1

NO. 12-09-00408-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

MARK R. VICKERY, § APPEAL FROM THE 188TH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF 

THE TEXAS COMMISSION ON 

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

APPELLANT

 § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

V.

C.M. STANLEY, JR.,

APPELLEE § GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a state official’s plea to the jurisdiction.1

C.M. Stanley, Jr. filed a declaratory judgment action in a Gregg County district court against 

Mark R. Vickery, Executive Director of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 

(TCEQ), seeking a declaration that he is not the owner or operator of the underground storage 

tank system on his land. Vickery filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on numerous grounds, 

which the trial court denied. In three issues, Vickery contends the trial court erred in 

determining that it has jurisdiction over this suit. We reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

Stanley owns a tract of land in Gregg County and operated a small store on the property 

from the 1950s until 1995. At some point, A.B. Barfield Distributing, Inc., a bulk petroleum 

distributor, installed an underground storage tank system on Stanley’s property for the purpose of 

selling gasoline. Barfield went out of business, going into foreclosure in 1988, and finally 

dissolving in 1990. Barfield abandoned the storage tank system, and no gas was sold on 

 

1

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon 2008). 
2

Stanley’s property after that. Stanley closed his store in August 1995. Beginning in 1995, the 

Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission, predecessor to TCEQ, maintained that 

Stanley owned the storage tank system, was in violation of the Texas Water Code and Texas 

Administrative Code, and owed an administrative penalty. In 2008, Vickery recommended that 

TCEQ order Stanley to pay an administrative penalty and bring his facility into compliance with 

the water code. In March 2009, Stanley filed his declaratory judgment action in district court in 

Gregg County and moved to abate the TCEQ enforcement proceeding during the pendency of the 

district court declaratory judgment action. The following month, Vickery amended his petition, 

adding A.B. Barfield Distributing, Inc., Bowie County Distributing Company, Inc., and Arnold 

B. Barfield, Jr. as respondents. Thereafter, the enforcement proceeding was abated. Stanley 

filed an amended petition for declaratory judgment, again arguing that he did not own the 

underground storage tanks. Vickery filed his plea to the jurisdiction, which was later denied. 

This interlocutory appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, a state entity cannot be sued.2See Tex. Dep’t of 

Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). Sovereign immunity from suit 

defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the 

jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). 

A plea questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction raises a question of law that we review de novo. 

State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007). In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, we 

review the pleadings and any evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issue. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. 

Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001). 

ULTRA VIRES EXCEPTION

In his first issue, Vickery contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over 

Stanley’s declaratory judgment suit because, although Stanley sued him for purported ultra vires 

 

2

Stanley’s petition names “Mark R. Vickery, Executive Director of the Texas Commission on 

Environmental Quality” as the defendant. A suit against a state official in his official capacity actually seeks to 

impose liability against the governmental unit and is, in all respects other than the name, a suit against the entity. 

See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex. 2007).
3

acts, he did not allege any act that was, in fact, ultra vires. Therefore, he argues, sovereign 

immunity bars the suit. 

Stanley asserts that, in determining whether his suit falls within the ultra vires exception, 

the focus is not whether Vickery was acting within his authority to enforce existing state policy. 

Instead, he argues, the focus should be on whether Vickery was acting outside his authority when 

he determined that Stanley was the owner of the underground storage tanks on Stanley’s land.

Applicable Law

The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) provides a procedural device for 

deciding matters already within a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and does not itself establish 

subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. 1994). Further, the 

UDJA is not a general waiver of sovereign immunity. See State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 

S.W.3d 345, 360 (Tex. App.–Austin 2009, pet. filed). Thus, it cannot be used as a vehicle to 

obtain declarations having the effect of establishing a right to relief against the state for which 

sovereign immunity has not been waived. Id. 

There is, however, an exception to sovereign immunity in cases where a party seeks 

declaratory relief against state officials who allegedly act without legal or statutory authority. 

City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009). A party may employ a 

declaratory judgment action to intervene in administrative proceedings when an agency is 

exercising authority beyond its statutorily conferred powers. Beacon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 

Montemayor, 86 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, no pet.). To fall within this ultra 

vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but 

rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to 

perform a purely ministerial act. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. The basis of the ultra vires rule 

is that when a government official is not following the law, his acts are not acts of the state, the 

suit is not an action against the state, and immunity is therefore not implicated. Id. at 370.

Analysis

In order to determine whether Vickery acted within his statutorily conferred powers, we 

must look to the applicable statutes for the scope of his authorized acts. It is the policy of the 

state to maintain and protect the quality of groundwater and surface water. TEX. WATER CODE 

ANN. § 26.341 (Vernon 2008). Chapter 26 of the water code governs water quality control. See

TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.562 (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2010). TCEQ is the principal 
4

authority in the state on matters relating to the quality of water in the state and is responsible for 

setting water quality standards. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.023, 26.127 (Vernon 2008). In 

furtherance of the state policy, TCEQ may develop a regulatory program regarding underground 

and above ground storage tanks in accordance with Chapter 26, Subchapter I of the water code. 

TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.345 (Vernon 2008). TCEQ or its executive director may institute 

legal proceedings to compel compliance with provisions of the Texas Water Code. TEX. WATER 

CODE ANN. § 7.002 (Vernon Supp. 2010). 

Owners and operators of underground storage tank systems are responsible for violations 

of the statutes regulating those systems. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 7.156, 26.3467, 

26.3475, 26.3512 (Vernon 2008). Section 26.342 of the water code provides that an “owner” is a 

person who holds legal possession or ownership of an interest in an underground storage tank 

system. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.342(9) (Vernon 2008). If the actual ownership of an 

underground storage tank system is uncertain, unknown, or in dispute, the fee simple owner of 

the surface estate of the tract on which the tank system is located is considered the owner of the 

system unless that person can demonstrate by legally acceptable means that the tank system is 

owned by another. Id. “Operator” means a person in day-to-day control of and having 

responsibility for the daily operation of the underground storage tank system. TEX. WATER 

CODE ANN. § 26.342(8) (Vernon 2008). 

Stanley has always maintained that he is not the owner of the tanks on his property, and 

he contends that Vickery was acting outside his authority by determining that Stanley was the 

owner. While we recognize the negative impact on one in Stanley’s position, we do not agree 

that the issue before us turns on the question of whether Stanley actually is the owner of the 

tanks. When Vickery named Stanley as the respondent in the enforcement action, he did not 

“determine” that Stanley was the owner. Vickery merely alleged that Stanley was the owner. 

The water code authorizes Vickery to use his prosecutorial discretion to pursue enforcement 

actions against “owners” as that term is defined in the statute. Because the tanks are on Stanley’s 

land and he therefore holds legal possession of the tanks, Stanley falls within the water code’s 

definition of “owner.” See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.342(9). Further, Vickery contends 

Stanley is the owner while Stanley claims he is not, placing ownership in dispute. Therefore, 

under the statutory definition of “owner,” Stanley, as the fee simple owner of the surface estate 

on which the tank system is located, is considered the owner of the system until he can prove 
5

otherwise. Id. Finally, as operator of the store and gas station, Stanley had day-to-day control of 

the tank system. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.342(8). Pursuant to the powers conferred on 

him by the water code, Vickery was authorized to allege that Stanley was the owner of the 

storage tanks without first proving ownership.

Under these facts, Vickery had the discretion to file enforcement proceedings against 

Stanley concerning the underground storage tanks on his land. Because Vickery had legal 

authority to do so, he did not commit an ultra vires act when he alleged that Stanley is the owner 

of the underground storage tanks on his land and attempted to enforce the provisions of Chapter 

26. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372; Montemayor, 86 S.W.3d at 267. In the absence of an 

ultra vires act, Vickery enjoys sovereign immunity. See Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638. Therefore, the 

trial court should have granted Vickery’s plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 

225-26. We sustain Vickery’s first issue.

 

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

In his second issue, Vickery contends the trial court lacks jurisdiction based on several 

different theories, including the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction. Specifically, he asserts that 

TCEQ has, pursuant to a pervasive regulatory scheme, exclusive jurisdiction of the regulation of 

underground storage tanks. 

Applicable Law

We presume that district courts are authorized to resolve disputes unless the constitution 

or other law conveys exclusive jurisdiction on another court or administrative agency. In re 

Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The UDJA cannot be 

invoked when it would interfere with some other entity’s exclusive jurisdiction. MBM Fin. 

Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009). An agency has 

exclusive jurisdiction when a pervasive regulatory scheme indicates that the legislature intended 

for the regulatory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the 

regulation is addressed. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 

221 (Tex. 2002). Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction is a matter of law that we review 

de novo by examination and construction of the relevant statutory scheme. Id. at 221-22. If an 

agency has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, a party must first exhaust administrative 

remedies before a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 221.
6

As explained above, TCEQ is authorized to develop a regulatory program regarding 

underground storage tanks and may institute legal proceedings to compel compliance with the 

water code. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 7.002, 26.345. Furthermore, it may hold hearings, 

receive evidence, make decisions, and issue orders to administer the provisions of and to 

effectuate the purposes of Chapter 26. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.019, 26.020 (Vernon 

2008). Finally, TCEQ may assess an administrative penalty against a person who violates a 

provision of the water code. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.051(a) (Vernon 2008).

Analysis

The water code provides a comprehensive plan for regulation of storage tanks to address 

the issue of possible groundwater contamination. Moreover, Chapter 26 of the water code 

constitutes a comprehensive scheme intended by the legislature to be the exclusive means of 

remedying the problem of contamination of ground water by use of underground storage tanks,

and TCEQ has exclusive jurisdiction over compliance with that chapter. See Subaru of Am., 

Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. Therefore, Stanley cannot invoke the UDJA because it would interfere 

with TCEQ’s exclusive jurisdiction. See MBM Fin. Corp., 292 S.W.3d at 669. The issue of 

whether Stanley is actually the owner of the tanks is properly determined through the 

administrative process as provided for in the water code. A person who has exhausted all 

administrative remedies available within a state agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision 

in a contested case is entitled to judicial review. TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 

2008); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.064 (Vernon 2008). Thus, Stanley must first exhaust his 

administrative remedies through the enforcement proceeding initiated by Vickery and TCEQ 

before a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. 

We sustain Vickery’s second issue to the extent he relies on the doctrine of exclusive 

jurisdiction. We need not address the remainder of Vickery’s arguments in his second issue or 

his third issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

CONCLUSION

Vickery, by applying the statutory definition of “owner,” was authorized to file 

enforcement proceedings against Stanley. Therefore, Vickery did not engage in an ultra vires 

act. Because the suit does not fall within the ultra vires exception, Vickery is shielded from suit 
7

by sovereign immunity. Therefore, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 

Further, TCEQ has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this cause with prejudice. See Harris 

County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 640-41 (Tex. 2004).

BRIAN HOYLE

 Justice

Opinion delivered November 17, 2010.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)