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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

BOBBY R. SHAMLIN, §

(Tarrant No. 0978864), §

 §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-468-O

§

BILL E. WAYBOURN, et al., §

 §

Defendants. §

 MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) 

This case is before the Court for review of pro-se inmate Bobby R. Shamlin’s 

(“Shamlin”) case under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Having reviewed the operative pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims and allegations 

against some defendants must be DISMISSED with prejudice under authority of these 

provisions, but that he may obtain service of process on the remaining claims. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Shamlin initially filed a form civil rights complaint. Compl., ECF No. 1. 

Shamlin remains detained in the Tarrant County Jail. Id. at 1, 3. In the complaint, Shamlin 

named as defendants Tarrant County Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn, the Tarrant County Jail, and 

Officer Gray Adams. Id at 1, 3. Shamlin provided the following state of claim: 

The two officers one white one black put me into a holding cell and into a 

wheelchair and then started after strapping my arms down and assaulting me by 

pulling my fingers upward which caused serious bodily injury to my fingers on 

my right hand on July 31, 2021 . . . at about 8:00 p.m. I was taken to my housing 

in the same wheelchair that I was assaulted in the same day. 

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Compl.5, ECF No. 1. After review of the original complaint, the Court issued an order for 

Shamlin to answer the Court’s questions in the form of a more definite statement of the facts 

related to his claims, and he responded by filing a handwritten more definite statement. Order for 

More Definite Statement (“MDS”), ECF No. 9; MDS, ECF No. 10. 

In review of the more definite statement, when asked about why he was placed in a 

“holding cell” Shamlin explained that he had repeatedly complained to the officers for not 

arresting “people who took my phone [sic].” MDS 1, ECF No. 10. As to the actions of Officer 

Gray Adams, Shamlin answered that “Adams put me into a big wheelchair and strapped me 

down my arms and then starter [sic] pulling my fingers upward which caused serious bodily 

injury to my fingers on my right hand.” Id. As to the unnamed officer John Doe, Shamlin wrote 

“the other officer involved was white, he also strapped my [ . . .] arm down and started to pull 

my fingers upward . . . I was not resisting.” Id. Shamlin contends he did receive medical 

attention in the form of a “right middle finger splint.” Id. at 1, 3. Shamlin acknowledged that 

Sheriff Waybourn was not personally involved but claimed he is “responsible for training the 

officers and the misconduct should not happen.” Id. at 3. As to the Tarrant County Jail, Shamlin 

asked the Court to consider his claim against Tarrant County, Texas, but he did not state any 

facts or allegations against the County. Id at 4. Shamlin seeks “a payment for being assaulted by 

a Tarrant County Jail.” Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) 

Plaintiff Shamlin is an inmate who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a 

part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which 

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requires a district court to review and screen a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee as soon as possible after docketing. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Because Shamlin is proceeding in-forma-pauperis, his pleadings are also subject to 

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A provide for sua sponte

dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). 

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is 

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in 

fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. A complaint fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, 

plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action” do not suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Id.

III. ANALYSIS

 A. Sheriff Bill Waybourn - No Personal Involvement - No Respondeat Superior 

When Shamlin filed this action on a prisoner complaint form, he invoked the Court’s 

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federal question jurisdiction by seeking relief against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a 

citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United 

States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It “afford[s] redress for violations of 

federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms.” Id. A claim of liability for violation of rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regardless of the particular constitutional theory, must be based upon 

allegations of personal responsibility. See Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(“[A] plaintiff bringing a section 1983 action must specify the personal involvement of each 

defendant”); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In order to successfully 

plead a cause of action in § 1983 cases, plaintiffs must enunciate a set of facts that illustrate the 

defendants’ participation in the wrong alleged”); Douthit v. Jones, 641 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.1981) 

(a state actor may be liable under § 1983 only if he “was personally involved in the acts causing 

the deprivation of his constitutional rights or a causal connection exists between an act of the 

official and the alleged constitutional violation.”) 

Shamlin listed Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn as a defendant. Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. A 

supervisory official, like Sheriff Waybourn, cannot be held liable pursuant to § 1983 under any 

theory of vicarious liability simply because an employee or subordinate allegedly violated the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Alton v. Texas A & M University, 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th 

Cir.1999); see also Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir.1979). Such officials may be 

liable when enforcement of a policy or practice results in a deprivation of a federally protected 

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“Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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right. Alton, 168 F.3d at 200 (citing Doe v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215-16 (5th Cir. 

1998)). 

The Court directed Shamlin to “state any particular facts of how any conduct of Sheriff 

Waybourn caused you to sustain any harm.” Order for MDS 3, ECF No. 9. In response, however, 

Shamlin did not provide any facts. MDS 3-4, ECF No. 10. Instead, he alleged only that 

Waybourn was “responsible for training the officers and the misconduct should not happen.” Id. 

But without supporting facts, Shamlin’s claim is essentially a claim that Waybourn is vicariously 

liable for the actions of the officers. As Shamlin has not provided sufficient facts to support a 

claim against Waybourn, his claims against Waybourn must be dismissed. 

B. Tarrant County Jail - No Jural Existence

Tarrant County, Texas - No Sufficient Claim of Municipal Liability 

As noted above, Shamlin named as a defendant the Tarrant County Jail. Compl. 1, ECF 

No. 1. After the Court explained to Shamlin the doctrine of jural existence in the Order for an 

MDS, however, Shamlin answered that he sought to state his claims only against Tarrant County, 

Texas. MDS 2, 4, ECF No. 10. Thus, Shamlin has abandoned his claims against the Tarrant 

County Jail and that defendant must be dismissed.

Shamlin alternatively names Tarrant County, Texas. Although a city or county is a 

“person” within the meaning of § 1983 a municipal government may not be held liable “unless 

action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell 

v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The Supreme Court, in 

Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, emphasized that a local government 

entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis:

[T]herefore . . . a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury 

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inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a 

government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that 

the government entity is responsible under § 1983.

Id. at 694. Thus, to the extent Shamlin claims that Tarrant County, Texas is responsible to him 

due to the actions of the guards at the Tarrant County Jail, as this claim is essentially a claim that 

the County is responsible on a vicarious liability or respondeat superior basis, such claim is 

without merit. 

Instead of vicarious liability for the actions of government employees, § 1983 liability 

attaches against a local government entity only “if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a 

person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692); City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (liability “only where the municipality itself causes the 

constitutional violation at issue”) (emphasis in original). An official municipal policy “includes 

the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices 

so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Prince v. Curry, 423 F. 

App’x 447, 450 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 60.) 

The Court directed Shamlin to provide any “facts of a custom or policy . . . that relates to 

your harm.” Order for MDS 3, ECF No. 9. Shamlin did not provide any responsive information

asserting any kind of facts against Tarrant County, Texas. Shamlin has provided no facts to 

support any claim that Tarrant County could be liable to him for a violation of constitutional 

rights on the facts as stated. 

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IV. SERVICE OR REMAINING CLAIMS 

Construed liberally, Shamlin has alleged facts against the remaining defendants, Officers 

Gray Adams and John Doe, that entitle him to service of the complaint and more definite 

statement on them. Thus, the Court will allow service of Shamlin’s remaining claims against 

these two Tarrant County Jail officers through the assistance of the officers of the Court under 28 

U.S.C. 1915(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 

1109-1110 (5th Cir. 1987).2

V. CONCLUSION and ORDER

2A separate order will issue regarding service of Shamlin’s remaining claims.

 It is therefore ORDERED that all plaintiff Bobby R. Shamlin’s claims for relief in this 

action against defendants Tarrant County Jail, Tarrant County, Texas, and Sheriff Bill E. 

Waybourn are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

SO ORDERED this 12th day of October, 2022.

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