1

Filed 12/6/12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HOPE DICAMPLI-MINTZ, )

)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )

) S194501

v. )

) Ct. App. 6 H034160

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., )

) Santa Clara County

Defendants and Respondents. ) Super. Ct. No. 1-07 CV 089159

) 

____________________________________)

Government Code1 section 915, subdivision (a) (section 915(a)), establishes 

the manner of delivery of a claim against the government. It requires that a claim 

be presented to a local public entity by “[d]elivering it to the clerk, secretary or 

auditor,” or by mailing it to one of these officials “or to the governing body.”

Section 915, subdivision (e) (section 915(e)), further provides that a misdirected 

claim “shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance” with section 915 if 

“[i]t is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public 

entity.” (§ 915(e)(1), italics added.) 

Here, the Court of Appeal held that “a claim may substantially comply with 

the act, notwithstanding failure to deliver or mail it to one of the specified 

recipients, if it is given to a person or department whose functions include the 

 

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code. 
2

management or defense of claims against the defendant entity.” We reject this

judicial expansion of the statutory requirements and affirm that a claim must 

satisfy the express delivery provisions language of the statute. 

I. BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2006, Dr. Bao-Thuong Bui and Dr. Abraham Sklar performed 

surgery on plaintiff Hope DiCampli-Mintz at Valley Medical Center (VMC), a 

hospital owned and operated by the County of Santa Clara (the County). In the 

recovery room, plaintiff complained of pain in her left leg, which appeared bluish 

and cold to the touch. An emergency tomography disclosed that her “left iliac 

artery” was “completely interrupted.” Plaintiff was returned to surgery and 

ultimately discharged. 

Later that year, plaintiff went to VMC‟s emergency department “in a great 

deal of pain.” An emergency room physician told her that another procedure was 

required because blood vessels had been damaged in the first surgery. 

Plaintiff retained counsel who prepared a letter for transmission to VMC, Dr. 

Bui, and Dr. Sklar, giving “notice, in accordance with Section 364 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure, that Hope DiCampli-Mintz will file suit against you for damages 

resulting from the personal injury of Hope DiCampli-Mintz.” Code of Civil 

Procedure section 364 requires that a plaintiff give notice of an intent to sue to a 

health care provider 90 days before filing a negligence action.2 The letter stated 

that defendants negligently performed surgery, interrupting blood flow to 

plaintiff‟s leg, then failed to repair the problem. 

On April 3, 2007, plaintiff‟s counsel personally delivered copies of the letter

to an employee of the medical staffing office in the hospital‟s administration 

 

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 364 is not part of the Government Claims 

Act (§ 810 et seq.). The notice of intent it mandates is a separate requirement. 
3

building. The letters were addressed to the Risk Management Department at 

VMC, Dr. Bui, and Dr. Sklar.3 While the letter included a request that it be 

forwarded to the recipient‟s insurance carrier, it did not request that it be 

forwarded to any of the statutorily designated recipients denoted in section 915. 

It is undisputed that the letter was never personally served or presented, nor 

was it mailed to the county clerk or the clerk of the board. The parties likewise 

agree that plaintiff knew VMC was owned and operated by the County. The letter 

was later received by the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department by 

April 6, 2007.4 On April 23, 2007, Dave Schoendaler at the County‟s Risk 

Management Department spoke with plaintiff‟s counsel by telephone. According 

to plaintiff‟s counsel, Schoendaler acknowledged receipt of the letter; orally 

opined that service on VMC required a tort claim which was late; questioned 

whether a tort claim was required as to Dr. Sklar and Dr. Bui and indicated that he 

would look into that; stated that plaintiff had an interesting case; mentioned a 

physical condition that put plaintiff at risk; and provided the name of the attorney 

handling the County‟s defense. Schoendaler did not mention that the letter failed 

 

3 Plaintiff‟s counsel also sent duplicate letters by certified mail. 

4 According to the County, the letters were addressed to the “Risk 

Management Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC.” Plaintiff 

did not dispute this and added that the letter was also received by the “Santa Clara 

County Risk Management Department.” At oral argument it was clarified that the 

“Santa Clara County Risk Management Department” and the “Risk Management 

Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC” are different entities. 

The “Santa Clara County Risk Management Department” is a department 

within the County‟s Employee Services Agency and deals with legal claims 

against the County. The “Risk Management Department at the Valley Health 

Center Clinic at VMC” is responsible for such things as the hospital‟s quality 

assurance and its compliance with regulatory matters. For reasons set forth below, 

any differences are irrelevant because plaintiff failed to properly present her letter

to a statutorily designated person, nor did any such designee actually receive the 

letter. (§ 915(a) & (e).) 
4

to satisfy section 915‟s delivery requirements. Plaintiff never received written 

notice that her claim was untimely or presented to the wrong party. 

On July 2, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint naming Dr. Bui, Dr. Sklar, and 

VMC as defendants. As described by the Court of Appeal, “The complaint 

acknowledged that „Plaintiff was required to comply with . . . [government claims 

statutes],‟ but asserted she was „excused‟ from doing so because defendants „failed 

to provide notice to Plaintiff as required by Government Code §§ 910.8, 911, 

911.3, and therefore waived any defenses they may have had to the sufficiency of 

Plaintiff‟s claim (Notice of Intention to Commence Action) as presented.‟ ”5 

On August 29, 2007, the County6 filed an answer denying plaintiff‟s 

allegations and asserting affirmative defenses, including that plaintiff “failed to 

comply with the provisions of the California [Government] Claims Act,” and that 

her claims were “barred by the provisions of Government Code §§ 810 through 

1000, inclusive.”7 

 

5 Section 910.8 requires the board of a public entity, or its designee, to give a 

claimant notice of a defective claim. Section 911 provides if the board fails to 

provide a notice of insufficiency as required by section 910.8, the defect is waived. 

Section 911.3, subdivisions (a) and (b) require that the board, or its designee give 

written notice to the claimant that a claim was untimely. Failure to do so waives a 

timeliness defense. As later discussed, because plaintiff‟s claim was not presented 

to or actually received by the board or a person designated by it, sections 910.8, 

911 and 911.3 are not applicable. (See post, pp. 10-12.) 

6 The Court of Appeal noted that the complaint was never amended to name 

the County as the proper defendant, although the parties have acted throughout the 

proceedings as if it were. The Court of Appeal treated this mistake as a harmless 

misnomer. (See Plumlee v. Poag (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 541, 547; see also 4 

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 477, pp. 605-606; 5 Witkin, Cal. 

Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 1219, p. 654.) The parties do not dispute this issue 

and we need not address it. 

7 At some point, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the suit against Dr. 

Bui and Dr. Sklar, agreeing that at all relevant times they acted within the course 

and scope of their County employment.
5

The County filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiff 

failed to comply with the Government Claims Act because her claim was never 

presented to or received by a statutorily designated recipient as required by section 

915. In opposition, plaintiff argued that she had “substantially complied” with the

Government Claims Act on April 3, 2007, by delivering the letter of intent to the 

Risk Management Department at VMC. She also alleged that the letter was 

received by the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department by April 6, 

2007, and that this department was the county department most directly involved 

with the processing and defense of tort claims against the County. 

The trial court granted the County‟s summary judgment motion. It held that 

the County made a sufficient showing of noncompliance, and that plaintiff could 

not avoid summary judgment because she failed to “raise a reasonable inference 

that her claim was actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the 

local public entity within the time prescribed for presentation thereof” and she also 

failed to “establish waiver and/or equitable estoppel.” 

The Court of Appeal reversed. It found that plaintiff had “substantially 

complied” with the presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. The 

Court of Appeal rejected other Court of Appeal cases holding that compliance is 

deemed satisfied only by actual receipt by the statutorily designated persons, under

section 915(e)(1). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Government Claims Act

Suits for money or damages filed against a public entity are regulated by 

statutes contained in division 3.6 of the Government Code, commonly referred to 

as the Government Claims Act. We have previously noted that “[s]ection 905 

requires the presentation of „all claims for money or damages against local public 

entities,‟ subject to exceptions not relevant here. Claims for personal injury and 
6

property damage must be presented within six months after accrual; all other 

claims must be presented within a year. (§ 911.2.) „[N]o suit for money or 

damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a 

claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been 

presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or has been deemed to 

have been rejected . . . .‟ (§ 945.4.) „Thus, under these statutes, failure to timely 

present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing 

a lawsuit against that entity.‟ [Citation.]” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737-738 (City of Stockton).)

Section 905 requires that, subject to exceptions not present here, “all claims 

for money or damages against local public entities” must be “presented in 

accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 

(commencing with Section 910)” of the Government Code. “ „Local public entity‟

includes a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other 

political subdivision or public corporation in the State . . . .” (§ 900.4.) 

Section 915(a) provides, “A claim . . . shall be presented to a local public 

entity by either of the following means: [¶] (1) Delivering it to the clerk, 

secretary or auditor thereof. [¶] (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to 

the governing body at its principal office.” Section 915(e)(1) clearly and narrowly 

sets forth how actual receipt may meet the presentation requirement: “A claim . . . 

shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even 

though it is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section if, within the time 

prescribed for presentation thereof, any of the following apply: [¶] (1) It is 

actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public 

entity.” (Italics added.) 

Even if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts that might support a 

claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied. (City of Stockton, supra, 42 
7

Cal.4th at p. 738.) “The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the 

maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an 

element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.” (Del Real v. City 

of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 (Del Real), italics added; Shirk v. 

Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (Shirk).) 

A goal of the Government Claims Act is to eliminate confusion and 

uncertainty resulting from different claims procedures. (Recommendation: 

Claims Against Public Entities (Dec. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 

(1963) p. 1008.) As we pointed out in City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 

page 738, “[t]he purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise, but „to 

provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately 

investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation. [Citations.] It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even 

in face of the public entity‟s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding 

the claim.‟ [Citation.] The claims statutes also „enable the public entity to engage 

in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the 

future.‟ [Citations.]” 

Moreover, the intent of the Government Claims Act is “not to expand the 

rights of plaintiffs against government entities. Rather, the intent of the act is to 

confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.” 

(Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776; State of 

California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1242-1243.) The claimant 

bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the appropriate public 

entity. (Life v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 901 (Life).)8 

 

8 In Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 213, we summarized the public policies 

supporting strict application of the claims presentation requirements: “Requiring a 

(footnote continued on next page)
8

B. Application of the Government Claims Statute 

Several points are important here. The County does not dispute that the 

content of the letter is sufficient to serve as a valid claim, nor does it dispute its 

timeliness. Plaintiff does not dispute that the County was the proper public entity 

where her claim should have been presented under section 915(a). The case stands 

or falls on whether presentation of plaintiff‟s letter of intention to someone other 

than the statute‟s designated recipients or the actual receipt of notice by a proper 

recipient, satisfies the prefiling claim requirement.

It is uncontested that the claim was never delivered or mailed to the “clerk, 

secretary or auditor” as required by section 915(a). Likewise, the “clerk, 

secretary, auditor or board” never actually received the claim. (§ 915(e)(1).) 

Thus, neither section 915(a)‟s specific requirements for compliance, nor section 

915(e)(1)‟s provision deeming actual receipt to constitute compliance, were 

satisfied. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that there was “substantial 

compliance.” This was error. 

 

(footnote continued from previous page)

[claimant] . . . to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, 

affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to 

the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] [It] also 

permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, 

memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a 

claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to 

settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives 

it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning. [Citations.] The notice 

requirement . . . thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public 

entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, 

because . . . public entities . . . will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the 

taxpayers.”
9

The proper construction of section 915 is dispositive. “In construing any 

statute, we first look to its language. [Citation.] „Words used in a statute . . . 

should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the 

language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it 

necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .‟ [Citation.] „If 

the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court 

looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be 

achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 

contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which 

the statute is a part.” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” (S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.) Also, a statute “ „must be given a reasonable and 

common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of 

the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon application 

will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.‟ ” (City of Poway v. 

City of San Diego (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 858, quoting DeYoung v. City of 

San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18.) A court may not, “under the guise of 

construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain 

and direct import of the terms used.” (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. 

City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.) Further, “ „[w]e must assume 

that the Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished to do so . . . . 

[Citation]‟ ” (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal erred by failing to adhere to the plain language of 

section 915. Instead, it rewrote the statute to read as the court believed it should 

provide. 

Section 915(a)(1) reflects the Legislature‟s intent to precisely identify those

who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity. Section 915(e)(1) 

reflects the Legislature‟s intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the 
10

presentation requirement if the claim is “actually received” by a statutorily 

designated recipient. Thus, compliance with section 915(e)(1) requires actual 

receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients. If an

appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or 

misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 901.) This straightforward construction honors the statutory language and is 

consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes.

9 

While resort to extrinsic sources is unnecessary, our conclusion is consistent 

with the legislative history. In 1959, the California Law Revision Commission‟s 

(Commission) report found that there were conflicting claim presentation 

requirements for public entities throughout the state. The Commission urged that 

specificity and uniformity were necessary and recommended adoption of uniform 

procedures for certain claims against public entities. (See Recommendation and 

Study relating to The Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities (Jan. 1959) 2 

Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) pp. A-57 to A-62, A-122 (1959 Study).) 

The Commission reported, “Much unnecessary litigation has been devoted to 

resolution of technical issues relating to allegedly improper presentation of 

claims. . . . [A recurring question is] whether presentation to the wrong official 

satisfies the statute. Avoidance of these problems can be achieved in part by clear 

identification of the officer to whom such claims are required to be presented and 

by express authorization of mailed notice. In order to avoid doubts and to 

preclude such purely technical issues from interfering with expeditious handling of 

claims, however, it is recommended that express provision be made to cure minor 

 

9 We need not determine whether section 915‟s use of the term “clerk” refers

to the county clerk or the clerk of the board of supervisors. It is undisputed that 

the claim was not mailed, delivered to, or received by either clerk. 
11

defects in the manner of service which do not prejudice the public entity.” (Id. at 

p. A-122, fns. omitted.) 

The Commission also referred to a New York law providing that, “ „[I]f 

service of such notice . . . [is] not in compliance with the provisions of this 

subdivision, such service shall be deemed valid if such notice is actually received

by such person.‟ ” (1959 Study, supra, 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. A122, italics added.) In 1959, the Legislature acted on the Commission‟s 

recommendation and added section 714, the predecessor of section 915.10 (Stats. 

1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136.) “The scheme in effect today was established in 

1963, when the Legislature combined the requirements for claims against local 

entities with those for claims against the state in part 3 of division 3.6 of title 1 of 

the Government Code. (Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, pp. 3369, 3372 et seq.)” (City of 

Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 739, fn. 4.)

It is logical to provide that actual receipt satisfies the claim presentation 

requirement. The goals of the claims statutes are to provide entities with sufficient

information to investigate and appropriately resolve claims and to plan for 

potential liabilities. These goals are satisfied when an adequate claim is actually 

received by an appropriate entity representative. The Legislature retains authority 

to determine which representatives are appropriate. The Court of Appeal cannot 

 

10 Former section 714 provided, “A claim may be presented to a local public 

entity (1) by delivering the claim to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof within 

the period of time prescribed by Section 715 or (2) by mailing the claim to such 

clerk, secretary or auditor or to the governing body at its principal office not later 

than the last day of such period. A claim shall be deemed to have been presented 

in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as 

provided herein if it is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or 

governing body within the time prescribed.” (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136, 

italics added.) 
12

override that determination simply because it concludes receipt by others should 

be considered sufficient. 

The Court of Appeal placed substantial reliance on Jamison v. State of 

California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513 (Jamison). Jamison proves too slender a 

reed to support the weight of the Court of Appeal‟s expansion. The Jamison

holding was later repudiated by its own panel and is in conflict with more recent 

authority. 

Jamison was injured in a traffic collision with a truck owned by the 

California Department of Water Resources. His lawyer filed a claim with the 

Department of Water Resources before filing suit. (Jamison, supra, 

31 Cal.App.3d at p. 515.) The trial court dismissed the action for failure to 

comply with the Government Claims Act. (Jamison, at p. 515.) At the time, 

section 915, subdivision (c), a prior version of section 915(e), required that notice 

be filed with the State Board of Control and Jamison had failed to do so. 

(Jamison, at pp. 515-516.) The Court of Appeal concluded Jamison had 

substantially complied with the existing statute. It noted that most claim statute 

cases dealt with “substantial compliance” in disputes over whether the contents or 

form of the claim was adequate, not whether the filing was properly presented. 

(Id. at p. 516.) It then reviewed the few California cases involving “the question 

of filing a proper claim with the wrong governmental department or agency.” 

(Ibid.) 

The Jamison court drew several conclusions: (1) The statutory requirement 

is not met when a claim is filed with the wrong entity. (Jamison, supra, 31 

Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) That principle is reflected in Jackson v. Board of 

Education (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 856, 858-860, which held that a requirement to 

serve a local board of education is not satisfied by serving the municipality. (2) If 

a claim is filed with the proper entity but with the wrong statutory official of that 
13

entity, the statute is satisfied if the claim is actually received by the statutory 

officer. (3) A complete failure to serve any responsible officer of the entity will 

not constitute substantial compliance. (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) 

As stated in Redwood v. State of California (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 501, 503-504: 

“It has been repeatedly held that where the claims statute provides for the person 

upon whom the claim is to be served . . . service upon another is insufficient.” 

The Jamison court went on to draw a fourth conclusion that it phrased as 

follows: “Service upon any responsible official of the entity, but not the statutory 

officer, is sufficient if the party served has the duty to notify the statutory agent.” 

(Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) Jamison cited no California authority 

for this proposition, referring instead to cases from Indiana (Galbreath v. City of 

Indianapolis (Ind. 1970) 255 N.E.2d 225) and the District of Columbia (Stone v. 

District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1956) 237 F.2d 28 [applying D.C. law]). 

(Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) The Jamison opinion does not reveal 

whether the statutes at issue in those cases bore any similarity to the California 

statutory scheme. 

As justification for importing its fourth conclusion into California law, the 

Jamison court stated, “Certainly, any responsible officer or employee of a major 

state agency knows, or should know, that if a substantial claim for damages is 

presented that it should be forwarded to the Board of Control. In the event the 

officer or employee actually receiving the claim does not know the proper agency, 

then a simply [sic] inquiry to the Attorney General‟s office would result in advice 

as to the proper agency.” (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 518.) The court

cited no statutory authority supporting the duty it created. Other California 

appellate courts have refused to follow it. (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 761; 

Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 894.)
14

In Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 894, the plaintiff was involved in an 

automobile accident. He was treated by medical staff at the county medical center 

that allegedly committed negligence. The plaintiff retained counsel who sent a 

personal injury claim to the medical center‟s legal department. (Id. at p. 897.) 

The legal department was not the proper body to receive the plaintiff‟s claim. The 

plaintiff later retained new counsel who filed a late claim with the county board of 

supervisors. (Ibid.) 

After the county denied the claim as untimely and his application for leave to 

present a late claim was also denied, Life filed a complaint against the county 

alleging medical negligence. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.) The county 

moved for summary judgment on the ground that Life had failed to timely present 

a claim. (Id. at p. 898.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Life‟s 

presentation of the claim to the hospital‟s legal department was insufficient. 

Compliance with section 915 would have occurred only if the misdirected claim 

was “ „actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public 

entity. . . .‟ ” (Life, at p. 900.) 

The Life court found Jamison unpersuasive because it failed to follow the 

statutory requirement that a misdirected claim be “actually received” by the 

designated party. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.) The court also 

remarked that “Jamison’s reliance on a public entity‟s internal transmittal of a 

claim conflicts with section 915, which requires the claimant to file with the 

appropriate official or board.” (Ibid.) The court persuasively concluded that “[b]y 

focusing on the duty of a public employee in receipt of a claim to forward the 

claim to the proper agency, Jamison inappropriately shifts responsibility for filing 

a claim with the proper official or body from the claimant to the public entity.” 

(Ibid.) 
15

In Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at page 764, the claim arose from an 

automobile accident with a Riverside police officer, Eric Charrette. Del Real‟s 

attorney wrote to Charrette seeking his account of the accident and requesting that 

the letter be forwarded to Charrette‟s insurance company. The city attorney 

responded to the letter, informing counsel that it represented Charrette and that he 

would not provide a statement. The letter also stated that any further contact with 

Charrette should be made through the city attorney‟s office. (Ibid.) Del Real later 

sued Charrette and the City of Riverside. Defendants moved for summary 

judgment alleging Del Real failed to satisfy the Government Claims statutes. Del 

Real urged in reply that her letter to Charrette constituted a timely claim. She 

argued that “even if the letter was not actually received by the appropriate person 

or body, it should have been,” citing Jamison for the proposition that Charrette 

had a duty to transmit the letter to the appropriate recipient. (Del Real, at p. 770.) 

In addition to holding that the letter did not contain the contents of a proper 

claim, the Court of Appeal held that because the letter was not properly directed it 

failed to comply with section 915. (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.) In 

rejecting Del Real‟s argument, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated, “we 

have reconsidered our earlier decision in Jamison and, as did the court in Life v. 

County of Los Angeles, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pages 900-901, we find that it is 

at odds with section 915, subdivision (c). We therefore decline to follow it.” 

(Ibid.) We agree with the holdings in Life and Del Real. Their application of the

compliance doctrine is consistent with the language of section 915(e)(1) requiring

actual receipt by the statutorily designated recipient. Jamison is unpersuasive 

because it fails to follow the statutory language specifically identifying who must 

actually receive a claim. Finding compliance when any agency employee is

served exponentially expands the scope of the statute. By placing a duty on a 

public employee who receives a misdirected claim to forward it to the proper 
16

agency, Jamison improperly shifted the responsibility for presenting a claim from 

the claimant to the public entity. (See §§ 910, 915.) 

Moreover, the County argues persuasively that, in addition to contravening

section 915‟s plain language, the Jamison rule creates uncertainty about how and 

where claims must be delivered. Misdirected claims may be received by various 

departments or employees and forwarded to multiple people and places, making it

difficult to determine whether the claims were actually delivered to, or received 

by, a department or employee charged with the overall management of claims 

against the county. The question of when a claim is actually received and whether 

a specific department or employee managed claims against a public entity would 

also be fodder for litigation. This result is contrary to the Government Claims 

Act‟s goal of eliminating uncertainty in the claims-presentation requirements. 

Accordingly, we disapprove Jamison v. State of California, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 

513. 

The Court of Appeal below further relied on cases decided before the

enactment of section 915 or its predecessor, section 714.

11 When these cases were 

decided, claims against the state, local, and municipal governments were governed 

by numerous state statutes and local ordinances. Recognizing this Byzantine

claims system, the Legislature standardized the procedure by enacting the 

Government Claims Act. In doing so, it replaced more than 150 separate 

procedures for directing claims against local governmental entities. (Ardon v. City 

of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 246.) Because of this comprehensive

 

11 Insolo v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 172; Peters v. City and 

County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 419; and Los Angeles Brick & Clay 

Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 478, 486. 
17

change in the statutory procedures, the early cases cited by the Court of Appeal are 

inapposite. 

The Court of Appeal also erred by relying on Elias v. San Bernardino County 

Flood Control Dist. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 75, and Carlino v. Los Angeles 

County Flood Control Dist. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1533. These cases hold 

that when the governing body of one public entity is also the governing body of 

another public entity, a claim against the subordinate entity that is delivered to the 

governing body constitutes substantial compliance with the claims statute. (Elias,

supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 75-77; Carlino, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1533-

1534. That is not the case here.12

 

12 The Court of Appeal additionally relied on out-of-state cases. (Shehyn v. 

District of Columbia (D.C. 1978) 392 A.2d 1008; Stone v. District of Columbia, 

supra, 237 F.2d 28, 29-30 [applying D.C. law]; Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 

supra, 255 N.E.2d 225; Coghill v. Badger (Ind. Ct.App. 1981) 418 N.E.2d 1201, 

1206, fn.3; Hawkeye Bank v. State (Iowa 1994) 515 N.W.2d 348, 350; Webb v. 

Highway Div. of Oregon State Dept. of Transp. (Or. 1982) 652 P.2d 783, 784.) 

Plaintiff also cites numerous out-of-state cases. (Finnie v. Jefferson County 

School District (Colo. 2003) 79 P.3d 1253; Robinson v. Washington County

(Me.1987) 529 A.2d 1357; Hansen v. City of Laurel (Md. Ct.Spec.App. 2010) 996 

A.2d 882, 891; Kelly v. City of Rochester (Minn. 1975) 231 N.W.2d 275, 276; 

Kirkpatrick v. City of Glendale (Mo. Ct.App. 2003) 99 S.W.3d 57; Ferrer v. 

Jackson County Board of Supervisors (Miss. 1999) 741 So.2d 216; Myears v. 

Charles Mix County (S.D. 1997) 566 N.W.2d 470; Mount v. City of Vermillion

(S.D. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 686.) 

We find these authorities unpersuasive. Neither the Court of Appeal nor 

plaintiff explain how the claim statutes at issue in these cases were consistent with 

California‟s Government Claims Act. 

 
18

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 

CORRIGAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

LIU, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 195 Cal.App.4th 1327

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S194501

Date Filed: December 6, 2012

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Santa Clara

Judge: William J. Elfving

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Campbell, Warburton, Fitzimmons, Smith, Mendell & Pastore, J. Michael Fitzsimmons and Lisa Jeong 

Cummins for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cheong, Denove, Rowell & Bennett and John D. Rowell for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus 

Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Miguel Marquez, County Counsel, Lori E. Pegg, Acting County Counsel, Marcy L. Berkman and Melissa 

R. Kiniyalocts, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.

Stephen D. Underwood; Michael M. Youngdahl and Jordan Sheinbaum for CSAC Excess Insurance 

Authority, California League of Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on 

behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Lisa Jeong Cummins

Campbell, Warburton, Fitzimmons, Smith, Mendell & Pastore

64 West Santa Clara Street

San Jose, CA 95113-1806

(408) 295-7701

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 538-2320

Melissa R. Kiniyalocts

Deputy County Counsel

70 West Hedding Street, 9th Floor, East Wing

San Jose, CA 95110-1770

(408) 299-5900