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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 FORT WORTH DIVISION

STEPHEN CRADDOCK,

Petitioner,

v. Civil No. 4:22-CV-519-P

BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, 

TDCJ- CID, 

Respondent.

 OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, Stephen Craddock (“Craddock), a state prisoner 

confined in the Daniel Unit of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ-CID), against Bobby Lumpkin, director of 

that division, Respondent. After considering the pleadings and relief sought by 

Craddock, the Court has concluded that the petition should be dismissed with 

prejudice as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

I. BACKGROUND

Craddock is in custody pursuant to his March 18, 2016 separate 

convictions from the 297th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, in cause 

number 1443284R for murder, and for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 

SHCR-01 at 86–901

; ECF No. 16-1. Craddock entered a guilty plea pursuant to a 

plea bargain as to both offenses; which includes, signed written plea 

admonishments and waivers, the trial court’s certification reflecting that Craddock 

would have no right of appeal, and a judicial confession. SHCR-01 at 81–89, 93, 

ECF No. 16-1. On March 18, 2016, Craddock was sentenced to the agreed twelve 

years’ imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. Id. at 86–90. Craddock 

1. SHCR-01” refers to the clerk’s record of the state habeas documents in Ex parte 

Stephen Craddock, No. 87,012-01, followed by the relevant page number[s]. “SHCR-02” 

refers to the clerk’s record of the state habeas documents in Ex parte Stephen Craddock, 

No. 87,012-02, followed by the relevant page number[s].

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did not file a direct appeal. SHCR-01 at 2 and SHCR-02 at 2 (“Clerks Summary 

Sheets”), ECF Nos. 16-1 and 16-7. 

Craddock filed his first state habeas corpus application on January 25, 

2017.2

 He challenged his convictions on three grounds: (1) ineffective assistance 

of counsel, arguing failure to investigate and coercing him to accept the guilty 

plea bargain; (2) failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; and (3) insufficient 

evidence to prove cause of death. SHCR-01 at 7–12, ECF No. 16-1. The trial 

court obtained a detailed attorney’s affidavit responding to Craddock’s claims. 

SHCR-01 at 31–35, ECF No. 16-1. The State provided proposed Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law with extensive exhibits attached. SHCR-01 at 36–76, 

ECF No. 16-1. The trial court adopted the State’s proposed findings in denying 

Craddock’s first state application. SHCR-01 at 78, ECF No. 16-1. The Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals (“TXCCA”) denied that application without written 

order on findings of the trial court without a hearing on July 26, 2017. SHCR-01 

(“Action Taken”), ECF No. 16-4.

On March 30, 2022, Craddock filed a second state habeas application.3

The one ground Craddock raised in that second application was “Newly 

discovered evidence.” SHCR-02 at 21, ECF No.oc. 16-7. Craddock Claimed that 

he could not have presented evidence supporting the grounds raised when he filed 

his first application. Id. at 19. Craddock alleged that the new evidence he relied on 

in support of his argument was an April 28, 2021 article in the Fort Worth Star 

Telegram newspaper. The article reported that there was a resolution introduced 

2. The state application was signed January 25, 2017, was postmarked January 26, 2017, 

and was file-stamped in the state district court on January 30, 2017. SHCR-01 at 2, 18–

19, 20, ECF No. 16-1. The mailbox rule applies to determine the timeliness of pro se state 

habeas applications. Richards v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 573, 578–79 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court 

will use the earliest date, January 25, 2017.

3. Craddock’s signature declaring the contents of the second state application to be true 

and correct, was dated March 30, 2022. SHCR-02 at 31, ECF No. 16-7. The application 

was file-stamped April 5, 2022. SHCR-02 at 16, ECF No. 16-7. Craddock also signed the 

petition, certifying that he sent his application to the TXCCA on March 30, 2020. SHCR02 at 33, ECF No. 16-7. Because the file stamp is close in time to the March 30, 2022 

signature date and because in Craddock’s sole ground for relief, he refers to a news 

article published in April 2021, the Court adopts the Respondent’s position that the 

March 30, 2022 signature date is the most logical date to use to apply the mailbox rule. 

SHCR-02 at 21–22; ECF No. 16-7.

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to investigate and audit the Tarrant County Medical Examiner due to several 

mistakes identified in twenty-seven of forty reviewed cases, and a judge’s finding 

that the medical examiner made false, inaccurate, and misleading statements in a 

death penalty case. SHCR-02 at 20–21, ECF No. 16-7. Craddock did not include a 

copy of the article with his state application. Id. at 16–37. Craddock also referred 

to the autopsy and police reports in his own case, but he did not attach those 

documents. Id. He alleged the autopsy report incorrectly determined that the 

victim’s death resulted from having been shot in the back, whereas the police 

report reflected that the victim had been shot in the chest. Id. at 25. 

The state court adopted the State’s proposed Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law to recommend denial of the second state application. SHCR02 at 54–63, ECF No. 16-7. That court found in part that Craddock presented no 

evidence to support his allegations, including his allegation that there was newly 

discovered evidence. SHCR-02 at 57 nos. 5, 10, ECF No. 16-7. The court also 

found that Craddock did not explain how the alleged newly discovered newspaper 

article affects his case. Id. at 55 no.6. The court also found that Craddock neither 

alleged nor proved that the newly discovered evidence established his innocence. 

Id. at 55 no.8, 57 at no.15; ECF No. 16-7. The TXCCA denied relief on June 29, 

2022, without written order on findings of the trial court without a hearing and on 

the Court’s independent review of the record. SHCR-02 at 61–62, ECF No. 16-7; 

and “Action Taken,” ECF No. 16-8.

Craddock constructively filed the instant federal petition for relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about June 9, 2022.4 Pet. 10, ECF No. 1. Craddock 

attached the autopsy report, police report, and the April 28, 2021 article as 

exhibits to his federal petition. Pet. Exhibits 1-7, ECF No. 1-1. This proceeding 

ensued.

II. ISSUES

The Court understands Craddock to allege the following four grounds for relief:

4. A § 2254 petition is also deemed filed on the date that the petition is placed into the 

prison mail system. See Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir 1998). Craddock 

dated the § 2254 petition on June 9, 2022, and thus that is the earliest date for 

constructive filing of the petition.

(1) He was denied the effective assistance of counsel when 

counsel failed to properly investigate the murder victim’s 

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cause of death and coerced Craddock to enter a guilty plea; 

(2) The State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; 

(3) The evidence was insufficient to prove the victim’s cause 

of death; and 

(4) newly discovered evidence.

Pet.6–7, ECF No.1.

III. RULE 5 STATEMENT 

The Respondent argues that the § 2254 petition in this case is barred by 

limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Respondent reserved the right to argue 

exhaustion and other procedural bars, pending the Court’s resolution of the timebar issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

IV. ANALYSIS/LIMITATIONS

A. Application of the Statute of Limitations 

Title 28, United States Code, § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute of 

limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

Section 2244(d) provides:

(d) (1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

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removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the 

claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).

Because the bulk of Craddock’s claims challenge events that arose before 

his convictions, the Court will first analyze the date the limitations period began 

to run as “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). Otherwise, the record does not indicate that any unconstitutional 

“State action” prevented Craddock from filing for federal habeas corpus relief 

prior to the end of the limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). Also, 

Craddock’s claims do not concern a constitutional right recognized by the 

Supreme Court within the last year and made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Craddock, however, has also claimed that 

he is entitled to relief because of “newly discovered evidence”of mistakes by the 

medical examiner’s office. Pet. 4, ECF No. 1. To the extent Craddock contends 

that he could not have discovered the factual predicate of this claim until a date 

subsequent to the date his conviction became final under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(D), the Court will address that alternative limitations claim infra.

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B. Analysis Based Upon Finality of Judgment under § 

2244(d)(1)(A) 

As noted in the Background section, Craddock’s judgments of conviction 

were entered on March 18, 2016. Craddock did not pursue a direct appeal from 

his convictions. SHCR-01 at 2 (“Clerk’s Summary Sheet”), ECF No. 16-1; 

SHCR-02 at 2 (“Clerk’s Summary Sheet”), ECF No. 16-7. Therefore, Craddock’s 

convictions became final on April 18, 2016,5 when the time to seek direct appeal 

of his convictions expired. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). Therefore, the one-year 

limitation period for filing a federal petition expired one year later on April 18, 

2017. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that 

Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the computation of 

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period). Craddock’s § 2254 petition, constructively 

filed in June 2022, was filed several years too late and should be dismissed with 

prejudice as time-barred absent any application of statutory or equitable tolling. 

Pet. 10, ECF No. 1. 

1. Statutory Tolling Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

AEDPA provides that “the time during which a properly filed application 

for State post–conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state habeas application “is 

‘pending’ for AEDPA’s tolling purposes on the day it is filed through (and 

including) the day it is resolved.” Windland v. Quarterman, 578 F.3d 314, 317 

(5th Cir. 2009). Here, Craddock’s first state writ application was filed on January 

25, 2017, 281 days after his convictions became final, and was denied on July 26, 

2017, having tolled the limitations period for 183 days, with 84 days remaining 

before the limitation period expired. SHCR-01 “Action Taken,” ECF No. 16-4. 

Accordingly, absent any additional tolling, Craddock’s one-year limitation period 

for filing a federal petition was extended to and expired on October 18, 2017.

Craddock’s second state habeas application, however, fails to toll the 

6.Thirty days after the March 18, 2016 judgments were entered was April 17, 2016. 

Because that date fell on a Sunday, Craddock’s judgments became final on April 18, 

2016. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a).

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AEDPA’s limitations period because it was filed at the earliest on March 30, 

2022, several years after the limitations period expired. SHCR-02 at 31–33; ECF 

No. 16-7. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (“state habeas 

application did not toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) because it was not 

filed until after the period of limitation had expired.”). Therefore, when Craddock 

filed this federal petition in June 2022, he did so over four years after his AEDPA 

one-year limitations period had expired. Pet. 10, ECF No. 1.

2. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period for filing a petition under § 2254 is subject 

to equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). 

Equitable tolling should be applied only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” 

Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Davis v. 

Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). More specifically, “[e]quitable 

tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant 

about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from 

asserting his rights.” Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489–90 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999) (abrogated on 

other grounds by Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2006)). The 

petitioner bears the burden to show entitlement to equitable tolling. See e.g. 

Phillips v. Donnelly, 223 F.3d 797, 797 (5th Cir. 2000). Craddock has not 

attempted to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

Moreover, “[i]n order for equitable tolling to apply, the applicant must 

diligently pursue his § 2254 relief.” Coleman, 184 F.3d at 403. One component of 

the obligation to diligently pursue rights is not to squander the one-year grace 

period. Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., 

Stroman v. Thaler, 603 F.3d 299, 302-03 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding the fact that 

petitioner’s state habeas application was filed when only five months of the oneyear limitation period remained to be among the indicia of petitioner’s lack of 

diligence). Here, Craddock did not pursue his first state habeas application until 

January 25, 2017, with less than three months remaining before the limitation 

period expired. SHCR-01 at 18, ECF No. 16-1. Then, Craddock did not seek 

federal habeas relief immediately after the TXCCA denied relief on his first state 

writ application. Instead, Craddock waited at least two years and five months and 

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then filed a second state writ application and waited over four years to then file 

his federal petition from the date his first state writ was denied. SHCR-02 at 16, 

31–33, ECF No.16-7; Pet. 10, ECF No.1. “[E]quity is not intended for those who 

sleep on their rights.” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir.1999) (citing 

Covey v. Arkansas River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989)). Craddock has 

not explained his delay in filing for habeas relief and has failed to demonstrate 

that he was diligent in pursuing habeas relief. Because Craddock has not met his 

burden, he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

C. Analysis Based Upon a Later Predicate Date under § 

2244(d)(1)(D) 

Craddock did not explicitly make an argument that he is entitled to a 

limitations period triggered by a factual predicate date pursuant to § 

2244(d)(1)(D), when prompted to do so in the § 2254 petition form. Pet. 9, ECF 

No.1. As noted above, § 2244(d)(1)(D) runs from “the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Importantly, it does not 

run from “the date on which the petitioner has in his possession evidence to 

support his claim.” In re Young, 789 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 199.

As noted, however, Craddock’s fourth ground for relief asserts a claim for 

newly discovered evidence, identifying a Fort Worth Star Telegram article dated 

in April 2021 regarding certain actions of the Tarrant County Medical Examiner 

as such evidence. Pet. 7, ECF No. 1; Pet. Exhibit 6-7, ECF No. 1-1. But newly 

discovered evidence is not a cognizable free-standing claim for federal habeas 

relief. None of Craddock’s claims are predicated on whether the medical 

examiner’s office made mistakes in other cases. Moreover, the article does not 

report evidence that mistakes were made in Craddock’s case or that any such 

mistakes were material. To the extent the newspaper article supports any of 

Craddock’s independent claims, the article is at most cumulative evidence. It does 

not constitute a factual predicate of any of his claims to trigger a limitations 

period under § 2244(d)(1)(D). And, as analyzed further below, because actual 

innocence is not a free-standing claim, it would not itself trigger the application of 

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§ 2244(d)(1)(D).

As noted, in the first state writ petition, Craddock argued that the autopsy 

report mistakenly reflected that the cause of the victim’s death was end stage 

renal failure and not complications of a gunshot wound. In the § 2254 federal 

petition, Craddock adds, as he did in his second state writ petition, that the 

autopsy report incorrectly reflects that the victim was shot in the back instead of 

the chest as the police report suggests. SHCR-01 at 11, ECF No. 16-1; SHCR-02 

at 21–22, ECF No. 16-7; Pet. (exhibits); ECF Nos. 1-1. Craddock claims that 

although he has still not seen all the discovery in his case, he did buy some of the 

documents. Pet. at 6, ECF No. 1. Craddock does not say which documents he 

obtained or on what date. 

To the extent that Craddock believes he is entitled to have the limitations 

period run from the date he obtained a copy of the autopsy and police reports, he 

confuses “his knowledge of the factual predicate of his claim[s] with the time 

permitted for gathering evidence in support of th[ose] claim[s].” Flanagan, 154 

F.3d at 199. Exercising due diligence, Craddock could have discovered the 

discrepancy between the autopsy and police reports before or shortly after he 

entered his guilty plea. Furthermore, Craddock’s first state writ petition reflects 

that he was already aware of the autopsy report’s contents, and as Craddock does 

not contend that he was not present during the shooting, he would have personal 

knowledge of whether the victim was shot in the back or the chest.

In sum, Craddock does not allege a date he discovered the factual 

predicates of his claims, nor does he provide any argument to substantiate that he 

exercised due diligence in making such discovery to establish the appropriateness 

of alternatively calculating his limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Therefore, Craddock has not shown that he is entitled to a later limitation start 

date under § 2244(d)(1)(D).

D. No Facts Support an Actual Innocence Claim under 

McQuiggin v. Perkins.

The Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA statute of limitations can be 

overcome by a showing of actual innocence. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 

383, 386 (2013). To the extent, if any, that Craddock’s ground for relief based 

upon alleged newly discovered evidence is an assertion of actual innocence, he 

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fails to satisfy the conditions for such relief set forth in McQuiggin. See Pet. 1, 

ECF No. 1; Response 13-20, ECF No. 17. 

In McQuiggin, the Supreme Court held that tenable claims of actual 

innocence serve as a gateway through which the petitioner may pass, allowing his 

underlying constitutional claims to be considered despite being raised outside the 

AEDPA statute of limitations. 569 U.S. at 386. However, “tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold 

requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new 

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and citing 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is 

“demanding” and seldom met)).

In this context, newly discovered evidence of a petitioner’s “[a]ctual 

innocence” refers to factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United 

States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998) (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 

(1992)). “A prototypical example of ‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the 

case where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.” Sawyer, 505 

U.S. at 340. And while diligence is not a discrete requirement, the timing of the 

federal habeas petition bears on the credibility of the evidence proffered to show 

actual innocence. See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399–400. Ultimately, “[t]he 

miscarriage of justice exception . . . applies to a severely confined category” of 

otherwise untimely claims. Id. at 395. To successfully open the actual-innocence 

“gateway”, a petitioner must present “‘evidence of innocence so strong that a 

court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also 

satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.’” McQuiggin, 

569 U.S. at 401 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316).

Craddock voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty to both offenses and 

signed judicial confessions. SHCR-01 at 43 nos. 53-56, 81–84, ECF No. 16-1. 

The Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed whether such a guilty plea precludes a 

petitioner from arguing actual innocence to extend a time period under 

McQuiggin, however, a number of courts in this district have determined a guilty 

plea likely forecloses McQuiggin as a gateway to overcome limitations. See 

Garcia v. Director, No.3:20-CV-1390-N (BT), 2022 WL 17096188, * 3 (N.D. 

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Tex. Oct. 26, 2022), rep. and rec. adopted, 2022 WL 17095923 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 

18, 2022) (citing Thomas v. Stephens, 4:13-CV-875-A, 2014 WL 929031, at *3 

n.3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2014) (recognizing split among district courts regarding 

whether McQuiggin applies to a guilty plea case, citing cases, but assuming 

without deciding that it does apply)); see also Garrison v. U.S., No. 3:16-CR153-D (2), 2021 WL 2598746, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2021), rep. and rec. 

adopted, No. 3:16-CR-153-D(2), 2021 WL 2592549 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2021) 

(recognizing split between courts, finding no relief even if McQuiggin applies). 

The Respondent contends that the actual innocence gateway outlined in 

McQuiggin is not available to Craddock because of his judicial confessions and 

voluntary guilty pleas, and this court agrees that the McQuiggins gateway is likely 

foreclosed.

But even assuming arguendo that McQuiggin applies in Craddock’s case, 

he still cannot overcome AEDPA’s statute of limitations because he fails to make 

the necessary showing of actual innocence to successfully open the actualinnocence “gateway.” See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 401. Neither the potential 

conflict between the autopsy report and the police report, nor the suggestion that 

the medical examiners have made mistakes in other cases rise to the level of 

convincing, reliable, credible evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Craddock of murder 

and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in light of the new evidence. 

McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399.

In his first state writ application, Craddock challenged the victim’s cause 

of death, arguing that the death was a hospice death, end stage renal failure, and 

not a homicide caused by a non-fatal one-year old gunshot wound. SHCR-01 at 

10-11, ECF No. 16-1. Craddock’s trial attorney provided an affidavit indicating 

that the Tarrant County Medical Examiner found the death to be a homicide. 

SHCR-01 at 34; ECF No. 16-1 at 37. The attorney questioned and investigated the 

cause and manner of death. Id. In denying Craddock’s writ petition, the trial court 

made numerous findings of fact. SHCR-01 at 36–43, ECF No. 16-1. Relevant to 

any claim of actual innocence, the state trial court found the following: (1) the 

evidence in the case included, in part, police reports, autopsy reports, and medical 

records of the victim from the date that he was shot until he died (SHCR-01 at 38 

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no.10, 39 no.12, ECF No. 16-1); (2) Dr. Judy Melinek, a pathologist at Stanford 

University Medical School, reviewed the autopsy report, medical records, and 

nursing home records and came to the same conclusion as to the cause and 

manner of death as did the Tarrant County Medical Examiner (SHCR-01 at 39–40 

nos. 14, 16–19, 22, 24, ECF No. 16-1); and (3) Kim Littleton, an expert nurse, 

reviewed the nursing home records and came to the same conclusion as did Dr. 

Melinek and the Tarrant County Medical Examiner (SHCR-01 at 40 nos. 23, 25, 

ECF No. 16-1). Upon review of these findings, the TX CCA denied Craddock’s 

state habeas application on the findings of the trial court without a hearing and on 

the court’s independent review of the record. SHCR-01 “Action Taken,” ECF No. 

16-4.

In his second state writ application, Craddock’s sole ground for relief 

alleged that newly discovered evidence exists, specifically an article in the Fort 

Worth Star Telegram newspaper published on April 28, 2021. SHCR-02 at 21–22; 

ECF No. 16-7. The state trial court reported that Craddock alleged that “newly 

discovered evidence exists suggesting that the members of the Tarrant County 

Medical Examiner’s Office had botched autopsies and testified falsely in some 

cases.” SHCR-02 at 55; ECF No. 16-7. In his state writ application, Craddock 

also made statements regarding his own case. SHCR-02 at 21–22; ECF Doc. 16-7 

at 21–22. He referred to the Medical Examiner’s Investigation Report as stating 

the decedent was shot in the back. SHCR-02 at 21, ECF No. 16-7. He described 

the autopsy report as stating the cause of death was complications of a gunshot to 

the back. Id. at 22. Craddock also described a police report stating the gunshot 

wound was to the chest. Id. Reviewing these allegations, the state court found that 

Craddock “alleges that there was a factual conflict between the autopsy report and 

the police report about where he was shot.” SHCR-02 at 55 no.7, ECF No.16-7. 

The state court went on to find that Craddock did not explain how the new 

information affects his case, did not allege that it proved his innocence, did not 

allege that in light of the alleged new evidence no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him, and presented no evidence to support his allegations. SHCR-02 at 

55 nos. 5–10, ECF No. 16-7. The TXCCA denied Craddock’s state habeas 

petition without written order on the findings of the trial court without a hearing 

and on the court’s independent review of the record. SHCR-02 “Action Taken,” 

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ECF No.16-8.

The state court’s factual findings “shall be presumed to be correct” unless 

the petitioner carries “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Reed v. 

Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 773 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2014) (declining petitioner’s suggestion 

that the Court not apply § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness to the CCA’s 

review of his actual innocence claim under Schlup); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 

941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001) (presumption of correctness also applies to “those 

unarticulated findings [including mixed findings of law and fact] which are 

necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed law and fact”) (citations 

omitted). Craddock has failed to meet this burden.

The Respondent contends that Craddock’s action of attaching document 

exhibits to his § 2254 petition that were earlier described in his state writ 

applications does not transform those documents into newly discovered evidence. 

Resp. 7, n. 5, ECF No. 17. The alleged facts underlying his newly discovered 

evidence claims, however, remain the same: that there is a conflict between the 

autopsy report and the police report as to whether the decedent was shot in the 

chest or the back, and that there is an article reporting that the Tarrant County 

Medical Examiner has made mistakes in other cases. SHCR-02 at 21–22, ECF 

No. 16-7. As recounted herein, even if the attached documents themselves could 

be considered new evidence, the state court found that two medical experts, 

contacted by the defense, and after reviewing the medical evidence, reached the 

same conclusion as the Medical Examiner regarding the manner and cause of 

death. SHCR-01 at 38 nos.10, at 39–40 nos. 12-19, 22–25, ECF No. 16-1. Thus, 

Craddock’s evidence fails to rise to the level of convincing, reliable, credible 

evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that, in light of 

the new evidence, that no reasonable juror would have convicted Craddock of 

murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 

399.

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V. CONCLUSION and ORDER

In sum, as Craddock’s § 2254 petition is filed beyond the applicable oneyear deadline from finality of judgment, as he has not shown he is entitled to a 

later limitations start date, as he has not shown that he is entitled to statutory 

tolling for a sufficient amount of time to make his § 2254 petition timely, as he is 

not entitled to equitable tolling, and as he has not met the McQuiggin standard of 

factual innocence, the petition under § 2254 must be dismissed with prejudice as 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

It is therefore ORDERED that Stephen Craddock’s petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DISMISSED with prejudice as timebarred. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), for the reasons discussed herein, 

a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on this 9th day of March, 2023.

______________________________ 

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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