UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

BLACKHAWK MANUFACTURING 

GROUP INC. d/b/a 80 Percent Arms,

 Intervenor-Plaintiff,

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED, and

THE SECOND AMENDMENT 

FOUNDATION, INC.

 Intervenors-Plaintiffs,

v.

MERRICK GARLAND, in his Official 

Capacity as Attorney General of the United 

States, et al.,

 Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00691-O

Defense Distributed’s Opposed Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal

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Intervenor Plaintiff Defense Distributed files this emergency motion for an injunction 

pending appeal. The Defendants were conferred with. The Defendants oppose the motion.

Argument

Defense Distributed files this emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal. The 

request is for an injunction paralleling the preliminary injunction this Court issued as the March 8, 

2023, “Opinion & Order on Defense Distributed and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.’s 

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.” Doc. 188 (attached as Exhibit A). The preliminary 

injunction’s key conclusion as to Defense Distributed was as follows:

Doc. 188 at 10. As opposed to the nationwide relief afforded by the Court’s final judgment, Doc.

231, the instant motion seeks only individualized relief for Defense Distributed—the same relief 

that the Court rightly awarded at the preliminary injunction stage. 

The instant motion is made necessary by (1) the Court’s entry of an administrative stay of 

the final judgment, and (2) the Agencies’ forthcoming effort to obtain a stay of the final judgment 

pending appeal from the Fifth Circuit. If and when (1) any administrative stay expires, and (2) the 

Fifth Circuit denies the Agencies’ stay requests, the instant motion for an injunction pending appeal 

would be unnecessary. In that situation, the existing final judgment’s nationwide vacatur of the 

Final Rule would retain its full force and unquestionably give Defense Distributed the protection

it is entitled to. But so long as this Court’s administrative stay is in effect, and if the Fifth Circuit 

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should grant the Agencies’ forthcoming stay requests, the final judgment’s nationwide vacatur of 

the Final Rule might no longer protect Defense Distributed from the irreparable harm caused by 

further enforcement.

Technically, an order staying the Court’s final judgment (administratively or otherwise) 

should be understood to resurrect the March 8 preliminary injunction order automatically, without 

the need for any further party or Court action.1 But the Agencies oppose that view. They posit 

that an order staying the Court’s final judgment would somehow halt the final judgment’s vacatur 

of the final rule but not reactivate the March 8 preliminary injunction. So to avoid any doubt about

that procedural issue, Defense Distributed files this motion to guarantee square presentation of 

their request for an injunction pending appeal that mirrors the prior preliminary injunction.

Defense Distributed should receive an injunction pending appeal for essentially the same 

reasons that the Court’s March 8 order granted Defense Distributed a preliminary injunction. 

Doc. 188. That preliminary injunction was justified both by the reasons that the Court expressly 

announced in that decision, id., as well as the additional reasons that Defense Distributed and SAF 

gave in their preliminary injunction briefs, see Docs 163, 176, and 184 (preliminary injunction briefs, 

all attached). The federal government’s reasons for seeking an administrative stay and stay 

pending appeal are focused on the nationwide aspect of the final judgment; they do not seriously 

contend that an administrative stay and/or stay pending appeal are warranted as to Defense 

Distributed individually. So regardless of how this Court and the Fifth Circuit deal with the final 

1 The issue turns on how exactly the stay order impacts the final judgment. If the stay order does not negate the final 

judgment itself and merely halts enforcement of the final judgment, then the stay order probably would not resurrect 

a preexisting preliminary injunction (because the preexisting preliminary injunction would have vanished upon 

issuance of the final judgment due to the merger rule). But if the stay order does negate the final judgment itself —

as would seem necessary to yield the Agencies’ desired result of halting the final judgment’s declaration and vacatur 

— then the stay order itself would arguably resurrect a preexisting preliminary injunction (by undoing the final 

judgment that had triggered the merger rule).

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judgment’s nationwide aspects, Defense Distributed in particular is entitled to an injunction 

protecting them for the duration of the appeal.

Emergency relief is needed now for the reasons Defense Distributed first introduced at the 

preliminary injunction stage. The situation is dire. If Defense Distributed is not protected by

either the Court’s existing final judgment or an individualized injunction pending appeal—if the 

Agencies are allowed to resume enforcement of the Final Rule against Defense Distributed—then 

Defense Distributed will go out of business and cease to exist. See Doc. 164 at 5-6 (“The Final 

Rule irreparably harms Defense Distributed.”); Doc. 164-01 (declaration of Cody Wilson, Defense 

Distributed’s director). Then and now, “the new Final Rule’s effect on Defense Distributed is 

devastating.” Doc. 164-1 at 5. “The new Final Rule will destroy Defense Distributed, soon, unless 

the government is enjoined from enforcing the new Final Rule against it and its customers.” Id.

Conclusion

The Court should order that Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, and employees 

are enjoined from implementing and enforcing against Defense Distributed and its customers 

(except for those individuals prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) the 

provisions in 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.11 and 478.12 that the Court has preliminarily determined are 

unlawful.

Respectfully submitted,

FLORES LAW PLLC

By /s/ Chad Flores

Chad Flores

cf@chadfloreslaw.com

State Bar No. 24059759

917 Franklin Street, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 893-9440

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