IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

____________________ 

RONALD MOBLEY, individually and on 

behalf of similarly situated individuals, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 1:22-cv-00226-WJ-LF 

CIG LOGISTICS LLC, 

CONTINENTAL INTERMODAL 

GROUP – TRUCKING LLC, 

 Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO TRANSFER VENUE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss and to Transfer Venue 

(Doc. 7) by Defendants CIG Logistics LLC and Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC 

(“Defendants”). Defendants argue that personal jurisdiction and venue are lacking in New Mexico 

and that the Court should transfer the case to the Northern District of Texas. Doc. 7 at 1. They also 

argue that Plaintiff’s New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (“NMWWA”) allegations fail to state a 

claim. Id. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds 

Defendants’ motion well-taken regarding personal jurisdiction and, accordingly, transfer to the 

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas is appropriate. The Court therefore 

TRANSFERS the case to the Northern District of Texas, leaving the NMWWA matter for 

litigation in the proper forum. 

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged unpaid wages for travel between his home of 

Louisiana and work sites in New Mexico, North Dakota, and Texas in the course of his 

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employment for Defendants. Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b) (Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 42) as well as the NMWWA (id. at 1). The FLSA claim takes the 

form of a collective action in which Plaintiff is suing on his own behalf as well as on behalf of 

others who are similarly situated. Id. at 6 ¶ 41. 

LEGAL STANDARD

In a Rule 12(b)(2) dispute over personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving 

that jurisdiction is proper over Defendants. See Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1074 

(10th Cir. 2004). Personal jurisdiction takes two forms. General jurisdiction grants a court power 

to make rulings binding the defendant “on any and all claims” regardless of where those claims 

arose. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). This expansive power belongs to courts 

in the defendant’s “home” state or states, which for a corporate defendant typically include its state 

of incorporation and its principal place of business, although additional locations are possible. 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). In contrast, specific 

jurisdiction allows courts in other states to exercise power over a defendant, but only when 

minimum contacts exist connecting the defendant, the forum state, and the underlying controversy. 

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 133. The forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction must comport with “traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice”—a freestanding requirement that must be met even if 

minimum contacts do exist. Benton, 375 F.3d at 1075. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that general jurisdiction does not exist over Defendants in New Mexico; 

that specific jurisdiction does not exist as to the claims regarding unpaid wages for travel to North 

Dakota and Texas; that venue is improper over the North Dakota and Texas claims; and that the 

case should be transferred to the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1404. Plaintiff responds that specific jurisdiction exists over Defendants in New Mexico as to

all claims, rendering venue proper here and transfer unnecessary; in the alternative, Plaintiff seeks 

transfer to Delaware. The Court considers the jurisdictional question first before moving to the 

transfer analysis. 

I. General and Specific Jurisdiction

Although the parties focus on specific jurisdiction, the Court first briefly addresses general 

jurisdiction. General jurisdiction for a corporation exists where that entity is “at home,” generally 

either its state of incorporation or its principal place of business. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., 

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). Defendant CIG Logistics, LLC (“Defendant CIG”) is 

incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Fort Worth, Texas. Doc. 1 at 1 

¶ 5. Defendant Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC (“Defendant Intermodal”) is 

incorporated in Oklahoma and has its principal place of business in Fort Worth, Texas. Id. at 1 ¶ 

6. Therefore, Defendant CIG is subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware and Texas, and

Defendant Intermodal is subject to general jurisdiction in Oklahoma and Texas. The parties have 

not argued that either defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in New Mexico. 

Rather, the parties focus on specific jurisdiction. To establish the minimum contacts 

necessary for specific personal jurisdiction, a defendant must have “purposefully directed its 

activities at residents of the forum state” and “the plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of [the] 

defendant’s forum-related activities.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 

895, 904 (10th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants employed Plaintiff 

(a Louisiana resident) and other well site operators to work out-of-state in New Mexico, North 

Dakota, and Texas. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 20. The Court agrees that by hiring individuals to work in the 

state of New Mexico, Defendants directed their activities at residents of New Mexico, and a failure 

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to pay wages for work in New Mexico is a “forum-related activity” from which Plaintiff’s injuries 

under the FLSA arose. 

However, this logic only applies to individuals hired to work in New Mexico. See Dental 

Dynamics, LLC v. Jolly Dental Grp., LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff must 

demonstrate personal jurisdiction with respect to each of the claims alleged). Claims that 

Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff or similarly situated individuals for travel to work in North 

Dakota or Texas have nothing to do with New Mexico. The unpaid wages for work in those 

locations—that is, many of the injuries in this case—do not arise out of Defendants’ conduct in 

New Mexico. Plaintiff’s argument that “[a]t issue in this lawsuit is whether and to what extent 

Defendant CIG, failed to overtime [sic] to employees (both New-Mexico-resident and out of state 

employees) according to the FLSA.” Doc. 9 at 5. This statement does not explain how alleged 

failure to pay wages to non-New Mexico employees traveling to North Dakota and Texas pertains 

to Defendants’ activities in New Mexico. The Court therefore finds that for the North Dakota and 

Texas claims, personal jurisdiction against the Defendants is lacking. 

II. Venue and Transfer 

Defendants also contest venue in the District of New Mexico. Venue is proper either in “a 

judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which 

the district is located” or in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If these options fail, venue may also be 

proper wherever any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. A corporate defendant resides 

in any state where the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. § 1391(c)(2). The Court 

therefore finds that venue is proper over Defendant CIG in Delaware and Texas, and over 

Defendant Intermodal in Oklahoma and Texas. Additionally, because the complaint alleges that a 

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substantial part of the unpaid wages are due to New Mexico workers, venue is also proper in New 

Mexico; it is merely personal jurisdiction that is lacking here. See Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 10 (case involves 

over 150 New Mexico class members). 

Defendants move for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or § 1404. Because venue is not 

improper, § 1406(a) is not an appropriate vehicle for transfer of this case. See id. (“The district 

court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, 

or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could 

have been brought.” (emphasis added)). Rather, § 1404(a) is more appropriate: “For the 

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 

civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or 

division to which all parties have consented.” 

Having satisfied the questions of if and how to transfer the case, the Court moves to the 

question of where. Plaintiff seeks transfer to Delaware. Doc. 9 at 7. Defendants argue that transfer 

to Delaware is improper because Defendant Intermodal would not be subject to jurisdiction there, 

and transfer is only proper where the case might have been brought. Doc. 12 at 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 

1404(a) (permitting transfer to “any other district or division where [the case] might have been 

brought”). Plaintiff anticipates this problem, however, and states that he is willing to dismiss 

Defendant Intermodal to facilitate the transfer to Delaware. Doc. 9 at 7 n.3. But Defendants seek 

transfer to the Northern District of Texas, where both defendants are subject to general jurisdiction. 

Doc. 12 at 4. Plaintiff argues that transfer to the Northern District of Texas would result in 

piecemeal litigation based on a Fifth Circuit opinion, Swales v. KLLM Transport Services, 985 

F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021), and asks the Court to transfer to Delaware instead in the name of judicial

economy so that the case can be litigated as a unified whole. Doc. 9 at 7. 

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The parties do not cite case law addressing whether transfer is appropriate after a defendant 

whose presence would destroy jurisdiction has been dismissed. The Court observes, however, that 

such a transfer is likely impermissible. In Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the Supreme 

Court considered § 1404(a)’s language “where it might have been brought” and concluded that it 

referred to a venue in which the plaintiff originally had a right to bring the case. See also Morris 

by Rector v. Peterson, 759 F.2d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1985) (characterizing Hoffman in this way). 

Although Hoffman involved a defendant’s consent to venue, Plaintiff’s agreement to dismiss a 

defendant in this case yields a similar result. Here, as in Hoffman, the location to which the plaintiff 

seeks to transfer the case is not somewhere that venue was proper at the case’s inception. 

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to transfer to the District of Delaware. 

Plaintiff argues that transfer to the Northern District of Texas would lead to piecemeal 

litigation. The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s underlying concern—piecemeal litigation, particularly 

in FLSA collective actions, is best avoided if possible. See Smith v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 

1:11-CV-02299, 2012 WL 12343344, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May 10, 2012) (in FLSA matter with many 

parties seeking a national collective action, interests of justice under § 1404(a) weigh strongly in 

favor of transfer to jurisdiction where defendant is headquartered due to judicial efficiency and 

risk of inconsistent rulings if action is splintered). However, because personal jurisdiction is 

lacking over some of the claims in this matter in the District of New Mexico, piecemeal litigation 

would occur if the Court declined to transfer the case; the North Dakota and Texas claims lacking 

jurisdiction would need to be dismissed. Transfer to the District of Delaware, where all the claims 

might be heard together, is not an option for the reasons described above. Therefore, nothing 

Plaintiff requests would prevent the same piecemeal litigation he claims a transfer to Texas would 

create. 

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Given the above constraints, transfer to the Northern District of Texas is the most 

expeditious option. When deciding on a motion to transfer, a court considers several discretionary 

factors, including, inter alia, “the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” “the accessibility of witnesses and 

other sources of proof,” and “all other considerations of a practical nature that make a trial easy, 

expeditious and economical.” Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1167 

(10th Cir. 2010). Because Plaintiff’s choices of forum have jurisdictional issues that will lead to 

piecemeal litigation, and because the case involves nationwide conduct that does not center on a 

single location, the Court’s focus is on the last factor: the practical considerations allowing for an 

“easy, expeditious and economical” trial. Id. Jurisdiction and venue are proper for both defendants 

in the Northern District of Texas, and a portion of the relevant conduct involves alleged 

nonpayment of wages in Texas. Whether the court in the Northern District of Texas will split the 

litigation is a question for that court in its considered judgment; given that piecemeal litigation 

would ensue in the District of New Mexico as well, that possibility does not weigh against transfer. 

The Court is therefore satisfied that the Northern District of Texas is the more appropriate 

and just venue in which to litigate this case. Accordingly, the Court TRANSFERS the case to the 

Northern District of Texas. The Court refrains from ruling on substantive matters, such as whether 

Plaintiff states a claim under the NMMWA, to allow the proper court to make such decisions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM P. JOHNSON 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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