J-S65026-14

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WYNDEL DEVERO

Appellant No. 368 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 18, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007044-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 05, 2014

Appellant, Wyndel Devero, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on September 18, 2013. We affirm.

The relevant procedural history and factual background of this case is 

as follows. On September 9, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to robbery,1

conspiracy to commit robbery,2and possessing an instrument of crime.3 He 

was immediately sentenced to 81⁄2 to 23 months’ imprisonment followed by 

60 months’ probation with respect to the robbery conviction, 84 months’ 

probation with respect to the conspiracy to commit robbery conviction, and 

60 months’ probation with respect to the possessing an instrument of crime 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii). 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
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conviction. To the extent possible, the terms of probation were ordered to 

run concurrent. Appellant was immediately paroled. 

On October 14, 2012, Appellant hit Dontell Cunningham 

(“Cunningham”) over the head with a baseball bat. On November 8, 2012, 

Appellant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, aggravated assault. 

See Commonwealth v. Devero, CP-51-CR-0000262-2013. On May 3, 

2013, prior to disposition of those charges, a parole revocation/Gagnon II4

hearing was held pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 

1973). The hearing was recessed until May 9, 2013 because Cunningham 

was subpoenaed to appear on that date. Cunningham failed to appear on 

May 9, 2013. 

At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court found that 

Appellant had violated the terms of his parole and probation. It deferred 

sentencing pending the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report. 

On September 18, 2013, the trial court revoked Appellant’s parole and 

ordered him to serve the remainder of his back time with respect to the 

robbery conviction. It also revoked Appellant’s probationary sentence and 

sentenced him to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment as to the conspiracy 

conviction (consecutive to the back time on the robbery conviction) and five 

years’ probation as to the possession of an instrument of crime conviction. 

 

4 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
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On September 27, 2013, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. The 

trial court denied the post-sentence motion that same day. On October 22, 

2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On November 13, 2013, Appellant 

filed a praecipe to discontinue the appeal because it was untimely. See 

Commonwealth v. Devero, 2907 EDA 2013. On December 19, 2013, 

Appellant filed a counseled petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546. On January 31, 2014, the PCRA 

court granted the petition and restored Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc 

pro tunc. This appeal followed.5 

Appellant raises three issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err when it permitted the Commonwealth to 

introduce hearsay . . . and relied upon hearsay in determining

that [Appellant] violated the terms of his probation where the 

hearsay consisted of, inter alia, unsworn, out of court 

statements made by [] Cunningham where [] Cunningham 

failed to appear on multiple occasions without explanation for 

the [revocation] hearing despite receiving notice, thus 

precluding cross-examination?

2. Was the properly admissible evidence insufficient as a matter 

of law to establish that [Appellant] violated the terms of his 

probation?

3. With respect to the sentence imposed upon [A]ppellant for a 

technical violation of probation, did the [trial] court abuse its 

discretion by imposing an unduly harsh and excessive 

aggregate sentence . . . ?

 

5 On February 10, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On March 1, 2014, Appellant filed his concise statement. 

On March 26, 2014, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. All 

issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement. 
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Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Appellant’s first issue challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence 

at the revocation hearing. Specifically, he argues that Cunningham’s 

statements to police were improperly admitted because Cunningham failed 

to appear for the revocation hearing. “The admission of evidence is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and our review is for an 

abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Valcarel, 94 A.3d 397, 398 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

At the revocation hearing, the Commonwealth began questioning 

Detective Linda Hughes regarding hearsay statements that were made by 

Cunningham after the incident in which he was attacked by Appellant. N.T., 

5/3/13, at 11. Appellant objected, and the trial court sustained the 

objection. Id. On cross-examination, however, defense counsel questioned 

Detective Hughes regarding hearsay statements that Cunningham had made 

and were recorded on Form 48, a standard form used by the Philadelphia 

Police Department to memorialize witness interviews and criminal 

investigations. Id. at 14. The Commonwealth objected on the basis of the 

testimony being hearsay. Id. Defense counsel argued that the Form 48 

was admissible as a business record. Id. at 14-15. The trial court agreed 

and overruled the Commonwealth’s objection. Id. at 15. On redirect 

examination, the Commonwealth requested that Detective Hughes read the 

entirety of Cunningham’s statement to police as recorded in the Form 48. 
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Id. at 18. Defense counsel objected on the basis of hearsay. Id. at 19. 

The trial court overruled the objection because it found that defense counsel 

had opened the door to that line of questioning. Id. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding 

that defense counsel had opened the door to that line of questioning. We 

find instructive this Court’s en banc decision in Commonwealth v. 

Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc), appeal denied, 76 

A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013). In Fransen, defense counsel elicited hearsay 

testimony from a detective on cross-examination. See id. at 1118 (citation 

omitted). The Commonwealth followed up by asking the detective to 

disclose further hearsay testimony on the same subject. See id. (citation 

omitted). Defense counsel objected and the trial court overruled the 

objection, finding that defense counsel had opened the door to that line of 

questioning. See id. We affirmed. Id. We concluded that defense 

counsel’s questioning of the detective permitted the Commonwealth to elicit 

further testimony from the detective to give the complete picture. Id. 

A similar situation occurred in the case sub judice. Although in 

Fransen defense counsel had called the detective as if on cross, that fact 

does not alter our analysis. Instead, as in Fransen, Appellant elicited 

hearsay testimony from Detective Hughes. In so doing, Appellant opened 

the door to further hearsay testimony regarding the same issue in order to 

give the trial court the complete picture. 
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Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Sheaff, defense counsel referred to a 

portion of a police report and had the testifying officer read a portion of the 

report. 530 A.2d 480, 483 (Pa. Super. 1987), affirmed, 544 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 

1988) (per curiam).6 We held that such examination opened the door for 

the Commonwealth to enter the full-text of the non-testifying officer’s report 

into evidence, even though it was inadmissible in the absence of defense 

counsel’s initial questioning. Sheaff, 530 A.2d at 483 (citation omitted). 

The same situation occurred in the case at bar. Appellant chose to 

refer to the Form 48 and have Detective Hughes answer questions based 

upon the contents of that document. The Commonwealth responded by 

having a significant portion of the Form 48 read into the record by Detective 

Hughes even though the trial court had prohibited the Commonwealth from 

pursuing that line of questioning on direct examination. As this Court has 

stated, “If [a] defendant delves into what would be objectionable testimony 

on the part of the Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth can probe 

further into the objectionable area.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 885 A.2d 

51, 54–55 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 906 A.2d 540 (Pa. 2006) 

(citation omitted). As Appellant opened the door to the Commonwealth’s 

line of questioning, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

 

6 The full-text of our Supreme Court’s order in Scheaff can be found at 

Commonwealth v. Moore, 567 A.2d 701, 704 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1989), 

appeal denied, 575 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1990). 
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discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to probe further into the Form 

48. 

Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to find that 

he violated the terms of his probation. A claim that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that Appellant violated the terms of his probation is

a question of law subject to plenary review. We must determine 

whether the evidence admitted . . . and all reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth . . . , is sufficient to support [a finding that the 

appellant violated the terms of his probation]. A reviewing court 

may not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that 

of the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 945 A.2d 169 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).

As this Court has stated: 

A probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the 

conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has proven to 

have been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and 

not sufficient to deter against future antisocial conduct. 

Moreover, the Commonwealth need only make this showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 886 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 20 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2011) (citations and footnote omitted).

Appellant’s main argument with respect to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is that the trial court improperly admitted Cunningham’s 

statements to Detective Hughes. We have, however, concluded that those 

statements were properly admitted into evidence and therefore could be 

considered by the trial court. Appellant also argues that the trial court’s 
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statements regarding the basis for finding Appellant violated the terms of his 

probation are troubling. In particular, he contends that the trial court’s 

reference to Cunningham’s “testimony” was erroneous. Although the trial 

court may have used imprecise language, there is no evidence that the trial 

court considered evidence not of record.7

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the admitted 

evidence shows that Cunningham told Detective Hughes that Appellant twice 

hit him over the head with a bat and struck him in the knee with a bat three 

times. N.T., 5/3/13, at 18-19. This attack caused Cunningham to be fitted 

with a neck brace, to sustain multiple lacerations, and to sustain bumps on 

the top of his head. Id. at 7. Furthermore, Appellant admitted to Detective 

John Druding that he hit Cunningham with a baseball bat despite the fact 

that Cunningham was not armed. See id. at 24. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find that Appellant 

violated the terms of his probation. 

Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing an excessive sentence. This claim does not challenge the 

revocation of Appellant’s probation. Rather, Appellant’s claim challenges the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 

 

7 We acknowledge that, at sentencing, the trial court referenced prior 

testimony by Cunningham that had not been admitted into evidence. See

N.T., 9/18/13, at 18-19. However, it is clear from the record that the trial 

court disregarded that testimony. See id. at 19 (“We don’t know whether 

you had a gun, but we certainly know you had a baseball bat because you 

beat [] Cunningham pretty seriously.”).
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54 A.3d 86, 91 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011). “[T]his [C]ourt’s scope of review in an 

appeal from a revocation sentencing includes discretionary sentencing 

challenges.” Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (en banc). 

We note that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 

A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an 

automatic right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for 

permission to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.

As this Court has explained:

To reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we 

conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; 

(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in 

a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; 

(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also 

Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“when 
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a court revokes probation and imposes a new sentence, a criminal defendant 

needs to preserve challenges to the discretionary aspects of that sentence 

either by objecting during the revocation sentencing or by filing a postsentence motion”). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and the issue 

was properly preserved in a post-sentence motion.8 Appellant’s brief also 

includes a statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

2119(f). Thus, we turn to whether the appeal presents a substantial 

question. 

Since Appellant was sentenced following the revocation of probation, 

the sentencing guidelines do not apply to Appellant’s sentence. 204 Pa. 

Code § 303.1(b); Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 741 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014).9 Nevertheless, in 

sentencing Appellant, the trial court was required to “consider the general 

principles and standards of the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. 

Russell, 460 A.2d 316, 322 (Pa. Super. 1983). Section 9721 expresses 

these general principles in the following manner:

 

8 The Commonwealth contends that Appellant’s post-sentence motion lacked 

the particularity required by this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Reeves, 778 A.2d 691, 692-693 (Pa. Super. 2001). We have reviewed 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion and conclude that Appellant’s arguments 

relating to the excessiveness of his sentence met the particularity 

requirements set forth in Reeves. 

9 As Appellant notes, our General Assembly has required that sentencing 

guidelines be promulgated for probation revocation proceedings. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2154.4. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, however, 

has failed to comply with this mandate in the six years since its enactment. 
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the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the 

offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on 

the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). As we have explained: 

The determination of whether a particular case raises a 

substantial question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Generally, however, in order to establish that there is a 

substantial question, the appellant must show actions by the 

sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or 

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process.

Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted).

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant states that the trial court’s 

sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for a technical probation violation is 

excessive. He contends that he was a good candidate for rehabilitation. He 

also argues that the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating factors. 

Finally, Appellant argues that the lack of sentencing guidelines for probation 

revocation proceedings requires this Court to closely monitor the sentences 

imposed upon revocation of probation. 

In Commonwealth v. Sierra, this Court held that “[o]n appeal from 

a revocation proceeding, we find a substantial question is presented when a 

sentence of total confinement, in excess of the original sentence, is imposed 

as a result of a technical violation of parole or probation.” 752 A.2d 910, 

913 (Pa. Super. 2000). In the case at bar, Appellant was sentenced to total 

confinement for a period exceeding his original sentence for a technical 
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violation of his probation. Accordingly, this case presents a substantial 

question and we will address the merits of Appellant’s challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Appellant first contends that the gravity of his offense was relatively 

low. He argues that he was only acting in self-defense when striking 

Cunningham over the head with the bat. That, however, assumes that 

Appellant’s version of the events was true. The trial court did not credit 

Appellant’s version of events. Instead, the evidence shows that Appellant 

caused serious bodily injury to Cunningham by striking him over the head 

with a baseball bat. Such violent behavior certainly was a very serious 

offense. Thus, Appellant’s argument that the gravity of the offense was low 

is without merit.

Appellant next contends that a long term of imprisonment was not 

necessary to protect the public. Specifically, Appellant claims that because 

the victim in this case was a family member, a long term of imprisonment is 

excessive. Appellant’s family, however, is also a part of the public. 

Appellant’s family is deserving of the protection of the court system and 

Appellant obviously presents a threat to the safety of his family members. 

Furthermore, Appellant’s attack was not a victimless crime. The fact that he 

was willing to attack a family member with a baseball bat shows that he is 

willing to attack members of the public as well. This is confirmed by the 

crimes he originally pled guilty to, i.e., robbery and related offenses. Thus, 
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a significant term of imprisonment was both reasonable and necessary to 

protect the public. 

Appellant also contends that the trial court did not meaningfully 

consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. The trial court found that it did not 

“know whether [Appellant could] be rehabilitated ever. [He] can’t be 

rehabilitated anytime soon.” N.T., 9/18/13, at 20. The trial court went on 

to discuss the need for Appellant to reflect upon his actions and to learn a 

trade while in prison. Id. at 21. This discussion by the trial court evidences 

its careful consideration of Appellant’s rehabilitative needs when it crafted 

the sentence. It determined that Appellant would need to spend a 

significant period of time in prison in order to be rehabilitated. This was not 

an abuse of discretion.

Appellant relies heavily upon the pre-sentence investigation report in 

arguing that he could be rehabilitated. Appellant, however, fails to 

recognize that the trial court took this section of the pre-sentence 

investigation report into account as the report suggested that Appellant 

participate in a vocational training program. As noted above, the trial court 

recommended vocational training at Appellant’s sentencing hearing. There 

is nothing in the pre-sentence investigation report, or elsewhere in the 

record, to suggest that Appellant could be rehabilitated in a short period of 

time. 
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Appellant notes that at the time of sentencing his aggravated assault 

charge was still pending and argues that resolution of that matter could 

warrant further review of the trial court’s probation violation sentence. We 

take judicial notice, however, that the Commonwealth has nolle prossed all 

of the charges in that case. See Commonwealth v. Devaro, CP-51-CR0000262-2013. Thus, Appellant is only being punished with a probation 

violation sentence for his violent conduct. 

Finally, Appellant points to his difficult childhood as a mitigating factor. 

However, millions of children in this nation are raised without a father and 

approximately 500,000 children a year spend time in foster care. Yet, the 

vast majority of those children do not beat a family member over the head 

with a baseball bat while on probation for a robbery conviction. In this case, 

the trial court carefully considered both aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. Appellant committed this violent act a mere six months after 

being paroled for his prior violent felony, robbery. The trial court 

determined that a significant period of incarceration was warranted. We 

conclude that the trial court’s determination and its ultimate sentence was 

not an abuse of discretion. 

In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the 

statements made by Cunningham to Detective Hughes. The trial court 

correctly found that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Appellant 

had violated the terms of his probation. Finally, we conclude that the trial 
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court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to 10 to 20 years’ 

imprisonment, consecutive to his back time, for violating the terms of his 

probation. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/5/2014