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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 124,617

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellant,

v.

ANGELA JONES,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Anderson District Court; ERIC W. GODDERZ, judge. Opinion filed July 15, 2022. 

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Elizabeth L. Oliver, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. 

John A. Boyd, of Harris Kelsey, Chtd., of Ottawa, for appellee.

Before ISHERWOOD, P.J., SCHROEDER and WARNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: On May 14, 2021, Deputy Sheriff David Michael Harper-Head 

initiated a traffic stop after observing a vehicle sitting unnecessarily stationary at a stop 

sign, with its high beams activated, and then execute a turn without first activating a turn 

signal 100 feet before doing so as required by statute. During the stop that ensued, 

Deputy Harper-Head noticed that the driver, Angela Jones, had red eyes, droopy eyelids,

and exhibited confusion as to her location. Based on the totality of this information, 

alongside his extensive experience and training with impaired drivers, Deputy HarperHead asked Jones to step out of the vehicle and complete several field sobriety tests. 

Jones failed three of those tests, was arrested, and Deputy Harper-Head subsequently 
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found methamphetamine in the back of his patrol car after transporting Jones for booking. 

The State charged Jones with two traffic violations, possession of methamphetamine, and 

for her third offense of driving under the influence of drugs.

Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress which the district court granted

following a hearing. In support of its ruling, the court explained that it "question[ed]" the 

lawfulness of the initial stop and also did not believe that Deputy Harper-Head possessed 

the reasonable suspicion required to expand the stop to conduct a DUI investigation. The 

State pursued an interlocutory appeal and requests that we review the propriety of the 

district court's ruling. Following a comprehensive review of the record we conclude 

reversal of the district court's order is warranted because, in our view, the court failed to 

analyze the totality of the circumstances. When all those factors are properly considered, 

they reflect that Deputy Harper-Head did, in fact, have reasonable suspicion to extend the 

stop. Thus, we reverse and remand Jones' case for further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of May 14, 2020, Anderson County Deputy Sheriff 

Harper-Head was westbound on County Road 2350 when he approached the stop sign 

where County Road 2350 bisected U.S. Highway 59 and noticed a vehicle sitting directly 

across from him at the stop sign facing east. The vehicle was stationary for an unusual 

length of time, with its high beams activated, and did not have a turn signal engaged. 

Deputy Harper-Head accounted for the only other traffic on the road. 

The deputy crossed the intersection and when his patrol car was parallel to the 

vehicle, he noticed the vehicle's turn signal go on and then off again. Harper-Head 

performed a U-turn and pulled up behind the vehicle, at which point the driver once again 

activated her turn signal but then turned onto the highway. Deputy Harper-Head followed 

and initiated a traffic stop. 
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The vehicle promptly pulled over and Deputy Harper-Head approached the driver, 

whom he identified as Angela Jones. He observed Jones had red eyes and droopy eyelids, 

a condition known to Harper-Head and one which he understood from his training and 

experience to potentially be the result of either a medical condition or drug intoxication. 

Jones provided a West Virginia driver's license and the deputy inquired where she was 

coming from and where she was going. Jones responded that she was coming from work 

at Jet, a company located in Gardner, Kansas. Deputy Harper-Head found the response 

odd given that Jones was travelling from the west and Gardner was east of their location. 

Harper-Head had enjoyed an approximately 20-year career in law enforcement, 

was a nationally certified and active drug recognition expert, attended the Advanced 

Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement course, and recently received accreditation as a 

standardized field sobriety testing instructor. Thus, based on the early morning hour, 

Jones' inexplicable delay at the stop sign while using her high beams, her failure to 

properly signal a turn, her red, droopy eyes, and her somewhat peculiar statements 

regarding her path of travel, Harper-Head believed it prudent to ask Jones to step from 

her vehicle and complete several field sobriety tests.

Jones ultimately failed the "walk-and-turn" test, with Deputy Harper-Head 

identifying "five out of eight possible [cues]" for intoxication. She also exhibited all four 

possible cues for intoxication while completing the one-leg stand test. Finally, Jones 

completed the Modified Romberg Test, which measures the accuracy of one's internal 

clock. Her performance of that exercise reflected an accelerated sense of time. During 

their interaction, Jones told Deputy Harper-Head that she had taken Zoloft or Sertraline. 

Following the field sobriety tests, Deputy Harper-Head placed Jones under arrest

and transported her to the jail. Upon their arrival, the deputy noticed "a small plastic bag 

containing a white substance that appeared to [him] to be methamphetamine." He 

testified that the bag necessarily belonged to Jones because his custom is to check the 
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backseat prior to the start of every shift to ensure occupants do not attempt to conceal 

contraband while riding in the vehicle. 

Harper-Head secured a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from Jones which 

yielded a positive result for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The bag recovered 

from the back of his patrol car likewise tested positive for methamphetamine. 

The State charged Jones with possession of methamphetamine, her third offense of 

driving under the influence of drugs, failure to dim her headlights, and a turn signal 

violation. Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress. During the hearing on that 

motion, Deputy Harper-Head offered the only testimonial evidence, but the State also 

introduced reports from the Kansas Bureau of Investigation for Jones' blood sample and 

the white substance from the bag in Harper-Head's patrol vehicle. 

Following testimony and arguments from the parties, the district court granted 

Jones' motion to suppress. In support of its ruling, the court first expressed concerns 

regarding the legality of the initial traffic stop. It opined that Deputy Harper-Head's 

testimony concerning Jones' blinker did not "make any sense to the Court from this

standpoint" because it was not a "justification for pulling over a vehicle" if the driver 

pulls up to a stop sign and only then determines which direction to turn, particularly in 

rural communities where residents rarely utilize turn signals. Additionally, the court 

noted that the dash camera video Jones introduced into evidence reflected that she 

properly signaled and correctly pulled to the side of the road when Deputy Harper-Head 

initiated the traffic stop. 

The court further remarked upon the deputy's observations regarding Jones' eyes 

and noted there were "no other indicators what I normally see or what the Court normally 

sees in driving under the influence type cases to where there's the smell of alcohol, the 

slurred speech, all those other types of indicators." In conjunction with that finding, it 
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observed that Deputy Harper-Head did not know Jones and, therefore, he could not truly 

assess whether she presented with uncharacteristically droopy eyes that morning. 

In conclusion, the court found that, with the exception of Jones' red eyes, it did not 

believe Deputy Harper-Head possessed the justification required to extend the stop and 

conduct the testing performed on Jones. 

The State filed a timely notice of appeal. 

ANALYSIS

To file an interlocutory appeal, the State must assert that the suppression of the 

evidence substantially impaired the State's case. State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 34, 680 

P.2d 257 (1984.) The State makes this argument on appeal and therefore jurisdiction is 

proper. 

Standard of Review

"The standard of review for a district court's decision on a motion to suppress has 

two parts. The appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine 

whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. But the court's ultimate 

legal conclusion is reviewed using a de novo standard. State v. Neighbors, 299 Kan. 234, 

240, 328 P.3d 1081 (2014). The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or assess 

the credibility of witnesses. State v. Reiss, 299 Kan. 291, 296, 326 P.3d 367 (2014). 

When the facts supporting the district court's decision on a motion to suppress are not 

disputed, the ultimate question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which the 

appellate court exercises unlimited review. State v. Stevenson, 299 Kan. 53, 57, 321 P.3d 

754 (2014)." State v. Hanke, 307 Kan. 823, 827, 415 P.3d 966 (2018). 

Resolution of this issue also requires a degree of statutory interpretation, which 

presents a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. Jarvis v. Kansas
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Dept. of Revenue, 312 Kan. 156, 159, 473 P.3d 869 (2020). "All Kansas courts use the 

same starting point when interpreting statutes: The Legislature's intent controls. To 

divine that intent, courts examine the language of the provision and apply plain and 

unambiguous language as written." 312 Kan. at 159. In doing so, courts must give 

"common words their ordinary meaning." State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 906, 368 P.3d 342 

(2016). "If the Legislature's intent is not clear from the language, a court may look to 

legislative history, background considerations, and canons of construction to help 

determine legislative intent." Jarvis, 312 Kan. at 159. 

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN FINDING DEPUTY HARPER-HEAD LACKED REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO INITIATE A TRAFFIC STOP?

The State correctly points out that it is unclear from the district court's ruling 

whether it found the deputy's initial stop of Jones unlawful. The court remarked that it

"questioned" the stop. But its oral pronouncement suggests the primary basis for granting 

Jones' motion to suppress was the court's finding that Deputy Harper-Head lacked an 

"objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activities" were taking place to 

justify expanding that traffic stop into a DUI investigation. Due to the presence of such 

ambiguity, we will analyze the deputy's reasonable suspicion for initiating the traffic 

stop, as well as the reasonable suspicion he possessed for an extension of that stop.

"Traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment and are subject to its 

limitations." State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 359, 363, 420 P.3d 456 (2018). "A police officer 

may perform a traffic stop if he or she reasonably suspects that the driver committed a 

traffic infraction." State v. Arceo-Rojas, 57 Kan. App. 2d 741, 749, 458 P.3d 272 (2020). 

"Reasonable suspicion is 'a specific, objective, articulable basis for believing that the 

person being detained is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.'" 57 

Kan. App. 2d at 749 (quoting State v. Kraemer, 52 Kan. App. 2d 686, 692, 371 P.3d 954 

[2016]). "Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a question of law." Lowery, 308 Kan. at 
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364. When faced with a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proving a 

search or seizure was lawful by a preponderance of evidence. State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 

881, 886, 190 P.3d 234 (2008]).

On appeal, the State makes two arguments for why Deputy Harper-Head 

possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Jones: the failure to properly and lawfully signal 

a turn and the failure to dim her headlights, both of which constitute traffic infractions. It

first contends that the deputy observed Jones violate K.S.A. 8-1548, the provision 

addressing the use of turn signals. K.S.A. 8-1548 provides: 

"(a) No person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless 

and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety, nor without giving an 

appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.

"(b) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 

given continuously during not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the 

vehicle before turning.

"(c) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first 

giving an appropriate signal, in the manner provided herein, to the driver of any vehicle 

immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal. 

"(d) The signals required on vehicles by subsection (b) of K.S.A. 8-1549 shall 

not be flashed on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" 

signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, nor be flashed on one side 

only of a parked vehicle except as may be necessary for compliance with this section." 

Though not explicitly stated, the State appears to rely on subsection (b) as an 

explanation for Harper-Head's initial traffic stop. The deputy testified that Jones did not 

have a turn signal activated when he first encountered her stationary vehicle. It was not 

until after Harper-Head crossed the highway and passed parallel to her vehicle that Jones 

turned the signal on and then off. Then, after Deputy Harper-Head pulled in behind Jones' 
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vehicle at the stop sign, she signaled a turn and pulled onto the highway. Accordingly, 

Jones failed to signal continuously for the last 100 feet before executing a turn in 

violation of K.S.A. 8-1548(b), which constitutes a traffic infraction. 

The State appropriately directs our attention to State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 

183 P.3d 788 (2008). In that case, Shanon Greever pulled up to a stop sign behind a 

police officer. The officer noticed that Greever only activated his turn signal after coming

to a stop behind the officer's vehicle. The officer initiated a traffic stop and ultimately 

discovered marijuana in Greever's vehicle. Greever filed a motion to suppress, which the 

district court denied. This court reversed upon finding that that the officer lacked 

reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because K.S.A. 8-1548 did not require an 

individual to activate a turn signal prior to forming the intent to turn. The Kansas 

Supreme Court granted review.

The Greever court explained that K.S.A. 8-1548 is an "absolute liability offense" 

and that, without exception, the statute requires "that anyone turning a vehicle must 

provide 'an appropriate signal'—namely, a turn signal given continuously for at least 100 

feet before the turn." 286 Kan. at 138. Put differently, drivers cannot substantially comply 

with the 100-foot requirement. 286 Kan. at 140. Based on this statutory interpretation, the 

Kansas Supreme Court reversed this court because Greever did not activate his turn 

signal until he was parked behind the officer's vehicle. 286 Kan. at 141. 

Similarly, Jones did not activate her turn signal until she was already parked at the 

stop sign for a period of time. Stated another way, she did not signal continuously for the 

last 100 feet before the turn. Contrary to the district court's suggestions, the statute does 

not allow her to sit at the stop sign, cogitate whether to turn, and then activate the signal

once the intent to turn is formed. Accordingly, Deputy Harper-Head had reasonable 

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop following Jones' commission of a traffic infraction in

violation of K.S.A. 8-1548(b). See also State v. Demarco, 263 Kan. 727, 733, 952 P.2d 
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1276 (1998) (holding a violation of K.S.A. 8-1548 provides an officer with probable 

cause to make a traffic stop). Given our conclusion that the turn signal violation afforded 

Deputy Harper-Head the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, it is not 

necessary to analyze the State's second claim that Jones' traffic infraction for failing to 

dim her headlights provided a sufficient basis to perform the stop. 

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN FINDING DEPUTY HARPER-HEAD LACKED REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO EXTEND THE TRAFFIC STOP AND CONDUCT A DUI INVESTIGATION?

On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in granting Jones' motion to 

suppress because, based on the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Harper-Head had 

reasonable suspicion that Jones was operating the vehicle under the influence of a drug. 

Jones replies that the indicators the State relies on have alternative, lawful explanations. 

Traffic stops are "more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial 

arrest, so courts treat the traffic stop, whether based on reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause, under the longstanding limitations from Terry for nonconsensual police-citizen 

contacts." State v. Jimenez, 308 Kan. 315, 323, 420 P.3d 464 (2018). "Under Terry, . . . a

lawful stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the 

interference in the first place." 308 Kan. at 323 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 

S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 [1968]). During a traffic stop, "the scope of the stop is

limited so that the officer may only 'request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run

a computer check, and issue a citation.'" Strickert v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 58 Kan.

App. 2d 1, 10, 462 P.3d 649 (2020) (quoting State v. Golston, 41 Kan. App. 2d 444, 451,

203 P.3d 10 [2009]). However, the stop may be extended if an officer has "reasonable

suspicion to believe that the person was or is involved in additional criminal activity." 58

Kan. App. 2d at 8 (citing State v. Jones, 300 Kan. 630, Syl. ¶ 6, 333 P.3d 886; Pollman,

286 Kan. 881, Syl. ¶ 3.
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"Reasonable suspicion is 'a specific, objective, articulable basis for believing that 

the person being detained is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.'" 

Arceo-Rojas, 57 Kan. App. 2d at 749 (quoting Kraemer, 52 Kan. App. 2d at 692).

Reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch. Lowery, 308 Kan at 366. "What is reasonable 

depends on the totality of circumstances in the view of a trained law enforcement 

officer." State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 487, 293 P.3d 718 (2013). Officers may "'draw 

on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions 

about the cumulative information available to them.'" Lowery, 308 Kan. at 366 (quoting 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 [2002]).

Here, the State argues that several factors, viewed collectively, support a finding 

that Deputy Harper-Head had reasonable suspicion that Jones was driving while under 

the influence of drugs. Thus, the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress.

The first factor highlighted by the State relates to the questionable aspects of 

Jones' driving that the deputy observed prior to the traffic stop. Specifically, the State 

correctly notes Jones' violation of K.S.A. 8-1548(b). See Strickert, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 11 

(reasonable suspicion finding for DUI included an officer's "observation of a traffic 

infraction"). Jones responds by noting that the district court viewed Harper-Head's dash 

camera footage and observed that Jones properly pulled off the road using her turn signal 

when the deputy initiated the traffic stop. Though true, the district court also properly 

observed that the dash camera was not recording when Deputy Harper-Head witnessed 

Jones' vehicle unnecessarily sitting stationary at a stop sign, or when he witnessed Jones 

violate K.S.A. 8-1548(b) by not activating her turn signal 100 feet prior to the turn. That 

is, the conduct that prompted him to execute the stop. An isolated example of appropriate 

driving does not negate the unlawful or peculiar operation of a vehicle. See City of 

Norton v. Wonderly, 38 Kan. App. 2d 797, 804, 172 P.3d 1205 (2007) (Three minutes of 

good driving within the city limits did not dissipate the officer's reasonable suspicion 

based on the fact Wonderly had earlier driven his truck in a reckless manner.).
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Jones further contends that the fact the stop occurred during the early morning 

hours is of limited import and "does not logically lead to an inference of impaired 

driving." However, this court previously rejected a similar argument in State v. Cox, No. 

110,447, 2014 WL 3732019, at *4 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), when we 

held that reasonable suspicion existed to extend a traffic stop into a DUI investigation 

when the arresting officer testified that his belief that the driver was intoxicated was 

partially based on his experience that "most DUI infractions are detected between 

midnight and 3 a.m." 

Next, the State directs our attention to the information Deputy Harper-Head 

gathered while interacting with Jones. Specifically, that Jones' red and droopy eyes can 

help "establish reasonable suspicion and probable cause for a DUI investigation." Jones 

replies that, as the district court noted, Deputy Harper-Head lacked any awareness of how 

Jones' eyes appeared under normal circumstances. Thus, a wholly innocent explanation 

may provide for the redness and ptosis, such as a medical condition or fatigue following a 

late shift at her job. Put simply, Jones suggests the appearance of her eyes was equally 

susceptible to innocent conduct.

It is important to note that numerous Kansas courts have considered similar 

physical characteristics when analyzing reasonable suspicion for DUI determinations. See 

Strickert, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 10 (reasonable suspicion finding for DUI included driver's 

"watery and bloodshot eyes"); State v. Bell, No. 106,360, 2012 WL 4372999, at *6 

(reasonable suspicion finding for DUI included driver's "droopy eyes"), State v. Jury, No. 

102,691, 2010 WL 4156764, at *3 (reasonable suspicion finding for DUI included 

driver's "droopy bloodshot eyes"); see also State v. Peltz, 242 Ariz. 23, 32, 391 P.3d 1215 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (probable cause finding for DUI included driver's ptosis). 

Additionally, the State contends that Jones' explanation that she was coming from 

Gardner, which, in actuality, was the opposite direction than she was coming from, 
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properly led the deputy to conclude that Jones was confused as to her surroundings. Jones 

takes issue with this assertion and argues that Harper-Head never followed up on where 

she was going. And had he done so, a valid explanation might have dispelled his 

suspicion, particularly given the fact her West Virginia driver's license provided notice of 

her unfamiliarity with the area. As support for this contention, Jones relies on Lowery, 

where the Kansas Supreme Court explained that a discrepancy between two individuals' 

accounts of their travel plans was "insignificant as a basis for suspecting criminal 

activity." 308 Kan. at 368. 

We are not persuaded that Lowery necessarily advances Jones' position. The facts 

in that case involved an inconsistency between the travel details provided by two

different individuals to the same officer, rather than a single vehicle operator, such as 

Jones, who appeared confused as to her location. The inconsistency in Lowery speaks to 

evasion or deception, whereas Jones' inconsistency regarding Gardner and her travel 

history leans toward disorientation. And that factor is one which Kansas courts have 

found to be indicative of impairment. See Leister v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 

115,090, 2017 WL 947236, at *5 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (reasonable 

suspicion finding for DUI partially based on driver being "so confused and disoriented 

that he was unable to tell Officer Walz which direction his pickup truck was facing or 

explain why he was headed north when his destination was in the opposite direction"); 

Scott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 111,589, 2015 WL 2414393, at *5 (Kan. App. 

2015) (unpublished opinion) (noting the driver's disorientation and confusion was 

indicative of impairment); see also State v. Kellogg, 22 Neb. App. 638, 645, 859 N.W.2d 

355 (Neb. Ct. App. 2015) (reasonable suspicion finding for DUI partially based on 

driver's confusion). 

Ultimately, it is our conclusion that both Jones and the district court erroneously 

evaluated Deputy Harper-Head's reasonable suspicion determination by (1) analyzing 

each factor individually, and (2) identifying a legal explanation for each individual factor. 
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This approach runs afoul of our Supreme Court's directive that "[t]he totality of the 

circumstances standard does not envision a reviewing court pigeonholing each factor as 

to innocent or suspicions appearances. Instead, the court determines whether all the 

circumstances justify the detention. Lowery, 308 Kan. at 366.

In Cox, a panel of this court rejected the very type of analysis engaged in by the 

district court here. Cox argued "that because there were potentially innocent explanations 

for each of the factors [the officer] relied on . . . [the officer] could not have formulated a 

reasonable suspicion that she was intoxicated." State v. Cox, No. 110,447, 2014 WL 

3732019, at *4 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion). In response, this court explained 

that Kansas caselaw "'precludes a divide-and-conquer analysis'" where each factor that 

may potentially carry a corresponding innocent explanation is excluded from the totality 

of the circumstances equation. 2014 WL 3732019, at *4 (quoting State v. Coleman, 292 

Kan. 813, 817-18, 257 P.3d 320 [2011]). 

The appropriate analysis contemplates collective consideration of all relevant

factors. Undertaking that analysis here, in conjunction with Deputy Harper-Head's 

extensive experience and training regarding traffic stops and impaired drivers, we do not 

hesitate to find that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to believe that Jones was driving 

under the influence of drugs. That is, the early morning hour, her delayed reaction time as 

evidenced by her unnecessary delay at the intersection, the traffic violation, her red and 

droopy eyes, and confusion as to her location. Kansas courts have previously found each 

of these factors compelling and we are similarly persuaded here. 

Reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.