IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint 

of:

DAVID WAYNE EVANS,

 Petitioner.

No. 85900-5-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MANN, J. — In this personal restraint petition (PRP), David Evans asks this court 

to remand this matter to the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) and direct 

the ISRB to release Evans or provide him with a new hearing. Evans argues that the 

ISRB abused its discretion when it denied his release by (1) not basing its decision on a 

risk assessment tool, (2) basing its decision on the future prospect of additional 

evaluation, and (3) making a factual error.

 Evans has not established that the ISRB abused its discretion. As a result, we 

deny Evans’s PRP.

I

Between May 2001 and June 2004, Evans, who coached a children’s soccer 

team, sexually assaulted two young male children, ages 11 and 12, who were on the 

team. Evans pleaded guilty to rape of a child in the first degree (count I), child 
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molestation in the first degree (count II), and communication with a minor for immoral 

purposes (count III). Evans was sentenced to confinement for 144 months to life for 

count I, 89 months to life for count II, and 365 days for count III. 

In 1997, Evans was charged with child molestation in the first degree and child 

molestation in the second degree based on allegations that Evans sexually assaulted a 

“familial male minor” when the child was between 10 and 13. Evans was acquitted on 

both counts. But Evans has since admitted to sexually abusing two familial male 

minors. 

Since 2015, the ISRB has held five hearings under RCW 9.95.420 (.420 hearing) 

over Evans’s release. Each time, the ISRB denied release. 

At the time of Evans’s first .420 hearing in 2015, Evans had not completed a Sex 

Offender Treatment and Assessment Program (SOTAP). Evans’s SOTAP therapist

testified that Evans was “further behind in dealing with his sexual deviancy than he was 

at the time of intake” and that it was hard to know when Evans was telling the truth. The 

therapist also testified that Evans was not forthcoming about the number of 

unadjudicated victims and had to be confronted with letters from family members before 

admitting to sexually assaulting familial male minors. 

The ISRB also considered the End of Sentence Review Committee’s (ESRC)

report. Although Evans’s actuarial risk scores were “low” and “low/moderate,” the 

ESRC recommended a level III risk level classification for Evans because he used a 

position of trust to gain access to his victims and demonstrated a pattern of behavior 

that increases the risk for sexual reoffense. A level III risk level classification means 

that there is a high risk of sexual reoffense within the community at large. The ESRC 
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also referred Evans to the ESRC Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Subcommittee to 

determine whether a forensic psychological evaluation should be ordered to determine 

whether he meets civil commitment criteria under RCW 71.09.020. 

At Evans’s second .420 hearing in 2016, the ISRB again denied release and 

added 36 months to his minimum term. While Evans had completed SOTAP, he made 

minimal progress. Evans’s SOTAP therapist explained, Evans’s “pursuit of deviant 

sexual arousal and behavior appears to be constant and not impacted even by time in 

prison. Furthermore, Mr. Evans works diligently to keep his behavior covert.” The ISRB 

learned that Evans received a general infraction for “unauthorized display of affection” 

and Evans admitted that he had engaged in sexual talk with a 26-year-old inmate. This 

investigation was not disclosed to the ISRB at Evans’s 2015 .420 hearing despite 

Evans’s awareness of the accusation. The ISRB recommended that Evans participate 

in Thinking for a Change or other programming to help him be more open and honest 

and then reapply for SOTAP. 

At Evans’s third .420 hearing in 2019, the ISRB denied release and added 36

months to Evans’s minimum term. Again, the ISRB recommended that Evans 

participate in SOTAP for a second time. The ISRB found that Evans “shows little 

remorse . . . minimizes his behavior and verbalizes little insight into his behavior.” In 

addition, Evans “has at least four minor male victims yet struggled to admit he had a 

deviant sexual attraction to them.”1

 1 Following Evans’s third .420 hearing, Evans filed a PRP which was denied by Division Two of 

this court. In re Pers. Restraint of Evans, No. 54254-4-II, slip op. at 12 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2021) 

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2054254-4-

II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. 
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In 2021, the ISRB agreed to see Evans early due to his completion of SOTAP 

and held Evans’s fourth .420 hearing. The SOTAP specialist testified that Evans did 

very well in treatment. The ISRB denied release and added six months to Evans’s

minimum term, the ISRB also recommended that Evans undergo a psychological 

evaluation for general sexual recidivism before his next hearing. 

Evans’s fifth .420 hearing—the one at issue here—occurred in May 2022. Prior 

to the hearing, Evans underwent a General Sexual Recidivism Evaluation (GSRE) with 

Dr. Lisa Robtoy. In Dr. Robtoy’s opinion, Evans was assessed to be moderate, if not 

high moderate risk for general sexual recidivism and was a questionable candidate for 

release. 

The ESRC found that the level III recommendation for Evans remained 

unchanged. Evans’s level III classification has remained unchanged since 2015. The 

ESRC also recommended that Evans be reviewed for civil commitment by the SVP 

subcommittee if the ISRB were to recommend release. The ESRC has made this 

recommendation since 2015. 

The ISRB concluded that “[b]ased on the burden of proof set out in RCW 

9.95.420 and the totality of evidence and information provided to the Board, the Board 

does find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Evans is more likely than not to 

commit a sex offense if released on conditions.” Consistent with RCW 9.95.420, the 

ISRB added 36 months to his minimum term. 

In its reasons for denying release, the ISRB listed that Evans was a level III 

notification risk and that the ESRC had referred Evans to the SVP subcommittee, only 

the highest risk of all sex offenders, less than two percent, are reviewed by the SVP 
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subcommittee and recommended for further evaluation. The ISRB also referenced Dr. 

Robtoy’s evaluation and opinion that “Evans presents a higher risk for general sexual 

recidivism than is reflected on the risk assessment tools” and “Evans is probably closer 

to moderate, if not high moderate risk for sexual recidivism.” Dr. Robtoy also opined 

that Evans “is a questionable candidate for release and his release would create public 

safety concerns, particularly for minor males.” The ISRB also found:

Mr. Evans fails to understand that having physical contact with his minor 

grandchildren creates a high-risk situation for him, creating serious 

questions about his internalization of sex offender treatment concepts 

designed to mitigate his risk for a future sex offense, particularly as it 

relates to having physical contact with minors.

Evans challenges the ISRB’s decision.

II

To succeed on a challenge of an ISRB decision, a petitioner must show that he is 

under unlawful restraint. In re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 164 Wn.2d 274, 285, 189 P.3d 

759 (2008) (citing RAP 16.4(b), (c)).

We review ISRB decisions denying release and setting a new minimum term for 

an abuse of discretion. In re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 175 Wn.2d 186, 196, 283 P.3d 

1103 (2012). We give the ISRB decision substantial deference, as we are “not a super 

[ISRB] and will not interfere with a[n ISRB] determination in this area unless the [ISRB] 

is first shown to have abused its discretion in setting [an offender’s] discretionary 

minimum term. In short, the courts will not substitute their discretion for that of the 

[ISRB].” Dyer, 175 Wn.2d at 196 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Whitesel, 111 Wn.2d 

621, 628, 763 P.2d 199 (1988)). 
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The ISRB abuses its discretion when it “fails to follow its own procedural rules for 

parolability hearings” or bases its decision on speculation and conjecture only. In re 

Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 157 Wn.2d 358, 363, 369, 139 P.3d 320 (2006). The petitioner 

has the burden to prove the ISRB abused its discretion. In re Pers. Restraint of 

Addleman, 151 Wn.2d 769, 774, 92 P.3d 221 (2004).

RCW 9.95.420(3)(a) states that the ISRB shall:

determine whether it is more likely than not that the offender will engage in 

sex offenses if released on conditions to be set by the [ISRB]. . . . The 

[ISRB] shall order the offender released, under such affirmative and other 

conditions as the [ISRB] determines appropriate, unless the [ISRB] 

determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite such 

conditions, it is more likely than not that the offender will commit sex 

offenses if released. 

In making its determination, the ISRB must rely on the ESRC report. See WAC 381-90-

050(1)-(2). The ESRC report:

may include but is not limited to . . . psychiatric or psychological reports, 

such as IQ appraisals, personality inventories, actuarial risk assessments

and sexual history polygraphs; . . . [b]ehavioral details of the crime(s) of 

conviction, . . . [and] [t]he department’s risk management level and the sex 

offender notification level.

WAC 381-90-050(2) (emphasis added). The ESRC “shall classify as risk level III those 

offenders whose risk assessments indicate they are at a high risk to sexually reoffend 

within the community at large.” RCW 72.09.345(6).

The ISRB may consider additional factors including: evidence of an offender’s 

continuing intent or propensity to engage in sex offenses, end of sentence review 

determination based on actuarial assessments identifying risk to sexually reoffend, and 

psychological evaluation including actuarial assessment information identifying risk to 

engage in criminal behavior. WAC 381-90-150(3)(c), (e), and (f). The ISRB may also 
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consider “[o]ther pertinent information.” WAC 381-90-050(4)(e). “All relevant 

information shall be admissible.” WAC 381-90-140.

III

Evans argues that the ISRB abused its discretion when it denied his release. We 

disagree.

Evans first asserts that the ISRB’s decision departs from accepted methods of 

risk prediction. He argues that under RCW 9.95.420(1)(a), the ISRB was required to

accept the results of a risk assessment incorporating accepted methodology. 

RCW 9.95.420(1)(a) states:

as part of the end of sentence review process . . . the department shall 

conduct, and the offender shall participate in, an examination of the 

offender, incorporating methodologies that are recognized by experts in 

the prediction of sexual dangerousness, and including a prediction of the 

probability that the offender will engage in sex offenses if released.

As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he actuarial approach evaluates a 

limited set of predictors and then combines these variables using a predetermined, 

numerical weighting system to determine future risk of reoffense which may be adjusted 

(or not) by expert evaluators considering potentially important factors not included in the 

actuarial measure.” In re Det. of Thorell, 149 Wn.2d 724, 753, 72 P.3d 708 (2003)

(emphasis added).

As part of Evans’s GSRE, Dr. Robtoy administered the Static-99R and the Sex 

Offender Treatment and Intervention Progress Scale (SOTIPS). Evans scored in the 

low risk range on the Static-99R and the moderate range on the SOTIPS. Even so, Dr. 

Robtoy explained:
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The Static 99R is loaded with static information, that is, information that 

will not change over time, despite efforts at treatment and/or rehabilitation. 

Scores are derived predominately from offense behavior, either charges or 

convictions. Considering Mr. Evans has been implicated in multiple other 

sexual offenses outside of the 1996 charges for molesting [a familial male 

minor], and the instant offenses, his score of one (lower risk than most sex 

offenders) is probably an underestimate. 

As for SOTIPS, Dr. Robtoy explained that it is “based much more on dynamic 

information such as treatment participation, current attitudes about sex, sexual interests, 

and cooperation with supervision” but is largely based on an individual’s self-report. 

Accordingly, Dr. Robtoy opined:

Unfortunately, Mr. Evans’ history suggests he is not truthful about his 

involvement in sexual offending until he is faced with evidence he cannot 

deny. For example, he only admitted to molesting [familial male minors]

after a letter was intercepted by the mail room and submitted to his 

SOTAP counselors, making his self-report during the SOTIPS 

questionable, and probably an underestimate about his current 

functioning, treatment needs, and risk for recidivism.

Dr. Robtoy concluded:

In my opinion, Mr. Evans presents a higher risk for general sexual 

recidivism than is reflected on the risk assessment tools noted above. 

While he appears to have made progress, particularly during his most 

recent involvement in the SOTAP, Mr. Evans is probably closer to 

moderate, if not high moderate risk for sexual recidivism.

Dr. Robtoy was not required to accept the results of the actuarial models and, 

instead, could consider “potentially important factors” and adjust the determination of 

future risk. Thorell, 149 Wn.2d at 753. Dr. Robtoy did so here and explained the 

reasons behind the adjustments.

The ESRC has also departed from these statistical models since 2015 and has 

consistently recommended a level III risk classification for Evans. As the ESRC 

explains, actuarial instruments are used to establish a recommended risk level 
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classification, however, the ESRC “may elect to depart from the initial risk level score if 

special circumstances warrant. Objective risk instruments include a number of factors 

relevant to re-offending, but do not consider unique circumstances or unusual 

characteristics of offenders.” Further, “departures give the [ESRC] the ability to 

incorporate a breadth of information about the individual under review and exercise its 

judgment and expertise.” Factors not otherwise captured by the actuarial risk 

instruments that the ESRC considers include a pattern of behavior that increases risk 

for sexual reoffense and whether the offender used a position of trust to gain access to 

victims. Both factors resulted in the ESRC recommending a risk level classification of III 

for Evans and maintaining that recommendation in 2022. 

The ISRB did not solely rely on Dr. Robtoy’s conclusions, it also relied on the 

ESRC report, which it was required to consider under WAC 381-90-050(1)(2). And the 

ISRB can exercise its discretion to determine the evidentiary weight of the actuarial 

tests as a predictive tool in this setting. See Thorell, 149 Wn.2d at 756.

Evans next argues that the evidence relied on by the ISRB was insufficient to

support the conclusion that he is likely to reoffend. Evans relies on In re Personal 

Restraint of Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d 279, 430 P.3d 710 (2018).

Brashear was convicted of first degree murder, first degree assault, and first 

degree burglary for crimes she committed at 15 years old. Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 

281. After serving 20 years of confinement, Brashear petitioned the ISRB for early 

release under RCW 9.94.730. Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 281. Early release under 

RCW 9.94.730(3) is presumptive unless the ISRB determines that, despite conditions, it 

is more likely than not that a person will reoffend. Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 287. 
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Brashear participated in a psychological evaluation which concluded that Brashear was 

at a low, or even a very low, risk to reoffend. Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 283-84, n.4. 

The ISRB denied Brashear’s petition for release. Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 285.

This court reversed and held that the ISRB abused its discretion because:

[r]ather than focusing on the statutory presumption of release, her 

awareness of her crimes, her changed behavior, her assessed low risk to 

reoffend, and appropriate release conditions, the ISRB relied on 

Brashear’s underlying crimes, the impact of those crimes, and the small 

portion of her sentence served in denying her petition.

Brashear, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 288.

Evans’s case is distinguishable. Evans committed his crimes, both adjudicated 

and unadjudicated, as an adult; he petitioned for release under RCW 9.95.420; the 

ESRC determined that Evans presented a high risk of sexual reoffense and 

recommended referral to the SVP subcommittee for additional evaluation; Dr. Robtoy 

opined that Evans was moderate, if not high moderate risk for reoffense; and Evans 

failed to understand why having physical contact with his minor grandchildren creates a 

high-risk situation for him.

2 The ISRB focused on its statutory mandate to consider 

whether Evans was more likely than not to reoffend.

Evans next points to two other factors the ISRB considered in denying his

release. First, Evans asserts that the fact that a referral was made to conduct a SVP 

evaluation does not make it more likely than not that he would commit a future sexual 

offense. But in making its decision, the ISRB must rely on the ESRC report. See WAC 

381-90-050(1)-(2). And in Evans’s case, the ESRC recommended that the ISRB submit 

 2 Evans also admitted to sexual attraction toward minor males and having about one deviant 

thought a day to Dr. Robtoy. A fact also relied on by the ISRB. 
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a request to evaluate whether Evans meets civil commitment criteria, a 

recommendation that is made only for the highest risk sex offenders. The ISRB was 

required to consider this.

Second, Evans challenges the ISRB’s conclusion that “Mr. Evans fails to 

understand that having physical contact with his minor grandchildren creates a high-risk 

situation for him, creating serious questions about his internalization of sex offender 

treatment concepts designed to mitigate his risk for a future sex offense, particularly as 

it relates to having physical contact with minors.” Evans asserts this is factually 

incorrect because his grandchildren are not minors. 

Evans includes a declaration that purports to include the ages of his 

grandchildren. But Evans’s declaration was submitted after the ISRB made its 

decision.3 And the declaration itself states that at least one, if not two, of his 

grandchildren was a minor at the time the ISRB made its decision. Evans admitted to 

sexual attraction toward minor males. 

Finally, Evans asserts that the ISRB completely failed to acknowledge several 

positive factors.4 Contrary to Evans’s argument, the ISRB did note that Evans is not a 

management issue and has not incurred a serious infraction since 2011, and that he is 

participating in CD treatment.5 The ISRB also noted that Evans could describe his high 

risks and interventions. 

 3 The ISRB’s decision is dated May 23, 2022. Evans’s declaration is dated January 6, 2023.

4 Evans cites the 2019 decision of the ISRB and the testimony his classification counselor gave 

during his third .420 hearing. 

5 The record before us does not specify what “CD treatment” is, however, “CD” often stands for 

“chemical dependency.” See In re Pers. Restraint of Schley, 197 Wn. App. 892, 865, 392 P.3d 1099 

(2017) (“[a]ny major infraction that causes a change in custody level or the violation of the condition(s) 

outlined in the CD [chemical dependency] Treatment Participation Requirements”).
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Evans has not established that the ISRB abused its discretion. As a result, we 

deny Evans’s PRP.

WE CONCUR: