IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

PLAINTIFF, §

 §

V. § 

 §

$46,120 IN U.S. CURRENCY, § CASE NO. 3:22-CV-1658-E

DEFENDANT, §

 §

V. §

 §

JAMAII JONES, §

MOVANT. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the district judge’s Order of Reference, Doc. 9, this 

case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial 

management, including the issuance of findings and a recommended disposition when 

appropriate. Now before the Court is Defendants [sic] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

Pursuant to Fed.R.C.P Rule 12(b)(1)and 12(c) and Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to 

Rule 41(g) Fed C.C.P. Doc. 7. As detailed herein, the motion should be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2022, the Rockwall County Sheriff’s Office seized $46,120.00 in United 

States currency (“the Property”) from Movant Jamaii Jones during a traffic stop. Doc. 1 at 2. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) subsequently adopted the case and began

administrative forfeiture proceedings. Doc. 1 at 2. Jones, through counsel, submitted an 

administrative claim of ownership (“Initial Claim”) under 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(2), which the DEA 

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received on March 25, 2022. Doc. 1 at 2. As relevant here, the claim form instructed Jones to 

“explain why you have a valid, good faith, and legally recognizable interest in the asset.” Doc. 8 

at 2; Doc. 8-1. In response, Jones stated in toto, “[a]ll assets were lawfully earned or borrowed 

from individuals who lawfully earned.” Doc. 8-1. 

In April 2022, the DEA informed Jones that his Initial Claim was defective since it “did 

not state [Jones’] interest in the property,” and further advised that Jones had 28 days to cure this

deficiency. Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 8-2 at 1-2. Jones, while disputing the DEA’s contention that his 

Initial Claim was defective, nevertheless resubmitted the claim with an affidavit (“Revised 

Claim”). Doc. 8-3. The DEA received the Revised Claim on May 2, 2022. Doc. 7 at 6.

On July 29, 2022, the Government brought this in rem civil forfeiture action against the 

Property under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (governing forfeitures related to a violation of the 

Travel Act—18 U.S.C. § 1952) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (governing forfeitures related to drug 

trafficking). Doc. 1 at 8-10. In response, Jones filed the instant motion seeking dismissal of this

case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)&(c), and the return of the Property under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). Doc. 7 at 4. 

In his motion to dismiss, Jones alleges the Government lacks “subject matter disposition

[sic]” and standing because it failed to file a complaint within 90 days of receiving his Initial 

Claim. Doc. 7 at 4-7. The Government responds that because Jones’ Initial Claim did not 

clearly articulate his interest in the seized property—as required by section 983(a)(2)(C)(ii)—the 

90-day period for filing a complaint did not begin until it received his Revised Claim on May 2, 

2022; therefore, the complaint filed on July 29, 2022—88 days after receipt of the Revised 

Claim—was timely. Doc. 8 at 2-3.

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II. APPLICABLE LAW

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

challenges a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 

12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed when the court lacks statutory or constitutional authority 

to adjudicate the claim. Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 

1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 

Also, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may 

move for judgment on the pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). The standard for determining a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c) is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Great Plains 

Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 

fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) when the complaint does not contain “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007).

Finally, Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 41(g) provides that a “person aggrieved by an 

unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the 

property’s return. . . . in the district where the property was seized.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g). 

“Relief under Rule 41(g) . . . is unavailable if the litigant has an adequate remedy at law and will 

not suffer irreparable injury if relief is denied.” Haberman v. United States, 594 F. App’x 264 

(5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Torres, 450 F. App’x 361, 362 (5th Cir.

2011)).

III. ANALYSIS

The procedure by which the federal government may effect a civil forfeiture of seized 

property is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 983. First, within 60 days of the seizure, the government must 

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send written notice of such to any interested parties. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(l)(A)(i). After receiving 

notice, an interested party may file a claim for return of the property. Id. § 983(a)(2)(A). The 

claim must “(i) identify the specific property being claimed; (ii) state the claimant’s interest in 

such property; and (iii) be made under oath, subject to penalty of perjury.” Id. § 983(a)(2)(C). 

Upon the filing of a claim, the government must file a complaint for forfeiture of the property 

within 90 days. Id. § 983(a)(3)(A). If the government fails to file a civil forfeiture complaint or 

otherwise obtain a criminal indictment and take alternative steps to maintain custody of the 

property, “the government shall promptly release the property.” Id. § 983(a)(3)(B).

Here, it is undisputed that the Government did not file its complaint within 90 days of its 

receipt of Jones’ Initial Claim. Thus, there is only a single, salient issue: whether Jones’ Initial 

Claim was sufficient to allege his ownership of the property, thereby starting the clock on the 

Government’s deadline to file this action. 

In his Initial Claim, Jones wholly failed to allege that he is the rightful owner or has any 

legal interest in the Property, asserting only that “[a]ll assets were lawfully earned or borrowed 

from individuals who lawfully earned.” Section 983(a) is explicit—a ”claim shall . . . state the 

claimant’s interest in such property.” Id. § 983(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Jones’ one-sentence 

statement in his Initial Claim clearly falls short of meeting this requisite. Cf. United States v. 

Basking, 853 F. App’x 783, 787-88 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that claimant did not show interest in 

the seized property by stating that it belonged to his girlfriend), and In re $20,000 in U.S. 

Currency, 523 F. App’x 322, 323-24 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (finding insufficient a mere

averment of possession of the seized property absent “some explanation or contextual 

information regarding the claimant’s relationship to the property”) (citation omitted). 

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Unlike his Initial Claim, Jones’ Revised Claim includes a “supplemental” affidavit 

containing the explicit, unequivocal, sworn statement, “I am the owner of the $46,120.00 of U.S. 

Currency seized . . . .” This was the first time Jones’ actually stated his interest in the Property, 

and, therefore, the first time that Jones filed a claim for the property that met the minimum 

requirements of § 983(a)(2)(C). Cf. United States v. Melquiades, 394 F. App’x 578, 585 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that movant who “clearly stated” that “in this case [he] is the owner of the 

property” had “alleged facts sufficient to show that he has a possessory interest in some 

property”). 

Consequently, because the Government’s complaint was filed within 90 days of its 

receipt of Jones’ Revised Claim, it was timely. Thus, Jones is entitled to no relief under Federal 

Civil Procedure Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(c). Further, because this in rem civil forfeiture action gives 

Jones an adequate remedy at law, he likewise is not entitled to relief under Federal Criminal 

Procedure Rule 41(g). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants [sic] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

Pursuant to Fed.R.C.P Rule 12(b)(1)and 12(c) and Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to 

Rule 41(g) Fed C.C.P., Doc. 7, should be DENIED.

SO RECOMMENDED on July 25, 2023.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner 

provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file 

specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to 

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate 

judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. 

Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual 

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district 

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 

1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending 

the time to file objections to 14 days).

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