UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-20265-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

NATHALIE SORENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant American Airlines, Inc.’s (“American

Airlines”) Motion to Transfer Venue, ECF No. [15] (“Motion”). Plaintiff Nathalie Sorensen 

(“Plaintiff”) filed a Response to the Motion, ECF No. [18], to which Defendant filed a Reply, ECF 

No. [19]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, all opposing and supporting submissions, 

the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff initiated this case against Defendants American Airlines and Thor ZubbriggenRoy (“Roy”) in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida on December 23, 

2021. ECF No [1-2]. On January 24, 2022, American Airlines removed the lawsuit to this Court. 

ECF No. [1]. In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following claims for relief against Defendant

American Airlines: negligence (Count I); vicarious negligence (Count VIII); and gross negligence 

(Count IX). Id. Although Plaintiff asserted claims for relief against Roy that include assault (Count 

II); battery (Count III); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV); defamation (Count 

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V); false imprisonment (Count VI) and gross negligence (Count VII), Plaintiff voluntarily 

dismissed Roy from the action with prejudice. See ECF No. [26].

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she was a fare-paying passenger aboard American 

Airlines flight 2575 from Miami, Florida to Dallas, Texas on December 29, 2019 (“Subject 

Flight”). ECF No. [1-2] ¶ 7. Plaintiff claims that Roy, a flight attendant employed by American 

Airlines, committed tortious acts and conduct in the course and scope of his employment on board 

the Subject Flight. Id. ¶ 5. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, while in business class with her 

fiancé, she fell asleep and was woken abruptly by Roy who clenched her arm and shook her 

violently while shouting at her and demanding that she “Wake up right now! Wake up!” Id. ¶¶ 7, 

8. Plaintiff alleges that Roy also publicly stated and accused Plaintiff of “stealing” the blanket she 

was using, exclaiming loud enough for everyone to hear “I know you stole this blanket!” Id. ¶ 9.

Plaintiff’s fiancé instructed Roy to stop touching his wife and to get away from her. Id. ¶ 10. Roy 

responded aggressively by stating, “This is my airplane. I am the Head Flight Attendant, and I can 

touch whoever I want.” Id. Plaintiff’s fiancé tried to reason with the male flight attendant and 

explain that no one had “stolen” any blanket, and in turn, Roy issued Plaintiff a “Passenger Inflight 

Disturbance Report” and threatened out loud that Plaintiff “better watch out.” Id. ¶ 13. The 

“Passenger Inflight Disturbance Report” was a Federal Aviation Administration warning 

threatening jail time and a fine. Id. ¶ 14. Once the aircraft landed, Roy and other persons employed 

by and on behalf of American Airlines contacted or caused to be contacted the Dallas-Fort Worth 

(“DFW”) Airport Police for purposes of arresting and detaining Plaintiff. Id. ¶16. Upon landing, 

Plaintiff was escorted off the plane. Id. ¶ 17. Approximately six police officers of the DFW Airport 

Police Department were waiting for Plaintiff at the gate. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff was detained, during 

which she described the incident, and was released after a period of time. Id. ¶ 18. 

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This is not the first time Plaintiff has litigated the precise claims now before this Court. On 

July 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a similar complaint, alleging the identical underlying facts, in a case 

styled Nathalie Sorensen vs. American Airlines, American Airlines, Inc., d/b/a American Airlines, 

American Airlines Group, Inc., d/b/a American Airlines, Case No. DC-20-09304, in the 14th

Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. (“First State Court Action”). See ECF No. [15-2]. 

The First State Court Action was transferred on January 8, 2021, to the 96th Judicial District Court, 

Tarrant County, State of Texas, and assigned Case No. 048-322772-2 (“Second State Court 

Action”). See id. at 6. Plaintiff amended her complaint and added Roy as a defendant, and 

subsequently “voluntarily nonsuited” defendant American Airlines. ECF No. [15-3] at 358. During 

the pendency of the Second State Court Action, the parties engaged in extensive discovery,

including depositions of Plaintiff and three eyewitnesses, protective orders were issued, motions

to compel discovery were briefed by the parties and ruled upon by the judge, and the parties 

proposed a scheduling order that was thereafter entered by the court. See ECF No. [15-3].

Following Plaintiff’s nonsuit of defendant American, defendant Roy removed the action to 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in a case styled Nathalie 

Sorensen v. Thor Zurbriggen-Roy, Case No. 4:22-cv-00056 (N.D. Texas) (“Texas District Court 

Action”). See ECF No. [15] at 5 n. 1. After the Florida lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff filed her motion 

to dismiss the Texas District Court Action, advising the court that she “no longer desires to 

prosecute her claims against Defendant THOR ZURBRIGGEN-ROY in this venue and requests 

that the Court dismiss” the claims. ECF No. [18-8]. On April 22, 2022, the court entered an order 

of dismissal of the Texas District Court Action. 1

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the proceedings and the filings in the First and Second State Court 

Actions, as well as those in Texas District Court Action. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 

1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (court may take judicial notice of public filings “for the purpose of determining what 

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Defendant now seeks to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas, arguing that the procedural and material facts in this case weigh 

strongly in favor of transfer. See generally ECF No. [15]. Plaintiff responds that her choice of 

forum is entitled to considerable deference, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, location 

of sources of proof, locus of operative facts, ability of process to compel the attendance of 

unwilling witnesses, trial efficiency, and the interest of justice weigh against transfer. See 

generally ECF No. [18].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which embodies a codification and revision of 

the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981), 

provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district 

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been 

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Congress authorized courts to transfer the venue of a case in order 

to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, and the public, and to conserve 

time, energy, and money.” Cellularvision Tech. & Telecomms., L.P. v. Alltel Corp., 508 F. Supp. 

2d 1186, 1188-89 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab’ys, 146 F. 

Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001)). Indeed, “Section 1404(a) reflects an increased desire to 

have federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place called for in the particular case by 

considerations of convenience and justice.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). The 

standard for transfer grants broad discretion to the district court. Osgood v. Disc. Auto Parts, LLC, 

981 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (stating that the “standard for transfer under 28 U.S.C. 

statements the documents contain and not to prove the truth of the documents’ contents”) (quoting authority 

omitted); Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. SEC, 177 F. App’x 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) (courts may take 

judicial notice of public records, such as a complaint filed in another court).

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§ 1404(a) leaves much to the broad discretion of the trial court”); see also Piper Aircraft Co., 454 

U.S. at 236 (noting that “[d]istrict courts were given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) 

than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens” (citation omitted)); Motorola 

Mobility, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“The Court has 

broad discretion in determining whether these factors suggest that transfer is appropriate.”). “[T]he 

burden is on the movant to establish that the suggested forum is more convenient.” In re Ricoh 

Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989).

In determining the appropriateness of transfer, courts employ a two-step process. See 

Osgood, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (citing Abbate v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 09-62047-

CIV, 2010 WL 3446878, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2010)). First, the district court is tasked with 

determining whether the action could have been pursued in the venue to which transfer is sought.

Id. With regard to this first prong, an action “might have been brought” in any court that has 

subject-matter jurisdiction, where venue is proper, and where the defendant is amenable to process 

issuing out of the transferee court. Windmere Corp. v. Remington Prods., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 8, 10 

(S.D. Fla. 1985) (citing 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3845 (1976)). 

Second, “courts assess whether convenience and the interest of justice require transfer to 

the requested forum.” Osgood, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (citation omitted); see also Abbate, 2010 

WL 3446878, at *3 (“The [Court of Appeals for the] The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that 

district courts have broad discretion in determining whether to transfer a case to another district 

for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interests of justice.”). In analyzing this 

second prong, courts apply several factors weighing the various public and private interests. See

Motorola Mobility, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76.

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III. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that transfer of this action to the Northern District of Texas is proper, 

contending that the public and private interest factors weigh in favor of transfer. ECF Nos. [15], 

[19]. Although Plaintiff opposes the Motion, the parties do not dispute that this action could have 

been pursued, and in fact was pursued, in the Northern District of Texas and venue would be proper 

in that district. See ECF Nos. [15] at 4, [18];

2

see also Osgood, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (stating 

that the first part of the two-step analysis in determining the appropriateness of transfer involves 

assessing whether the action could have been pursued in the venue to which transfer is sought

(citing Abbate, 2010 WL 3446878, at *4)). The Court agrees and easily finds that the action could 

have been pursued in the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiff already filed a similar suit involving 

the same underlying facts in Texas state court and was removed to the Northern District of Texas

prior to its voluntary dismissal by Plaintiff. The parties litigated the claims in the Texas state and 

federal actions for nearly two years and that is the most persuasive ground supporting transfer. 

Adjudication of the present dispute by the court having an extensive familiarity with the parties, 

facts, and the claims will certainly enable an expeditious and efficient resolution to the litigation. 

Relevant here, Plaintiff was a resident of Miami at the time she chose to initiate suit in Texas in 

2020.

Accordingly, the Court addresses “whether convenience and the interest of justice require 

transfer to the requested forum,” Osgood, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1263, and the Court’s transfer analysis 

focuses on the weight of the public and private interest factors. Defendant, as the movant, bears

the burden of demonstrating entitlement to transfer. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d at 573 (“[I]n 

2 See Windmere Corp., 617 F. Supp. at 10 (“An action ‘might have been brought’ in a proposed transferee 

court if: (1) the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; (2) venue is proper there; and 

(3) the defendant is amenable to process issuing out of the transferee court.”).

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the usual motion for transfer under section 1404(a), the burden is on the movant to establish that 

the suggested forum is more convenient.”).

In analyzing whether a defendant has sufficiently demonstrated that transfer is appropriate, 

a court considers the following private and public interest factors:

(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the 

relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) 

the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance 

of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum’s 

familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’s choice of 

forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of 

the circumstances.

Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). “Ultimately, transfer can 

only be granted where the balance of convenience of the parties strongly favors the defendant.”

Steifel Labs., Inc. v. Galderma Labs., Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing 

Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996)).

A. Private Interest Factors

Defendant argues that convenience of the parties and witnesses, the location of relevant 

documents, and the relative ease of access to sources of proof support a transfer of this action. ECF 

No. [15] at 6-7. Plaintiff responds that eight of the nine private interest factors weigh against 

transfer of this action. See generally ECF No. [1]. The Court finds that consideration of the private 

interest factors weighs in favor of transfer to the Northern District of Texas. 

1. The Convenience of the Witnesses

Defendant argues that the remaining depositions involve potential American Airlines flight 

attendants and police officers who are “most logically residents of Dallas or Fort Worth, Texas[.]” 

ECF Nos. [15] at 7, [19] at 5. Defendant asserts that “the DFW police officers that were purportedly 

involved in escorting Plaintiff off the plane will almost certainly be critical witnesses in this 

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matter.” ECF No. [19] at 4. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s Miami-based witnesses—

Avery Andon (Plaintiff’s fiancé), Jeannie Etter (a Miami-based attorney who was on the Subject 

Flight), and David Coulson (Etter’s spouse and a Miami-based attorney who was on the Subject 

Flight), see ECF No. [18] ¶ 13— have already been deposed in the Second State Court Action, so 

they would not be inconvenienced by a transfer to the Northern District of Texas. ECF Nos. [15] 

at 7.

Plaintiff quotes to Osgood and responds that “[t]he convenience of both the party and nonparty witnesses is probably considered the single most important factor in the analysis whether a 

transfer should be granted.” ECF No. [18] ¶ 7 (quoting 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1264). She also maintains 

that “[w]hen weighing the convenience of the witnesses, a court does not merely tally the number 

of witnesses who reside in the current forum in comparison to the number located in the proposed 

transferee forum. Instead, the court must qualitatively evaluate the materiality of the testimony 

that the witness may provide.” Id. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the Court should consider whether 

the witnesses are subject to the subpoena power of the court. Id. She argues this factor weighs

against transfer because the testimony of George Flores (“Flores”), a Miami resident and 

individual who was an eyewitness to the alleged tortious conduct committed by Roy, is essential 

to proving her case in chief. ECF No. [18] ¶ 8. Most importantly, Plaintiff notes that Flores failed 

to attend his deposition in Miami and Plaintiff will need to rely on the Court’s subpoena power to 

compel Flores’ attendance in the future. Id.

The Court notes that the deposition testimony of each of the witnesses, with the exceptions 

of Flores and Roy, has already been taken in the Texas action. As to Flores, neither party sought 

relief from the court after Flores failed to appear for his deposition last year in Miami so the Court 

gives little weight to the claim that Plaintiff may rely in the future on the Court’s subpoena power. 

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As to Roy, he is an employee of American and where witnesses are employees of a party, their 

convenience is entitled to less weight because the respective party will be able to compel their 

attendance and testimony at trial. Nat’l Tr. Ins. Co. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 

3d 1236, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2016); Trinity Christian Ctr. of Santa Ana, Inc. v. New Frontier Media, 

Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that this factor's “significance is 

diminished when the witnesses ... are employees of a party.”); Allstar Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Your 

Store Online, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“The court accords less weight 

to the inconvenience of party witnesses, however, as they can be compelled to testify regardless 

of the forum in which the lawsuit is ultimately litigated.”); Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical 

Labs., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“Thus, transfer may be denied when the 

witnesses, although in another district, are employees of a party and their presence can be obtained 

by that party.”). Indeed, “it is not so much the convenience of the witnesses but the possibility of 

having their testimony at trial that is important.” Dale v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 

1257-58 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Mason, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1361). The other witnesses 

Defendant identifies are also employees of Defendant American Airlines. As to the DFW police 

officers, Defendant has not identified any specific individual who would testify but for the location

of the forum, rather than merely potential witnesses. Upon consideration, the Court is unpersuaded

that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. 

2. Location of Relevant Documents and the Relative Ease of Access to Sources of 

Proof

Defendant argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because its principal place of 

business, the airport where the Subject Flight landed, and the police department where Plaintiff 

was detained are all located within the Northern District of Texas. ECF No. [15] at 7. Plaintiff 

responds that this factor weighs against transfer because the witnesses who have been deposed in 

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the Second State Court Action are domiciled or work in Miami, Florida. ECF No. [18] ¶ 10. Yet, 

Plaintiff concedes that the location of documents is a neutral factor because documents and sources 

of proof can be exchanged via electronic means. Id.

Defendant has not established that the location of Defendant’s principal place of business, 

the airport where the Subject Flight landed, and the police department where Plaintiff was detained 

are sources of proof in this case. Further, Defendant has not alleged that a jury view is needed of

any of those locations during trial or that any documents or evidence related to the case that may 

be located at these sites are not available for viewing or accessing outside of the Northern District 

of Texas. Moreover, the location of relevant documents warrants little weight because documents 

and sources of proof can be exchanged via electronic means. Mason, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (“[I]n 

light of technological advancements in document imaging, management, and retrieval, it is 

unlikely that document production will be unduly burdensome if transfer is denied.”). Accordingly, 

this factor is neutral and does not weigh toward or against transfer of this action.

3. The Convenience of the Parties

Defendant argues that this factor weighs in favor transfer because Plaintiff has already 

voluntarily engaged in litigation against Defendant and Roy in Texas so she cannot now claim it 

is inconvenient for her to litigate in that forum. ECF No. [15] at 6. Further, Defendant argues that 

it would be more convenient for Defendant to litigate this case in the Northern District of Texas 

because its principal place of business is within the territorial boundaries of the Northern District 

of Texas. Id. Plaintiff responds that she is a resident of Florida, four witnesses are Florida residents,

and that “both Courts are equally familiar with the applicable law.” ECF No. [18] ¶ 15.

Upon consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s decision to file her action in Texas and 

to proceed with significant discovery, including her own videotaped deposition and those of three 

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eyewitnesses who also live in Miami, seriously undermines her claim that she will be 

inconvenienced. However, Defendant has failed to show how transfer would be more convenient, 

as opposed to merely shifting the convenience to Defendant. As such, this factor does not weigh 

in favor of either party.

4. The Locus of Operative Facts

Defendant correctly points out that the claimed tortious acts were committed either in midflight between MIA and DFW, or at DFW when Plaintiff was escorted off the flight and detained 

by DFW police. ECF No. [19] at 3. Plaintiff responds that the locus of operative facts weighs 

against transfer because she requested a blanket while boarding the plane in Florida, Plaintiff’s 

fiancé searched for a blanket as the Subject Flight was boarding at Miami International Airport in 

Florida, and she was given a blanket approximately 30 minutes into the Subject Flight. ECF No. 

[18] at ¶ 11. Yet, Plaintiff concedes that the incident giving rise to this case occurred somewhere 

in the air between Miami and DFW International Airport. Id.; ECF No. [19] at 3. Defendant replies

that the locus of operative facts weighs in favor of transfer because as “between Texas and Florida, 

more of the alleged critical events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Texas.” Id. at 4. 

Moreover, the tortious encounter at issue commenced when Plaintiff was woken up by a flight 

attendant about an hour and thirty minutes into the Subject Flight which would place the aircraft 

either over the Gulf of Mexico or the airspace between Louisiana. Id. at 3. Further, the events that 

support Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim occurred in Dallas, Texas. Id. at 4.

“The locus of operative facts refers to the specific action or omissions that gave rise to the 

cause of action.” Hagin v. TA Operating, LLC, 2014 WL 1385709, *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2014) 

(quoting authority omitted). Here, the operative facts span between both Florida and Texas. The 

events underlying the tortious acts at issue occurred mid-flight between Florida and Texas and in 

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Texas when Plaintiff was escorted off the Subject Flight and detained by DFW police. The fact 

that Plaintiff boarded the flight is merely incidental. Because the alleged tortious activity occurred 

mid-flight spans between Texas and Florida, there is no significant connection to either Texas or 

Florida. Plaintiff’s detention and questioning in DFW, however, demonstrates that the connection 

to Texas is stronger than the connection to Florida. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 

transfer. 

5. The Availability of Process to Compel the Attendance of Unwilling Witnesses

The availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses does not weigh 

in favor of transfer. Defendant has failed to identify any unwilling witnesses who could not be 

compelled to attend a trial in Miami but who would otherwise attend in Texas. This factor offers 

Defendant no support. Thus, this factor does not tilt in favor of transfer. See, e.g., Perlman v.

Delisfort-Theodule, No. 09-80480-CIV, 2010 WL 11504751, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 

2010), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 846 (11th Cir. 2012) (denying transfer where movant “has identified 

no witnesses who would be unwilling to travel to Florida to testify or who could not be compelled 

to do so.”); Legg v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 14-61116-CIV, 2015 WL 13753742, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 

Mar. 6, 2015) (determining that the fifth factor “does not weigh in either party’s favor at this early 

stage” where “[n]either party has identified any witnesses that are potentially unwilling to 

participate at trial and thus the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling 

witnesses is a non-issue”); Roy v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. 613CV1656ORL36KRS, 2014 WL 

12783276, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (finding that the convenience of witnesses and 

availability of process to compel attendance did not weigh in favor of transfer where defendant did 

“not identify any non-party witnesses who are unwilling to testify”); Figueroa v. Sharper Image

Corp., No. 05-21251-CIV, 2005 WL 8154985, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2005) (noting that transfer 

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may be denied “where the movant does not show that the witnesses would be unwilling to testify”) 

(quoting Mason, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-620). Plaintiff has identified one eyewitness, Flores, a 

resident of Miami, who has already failed to appear for his deposition. However, as stated, Plaintiff 

has not sought the assistance of the Court to compel that witness’s appearance. The Court notes 

that the court provided letters rogatory for each of the eyewitnesses, see, e.g., ECF No. [15-3] at 

280, and the requested subpoenas were issued by the clerk of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in 

Miami. Id. at 228. However, following the nonappearance of Flores in Miami in September 2021, 

no effort was made to seek the court’s assistance. Accordingly, the Court finds this factor is neutral.

6. The Relative Means of The Parties

Regarding the relative means of the parties, the Court finds that this factor is neutral. 

Defendant does not address this factor in its Motion. See generally ECF No. [15]. Plaintiff argues 

that Defendant has more means to litigate this action in Florida than Plaintiff has to litigate the 

action in Texas. ECF No. [18] ¶ 16. Plaintiff is an individual whereas Defendant is a corporation 

and “one of the largest private employers in Miami-Dade County with an annual payroll that 

exceeds $415 million and 115,000 jobs are created through ancillary businesses.” ECF No. [18-5] 

at 1.

3 This factor does not weigh in favor of either party. The Court acknowledges that Defendant 

is a large corporation and Plaintiff is an individual. But by filing and litigating the previous action

in Texas, Plaintiff established that she has the relative means to litigate this case in the Northern 

District of Texas in the event of transfer. As such, both parties have the means to litigate this case 

in the event of transfer. 

3 Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s Exhibit E, a document titled American’s Miami Hub and the source 

of this quote, or the facts contained therein.

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7. Forum’s Familiarity with the Governing Law

Defendant addresses this factor in the context of the public interest factor which considers 

the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must 

govern the action. ECF No. [15] at 10. Defendant argues that Texas law should be applied to the 

substantive matters in this suit and the Northern District of Texas is the proper forum for this suit. 

Id. Plaintiff does not address the forum’s familiarity with the governing law. See generally ECF 

No. [15]. 

The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. While this Court need not 

determine the law of which state governs the suit at this time, both the Southern District of Florida 

and the Northern District of Texas are equally as equipped to apply the laws of Texas or Florida. 

See Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 67–68 (2013) (“And, 

in any event, federal judges routinely apply the law of a State other than the State in which they 

sit. We are not aware of any exceptionally arcane features of Texas contract law that are likely to 

defy comprehension by a federal judge sitting in Virginia.”). However, the court records reflect

that Texas law has already been applied to certain pretrial matters as the Texas Court held three 

separate hearings and decided pretrial discovery matters, including a protective order, motions to 

compel, and release of Plaintiff’s medical records. See ECF No. [15-3] at 370.

8. Weight Accorded to a Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s initial choice of forum was Texas, Plaintiff’s 

choice of forum in Florida is entitled to less consideration because the tortious acts did not occur 

within this forum. ECF No. [15] at 6. Plaintiff responds that her choice of forum should be given 

considerable deference because significant facts giving rise to this case have a material relation to 

this forum. ECF No. [18] ¶ 18. Defendant replies that Plaintiff’s choice of forum should be 

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accorded less deference because Plaintiff’s decision to first file suit in Texas and now file the 

instant suit in the Southern District of Florida indicates that Plaintiff is forum shopping. ECF No. 

[19] at 2-3. 

Traditionally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded considerable deference and unless 

the Plaintiff’s choice of forum is clearly outweighed by other considerations, it should not be 

disturbed. Robinson v. Giramarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 254 (11th Cir. 1996). However, “where 

the operative facts underlying the cause of action did not occur within the forum chosen by the 

Plaintiff, the choice of forum is entitled to less consideration.” Motorola Mobility, Inc., 804 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1276 (quoting Windmere, 617 F. Supp. at 10). “Furthermore, plaintiff’s choice of a 

forum warrants less deference if ‘there is any indication that plaintiff’s choice of forum is the result 

of forum shopping.’” Combs v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 461 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1214 (N.D. Fla. 2020) 

(quoting authority omitted). Defendant contends that “Plaintiff’s brazen and shameless forum 

efforts to forum shop should not be encouraged,” ECF No. [19] at 5, yet Defendant offers no reason 

why the Court should accept this conclusion. As such, Defendant’s citation to Gillig v. Nike, Inc., 

No. 08-22845-CIV, 2008 WL 11429501, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2008) is inapposite. There, the

plaintiff sought to transfer a case from the venue he initially selected. The court found there was 

forum shopping because the plaintiff attempted to avoid adverse rulings when he opposed transfer 

of the case to the original forum where a related case has already been litigated and adverse rulings 

were made against him in the original forum. Here, Defendant offers no basis to allow the Court 

to find forum shopping on Plaintiff’s part.

However, Defendant is correct that, critically, Plaintiff’s initial choice of forum was Texas, 

not Florida. After litigating the case in Texas for over one year, and while that action was still 

pending, Plaintiff filed this case in Florida’s state court. Moreover, Plaintiff’s choice of forum is 

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entitled to less consideration because the operative facts did not occur in Florida. In contrast to 

Plaintiff’s contention, boarding the flight in Miami or requesting a blanket once on the flight are

merely incidental to the claimed tortious conduct. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s choice to bring this 

action in Florida is not afforded much deference.

B. Public Interest Factors and the Interests of Justice

Next, the Court considers, based on the totality of the circumstances, the interests of justice 

and several other public interest factors, that include:

the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in 

having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a 

diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; 

the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of 

foreign law; and the unfairness in burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with 

jury duty.

Trace-Wilco, Inc., 2009 WL 455432, at *2 (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258 n.6).

Defendant argues that all the public interest factors weigh in favor of transfer. Moreover, 

Defendant contends that administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion weigh in favor 

of transfer because the Southern District of Florida has one of the busiest dockets in the country. 

ECF No. [15] at 9. Defendant cites statistics that demonstrate the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Texas had fewer filings in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2021, 

than in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Id. However, as 

recognized by Defendant, “this factor generally does not warrant significant consideration in the 

forum non conveniens analysis, and the Court does not accord it much weight.” Beaman v. Maco 

Caribe, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379–80 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Defendant also contends that Texas 

has an interest in having localized controversies decided at home and having the trial of a diversity 

case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action weighs in favor of transfer. 

ECF No. [15] at 9-10. Lastly, Defendant argues that it is unfair to burden citizens of the Southern 

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District of Florida with jury duty because this dispute has no relation to Florida. Id. at 11. Plaintiff

does not address the public interest factors and generally argues that trial efficiency and the interest 

of justice weigh in favor of the case remaining in the Southern District of Florida because the 

material witnesses reside in this district and trial in Miami will be more efficient. ECF No. [18]. 

The Court finds that the public interest factors weigh heavily in favor of transfer. While 

this case has a relation to the Southern District of Florida, namely Plaintiff is a Florida resident, its 

relation to the Northern District of Texas is stronger, and the Texas District Court Action was 

previously pending and involved the same underlying events at issue in this case.4In her Response, 

Plaintiff represents that she has requested dismissal of the Texas action and it is no longer pending. 

As such, Defendant’s request to consolidate the Florida case with the Texas case would not be 

appropriate. However, given the Texas court’s familiarity with the case, judicial economy warrants 

litigating the case in Texas. The record plainly demonstrates that significant judicial resources and 

substantial time and energy have been expended in the Texas Second State Court Action and the

Texas District Court Action. Following a balancing of the public and private interests, the Court 

finds that it weighs heavily in favor of transferring the case to the Northern Texas, Ft. Worth 

4 Defendant’s argument that this action should be transferred because the substantially similar related action 

pending in Texas was filed first, is not a proper consideration in the transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a). Defendant cites to Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2005) and In re 

Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2012) which discuss the federal 

court’s power under the “first to file rule.” “[T]he first to file rule not only determines which court may 

decide the merits of substantially similar issues, but also establishes which court may decide whether the 

second suit filed must be dismissed, stayed or transferred and consolidated.” In re Checking Acct. Overdraft 

Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 (internal quotations and citing authority omitted). Defendant did not seek a 

dismissal, stay or transfer of this case pursuant to “first to file rule.” As such, Defendant’s argument that 

“[w]here two actions involving overlapping issues and parties are pending in two federal courts, there is a 

strong presumption across the federal circuits that favors the forum of the first-filed suit under the first-filed 

rule[]” is not relevant to the Court’s present analysis. Manuel, 430 F.3d at 1135.

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Division and overcomes any presumption in favor of Plaintiff’s now chosen forum. Accordingly, 

the Motion is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 

1. Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. [15], is GRANTED.

2. The case is TRANSFERRED to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of Texas, Ft. Worth Division.

3. Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT and scheduled hearings are 

CANCELED.

4. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to CLOSE the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on June 8, 2022.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: 

Counsel of Record 

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