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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

Chasity Congious, by and through )

her Guardian, Kimberly Hammond, )

on behalf of herself and as Mother and )

Next Friend of Z.C.H., Deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00092-O 

)

City of Fort Worth, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Chasity Congious (“Plaintiff” or “Chasity”) respectfully submits this

reply brief in support of her Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) motion for relief

from the Final Judgment as to Defendant Dr. Aaron Ivy Shaw (“Dr. Shaw”). 

Introduction

The response to Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion raises three arguments trying to

escape the impact of the May 17, 2020 email showing that Dr. Shaw knew on the 

morning that Chasity gave birth that she was complaining of stomach pain and was in 

labor, and that Dr. Shaw took no action in response to receiving the email. Specifically, 

Dr. Shaw claims that: (1) Plaintiff did not show reasonable diligence in obtaining the 

May 17, 2020 email; (2) the May 17, 2020 email is not material or controlling, and would 

not have changed the Court’s motion to dismiss decision; and (3) Plaintiff’s motion is 

untimely.

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As will be set forth in detail below, Dr. Shaw’s arguments are without merit. 

First, Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence by obtaining the May 17, 2020 email

during discovery because it was not produced in response to Plaintiff’s pre-litigation 

record requests. Second, the email to Dr. Shaw is material, controlling, and would have 

led the Court to deny the motion to dismiss because it added the new facts that Dr. 

Shaw did nothing despite knowing on the morning that Chasity gave birth that she was

experiencing untreated pain and was in labor. Third, Plaintiff’s motion is timely under 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant case law. The Court therefore 

should grant Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion. 

Argument

I. Plaintiff Meets the Burden to Show Reasonable Diligence in Obtaining the 

Newly Discovery Evidence.

Deflecting from the fact that Plaintiff did not have the May 17, 2020 email to Dr. 

Shaw because discovery had not begun, Dr. Shaw attempts to blame Plaintiff for the 

fact that discovery was stayed by the Court. ECF No. 97 at 5. Dr. Shaw fails to mention 

that it was Defendants who moved to stay discovery over the opposition of Plaintiff. 

ECF No. 25. Regardless, it is indisputable that discovery had not begun – which made it 

impossible for Plaintiff to have obtained the May 17, 2020 email to Dr. Shaw – prior to 

Plaintiff filing her Amended Complaint and prior to the Court entering the Final

Judgment for Dr. Shaw. 

Dr. Shaw also argues that Plaintiff failed to explain what efforts she undertook 

prior to commencing this action to obtain the May 17, 2020 email. ECF No. 97 at 5-6. The 

May 17, 2020 email was sent from Aaron Green of JPS Health Network (“JPS”) to Dr. 

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Shaw as well as other JPS and Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office (“TCSO”) officials. ECF 

No. 94 at 5. Prior to commencing this case, Plaintiff’s counsel sought and obtained

Chasity’s medical records from JPS, including but not limited to records pertaining to 

Chasity giving birth at the Tarrant County Jail on May 17, 2020. The May 17, 2020 email 

to Dr. Shaw was not included in the medical records produced by JPS to Plaintiff’s 

counsel. Appendix at 3, ¶ 3. Also prior to commencing this case, Plaintiff’s counsel 

sought and obtained records via an open records request to the TCSO for records 

pertaining to Chasity giving birth at the Tarrant County Jail on May 17, 2020. The May 

17, 2020 email to Dr. Shaw also was not included in the records produced by the TCSO

to Plaintiff’s counsel. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 4. Plaintiff therefore exercised reasonable diligence to 

obtain the May 17, 2020 email to Dr. Shaw prior to commencing this case by seeking 

and obtaining records from both JPS and the TCSO. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion is based in part upon the expert 

opinion of David A. Gutman, MD, MBA, FASA stating that the May 17, 2020 email to 

Dr. Shaw showed that Chasity was in labor. ECF No. 94 at 12. In his response brief, Dr. 

Shaw failed to claim that Plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining Dr. 

Gutman’s opinion. ECF 97 at 5-6. Consequently, Dr. Shaw abandoned any such claim. 

See Torres v. Seterus Inc., No. 5:18-CV-575-DAE, 2018 WL 7286487, *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 

2018) (recognizing that the failure to raise a claim in a response brief results in 

abandonment). Furthermore, Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining Dr. 

Gutman’s opinion because she obtained his report on December 12, 2023 (ECF No. 94 at 

9), which was in time for compliance with the rebuttal expert designation date in 

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Court’s Amended Scheduling Order. ECF No. 65 at 1 (stating that rebuttal expert 

designations were due 30 days after disclosure made by other party, which was 

December 13, 2023 because Defendant Tarrant County (“the County”) disclosed its 

responsive expert designation on November 13, 2023 (Appendix at 4, ¶ 5)). 

II. The Email to Dr. Shaw is Material and Controlling, and Would Have 

Changed the Result on the Motion to Dismiss.

Dr. Shaw presents several alleged reasons why the May 17, 2020 email is not 

material and controlling, and would not have altered the Court’s motion to dismiss

decision. ECF No. 97 at 6-9. The Court should reject Dr. Shaw’s reasons.

First, Dr. Shaw misconstrues the Court’s motion to dismiss decision to assert that 

the May 17, 2020 email does not add any new facts. ECF No. 97 at 6-7. Specifically, Dr. 

Shaw contends that the Court already accepted that Dr. Shaw knew that Chasity was at 

risk and made a decision to deny her medical care. Id. Contrary to Dr. Shaw’s 

contention that the Court had all the facts pertaining to Dr. Shaw’s knowledge of the

risks to Chasity, the motion to dismiss decision relied upon the facts that Dr. Shaw did 

not act on the recommendation to induce labor, did not transfer Chasity to a medical 

facility or provide her with around-the-clock monitoring, and instead decided to keep 

Chasity alone in her cell. ECF No. 61 at 4-5 and 19-22. There was nothing in the decision 

about the May 17, 2020 email showing that Dr. Shaw knew on the morning that Chasity

gave birth that she was complaining of stomach pain and was in labor, or about the fact

that Dr. Shaw took no action in response to receiving the email. Id. The email to Dr. 

Shaw therefore adds important new facts that the Court did not have when granting the 

motion to dismiss – Dr. Shaw was subjectively aware on the morning Chasity gave birth 

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of serious risks to the health of Chasity and her baby, and that Dr. Shaw was 

deliberately indifferent to these serious risks by doing nothing. 

Second, Dr. Shaw seeks to distinguish the facts of Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 

(5th Cir. 2006) from the facts of this case because the patient in Easter personally 

complained of pain to a nurse as opposed to Chasity’s complaint of pain being 

conveyed by email to Dr. Shaw. ECF No. 97 at 7-8. In reaching its holding that the nurse 

violated clearly established law by offering no treatment options to the patient, the 

court of appeals in Easter did not state that the means of conveying the complaint of 

pain was relevant to its decision. 467 F.3d at 461-65. Here, the May 17, 2020 email 

establishes that Dr. Shaw offered pregnant Chasity no treatment options on the 

morning she gave birth despite knowing that was she was complaining of stomach pain 

and was in labor. Accordingly, Dr. Shaw violated Chasity’s clearly established rights. 

See id. 

Third, Dr. Shaw attempts to avoid Dr. Gutman’s expert opinion by making 

evidentiary arguments about the admissibility and substance of the opinion. ECF No. 97 

at 8. Such evidentiary considerations are irrelevant because the Court entered the Final

Judgment based upon a motion dismiss, where the Court must accept the facts in the 

Amended Complaint as true. See Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 673, 

675 (5th Cir. 2007). If Plaintiff would have had the May 17, 2020 email to Dr. Shaw and 

Dr. Gutman’s expert opinion prior to filing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff would 

have alleged that Dr. Shaw knew on the morning that Chasity gave birth that she was

complaining of stomach pain and in labor but did nothing in response. The Court 

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would have accepted these facts as true for the purpose of deciding Dr. Shaw’s motion 

to dismiss. See Sonnier, 590 F.3d at 675. 

Fourth, Dr. Shaw argues that Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim is merely a 

challenge to his medical judgment and therefore does not state a claim for deliberate 

indifference. ECF No. 97 at 8-9. This argument is incorrect. As stated in Easter, a plaintiff 

can establish deliberate indifference for a denial of medical care claim “by showing that 

a prison official refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him 

incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton 

disregard for any serious medical needs.” 467 F.3d at 464 (emphasis added) (internal 

quotation marks and quotations omitted). In this case, the May 17, 2020 email shows

that Dr. Shaw ignored Chasity’s complaints of stomach pain and refused to treat her on 

the morning she gave birth. Plaintiff therefore can establish that Dr. Shaw acted with 

deliberate indifference. See id. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion is Timely.

Dr. Shaw claims that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion is untimely because it was 

brought more than one year after the Court issued the Memorandum Opinion and 

Order on May 31, 2023 and/or because it was not brought within a reasonable time. 

ECF No. 97 at 9-11. This claim is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. Plaintiff’s motion was filed within one year of the Final Judgment. 

On April 3, 2023, the Court entered Final Judgment for Dr. Shaw pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). ECF No. 62. The Rule states as follows:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a claim, 

counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple parties are 

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involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, 

but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines 

that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, 

however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 

and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any 

of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of 

a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and 

liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Court’s May 31, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order

adjudicated less than all the claims of fewer than all the parties because Plaintiff’s 

claims against the County survived. ECF No. 61 at 33. But because the Court has

entered Final Judgment for Dr. Shaw (ECF No. 62), Plaintiff could not seek revision of 

the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order under Rule 54(b) and instead seeks relief 

from the Court’s Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2). Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion 

brought on April 2, 2024 (ECF No. 92) therefore is timely because it was brought within 

one year of the Court’s April 3, 2023 Final Judgment (ECF No. 62). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(c)(1). See also Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(stating that the one-year time limit for a Rule 60(b) motion “runs from the date the 

district court entered final judgment.”).1 

B. Plaintiff’s motion was filed within a reasonable time. 

Relying upon In re Nick Julian Motors, 148 B.R. 22 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992), Dr. 

Shaw argues that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion is untimely because it was brought

1 If Dr. Shaw was correct that Plaintiff could bring a Rule 54(b) motion for the Court to 

revise the May 31, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order, then Dr. Shaw’s timeliness 

argument would be moot. Plaintiff could bring a motion for revision of the May 31, 2023

Memorandum Opinion and Order at any time prior to the entry of final judgment on all 

claims for all parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

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about four months after discovering the May 17, 2020 email to Dr. Shaw. ECF No. 97 at 

10-11. Dr. Shaw’s reliance upon In re Nick Julian Motors is mistaken because the court 

denied a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a default judgment due to a seven-month 

delay. 148 B.R. at 26-27. In particular, the court based its denial upon the fact that “when 

the adversary process has been halted because if an essentially unresponsive party, 

default judgment is appropriate to protect the non-defaulting party from interminable 

delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights.” Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks 

and quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff is not a defaulting or unresponsive party 

and did not wait seven months to bring the Rule 60(b)(2) motion. And the adversary 

process has not been halted because this case is still pending. The decision in In re Nick 

Julian Motors therefore does not suggest denial of Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion.

In fact, the principles set forth in In re Nick Julian Motors actually support 

granting Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion. To begin with, the court recognized that 

prejudice to the parties should be considered. In re Nick Julian Motors, 148 B.R. at 26. Dr. 

Shaw did not claim any prejudice in his response brief. ECF No. 97 at 1-11. On the other 

hand, Plaintiff would suffer significant prejudice if the Rule 60(b)(2) motion is denied

because she would not get the chance to conduct full discovery on her denial of medical 

care claim against Dr. Shaw or to obtain a resolution on the merits based upon all the 

facts. And as recognized by the court in In re Nick Julian Motors, “[a]ll doubts are to be 

resolved in favor the party seeking relief from judgment to facilitate resolution of 

disputes on their merits.” 148 B.R. at 27 (quotation omitted). Thus, the Court should 

grant Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) so that the dispute with Dr. Shaw can be resolved on the 

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merits with all the facts. See In re Nick Julian Motors, 148 B.R. at 27. 

Moreover, there is Fifth Circuit case law establishing that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) 

motion filed within only about four months of discovery of the email to Dr. Shaw is 

timely. See e.g., First RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 

1992) (citing with approval a Second Circuit case finding that a Rule 60(b) motion was

brought within a reasonable time when it was filed four months after the grounds for 

the motion were known); Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 929 (5th Cir. 

1976) (determining that a Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a reasonable time when it 

was filed four months after the filing of a notice of appeal); Coleman v. Cain, No. 05-799, 

2009 WL 3400462, *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2009) (assuming without deciding that a Rule 

60(b) motion brought within about four months was a reasonable time); Curley v. JP 

Morgan Chase Bank NA, No. 14-2633, 2015 WL 3863499, **1-2, W.D. La. June 22, 2015) 

(addressing the merits a Rule 60(b) motion filed within four months). 

The Court also should consider what occurred during the approximately four 

months between the discovery of the email to Dr. Shaw in December 2023 and the filing 

of Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion on April 2, 2024. To begin with, the holidays occurred 

during this time period. In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel had a two-week trial in the 

Southern District of New York in January 2024. Appendix at 4, ¶ 6. Also, Plaintiff’s 

counsel was on paternity leave in March and April 2024 due to the birth of his first 

child. Id. at 4, ¶ 7. And there is the time it took for Plaintiff’s counsel to: (1) evaluate the 

importance of the email to Dr. Shaw as well as Dr. Gutman’s expert opinion; (2) 

perform the necessary legal research and analysis; and (3) prepare the Rule 60(b) 

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motion and supporting materials. Under these circumstances, a time period of only

about four months should be deemed reasonable. 

Lastly, it is well-established that Rule 60(b) “should be liberally construed in 

order to achieve substantial justice.” Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300, 305 

(5th Cir. 2007). Here, Chasity’s claim against Dr. Shaw is that he denied her medical 

care which resulted in the tragic and preventable death of an innocent baby. When 

Chasity filed her Amended Complaint and when the Court entered the Final Judgment 

for Dr. Shaw, Chasity did not have the May 17, 2020 email showing that Dr. Shaw knew 

on the morning Chasity gave birth that she was in pain and in labor but did nothing. 

The Court therefore should permit Chasity’s claim against Dr. Shaw to proceed on all 

the facts so that substantial justice may be achieved. See Steverson, 508 F.3d at 305. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court 

grant the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) motion for relief from Final Judgment 

as to Dr. Shaw. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jarrett Adams

Jarrett Adams, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF JARRETT ADAMS, PLLC

40 Fulton St., Floor 28

New York, New York 10038

T: 646.880.9707

F: 646.880.9707

E: JAdams@JarrettAdamsLaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 7, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing pleading 

with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas using the 

CM/ECF system, which will automatically serve a true and complete copy upon all 

counsel of record. 

/s/Jarrett Adams

Jarrett Adams, Esq.

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