IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

PLAINTIFF, §

 §

V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-995-S-BK

 §

$31,480 IN U.S. CURRENCY, §

DEFENDANT IN REM. §

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the district judge’s referral order, Doc. 12, the Court 

now considers the United States’ Motion for Default Judgment and Final Judgment of Forfeiture. 

Doc. 11. The requisites for default judgment having been satisfied in this case, the motion should

be GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The United States of America (“the Government”), initiated this action against the in rem

Defendant in May 2022, seeking forfeiture of Defendant property (the “Property”), which was 

seized at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport from Dajon Anthony West (“West”) in the 

course of a drug-trafficking investigation. Doc. 1 at 1-3. The Government then served notice by 

publication to potential claimants regarding the impending forfeiture of the Property on an official 

federal government website for 30 consecutive days, commencing on May 5, 2022. Doc. 6. 

Additionally, the Government sent notice of the forfeiture action and a copy of its Verified 

Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem (the “Complaint”) to West and to his attorney, receipt of which 

was verified via tracking numbers. Doc. 7-1 at 5-13. 

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West did not file a claim for the Property. Doc. 7-1 at 3 (Decl. of Travis K. Elder). After 

both the direct notice and publication notice deadlines expired, the Clerk entered a default on the 

Government’s request against “West and all other persons and entities for failure to plead, file a 

claim, answer, or otherwise defend this action.” Doc. 7 at 1; Doc. 10. The Government then filed 

the instant motion seeking a default judgment against West and all other potential claimants to the 

Property as well as a final judgment of forfeiture. Doc. 11.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Rule 55 

The conditions under which default may be entered against a party, as well as the 

procedure to seek the entry of default judgment, are found in Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The entry of default judgment is the culmination of three events: (1) default, which 

occurs when a defendant has failed to timely plead or otherwise respond to the complaint; (2) entry 

of default by the clerk of court when such default is established by affidavit or otherwise; and (3) 

application by the plaintiff for a default judgment after the entry of default. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a); 

N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Standing alone, however, a defendant’s default does not entitle a plaintiff to a default 

judgment. Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Nishimatsu Constr. Co. 

v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). A court should first consider whether 

such entry is procedurally warranted. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 

1998). Factors relevant to this inquiry include: (1) whether there are material issues of fact; (2) 

whether the defendant has been substantially prejudiced; (3) whether the movant has shown that 

the grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether the defendant’s default was caused by 

excusable neglect or a good faith mistake; (5) the “harshness” of a default judgment under the

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circumstances; and (6) whether the court would feel obligated to set aside a default on the 

defendant’s motion. Id.

The decision to grant a default judgment is one soundly within the district court’s 

discretion. Lewis, 236 F. 3d at 767. “[D]efault judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the 

Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Id. (quoting Sun Bank of 

Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Assoc., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)). There must be a 

sufficient basis in the pleadings for a court to enter judgment by default. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 

515 F.2d at 1206. Defendants, by virtue of having a default entered against them, are deemed to 

have admitted the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and are precluded from contesting the 

established facts. Id. (citations omitted).

B. Supplemental Rule G for Asset Forfeiture Actions

A court may enter a judgment of forfeiture “only if the government has published notice of 

the action within a reasonable time after filing the complaint or at a time the court orders.” FED. R.

CIV. P. SUPP. R. G(4)(a)(i).1 The Government can publish such notice by posting it on an official 

internet government forfeiture website for at least 30 consecutive days. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. 

R. G(4)(a)(iv). Further, “[t]he government must send notice of the action and a copy of the 

complaint to any person who reasonably appears to be a potential claimant on the facts known to 

the government . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. G(4)(b)(i). Notice sent to such potential claimants 

must include (1) the date on which the notice is sent; (2) a deadline for filing a claim, which must 

be at least 35 days after the notice is sent; (3) notice that an answer or motion under Rule 12 must 

1Citation is to the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture 

Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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be filed no later than 21 days after filing a claim; and (4) the name of the government attorney the 

claimant should serve with his claim and answer. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP R. G(4)(b)(ii).

Two provisions govern deadlines for potential claimants who did not receive direct notice 

of the forfeiture action to file a claim to the property: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) sets the 

deadline as “no later than 30 days after the date of final publication of notice of the filing of the 

complaint,” and (2) Rule G(5)(a)(ii)(B) sets the deadline as “no later than 30 days after final 

publication of . . . notice . . . or no later than 60 days after the first day of publication on an official 

internet government forfeiture site.” For potential claimants who did receive notice of the 

forfeiture action to file a claim to the property, two provisions govern deadlines: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 

983(a)(4)(A) establishes the deadline as “not later than 30 days after the date of service of the 

government’s complaint,” and (2) Rules G(5)(a)(ii)(A) and G(4)(b)(ii)(B) allow the Government to 

set the deadline in the notice for a day that is “at least 35 days after the notice is sent.”

Relevant here, a civil forfeiture complaint must 

(a) be verified; (b) state the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction 

over the defendant property, and venue; (c) describe the property with reasonable 

particularity; . . . (e) identify the statute under which the forfeiture action is brought; 

and (f) state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the 

government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.

FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP R. G(2). In particular, “the complaint shall state the circumstances from 

which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will be able, without 

moving for a more definite statement, to commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a 

responsive pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP R. E(2)(a).

“Rule E(2)(a) imposes a substantive pleading requirement” and requires the Government to 

“do more than simply provide greater detail than it otherwise would be required to do under Rule 8 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” United States v. $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d 371, 376 

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n.8 (5th Cir. 2003). Although the Government need not prove the elements of its case at the 

pleading stage, it “must allege facts supporting a reasonable belief that it will be able to bear its 

burden at trial.” Id. Where parties with an interest in property at issue in a forfeiture procedure 

fail to timely file an answer or claim to the property, and the Government makes the required 

showing, default against such parties is proper. See United States v. One 1978 Piper Navajo PA31 Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by granting a default judgment in an action for forfeiture in rem where no claim or 

responsive pleading was filed).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Default Judgment is Procedurally Warranted

The Government has shown that no potential claimants have filed claims to the Property 

and the deadline to file such claims has passed. As discussed above, individuals who did not 

receive direct notice must file claims by either 30 days from the final date of publication of the 

notice or 60 days after the first day of publication. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A); FED. R. CIV. P.

SUPP. AMC G(5)(a)(ii)(B). Here, the 30-day publication period commenced on May 5, 2022, 

meaning that parties who did not receive direct notice needed to file a claim by June 4, 

2022. See Doc. 6.

The Government also directly notified West by sending notice of the forfeiture action to 

him and to his attorney on May 4, 2022. Doc. 7-1 at 5, 8. The notices included the deadlines, 

applicable procedures, and the name of the Government attorney on whom West should serve a 

claim and answer. West thus had until June 3, 2022 to file a claim but has not done so to date. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A). Because the deadlines for potential claimants who were indirectly 

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or directly notified have passed and no individuals have filed claims, West and all other potential 

claimants to the Property are in default.

Additionally, the factors identified in Lindsey support granting default judgment. Lindsey, 

161 F.3d at 893. The Government has clearly established the grounds for default by showing that 

no potential claimant has filed a claim, answered, or otherwise appeared despite direct notice to 

West, who reasonably appeared to be a potential claimant, and published notice of this case. 

Because no potential claimants filed a claim to the Property, there are no material facts in 

dispute. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206 (“The defendant, by his default, admits the 

Government's well pleaded allegations of fact”). There is no evidence to suggest that any 

claimant’s failure to file a claim or otherwise appear is the result of a good faith mistake or 

excusable neglect. Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. All potential claimants have had ample time to file 

a claim, and their failure to do so mitigates the harshness of a default judgment. Id. Finally, the 

record contains no facts which indicate the Court would be obligated to set aside the default, if 

challenged. Id. Accordingly, a default judgment is procedurally warranted.

B. Sufficient Basis for Entry of Default Judgment

In addition to demonstrating that a default judgment is procedurally warranted, the 

Complaint meets the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule G(2) 

and pleads sufficient facts supporting entry of default judgment. In particular, the Complaint 

states the grounds for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the case, for in rem jurisdiction 

over the property, and for venue in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of 

Texas. See Doc. 1 at 2. Further, the Complaint describes the Property with reasonable 

particularity. Doc. 1 at 4-10. The Complaint additionally identifies the statutes under which 

forfeiture is sought, namely 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 881, and 18 U.S.C. § 

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1952. Doc. 1 at 1. Finally, the Complaint contains facts indicating that the Government will be 

able to meet its burden of proof at trial. Doc. 1 at 6.

Specifically, the well-pleaded allegations of Complaint establish that a drug interdiction 

officer, Deputy D. Starks (“Starks”), approached West on the jet bridge of a flight found for Los 

Angeles International Airport, which is in a known source state for marijuana as well as narcotic 

trafficking activity. Doc. 1 at 4. West consented to a search of his carry-on bag and, while 

conducting the search, Starks saw a blue bank bag in West’s jacket pocket. Doc. 1 at 4. When 

Starks questioned West about what was in his pocket, West became nervous and changed his 

story about what was in his pocket and in the bank bag. Doc. 1 at 4-5. Although West said he did 

not use drugs, a certified narcotics odor detection canine gave a positive alert for the presence of 

the odor of narcotics on or about West’s luggage at which point West admitted that he had 

recently smoked marijuana. Doc. 1 at 5. The canine subsequently alerted for the presence of an 

odor of narcotics on or about the currency in West’s bank bag. Doc. 1 at 6.

West gave differing accounts about the source of the money, first saying it had been 

withdrawn from a bank and then that he had received the cash from his dog breeding broker. 

Doc. 1 at 6. At that point, a different drug task force officer seized the currency as well as West’s 

phone — which West attempted to break in the process — based on probable cause that the phone 

contained evidence of illegal drug trafficking. Doc. 1 at 6-7. A search of the phone and West’s 

social media accounts subsequently revealed substantial activity relating to marijuana trafficking, 

including posts, text messages, pictures, and videos. Doc. 1 at 8-10. Upon consideration of these 

facts, the Government has presented the Court with a sufficient basis on which to grant a default 

judgment against West and all other potential claimants on its claim for forfeiture of the Property. 

Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ Motion for Default Judgment and Final 

Judgment of Forfeiture, Doc. 11, should be GRANTED, and the Court should enter the 

Government’s proposed Default Judgment and Final Judgment of Forfeiture, Doc. 11-1 at 1-2.

SO RECOMMENDED on October 6, 2022.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written 

objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). An objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996), modified by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 

days).

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