UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BLACKHAWK MANUFACTURING 

GROUP INC., et al., 

Intervenor Plaintiffs, 

v. 

MERRICK GARLAND, et al.

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00691-O

OPINION & ORDER ON DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED AND THE SECOND 

AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC.’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

Before the Court is Intervenor Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and the Second Amendment 

Foundation, Inc.’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 163) and Brief in Support (ECF 

No. 164), filed January 12, 2023; Defendants’ Response in Opposition (ECF No.176), filed 

February 2, 2023; and Intervenor Plaintiffs’ Reply (ECF No. 184), filed February 17, 2023. Having 

considered the parties’ briefing and applicable law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in 

part Intervenor Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. 

I. BACKGROUND

The parties are well versed in the legal and factual background relevant to this case. To 

briefly summarize, the United States Congress created the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (“ATF”), the agency with authority to regulate “firearms” in interstate commerce 

under the Gun Control Act of 1986 (“GCA”). See 26 U.S.C. § 599A(a); 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a); 18 

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U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). In August of 2022, ATF promulgated a Final Rule that purports to regulate 

partially manufactured firearm parts and weapon parts kits.1 This Rule departs from nearly 45 

years of ATF precedent, during which the agency declined to interpret the GCA’s term “firearms” 

to include partially manufactured frames and receivers.2 Months later, on December 27, 2022, ATF 

issued an “Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees,” providing clarification that certain 

products are considered “frames” (and are therefore “firearms”) for purposes of the GCA under 

the Final Rule’s redefinition of that term.3 Those products include partially complete Polymer80, 

Lone Wolf, and similar striker-fired semi-automatic pistol frames, including those sold within 

parts kits.4

On August 11, 2022, before the regulation took effect, Original Plaintiffs brought this suit 

challenging the legality of the Final Rule arguing, among other things, that the regulation exceeds 

the lawful scope of ATF’s statutory authority.

5 Original Plaintiffs subsequently moved for a 

preliminary injunction seeking to broadly enjoin the Government from enforcing its Final Rule.6

The Court granted that injunction on grounds that Original Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the 

merits of their claim that ATF’s Final Rule—specifically, 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.11, 478.12(c)—

exceeds the scope of the agency’s lawful authority under the GCA and enjoined Defendants from 

implementing or enforcing the rule against Tactical Machining, LLC, the only Original Plaintiff 

1

See Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) 

(codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 447, 478, 479).

2

See First Opinion 2–3, ECF No. 56 (discussing ATF’s Title and Definition Changes, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,531, 

13,537 (Mar. 31, 1978) and others). 

3 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, Open Letter to All Federal 

Firearms Licensees (Dec. 27, 2022) (“ATF Open Letter (Dec. 27, 2022)”), https://www.atf.gov/rules-andregulations/docs/open-letter/all-ffls-dec2022-open-letter-impact-final-rule-2021-05f/download. 

4

Id.

5 Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. 

6 Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 15. 

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to establish irreparable harm.

7

In subsequent months, the Court expanded its injunction to include 

additional Original Plaintiffs and Intervenors.8 Following those decisions, and upon learning that 

their interests would not be protected, Intervenor Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and the Second 

Amendment Foundation (“SAF”) successfully intervened in the suit and now move this Court to 

either expand the current injunction or enter a separate injunction providing them with appropriate 

interim relief.

9 The parties have briefed the issues and the motion is ripe for review. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The decision to extend interlocutory relief is committed to the district court’s sound 

discretion. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 

1985). To establish entitlement to a preliminary injunction, Intervenor Plaintiffs must demonstrate: 

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm; 

(3) that the balance of hardships weighs in their favor; and (4) that the issuance of the preliminary 

injunction will not disserve the public interest. Daniels Health Servs., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health 

Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013). The last two factors merge when the government 

is the opposing party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). As movant, the party seeking 

relief bears the burden of proving all four elements of the preliminary injunction. Nichols v. Alcatel 

USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008); Miss. Power & Light Co., 760 F.2d at 621. 

Once it has determined that a party is entitled to injunctive relief, a court must make a 

separate determination regarding the appropriate scope of that prospective injunction, “dictated by 

the extent of the violation established[.]” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). As an 

7

Id.

8

See generally Second Opinion, ECF No. 89 (expanding scope of preliminary injunction to include 

Individual Plaintiffs and customers of Original Plaintiff Tactical Machining, LLC); Third Opinion, ECF 

No. 118 (including BlackHawk Manufacturing Group Inc. in preliminary injunction). 

9 Order Granting Defense Distributed and SAF Motion to Intervene 6, ECF No. 137. 

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extraordinary remedy, an injunction “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than 

necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff[].” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 

U.S. 753, 756 (1994) (cleaned up). Thus, an injunction must “redress the plaintiff’s particular 

injury,” and no more. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To obtain a preliminary injunction, first the movants must show that they are likely to

succeed on the merits of at least one of their claims. Daniels Health Servs., 710 F.3d at 582. In 

support of their motion, Intervenor Plaintiffs put forward two claims that they allege are likely to 

succeed on the merits: (1) an outcome-based APA claim that the Final Rule was issued in excess 

of ATF’s statutory authority under the GCA; and (2) a process-based APA claim arising from 

ATF’s failure to consider relevant factors and data in issuing the Final Rule.10 This element has 

already been proved because the Court previously determined that claims challenging the Final 

Rule on grounds that it was issued in excess of ATF’s statutory authority are likely to prevail on 

the merits.11 For the sake of brevity, the Court adopts its prior analysis with respect to that claim 

here.

12 Because Defense Distributed and SAF challenge the Final Rule on those grounds (Count 

One), the Court holds that they have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of that 

claim.

13 As such, the Court need not address their second claim regarding Defendants’ purported

process-based violations of the APA.14

10 Intervenor Pls.’ Mot. 2, ECF No. 163. 

11 See generally First Opinion, ECF No. 56. 

12 Id. 6–16, ECF No. 56. 

13 Intervenor Pls.’ Compl. 20, ECF No. 143 (raising a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) on grounds 

that Final Rule was issued in excess of ATF’s statutory authority under the Gun Control Act).

14 Id. at 22 (raising a process-based challenge under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) on grounds that Defendants failed 

to consider relevant factors and data in promulgating the Final Rule, as required by Supreme Court 

precedent). 

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B. Substantial Threat of Irreparable Harm Absent Injunctive Relief

Next, Intervenor Plaintiffs must demonstrate a substantial threat of irreparable harm. The 

Fifth Circuit considers harm irreparable “if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.”

Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Interox

Am. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 194, 202 (5th Cir.1984)). A showing of economic loss is usually

insufficient to establish irreparable harm because damages may be recoverable at the conclusion

of litigation. Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011). However, “an exception exists

where the potential economic loss is so great as to threaten the existence of the movant’s business.”

Atwood Turnkey Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 875 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir. 1989).

Or where costs are nonrecoverable because the government-defendant enjoys sovereign immunity

from monetary damages, as is the case here, irreparable harm is generally satisfied. See Wages &

White Lion Invs., L.L.C. v. FDA, 16 F.4th 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 2021). Irreparable harm must be 

concrete, non-speculative, and more than merely de minimis. Daniels Health Servs., 710 F.3d at 

585; Dennis Melancon, Inc., 703 F.3d at 279 (cleaned up). Finally, a movant’s “delay in seeking 

relief is a consideration when analyzing the threat of imminent and irreparable harm.” Anyadike v. 

Vernon Coll., No. 7:15-cv-00157, 2015 WL 12964684, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015). 

a. Defense Distributed Has Shown a Substantial Threat of Irreparable Harm

Defense Distributed has shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm—through 

unrecoverable lost revenues and, potentially, eventual total dissolution of its business—if the Court 

does not provide injunctive relief while litigation is ongoing.15 Solely in response to the Final Rule, 

Defense Distributed avers it ceased dealing in unfinished frames, unfinished receivers, and frame 

15 Intervenor Pls.’ Br. 5–6, ECF No. 164; Wilson Decl. 3–5, ECF No. 164-1 (indicating that the company 

ceased dealing in unfinished frames and receivers and part kits in response to the Final Rule, resulting in 

loss of nearly 20% monthly revenues with expectation that business will shortly have to dissolve absent an 

interim injunction); see also id. at ¶ 14 (identifying myriad interim harms to occur absent injunctive relief). 

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and receiver parts kits out of fear of violating the new regulation.16 That this fear was well-founded 

was later confirmed by ATF’s Open Letter identifying certain types of partially manufactured, 

frames, receivers, and parts kits as “firearms” for purposes of the GCA.17 Though the Government 

contends that Defense Distributed’s description of its products is too vague to justify a finding of 

irreparable harm, the Court disagrees.18 At least one of the products Defense Distributed sold

previously, then stopped selling following the Final Rule’s enactment (the Polymer80 pistol 

frame), is now considered a “firearm” under the new regulations.19 Defense Distributed stopped 

selling, and its customers stopped purchasing, this and similar items because they fear facing 

criminal prosecution for purchasing products that might run afoul of the Final Rule.20 Moreover, 

the corresponding loss in revenue is nonrecoverable because Defense Distributed cannot seek 

damages from Defendants entitled to sovereign immunity—a fact the Government does not 

contest. White Lion, 16 F.4th at 1142. And for reasons discussed in its prior Opinions, Defense

Distributed’s costly choice to comply with the regulations would not mitigate its threatened

irreparable harm.21 This meets the standard of irreparable harm.

Nor does the company’s purported delay in seeking a preliminary injunction militate 

against a showing of irreparable harm.22 It is true that, “[a]bsent a good explanation, a substantial 

period of delay” may weigh against a movant’s request for injunctive relief “by demonstrating that 

there is no apparent urgency to the request.” Wireless Agents, L.L.C. v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., No. 

3:05-cv-0094, 2006 WL 1540587, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2006) (cleaned up). The Government 

16 Wilson Decl. 3–4, ECF No. 164-1.

17 Id.; ATF Open Letter (Dec. 27, 2022).

18 Defs.’ Resp. 9–10, ECF No. 176. 

19 Reply 8, ECF No. 184; ATF Open Letter (Dec. 27, 2022).

20 See Intervenor Pls.’ Br. 6, ECF No. 164; Wilson Decl. 4, ECF No. 164-1; Reply 8, ECF No. 184. 

21 First Opinion 17–19, ECF No. 56; Order on BlackHawk Prelim. Inj. 7, ECF No. 118. 

22 Defs.’ Resp. 7–8, ECF No. 176. 

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first suggests Defense Distributed waited nine months to pursue injunctive relief, calculating this 

span from the date the Final Rule was announced (April 24, 2022) to the date Defense Distributed

filed its motion for injunctive relief (Jan. 12, 2023).

23 The Government then contends that 

“[m]ovants’ delay is not excused by any expectation that [they] would be protected by Firearms 

Policy Coalition, Inc. (FPC) having filed this lawsuit.”

24 But it is wrong in both respects. 

Oddly, the Government argues that Defense Distributed’s FPC membership does not 

excuse its delay. It does so despite this Court’s explicit prior determination that Defense 

Distributed moved to intervene shortly after “learning that its interest would not be represented by 

FPC on the basis of associational standing.”25 As such, Defense Distributed’s FPC membership is

indeed relevant to the company’s explanation regarding its delay in seeking injunctive relief. Given 

this, if the Court accepts that Defense Distributed first learned its interests would not be adequately 

represented via FPC on the Court’s First Opinion and measures from that date (Sept. 2, 2022) until 

the date Defense Distributed filed its motion (Jan. 12, 2022), the period of delay is four months at 

most, not nine.26 And as the Government points out, “courts generally consider anywhere from a 

three-month delay to a six-month delay enough to militate against issuing injunctive relief.” Leaf 

Trading Cards, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., No. 3:17-cv-3200-N, 2019 WL 7882552, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

Sept. 18, 2019) (collecting cases). And in that four-month period prior to filing its motion for 

injunctive relief, Defense Distributed sought and waited for the right to intervene in this lawsuit. 

In sum, these facts excuse any purported delay in seeking injunctive relief and do not 

23 Id. at 8, 8 n.3. 

24 See id. at 8 (citing the Court’s First Opinion, ECF No. 56). 

25 Order Granting Defense Distributed and SAF Motion to Intervene 6, ECF No. 137.

26 See First Opinion, ECF No. 56 (Sept. 2, 2022) (denying FPC and its members injunctive relief but inviting 

parties to provide further briefing on the proper scope of the injunction); Second Opinion, ECF No. 89 (Oct. 

1, 2022) (denying FPC’s members injunctive relief on the basis of associational standing); Intervenor Pls.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 163 (Jan. 12, 2023) (moving for preliminary injunction). 

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greatly undermine a finding of irreparable harm to Defense Distributed.

b. The Second Amendment Foundation Has Not Carried Its Burden on Irreparable 

Harm

While Defense Distributed has proven a substantial threat of irreparable harm, the Second 

Amendment Foundation has not. To make this showing, SAF’s Executive Vice President attests 

that the Final Rule irreparably harms “the substantial number of SAF members” who reasonably 

desire to and would imminently purchase from Defense Distributed or similar firms “articles 

defined for the first time ever as ‘firearms’ by the new Final Rule.”27 SAF further attests that “the 

New Final Rule’s vagueness exerts a chilling effect on SAF members, who cannot reasonably 

determine what the law deems punishable and cannot reasonably determine how it will be 

administered.”28

Though the Court previously held that a threat of criminal prosecution that has a chilling 

effect on a consumer’s choice to engage in previously lawful activity can constitute irreparable 

harm,

29 no such harm exists here. Indeed, SAF’s members may lawfully purchase such articles 

from “firms like Defense Distributed”—namely Tactical Machining, LLC and BlackHawk 

Manufacturing Group Inc.—under the current injunction.30 And SAF has not shown how its 

members’ ability to purchase unfinished frames and receivers and parts kits from Tactical and 

BlackHawk—but not from Defense Distributed or other firms—constitutes an irreparable harm 

that can only be alleviated with an injunction. Moreover, should Defense Distributed be entitled 

to injunctive relief (it is), SAF’s members’ purported injury is further alleviated. Therefore, SAF’s 

failure to carry its burden of persuasion with respect to this element bars its request for injunctive 

27 Gottlieb Decl. 2, ECF No. 164-2. 

28 Id.

29 Second Opinion 9–12, ECF No. 89. 

30 Intervenor Pls.’ Br. 7, ECF No. 164; see, e.g., Second Opinion 21–22, ECF No. 89. 

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relief on behalf of its members.

C. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Favor Issuing an Injunction

The final two elements necessary to support a grant of injunctive relief—the balance of 

equities (the difference in harm to the respective parties) and the public interest—“merge” when 

the Government is a party. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. In this assessment, the Court weighs “the 

competing claims of injury and [] consider[s] the effect on each party of the granting or 

withholding of the requested relief,” while also considering the public consequences of granting 

injunctive relief. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) 

(internal citations omitted). 

As with its analysis of likely success on the merits, the Court’s prior reasoning with respect 

to the balance of equities and competing public interests largely applies to the instant motion for 

injunctive relief. This Court previously held that any injury to the Government’s general interest

in law enforcement and public safety is appreciably undermined by the Court’s preliminary 

determination that the Final Rule is likely unlawful.31 Once again, this reasoning is strengthened 

by the fact that the Government’s likely ultra vires enforcement efforts upset decades of ATF 

regulatory precedent against a public that has relied on that historic posture. The Court also held

that the liberty interests of law-abiding citizens wishing to engage in historically lawful conduct 

(dealing in now-regulated parts)—which Defense Distributed shares—outweighs the 

Government’s competing interest in preventing prohibited persons from unlawfully possessing

firearms.32 Moreover, the Court has endeavored to protect this competing interest with its 

Clarification Order allowing the Government to enforce the Final Rule against persons who may 

31 First Opinion 21–22, ECF No. 56.

32 Id. at 22. 

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not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).33 Finally, the Court has recognized that the public’s 

interest “in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence 

and operations” weighs in favor of an injunction. League of Women Voters of United States v. 

Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

For these reasons, the Court holds that the balance of equities weighs in favor of granting 

Defense Distributed’s motion for a preliminary injunction and that the public interest is not 

disserved by affording such relief. 

* * * *

Having considered the arguments, evidence, and applicable law, the Court holds that the 

relevant factors weigh in favor of expanding the current preliminary injunction to include Defense 

Distributed and, necessarily, its customers. As this Court has previously determined, such injuries 

cannot be remedied if the company’s only source of revenue—customer willingness to transact 

business—has been severely curtailed.34

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, Defense Distributed has shown it is entitled to a preliminary injunction against 

Defendants’ enforcement of the Final Rule. However, the Second Amendment Foundation has not 

carried its burden. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion in part and ORDERS that 

Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, and employees are enjoined from implementing 

and enforcing against Defense Distributed and its customers (except for those individuals 

prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) the provisions in 27 C.F.R. 

§§ 478.11 and 478.12 that the Court has preliminarily determined are unlawful. The Court waives 

the security requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles 

33 Clarification Order, ECF No. 91. 

34 Second Opinion 17–19, ECF No. 89. 

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Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996). The motion for injunctive relief is DENIED with respect 

to the Second Amendment Foundation. 

SO ORDERED this 2nd day of March, 2023. 

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