# Official Journal L 201/2022

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 201 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 651 August 2022 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 201

English edition

Legislation

Volume 651 August 2022

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| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1329 of 28 July 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau | 1 |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1330 of 28 July 2022 implementing Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau | 3 |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1331 of 28 July 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | 5 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1332 of 26 July 2022 approving non-minor amendments to the product specification for a name entered in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications [Beurre Charentes-Poitou / Beurre des Charentes / Beurre des Deux-Sèvres (PDO)] | 23 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1333 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) | 25 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1334 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) | 27 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision 2012/285/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau | 29 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1336 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | 31 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1337 of 28 July 2022 setting out the template for the provision of information to third-country nationals about the processing of personal data in the Entry/Exit System | 48 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1338 of 29 July 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (
  1
  ) | 54 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1339 of 29 July 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (
  1
  ) | 57 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1340 of 29 July 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (
  1
  ) | 60 |
| | | RECOMMENDATIONS |
| | * | Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1341 of 23 June 2022 on voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment used in public spaces (outside aviation) | 63 |
| | * | Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1342 of 28 July 2022 on the monitoring of mercury in fish, crustaceans and molluscs | 71 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1329 of 28 July 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

1

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1330 of 28 July 2022 implementing Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

3

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1331 of 28 July 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

5

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1332 of 26 July 2022 approving non-minor amendments to the product specification for a name entered in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications [Beurre Charentes-Poitou / Beurre des Charentes / Beurre des Deux-Sèvres (PDO)]

23

DECISIONS

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1333 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA)

25

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1334 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)

27

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision 2012/285/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

29

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1336 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

31

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1337 of 28 July 2022 setting out the template for the provision of information to third-country nationals about the processing of personal data in the Entry/Exit System

48

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1338 of 29 July 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (
  1
  )

1

54

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1339 of 29 July 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (
  1
  )

1

57

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1340 of 29 July 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (
  1
  )

1

60

RECOMMENDATIONS

*

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1341 of 23 June 2022 on voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment used in public spaces (outside aviation)

63

*

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1342 of 28 July 2022 on the monitoring of mercury in fish, crustaceans and molluscs

71

| | | Corrigenda |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | * | Corrigendum to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1096 of 30 June 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Korea to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( OJ L 176, 1.7.2022 ) | 74 |

Corrigenda

*

Corrigendum to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1096 of 30 June 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Korea to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( OJ L 176, 1.7.2022 )

( OJ L 176, 1.7.2022 )

74

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| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/1

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COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/1329

of 28 July 2022

amending Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof,

Having regard to Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision 2012/285/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (1),

Having regard to the joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Council Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 (2) gives effect to Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP (3) and provides for certain measures directed against persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, including the freezing of their assets. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Council Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 (2) gives effect to Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP (3) and provides for certain measures directed against persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, including the freezing of their assets.

| (2) | Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335 amends the title of Decision 2012/285/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335 amends the title of Decision 2012/285/CFSP.

| (3) | Regulatory action at Union level is therefore necessary in order to give effect to Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335, in particular with a view to ensuring uniform application by economic operators in all Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Regulatory action at Union level is therefore necessary in order to give effect to Decision (CFSP) 2022/1335, in particular with a view to ensuring uniform application by economic operators in all Member States.

| (4) | Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The title of Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 is replaced by ‘Council Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 of 3 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guinea-Bissau’.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

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(1)  See page 29 of this Official Journal.

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 of 3 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (OJ L 119, 4.5.2012, p. 1).

2

(3)  Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP of 31 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and repealing Decision 2012/237/CFSP (OJ L 142, 1.6.2012, p. 36).

3

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| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/3

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1330

of 28 July 2022

implementing Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 of 3 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (1), and in particular Article 11(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 3 May 2012, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 377/2012. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 3 May 2012, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 377/2012.

| (2) | The Council considers that nine persons should be removed from the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 377/2012. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Council considers that nine persons should be removed from the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 377/2012.

| (3) | Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 377/2012 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

---

(1)  
  OJ L 119, 4.5.2012, p. 1.

1

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ANNEX

In Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 377/2012, the entries concerning the persons listed below are deleted:

| ‘6. | General Augusto MÁRIO CÓ |
| --- | --- |

‘6.

| 7. | General Saya Braia Na NHAPKA |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Colonel Tomás DJASSI |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Cranha DANFÁ |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Colonel Celestino de CARVALHO |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 14. | Tcham NA MAN (a.k.a. Namam) |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Major Samuel FERNANDES |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 18. | Commander (Navy) Agostinho Sousa CORDEIRO |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 20. | Lieutenant Lassana CAMARÁ’. |
| --- | --- |

20.

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| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/5

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1331

of 28 July 2022

implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 of 30 August 2017 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and repealing Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 (1), and in particular Articles 47(2) and 47(5) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 30 August 2017, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2017/1509. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 30 August 2017, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2017/1509.

| (2) | In accordance with Article 47a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes XV, XVI, XVII and XVIII to that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In accordance with Article 47a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes XV, XVI, XVII and XVIII to that Regulation.

| (3) | The restrictive measures against all persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes XV and XVI to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 should be maintained, with the exception of one deceased person designated in Annex XV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, whose entry should be removed from that Annex. The statement of reasons for 17 persons and one entity, and the identifying information for 59 persons and five entities should be updated. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The restrictive measures against all persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes XV and XVI to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 should be maintained, with the exception of one deceased person designated in Annex XV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, whose entry should be removed from that Annex. The statement of reasons for 17 persons and one entity, and the identifying information for 59 persons and five entities should be updated.

| (4) | On 30 June 2022, the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) updated the information relating to one person in the list set out in Annex XIII to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 30 June 2022, the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) updated the information relating to one person in the list set out in Annex XIII to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509.

| (5) | Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annexes XIII, XV and XVI to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

---

(1)  
  OJ L 224, 31.8.2017, p. 1.

1

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ANNEX

| (1) | In Annex XIII to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons’, entry 29 is replaced by the following: | Name | Alias | Identifying information | Date of UN designation | Statement of reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘29. | Pak Chun Il | | Passport: 563410091;
  DOB: 28.7.1954;
  Nationality: DPRK | 30.11.2016 | Served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID. Concluded his tour of duty and left Egypt on 15 November 2016.’ |

(1)

In Annex XIII to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons’, entry 29 is replaced by the following:

Name

Alias

Identifying information

Date of UN designation

Statement of reasons

‘29.

Pak Chun Il

Passport: 563410091;

DOB: 28.7.1954;

Nationality: DPRK

30.11.2016

Served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID. Concluded his tour of duty and left Egypt on 15 November 2016.’

| (2) | Annex XV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 is amended as follows:






  (a) | under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons designated in accordance with point (a) of Article 34(4)’, entries 1, 3 to 13 and 16 to 31 are replaced by the following: | Name (and possible aliases) | Alias | Identifying information | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | CHON Chi Bu
  전지부 | CHON Chi-bu | Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, former technical director of Yongbyon. Photographs connected him to nuclear reactor in Syria before it was bombed by Israel in 2007. |
| 3. | O Kuk-Ryol
  오극렬 | O Kuk Ryol | DOB: 7.1.1930
  POB: Jilin Province, China.
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Korean People’s Army General, former deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, responsible for supervising the acquisition from other countries of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistic programmes. Former Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Central Committee. |
| 4. | PAK Jae-gyong
  박재경 | PAK Chae-Kyong
  PAK Jae Gyong | DOB: 10.6.1933
  Passport number: 554410661
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | General of the Korean People’s Army. Former Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Armed Forces and former Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-Il). Present at KIM Jong Un’s inspection of Strategic Rocket Force Command in 2012. Former member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. President of the Korean Committee of Veterans against Imperialism. |
| 5. | RYOM Yong
  렴영 | | Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations), in charge of international relations. |
| 6. | SO Sang-kuk
  서상국 | SO Sang Kuk | DOB: 30.11.1938
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il Sung University. |
| 7. | KIM Yong Chol
  김영철 | KIM Yong-Chol; KIM Young-Chol; KIM Young-Cheol; KIM Young-Chul | DOB: 1946
  POB: Pyongan-Pukto, DPRK
  Gender: male | 19.12.2011 | Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Political Bureau, the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and, until June 2022, Director of the United Front Department. Former commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), an entity sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. |
| 8. | CHOE Kyong-song
  최경성 | CHOE Kyong song | DOB: 1945
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 9. | CHOE Yong-ho
  최용호 | CHOE Yong Ho | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army/Korean People’s Army Air Force General. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Commander of Korean People’s Army Air Force and Anti-aircraft force. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 10. | HONG Sung-Mu
  홍승무 | HONG Sung Mu | DOB: 1.1.1942
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. As such, Hong is responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear arms-related, ballistic-missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. He witnessed the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on 28 November 2017. Participated in a meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party in July 2020 dedicated to ‘deterrence from war’, a euphemism used to refer to the DPRK nuclear programme. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021. |
| 11. | JO Kyongchol
  조경철 | JO Kyong Chol | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Director of the Military Security Command. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Accompanied Kim Jong Un to largest-ever long-range artillery fire drill. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021. |
| 12. | KIM Chun-sam
  김춘삼 | KIM Chun Sam | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Lieutenant General, former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Director of the Operations Department of the Military Headquarters of the Korean People’s Army and first vice chief of the Military Headquarters. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 13. | KIM Chun-sop
  김춘섭 | KIM Chun Sop | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Former director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. Former member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Present at a photo session for those who contributed to successful SLBM test in May 2015. |
| 16. | KIM Won-hong
  김원홍 | KIM Won Hong | DOB: 7.1.1945
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: 745310010
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | General of the Korean People’s Army. Former First Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army. Former Director of the State Security Department. Former Minister of State Security. Former Member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 17. | PAK Jong-chon
  박정천 | PAK Jong Chon | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea and Member of the State Affairs Commission. Marshal and former Chief of the General Staff. Performed the formal review at the 25 April 2022 military parade, which with his current positions indicate his continuing role in and responsibility for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Elected to the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in January 2021. |
| 18. | LI Yong-ju
  리용주 | RI Yong Ju | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Admiral of the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Commander in chief of the Korean People’s Navy, which is involved in the development of ballistic-missile programmes and in the development of the nuclear capacities of the DPRK naval forces. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 19. | SON Chol-ju
  손철주 | SON Chol Ju | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Colonel General of the Korean People’s Army. Vice Director, Guidance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau and former Political Director of the Air and Anti-Air Forces, which oversee the development of modernised anti-aircraft rockets. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Son was listed as participating in a meeting of the Central Military Commission in May 2020 as Deputy Director responsible for the organisation of the Korean People’s Army. |
| 20. | YUN Jong-rin
  윤정린 | YUN Jong Rin | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | General of the Korean People’s Army, former commander of the Supreme Guard Command. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 21. | HONG Yong Chil
  홍영칠 | | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UNSC on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including R&D programmes. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences – also designated in August 2010 – are subordinate to the MID. Hong was described in 2019 as one of the leading officials in the field of national defence science. He accompanied Kim Jong Un during the firing of a new type of tactical guided weapon, and during the inspection of a new type of submarine under construction. |
| | | | | | He was one of the scientists congratulated by Kim Jong Un in 2017 for the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and observed earlier engine tests and other ballistic launches. In 2016, he accompanied Kim Jong Un to a meeting with scientists in which research to mount nuclear warheads on tactical and strategic missiles was discussed. He may have played a significant role in the DPRK’s nuclear test on 6 January 2016. As such, he is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 22. | RI Hak Chol
  리학철 | RI Hak Chul; RI Hak Cheol | DOB: 19.1.1963 or 8.5.1966
  Passport numbers: 381320634,
  PS- 563410163
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | President of Green Pine Associated Corporation (‘Green Pine’). According to the UN Sanctions Committee in 2012, Green Pine had taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Green Pine was also seen as responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK. Green Pine was identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related materiel from the DPRK. Green Pine specialises in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms. Green Pine has been designated by the UNSC. |
| 23. | YUN Chang Hyok
  윤창혁 | | DOB: 9.8.1965
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Deputy Director of the Satellite Control Centre, National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), which Kim Jong Un visited prior to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test on 24 March 2022. NADA is subject to sanctions under UNSCR 2270 (2016) for involvement in the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets. UNSCR 2270 (2016) condemned the DPRK’s satellite launch of 7 February 2016 for using ballistic missile technology and being in serious violation of Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 24. | RI Myong Su
  리명수 | | DOB: 1937
  POB: Myongchon, North Hamgyong, DPRK
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Vice Marshall of the Korean People’s Army, first vice commander of the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command. Until 2018, member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chief of Staff of the People’s Armed Forces. Chief military representative at a state funeral in May 2022, but described as veteran in an April 2022 parade. Ri Myong Su has been influential in national defence matters including the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Ri is a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). |
| 25. | SO Hong Chan
  서홍찬 | | DOB: 30.12.1957
  POB: Kangwon, DPRK
  Passport: PD836410105
  Passport date of expiration: 27.11.2021
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Former First Vice-Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, former Director General of the Rear Services Bureau and former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Re-elected as a Member of the Central Committee in January 2021. In this capacity, So Hong Chan is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 26. | WANG Chang Uk
  왕창욱 | | DOB: 29.5.1960
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Minister for Industry and Atomic Energy, promoted to full Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee in December 2021. In this capacity, Wang Chang Uk is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 27. | JANG Chol
  장철 | | DOB: 31.3.1961
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: 563310042
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Member of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission and former president of the State Academy of Sciences, an organisation dedicated to the development of technological and scientific capacities of the DPRK. In this latter capacity, Jang Chol held a strategic position for the development of DPRK nuclear activities. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 28. | KIM Su Gil
  김수길 | KIM Su-Gil | DOB: 1950
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as Director of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau between 2018 and 2021 and a Member of the State Affairs Commission between 2019 and 2021, he was responsible for the implementation of the Korean Workers’ Party decisions, related to the development of nuclear and ballistic programmes in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). |
| 29. | JON Il Ho
  전일호 | JON Il-Ho | DOB: 1955 or 1956
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as a ‘leading official in the field of national defence science’, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. Promoted to Colonel General in August 2019, recipient of the February 16 Science and Technology Prize, Director of the Research Institute of Automation and Institute Director of Kim Chaek University of Technology, and Vice Director of a Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, he participated at the launches of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as most other missile launches in 2017, 2019 and March 2020. |
| 30. | JONG Sung Il
  정승일 | JONG Sung-Il | DOB: 20.3.1961
  Passport number: 927240105
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as a ‘Senior Party Official’ and ‘leading official in the field of national defence science’ and identified by a UN Member State as a former Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea in 2017, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, in particular ballistic missiles. He was present during the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017 and present during ballistic missiles/large Multiple Launch Rocket System launches on 24 August 2019 and 10 September 2019. |
| 31. | YU Jin
  유진 | YU Jin | DOB: 1960
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as Director of the Munitions Industry Department and Alternative Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea, he is responsible for playing a major role in the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes both in nuclear and ballistic fields. He accompanied Kim Jong Un to the National Aerospace Development Administration prior to the March 2022 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch and took part in the 2021 National Defence Exhibition, which displayed apparently new weapons systems. As Deputy Director he was present during the Hwasong-14 ICBM tests of 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as Kim Jong Un’s inspection of a new type of submarine, which the DPRK indicated was intended for the ‘strategic’ purpose of deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, possibly capable of carrying nuclear warheads, on 22 July 2019 and the ballistic missile launches of 25 July and 30 July 2019, and 2 August 2019.’ |

(2)

Annex XV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 is amended as follows:

(a)

under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons designated in accordance with point (a) of Article 34(4)’, entries 1, 3 to 13 and 16 to 31 are replaced by the following:

Name (and possible aliases)

Alias

Identifying information

Date of designation

Reasons

‘1.

CHON Chi Bu

전지부

CHON Chi-bu

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, former technical director of Yongbyon. Photographs connected him to nuclear reactor in Syria before it was bombed by Israel in 2007.

3.

O Kuk-Ryol

오극렬

O Kuk Ryol

DOB: 7.1.1930

POB: Jilin Province, China.

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Korean People’s Army General, former deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, responsible for supervising the acquisition from other countries of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistic programmes. Former Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Central Committee.

4.

PAK Jae-gyong

박재경

PAK Chae-Kyong

PAK Jae Gyong

DOB: 10.6.1933

Passport number: 554410661

Gender: male

22.12.2009

General of the Korean People’s Army. Former Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Armed Forces and former Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-Il). Present at KIM Jong Un’s inspection of Strategic Rocket Force Command in 2012. Former member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. President of the Korean Committee of Veterans against Imperialism.

5.

RYOM Yong

렴영

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations), in charge of international relations.

6.

SO Sang-kuk

서상국

SO Sang Kuk

DOB: 30.11.1938

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il Sung University.

7.

KIM Yong Chol

김영철

KIM Yong-Chol; KIM Young-Chol; KIM Young-Cheol; KIM Young-Chul

DOB: 1946

POB: Pyongan-Pukto, DPRK

Gender: male

19.12.2011

Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Political Bureau, the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and, until June 2022, Director of the United Front Department. Former commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), an entity sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.

8.

CHOE Kyong-song

최경성

CHOE Kyong song

DOB: 1945

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

9.

CHOE Yong-ho

최용호

CHOE Yong Ho

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army/Korean People’s Army Air Force General. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Commander of Korean People’s Army Air Force and Anti-aircraft force. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

10.

HONG Sung-Mu

홍승무

HONG Sung Mu

DOB: 1.1.1942

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. As such, Hong is responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear arms-related, ballistic-missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. He witnessed the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on 28 November 2017. Participated in a meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party in July 2020 dedicated to ‘deterrence from war’, a euphemism used to refer to the DPRK nuclear programme. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021.

11.

JO Kyongchol

조경철

JO Kyong Chol

Gender: male

20.5.2016

General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Director of the Military Security Command. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Accompanied Kim Jong Un to largest-ever long-range artillery fire drill. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021.

12.

KIM Chun-sam

김춘삼

KIM Chun Sam

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Lieutenant General, former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Director of the Operations Department of the Military Headquarters of the Korean People’s Army and first vice chief of the Military Headquarters. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

13.

KIM Chun-sop

김춘섭

KIM Chun Sop

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Former director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. Former member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Present at a photo session for those who contributed to successful SLBM test in May 2015.

16.

KIM Won-hong

김원홍

KIM Won Hong

DOB: 7.1.1945

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: 745310010

Gender: male

20.5.2016

General of the Korean People’s Army. Former First Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army. Former Director of the State Security Department. Former Minister of State Security. Former Member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

17.

PAK Jong-chon

박정천

PAK Jong Chon

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea and Member of the State Affairs Commission. Marshal and former Chief of the General Staff. Performed the formal review at the 25 April 2022 military parade, which with his current positions indicate his continuing role in and responsibility for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Elected to the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in January 2021.

18.

LI Yong-ju

리용주

RI Yong Ju

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Admiral of the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Commander in chief of the Korean People’s Navy, which is involved in the development of ballistic-missile programmes and in the development of the nuclear capacities of the DPRK naval forces. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

19.

SON Chol-ju

손철주

SON Chol Ju

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Colonel General of the Korean People’s Army. Vice Director, Guidance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau and former Political Director of the Air and Anti-Air Forces, which oversee the development of modernised anti-aircraft rockets. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Son was listed as participating in a meeting of the Central Military Commission in May 2020 as Deputy Director responsible for the organisation of the Korean People’s Army.

20.

YUN Jong-rin

윤정린

YUN Jong Rin

Gender: male

20.5.2016

General of the Korean People’s Army, former commander of the Supreme Guard Command. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

21.

HONG Yong Chil

홍영칠

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UNSC on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including R&D programmes. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences – also designated in August 2010 – are subordinate to the MID. Hong was described in 2019 as one of the leading officials in the field of national defence science. He accompanied Kim Jong Un during the firing of a new type of tactical guided weapon, and during the inspection of a new type of submarine under construction.

He was one of the scientists congratulated by Kim Jong Un in 2017 for the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and observed earlier engine tests and other ballistic launches. In 2016, he accompanied Kim Jong Un to a meeting with scientists in which research to mount nuclear warheads on tactical and strategic missiles was discussed. He may have played a significant role in the DPRK’s nuclear test on 6 January 2016. As such, he is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

22.

RI Hak Chol

리학철

RI Hak Chul; RI Hak Cheol

DOB: 19.1.1963 or 8.5.1966

Passport numbers: 381320634,

PS- 563410163

Gender: male

20.5.2016

President of Green Pine Associated Corporation (‘Green Pine’). According to the UN Sanctions Committee in 2012, Green Pine had taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Green Pine was also seen as responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK. Green Pine was identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related materiel from the DPRK. Green Pine specialises in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms. Green Pine has been designated by the UNSC.

23.

YUN Chang Hyok

윤창혁

DOB: 9.8.1965

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Deputy Director of the Satellite Control Centre, National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), which Kim Jong Un visited prior to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test on 24 March 2022. NADA is subject to sanctions under UNSCR 2270 (2016) for involvement in the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets. UNSCR 2270 (2016) condemned the DPRK’s satellite launch of 7 February 2016 for using ballistic missile technology and being in serious violation of Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

24.

RI Myong Su

리명수

DOB: 1937

POB: Myongchon, North Hamgyong, DPRK

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Vice Marshall of the Korean People’s Army, first vice commander of the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command. Until 2018, member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chief of Staff of the People’s Armed Forces. Chief military representative at a state funeral in May 2022, but described as veteran in an April 2022 parade. Ri Myong Su has been influential in national defence matters including the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Ri is a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).

25.

SO Hong Chan

서홍찬

DOB: 30.12.1957

POB: Kangwon, DPRK

Passport: PD836410105

Passport date of expiration: 27.11.2021

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Former First Vice-Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, former Director General of the Rear Services Bureau and former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Re-elected as a Member of the Central Committee in January 2021. In this capacity, So Hong Chan is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

26.

WANG Chang Uk

왕창욱

DOB: 29.5.1960

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Minister for Industry and Atomic Energy, promoted to full Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee in December 2021. In this capacity, Wang Chang Uk is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

27.

JANG Chol

장철

DOB: 31.3.1961

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: 563310042

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Member of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission and former president of the State Academy of Sciences, an organisation dedicated to the development of technological and scientific capacities of the DPRK. In this latter capacity, Jang Chol held a strategic position for the development of DPRK nuclear activities. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

28.

KIM Su Gil

김수길

KIM Su-Gil

DOB: 1950

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as Director of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau between 2018 and 2021 and a Member of the State Affairs Commission between 2019 and 2021, he was responsible for the implementation of the Korean Workers’ Party decisions, related to the development of nuclear and ballistic programmes in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).

29.

JON Il Ho

전일호

JON Il-Ho

DOB: 1955 or 1956

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as a ‘leading official in the field of national defence science’, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. Promoted to Colonel General in August 2019, recipient of the February 16 Science and Technology Prize, Director of the Research Institute of Automation and Institute Director of Kim Chaek University of Technology, and Vice Director of a Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, he participated at the launches of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as most other missile launches in 2017, 2019 and March 2020.

30.

JONG Sung Il

정승일

JONG Sung-Il

DOB: 20.3.1961

Passport number: 927240105

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as a ‘Senior Party Official’ and ‘leading official in the field of national defence science’ and identified by a UN Member State as a former Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea in 2017, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, in particular ballistic missiles. He was present during the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017 and present during ballistic missiles/large Multiple Launch Rocket System launches on 24 August 2019 and 10 September 2019.

31.

YU Jin

유진

YU Jin

DOB: 1960

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as Director of the Munitions Industry Department and Alternative Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea, he is responsible for playing a major role in the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes both in nuclear and ballistic fields. He accompanied Kim Jong Un to the National Aerospace Development Administration prior to the March 2022 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch and took part in the 2021 National Defence Exhibition, which displayed apparently new weapons systems. As Deputy Director he was present during the Hwasong-14 ICBM tests of 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as Kim Jong Un’s inspection of a new type of submarine, which the DPRK indicated was intended for the ‘strategic’ purpose of deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, possibly capable of carrying nuclear warheads, on 22 July 2019 and the ballistic missile launches of 25 July and 30 July 2019, and 2 August 2019.’

| (b) | under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons designated in accordance with point (a) of Article 34(4)’, entry 2 is deleted. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons designated in accordance with point (a) of Article 34(4)’, entry 2 is deleted.

| (c) | under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(b) Legal persons, entities and bodies designated in accordance with point (a) of Article 34(4)’, entries 4 and 5 are replaced by the following: | Name (and possible aliases) | Alias | Location | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘4. | Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre
  녕변 원자력 연구소
  영변 원자력 연구소 | | | 22.12.2009 | Facilities capable of producing fissile material for military uses, including a 5MW (e) reactor, a plutonium reprocessing facility (radio-chemical laboratory), and a reported uranium enrichment facility. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the UNSC, 16.7.2009). In its final report of March 2022, the Panel of Experts set up pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 noted the completion of external work on a light-water reactor and the construction of other buildings at the site, as well as indications that the 5MW (e) reactor was operational in 2021. Plumes of steam from the uranium dioxide production building indicated that the DPRK would continue production of fissile material. |
| 5. | Korean People’s Army
  조선인민군 | | | 16.10.2017 | The Korean People’s Army includes the Strategic Rocket Force, which controls the DPRK’s nuclear and conventional strategic missile units. The Strategic Rocket Force has been listed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2356 (2017).’ |

(c)

under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(b) Legal persons, entities and bodies designated in accordance with point (a) of Article 34(4)’, entries 4 and 5 are replaced by the following:

Name (and possible aliases)

Alias

Location

Date of designation

Reasons

‘4.

Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre

녕변 원자력 연구소

영변 원자력 연구소

22.12.2009

Facilities capable of producing fissile material for military uses, including a 5MW (e) reactor, a plutonium reprocessing facility (radio-chemical laboratory), and a reported uranium enrichment facility. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the UNSC, 16.7.2009). In its final report of March 2022, the Panel of Experts set up pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 noted the completion of external work on a light-water reactor and the construction of other buildings at the site, as well as indications that the 5MW (e) reactor was operational in 2021. Plumes of steam from the uranium dioxide production building indicated that the DPRK would continue production of fissile material.

5.

Korean People’s Army

조선인민군

16.10.2017

The Korean People’s Army includes the Strategic Rocket Force, which controls the DPRK’s nuclear and conventional strategic missile units. The Strategic Rocket Force has been listed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2356 (2017).’

| (d) | under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(c) Natural persons designated in accordance with point (b) of Article 34(4)’, entries 1 to 6 are replaced by the following: | Name (and possible aliases) | Alias | Identifying information | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | JON Il-chun
  전일춘 | JON Il Chun | DOB: 24.8.1941
  Gender: male | 22.12.2010 | Former Director of ‘Office 39’, an office of the Worker’s Party of Korea responsible for acquiring hard currency, and former Director General of the State Development Bank. In this capacity, he was responsible for procuring financial resources that could be used to support the nuclear and ballistic missile programme. ‘Office 39’ was also in charge of bypassing sanctions by purchasing goods through DPRK diplomatic representations. Representative of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, he was elected director-general of the State Development Bank in March 2010. Elected Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee alternate member in May 2016 at the 7th Party Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea. |
| 2. | KIM Tong-un
  김동운 | KIM Tong Un | DOB: 1.11.1936
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Former director of ‘Office 39’ of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was involved in proliferation financing. He may have also worked in another Party unit, ‘Office 38’, to raise funds for the leadership and elites that could have supported the nuclear and ballistic missile programme. |
| 3. | KIM Yong Nam
  김영남 | KIM Yong-Nam, KIM Young-Nam, KIM Yong-Gon | DOB: 2.12.1947
  POB: Sinuju, DPRK
  Gender: male | 20.4.2018 | KIM Yong Nam has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his son KIM Su Gwang have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Yong Nam opened various current and savings accounts in the European Union and was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his son KIM Su Gwang and daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui. |
| 4. | DJANG Tcheul Hy
  장철희 | JANG Tcheul-hy, JANG Cheul-hy, JANG Chol-hy, DJANG Cheul-hy, DJANG Chol-hy, DJANG Tchoul-hy, KIM Tcheul-hy | DOB: 11.5.1950
  POB: Kangwon
  Gender: female | 20.4.2018 | DJANG Tcheul Hy was involved together with her husband KIM Yong Nam, her son KIM Su Gwang and her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She was the owner of several bank accounts in the European Union, which were opened by her son KIM Su Gwang in her name. She was also involved in several bank transfers from accounts from her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui to bank accounts outside the Union. |
| 5. | KIM Su Gwang
  김수광 | KIM Sou-Kwang, KIM Sou-Gwang, KIM Son-Kwang, KIM Su-Kwang, KIM Soukwang, KIM Su-gwang, KIM Son-gwang | DOB: 18.8.1976
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Diplomat, DPRK Embassy, Belarus
  Gender: male | 20.4.2018 | KIM Su Gwang has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his father KIM Yong Nam have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Su Gwang opened multiple bank accounts in several Member States, including under family members’ names. He was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his spouse KIM Kyong Hui. |
| 6. | KIM Kyong Hui
  김경희 | | DOB: 6.5.1981
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Gender: female | 20.4.2018 | KIM Kyong Hui was involved together with her husband KIM Su Gwang, her father-in-law KIM Yong Nam and her mother-in-law DJANG Tcheul Hy in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She received several bank transfers from her husband KIM Su Gwang and father-in-law KIM Yong Nam, and transferred money to accounts outside the Union in her name or the name of her mother-in-law, DJANG Tcheul Hy.’ |

(d)

under the heading ‘List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(c) Natural persons designated in accordance with point (b) of Article 34(4)’, entries 1 to 6 are replaced by the following:

Name (and possible aliases)

Alias

Identifying information

Date of designation

Reasons

‘1.

JON Il-chun

전일춘

JON Il Chun

DOB: 24.8.1941

Gender: male

22.12.2010

Former Director of ‘Office 39’, an office of the Worker’s Party of Korea responsible for acquiring hard currency, and former Director General of the State Development Bank. In this capacity, he was responsible for procuring financial resources that could be used to support the nuclear and ballistic missile programme. ‘Office 39’ was also in charge of bypassing sanctions by purchasing goods through DPRK diplomatic representations. Representative of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, he was elected director-general of the State Development Bank in March 2010. Elected Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee alternate member in May 2016 at the 7th Party Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea.

2.

KIM Tong-un

김동운

KIM Tong Un

DOB: 1.11.1936

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Former director of ‘Office 39’ of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was involved in proliferation financing. He may have also worked in another Party unit, ‘Office 38’, to raise funds for the leadership and elites that could have supported the nuclear and ballistic missile programme.

3.

KIM Yong Nam

김영남

KIM Yong-Nam, KIM Young-Nam, KIM Yong-Gon

DOB: 2.12.1947

POB: Sinuju, DPRK

Gender: male

20.4.2018

KIM Yong Nam has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his son KIM Su Gwang have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Yong Nam opened various current and savings accounts in the European Union and was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his son KIM Su Gwang and daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui.

4.

DJANG Tcheul Hy

장철희

JANG Tcheul-hy, JANG Cheul-hy, JANG Chol-hy, DJANG Cheul-hy, DJANG Chol-hy, DJANG Tchoul-hy, KIM Tcheul-hy

DOB: 11.5.1950

POB: Kangwon

Gender: female

20.4.2018

DJANG Tcheul Hy was involved together with her husband KIM Yong Nam, her son KIM Su Gwang and her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She was the owner of several bank accounts in the European Union, which were opened by her son KIM Su Gwang in her name. She was also involved in several bank transfers from accounts from her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui to bank accounts outside the Union.

5.

KIM Su Gwang

김수광

KIM Sou-Kwang, KIM Sou-Gwang, KIM Son-Kwang, KIM Su-Kwang, KIM Soukwang, KIM Su-gwang, KIM Son-gwang

DOB: 18.8.1976

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Diplomat, DPRK Embassy, Belarus

Gender: male

20.4.2018

KIM Su Gwang has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his father KIM Yong Nam have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Su Gwang opened multiple bank accounts in several Member States, including under family members’ names. He was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his spouse KIM Kyong Hui.

6.

KIM Kyong Hui

김경희

DOB: 6.5.1981

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Gender: female

20.4.2018

KIM Kyong Hui was involved together with her husband KIM Su Gwang, her father-in-law KIM Yong Nam and her mother-in-law DJANG Tcheul Hy in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She received several bank transfers from her husband KIM Su Gwang and father-in-law KIM Yong Nam, and transferred money to accounts outside the Union in her name or the name of her mother-in-law, DJANG Tcheul Hy.’

| (3) | Annex XVI to Regulation (EU) 1509/2017 is amended as follows:






  (a) | under the heading ‘List of persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons’, entries 1 to 19 and 21 to 26 are replaced by the following: | Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | KIM Hyok Chan
  김혁찬 | Date of birth: 9.6.1970
  Passport number: 563410191 | 16.10.2017 | Kim Hyok Chan has served as Secretary at the DPRK embassy in Angola and as representative of Green Pine, a UN listed entity, including negotiating contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 2. | CHOE Chan Il
  촤찬일 | | 22.1.2018 | Director of the Dandong office of Korea Heungjin Trading Company, a UN designated entity. Korea Heungjin is used by KOMID, another UN designated entity, for trading purposes. KOMID was designated by the UN Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. |
| 3. | KIM Chol Nam
  김철남 | | 22.1.2018 | Dandong branch of Sobaeksu United Director of the Corp which has been designated by the Union. Representative of the Beijing branch of Korea Changgwang Trading Corporation, which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as an alias of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. |
| 4. | JON Chol Young
  a.k.a: JON Chol Yong
  전철영 | Date of birth: 30.4.1975
  Passport number: 563410192
  Diplomat DPRK Embassy, Angola | 22.1.2018 | Former representative in Angola of Green Pine Associated Corporation and DPRK diplomat accredited to Angola.
  Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including violating the UN arms embargo. Green Pine has also negotiated contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 5. | AN Jong Hyuk
  a.k.a: An Jong Hyok
  안정혁
  안종혁 | Date of birth: 14.3.1970
  Passport number: 563410155 | 22.1.2018 | Representative of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation, and DPRK diplomat in Egypt.
  Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including breach of the UN arms embargo.
  An Jong Hyuk was authorized to conduct all types of business on behalf of Saeng Pil, including signing and implementing contracts and banking business. The company specializes in the construction of naval vessels and the design, fabrication and installation of electronic communication and marine navigation equipment. |
| 6. | YUN Chol a.k.a. CHOL Yun
  윤철 | | 22.1.2018 | Yun Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as contact person of the DPRK Company General Precious Metal involved in the sale of lithium-6, a UN prohibited nuclear-related item, and DPRK diplomat.
  General Precious Metal has previously been identified by the Union as an alias of the UN designated entity Green Pine. |
| 7. | CHOE Kwang Hyok
  최광혁 | | 22.1.2018 | Choe Kwang Hyok has served as a representative of Green Pine Associated Corporation, a UN designated entity.
  Choe Kwang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as chief executive of Beijing King Helong International Trading Ltd, an alias of Green Pine. He has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as director of Hong Kong King Helong Int'l Trading Ltd and operator of the DPRK entity named Beijing representative office of Korea Unhasu Trading Company, which are also aliases of Green Pine. |
| 8. | KIM Chang Hyok
  a.k.a: James Kim
  김창혁 | Date of birth: 29.4.1963
  Place of birth: N. Hamgyong
  Passport number: 472130058 | 22.1.2018 | Kim Chang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in Malaysia. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.
  Established multiple accounts in Malaysia in the name of front companies of ‘Glocom’, itself a front company of designated entity Pan Systems Pyongyang. |
| 9. | PARK Young Han
  박영한 | | 22.1.2018 | Director of Beijing New Technology which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a front company of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
  Legal representative of Guancaiweixing Trading Co., Ltd, which was identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the shipper of an intercepted shipment to Eritrea of military-related items in August 2012. |
| 10. | RYANG Su Nyo
  량수니오 | Date of birth: 11.8.1959
  Place of birth: Japan | 22.1.2018 | Director of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 11. | PYON Won Gun
  변원군 | Date of birth: 13.3.1968
  Place of birth: S. Phyongan
  Service passport number: 836220035
  Passport number: 290220142 | 22.1.2018 | Director of Glocom, a front company of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.
  Glocom advertises radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations.
  Pyon Won Gun has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. |
| 12. | PAE Won Chol
  배원철 | Date of birth: 30.8.1969
  Place of birth: Pyongyang
  Diplomatic passport number: 654310150 | 22.1.2018 | Pae Won Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 13. | RI Sin Song
  리신송 | | 22.1.2018 | Ri Sin Song has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 14. | KIM Sung Su
  김성수 | | 22.1.2018 | Kim Sung Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in China. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 15. | KIM Pyong Chol
  김병철 | | 22.1.2018 | Kim Pyong Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 16. | CHOE Kwang Su
  최광수 | Date of birth: 20.4.1955
  Passport number: 381210143 (expiration date: 3.6.2016) | 22.1.2018 | Choe Kwang Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a representative of Haegeumgang Trading Company. In this capacity Choe Kwang Su signed a DPRK – Mozambique military cooperation contract in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The contract concerned the supply of arms and arm-related material to Monte Binga, a company controlled by the Government of Mozambique. |
| 17. | PAK In Su
  a.k.a: Daniel Pak
  박인수 | Date of birth: 22.5.1957
  Place of birth: N. Hamgyong
  Diplomatic passport number: 290221242 | 22.1.2018 | Pak In Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in activities related to the sale of coal from DPRK in Malaysia in violation of the prohibitions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 18. | SON Young-Nam
  손영남 | | 22.1.2018 | Son Young-Nam has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in the smuggling of gold and other items to the DPRK in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 19. | KIM Il-Su
  a.k.a. KIM Il Su
  김일수 | DOB: 2.9.1965
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK | 3.7.2015 | Manager in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 21. | CHOE Chun-Sik
  a.k.a. CHOE Chun Sik
  최천식 | DOB: 23.12.1963
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: 745132109
  Valid until 12.2.2020 | 3.7.2015 | Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 22. | SIN Kyu-Nam
  a.k.a. SIN Kyu Nam
  신규남 | DOB: 12.9.1972
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: PO472132950 | 3.7.2015 | Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 23. | PAK Chun-San
  a.k.a. PAK Chun San
  박천산 | DOB: 18.12.1953
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: PS472220097 | 3.7.2015 | Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang at least until December 2015 and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, continues to act for or on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 24. | SO Tong Myong
  서동명 | DOB: 10.9.1956 | 3.7.2015 | Former president of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), former KNIC Executive Management Committee Chairman (June 2012); former KNIC General Manager, September 2013, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 25. | PAK Hwa Song
  a.k.a. PAK Hwa-Song
  박화성 | Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company
  POB: DPRK
  Passport number: 654331357
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male
  Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | 21.4.2022 | Pak Hwa Song is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UN sanctions. Pak also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Pak works with Hwang Kil Su. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes. |
| 26. | HWANG Kil Su
  a.k.a. HWANG Kil-Su
  황길수 | Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company
  POB: DPRK
  Passport number: 654331363
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male
  Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | 21.4.2022 | Hwang Kil Su is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang works with Pak Hwa Song. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes.’ |

(3)

Annex XVI to Regulation (EU) 1509/2017 is amended as follows:

(a)

under the heading ‘List of persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(a) Natural persons’, entries 1 to 19 and 21 to 26 are replaced by the following:

Name (and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Date of designation

Reasons

‘1.

KIM Hyok Chan

김혁찬

Date of birth: 9.6.1970

Passport number: 563410191

16.10.2017

Kim Hyok Chan has served as Secretary at the DPRK embassy in Angola and as representative of Green Pine, a UN listed entity, including negotiating contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

2.

CHOE Chan Il

촤찬일

22.1.2018

Director of the Dandong office of Korea Heungjin Trading Company, a UN designated entity. Korea Heungjin is used by KOMID, another UN designated entity, for trading purposes. KOMID was designated by the UN Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

3.

KIM Chol Nam

김철남

22.1.2018

Dandong branch of Sobaeksu United Director of the Corp which has been designated by the Union. Representative of the Beijing branch of Korea Changgwang Trading Corporation, which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as an alias of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

4.

JON Chol Young

a.k.a: JON Chol Yong

전철영

Date of birth: 30.4.1975

Passport number: 563410192

Diplomat DPRK Embassy, Angola

22.1.2018

Former representative in Angola of Green Pine Associated Corporation and DPRK diplomat accredited to Angola.

Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including violating the UN arms embargo. Green Pine has also negotiated contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

5.

AN Jong Hyuk

a.k.a: An Jong Hyok

안정혁

안종혁

Date of birth: 14.3.1970

Passport number: 563410155

22.1.2018

Representative of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation, and DPRK diplomat in Egypt.

Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including breach of the UN arms embargo.

An Jong Hyuk was authorized to conduct all types of business on behalf of Saeng Pil, including signing and implementing contracts and banking business. The company specializes in the construction of naval vessels and the design, fabrication and installation of electronic communication and marine navigation equipment.

6.

YUN Chol a.k.a. CHOL Yun

윤철

22.1.2018

Yun Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as contact person of the DPRK Company General Precious Metal involved in the sale of lithium-6, a UN prohibited nuclear-related item, and DPRK diplomat.

General Precious Metal has previously been identified by the Union as an alias of the UN designated entity Green Pine.

7.

CHOE Kwang Hyok

최광혁

22.1.2018

Choe Kwang Hyok has served as a representative of Green Pine Associated Corporation, a UN designated entity.

Choe Kwang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as chief executive of Beijing King Helong International Trading Ltd, an alias of Green Pine. He has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as director of Hong Kong King Helong Int'l Trading Ltd and operator of the DPRK entity named Beijing representative office of Korea Unhasu Trading Company, which are also aliases of Green Pine.

8.

KIM Chang Hyok

a.k.a: James Kim

김창혁

Date of birth: 29.4.1963

Place of birth: N. Hamgyong

Passport number: 472130058

22.1.2018

Kim Chang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in Malaysia. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

Established multiple accounts in Malaysia in the name of front companies of ‘Glocom’, itself a front company of designated entity Pan Systems Pyongyang.

9.

PARK Young Han

박영한

22.1.2018

Director of Beijing New Technology which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a front company of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Legal representative of Guancaiweixing Trading Co., Ltd, which was identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the shipper of an intercepted shipment to Eritrea of military-related items in August 2012.

10.

RYANG Su Nyo

량수니오

Date of birth: 11.8.1959

Place of birth: Japan

22.1.2018

Director of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

11.

PYON Won Gun

변원군

Date of birth: 13.3.1968

Place of birth: S. Phyongan

Service passport number: 836220035

Passport number: 290220142

22.1.2018

Director of Glocom, a front company of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

Glocom advertises radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations.

Pyon Won Gun has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang.

12.

PAE Won Chol

배원철

Date of birth: 30.8.1969

Place of birth: Pyongyang

Diplomatic passport number: 654310150

22.1.2018

Pae Won Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

13.

RI Sin Song

리신송

22.1.2018

Ri Sin Song has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

14.

KIM Sung Su

김성수

22.1.2018

Kim Sung Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in China. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

15.

KIM Pyong Chol

김병철

22.1.2018

Kim Pyong Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

16.

CHOE Kwang Su

최광수

Date of birth: 20.4.1955

Passport number: 381210143 (expiration date: 3.6.2016)

22.1.2018

Choe Kwang Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a representative of Haegeumgang Trading Company. In this capacity Choe Kwang Su signed a DPRK – Mozambique military cooperation contract in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The contract concerned the supply of arms and arm-related material to Monte Binga, a company controlled by the Government of Mozambique.

17.

PAK In Su

a.k.a: Daniel Pak

박인수

Date of birth: 22.5.1957

Place of birth: N. Hamgyong

Diplomatic passport number: 290221242

22.1.2018

Pak In Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in activities related to the sale of coal from DPRK in Malaysia in violation of the prohibitions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

18.

SON Young-Nam

손영남

22.1.2018

Son Young-Nam has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in the smuggling of gold and other items to the DPRK in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

19.

KIM Il-Su

a.k.a. KIM Il Su

김일수

DOB: 2.9.1965

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

3.7.2015

Manager in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

21.

CHOE Chun-Sik

a.k.a. CHOE Chun Sik

최천식

DOB: 23.12.1963

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: 745132109

Valid until 12.2.2020

3.7.2015

Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

22.

SIN Kyu-Nam

a.k.a. SIN Kyu Nam

신규남

DOB: 12.9.1972

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: PO472132950

3.7.2015

Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

23.

PAK Chun-San

a.k.a. PAK Chun San

박천산

DOB: 18.12.1953

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: PS472220097

3.7.2015

Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang at least until December 2015 and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, continues to act for or on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

24.

SO Tong Myong

서동명

DOB: 10.9.1956

3.7.2015

Former president of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), former KNIC Executive Management Committee Chairman (June 2012); former KNIC General Manager, September 2013, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

25.

PAK Hwa Song

a.k.a. PAK Hwa-Song

박화성

Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company

POB: DPRK

Passport number: 654331357

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

21.4.2022

Pak Hwa Song is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UN sanctions. Pak also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Pak works with Hwang Kil Su. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes.

26.

HWANG Kil Su

a.k.a. HWANG Kil-Su

황길수

Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company

POB: DPRK

Passport number: 654331363

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

21.4.2022

Hwang Kil Su is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang works with Pak Hwa Song. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes.’

| (b) | under the heading ‘List of persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(b) Legal persons, entities and bodies’, entries 1 to 4, 6 and 8 are replaced by the following: | Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | Korea International Exhibition Corporation
  조선국제전람사 | Address: Jungsong-dong, Central District, Sungri St, Pyonyang, DPRK
  Telephone: 850 2 381 5926
  Email: kiec@silibank.net.kp | 16.10.2017 | The Korea International Exhibition Corporation has assisted designated entities in the evasion of sanctions by hosting the Pyongyang International Trade Fair, which provides designated entities with the opportunity to breach UN sanctions by continuing economic activity. |
| 2. | Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation
  a.k.a. Rungrado Trading Corporation
  조선릉라도무역총회사 | Address: Segori-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
  Telephone: 850-2-18111-3818022
  Fax: 850-2-3814507
  Email: rrd@co.chesin.com | 16.10.2017 | The Panel of Experts reported that Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation has assisted in violating sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions through the sale of Scud missiles to Egypt. |
| 3. | Maritime Administrative Bureau
  a.k.a. Maritime Administration of DPR Korea
  조선민주주의인민공화국 국가해사감독국 | Address: Ryonhwa-2Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
  PO Box 416
  Telephone: 850-2-18111 Ex 8059
  Fax: 850 2 381 4410
  Email: mab@silibank.net.kp
  Website: www.ma.gov.kp | 16.10.2017 | The Maritime Administrative Bureau has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council including by renaming and re-registering assets of designated entities and providing false documentation to vessels subject to United Nations sanctions. |
| 4. | Pan Systems Pyongyang
  a.k.a. Wonbang Trading Co.; Glocom; International Golden Services; International Global System | Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, DPRK | 16.10.2017 | Pan Systems has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea.
  Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 6. | Korea General Corporation for External Construction (Aliases: KOGEN, GENCO)
  조선대외건설총회사 | Address: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | 21.4.2022 | The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (KOGEN), as a professional construction company abroad, relies on sending skilled workers abroad, according to the presentation made by the official DPRK internet portal Naenara, and has carried out projects in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Russia, Libya and Mongolia. It has also established local branches, such as in Zambia. KOGEN is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes as it transfers all or part of the wages of workers it sends abroad to the regime, a practice prohibited by UNSCR 2397 (2017). |
| 8. | Korea Paekho Trading Corporation
  (Alias: Joson Paekho Muyok Hoesa)
  조선백호무역회사 | Address: Chongryu 3-dong, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | 21.4.2022 | Paekho Trading Corporation is an art company involved in constructing statues overseas, in exporting artwork statues produced by Paekho Art Studio, and facilitates illicit labour and access to international financial systems. It specifically targets development grants and loans, as well as foreign-direct investment earmarked for municipal projects. It is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes.’ |

(b)

under the heading ‘List of persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 34(1) and 34(3)’, subheading ‘(b) Legal persons, entities and bodies’, entries 1 to 4, 6 and 8 are replaced by the following:

Name (and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Date of designation

Reasons

‘1.

Korea International Exhibition Corporation

조선국제전람사

Address: Jungsong-dong, Central District, Sungri St, Pyonyang, DPRK

Telephone: 850 2 381 5926

Email: kiec@silibank.net.kp

16.10.2017

The Korea International Exhibition Corporation has assisted designated entities in the evasion of sanctions by hosting the Pyongyang International Trade Fair, which provides designated entities with the opportunity to breach UN sanctions by continuing economic activity.

2.

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

a.k.a. Rungrado Trading Corporation

조선릉라도무역총회사

Address: Segori-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Telephone: 850-2-18111-3818022

Fax: 850-2-3814507

Email: rrd@co.chesin.com

16.10.2017

The Panel of Experts reported that Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation has assisted in violating sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions through the sale of Scud missiles to Egypt.

3.

Maritime Administrative Bureau

a.k.a. Maritime Administration of DPR Korea

조선민주주의인민공화국 국가해사감독국

Address: Ryonhwa-2Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK

PO Box 416

Telephone: 850-2-18111 Ex 8059

Fax: 850 2 381 4410

Email: mab@silibank.net.kp

Website: www.ma.gov.kp

16.10.2017

The Maritime Administrative Bureau has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council including by renaming and re-registering assets of designated entities and providing false documentation to vessels subject to United Nations sanctions.

4.

Pan Systems Pyongyang

a.k.a. Wonbang Trading Co.; Glocom; International Golden Services; International Global System

Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, DPRK

16.10.2017

Pan Systems has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea.

Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations.

6.

Korea General Corporation for External Construction (Aliases: KOGEN, GENCO)

조선대외건설총회사

Address: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

21.4.2022

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (KOGEN), as a professional construction company abroad, relies on sending skilled workers abroad, according to the presentation made by the official DPRK internet portal Naenara, and has carried out projects in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Russia, Libya and Mongolia. It has also established local branches, such as in Zambia. KOGEN is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes as it transfers all or part of the wages of workers it sends abroad to the regime, a practice prohibited by UNSCR 2397 (2017).

8.

Korea Paekho Trading Corporation

(Alias: Joson Paekho Muyok Hoesa)

조선백호무역회사

Address: Chongryu 3-dong, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

21.4.2022

Paekho Trading Corporation is an art company involved in constructing statues overseas, in exporting artwork statues produced by Paekho Art Studio, and facilitates illicit labour and access to international financial systems. It specifically targets development grants and loans, as well as foreign-direct investment earmarked for municipal projects. It is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes.’

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/23

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1332

of 26 July 2022

approving non-minor amendments to the product specification for a name entered in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications [‘Beurre Charentes-Poitou / Beurre des Charentes / Beurre des Deux-Sèvres’ (PDO)]

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission examined France’s application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the protected designation of origin ‘Beurre Charentes-Poitou / Beurre des Charentes / Beurre des Deux-Sèvres’, registered under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1107/96 (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission examined France’s application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the protected designation of origin ‘Beurre Charentes-Poitou / Beurre des Charentes / Beurre des Deux-Sèvres’, registered under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1107/96 (2).

| (2) | Since the amendments in question are not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(a) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since the amendments in question are not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(a) of that Regulation.

| (3) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendments to the specification should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendments to the specification should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The amendments to the product specification published in the Official Journal of the European Union regarding the name ‘Beurre Charentes-Poitou / Beurre des Charentes / Beurre des Deux-Sèvres’ (PDO) are hereby approved.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 26 July 2022.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1107/96 of 12 June 1996 on the registration of geographical indications and designations of origin under the procedure laid down in Article 17 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 (OJ L 148, 21.6.1996, p. 1).

2

(3)  
  OJ C 159, 12.4.2022, p. 44.

3

---

DECISIONS

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/25

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/1333

of 28 July 2022

amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 9 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 (1), which established the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) with an initial mandate until 8 August 2022, 2 years after the launch of EUAM RCA. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 9 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 (1), which established the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) with an initial mandate until 8 August 2022, 2 years after the launch of EUAM RCA.

| (2) | On 12 April 2022, on the basis of the Holistic Strategic Review of the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) and of EUAM RCA, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended that the mandate of EUAM RCA be extended until 9 August 2024. On 11 May 2022, the PSC agreed that the mandate of EUAM RCA should be adjusted to the situation in the Central African Republic. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 12 April 2022, on the basis of the Holistic Strategic Review of the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) and of EUAM RCA, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended that the mandate of EUAM RCA be extended until 9 August 2024. On 11 May 2022, the PSC agreed that the mandate of EUAM RCA should be adjusted to the situation in the Central African Republic.

| (3) | Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 should be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 should be amended accordingly.

| (4) | EUAM RCA will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

EUAM RCA will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 is amended as follows;

| (1) | in Article 2, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

  ‘1.   The strategic objectives of EUAM RCA shall be to:






  (a) | support the build-up of rule-based governance and management capacities within the Ministry for Interior and Public Security of the Central African Republic, in the design, implementation, build-up and monitoring of all relevant planning categories; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

in Article 2, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   The strategic objectives of EUAM RCA shall be to:

(a)

support the build-up of rule-based governance and management capacities within the Ministry for Interior and Public Security of the Central African Republic, in the design, implementation, build-up and monitoring of all relevant planning categories;

| (b) | support the sustainable transformation of the Central African Republic’s Internal Security Forces and their operational effective functioning and deployment; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

support the sustainable transformation of the Central African Republic’s Internal Security Forces and their operational effective functioning and deployment;

| (c) | assist in developing an integrated support to the Internal Security Forces of the Central African Republic through close coordination, ensuring unity of action and complementarity of efforts with the relevant actors; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

assist in developing an integrated support to the Internal Security Forces of the Central African Republic through close coordination, ensuring unity of action and complementarity of efforts with the relevant actors;

| (d) | establish a comprehensive situational picture through a dedicated Analytical Capacity, including in domains such as strategic communications and political-security developments; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

establish a comprehensive situational picture through a dedicated Analytical Capacity, including in domains such as strategic communications and political-security developments;

| (e) | support the strategic communication efforts to foster Union values, promote Union action and expose violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law by foreign forces in the Central African Republic.’; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

support the strategic communication efforts to foster Union values, promote Union action and expose violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law by foreign forces in the Central African Republic.’;

| (2) | in Article 13, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

  ‘1.   The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM RCA for the period from 9 December 2019 until 8 August 2022 shall be EUR 30 352 481,10.
  The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM RCA for the period from 9 August 2022 until 9 August 2024 shall be EUR 28 400 000,00.’; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

in Article 13, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM RCA for the period from 9 December 2019 until 8 August 2022 shall be EUR 30 352 481,10.

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM RCA for the period from 9 August 2022 until 9 August 2024 shall be EUR 28 400 000,00.’;

| (3) | in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

  ‘It shall expire on 9 August 2024.’. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘It shall expire on 9 August 2024.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 of 9 December 2019 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) (OJ L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 141).

1

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/27

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/1334

of 28 July 2022

amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 19 April 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 (1), which established the European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) with a mandate until 19 September 2018, 24 months after EUTM RCA reached full operational capability. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 19 April 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 (1), which established the European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) with a mandate until 19 September 2018, 24 months after EUTM RCA reached full operational capability.

| (2) | On 30 July 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1133 (2), which extended the mandate of EUTM RCA until 19 September 2022. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 30 July 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1133 (2), which extended the mandate of EUTM RCA until 19 September 2022.

| (3) | On 12 April 2022, on the basis of the Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM RCA and of the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended that the mandate of EUTM RCA be extended until 20 September 2023. On 11 May 2022, the PSC agreed that the mandate of EUTM RCA should be adjusted to the situation in the Central African Republic. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 12 April 2022, on the basis of the Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM RCA and of the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended that the mandate of EUTM RCA be extended until 20 September 2023. On 11 May 2022, the PSC agreed that the mandate of EUTM RCA should be adjusted to the situation in the Central African Republic.

| (4) | Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 should be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 is amended as follows:

| (1) | in Article 1, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

  ‘2.   Working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA), EUTM RCA shall provide:






  (a) | strategic advice to the Central African Republic’s Ministry of Defence and to the FACA General Staff in support of the creation of capable security forces under democratic control that respect human rights, international humanitarian law and international standards regarding gender issues, the protection of civilians, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agenda, as well as advice to training establishments for commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the FACA in order to create a capable leadership education system; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

in Article 1, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2.   Working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA), EUTM RCA shall provide:

(a)

strategic advice to the Central African Republic’s Ministry of Defence and to the FACA General Staff in support of the creation of capable security forces under democratic control that respect human rights, international humanitarian law and international standards regarding gender issues, the protection of civilians, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agenda, as well as advice to training establishments for commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the FACA in order to create a capable leadership education system;

| (b) | education to the FACA in non-operational domains, including human rights, international humanitarian law, gender issues, the protection of civilians, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agenda; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

education to the FACA in non-operational domains, including human rights, international humanitarian law, gender issues, the protection of civilians, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agenda;

| (c) | if the Political and Security Committee decides that conditions are met, training to the FACA; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

if the Political and Security Committee decides that conditions are met, training to the FACA;

| (d) | support for the strategic communication efforts to foster Union values, promote Union action and expose violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law by foreign forces in the Central African Republic.’; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

support for the strategic communication efforts to foster Union values, promote Union action and expose violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law by foreign forces in the Central African Republic.’;

| (2) | in Article 10, the following paragraph is added:

  ‘5.   The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUTM RCA for the period from 20 September 2022 until 20 September 2023 shall be EUR 7 813 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 51(2) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (*1) shall be 15 % in commitments and 0 % for payments.


  (*1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14).’;" |
| --- | --- |

(2)

in Article 10, the following paragraph is added:

‘5.   The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUTM RCA for the period from 20 September 2022 until 20 September 2023 shall be EUR 7 813 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 51(2) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (*1) shall be 15 % in commitments and 0 % for payments.

(*1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14).’;"

*1

| (3) | in Article 13, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

  ‘2.   EUTM RCA shall end on 20 September 2023.’. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

in Article 13, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2.   EUTM RCA shall end on 20 September 2023.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 of 19 April 2016 on a European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) (OJ L 104, 20.4.2016, p. 21).

1

(2)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1133 of 30 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP Military Training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) (OJ L 247, 31.7.2020, p. 22).

2

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/29

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/1335

of 28 July 2022

amending Decision 2012/285/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 31 May 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/285/CFSP (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 31 May 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/285/CFSP (1).

| (2) | The Council considers that the title of Decision 2012/285/CFSP should be amended. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Council considers that the title of Decision 2012/285/CFSP should be amended.

| (3) | The Council considers that seven persons should be removed from the list of persons subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex II to Decision 2012/285/CFSP and that nine persons should be removed from the list of persons subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex III to that Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Council considers that seven persons should be removed from the list of persons subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex II to Decision 2012/285/CFSP and that nine persons should be removed from the list of persons subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex III to that Decision.

| (4) | Decision 2012/285/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Decision 2012/285/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2012/285/CFSP is amended as follows:

| (1) | the title is replaced by the following:

  ‘Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP of 31 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guinea-Bissau and repealing Decision 2012/237/CFSP’; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

the title is replaced by the following:

‘Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP of 31 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guinea-Bissau and repealing Decision 2012/237/CFSP’;

| (2) | Annexes II and III are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Annexes II and III are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

---

(1)  Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP of 31 May 2012 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and repealing Decision 2012/237/CFSP (OJ L 142, 1.6.2012, p. 36).

1

---

ANNEX

(1)

| ‘1. | General Augusto MÁRIO CÓ |
| --- | --- |

‘1.

General Augusto MÁRIO CÓ

| 2. | General Saya Braia Na NHAPKA |
| --- | --- |

2.

General Saya Braia Na NHAPKA

| 3. | Colonel Tomás DJASSI |
| --- | --- |

3.

Colonel Tomás DJASSI

| 5. | Colonel Celestino de CARVALHO |
| --- | --- |

5.

Colonel Celestino de CARVALHO

| 10. | Major Samuel FERNANDES |
| --- | --- |

10.

Major Samuel FERNANDES

| 13. | Commander (Navy) Agostinho Sousa CORDEIRO |
| --- | --- |

13.

Commander (Navy) Agostinho Sousa CORDEIRO

| 15. | Lieutenant Lassana CAMARÁ’. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Lieutenant Lassana CAMARÁ’.

(2)

| ‘6. | General Augusto MÁRIO CÓ |
| --- | --- |

‘6.

General Augusto MÁRIO CÓ

| 7. | General Saya Braia Na NHAPKA |
| --- | --- |

7.

General Saya Braia Na NHAPKA

| 8. | Colonel Tomás DJASSI |
| --- | --- |

8.

Colonel Tomás DJASSI

| 9. | Cranha DANFÁ |
| --- | --- |

9.

Cranha DANFÁ

| 10. | Colonel Celestino de CARVALHO |
| --- | --- |

10.

Colonel Celestino de CARVALHO

| 14. | Tcham NA MAN (a.k.a. Namam) |
| --- | --- |

14.

Tcham NA MAN (a.k.a. Namam)

| 15. | Major Samuel FERNANDES |
| --- | --- |

15.

Major Samuel FERNANDES

| 18. | Commander (Navy) Agostinho Sousa CORDEIRO |
| --- | --- |

18.

Commander (Navy) Agostinho Sousa CORDEIRO

| 20. | Lieutenant Lassana CAMARÁ’. |
| --- | --- |

20.

Lieutenant Lassana CAMARÁ’.

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/31

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/1336

of 28 July 2022

amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 27 May 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 27 May 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 (1).

| (2) | In accordance with Article 36(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II, III, V and VI to that Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In accordance with Article 36(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II, III, V and VI to that Decision.

| (3) | The restrictive measures against all persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes II and III to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 should be maintained, with the exception of one deceased person designated in Annex II to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, whose entry should be removed from that Annex. The statement of reasons for 17 persons and one entity, and the identifying information for 59 persons and five entities should be updated. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The restrictive measures against all persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes II and III to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 should be maintained, with the exception of one deceased person designated in Annex II to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, whose entry should be removed from that Annex. The statement of reasons for 17 persons and one entity, and the identifying information for 59 persons and five entities should be updated.

| (4) | On 30 June 2022, the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) updated the information relating to one person in the list set out in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 30 June 2022, the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) updated the information relating to one person in the list set out in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849.

| (5) | Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Annexes I, II and III to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of 27 May 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and repealing Decision 2013/183/CFSP (OJ L 141, 28.5.2016, p. 79).

1

---

ANNEX

(1)

| | Name | Alias | Date of birth | Date of UN designation | Statement of reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘29. | Pak Chun Il | | Passport: 563410091;
  DOB: 28.7.1954;
  Nationality: DPRK | 30.11.2016 | Served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID. Concluded his tour of duty and left Egypt on 15 November 2016.’ |

Name

Alias

Date of birth

Date of UN designation

Statement of reasons

‘29.

Pak Chun Il

Passport: 563410091;

DOB: 28.7.1954;

Nationality: DPRK

30.11.2016

Served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID. Concluded his tour of duty and left Egypt on 15 November 2016.’

(2)

| (a) | under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entries 1, 3 to 13 and 16 to 31 are replaced by the following: | Name | Alias | Identifying information | Date of designation | Statement of Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | CHON Chi Bu
  전지부 | CHON Chi-bu | Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, former technical director of Yongbyon. Photographs connected him to nuclear reactor in Syria before it was bombed by Israel in 2007. |
| 3. | O Kuk-Ryol
  오극렬 | O Kuk Ryol | DOB: 7.1.1930
  POB: Jilin Province, China.
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Korean People’s Army General, former deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, responsible for supervising the acquisition from other countries of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistic programmes. Former Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Central Committee. |
| 4. | PAK Jae-gyong
  박재경 | PAK Chae-Kyong
  PAK Jae Gyong | DOB: 10.6.1933
  Passport number: 554410661
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | General of the Korean People’s Army. Former Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Armed Forces and former Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-Il). Present at KIM Jong Un’s inspection of Strategic Rocket Force Command in 2012. Former member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. President of the Korean Committee of Veterans against Imperialism. |
| 5. | RYOM Yong
  렴영 | | Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations), in charge of international relations. |
| 6. | SO Sang-kuk
  서상국 | SO Sang Kuk | DOB: 30.11.1938
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il Sung University. |
| 7. | KIM Yong Chol
  김영철 | KIM Yong-Chol; KIM Young-Chol; KIM Young-Cheol; KIM Young-Chul | DOB: 1946
  POB: Pyongan-Pukto, DPRK
  Gender: male | 19.12.2011 | Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Political Bureau, the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and, until June 2022, Director of the United Front Department. Former commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), an entity sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. |
| 8. | CHOE Kyong-song
  최경성 | CHOE Kyong song | DOB: 1945
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 9. | CHOE Yong-ho
  최용호 | CHOE Yong Ho | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army/Korean People’s Army Air Force General. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Commander of Korean People’s Army Air Force and Anti-aircraft force. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 10. | HONG Sung-Mu
  홍승무 | HONG Sung Mu | DOB: 1.1.1942
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. As such, Hong is responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear arms-related, ballistic-missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. He witnessed the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on 28 November 2017. Participated in a meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party in July 2020 dedicated to “deterrence from war”, a euphemism used to refer to the DPRK nuclear programme. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021. |
| 11. | JO Kyongchol
  조경철 | JO Kyong Chol | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Director of the Military Security Command. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Accompanied Kim Jong Un to largest-ever long-range artillery fire drill. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021. |
| 12. | KIM Chun-sam
  김춘삼 | KIM Chun Sam | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Lieutenant General, former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Director of the Operations Department of the Military Headquarters of the Korean People’s Army and first vice chief of the Military Headquarters. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 13. | KIM Chun-sop
  김춘섭 | KIM Chun Sop | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Former director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. Former member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Present at a photo session for those who contributed to successful SLBM test in May 2015. |
| 16. | KIM Won-hong
  김원홍 | KIM Won Hong | DOB: 7.1.1945
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: 745310010
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | General of the Korean People’s Army. Former First Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army. Former Director of the State Security Department. Former Minister of State Security. Former Member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 17. | PAK Jong-chon
  박정천 | PAK Jong Chon | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea and Member of the State Affairs Commission. Marshal and former Chief of the General Staff. Performed the formal review at the 25 April 2022 military parade, which with his current positions indicate his continuing role in and responsibility for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Elected to the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in January 2021. |
| 18. | LI Yong-ju
  리용주 | RI Yong Ju | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Admiral of the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Commander in chief of the Korean People’s Navy, which is involved in the development of ballistic-missile programmes and in the development of the nuclear capacities of the DPRK naval forces. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 19. | SON Chol-ju
  손철주 | SON Chol Ju | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Colonel General of the Korean People’s Army. Vice Director, Guidance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau and former Political Director of the Air and Anti-Air Forces, which oversee the development of modernised anti-aircraft rockets. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Son was listed as participating in a meeting of the Central Military Commission in May 2020 as Deputy Director responsible for the organisation of the Korean People’s Army. |
| 20. | YUN Jong-rin
  윤정린 | YUN Jong Rin | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | General of the Korean People’s Army, former commander of the Supreme Guard Command. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 21. | HONG Yong Chil
  홍영칠 | | Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UNSC on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including R&D programmes. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences – also designated in August 2010 – are subordinate to the MID. Hong was described in 2019 as one of the leading officials in the field of national defence science. He accompanied Kim Jong Un during the firing of a new type of tactical guided weapon, and during the inspection of a new type of submarine under construction.
  He was one of the scientists congratulated by Kim Jong Un in 2017 for the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and observed earlier engine tests and other ballistic launches. In 2016, he accompanied Kim Jong Un to a meeting with scientists in which research to mount nuclear warheads on tactical and strategic missiles was discussed. He may have played a significant role in the DPRK’s nuclear test on 6 January 2016. As such, he is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 22. | RI Hak Chol
  리학철 | RI Hak Chul; RI Hak Cheol | DOB: 19.1.1963 or 8.5.1966
  Passport numbers: 381320634, PS- 563410163
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | President of Green Pine Associated Corporation (“Green Pine”). According to the UN Sanctions Committee in 2012, Green Pine had taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Green Pine was also seen as responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK. Green Pine was identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related materiel from the DPRK. Green Pine specialises in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms. Green Pine has been designated by the UNSC. |
| 23. | YUN Chang Hyok
  윤창혁 | | DOB: 9.8.1965
  Gender: male | 20.5.2016 | Deputy Director of the Satellite Control Centre, National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), which Kim Jong Un visited prior to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test on 24 March 2022. NADA is subject to sanctions under UNSCR 2270 (2016) for involvement in the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets. UNSCR 2270 (2016) condemned the DPRK’s satellite launch of 7 February 2016 for using ballistic missile technology and being in serious violation of Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 24. | RI Myong Su
  리명수 | | DOB: 1937
  POB: Myongchon, North Hamgyong, DPRK
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Vice Marshall of the Korean People’s Army, first vice commander of the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command. Until 2018, member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chief of Staff of the People’s Armed Forces. Chief military representative at a state funeral in May 2022, but described as veteran in an April 2022 parade. Ri Myong Su has been influential in national defence matters including the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Ri is a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). |
| 25. | SO Hong Chan
  서홍찬 | | DOB: 30.12.1957
  POB: Kangwon, DPRK
  Passport: PD836410105
  Passport date of expiration: 27.11.2021
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Former First Vice-Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, former Director General of the Rear Services Bureau and former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Re-elected as a Member of the Central Committee in January 2021. In this capacity, So Hong Chan is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 26. | WANG Chang Uk
  왕창욱 | | DOB: 29.5.1960
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Minister for Industry and Atomic Energy, promoted to full Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee in December 2021. In this capacity, Wang Chang Uk is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 27. | JANG Chol
  장철 | | DOB: 31.3.1961
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: 563310042
  Gender: male | 7.4.2017 | Member of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission and former president of the State Academy of Sciences, an organisation dedicated to the development of technological and scientific capacities of the DPRK. In this latter capacity, Jang Chol held a strategic position for the development of DPRK nuclear activities. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. |
| 28. | KIM Su Gil
  김수길 | KIM Su-Gil | DOB: 1950
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as Director of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau between 2018 and 2021 and a Member of the State Affairs Commission between 2019 and 2021, he was responsible for the implementation of the Korean Workers’ Party decisions, related to the development of nuclear and ballistic programmes in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). |
| 29. | JON Il Ho
  전일호 | JON Il-Ho | DOB: 1955 or 1956
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as a “leading official in the field of national defence science”, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. Promoted to Colonel General in August 2019, recipient of the February 16 Science and Technology Prize, Director of the Research Institute of Automation and Institute Director of Kim Chaek University of Technology, and Vice Director of a Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, he participated at the launches of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as most other missile launches in 2017, 2019 and March 2020. |
| 30. | JONG Sung Il
  정승일 | JONG Sung-Il | DOB: 20.3.1961
  Passport number: 927240105
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as a “Senior Party Official” and “leading official in the field of national defence science” and identified by a UN Member State as a former Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea in 2017, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, in particular ballistic missiles. He was present during the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017 and present during ballistic missiles/large Multiple Launch Rocket System launches on 24 August 2019 and 10 September 2019. |
| 31. | YU Jin
  유진 | YU Jin | DOB: 1960
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male | 21.4.2022 | In his capacity as Director of the Munitions Industry Department and Alternative Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea, he is responsible for playing a major role in the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes both in nuclear and ballistic fields. He accompanied Kim Jong Un to the National Aerospace Development Administration prior to the March 2022 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch and took part in the 2021 National Defence Exhibition, which displayed apparently new weapons systems. As Deputy Director he was present during the Hwasong-14 ICBM tests of 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as Kim Jong Un’s inspection of a new type of submarine, which the DPRK indicated was intended for the “strategic” purpose of deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, possibly capable of carrying nuclear warheads, on 22 July 2019 and the ballistic missile launches of 25 July and 30 July 2019, and 2 August 2019.’ |

(a)

under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entries 1, 3 to 13 and 16 to 31 are replaced by the following:

Name

Alias

Identifying information

Date of designation

Statement of Reasons

‘1.

CHON Chi Bu

전지부

CHON Chi-bu

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, former technical director of Yongbyon. Photographs connected him to nuclear reactor in Syria before it was bombed by Israel in 2007.

3.

O Kuk-Ryol

오극렬

O Kuk Ryol

DOB: 7.1.1930

POB: Jilin Province, China.

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Korean People’s Army General, former deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, responsible for supervising the acquisition from other countries of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistic programmes. Former Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Central Committee.

4.

PAK Jae-gyong

박재경

PAK Chae-Kyong

PAK Jae Gyong

DOB: 10.6.1933

Passport number: 554410661

Gender: male

22.12.2009

General of the Korean People’s Army. Former Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Armed Forces and former Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-Il). Present at KIM Jong Un’s inspection of Strategic Rocket Force Command in 2012. Former member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. President of the Korean Committee of Veterans against Imperialism.

5.

RYOM Yong

렴영

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations), in charge of international relations.

6.

SO Sang-kuk

서상국

SO Sang Kuk

DOB: 30.11.1938

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il Sung University.

7.

KIM Yong Chol

김영철

KIM Yong-Chol; KIM Young-Chol; KIM Young-Cheol; KIM Young-Chul

DOB: 1946

POB: Pyongan-Pukto, DPRK

Gender: male

19.12.2011

Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Political Bureau, the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and, until June 2022, Director of the United Front Department. Former commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), an entity sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.

8.

CHOE Kyong-song

최경성

CHOE Kyong song

DOB: 1945

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

9.

CHOE Yong-ho

최용호

CHOE Yong Ho

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Colonel General in the Korean People’s Army/Korean People’s Army Air Force General. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Commander of Korean People’s Army Air Force and Anti-aircraft force. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

10.

HONG Sung-Mu

홍승무

HONG Sung Mu

DOB: 1.1.1942

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. As such, Hong is responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear arms-related, ballistic-missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. He witnessed the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on 28 November 2017. Participated in a meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party in July 2020 dedicated to “deterrence from war”, a euphemism used to refer to the DPRK nuclear programme. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021.

11.

JO Kyongchol

조경철

JO Kyong Chol

Gender: male

20.5.2016

General in the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Director of the Military Security Command. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Accompanied Kim Jong Un to largest-ever long-range artillery fire drill. Re-elected to Party Central Committee in January 2021.

12.

KIM Chun-sam

김춘삼

KIM Chun Sam

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Lieutenant General, former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Director of the Operations Department of the Military Headquarters of the Korean People’s Army and first vice chief of the Military Headquarters. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

13.

KIM Chun-sop

김춘섭

KIM Chun Sop

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Former director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UN Security Council on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including research and development programmes. Former member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Present at a photo session for those who contributed to successful SLBM test in May 2015.

16.

KIM Won-hong

김원홍

KIM Won Hong

DOB: 7.1.1945

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: 745310010

Gender: male

20.5.2016

General of the Korean People’s Army. Former First Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army. Former Director of the State Security Department. Former Minister of State Security. Former Member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

17.

PAK Jong-chon

박정천

PAK Jong Chon

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea and Member of the State Affairs Commission. Marshal and former Chief of the General Staff. Performed the formal review at the 25 April 2022 military parade, which with his current positions indicate his continuing role in and responsibility for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Elected to the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in January 2021.

18.

LI Yong-ju

리용주

RI Yong Ju

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Admiral of the Korean People’s Army. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. Former Commander in chief of the Korean People’s Navy, which is involved in the development of ballistic-missile programmes and in the development of the nuclear capacities of the DPRK naval forces. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

19.

SON Chol-ju

손철주

SON Chol Ju

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Colonel General of the Korean People’s Army. Vice Director, Guidance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau and former Political Director of the Air and Anti-Air Forces, which oversee the development of modernised anti-aircraft rockets. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Son was listed as participating in a meeting of the Central Military Commission in May 2020 as Deputy Director responsible for the organisation of the Korean People’s Army.

20.

YUN Jong-rin

윤정린

YUN Jong Rin

Gender: male

20.5.2016

General of the Korean People’s Army, former commander of the Supreme Guard Command. Former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and member of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

21.

HONG Yong Chil

홍영칠

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department (MID). The MID – designated by the UNSC on 2 March 2016 – is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile programme. The MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, including R&D programmes. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences – also designated in August 2010 – are subordinate to the MID. Hong was described in 2019 as one of the leading officials in the field of national defence science. He accompanied Kim Jong Un during the firing of a new type of tactical guided weapon, and during the inspection of a new type of submarine under construction.

He was one of the scientists congratulated by Kim Jong Un in 2017 for the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and observed earlier engine tests and other ballistic launches. In 2016, he accompanied Kim Jong Un to a meeting with scientists in which research to mount nuclear warheads on tactical and strategic missiles was discussed. He may have played a significant role in the DPRK’s nuclear test on 6 January 2016. As such, he is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

22.

RI Hak Chol

리학철

RI Hak Chul; RI Hak Cheol

DOB: 19.1.1963 or 8.5.1966

Passport numbers: 381320634, PS- 563410163

Gender: male

20.5.2016

President of Green Pine Associated Corporation (“Green Pine”). According to the UN Sanctions Committee in 2012, Green Pine had taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Green Pine was also seen as responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK. Green Pine was identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related materiel from the DPRK. Green Pine specialises in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms. Green Pine has been designated by the UNSC.

23.

YUN Chang Hyok

윤창혁

DOB: 9.8.1965

Gender: male

20.5.2016

Deputy Director of the Satellite Control Centre, National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), which Kim Jong Un visited prior to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test on 24 March 2022. NADA is subject to sanctions under UNSCR 2270 (2016) for involvement in the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets. UNSCR 2270 (2016) condemned the DPRK’s satellite launch of 7 February 2016 for using ballistic missile technology and being in serious violation of Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

24.

RI Myong Su

리명수

DOB: 1937

POB: Myongchon, North Hamgyong, DPRK

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Vice Marshall of the Korean People’s Army, first vice commander of the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command. Until 2018, member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chief of Staff of the People’s Armed Forces. Chief military representative at a state funeral in May 2022, but described as veteran in an April 2022 parade. Ri Myong Su has been influential in national defence matters including the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Ri is a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).

25.

SO Hong Chan

서홍찬

DOB: 30.12.1957

POB: Kangwon, DPRK

Passport: PD836410105

Passport date of expiration: 27.11.2021

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Former First Vice-Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, former Director General of the Rear Services Bureau and former member of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Re-elected as a Member of the Central Committee in January 2021. In this capacity, So Hong Chan is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

26.

WANG Chang Uk

왕창욱

DOB: 29.5.1960

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Minister for Industry and Atomic Energy, promoted to full Member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee in December 2021. In this capacity, Wang Chang Uk is responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

27.

JANG Chol

장철

DOB: 31.3.1961

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: 563310042

Gender: male

7.4.2017

Member of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission and former president of the State Academy of Sciences, an organisation dedicated to the development of technological and scientific capacities of the DPRK. In this latter capacity, Jang Chol held a strategic position for the development of DPRK nuclear activities. As such, responsible for supporting or promoting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

28.

KIM Su Gil

김수길

KIM Su-Gil

DOB: 1950

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as Director of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau between 2018 and 2021 and a Member of the State Affairs Commission between 2019 and 2021, he was responsible for the implementation of the Korean Workers’ Party decisions, related to the development of nuclear and ballistic programmes in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).

29.

JON Il Ho

전일호

JON Il-Ho

DOB: 1955 or 1956

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as a “leading official in the field of national defence science”, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. Promoted to Colonel General in August 2019, recipient of the February 16 Science and Technology Prize, Director of the Research Institute of Automation and Institute Director of Kim Chaek University of Technology, and Vice Director of a Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, he participated at the launches of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as most other missile launches in 2017, 2019 and March 2020.

30.

JONG Sung Il

정승일

JONG Sung-Il

DOB: 20.3.1961

Passport number: 927240105

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as a “Senior Party Official” and “leading official in the field of national defence science” and identified by a UN Member State as a former Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea in 2017, he plays a major role in and is responsible for the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, in particular ballistic missiles. He was present during the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests on 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017 and present during ballistic missiles/large Multiple Launch Rocket System launches on 24 August 2019 and 10 September 2019.

31.

YU Jin

유진

YU Jin

DOB: 1960

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

21.4.2022

In his capacity as Director of the Munitions Industry Department and Alternative Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea, he is responsible for playing a major role in the development of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programmes both in nuclear and ballistic fields. He accompanied Kim Jong Un to the National Aerospace Development Administration prior to the March 2022 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch and took part in the 2021 National Defence Exhibition, which displayed apparently new weapons systems. As Deputy Director he was present during the Hwasong-14 ICBM tests of 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017, as well as Kim Jong Un’s inspection of a new type of submarine, which the DPRK indicated was intended for the “strategic” purpose of deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, possibly capable of carrying nuclear warheads, on 22 July 2019 and the ballistic missile launches of 25 July and 30 July 2019, and 2 August 2019.’

| (b) | under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entry 2 is deleted. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entry 2 is deleted.

| (c) | under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them’, subheading ‘B. Entities’, entries 4 and 5 are replaced by the following: | Name | Alias | Location | Date of designation | Other information |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘4. | Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre
  녕변 원자력 연구소
  영변 원자력 연구소 | | | 22.12.2009 | Facilities capable of producing fissile material for military uses, including a 5MW (e) reactor, a plutonium reprocessing facility (radio-chemical laboratory), and a reported uranium enrichment facility. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the UNSC, 16.7.2009). In its final report of March 2022, the Panel of Experts set up pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 noted the completion of external work on a light-water reactor and the construction of other buildings at the site, as well as indications that the 5MW (e) reactor was operational in 2021. Plumes of steam from the uranium dioxide production building indicated that the DPRK would continue production of fissile material. |
| 5. | Korean People’s Army
  조선인민군 | | | 16.10.2017 | The Korean People’s Army includes the Strategic Rocket Force, which controls the DPRK’s nuclear and conventional strategic missile units. The Strategic Rocket Force has been listed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2356 (2017).’ |

(c)

under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them’, subheading ‘B. Entities’, entries 4 and 5 are replaced by the following:

Name

Alias

Location

Date of designation

Other information

‘4.

Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre

녕변 원자력 연구소

영변 원자력 연구소

22.12.2009

Facilities capable of producing fissile material for military uses, including a 5MW (e) reactor, a plutonium reprocessing facility (radio-chemical laboratory), and a reported uranium enrichment facility. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the UNSC, 16.7.2009). In its final report of March 2022, the Panel of Experts set up pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 noted the completion of external work on a light-water reactor and the construction of other buildings at the site, as well as indications that the 5MW (e) reactor was operational in 2021. Plumes of steam from the uranium dioxide production building indicated that the DPRK would continue production of fissile material.

5.

Korean People’s Army

조선인민군

16.10.2017

The Korean People’s Army includes the Strategic Rocket Force, which controls the DPRK’s nuclear and conventional strategic missile units. The Strategic Rocket Force has been listed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2356 (2017).’

| (d) | under the heading ‘II. Persons and entities providing financial services or the transfer of assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entries 1 to 6 are replaced by the following: | Name | Alias | Identifying information | Date of designation | Statement of Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | JON Il-chun
  전일춘 | JON Il Chun | DOB: 24.8.1941
  Gender: male | 22.12.2010 | Former Director of “Office 39”, an office of the Worker’s Party of Korea responsible for acquiring hard currency, and former Director General of the State Development Bank. In this capacity, he was responsible for procuring financial resources that could be used to support the nuclear and ballistic missile programme. “Office 39” was also in charge of bypassing sanctions by purchasing goods through DPRK diplomatic representations. Representative of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, he was elected director-general of the State Development Bank in March 2010. Elected Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee alternate member in May 2016 at the 7th Party Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea. |
| 2. | KIM Tong-un
  김동운 | KIM Tong Un | DOB: 1.11.1936
  Gender: male | 22.12.2009 | Former director of “Office 39” of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was involved in proliferation financing. He may have also worked in another Party unit, “Office 38”, to raise funds for the leadership and elites that could have supported the nuclear and ballistic missile programme. |
| 3. | KIM Yong Nam
  김영남 | KIM Yong-Nam, KIM Young-Nam, KIM Yong-Gon | DOB: 2.12.1947
  POB: Sinuju, DPRK
  Gender: male | 20.4.2018 | KIM Yong Nam has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his son KIM Su Gwang have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Yong Nam opened various current and savings accounts in the European Union and was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his son KIM Su Gwang and daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui. |
| 4. | DJANG Tcheul Hy
  장철희 | JANG Tcheul-hy, JANG Cheul-hy, JANG Chol-hy, DJANG Cheul-hy, DJANG Chol-hy, DJANG Tchoul-hy, KIM Tcheul-hy | DOB: 11.5.1950
  POB: Kangwon
  Gender: female | 20.4.2018 | DJANG Tcheul Hy was involved together with her husband KIM Yong Nam, her son KIM Su Gwang and her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She was the owner of several bank accounts in the European Union, which were opened by her son KIM Su Gwang in her name. She was also involved in several bank transfers from accounts from her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui to bank accounts outside the Union. |
| 5. | KIM Su Gwang
  김수광 | KIM Sou-Kwang, KIM Sou-Gwang, KIM Son-Kwang, KIM Su-Kwang, KIM Soukwang, KIM Su-gwang, KIM Son-gwang | DOB: 18.8.1976
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Diplomat, DPRK Embassy, Belarus
  Gender: male | 20.4.2018 | KIM Su Gwang has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his father KIM Yong Nam have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Su Gwang opened multiple bank accounts in several Member States, including under family members’ names. He was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his spouse KIM Kyong Hui. |
| 6. | KIM Kyong Hui
  김경희 | | DOB: 6.5.1981
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Gender: female | 20.4.2018 | KIM Kyong Hui was involved together with her husband KIM Su Gwang, her father-in-law KIM Yong Nam and her mother-in-law DJANG Tcheul Hy in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She received several bank transfers from her husband KIM Su Gwang and father-in-law KIM Yong Nam, and transferred money to accounts outside the Union in her name or the name of her mother-in-law, DJANG Tcheul Hy.’ |

(d)

under the heading ‘II. Persons and entities providing financial services or the transfer of assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entries 1 to 6 are replaced by the following:

Name

Alias

Identifying information

Date of designation

Statement of Reasons

‘1.

JON Il-chun

전일춘

JON Il Chun

DOB: 24.8.1941

Gender: male

22.12.2010

Former Director of “Office 39”, an office of the Worker’s Party of Korea responsible for acquiring hard currency, and former Director General of the State Development Bank. In this capacity, he was responsible for procuring financial resources that could be used to support the nuclear and ballistic missile programme. “Office 39” was also in charge of bypassing sanctions by purchasing goods through DPRK diplomatic representations. Representative of the National Defence Commission, which was a key body for national defence matters in the DPRK, he was elected director-general of the State Development Bank in March 2010. Elected Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee alternate member in May 2016 at the 7th Party Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea.

2.

KIM Tong-un

김동운

KIM Tong Un

DOB: 1.11.1936

Gender: male

22.12.2009

Former director of “Office 39” of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was involved in proliferation financing. He may have also worked in another Party unit, “Office 38”, to raise funds for the leadership and elites that could have supported the nuclear and ballistic missile programme.

3.

KIM Yong Nam

김영남

KIM Yong-Nam, KIM Young-Nam, KIM Yong-Gon

DOB: 2.12.1947

POB: Sinuju, DPRK

Gender: male

20.4.2018

KIM Yong Nam has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his son KIM Su Gwang have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Yong Nam opened various current and savings accounts in the European Union and was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his son KIM Su Gwang and daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui.

4.

DJANG Tcheul Hy

장철희

JANG Tcheul-hy, JANG Cheul-hy, JANG Chol-hy, DJANG Cheul-hy, DJANG Chol-hy, DJANG Tchoul-hy, KIM Tcheul-hy

DOB: 11.5.1950

POB: Kangwon

Gender: female

20.4.2018

DJANG Tcheul Hy was involved together with her husband KIM Yong Nam, her son KIM Su Gwang and her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She was the owner of several bank accounts in the European Union, which were opened by her son KIM Su Gwang in her name. She was also involved in several bank transfers from accounts from her daughter-in-law KIM Kyong Hui to bank accounts outside the Union.

5.

KIM Su Gwang

김수광

KIM Sou-Kwang, KIM Sou-Gwang, KIM Son-Kwang, KIM Su-Kwang, KIM Soukwang, KIM Su-gwang, KIM Son-gwang

DOB: 18.8.1976

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Diplomat, DPRK Embassy, Belarus

Gender: male

20.4.2018

KIM Su Gwang has been identified by the Panel of Experts as an agent of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. He and his father KIM Yong Nam have been identified by the Panel of Experts as engaging in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. KIM Su Gwang opened multiple bank accounts in several Member States, including under family members’ names. He was involved in various large bank transfers to bank accounts in the European Union or to accounts outside the European Union while working as a diplomat, including to accounts in the name of his spouse KIM Kyong Hui.

6.

KIM Kyong Hui

김경희

DOB: 6.5.1981

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Gender: female

20.4.2018

KIM Kyong Hui was involved together with her husband KIM Su Gwang, her father-in-law KIM Yong Nam and her mother-in-law DJANG Tcheul Hy in a pattern of deceptive financial practices, which could have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. She received several bank transfers from her husband KIM Su Gwang and father-in-law KIM Yong Nam, and transferred money to accounts outside the Union in her name or the name of her mother-in-law, DJANG Tcheul Hy.’

(3)

| (a) | under the heading ‘List of persons referred to in point (c) of Article 23(1) and point (c) of Article 27(1)’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entries 1 to 19 and 21 to 26 are replaced by the following: | Name | Identifying information | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | KIM Hyok Chan
  김혁찬 | Date of birth: 9.6.1970
  Passport number: 563410191 | 16.10.2017 | Kim Hyok Chan has served as Secretary at the DPRK embassy in Angola and as representative of Green Pine, a UN listed entity, including negotiating contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 2. | CHOE Chan Il
  촤찬일 | | 22.1.2018 | Director of the Dandong office of Korea Heungjin Trading Company, a UN designated entity. Korea Heungjin is used by KOMID, another UN designated entity, for trading purposes. KOMID was designated by the UN Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. |
| 3. | KIM Chol Nam
  김철남 | | 22.1.2018 | Director of the Dandong branch of Sobaeksu United Corp. which has been designated by the Union. Representative of the Beijing branch of Korea Changgwang Trading Corporation, which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as an alias of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. |
| 4. | JON Chol Young
  a.k.a.: JON Chol Yong
  전철영 | Date of birth: 30.4.1975
  Passport number: 563410192
  Diplomat DPRK Embassy, Angola | 22.1.2018 | Former representative in Angola of Green Pine Associated Corporation and DPRK diplomat accredited to Angola.
  Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including violating the UN arms embargo. Green Pine has also negotiated contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 5. | AN Jong Hyuk
  a.k.a.: An Jong Hyok
  안정혁
  안종혁 | Date of birth: 14.3.1970
  Passport number: 563410155 | 22.1.2018 | Representative of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation, and DPRK diplomat in Egypt.
  Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including breach of the UN arms embargo.
  An Jong Hyuk was authorized to conduct all types of business on behalf of Saeng Pil, including signing and implementing contracts and banking business. The company specializes in the construction of naval vessels and the design, fabrication and installation of electronic communication and marine navigation equipment. |
| 6. | YUN Chol a.k.a. CHOL Yun
  윤철 | | 22.1.2018 | Yun Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as contact person of the DPRK Company General Precious Metal involved in the sale of lithium-6, a UN prohibited nuclear-related item, and DPRK diplomat.
  General Precious Metal has previously been identified by the Union as an alias of the UN designated entity Green Pine. |
| 7. | CHOE Kwang Hyok
  최광혁 | | 22.1.2018 | Choe Kwang Hyok has served as a representative of Green Pine Associated Corporation, a UN designated entity.
  Choe Kwang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as chief executive of Beijing King Helong International Trading Ltd, an alias of Green Pine. He has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as director of Hong Kong King Helong Int’l Trading Ltd and operator of the DPRK entity named Beijing representative office of Korea Unhasu Trading Company, which are also aliases of Green Pine. |
| 8. | KIM Chang Hyok
  a.k.a.: James Kim
  김창혁 | Date of birth: 29.4.1963
  Place of birth: N. Hamgyong
  Passport number: 472130058 | 22.1.2018 | Kim Chang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in Malaysia. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.
  Established multiple accounts in Malaysia in the name of front companies of “Glocom”, itself a front company of designated entity Pan Systems Pyongyang. |
| 9. | PARK Young Han
  박영한 | | 22.1.2018 | Director of Beijing New Technology which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a front company of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
  Legal representative of Guancaiweixing Trading Co., Ltd, which was identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the shipper of an intercepted shipment to Eritrea of military-related items in August 2012. |
| 10. | RYANG Su Nyo
  량수니오 | Date of birth: 11.8.1959
  Place of birth: Japan | 22.1.2018 | Director of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 11. | PYON Won Gun
  변원군 | Date of birth: 13.3.1968
  Place of birth: S. Phyongan
  Service passport number: 836220035
  Passport number: 290220142 | 22.1.2018 | Director of Glocom, a front company of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.
  Glocom advertises radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations.
  Pyon Won Gun has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. |
| 12. | PAE Won Chol
  배원철 | Date of birth: 30.8.1969
  Place of birth: Pyongyang
  Diplomatic passport number: 654310150 | 22.1.2018 | Pae Won Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 13. | RI Sin Song
  리신송 | | 22.1.2018 | Ri Sin Song has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 14. | KIM Sung Su
  김성수 | | 22.1.2018 | Kim Sung Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in China. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 15. | KIM Pyong Chol
  김병철 | | 22.1.2018 | Kim Pyong Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 16. | CHOE Kwang Su
  최광수 | Date of birth: 20.4.1955
  Passport number: 381210143 (expiration date: 3.6.2016) | 22.1.2018 | Choe Kwang Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a representative of Haegeumgang Trading Company. In this capacity Choe Kwang Su signed a DPRK – Mozambique military cooperation contract in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The contract concerned the supply of arms and arm-related material to Monte Binga, a company controlled by the Government of Mozambique. |
| 17. | PAK In Su
  a.k.a.: Daniel Pak
  박인수 | Date of birth: 22.5.1957
  Place of birth: N. Hamgyong
  Diplomatic passport number: 290221242 | 22.1.2018 | Pak In Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in activities related to the sale of coal from DPRK in Malaysia in violation of the prohibitions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 18. | SON Young-Nam
  손영남 | | 22.1.2018 | Son Young-Nam has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in the smuggling of gold and other items to the DPRK in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. |
| 19. | KIM Il-Su
  a.k.a. KIM Il Su
  김일수 | DOB: 2.9.1965
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK | 3.7.2015 | Manager in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 21. | CHOE Chun-Sik
  a.k.a. CHOE Chun Sik
  최천식 | DOB: 23.12.1963
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: 745132109
  Valid until 12.2.2020 | 3.7.2015 | Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 22. | SIN Kyu-Nam
  a.k.a. SIN Kyu Nam
  신규남 | DOB: 12.9.1972
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: PO472132950 | 3.7.2015 | Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 23. | PAK Chun-San
  a.k.a. PAK Chun San
  박천산 | DOB: 18.12.1953
  POB: Pyongyang, DPRK
  Passport number: PS472220097 | 3.7.2015 | Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang at least until December 2015 and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, continues to act for or on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 24. | SO Tong Myong
  서동명 | DOB: 10.9.1956 | 3.7.2015 | Former president of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), former KNIC Executive Management Committee Chairman (June 2012); former KNIC General Manager, September 2013, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction. |
| 25. | PAK Hwa Song
  a.k.a. PAK Hwa-Song
  박화성 | Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company
  POB: DPRK
  Passport number: 654331357
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male
  Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | 21.4.2022 | Pak Hwa Song is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UN sanctions. Pak also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Pak works with Hwang Kil Su. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes. |
| 26. | HWANG Kil Su
  a.k.a. HWANG Kil-Su
  황길수 | Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company
  POB: DPRK
  Passport number: 654331363
  Nationality: DPRK
  Gender: male
  Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) | 21.4.2022 | Hwang Kil Su is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang works with Pak Hwa Song. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes.’ |

(a)

under the heading ‘List of persons referred to in point (c) of Article 23(1) and point (c) of Article 27(1)’, subheading ‘A. Persons’, entries 1 to 19 and 21 to 26 are replaced by the following:

Name

Identifying information

Date of designation

Reasons

‘1.

KIM Hyok Chan

김혁찬

Date of birth: 9.6.1970

Passport number: 563410191

16.10.2017

Kim Hyok Chan has served as Secretary at the DPRK embassy in Angola and as representative of Green Pine, a UN listed entity, including negotiating contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

2.

CHOE Chan Il

촤찬일

22.1.2018

Director of the Dandong office of Korea Heungjin Trading Company, a UN designated entity. Korea Heungjin is used by KOMID, another UN designated entity, for trading purposes. KOMID was designated by the UN Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

3.

KIM Chol Nam

김철남

22.1.2018

Director of the Dandong branch of Sobaeksu United Corp. which has been designated by the Union. Representative of the Beijing branch of Korea Changgwang Trading Corporation, which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as an alias of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

4.

JON Chol Young

a.k.a.: JON Chol Yong

전철영

Date of birth: 30.4.1975

Passport number: 563410192

Diplomat DPRK Embassy, Angola

22.1.2018

Former representative in Angola of Green Pine Associated Corporation and DPRK diplomat accredited to Angola.

Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including violating the UN arms embargo. Green Pine has also negotiated contracts for the refurbishment of Angolan naval vessels in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

5.

AN Jong Hyuk

a.k.a.: An Jong Hyok

안정혁

안종혁

Date of birth: 14.3.1970

Passport number: 563410155

22.1.2018

Representative of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation, and DPRK diplomat in Egypt.

Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including breach of the UN arms embargo.

An Jong Hyuk was authorized to conduct all types of business on behalf of Saeng Pil, including signing and implementing contracts and banking business. The company specializes in the construction of naval vessels and the design, fabrication and installation of electronic communication and marine navigation equipment.

6.

YUN Chol a.k.a. CHOL Yun

윤철

22.1.2018

Yun Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as contact person of the DPRK Company General Precious Metal involved in the sale of lithium-6, a UN prohibited nuclear-related item, and DPRK diplomat.

General Precious Metal has previously been identified by the Union as an alias of the UN designated entity Green Pine.

7.

CHOE Kwang Hyok

최광혁

22.1.2018

Choe Kwang Hyok has served as a representative of Green Pine Associated Corporation, a UN designated entity.

Choe Kwang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as chief executive of Beijing King Helong International Trading Ltd, an alias of Green Pine. He has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as director of Hong Kong King Helong Int’l Trading Ltd and operator of the DPRK entity named Beijing representative office of Korea Unhasu Trading Company, which are also aliases of Green Pine.

8.

KIM Chang Hyok

a.k.a.: James Kim

김창혁

Date of birth: 29.4.1963

Place of birth: N. Hamgyong

Passport number: 472130058

22.1.2018

Kim Chang Hyok has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in Malaysia. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

Established multiple accounts in Malaysia in the name of front companies of “Glocom”, itself a front company of designated entity Pan Systems Pyongyang.

9.

PARK Young Han

박영한

22.1.2018

Director of Beijing New Technology which has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a front company of KOMID. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Legal representative of Guancaiweixing Trading Co., Ltd, which was identified by the UN Panel of Experts as the shipper of an intercepted shipment to Eritrea of military-related items in August 2012.

10.

RYANG Su Nyo

량수니오

Date of birth: 11.8.1959

Place of birth: Japan

22.1.2018

Director of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

11.

PYON Won Gun

변원군

Date of birth: 13.3.1968

Place of birth: S. Phyongan

Service passport number: 836220035

Passport number: 290220142

22.1.2018

Director of Glocom, a front company of Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

Glocom advertises radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations.

Pyon Won Gun has also been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang.

12.

PAE Won Chol

배원철

Date of birth: 30.8.1969

Place of birth: Pyongyang

Diplomatic passport number: 654310150

22.1.2018

Pae Won Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the European Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

13.

RI Sin Song

리신송

22.1.2018

Ri Sin Song has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

14.

KIM Sung Su

김성수

22.1.2018

Kim Sung Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as representative of Pan Systems Pyongyang in China. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

15.

KIM Pyong Chol

김병철

22.1.2018

Kim Pyong Chol has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a DPRK national operating Pan Systems Pyongyang. Pan Systems Pyongyang has been designated by the Union for assisting in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea. Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau which has been designated by the United Nations.

16.

CHOE Kwang Su

최광수

Date of birth: 20.4.1955

Passport number: 381210143 (expiration date: 3.6.2016)

22.1.2018

Choe Kwang Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as a representative of Haegeumgang Trading Company. In this capacity Choe Kwang Su signed a DPRK – Mozambique military cooperation contract in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The contract concerned the supply of arms and arm-related material to Monte Binga, a company controlled by the Government of Mozambique.

17.

PAK In Su

a.k.a.: Daniel Pak

박인수

Date of birth: 22.5.1957

Place of birth: N. Hamgyong

Diplomatic passport number: 290221242

22.1.2018

Pak In Su has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in activities related to the sale of coal from DPRK in Malaysia in violation of the prohibitions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

18.

SON Young-Nam

손영남

22.1.2018

Son Young-Nam has been identified by the UN Panel of Experts as being involved in the smuggling of gold and other items to the DPRK in violation of the prohibitions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

19.

KIM Il-Su

a.k.a. KIM Il Su

김일수

DOB: 2.9.1965

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

3.7.2015

Manager in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

21.

CHOE Chun-Sik

a.k.a. CHOE Chun Sik

최천식

DOB: 23.12.1963

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: 745132109

Valid until 12.2.2020

3.7.2015

Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

22.

SIN Kyu-Nam

a.k.a. SIN Kyu Nam

신규남

DOB: 12.9.1972

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: PO472132950

3.7.2015

Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang and former authorised representative of KNIC in Hamburg, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

23.

PAK Chun-San

a.k.a. PAK Chun San

박천산

DOB: 18.12.1953

POB: Pyongyang, DPRK

Passport number: PS472220097

3.7.2015

Director in the reinsurance department of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) based in the headquarters in Pyongyang at least until December 2015 and former authorised chief representative of KNIC in Hamburg, continues to act for or on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

24.

SO Tong Myong

서동명

DOB: 10.9.1956

3.7.2015

Former president of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), former KNIC Executive Management Committee Chairman (June 2012); former KNIC General Manager, September 2013, acting on behalf of KNIC or at its direction.

25.

PAK Hwa Song

a.k.a. PAK Hwa-Song

박화성

Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company

POB: DPRK

Passport number: 654331357

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

21.4.2022

Pak Hwa Song is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UN sanctions. Pak also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Pak works with Hwang Kil Su. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes.

26.

HWANG Kil Su

a.k.a. HWANG Kil-Su

황길수

Co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company

POB: DPRK

Passport number: 654331363

Nationality: DPRK

Gender: male

Address: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

21.4.2022

Hwang Kil Su is engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. He is co-founder of the CONGO ACONDE company, a front company of the PAEKHO TRADING CORPORATION. PAEKHO is involved in the export of statues to several Sub-Saharan countries in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang also opened a bank account in a Lubumbashi branch of a Cameroon-based bank in violation of UNSC resolutions. Hwang works with Pak Hwa Song. He provides financial services supporting the DPRK’s regime and nuclear programmes.’

| (b) | under the heading ‘List of persons referred to in point (c) of Article 23(1) and point (c) of Article 27(1)’, subheading ‘B. Entities’, entries 1 to 4, 6 and 8 are replaced by the following: | Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Date of designation | Reasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | Korea International Exhibition Corporation
  조선국제전람사 | Address: Jungsong-dong, Central District, Sungri St, Pyonyang, DPRK
  Telephone: 850 2 381 5926
  Email: kiec@silibank.net.kp | 16.10.2017 | The Korea International Exhibition Corporation has assisted designated entities in the evasion of sanctions by hosting the Pyongyang International Trade Fair, which provides designated entities with the opportunity to breach UN sanctions by continuing economic activity. |
| 2. | Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation
  a.k.a. Rungrado Trading Corporation
  조선릉라도무역총회사 | Address: Segori-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
  Telephone: 850-2-18111-3818022
  Fax: 850-2-3814507
  Email: rrd@co.chesin.com | 16.10.2017 | The Panel of Experts reported that Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation has assisted in violating sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions through the sale of Scud missiles to Egypt. |
| 3. | Maritime Administrative Bureau
  a.k.a. Maritime Administration of DPR Korea
  조선민주주의인민공화국 국가해사감독국 | Address: Ryonhwa-2Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
  PO Box 416
  Telephone: 850-2-18111 Ex 8059
  Fax: 850 2 381 4410
  Email: mab@silibank.net.kp
  Website: www.ma.gov.kp | 16.10.2017 | The Maritime Administrative Bureau has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council including by renaming and re-registering assets of designated entities and providing false documentation to vessels subject to United Nations sanctions. |
| 4. | Pan Systems Pyongyang
  a.k.a. Wonbang Trading Co.; Glocom; International Golden Services; International Global System | Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, DPRK | 16.10.2017 | Pan Systems has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea.
  Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations. |
| 6. | Korea General Corporation for External Construction (Aliases: KOGEN, GENCO)
  조선대외건설총회사 | Address: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | 21.4.2022 | The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (KOGEN), as a professional construction company abroad, relies on sending skilled workers abroad, according to the presentation made by the official DPRK internet portal Naenara, and has carried out projects in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Russia, Libya and Mongolia. It has also established local branches, such as in Zambia. KOGEN is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes as it transfers all or part of the wages of workers it sends abroad to the regime, a practice prohibited by UNSCR 2397 (2017). |
| 8. | Korea Paekho Trading Corporation
  (Alias: Joson Paekho Muyok Hoesa)
  조선백호무역회사 | Address: Chongryu 3-dong, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | 21.4.2022 | Paekho Trading Corporation is an art company involved in constructing statues overseas, in exporting artwork statues produced by Paekho Art Studio, and facilitates illicit labour and access to international financial systems. It specifically targets development grants and loans, as well as foreign-direct investment earmarked for municipal projects. It is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes.’ |

(b)

under the heading ‘List of persons referred to in point (c) of Article 23(1) and point (c) of Article 27(1)’, subheading ‘B. Entities’, entries 1 to 4, 6 and 8 are replaced by the following:

Name (and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Date of designation

Reasons

‘1.

Korea International Exhibition Corporation

조선국제전람사

Address: Jungsong-dong, Central District, Sungri St, Pyonyang, DPRK

Telephone: 850 2 381 5926

Email: kiec@silibank.net.kp

16.10.2017

The Korea International Exhibition Corporation has assisted designated entities in the evasion of sanctions by hosting the Pyongyang International Trade Fair, which provides designated entities with the opportunity to breach UN sanctions by continuing economic activity.

2.

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

a.k.a. Rungrado Trading Corporation

조선릉라도무역총회사

Address: Segori-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Telephone: 850-2-18111-3818022

Fax: 850-2-3814507

Email: rrd@co.chesin.com

16.10.2017

The Panel of Experts reported that Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation has assisted in violating sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions through the sale of Scud missiles to Egypt.

3.

Maritime Administrative Bureau

a.k.a. Maritime Administration of DPR Korea

조선민주주의인민공화국 국가해사감독국

Address: Ryonhwa-2Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK

PO Box 416

Telephone: 850-2-18111 Ex 8059

Fax: 850 2 381 4410

Email: mab@silibank.net.kp

Website: www.ma.gov.kp

16.10.2017

The Maritime Administrative Bureau has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council including by renaming and re-registering assets of designated entities and providing false documentation to vessels subject to United Nations sanctions.

4.

Pan Systems Pyongyang

a.k.a. Wonbang Trading Co.; Glocom; International Golden Services; International Global System

Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, DPRK

16.10.2017

Pan Systems has assisted in the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council through the attempted sale of arms and related materiel to Eritrea.

Pan Systems is also controlled by and works on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an entity that has been designated by the United Nations.

6.

Korea General Corporation for External Construction (Aliases: KOGEN, GENCO)

조선대외건설총회사

Address: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

21.4.2022

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (KOGEN), as a professional construction company abroad, relies on sending skilled workers abroad, according to the presentation made by the official DPRK internet portal Naenara, and has carried out projects in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Russia, Libya and Mongolia. It has also established local branches, such as in Zambia. KOGEN is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes as it transfers all or part of the wages of workers it sends abroad to the regime, a practice prohibited by UNSCR 2397 (2017).

8.

Korea Paekho Trading Corporation

(Alias: Joson Paekho Muyok Hoesa)

조선백호무역회사

Address: Chongryu 3-dong, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

21.4.2022

Paekho Trading Corporation is an art company involved in constructing statues overseas, in exporting artwork statues produced by Paekho Art Studio, and facilitates illicit labour and access to international financial systems. It specifically targets development grants and loans, as well as foreign-direct investment earmarked for municipal projects. It is, thereby, engaged in sanctions evasion and responsible for supporting financially the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic programmes.’

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/48

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/1337

of 28 July 2022

setting out the template for the provision of information to third-country nationals about the processing of personal data in the Entry/Exit System

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 (1), and in particular Article 50(4) and (5) first paragraph thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 established the Entry/Exit System (EES) as a system which registers electronically the time and place of entry and exit of third-country nationals admitted for a short stay to the territory of the Member States and which calculates the duration of their authorised stay. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 established the Entry/Exit System (EES) as a system which registers electronically the time and place of entry and exit of third-country nationals admitted for a short stay to the territory of the Member States and which calculates the duration of their authorised stay.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 50(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, third-country nationals whose data are to be recorded in the EES are to be informed about their rights and obligations regarding the processing of their data. Pursuant to Article 50(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 that information is to be provided in the form of a template. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 50(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, third-country nationals whose data are to be recorded in the EES are to be informed about their rights and obligations regarding the processing of their data. Pursuant to Article 50(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 that information is to be provided in the form of a template.

| (3) | Where necessary to comply with their national laws, Member States are to complete the template with relevant national information. With a view of providing awareness and clarity towards the third-country nationals, Member States should add, in particular, information related to the consequences of being an overstayer, the rights of data subject, the possibility of assistance by the supervisory authorities, contact details of the relevant data protection authorities and the lodging of complaints. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Where necessary to comply with their national laws, Member States are to complete the template with relevant national information. With a view of providing awareness and clarity towards the third-country nationals, Member States should add, in particular, information related to the consequences of being an overstayer, the rights of data subject, the possibility of assistance by the supervisory authorities, contact details of the relevant data protection authorities and the lodging of complaints.

| (4) | The template referred to in Article 50(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 should therefore be established. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The template referred to in Article 50(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 should therefore be established.

| (5) | Given that Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark notified on 30 May 2018 its decision to implement Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 in its national law, in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Denmark is therefore bound by this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Given that Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark notified on 30 May 2018 its decision to implement Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 in its national law, in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Denmark is therefore bound by this Decision.

| (6) | As regards Ireland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part (2); Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

As regards Ireland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part (2); Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

| (7) | As regards Iceland and Norway, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning those States association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (3), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (4). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

As regards Iceland and Norway, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning those States association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (3), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (4).

| (8) | As regards Switzerland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (5), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC (6). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

As regards Switzerland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (5), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC (6).

| (9) | As regards Liechtenstein, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (7) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU (8). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

As regards Liechtenstein, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (7) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU (8).

| (10) | As regards Bulgaria and Romania, as the verification in accordance with applicable Schengen evaluation procedure has been successfully completed, as confirmed by Council conclusions of 9 and 10 June 2011, the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System have been put into effect by Council Decision (EU) 2018/934 (9) and the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Visa Information System have been put into effect by Council Decision (EU) 2017/1908 (10), all the conditions for the operation of the Entry/Exit System set out in Article 66(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 are met and those Member States should therefore operate the Entry/Exit System from the start of operations. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As regards Bulgaria and Romania, as the verification in accordance with applicable Schengen evaluation procedure has been successfully completed, as confirmed by Council conclusions of 9 and 10 June 2011, the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System have been put into effect by Council Decision (EU) 2018/934 (9) and the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Visa Information System have been put into effect by Council Decision (EU) 2017/1908 (10), all the conditions for the operation of the Entry/Exit System set out in Article 66(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 are met and those Member States should therefore operate the Entry/Exit System from the start of operations.

| (11) | As regards Cyprus and Croatia, the operation of the Entry/Exit System requires the granting of passive access to the Visa Information System and the putting into effect of all the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in accordance with the relevant Council Decisions. Those conditions can only be met once the verification in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedure has been successfully completed. The Entry/Exit System should be operated only by those Member States which fulfil those conditions at the start of the operation of the Entry/Exit System. Member States not operating the Entry/Exit System from the start of operations should be connected to the Entry/Exit System, in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, as soon as all of those conditions are met. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

As regards Cyprus and Croatia, the operation of the Entry/Exit System requires the granting of passive access to the Visa Information System and the putting into effect of all the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in accordance with the relevant Council Decisions. Those conditions can only be met once the verification in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedure has been successfully completed. The Entry/Exit System should be operated only by those Member States which fulfil those conditions at the start of the operation of the Entry/Exit System. Member States not operating the Entry/Exit System from the start of operations should be connected to the Entry/Exit System, in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, as soon as all of those conditions are met.

| (12) | The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11) and delivered an opinion on 11 March 2022. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11) and delivered an opinion on 11 March 2022.

| (13) | The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Smart Borders Committee, established by Article 68 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Smart Borders Committee, established by Article 68 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The information referred to in Article 50(4) and the template referred to in Article 50(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 shall be as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, p. 20.

1

(2)  This Decision falls outside the scope of the measures provided for in Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland’s request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20).

2

acquis

(3)  
  OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36.

3

(4)  Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31).

4

acquis

(5)  
  OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52.

5

(6)  Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 1).

6

acquis

(7)  
  OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21.

7

(8)  Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 19).

8

acquis

(9)  Council Decision 2018/934/EU of 25 June 2018 on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (OJ L 165, 2.7.2018, p. 37).

9

acquis

(10)  Council Decision 2017/1908/EU of 12 October 2017 on the putting into effect of certain provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Visa Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (OJ L 269, 19.10.2017, p. 39).

10

acquis

(11)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

11

---

ANNEX

| Template for the provision of information to third-country nationals about the processing of personal data in the Entry/Exit System |
| --- |

Template for the provision of information to third-country nationals about the processing of personal data in the Entry/Exit System

The Entry/Exit System (1) contains personal data records on third-country nationals coming to the territory of the Member States (2) for a short stay (maximum of 90 days in any 180-day period). The system became operational on [date]. As of this date, information about your entries into and exits out of the territory of the Member States, and, if applicable, information on whether you have been refused entry, is registered in the Entry/Exit System.

To this end, your data is collected and processed on behalf of [Authority of the Member State responsible for the processing] (controller(s)). Please see below the contact details. Your personal data is processed for the purposes of border management, preventing irregular immigration and facilitating the management of migration flows. This is required in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 (3), specifically Articles 14, 16 to 19 and 23 of Chapter II and Chapter III of the Regulation

What data is collected, recorded and processed?

During checks at the external borders of the Member States, the collection of your personal data is mandatory for the examination of entry conditions. The following personal data is collected and recorded:

| (1) | data listed in your travel document; and |
| --- | --- |

(1)

data listed in your travel document; and

| (2) | biometric data: from your facial image and fingerprints (4). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

biometric data: from your facial image and fingerprints (4).

Data about you is also collected from other sources, depending on your situation:

| (1) | the Visa Information System: data contained in your personal file; and |
| --- | --- |

(1)

the Visa Information System: data contained in your personal file; and

| (2) | the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, in particular the status of your travel authorisation and your family member status, if applicable. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, in particular the status of your travel authorisation and your family member status, if applicable.

What happens if you do not provide the requested biometric data?

If you do not provide the requested biometric data for registration, verification or identification in the Entry/Exit System, you will be refused entry at the external borders.

Who can access your data?

Member States can access your data for the purposes of border management, facilitation of border crossings, immigration, and law enforcement. Europol may also access your data for law enforcement purposes. Under strict conditions, your data may also be transferred to a Member State, a third country or an international organisation listed in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 (5) for the purposes of return (6) or law enforcement (7).

Your data will be stored in the Entry/Exit System for the following duration, after which it will be automatically erased:

   (8)

| (1) | records of each entry, exit or refusal of entry record are stored for 3 years starting on the date of the entry, exit, refusal of entry record; (9) |
| --- | --- |

(1)

records of each entry, exit or refusal of entry record are stored for 3 years starting on the date of the entry, exit, refusal of entry record; (9)

| (2) | the individual file containing your personal data is stored for 3 years and one day starting from the date of the last exit record or of the refusal of entry record where is no entry recorded during that period; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

the individual file containing your personal data is stored for 3 years and one day starting from the date of the last exit record or of the refusal of entry record where is no entry recorded during that period;

| (3) | where there is no exit record, your data are stored for 5 years starting on the date of the expiration of your authorised stay. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

where there is no exit record, your data are stored for 5 years starting on the date of the expiration of your authorised stay.

Remaining authorised stay and overstay

You have the right to receive from the border guard information on the maximum remaining duration of your authorised stay on the territory of the Member States. You can also consult the following website [link to EES public website] or, where available, the equipment installed at borders to self verify your remaining authorised stay.

If you overstay the period of your authorised stay, your data will be automatically added to a list of identified persons (a list of overstayers). The list can be accessed by competent national authorities. If you are on this list of overstayers [consequences of being an overstayer to be added by the Member States]. (10) However, if you can provide credible evidence to the competent authorities that you exceeded the authorised duration of your stay due to unforeseeable and serious events, your personal data can be rectified or completed in the Entry/Exit System and you can be removed from the list of overstayers.

Your rights with regard to the processing of personal data

You have the following rights:

| (1) | to request from the controller access to data relating to you; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

to request from the controller access to data relating to you;

| (2) | to request that inaccurate or incomplete data relating to you is rectified or completed; and |
| --- | --- |

(2)

to request that inaccurate or incomplete data relating to you is rectified or completed; and

| (3) | to request that unlawfully processed personal data that concerns you is erased or that the processing thereof is restricted. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

to request that unlawfully processed personal data that concerns you is erased or that the processing thereof is restricted.

If you want to exercise any of these rights listed in points (1) to (3), you must contact the data controller or data protection officer indicated below.

Contact details

| Data controller(s):
  [address and contact details to be filled by MS – data controller]. | Data protection officer(s):
  [address and contact details to be filled by MS]. |
| --- | --- |

Data controller(s):
  [address and contact details to be filled by MS – data controller].

Data protection officer(s):
  [address and contact details to be filled by MS].

In line with the division of tasks between Member States’ authorities and the European agencies involved, you can lodge a complaint with:

| Supervisory authority of [the Member State] which is in charge of processing your data (e.g. if you allege that they have recorded your data incorrectly):

  [Member State specific information to be specified – address and contact details] | European Data Protection Supervisor for matters of data processing by European Agencies:


  [contact details to be specified – address and contact details] |
| --- | --- |

Supervisory authority of [the Member State] which is in charge of processing your data (e.g. if you allege that they have recorded your data incorrectly):

[Member State specific information to be specified – address and contact details]

European Data Protection Supervisor for matters of data processing by European Agencies:

[contact details to be specified – address and contact details]

[Further information by Member States on rights of the data subjects or the possibility of assistance by the supervisory authorities].
  For additional information please consult the Entry/Exit System public website
  [add link/name].

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011

(2)  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

(3)  Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 on establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ L 327 9.12.2017, p. 20).

(4)  Please note that the fingerprints data of third-country nationals who do not need a visa to enter the Schengen area and holders of Facilitated Transit Documents will also be stored in the Entry/Exit System. If you need a visa to enter the Schengen area, your fingerprints will already be stored in the Visa Information System as part of your file there and will not be stored again in the Entry/Exit System.

(5)  UN organisation, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the International Committee of the Red Cross.

(6)  Article 41(1) and (2) and Article 42.

(7)  Article 41(6).

(8)  If you are subject to visa requirement, your fingerprint will not be stored in the Entry/Exit system as they are already stored in the Visa Information System.

(9)  In the case of third-country nationals who are family members of mobile EU, EEA or Swiss citizens (i.e. of EU EEA or Swiss citizens who travel to a State other than the State of their nationality or already reside there),and are accompanying or joining the EU, EEA or Swiss citizen, each entry, exit or refusal of entry record will be stored for one year following the date of the exit record or of the refusal of entry record.

(10)  The calculation of the duration of the authorised stay and the generation of alerts to Member States when the authorised stay has expired do not apply to third-country nationals who are family members of mobile EU, EEA or Swiss citizens (i.e. of EU EEA or Swiss citizens who travel to a State other than the State of their nationality or already reside there) and are accompanying or joining the EU, EEA or Swiss citizen

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| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/54

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/1338

of 29 July 2022

establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic (1), and in particular Article 8(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EU) 2021/953 lays down a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (‘EU Digital COVID Certificate’) for the purpose of facilitating the holders’ exercise of their right to free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also to contribute to facilitating the gradual lifting of restrictions to free movement put in place by Member States, in accordance with Union law, to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, in a coordinated manner. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EU) 2021/953 lays down a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (‘EU Digital COVID Certificate’) for the purpose of facilitating the holders’ exercise of their right to free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also to contribute to facilitating the gradual lifting of restrictions to free movement put in place by Member States, in accordance with Union law, to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, in a coordinated manner.

| (2) | Regulation (EU) 2021/953 allows for the acceptance of COVID-19 certificates issued by third countries to Union citizens and their family members where the Commission finds that those COVID-19 certificates are issued in accordance with standards that are to be considered as equivalent to those established pursuant to that Regulation. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), Member States are to apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/953 to third-country nationals who do not fall within the scope of that Regulation, but who are legally staying or residing in their territory and who are entitled to travel to other Member States in accordance with Union law. Therefore, any equivalence findings laid down in this Decision should apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to Union citizens and their family members. Similarly, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/954, such equivalence findings should also apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territory of the Member States under the conditions laid down in that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Regulation (EU) 2021/953 allows for the acceptance of COVID-19 certificates issued by third countries to Union citizens and their family members where the Commission finds that those COVID-19 certificates are issued in accordance with standards that are to be considered as equivalent to those established pursuant to that Regulation. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), Member States are to apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/953 to third-country nationals who do not fall within the scope of that Regulation, but who are legally staying or residing in their territory and who are entitled to travel to other Member States in accordance with Union law. Therefore, any equivalence findings laid down in this Decision should apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to Union citizens and their family members. Similarly, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/954, such equivalence findings should also apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territory of the Member States under the conditions laid down in that Regulation.

| (3) | On 27 October 2021, the Republic of the Philippines provided the Commission with detailed information on the issuance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination certificates under the system entitled ‘VaxCertPH’. The Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that it considered that its COVID-19 certificates are being issued in accordance with a standard and a technological system, that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 and that allow for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. In this regard, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system contain the data set out in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 27 October 2021, the Republic of the Philippines provided the Commission with detailed information on the issuance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination certificates under the system entitled ‘VaxCertPH’. The Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that it considered that its COVID-19 certificates are being issued in accordance with a standard and a technological system, that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 and that allow for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. In this regard, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system contain the data set out in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (4) | The Republic of the Philippines also informed the Commission that it accepts vaccination, test certificates for NAAT tests (e.g.: RT-PCR) and recovery certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Republic of the Philippines also informed the Commission that it accepts vaccination, test certificates for NAAT tests (e.g.: RT-PCR) and recovery certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (5) | On 14 July 2022, following a request by the Republic of the Philippines, the Commission carried out technical tests that demonstrated that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953, allowing for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. The Commission also confirmed that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system contain the necessary data. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 14 July 2022, following a request by the Republic of the Philippines, the Commission carried out technical tests that demonstrated that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953, allowing for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. The Commission also confirmed that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system contain the necessary data.

| (6) | In addition, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that it issues interoperable vaccination certificates for COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccines currently include Comirnaty, Vaxzevria, CoronaVac, Sputnik V, Sputnik Light, Jcovden, Covaxin, Spikevax, and Covovax. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In addition, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that it issues interoperable vaccination certificates for COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccines currently include Comirnaty, Vaxzevria, CoronaVac, Sputnik V, Sputnik Light, Jcovden, Covaxin, Spikevax, and Covovax.

| (7) | The Republic of the Philippines also informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable test certificates. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Republic of the Philippines also informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable test certificates.

| (8) | Furthermore, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable certificates of recovery. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Furthermore, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable certificates of recovery.

| (9) | In addition, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that when verifiers in the Philippines verify certificates, the personal data included in them will be processed only to verify and confirm the holder’s vaccination, test result or recovery status and will not be retained afterwards. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In addition, the Republic of the Philippines informed the Commission that when verifiers in the Philippines verify certificates, the personal data included in them will be processed only to verify and confirm the holder’s vaccination, test result or recovery status and will not be retained afterwards.

| (10) | The necessary elements for establishing that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system are to be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are thus fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The necessary elements for establishing that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system are to be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are thus fulfilled.

| (11) | Therefore, COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system should be accepted under the conditions referred to in Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Therefore, COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system should be accepted under the conditions referred to in Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (12) | In order for this Decision to be operational, the Republic of the Philippines should be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In order for this Decision to be operational, the Republic of the Philippines should be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (13) | In order to protect the Union’s interests, in particular in the area of public health, the Commission may use its powers to suspend application of this Decision or repeal it, if the conditions of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are no longer met. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In order to protect the Union’s interests, in particular in the area of public health, the Commission may use its powers to suspend application of this Decision or repeal it, if the conditions of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are no longer met.

| (14) | In order to connect the Republic of the Philippines to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 as rapidly as possible, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In order to connect the Republic of the Philippines to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 as rapidly as possible, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (15) | The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/953, |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/953,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the ‘VaxCertPH’ system shall, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

Article 2

The Republic of the Philippines shall be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 29 July 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 211, 15.6.2021, p. 1.

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) with regard to third country nationals legally staying or residing in the territories of Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 211, 15.6.2021, p. 24).

2

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/57

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/1339

of 29 July 2022

establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic (1), and in particular Article 8(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EU) 2021/953 lays down a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (‘EU Digital COVID Certificate’) for the purpose of facilitating the holders’ exercise of their right to free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also to contribute to facilitating the gradual lifting of restrictions to free movement put in place by Member States, in accordance with Union law, to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, in a coordinated manner. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EU) 2021/953 lays down a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (‘EU Digital COVID Certificate’) for the purpose of facilitating the holders’ exercise of their right to free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also to contribute to facilitating the gradual lifting of restrictions to free movement put in place by Member States, in accordance with Union law, to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, in a coordinated manner.

| (2) | Regulation (EU) 2021/953 allows for the acceptance of COVID-19 certificates issued by third countries to Union citizens and their family members where the Commission finds that those COVID-19 certificates are issued in accordance with standards that are to be considered as equivalent to those established pursuant to that Regulation. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), Member States are to apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/953 to third-country nationals who do not fall within the scope of that Regulation, but who are legally staying or residing in their territory and who are entitled to travel to other Member States in accordance with Union law. Therefore, any equivalence findings laid down in this Decision should apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to Union citizens and their family members. Similarly, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/954, such equivalence findings should also apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territory of the Member States under the conditions laid down in that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Regulation (EU) 2021/953 allows for the acceptance of COVID-19 certificates issued by third countries to Union citizens and their family members where the Commission finds that those COVID-19 certificates are issued in accordance with standards that are to be considered as equivalent to those established pursuant to that Regulation. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), Member States are to apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/953 to third-country nationals who do not fall within the scope of that Regulation, but who are legally staying or residing in their territory and who are entitled to travel to other Member States in accordance with Union law. Therefore, any equivalence findings laid down in this Decision should apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to Union citizens and their family members. Similarly, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/954, such equivalence findings should also apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territory of the Member States under the conditions laid down in that Regulation.

| (3) | On 3 March 2022, the Sultanate of Oman provided the Commission with detailed information on the issuance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination certificates under the system entitled ‘Tarassud’. The Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that it considered that its COVID-19 certificates are being issued in accordance with a standard and a technological system, that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 and that allow for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. In this regard, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system contain the data set out in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 3 March 2022, the Sultanate of Oman provided the Commission with detailed information on the issuance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination certificates under the system entitled ‘Tarassud’. The Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that it considered that its COVID-19 certificates are being issued in accordance with a standard and a technological system, that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 and that allow for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. In this regard, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system contain the data set out in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (4) | The Sultanate of Oman also informed the Commission that it accepts vaccination, test and recovery certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Sultanate of Oman also informed the Commission that it accepts vaccination, test and recovery certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (5) | On 14 July 2022, following a request by the Sultanate of Oman, the Commission carried out technical tests that demonstrated that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953, allowing for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. The Commission also confirmed that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system contain the necessary data. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 14 July 2022, following a request by the Sultanate of Oman, the Commission carried out technical tests that demonstrated that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953, allowing for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. The Commission also confirmed that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system contain the necessary data.

| (6) | In addition, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that it issues interoperable vaccination certificates for COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccines currently include Comirnaty, Covishield, R-COVI, Sputnik V, CoronaVac, and Vaxzevria. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In addition, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that it issues interoperable vaccination certificates for COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccines currently include Comirnaty, Covishield, R-COVI, Sputnik V, CoronaVac, and Vaxzevria.

| (7) | The Sultanate of Oman also informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable test certificates. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Sultanate of Oman also informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable test certificates.

| (8) | Furthermore, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable certificates of recovery. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Furthermore, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable certificates of recovery.

| (9) | In addition, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that when verifiers in Oman verify certificates, the personal data included in them will be processed only to verify and confirm the holder’s vaccination, test result or recovery status and will not be retained afterwards. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In addition, the Sultanate of Oman informed the Commission that when verifiers in Oman verify certificates, the personal data included in them will be processed only to verify and confirm the holder’s vaccination, test result or recovery status and will not be retained afterwards.

| (10) | The necessary elements for establishing that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system are to be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are thus fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The necessary elements for establishing that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system are to be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are thus fulfilled.

| (11) | Therefore, COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system should be accepted under the conditions referred to in Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Therefore, COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system should be accepted under the conditions referred to in Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (12) | In order for this Decision to be operational, the Sultanate of Oman should be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In order for this Decision to be operational, the Sultanate of Oman should be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (13) | In order to protect the Union’s interests, in particular in the area of public health, the Commission may use its powers to suspend application of this Decision or repeal it, if the conditions of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are no longer met. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In order to protect the Union’s interests, in particular in the area of public health, the Commission may use its powers to suspend application of this Decision or repeal it, if the conditions of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are no longer met.

| (14) | In order to connect the Sultanate of Oman to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 as rapidly as possible, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In order to connect the Sultanate of Oman to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 as rapidly as possible, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (15) | The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/953, |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/953,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Sultanate of Oman in accordance with the ‘Tarassud’ system shall, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

Article 2

The Sultanate of Oman shall be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 29 July 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 211, 15.6.2021, p. 1.

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) with regard to third country nationals legally staying or residing in the territories of Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 211, 15.6.2021, p. 24).

2

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| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/60

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/1340

of 29 July 2022

establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic (1), and in particular Article 8(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EU) 2021/953 lays down a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (‘EU Digital COVID Certificate’) for the purpose of facilitating the holders’ exercise of their right to free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also to contribute to facilitating the gradual lifting of restrictions to free movement put in place by Member States, in accordance with Union law, to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, in a coordinated manner. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EU) 2021/953 lays down a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (‘EU Digital COVID Certificate’) for the purpose of facilitating the holders’ exercise of their right to free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also to contribute to facilitating the gradual lifting of restrictions to free movement put in place by Member States, in accordance with Union law, to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, in a coordinated manner.

| (2) | Regulation (EU) 2021/953 allows for the acceptance of COVID-19 certificates issued by third countries to Union citizens and their family members where the Commission finds that those COVID-19 certificates are issued in accordance with standards that are to be considered as equivalent to those established pursuant to that Regulation. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), Member States are to apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/953 to third-country nationals who do not fall within the scope of that Regulation, but who are legally staying or residing in their territory and who are entitled to travel to other Member States in accordance with Union law. Therefore, any equivalence findings laid down in this Decision should apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to Union citizens and their family members. Similarly, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/954, such equivalence findings should also apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territory of the Member States under the conditions laid down in that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Regulation (EU) 2021/953 allows for the acceptance of COVID-19 certificates issued by third countries to Union citizens and their family members where the Commission finds that those COVID-19 certificates are issued in accordance with standards that are to be considered as equivalent to those established pursuant to that Regulation. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), Member States are to apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/953 to third-country nationals who do not fall within the scope of that Regulation, but who are legally staying or residing in their territory and who are entitled to travel to other Member States in accordance with Union law. Therefore, any equivalence findings laid down in this Decision should apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to Union citizens and their family members. Similarly, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/954, such equivalence findings should also apply to COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territory of the Member States under the conditions laid down in that Regulation.

| (3) | On 7 April 2022, the Republic of Peru provided the Commission with detailed information on the issuance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination certificates under the system entitled ‘Vaccination Card against COVID–19’. The Republic of Peru informed the Commission that it considered that its COVID-19 certificates are being issued in accordance with a standard and a technological system, that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 and that allow for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. In this regard, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID-19’ system contain the data set out in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 7 April 2022, the Republic of Peru provided the Commission with detailed information on the issuance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination certificates under the system entitled ‘Vaccination Card against COVID–19’. The Republic of Peru informed the Commission that it considered that its COVID-19 certificates are being issued in accordance with a standard and a technological system, that are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 and that allow for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. In this regard, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID-19’ system contain the data set out in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (4) | The Republic of Peru also informed the Commission that it accepts vaccination, test and recovery certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Republic of Peru also informed the Commission that it accepts vaccination, test and recovery certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (5) | On 29 June 2022, following a request by the Republic of Peru, the Commission carried out technical tests that demonstrated that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID -19’ system are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953, allowing for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. The Commission also confirmed that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID –19’ system contain the necessary data. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 29 June 2022, following a request by the Republic of Peru, the Commission carried out technical tests that demonstrated that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID -19’ system are interoperable with the trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953, allowing for the verification of the authenticity, validity and integrity of the certificates. The Commission also confirmed that the COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID –19’ system contain the necessary data.

| (6) | In addition, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that it issues interoperable vaccination certificates for COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccines currently include Comirnaty, Vaxzevria, BBIBP-CorV, Spikevax, and Jcovden. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In addition, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that it issues interoperable vaccination certificates for COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccines currently include Comirnaty, Vaxzevria, BBIBP-CorV, Spikevax, and Jcovden.

| (7) | The Republic of Peru also informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable test certificates. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Republic of Peru also informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable test certificates.

| (8) | Furthermore, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable certificates of recovery. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Furthermore, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that it does not issue interoperable certificates of recovery.

| (9) | In addition, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that when verifiers in Peru verify certificates, the personal data included in them will be processed only to verify and confirm the holder’s vaccination, test result or recovery status and will not be retained afterwards. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In addition, the Republic of Peru informed the Commission that when verifiers in Peru verify certificates, the personal data included in them will be processed only to verify and confirm the holder’s vaccination, test result or recovery status and will not be retained afterwards.

| (10) | The necessary elements for establishing that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID- 19’ system are to be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are thus fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The necessary elements for establishing that COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID- 19’ system are to be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are thus fulfilled.

| (11) | Therefore, COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID-19’ system should be accepted under the conditions referred to in Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Therefore, COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘Vaccination Card against COVID-19’ system should be accepted under the conditions referred to in Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (12) | In order for this Decision to be operational, the Republic of Peru should be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In order for this Decision to be operational, the Republic of Peru should be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

| (13) | In order to protect the Union’s interests, in particular in the area of public health, the Commission may use its powers to suspend application of this Decision or repeal it, if the conditions of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are no longer met. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In order to protect the Union’s interests, in particular in the area of public health, the Commission may use its powers to suspend application of this Decision or repeal it, if the conditions of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 are no longer met.

| (14) | In order to connect the Republic of Peru to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 as rapidly as possible, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In order to connect the Republic of Peru to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953 as rapidly as possible, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (15) | The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/953, |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/953,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

COVID-19 vaccination certificates issued by the Republic of Peru in accordance with the ‘ Vaccination Card against COVID-19’ system shall, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, be considered as equivalent to those issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

Article 2

The Republic of Peru shall be connected to the EU Digital COVID Certificate trust framework established by Regulation (EU) 2021/953.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 29 July 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 211, 15.6.2021, p. 1.

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/954 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) with regard to third country nationals legally staying or residing in the territories of Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 211, 15.6.2021, p. 24).

2

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RECOMMENDATIONS

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/63 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/63

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COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2022/1341

of 23 June 2022

on voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment used in public spaces (outside aviation)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Except for the field of civil aviation, Union law does not provide, at present, for harmonised performance requirements for X-ray equipment used for detection in public spaces. Such requirements differ between Member States, leading to uneven and not always sufficiently high levels of protection of the general public against security threats. Terrorists and other criminals may exploit the resulting vulnerabilities, including to stage attacks or conduct other criminal activities in Member States with a lower level of security in public spaces. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Except for the field of civil aviation, Union law does not provide, at present, for harmonised performance requirements for X-ray equipment used for detection in public spaces. Such requirements differ between Member States, leading to uneven and not always sufficiently high levels of protection of the general public against security threats. Terrorists and other criminals may exploit the resulting vulnerabilities, including to stage attacks or conduct other criminal activities in Member States with a lower level of security in public spaces.

| (2) | Terrorist attacks committed across the Union in recent years have predominantly taken place in public spaces, targeting members of the general public. In order to contribute to a sufficiently high level of protection against terrorist attacks and security threats in public spaces across the Union, voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment should be set out at Union level. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Terrorist attacks committed across the Union in recent years have predominantly taken place in public spaces, targeting members of the general public. In order to contribute to a sufficiently high level of protection against terrorist attacks and security threats in public spaces across the Union, voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment should be set out at Union level.

| (3) | The detection equipment, including X-ray equipment, used in the field of civil aviation is subject to detailed requirements laid down in Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 8005 (1). Those requirements are well defined and offer a high and consistent level of protection in the field of civil aviation security. Therefore, that field should not be covered by this Recommendation. In addition, in the interest of clarity, it should be clarified that this Recommendation is without prejudice to acts of Union law regulating safety aspects of X-ray equipment. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The detection equipment, including X-ray equipment, used in the field of civil aviation is subject to detailed requirements laid down in Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 8005 (1). Those requirements are well defined and offer a high and consistent level of protection in the field of civil aviation security. Therefore, that field should not be covered by this Recommendation. In addition, in the interest of clarity, it should be clarified that this Recommendation is without prejudice to acts of Union law regulating safety aspects of X-ray equipment.

| (4) | In the Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU (2), the Commission committed to support the development of voluntary requirements for detection technologies to ensure that they detect the security threats they need to detect, while preserving the mobility of people. In pursuit of this commitment, the Commission established the Technical Working Group on detection performance requirements, composed of Member State experts, manufacturers and officials from a number of Commission services, and asked it to assist in developing voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment at Union level. This Recommendation, and in particular the voluntary requirements contained therein relating to product documentation and X-ray performance, is based on the preparatory work conducted by this working group. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In the Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU (2), the Commission committed to support the development of voluntary requirements for detection technologies to ensure that they detect the security threats they need to detect, while preserving the mobility of people. In pursuit of this commitment, the Commission established the Technical Working Group on detection performance requirements, composed of Member State experts, manufacturers and officials from a number of Commission services, and asked it to assist in developing voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment at Union level. This Recommendation, and in particular the voluntary requirements contained therein relating to product documentation and X-ray performance, is based on the preparatory work conducted by this working group.

| (5) | The voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation should be used by Member States in public procurement of X-ray equipment intended to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation should be used by Member States in public procurement of X-ray equipment intended to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces.

| (6) | This Recommendation, which has no binding force, should not be understood as requiring the Member States to procure or use certain particular X-ray equipment for security-threat detection in public spaces. The decisions on which equipment to procure or use in a given public space should continue to be taken exclusively by Member States, in accordance with Union law. This Recommendation should rather aim to promote the use of the voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation in the context of Member States’ procurement activities to contribute to achieving an equivalent and high level of security-threat detection performance by X-ray equipment used by Member States’ authorities in public spaces across the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

This Recommendation, which has no binding force, should not be understood as requiring the Member States to procure or use certain particular X-ray equipment for security-threat detection in public spaces. The decisions on which equipment to procure or use in a given public space should continue to be taken exclusively by Member States, in accordance with Union law. This Recommendation should rather aim to promote the use of the voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation in the context of Member States’ procurement activities to contribute to achieving an equivalent and high level of security-threat detection performance by X-ray equipment used by Member States’ authorities in public spaces across the Union.

| (7) | The voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation should not be understood as being intended to replace national performance standards for X-ray equipment, where such national standards exist. In particular, Member States should remain free to apply, in accordance with Union law, more stringent performance requirements for X-ray equipment used to detect security threats in public spaces. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation should not be understood as being intended to replace national performance standards for X-ray equipment, where such national standards exist. In particular, Member States should remain free to apply, in accordance with Union law, more stringent performance requirements for X-ray equipment used to detect security threats in public spaces.

| (8) | This Recommendation should indirectly incentivise manufacturers to comply with the requirements in future production of X-ray equipment. Member States should therefore require in the procurement document for the X-ray equipment to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces that the tenderers include in the tender the product documentation and declaration of conformity based on the manufacturer’s own methodology to demonstrate the conformity of the X-ray equipment with the voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

This Recommendation should indirectly incentivise manufacturers to comply with the requirements in future production of X-ray equipment. Member States should therefore require in the procurement document for the X-ray equipment to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces that the tenderers include in the tender the product documentation and declaration of conformity based on the manufacturer’s own methodology to demonstrate the conformity of the X-ray equipment with the voluntary performance requirements contained in this Recommendation.

| (9) | The use of X-ray equipment in public spaces may pose challenges from the viewpoint of the rights to protection of privacy and personal data. It is of crucial importance in relation to all activities connected to the use of the X-ray equipment at issue, including the procurement and operation of the equipment and any subsequent processing activities, to limit the intrusiveness as much as possible and, in any event, to act in compliance with the relevant acts of Union law, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The use of X-ray equipment in public spaces may pose challenges from the viewpoint of the rights to protection of privacy and personal data. It is of crucial importance in relation to all activities connected to the use of the X-ray equipment at issue, including the procurement and operation of the equipment and any subsequent processing activities, to limit the intrusiveness as much as possible and, in any event, to act in compliance with the relevant acts of Union law, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

| (10) | Bearing in mind in particular the relevant technological developments in the area of security-threat detection, the voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment contained in this Recommendation should be subject to review and adjustments where necessary. The Commission, with the assistance of the technical working group on detection performance requirements, will therefore closely follow technological and other relevant developments and regularly assess the need for adjustments of this Recommendation. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Bearing in mind in particular the relevant technological developments in the area of security-threat detection, the voluntary performance requirements for X-ray equipment contained in this Recommendation should be subject to review and adjustments where necessary. The Commission, with the assistance of the technical working group on detection performance requirements, will therefore closely follow technological and other relevant developments and regularly assess the need for adjustments of this Recommendation.

| (11) | In the interest of effectiveness and transparency, Member States should be encouraged to give effect to this Recommendation and submit a report on their implementing measures to the Commission within a reasonable timeframe. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In the interest of effectiveness and transparency, Member States should be encouraged to give effect to this Recommendation and submit a report on their implementing measures to the Commission within a reasonable timeframe.

| (12) | On the basis of those reports and any other relevant information, the Commission will, after a suitable time period, assess the progress made in giving effect to this Recommendation, with a view, inter alia, to assessing whether Union legal acts with binding force on this subject matter are necessary, |
| --- | --- |

(12)

On the basis of those reports and any other relevant information, the Commission will, after a suitable time period, assess the progress made in giving effect to this Recommendation, with a view, inter alia, to assessing whether Union legal acts with binding force on this subject matter are necessary,

HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

| 1. | For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:






  (a) | ‘X-ray equipment’ means radiographic X-ray scanners used for physical controls aimed at security-threat detection, in which a pseudo-colour image is generated based on measured changes of X-ray radiation that passes through scanned items of interest; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

‘X-ray equipment’ means radiographic X-ray scanners used for physical controls aimed at security-threat detection, in which a pseudo-colour image is generated based on measured changes of X-ray radiation that passes through scanned items of interest;

| (b) | ‘security-threat detection’ means the determination of the presence or absence of one or more substances or objects of interest which may be used to cause security threats, such as explosives, dangerous chemicals, firearms or sharp objects; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

‘security-threat detection’ means the determination of the presence or absence of one or more substances or objects of interest which may be used to cause security threats, such as explosives, dangerous chemicals, firearms or sharp objects;

| (c) | ‘performance requirements’ mean the technical specifications to be met by X-ray equipment intended to ensure that the equipment adequately performs its security-threat detection functions; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

‘performance requirements’ mean the technical specifications to be met by X-ray equipment intended to ensure that the equipment adequately performs its security-threat detection functions;

| (d) | ‘product documentation’ means the documentation, in paper or electronic form, accompanying the X-ray equipment; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

‘product documentation’ means the documentation, in paper or electronic form, accompanying the X-ray equipment;

| (e) | ‘public spaces’ mean any physical place that is accessible to the public, regardless of whether certain conditions for access may apply. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

‘public spaces’ mean any physical place that is accessible to the public, regardless of whether certain conditions for access may apply.

| 2. | Member States should require in the procurement document for X-ray equipment to be used for security threat detection in public spaces that the tenderer include in the tender the product documentation set out in point 1 of the Annex. |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Member States should ensure that the X-ray equipment they procure for the use of security-threat detection in public spaces comply with the performance requirements set out in point 2 of the Annex, except when acting in the field of civil aviation. |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Member States should require in the procurement document for X-ray equipment to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces that the tenderer include in the tender a declaration of conformity with the performance requirements that is issued by the manufacturer, based on the manufacturer’s own methodology. |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | By 23 June 2023, Member States should take the necessary measures, in accordance with Union law, to give effect to this Recommendation. |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Member States should report to the Commission on their implementing measures by 23 December 2023. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Done at Brussels, 23 June 2022.

For the Commission

Ylva JOHANSSON

Member of the Commission

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(1)  Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 8005 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security containing information, as referred to in point (a) of Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008.

1

(2)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond COM(2020) 795 final.

2

(3)  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

3

(4)  Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89).

4

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ANNEX

Product Documentation and X-ray Performance Requirements

Terms and Definitions

For the purposes of this Annex, the following terms and definitions should apply:

| (1) | ‘Concept of operations (CONOPS)’: document describing the equipment characteristics and correct operating procedure(s); |
| --- | --- |

(1)

‘Concept of operations (CONOPS)’: document describing the equipment characteristics and correct operating procedure(s);

| (2) | ‘Dark alarm’: visual indication presented to the operator when X-ray equipment cannot fully penetrate a scanned item (also known as ‘shield alarm’ or ‘dark alarm’); |
| --- | --- |

(2)

‘Dark alarm’: visual indication presented to the operator when X-ray equipment cannot fully penetrate a scanned item (also known as ‘shield alarm’ or ‘dark alarm’);

| (3) | ‘Dual energy’: the exploitation of the energy-dependent attenuation of X-rays in different materials to estimate the effective atomic number of scanned materials, typically employed to discriminate between organic and inorganic material; |
| --- | --- |

(3)

‘Dual energy’: the exploitation of the energy-dependent attenuation of X-rays in different materials to estimate the effective atomic number of scanned materials, typically employed to discriminate between organic and inorganic material;

| (4) | ‘Dual view’: X-ray equipment where X-ray detection is implemented at two different angles of at least 60° and no more than 90° rotation to give two simultaneous views of scanned objects; |
| --- | --- |

(4)

‘Dual view’: X-ray equipment where X-ray detection is implemented at two different angles of at least 60° and no more than 90° rotation to give two simultaneous views of scanned objects;

| (5) | ‘Edge enhancement’: an image-processing filter that enhances the edge contrast of an image in an attempt to improve its apparent sharpness; |
| --- | --- |

(5)

‘Edge enhancement’: an image-processing filter that enhances the edge contrast of an image in an attempt to improve its apparent sharpness;

| (6) | ‘Effective atomic number’: real (non-integer) number describing a hypothetical single element that would exhibit very similar X-ray attenuation as the scanned object comprising different elements; |
| --- | --- |

(6)

‘Effective atomic number’: real (non-integer) number describing a hypothetical single element that would exhibit very similar X-ray attenuation as the scanned object comprising different elements;

| (7) | ‘Inorganic material’: in the context of X-ray security screening, a material with an effective atomic number greater than 10; |
| --- | --- |

(7)

‘Inorganic material’: in the context of X-ray security screening, a material with an effective atomic number greater than 10;

| (8) | ‘Multi view’: X-ray equipment where X-ray detection is implemented at different angles to give different simultaneous views of scanned objects; |
| --- | --- |

(8)

‘Multi view’: X-ray equipment where X-ray detection is implemented at different angles to give different simultaneous views of scanned objects;

| (9) | ‘Organic material’: in the context of X-ray security screening, a material with an effective atomic number less than 10; |
| --- | --- |

(9)

‘Organic material’: in the context of X-ray security screening, a material with an effective atomic number less than 10;

| (10) | ‘Threat image projection (TIP)’: a software function used in X-ray screening to merge a pre-recorded scan of a threat item with an operational scan to create a realistic combined image that is presented to the operator in near real-time. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

‘Threat image projection (TIP)’: a software function used in X-ray screening to merge a pre-recorded scan of a threat item with an operational scan to create a realistic combined image that is presented to the operator in near real-time.

1.   
  Product Documentation

The X-ray equipment to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces should be supplied together with documentation (in paper and/or electronic form) that contains the following information:

1.1.   Physical dimensions of equipment

| — | overall dimension should be expressed as length (L) x width (W) x height (H) in millimetres (mm); |
| --- | --- |

—

overall dimension should be expressed as length (L) x width (W) x height (H) in millimetres (mm);

| — | tunnel size should be expressed as length (L) x width (W) in mm; |
| --- | --- |

—

tunnel size should be expressed as length (L) x width (W) in mm;

| — | the maximum object size that can be scanned should be expressed as length (L) x width (W) in mm; |
| --- | --- |

—

the maximum object size that can be scanned should be expressed as length (L) x width (W) in mm;

| — | the maximum conveyor load should be evenly distributed and expressed in kilograms (kg); |
| --- | --- |

—

the maximum conveyor load should be evenly distributed and expressed in kilograms (kg);

| — | the conveyor height (H) should be expressed in mm. |
| --- | --- |

—

the conveyor height (H) should be expressed in mm.

1.2.   Weight of equipment

The overall weight of the X-ray equipment should be expressed in kilograms (kg). The equipment weight should only consider the X-ray hardware and not include additional elements, such as a conveyer belt.

1.3.   Throughput

The throughput should be expressed as conveyor speed in meter per second (m/s).

1.4.   Power supply and consumption

| — | the power supply of the X-ray equipment should be expressed in voltage of alternating current (VAC) with a tolerance of ± 10 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

the power supply of the X-ray equipment should be expressed in voltage of alternating current (VAC) with a tolerance of ± 10 %;

| — | power consumption should be expressed in kilovolt-ampere (kVA). |
| --- | --- |

—

power consumption should be expressed in kilovolt-ampere (kVA).

1.5.   X-ray generator

| — | the number of generators should be indicated (e.g. single, dual, multi); |
| --- | --- |

—

the number of generators should be indicated (e.g. single, dual, multi);

| — | the anode voltage should be expressed in kilovolt (kV); |
| --- | --- |

—

the anode voltage should be expressed in kilovolt (kV);

| — | the beam current should be expressed in milliampere (mA); |
| --- | --- |

—

the beam current should be expressed in milliampere (mA);

| — | the cooling system should be described (e.g., sealed oil bath with forced air). |
| --- | --- |

—

the cooling system should be described (e.g., sealed oil bath with forced air).

1.6.   IP rating

The IP rating according to IEC 60529 should be reported.

1.7.   Operating environment

| — | operating temperature should be expressed in degree Celsius (°C); |
| --- | --- |

—

operating temperature should be expressed in degree Celsius (°C);

| — | storage temperature should be expressed in degree Celsius (°C); |
| --- | --- |

—

storage temperature should be expressed in degree Celsius (°C);

| — | humidity should be expressed in range in % (non-condensing). |
| --- | --- |

—

humidity should be expressed in range in % (non-condensing).

1.8.   System of conveyance

It should be indicated if the equipment includes a system of conveyance.

1.9.   Threat image projection

It should be indicated if the system is able to provide threat image projection (TIP) functionality.

1.10.   Requirements for CE marking

The equipment should be provided with all relevant documentation to demonstrate compliance with the requirements laid down in the applicable EU legislation that would allow affixing the CE marking. It should be the responsibility of manufacturers to determine which rules apply for their products. Relevant provisions can include, for example:

| — | Directive 2006/42/EC on machinery |
| --- | --- |

—

Directive 2006/42/EC on machinery

| — | Directive 2014/35/EU on low voltage |
| --- | --- |

—

Directive 2014/35/EU on low voltage

| — | Directive 2014/30/EU on electromagnetic compatibility |
| --- | --- |

—

Directive 2014/30/EU on electromagnetic compatibility

1.11.   Radiation leakage

Equipment should be provided with a declaration signed by a legal representative of the manufacturer that it meets all requirements for occupational and public exposure to ionising radiation in accordance with Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom on basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation.

1.12.   Operating instructions (concept of operations)

The system should be provided with operating instructions, also referred to as concept of operations (CONOPS).

2.   
  X-ray Performance Requirements

The X-ray equipment to be used for security-threat detection in public spaces should meet the following performance requirements:

2.1.   Image enhancement functions

The X-ray equipment should have the following functions to enhance the image deployed on the screen:

| — | the capability of at least two times zoom on any part of the image; |
| --- | --- |

—

the capability of at least two times zoom on any part of the image;

| — | video inversion so as to be able to display a monochrome image with white displayed as black, and black displayed as white; |
| --- | --- |

—

video inversion so as to be able to display a monochrome image with white displayed as black, and black displayed as white;

| — | an edge-enhancement feature. |
| --- | --- |

—

an edge-enhancement feature.

Any selected function should reset automatically when the next screened object is shown to the operator.

2.2.   Dark alarms

The X-ray equipment should generate dark alarms when scanned objects cannot be fully penetrated by X-ray.

2.3.   Colour mapping behaviour

The X-ray equipment should differentiate between inorganic and organic materials by displaying them in different colours. The X-ray equipment should have the following image functions to differentiate between inorganic and organic materials:

| — | inorganic function to highlight inorganic materials. |
| --- | --- |

—

inorganic function to highlight inorganic materials.

| — | organic function to highlight organic materials. |
| --- | --- |

—

organic function to highlight organic materials.

The colour mapping behaviour specifications that the X-ray equipment should meet is indicated in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1

Colour mapping behaviour

| Effective atomic number of material | no image function enabled | organic function enabled | inorganic function enabled |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 < Zeff ≤ 10 | orange | orange | none |
| 10 < Zeff ≤ 17 | green | orange | blue/green |
| Zeff > 17 | blue | none | blue |

Effective atomic number of material

no image function enabled

organic function enabled

inorganic function enabled

0 < Zeff ≤ 10

orange

orange

none

10 < Zeff ≤ 17

green

orange

blue/green

Zeff > 17

blue

none

blue

When organic and inorganic material are stacked on top of each other, the X-ray equipment should display the organic material when the organic function is enabled, as indicated in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2

Colour mapping behaviour (stacked organic/inorganic)

| Effective atomic number of material | no image function enabled | organic function enabled | inorganic function enabled |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| organic material under aluminium plate | green | orange | blue/green |
| organic material under steel plate | blue | orange | blue |

Effective atomic number of material

no image function enabled

organic function enabled

inorganic function enabled

organic material under aluminium plate

green

orange

blue/green

organic material under steel plate

blue

orange

blue

2.4.   Image quality tests

The image quality tests for the X-ray equipment should be performed by using the human perception (HP) test piece described in the following international standard:

| — | ASTM F792-17e1, Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray Systems, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, PA, 2017, www.astm.org |
| --- | --- |

—

ASTM F792-17e1, Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray Systems, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, PA, 2017, www.astm.org

The image quality of the X-ray equipment should be assessed by using the following nine tests:

2.4.1.   Test 1: wire display

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify metal wires. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify metal wires.

2.4.2.   Test 2: useful penetration

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to produce an image that allows for the detection, by an operator or algorithm, of wires that are hidden by different thicknesses of blocking material. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to produce an image that allows for the detection, by an operator or algorithm, of wires that are hidden by different thicknesses of blocking material.

2.4.3.   Test 3: spatial resolution

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display closely spaced, high-contrast items as separate. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display closely spaced, high-contrast items as separate.

2.4.4.   Test 4: simple penetration

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify lead numerals that would otherwise be hidden by steel blocking material. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify lead numerals that would otherwise be hidden by steel blocking material.

2.4.5.   Test 5: thin organic imaging

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify thin pieces of organic material. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify thin pieces of organic material.

2.4.6.   Test 6: steel contrast sensitivity

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify shallow circular recesses in steel. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to identify shallow circular recesses in steel.

2.4.7.   Test 7: materials discrimination

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to discriminate between materials with different effective atomic numbers. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to discriminate between materials with different effective atomic numbers.

2.4.8.   Test 8: materials classification

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to consistently identify a particular material over a range of different thicknesses. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to consistently identify a particular material over a range of different thicknesses.

2.4.9.   Test 9: organic differentiation

| — | the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to differentiate between organic materials of different effective atomic numbers. |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability of an X-ray equipment to display images that can be used by an operator to differentiate between organic materials of different effective atomic numbers.

2.5.   Image quality thresholds

With reference to the human perception (HP) test piece in ASTM F792-17e1, the minimum thresholds for each image quality test should be as described in Table 2.3 below. To qualify for a specific standard, the X-ray equipment should reach the respective minimum thresholds for all image quality tests.

Table 2.3

Thresholds for image quality

| | Image quality Test | Standard 1 | Standard 2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | wire display: wire thickness in air | AWG 30
  (0,255 mm) | AWG 34
  (0,160 mm) |
| 2 | useful penetration: wire thickness under aluminium (Al) of specified thickness | AWG 24 (0,511 mm) behind 16 mm Al | AWG 24 (0,511 mm) behind 20 mm Al
  &
  AWG 30 (0,255 mm) behind 12 mm Al |
| 3 | spatial resolution: perpendicular line-pair gauges (4 slots, horizontal & vertical, in 1018, 1010 or 1008 steel) | 2 mm wide slots with 2mm spacing | 1,5 mm wide slots with 1,5 mm spacing |
| 4 | simple penetration: lead numerals (thickness 3,0 ± 0,2 mm) attached to steel of specified thickness; | 24 mm thick steel | 28 mm thick steel |
| 5 | thin organic imaging: steps in polyoxymethylene with thicknesses of 0,25, 0,5, 1, 2 and 5 mm. Each step has holes of 2, 5 and 10 mm diameter. | 4 holes visible (*) | 7 holes visible (*) |
| 6 | steel contrast sensitivity: steel steps with thicknesses of 0,5, 1, 2, and 5 mm. Each step has holes of 2, 5 and 10 mm, all of depth 0,1 mm. | 4 holes visible (*) | 7 holes visible (*) |
| 7 | materials discrimination: a grid of square attenuators (varying amounts of steel & plastic varying effective atomic number and attenuation (**)). | hues of 10 neighbouring squares can be differentiated | hues of 12 neighbouring squares can be differentiated |
| 8 | materials classification: a test that the system consistently identifies a given material over a range of thicknesses (**). | 4 columns are classified as the same material per column | 6 columns are classified as the same material per column |
| 9 | organic differentiation: the observer records if he/she perceives a difference in hue between four different squares (**). | squares 1 through 4 displayed as organic material | squares 1 through 4 displayed as organic material |

Image quality Test

Standard 1

Standard 2

1

wire display: wire thickness in air

AWG 30

(0,255 mm)

AWG 34

(0,160 mm)

2

useful penetration: wire thickness under aluminium (Al) of specified thickness

AWG 24 (0,511 mm) behind 16 mm Al

AWG 24 (0,511 mm) behind 20 mm Al

&

AWG 30 (0,255 mm) behind 12 mm Al

3

spatial resolution: perpendicular line-pair gauges (4 slots, horizontal & vertical, in 1018, 1010 or 1008 steel)

2 mm wide slots with 2mm spacing

1,5 mm wide slots with 1,5 mm spacing

4

simple penetration: lead numerals (thickness 3,0 ± 0,2 mm) attached to steel of specified thickness;

24 mm thick steel

28 mm thick steel

5

thin organic imaging: steps in polyoxymethylene with thicknesses of 0,25, 0,5, 1, 2 and 5 mm. Each step has holes of 2, 5 and 10 mm diameter.

4 holes visible (*)

7 holes visible (*)

6

steel contrast sensitivity: steel steps with thicknesses of 0,5, 1, 2, and 5 mm. Each step has holes of 2, 5 and 10 mm, all of depth 0,1 mm.

4 holes visible (*)

7 holes visible (*)

7

materials discrimination: a grid of square attenuators (varying amounts of steel & plastic varying effective atomic number and attenuation (**)).

hues of 10 neighbouring squares can be differentiated

hues of 12 neighbouring squares can be differentiated

8

materials classification: a test that the system consistently identifies a given material over a range of thicknesses (**).

4 columns are classified as the same material per column

6 columns are classified as the same material per column

9

organic differentiation: the observer records if he/she perceives a difference in hue between four different squares (**).

squares 1 through 4 displayed as organic material

squares 1 through 4 displayed as organic material

---

(*)  A hole is considered visible if it at least half of its area or edge can be discerned.

(**)  See ASTM F792-17e1 for a more detailed description of the human perception test piece.

---

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/71 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/71

---

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2022/1342

of 28 July 2022

on the monitoring of mercury in fish, crustaceans and molluscs

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 22 November 2012, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted an opinion on mercury and methylmercury in food (1). In that opinion, the Authority established a tolerable weekly intake (‘TWI’) for inorganic mercury of 4 μg/kg body weight (‘b.w.’) and for methylmercury of 1,3 μg/kg b.w. (both expressed as mercury) and concluded that the 95th percentile dietary exposure is close to or above the TWI for all age groups. High fish consumers, which might include pregnant women, may exceed the TWI by up to approximately six-fold. Unborn children constitute the most vulnerable group. The opinion concluded that exposure to methylmercury above the TWI is of concern, but advised taking into account the beneficial effects of fish consumption, if measures to reduce methylmercury exposure were considered. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 22 November 2012, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted an opinion on mercury and methylmercury in food (1). In that opinion, the Authority established a tolerable weekly intake (‘TWI’) for inorganic mercury of 4 μg/kg body weight (‘b.w.’) and for methylmercury of 1,3 μg/kg b.w. (both expressed as mercury) and concluded that the 95th percentile dietary exposure is close to or above the TWI for all age groups. High fish consumers, which might include pregnant women, may exceed the TWI by up to approximately six-fold. Unborn children constitute the most vulnerable group. The opinion concluded that exposure to methylmercury above the TWI is of concern, but advised taking into account the beneficial effects of fish consumption, if measures to reduce methylmercury exposure were considered.

| (2) | On 27 June 2014, the Authority adopted an opinion on the health benefits of seafood consumption in relation to the health risks associated with exposure to methylmercury (2). In that opinion, the Authority reviewed the role of seafood in European diets and evaluated the beneficial effects of seafood consumption in relation to health outcomes, including the effects of seafood consumption during pregnancy on functional outcomes of children’s neurodevelopment and the effects of seafood consumption on cardiovascular disease risk in adults. The Authority concluded that consumption of about one to two servings of seafood per week and up to three to four servings per week during pregnancy has been associated with better functional outcomes of neurodevelopment in children compared to no consumption of seafood. Such amounts have also been associated with a lower coronary heart disease mortality in adults. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 27 June 2014, the Authority adopted an opinion on the health benefits of seafood consumption in relation to the health risks associated with exposure to methylmercury (2). In that opinion, the Authority reviewed the role of seafood in European diets and evaluated the beneficial effects of seafood consumption in relation to health outcomes, including the effects of seafood consumption during pregnancy on functional outcomes of children’s neurodevelopment and the effects of seafood consumption on cardiovascular disease risk in adults. The Authority concluded that consumption of about one to two servings of seafood per week and up to three to four servings per week during pregnancy has been associated with better functional outcomes of neurodevelopment in children compared to no consumption of seafood. Such amounts have also been associated with a lower coronary heart disease mortality in adults.

| (3) | On 19 December 2014, the Authority adopted a statement on the benefits of fish/seafood consumption compared to the risks of methylmercury in fish/seafood (3), where it concluded that, to achieve the benefits of fish consumption associated with one to four fish servings per week and to protect against neurodevelopmental toxicity of methylmercury, the consumption of fish/seafood species with a high content of mercury should be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 19 December 2014, the Authority adopted a statement on the benefits of fish/seafood consumption compared to the risks of methylmercury in fish/seafood (3), where it concluded that, to achieve the benefits of fish consumption associated with one to four fish servings per week and to protect against neurodevelopmental toxicity of methylmercury, the consumption of fish/seafood species with a high content of mercury should be limited.

| (4) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006 (4) sets maximum levels for mercury in muscle meat of fish, crustaceans, bivalve molluscs and food supplements. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006 (4) sets maximum levels for mercury in muscle meat of fish, crustaceans, bivalve molluscs and food supplements.

| (5) | As recent occurrence data showed that there was a margin to lower the maximum levels for mercury in various fish species, the maximum levels for those fish species have been lowered by means of Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/617. (5) For other fish species such as shark and swordfish, despite some calls to increase the existing maximum levels, Regulation (EU) 2022/617 has maintaned them in view of the related health concerns, pending a further data collection and scientific assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

As recent occurrence data showed that there was a margin to lower the maximum levels for mercury in various fish species, the maximum levels for those fish species have been lowered by means of Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/617. (5) For other fish species such as shark and swordfish, despite some calls to increase the existing maximum levels, Regulation (EU) 2022/617 has maintaned them in view of the related health concerns, pending a further data collection and scientific assessment.

| (6) | Therefore, and in order to obtain detailed data on the effective impact of the lowered maximum levels for certain fish species on the overall consumer exposure to mercury, it is advisable that Member States report to the Authority on the occurrence of mercury in all fish species for both farmed and wild caught products from different production types. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Therefore, and in order to obtain detailed data on the effective impact of the lowered maximum levels for certain fish species on the overall consumer exposure to mercury, it is advisable that Member States report to the Authority on the occurrence of mercury in all fish species for both farmed and wild caught products from different production types.

| (7) | Furthermore, so far, most occurrence data are available for total mercury. As methylmercury is more toxic than inorganic mercury, occurrence data for both methylmercury and total mercury in the samples should be reported to help to calculate the ratio of methylmercury on total mercury in specific fish species. This would help to refine the exposure and risk assessments for mercury in food. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Furthermore, so far, most occurrence data are available for total mercury. As methylmercury is more toxic than inorganic mercury, occurrence data for both methylmercury and total mercury in the samples should be reported to help to calculate the ratio of methylmercury on total mercury in specific fish species. This would help to refine the exposure and risk assessments for mercury in food.

| (8) | Consumption advice for fish is an important risk management instrument in view of fully achieving the beneficial effects of fish consumption, whilst limiting the risks of mercury toxicity. However, the exposure data for specific fish species in the 2012 Authority opinion suggest a lack of knowledge or respect by consumers of the available consumption advice. It is therefore useful to recommend the development of national consumption advice by Member State competent authorities as well as an active communication of such an advice, leading to an increased awareness of such consumption advice. Due to the wide variety in fish species consumed across the Union, Member States should tailor consumption advice, taking into consideration their national pattern of fish consumption, especially the species of fish consumed. In the distribution of this national food consumption advice, Member States competent authorities should be assisted by all involved parties such as food business operators, relevant health care workers, universities, consumer organisations and other interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Consumption advice for fish is an important risk management instrument in view of fully achieving the beneficial effects of fish consumption, whilst limiting the risks of mercury toxicity. However, the exposure data for specific fish species in the 2012 Authority opinion suggest a lack of knowledge or respect by consumers of the available consumption advice. It is therefore useful to recommend the development of national consumption advice by Member State competent authorities as well as an active communication of such an advice, leading to an increased awareness of such consumption advice. Due to the wide variety in fish species consumed across the Union, Member States should tailor consumption advice, taking into consideration their national pattern of fish consumption, especially the species of fish consumed. In the distribution of this national food consumption advice, Member States competent authorities should be assisted by all involved parties such as food business operators, relevant health care workers, universities, consumer organisations and other interested parties.

| (9) | In order to assess the impact of the consumption advice for fish on the consumer exposure, the Authority should carry out a survey on the effectiveness of the Member States’ consumption advice. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In order to assess the impact of the consumption advice for fish on the consumer exposure, the Authority should carry out a survey on the effectiveness of the Member States’ consumption advice.

| (10) | The collected occurrence data for mercury and the information on the effectiveness of the consumption advice will help to refine the consumer exposure assessment, which is needed for a future update of the consumer risk assessment for mercury. These assessments will allow to evaluate whether it might be appropriate to revise the maximum level for mercury in certain fish species. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The collected occurrence data for mercury and the information on the effectiveness of the consumption advice will help to refine the consumer exposure assessment, which is needed for a future update of the consumer risk assessment for mercury. These assessments will allow to evaluate whether it might be appropriate to revise the maximum level for mercury in certain fish species.

HEREBY RECOMMENDS:

| 1. | Member States should perform during the years 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 monitoring on the presence of methylmercury and total mercury in fish, crustaceans and molluscs. The monitoring should include a wide variety of fish-, crustacean- and mollusc species and should reflect consumption habits, in order to enable an accurate estimation of the consumer exposure to mercury. Data should be gathered for both farmed and wild caught products. |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Member States should develop specific national consumption advice related to the consumption of fish, crustaceans and molluscs to fully achieve the beneficial effects of fish and seafood consumption, whilst limiting the risks of mercury toxicity. When developing this consumption advice, Member States should especially advise on the frequency of the consumption of fish, crustaceans and molluscs and the species consumed. |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Member States, food business operators and other interested parties should communicate on a continuous basis the specific national consumption advice to the consumer as well as to relevant health care workers, working with the consumer groups most at risk. |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Member States should inform the Commission and the Authority of their specific national consumption advice. |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Member States should inform the Commission of their actions to communicate the national consumption advice to consumers and relevant health care workers. |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Member States and food business operators should report on a regular basis to the Authority on the occurrence of total mercury and methylmercury in various fish, crustacean and mollusc species, with the information and in the electronic reporting format as set out by the Authority. When reporting the data, they should pay particular attention to specify the production type (wild, gathered or hunted versus farmed non organic production or farmed organic production). |
| --- | --- |

6.

Done at Brussels, 28 July 2022.

For the Commission

Stella KYRIAKIDES

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  EFSA Panel on Contaminants in the Food Chain (CONTAM); Scientific Opinion on the risk for public health related to the presence of mercury and methylmercury in food. EFSA Journal 2012;10(12):2985.

1

(2)  EFSA NDA Panel (EFSA Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies), 2014. Scientific Opinion on health benefits of seafood (fish and shellfish) consumption in relation to health risks associated with exposure to methylmercury. EFSA Journal 2014;12(7):3761.

2

(3)  EFSA Scientific Committee, 2015. Statement on the benefits of fish/seafood consumption compared to the risks of methylmercury in fish/seafood. EFSA Journal 2015;13(1):3982.

3

(4)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006 of 19 December 2006 setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs (OJ L 364, 20.12.2006, p. 5).

4

(5)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/617 of 12 April 2022 amending Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006 as regards maximum levels of mercury in fish and salt (OJ L 115, 13.4.2022, p. 60).

5

---

Corrigenda

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 201/74 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 201/74

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Corrigendum to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1096 of 30 June 2022 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Korea to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 176 of 1 July 2022
  )

On page 65, in recital 4:

for:

| ‘(4) | The Republic of Korea also informed the Commission that, there are currently no travel restrictions related to COVID-19 for entry and stay into the Republic of Korea. Should there be a need to re-introduce travel requirements, the Republic of Korea confirms that it would accept vaccination and test certificates issued by the Member States and EEA countries in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953. Concerning the vaccination certificates, the Republic of Korea informed the Commission that certificates indicating vaccines with EU-wide authorisation will only be accepted if the vaccine has completed the WHO Emergency Use Listing procedure. Concerning the recognition of the recovery certificates in particular, in case of need to re-introduce travel restrictions, the Republic of Korea confirms that it would not recognise them.’; |
| --- | --- |

‘(4)

read:

| ‘(4) | The Republic of Korea also informed the Commission that it would accept vaccination and test certificates issued by the Member States and countries of the European Economic Area in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 under the same conditions as its own certificates. However, the Republic of Korea informed the Commission that, due to the epidemiological situation, it currently required tests for all incoming travellers. Concerning the vaccination certificates, the Republic of Korea informed the Commission that certificates indicating vaccines with Union-wide authorisation would only be accepted if the vaccine has completed the WHO Emergency Use Listing procedure. Finally, the Republic of Korea informed the Commission that it did not accept certificates of recovery.’. |
| --- | --- |

‘(4)

---