NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0066n.06 Filed: January

29, 2009 No. 06-5033
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. KA CY HENDERSON, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EA STER

N D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF ORE: SILE R, CL AY and C OOK , Ci r c uitJudg e s. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant- Appellant, Ka cy Hende rson, appeals his conviction and sentenc e for

conspirac y

wi th intent to dis tribute 500 g rams or more of coc aine in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, en t er ed b y t h e United States District Court for the Easter

n District of Tenne ssee. Spec ifically , Hende rson appe als (1) the district court’s a d m i s sion of out-of-c ourt statements under

the coc onspirator e x ception of the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence ; (2) the district court’s f ailure to charg e the jury reg arding corr oboration of post-arr est statements t o police; (3) the district court’s determination reg arding the drug quantity attributable to him; (4) the district court’s denial of an offe nse level reduc tion f or acc eptanc e of responsibility ; ( 5) the district cou rt ’s d enial of a “ mitigatingrole” reduc tion; and (6) the district c ourt’s re jection of a

“saf ety valve” adjustment to his sentence. F or the re asons that follow, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.No. 06-5033

2 BACK GR OUND I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound I n 2001, the Chattanoog a P o li c e D e p a r tm e nt b e g a

n in v e s ti g a ti n g Def endant, Ka cy

Hende rson (“H ender son”), a fter a tip f rom a conf

idential informant by

the name of

Geor g e Jones (“Jones”). Poli ce ar re s t ed J ones on Nove mber 5, 2000 for possession of cra ck coc aine. In exchang e for favor able c onsideration at se ntencing , J ones beg an coope ratingwith police and d isclosed that he purcha sed the drug s found in his possession from Hende rso n . As part of his effor t to cooperate, J ones enlisted the he lp of his former g irlfriend, Stephanie Gar ner (“G arne r”) , to a ct as a conf idential informant on his beha lf. Gar ner later met He nderson at a local K- Mart af ter be ing int ro duced by a mutual acqua intance. T here afte r, the two be g an to spend time tog ether socially
. On one oc casion, Ga rner told Hender son that she “ne ed[ed] som e help as far as g etting some drug s to make some money . . . .” (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 229.) Althoug h initially hesit an t , He n d er son ag ree d to help. On May 2, 2 0 0 2 , the two met at a Waf fle House and made arr ang ements for Gar ner to purc hase two ounces of powder coca ine and two ounces of cra ck coc aine f rom Hende rson. Gar

ner r ecor ded the latter co nversation and turned the e vidence over to Na rcotics De tective L ee Wolff ( “De tective Wolff”) of the Chattanoog a Police De partment. On May 3, 2002, Chattanoog a Police ar rang ed a “ buy

and bust,” whe rein Ga

rner purported to purcha se cocaine from Hende rson. Duringthe transa ction, police interve ned and H ender son was detained by

Detec tive Wolff. Poli ce f ound 170 g rams of c ocaine in Hender son’s possession.No. 06-5033

3 There afte r, He nderson accompa nied pol ice to his apartment whe re the y conducte d a sea

rch, f inding digital sc ales, small plastic bag s, a gun and appr ox imately $946.00 in cash. After the sea rch of his apartment, He nderson wa s transported to the Police Ser vices Center for questioning by

Wolff and another

Detec tive, Phill ip Narr amore (“D etec tive Nar ramore ”). Duringquestioning, D etec tive Nar ramore inquired reg arding Hende rson’s re lationship with My ron “F lush” Ba

ker ( “B aker ”), a drug de aler whom police had be en investig ating since the 1990s. Ac c or din g to p oli c e , H e nd e rs on a g re e d to c oo pe ra

te and a dmi tte d th a t he tr a ve le d to At lanta wi th Ba ker on s e v e r a l o c c a s io n s to p u r c h a s e c o c a in e . H e n d e r s o nto ld p o li c e th a t h e w o u ld

o f te ng ive
mon e y to B ake r t o p ur c ha se c oc a ine and the tw o w ou ld late r div ide the pr oc e e ds . H e nd e rs on tol d the De te c tiv e s that the mos t he e ve r re c e ive d wa s on e ha lf of a kil og ra m, whil e B a ke r w ou ld o bta in betwee n one and three kilogr ams of coca ine. Hende rson stated that he had neve r met B aker ’s source but had see n him on one of their e x cursions to Atlanta. Ba sed on his statements, the police did not arrest He nderson but instead r elea sed him so that he could obtain f

urther inf

ormation reg ardingBa

ker . After

Hende rson’s re lease , Detec tive Na rr amor e pr e pa

re d a wr itt e n s umm ary

of He nd e rs on ’s state me nts
. Ov e r a pe ri od of tw o mo nth s, He nd e rs on

me t w ithde te c tiv e s o n s e ve ra l oc c a sio ns , e a c h ti me pr ov idi ngup date s r e g ard inghis activity with Baker. The se conve rsations wer e also re duced to wr itten summaries by detec tives. II. P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound On J uly 8, 2003, a g rand jury sitti ng in the Easter

n District of Tenne ssee ha nded down a

three count indictment char g ing Hende rson with c onspiracy to possess coca ine with intent to dist ribute, in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 6, po sse ssi on wi th i nte nt t o d ist

ri bute c oc a ine in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C.No. 06-5033

4 § 841(a) , and possession of a firea rm afte r beingconvicted of a misdemea n o r d o m es t ic violence offe nse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (9)
. On April 27, 2004, Hende rson was a rre sted and char g ed with the off

ens es en u m erated in the indictment. On January 25, 2005, the g overnme nt obtained a Super seding I ndictment, char g ing Hender son with an additional count of distribution of
cra ck coc aine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)( 1) and ( b)(1) (C). A. G uilt y P le as On Marc h 3 , 2 00 5, He nd e rs on a pp e are d b e fo re th e d i str ic t c ourt and a tte mpt e d to ple a d guil ty to c on sp ir a c y

to p os se ss c oc a ine wi th i nte nt t o dist ri bute , pur su ant to a ple a a g re e me nt r e a c he d w ith the g ov e rnme nt. Duri ng the he ari ng , He nd e rs on , thr ou g h co un se l, ar g ue d th a t no tw ith sta nd inghis entry of a guilty

plea, the f

actua l basis o f t h e p l ea ag ree ment overstate d his involvement with the conspirac y . There afte r, the district cour t rejec ted Hende rson’s guilty plea, noting that the fa ctual basis of the plea

ag ree ment did not support the conspirac y char g e. On Ap ri l 21 , 2 00 5, He nd e rs on ple a de d guil ty

to C ount Th re e of

the Sup e rs e din g I nd ic tme nt, wh ic h a lle g e d p os se ssi on of c oc a ine with int e nt t o d ist ri bute . H e nd e rs on , h ow e ve r, pr oc e e de d to tr ia l on the re ma ini ngc ounts of

the Sup e rs e din g I nd ic tme nt. B. Suppr e ssi on H e ar ing Prior to trial, Hende rson filed a moti o n t o s u p p ress his statement to De tectives Wolff and Na rr amor e fo ll owi ng hi s Ma y 3, 20 02 arr e st. He nd e rs on a lle g e d th a t he wa s n ot p ro pe rl y Mirandized and that his statement to police wa s coer ced. D uring the suppression hea rin g , H e n d erson too k th e sta

nd on his ow n b e ha lf

. H e nd e rs on

te sti fi ed th at he wa s n ot r e a d h is Miranda rig hts by po lic e no r d id h e ma

ke any state me nts ind ic a tin g that he we nt to Atl anta wi th B a ke r f or the purp os eNo. 06-5033

5 of purc ha sin g dr

ug s. He nd e rs on te sti fi e d that the De te c tiv e s thr e a te ne d him, statin g that he wo uld be subjec t to a fede ral charg e if he did not cooper ate. He nderson f urther te stified that he met B aker only afte r he be g an coope ratingwith police. Afte r additional testimony by Detec tives Wol ff a

nd Nar ramore , the district court de nied Hende rson’s motion to suppress evidenc e. C. Trial On Ap ri l 27 , 2 00 5, He nd e rs on pr oc e e de d to tr ia l on

the char g e s o f c on sp ir a c y to p os se ss
coca ine with intent to dist ribute and distribution of cra ck coc aine. Dur ing the trial, the g overnme nt called D etec tives Wol ff a nd Nar ramo re to testify

reg ardingtheir intera ctions with Hender son, the details surroundinghis arre st on March 3, 2002 a nd subsequent stateme nts made to police. Th e g ov e rnme nt a lso c a lle d in div idu a ls t o te sti fy re g ard ing He nd e rs on ’s dr ugtr ans a c tio ns , including J ones, Garner and an informant, Senec a Sandridg e (“ Sandridg e”) . Sandridg e testified that h e o b t ai n edp o wd er

co ca i n e f ro man i n d i v i d

u al n am edFr ed d i e H am ri ck(“ Ha m ri ck ” )
. S an dri d ge testifie d th a t H amr ic k

li v e d a c r o s s th e s tr e e t a

n d th a t h e f

r e qu e n tl y s aw H e n d e r s o nv isiti ng Hamric k’s apa

rtment. Sandridg e testified that Ha mrick told him that Henderson w as Hamrick’s
coca ine s ource and that He nderson obtaine d his drug s from someone in Ge org ia. Over Hende rson’s objections, the district court a dmitted Sandridg e’s testimony reg ardingHamric k’s statements under the coc onspirator he arsa

y exception of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e. Sandridg e also de scribed a n
occa sion in which he purc hased nine ounces of coca ine from He nderson. After closing arguments, Hende rson re qu es t ed a specia l jury instruction reg ardingthe
cre dibilit y of Hende rson’s post-arr est statement to police and the need for corr oboratingevidenc e reg ardingthe essential f

acts a dmitted by

Hende rson in the stat em en t
. T h e dis trict court de niedNo. 06-5033

6 Hende rson’s re quest reg ardingthe spec ial jury instruction, noting that “this is not a ca se whe re the sole evidenc e, or e ven the pr imary evidenc e ag ainst the defe ndant is the confe ssion.” (J.A. at 303- 04.) Th e jur

y ult imate ly

fo un d H e nd e rs on

g uil ty of c on sp ir a c y

to p os se ss c oc a ine wi th i nte nt t o dis tr ibute , b ut f

ound that th e g ov e rnme nt d id n ot p ro ve t hat H e nd e rs on

c on sp ir e d to dis tr ibute a t le a st five ki lo grams of

c oc a ine . T he jur

y did , h ow e ve r, fi nd

tha t th e g ov e rnme nt m e t it s b ur de n w ith respe ct to proving that the conspira cy involved at least 5 0 0 grams of coca ine. The jury acquitted Hende rson of possession of c ocaine with intent to dis tribute. D. Se nt e nc ing On Novembe r 16, 2005, the di strict court commenced Hender son’s sentenc ing he aringand hear d objections reg arding the rec ommendations made in H ender son’s Presentenc e Report (“ PSR ”). Hende rson’s PSR recommended a base offe nse leve l of 32 afte r attributing five kilog rams of c ocaine to Hender son. The PSR also rec ommended a sente ncingenhanc ement for obstruction of justice as a result of Henderson’s testimony at t he suppression hear ing. Additionally , the P SR recommended
a g a i n s tt h e a

p p l i c a t i o no f

ana d j u s t m e n tt o H e n d e r s o n ’ s s e n t e n c e f o r a c c e p t an c e o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. Fur ther, the PSR re co m m ended ag ainst the application of the “saf ety valve” provision of the SentencingGuidelines, which would have permitted the district c ourt to sentence Hende rson below the statutory

minimum for his off

ense. After heari n g argume nt from counse l, the district court conc luded that five kilog rams of
co ca i n e w as at t ri b u t ab l e t o He n d er s o naf t er cr ed i t i n g t h e t es t i m o ny

of De tective Na

rra more re g arding the quantity of coca ine involved in the conspirac y . At a later hear ing, the district court found thatNo. 06-5033

7 there w a s in s u f

f ic ie n t e v id e n c e to s u

p p o rt a ne n h an c e me n t f

o r o b s tr u c ti o no f ju s ti c e . T h e d is tr ict
c ourt a lso c on c lud e d th a t th e a c c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty and sa fe ty va lve a dju stm e nts did

no t a pp ly to Hender son. Moreove r, the district cour t d ec l i n ed Hende rson’s re quest for a “minor role” adjustment. Hende rson was ultimately sentenc ed to 121 months of imprisonment and four y ear s of supervised r elea se. He nderson now timely appea ls. DI SCU SSIO N I. Adm iss ion of C oc ons pir at orSt at e m e nt s A. Stand ard of Review

“ I n r e vie w i n g

a t r i a l c o ur t’ s e vid e nti ary

de te rm inatio ns , th is c ourt re vie ws de novo the cour

t’s conclusions of law , e.g ., the dec ision that certain evidenc e constitutes he arsa y , and revie ws for c lear
err or the c ourt’s fa ctual dete rminations that underpin its leg al conc lusions. ” United States v. Pay ne , 4 3 7 F. 3 d 5 4 0 , 5 4 4 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Mc Daniel , 398 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2005)). This Court has noted that “[t] his standard is consistent with the Supreme Court’s a dmonition in Gene ral Electric Co. v. Joine r , 522 U. S
. 1 36, 142, 118 S.Ct . 512, 139 L .Ed.2d 508 (1997), that
we re vie w e vid e nti ary

de te rm inatio ns fo r a

bu se of dis c re tio n, be c a

us e it i s an a

bu se of dis c re tio n to make e rror s of law or

clea r er rors of f actua l determination.” Payne , 437 F.3d at 554. B. Ana lys is Hende rson alleg es that the district court er roneously admitted out-of-c ourt statements made by Hamric k under the coconspirator ex ce p t i o n of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e. He nderson contends that the g overnme nt did not me et its burde n with respec t to the foundational pre requisites for the a dmission of out-of-cour t statements under the coconspirator exception. We disagr ee.No. 06-5033

8 1. Dispu ted Out-of-Court State m ents As part of

its case in chie f, the g overnme nt called Sandr idge to testify reg ardingthe conspirac y

alleg ed in Count One of the Super seding I ndictment. Sandridg e’s testimony cente red
aro un d h is i nte ra c tio ns wi th h is cocain e su pp lie r, Ha

mr ic k. Sand

ri dg e te sti fi e d th a t f

ro m 20 00 to 2002, he purc hased c ocaine from Hamrick, a dr ug deale r who lived acr oss the street, “ at least onc e or twice a we ek.” ( J .A. at 243, 252.) A dditionally , Sandridg e testi fied re g ardinga number of statements alleg edly

made by Hamric k reg ardinghis coca ine source : Q: Okay . And wher e wa s Fre ddie g etting his drug s from; do y ou know? A : F r o mK a c y. Q: An d h owdo y ou

kn owthat? A: Fr ed Ha

mrick told me. *** Q: Do y ou know how long F reddie Hamric k had bee n g etting c ocaine from Mr. Hende rson? A: Ev e r s inc e Iwa s c op ing[sic ] fr om h im. Q: An d d o you

kn owwh e n th a t w a s? A: Fr om 2000 to 2002. Q: Ok ay . A nd

did Mr . H a mr ic k e ve r t e ll you wh e re Mr . H e nd e rson w a s g e tti nghis coca ine? A: Geor g ia. (J.A. 244-45.) Over

Hende rson’s objec tions, the district court conditionally admitted the testimony reg ardingHar

mick’s statements under

the coc onspirator exception of the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence “subjec t to a later de monstration of [it s] admis sibili ty by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e.” United States v. Vinson , 606 F.2d 149, 153 ( 6th Cir. 1979) . Sandridg e also testified r eg ardinga purc hase f rom Hende rson which wa s arr ange d by Hamric k. Acc ording to Sandridg e, Hamrick assisted him in purcha sing nine ounces of coca ine from Hende rson. L ater , howeve r, whe n the coc aine would not “c ook” into cr ac k co ca i ne he c ontactedNo. 06-5033

9 Hamric k, who then ca lled Hende rson for a ss i s t ance. Sandridg e fur ther testified that although he
ne ve r s aw H e nd e rs on

wi th H amr ic k, no r did he se e He nd e rs on g ive Ha mr ic k d ru g s, he fr e qu e ntl y ob se rv e d H e nd e rs on

vis iti ngHa

mr ic k’ s a pa rtme nt. 2. Co-Conspirator Exce ption Under the Feder al Rules of Evidence, an out-of-c ourt statement is admissible when made by a “coconspirator of a party during the course of and in further ance of t he conspiracy .” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)( 2)(E) . An out-of- court stateme nt is admissibl e under the coc onspirator e x ception whe n the offe ring party

proves thre e foundational prere quisites: (1) that a conspiracy exis ted; (2) that the de fe nd ant w a s a me mbe r of the c on sp ir a c y ; and (3 ) that th e state me nt w a s ma de duri ngthe c ours e of and in fur

thera nce of the conspira cy . United States v. Conrad , 507 F.3d 424, 429 ( 6th Cir. 2007); Payne , 437 F.3d at 544 (citin g Uni ted Sta te s v . G essa , 971 F.2d 1257, 1261 ( 6th Cir. 1992)(en ba nc )) ; Un ite d S

tates v . Clar

k, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir. 1994). “I f i t is more li kely than not that the dec lara

nt and the def

endant we re me mbers of a conspirac y

when the he arsa

y statement wa s made, a nd that the statement was made in further ance of the c onspiracy , the hea rsay is admissibl e.” U n ite d S ta te s v . Hitow , 889 F.2d 1573, 1581 ( 6th Cir. 1989). Stated differ ently , the three foundational pre requisites mus t b e p ro v en by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Cla rk, 18 F.3d at 1341. I n assessingwhether the offe ring party

has met its burden, the district c ourt may consider the hear say statement itself. Bourjaily v. United States , 4 83 U. S. 1 71 , 1 77 -7 8 ( 19 87 ); Vinson , 606 F.2d at 153. Be cause “out-of- court stateme nts are pr esumptively unreliable ,” Clark, 18 F.3d at 1342, the he ars ay state me nt a lon e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli shthe re qu ir e me nts fo r a dmi ssi on un de r F ed. R.No. 06-5033

Howeve r, even i f He nderson we re to c halleng e the district cour t’s finding reg ardingthe 1 exis tence of a c onspiracy , it is clea r t hat t he district cour

t did not err in its preliminary finding that a c on sp ir a c y

e xiste d a s me a sure d b y

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e . T o e sta

bli sha c on sp ir a c y , it must shown that there wa s an ag ree ment betwee n two or m o re p eo p le to distribute drug s and that Def endant entere d into the agr eeme nt. Un ite d S tates v . B ou rja ily , 781 F.2d 539, 544 ( 6th Cir. 1989). As an initial matter, the he arsa y statements support a f

inding of a conspira cy . I n d eed, Hamrick’ s statements identi fy i n g He n d er s o nas h i s s u p p l i er an d He n d er s o n ’s s o u rc e i nAt l an t a s u p p o rt a f i n ding that a so-c alled “c hain” c onspiracy to d i s t ri bute drug s exi sted. Moreove r, indepe ndent evidenc e su ppor ts t he fi nd ingtha

t a c on sp ir a c y

e xiste d. Duri ngHe nd e rs on ’s tr ia l, a numbe r o f w itn e sse s, including D etec t i v e N arra m o re , Ga rn er an d J o n es , t es t i fi edre gar d i n g t h e a cq u i s i t i o nan d d i s t ri bution of coc aine that f

ormed the ba sis of the district court’s c onspiracy fi n d i n g. Ad d itionally , the g overnme nt presente d evidenc e of the 170 g rams of c ocaine found in the possession of He nderson at the time of his init ial arr est for distribution of coc aine. Ta ken tog ether , the evidenc e produc ed by the g overnme n t s upports a findingthat a conspira cy exis ted by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e ina smu c h as it ser

ve s a s c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e of a c omm on pla n to dis tr ibute dr

ug s o bta ine d in Atlanta to var ious buy ers in Chattanoog a. 10 Evid. 801(d)(2) (E). Rathe r, the propone nt of the statement must submit some independe nt evidence
o f i ts verac ity . I n Cla rk, t h i s C o u rt n o t e d t h a t “ ‘ [ s ] o m e ’ i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e i s n o t m e r e l y a scintilla, but rather e noug h to reb u t the pre sumed unreliability of hea rsay .” 18 F .3d at 1342. He nd e rs on

do e s n ot c on te st the dis tr ic t court ’s fi nd ing that a con sp ir a c y e xiste d, rathe r h e a sse rt s

1 that the go vernme nt did not establish that Hamrick wa s a member of the c onspiracy

or that the alleg ed stateme nts were made in the c ourse of and in furthe ranc e of the conspirac y . a. Mem bership i n the Conspi racy A statement is admissible under the coc o n s p i ra t or exception wher e the pr oponent of the evidenc e demonstrates that the def endant wa s a member

of t he alleg ed conspira cy . Hende rson does
n o tc h a l l e n g e t h e s u f

f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a th e w a s a

m e mb e r o f t h e c o n s p i r a c y; rathe r, he a lleg es that t here was insufficient evidenc e re g ardingHamric k’s role a s a co- conspirator
. Hende rson’s ar g ument is unpersuasive.No. 06-5033

11 I n the instant case , there is ample evidenc e to support a findingthat Hamric k was a member of th e c o n s p ir a c y to d is tr ib u te dr u g s . T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt c o n s id e r e d e v id e n c e of Ha mrick’s

“ kn ow le dg e of

a larg e op e ratio n” in t

he fo rm of Ha mr ic k’ s st a te men t that

He nd e rs on

wa s h is supplier as we ll as his knowledg e of H ender son’s source in Georg ia. Fur thermore , the evidence on the re c or d s up po rt s an in fe re nc e that H a mr ic k a c te d to fu rt he r t he ob je c t of the c on sp ir a c y

to distribute coca ine when he arr ang ed for Hende rson to se ll c ocaine to Sandr idge and later inter vened when Sandr idge ques t i o n ed t h e quality of the produc t sold by

Hende rson. Thus, Sandridg e’s testimony supports the contention that Hamrick wa s involved in a conspira cy to distribute cocaine
. b. St at e m e nt s M ade Dur ing th e Co ur se of and in F ur th e r anc e of t he Conspi racy Additionally , for a

statement to be a dmissibl e under the c o c o n s p ir a

tor exception, it mus t have been ma de duringthe cour se of a nd in further ance of the c onspiracy . “A state ment is ‘in further ance of’ a conspirac y

if it is int ended to pr omote the objectives of the conspira cy .’” Cla rk, 18 F.3d at 1342. “The re is a r ang e of state ments that are deeme d to be in fu rt h er an ce of a c onspiracy for purposes of a dmission under Rule 801(d)(2) (E).” Un ite d S tates v . F ra nk lin , 4 15 F .3 d 5 37 , 5 52 (6 th Cir. 2005). Statements have be en found to be in further anc e of a conspirac y

wher e they

“identify other c oconspirator s and their r oles,” a pprise other coconspirators of the status of the conspira cy , or indicate “ the source or purc haser of controlled substanc es.” Hitow , 889 F.2d at 1581 (collec ting cases). A stateme nt may be in furthe ranc e of a

conspirac y

“eve n if not exclusively , or eve n p ri marily , made to fur

ther the c onspiracy .” United States v. Tocc o , 2 0 0 F
. 3 d 4 0 1 , 4 1 9 ( 6 th Cir. 2 0 0 0 ) ( i n t e r

n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )
. W h i l e t h e s t a t e m e n t“ n e e d n o ta c tu a l l y f

u rt h e r t h e c o n s p i r a c y” to be admissible, United States v. Salgado , 250 F.3d 438, 450 (6th Cir. 2001), “mere idle chatter orNo. 06-5033

12 casua l conver sation about past eve nts is not considere d a st atement in further ance of the c onspiracy .” United States v. Darwich , 337 F.3d 645, 657 ( 6th Cir. 2003). The district court did not err in admitting the alleg ed co- conspirator statements inasmuch a s the g overnme nt demonstrated that the statements wer e made during the course of and in fur thera nce of the c onspiracy

by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. In the instant case , it is clea r fr om Sandridg e’s te sti mony that H amr ic k id e nti fi ed Hen derso n a s h is s up pli e r a nd He nd e rs on ’s ult imate so ur c e in Geor g ia duringthe cour se of the c onspiracy . Fr om the context of the statements, it can be inferr ed that the statements we re not “ mere idle chatter ,” but rather ident i fi ed “t he sourc e or pur chase r of controlled substanc es” that were involved in the conspirac y . Hitow , 88 9 F .2 d a t 15 81 . Ind e e d, “ if it is more likely than not that the decla rant and the defe ndant wer e members of the conspirac y when th e h ea rs ay s tatement wa s made, a nd that the statement wa s in furthera nce of the conspira cy , the [st atements] are admissible.” Id. Thus, the di strict court did not err in admitting the coc onspirator statements pursuant to F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 801(d) (2)( E). II. Jury Instructions Regarding Corroborat ion of P ost-Ar restStatem ents A. Stand ard of Review This Court “re view[s] jury instructions as a whole to deter mine if they

adequately

inform the jur y of the re le va

nt c on sid e ratio ns and

pr ov ide a

ba sis in l aw for ai din g the jur y in r e a c hin g its decision and will reve rse a jury verdic t on acc ount of an instructional e rror only in situations where the ins t ru ct i o n , viewed a s a whole, is conf using, misleading , and pre judicial.” United States v. Blac k we ll , 459 F.3d 739, 764 ( 6th Cir. 2006).No. 06-5033

13 This Court “revie ws a dist ri ct cour t’s ref usal to g ive re quested jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standa

rd.” King v. Ford Motor Co. , 209 F.3d 886, 897 ( 6th Cir. 2000). A ref usal to give a requested inst ruction i s an abuse of di scre tion requiring reve rsal if the i nstruction is “(1)
a cor rec t statement of the law ; (2) not substantially cover ed by the charg e actually delivere d to the jury ; and (3) conce rns a point so important in the t rial t hat t he failure to g ive it substantially impairs the def endant’ s defe nse.” Un ite d S tates v . F ra nk lin , 415 F.3d 537, 553 ( 6th Cir. 2005). B. Ana lys is Hende rson ar g ues that the district c ourt err ed in r ejec ting his propose d instruction reg arding
corr oboration of post-a

rre st statements. We disagr ee. Af te r c los ing argume nts , He nd e rs on re qu e ste d the fo llo wi ngjur y ins tr uc tio n r e g ard inghis post-arr est statement to police: The de fenda

nt is alleg ed to have made a statement to the pol i ce af t er he was take n into custody

in 2002. There is a diffe renc e betwe en an a dmission by a def endant afte r the c rime has been commit ted and a defenda nt who admit s simil ar f

acts be fore , or duri ngthe c omm iss ion of , a c ri me . Th e de fe nd ant’ s out- of -c ourt a dmi ssi on

mus t be cor roborated in the forme r situat ion, but need not be c orrobor ated in the latter instance. The rationale underlying this rule is that out-of- court a dmissions occur ring afte r a c rime has be en complete d ar e l ess re liable than similar admissions made befor ehand. Opper v . United States , 348 U.S. 84, 89-91 (1954). (J.A. at 93-94.) Th e dis tr ic t court fo un d the re qu e ste d in str uc tio n unn e c e ssa

ry , n oti ngthat “ thi s is not a ca se whe re the sole evidenc e, even the primary evidenc e, ag ainst the defe ndant is the confe ssion.” (J.A. at 303.) Hende rson contends that his requested i n s t ruction would have g iven the jury the prope r g uidance reg ardingthe eva luation of evidenc e nece ssary to suppor t his c onviction. The g overnme ntNo. 06-5033

14 maintains tha

t t h e d is tric t court prope rly

ref used to g ive the re quested instruction bec ause it misstated the law a nd the fa ilure to g ive the instruction did not substantially i m p ai r Henderson’s de fense
. Thus, the dispute reg ardingthe re quested instruction c e nte rs ar ound whether it corre ctly

summarized the leg al s tandar d for corrobor ation and whe ther He nderson’ s defe nse wa s impaired by its omi ssion from the jury

instructions. W e discuss ea ch point of conte ntion in turn. 1. Corr ect

Statem ent of the Law This Court has held that to obtain a re quested jury instruction, the instruct i o n m ust be an
acc urate statement of the la w. Uni ted States v. W

illiams , 952 F.2d 1504, 1512 ( 6th Cir. 1991). Hende rson’s re quested instruction re g ardingthe cor roboration of post-arr est statements was based upon Opper v . United States , 348 U.S. 84 (1954). In Opper , the Sup re me Court he ld that po st- arr e st admissions and confe ssions “are of the same char acte r” and thus both require corr oboration of the essential fa cts admitted by a def endant. Id. at 163. The pur pose of requiringcorr oboration of suc h statements is to “preve nt ‘err ors in convictions based upon untr ue confessions alone.’ ” United States

v . M ar sh all , 8 6 3 F. 2 d

1 2 8 5 , 1 2 8 7 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 8 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Smith v. United States , 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954))
. As we obse rved in Un ite d S tates v . M ar sh all , “[t]hi s Circ uit

ha s lo ngfo llo we d th e pr inc ipl e enunciated in Op

pe r and Sm ith , that a def endant’ s ext rajudicia l, post-offen se statements must be
corr oborate d with independent evidence in order to assure r eliability

and truthfulness.” 863 F.2d at 12 87 ; se e als o United St ates v. Trombley , 733 F.2d 35, 37 (6th Cir. 1984). In Ma rsh all , a def endant
wa s c ha rg e d w iththe dis tr ibutio n o f t wo g ra ms o f c oc a ine ba se d pr ima ri ly on ta pe d a dmi ssi on s to an F BI informan t wh o soug ht to sell the defenda nt coca ine. 863 F.2d a

t 1286. During tapedNo. 06-5033

15 conver sations, the defe ndant ac cepte d a sample of coca ine and state d that “some of his f riends we re interested in buy

ing dr ug s.” Id
. Af

t er b eingconvicted of

the distribution offense, the defe ndant alleg ed that the district cour t erre d in failing to instruct the jury that it could not f

ind him g uilty

of distribution of cocaine based solely on uncorr oborate d statements. Id. Ba sed on Op pe r and Sm ith , we r ever sed, findingthat “[i] ndepende nt corrobor at i n g evidenc e . . . is nec essar y to establish the reliability of the stateme nts.” Id. at 1288. Thus, it appear s at first blush that Hende rson’s re quested instruction was a c orre ct statement of the law. The g overnme nt, however , argues that cor roboration of a post-ar

re s t s ta te me nt i s not require d wher e indepe ndent evidenc e, in the for m of dru gs s ei z ed from a de fenda nt, serves a s the corpus de lic ti of the c rime. Indeed, this Court has noted “ that proof that the c riminal act took plac e–the socalled ‘ c or

pu s d e lic ti ’–will satisfy

the cor roboration requi rement.” Ma rsh all , 863 F.2d at 1287. Thus , wh ere such c or

pu s d e lic ti is o ff

e re d in to e vid e nc e , s e pa

rate c or ro bo ratio n o f a

po st- arr e st statement is not require d. The g overnme nt contends that the 170 g rams of co ca i ne found in He nderson’ s possession
serve as the c or

pu s d e lic ti of the conspirac y offe nse, thus ne g ating any need for an i n s t ru ction reg ardingcorr oboration. In interpre tin g wh en d ru gs may serve as the c or

pu s d e lic tiof a dr

ug of fe ns e , th is C ou rt has dr awn dis tin c tio ns be tw e e n o ff e ns e s b a se d o n p os se ssi on or int e nt t o d is tr ib u te an d c o n s p ir a c y o f f e n s e s. Co mpare United States v. Calhoun , N o . 9 2

- 2 0 1 1 , 1 9 9 3 WL 280324, at * 4 (6th Cir. J uly 26, 1993) (unpublished) ( finding that fo ur bag s of coc aine did not constitute c or

pu s d e lic tiin a conspira cy

offe nse and thus cor

roboration of post -ar

rest stateme nt was require d), with Un ite d S

tates v . H arris , No. 93-5706, 1994 WL 47806, at *4 (6th Cir. Fe b. 15, 1994)No. 06-5033

16 (unpublished) (f

inding c orrobor ation of post-ar rest stateme nt unnece ssary beca use def end ant’s possession of coc aine se rved a s the c or pu s d e lic tiof intent to distribute offense ). When rea d toge ther, Calhoun and Ha rri s stand fo r the proposition that a de fenda nt’s possession of drug s does not eliminate the require ment that post-arr est statements be c orrobor ated by additional independe nt evidence in the context of conspirac y offe nses. Such a rea ding of the two
case s is appropriate inasmuch as the c ritical element of conspirac y is not mer ely the distribution or possession of drug s, but an agreem ent among two or more pa rties to eng ag e in such distribution or po sse ssi on . Si mil arl y , in

the ins tant ca se , the a g re e me nt be tw e e n He nd e rs on a nd oth e rs to d istri bu te drug s is a critica l element of the off en s e with re spect to both the over all conspirac y as we ll as the drugquantity

alleg ed to have been i n v o lved in the conspira cy . Thus, while drug s may serve as
e vid e nc e of

a c on sp ir a c y , th e y

do no t r e move th e nee d f or c or ro bo ra tin g e vid e nc e of

po st- arr e st
s t a t e m e n t s r e g ar d i n g t h e c o n s p i r a c y. The g overnme n t , h o we v er , p er s i s t s i nar gu i n g t h at an i n s t ru ct i o nre gar d i n g co rr o b oration wa s
unne c e ssa

ry g ive n th a t th e po st- arr e st s tate me nt w a s n ot t he on ly e vid e nc e of

He nd e rs on ’s g uil t. This Court has held that such an instruction is require d notwithstanding the ex istence of additional
corr oboratingevidenc e. Indeed, as this Court noted in Ma rsh all under similar c ircumstance s, “[t] he
rec ord r ev ea ls some evidence which may tend to corr oborate defe ndant’s stateme nts that he distributed coca ine, but the jury was never a dvised that corr oboration wa s nece ssary .” 863 F .2d at 1288. T h er ef

o re, this Court conclude d that “[t] he district cour t’s ref usal to g ive the re quested
corr oboration instruction was e rrone ous . . . .” Id. Thus, it appea rs t hat Henderson’s jury

instruction
c or re c tly state d th e law w ithre sp e c t to c or ro bo ra tio n o f h is p os t- arr e st s tate me nt.No. 06-5033

17 2. F ail ur e to G ive Re que st e d Ins tr u c ti on D id N otSubst ant ial ly I m pai r De fens e Although H ender son’s reque sted jury instruction w as a corr ect state ment of the law , we f ind that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa ilure to g ive the re qu e ste d instru c tio n d id n ot s ub sta nti a lly imp a ir Hende rs o n ’s d ef

ense. In the instant case , during closing arguments to the jury , defe nse counse l contende d that the post-ar rest st atements made by Hende rson were unre liable base d on the coe rcive circ umstances unde r which the y wer e g iven. Def

ense co u n s el further conte nded that the dr ug quantiti es di scussed duringthe interviewwer e attributable to Baker, not He nderson. The jury
c on sid e re d th e e vid e nce p re se nte d at tr ia l and the argume nts ma de by

the de fe ns e and

ult imate ly convicted H ender son of conspiracy to distribute coca ine. Notably , it appea rs t hat t he jury took the arguments made by

the def ense to he art inasmuch a s they found t hat the g overnme nt did not prove that Hende rson was guilt y o f conspiringto distribute five or more kilogr ams of coc aine be y ond a
rea sonable doubt, instead fi n d i n g t h at i t was prove n that he conspire d to distribute 500 gr ams of
coca ine. Ther efor e, although the di strict court errone ously ref used to g ive Hende rson’s re quested instruction, Hender son’s defe nse wa s not substantially impaired. Conseque ntly , Hende rson is not entitled to a re versa l of his conviction on this ground. III . Se nt e nc ing G uide line s C alc ula ti ons A. Stand ard of Review Hende rson alleg es that his se ntence is pr ocedur ally unrea sonable beca use the district cour

t
e rr e d in c a lc ulatin g the a

pp lic a ble Gu ide lin e s r ang e . A t se nte nc ing , d ist ri c t c ourt s a

re require d to consult the Guidelines as part of t heir consideration of the § 3553(a) fac tors. As the Supreme Court
rec ently noted in Gall v. United States , 1 28 S.Ct . 5 86 , 5 96 (2 00 7) , “ a dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld b e g in a llNo. 06-5033

18 sentenc ing pr ocee dings by corr ectly calc ulating the appli ca b l e Gu idelines rang e.” I ndeed, “ the Guidelines should be the star ting point and the initial benc hmark.” Id. As part of our re view of pr ocedur al re asonable ness, this Court m ust “ensure that the district
c ourt c omm itt e d no sig nif ic ant pr oc e dura l e rr or , su c h a s fa ili ng to c a lc ulat e (or im pr op e rl y calc ulating) the Guidelines ra ng e, tre ating the Guidelines a s mandatory , faili ng to consider the § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s, se le c tin g a

se nte nc e ba se d o n c le arl y

e rr on e o u s fa c ts, or

fa ili ngto a de qu a te ly

e xpla in the chose n sentenc e . . . .” Ga ll , 128 U.S. at 597. This Court’s “re asonable ness re view foc uses on the fa ctors listed in § 3553(a) , one of which is the S entenc ing Guidelines themselves.” United States

v . D uc k ro , 466 F.3d 438, 442 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Th is C ourt

ha s o bs e rv e d th a t “ a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s mis int e r

p r e t a t i o n o f t he Gu ide lin e s e ff

e c tiv e ly means that it has not proper ly consulted the Guide lines.” United States v. Haze lwood , 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). We revie w the district cour t’s leg al conc lusions reg ardingthe Sent en cing Gu ide lin e s de novo
. United States v. Lev y , 250 F.3d 1015, 1017 ( 6th Cir. 2001). The district cour t’s deter mination of the quantity of drug s used to c alculate a defe ndant’s Guidelines rang e, h oweve r, is a finding of fa ct that should be upheld unless c lear ly err oneous. United St ates v. W ilson , 954 F.2d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1992)
. A fa ctual findingis clear ly err oneous “when the r eviewingcourt on the entire e vidence is l ef

t with the definite and f

irm conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.” Tran v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 937, 943 ( 6th Cir. 2006). B. Ana lys is Hende rson contends that the district court committed proce dural e rror in calculating the
app lic a b l e G u i d e l i n e s r an g e b a s e d o n( 1 ) t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s c a l c u l a t i o no f t h e dr u g qu an t ityNo. 06-5033

19 attributabl e t o him; (2) the district court’s f ailure to a

pply a re duction for a cce ptance of responsibility ; (3) the district court’s de nial of his reque st f or a “minor role” reduc tion; and (4) the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ingtha t he wa s n ot e lig ibl e fo r “ sa fe ty va lve ” pr ote c tio n und e r t he Gu ide lin e s. F or the re a so ns dis c us se d b e low , w e fi nd e a c h o f t he se c on te nti on s to be wi tho ut m e ri t. 1. Drug Quantity Calculation He nd e rs on

c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in its det erm in ation o f t

he dr ugqu anti ty
a ttr ibuta ble to h im. He nd e rs on a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp e rm iss ibl y

e sta bli sh e d h is o ff

e ns e le ve l ba se d o n a dru g qu anti ty g re a te r t ha n th e amou

nt f ound by the jur y on its sp e c ia l ve rd ic t f

or m. The spec ial verdict form indicated that the jury found He nderson guilty

of conspira cy . Howeve r, the jury found that the gove rnment had not proven, bey ond a re asonable doubt, that the conspirac y involved five kilog rams of c ocaine
. I nstead, the jury found that the c onspiracy involved 500 or more g rams of co ca ine. At sentenc ing, how ever , the district court he ld Hender son acc ountable for five kilogr ams of coc aine. Esse ntially , Hende rson ar g ues that the district court improper ly considere d
a c qu itt e d c on du c t in

c a lc ulatin g the dr

ugqu anti tie s attr ibuta

ble to him
. Th e g ov e rnme nt, fo r its pa rt , argues that neither United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), nor its prog eny , prohibit a district
c ourt fr om se nte nc ing a de fe nd ant ba se d on fa c ts not fo un d by a jur y wh e n th e re su lti ngse nte nc e is below the statutory

maxi mum. A d e fe nd ant c on vic te d o f c on sp ir a c y may be he ld r e sp on sib le fo r t

he c o n du c t of

oth e rs wi thi n the c on sp ir a c y . U SSG § 1 B 1. 3( a )( 1) (B ). I n inte rpr e tin g § 1 B 1. 3( a )( 1) (B ) o f t he Gu ide lin e s, thi s Court has explained that “the scope of conduc t for which a defe ndant ca

n be held a ccounta

ble under the sentenc ing gui d el i nes is signific antly narr ower

than the conduc t embrac ed by the law ofNo. 06-5033

20 conspirac y .” United States v. Swiney , 203 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2000). Under this narrowe r scope , a dis tr ic t c ourt

may ho ld a de fe nd ant a c c ounta

ble on ly fo r t hat c on du c t w hic h is re a so na bly fo re se e a ble wi thi n th e con fi nes of the c on sp ir a c y . In a

pp lyingthe Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s to pa rt ic ula r defend ants wh o h ave be e n c on vic te d f or the ir ro le in a c on sp ir a c y , a

dis tr ic t c ourt

mus t di f f e r e nt i a t e be tw e e n th e c oc on sp ir a tor s and make ind ivi du a lize d f

ind ing s o f f

a c t f or e a c h d e fe nd ant. United States v. Me acham , 27 F.3d 214, 217 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ). The g overnme nt must prove the amount of drug s a def

endant is re sponsible for by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id. We f ind tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t e rr in c a lc ulatin g the dr

uga mou nt a ttr ibuta

ble to H e n d e r s o n . H e n d e r s o n ’ s ar g u m e n tt o t h e c o n t r ar y i s d i r e c t l y f

o r e c l o s e d b y Un ite d S

tates v . M e nd e z, 498 F.3d 423 ( 6th Cir. 2007), whe re this Court confr onted a ne arly identical set of f

acts. In Mende

z , the def endant wa s convicted of

conspirac y

to distribute methamphetamine. The jury indicated that the g ov e rnme nt d id n ot p ro ve , b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, t

hat th e c on sp ir a c y

inv olv e d 5 00 g ra

ms of methamphe tamine. Id . at 42 5. Th e jur y did fi nd , how e ve r, that th e c on sp ir a c y inv olv e d at le a st 50 g rams of the drug
. Id. Notwithstanding the jury ’s ver dict reg ardingthe drugquantity , the district court attributed 2.95 kilogra ms of methamphetamine to the de fenda nt based the te stimony

of a g o v e r n me n t w it

n e ss. Id . This Court affirme d, holding that a sentenc ing c ourt may

consider “‘a cquitted conduc t’ if it finds fac ts supporting that conduct by a prepondera nce of the evide nce.” Id. at 427. In Un ite d Sta te s v . W hite , --- F.3d ---, 2008 W L5396246, at *3 (6th Cir. 2008) (e n banc) , thi s Co ur t r e a ff ir me d th e ru le fr om Mende z , h old ingtha

t, “ [s]o long as th e de fe nd ant r e c e ive s a
s en t en ce at o r b el o w t h e s t at u t o ry ce i l i n g s et b y

t h e j u ry ’s v er d i ct , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt d o es n o tab ri d geNo. 06-5033

21 the def endant ’s ri g ht to a jury

trial by looking to other

fac ts, including a cquitted conduc t, when selec ting a

sentenc e within that statutory rang e.” T h is c a s e inv o lv e s f

a c ts s im il ar

to th o s e in Mende

z . I n this case, the jur

y found that the g overnme nt did not prove beyond a re asonable doubt that the coca ine conspira cy involved five kilogr ams of coc aine, but rather th at the conspira cy involved at least 500 g rams of c ocaine
. Neve rtheless, the district c ourt attributed the highe r drug quantity amount to Hender son based on the testimony of De tective Na

rra more, who te stified t hat Hende rson and B aker procur ed at lea st five kilogr ams of

c o c a in e o v e r

th e c o u r s e o f

thr e e s e p ar a te v is it s to A tl an ta
. B a s e d o nN ar r a mo r e ’s t e s t i m o n y, t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtc o u l d h av e f o u n d a c o n s p i r a c y t o p o s s e s s a tl e a s tf i v e k i l o g r a m s b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, eve n though the jury did not find a c onspiracy to possess that amount b e yo n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t
. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt th e r e f o r e d i d n o t e r

r i n c a l c u l a t i n g t h e dr

u g qu an t i t y. 2. Acc eptance of Responsib ility Un de r § 3E 1. 1( a ) o f t

he Gu ide lin e s, a defe ndant i s e nti tle d to a tw o- le ve l r e du c tio n o f h is base of fense level whe re he “cle arly d em o n s t rates acc eptanc e of r esponsibility for his off

ense.” U. S.S. G. § 3 E1 .1 (a ). “ En tr y of a ple a of

g uil ty pr ior to t he c omm e nc e me nt o f t

ri a l c omb ine d w ith truthfully admitting the c onduct comprisi n g t h e o ffe nse of c onviction” as we ll as any rele vant conduct “ will consti t u t e sig nificant e vidence of ac cepta nce of responsibility

for the pur

poses of subsection (a ).” Id. at cmt. 3. Howe ver, this evidenc e may be out we i g hed by

conduct of

the defe ndant that is inconsistent with such acc eptanc e of r esponsibility
. Id. Alt h o u gh a d efendant who proc eeds to trial is g ener ally not eligible f

or an a cce ptance of
re sp on sib ili ty

re du c tio n, the re may

be “r are sit

uatio ns ” in whic h a

re du c tio n is a

pp ro pr iateNo. 06-5033

22 notwithstanding the de fenda nt’s “exerc ise of his constitutional right to a trial.” Id. “In eac h such instance, how ever , a dete rmination that a def endant ha s acc epted r esponsibility will be based primarily upon pre- trial statements and c onduct.” Id. The de fenda nt has the burde n of establishing that he is entitled to a re duction for a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. United States v. Bank

s , 252 F.3d 801, 806 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Hende rson ar g ues that he e s t ab l i s hed that he is e ntitled to a two-level re duction for
acc eptanc e of r esponsibility by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. He nderson a sserts t hat evidenc e of his attempted g uilty plea, cooper ation with loc al and fede ral law enfor ceme nt office rs following his arre st, and his actual guilty plea to Cou n t T h re e o f the indictment demonstrate that he has
a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty

fo r h is o ff

e ns e . T his c on te nti on

is w ith out me ri t. Whil e it may be the case that Hende rson provided assistance to la w enfo rc em en t and attempted to plead guilty , the district court de termined that He nderson’ s subsequent eva sive statements duringa pre -trial suppre ssion h ea ri n g indicated that He nderson did not ac cept
re s p o n s i b i l i t y

fo r h i s o ff

en s e. Fo r e x am p l e, d

u ri n g h i s t es t i m o n y

at t h e s u

p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g, Hende rson testified that at the time of his arre st he had never met Ba ker, which contra dicted his prior
s tate me n t to p o li c e . A lt

h o u g h th e c o n tr a d ic ti o n s w e r e n o t e n o u g h to s u p p o rt an e nhance ment for obstruction of justice, He nderson’ s actions leadingup to trial were inconsistent with acce ptance of responsibility

and ser ved to “outwe igh” his prior coope ration with law e nforc eme n t. See U nited Sta te s v . V an Sh utte rs , 163 F.3d at 331, 340-41 (6th Cir. 1998) (af firming a denia l of an a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty

adjustment despite def

endant’ s cooper ation with law enf orce ment wher e def

endant did not ex press re morse and w as untruthful during his se ntencing hear ing)
. Thus, the district court’sNo. 06-5033

23 fac tual finding s wer e not clea rly err oneous and the ref

ore the acc eptanc e of r esponsibility reduc tion was prope rly

denied. 3. M ino r Ro le Re duc ti on Hende rson alleg es that the district cour t e rre d in de nying his re quest for a “mitigating r ole”
re du c tio n p ur su ant t o U .S. S.G . § 3B 1. 2 b a se d o n h is m ino r r ole in t he c on sp ir acy to d istri bu te
coca ine. Whether a

def en d ant qualifies for a r ole re duction “depe nds heavily on fac tual deter minations,” which we revie w for c lear err or. Un ite d S

tates v . Ca mp be ll , 2 79 F .3 d 3 92 , 3 96 (6 th Cir . 2 00 2) . T his Cou

rt , how e ve r, re vie ws the a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he Gu ide lin e s to a

pa rt ic ula r s e t of fa c ts de novo
. United States v. Lev y , 250 F.3d 1015, 1017 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Under § 3B1.2, a

defe ndant is entitled to a two-leve l r eduction to his offe nse leve l where “the defe ndant was a

mino r p ar t i cipant in any criminal ac tivity ” involving mor e than one person. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) . A “minor pa rticipant” is d ef

i n ed as a de fenda

nt “who is less culpable than
mos t ot he r part ic ipa

nts , but wh os e ro le c ou ld not be de sc ri be d a s mi nim a l.” U. S.S. G. § 3 B 1. 2, c mt. 5. Thus, the cr itical question in whether t o gra nt a “mitigating r ole” r eduction is what role the defe ndant play ed in re lation to others involved in the criminal ente rprise. Cam pb e ll , 279 F.3d at 396 (“ Th e sa lie nt i ssu e is the ro le the de fe nd ant p lay e d in re latio n to the a c tiv ity fo r wh ic h the c ourt he ld h i mo r h er

ac co u n t ab l e. ”)
. W h er e ad ef en d an ti s h el d

ac co u n t ab l e o n l y

fo r t h e a m o u n to f d ru gs at tr ib u ta b le to h im , h e is n o t e n ti tl e d to a r o le r e d u c ti o n b e c a

u s e th e in d iv id

u a l d e te r mi n a tion ha s
a lr e a dy take n th e de fe nd ant’ s li mit e d r ole into a c c ount, thu s n e g a tin g any ba sis fo r c omp ari so n to others involved in the cr iminal activity
. Id.No. 06-5033

24 Hende rson a ll e g e s th at bec ause he was he ld acc ountable for five kilog rams, the e ntire amount of coc aine involved in the c onspiracy , he is entitle d t o a “mitig ating role” reduc tion. Hender son argues that he play ed a “minor” role within the sc ope of the conspirac y when c ompare d with Baker beca us e “[h] e did not know My ron B aker ’s supplier, and did nothing more than obta in his own drug s, after

Ba ker obta ined his.” (De f. Br. at 42) This contention, however, is belied by the re cord. As an in iti a l matte r, He nd e rs on ’s ro le in t he c on sp ir a c y

wa s f ar gre a te r t

ha n o the r p art ic ipa

nts such as Ha

mrick, wh o wa s merely

a purc haser . Thus, Hende rson was more culpable tha n other pa rt ic ipa nts in t he c on sp ir a c y

to di strib ute c oc a ine . T he dis tr ic t c ourt , th e re fo re , d id n ot e rr in concludingthat Hende rs o n was not entitled a “ mitigating role” reduc tion based on his “minor” p art i c i p a t i o ni nt h e c o n s p i r a c y. Moreove r, it appea

rs that rather tha n b ei ng a minor par ticipant, Hende rson was a n i n d i s p e n s a

b l e f i g u r e w i t h i nt h e c o n s p i r a c y an d t h u s n o te n t i t l e d

t o a “ m i t i g a t i n g r o l e ” r e d

u c t i o n . In Un ite d S tates v . S am ue ls , 308 F.3d 662 ( 6th Cir. 2002), this Court held that “ [t ]hose participants who
are indispensable to the conspira cy are not e ntitled to a role reduc tion pur suant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.” Id. at 672. Ther e, this Court rejec ted the application of a “minor r ole” r eduction for a def endant who

“ pla y e d a ke y ro le in b ro ke ri ngthe dr

ugtr ans a c tio n” by se rv ing a s a midd le man to va ri ou s p art ie s. Id. at 672. I n the ca se at bar, the district c ourt relied on the testimony of De tective Na

rramore re g arding He n d e r s o n ’ s tr av e ls to A tl an ta f o r th e p u r p o s e s o f s e c u r in g c o c a in e f

o r r e s a le in Ch a tt an oog a. Detec tive Nar

ramore testified that Hende rson g ave mone y to Baker f

or the purc hase of

up to three k il o g r ams o f

c o c a in e , o f

w h ic hH e n d e r s o no b ta in e d u p to o n e - h a lf

o f a k il o g r a m. Detec tiveNo. 06-5033

T h e fi v e c rite ria se t f

o rth in U .S .S .G . § 5 C 1 .2 a re a s fo llo w s: 2 (1) t he d ef

end ant do es not have m o re t han 1 c rim ina l h i st o ry po i nt , as d et erm i ned unde r t he sent enci ng gui d el i nes bef

o re app l i cat i o n of subsect i o n (b ) o f 4A 1
. 3 (D ep art ures B ased o n Inadeq uacy o f C ri m i nal H i st o ry 25 Nar ramore testified that the utility of this prac tice “boils down – just like y our ec onomy today , the more bulk y ou buy , in business or any thing, the better price that y ou would g et for it.” (J.A. at 184.) This pooling of r esourc es wit h Ba ker does not signify a “minor role” in a conspiracy to possess or distribute coca ine; rathe r, it establishes Hende rson as a centra l fig ure in the a cquisition of coca ine from B aker ’s source in Atlanta. Surely it can be inf

err ed that the conspira cy

might not have been
as ec onomically viable in the abse nce of Hende rson’s contr ibution and theref ore the district court did no t c le arl y

e rr in r e a c hin g the c on c lus ion that H e nd e rs on

oc c up ie d mo re tha

n a “ min or ” ro le in the conspira cy . Thus, as an indispensable figure , Hende rson was not entitled to a “mitig ating role”
re du c tio n p ur su ant t o § 3B 1. 2 o f t he Gu ide lin e s. 4. Saf

ety V alve Application He nd e rs on

c ha lle ng e s th e di stric t c ourt ’s fi nd ingre g ard inghis e lig ibi lity fo r t he “ sa fe ty
va lve ” pr ov isi on

of th e Gu i d e l i n e s . S p e c if

ic a lly , H e nd e rs on

a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr on e ou sly den ie d h is r e qu e s t f

o r th e a p p li c a ti o no f

th e “ s a f e ty v a lv e ” p r o v is io nb a s e d

o nth e g o v e r

nment’s repr esentations that Henderson did not trut h ful ly disclose all information conc erninghis offense
. The district cour

t’s deter mination reg arding wh et h er a def endant met the r equire ments for the
a pp lic a tio n o f a

“ sa fety va lve ” a dju stm e nt i s a

fi nd ingof

fa c t th a t sh ou ld b e up he ld u nle ss c le arl y
err oneous. United States v. Adu , 82 F.3d 119, 123- 24 (6th Cir. 1996). Under § 5C1.2 of the Guidelines, a court may

sentenc e a d ef

en d ant below the statutory minimum wher e the five criteria enumerated i n the provisi on are satisfied. Id. at 121. While the 2No. 06-5033

C at ego ry ); (2) t he d ef

end ant did no t us e vi o l ence o r cr ed i b l e t hreat s o f vi o l ence o r po ss ess a f i rearm o r ot her dange rous weapon ( or i nduce an ot her par t i ci pant t o do s o) i n c onnec t i on wi t h t he of f ens e; (3) t he o f

f ense di d not res ul t i n de at h or ser i o us b o d i l y i njury t o any pe rs o n; ( 4) t he def

endan t was not an org ani ze r, lead er, manag er , or s uper vi s or of ot her s i n t he of

f ens e, as det er mi ned u nder t he s ent enc i ng gu i del i nes and was not eng age d i n a cont i nu i ng cr i mi nal en t er pri s e, as def i ned i n 21 U
. S.C
. § 8 4 8 ; and (5) not l at er t han t he t i m e o f t he se n te n c i ng heari ng, t he d ef end ant has t rut hf

ul l y pro vi d ed t o t he G over nment al l i nf

ormat i on an d evi dence t he def endan t has co nce r ni ng t he of f ens e o r of

f ens es t hat were p art of t he same co urs e o f co nd uct or o f a co m m o n schem e o r p l an, but t he f act t hat t he d ef

end ant has no rel evant or usef

ul other i nf

o rma t i o n t o p rovide o r t hat t he G o vernm ent i s al read y aware o f t he info rm a tio n sh a ll n o t p re c lud e a d e te rm ina tio n b y th e c o u rt tha t t h e d e fen d a n t ha s c o m p lied w ith this re q u ire m e n t. 26 parties a g ree that four of the five c riteria ha

ve bee n met by

Hende rson, they

dispute w h ether Hende rson established the f ifth criter ia outlined in § 5C1.2. Subsection (a) (5) of § 5C1.2 provides that (a) . . . in the case of an offe nse under 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 844, § 846, § 960, or § 963, the cour t shall impose a sentenc e in accorda nce w ith the applicable guidelines without reg ard to a

ny statutory min i m u m sentenc e, if the c ourt finds that the defe ndant meets the c riteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1)- (5) se t forth below. *** (5 ) n ot l a te r t

ha n th e tim e of

the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e de fe nd ant h a s tr uth fu lly provided to the Gover

nment all information and evidenc e the defe n d an t has conce rning the offe nse or of fense s that wer e part of the same c ourse of conduct or

of a common sche me or plan, but the fact that the def endant ha s no releva

nt or useful other infor

mation to provide or t h at t h e Gover nment is alrea dy

awa re of the information shall not prec lude a de termination by the cour t that t h e d ef

en d ant has c omp lie d w iththi s r e qu ir e me nt. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). H ender son, as the party seeking the application of the

“ s a f e t y v a l v e p r o v i s i o n , ” h a s t h e b u r d e no f p r o v i n g t h a t h e i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e “ s a f

e t y v a l v e ” b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. United St ates v. Salgado , 25 0 F .3 d 4 38 , 4 59 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) ; Adu , 82 F.3d at 123. I n meetingthis burden, “[t] he defenda nt is require d to provide c omplete informationNo. 06-5033

27 reg ardingnot only

the offe nse of conviction, but also any rele vant conduct, including disclosure of information re g ardingthe par ticipation of other pe o p l e i n t h e off ense.” Salgado , 250 F.3d at 459 (c i t i n g United States v. Maduk a , 104 F.3d 891, 894 ( 6th Cir. 1997)). As thi s Co ur

t ha s n ote d, Con g re ss en a c te d th e “ sa fe ty va lve ” pr ov isi on

to “ mor e e qu ita

bly mete out justice to cooper ating individuals play ing minor roles in such c onspiracie s.” United States

v . O 'De ll , 247 F.3d 655, 674 (6th Cir. 2001). Indeed, “ [t ]hese stringe nt require ments ref lect the f act that the safe ty valve ‘wa s intended to be nefit only those defe ndants who truly cooper ate.’ ” Salgado, 2 5 0 F. 3 d at 4 7 5 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . M ar in , 144 F.3d 1085, 1094 ( 7th Cir. 1998)). B e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt

a t se nte nc ing , H e nd ers on reque ste d th e a pp lic a tio n o f t

he sa fe ty valve and introduced evidence of hi s cooper ation in the form of repor ts from the Chattanoog a Police Depa rtment detailing information provided by Hende rson reg arding Ba ker. (J.A. at 101-05.) T he g overnme nt, although a cknow l ed gi n g t h at He n d er s o np ro v i d edi n fo rm at i o n , o p p o s edt h e ap p l i ca tion of the saf ety valve on the basis that “[h] e did not tell us the truth, did not give us the f ull ex tent of his involvement.” (J.A. at 382.) As proof, the g overnme nt threatened to int roduce a witness who
wo uld te sti fy re g ard ing a dd iti on a l tr ips ma de to At lanta by He nd e rs on wh ic h w e re no t di sc los e d to the g overnme nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt , ho we ve r, did no t he ar f ro m th e g ov e rnme nt w itn e ss a nd sim ply sustained the g overnme nt’s objection af ter noting that disclosure of the entire sc ope of involveme nt is a “ ne c e ssa ry e le me nt” fo r t

he a pp lic a tio n o f t

he “ sa fe ty va lve ” a dju stm e nt. The district cour

t did not err in r ef

using to a pply the safe ty

valve pr ovision to Henderson. Although Hende rson produce d evidenc e of his c ooperation, the district c ourt also hear d evidence
re g ardin g h is lac k o f t

ra ns pa re nc y pe rt a ini ngto h is s tate me nts to p oli c e and the sc op e of

hisNo. 06-5033

28 involvement with the conspirac y . We do note, howeve r, that the district c ourt did not a ctually hear from the g overnme nt’s witness reg ardingHende rson’s additional trips to Atlanta. Ne verthe less, the burden w as on He nderson, not the g overnme nt, to establ i s h h i s el igibility for the sa fety

valve. I ndeed, “ [w] here the g overnme nt challeng es a defe ndant’s cla im of complete a nd timely disclosure
an d the def

endant doe s not produce e vidence that demonstrates suc h disclosure, a district court’s denial of a reque st to apply a § 3553(f) and § 5C1.2(5) is not clea rly err oneous.” Salgado , 250 F.3d at 460. Inasmuch a s Hende rson was not c ompletely forthrig ht in his represe ntat i ons during the suppression hea

ring or re g ardingthe full scope of his involvement with the conspirac y , he did not meet his burden a

nd thus was not entitled to protection under the “sa fety

valve” provision of the Gu ide lin e s. CO NC LU SION For the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.