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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

KENNITA K. BELL, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

CASCADE RECEIVABLES 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, 

 Defendant. 

CIVIL COMPLAINT 

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-01400 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

COMPLAINT 

 NOW comes KENNITA K. BELL (“Plaintiff”), by and through the undersigned, 

complaining as to the conduct of CASCADE RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT, LLC 

(“Defendant”), as follows: 

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Plaintiff brings this action for damages pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”) under 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq. and the Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”) under 

Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392 et seq. for Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This action arises under and is brought pursuant to the FDCPA. Subject matter jurisdiction 

is conferred upon this Court by 15 U.S.C §1692, 47 U.S.C §227, 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1337, as 

the action arises under the laws of the United States. Supplemental jurisdiction exists for the state 

law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367. 

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3. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 as Defendant conducts business 

in the Northern District of Texas and a substantial portion the events or omissions giving rise to 

the claims occurred within the Northern District of Texas.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff is a natural “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(39), over 18 years of age, 

residing in the Northern District of Texas. 

5. Defendant is a third party debt collector providing services to “holders of illiquid and nonperforming accounts receivables.”1

 Defendant is a limited liability company organized under the 

laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 5431 Old Redwood 

Highway, Suite 210, Petaluma, California. 

6. Defendant is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(39). 

7. Defendant acted through its agents, employees, officers, members, directors, heirs, 

successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives and insurers at all 

times relevant to the instant action. 

FACTS SUPPORTING CAUSES OF ACTION

8. The instant action arises out of Defendant’s efforts to collect upon a purportedly defaulted 

medical debts (“subject debts”) said to be owed by Plaintiff. 

9. Upon information and belief, following Plaintiff’s purported default on the subject debts, 

the subject debts were charged off and placed with Defendant for collection purposes. 

10. In approximately the summer of 2022, Plaintiff began receiving calls to her cellular phone, 

(504) XXX-8042, from Defendant seeking collection of the subject debt. 

 

1

 https://cascade365.com/companies/cascade-receivables/ 

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11. Defendant has primarily used the phone number (480) 498-7881 when placing calls to 

Plaintiff’s cellular phone, but upon belief, it has used other numbers as well. 

12. Upon speaking with Defendant, Plaintiff was informed that Defendant was a debt collector 

attempting to collect upon the subject debts. 

13. On or about June 9, 2022, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant, disputed the subject debts, and 

demanded that Defendant cease calling her cellular phone regarding both subject debts and instead 

communicate with her in writing. 

14. Defendant advised that Plaintiff would be receiving a dispute packet in about thirty days 

and the calls would stop until the dispute packet was received. 

15. However, on or about June 17, 2022, Defendant again contacted Plaintiff seeking 

collection of the subject debt. 

16. Plaintiff asked why Defendant was calling when she had already asked that they stop, and 

Defendant responded that such conversation never happened, even though it clearly had. 

17. Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 1006.14(h), “in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt 

collector must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a person through a medium of 

communication if the person has requested that the debt collector not use that medium to 

communicate with the person.” 

18. Defendant violated the regulation governing its calling practices by continuing to 

communicate with Plaintiff via phone calls despite Plaintiff’s clear request that Defendant cease 

utilizing such medium of communication. 

19. Additionally, even if Defendant’s June 17th phone call falls within the presumptively 

reasonable frequency of communication permitted for debt collectors, the factors that go about 

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rebutting such presumptive compliance include whether a consumer has previously requested that 

a debt collector’s phone calls cease. See 12 C.F.R. § 1006.14(b)(2). 

20. Because Plaintiff had already demanded that Defendant’s phone calls cease, all phone 

calls following such cease requests illustrate Defendant’s intent to harass Plaintiff through 

continued phone calls, even if such calls fall within the presumptively reasonable volume and 

timing of collection attempts made via phone call as outlined in the relevant regulations. 

21. Frustrated over Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff spoke with the undersigned regarding her 

rights, compelling her to spend time dealing with the fallout of Defendant’s conduct. 

22. Plaintiff has been unfairly and unnecessarily harassed by Defendant's actions. 

23. Plaintiff has suffered concrete harm as a result of Defendant’s actions, including but not 

limited to, invasion of privacy, aggravation that accompanies unwanted collection calls, being 

subjected to harassing debt collection communications, and violations of her federally protected 

interests to be free from harassing, oppressive, and abusive debt collection conduct. 

COUNT I – VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

24. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 23 as though fully set forth herein. 

25. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 

26. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by §1692a(6) of the FDCPA, because it regularly 

use the mail and/or the telephone to collect, or attempt to collect, delinquent consumer accounts. 

27. Defendant identifies itself as a debt collector, and is engaged in the business of collecting 

or attempting to collect, directly or indirectly, defaulted debts owed or due or asserted to be owed 

or due to others, and is similarly a business whose principal purpose is the collection of debts. 

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28. The subject debts are “debt[s]” as defined by FDCPA §1692a(5) as they arise out of 

transactions due or asserted to be owed or due to another for personal, family, or household 

purposes. 

a. Violations of FDCPA § 1692d et seq., and 12 C.F.R. § 1006.14 et seq.

29. The FDCPA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692d, prohibits a debt collector from engaging “in 

any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in 

connection with the collection of a debt.” §1692d(5) further prohibits, “causing a telephone to ring 

or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, 

abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” 

30. The newly amended Regulation F provides further guidance on what circumstances 

constitute harassing and oppressive debt collection conduct. 12 C.F.R. § 1006.14(b)(2) provides 

guidance on when calls are made repeatedly and continuously, and debt collectors are presumed 

to comply with these provisions if they do not call a consumer more than 7 times over 7 consecutive 

days, or if they wait 7 days after communicating with a consumer before attempting another 

communication. However, the commentary thereto confirms that this presumptive compliance can 

be rebutted by several factors, including “[t]he content of a person’s prior communications with 

the debt collector.” An example of facts rebutting the presumptive compliance would be a prior 

indication “that the person did not wish to be contacted again about the particular debt.” 

Additionally, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 1006.14(h), a debt collector cannot “communicate or attempt 

to communicate with a person through a medium of communication if the person has requested 

that the debt collector not use that medium to communicate with the person.” 

31. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d & d(5), as well as 12 C.F.R. §§ 1006.14(b) & (h), 

through its placement of phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone following her do not call requests. 

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Plaintiff plainly demanded that Defendant cease calling her cellular phone regarding both subject 

debts, and instead send her information in the mail. Despite the nature of these prior 

communications, Defendant nevertheless continued placing phone calls seeking collection of the 

subject debt, even before it sent the dispute packet it said would be sent. Such conduct is blatantly 

prohibited by Regulation F, which underscore Defendant’s violations of those regulations, as well 

as the corresponding portions of the FDCPA. The regulations clarify that consumers who have 

requested calls to stop, yet nevertheless receive further calls, may state claims for repeated phone 

calls notwithstanding a debt collector’s compliance with the presumptively reasonable frequency 

of calls. Furthermore, Regulation F clarifies that communicating with a consumer through a 

medium after that consumer has requested no communications through such medium – as occurred 

here – constitutes harassing and oppressive conduct in itself. Defendant’s violations of the relevant 

statutes and regulations caused Plaintiff harm in the form of invasion of privacy stemming from 

Defendant’s persistence in placing unwanted phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone. 

b. Violations of FDCPA § 1692e 

32. The FDCPA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, prohibits a debt collector from using “any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any 

debt.” 

33. In addition, this section enumerates specific violations, such as: 

“The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or 

attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a 

consumer.” 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). 

34. Defendant violated §§ 1692e and e(10) when it deceptively continued communicating with 

Plaintiff through her cellular phone despite Plaintiff having requested Defendant to no longer use 

such medium of communication. Defendant falsely and deceptively represented its ability to 

continue such calls since, under the binding regulations, Defendant was precluded from engaging 

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in such conduct. Defendant’s deceptive conduct was designed to compel Plaintiff’s payment on 

the debt through undue and deceptive means. 

35. Defendant further violated §§ 1692e and e(10) when it deceptively informed Plaintiff that 

she had not previously requested their phone calls stop. Defendant engaged in this deceptive 

conduct in an attempt to convince Claimant that its otherwise harassing phone calls were somehow 

proper. 

c. Violations of FDCPA § 1692f 

36. The FDCPA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair 

or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 

37. Defendant violated §1692f when it unfairly and unconscionably attempted to collect on a 

debt by continuing to call Plaintiff’s cellular phone despite her requests that such calls cease. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, KENNITA K. BELL, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court 

enter judgment in her favor as follows: 

a. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful and violate the 

aforementioned bodies of law; 

b. Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages of $1,000.00 as provided under 15 U.S.C. 

§1692k(a)(2)(A); 

c. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, as provided 

under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(1); 

d. Awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney fees as provided under 15 U.S.C. 

§1692k(a)(3); and 

e. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and appropriate. 

COUNT II – VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION ACT

38. Plaintiff restates and realleges paragraphs 1 through 37 as though fully set forth herein. 

39. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(1). 

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40. Defendant is a “debt collector” and a “third party debt collector” as defined by Tex. Fin. 

Code Ann. § 392.001(6) and (7). 

41. The subject debt is a “consumer debt” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(2) as 

it is an obligation, or alleged obligation, arising from a transaction for personal, family, or 

household purposes. 

a. Violations of TDCA § 392.302 

42. The TDCA, pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(4), states that “a debt collector may 

not oppress, harass, or abuse a person by causing a telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously, 

or making repeated or continuous telephone calls, with the intent to harass a person at the called 

number.” 

43. Defendant violated the TDCA when it continued to call Plaintiff’s cellular phone after she 

notified it to stop calling her cellular phone. Claims under the TDCA are treated similarly as claims 

under the FDCPA, and as discussed above, Defendant’s conduct and phone calls present the type 

of conduct deemed to violate the FDCPA’s prohibitions on harassing and oppressive conduct. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, KENNITA K. BELL, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court 

enter judgment in her favor as follows: 

a. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful and violate the 

aforementioned statutes and regulations; 

b. Entitling Plaintiff to injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(1). 

c. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(2). 

d. Awarding Plaintiff punitive damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, for the 

underlying violations; 

e. Awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 

392.403(b); 

f. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and appropriate. 

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Dated: June 29, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 

s/ Nathan C. Volheim s/Eric D. Coleman 

Nathan C. Volheim, Esq. #6302103 Eric D. Coleman, Esq. #6326734 

Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for Plaintiff 

Admitted in the Northern District of Texas Admitted in the Northern District of Texas 

Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd. Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd. 

2500 South Highland Ave., Suite 200 2500 South Highland Ave., Suite 200 

Lombard, Illinois 60148 Lombard, Illinois 60148 

(630) 568-3056 (phone) (331) 307-7648 (phone) 

(630) 575-8188 (fax) (630) 575-8188 (fax) 

nvolheim@sulaimanlaw.com ecoleman@sulaimanlaw.com 

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