UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-CV-00733-P

CECILE YOUNG,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

The United States Magistrate Judge issued Findings, Conclusions, 

and Recommendations (“FCR”) on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

(“Motion”) filed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 25. The FCR recommends that the 

Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff timely objected to the FCR. ECF 

No. 33. After reviewing the FCR de novo, the Court ADOPTS the 

reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF No. 25) and 

OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objection (ECF No. 33).

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a medically fragile individual who received twenty-fourhour care in a group home through the Texas Health and Human 

Services Commission’s (“HHSC”) STAR Kids Program. ECF No 1 at 1–

2. However, Plaintiff recently aged out of eligibility for this program. Id. 

at 2. Plaintiff now receives medical care through the Home and 

Community-Based Services (“HCS”) which does not provide for the same 

level of care due to a cap on expenses. Id. at 3–4. Plaintiff contends that 

the lack of twenty-four-hour care is dangerous to Plaintiff’s continued 

survival. Id. at 6. 

Plaintiff sued to maintain his twenty-four-hour care contending that 

he is entitled to discretionary “general revenue funding” under the Due 

Process Clause, The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the 

Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1–23. Plaintiff further moved for a temporary 

restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 3.

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Plaintiffs motion for a TRO was referred to the Magistrate. The 

Magistrate issued an FCR granting the TRO. However, this Court 

overruled the FCR based on Defendant’s objection and the Fifth Circuit’s 

recent ruling in Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022). 

ECF No. 17. The portion of the Motion seeking a preliminary injunction 

remained pending before the Court and was again referred to the 

Magistrate. The Magistrate issued another FCR recommending denying 

the preliminary injunction and Plaintiff timely objected. Thus, the 

Magistrate’s findings are now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

A Magistrate Judge’s FCR on a dispositive matter is reviewed de 

novo if a party timely objects. FED. R. CIV. P. 72. But if all or a part of 

the Magistrate Judge’s disposition governs a non-dispositive matter or 

is not objected to, the FCR is reviewed for clear error. Id. Because 

Plaintiff timely objected to the Magistrate’s FCR, the Court reviews the 

motion de novo. 

B. Preliminary Injunction Standard 

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” and will be 

granted only if the movants carry their burden on four requirements. 

Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008). The 

movants must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the 

merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) the threatened 

injury to the movant outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought 

to be enjoined; and (4) granting the injunctive relief will not disserve the 

public interest.” City of Dall. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 285 

(5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). “The decision to grant or deny a 

preliminary injunction is discretionary with the district court.” Miss. 

Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th 

Cir. 1985).

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ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To determine Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, the 

Court must look to the standards set by substantive law. See Roho, Inc. 

v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s likelihood of 

success based on the standards of substantive law must be more than 

negligible. Compact Van Equip. Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 566 F.2d 

952, 954 (5th Cir. 1978). A preliminary injunction should not be granted 

unless the question presented by the litigant is free from doubt. Cong.

of Racial Equal. v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 

U.S. 829 (1963). Where a plaintiff is unable to show a likelihood of 

success on the merits, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. 

See Cardoni v. Prosperity Bank, 805 F.3d 573, 589 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(holding that a preliminary injunction was not warranted based on a

failure to meet this first factor).

In his FCR, the Magistrate found that “Plaintiff, without a property 

interest in the treatment he is seeking, is unable to show the ‘likelihood 

of success’ factor required for a preliminary injunction.” ECF No. 25 at 

2. The Magistrate found that the facts of this case directly paralleled the 

Fifth Circuit’s recent ruling in Harrison, 48 F.4th at 336. 

In Harrison, a medically fragile individual who required around-theclock nursing services, sought an injunction against the state of Texas 

to use “general state revenues” when she did not qualify for the 24/7 care 

she required. Id. at 336. The individual’s guardian brough the lawsuit 

alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 337. The Fifth 

Circuit found all three of these claims could not proceed as they failed to 

meet the likelihood of success requirement for a preliminary injunction. 

Id. The Court thus analyzes the three claims in turn. 

Regarding the Due Process claim, the Fifth Circuit found that 

“[w]ithout ‘mandatory language’ requiring the payment of benefits, a 

claimant has no property interest in the requested funds.” Id. at 340; 

(citing Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727, 736 (5th Cir. 2008)). Further, the 

opinion held that “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government 

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officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.” Id. (citing Town of 

Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)). Because the 

individual in Harrison was asserting rights in discretionary funds, the 

likelihood of her success on the merits was lacking. Like the individual 

in Harrison, who asserted a Due Process claim over discretionary 

general revenue funds from the HHSC, Plaintiff also asserts a Due 

Process claim over general revenue funding from the same state agency. 

ECF No. 3 at 6. With no property right in the general funds, and no 

relevant factual differences between these two cases, the Court finds the 

Plaintiff has no likelihood of success on his Due Process Claim.

Regarding the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in Harrison, the 

Fifth Circuit found that “the narrow, marginal cost comparison the 

district court relied on—one that just barely showed institutionalization 

to be more costly—is not sufficient to determine that plaintiff is likely to 

succeed on her disability-discrimination claims.” Harrison, 48 F.4th at 

342. The Fifth Circuit further noted that the controlling ADA case—

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999)—does 

not require “community-care services that would exceed the federally 

approved cost cap on a Medicaid program that provides an alternative 

to institutionalization.” Id. The opinion further noted that “other courts 

have rejected Olmstead claims that would exceed similar caps on 

Medicaid programs.” Id. (citing Arc of Wash. State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 

F.3d 615, 620–22 (9th Cir. 2005)). As a result, the individual in Harrison

failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of her ADA and 

Rehabilitation claims. Like the individual in Harrison, Plaintiff asserts 

that the accommodations are reasonable “taking into account the 

resources of the State.” ECF No. 3 at 17. As Harrison holds, however, 

the reasonableness of the accommodation is not a consideration or a 

requirement under Olmstead. Once again, Plaintiff’s claim parallels

Harrison, and the Court finds that Plaintiff has no likelihood of success 

on the merits of his ADA and Rehabilitation claims.

B. Plaintiff’s First Objection Fails 

Plaintiff first objects that the facts in Harrison are dissimilar 

because Plaintiff was not afforded a one-on-one interview. Aside from 

pointing out this factual difference in the two cases, Plaintiff provides 

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no authority showing that this distinction is relevant to the matter 

before the Court. The Court further notes that Harrison did not rely on

this fact in its analysis. While this presents a difference in fact it does 

nothing to distinguish the case in law which is this Court’s only concern. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s first objection is overruled. 

C. Plaintiff’s Second Objection Fails 

Plaintiff next objects that the Magistrate analyzed only his Due 

Process claim and failed to address his claims under the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act. Though the Magistrate’s analysis was spartan—

comparing the case to Harrison without discussing the particulars of the 

Fifth Circuit’s ruling—the Court finds that it adequately covered all 

claims in this comparison. As shown in detail above, Harrison analyzed 

the three identical claims—Due Process, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act—

brought by Plaintiff and found that an injunction was not warranted. 

The Magistrate’s quick reference to Harrison incorporated its analysis 

on all claims including the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Thus, Plaintiff’s second objection is overruled. 

ORDER

Bound by precedent, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to 

show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The Court thus 

ADOPTS the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF No. 25) 

and OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objections (ECF No. 33).

SO ORDERED on this 14th day of November 2022.

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