* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-20635

RAYMOND TORRES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION

Respondent-Appellee,

Appeal from the decision of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-88-CV-1960)

February 1, 1999

Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM: *

On March 16, 1977, a jury found Raymond Torres guilty of

murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. His conviction was

affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Following three

state habeas petitions, Torres filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application

in federal district court. On May 22, 1991, a magistrate judge

issued a memorandum recommending that the petition be dismissed.

On July 1, 1991, the district court adopted the recommendation and

dismissed the action.

Nearly six years later, Torres filed a Fed. R. Civ. P.1 In the district court, the appellant arguably cited only

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) in support of his request for relief. His

mot ion, filed outside the one year period of limitations for

pursuing relief based on excusable neglect, was untimely. S ee Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b). However, construing the p ro se motion liberally,

this court will consider the pleading a request for general relief

under Rule 60(b). See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92

S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1974) (interpreting pro se litigant’s pleadings

liberally).

2 60(b) motion for relief from the final judgment. 1 Torres argued

that the district court clerk’s office had failed to notify him

when the judgment was entered, even thou gh he had, allegedly,

meticulously apprised the clerk of his changing add resses. The

district court denied Rule 60(b) relief. By filing a timely motion

for certificate of appealability, Torres perfected his appeal from

the district court’s decision. S ee Stevens v. Heard

, 674 F.2d 320,

322 (5th Cir. 1982). The appellant requests that this court

reverse the district court and grant “leave to appeal from the

final judgment entered on July 1, 1991.” We affirm.

We review the distric t court’s decision not to grant

relief under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. S ee Browder v.

Director

, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7, 98 S. Ct. 556, 560 n.7 (1978);

Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc. , 151 F.3d 465, 470 (5th

Cir. 1998). While Torres also challenges the district court’s

denial of his habeas petition, this court will not review the

u nderlying merits of an action in an appeal from the denial of

relief under Rule 60(b). See id. (“A timely appeal from a ruling

on a Rule 60(b) motion may be taken under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5),

although the court of appeals may review the ruling only for abuse

of discretion and although the appeal does not bring up the2 In Tubbs v. Campbell

, 731 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (5th Cir.

1984), this court granted Rule 60(b)( 6) relief when the clerk’s

office affirmatively mislead an appellant regarding the status of

his case. The petitioner has neither alleged such conduct nor

would the record support such a finding. Aside from making

intermittent req uests for the docket number of his action and

providing various updates with respect to his address es, the

petitioner in this case did nothing more than rely on the clerk to

give notice of the entry of judgment

-- an insufficient showing to

warrant relief. See L atham

, 987 F.2d at 1205. In fact, from

October 13, 1993, until February 5, 1997, the petitioner does not

allege that he made any inquiries regarding the status of his case.

3 underlying judgment for review.” (internal punctuation and citation

omitted)).

Finding no abuse of dis cretion, we affirm the district

court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b). First, this circuit has

consistently refused to grant Rule 60(b) relief for the sole

purpose of allowing an appellant to perfect a timely appeal

-- the

exact relief sought by Torres. See Lancaster v. Presley , 35 F.3d

229, 231 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[The] petition violates a fundamental

tenet of this Circuit’s construction of Rule 60(b), i.e., Rule

60(b) cannot be used to extend the time to appeal.”). Moreover,

even if the appellant’s allegatio ns concerning his dealings with

the district court clerk’s office are accurate, the clerk’s failure

to notify a party of the entry of a final judgment, without more, 2

does not entitle a party to Rule 60(b) rel ief from the strict

language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d). S ee Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A.

, 987 F.2d 1199, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Wilson v.

Atwood Group

, 725 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). As this

court noted in Latham

, “Following Wilso n , we have consistently

rejected the use of Rule 60(b) to provide relief for parties4

complaining of lack of notice.” L atham

, 987 F.2d at 1205; see also

Lancaster

, 35 F.3d at 231-32. Torres could have filed written

requests with the district court or the district court clerk’s

office in order to document his need for information regarding the

status of his case.

AFFIRMED

.