IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

BRYAN P. SPENCE, TYLER W. STEF, 

RYAN CORCORAN, MITCHELL B. PIKE, 

STEVEN R. HAYNES, ANDREW GRIEB, 

DANIELLE A. RUNYAN, CHRISTOPHER M. 

WU, and ALAN SOSEBEE, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, in his official capacity 

as United States Secretary of Defense, 

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE, and FRANK KENDALL, in his official 

capacity as United States Secretary of the Air Force, 

Defendants. 

Case No: 4:22-cv-453-O 

 

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

I. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Claims that Denial of Their 

Religious Accommodation Requests Violates the Free Exercise Clause 

and RFRA. ......................................................................................................... 7

A. Defendants’ COVID-19 vaccine mandates substantially burden 

Plaintiffs’ and prospective class members’ sincerely held 

religious beliefs. ...................................................................................... 8

B. The vaccine mandate does not satisfy strict scrutiny. ............................. 9

1. Defendants cannot demonstrate a compelling interest that 

justifies burdening Plaintiffs’ and prospective class members’ 

religious beliefs and practices. ................................................................ 9

2. Defendants’ adverse actions against Plaintiffs and class members 

are not the least restrictive means of achieving their purported 

interest. .................................................................................................. 14

C. The vaccine mandate is neither neutral nor generally applicable. ........ 16

II. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors Favor Relief. ........................ 19

A. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury. ............................................. 19

B. The balance of harms and the public interest in protecting 

constitutional and statutory rights weigh in favor of an 

injunction. ............................................................................................. 22

III. The Requested Injunction Does Not Prevent Defendants from Making 

Operational Decisions. ..................................................................................... 23

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 25

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 

Cases

BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 

United States Dep't of Lab., 17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................... 4, 11, 21 

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) ................................................... 8, 9, 10, 14 

Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009) ............................................................... 7 

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 

508 U.S. 520 (1993) ................................................................................................ passim

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) ................................................................................. 20 

Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021)................................................ 3, 12, 16, 18 

Gonzalez v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 

546 U.S. 418 (2006) ................................................................................................... 9, 10 

Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, 

760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................... 4, 23 

Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2012) ................... 20 

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) ................. 3, 17, 20, 23 

Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610 

(5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022).............................................................................................. 4, 21 

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ............................................................................. 8 

Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016) ..................................................... 18 

Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) ...................................................... 3, 14, 15, 17 

Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) ..................................... 8 

U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-01236-O, 2022 WL 34443 

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2022) ......................................................................................... passim

Rules

Air Force Policy Directive 52-2: Accommodation of Religious Practices in 

the Air Force, Sec’y of the Air Force (July 28, 2020) ................................................... 24 

Frank Kendall, Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of 

Department of the Air Force Military Members, Sec'y of Air Force (Sept. 

3, 2021) ...................................................................................................................... 5, 10 

Lloyd Austin, Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of 

Department of Defense Service Members, Dep't of Def. (Aug. 24, 2021) ................ 5, 10 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 3 of 31 PageID 69
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Other Authorities

Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved Product: 

Review Memorandum, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 11, 2020) ......................... 4, 13 

Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved Product: 

Review Memorandum, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 18, 2020) ......................... 4, 13 

Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved Product: 

Review Memorandum, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 27, 2021) .......................... 4, 13 

FDA News Release, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Authorizes 

First Oral Antiviral for Treatment of COVID-19, 

U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 22, 2021) .................................................................. 13 

Know Your Treatment Options for COVID-19, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. ..................... 13 

Possible Treatment Options for COVID-19, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 

Servs. .............................................................................................................................. 13 

Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, DAF COVID-19 Statistics – 

May 2022, DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE (May 17, 2022) ............................................ passim

Kristina Wong, Exclusive: Air Force Admits All Granted Religious 

Accommodations for Vax Were for Airmen Already Leaving Service, 

BREITBART (May 10, 2022) ............................................................................................. 6 

 

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INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs are nine servicemembers in the United States Air Force. They include four 

Lieutenant Colonels, three Majors, one Captain, and one First Lieutenant. Their service—

ranging in length from three to over twenty years—has been outstanding. They have earned 

Combat Action Medals, Meritorious Service Medals, Top Gun awards, Defense 

Meritorious Medals, Air Medals with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters, Commendation Medals, and a 

host of other awards and decorations. And until Defendants forced them to choose between 

their Air Force careers and their faith, the record of each was unblemished. 

Defendants are attempting to coerce Plaintiffs, and others like them, to receive a 

COVID-19 vaccination. But Plaintiffs cannot receive any of the FDA-approved vaccines 

without violating their sincere religious beliefs. Accordingly, each Plaintiff submitted a 

Religious Accommodation Request (“RAR”). But instead of considering less restrictive 

means of mitigating the risks of COVID-19, the Air Force has denied or is in the process 

of denying each request. In many instances, they have punished Plaintiffs for the mere act 

of making the request: Plaintiffs have been removed from training, grounded from flight, 

and lost promised promotions, even before their RAR is formally denied. Once denials are 

issued, the Air Force swiftly begins the process of administrative consequences and 

nonjudicial punishment, which will ultimately lead to Plaintiffs’ involuntary separation 

from the Air Force. Defendants’ message is clear: Get a jab, or lose your job. 

Airmen who sought medical or administrative exemptions to Defendants’ vaccine 

mandate received no such message. The Air Force has approved over 1,800 medical and 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 5 of 31 PageID 71
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administrative accommodations.1 Plaintiffs are personally aware of unvaccinated Airmen 

in their units with the same duties as Plaintiffs who have faced no adverse action 

whatsoever due to their medical exemptions. See, e.g., Grieb Aff. ¶¶ 31–32 (App.111); 

Haynes Aff. ¶ 32 (App.100); Spence Aff. ¶ 33 (App.47). And in one instance, the Air Force 

has allowed an unvaccinated pilot with an expired medical exemption to continue flying 

on a team responsible for preparing for President Biden’s visits abroad. Grieb Aff. ¶¶ 31–

32 (App.111); Haynes Aff. ¶ 32 (App.100). Defendants have thus made it very clear that 

they can accommodate unvaccinated Airmen without jeopardizing mission readiness or the 

health of the Air Force. They simply refuse to do so when an Airman is unvaccinated for 

religious reasons. 

Because of the Air Force’s violations of the religious rights of thousands of Airmen, 

Plaintiffs have brought this class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all others 

similarly situated. And, in this motion, Plaintiffs ask this Court to issue a temporary 

restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the 

vaccine mandate against them and taking adverse action based on their religious 

accommodation requests. 

Plaintiffs have clearly met the requirements for such an injunction. First, they are 

likely to prevail on the merits: Neither the First Amendment nor the Religious Freedom 

Restoration Act (“RFRA”) can brook the Air Force’s blatant double standard, which 

1 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, DAF COVID-19 Statistics – May 2022, DEP’T 

OF THE AIR FORCE (May 17, 2022), https://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/Article/3018445/daf-covid-19-statistics-may-17-2022/. 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 6 of 31 PageID 72
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penalizes Airmen who are unvaccinated due to their religious beliefs, but not Airmen who 

are unvaccinated for medical or administrative reasons. The Air Force’s system of 

individualized exemptions also renders its vaccine mandate not neutral and generally 

applicable. Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021). The mandate must 

therefore undergo strict scrutiny under both the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. Church 

of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993). 

The mandate cannot survive that scrutiny. It places a substantial burden on 

Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs by forcing them to choose between their consciences and their 

careers. The Air Force has no compelling interest in vaccinating Plaintiffs and prospective 

class members, who comprise only 3% of the Air Force. Indeed, the Air Force’s decision 

to exempt other comparably situated Airmen from the mandate shows it lacks a compelling 

interest in forcing these particular Airmen to receive a vaccine in violation of their religious 

beliefs. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021). Likewise, the same precautions 

that the Air Force requires of medically and administratively exempt servicemembers 

would suffice to achieve any interest the government does have. Defendants’ decision to 

instead pursue punitive action against Plaintiffs and prospective class members is not the 

least restrictive means they could have chosen. Plaintiffs will succeed on their First 

Amendment and RFRA claims. 

The remaining factors necessary to obtain a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction are also present. The deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights 

is per se irreparable injury. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 

(2020). So too is the crisis of conscience Defendants have created. BST Holdings, L.L.C. 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 7 of 31 PageID 73
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v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., United States Dep't of Lab., 17 F.4th 604, 618 

(5th Cir. 2021); Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610 (5th 

Cir. Feb. 17, 2022). The injunction will serve the public interest by preventing 

constitutional deprivations. Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, 760 F.3d 

448, 458 n.9 (5th Cir. 2014); U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-01236-O, 2022 

WL 34443, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2022). And the harm to Plaintiffs from the loss of 

their religious liberty and their careers outweighs any conceivable harm to the Air Force, 

which already has a 97% vaccination rate.2

 

Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to grant the temporary restraining order and the

preliminary injunction. 

FACTS 

On July 29, 2021—several months after COVID-19 vaccines became widely 

available3

—President Biden announced that he would direct the Department of Defense 

(“DoD”) to add the COVID-19 vaccine to its list of required immunizations for military 

service members. Less than a month later, on August 24, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. 

2

 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, supra note 1. 

3 Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved Product: Review Memorandum, 

U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/144416/download 

(“Pfizer Vaccine Emergency Authorization”); Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an 

Unapproved Product: Review Memorandum, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 18, 2020), 

https://www.fda.gov/media/144673/download (“Moderna Vaccine Emergency 

Authorization”); Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved Product: 

Review Memorandum, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 27, 2021), 

https://www.fda.gov/media/146338/download (“Johnson & Johnson Vaccine Emergency 

Authorization”). 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 8 of 31 PageID 74
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Austin issued a memorandum directing DoD to vaccinate all active-duty and reserve 

service members against COVID-19. The memo made clear that service members who 

have contracted and recovered from COVID-19 must still receive a vaccination.4 But the 

memo also exempted from the mandate all service members who are currently participating 

in a COVID-19 clinical trial—even those given a placebo.5 And the memo specified that 

the mandate “will be subject to any identified contraindications and any administrative or 

other exemptions established in Military Department policy.”6

On September 3, 2021, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall issued a 

memorandum to all Air Force Commanders, entitled “Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 

2019 Vaccination of Department of the Air Force Military Members.”7 This document 

imposed a vaccination mandate for Air Force active-duty and reserve personnel, directing 

them to become vaccinated within 90 and 120 days, respectively. The mandate reiterated 

that “[i]ndividuals with previous COVID-19 infection or positive serology are not 

considered fully vaccinated and are not exempt.” 

After Defendant Kendall’s memorandum was issued, Plaintiffs’ commanders began 

ordering them to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Each Plaintiff sought a religious 

4 Lloyd Austin, Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of Department of 

Defense Service Members, Dep't of Def. (Aug. 24, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/5xtab3en.

(App.1). 

5 Id. 

6 Id.

7 Frank Kendall, Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of Department of the 

Air Force Military Members, Sec'y of Air Force (Sept. 3, 2021), 

https://tinyurl.com/2p83e9z6 (App.5–6). 

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accommodation request (“RAR”) to the vaccine mandate based on their sincerely held 

religious beliefs. Each has received at least an initial denial of their RAR, and several have 

also received a denial of their appeal. See Corcoran Aff. ¶ 22 (App.77); Grieb Aff. ¶¶ 22, 

34 (App.108, App.112); Haynes Aff. ¶¶ 22, 26 (App.95–96); Pike Aff. ¶¶ 18, 21 (App.85–

86); Runyan Aff. ¶ 19 (App.121); Sosebee Aff. ¶¶ 22, 26 (App.145–46); Spence Aff. ¶ 24 

(App.45); Stef Aff. ¶¶ 44–45 (App.61); Wu Aff. ¶ 25 (App.133–34). Plaintiffs who have 

pending appeals of the denial of their RARs will certainly receive those denials soon: to 

date, the Air Force has granted only 81 RARs, out of more than 10,000 requests.8

 As the 

government admitted during a recent preliminary injunction hearing, those religious 

exemptions were granted to Airmen who were already leaving the service, not to those who 

wish to continue serving.

9 In short, the Air Force’s accommodations process is “theater.” 

See SEALs 1-26, 2022 WL 34443, at *1. 

Defendants have not even waited for the conclusion of the RAR process before 

taking adverse actions against religious requesters. Plaintiffs have faced myriad forms of 

discrimination, including losing promised promotions, being prohibited from fulfilling 

their duties, grounded from flight, barred from long-scheduled training opportunities, and 

denied pay. See, e.g., Wu Aff. ¶ 24 (App.133); Stef Aff. ¶ 9 (App.40); Grieb Aff. ¶ 40 

(App.113). Those Plaintiffs who have received final denials quickly found themselves 

8

 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, supra note 1. 

9 Kristina Wong, Exclusive: Air Force Admits All Granted Religious Accommodations for 

Vax Were for Airmen Already Leaving Service, BREITBART (May 10, 2022), 

https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/05/10/exclusive-air-force-admits-all-grantedreligious-accommodations-for-vax-were-for-airmen-already-leaving-service/. 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 10 of 31 PageID 76
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subject to progressive disciplinary action, including issuance of Letters of Counseling, 

Letters of Admonishment, and Letters of Reprimand. See, e.g., Sosebee Aff. ¶ 29 

(App.147–48); Stef Aff. ¶ 72 (App.68). Now, those Plaintiffs await the next step of their 

nonjudicial punishment, never knowing what day will bring further discipline. For some, 

the next step could very well be a Show Cause Order, which would initiate separation 

proceedings from the Air Force. Stef Aff. ¶ 72 (App.68). Without immediate relief from 

this Court, their service to this country will soon be over because they stood by their 

religious convictions. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The movant seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: “(1) a substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the 

injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs 

any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction 

will not disserve the public interest.” Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiffs satisfy each of these factors. 

ARGUMENT 

I. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Claims that Denial of Their Religious 

Accommodation Requests Violates the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. 

As to likelihood of success: There is no question that Plaintiffs satisfy the 

preliminary requirement for both a RFRA and a free-exercise claim, i.e., that the Air 

Force’s vaccine policy forces them to choose between their careers and their religious 

beliefs, and therefore substantially burdens their religious beliefs. It’s also clear that the 

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Air Force does not have a compelling interest in vaccinating these particular Plaintiffs, and 

that the vaccine mandate is not the least restrictive means of pursuing its interest in 

protecting its members from COVID infections. And those three conclusions are sufficient 

to establish a RFRA violation. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 726 

(2014). In addition, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim under the Free Exercise 

Clause because the vaccine mandate is neither neutral nor generally applicable, triggering 

the same strict scrutiny requirement Defendants fail to meet under RFRA. 

A. Defendants’ COVID-19 vaccine mandates substantially burden Plaintiffs’ 

and prospective class members’ sincerely held religious beliefs. 

Defendants’ coercive vaccine mandate places a substantial burden on the sincerely 

held religious beliefs of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. Defendants’ policies and 

practices “put substantial pressure” on Airmen and Guardians who object to COVID-19 

vaccination on religious grounds to “modify [their] behavior and to violate [their] beliefs.” 

See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). As this Court 

has already recognized, a substantial burden is especially evident “when the government 

imposes a choice between one’s job and one’s religious belief.” U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. 

Biden, No. 4:21-cv-01236-O, 2022 WL 34443, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2022) (citing 

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)). Just like the Plaintiffs in the SEALs case, 

Plaintiffs here “must decide whether to lose their livelihoods or violate sincerely held 

religious beliefs. Because they will not compromise these religious beliefs, Plaintiffs have 

been threatened with separation from the military and other disciplinary action.” Id. The 

burden imposed by such a choice is substantial. 

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B. The vaccine mandate does not satisfy strict scrutiny.

As the Supreme Court has held, “[a] law that targets religious conduct for distinctive 

treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a 

religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 

546. This is no such rare case. Defendants’ actions, particularly with regard to medical 

exemption requests, plainly evidence that their interest in vaccinating Plaintiffs and 

prospective class members is not compelling and that their punitive disciplinary measures 

are not the least restrictive means of achieving any legitimate interest they may have. 

1. Defendants cannot demonstrate a compelling interest that justifies 

burdening Plaintiffs’ and prospective class members’ religious 

beliefs and practices. 

No compelling interest justifies the substantial burden Defendants have placed on 

religious exercise. The compelling interest prong presents a “focused” inquiry: the 

government must “demonstrate that the compelling interest is satisfied through application 

of the challenged law ‘to the person’—to the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of 

religion is being substantially burdened.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 

682, 726 (2014) (quoting Gonzalez v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 

546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006)). Courts must “look beyond broadly formulated interests” 

and “scrutinize the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious 

claimants.” Id. at 726–27 (cleaned up) (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431). 

Thus, it will not do for Defendants’ to simply assert “a broadly formulated interest 

in ‘national security.’” SEALs, 2022 WL 3443, at *10. “They must articulate a compelling 

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interest in vaccinating” Plaintiffs and prospective class members—approximately 3% of 

Air Force members. Id.10 And in evaluating that purported compelling interest, this Court 

must “look to the marginal interest in enforcing the [vaccine] mandate in these cases.” 

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 727 (citing O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431). Defendants cannot carry 

their burden under that test for several reasons. 

First, as this Court has already recognized, the underinclusivenss of the military’s 

COVID-19 vaccine mandate undermines Defendants’ purported compelling interest. See 

SEALs, 2022 WL 3443, at *10. The Supreme Court has held that: 

Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and 

fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm 

or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction 

is not compelling. It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that a law 

cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves 

appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited. 

Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47 (cleaned up). 

If Defendants are truly concerned about the spread of COVID-19 through military 

ranks, they have left a shocking amount of “appreciable damage” unprohibited. Here, as in 

SEALs, the Air Force “is willing to grant exemptions for non-religious reasons.” SEALs, 

2022 WL 34443, at *10. And here, as there, “[i]ts mandate includes carveouts for those 

participating in clinical trials and those with medical contraindications and allergies to 

vaccines.” See id.11

10 See Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, supra note 1. 

11 See also Austin, supra note 4 (App.2–3); Kendall, supra note 7 (App.5–6). 

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The Air Force will even treat the same Airmen differently depending on whether a 

medical or a religious accommodation is at issue. Plaintiffs Pike and Stef were permitted 

to schedule and/or attend flight training while they had medical accommodations in place, 

but after those accommodations were revoked, they were grounded from flight. Pike Aff. 

¶ 15–20 (App.85–86); Stef Aff. ¶¶ 40–43 (App.60). Their vaccination status did not 

change, and consequently neither did their susceptibility to COVID-19. The only thing that 

changed was that the basis for their claim was religious, rather than secular. 

Plaintiffs are also aware of unvaccinated individuals with their same duties,

sometimes even in their same units, who have not faced adverse action, simply because 

their accommodation requests were medical, rather than religious. Grieb Aff. ¶¶ 31–32 

(App.111–12); Haynes Aff. ¶ 32 (App.100); Spence Aff. ¶ 33 (App.47). In one instance, 

an unvaccinated Airman has been permitted to continue flying even though his temporary 

medical exemption has expired. Grieb Aff. ¶ 32 (App.111–12). That Airman has been 

permitted to travel on training missions from which Plaintiff Haynes has been restricted 

because of his religious accommodation request and has also been permitted to travel on 

the Presidential Advance Team, which is responsible for coordinating with the Secret 

Service in preparation for Air Force One movements supporting the President’s travel. 

Grieb Aff. ¶¶ 31–32 (App.111–12); Haynes Aff. ¶ 32 (App.100). 

Such underinclusiveness, as this Court has pointed out, “is often regarded as a 

telltale sign that the government's interest in enacting a liberty-restraining pronouncement 

is not in fact ‘compelling.’” SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *10 (quoting BST Holdings, LLC

v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 17 F.4th 604, 616 (5th Cir. 2021). Indeed, as the 

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Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he creation of a system of exceptions” undermines 

Defendants’ contention their vaccine mandate “can brook no departures.” Fulton, 141 S. 

Ct. at 1882. Where it is “only conduct motivated by religious conviction that bears the 

weight of the governmental restrictions” there “can be no serious claim that those interests 

justify the [mandate.]” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547. 

Furthermore, to quote again from this Court’s SEALs opinion, “[e]ven if Defendants 

have a broad compelling interest in widespread vaccination of its force, they have achieved 

this goal without the participation” of Plaintiffs and prospective class members. SEALs, 

2022 WL 3443, at *10. At least 96.9% of all active-duty Air Force servicemembers have 

been fully vaccinated.

12 “The remaining [3]% is unlikely to undermine the [Air Force’s] 

efforts.” See SEALs, 2022 WL 3443, at *10. 

 Additionally, the Air Force has not conducted the “individualized assessment” 

necessary to demonstrate a compelling interest in vaccinating these particular Plaintiffs.

See id. Like the Plaintiffs in the SEALs case, “[b]y all accounts, Plaintiffs have safely 

carried out their jobs during the pandemic.” See id. Before the vaccine mandate, at least 

three Plaintiffs “conducted large-scale trainings and led courses without incident.” See id.; 

Stef Aff. ¶ 8 (App.52); Haynes Aff. ¶ 19 (App.95); Sosebee Aff. ¶¶ 7, 20 (App.142, 

App.145). At least three have successfully teleworked for some of their duties. Runyan 

Aff. ¶ 20 (App.121); Sosebee Aff. ¶ 13 (App.143); Corcoran Aff. ¶ 20 (App.77). And at 

least two have successfully deployed or gone on temporary duty location trips. Spence Aff. 

12 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, supra note 1. 

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¶ 22 (App.43–44); Sosebee Aff. ¶ 13 (App.143–44). And at least one has safely performed 

his duties without any restrictions. Wu Aff. ¶ 14 (App.130). 

That Defendants waited over seven months before issuing their mandate further 

underscores their lack of a compelling interest in vaccinating Plaintiffs.13 If vaccinating or 

involuntarily separating religious requesters is truly critical to military effectiveness, 

Defendants’ delay in pursuing that course of action is puzzling. 

Finally, as in SEALs, “Plaintiffs present a lower risk of infection and transmission 

than in the earlier days of the pandemic.” See SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *10. “Several 

Plaintiffs have tested positive for antibodies, showing the presence of natural immunity.” 

Id.; Corcoran Aff. ¶ 32 (App.79–80); Haynes Aff. ¶ 27 (App.96–97); Runyan Aff. ¶ 26 

(App.123); Stef Aff. ¶ 46 (App.61–62); Grieb Aff. ¶ 16 (App.106–07). “With a [97]% 

vaccination rate, [the Air Force’s] herd immunity is at an all-time high.” See SEALs, 2022 

WL 34443, at *10. “COVID-19 treatments are becoming increasingly effective at reducing 

hospitalization and death.”14 Id. Indeed, the Air Force’s own statistics make this 

effectiveness evident: As of May 16, of the 98,372 COVID cases in the Air Force’s military 

13 See Pfizer Vaccine Emergency Authorization, supra note 3; Moderna Vaccine 

Emergency Authorization, supra note 3; Johnson & Johnson Vaccine Emergency 

Authorization, supra note 3. 

14 Additionally, new treatments are available to treat COVID-19, mitigating the effects of 

virus transmission. See, e.g., FDA News Release, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA 

Authorizes First Oral Antiviral for Treatment of COVID-19, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 

(Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronaviruscovid-19-update-fda-authorizes-first-oral-antiviral-treatment-covid-19; Possible 

Treatment Options for COVID-19, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (last accessed May 

26, 2022), https://combatcovid.hhs.gov/possible-treatment-options-covid-19.

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force (including both Active and Reserve components), only 0.026% of cases resulted in 

hospitalization and only 0.016% of cases resulted in death.15 While any death is, of course, 

tragic, lightning-strike rarities cannot justify trampling civil liberties. 

In short, the Air Force cannot demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in forcing 

these Plaintiffs to be vaccinated in violation of their sincerely held beliefs. That reality, 

combined with the substantial burden the Air Force’s mandate creates, is sufficient to 

establish Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 727. 

2. Defendants’ adverse actions against Plaintiffs and class members are 

not the least restrictive means of achieving their purported interest. 

Even if Defendants could establish that they have a compelling interest in 

vaccinating these particular Plaintiffs and other religious requesters, applying their vaccine 

mandate to Plaintiffs is not the least restrictive means of achieving any such interest. As 

discussed above, the vaccine mandate is substantially underinclusive. And, as the Supreme 

Court has put it, where “the proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous 

non-religious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower [precautions] that 

burdened religion to a far lesser degree,” government action does not survive strict scrutiny.

See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. Again, nothing about the COVID-19 virus changes the 

constitutional analysis: The Supreme Court has struck down government action when 

defendants could not “show that the religious exercise at issue is more dangerous than those 

activities even when the same precautions are applied.” Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 

15 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, supra note 1. 

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1294, 1296–97 (2021). Defendants’ treatment of medical exemptions thus shows the 

adverse actions they have pursued against religious requesters are not the least restrictive 

means of achieving any government interest. 

This conclusion is buttressed by the principle, articulated by the Supreme Court in 

Tandon, that courts must presume “precautions that suffice for other activities suffice for 

religious exercise too.” Id. at 1297. Here, Defendants cannot show that Airmen who are 

unvaccinated for religious reasons pose any greater threat to military readiness than Airmen 

who are unvaccinated for medical reasons; viruses, unlike Defendants, do not discriminate 

between secular and religious motivations. Hence the same precautions Defendants have 

taken for servicemembers with medical exemptions would suffice for servicemembers who 

have requested religious accommodations. For Airmen with medical exemptions, those 

precautions have not included disciplinary action, being removed from their jobs, or 

involuntary separation from the military. See, e.g., Haynes Aff. ¶ 32 (App.100); Grieb Aff. 

¶ 31–32 (App.111–12); Spence Aff. ¶ 30 (App.46). Treating Plaintiffs and prospective 

class members in this manner is not the least restrictive means of achieving the 

government’s interests. 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ experience over eighteen months during the height of the 

pandemic—doing their jobs with other precautions in place—shows that there are less 

restrictive means available than the discriminatory course Defendants have taken against 

religious requesters. See, e.g., Spence Aff. ¶ 22 (App.43–44) (commander says Spence 

could work by wearing a mask, social distancing, and periodically testing); Sosebee Aff. 

¶ 13 (App.143) (social distancing, masks, telework, selective scheduling); Corcoran Aff. ¶

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20 (App.77) (telework); Runyan Aff. ¶ 20 (App.121) (telework). There simply is no need 

to remove Plaintiffs from their job responsibilities, issue disciplinary action, revoke 

promotions, and ultimately force Plaintiffs to separate from the military. The vaccine 

mandate is not the least restrictive means of achieving any government interest, and on that 

basis too it should be enjoined as a violation of RFRA. 

C. The vaccine mandate is neither neutral nor generally applicable. 

Defendants’ vaccine mandate is not neutral and generally applicable and is therefore 

also subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. As 

the Supreme Court has recognized, a law “is not generally applicable if it invites the 

government to consider the particular reasons for a person's conduct by providing a 

mechanism for individualized exemptions.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877 (cleaned up). This 

mandate, like the Navy vaccine mandate this Court has already enjoined, “accept[s] 

individual applications for exemptions,” and thus “invites an individualized assessment of 

the reasons why a servicemember is not vaccinated.” See SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *11. 

“Consequently, favoritism is built into the mandate.” Id. 

Absent a compelling reason—and Defendants do not have one for reasons already 

explained—the military cannot choose to extend such favoritism only to those who seek 

accommodation for medical and other secular reasons, and to deny equal munificence to 

cases of “religious hardship.” See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877. As the Supreme Court held 

in Fulton, a “law ... lacks general applicability if it prohibits religious conduct while 

permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar 

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way.” Id. There is no COVID-19 exception to this principle: “Whenever” government 

regulations “treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise,” 

those regulations must undergo strict scrutiny. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (emphasis in 

original). Accord Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 74 (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring) (noting that COVID-19 restrictions were discriminatory where they treated 

religious activity on less favorable terms than secular activity). 

Such is the case here. The Air Force treats “comparable secular activity”—by 

granting exemptions for medical reasons or participation in a clinical trial—favorably, 

while discriminating against religious activity. Medical accommodation requests are 

clearly “comparable” to religious accommodation requests. As the Supreme Court has held, 

“whether two activities are comparable for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause must be 

judged against the asserted government interest that justifies the regulation at issue.” 

Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (citing Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67). 

“Comparability is concerned with the risks various activities pose, not the reasons why” an 

accommodation is sought. Id. Unlike Defendants, the COVID-19 virus does not stop to 

inquire whether an individual is unvaccinated for medical or for religious reasons. Plaintiffs 

are aware of no CDC guidance suggesting that a pilot who is unvaccinated because his 

body rejects a vaccine’s polyethylene is less susceptible to infection than a pilot who is 

unvaccinated because his conscience rejects a vaccine’s connection to abortion. 

Defendants’ choice to accommodate those with secular objections while pursuing 

disciplinary actions against those with religious objections is plain discrimination. 

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Defendants may claim that “governments should enjoy greater leeway under the 

Free Exercise Clause when setting rules for [members of the military] than when regulating 

the general public.” See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878. They may further argue that, when 

individuals enter military service, “they accept certain restrictions on their freedom as part 

of the deal.” Id. But the total abdication of First Amendment and RFRA rights—rights 

these Airmen defend for others, sometimes at risk of life and limb—was not part of the 

deal. As the Court put it in Fulton, “principles of neutrality and general applicability still 

constrain the government” in its capacity as manager of the military. See id.

16 In any event, 

“[n]o matter the level of deference” this Court extends to Defendants, “the inclusion of a 

formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions” renders the vaccine mandate not 

generally applicable. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878. 

Defendants may also attempt to justify their religious discrimination by contrasting 

the number of medical and religious requests. But this Court has already wisely rejected 

that argument: “an influx of religious accommodation requests is not a valid reason to deny 

First Amendment rights. No matter how small the number of secular exemptions by 

comparison, any favorable treatment . . . defeats neutrality.” SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at 

*11. And Defendants in this case have granted far more medical accommodations than the 

16 Accordingly, both this Court and other courts have recognized that military members are 

still entitled to the protections of RFRA. See, e.g., SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *9 (“RFRA 

extends to the military, because under the text of the statute, ‘government’ includes any 

‘branch, department, agency ... of the United States.’”). Courts have also recognized that 

application of RFRA to the military is consistent with congressional intent. Singh v. 

McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201, 217–18 (D.D.C. 2016).

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Court considered in the SEALs case.17 Defendants cannot escape the strict scrutiny 

mandated by their favorable treatment of secular accommodation requests over religious 

accommodation requests. 

II. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors Favor Relief. 

Each of the remaining preliminary injunction factors is also satisfied here: 

irreparable injury, the public interest, and balance of the harms. 

A. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury. 

It is imperative that this Court speedily issue a temporary restraining order to stop 

the ongoing harms Plaintiffs face. Plaintiffs have already suffered myriad harms from 

Defendants’ vaccine mandate: they have been issued Letters of Counseling, 

Admonishment, and Reprimand, each of which goes in their personnel file and essentially 

guarantees they will not be promoted. Stef Aff. ¶ 72 (App.68–69); Sosebee Aff. ¶ 29 

(App.147–48). One lost a promised promotion because of his RAR even before that RAR 

was denied. Wu Aff. ¶ 24 (App.133). They face the prospect of receiving a final denial of 

their RAR appeal while on duty, which would curtail their duty and prevent them from 

having a “good year” and thus cause them to lose the points and time necessary to be 

eligible for promotion and retirement in the standard course. Runyan Aff. ¶¶ 18–19 

17 Compare Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, supra note 1 (stating that the Air 

Force had granted 825 medical exemptions as of May 16, 2022) with SEALs, 2022 WL 

34443 at *11 (stating that there were seven permanent medical exemptions for all Navy 

and Reserve personnel). Additionally, whether the Air Force’s medical exemptions are 

temporary or permanent also should not change this Court’s analysis, because the Air Force 

is not even granting temporary religious exemptions to Plaintiffs and those similarly 

situated. 

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(App.120–21). They have been placed on “No Pay No Points” status, meaning they cannot 

perform duty for pay or earn points toward retirement. Grieb Aff. ¶ 38 (App.113). They 

have been denied long-scheduled training opportunities and instead been forced to perform 

basic duties well below their ranks and capabilities. E.g., Stef Aff. ¶ 26 (App.56). They 

face additional imminent harm in the future: loss of retirement (e.g., Corcoran Aff. ¶ 19, 

26, 30 (App.77–79); Grieb Aff. ¶ 39 (App.113)), forced separation (e.g., Sosebee Aff. ¶ 30 

(App.148–49); Stef Aff. ¶ 76 (App.70–71)), and less than honorable discharge, which will 

harm their ability to find employment outside the military (e.g., Pike Aff. ¶ 25 (App.86–

87)). The weight of this stress has caused immeasurable strain on Plaintiffs and their 

families. E.g., Sosebee Aff. ¶ 30 (App.148); Stef Aff. ¶ 74 (App.69–70); Grieb Aff. ¶ 43 

(App.114). 

As this Court already recognized in the SEALs case, “because these injuries are 

inextricably intertwined with Plaintiffs’ loss of constitutional rights, this Court must 

conclude that Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm.” SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *13. 

As the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal 

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Roman Cath. Diocese of 

Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality 

opinion)). The Fifth Circuit and this Court have recognized that the same principle holds 

true for RFRA. Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 

2012); SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *13. “Thus, any losses the Plaintiffs have suffered in 

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connection with their religious accommodation requests sufficiently demonstrate 

irreparable injury.” SEALs, 2022 WL 34443, at *13. 

Furthermore, as this Court recognized in the SEALs case, “[t]he crisis of conscience 

imposed by the mandate is itself an irreparable harm.” Id. Here, as there, Defendants have 

put Plaintiffs to a job-or-jab choice. And, as Plaintiff Stef’s affidavit shows, when faced 

with that choice, Airmen may well find themselves taking a vaccine over their religious 

objections in order to put food on the table, provide dependents with critical medical care, 

and continue a career to which these servicemembers have devoted years. Stef Aff. ¶¶ 68–

70, 74 (App.67–69). The Fifth Circuit has already recognized that this kind of coercion 

constitutes irreparable harm. BST Holdings, 17 F.4th at 618. And Plaintiffs are suffering 

that irreparable harm as a direct result of the government’s “decision to coerce [them] into 

violating their religious convictions.” See Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 

2022 WL 486610, at *7 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022). “That harm and that harm alone is 

irreparable and supports a preliminary injunction.” Id.18

18 The fact that some Plaintiffs still have pending appeals of the denial of their religious 

accommodation requests does not preclude a finding of irreparable injury. As in SEALs, 

“Plaintiffs are already suffering injury while waiting for the [Air Force] to adjudicate their 

requests.” SEALs, 2022 WL 34443 at *12. This Court should again recognize that the harms 

Plaintiffs face in these circumstances—coercion to violate their religious beliefs, loss of 

First Amendment freedoms, and adverse employment actions—are not “speculative.” See 

id.

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B. The balance of harms and the public interest in protecting constitutional 

and statutory rights weigh in favor of an injunction. 

As this Court observed in the SEALs case, “[t]he final two elements of the 

preliminary injunction standard—the balance of the harms and whether an injunction will 

disserve the public interest—must be considered together. These factors merge when the 

Government is the opposing party.” SEALs, 2022 WL 34443 at *13. Here, both factors 

clearly weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

First, as in SEALs, “[w]hen balancing the harms, courts must consider whether the 

movant's injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin.” Id.

“Plaintiffs’ loss of religious liberties outweighs any forthcoming harm” to the Air Force. 

Id. As this Court recognized in the SEALs case: 

Even the direst circumstances cannot justify the loss of constitutional rights. 

Fortunately, the future does not look so dire. Nearly 100% of the [Air Force] 

has been vaccinated. Hospitalizations are rising at a much slower rate than 

COVID-19 cases. COVID-19 treatments are becoming more effective and 

widely available. 

Id. 

Under such circumstances, it is evident that the harm to Plaintiffs outweighs any 

harm to the Air Force’s purported interests—particularly when, as noted above, the Air 

Force doesn’t take those interests all that seriously when the basis for an exemption request 

is medical, rather than religious. 

An injunction also will not disserve the public interest. To the contrary, it will serve 

the public interest by protecting First Amendment and RFRA rights. See SEALs, 2022 WL 

34443, at *13 (citing Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 458 

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n.9 (5th Cir. 2014)) (“An injunction does not disserve the public interest when it prevents 

constitutional deprivations.”). As the Supreme Court has urged, “even in a pandemic, the 

Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. 

Ct. at 68. Here too, the military’s mandate “strike[s] at the very heart of the First 

Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty.” Id. And it aims its strike at those who have 

dedicated their lives to defending those rights. This Court should enjoin Defendants from 

taking any further adverse actions against Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 

III. The Requested Injunction Does Not Prevent Defendants from Making 

Operational Decisions. 

Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin Defendants’ discriminatory and unlawful course 

of adverse action against servicemembers who request religious accommodations. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin Defendants from: 

1. across-the-board denial of religious accommodation requests for COVID-19 

vaccination; 

2. differential treatment of accommodation requests for the COVID-19 vaccination 

for secular reasons and accommodation requests for religious reasons; 

3. retributive or negative action against servicemembers who make or have made 

religious accommodation requests; and 

4. subject to the limitation below for bona fide operational decisions, making nonreceipt of COVID-19 vaccination or submission of a request for a religious 

accommodation from COVID-19 vaccination a basis for any adverse action 

against any servicemembers including, but not limited to: 

• administrative counselings, admonishments, or reprimands; 

• nonjudicial punishment or separation from service; 

• involuntary placement in the Individual Ready Reserve; 

• change in job titles or duties, removal from assignments, or non-issuance 

of assignments; 

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• negative performance reviews, promotion recommendations, or 

stratifications; 

• giving a less than honorable discharge; 

• recoupment of education or training expenses; 

• determination of medical disqualification or non-deployability; 

• loss or delay of promotion, training opportunities, or retirement; 

• loss of bonuses, pay or benefits; or 

• precluding servicemembers from traveling to and performing duty in 

person, 

unless Defendants can prove that failing to take a particular adverse action 

against the servicemember in question would likely have a real and concrete 

(not theoretical) adverse impact on a compelling government interest. 

Defendants will no doubt cry that the sky will fall if this Court enjoins them from 

taking adverse actions against Plaintiffs and prospective class members because of their 

religious accommodation requests and unvaccinated status. Plaintiffs, who are Air Force 

officers themselves, do not contest that the courts should not interfere in true military 

operational decisions. But the requested relief does not prohibit Defendants from making 

any such decisions. Plaintiffs merely ask this Court to enjoin Defendants from taking 

unlawful adverse action against them and the prospective class members on the basis of 

their RARs or unvaccinated status when there is no real risk to compelling interests. The 

Air Force’s own policy require that assessment.

19 But the facts make clear that Defendants 

have not acted in accordance with those regulations, or with the demands of RFRA and the 

Free Exercise Clause. Plaintiffs simply ask that Defendants be ordered to comply with the 

law. 

19 See Air Force Policy Directive 52-2: Accommodation of Religious Practices in the Air 

Force, Sec’y of the Air Force (July 28, 2020), https://static.epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_hc/publication/afpd52-2/afpd52-2.pdf. 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 28 of 31 PageID 94
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As it stands, the facts clearly show that Defendants are not making reasoned, nondiscriminatory operational decisions. No operational decision could justify allowing 

medically or administratively exempt Airmen to continue to perform their job duties, with 

no threat of discipline or separation from the Air Force, while punishing those who seek 

otherwise identical religious exemptions. As Justice Kavanaugh wisely explained in 

another COVID case, “judicial deference in an emergency or a crisis does not mean 

wholesale judicial abdication, especially when important questions of religious 

discrimination, racial discrimination, free speech, or the like are raised.” Roman Cath. 

Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 74 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Plaintiffs respectfully 

ask this Court to enjoin Defendants’ discriminatory policies and practices. 

CONCLUSION 

 When Plaintiffs swore to serve our country, they swore to support and defend the 

United States Constitution. They have borne “true faith and allegiance to the same,” 

knowing that to do so may one day require the ultimate sacrifice. The promise of the First 

Amendment and of RFRA is that the government may neither single out the religious for 

special burdens, nor impose burdens on sincere religious exercise unless it has a compelling 

interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Defendants’ 

conduct makes plain that they have no such interest in vaccinating religious requesters, and 

that their discriminatory policies are not the least restrictive means of achieving any interest 

they may have. Plaintiffs now ask that this Court vindicate their constitutional and statutory 

rights to religious liberty and swiftly enter a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction to stop Defendants from imposing further harm. 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 29 of 31 PageID 95
26 

May 27, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Cristina M. Squiers 

 Gene C. Schaerr* 

 D.C. Bar No. 416368 

Cristina M. Squiers 

 Texas Bar No. 24093764 

Counsel of Record

 Annika M. Boone* ** 

 Utah Bar No. 17176) 

 SCHAERR | JAFFE LLP 

 1717 K Street NW, Suite 900 

 Washington, DC 20006 

 Telephone: (202) 787-1060 

Facsimile: (202) 776-0136 

gschaerr@schaerr-jaffe.com 

csquiers@schaerr-jaffe.com 

aboone@schaerr-jaffe.com 

Kelly J. Shackelford 

 Texas Bar No. 18070950 

Jeffrey C. Mateer 

 Texas Bar No. 13185320 

David J. Hacker 

 Texas Bar No. 24103323 

Michael D. Berry 

 Texas Bar No. 24085835 

Roger Byron 

 Texas Bar No. 24062643 

First Liberty Institute 

2001 W. Plano Pkwy., Ste. 1600 

Plano, Texas 75075 

Tel: (972) 941-4444 

jmateer@firstliberty.org 

dhacker@firstliberty.org 

mberry@firstliberty.org 

rbyron@firstliberty.org 

Case 4:22-cv-00453-O Document 5 Filed 05/27/22 Page 30 of 31 PageID 96
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Jordan E. Pratt* 

Florida Bar No. 100958 

227 Pennsylvania Ave, SE

Washington, DC 20003 

(972) 941-4444 

jpratt@firstliberty.org 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the 

Proposed Class

*Pro hac vice motions forthcoming

** Not yet admitted in D.C. Practicing 

under the supervision of D.C. attorneys. 

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