 

December 4, 2012.

A shelter care hearing was held on November 16, 2012 before 

Master Carol A. Carson. Master Carson lifted the OPC and 

ordered that the children be temporarily committed to DHS.

On November 29, 2012, an adjudicatory hearing was held before 

the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine adjudicated the 

children dependent and committed them to DHS.

On February 28, 2013, Judge Irvine found clear and convincing 

evidence had been presented to establish aggravated 

circumstances existed as to E.M. regarding K.T. (d.o.b. []-08). 

On May 16, 2013, Judge Irvine found aggravated circumstances 

as to E.M. in the cases of the three other children.

The matter was then listed on a regular basis before judges of 

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas - Family Court Division -

Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, and evaluated for the purpose of determining 

or reviewing the permanency plan of the child.

In subsequent hearings, the DRO’s [Dependency Review Orders] 

reflect the Court’s review and disposition as a result of evidence 

presented, addressing, and primarily with, the goal of finalizing 

the permanency plan.
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On November 20, 2014[,] E.M.[,] mother, executed voluntary 

relinquishment petitions [and consents to adoption with respect 

to her four children].

On December 17, 2014[,] E.M. sent a letter to DHS revoking the 

voluntary relinquishment petitions.

Subsequently, at a hearing on February 12, 2015, the mother, 

E.M., changed her mind and withdrew her letter of revocation 

regarding the voluntary relinquishment petitions. The mother 

requested that the Court proceed on her voluntary 

relinquishment petitions. Therefore, the Trial Court issued a 

decree of voluntary termination of parental rights of E.M. and 

transferred custody of the children to DHS in accordance with 

the mother’s request.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/2015, at 1–2.4 Following the entry of the trial 

court’s voluntary termination decrees, Mother appealed.5, 6

____________________________________________

4

For the sake of completeness, we note the court also involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of the father of K.T., K.T., and K.T., and 

confirmed the consent to adoption of the father of S.M.T.

5 On March 12, 2015, along with the notice of appeal, Mother’s counsel filed 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, stating “[t]he only issue that could possibly 

be raised is whether [Mother’s] consent was legally obtained prior to the 

termination of her parental rights on February 12, 2015.” Mother’s 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to [Pa.]R.A.P. 

1925(b), 3/12/2015, at ¶2. 

We note that on April 21, 2015, the trial court permitted Mother’s 

counsel to withdraw, and appointed new counsel to represent Mother on 

appeal.

6 On March 10, 2015, Mother herself filed a pro se notice of appeal and Rule 

1925(b) statement, claiming that “I was told if I sign over my rights the 

children were going to stay with grandmother,” that “I have a learning 

disability and was lied to by the DHS worker and appointed counsel,” and 

that appointed counsel “never helped me understand the petitionS I signed.” 

Mother’s Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b), pro se, 3/10/2015. However, since Mother was represented by 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our standard of review is as follows:

When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ Court, this 

Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error 

and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. 

Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines 

the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will not 

reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that 

discretion.

In re A.J.B., 797 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. 2002). Our Supreme Court has 

explained that “[a] party seeking to disturb a termination decree must show 

that the consent given to terminate parental rights was not intelligent, 

voluntary and deliberate.” In re M.L.O., 416 A.2d 88, 90 (Pa. 

1980)(citations omitted).

Prior to addressing the issues identified in this appeal, we must review 

counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 

1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (“Initially, we note that we may not 

address the merits of the issue raised on appeal without first reviewing the 

request to withdraw.”). 

In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court 

extended the ability of counsel to withdraw when counsel believed an appeal 

to be frivolous to appeals involving the termination of parental rights. We 

stated that counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on an appeal 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

counsel, her pro se filings were legal nullities. See Commonwealth v. 

Ellis, 534 Pa. 176, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1993) (“Ellis II”) (holding there is 

no right to hybrid representation either at trial or on appeal).
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from a decree terminating parental rights may, after a conscientious and 

thorough review of the record, petition this Court for leave to withdraw as 

counsel and must submit an Anders brief. Id. at 1275. In this regard, this 

Court has explained:

In order to comply with Anders and its Pennsylvania progeny, 

counsel must: 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that 

after making a conscientious examination of the record 

and interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined 

the appeal would be frivolous;

(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably 

support the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no 

merit” letter or amicus curiae brief; and

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise 

him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or 

raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the 

court’s attention.

In re S.M.T., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Further, in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of

Anders — the contents of the Anders brief — and held that the brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 
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case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.7 

Our review confirms counsel has complied with the requirements of 

Anders and Santiago. We also require counsel to send a letter advising 

the appellant of his or her rights, and counsel has satisfied this Court that he 

has done so. Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 

2005).8, 9 Therefore, we proceed “to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the 

appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 

1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). In so doing, we review not 

only the issues identified by appointed counsel in the Anders brief, but 

examine all of the proceedings to “make certain that appointed counsel 

____________________________________________

7 Counsel concludes that, “[w]ith such a limited standard of review, following 

an interview with Mother and thorough review of the record and trial court’s 

opinion, it is wholly without merit to argue that [sic] the first issue that trial 

counsel was ineffective.” Anders Brief at 21–22. Counsel further states 

“[b]ecause the [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] statement of errors does not include the 

second issue, it is waived.” Id. at 22. 

8 A per curiam Order was filed on July 10, 2015, directing counsel to provide 

the Prothonotary of this Court with a copy of the letter he sent to Mother 

informing her of her right to retain counsel or proceed pro se in these 

appeals. A copy of counsel’s letter to Mother was received by this Court on 

July 27, 2015.

9 Mother has not filed a response to counsel’s Anders brief and petition to 

withdraw. 

 
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has not overlooked the existence of potentially non-frivolous issues.” Id. at 

1249.

The first issue discussed in the Anders brief by whether trial counsel 

was ineffective, specifically, in failing to help Mother understand the 

voluntary relinquishment petitions. See Anders Brief at 16–17. 

This Court has explained an indigent person’s right to counsel in a 

termination hearing as follows:

The unique nature of parental termination cases has long been 

recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Thus, In re 

Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1973), the 

Supreme Court held that an indigent parent in a termination of 

parental rights case has a constitutional right to counsel. The 

right to counsel in parental termination cases is the right to 

effective assistance of counsel even though the case is civil in 

nature. In re Adoption of T.M.F., 392 Pa. Super. 598, 573 

A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. 1990) (en banc); see also, In the 

Interest of S.W., 2001 Pa. Super 228, 781 A.2d 1247 (Pa. 

Super. 2001). However, this right is more limited than that in 

criminal cases, as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

must be raised on direct appeal. We then review the record as a 

whole to determine whether or not the parties received a 

“fundamentally fair” hearing; a finding that counsel was 

ineffective is made only if the parent demonstrates that 

counsel’s ineffectiveness was “the cause of the decree of 

termination.” T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1044; see also, S.W., 781 

A.2d at 1249.

In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 774–775 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Mother, on November 20, 2014, for each child, signed a petition for 

voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, see 23 Pa.C.S. § 2501, and, as 

well, signed a consent to adoption that was attached to the petition. 

Thereafter, on December 17, 2014, Mother wrote a letter to DHS indicating 
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she had changed her mind about consenting to the termination of her 

parental rights. See N.T., 2/12/2015, at 7. However, at the hearing held 

on February 12, 2015, Mother stated on the record that she wished to 

withdraw the letter and proceed on the petitions to voluntarily relinquish her 

parental rights to the children. Id.

Following a colloquy of Mother by her appointed counsel, the trial court 

entered decrees of voluntary termination of parental rights of mother as to 

each child, stating “[E.M.] has relinquished forever all his/her parental rights 

in and to his/her minor child, [child’s name] and parental rights are hereby 

terminated. The custody of [child’s name] is hereby transferred to the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services. ....” Decrees, 2/12/2014. In 

addition, by these decrees, petitions to confirm consent to terminate 

parental rights and to involuntarily terminate parental rights were 

withdrawn. See id.

The trial court, in its opinion written in support of its decision, 

explained:

A parent may relinquish their parental rights to an agency under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501:

(a) Petition. --When any child under the age of 18 years 

has been in the care of an agency for a minimum period 

of three days or, whether or not the agency has the 

physical care of the child, the agency has received a 

written notice of the present intent to transfer to it 

custody of the child, executed by the parent, the parent 

or parents of the child may petition the court for 

permission to relinquish forever all parental rights and 

duties with respect to their child.
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The parent’s consent to relinquish parental rights must be 

intelligent, voluntary and deliberate. In re Watson, 450 Pa. 

579, 301 A.2d 861 (1973). In the instant case, the mother, E.M. 

was colloquied by her attorney regarding her request to revoke 

her revocation letter. Furthermore, she was colloquied by her 

attorney regarding her request to proceed on her voluntary 

relinquishment petitions. The mother testified that she did sign 

consents to terminate her parental rights on a voluntary basis; 

she read and understood the documents she signed and 

understood her signature indicated that she gave up her parental 

rights. (N.T., 2-12-15, pgs. 5-9). Furthermore, E.M. testified that 

no one promised her anything or forced her to sign the 

document. (N.T., 2-12-15, p. 9). Moreover, E.M. testified that 

she understood the procedure for revoking her consent because 

she wrote a letter to DHS revoking her consent to voluntarily 

terminate her parental rights just short of the thirty day 

revocation deadline. (N.T., 2-12-15, p. 6). The mother, E.M., 

clearly testified that she changed her mind and wanted to 

rescind that letter. Lastly, the Court sent mother and her 

attorney out of the courtroom to confer with her regarding her 

revocation request. The Court stated to mother’s attorney “Take 

a moment and step out in the hall with mom, I just want it her 

to be one hundred percent sure”. (N.T., 2-12-15, p. 6). 

As explained in the initial Decrees, the Trial Court found the [sic] 

E.M. relinquished forever all her parental rights in and to her 

minor children and her parental rights are terminated.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/2015, at 3.

Our review of the record confirms the trial court’s account of the 

colloquy by Mother’s counsel and its assessment of Mother’s consent. 

Mother indicated to the court she wished to withdraw her revocation of 

consent letter, wanted to proceed with the petition to voluntarily terminate 

her parental rights, and was “willing to by consent give up [her] parental 

rights to [her] children.” N.T., 2/12/2015, at 9. She further testified no one 

had forced her to sign the consent and that no promises had been made to 
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her in exchange for her consent. See N.T., 2/12/2015, at 9. Based on this 

colloquy, Mother cannot show she did not receive a “fundamentally fair” 

hearing or demonstrate that counsel’s ineffectiveness was “the cause of the 

decree of termination.” Interest of J.T., supra, 983 A.2d at 775. 

Accordingly, we conclude this ineffectiveness issue is frivolous.

The second issue identified in the Anders brief is that the court failed 

to consider whether a natural bond exists between the children and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. 

We note that Mother failed to include this specific challenge in her 

counseled Rule 1925(b) statement and, therefore, the issue is waived. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not 

raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are 

waived.”). In any event, Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act requires the 

court to “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child,” in involuntary termination 

proceedings. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Here, however, Mother’s parental rights 

were voluntarily terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2501. Consequently, any 

issue related to the inadequacy of the evidence under section 2511 bears no 

relevance to the trial court’s order, and is frivolous.
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In sum, we conclude the issues presented in this appeal are frivolous, 

and our independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Decrees affirmed. Petition for leave to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/17/2015