IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

MICHELLE LOUISE BRAWLEY, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1257-G-BN 

§ 

THE CITY OF DALLAS TEXAS, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Michelle Louise Brawley filed this lawsuit pro se alleging violations 

of the Constitution and state law against the City of Dallas, a state agency (Child 

Protective Services (or CPS)), Dallas and CPS officers and employees in their official 

and individual capacities, and other individuals, asserting facts intertwined with 

multiple state court proceedings. See Dkt. No. 3. 

Brawley also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). See Dkt. No. 

4. So Senior United States District Judge A. Joe Fish referred Brawley’s lawsuit to 

the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

The Court granted Brawley leave to proceed IFP and denied her motion to 

transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Dkt. Nos. 8-10. 

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should terminate all pending motions and dismiss 

Brawley’s lawsuit for the reasons and to the extent set out below. 

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Legal Standards 

A district court is required to screen a civil action filed IFP and may summarily 

dismiss that action, or any portion of the action, if, for example, it fails to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The same statute 

provides for summary dismissal of claims “seek[ing] monetary relief against a 

defendant who is immune from such relief.” See id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 

“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per 

curiam). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain 

detailed factual allegations, but a plaintiff must allege more than labels and 

conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, it 

is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id.

And, to survive dismissal, a plaintiff must “plead facts sufficient to show” that 

the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and 

directly events” that a plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City 

of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), 

(d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 

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890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 

for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citing 

Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he degree of 

specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and therefore the need 

to include sufficient factual allegations, depends on context.”))). 

Put differently, plaintiffs, through the complaint, must provide the Court 

enough factual content to demonstrate an entitlement to relief. Compare Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.”), with Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (“The burden is on the 

plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ 

that he or she is entitled to relief.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). 

Analysis 

Initially, while several specific pleading deficiencies (unique to municipal 

liability, immunity, state action, and federalism) apply to Brawley’s allegations – and 

are discussed below – Brawley’s allegations are mainly a collection of legal 

conclusions couched as facts. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 6 (“Michelle was at home enjoying 

her fourth amendment right when an officer entered the home of Preston Smith and 

husband and Michelle Brawley wife, during an unverified visit an assault, injury, 

along with three false charges were charged against Michelle’s public name by 

employees that work for the City of Dallas Police Department.”); id. at 7 (“A false 

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claim was made.”); id. at 7 (“The supervisor ... did an illegal search of the home 

without Michelle’s consent.... Michelle Brawley’s husband Preston Smith was forced 

into the fraudulent safety plan.”). 

“[P]leadings that ... are no more than conclusions ... are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. [And, w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

Relatedly, where Brawley asserts specific causes of action, as to each, she 

“repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs previously 

set forth.” See Dkt. No. 3 at 13-18. 

Pleading in this manner is the “oppo[site of] the ‘short and plain statement’ 

requirement contemplated by Rule 8.” Roe v. Johnson Cnty., Tex., No. 3:18-cv-2497-

B-BN, 2019 WL 5031357, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2019) (citations omitted), rec. 

accepted, 2019 WL 3980737 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2019). And doing so makes it 

“virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which 

claim(s) for relief.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 

366 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Consequently, “[a] dismissal under Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) is appropriate.” 

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320-23 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(citing Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366); see also Roe, 2019 WL 5031357, at *5 (“Shotgun 

pleadings are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), particularly where – as shown 

by the multiplicity of claims here – ‘the pleader heedlessly throws a little bit of 

everything into his complaint in the hopes that something will stick.’” (quoting S. 

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Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 1986))); Lowe v. Dall. 

Police Dep’t, No. 3:17-cv-704-G-BN, 2017 WL 4863076, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2017) 

(“[M]erely attaching a label and/or legal conclusion to no facts unique to [a] claim or, 

at best, threadbare unique facts” “is not sufficient to state a claim that is plausible 

on its face.”), rec. accepted, 2017 WL 4838980 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017). 

Moving on to the more specific pleading deficiencies, to the extent that Brawley 

alleges that the City of Dallas, a municipality, has violated her civil rights, “[a] person 

may sue a municipality that violates his or her constitutional rights ‘under color of 

any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.’” Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., Tex., 

994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983; citing Monell v. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). 

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff alleging a Monell claim “has two burdens: to 

[plausibly allege] (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that a municipal 

policy was the moving force behind the violation.” Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Tex., 956 

F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

So, even if Brawley could allege a plausible constitutional violation – which she 

hasn’t because her claims are conclusory – an isolated incident is not enough to allege 

that the City may be liable. 

That is, a plaintiff may proceed on a Monell claim only by “identify[ing] ‘(1) an 

official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or 

constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose moving force is that 

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policy (or custom).’” Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482 (quoting Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 

F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). 

Accordingly, “[m]unicipalities are not liable ‘on the theory of respondeat 

superior’ and are ‘almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part 

of an employee.’” Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th 

Cir. 2009)). 

And, insofar as Brawley has sued an employee of the City in his or her official 

capacity, “the § 1983 action against [a municipal employee in an] official capacity is, 

in effect, a claim against [the City].” Palo ex rel. Estate of Palo v. Dall. Cnty., No. 3:05-

cv-0527-D, 2006 WL 3702655, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2006) (citing Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). 

Turning to CPS and CPS employees sued in their official capacity, “[a]bsent 

waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully expressed in, 

the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v. Lawley, 44 F.4th 

318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 

374, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)). 

And the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has held that 

Child Protective Services is ‘an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment.’” 

Noble v. CPS – Fort Worth, No. 4:20-cv-241-P-BP, 2020 WL 5505660, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

Aug. 24, 2020) (quoting Hall v. Dixon, No. H-09-2611, 2010 WL 3909515, *46 (S.D. 

Tex. Sept. 30, 2010) (citing, in turn, Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1990))), 

rec. accepted, 2020 WL 5500269 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2020). 

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So, because “Texas has not consented by statute, and § 1983 does not abrogate 

state sovereign immunity,” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th 

Cir. 2015) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)), the Court lacks 

jurisdiction over claims under Section 1983 against CPS and CPS employees sued in 

their official capacities, see id. at 393-94 (citing Moore v. La. Bd. of Elementary & 

Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014)). 

And, to the extent that Brawley alleges Section 1983 claims against individuals 

who are not plausibly employees or officers of the City or of CPS, see Dkt. No. 3 at 2, 

“[a] plaintiff makes out a § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the Constitution or 

of federal law, and then shows that the violation was committed by someone acting 

under color of state law,’” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned 

up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)). “The traditional 

definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 

action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 

because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Gomez v. Galman, 

18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 

49 (1988) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941))). And, 

as to these defendants, Brawley fails to allege facts to show that they exercised such 

power or otherwise acted under the authority of state law. 

In addition, all of Brawley’s claims in this civil suit appear to be intertwined 

with various state court proceedings, including state felony and misdemeanor 

prosecutions that appear to have been dismissed, see Dkt. No. 3 at 8, 12 (referencing 

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F2056352, M2057070, and M2057071), and family court or child support proceedings 

that may be closed or ongoing, see id. at 7 (referencing “305th Judicial District Court 

case number JC-20-00409, a CPS state claim [ ] made against Preston Smith and 

Michelle Brawley alleging neglect and abuse”); id. at 12-13 (referencing DF-16-20302, 

a child support proceeding against the father of Brawley’s child). 

Insofar as Brawley makes claims in this proceeding that implicate ongoing 

state court proceedings, the Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over 

those claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which, “following Pennzoil 

Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987), [ ] also applies ‘when certain civil 

proceedings are pending, if the State’s interests in the proceeding are so important 

that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the 

States and the National Government,’” Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 494 

(5th Cir. 2008). 

Section 1983 “does not ‘qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and 

federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court 

proceeding.’” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mitchum v. 

Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972); citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-47). 

And, under Younger, a federal court should abstain from exercising its 

jurisdiction when to do so would result in the interference in certain, select state 

proceedings. Younger abstention “applies only to three exceptional categories of state 

proceedings: ongoing criminal prosecutions, certain civil enforcement proceedings 

akin to criminal prosecutions, and pending civil proceedings involving certain orders 

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... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial 

functions.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sprint 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (quoting, in turn, New Orleans Pub. 

Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (NOPSI)); 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

The doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where 

three conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing 

state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the 

subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the 

state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 

677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden 

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); internal citations omitted); accord Hood, 

822 F.3d at 222-23. 

Of the three exceptional categories identified in NOPSI, which “define 

Younger’s scope,” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78, the unique posture of this litigation – filed 

to request that a federal district court direct how a state court should conduct a 

pending proceeding – fits within the third, see Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 13-14 (“Both 

Juidice[ v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977),] and this case involve challenges to the processes 

by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts. Not only 

would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state 

judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which 

those judgments were obtained.”); Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 

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953 F.3d 660, 671 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[B]oth Juidice and Pennzoil involved requests to 

directly or indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” (citing Joseph A. ex 

rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Younger governs 

whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court’s ability to conduct 

proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding 

directly.”); Zeeco, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-CV-384-JEDFHM, 2017 WL 6539504, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2017) (“What Younger, Juidice, 

and Pennzoil have in common is that they all involved plaintiffs filing separate 

federal suits in an attempt to enjoin ongoing state proceedings.”))). 

The additional Middlesex County factors are present here: “In this case, the 

state proceedings are judicial in nature and represent important state interests, as 

state courts must be empowered to enforce their own orders and judgments. 

Moreover, [Brawley] has had opportunities to raise his federal challenges in these 

state proceedings and there has been no procedural bar to his doing so.” Dandar v. 

Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 619 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(per curiam); see also Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15 (“[W]hen a litigant has not 

attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal 

court should assume that the state procedures will afford an adequate remedy.”); 

Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979) (“Certainly, abstention is appropriate 

unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.”); Gates, 

885 F.3d at 880 (“The relevant question is whether the would-be federal plaintiff has 

the opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court.” (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 

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425; emphasis in original)). 

And, to the extent that state proceedings have concluded, such that no appeal 

was pending when Brawley filed this lawsuit, this federal district court lacks 

jurisdiction “to modify or reverse” a state proceeding under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced 

to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not 

have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized 

by Congress.” (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 

(5th Cir. 2004))); but see also Miller v. Dunn, 35 F.4th 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(“Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is pending when the federal 

suit is filed.”). 

For these reasons, Brawley’s claims should be dismissed. 

Leave to Amend 

The time to file objections to this recommendation (further explained below) 

allows Brawley an opportunity to explain how the fatal pleading deficiencies 

identified above can be cured and thus show the Court that this case should not be 

dismissed at this time and that the Court should instead grant leave to amend. See 

Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A 

court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, FED. R. CIV. P. 

15(a)(2), but a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her 

amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s 

defects. Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). If the 

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plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects 

could be cured, a district court may deny leave. McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 

309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs 

‘failed to amend their complaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district 

court with a proposed amended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the 

defendants to the substance of their proposed amendment’).”). 

And, if Brawley fails to show that leave to amend should be granted, the Court 

should dismiss this case with prejudice. 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this action with prejudice unless, within the time to 

file objections, Plaintiff Michelle Louise Brawley shows a basis to grant leave to 

amend the complaint. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

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factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: April 12, 2023 

_________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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