IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JENNIFER VANDERSTOK; 

MICHAEL G. ANDREN; 

TACTICAL MACHINING, LLC, a limited liability 

company; and 

FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC., a nonprofit 

corporation, 

 Plaintiffs, 

and

BLACKHAWK MANUFACTURING GROUP INC. 

d/b/a 80 PERCENT ARMS, 

Intervenor-Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MERRICK GARLAND, in his official capacity as 

Attorney General of the United States; 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 

STEVEN DETTELBACH, in his official capacity as 

Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives; and 

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS 

AND EXPLOSIVES,

 Defendants. 

 Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-691-O 

BLACKHAWK MANUFACTURING GROUP INC. d/b/a 80 PERCENT ARMS’ 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1 

I. BLACKHAWK HAS DEMONSTRATED IRREPARABLE HARM............................... 1 

A. The Record Shows and This Court Has Recognized That BlackHawk Will 

Be Forced Out of Business by the Rule ........................................................................ 1 

B. Defendants’ Argument Regarding BlackHawk’s FFL Status Is Misplaced ................. 2 

II. THERE WAS NO UNDUE DELAY ................................................................................. 4 

A. The Record Shows BlackHawk Moved Quickly to Protect Its Interests ...................... 4 

B. Defendants’ Claim of Undue Delay Is Not Supported by the Record and 

Is Based on a False Premise .......................................................................................... 5 

III. THE EQUITIES FAVOR BLACKHAWK AND THE GRANTING OF 

A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION..................................................................................... 8 

IV. BLACKHAWK SEEKS ONLY WHAT THIS COURT GRANTED TO 

TACTICAL ......................................................................................................................... 9 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 10 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

ADT, LLC v. Cap. Connect, Inc., 

 145 F. Supp. 3d 671 (N.D. Tex. 2015) ....................................................................................... 5 

Anyadike v. Vernon Coll., 

 No. 7:15-CV-00157-O, 2015 WL 12964684 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015) ................................. 5 

Atwood Turnkey Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 

 875 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................... 1 

BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 

 17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................... 9 

Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. Redgate Software, Inc., 

 No. 1:17-cv-444-RP, 2017 WL 5588190 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2017) ....................................... 7 

Grace v. District of Columbia, 

 187 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 2016) ........................................................................................... 9 

Golden Cheek Ventures, L.P. v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 

 No. 4:15-cv-0821-O, 2015 WL 13469994 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2015) ..................................... 7 

Gordon v. Holder, 

 721 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................... 9 

H.D. Vest, Inc. v. H.D. Vest Mgmt. & Servs., LLC, 

 No. 3:09-CV-00390-L, 2009 WL 1766095 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2009) ................................ 6, 7 

Joseph Paul Corp. v. Trademark Custom Homes, Inc., 

 No. 3:16-CV-1651-L, 2016 WL 4944370 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2016) ..................................... 6 

Leaf Trading Cards, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 

 No. 3:17-CV-3200-N, 2019 WL 7882552 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2019) ...................................... 6 

Luckenbach Texas, Inc. v. Skloss, 

No. 1:21-CV-871-RP, 2022 WL 5568437 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2022) ........................................ 6 

Marks Organization, Inc. v. Joles, 

 784 F.Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .......................................................................................... 5 

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, 

 No. 5:16-CV-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) .................................... 9 

Case 4:22-cv-00691-O Document 112 Filed 10/31/22 Page 3 of 16 PageID 1443
iii

N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 

686 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2009)................................................................................................ 9

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 

142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)................................................................................................................ 8

Pruvit Ventures, Inc. v. Forevergreen Int’l LLC, 

No. 4:15-CV-571-ALM-CAN, 2015 WL 9876952 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015), report and

recommendation adopted No. 4:15-CV-571-ALM-CAN, 2016 WL 231160 

(E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2016)............................................................................................................ 6

TitleMax of Texas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 

No. 3:21-CV-1040-S-BN, 2021 WL 4994448 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2021), report and 

recommendation adopted No. 3:21-CV-1040-S-BN, 2021 WL 4991989 

(N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2021) .......................................................................................................... 4

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2)...................................................................................................................... 3

18 U.S.C. § 922(g).......................................................................................................................... 9

Other Authorities

Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 

86 Fed. Reg. 51,249 (Aug. 19, 2022) ......................................................................................... 8

Gun Control Act of 1968 ................................................................................................................ 8

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INTRODUCTION

The record shows that BlackHawk Manufacturing Group Inc. d/b/a 80 Percent Arms’ 

(“BlackHawk”) will be irreparably harmed by the Final Rule and took steps to protect its interests 

in a timely manner. Defendants’ Opposition (“Opposition”) to BlackHawk’s Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”) largely ignores this Court’s prior findings and mischaracterizes

the established facts in this case. 

ARGUMENT

I. BLACKHAWK HAS DEMONSTRATED IRREPERABLE HARM

A. The Record Shows and This Court Has Recognized That BlackHawk Will Be 

Forced Out of Business by the Rule

The Court has already recognized the existential threat that the Final Rule poses to 

BlackHawk. In evaluating the potential prejudice to BlackHawk if intervention was denied, the 

Court concluded: “BlackHawk alleges—and the Court accepts at this stage—that it will likely be 

forced out of business within a few months.” ECF No. 98 (Order dated October 18, 2022) at 6.

The Court also concluded: “Indeed, absent expanded injunctive relief, BlackHawk’s cognizable 

property interest may not only be impeded, it will likely dissolve entirely.” ECF No. 98 at 7–8

(emphasis added).

This conclusion is amply supported by the record. BlackHawk has been forced to 

discontinue selling key products out of fear of criminal liability and has experienced a sharp 

decline in sales as its now fearful-and-confused customers are hesitant to continue purchasing

BlackHawk’s products. See ECF No. 103-1 (Lifschitz Decl.) ¶¶ 11–14. These facts fall squarely 

within the Fifth Circuit’s definition of irreparable injury, which exists where “the potential 

economic loss is so great as to threaten the existence of the movant’s business.” Atwood Turnkey 

Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 875 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir. 1989).

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B. Defendants’ Argument Regarding BlackHawk’s FFL Status Is Misplaced

The record also shows that BlackHawk’s status as a federal firearm licensee (“FFL”) does 

not mean that it will not be irreparably harmed by the Final Rule. The Declaration submitted by 

BlackHawk’s President demonstrates why this is so: 

BlackHawk is set up to make retailing of these products painless to customers using a 

direct-to-consumer model where orders are fulfilled directly. This is possible because the 

products that it sells do not meet the statutory definition of a “frame or receiver.” 

Reclassifying those products as “frames or receivers” by agency rulemaking ignores the 

plain text of the GCA and the federal government’s historical application of the GCA. 

Given the uncertainty over the meaning and enforcement of the Final Rule BlackHawk 

must now weigh the prospect of being forced to abandon the entire business model it has 

built up over the past decade due to concerns that its continued operations under its existing 

business model could subject it and its customers to criminal charges.

Earlier in this case, the government asserted that there is no irreparable harm because 

businesses such as BlackHawk can simply get a license and continue with business as 

usual. As stated above, BlackHawk does business as 80 Percent Arms which is a fully 

licensed FFL, but being an FFL does not permit 80 Percent Arms to operate or survive 

under the regulatory scheme of the Final Rule, as nearly 100% of 80 Percent Arms’ 

business is for the products described above that the Final Rule newly seeks to regulate as 

firearms.

Lifschitz Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.

The Final Rule requires BlackHawk to stop selling products that form a majority of its

sales, and the ensuing precipitous revenue losses, unless reversed, will prove fatal to the business. 

Id. ¶¶ 11, 15, 20–21. Defendants do not contest BlackHawk’s evidence, but instead suggest that 

any harm is not truly irreparable because BlackHawk, as an FFL, could continue to sell its products

“even if they are classified as firearms under the Final Rule,” and “[t]herefore, any harm to its 

business from its decision to discontinue products is self-inflicted, and not cognizable.” Opp’n at 

7–8.

In other words, Defendants argue that BlackHawk can avoid the extinction of its business 

by simply complying with the Final Rule. That argument is defective in two ways. First, it 

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disregards the BlackHawk’s online, direct-to-consumer business model. Lifschitz Decl. ¶ 7. 

BlackHawk’s status as a federally licensed manufacturer does nothing to preserve the viability of 

its direct-to-consumer sales of most of its products because those products are now unlawfully 

defined as “firearms.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (prohibiting interstate transfers of firearms to any 

person who does not have a license).1 Second, even if it were factually sound, “Defendants’ 

argument relies on the incorrect legal premise that compliance costs are not an irreparable 

harm . . . . Defendants admit that such costs are nonrecoverable. And nonrecoverable means 

irreparable.” ECF No. 56 (Order dated September 2, 2022 (“September 2 Order”)) at 17. 

The record demonstrates that for BlackHawk the costs of “compliance” with the Final Rule 

would be the loss its existing direct-to-consumer business model. Defendants’ arguments have 

already been rejected in the Court’s prior Order granting injunctive relief to Tactical Machining: 

Tactical Machining will likely suffer irreparable harm, either by shutting down its 

operations forever or paying the unrecoverable costs of compliance. Defendants do not 

contest Plaintiffs’ evidence. Rather, they suggest that Tactical Machining should trade one 

form of irreparable harm for another. That argument overlooks clear Fifth Circuit 

precedent. Tactical Machining faces substantial threat of irreparable harm, and it is no 

answer to say that it may avoid the harm by complying with an unlawful agency rule.

September 2 Order at 19 (footnotes omitted). Defendants, as with Tactical, do not refute 

BlackHawk’s evidence, and the reappearance of these erroneous arguments in Defendants’ 

Opposition to BlackHawk’s Motion is an implicit admission that Defendants can articulate no 

meaningful distinction between the harm shown by BlackHawk and that shown by Tactical, which 

the Court has already found irreparable. 

1 The notion of de minimus compliance costs for FFLs is belied by ATF’s own FFL Reference and Best 

Practices Guide which comprises hundreds of pages of content describing the extensive requirements for 

an FFL to operate in compliance with ATF regulations. See https://www.atf.gov/firearms/federal-firearmslicensee-quick-reference-and-best-practices-guide

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II. THERE WAS NO UNDUE DELAY

A. The Record Shows BlackHawk Moved Quickly to Protect Its Interests

The relevant history is already known to the Court. BlackHawk’s first involvement in this 

case occurred September 8—only 15 days after the Final Rule’s effective date—when BlackHawk 

submitted a declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ request to expand the preliminary injunction. 

ECF No. 62-5. While at the time BlackHawk submitted the declaration there was a possibility that 

injunctive relief could be extended to protect BlackHawk’s ability to continue operating, 

BlackHawk nevertheless moved to intervene in this case on September 22, 2022, ECF No. 76, 

concurrently submitting a proposed complaint and motion for preliminary injunction. ECF Nos. 

77-1 and 77-3. 

Over Defendants’ objections, the Court found that BlackHawk’s Motion to Intervene was 

timely, and in doing so recounted that “BlackHawk filed its motion to intervene just over a month 

after Plaintiffs’ original complaint, within a month of the Final Rule’s effective date, and within 

twenty days of learning that it would not be covered by the Court’s preliminary injunction as a 

member of Plaintiff FPC’s organization.” ECF No. 98 at 5; see TitleMax of Texas, Inc. v. City of 

Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-1040-S-BN, 2021 WL 4994448, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2021) (finding 

that six-week delay between removal to federal court and filing of motion for preliminary 

injunction “is explainable and should not be held against Plaintiffs”), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. 3:21-CV-1040-S-BN, 2021 WL 4991989 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2021).

The factual and procedural history relevant to and comprising this case readily affirms that 

BlackHawk has established that enforcement of the Final Rule will inflict irreparable harm in the 

absence of injunctive relief. See ECF No. 98 at 6 (“BlackHawk’s decision to forego intervention 

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in another case, or to bring an independent case, is irrelevant to the issue of timeliness in this 

case.”). 

B. Defendants’ Claim of Undue Delay Is Not Supported by the Record and Is 

Based on a False Premise

Defendants’ claim of delay fails as a factual and legal matter. As a factual matter (as 

discussed above), Defendants’ opening statement that BlackHawk was “sitting on the sidelines for 

months”, Opp’n at 1, misstates the record. As a legal matter, Defendants’ argument fails because 

courts routinely have granted preliminary injunctions in time periods much longer than any claim 

of delay here. See, e.g., ADT, LLC v. Cap. Connect, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 3d 671, 699 

(N.D. Tex. 2015) (finding that movant’s eight-month delay was not unreasonable and noting that 

imminence of alleged irreparable harm is not undermined where delays were “caused by 

[plaintiff’s] good faith efforts to investigate facts and law”) (quoting Marks Organization, Inc. v. 

Joles, 784 F.Supp.2d 322, 333–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).

Defendants’ arguments regarding the timeliness of BlackHawk’s Motion include little 

engagement with the relevant decisions and procedural history of this proceeding. Instead, their 

Opposition makes these assertions in reliance on in-circuit case law that is distinguishable or outof-circuit precedent with no controlling weight. 

For example, Defendants cite Anyadike v. Vernon Coll., No. 7:15-CV-00157-O, 2015 WL 

12964684, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015), for the rather prosaic observation that “delay in 

seeking a remedy is an important factor bearing on the need for preliminary injunction.” Opp’n at 

4. However, Defendants fail to explain how Anyadike—which involved a plaintiff who had filed 

two motions for TRO and, after the first was dismissed, waited two weeks before filing a second,

and at which time first provided defendants with notice of suit—provides any relevant, instructive 

application here. See Anyadike at 3. Defendants’ quote similarly anodyne remarks from the equally 

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distinguishable Luckenbach Texas, Inc. v. Skloss, No. 1:21-CV-871-RP, 2022 WL 5568437, at *4–

5 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2022) (involving a nearly two-year delay: “Although Plaintiff began sending 

cease and desist letters as early as March 2020 that accused Skloss of infringement, Plaintiff waited 

until the end of 2021 to file its motion seeking a preliminary injunction.”).

Defendants also rely on Leaf Trading Cards, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., No. 3:17-CV-3200-

N, 2019 WL 7882552, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2019), for the proposition that a three-month to 

six-month delay militates against issuing injunctive relief. Opp’n at 4. However, unlike 

BlackHawk, the movant in Leaf Trading was denied injunctive relief because it didn’t move for a 

preliminary injunction until one year after filing suit. Leaf Trading, 2019 WL 7882552 at *1. 

Furthermore, where the Leaf Trading court stated that a “three-month delay to a six month delay”

was enough to rebut any presumption of irreparable harm, it string-cited a variety of trademark 

and patent cases where the shortest delay was only four months (an out-of-circuit case) and the 

other examples were five-to-six month delays. Id. at 2.2

 Here, BlackHawk filed its proposed 

motion for injunctive relief simultaneously with its motion to intervene. ECF Nos. 76 and 77-3.

Defendants also rely on H.D. Vest, Inc. v. H.D. Vest Mgmt. & Servs., LLC, No. 3:09-CV00390-L, 2009 WL 1766095, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2009). Opp’n at 4 n.3. The H.D. Vest court 

denied injunctive relief to the movant in a trademark infringement case, and in its decision 

discussed how movant’s failure to provide evidence of injury, failure to explain why money 

2 Distinguishable cases cited in Leaf Trading included Joseph Paul Corp. v. Trademark Custom Homes, 

Inc., No. 3:16-CV-1651-L, 2016 WL 4944370, at *13–17 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2016) (denying motion for 

TRO and preliminary injunction that was filed without support and concluding its analysis with observation 

that “Plaintiff’s [six month] delay in seeking a TRO and preliminary injunction militates against” granting 

motion); Pruvit Ventures, Inc. v. Forevergreen Int’l LLC, No. 4:15-CV-571-ALM-CAN, 2015 WL 

9876952, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015) (denying injunction in patent infringement case where motion 

failed to show nonspeculative harm or that money damages were inadequate and finding five-month delay 

by patentee “strongly suggests that the patentee does not face irreparable harm”), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 4:15-CV-571, 2016 WL 231160 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2016).

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damages were inadequate, and five-month delay in filing its motion would have rebutted a

presumption—applicable in other circuits but not the Fifth—of irreparable harm from alleged 

infringement. H.D. Vest, 2009 WL 1766095 at *4. As previously noted, BlackHawk here filed its

properly supported Motion less than two months after commencement of the harm caused by the 

Final Rule taking effect. 

Defendants rely on two additional cases that are also readily distinguishable. In Golden 

Cheek Ventures, L.P. v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., No. 4:15-cv-0821-O, 2015 WL 13469994

(N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2015), Opp’n at 6, the movant waited nearly 17 months before filing its 

motion for temporary restraining order, and, when it finally did so, submitted counterproductive 

affidavits that undermined a finding of irreparable harm. Golden Cheek, 2015 WL 13469994 at 

*2–3. And in Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. Redgate Software, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-444-RP, 2017 WL 

5588190 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2017), the court denied a motion for preliminary injunction because 

plaintiff filed its complaint six months after the injurious event and then took another month after 

filing its complaint to file brief in support of its motion for injunction. Embarcadero, 2017 WL 

5588190 at *3. Here, in contrast, BlackHawk filed a declaration in support of the initial motion for 

injunctive relief in this proceeding, ECF No. 62-5, and moved to intervene less than one month 

after the commencement of the harm, and in the process simultaneously filed a proposed complaint 

and a proposed motion for injunctive relief and brief in support, ECF No. 77-3, and once 

intervention was granted, ECF No. 98, BlackHawk filed its Motion and brief in support of its 

Motion just two days after being allowed to intervene. ECF Nos. 102 and 103.

The remaining cases that Defendants cite in support of their contention that BlackHawk’s 

Motion is not timely are out-of-circuit. These cases require little comment, as even the in-circuit 

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cases hold no weight against BlackHawk. In short, this Court should treat these authorities for

what they are: inapplicable and unpersuasive. 

Defendants also base their “delay” argument on hypothetical scenarios that pre-date the

effective date of the Final Rule. The Final Rule was published on April 26, 2022, consisted of 

nearly 400 pages, differed significantly from the Proposed Rule, upended decades of precedent, 

and was followed in June by the Supreme Court’s opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol 

Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), further changing the legal landscape related to 

firearms. The formal status of the Final Rule itself remained fluid even after the commencement 

of this lawsuit when—just five days before the Final Rule went into effect—ATF published a 

notice of Corrections to the Final Rule.3 In this light there is no basis to judge what a plaintiff 

should or should not have done under these circumstances.

III. THE EQUITIES FAVOR BLACKHAWK AND THE GRANTING OF A 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This Court has already found that provisions of the Final Rule are “facially unlawful,” that 

the Final Rule is outside the scope of ATF’s authority under the Gun Control Act, and that the 

Final Rule unlawfully treats weapons parts kits as firearms. September 2 Order at 6, 12, 15 and 22.

There is no reason, as the Government requests, to undertake a fresh balancing of equities, 

reframed as those of “Defendants’ interests in public safety and law enforcement [weighed against]

harms that result from BlackHawk’s unwillingness to comply with requirements for the 

commercial sale of firearm frames and receivers.” Opp’n at 9. 

In addition to ignoring the Court’s prior findings, Defendants’ Opposition is dismissive of 

the reliance interest that developed among industry participants like BlackHawk as a result of 50+ 

3 Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms; Corrections, 87 Fed. Reg. 51,249 

(Aug. 19, 2022).

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years of ATF precedent, and cites “technological advances” as necessitating the Final Rule’s 

“update to ATF’s formerly longstanding regulations.” Opp’n at 10. Over the course of 50+ years 

and multiple administrations of both political parties, it has never been government’s position to 

regulate receiver blanks. ATF previously (and rightfully) determined that receiver blanks were not 

firearms, and as such ATF has denied any legal authority in regulating parts, jigs, and instructions 

sold by companies like BlackHawk. Now, because of the current administration’s stance—not the 

government’s stance—an entire industry has been (unlawfully) disrupted by actions that 

Defendants defend as a newly unveiled government interest. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 

Perez, No. 5:16-CV-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *33 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (“the fact that 

DOL has waited over fifty years to promulgate its New Rule strongly suggests there is no 

compelling government interest at stake”).

Furthermore, “enforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to the public 

interest.” Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 150 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Gordon 

v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Moreover, the “public interest” is properly “served 

by maintaining our constitutional structure and maintaining the liberty of individuals[.]” BST 

Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021); see N. Mariana Islands v. United 

States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he public interest is served when administrative 

agencies comply with their obligations under the APA.”). 

IV. BLACKHAWK SEEKS ONLY WHAT THIS COURT GRANTED TO TACTICAL

Defendants’ final claim that BlackHawk seeks to extend the scope of any injunction to 

“customers prohibited from possessing firearms by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)”, Opp’n at 11–12, is wrong 

and requires little comment. BlackHawk has never been interested in selling to prohibited persons 

and it is unfair for the Government to suggest it.

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As discussed in its initial Brief, Blackhawk seeks only to carry on its business as it did 

prior to the unlawful Final Rule and under the same as protections as Tactical. ECF No. 103 at 

1362. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, BlackHawk respectfully requests that this Court enjoin the 

enforcement of the Final Rule as to BlackHawk and issue a determination that BlackHawk is 

entitled to the injunctive relief granted in the Court’s September 2 and October 1 Orders and 

remains protected to continue transacting business with its customers to the full extent and capacity 

as existed prior to the effective date of the Final Rule. 

Respectfully submitted, 

s/ Brian D. Poe 

Brian D. Poe 

TX Bar No. 24056908 

BRIAN D. POE, ATTORNEY AT LAW PLLC

The Bryce Building 

909 Throckmorton Street 

Fort Worth, TX 76102 

Phone: (817) 870-2022 

Fax: (817) 977-6501 

bpoe@bpoelaw.com 

Michael J. Sullivan

Pro Hac Vice, MA Bar No. 487210

J. Christopher Amrhein, Jr. 

Pro Hac Vice, MA Bar No. 703170 

Nathan P. Brennan 

Pro Hac Vice, MN Bar No. 389954 

ASHCROFT LAW FIRM LLC

200 State Street, 7th Floor 

Boston, MA 02109 

Phone: (617) 573-9400 

Fax: (617) 933-7607 

msullivan@ashcroftlawfirm.com 

camrhein@ashcroftlawfirm.com

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nbrennan@ashcroftlawfirm.com

Counsel for Intervenor-Plaintiff BlackHawk 

Manufacturing Group Inc. d/b/a 80 Percent Arms

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 31, 2022, the foregoing document was served, via the Court’s 

CM/ECF Document Filing System, upon the registered CM/ECF users in this action. 

 /s/ Brian D. Poe 

Brian D. Poe 

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