NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 210378-U

Order filed May 22, 2023

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

KYA R.E. KELLY, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 14th Judicial Circuit, 

Henry County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-21-0378 

Circuit No. 20-CF-352 

Honorable 

Terence M. Patton, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices McDade and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction for failure 

to register as a sex offender. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Kya R.E. Kelly, appeals from her conviction for failure to register as a sex 

offender. Defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove her 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the jury was not instructed on an essential element of the 

offense, and (3) she did not validly waive her right to a 12-person jury. We reverse defendant’s 

conviction outright. 
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged defendant with failure to register as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/3(a) 

(West 2020)). The information alleged that on or about May 20, 2020, defendant, “a sex offender 

who lacks a fixed residence, knowingly failed to register, in accordance with the provisions of the 

Sex Offender Registration Act [(Act)], with the Kewanee Police Department, Henry County, 

Illinois, on a weekly basis as required under the *** Act, said defendant having previously violated 

the *** Act in Henry County Case Number 19-CF-157.” Counsel was appointed to represent 

defendant. 

¶ 5 The case proceeded to a six-person jury trial on May 5, 2021. Prior to the start of trial,

defendant filed motions in limine to exclude evidence of her prior convictions and bad acts. 

Regarding defendant’s prior conviction for a sex offense, the parties agreed to stipulate to the 

following: “1. Defendant *** is a person who has been charged and convicted under Illinois law 

of a sex offense. 2. Defendant *** is a sex offender as defined under the laws of the State of 

Illinois.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court indicated that the trial would begin the next 

morning at 9 a.m., and the case recessed for a short time before the beginning of voir dire. Six 

jurors and one alternate were chosen. The next morning, defendant failed to appear. The trial 

proceeded in absentia. 

¶ 6 Officer Dalton Kuffel of the Kewanee Police Department testified that he was familiar with 

defendant and identified a photograph of her. On August 11, 2019, Kuffel met with defendant at 

the police department and completed the sex offender registration with her. The registration form 

that defendant signed that day was admitted into evidence. Kuffel testified that in the process of 

completing the registration, he read the contents of the form to defendant. The form indicated that 

defendant was homeless and registered weekly. The second page of the registration form contained 
3 

the language: “I have read and/or had read to me the above requirements. It has been explained to 

me and I understand my duty to register next on or before 8-18 of 2019.” Underneath this language, 

defendant signed the form. She affixed her signature in the presence of Kuffel. Kuffel explained 

that registrants review all the information on the form and any necessary changes are made. Once 

the form is complete, it is kept on file at the police department. A copy of the form was given to 

defendant before she left that day.

¶ 7 Officer Eric Hamilton of the Kewanee Police Department testified that he was familiar 

with defendant and identified a photograph of her. On May 20, 2020, he located defendant at the 

Rux Funeral Home in Kewanee. He indicated that he “made contact with her because [he] knew 

that she was in violation of her sex offender registration.” Hamilton explained that he knew 

defendant was in violation because she “registers as homeless weekly. She has to register every 

week. And she failed to do so.” He also indicated that the police department had received 

complaints about her staying at various addresses, several of which officers had attempted to 

verify. The State questioned Hamilton regarding his investigation into the date of defendant’s last 

registration: 

“Q. Once you had made contact with [defendant], did you confirm with 

dispatch or at the police department what her last registration date had been?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. 

And did you confirm whether there had been any registrations between that 

prior registration date and the 20th of May— 

A. Yes.

Q.—2020? 
4 

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any between those?

A. No.” 

Hamilton explained that any such registrations would be kept on file at the police department. He 

did not disclose the date of defendant’s last registration.

¶ 8 After Hamilton’s testimony, the State rested. Defense counsel’s motion for directed verdict 

was denied. Defendant presented no evidence. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and a bench 

warrant was issued for defendant. Defendant was subsequently arrested on the warrant and 

sentenced to four years’ imprisonment following a sentencing hearing. Defendant appeals. 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented, the propriety of the jury 

instructions given regarding the essential elements of the charge, and the validity of defendant’s

waiver of her right to a 12-person jury. We begin by addressing the sufficiency of the evidence. 

¶ 11 We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People 

v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). In making this determination, we review the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. All reasonable 

inferences in favor of the State are allowed but unreasonable or speculative inferences are not 

permissible. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). Where an element of the charged 

offense requires temporal context, generalized testimony without reference to a specific time or 

date is insufficient. People v. Cadena, 2013 IL App (2d) 120285, ¶ 16 (officer’s testimony that a 

church “ ‘is an active church’ ” without any other reference to time or date failed to provide 

temporal context demonstrating that the building was an active church on the date of the offense 
5 

sufficient to support convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled substance within 1000 

feet of a church). “A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable 

or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 

261. “A conviction will be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or 

unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” People v. Holliday, 2019 

IL App (3d) 160315, ¶ 10. 

¶ 12 The State charged defendant with violating her duty to register as a sex offender where 

defendant, a sex offender who lacked a fixed residence, knowingly failed to register with the 

Kewanee Police Department on a weekly basis as required by the Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq.

(West 2020)). The provision of the Act which governs the duty to register provides in relevant part 

that: “[a]ny person who lacks a fixed residence must report weekly, in person, *** with the chief 

of police in the municipality in which he or she is located.” Id. § 3(a). 

¶ 13 The parties disagree on what the State must prove to sustain a conviction for the offense of 

failure to register as a sex offender as charged. Defendant argues that violations of the Act can be 

charged in a variety of ways and the essential elements of those offenses depend on the specific 

allegations that have been made. Accordingly, defendant contends that the State must prove that

defendant (1) was a sex offender, (2) lacked a fixed residence, (3) knowingly failed to register 

weekly, (4) was required to register with the Kewanee Police Department, and (5) failed to register 

on or about May 20, 2020. The State submits that to sustain a conviction, it must only prove that 

defendant was subject to registration requirements under the Act and knowingly failed to register. 

¶ 14 The evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction even under 

the State’s proposed elements. Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant 

was required to register as a sex offender and that she knew she needed to register weekly. 
6 

However, the State presented no direct evidence about defendant’s failure to register between 

August 11, 2019, and her May 20, 2020, arrest. 

¶ 15 Kuffel testified that on August 11, 2019, defendant registered at the police department

and signed the sex offender registration form. The form indicated that defendant was required to 

register weekly. Kuffel did not testify that August 11, 2019, was her last registration date. 

Hamilton testified that he knew defendant was in violation because she was required to register 

every week and had failed to do so. When asked if he had confirmed with dispatch or the police 

department what her last registration date had been, he simply responded, “Yes.” Hamilton failed 

to provide the specific date of defendant’s last registration. This exchange contains no temporal 

context. See Cadena, 2013 IL App (2d) 120285, ¶ 15. Based on Hamilton’s testimony, 

defendant’s last registration date could have occurred any time between her August 11, 2019, 

registration with Kuffel and her May 20, 2020, arrest. Accordingly, no inference can be drawn 

regarding her failure to register as required. Under this set of facts, the jury could only speculate 

that defendant’s last registration date occurred more than one week prior to May 20, 2020. 

¶ 16 Moreover, even if Hamilton’s testimony could be taken to mean that defendant failed to 

register within a week of May 20, 2020, the evidence offered to establish how Hamilton knew 

this information was hearsay. See People v. Gladney, 2020 IL App (3d) 180087, ¶ 21 (officers 

may testify to out-of-court statements made to explain their actions but not to establish the truth 

of the matter). Hamilton testified that he learned defendant’s last date of registration from 

“dispatch or at the police department.” Hamilton failed to offer testimony demonstrating his 

investigation and personal knowledge of defendant’s registration date outside of what was told to 

him by others. Such personal knowledge is easily established by testimony that he checked 
7 

defendant’s file at the police department or searched for her last registration date in the Law 

Enforcement Agencies Data System. See People v. Sweigart, 2021 IL App (2d) 180543, ¶ 49.

¶ 17 Additionally, Hamilton’s testimony that he “made contact with her because [he] knew that 

she was in violation of her sex offender registration” is conclusory. When asked how he knew she 

was in violation, Hamilton stated that defendant was required to register weekly and failed to do 

so. No explanation is given for Hamilton’s familiarity with defendant’s registration status. Without 

more explanation, these statements are insufficient to prove defendant’s failure to register as 

required. See Cadena, 2013 IL App (2d) 120285, ¶ 17 (a witness’s familiarity with the status of 

something requires an explanation of that witness’s familiarity, more than the bare facts that the 

witness is a police officer with several years of service). Thus, the evidence presented is 

insufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse

defendant’s conviction outright. Since we reversed defendant’s conviction, we need not reach 

defendant’s remaining arguments. 

¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant’s conviction for failure to register as a sex 

offender. 

¶ 20 Conviction reversed.