Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 48949 

considerations for other equipment that 

may be affected environmentally by the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS equipment 

installation. The level of environmental 

qualification must be related to the 

severity of the considered failure 

conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. 

Test and Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the HeliSAS AP/SAS is a 

complex system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS system installed 

on a Robinson Helicopter Company 

model R66 helicopter, Type Certificate 

Number R00015LA, meet these 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design system 

integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on August 7, 

2014. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–19539 Filed 8–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0595; Special 

Conditions No. 27–031–SC] 

Special Conditions: Airbus Helicopters 

Deutschland GmbH Model EC135 

Series Helicopters, Installation of 

HeliSAS Autopilot and Stabilization 

Augmentation System (AP/SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the modification of the Airbus 

Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus 

Helicopters) Model EC135 series 

helicopters. These model helicopters 

will have a novel or unusual design 

feature after installation of the S–TEC 

Corporation (S–TEC) HeliSAS 

helicopter autopilot/stabilization 

augmentation system (AP/SAS) that has 

potential failure conditions with more 

severe adverse consequences than those 

envisioned by the existing applicable 

airworthiness regulations. These special 

conditions contain the added safety 

standards the Administrator considers 

necessary to ensure the failures and 

their effects are sufficiently analyzed 

and contained. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is August 7, 2014. We 

must receive your comments on or 

before October 3, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2014–0595] 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver 

comments to the Docket Operations, in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://regulations.gov, including any 

personal information the commenter 

provides. Using the search function of 

the docket Web site, anyone can find 

and read the electronic form of all 

comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for accessing the 

docket or go to the Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt 

Wilbanks, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5051; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961; or email to 

Matt.Wilbanks@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The FAA has determined that notice 

and opportunity for public comment are 

unnecessary because the substance of 

these special conditions has been 

subjected to the notice and comment 

period previously and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. As it is unlikely that 

we will receive new comments, the FAA 

finds that good cause exists for making 

these special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your mailed comments on 

these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which 


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48950 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

the docket number appears. We will 

stamp the date on the postcard and mail 

it back to you. 

Background 

On June 18, 2013, S–TEC submitted 

an application to the FAA’s Los Angeles 

Aircraft Certification Office for a 

supplemental type certificate (STC) to 

install a HeliSAS AP/SAS on the Airbus 

Helicopters model EC135 series 

(EC135P1, EC135T1, EC135P2, 

EC135T2, EC135P2+, and EC135T2+) 

helicopters. The Airbus Helicopters 

model EC135 series helicopters are 14 

CFR part 27 normal category, twin 

turbine engine, conventional helicopters 

designed for civil operation. These 

helicopter models are capable of 

carrying up to seven passengers with 

one pilot, and have a maximum gross 

weight of up to 6,504 pounds, 

depending on the model configuration. 

The major design features include a 3- 

blade, fully articulated main rotor, an 

anti-torque tail rotor system, a skid 

landing gear, and a visual flight rule 

basic avionics configuration. S–TEC 

proposes to modify these model 

helicopters by installing a two-axis 

HeliSAS AP/SAS. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.115, S–TEC must 

show that the Airbus Helicopters model 

EC135 series helicopters, as modified by 

the installed HeliSAS AP/SAS, continue 

to meet the requirements specified in 14 

CFR 21.101. The baseline of the 

certification basis for the unmodified 

Airbus Helicopters model EC135 series 

helicopters is listed in Type Certificate 

Number H88EU. Additionally, 

compliance must be shown to any 

applicable equivalent level of safety 

findings, exemptions, and special 

conditions prescribed by the 

Administrator as part of the certification 

basis. 

The Administrator has determined the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain 

to this STC, do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for the 

Airbus Helicopters model EC135 series 

helicopters because of a novel or 

unusual design feature. Therefore, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

§ 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, S–TEC must show 

compliance of the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

STC altered Airbus Helicopters model 

EC135 series helicopters with the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101(d). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The HeliSAS AP/SAS incorporates 

novel or unusual design features for 

installation in an Airbus Helicopters 

model EC135 series helicopter, Type 

Certificate Number H88EU. This 

HeliSAS AP/SAS performs non-critical 

control functions. However, the possible 

failure conditions for this system, and 

their effect on the continued safe flight 

and landing of the helicopters, are more 

severe than those envisioned by the 

present rules. 

Discussion 

The effect on safety is not adequately 

covered under § 27.1309 for the 

application of new technology and new 

application of standard technology. 

Specifically, the present provisions of 

§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major 

failure conditions, or for complex 

systems whose failures could result in 

major failure conditions. The current 

regulations are inadequate because 

when § 27.1309(c) were promulgated, it 

was not envisioned that this type of 

rotorcraft would use systems that are 

complex or whose failure could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is 

particularly true with the application of 

new technology, new application of 

standard technology, or other 

applications not envisioned by the rule 

that affect safety. 

To comply with the provisions of the 

special conditions, we require that S– 

TEC provide the FAA with a systems 

safety assessment (SSA) for the final 

HeliSAS AP/SAS installation 

configuration that will adequately 

address the safety objectives established 

by a functional hazard assessment 

(FHA) and a preliminary system safety 

assessment (PSSA), including the fault 

tree analysis (FTA). This will ensure 

that all failure conditions and their 

resulting effects are adequately 

addressed for the installed HeliSAS AP/ 

SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and 

FTA are all parts of the overall safety 

assessment process discussed in FAA 

Advisory Circular 27–1B (Certification 

of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and 

Society of Automotive Engineers 

document Aerospace Recommended 

Practice 4761 (Guidelines and Methods 

for Conducting the Safety Assessment 

Process on Civil Airborne Systems and 

Equipment). 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS installed on an 

Airbus Helicopters model EC135 series 

helicopter meet the requirements to 

adequately address the failure effects 

identified by the FHA, and subsequently 

verified by the SSA, within the defined 

design integrity requirements. 

Failure Condition Categories. Failure 

conditions are classified, according to 

the severity of their effects on the 

rotorcraft, into one of the following 

categories: 

1. No Effect—Failure conditions that 

would have no effect on safety. For 

example, failure conditions that would 

not affect the operational capability of 

the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; 

however, could result in an 

inconvenience to the occupants, 

excluding the flight crew. 

2. Minor—Failure conditions which 

would not significantly reduce rotorcraft 

safety, and which would involve crew 

actions that are well within their 

capabilities. Minor failure conditions 

would include, for example, a slight 

reduction in safety margins or 

functional capabilities, a slight increase 

in crew workload such as routine flight 

plan changes or result in some physical 

discomfort to occupants. 

3. Major—Failure conditions which 

would reduce the capability of the 

rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 

cope with adverse operating conditions 

to the extent that there would be, for 

example, a significant reduction in 

safety margins or functional capabilities, 

a significant increase in crew workload 

or result in impairing crew efficiency, 

physical distress to occupants, 

including injuries, or physical 

discomfort to the flight crew. 

4. Hazardous/Severe-Major. 

a. Failure conditions which would 

reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or 

the ability of the crew to cope with 

adverse operating conditions to the 

extent that there would be: 

(1) A large reduction in safety margins 

or functional capabilities; 

(2) physical distress or excessive 

workload that would impair the flight 

crew’s ability to the extent that they 

could not be relied on to perform their 

tasks accurately or completely; or 

(3) possible serious or fatal injury to 

a passenger or a cabin crewmember, 

excluding the flight crew. 

b. ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure 

conditions can include events that are 

manageable by the crew by the use of 

proper procedures, which, if not 

implemented correctly or in a timely 

manner, may result in a catastrophic 

event. 

5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions 

which would result in multiple fatalities 

to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation 


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to the flight crew, or result in loss of the 

rotorcraft. 

Radio Technical Commission for 

Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document 

DO–178C (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) provides software design 

assurance levels most commonly used 

for the major, hazardous/severe-major, 

and catastrophic failure condition 

categories. The HeliSAS AP/SAS system 

equipment must be qualified for the 

expected installation environment. The 

test procedures prescribed in RTCA 

Document DO–160G (Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment) are recognized by 

the FAA as acceptable methodologies 

for finding compliance with the 

environmental requirements. Equivalent 

environment test standards may also be 

acceptable. This is to show that the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS system performs its 

intended function under any foreseeable 

operating condition, which includes the 

expected environment in which the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS is intended to operate. 

Some of the main considerations for 

environmental concerns are installation 

locations and the resulting exposure to 

environmental conditions for the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS system equipment, 

including considerations for other 

equipment that may be affected 

environmentally by the HeliSAS AP/

SAS equipment installation. The level 

of environmental qualification must be 

related to the severity of the considered 

failure conditions and effects on the 

rotorcraft. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

installed as an STC approval in Airbus 

Helicopters model EC135P1, EC135T1, 

EC135P2, EC135T2, EC135P2+, and 

EC135T2+ helicopters, Type Certificate 

Number H88EU. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features for a HeliSAS 

AP/SAS STC installed on the specified 

model series of helicopters. It is not a 

rule of general applicability and affects 

only the applicant who applied to the 

FAA for approval of these features. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

The Special Conditions 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the S–TEC Corporation 

(S–TEC) supplemental type certificate 

basis for the installation of a HeliSAS 

helicopter autopilot/stabilization 

augmentation system (AP/SAS) on 

Airbus Helicopters model EC135P1, 

EC135T1, EC135P2, EC135T2, 

EC135P2+, and EC135T2+ helicopters, 

Type Certificate Number H88EU. In 

addition to the requirement of 

§ 27.1309(c), HeliSAS AP/SAS 

installations on Airbus Helicopters 

model EC135P1, EC135T1, EC135P2, 

EC135T2, EC135P2+, and EC135T2+ 

helicopters must be designed and 

installed so that the failure conditions 

identified in the functional hazard 

assessment (FHA) and verified by the 

system safety assessment (SSA), after 

design completion, are adequately 

addressed in accordance with the 

following requirements. 

Requirements 

S–TEC must comply with the existing 

requirements of § 27.1309 for all 

applicable design and operational 

aspects of the HeliSAS AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of ‘‘no 

effect,’’ and ‘‘minor,’’ and for noncomplex systems whose failure 

condition category is classified as 

‘‘major.’’ S–TEC must comply with the 

requirements of these special conditions 

for all applicable design and operational 

aspects of the HeliSAS AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of 

‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/

major,’’ and for complex systems whose 

failure condition category is classified 

as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a 

system whose operations, failure 

conditions, or failure effects are difficult 

to comprehend without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, FTA, 

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

FHA). 

System Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition 

categories defined in these special 

conditions relate to the corresponding 

aircraft system integrity requirements. 

The system design integrity 

requirements, for the HeliSAS AP/SAS, 

as they relate to the allowed probability 

of occurrence for each failure condition 

category and the proposed software 

design assurance level, are as follows: 

1. ‘‘Major’’—For systems with 

‘‘major’’ failure conditions, failures 

resulting in these major effects must be 

shown to be remote, a probability of 

occurrence on the order of between 1 × 

10¥5 to 1 × 10¥7 failures/hour, and 

associated software must be developed, 

at a minimum, to the Level C software 

design assurance level. 

2. ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For 

systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these hazardous/severe-major effects 

must be shown to be extremely remote, 

a probability of occurrence on the order 

of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9 failures/ 

hour, and associated software must be 

developed, at a minimum, to the Level 

B software design assurance level. 

3. ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, 

failures resulting in these catastrophic 

effects must be shown to be extremely 

improbable, a probability of occurrence 

on the order of 1 x 10¥9 failures/hour 

or less, and associated software must be 

developed, at a minimum, to the Level 

A design assurance level. 

System Design Environmental 

Requirements 

The HeliSAS AP/SAS system 

equipment must be qualified to the 

appropriate environmental level for all 

relevant aspects to show that it performs 

its intended function under any 

foreseeable operating condition, 

including the expected environment in 

which the HeliSAS AP/SAS is intended 

to operate. Some of the main 

considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

system equipment, including 

considerations for other equipment that 

may be affected environmentally by the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS equipment 

installation. The level of environmental 

qualification must be related to the 

severity of the considered failure 

conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. 

Test and Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the HeliSAS AP/SAS is a 

complex system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 


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48952 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS system installed 

on an Airbus Helicopters model 

EC135P1, EC135T1, EC135P2, EC135T2, 

EC135P2+, or EC135T2+ helicopter, 

Type Certificate Number H88EU, meet 

these requirements to adequately 

address the failure effects identified by 

the FHA, and subsequently verified by 

the SSA, within the defined design 

system integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on August 7, 

2014. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–19540 Filed 8–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0252; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–213–AD; Amendment 

39–17933; AD 2014–16–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 707 

airplanes, Model 720 and 720B series 

airplanes, Model 727 airplanes, and 

Model 737–100, –200, and –200C series 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 

report of a fire that originated near the 

first officer’s area and caused extensive 

damage to the flight deck on a different 

airplane model. This AD requires 

replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses 

with non-conductive low-pressure 

oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent 

electrical current from inadvertently 

passing through an internal, anticollapse spring of the low-pressure 

oxygen hose, which can cause the lowpressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, 

leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or 

smoke in the flight deck. 

DATES: This AD is effective September 

23, 2014. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of September 23, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; 

telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; 

fax 206–766–5680; Internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view 

this referenced service information at 

the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0252; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

Model 707 airplanes, Model 720 and 

720B series airplanes, and Model 727 

airplanes, contact Patrick Farina, 

Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety, 

Mechanical and Environmental Systems 

Branch, ANM–150L, FAA, Los Angeles 

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3960 

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 

90712–4137; phone: 562–627–5344; fax: 

562–627–5210; email: Patrick.Farina@

faa.gov. 

For Model 737–100, –200, and –200C 

series airplanes, contact Tracy Ton, 

Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety, 

Mechanical and Environmental Systems 

Branch, ANM–150L, FAA, Los Angeles 

ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, CA 90712–4137; phone: 

562–627–5352; fax: 562–627–5210; 

email: Tracy.Ton@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain The Boeing Company 

Model 707 airplanes, Model 720 and 

720B series airplanes, Model 727 

airplanes, and Model 737–100, –200, 

and –200C series airplanes. The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

April 23, 2014 (79 FR 22599). The 

NPRM was prompted by a report of a 

fire that originated near the first officer’s 

area and caused extensive damage to the 

flight deck on a different airplane 

model. The NPRM proposed to require 

replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses 

with non-conductive low-pressure 

oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent 

inadvertent electrical current from 

passing through an internal, anticollapse spring of the low-pressure 

oxygen hose, which can cause the lowpressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, 

leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or 

smoke in the flight deck. 

Explanation of Changes Made to This 

Final Rule 

We have changed the point-of-contact 

information for the various affected 

airplane models in paragraphs (i)(1) and 

(j) of this final rule. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM (79 

FR 22599, April 23, 2014) or on the 

determination of the cost to the public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 

22599, April 23, 2014) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 22599, 

April 23, 2014). 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 530 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 


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