UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DR. KRISTEN BENNETT, §

§

 Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-0289-B

§

TARRANT COUNTY COLLEGE

DISTRICT,

§

§

§

 Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Dr. Kristen Bennett’s Motion for Leave to File Amended

Pleading (Doc. 47). Based on recent deposition testimony, Dr. Bennett seeks to amend her Title VII

retaliation claim and her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in

part the Motion. Specifically, Dr. Bennett’s request for leave to amend her Title VII retaliation claim

is GRANTED. Dr. Bennett’s request for leave to amend and replead her § 1983 claims is DENIED. 

By Friday, April 28, 2023, Dr. Bennett must file an amended complaint, amending only her

claim for retaliation under Title VII. By May 5, 2023, Defendant Tarrant County College District

(“TCCD”) must respond to only the amended Title VII retaliation claim. If TCCD responds by filing

a Rule 12 motion, Dr. Bennett’s response to that motion is due May 12, 2023. No reply will be

considered. Further, the parties deadline for dispositive motions is EXTENDED to May 30, 2023.

“When, as here, the deadline for seeking leave to amend pleadings has expired, a court

considering a motion to amend must first determine whether to modify the scheduling order under

the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 16(b)(4) good cause standard.” Valcho v. Dallas Cnty. Hosp.

Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (footnote omitted). The Rule

- 1 -

Case 3:22-cv-00289-B Document 52 Filed 04/27/23 Page 1 of 3 PageID 1077
16(b)(4) “good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’” S&W Enters., L.L.C.

v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright

et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)). In determining whether good cause

has been shown, courts consider “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to

amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment;

and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Meaux Surface Protection, Inc. v.

Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010).

“If the movant satisfies the requirements of Rule 16(b)(4), the court must next determine

whether to grant leave to amend under the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a)(2), which provides

that ‘the court should freely give leave when justice so requires.’” Valcho, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 814

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). Since Rule 15(a)(2) provides that leave to

amend should be granted “freely” as “justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), “[a] motion to

amend ordinarily should be granted absent some justification for refusal.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d

631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013). 

Applying the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause factors, the Court finds the first two factors heavily

support a finding of good cause. Dr. Bennett seeks to include allegations based on deposition

testimony that was not available until recently. Doc. 47, Mot., 1, 4. And these allegations are

relevant to the deficiency the Court identified in Dr. Bennett’s claim for retaliation under Title VII.

See Doc. 34, Mem. Op. & Order, 10 (dismissing Dr. Bennett’s Title VII retaliation claim because she

failed to show she engaged in a protected activity). As to the final two factors, the Court finds that

any prejudice to Defendant TCCD can be cured by a two-week extension of the dispositive motions

- 2 -

Case 3:22-cv-00289-B Document 52 Filed 04/27/23 Page 2 of 3 PageID 1078
deadline and a limited response to the amended complaint. The Court therefore finds good cause

under Rule 16(b)(4).

TCCD argues that leave to amend should nonetheless be denied because the proposed

amendments would be futile. Doc. 51, Resp., 1. The Court may deny Dr. Bennett’s Motion to the

extent the repleaded claims fail to overcome the deficiencies that led to their dismissal. See Simmons

v. Sabine River Auth. La., 732 F.3d 469, 478 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court finds the proposed

amendment to Dr. Bennett’s Title VII claim is not obviously futile. It addresses the deficiency

identified by the Court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 34)—failure to allege an

unlawful employment practice. TCCD presents several arguments why the retaliation claim is

deficient, but the Court finds these arguments are better suited for a motion to dismiss or summary

judgment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Dr. Bennett leave to amend her Title VII claim.

However, the Court finds that Dr. Bennett’s proposed amendment to her § 1983 claims fails

to overcome the deficiency that led to their dismissal—failure to show municipal liability. The Court

finds that the proposed amendment still fails to show municipal liability, see Piotrowski v. City of

Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978)), thus amendment would be futile, see Simmons, 732 F.3d at 478. The Court therefore

DENIES leave to amend those claims as futile. See id.

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED: April 27, 2023.

______________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 3 -

Case 3:22-cv-00289-B Document 52 Filed 04/27/23 Page 3 of 3 PageID 1079