IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

SHARON RENEE CRAVER, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1884-N-BN 

§ 

CHAMPION MORTAGE, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Sharon Renee Craver has filed a pro se Qui Tam Suit Complaint for 

Damages, through which she explicitly alleges mortgage and insurance fraud; 

predatory lending; vicarious elder abuse; and theft by conversion and deception and 

seeks “an Emergency Injunction against all Defendants to immediately cease and 

desist their intentional fraudulent eviction actions.” Dkt. No. 3. 

Because Craver moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), see Dkt. 

No. 4, United States District Judge David C. Godbey referred this lawsuit to the 

undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

The Court will grant Craver leave to proceed IFP through a separate order. 

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that, insofar as she asserts a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

requesting injunctive relief, because that claim is barred and since the Court 

otherwise lacks or should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, the Court should 

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dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice. 

Craver previously filed a lawsuit in this district regarding eviction proceedings 

in a state court in Kaufman County concerning the same property. Compare, e.g., 

Dkt. No. 3 (compl.), ¶¶ 8, 11, with Craver v. Champion Mortg., No. 3:22-cv-238-K-BN 

(N.D. Tex.), Dkt. No. 3 (compl.), ¶¶ 6, 8. 

And the court dismissed the first lawsuit without prejudice, concluding that, 

“insofar [there was] jurisdiction over Craver’s complaint, it should abstain from 

exercising jurisdiction over her claims.” Craver v. Champion Mortg., No. 3:22-cv-238-

K-BN, 2022 WL 617622 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2022), rec. accepted, 2022 WL 614991 (N.D. 

Tex. Mar. 1, 2022) (Craver I). 

Craver’s latest allegations imply that the state court eviction proceeding 

remains pending. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 3, ¶ 2 (“Plaintiff is herein also seeking issuance 

of an Emergency Injunction against all Defendants to immediately cease and desist 

their intentional fraudulent eviction actions until this matter is adjudicated by this 

Court and Jury Trial in the interest of Due Process of the law, and Justice that to 

date Plaintiff has not received solely because of the patent and obvious prejudice and 

bias against Plaintiff by the Court and favoritism for Defendants that bespeaks of 

collusion to deny and violate Plaintiffs Civil and Constitutional Rights.”); id., ¶ 8 

(“[T]here is a very serious issue with Judicial Prejudice and Bias against Plaintiff in 

her existing Texas Case in this matter (Case Number 109970-422).”). 

So, insofar as there is a pending state lawsuit concerning the subject matter of 

the complaint, this lawsuit should be dismissed without prejudice for the same 

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reasons set out in Craver I: 

At the outset, the Court must be satisfied that subject matter jurisdiction 

exists. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999) (“Subjectmatter limitations ... keep the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and 

Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter delineations must be policed 

by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.” (citations omitted)). 

As Craver has otherwise again not shown that the Court has jurisdiction over 

the claims that she may allege – by showing that jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332, for example – Craver’s facts are again construed as alleging a claim under 42 

U.S.C. 1983. See Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A plaintiff 

makes out a § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, 

and then shows that the violation was committed by someone acting under color of 

state law.’” (cleaned up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008))); 

accord Thurman v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc., 982 F.3d 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2020). 

At first, Craver’s lawsuit appears to implicate the Anti-Injunction Act, which 

provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 

proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or 

where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” 

28 U.S.C. § 2283, and which “has been interpreted consistently as an absolute bar to 

any federal court action that has the effect of staying a pending state court proceeding 

unless that action falls within one of the Act’s three specifically designated 

exceptions,” Phillips v. Charles Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1990) 

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(footnotes and citations and omitted).1

But, insofar as Craver alleges that a state actor, specifically a state judge, has 

violated her constitutional rights, such a claim implicates Section 1983, “an express 

authorization from Congress permitting federal courts to enjoin state proceedings in 

order to protect federal rights.” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972)).2

Section 2283 does not therefore prevent the Court from enjoining the state 

proceeding. But Section 1983 “does: it expressly disallows injunctive relief against a 

judicial officer ‘for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless 

a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Hatton v. 

Combs, 793 F. App’x 801, 803 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983; citing Knox 

v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Although we have previously said 

that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a state judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

those statements were abrogated by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, 

1 Cf. Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 493 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008) (“‘It 

must be remembered that the anti-injunction act limits federal remedies without 

ousting federal subject-matter jurisdiction.’” (quoting 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,

ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 

4469 at 82 n.19 (2d ed. 2002))). 

2 See also Mills v. Criminal Dist. Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 

1988) (“[P]rivate attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state 

actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.”); Castaneda v. 

Lucas, No. EP-19-CV-185-PRM-MAT, 2019 WL 4935445, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 24, 

2019) (“[A] claim of legal malpractice” does “not arise from the United States 

Constitution or federal statutes or treaties, [to] provide the Court with federal 

question jurisdiction over the claims.”), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 4729426 (W.D. Tex. 

Sept. 27, 2019).

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which provides that ‘injunctive relief [against a judicial officer] shall not be granted 

unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,’ 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.” (citations omitted))). 

Any Section 1983 claim that Craver may bring that attempts to enjoin the 

judge presiding over the state eviction proceeding based on alleged constitutional 

violations is therefore barred. 

Further, to the extent that Craver’s factually plausible constitutional claims – 

all related to the ongoing state proceeding – go beyond actions taken by the presiding 

judge in a judicial capacity, this Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction 

over those claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which, “following 

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987), [ ] also applies ‘when certain 

civil proceedings are pending, if the State’s interests in the proceeding are so 

important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity 

between the States and the National Government,’” Health Net, Inc., 534 F.3d at 494. 

Section 1983 “does not ‘qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and 

federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court 

proceeding.’” Gates, 885 F.3d at 880 (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243; citing 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-47). And, under Younger, a federal court should abstain from 

exercising its jurisdiction when to do so would result in the interference in certain, 

select state proceedings. Younger abstention “applies only to three exceptional 

categories of state proceedings: ongoing criminal prosecutions, certain civil 

enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, and pending civil proceedings 

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involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 

perform their judicial functions.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 

2016) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (quoting, in 

turn, New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 

368 (1989) (NOPSI)); internal quotation marks omitted). 

The doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where 

three conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing 

state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the 

subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the 

state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 

677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden 

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); internal citations omitted); accord Hood, 

822 F.3d at 222-23. 

Of the three exceptional categories identified in NOPSI, which “define 

Younger’s scope,” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78, the unique posture of this litigation – filed 

to request that a federal district court direct how a state court should conduct a 

pending proceeding – fits within the third, see Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 13-14 (“Both 

Juidice[ v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977),] and this case involve challenges to the processes 

by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts. Not only 

would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state 

judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which 

those judgments were obtained.”); Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 

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953 F.3d 660, 671 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[B]oth Juidice and Pennzoil involved requests to 

directly or indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” (citing Joseph A. ex 

rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Younger governs 

whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court’s ability to conduct 

proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding 

directly.”); Zeeco, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-CV-384-JEDFHM, 2017 WL 6539504, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2017) (“What Younger, Juidice, 

and Pennzoil have in common is that they all involved plaintiffs filing separate 

federal suits in an attempt to enjoin ongoing state proceedings.”))). 

The additional Middlesex County factors are present here: “In this case, the 

state proceedings are judicial in nature and represent important state interests, as 

state courts must be empowered to enforce their own orders and judgments. 

Moreover, [Craver] has had opportunities to raise his federal challenges in these state 

proceedings and there has been no procedural bar to his doing so.” Dandar v. Church 

of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 619 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam); see also Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15 (“[W]hen a litigant has not attempted 

to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should 

assume that the state procedures will afford an adequate remedy.”); Moore v. Sims, 

442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979) (“Certainly, abstention is appropriate unless state law 

clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.”); Gates, 885 F.3d at 880 

(“The relevant question is whether the would-be federal plaintiff has the opportunity

to raise his federal claims in state court.” (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 425; emphasis in 

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original)). 

And, to the extent that state proceedings have concluded, such that no appeal 

was pending when Craver filed this lawsuit, this federal district court lacks 

jurisdiction “to modify or reverse” the state proceedings under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced 

to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not 

have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized 

by Congress.” (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 

(5th Cir. 2004))); but see also Miller v. Dunn, 35 F.4th 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(“Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is pending when the federal 

suit is filed.”). 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this case without prejudice. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

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to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: August 30, 2022 

_________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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