IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DARRON LASHAWN COLLIER, )

ID # 02159257, )

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) No. 3:22-CV-0300-S-BH

)

TY BURNES, et al., )

Defendants. ) Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the plaintiff’s Notice and Disagreement Regarding Consent to Proceed

Before a United States Magistrate Judge In the Northern District of Texas, received on February 22,

2022 (doc. 10). Based on the contention that the federal district court in which the case was initially

filed is the proper court to hear some of the plaintiff’s claims, and that this district is the proper court

to hear only one, as well as the statement that “[t]his motion is made in good faith”, the filing is

liberally construed as a motion to sever and transfer some claims back to the transferring court. The

motion is DENIED.

I.

In this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff claims that two police

officers violated his constitutional rights while serving a “no-knock” search warrant at his home in

Terrell, Texas, in 2016. (See doc. 1 at 4.)2

 He claims there were no “exigent circumstances” for the

entry into his home while he and his girlfriend were in bed, and that the officers’ actions violated

his right to privacy and his “liberty to be free from an unwanton seizure of personal property.” (Id.)

1

 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se prisoner case has been automatically referred for full case management. 

2

 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the page numbers

at the bottom of each filing.

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He also contends that the officers did not make any determination regarding “joint possession” of

the drugs recovered at his residence. (Id. at 6.) As a result of the search warrant, he was convicted

of a state criminal offense, and received an 18-year sentence. (Id.) Two vehicles and cash were

confiscated and forfeited. (Id. at 7.)

The plaintiff filed this action on November 29, 2021, in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Texas. By order dated January 18, 2022, that court found that the plaintiff’s

claims arose out of an incident that occurred in this judicial district, and that the interest of justice

would be best served by transferring the lawsuit to the proper district and division. (See doc. 5.) 

The plaintiff’s motion contends that the district in Eastern District, where he resides and the case

was initially filed, is the proper court to consider his privacy and liberty interest claims, and that this

district is the proper court to hear his property interest claim. (See doc. 10 at 3-5.) It also claims that

he faces bias and prejudice in this district based on its familiarity with the criminal proceedings. 

(See id. at 3.)

II.

Under the law of the case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision

should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same case.” Christianson v.

Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-816 (1988) (citation omitted). This “doctrine is a

discretionary rule”, however. United States v. Agofsky, 516 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing

Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)). Review of a prior substantive ruling is

appropriate in three instances: (1) substantially different evidence; (2) a change in controlling

authority; or (3) a “clearly erroneous” decision that “would work a manifest injustice.” See Free v.

Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1999). Importantly, the “doctrine applies only to

2

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issues that were actually decided, rather than all questions in the case that might have been decided,

but were not.” Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted).

“An issue is ‘actually decided’ if the court explicitly decided it or necessarily decided it by

implication.” Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006).

“Federal courts routinely apply law-of-the-case principles to transfer decisions of coordinate

courts.” Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816; see also In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 411 (5th

Cir.2009) (“transfer courts should use the law of the case doctrine to determine whether to revisit

a [transfer] decision” and should “rarely reverse” ); In re Cragar Indus., Inc., 706 F.2d 503, 505 (5th

Cir. 1983) (citation omitted) (explaining that “the decision of a transferor court should not be

reviewed again by the transferee court”). While a court has the power to revisit a prior decision to

transfer a case, it “should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as

where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’”

Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). This is

because “transferee courts that feel entirely free to revisit transfer decisions of a coordinate court

threaten to send litigants into a vicious circle of litigation.” Id. at 816. “Under law-of-the-case

principles, if the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry

is at an end.” Id. at 819.

Here, the Eastern District specifically considered the issue of venue and determined that

because the plaintiff’s claims arose out of an incident in this district, this district was the appropriate

venue. The decision to transfer the case here in the interest of justice, instead of dismissing it for

improper venue, was plausible. The City of Terrell is located in Kaufman County, which lies within

this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(1). All of the events upon which he bases his claims occurred

3

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in this district, and the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants are not located in this district. 

He has not shown that the transfer decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust, and no

extraordinary circumstances for revisiting that decision are apparent from the record.

III.

The plaintiff’s motion to sever some of his claims and transfer them back to the Eastern

District of Texas is DENIED.

SIGNED this 24th day of February, 2022.

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

4

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