STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING

CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES

FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Completed pursuant to section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 

January 2011 

 
CONTENTS    2 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................................... 4

PART A: SUMMARY OF SECTION 622, AS ENACTED .................................................................... 5

1. General Prohibition ............................................................................................................. 5

2. Scope of Financial Companies subject to the Concentration Limit .................................... 5

3. Calculation of a Financial Company’s Liabilities .............................................................. 6

4. Statutory Exceptions and Interpretations ............................................................................ 7

PART B: EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT ................................................................... 8

1. Overall Effects of the Concentration Limit ........................................................................ 8

2. Effects of the Concentration Limit on Future Financial Stability ....................................... 9

3. Effects of the Concentration Limit on Moral Hazard ....................................................... 10

4. Effects of the Concentration Limit on the Efficiency and Competitiveness of U.S. 

 Financial Firms and Markets ............................................................................................ 11

5. Effects of the Concentration Limit on the Cost and Availability of Credit and Other 

 Financial Services ............................................................................................................. 13

PART C:   RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS

 TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT ............................................................................... 14

1. Implementation Issues ...................................................................................................... 14

2. Recommended Modifications to the Concentration Limit ................................................ 16

2.1. Definition of “Liabilities” for Certain Companies ................................................................................ 16

2.2. Collection, Aggregation and Public Dissemination of Concentration Limit Data ............................. 20

2.3. Acquisition of Failing Insured Depository Institutions ......................................................................... 21

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 23

FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................ 24

Figure 1: National Deposit Shares of the Four Largest Depository Institutions ................. 24

Figure 2: U.S. General Purpose Credit Card Purchase Volume ......................................... 24

Figure 3: Mortgage Originations and Servicing, 2009 ....................................................... 24

Figure 4: Syndicated Lending Market Shares ..................................................................... 25

Figure 5:       Estimated Difference between GAAP and Risk-Based Capital Liability 

 Measures by Category of Companies ................................................................. 26
INTRODUCTION    3 

INTRODUCTION

Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act” or 

“Dodd-Frank Act”) establishes a financial sector concentration limit that generally prohibits a 

financial company from merging or consolidating with, or acquiring, another company if the 

resulting company’s consolidated liabilities would exceed 10 percent of the aggregate 

consolidated liabilities of all financial companies.1

 This concentration limit is intended, along 

with a number of other provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, to promote financial stability and 

address the perception that large financial institutions are “too big to fail”. Section 622 of the 

Act also requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “Council”) to: (i) complete a 

study of the extent to which the concentration limit would affect financial stability, moral hazard 

in the financial system, the efficiency and competitiveness of United States financial firms and 

financial markets, and the cost and availability of credit and other financial services to 

households and businesses in the United States; and (ii) make recommendations regarding any 

modifications to the concentration limit that the Council determines would more effectively 

implement section 622.2 The Act requires the Council to complete its study and make its 

recommendations by January 21, 2011. 

The Act specifically provides that the concentration limit set forth in section 622 is “subject to,” 

and thus may be modified by, the recommendations made by the Council.3 The Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Board”) is thus required to adopt regulations that 

reflect and are in accordance with the Council’s recommendations to implement section 622.4 

The Board must prescribe these rules no later than 9 months after completion of the Council’s 

study. The Board also is authorized to issue interpretations or guidance regarding application of 

the concentration limit to an individual financial company or financial companies generally. 

This report fulfills each of these two Congressional directives to the Council in section 622. Part 

A provides a general summary of section 622’s statutory provisions. Part B provides an 

overview of the effects of the concentration limit and discusses the specific effect of the 

concentration limit in the four areas that section 622 directs the Council to study and address. 

Part C briefly discusses several practical implementation issues that are raised by those 

provisions and contains the Council’s three recommendations regarding modifications to the 

concentration limit that the Council has determined would more effectively implement section 

622. The Council will request comment on the recommendations for a period of 30 days after 

publication in the Federal Register. The Council will review and, if appropriate, revise these 

recommendations in light of the comments it receives. 

 

1

 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). In this report, we refer to the limit established by section 622 generally as the “concentration 

limit.” This concentration limit was adopted as a new section 14 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (the “BHC Act”) (to be codified at 

12 U.S.C. § 1852) and, accordingly, terms used in section 622 have the meanings, if any, ascribed to them in the BHC Act unless otherwise 

provided. 

2

 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e). 3

 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b). 4

 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(d). 
INTRODUCTION    4 

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Council believes that the concentration limit will have a positive impact on U.S. financial 

stability. Specifically, the Council believes that the concentration limit will reduce the risks to 

U.S. financial stability created by increased concentration arising from mergers, consolidations 

or acquisitions involving the largest U.S. financial companies. Restrictions on future growth by 

acquisition of the largest financial companies ultimately will prevent acquisitions that could 

make these firms harder for their officers and directors to manage, for the financial markets to 

understand and discipline, and for regulators to supervise. The concentration limit, as structured, 

could also have the beneficial effect of causing the largest financial companies to either shed risk 

or raise capital to reduce their liabilities so as to permit additional acquisitions under the 

concentration limit. Such actions, other things equal, would tend to reduce the chance that the 

firm would fail. Moreover, the concentration limit should provide a more comprehensive 

limitation on growth by acquisition than the 10 percent nationwide deposit cap imposed by the 

Riegle-Neal Act because it also takes into account non-deposit liabilities and off-balance sheet 

exposures, limiting incentives to shift liabilities from deposits to potentially more volatile onand off-balance-sheet liabilities. 

Although the Council expects the impact of the concentration limit on moral hazard, 

competition, and the availability of credit in the U.S. financial system to be generally neutral 

over the short- to medium-term, over the long run the Council expects the concentration limit to 

enhance the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets by preventing the increased dominance of 

those markets by a very small number of firms. 

To more effectively implement section 622, the Council recommends: (i) modifying the statutory 

definition of “liabilities” for certain companies that do not currently calculate or report riskweighted assets; (ii) modifying the calculation of aggregate financial sector liabilities to use a 

two-year rolling average instead of a single year for purposes of calculating the denominator of 

the limit and requiring the Board to publicly report, on an annual basis and no later than July 1 of 

any calendar year, a final calculation of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial 

companies as of the end of the preceding calendar year; and (iii) extending the exception 

provided in the statute for the acquisition of failing banks to other failing insured depository 

institutions. 
SUMMARY OF SECTION 622, AS ENACTED 5 

PART A: SUMMARY OF SECTION 622, AS ENACTED

The concentration limit established by section 622 has four principal components: (i) its general 

prohibition; (ii) the scope of financial companies to which it applies; (iii) the manner in which a 

financial company’s liabilities are calculated for purposes of the concentration limit; and (iv) 

exceptions for certain types of transactions. Each of these components is described in further 

detail below. 

1. GENERAL PROHIBITION

The concentration limit under section 622 prohibits any financial company from merging or 

consolidating with, acquiring all or substantially all of the assets of, or otherwise acquiring 

control of, another company if the total consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial 

company upon consummation of the transaction would exceed 10 percent of the aggregate 

consolidated liabilities of all financial companies at the end of the calendar year preceding the 

transaction.5

 By its terms, the concentration limit applies to the acquisition by a financial 

company of any type of company, and is not limited solely to acquisitions of other financial 

companies. The concentration limit does not limit internal growth by a financial company (i.e., 

growth other than through acquisitions, consolidations or mergers). The concentration limit is in 

addition to restrictions that may apply under antitrust or other laws, including the nationwide 

deposit cap in section 3(d) of the BHC Act. 

2. SCOPE OF FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUBJECT TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT

Section 622’s concentration limit applies only to a “financial company,” which is defined in the 

statute as: (i) any insured depository institution; (ii) any bank holding company; (iii) any savings 

and loan holding company; (iv) any company that controls an insured depository institution; (v) 

any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board under title I of the Dodd-Frank Act;6

and (vi) any foreign bank or company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of 

the BHC Act.7

 Notably, this definition of “financial company” encompasses any type of insured 

depository institution, including savings associations, limited-purpose trust companies the 

deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), limitedpurpose credit card banks and industrial loan companies that are excluded from the BHC Act’s 

definition of “bank.”8

 The definition also includes any company that controls such an insured 

depository institution, regardless of whether or not that company is, or is treated as, a bank 

holding company or a savings and loan holding company. Accordingly, commercial or industrial 

firms (such as retailers and automobile companies) that control an insured depository institution 

 

5

 Id. at § 1852(b). 6

 Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Council with the authority to require that a “nonbank financial company” be subject to 

supervision and heightened prudential standards issued by the Board if the Council determines that the nonbank financial company could 

potentially pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States in the event of material financial distress at the nonbank financial company. 

See Dodd-Frank Act, § 113 (2010). 7

 Under section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, a foreign bank or foreign company is subject to the BHC Act in the same manner and 

to the same extent that bank holding companies are subject to the BHC Act if it, or one of its subsidiaries, is a foreign bank that maintains a 

branch or agency in the United States or has a commercial lending subsidiary in the United States. See 12 U.S.C. § 3106. 8

 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). We also note that the definition of “financial company” does not encompass credit unions, and companies that control 

credit unions are not otherwise included in the definition. 
SUMMARY OF SECTION 622, AS ENACTED 6 

(e.g., an industrial loan company or limited-purpose credit card bank) are defined as “financial 

companies” for purposes of section 622 and subject to the concentration limit, and their liabilities 

are included in the denominator of the concentration limit for purposes of determining whether 

other financial companies are in compliance with the limit. 

On the other hand, a financial company that is not affiliated with an insured depository 

institution or a foreign bank with a U.S. banking office is not considered a financial company 

under section 622, unless the company is designated by the Council as a nonbank financial 

company subject to the supervision of the Board. As a result, companies that engage in activities 

that are perceived as “financial” generally speaking, such as insurance or securities firms, but 

that are not affiliated with an insured depository institution or a foreign bank with a U.S. banking 

office, are generally not captured by the statutory definition of “financial company.” These 

companies are not subject to the concentration limit and their liabilities are not included in the 

denominator of the concentration limit for purposes of determining whether other financial 

companies are in compliance with the limit. 

3. CALCULATION OF A FINANCIAL COMPANY’S LIABILITIES

The statutory concentration limit uses a financial company’s “liabilities” to measure and limit 

concentration within the financial sector. Under section 622, as enacted, a financial company’s 

“liabilities” are used to measure both that company’s individual size (which we sometimes refer 

to in this study as the concentration limit “numerator”) and the aggregate size of all financial 

companies (which we sometimes refer to in this study as the concentration limit “denominator”). 

It should be noted that in most cases the statutory definition of a financial companies liabilities is 

based on risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital, which are different than liabilities 

calculated under generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Section 622, as enacted, 

defines “liabilities” to mean, with respect to most U.S. financial companies, (i) the total riskweighted assets of the company, as determined under the risk-based capital rules applicable to 

bank holding companies (and as adjusted to reflect exposures that are deducted from regulatory 

capital), less (ii) the total regulatory capital of the company, as determined under the same riskbased capital rules.9

 

The statute defines the liabilities of foreign-based financial companies, insurance companies and 

nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board slightly differently. For a foreign-based 

financial company, liabilities are defined by the statute in a manner similar to U.S. financial 

companies, except that a foreign-based company’s risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital: 

(i) are limited to those “of the United States operations” of the financial company; and (ii) are to 

be calculated under “applicable” risk-based capital rules.10 For both insurance companies and 

nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board, the statute provides that such companies 

 

9

 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(A). Under the risk-based capital rules applicable to bank holding companies, a firm computes its risk-weighted 

assets by multiplying each of its balance-sheet assets by a risk weight, reflecting the credit risk of the asset. In addition, a firm must convert each 

of its off-balance-sheet exposures to an on-balance-sheet equivalent and multiply the resulting amount by the appropriate risk weight. A firm’s 

total risk-weighted assets are the sum of the risk-weighted assets associated with its on-balance-sheet assets and off-balance-sheet exposures. 10 Id. at § 1852(a)(3)(B). 
SUMMARY OF SECTION 622, AS ENACTED 7 

“liabilities” shall mean “such assets of the company as the Board shall specify by rule, in order to 

provide for consistent and equitable treatment of such companies.”11

4. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 

The statute excepts three types of acquisitions from the concentration limit: (i) an acquisition of 

a bank in default or in danger of default;12 (ii) an acquisition with respect to which the FDIC 

provides assistance under section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the “FDI Act”); 

and (iii) an acquisition that would result only in a de minimis increase in the liabilities of the 

financial company.13 A financial company seeking to make an acquisition under any of these 

three exceptions must obtain the prior written consent of the Board (in addition to any other 

regulatory notices or approvals otherwise required for the transaction). 

 

11 Id. at § 1852(a)(3)(C). Unlike the definition of liabilities for purposes of other types of financial companies, which are generally determined by 

subtracting capital from assets, the definition of liabilities applicable to insurance companies and nonbank financial companies supervised by the 

Board refers only to assets. 

12 Id. at § 1852(c)(1). We note that this exception applies by its terms to a failing “bank,” rather than a failing insured depository institution. 

Under the BHC Act, within which section 622 is codified, the term “bank” is defined in a manner that excludes certain insured depository 

institutions, including savings associations, industrial loan companies, credit card banks and limited-purpose trust companies. See 12 U.S.C. § 

1841(c). 

13 Id. at § 1852(c). The Board, in establishing a threshold for the de minimis exception, should ensure that the exception does not permit 

transactions that would be inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the concentration limit. 
EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 8 

PART B: EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT

1. OVERALL EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT

In the near term, the financial sector concentration limit is likely to prohibit acquisitions by only 

a small number of financial companies. As described in Part A, the concentration limit applies to 

insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, 

other companies that control an insured depository institution, nonbank financial companies 

supervised by the Board, and foreign banking organizations that are treated as bank holding 

companies under the BHC Act. The extent to which the concentration limit may affect the 

financial sector depends on the extent to which financial companies are (or would become as 

result of an acquisition) near, at, or over the concentration limit. In the near term, the 

concentration limit is mostly likely to restrict or otherwise affect acquisitions by four financial 

institutions–Bank of America Corporation, J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Citigroup, Inc., and 

Wells Fargo & Company–because only these four firms, based on current estimates, appear to 

hold more than 5 percent of the aggregate liabilities of all financial companies subject to the 

concentration limit.14 Over time, the concentration limit may affect different or additional firms 

depending on firms’ relative growth. 

In 1994, Congress prohibited any bank holding company from making an interstate acquisition 

of a bank if it would result in the acquirer controlling 10 percent or more of the total insured 

deposits in the United States. The 10 percent deposit cap was not binding on any firm when it 

was imposed in 1994, but acquisitions by large commercial banks brought three firms up to the 

cap, and acquisitions of institutions not covered by the deposit cap put Bank of America above 

the cap. Growth of deposits generally, as well as each firm’s internal growth, could affect these 

calculations over time. Table 1 gives the year-end deposit shares as measured in the Riegle-Neal 

Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (the “Riegle-Neal Act”)15 deposit-cap 

calculations from 2003 through 2009 for the four largest depository institutions.16 Historical 

deposit shares show a number of large jumps when the four firms have made major acquisitions. 

Historical trends also indicate that growth of the largest financial institutions has taken place 

largely through acquisitions and mergers, particularly since the Riegle-Neal Act lifted the 

statutory restriction on interstate banking combinations. Growth through acquisitions and 

 

14 As described below in Part C.1, section 622, as enacted, defines “liabilities” by reference to risk-weighted asset and capital figures under riskbased capital rules for many financial companies, but some of those financial companies currently are not required to calculate their riskweighted assets and capital under risk-based capital rules. As a result, it is not possible to produce precise estimates of the relative concentration 

among financial companies under section 622, as enacted. For this reason, the Council has recommended in Part C.2.1 that the concentration 

limit’s definition of liabilities applicable to certain financial companies be modified. The Council's initial, preliminary and non-binding estimate 

of the total liabilities of financial companies under the concentration limit, as of December 31, 2009, but otherwise reflecting the modification 

recommended by the Council in Part C.2.1, is roughly $14.3 trillion. This figure uses the following measures by category of firm (some of which 

are estimates): for standalone insured depository institutions and bank holding companies, risk-weighted assets minus capital figures under riskbased capital rules; for savings and loan holding companies and companies that control an insured depository institution that are not or are not 

treated as a savings and loan holding companies or banking holding companies, GAAP liabilities; for foreign-based firms, total U.S. third party 

liabilities as reported on U.S. regulatory reporting forms. Data for some privately held parents of industrial loan companies, credit card banks and 

special purpose trusts are not available from existing regulatory reports or public data sources. 15 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). Currently, the Riegle-Neal Act deposit cap prohibits a depository institution, bank holding 

company or savings and loan holding company from acquiring or merging with an insured depository institution in another state if, after 

consummation of the acquisition, the applicant would control more than 10 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository 

institutions in the United States. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c), 1843(i), and 1467a(e)(2). 16 National deposit shares as defined by the Riegle-Neal Act were not calculated prior to 2003, because it was obvious from national shares of 

total deposits that no firm was close to the 10 percent deposit cap. 
EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 9 

mergers provides the ability to execute strategic options more quickly than organic growth. As 

such, it can be expected that large financial organizations would continue to want to make 

strategic acquisitions in the future. 

Although the acquisition of insured deposits is already constrained by the 10 percent nationwide 

deposit cap imposed by the Riegle-Neal Act, the concentration limit should provide a more 

comprehensive limitation on growth by acquisition because it also allows non-deposit liabilities 

and off-balance sheet exposures to be taken into account. Currently, the deposit cap provides 

incentives for banking firms near, at, or over the cap to shift liabilities from deposits to 

potentially more volatile on- and off-balance-sheet liabilities. A firm wishing to acquire a 

banking organization but constrained by the deposit cap can shed deposits in exchange for more 

volatile liabilities, thereby reducing its national deposit share while maintaining the same volume 

of total assets. Similarly, because the deposit cap is measured based solely on deposits, it does 

not constrain a banking organization from increasing its exposure to potentially risky assets, 

including risky off-balance sheet positions. 

 The impact of the concentration limit on financial companies at or near the threshold is likely to 

be muted by the fact that these firms will likely already be constrained by the 10 percent 

nationwide deposit cap imposed by the Riegle-Neal Act. As a consequence, the incremental 

effect of the concentration limit in the near term will likely be limited to restricting the largest 

U.S. banking firms from large acquisitions of foreign firms or non-depository domestic 

organizations. Because there is no de minimis exemption in the Riegle-Neal Act deposit cap, 

depository institutions that control more than 10 percent of national deposits can generally 

acquire only non-insured depository institutions under the Riegle-Neal Act deposit cap.17 

 It is important to note that neither the Riegle-Neal Act deposit cap nor the Dodd-Frank 

Act concentration limit prevent firms from growing larger through internal, organic growth. 

Large commercial banks generally have not demonstrated the ability to increase their deposit 

share substantially through organic growth; instead, they have relied largely on acquisition rather 

than organic growth to expand. If this pattern continues in the future, the deposit cap and 

concentration limit could be expected to keep the shares of a financial company that is 

predominantly engaged in banking from growing significantly above the 10 percent cap in the 

future. 

2. EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT ON FUTURE FINANCIAL STABILITY

The concentration limit is likely to promote greater future U.S. financial stability by restricting 

the rapid growth of the largest firms in the U.S. financial markets. The concentration limit will 

restrict the ability of the largest financial companies to engage in acquisition transactions that 

substantially increase their size. Restrictions on future growth by acquisition of the largest 

financial companies ultimately will prevent acquisitions that could make these firms harder for 

their officers and directors to manage, for the financial markets to understand and discipline, and 

for regulators to supervise. The concentration limit, as structured, could also have the beneficial 

 

17 The Riegle-Neal Act deposit cap applies only to interstate acquisitions of banks, so a firm constrained by the cap is not prohibited from 

acquiring a bank with positive deposits if that bank is headquartered in the same state as the acquiring firm. Prior to the passage of the DoddFrank Act, the deposit cap did not apply to acquisitions of thrift institutions, but section 623 of the Dodd-Frank Act expands application of the 

deposit cap to acquisitions of any insured depository institution. 
EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 10 

effect of causing the largest financial companies to either shed risk or raise capital to create room 

under the cap. Such actions, other things equal, would tend to reduce the chance that the firm 

would fail. In addition, as noted earlier, the concentration limit ameliorates the incentive for 

large financial companies to shift from deposits to potentially less stable liabilities in order to be 

able to make additional acquisitions. 

Because firms with less than 10 percent of U.S. financial liabilities can be sufficiently large or 

otherwise critical to the functioning of financial markets to raise systemic issues in the event of 

failure, the concentration limit alone is unlikely to sufficiently reduce the risks posed to financial 

stability by systemically important firms. But together with other reforms – including the 

enhanced prudential standards that will apply to bank holding companies with more than $50 

billion in assets and nonbank financial companies designated as systemically important firms and 

the new resolution regime established by title II of the Dodd Frank Act–the concentration limit 

should help increase future financial stability. 

3. EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT ON MORAL HAZARD

The overall effect of the concentration limit on moral hazard is expected to be small. While the 

financial sector concentration limit is expected to moderately decrease the moral hazard 

associated with the “too-big-to-fail” problem, it also may slightly increase moral hazard in the 

sector by reducing the likelihood of hostile takeovers of large financial companies. 

Moral hazard may be defined as the risk that one party to a transaction behaves differently than it 

would behave if it fully took into account the risk of the transaction. Moral hazard in the 

banking industry is often associated with the “too big to fail” problem, where managers, owners, 

and creditors of large banking organizations benefit from the upside of risk taking, but may 

expect to bear little cost of the downside in the event of failure, because of the perceived 

likelihood of government support. As one piece of a coordinated set of legislative and regulatory 

efforts to end the “too-big-to-fail” problem, the financial sector concentration limit should help 

reduce the prospects for any increase in implicit subsidy for the nation’s largest financial firms 

going forward and the moral hazard created by the perception that any firm is too big to fail. 

Moral hazard also often arises in principal-agent situations, where one party (such as the 

management of a firm) acts on behalf of another party (such as the owners of a firm). Healthy 

markets for corporate control can help mitigate the moral hazard problem associated with the 

separation of ownership and control in publicly traded companies.18 The concentration limit may 

cause a modest increase in moral hazard for financial companies that are near, at, or above the 

limit by eliminating the market discipline that might otherwise be imposed by the potential 

acquisition of such firms by other financial companies.19 It is noteworthy, however, that hostile 

takeovers are quite rare in the U.S. commercial banking industry. This fact further reduces the 

modest extent to which the concentration limit may increase moral hazard. In addition, all bank 

holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets are now subject to heightened prudential 

regulation, which may offset, to some extent, any increase in moral hazard. 

 

18 Managers who fail to act in the best interest of their shareholders face the threat of hostile takeover and subsequent ouster. 19 The limit will ultimately make it difficult for any of the largest U.S. banking firms to be acquired by another financial institution, other than a 

foreign firm with limited U.S. operations, thereby potentially reducing market discipline on the management of these firms. 
EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 11 

The concentration limit is likely to have little or no effect on the actions of financial companies 

that are not constrained by the concentration limit, and will likely neither increase nor decrease 

the effects of moral hazard on the behavior of such companies. The concentration limit may 

ultimately reduce the number of potential acquirers for some smaller non-depository financial 

organizations by the small number of firms that approach or exceed the limit, but a large number 

of potential acquirers would remain for such firms. 

4. EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT ON THE EFFICIENCY AND

 COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. FINANCIAL FIRMS AND MARKETS

The concentration limit is not expected to significantly affect the efficiency and 

competitiveness of U.S. markets in the near term because it will constrain the behavior of only a 

handful of firms that already operate at a very large scale and because the limit does not restrict 

organic growth by any firm.20 In addition, based on existing research, there is limited evidence 

that economies of scale and scope exist in the financial sector beyond modest size levels.21 Over 

the long run, however, the concentration limit can be expected to enhance the competitiveness of 

U.S. financial markets by preventing the increased dominance of those markets by a very small 

number of firms. 

The expected impact of the concentration limit on the competitiveness of U.S. financial firms is 

more mixed. The concentration limit is expected to improve competition in U.S. financial 

markets over time by reducing the possibility that one or two firms will dominate the sector. At 

the same time, the Council is concerned that the limit introduces the potential for disparate 

regulatory treatment of mergers between the largest U.S. and foreign firms, depending on which 

firm is the acquirer or the target. Specifically, the statutory concentration limit would allow 

large foreign-based firms with a small U.S. presence to acquire large U.S. firms, but would 

prohibit large U.S. firms from acquiring large foreign-based financial firms. 

A very extensive empirical literature on economies of scale for commercial banks has found 

conflicting results. Most research using data from years prior to 2000 found that scale 

economies disappear long before a firm would become large enough to be bound by the 

concentration limit.22 Some research using more recent data has found economies of scale for 

even the largest banking organizations, though the size of these economies is often modest and 

may not exist for firms with entrenched management.23 All such research is limited to data on 

existing financial institutions, and applying estimates of scale economies from a large sample of 

smaller firms to the very largest U.S. financial companies runs the risk of applying estimates to 

firms outside the size range of the sample on which they were computed. Also, as noted earlier, 

the deposit cap imposed by Riegle-Neal Act could have the same effect on realizing scale 

economies. A smaller and less current body of research has found little or no evidence of 

 

20 Efficiency is measured by the amount of output a firm produces for a given amount of inputs. Competitiveness measures the same concept at 

the market level, measuring how much output all market participants as a group produce from a given amount of inputs. 21 Two basic concepts in the measurement of efficiency are economies of scale and economies of scope. Scale economies are said to exist if 

larger firms can produce output at lower average cost of inputs than smaller firms. Scope economies exist if firms that provide a variety of 

products can produce them at lower average cost than firms that specialize in a narrower range of products. 22 Most such research finds economies of scale for very small commercial banks and a shallow U-shaped average-cost curve for banks above a 

minimum-efficient scale. This means that medium-sized banking organizations are slightly more efficient than either small or large firms. 

Different studies have placed the upper limit on scale economies at from $100 million to $25 billion in assets. While this is a broad range, its 

upper end is well below the size of banks constrained by the liability cap. A summary of this literature can be found in Group of Ten (2001). 23 See, e.g., Feng and Serletis (2010), Wheelock and Wilson (2010), and Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon and Pagano (2003). 
EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 12 

economies of scope among financial lines of business.24 Research on economies of scope is less 

extensive than that on scale economies and is hampered by the lack of specialized banks to 

which a bank offering a broader range of products can be compared.25 

The concentration limit can be expected to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. financial 

markets over the long run by preventing the increased dominance of those markets by a very 

small number of firms. Evidence suggests that maintaining a less concentrated market structure 

in the long run results in more competitive markets.26 While the small number of firms 

constrained by the concentration limit may compete less vigorously for some business in order to 

avoid exceeding the concentration limit, sufficient numbers of competitors not constrained by the 

cap are likely to exist in financial markets to maintain competitive conditions. Therefore, we 

would expect competitive benefits from the concentration limit in the long run. 

Given the evidence on scale and scope economies, the concentration limit likely will not 

seriously limit the ability of U.S. financial firms to compete effectively with foreign financial 

firms. Even the small number of firms subject to the cap can expand internationally through 

internal growth, such as by establishing new foreign subsidiaries. 

The concentration limit, as enacted, treats acquisitions by U.S-based firms and foreign-based 

firms unequally. The statutory concentration limit includes the global consolidated liabilities of 

U.S. financial companies but only the liabilities of the U.S. operations of foreign firms. As a 

result, a large, globally-active U.S. financial company–whose liabilities are measured on a global 

basis under section 622–could be prevented by the concentration limit from making any material 

acquisitions (U.S. or foreign), but a large foreign-based financial company with a relatively small 

U.S. presence may be able to acquire that same U.S. financial company because only the U.S. 

liabilities of the resulting company would be subject to the concentration limit. In addition, 

depending on the extent of its U.S. operations, the foreign-based company might be able to 

continue to acquire U.S. financial companies without running afoul of the concentration limit 

because, unlike a U.S.-based firm, the foreign operations of the foreign-based company are 

excluded from the concentration formula. Over time, this disparity could increase the degree to 

which the largest firms operating in the U.S. financial sector are foreign-based. Further 

consideration and review of this issue is warranted and the Council recommends that the Board 

continue to monitor and report on these competitive dynamics. If the Council determines that 

there are any significant negative effects, the Council will then issue a recommendation to 

Congress to address adverse competitive dynamics. 

 

24 See Group of Ten (2001). We note that scope of activities is only relevant to the concentration limit analysis to the extent that it has an 

indirect, positive relationship to a firm’s scale more generally. 

25 There is little empirical research on economies of scale and scope in investment banking, but the research that does exist reaches conclusions 

that parallel those for commercial banking: there are economies at modest levels of scale and scope, but these are exhausted below the size of the 

largest firms. Some activities of investment banks, such as foreign exchange trading, appear to offer substantial economies of scale. 26 A large body of theoretical and empirical work has found that less concentrated markets produce socially beneficial results compared to more 

concentrated markets. Empirical research using reduced-form analysis has found an economically meaningful relationship between market 

concentration and prices. In addition, empirical models have been developed in recent years that derive estimates from underlying consumer 

preferences, firm costs, and interactions among firms. These theoretically derived empirical models allow for a richer characterization of 

markets; their results are consistent with the idea that more concentrated markets are, in general, associated with higher prices. See Dick and 

Hannan (2010). 
EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 13 

5. EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT ON THE COST AND

 AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES

The concentration limit is unlikely to have a significant effect on the cost and availability of 

credit and other financial services. In the short run, the concentration limit may marginally 

reduce the provision of some financial services by the firms that are closest to the limit, if they 

restrict provision of these services in order to engage in an acquisition without violating the limit. 

In the long run, it is possible that a small number of other firms may also be constrained by the 

concentration limit. However, credit markets include large numbers of competitors, so it is not 

likely that the overall provision of financial services would be adversely affected by the 

concentration limit. 

A few specific credit markets are dominated by the largest U.S. banking firms to a greater extent 

than are credit markets in general. For example, the four largest U.S. commercial banking firms 

control 56.6 percent of the market in general purpose credit card purchase volume.27 Similarly, 

these four firms originated 58.2 percent of mortgage loans by volume in 2009 and serviced 56.3 

percent of such loans.28 However, even in these markets, firms providing almost one-half of the 

market are likely to be unaffected by the concentration limit in the short- to medium-run and 

should be able to fill any competitive void caused by constrained firms that choose to reduce 

their presence in a particular product line to stay below the concentration limit. The share of the 

four largest U.S. banking organizations in other markets, such as syndicated lending, is smaller.29

If markets for securitized credit card and mortgage loans operate smoothly, the ability of the 

largest U.S. banks to grow organically and to sell assets in such markets would further limit the 

effect of the concentration limit on the provision of those types of credit in which the four largest 

U.S. banking organizations have the largest combined market shares. Thus, even if these firms 

increase their combined share of the credit card or mortgage market, the ability to sell such loans 

to other investors allows these firms to continue to supply credit without regard to constraints 

imposed by the concentration limit. 

 

27 See Table 2. 28 See Table 3. 29 See Table 4. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 14 

PART C: RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS

 TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT

As noted previously, Congress specifically directed the Council to, concurrent with its study, 

“make recommendations regarding any modification to the concentration limit that the Council 

determines would more effectively implement [section 622].”30 In addition, Congress 

specifically made the operative part of the statutory concentration limit itself “[s]ubject to the 

recommendations of the Council,” and directed the Board to issue regulations implementing 

section 622 that “reflect” and are “in accordance with the recommendations of the Council.”31 In 

considering potential modifications to the concentration limit that might more effectively 

implement section 622 as enacted, the Council has taken note of the specific topics that Congress 

required the Council to address in this study–the extent to which the concentration limit under 

this section would affect financial stability, moral hazard in the financial system, the efficiency 

and competitiveness of United States financial firms and financial markets, and the cost and 

availability of credit and other financial services to households and businesses in the United 

States. The Council believes that the Congressional mandate to consider these factors strongly 

suggests that Congress intended section 622 to (i) promote financial stability, (ii) limit moral 

hazard, (iii) promote the efficiency and competitiveness of United States financial firms and 

financial markets, and (iv) improve, or at least not unduly constrain, the cost and availability of 

credit and other financial services to households and businesses in the United States. 

Taking these considerations into account, the Council has focused on potential modifications that 

it believes would implement section 622 in the most effective way by mitigating practical 

difficulties likely to arise in the administration and enforcement of the concentration limit, 

without undermining its effectiveness in limiting excessive concentration among financial 

companies. In doing so, the Council has identified a number of implementation issues posed by 

section 622 as enacted; these implementation issues are summarized below in Part C.1. In light 

of these and other issues considered by the Council, the Council has decided to recommend 

three modifications that it believes would more effectively implement section 622. The formal 

terms of each of these recommended modifications are included below in Part C.2, along with a 

discussion of the Council’s reasons for recommending them. 

1. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

Substantial challenges exist to implementing the concentration limit in the precise form enacted.

For example, as described in Part A, the statute generally uses a financial company’s “liabilities” 

to measure and limit financial sector concentration, and defines this term in specific and different 

ways with respect to different types of financial companies. For a U.S.-based firm (other than an 

insurance company or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board), the statute defines 

liabilities by reference to risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital figures determined under 

the risk-based capital rules applicable to bank holding companies. As discussed above, riskweighted assets are calculated by applying specific weights to different types of on- and off-

 

30 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e). 

31 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c), (e). 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 15 

balance sheet positions that reflect the inherent risk in those positions. The use of risk-weighted 

assets and regulatory capital allows the concentration limit to capture the relative riskiness of 

firms, as well as off-balance-sheet exposures that would not be included in a simple accounting 

measure of liabilities. 

However, a number of companies that are included in section 622’s definition of “financial 

company” are not required to, and do not calculate, consolidated risk-based capital figures under 

the rules applicable to bank holding companies. In particular, U.S. companies that control an 

insured depository institution but are not, and are not treated as, bank holding companies 

currently are not required to calculate or report consolidated risk-based capital figures under the 

risk-based rules applicable to bank holding companies. Such companies include both savings 

and loan holding companies and firms that own or control industrial loan companies or limitedpurpose credit card banks. Because these companies currently are not required to calculate or 

report consolidated risk-based capital figures, it is not currently possible to apply the statutory 

definition of liabilities to all financial companies subject to section 622’s concentration limit as a 

practical matter.32

With respect to savings and loan holding companies, this practical problem is only transitional, 

as other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act will require these companies to calculate riskweighted assets and regulatory capital in the future. Section 171 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires 

that savings and loan holding companies become subject to risk-based capital requirements that 

are no less than the minimum risk-based capital requirements that were generally applicable to 

insured depository institutions on the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.33 Accordingly, 

savings and loan holding companies will become subject to risk-based capital rules in the future, 

at which time these companies’ risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital figures may be used 

in calculating and applying the concentration limit. 

With respect to companies that own an insured depository institution but are not, and are not 

treated as, bank holding companies or savings and loan holding companies (e.g., companies that 

own industrial loan companies or limited-purpose credit card banks), these companies are not 

currently subject to, and are not legally required to become subject to, risk-based capital rules. 

As a result, the practical problems posed in applying the statutory definition of liabilities to these 

companies are not merely transitional. However, many of these firms are predominantly 

nonfinancial, and total GAAP liabilities are a much closer proxy for the statutory definition of 

liabilities for these firms than for firms that are predominantly financial, due to the more limited 

off-balance-sheet activities of nonfinancial firms and the fact that the assets of these firms would 

likely receive a 100 percent risk weight under the risk-based capital rules applicable to bank 

holding companies. 

 

32 In the case of a foreign-based financial company, section 622 limits the definition of liabilities to the risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital 

of the company’s U.S. operations, and does not include the company’s foreign assets and regulatory capital. However, the foreign-based 

companies subject to section 622’s concentration limit generally do not, and are not required under U.S. or foreign law to, distinguish between 

assets and/or capital that are attributable to U.S. versus non-U.S. operations, respectively. The Board, as the appropriate Federal banking agency 

for those foreign banking organizations that are subject to the concentration limit (because they are, or are treated as, bank holding companies) 

has the authority to require such foreign banking organizations to compute risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital for their U.S. operations. 33 See Dodd Frank Act, § 171 (2010). Section 616 of the Dodd-Frank Act also authorizes the appropriate Federal banking agency for savings and 

loan holding companies to establish consolidated capital requirements for these companies. See Dodd Frank Act, § 616 (2010). The Council also 

notes that Section 171 requires that nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board become subject to risk-based capital rules that are no 

less than the minimum risk-based capital requirements that were generally applicable to insured depository institutions on the date of enactment 

of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 16 

Section 622 as enacted requires that the concentration limit be applied by reference to “the 

aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies at the end of the calendar year 

preceding the transaction.” This provision may make it difficult or impossible for the Board and 

any financial company to determine whether a transaction to be consummated early in a calendar 

year would comply with the concentration limit because of delays in the reporting of data that 

would be necessary for calculating the limit. In the early portion of any given year, information 

regarding the liabilities of financial companies, whether individually or in the aggregate, will not 

yet be available. For example, bank holding companies and companies treated as bank holding 

companies generally are not required to calculate and report final risk-based capital figures for 

December 31 until February 14 of the following year,34 and insured depository institutions 

generally are not required to calculate and report final risk-based capital figures for December 31 

until January 30 of the following year.35 Additional time is required for Federal banking 

agencies to review and validate this information. In addition, public financial companies that are 

required to file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are not required to file their financial statements (including 

GAAP-based asset and capital figures) for December 31 of any given year until 60 to 90 days

thereafter.36 As a result, data needed to calculate or estimate the aggregate consolidated 

liabilities of all financial companies at the end of any calendar year may not be available for 

some time after that date. The Council is also concerned that applying the denominator for any 

given year as of a single date (i.e., the end of the calendar year) may introduce unnecessary 

volatility into the concentration limit and its application, particularly given the large increase or 

decrease to the denominator that might occur from year to year as the result of specific events, 

such as the designation of a large nonbank financial company as systemically important by the 

Council, the rescission of such a designation, or the acquisition (or sale) of a bank by a large 

company that causes it to be newly included (or excluded) from the concentration limit 

denominator. 

Lastly, the concentration limit does not restrict an acquisition of a “bank” (as that term is defined 

in the BHC Act) in default or in danger of default, subject to the prior written consent of the 

Board. However, this exception applies by its terms to a failing “bank,” rather than all types of 

failing insured depository institutions, including savings associations, industrial loan companies, 

limited-purpose credit card banks and limited-purpose trust companies. However, the same 

strong public interest in limiting the costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund that could arise if a 

bank were to fail likely applies to insured depository institutions generally. 

2. RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 

2.1. DEFINITION OF “LIABILITIES” FOR CERTAIN COMPANIES

Council Recommendation: The concentration limit under Section 622 should be modified so 

that the liabilities of any financial company (other than an insurance company, a nonbank 

financial company supervised by the Board, or a foreign bank or a foreign-based financial 

 

34 See Instructions to Federal Register Form FR Y-9C at GEN-3; Instructions to Federal Register Form FR Y-9SP at GEN-3. 35 See, e.g., Instructions to FFIEC Form 041, Consolidated Report of Condition and Income, at 7. 36 See General Instructions to Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934, at 1. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 17 

company that is or is treated as a bank holding company) that is not subject to consolidated 

risk-based capital rules that are substantially similar to those applicable to bank holding 

companies shall be calculated for purposes of the concentration limit pursuant to GAAP or 

other appropriate accounting standards applicable to such company, until such time that 

these companies may be subject to risk-based capital rules or are required to report riskweighted assets and regulatory capital. 

Discussion: As described in Part C.1, although the statutory provisions of section 622 

generally define a financial company’s “liabilities” by reference to risk-weighted asset and 

regulatory capital figures under applicable risk-based capital rules, several types of financial 

companies subject to section 622’s concentration limit are not currently subject to 

consolidated risk-based capital rules. The statutory language’s incorporation of regulatory 

capital figures that are not readily available for certain financial companies poses a 

substantial practical obstacle to both the accurate calculation of an individual financial 

company’s liabilities for purposes of the concentration limit and the collection and 

calculation of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies for purposes of 

monitoring compliance with the concentration limit generally. 

The Council believes that, given the substantial impact that the concentration limit may have 

on individual financial companies and the structure of the financial sector, it is fundamentally 

important that the concentration limit be implemented in a manner that is workable and 

transparent, both in the immediate future and over time. In particular, the Council believes 

that in order for the concentration limit to be effective, financial companies must be able to 

reasonably estimate whether and to what extent their activities are constrained by the 

concentration limit, and the Board must be able to effectively and efficiently monitor and 

enforce compliance with the concentration limit. As a result, the Council believes modifying 

the statutory definition of “liabilities” with respect to certain financial companies, so as to 

ensure that the liabilities of all financial companies subject to the concentration limit can be 

reasonably determined and calculated, is necessary to effectively implement section 622. 

Specifically, the Council recommends that the Board’s rules implementing section 622 

provide that, with respect to any financial company (other than an insurance company, a 

nonbank financial company supervised by the Board, or a foreign bank or foreign-based 

financial company that is or is treated as a bank holding company) that is not subject to 

consolidated risk-based capital rules that are substantially similar to those applicable to bank 

holding companies, the “liabilities” of such a company be calculated pursuant to GAAP or, 

where GAAP is not applicable, other appropriate accounting standards applicable to such 

company.37 

In setting forth this recommendation, the Council is aware of the statutory definition of 

liabilities set forth in section 622 and, as described above, that for certain types of financial 

companies the required information is currently not calculated or reported. Therefore, the 

 

37 Foreign-based financial companies that are or are treated as a bank holding company are not included within the scope of this recommendation 

because section 622 specifies that the liabilities of such companies shall be determined under “applicable” risk-based capital rules. Insurance 

companies and nonbank financial companies are not included because section 622 specifies that the liabilities of such companies shall be such 

assets of the company as the Board may specify by rule. See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(B), (C). Accordingly, the statute as enacted should provide 

the Board with sufficient flexibility to specify the manner in which the liabilities of these companies should be calculated to allow effective 

implementation of section 622. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 18 

Council is recommending a “hybrid approach,” which will use the statutory definition of 

liabilities for those entities that currently calculate and report risk-weighted assets and 

regulatory capital figures determined under the risk-based capital rules, and GAAP liabilities 

for all other financial companies. As described below, liabilities calculated under GAAP can 

be different from liabilities calculated under risk-based capital rules. For example, under the 

risk-based capital approach required by the statutory definition of liabilities, the liabilities of 

bank holding companies are, in the aggregate, 37% less than the amount calculated under 

GAAP. The same adjustment would not be applicable for entities to which the GAAP 

approach would apply, thought it is unclear whether the difference between liabilities under a 

risk-based capital approach and under GAAP would be significant for financial companies 

that would follow the GAAP approach under the proposed modification because many of 

those companies are commercial or retail entities that hold assets that are largely or 

exclusively subject to the high risk-weighting under risk-based capital rules.38

In practice, this will produce a test that uses the following measures: 

 For stand-alone U.S. insured depository institutions, the existing statutory definition of 

liabilities for these companies (i.e., risk-weighted assets less regulatory capital);39

 For U.S. bank holding companies, the existing statutory definition of liabilities for these 

companies; 40

 For U.S. nonbank financial companies designated by the Council, the existing statutory 

definition of liabilities for these companies;41

 For U.S. savings and loan holding companies, the existing statutory definition of 

liabilities for these companies (other than during the transitional period before these 

companies become subject to risk-based capital rules as required under other provisions 

of the Dodd-Frank Act, during which time GAAP (or other applicable accounting 

standards) liabilities will be used); 

 For U.S. and foreign financial companies that own an insured depository institution but 

are not, and are not treated as, a bank holding company or savings and loan holding 

company, GAAP liabilities; and 

 For foreign-based companies that are, or are treated as, bank holding companies, the 

existing statutory definition of liabilities for these companies.42

The Council believes that the impact noted above will be temporary, as savings and loan 

holding companies, which as of December 31, 2009 total an estimated 394 financial 

companies (5.5 percent of the financial companies in the study), but make up an estimated 

24.3 percent of the total financial company liabilities under the hybrid approach, would be 

required as a result of section 171 of the Dodd-Frank Act, to calculate and report statutory 

liabilities pursuant to a risk-based capital approach. In addition, the Council believes that to 

address implementation issues with respect to foreign banking organizations, the Board 

 

38 See Table 5 for an overview of the difference between liabilities calculated under GAAP and risk-based capital rules. 39 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(A)). 

40 See id. 

41 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(C)). 

42 See 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(C)). It will be necessary to estimate the risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital of the U.S. operations of such 

foreign-based companies until such time that this information is available. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 19 

should use its authority to collect information from foreign banking organizations about the 

amount of risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital attributable to the organizations’ U.S. 

operations. 

Therefore, after this transitional period, over 99 percent of the number of financial companies 

will be calculating and reporting statutory liabilities. Accordingly, the concentration limit 

will be more consistent, with only an estimated 42 entities reporting GAAP liabilities, 

making up 3.8 percent of the estimated aggregate financial companies liabilities (as of 

December 21, 2009) under the hybrid method. 

In implementing this recommended modification, the Council believes that the Board should, 

through implementing regulations or guidance, address (i) what other accounting standards 

may be appropriate for calculating liabilities in this manner and (ii) what GAAP or other 

accounting financial measures should be used in determining liabilities (e.g., assets and 

shareholders’ equity). 

The Council believes that the recommended approach has a number of benefits. First, it 

leaves the statutory definition of “liabilities” intact for all financial companies that already 

calculate regulatory capital figures in substantially the same manner as bank holding 

companies. Second, for firms within the scope of the recommendation that do not calculate 

regulatory capital figures, the use of appropriate, applicable accounting principles (i) makes 

use of figures that financial companies already calculate and, in many cases, disclose to the 

public or shareholders, and (ii) does not require a series of assumptions that could undermine 

the integrity and transparency of the calculation. The Council believes that this 

recommended modification would more effectively implement section 622’s concentration 

limit by making it possible for financial companies to monitor and comply with the 

concentration limit and for the Board to test and enforce such companies’ compliance, 

without undermining either section 622’s fundamental purpose and function in limiting 

concentration among financial companies or the fairness of the concentration limit as applied 

to different financial companies. 

In considering whether to adopt the recommendation, the Council considered the potential 

impact of the recommended approach on the extent to which the concentration limit may 

bind large financial companies, particularly during the transitional period. As described 

above, total GAAP liabilities will not perfectly mirror financial liabilities measured by riskweighted assets minus regulatory capital for firms that are not currently subject to risk-based 

capital rules. GAAP assets may be higher for a particular firm than assets calculated under 

risk-based capital rules because low-risk assets or exposures of the company may be assigned 

low risk-weights under risk-based capital rules. Conversely, GAAP assets may be lower for 

a particular firm than assets calculated under risk-based capital rules because off-balance 

sheet positions of the company are reflected under risk-based capital rules. As a result, to the 

extent that the liabilities of financial companies subject to this recommendation were, in the 

aggregate, larger under GAAP than they would be if calculated under risk-based capital 

rules, this would make the concentration limit denominator larger. This could have the effect 

of permitting a large financial company, particularly during the transition period, to make an 

acquisition that might otherwise be prohibited if risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital 

figures were immediately available for all firms. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 20 

Nevertheless, the Council believes that the transparency, consistency and reliability 

associated with this approach are preferable to employing a series of assumptions about what 

the risk-based capital profile of firms that do not calculate risk-based capital figures would 

likely be. Moreover, the Council emphasizes that this recommendation is principally 

transitional in effect, as it only applies for so long as the specified financial companies are 

not subject to risk-based capital rules that are substantially the same as those applicable to 

bank holding companies. For example, as stated above, once savings and loan holding 

companies become subject to risk-based capital rules, the liabilities of such companies 

would, in accordance with the Council’s recommendation, be calculated under those riskbased capital rules in accordance with the statutory definition of liabilities. As a result, the 

Council expects the population of financial companies included in the concentration limit 

that will not be subject to risk-based capital rules (and thus, for which GAAP liabilities will 

be used) is very small, constituting only an estimated 3.8 percent of the total concentration 

limit denominator as calculated under the recommendation modification as of December 31, 

2009. 

In order to ensure that appropriate financial information under applicable accounting 

principles is available for companies not currently subject to risk-based capital rules, the 

Council encourages the Board, the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 

to collect this information by requiring each insured depository institution that is not 

controlled by a bank holding company, a company treated as a bank holding company, or a 

savings and loan holding company to report the total consolidated liabilities of its top-tier 

parent company as of the end of each calendar year based on the appropriate accounting 

standards and, to the extent possible, to use publicly reported data. 

2.2. COLLECTION, AGGREGATION AND PUBLIC DISSEMINATION OF 

 CONCENTRATION LIMIT DATA

Council Recommendation: The concentration limit under Section 622 should be modified to 

provide that a transaction covered by section 622 shall be considered to have violated the 

concentration limit if the total consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial company 

upon consummation of the transaction would exceed 10 percent of the average amount of 

aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies as reported by the Board as of 

the end of the two most recent calendar years. For this purpose, rules issued under section 

622 shall provide for the Board to publicly report, on an annual basis and no later than July 

1 of any calendar year, a final calculation of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all 

financial companies as of the end of the preceding calendar year. 

Discussion: As described in Part C.1, although the statutory provisions of section 622 

require a financial company to comply with the concentration limit with respect to aggregate 

financial company liabilities as of the end of the most recent calendar year, the data 

necessary to determine such aggregate liabilities will not be publicly available for some time 

following the end of the calendar year. In addition, it is likely that the Board will require an 

additional period of time, perhaps 2 to 3 months, to aggregate all available data and verify 

and publish an aggregate financial company liabilities figure. Until such data are compiled, 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 21 

certified, and made available, financial companies will, at best, only be able to estimate 

whether a transaction would comply with the limit. 

In addition, the Council is concerned that applying the denominator for any given year as of a 

single date (i.e., the end of the calendar year) may introduce unnecessary volatility into the 

concentration limit and its application, particularly given the large increase or decrease to the 

denominator that might occur from year to year as the result of specific events, such as the 

designation of a large nonbank financial company as systemically important by the Council, 

the rescission of such a designation, or the acquisition (or sale) of a bank by a large company 

that causes it to be newly included (or excluded) from the concentration limit denominator. 

To address this concern, the Council recommends that the Board, in implementing section 

622, use the average of the final aggregate financial company liabilities figure as of the end 

of the prior 2 years as the denominator in the concentration limit, rather than just using the 

aggregate financial company liabilities figure as of the end of the prior year. 

As a result, the Council recommends that the statutory provision be modified to provide that 

a transaction covered by section 622 shall be considered to have violated the concentration 

limit if the total consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial company upon 

consummation of the transaction would exceed 10 percent of the average amount of 

aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies as reported by the Board as of the 

end of the two most recent calendar years. This will reduce the volatility of the denominator 

of the concentration limit and will ensure that the applicable denominator is at all times 

transparent and known to each financial company subject to the concentration limit. 

In addition, the Council believes that the Board should make a final denominator amount 

public on an annual basis, which upon publication would be the legally effective denominator 

(subject to the averaging discussed in the preceding paragraph) beginning on that date and 

continuing until the next annual final denominator amount is made public by the Board. 

Separate from and in addition to publication of this legally effective denominator figure, in 

order to provide financial companies with as much advance notice as possible as to what the 

denominator amount is likely to be, the Council encourages the Board to consider making 

public an initial, nonbinding and estimated denominator amount in advance of the final 

figure. The Council believes that its recommended approach will both resolve the practical 

problems posed by the statutory provisions on this point and help ensure that the 

concentration limit is implemented and enforced in a fair and transparent fashion around 

which financial companies can organize meaningful compliance efforts. 

2.3. ACQUISITION OF FAILING INSURED DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS

Council Recommendation: The concentration limit under section 622 should be modified to 

provide that, with the prior written consent of the Board, the concentration limit shall not 

apply to an acquisition of any type of insured depository institution in default or in danger of 

default. 

Discussion: As described in Part A, the statute includes an exception from the concentration 

limit for an acquisition of a bank in default or in danger of default, subject to the prior written 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONCENTRATION LIMIT 22 

consent of the Board.43 However, this exception applies by its terms to a failing “bank,” 

rather than a failing insured depository institution. Under the BHC Act (within which section 

622 is codified) the term “bank” is defined in a manner that excludes certain insured 

depository institutions, including savings associations, industrial loan companies, limitedpurpose credit card banks and limited-purpose trust companies.44 The Council believes that 

the important policy that supports the exception for the acquisition of failing banks–namely, 

the strong public interest in limiting the costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund that could arise 

if a bank were to fail, which might be partly or wholly limited through acquisition of a failing 

bank by another firm–applies equally to insured depository institutions generally, and is not 

limited to “banks” as that terms in defined in the BHC Act. Accordingly, the Council 

recommends that the concentration limit be modified to except from the concentration limit 

an acquisition of a failing insured depository institution. As with the other statutory 

exceptions, use of this exception would require the prior written consent of the Board in any 

specific instance. Such approval would be in addition to any other regulatory approvals 

required for the transaction. 

 

43 Id. at § 1852(c)(1). 44 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). 
REFERENCES 23 

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Pagano (2003), “Do Bankers Sacrifice Value to Build Empires? Managerial Incentives, Industry 

Consolidation, and Financial Performance,” Journal of Banking and Finance 27:417-447. 

Wheelock, David C., and Paul W. Wilson (2010), “Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New 

Estimates of Returns to Scale for U.S. Banks,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research 

Division Working Paper 2009-054C
FIGURES 24 

FIGURES

FIGURE 1: NATIONAL DEPOSIT SHARES OF THE FOUR LARGEST DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

Bank of America 7.41 9.99 8.99 9.06 10.01 10.61 11.99 

Wells Fargo 4.55 4.61 4.78 4.27 4.15 9.90 9.94 

J.P. Morgan Chase 3.76 6.83 6.92 7.23 7.43 9.99 8.49 

Citigroup 3.55 3.45 3.50 3.766 4.24 4.36 4.26 

SOURCE: Reports of Income and Condition and equivalent reports from thrift institution 

FIGURE 2: U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE CREDIT CARD PURCHASE VOLUME

SOURCE: Nilson Report 

FIGURE 3: MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS AND SERVICING, 2009 

 Market Share (%) 

SOURCE: 

Mortgage Market Statistical Annual 

2009 Market Shares (%) 

 American Express 23.27 

 J.P. Morgan Chase 17.85 

Bank of America 12.88 

Citigroup 10.70 

Capital One 5.31 

Discover 4.97 

U.S. Bank 3.85 

Wells Fargo 2.63 

HSBC 1.91 

Barclays 1.64 

USAA 1.44 

GE Money 1.03 

Originations Servicing 

Wells Fargo 23.5 16.7 

Bank of America 21.6 20.0 

J.P. Morgan Chase 8.6 12.9 

Citigroup 4.5 6.7 

GMAC 3.5 3.2 

US Bank 3.1 1.6 

SunTrust Mortgage Inc 2.8 1.6 

Provident Funding 2.1 0.4 

USAA Federal Savings Bank 2.1 0.2 

PHH Mortgage 2.0 1.4 
FIGURES 25 

FIGURE 4: SYNDICATED LENDING MARKET SHARES

NOTE: Market shares are measured by syndicated lending volume as reported by Bloomberg. 

Bank of America’s share for 2009 includes Merrill Lynch. 

 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

J.P. Morgan Chase 3.9 25.0 27.1 24.0 19.0 19.6 15.5 14.7 12.0 8.9 8.9 

Citigroup 9.1 12.0 15.9 13.4 13.8 12.7 12.3 10.6 9.9 7.5 6.9 

Bank of America 11.2 12.9 13.3 10.9 9.6 11.0 9.4 8.9 7.2 5.6 6.9 

BNP Paribas Group 2.3 1.6 1.8 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6 4.6 5.3 

RBS 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.3 2.2 2.7 3.5 4.7 4.1 6.2 4.0 

Barclays Capital 1.6 3.0 2.7 4.3 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 3.4 3.1 

Credit Agricole CIB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.0 2.6 1.9 2.1 2.7 3.1 

HSBC Bank PLC 1.5 2.0 1.6 2.5 3.4 2.4 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.6 3.0 

Deutsche Bank AG 4.9 4.0 4.6 5.4 4.0 3.7 3.6 4.0 3.8 3.1 2.8 

Wells Fargo & Co 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 2.4 
FIGURES 26 

FIGURE 5: ESTIMATED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GAAP AND RISK-BASED

 CAPITAL LIABILITY MEASURES BY CATEGORY OF COMPANIES

Preliminary and Non-Binding Estimates 

Categories of Companies 

(US$ billions) 

Number of 

Companies 

Total 

Liabilities

under GAAP

(“GAAP 

Liabilities”)

RiskWeighted 

Assets 

less 

Regulatory 

Capital 

(“RWA-RC 

Liabilities”) 

Percentage 

Difference 

between GAAP 

Liabilities and 

RWA-RC 

Liabilities 

Liabilities under the 

Recommended 

Modification to the 

Definition of Liabilities in 

Part C.2.1 

Stand-alone Insured 

Depository Institutions 

(“IDIs”) 

1,711 368 237 -35.5% 237 

Bank Holding 

Companies (“BHCs”) 4,886 13,267 8,293 -37.5% 8,293 

Savings and Loan 

Holding Companies 

(“SHLCs”) 

394 3,465 N/A N/A 3,465 

Companies that control 

IDIs but are not, and are 

not treated as, BHCs or 

SLHCs 

42 551 N/A N/A 551 

Foreign Banking 

Organizations* 178 N/A N/A N/A N/A 

NOTE: Liabilities under the recommended modification to the definition of liabilities in Part C.2.1 are: 

 Risk-weighted assets minus risk-based capital for BHCs and stand alone insured depository institutions, 

and 

 GAAP liabilities for SLHCs and companies that control an IDI but are not and are not treated as BHCs or 

SLHCs. 

 

* For foreign-based firms, liabilities will be estimated using U.S. third party liabilities or other appropriate methods as reported on U.S. bank 

regulatory forms until risk-weighted assets and capital figures under risk-based capital rules are reported on a U.S. operations basis. The 

complete information that is required to calculate U.S.-only liabilities under GAAP or risk-based capital rules is not currently available.