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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 FORT WORTH DIVISION

DAVID CLAYTON RATLIFF,

Petitioner,

v. Civil No. 4:22-CV-478-P

BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, 

TDCJ- CID, 

Respondent.

 OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, David Clayton Ratliff (“Ratliff”), a state 

prisoner confined in the Duncan Transfer Unit of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice (TDCJ-CID), against Bobby Lumpkin, director of that division, 

Respondent. After considering the pleadings and relief sought by Ratliff, the 

Court has concluded that the petition should be dismissed with prejudice as barred 

by the applicable statute of limitations, and alternatively, denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ratliff is in custody pursuant to the judgments and sentences of the 213th 

District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, in cause numbers 1571133D and 

1571132D, for evading arrest and possession of 1–4 grams of methamphetamine, 

both occurring on November 17, 2018. See TDCJ Commitment Inquiry, Answer 

(Exhibit A) 2-3, ECF 15-1. Ratliff pleaded guilty, and on January 23, 2020, was 

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for each conviction. Id. In this proceeding, 

however, Ratliff challenges prison disciplinary case number 20210010176. Pet. 5, 

ECF No. 1. Thus, the procedural history of any direct or collateral proceedings 

with regards to Ratliff’s holding convictions is not relevant to the disposition of 

this case and is therefore not reviewed. 

On September 18, 2020, at 12:35 p.m., Ratliff was notified that he was 

being charged with exposing a mailroom clerk to semen by sending out a letter 

with dried semen on the paper. Disciplinary Hearing Record (“DHR”) at 3-10, 

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ECF No. 16-1. On September 22, 2020, at 11:55 a.m., the disciplinary hearing 

officer convened Ratliff’s hearing and ultimately found him guilty of the charge 

and assessed his punishment as: (1) a loss of forty-five days of recreation 

privileges; (2) a loss of sixty days of commissary privileges; (3) a reduction in 

class from S3 to L1; and (4) a loss of sixty days of good-time credit. Id. at 3. On 

March 2, 2021, Ratliff filed a Step One grievance directly challenging this 

disciplinary proceeding resulting in grievance number 2021077461, but TDCJ 

officials returned that grievance the same day because the time to file a grievance 

had expired.1 Disciplinary Grievance Records (“DGR”) at 1–3. This proceeding 

under § 2254 followed.

II. ISSUES

The Court understands Ratliff to allege the following grounds for relief:

1.The Respondent provided a copy of Ratliff’s commitment inquiry as Exhibit A. Resp 

(Exhibit A) 1-3, ECF No. 15-1. The Respondent also provided copies of the Disciplinary 

Hearing Record (“DHR”), the Disciplinary Grievance Record (“DGR”), and the 

Disciplinary Hearing Audio (“DHA”) with accompanying business records affidavits as 

state court records. ECF Nos. 16, 16-1, 16-2, 16-3 and 16-4. 

The Respondent also requested and obtained records pertaining to grievance number 

2021010431 because Ratliff referenced that separate grievance in his § 2254 petition. The 

Respondent included these records as Miscellaneous Grievance Records (“Misc. GR”) 

for the limited purpose of completion. Resp. 3-4, ECF No. 15. 

(1) The evidence is insufficient to support his disciplinary violation 

because he simply used commissary-purchased-white watercolor 

as a form of white out;

(2) Ratliff was denied his right to due process when TDCJ failed to 

test the substance; and

(3) Ratliff’s disciplinary violation is the result of perjured 

testimony.

Pet. at 6–7, Attached Memo 12, ECF No. 1. 

III. RULE 5 STATEMENT 

The Respondent argues that the § 2254 petition in this case is barred by 

limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and that his claims were not properly exhausted 

and procedurally barred. The Respondent reserved the right to argue any other 

procedural bars, pending the Court’s resolution of the time-bar and procedural bar 

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issues. Resp. 4, ECF No. 15. 

IV. ANALYSIS/LIMITATIONS

A. Application of the Statute of Limitations 

Title 28, United States Code, § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute of 

limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 

Ratliff’s disciplinary challenge is subject to this limitations provision. See 

Kimbrell v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2002) (AEDPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations applies to petitions attacking prison disciplinary 

proceedings). Section 2244(d) provides:

(d) (1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the 

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claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).

As noted above, Ratliff does not directly challenge his convictions in this 

§ 2254 proceeding. Pet. 2, 5–7, ECF No. 1. Thus, the limitations statute cannot 

begin to run when his convictions became final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Moreover, the record does not reflect that any unconstitutional “State Action” 

prevented Ratliff from filing for federal habeas corpus relief prior to the end of 

the limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). Additionally, Ratliff’s 

claims do not concern a constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court 

within the last year and made retroactive to cases on collateral review. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Therefore, in this case the only applicable limitations 

start date provision is “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Kimbrell, 311 F.3d at 362–64 (“Kimbrell 

knew he was deprived of several thousand days of good time . . . when the 

hearing was held on December 2, 1998.”). Applying this law to the facts in this 

proceeding, the factual basis for Ratliff’s claims occurred on September 22, 2020, 

the of his disciplinary hearing and assessment of punishment. DHR at 3, ECF No. 

16-1. Therefore, the running of the one-year limitation period expired one year 

later on September 22, 2021, absent application of either statutory or equitable 

tolling. 

1. Tolling Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

The AEDPA provides that “the time during which a properly filed 

application for State post–conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). For purposes of this 

review, the Court will construe the grievance proceedings which Ratliff was 

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required to pursue to exhaust his administrative remedies, to be “other collateral 

review . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).2

Ratliff’s Step 1 Grievance was filed and returned on March 2, 2021, 

because it was filed outside of the applicable time period. DGR 2-4, ECF No. 16-

2. Even assuming that Ratliff’s Step 1 Grievance tolls the limitations period 

despite being untimely itself, this grievance would only toll the limitations period 

for the one day on which it was filed and returned. Id. Consequently, Ratliff 

would have had until September 23, 2021, to timely file his federal petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 

For purposes of determining the applicability of AEDPA, a federal 

petition is filed on the date it is placed in the prison mail system. Spotville v. Cain, 

149 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1998). In this § 2254 petition, however, there is nearly 

a three-month delay between Ratliff’s signature date on February 28, 2022, and 

the Court’s file-stamp date of May 26, 2022. Pet at 1, 10, ECF No. 1. The 

Respondent informed the Court that mail logs had been requested to determine the 

date upon which Ratliff submitted his § 2254 petition to the prison mailing system 

but were never received. Resp. 7 n. 5, ECF No. 15. Thus, the Respondent 

acknowledged that the date of Ratliff’s signature on February 28, 2022 must be 

used for purposes of § 2244 analysis. Id. Even so, when Ratliff constructively 

filed his § 2254 petition on February 28, 2022, he did so approximately five 

months too late.3

 Pet. 10, ECF No. 1. 

2. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period for filing a petition under § 2254 is subject 

2. In Kimbrell, the 5th Circuit stated, “[t]he timely pendency of prison grievance 

procedures would have tolled the one-year period . . . .” 311 F.3d at 364. The court there 

did not indicate whether the tolling would be equitable tolling or statutory tolling 

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Id. The Respondent notes this, but acknowledges 

these disciplinary grievance proceedings are the only vehicle to address claims raised by 

an inmate before proceeding to federal court. Resp. 6-7 n. 4, ECF No. 15 (citing Ex parte 

Brager, 704 S.W.2d 46, 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). 

3. The Respondent also noted that even if Ratliff’s grievance filed about the actions of 

mailroom staff was considered for tolling purposes (tolling of forty-four days, from 

September 24, 2020 through November 6, 2020), Ratliff’s federal petition would remain 

untimely by nearly four months. Resp. 7 n. 5, ECF No. 15; Misc. GR.1-6, ECF No. 16-3. 

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to equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). 

Equitable tolling should be applied only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” 

Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Davis v. 

Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). More specifically, “[e]quitable 

tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant 

about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from 

asserting his rights.” Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489–90 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999) (abrogated on 

other grounds by Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2006)). The 

petitioner bears the burden to show entitlement to equitable tolling. See e.g. 

Phillips v. Donnelly, 223 F.3d 797, 797 (5th Cir. 2000). Nothing in the records 

suggests the state misled Ratliff. 

 Moreover, “[i]n order for equitable tolling to apply, the applicant must 

diligently pursue his § 2254 relief.” Coleman, 184 F.3d at 403. Ratliff has failed 

to diligently pursue such relief because, as established above, he waited nearly 

one year from the return of his Step 1 grievance to file his federal writ petition. 

“[E]quity is not intended for those who sleep on their rights.” Fisher v. Johnson, 

174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Covey v. Ark. River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 

662 (5th Cir. 1989)). Therefore, equitable tolling is not warranted in this case. 

In sum, as Ratliff’s § 2254 petition was filed far beyond the applicable 

one-year deadline from the applicable limitations commencement date under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and as he has not shown that he is entitled to statutory 

or equitable tolling, the petition under § 2254 must be dismissed with prejudice as 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

V. ANALYSIS-ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS

A. Claims are Unexhausted and Procedurally Barred. 

In the alternative, the Court finds and determines that, for the reasons 

stated in the response at Section II, Ratliff has failed to properly exhaust his 

administrative remedies, and because any efforts to do so would now be futile, his 

claims are alternatively procedurally barred. 

B. Claims Challenging Loss of Privileges/Change in Custodial 

Classification Fail to State a Due Process Violation

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Furthermore, with regard to Ratliff’s challenges to his punishments of a 

(1) loss of forty-five days of recreation privileges; (2) loss of sixty days 

commissary privileges; and (3) reduction in line class status, as explained in 

Section III of the response, those punishments do not violate the due process 

clause sufficient to state a claim of a federal constitutional violation. Thus, as to 

Ratliff’s challenges to these punishments, his claims must be denied. 

C. Ratliff’s Challenge to his Loss of Good Time Credit Fails

Finally, to the extent Ratliff challenges the loss of good time as a violation 

of his right to due process of law, such claim fails for the detailed reasons 

provided in the response Section IV. As listed therein, Ratliff’s disciplinary 

proceeding satisfied the applicable due process requirements, because Ratliff: (1) 

received notice of the charges against him; (2) was provided a chance to call 

witnesses and present evidence; (3) was provided with a written statement of the 

evidence relied upon by the fact-finder; (4) was provided substitute counsel; and 

(5) the hearing officer’s determination of guilt was supported by sufficient 

evidence. Thus, as to Ratliff’s challenges to his loss of good time credit, such 

claims must be denied. 

 

 VI. CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that David Clayton Ratliff’s petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DISMISSED with prejudice as timebarred, and alternatively, is DENIED. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), 

for the reasons discussed herein, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on this 13th day of March, 2023.

______________________________ 

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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