* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 10 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MARIA LOURDES ARAGON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-1309 (District of Colorado) (D.C. No. 95-CR-19-S)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , LUCERO, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Maria Lourdes Ara gon was found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to aid and abet the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846, and of conspiracy to possess ephedrine, know ing or having reasonable cause to believe that the ephedrine would be used i n the manufacture of-2-

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d) (1)-(2) and § 846. The jury also found Aragon’s interest in certain real property subject to forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. In addition, Aragon was found guilty of using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), but that count was dismissed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). Finally, Aragon was acqui tted of two other charges, possession of ephedrine, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the ephedrine would be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(1)-(2), and possess ion with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). She was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 240 months on the first conspiracy conviction and to imprisonment for a term of 120 months on the secondconspiracy conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Aragon argues that (1) there was insuffi cient evidence to convict her of the conspiracy offenses; (2) the tri al court erred by denying her motion in limine requesting that all evidence pertaining to her use of an alias be excluded; (3) the trial court erred by refusing herrequest for the appointment of a psychologist to determine whether she suffered froman impairment which would warrant a downward departure under the Sentencing G uidelines; (4) the trial court erred in attributing certain drug amounts to her fo r purposes of determining her1 Aragon was charged in the indictment with Erenio Pe rez, Erasmo Perez,

and Sylvia Perez. Like Aragon, Erenio was found gu ilty of the two conspiracy counts. He was also found guilty of the two posses sion counts and four firearm counts, but was acquitted of one firearm count. Er asmo Perez was acquitted of all charges. The charges against Sylvia Perez were dis missed pursuant to a plea agreement in another case in which she was also ind icted.

2 Aragon is alternately described by those who testif ied as Erenio’s girlfriend and wife. -3- base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (5) the trial court erred by assigning her a “minor,” rather than a “minimal, ” role in the conspiracy for purposes of sentencing. This court affirms.
I. BACKGROUND While on patrol in December 1994, a detective from the Sheriff’s Department in Fremont County, Colorado, came upon alarge U-haul truck stuck in a ditch. The truck contained approximately twen ty-one barrels of ephedrine, which is a precursor chemical used to manufacture m ethamphetamine. The driver of the truck, Ricardo Perez, was arrested. He ulti mately cooperated with law enforcement officers and testified on behalf of the government at the trial of Aragon and her codefendants, Erenio Perez and Erasm o Perez. 1
Ricardo testified that he was involved in an exte nsive methamphetamine business in Colorado with Erenio Perez, his brother . Ricardo knew Aragon as Erenio’s girlfriend 2 and stated that she lived with Erenio in Colorado Springs. In September 1994, Aragon, Ricardo’s wife, and anotherindividual purchased-4-

property near Westcliffe, Colorado (the “Westcliffe property”), paying $9000 cash as a down payment. According to Ricardo, the prope rty was purchased for purposes of storing methamphetamine acquired in Cal ifornia to sell in Colorado and barrels of ephedrine acquired in Colorado to se ll in California. Ricardo further testified that several people, including Ar agon, went to California in October 1994 to get fake driver’s licenses. Aragonobtained a license in the name of Maria Ceja Avila. Several officers testified about their surveillance of the defendants in late 1994 and the searches of defendants’ various properties conducted after Ricardo was arrested. During the search of a motel room wh ich was previously under surveillance, officers found an itemized billing st atement from the motel in the name of Maria Avila. During the search of the West cliffe property, officers found methamphetamine, other illicit drugs, ammunit ion, firearms, a bulletproof vest, and a vehicle with two hidden compartments. In an RV on the Westcliffe property, officers found $84,000 in cash, firearms, and a triple beam scale. While searching another piece of property in Colorado own ed by Erenio and Ricardo, officers found numerous barrels of ephedrine, a fir earm, and ammunition. In the home shared by Aragon and Erenio, officers found anempty barrel with the name and address of the Chemins Company, $6580 in cash, torn records regarding the purchase of the Westcliffe property, and various do cuments in the name of Maria-5-

Aragon, Lourdes Aragon, and Maria Avila. Finally, during the search of a vehicle purchased by Aragon using her alias, officers foundthrowing stars, a night vision scope, a firearm, and $7000 in cash.
II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Aragon first claims the evidence was insufficient t o sustain her conspiracy convictions. Whether the government introduced suf ficient evidence to sustain her convictions is a question of law which this cou rt reviews de novo. See United
States v. Carter , 130 F.3d 1432, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997). In examini ng the record, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable t o the government without ‘weigh[ing] conflicting evidence or consider[ing] the credibility of witnesses.’” United States v. Ramirez , 63 F.3d 937, 945 (10th Cir. 1995) (alterations in original) (quoting Kelly v. Roberts , 998 F.2d 802, 808 (10th Cir. 1993)). This court will not reverse a jury’s guilty verdict “‘un less no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyo nd a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Romero v. Tansy , 46 F.3d 1024, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995)). So long as the jury’s verdict is “‘within the bounds of reason,’” it will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. (quoting Grubbs v. Hannigan , 982 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)). To convict a defendant of conspiracy in violation o f 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must establish the following elements be yond a reasonable doubt:-6-

“(1) an agreement with another person to violate th e law, (2) knowledge of the essential objectives of the conspiracy, (3) knowing and voluntary involvement, and (4) interdependence among the alleged conspirat ors.” Carter , 130 F.3d at 1439. Aragon contends the government did not meet its burden of introducing sufficient evidence to establish any of the four el ements. Although she concedes the record is “replete with references” to her bein g present on occasions when drugs were transported, she argues that “there is n o evidence supporting the required nexus between [her] presence and her knowl edge or activity in furtherance of the crimes charged.” 1. Agreement An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be infer red “‘from the acts of the parties and other circumstantial evidence indic ating concert of action for the accomplishment of a common purpose.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson , 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1994)). Although “me re association” with conspirators is insufficient to support a conspirac y conviction, “frequent contacts” among conspirators and “their joint appearances at transactions and negotiations” tend to show the existence of an agreement. United States v. Evans , 970 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). The government introduced evidence that Aragon, alo ng with two others, purchased the Westcliffe property where illegal dru gs were stored. The real3 During direct examination, Ricardo Perez testified that the property was

purchased with drug proceeds. On cross examination , however, he stated that he was not sure where Aragon got her portion of the payment.

4 Other evidence also supported the government’s asse rtion that Aragon knew the members of the conspiracy were dealing dru gs. For example, Vladamar Lansky testified that Aragon was present when he de livered ephedrine to Ricardo Perez at an RV park and when he purchased methamphe tamine from Robert Lopez at a ranch south of Colorado Springs. Mr. Lansky f urther testified that Aragon was present when he and others removed methamphetam ine from a hidden compartment in an RV, which was parked at a private residence.

5 Aragon separately argues the district court erred i n admitting evidence regarding her use of an alias. This court conclude s the district court did not err in admitting such evidence. See infra Part II.B. We therefore consider Aragon’s use of an alias in determining whether the government p resented sufficient evidence -7- estate broker who sold the Westcliffe property test ified that he received $3000 cash from each of the three purchasers as earnest m oney. 3 Ricardo Perez, who testified for the government, stated that the “inte nded use” of the property was “[t]o bury drugs.” Aragon argues there was no evidence that she knew the Westcliffe property was being used for the storage of drugs. Ricardo t estified, however, that Aragon was present on certain occasions when drugs were bu ried on the Westcliffe property, though he further stated that only he and Erenio Perez knew exactly where the drugs were buried. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that, although Aragon may not have known e xactly where drugs were kept on the property, she nonetheless knew that dru gs were being stored there. 4 The government also introduced evidence that Aragon , using an alias, 5to sustain her conspiracy convictions. -8-

purchased a vehicle that was used by other members of the conspiracy. During a search of the vehicle, officers found a semiautomat ic handgun, $7000 cash, four throwing stars, and a night vision scope. Addition ally, the evidence showed that Aragon used an alias to rent a motel room during th e time frame of the conspiracy, and various vehicles linked to other me mbers of the conspiracy were seen at the motel during the period of the rental. Cf. United States v. Burgos , 94 F.3d 849, 872 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Employing an alias and attempting to conceal identity reinforces the conclusion of the existence of a conspiracy.”), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1087 (1997). Finally, as Aragon concedes, the evidence establish ed that she was present on many occasions when drug transactions were condu cted. “Mere presence” at the scene of a crime does not, by itself, prove that a person is a member of the conspiracy, but such presence is a “material factor .” United States v. Esparsen , 930 F.2d 1461, 1472 (10th Cir. 1991). The evidence , considered as a whole and in a light most favorable to the government, is suf ficient to establish that Aragon entered into an agreement with her coconspirators t o violate the law. 2. Knowledge of Objectives To establish that a defendant had knowledge of the essential objectives of the conspiracy, the government must “show that the ‘defendant shared a common-9-

purpose or design with his alleged coconspirators.’ ” Evans , 970 F.2d at 669 (quoting United States v. Horn , 946 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1991)). In this cas e, the apparent objective of the conspiracy was to sel l drugs in Colorado which had been purchased in California and to sell barrels of ephedrine in California which had been purchased in Colorado. Aragon was a one-third owner of one of the properties in Colorado used to store the drugs and barrels of ephedrine. The evidence established that she was present during se veral drug transactions. The jury could therefore have reasonably inferred that Aragon had knowledge of the conspiracy’s objectives. 3. Knowing and Voluntary Involvement “A jury may presume a defendant is a knowing partic ipant in the conspiracy when he or she acts in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.” Carter , 130 F.3d at 1440. As discussed, an essential compo nent of the conspiracy was the storage of illegal drugs on properties the defendants owned in Colorado. Aragon, along with two others, purchased one of the propert ies where drugs were stored. Her purchase of the property thus constituted an ac t in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. The jury could theref ore have reasonably concluded that Aragon was a knowing and voluntary participantin the conspiracy.-10-

4. Interdependence Interdependence among coconspirators exists when “e ach coconspirator’s activities constitute essential and integral steps toward the realization of a common, illicit goal.” Id. Although each coconspirator must generally be aware of the existence of the other coconspirators, each coconspirator “is not required to be personally acquainted with all coconspirators orknow all of the details of the
venture.” United States v. Horn , 946 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1991). The coconspirators shared a common goal, the purcha se and sale of ephedrine and methamphetamine. Aragon’s purchase o f the Westcliffe property, on which drugs were stored, constituted an “essenti al” step toward realization of that goal. The evidence established that other mem bers of the conspiracy also took affirmative steps to facilitate the goals of t he conspiracy. The evidence presented was thus sufficient to establish interdep endence among the coconspirators. 5. Summary Although the evidence supporting Aragon’s conspirac y convictions must be “substantial” and “do more than raise a mere suspic ion of guilt, it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothe sis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v. Johnson , 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitt ed). After carefully reviewing6 To the extent that Aragon argues the evidence was i nsufficient to sustain

her conspiracy convictions because the government f ailed to prove she actually or constructively possessed contraband, her argument i s rejected. A conspiracy conviction for possession with intent to distribute or manufacture does not require evidence of possession. See United States v. Slater , 971 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Esparsen , 930 F.2d 1461, 1472 (10th Cir. 1991). -11- the record, this court concludes the government pre sented sufficient evidence upon which to convict Aragon of the conspiracy char ges. 6
B. Use of Alias Aragon next contends the trial court erred by denyi ng her motion in limine requesting that all evidence regarding her use of a n alias be excluded. In her motion, Aragon sought to exclude thirteen evidentia ry items containing her alias, including a driver’s license, motel billing records , vehicle records, money grams, and various receipts. The district court denied he r motion, and the items were admitted at trial, over Aragon’s objections. On appeal, Aragon asserts the items were “never con nected with any of the other alleged [illegal] acts,” were “not inextricab ly intertwined as part of the charged criminal episode,” and were not “necessary to complete the story of the crime charged.” Aragon therefore argues the distri ct court abused its discretion in admitting the items because they were irrelevant an d highly prejudicial. The government first argues that because Aragon objecte d to the introduction of the items at trial solely on the basis of relevance, sh e has waived her objection based-12-

on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Alternatively, th e government argues the items were admissible, as they “were all relevant to prov ing [Aragon’s] knowledge and role in the conspiracy.” This court need not decide whether Aragon waived he r objection based on Rule 403 because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. “A district court has broa d discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential p rejudicial effect, and will be reversed only on a showing of abuse of that discret ion.” United States v. Scarborough , 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997). Contrary to Aragon’s assertion, the government did tie her use of the alias to the conspiracy. For example, all uses of the al ias occurred during the time frame of the conspiracy and, more specifically, dur ing the four months prior to the date she was arrested. Aragon used the alias t o purchase a vehicle that was used by other members of the conspiracy. During a search of the vehicle, officers found a semiautomatic handgun, $7000 cash, four thr owing stars, and a night vision scope. Cf. United States v. Copeland, 51 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding district court did not abuse its discretio n in admitting receipts with defendant’s alias and noting receipts tied defendan t “to certain automobiles referred to in testimony related to the drug conspi racy period”). Aragon also used the alias to rent a motel room; during surveillance of the motel, officers observed-13-

numerous vehicles linked to the conspiracy. This c ourt therefore agrees with the government that Aragon’s use of the alias was relev ant to show, among other things, her knowledge of and role in the conspiracy

. Cf. United States v. Glass , 128 F.3d 1398, 1408 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A defendant’ s use of an alias to conceal his identity from law enforcement officers is relev ant as proof of consciousness of guilt.”); United States v. Walcott , 61 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[The defendant’s] use of aliases and other conduct enlis ted to hide his identity and whereabouts were consistent with involvement in the drug trade.”). Although relevant, Aragon’s use of an alias would b e inadmissible under Rule 403 if its probative value was substantially o utweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Aragon has failed to explain, however, how the admission of the items containing her alias unfairly prejudiced her. Arag on apparently argues that the items were prejudicial because they were not connec ted in any way to the conspiracy, an argument which we have already rejec ted. Under the circumstances, this court finds no abuse of discret ion in admitting the evidence. Cf. Scarborough , 128 F.3d at 1380 (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting driver’s licenses with defendant’s alias because “l icenses were relevant to link[] defendant to the crime”).-14- C. Appointment of Psychologist Aragon next argues the district court erred by refu sing her request for expert services under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA ). The CJA provides that district courts shall authorize counsel of indigentdefendants to retain experts upon finding that the expert services are “necessary for adequate representation” and that the defendant is financially unable to obt ain the services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). In an ex parte motion filed with th e district court prior to sentencing, Aragon’s counsel requested that the cou rt authorize the hiring of a psychologist, stating that “[i]f a psychologist cou ld examine certain issues and facts” concerning her background, “there may be som e factual grounds under the [Sentencing Guidelines] for a departure of a kind n ot taken into consideration by the Guideline Commission.” In support of the reque st, counsel stated that “there may be an issue of the defendant’s age in relation to Mr. Erenio Perez, her husband and co-defendant. . . . This issue arises because of the death at a very young age of [her] natural father.” The district c ourt denied the motion, stating that “[a]ll of the reasons set forth by [Aragon] fo r seeking the services of a psychologist have already been expressly consideredby the Guidelines.” At sentencing, the district court held a closed hea ring to again consider Aragon’s request for the appointment of a psycholog ist. Aragon’s counsel stated that if a psychologist examined Aragon, the psychol ogist may find that Aragon’s-15-

dependence on Erenio was so extraordinary that it s hould be taken into account under the Sentencing Guidelines in allowing a downw ard departure. Counsel admitted that he did not know whether such dependen ce existed, but argued that without a psychological evaluation, he could not kn ow. The district court again denied Aragon’s request. On appeal, Aragon argues the district court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint a psychologist. To obtain expert servic es under the CJA, a “defendant must do more than allege that the services would be helpful.” United States v. Kennedy , 64 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995). The burden is on the defendant to show with particularity that the requested services are “necessary” to present an adequate defense. See Castro v. Ward, No. 97-6179, 1998 WL 113193, at *16 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1998). “‘[U]ndeveloped assertio ns that the requested assistance would be beneficial’” to the defense are not suffic ient to satisfy this burden. Matthews v. Price , 83 F.3d 328, 335 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985)); see also Liles v. Saffle , 945 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1991) (“General allegations supporti ng a request for court appointment of a psychiatric expert, without substa ntive supporting facts, . . . will not suffice to require the appointment of a psychiatrist to aid in the preparation of a criminal defense.”). This court reviews the deni al of a request for expert services under the CJA for abuse of discretion. See Kennedy , 64 F.3d at 1465.7 Because the 63.41 kilograms of methamphetamine was sufficient to

support the highest base offense level under the Se ntencing Guidelines, the court did not specifically consider whether the ephedrine involved in the conspiracy should also be attributed to Aragon. In its senten cing statement, the government argued that Aragon should be held accountable for 1 375 kilograms of ephedrine, based on her conviction for conspiracy to possess e phedrine, knowing and having reasonable cause to believe that ephedrine would be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. For purposes of computing Aragon’ s base offense level, the government argued the ephedrine should be convertedto methamphetamine at a -16- In her brief, Aragon states that she requested a ps ychologist “to see if there were any problems that could have led to her being involved with Mr. Erenio Perez.” She further states that “[i]t is not outsi de the realm of possibility that [she] could have been suffering from some . . . unh ealthy dependence upon Mr. Erenio Perez.” These general assertions, particula rly in light of Aragon’s two previous convictions for possession of methamphetam ine, fail to demonstrate the necessity of a psychologist’s services to the prese ntation of her defense. See, e.g. , id. at 1470. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of her request. D. Drug Quantities Aragon next argues the district court erred in cons idering certain drug quantities as relevant conduct for purposes of dete rmining her base offense level because the quantities were not foreseeable to her. At sentencing, the district court determined that Aragon’s base offense level w as 38, based on its finding that 63.41 kilograms of methamphetamine were attrib utable to her. 7ratio of ten to eight, resulting in an additional 1 100 kilograms of

methamphetamine attributable to Aragon. -17- This court reviews “the district court’s factual fi ndings regarding the quantity of drugs for which a defendant is held res ponsible for clear error.” United States v. Hooks , 65 F.3d 850, 854 (10th Cir. 1995). The drug quan tities attributable to a defendant convicted of conspiracy are established not by looking at the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracyas a whole, but rather by looking at the quantity of drugs the defendant reas onably foresaw or which fell within the scope of the defendant’s agreement with coconspirators. See id. ; United States v. Roberts , 14 F.3d 502, 522 (10th Cir. 1993). The government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the quantity of drugs attributable to each defendant in the conspir acy. See Hooks , 65 F.3d at 854. The district court may estimate the quantity provid ed the information underlying the estimate possesses a “minimum indicia of reliab ility.” United States v. Browning , 61 F.3d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1995). The court mayalso consider drug quantities associated with a drug charge for which the defendant was acquitted so long as the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the quantities were foreseeable by the defendant. See United States v. Garcia , 987 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (10th Cir. 1993).8 Effective November 1, 1997, § 2D1.1(c) of the Sente ncing Guidelines was

amended so that only 15 kilograms of methamphetamin e is now required to support a base offense level of 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). -18- To support the base offense level of 38, the gove rnment was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at le ast thirty kilograms of methamphetamine 8 were foreseeable by, and thus attributable to, Ara gon. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (amended Nov. 1, 1997). Among other drug quantities, 120 pounds (approximately fifty-four kilograms) of meth amphetamine were attributed to Aragon based on Ricardo Perez’s testimony that the Dodge Dart found on the Westcliffe property was used to transport ephedrine to California and bring back methamphetamine. According to Ricardo, the vehicle was used on four occasions to bring back on each occasion approximately thirty pounds of methamphetamine, which was then buried on the Westcliffe property until it was sold. These activities were within the scope of the conspiracy, the purpose of which was to sell drugs in Colorado that had been purchased in C alifornia and to sell barrels of ephedrine in California that had been purchased in Colorado. Aragon was a onethird owner of the Westcliffe property, which was p urchased specifically for storing drugs. According to Ricardo, Aragon was pr esent on the property when drugs were buried, although she did not know exactl y where the drugs were buried.-19-

The district court’s conclusion that the 120 pounds of methamphetamine was reasonably foreseeable to Aragon is supported b y the record and is not clearly erroneous. Because this quantity is sufficient to support Aragon’s base offense level of 38, we need not consider whether the courterred in attributing additional amounts of methamphetamine to Aragon.
E. Role in the Offense Aragon’s final argument is that the district court erred by refusing to grant her a four-level reduction in her offense level bas ed on her alleged “minimal” role in the conspiracy. This court reviews the districtcourt’s factual findings regarding a defendant’s role in the offense for cle ar error. See United States v. Ayers , 84 F.3d 382, 383 (10th Cir. 1996). Questions of law concerning application of the Sentencing Guidelines are review ed de novo. See United States v. Lacey , 86 F.3d 956, 967 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 331 (1996). The burden is on the defendant to establish by a prepon derance of the evidence that she is entitled to an offense level reduction underthe Sentencing Guidelines. See Ayers , 84 F.3d at 383. Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines “‘vests the district court with discretion to grant a base offense level reduction if it finds a defendant is less culpable relative to other participants in a given offense.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Santistevan , 39 F.3d 250, 254 (10th Cir. 1994)). The court may reduce-20-

the defendant’s offense level by four levels if it finds the defendant was a “minimal” participant in the criminal activity, by two levels if the defendant was a “minor” participant in the activity, or by three le vels if the defendant’s actions fell between a minimal and minor role. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. In this case, the district court granted Aragon a two-level reduction, finding that she was a minor, rather than a minimal, partic ipant in the conspiracy. The application notes to § 3B1.2 provide that the four- level reduction for a minimal role “is intended to cover defendants who are plain ly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. . . . [T] he defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structu re of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as a m inimal participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 application note 1. The notes further prov ide that the four-level adjustment is to be used “infrequently” and “would be appropriate, for example, for someone who played no other role in a very larg e drug smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment .” Id. application note 2. A minor participant, on the other hand, is defined as “any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose ro le could not be described as minimal.” Id. application note 3. As discussed above, Aragon purchased property on wh ich drugs were stored and, using an alias, purchased a vehicle which was used by other members of the-21-

conspiracy. Her purchases facilitated the overall goals of the conspiracy. The district court’s conclusion that Aragon was a minor , rather than minimal, participant in the conspiracy is supported by the r ecord and is not clearly

erroneous. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge