# F IL ED
NOV 5 2020 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T 

### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: A DRI A N N E MA R C IA MO O R E,

Deb to r. A DRI A N N E MA R C IA MO O R E, db a Mo o re Fam ily C hild C are,

A p pellant, v. U N ITED STA TES TRU STEE,

A p pellee. BA P N o . C C -19-1246-TLS Bk. N o . 2:19-b k-10379-ER

M E M ORA ND U M *

A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the C entral Distric t o f C alifo rnia E rnest M. R ob les, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding Befo r e: T A Y L O R, L AF F E R T Y, and S P RA K E R, Bankruptcy Judges. INT ROD U CT I ON C hapter 11 1 deb to r A drianne Marc ia Mo o re appeals fro m the

*Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, seeFed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S
. C. §§ 101–1532, all “Local Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Local Bankr uptcy Rules forthe Uni ted S tates Bankr uptcy Cour t for the Centr al Di str i ct of Cali for ni a, all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Ci v i lRule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder a l Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e.b ankruptcy c o urt’s o r der denying her m o tio n to rec o nsider an o rder

dism issing her b ankruptcy c ase. Bec ause she do es no t articulate a b asis under C ivil Rule 60(b ) fo r reversal and b ec ause the rec o r d do es no t
o therwise suppo rt her, we A FFIRM. FA CT S 2 Mo o re ac c o m panied her chapter 11 petitio n with b ankruptcy schedules that evidenc ed b leak pro spec ts fo r c ase suc c ess: m o nthly expenses exc eeded inc o m e and secured deb ts exc eeded the value o f the related c o llateral. True, the schedules referenc ed a b elief in future im pro ved inc o m e, b ut this assertio n was unsuppo rted b y any spec ific s. Im pro ved financ es never m aterialized. Instead, irregularities in the
c o nduc t o f the c a se quic kly b ec am e apparent, and the United States Trustee (“U ST”) filed a m o tio n seeking c ase dism issal with a 180-day refiling b ar, c o nversio n, o r appo intm ent o f a chapter 11 trustee (“Dism issal Mo tio n”) b ased o n Mo o re’s failure to c o m ply with the Bankruptc y C o de, Lo c al Rules 2015-2(a)(1) and (b )(2), 3 and the Guidelines and Requirem ents fo r

2 We exer ci se our di scr eti on to take j udi ci al noti ce of documents electr oni cally fi led in Moor e’s bankr uptcy cases. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood) , 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Ci r . BAP 2003).

3 Local Rule 2015-2(a)(1) r equi r es debtor s in possessi on to “ti mely pr ov i d e the Uni ted S tates tr ustee wi th financi al, management and oper ati onal r epor ts, and such other infor mati on r equested by the Uni ted S tates tr ustee pur suant to the Gui delines . . . as necessary to pr oper ly super vi se the admini str ati on of a chapter 11 case.” Local Rule 2015-2(b)(2) r equi r es debtor s in possessi on to fi le monthly oper ati ng r epor ts by the (continued...) 2C hapter 11 Deb t o r s in Po ssessio n (“Guidelines”). Mo o re’s vio latio ns

inc luded her failure to file all required o perating repo rts, tim ely pro o f o f prepetitio n b ank ac c o u nt c lo sures, and a 90-day pro jec tio n o f c ash flo w, and, as later was identified, her failure too pen deb to r in po ssessio n ac c o u nts. Mo o re did no t tim ely o ppo se the Dism issal Mo tio n. And b efo re the hearing, the b ankruptcy c o urt issued a tentative ruling granting it and dism issing the c a s e with a 180-day refiling b ar b ased o n Mo o re’s
c o m p lianc e defic ienc ies, histo ry o f five dism issed b ankruptcy c ases in the prio r nine years, and lac k o f any m eaningful pro gress in the c ase. The tentative disc ussed and rejec ted the o ptio n o f c o nversio n. But despite the lac k o f a written respo nse, Mo o re’s c o unsel attended the hearing. A nd no twithstanding the severity o f the no n-c o m plianc e, the b ankruptcy c o urt granted Mo o re an additio nal m o nth to cure her defic ienc ies. In return, Mo o re, thro ugh c o unsel, agreed that if she failed to do so, the U ST c o u ld sub m it an applic atio n fo r c ase dism issal
. Fo llo w ing the hearing, the b ankruptcy c o urt entered its o r der (“C o m plianc e O rder”) m em o rializing the agreem ent and pro viding that Mo o re m ust cure all c o m p lianc e item s “b y no later than July 18, 2019,” o r the U ST m ay apply fo r c ase dism issal with a 180-day b a r, witho ut further

3 (...continued) fi fteenth day of the month followi ng the month that i s the subj ect of the r epor t. 3no tic e and hearing.

Mo o re did no t appeal o r o therwise c o ntest the C o m plianc e O rder. She then failed to pro vide pro o f that she tim ely c ured all defic ienc ies b efo re the deadline, 4 and the b ankruptcy c o urt entered a dism issal o rder (“Dism issal O rder”). Mo o re filed a m o t io n to rec o nsider o r vac ate the Dism issal O rder ten days after its entry. She: (I) em phasized that her first twob ankruptc ies had b een filed witho ut her perm issio n; and (ii) pro vided an excu se fo r failing to
c lo s e her prepetitio n b ank ac c o unts. Fo r reaso ns c arefully artic u lated in its
o rder (“First Rec o nsideratio n O rder”), the b ankruptcy c o urt denied the
m o tio n. Then, eighteen days after entry o f the First R ec o nsideratio n O r der, Mo o re filed a sec o nd rec o nsideratio n m o tio n, which again requested that the Dism issal O rder b e vac ated and that the previo u s denial o f
rec o nsideratio n b e vac ated. This m o tio n desc rib ed Mo o re’s effo r ts and diffic ulties in o pening deb t o r in po s sessio n b a nk ac c o unts, as well as her
c o m munic atio ns with the U ST’s o ffic e c o nc erning the status o f her
c o m p lianc e. But she failed to state a legal b asis fo r her m o tio n o r to dispute that she failed to c lo s e her prepetitio n b a nk ac c o unts and topro vide the

4 Moor e’s counsel infor med the US T’s offi ce that Moor e had opened a debtor in possessi on account by the deadline, but shor tly after , she had to sear ch foranother bank after one financi al insti tuti on unexpectedly closed her account. 4U ST with a ninety-day c ash flo w pro j ec tio n. The b ankruptcy c o urt issued a m em o randumdec isio n and o rder denying this renewed rec o nsideratio n request (“Sec o nd R ec o nsideratio n O rder”). The b a nkruptc y c o urt fo und that Mo o re did no t present any new fac t s o r previo usly unavailab le evidenc e warranting rec o nsideratio n. In additio n, the b ankruptcy c o urt fo und that Mo o re failed to adequately explain her inab ility to satisfy each requirem ent o f the C o m plianc e O rder. Mo o re tim ely appealed the Sec o nd R ec o nsideratio n O rder. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(A ). Mo o re did no t tim ely appeal fro mthe Dism issal O rder and First R ec o nsideratio n O r der; we thus lac k jurisdic tio n to hear any appeal related to tho se o r ders. S ee Rule 8002(b )(1); D o b a rd v. S .F . Bay AreaR apid Tra nsit D ist. , N o . 93-17293, 56 F.3d 71, 1995 W L 309554, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1995) (interpreting Fed. R . A pp. P. 4(a)(4)). “An appeal fro man o rder denying a [C ivil Rule] 60(b ) m o t io n b r ings up fo r review o nly the
c o r rec tness o f that denial and do es no t b ring up fo r review the final judgm ent.” 5 Tenna nt v. R o ja s (In re Tenna nt) , 318 B.R . 860, 866 (9th C ir. BA P

5 Although the Rules do not speci fi cally per m i t a moti on to v acate case di smi s sal, we constr ue Moor e’s second r econsi der ati on moti on as a moti on for r eli ef fr om or der underCi v i l Rule 60(b), made appli cable by Rule 9024, because it was fi l ed mor e than (continued...) 52004) (internal c itatio n and quo tatio n m arks o m itted). A c c o rdingly, o ur

review is lim ited to the Sec o nd R ec o nsideratio n O r der. Id. ISSU E Did the b ankruptcy c o urt ab use its disc r etio n in denying Mo o re’s
sec o nd rec o nsideratio n m o tio n? ST A ND A RD OF RE V I E W W e review the denial o f a C ivil Rule 60(b ) m o t io n fo r relief fro m judgm ent fo r an ab use o f disc retio n. In re Ferna ndez, 227 B.R . at 177. A b ankruptcy c o urt ab uses its disc retio n if it applies the wro ng legal standard, m isapplies the c o r rec tlegal standard, o r m a kes fac tual findings that are illo gic al, im plausib le, o r witho ut suppo rt in inferenc es that m ay b e drawn fro mthe fac ts in the rec o rd. S e e Tra fficS cho o l .co m, Inc. v. Edriver Inc. , 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011). W e m a y affirmo n any b asis suppo rted b y the rec o rd. S ha nks v. D ressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). D ISCU SSION While no t raised b y Mo o re, we ob s erve that the b ankruptcy c o urt

5 (...continued) four teen days after entr y of the Fi r st Reconsi d er ati on Or der
. See Fernandez v. GE Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In re Fernandez) , 227 B.R. 174, 177 (9th Ci r . BAP 1998), aff’d, 208 F.3d 220 (9th Ci r . 2000). Had the moti on been fi led wi thin four teen days of entr y of the Fi r st Reconsi der ati on Or der, then i t would hav e been consi d er ed a moti on for r econsi der ati on underCi v i lRule 59, made appli cable by Rule 9023. Negrete v. Bleau (In re Negrete) , 183 B.R. 195, 197 (9th Ci r . BAP 1995), aff’d, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Ci r . 1996). 6inc o r rec tly identified C ivil Rule 59(e), and no t C ivil Rule 60(b ), as

go verning Mo o re’s sec o nd rec o nsideratio n m o tio n. A s discussed supra, b ec ause it was filed m o re than fo urteen days after entry o f the o rder, it was a C ivil Rule 60(b ) m o tio n. In re N egrete, 183 B.R
. at 197. Any resulting erro r, ho wever, was harm less; the rec o rd and the b ankruptcy c o urt’s findings adequately suppo rt its denial. Mo o re fatally failed to identify gro unds under, and indeed did no t
even c ite to, Rule 9024 and C ivil Rule 60(b ) in her sec o nd rec o nsideratio n m o tio n. Sim ilarly, she did no t pro vide any statuto r y o r o ther legal autho r ity fo r her requested relief. A lso, she pro vided no evidenc e justifying her failure to c o m pletely c o m ply with the C o m plianc e O rder. The new argum ents and evidenc e she sub m itted were kno wn and availab le to her b efo r e the Dism issal O rder was entered; they c o u ld no t b e gro unds fo r C ivil Rule 60(b ) relief. Ma r lyn Nutra ceutica ls Co ., Inc. v. M uco s Pha rm a Gm bH &Co . , 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). R ather, Mo o re used her
rec o nsideratio n m o tio ns to reargue the U ST’s Dismissal Mo tio n. C ivil Rule 60(b ) pro vides no b asis fo r rec o nsideratio n o f issues already raised and ruled upo n b ased o n fac ts that were o therwise availab le when o riginally b riefed. S ee In re N

egrete, 183 B.R . at 197. O n appeal, Mo o r e b egins her argum ent with m isstatem ent; she alleges that in seeking the Dism issal O rder the U S T failed to ac kno wledge that she had ob tained a deb to r in po ssessio n b a nk ac c o unt b efo re her

7July 18, 2019 c o m plianc e deadline. This is fac tually inac curate; the U ST’s

applic atio n fo r the Dism issal O rder discussed her difficu lties in o pening an
ac c o u nt, and the b ankruptcy c o urt m entio ned this c o ntentio n in its
m em o randumdec isio n. It, nevertheless, fo und that Mo o r e’s attem pt to
o pen and m aintain deb to r in po ssessio n ac c o unts “is no tan adequate explanatio n fo r her inab ility to satisfy o ther requirem ents, such as c lo sing
o f all pre-petitio n ac c o unts.” 6 W e agree. The b a nkruptc y c o urt’s findings that Mo o re did no t tim ely c o m ply with the repo rting requirem ents
m andated b y the C o m plianc e O rder in m ultiple o ther respec ts are suppo rted b y the rec o rd. Mo o re’s o pening b rief o n appeal alsoc o ntains a num b er o f additio nal argum ents regarding the validity o f the Dism issal O rder, which were waived b y Mo o re’s failure toinc lude themin her rec o nsideratio n m o tio ns, see In re Mo rtg. S to re, Inc. , 773 F.3d at 998, o rare legally insuffic ient. First, the b ankruptcy c o urt dism issed the c ase under the C o m plianc e O rder; it did no t rely o n c ause b ased o n a sub stantial o r c o ntinuing lo ss to the estate, gro ss m ism anagem ent, o r failure to tim ely file a disc lo sure statem ent o r plan. Sec o nd, the rec o r d is c lear that the b ankruptcy c o urt appro priately c o nsidered the b est interests o f the c redito rs and estate when

6 Moor e’s opening br i ef also includes unsubstanti ated musings r egar din g the financi al insti tuti on’s moti v a ti ons behind closing her debtor inpossessi on accounts, whi ch wer e not r a i sed wi th the bankr u ptcy cour t and ther efor e wi ll not be consi der ed. Mano-Y & M, Ltd. v. Field (In re Mortg. Store, Inc.) , 773 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Ci r . 2014). 8it dec ided to dism iss, rather than c o nvert, the c a se. Third, she c anno t assert

a due pro c ess vio latio n when the b ankruptcy c o urt utilized the pro c edures she agreed to in the C o m plianc e O rder. Finally, her c hallenge to im po sitio n o f the 180-day b ar is prec luded b y the c o nsensual term s o f the C o m plianc e O rder and is m o o t as the 180-day perio d has expired. S ee In re Ferna ndez, 227 B.R . at 178. CONCL U SION Based o n the fo rego ing, we A FFIRM.

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