IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

COURTNEY BRESHELL, §

PLAINTIFF, §

§

V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-1733-S-BK

§

BARBARA M.G. LYNN, ET AL. §

DEFENDANTS. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this case was referred to the United 

States magistrate judge for management, including issuance of findings and a recommended 

disposition where appropriate. For the reasons stated here, this civil action should be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to comply with a court order and for lack of 

prosecution. 

I.

Plaintiff Courtney Breshell is proceeding pro se and has not paid the filing fee. Breshell

filed a purported application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) but refused to respond to the 

application inquiries that would allow the Court to determine whether she is entitled to proceed 

without payment of costs. See generally Doc. 4. Instead, Breshell attached a titled “Notice to 

Clerk Justice is not for sale,” in which she states she will not pay court fees because “justice is 

not for sale.” Doc. 4 at 6. 

On August 25, 2022, the Court issued a deficiency order requiring Breshell, to either pay 

the filing fee or submit a completed IFP application by September 21, 2022. Doc. 7. On

October 12, 2022, after Breshell had failed to do either, the Court again ordered her to either pay 

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the filing fee or submit a completed application to proceed IFP. Doc. 8. The deadline to comply 

with the second deficiency order was November 2, 2022. Doc. 8. As of the date of this 

recommendation, however, Breshell has again failed to comply or request an extension of the 

time to do so.

Breshell’s complaint is difficult to decipher, but she appears to allege the “unlawful 

detainment” of her husband, which she deems a trespass and kidnapping. See Doc. 3 at 2. She 

claims that the “trespass” began on January 19, 2022 and is continuing. Doc. 3 at 2. Breshell

names as defendants several federal judges, United States Attorneys, the Clerk of Court for the 

Northern District of Texas, and federal public defenders. Doc. 3 at 2. She also references 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”); the Privacy Act of 1974;

and the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments, Doc. 3 at 2, 28, and seeks restoration of her 

property and $215,369,770 in damages. Doc. 3 at 3.

1

 

Ultimately, given the dearth of legally cognizable allegations in the complaint, the Court 

cannot ascertain whether the dismissal of this action will result in Breshell being precluded from 

pursuing her claims in the future due to limitations.

2

 That notwithstanding, dismissal is 

appropriate even applying a higher standard of review.

1 Breshell attached documents from the federal criminal proceedings in this court against 

Jonathan Obrian James (presumably her husband) to her complaint, including the docket sheet 

and a motion for detention. Doc. 3 at 4-10; see also United States v. Jonathan Obrian James, 

Crim. No. 3:22-CR-026-X (N.D. Tex. 2022). She also attaches various filings from a Texas state 

court seizure and forfeiture proceeding involving Jonathan Obrian James, as well as another civil 

complaint addressed to the United States Court of Federal Claims. Doc. 3 at 11-27. 

2 The statute of limitations for claims under sections 1983 and 1985 that are brought in Texas 

federal courts is two years from the date the claims accrue. See, e.g., Piotrowski v. City of 

Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 577 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th 

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II.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua 

sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the federal rules or any court order. 

Larson v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1998). “This authority flows from the court’s 

inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending 

cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. 

Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). 

When a litigant may be barred by the statute of limitations from re-asserting her claims, a 

Rule 41(b) dismissal is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice and the court is required to 

apply a higher standard of review. See Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th 

Cir. 1992) (concluding that where limitations prevents or arguably may prevent further litigation, 

the court may dismiss for want of prosecution only when there is a clear record of delay or 

contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and the district court has expressly determined that lesser 

sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution, or the record shows that the district court 

employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile). In applying the higher standard, the court 

must find “at least one of three aggravating factors: ‘(1) delay caused by [the] plaintiff himself 

Cir. 1989)) (footnote omitted); see also Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987)). 

The statute of limitations for APA claims is six years from the time the claim accrues. See 

American Stewards of Liberty v. Dept’ of Interior, 960 F.3d 223, 229, n.3 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing 

Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interests, Inc. v. National Park Service, 112 F.3d 1283 1286 (5th 

Cir. 1997) (citing, in turn, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). And a claim under the Privacy Act must be 

brought within two years of the date that the cause of action accrues. See 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(5). 

So, if Breshell’s claims accrued on January 19, 2022, their dismissal here would not necessarily

amount to a dismissal with prejudice. But, again, given the ambiguous and vague nature of the 

pleadings, the Court cannot say with much certainty that the claims accrued on that date and 

applies the higher standard of review for recommending their dismissal under Rule 41(b).

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and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the defendant; or (3) delay caused by intentional 

conduct.’” Id.; see also Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 

2016) (“Although ‘[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually 

appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where 

there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser 

sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’”) (internal quotations and quoted cases 

omitted)).

Here, the Court finds that there is a clear record of purposeful delay or contumacious 

conduct by Breshell. Breshell has had ample time to comply with the Court’s deficiency orders 

by either paying the $402.00 filing fee or filing a completed form-motion to proceed IFP. Since 

Breshell is representing herself, the delay caused by her implied refusal to comply with the 

Court’s orders is attributable to her alone. See Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191. Moreover, considering 

her failure to pay the filing fee or file a proper IFP motion despite two orders from the Court, no 

lesser sanction will prompt diligent prosecution of this case. Indeed, the case cannot proceed 

absent the filing fee or a motion to proceed IFP. Thus, the Court should exercise its discretion to 

dismiss under Rule 41(b) even if limitations may prevent further litigation of Breshell’s claims. 

See Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (holding court did not abuse its discretion in applying higher 

standard of review and dismissing pro se civil rights action due to plaintiff’s intentional 

noncompliance with court orders); Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008)

(per curiam) (same as to habeas petition).

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For the foregoing reasons, this action should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for failure to comply with court orders and for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

SO RECOMMENDED on December 21, 2022.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific 

written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific 

written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time 

to file objections to 14 days). 

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