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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

BRAYLON RAY COULTER, §

 #58976-177, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:22-cv-01384-X (BT)

§

CHIEF JUDGE LYNN, et al., §

 Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Braylon Ray Coulter, a convicted felon awaiting sentencing in 

a federal case, brings this pro se civil rights action under Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971). The Court granted Coulter leave to proceed in forma pauperis but 

has not issued process pending judicial screening. (ECF No. 10.) As 

explained below, the Court should stay and administratively close this case. 

Background

Coulter’s civil rights claims arise out of the criminal prosecution and 

resulting conviction in his federal case: United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-

cr-68-M-1 (N.D. Tex.). On September 20, 2022, a jury found Coulter guilty 

of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). See United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-cr-68-M-1 

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(N.D. Tex.) (ECF No. 293). His sentencing hearing is scheduled for February 

7, 2023. See id. (ECF No. 295).

Coulter has been representing himself in the criminal case since April 

19, 2021. See Coulter, No. 3:19-cr-68-M-1 (ECF No. 155). In that case, on 

June 7, 2022, Coulter filed a document entitled “Grounds To Move For 

Judgment Of Acquittal.” See id. (ECF No. 242). The Court determined 

Coulter’s filing raised civil rights claims and severed those claims into this 

pro se civil rights action under Bivens. See id. (ECF No. 248).

In his second amended complaint, which is the live pleading in this 

action, Coulter alleges that Officer Joshua Guzman lacked “reasonable 

suspicion to prolong [his] traffic stop beyond [the] scope of [the] mission.” 

2d Am. Comp. 4 (ECF No. 17). Coulter further alleges that Assistant United 

States Attorney (AUSA) John J. Boyle is “maliciously prosecuting an unjust 

prosecution” and even suborned perjury. Id. He contends that the judge 

assigned to his federal criminal case, United States District Judge Barbara 

M. G. Lynn, “misapplied [the] reasonable suspicion” standard. Id. Coulter 

further contends that United States magistrate judge Renee Toliver erred in 

ordering him detained pending trial. Coulter claims that the evidence in his 

federal criminal case is woefully insufficient and prejudicial. He further 

claims that his federal criminal case amounts to little more than a 

“conspiracy.” Id. at 6. As relief, Coulter seeks: a preliminary injunction; a 

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monetary reward (treble and punitive damages); and the 

“dismissal/acquittal” of his federal criminal case. 

Legal Standards and Analysis

A.

Coulter’s second amended complaint is subject to preliminary 

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part: 

The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, 

a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress 

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify 

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) 

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

suit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b). 

And under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may summarily dismiss 

a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous 

or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) 

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

The Court liberally construes Coulter’s filings with all possible 

deference due a pro se litigant. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007) (pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (citing Estelle v.

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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972) (per curiam) (noting that allegations in a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, are held to less stringent standards than form 

pleadings drafted by lawyers); Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be 

construed so as to do justice”). 

B.

As relief in this civil rights action, Coulter requests, in part, the Court 

dismiss his federal criminal charges in United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-cr68-M-1 (N.D. Tex.) or find him not guilty of those charges. 2d Am. Compl.4 

(ECF No. 17). However, these are not remedies available in a civil rights 

action. And to the extent that Coulter seeks dismissal of his federal criminal 

case, a civil rights action is not the appropriate means for obtaining that 

relief. Id. 

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 

We have noted that a habeas petition is the proper vehicle to 

seek release from custody, while a civil rights suit pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a state prisoner or under Bivens for a 

federal prisoner is the proper vehicle to attack unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement and prison procedures. The brightline rule our court has adopted is that if a favorable 

determination of the prisoner's claim would not automatically 

entitle him to accelerated release, then the proper vehicle is a 

civil rights suit.

Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and 

footnotes omitted); see also Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)

(recognizing a habeas action is appropriate when there is a challenge “to the 

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very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is 

a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release 

from that imprisonment”); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 

1997) (recognizing a civil rights action attacks unconstitutional conditions 

of confinement and prison procedures, and a habeas petition is appropriate 

when a prisoner seeks release from custody) (citing Pugh v. Parish of St. 

Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Texas Dep’t of 

Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 

1994)); United States v. Carrera, 2020 WL 7225997, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 

7, 2020) (“Insofar as Carrera seeks judicial review of his conditions of 

confinement, including the sufficiency of the medical care he is receiving in 

prison, he may file a civil-rights complaint.”) (citing Melot, 970 F.3d at 599). 

And the extent to which a plaintiff requests relief “in the form of dismissal 

of his criminal charges . . . he is requesting relief which is simply not 

available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [or Bivens].” Reyes v. Hale Cnty. Jail, 

2003 WL 22670929, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2003) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. 

at 475). 

C.

Coulter also attacks the validity of his federal criminal charges in 

United States v. Coulter, No. 3:19-cr-68-M-1 (N.D. Tex.). For instance, he 

argues that Officer Joshua Guzman did not have “reasonable suspicion” to 

prolong his traffic stop. 2d Am. Compl. 4 (ECF No. 17). Coulter further 

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argues that Judge Lynn “misapplied” the law regarding “reasonable 

suspicion” and erred in denying his motion to suppress. Id. Coulter contends 

that Judge Lynn’s decision was “bias[ed] and prejudicially influenced.” Id.

at 7. He claims the alleged errors that occurred during the hearing on his 

motion to suppress violated his “4th Amendment Substantial Right(s).” Id. 

Coulter’s claims attacking his federal criminal charges could be barred 

by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

In Heck, the Court stated:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983 plaintiff must 

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by 

a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486-87.

At bottom, “Heck requires the district court to consider ‘whether a 

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of 

his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed 

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has 

already been invalidated.’” Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 

1995) (citation omitted); see also Jewell v. Bartlett, 2022 WL 1129910, at 

*2-3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2022), rec. adopted 2022 WL 1128957 (N.D. Tex. 

Apr. 15, 2022); Warren v. Mackey, 2021 WL 5339647, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 

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22, 2021), rec. adopted 2021 WL 5326530 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2021). Heck 

involved a federal civil rights case under § 1983, but it applies equally to a 

Bivens civil rights action. Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26 n.1, 27 (5th Cir. 

1994) (per curiam). 

A favorable judgment in this action would necessarily call into 

question the validity of Coulter’s conviction in United States v. Coulter, No. 

3:19-cr-68-M-1 (N.D. Tex.). And that is precisely part of the relief he seeks. 

2d Am. Compl. (ECF No. 17) at 4. However, it is premature to determine 

whether Heck bars Coulter’s civil rights claims because courts have generally 

not extended Heck’s holding to a civil rights action where the plaintiff 

challenges his arrest and trial before any conviction. Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007) (any claim related to rulings likely to be made in a 

pending criminal trial should be stayed until the criminal case has ended); 

see also Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding the 

record was not clear if the plaintiff had been tried or convicted, and it was 

“premature” to determine if his claims were barred by Heck). And a court 

should stay the civil rights lawsuit until the pending charges have run their 

course. Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746; see also DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 

488 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting the Court had recently “refused” 

to extend the application of Heck to pending criminal matters and citing the 

Supreme Court’s ruling in Wallace, 549 U.S. at 384). 

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Although a jury has found Coulter guilty in his criminal case, that case 

has not ended. Indeed, sentencing is still several months away, and Coulter 

has filed at least eight motions challenging the jury’s verdict. Because it is 

premature for the Court to determine whether Heck bars Coulter’s civil 

rights claims, those claims should be stayed until his pending federal 

criminal case has run its course. See Profit v. Ouachita Parish, 411 F. App’x 

708, 709 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (noting with approval the district court 

stayed a civil case attacking the legality of the detainee’s arrest, prosecution, 

and detention pending the resolution of the criminal charges); see also 

Hunter v. Watkins, 2015 WL 505430, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2015)

(finding a conviction on the pending state criminal charge would implicate 

Heck, and it was appropriate to recommend a stay of the remaining civil 

rights claims pending resolution of the criminal charges), rec. adopted 2015 

WL 509360 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2015). 

Conclusion

The Court should stay and administratively close this case and 

instruct Coulter that (1) he must file a motion to reopen the case within 60 

days after entry of judgment in his federal criminal court case, and (2) the 

failure to do so will result in the dismissal without prejudice of this case for 

failure to prosecute and/or comply with a Court order under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b). 

SO RECOMMENDED.

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December 12, 2022. 

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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