J-A16007-14 

2014 PA Super 181 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

JOAN ORIE MELVIN, :

:

 Appellant : No. 844 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 7, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0009885-2012 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

JOAN ORIE MELVIN, :

:

 Appellant : No. 1974 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order November 15, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0009885-2012 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2014 

Here we decide two appeals by Appellant, Joan Orie Melvin (“Orie 

Melvin”), a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. First, at 

docket number 844 WDA 2013, Orie Melvin appeals from the judgment of 

sentence following her convictions of three counts of theft of services, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3926(b), and one count each for conspiracy to commit theft of 
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services, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a), misapplication of entrusted property, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4113(a), and conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate evidence, 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence except that we eliminate the condition that the letters of 

apology to the members of the Pennsylvania judiciary be written on a 

photograph of Orie Melvin in handcuffs. 

Second, at docket number 1974 WDA 2013, Orie Melvin appeals the 

trial court’s sua sponte order dated November 15, 2013 staying her criminal 

sentence in its entirety. On this second appeal, we reverse the trial court’s 

order staying Orie Melvin’s criminal sentence and reinstate the sentence set 

forth in the written sentencing order dated May 7, 2013, as modified by the 

written order of the trial court on May 14, 2013 with the exception that the 

condition that the letters of apology to the members of the Pennsylvania 

Judiciary be written on a photograph of Orie Melvin in handcuffs is 

eliminated. 

In 1990, Orie Melvin was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, and in 1991 she was elected to serve a 

full term on that court. In 1997, she was elected as a judge on the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and she won a retention election for her 

seat on this Court in 2007. In 2003, Orie Melvin ran, unsuccessfully, for a 

seat as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In 2009, she ran 

for this position again and won a 10-year term. 
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On May 18, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a nine-count criminal 

complaint against Orie Melvin, alleging, inter alia, that she illegally used her 

judicial staff as well as the legislative staff of her sister, former State 

Senator Jane Clare Orie (“Jane Orie”), in connection with her 2003 and 

2009 campaigns for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. At a preliminary 

hearing on July 30-31, 2012, the magisterial district judge dismissed two 

counts (official oppression and solicitation to tamper with evidence).1

 On 

August 14, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a seven-count information 

charging Orie Melvin with three counts of theft of services (Counts 1-3), 

conspiracy to commit theft of services (Count 4), misapplication of 

entrusted property (Count 5), official oppression (Count 6), and conspiracy 

to tamper with or fabricate evidence (Count 7). Information, 8/14/2012, at 

1-3. 

A jury trial began on January 24, 2013, and on February 21, 2013, 

the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts except for Count 6, on which 

it advised the trial court that it could not reach a unanimous verdict. On 

May 7, 2013, the trial court sentenced Orie Melvin on Count 1 to county 

intermediate punishment (house arrest) for a maximum period of three 

 

1

 The magisterial district judge dismissed the count for official oppression 

relating to Jamie Pavlot (“Pavlot”), Jane Orie’s former Chief of Staff, but 

held over for trial the count (Count 6) for official oppression relating to Lisa 

Sasinoski (“Sasinoski”), Orie Melvin’s former Chief Law Clerk. In addition, 

the magisterial district judge dismissed the count for soliciting Pavlot to 

tamper with evidence, but held over for trial the count (Count 7) for 

conspiracy with Pavlot and Jane Orie to tamper with evidence. 
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years, with the following conditions: that she be approved for release to 

attend church services, that she volunteer in a soup kitchen three times per 

week, pay a $15,000 fine, and comply with DNA registration. The trial 

court imposed identical sentences with respect to Counts 3 and 4, and while 

not expressly stating that the sentences for Counts 1, 3, and 4 were to run 

concurrently, so indicated by ruling that all three would commence at the 

same time (the date of sentencing, May 7, 2013). With respect to Counts 5 

and 7, the trial court imposed terms of two years of probation and $5,000 

fines. The trial court imposed no penalty on the conviction under Count 2. 

The trial court incorporated all of these terms in a written sentencing 

order dated May 7, 2013. Order of Sentence, 5/7/2013, at 1-3. Not set 

forth in this written sentencing order, but as described in the transcript of 

the May 7, 2013 sentencing hearing, the trial court purported to impose 

additional conditions on Orie Melvin, including that she was removed from 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and could not use the term “Justice” 

while on house arrest and probation. N.T., 5/7/2013, at 63-64. The trial 

court also instructed Orie Melvin that she would be required to write letters 

of apology to everyone on her judicial staff that did illegal work for her 

benefit at her behest. Id. at 63. Finally, the trial court directed Orie Melvin 

to pose in handcuffs for a photograph taken by the court photographer, on 

the front of which she would be compelled to write an apology, to be sent to 

every common pleas court and intermediate appellate court judge in 
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Pennsylvania as well as the Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 

Id. at 64-65. 

At a subsequent sentencing hearing on May 14, 2013, the trial court 

modified certain terms of Orie Melvin’s sentence. Specifically, the trial court 

modified the sentences for Counts 1, 3, and 4 to provide that each count 

would carry a one-year term of county intermediate punishment plus a 

$15,000 fine, and that these three sentences would run consecutively to 

each other. N.T., 5/14/2013, at 3. With respect to the sentences on 

Counts 5 and 7, the trial court clarified that the two-year terms of probation 

for these counts would run concurrently with each other, and consecutively 

to the sentences on Counts 1, 3, and 4. Id. These modifications to Orie 

Melvin’s sentence, along with other terms of the sentence announced by the 

trial court on May 7, 2013 (including the writing of both types of apology 

letters), were subsequently set forth first in a written Amended Order of 

Sentence and later in a written Corrected Amended Order of Sentence.2

 

2

 Inexplicably, all three sentencing orders are dated May 7, 2013, even 

though the Amended Order of Sentence and the Corrected Amended Order 

of Sentence both contain terms that were not announced by the trial court 

until May 14, 2013. A notation at the bottom right-hand corner of these 

two orders reflects that they were printed on May 15, 2013 and May 17, 

2013, respectively. In addition, all three sentencing orders were filed at the 

same docket entry (“#85 05/07/2013 Order – Sentence/Penalty 

Imposed”). Orie Melvin’s Reproduced Record contains only the original 

Order of Sentence (R. 7714a-15a), but does not contain either Amended 

Order of Sentence or the Corrected Amended Order of Sentence. The 

Commonwealth did not attempt to supplement the reproduced record to 

add these two sentencing orders. 
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On May 20, 2013, Orie Melvin filed a notice of appeal from the 

judgment of sentence at docket number 844 WDA 2013. 

Orie Melvin did not write or send letters of apology as demanded by 

the trial court at the sentencing hearing on May 7, 2013, and in response, 

the trial court scheduled a violation of probation hearing for October 15, 

2013. On September 27, 2013, Orie Melvin applied to this Court for a stay 

of the requirement that she write apology letters because to do so would 

violate her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. By Opinion dated 

November 6, 2013, this Court granted the requested stay, indicating that it 

would remain in effect “until such time as her direct appeal in this Court has 

been decided.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 79 A.3d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). In its Opinion granting the stay, this Court further indicated 

that it took no position regarding the merits of any of the issues raised by 

Orie Melvin on appeal. Id. Finally, this Court rejected the Commonwealth’s 

request to remand the case to the trial court immediately for resentencing 

because a stay would disrupt the trial court’s sentencing scheme. Id. at 

1204-05. 

Despite this Court’s express finding that “the grant of the Application 

for Stay does not disrupt the trial court’s sentencing scheme,” on November 

14, 2013 the trial court, on its own initiative, convened a “hearing on 

adjustments” to Orie Melvin’s sentence, at which it concluded that this 

Court’s stay of the apology letters did disrupt its sentencing scheme: 
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Now, my problem now is there seems to be, and I 

may well be overly sensitive about this, but the 

opinion I have here from the Superior Court, there 

seems to be little question as to whether or not this 

is a sentencing scheme. This is a sentencing 

scheme. There were several parts to the sentence. 

Your client, [Orie Melvin], was placed on house 

arrest for a certain period of time. She was ordered 

to pay certain fines. And she was ordered to do 

certain things while she was part of house arrest. 

Apparently, she likes all of that except one of the 

things I asked her to do. This is Column A, this isn’t 

Column B, Mr. Casey. This is one sentence. It’s all 

the same. And because of that, and because, to be 

honest with you – I read the opinion by the Superior

Court and it was thought provoking. I would hate to

think that the Superior Court – well, not hate to 

think. Well, yeah. If the Superior Court tells me 

that it’s a violation of her Fifth Amendment, it may 

well be. That would ruin the sentencing scheme. 

And the thought of your client serving house arrest 

and going to the soup kitchen and doing everything 

I told her to do, on a sentence which just was 

invalid, is not just. 

So what I’m going to do today is I’m going to grant 

the supersedeas of the whole sentence, tell the 

Probation Department to cut off the bracelet and 

take the equipment out of the house. So that 

everybody understands this is one sentence. 

N.T., 11/14/2013, at 4-5. On November 15, 2013, over Orie Melvin’s 

objection that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so, the trial court 

issued an order staying her sentence in its entirety. 

On December 13, 2013, Orie Melvin filed a notice of appeal from the 

trial court’s November 15, 2013 order at docket number 1974 WDA 2013. 
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In the appeal at docket number 844 WDA 2013, Orie Melvin raises 

fifteen issues for our consideration and determination:

I. Whether the criminal charges against Orie Melvin 

are unconstitutional because they infringe upon the 

Judiciary’s exclusive power to supervise the courts 

under Article 5, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution? 

II. Whether it violated due process to base criminal 

charges on alleged violations of an internal court 

rule governing conduct by court employees? 

III. Whether the warrant authorizing the seizure of Orie 

Melvin’s entire private email account was 

unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution? 

IV. Whether it was error to decline to appoint an out-ofcounty judge to preside over this matter involving 

Orie Melvin who is a former member of the 

Allegheny County bench and where a key 

prosecution witness is the wife of a sitting Allegheny 

County judge? 

V. Whether the extension of the statue [sic] of 

limitations for ‘public officers or employees’ in 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(c) applies to ‘Judicial officers’ like 

Orie Melvin? 

VI. Whether the criminal charges against Orie Melvin 

should have been dismissed with prejudice as a 

sanction for the prosecutor’s knowing introduction of 

false evidence and subornation of perjury? 

VII. Whether the case against Orie Melvin was properly

joined with the cases against her sister, Janine Orie, 

where the charges are factually inconsistent and 

each faces charges not filed against the other? 
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VIII. Whether Orie Melvin had the right to have her

expert examine original electronic evidence seized 

by the District Attorney from the office of former 

State Senator Jane Orie? 

IX. Whether Orie Melvin had the right to have her 

expert examine original electronic evidence in the 

possession of the Superior Court which was 

searched at the request of the District Attorney? 

X. Whether Orie Melvin’s request for habeas corpus

relief should have been granted as a result of the 

Commonwealth’s failure to make out a prima facie

case on the theft of services, misapplication of 

government property and conspiracy charges at the 

preliminary hearing? 

XI. Whether the trial court erred in excluding relevant 

evidence relating to the productivity of Orie Melvin’s 

judicial chambers as a means of negating the theft 

or diversion element of the theft of services 

charges? 

XII. Whether the trial court deprived Orie Melvin of a fair 

trial by offering personal opinions and improperly 

commenting on the evidence in front of the jury? 

XIII. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the 

evidence at trial was sufficient to support a 

conviction for theft of services, misapplication of 

government property and conspiracy? 

XIV. Whether it was error for the trial court to instruct 

the jury on the issue of accomplice liability after the 

jury started deliberations? 

XV. Whether the trial court erred constitutionally, legally 

and procedurally in attempting to require Orie 

Melvin to write letters of apology as part of her 

criminal sentence while she continues to maintain 

her innocence? 

Orie Melvin’s Brief at 5-8. 
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In the appeal at docket number 1974 WDA 2013, Orie Melvin raises 

the following two issues for our review: 

I. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction and 

authority to sua sponte suspend Orie Melvin’s entire 

sentence while all conditions of county intermediate 

punishment were satisfied and while Orie Melvin’s 

direct appeal was pending in this Court? 

II. Whether the trial court violated Orie Melvin’s rights 

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution by sua sponte

staying her criminal sentence after jeopardy 

attached? 

Orie Melvin’s Brief at 2-3. 

I. TRIAL AND SENTENCING CLAIMS 

A. The Charges and Separation of Powers Doctrine 

For her first two issues on appeal at docket number 844 WDA 2013, 

Orie Melvin contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing the charges 

against her because they amounted to nothing more than an 

unconstitutional attempt to criminalize non-criminal, court-imposed 

restrictions on the political activity of judicial employees. According to Orie 

Melvin, the power to discipline members of the judiciary is the exclusive 

province of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and that as a result, her 

convictions for theft of services, conspiracy to commit theft of services, and 
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misapplication of entrusted property must be dismissed.3

 Orie Melvin 

further argues that because the Supreme Court’s rule against political 

activity by court employees does not specify any criminal sanctions for its 

violation, and because no criminal statute prohibits political conduct by 

court employees, she had no notice that political activity by members of her 

staff could result in criminal prosecution. 

The notion of the inherent power of the judiciary is implicit in the 

doctrine of separation of powers. The separation of powers doctrine 

provides that “the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are 

independent, co-equal branches of government.” Beckert v. Warren, 439 

A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1981). The dividing lines among the three branches 

“are sometimes indistinct and are probably incapable of any precise 

definition.” Stander v. Kelly, 250 A.2d 474, 482 (Pa. 1969) (plurality). 

“Under the principle of separation of the powers of government, ... no 

branch should exercise the functions exclusively committed to another 

branch.” Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 706 (Pa. 1977). 

The Supreme Court’s authority to regulate the courts and the 

members of the judiciary is set forth in Article V, Section 10 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution: 

 

3

 In this regard, Orie Melvin makes no mention of her conviction of 

conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate evidence (Count 7), and thus 

presumably does not contend that this conviction should be dismissed on 

this basis. 
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(a) The Supreme Court shall exercise general 

supervisory and administrative authority over all the 

courts and justices of the peace, including authority 

to temporarily assign judges and justices of the 

peace from one court or district to another as it 

deems appropriate. 

 * * * 

(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to 

prescribe general rules governing practice, 

procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of 

the peace and all officers serving process or 

enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court 

or justice of the peace, including ... the 

administration of all courts and supervision of all 

officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are 

consistent with this Constitution and neither 

abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights 

of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General

Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court 

or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any 

statute of limitation or repose. All laws shall be 

suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent 

with rules prescribed under these provisions. 

PA. CONST. art. V, § 10. 

Pursuant to the authority conferred by these constitutional provisions, 

the Supreme Court established the Code of Judicial Conduct to regulate the 

activity of judges, and also issued an order dated November 24, 1998 

prohibiting political activity by court employees (hereinafter, the “1998 

Supreme Court Order”). Based upon these enactments, Orie Melvin 

contends that the criminal charges against her infringed upon the Supreme 

Court’s exclusive power to regulate the courts of this Commonwealth. Orie 
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Melvin’s Brief at 17-18. In support of this argument, Orie Melvin directs our 

attention to three Supreme Court decisions. 

In Commonwealth v. Stern, 701 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1997), the Supreme 

Court affirmed a trial court’s order declaring unconstitutional a statute 

prohibiting the payment by lawyers of referral fees to non-lawyers. Id. at 

569. The Supreme Court had already adopted a provision in the Rules of 

Professional Conduct and the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement prohibiting 

lawyers from paying referral fees to non-lawyers, and thus the Supreme 

Court ruled that the statute passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature 

infringed upon its exclusive authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys 

practicing in the Commonwealth. Id. at 573. 

Similarly, in In re Dobson, 534 A.2d 460 (Pa. 1987), the Supreme 

Court rejected petitions for relief by court-appointed employees from a 

Supreme Court rule prohibiting said employees from engaging in partisan 

political activities. Id. at 461. Although the Supreme Court had ruled that

the election of the two petitioners to positions as school board directors 

constituted partisan political activity in violation of its rule, the petitioners 

contended that they were entitled to relief because amendments to the 

Pennsylvania Election Code permitted candidates for school board 

directorships to run on multiple political tickets (essentially designating 

school board directorships to be nonpartisan positions). Based upon its 

exclusive constitutional supervisory power over the judiciary, including its 
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employees, the Supreme Court refused to grant the requested relief, stating 

that “it is for this Court, not the legislature, to determine what amounts to 

prohibited political activity by judicial employees.” Id. at 464. 

Finally, in Kremer v. State Ethics Commission, 469 A.2d 593 (Pa. 

1983), the Supreme Court found unconstitutional as applied to judges the 

financial disclosure requirements in the state’s Ethics Act applicable to 

candidates running for office. Id. at 594. The Supreme Court ruled that 

the Code of Judicial Conduct applicable to judges set forth detailed 

provisions specifically designed to prevent conflicts of interest (financial and 

otherwise), and that these provisions advanced the same interests sought 

to be preserved through enforcement of the Ethics Act. Id. at 595-96. The 

Supreme Court thus determined that application of the provisions of the 

Ethics Act was unconstitutional as applied to judges, as the conduct of 

judges running for office “must be accomplished through rules promulgated 

by this Court and not by legislative enactment.” Id. at 596. 

Orie Melvin argues that Stern, Dobson, and Kremer compel the 

conclusion that in her case “the District Attorney is seeking to criminalize 

conduct that is already the subject of regulation by the Supreme Court.” 

Orie Melvin’s Brief at 22. We disagree. In those three cases, the Supreme 

Court had adopted rules regulating the specific conduct of attorneys and 

judges, thus establishing in each instance the Supreme Court’s intention to 

exercise its authority to regulate the conduct at issue. More importantly, in 
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each of those cases, the Legislature attempted to regulate precisely the 

same conduct covered by the Supreme Court rules. That symmetry does 

not exist in this case. While the Supreme Court has adopted a rule 

prohibiting political activity by court employees, Orie Melvin was not 

criminally prosecuted for using her judicial staff to advance her political 

aspirations.4

 None of the crimes for which she was prosecuted or convicted 

specifically proscribes political activity.5

 Instead she was prosecuted for the 

 

4

 We note that in its charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury 

that Orie Melvin was not being prosecuted for violation of the court rule 

against political activity: 

You have heard testimony about the Supreme Court 

Order dated November 24, 1998, prohibiting certain 

criminal activity by court employees. It is in 

evidence as [Orie Melvin’s] Exhibit Q. This Order is 

a work rule that applies to court employees. It is 

not a criminal law. A violation of a work rule is not 

a crime. You are instructed you may not base your 

verdict of guilt or innocence in any way on any 

alleged violation of a court rule. 

N.T., 2/15/2013, at 2805-06. 

The 1998 Supreme Court Order was irrelevant to the charges against Orie 

Melvin. In the absence of any such order, it remained a violation of the 

theft of services statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926(b), to use Commonwealth 

paid employees for activities inuring to her personal benefit. 

Because we agree that Orie Melvin was not convicted for violating the 

Supreme Court’s rule against political activity, we likewise conclude that her 

convictions are not unconstitutional for lack of notice of potential criminal 

sanctions. 

5

 Section (b) of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926, entitled “Theft of services,” provides 

as follows: “Diversion of services -- A person is guilty of theft if, having 
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use, or rather the misuse, of her judicial staff in violation of criminal 

statutes prohibiting the diversion of services belonging to the 

Commonwealth to her own personal benefit. The political nature of the 

conduct did not serve as the basis of the criminal conviction. Any conduct 

by her judicial staff that inured to Orie Melvin’s personal benefit constituted 

a diversion of services from the Commonwealth, whether or not said 

conduct violated the 1998 Supreme Court Order against political activity. In 

sum, Orie Melvin’s convictions were based on her theft of services by using 

her judicial staff and her sister’s senatorial staff, all of whom were paid with 

 

control over the disposition of services of others to which he is not entitled, 

he knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit or to the benefit of 

another not entitled thereto.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926(b). 

Section (a) of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, entitled “Criminal conspiracy,” provides 

that a person “is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to 

commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission 

he: (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more 

of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt 

or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person 

or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). 

Section (a) of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4113, entitled “Misapplication of entrusted 

property of government or financial institutions,” states that “[a] person 

commits an offense if he applies or disposes of property that has been 

entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the government or of a 

financial institution, in a manner which he knows is unlawful and involves 

substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property or to a 

person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4113(a). 
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taxpayer dollars to advance her campaign for a seat on the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court.6

 

B. The Search Warrant For Personal Emails 

For her third issue on appeal, Orie Melvin argues that a warrant 

authorizing the seizure of her personal emails at oriemelvin@yahoo.com

and judgeoriemelvin4supreme@yahoo.com was overbroad.7 For the 

 

6

 In addition to the 1998 Supreme Court Order, Orie Melvin likewise argues 

that the adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct evidences the Supreme 

Court’s exclusive power to regulate judges. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Since 

Orie Melvin makes only an amorphous, non-particularized reference to the 

Code of Judicial Conduct, we note generally the following to highlight the 

faulty predicate for her analysis. Orie Melvin was charged with crimes that 

took place during her 2003 and 2009 campaigns for the seat of a justice of 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. During these respective campaigns, Orie 

Melvin was a judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In 2003 and 

2009, Orie Melvin (and all judges and justices in this Commonwealth) were 

bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Matter of Chiovero, 570 A.2d 57, 

60 (Pa. 1990) (the Code of Judicial Conduct imposes standards of conduct 

upon the judiciary). The Code of Judicial Conduct during both of these time 

periods was essentially unchanged since, although it was amended in 2005, 

this amendment only modified various references to ensure that they were 

gender neutral. 35 Pa. Bull. 6647 (Dec. 10, 2005). 

Both the pre-2005 and post-2005 versions of the Code contain seven 

“canons.” Canon 2A sets forth the directive from the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court that “judges should respect and comply with the law... .” Thus, under 

Orie Melvin’s theory, no judge could be prosecuted for the violation of any 

criminal statute. The absurdity of this hypothesis is self-evident. Moreover, 

Orie Melvin was not prosecuted for theft of services or any other crime 

arising from her direct campaign activities. Canon 7 articulates the 

standards applicable to jurist candidates. Given the crimes charged, Canon 

7 has no relevance to Orie Melvin’s argument. 

7

 The January 5, 2010 warrant sought “[a]ll stored communications and 

other files reflecting communications to or from user account/user names 

oriemelvin@yahoo.com, judgeoriemelvin4supreme@yahoo.com AND 
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reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the warrant in question was 

overbroad, but that the failure to suppress the contents of the email 

account at trial was harmless error. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed this issue as 

follows: 

This issue was not presented to this Court. 

Furthermore, this issue was addressed by the 

Honorable Jeffrey A. Manning in his Memorandum 

Opinion Re: Suppression in Commonwealth v. Jane 

C. Orie and Janine Orie at CC201010285, 

CC2010010286. This Court adopts that analysis. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2013, at 8. 

We conclude that the issue was in fact presented to the trial court and 

the trial court’s adoption of Judge Manning’s analysis was error because 

Judge Manning’s analysis and ruling were erroneous. In the prior case 

involving Jane Orie and Janine Orie, Jane Orie challenged as overbroad a 

warrant seeking, inter alia, “all stored communications and other files ... 

between August 1, 2009 and the present, including all documents, images, 

recordings, spreadsheets or any other data stored in digital format.” 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2014). Judge 

Manning ruled that “the search of the AOL account JaneOrie@aol.com (Com 

Ex. 10) was supported by sufficient probable cause and was not overbroad 

 

orieonthemove@yahoo.com between August 1, 2009 and the present.” 

Search Warrant Continuation Pages, 1/5/2010, at 1. On appeal, Orie Melvin 

does not contest the search or seizure of emails from the 

judgeoriemelvin4supreme@yahoo.com account. 
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or general.” Commonwealth v. Jane C. Orie and Janine Orie, CP-02-

CR-0010285-86, at 26 (Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

February 4, 2011) (unpublished memorandum). Judge Manning further 

ruled that the warrant “authorized that the content of the e-mails be 

searched for anything that contained information relevant to the crimes 

being investigated,” and thus “cannot be considered to be overly broad.” 

Id. at 26-27. 

On appeal, however, this Court concluded that the warrant was 

overbroad. In so doing, we first set forth the applicable law in this area: 

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

provides, in pertinent part: ‘[N]o warrant to search 

any place or to seize any person or things shall 

issue without describing them as nearly as may be, 

nor without probable cause....’ 21 PA. CONST. Art. I 

§ 8. This Court has explained: 

It is a fundamental rule of law that a 

warrant must name or describe with 

particularity the property to be seized 

and the person or place to be 

searched.... The particularity 

requirement prohibits a warrant that is 

not particular enough and a warrant that 

is overbroad. These are two separate, 

though related, issues. A warrant 

unconstitutional for its lack of 

particularity authorizes a search in 

terms so ambiguous as to allow the 

executing officers to pick and choose 

among an individual's possessions to 

find which items to seize. This will 

result in the general ‘rummaging’ 

banned by the [F]ourth [A]mendment. 

A warrant unconstitutional for its 
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overbreadth authorizes in clear or 

specific terms the seizure of an entire 

set of items, or documents, many of 

which will prove unrelated to the crime 

under investigation. ... An overbroad 

warrant is unconstitutional because it 

authorizes a general search and seizure. 

 * * * 

The language of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution requires that a warrant 

describe the items to be seized ‘as 

nearly as may be....’ The clear meaning 

of the language is that a warrant must 

describe the items as specifically as is 

reasonably possible. This requirement 

is more stringent than that of the Fourth 

Amendment, which merely requires 

particularity in the description. The 

Pennsylvania Constitution further 

requires the description to be as 

particular as is reasonably possible.... 

Consequently, in any assessment of the 

validity of the description contained in a 

warrant, a court must initially determine 

for what items probable cause existed. 

The sufficiency of the description must 

then be measured against those items 

for which there was probable cause. 

Any unreasonable discrepancy between 

the items for which there was probable 

cause and the description in the warrant 

requires suppression. An unreasonable 

discrepancy reveals that the description 

was not as specific as was reasonably 

possible. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 816 A.2d 282, 290–91 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted), appeal 

denied, 828 A.2d 350 (Pa. 2003). Because the 

particularity requirement in Article I, Section 8 is 

more stringent than in the Fourth Amendment, if 
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the warrant is satisfactory under the Pennsylvania 

Constitution it will also be satisfactory under the 

federal Constitution. 

Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

instructed that search warrants should ‘be read in a 

common sense fashion and should not be 

invalidated by hypertechnical interpretations. This 

may mean, for instance, that when an exact 

description of a particular item is not possible, a 

generic description will suffice.’ Commonwealth v. 

Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1012 (2007) 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1316 

(2008). 

Orie, 88 A.3d at 1002-03. 

We then concluded that the warrant for Jane Orie’s email account was 

overbroad because while the supporting affidavit provided probable cause 

that evidence of criminal activity could be found in emails in the account, it 

did not justify a search of every email therein, including those with no 

relation to criminal activity. Id. at 1008-09. Because the warrant 

permitted the seizure of every email in the account without any attempt to 

distinguish the potentially relevant emails from those unrelated to the 

investigation, it permitted a general search and seizure that was 

unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.

The analysis in the Orie case did not, however, end there. In Orie, 

we declined to reverse Judge Manning’s denial of the suppression motion 

based upon the “unique facts” presented. Id. at 1008. In particular, the 

evidence there showed that while law enforcement had seized Jane Orie’s 
J-A16007-14 

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entire email account, it did not conduct a search of its contents until after 

obtaining a second warrant that provided the particularity that the first 

warrant had lacked. Id. at 1009. The evidence further showed that law 

enforcement had conducted this search in accordance with the specific 

parameters in the second warrant. Id. at 1007. While noting that two 

warrants are neither required nor preferred with respect to such searches 

and seizures, we concluded that under the “unique facts” presented, the 

search of Jane Orie’s email account passed constitutional muster. Id. at 

1008 n.42. 

No such “unique facts” exist with respect to the warrant for Orie 

Melvin’s email accounts. To the contrary, although the Commonwealth did 

subsequently obtain a second warrant that provided the specificity lacking 

in the first warrant, the certified record reflects that the Commonwealth 

began its review of Orie Melvin’s emails obtained pursuant to the first 

warrant before it obtained the second warrant. In the affidavit of probable 

cause in support of the second warrant, the affiant (Detective Lyle M. 

Graber of the Allegheny County Office of the District Attorney) explained 

that when he was reviewing the documents received from Yahoo in 

response to the first warrant, he noticed a number of emails with subject 

lines relating to Orie Melvin’s campaign, and that upon further inspection of 

these emails he came across the name of Matthew Haverstick, a lawyer for 

the Senate Republican Caucus. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/27/2010, at 
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12. As a result, he stopped further review of the emails and sought the 

second warrant, so that the documents could be reviewed by the Special 

Master for privilege issues before distribution to the parties.8

Pursuant to our analysis in Orie, therefore, we must conclude that the 

warrant authorizing the seizure of Orie Melvin’s personal emails at 

oriemelvin@yahoo.com and judgeoriemelvin4supreme@yahoo.com was 

overbroad. Unfortunately, however, while Orie Melvin contends that her 

convictions should be reversed and she should be granted a new trial, Orie 

Melvin’s Brief at 35, she has not offered this Court any legal basis for 

granting such relief. Similarly, the Commonwealth does not attempt to 

address the proper remedy in this case for the trial court’s failure to 

suppress the emails obtained pursuant to the warrant in question. 

“An appellate court may affirm a judgment or verdict for any reason 

appearing of record.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 919 A.2d 943, 948 (Pa. 

2007). In Commonwealth v. Thornton, 431 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1981), our 

Supreme Court explained as follows: 

The doctrine of harmless error is a technique of 

appellate review designed to advance judicial 

economy by obviating the necessity for a retrial 

where the appellate court is convinced that a trial 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Its 

purpose is premised on the well-settled proposition 

that ‘[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a 

perfect one.’ 

 

8

 See infra at page 49 for a more detailed discussion of the appointment 

of the Special Master. 
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Id. at 251 (1981). We may affirm a judgment based on harmless error sua 

sponte, even if the parties did not raise the argument. Commonwealth v. 

Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182, 182 n.21 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 

2336 (U.S. 2013). 

An error involving state or federal constitutional law “can be harmless 

only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

error is harmless.” Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 

1978). The analysis is closely tied to the facts of the case and requires an 

examination of the entire record. Id. at 166 n.24; Commonwealth v. 

Whiting, 517 A.2d 1327, 1333 (Pa. Super. 1986), appeal denied, 529 A.2d 

1080 (Pa. 1987). 

Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not 

prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de 

minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was 

merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which 

was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted 

evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and 

uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error

was so insignificant by comparison that the error 

could not have contributed to the verdict. 

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 811 A.2d 556, 561 (Pa. 2002) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1999)), cert. 

denied, 540 U.S. 858 (2003). Based upon our review of the entire certified 

record on appeal, the trial court’s failure to suppress the contents of Orie 

Melvin’s email account was harmless error. 
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At trial, the Commonwealth introduced 10 emails into evidence from 

Orie Melvin’s email account obtained pursuant to the overbroad warrant.9

 

Six of these emails10 were to or from Molly Creenan (“Creenan”), a member 

of Orie Melvin’s judicial staff from January 1998 through December 2009. 

N.T., 2/4/2013, at 1367. While Creenan’s tenure on Orie Melvin’s judicial 

staff spanned both the 2003 and 2009 political campaigns, given the scope 

of the warrant, the emails at issue here relate only to the 2009 campaign.11 

As a result, these six emails did not prejudice Orie Melvin, or the prejudice 

was de minimis, in large part because Creenan testified that she refused to 

perform any political activities during the 2009 campaign. In particular, 

Creenan testified that she reluctantly performed various political activities 

during Orie Melvin’s 2003 campaign, but this changed on Election Day in 

November 2003 when she refused to go to a poll site as directed by Janine 

 

9

 In her Reply Brief, Orie Melvin initially identified 21 such emails. Orie 

Melvin’s Reply Brief at 12. A review of the certified record, however, 

demonstrates that while the Commonwealth marked 21 emails for 

identification, it only introduced 10 of them into evidence. At oral argument 

on May 20, 2014, this Court asked counsel for Orie Melvin to provide a 

supplemental submission identifying all emails obtained pursuant to the 

warrant at issue that were introduced into evidence at trial, at which time 

counsel for Orie Melvin identified the 10 emails we discuss herein. 

10 Exhibit 34, Tabs 9, 11, 13, 14, 25, and 26. 

11 As noted hereinabove, see supra footnote 7, the warrant sought only 

emails for the time period from August 1, 2009 to January 5, 2010, and 

thus the documents produced in response related only to the 2009 political 

campaign. 
J-A16007-14 

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Orie.12

 Id. at 1374. When Creenan learned in December 2008 that Orie 

Melvin intended to run again in the 2009 election, she testified that she 

went to Orie Melvin and informed her that what she had done in 2003 “can’t 

happen in 2009” and made clear to Orie Melvin that she would no longer 

violate the 1998 Supreme Court Order prohibiting judicial employees from 

participating in political activity. Id. at 1384-86. As a result, when asked 

at trial about the six emails in question, Creenan testified that she had no 

specific information about the events at issue or had not performed the 

political tasks requested of her. Id. at 1414-30. 

We likewise conclude that another email13 was not prejudicial or the 

prejudice was de minimis. In this email, Audrey Denise Mackie (then using 

her maiden name Rasmussen), a member of Jane Orie’s legislative staff, 

merely provided Janine Orie (at Orie Melvin’s request) with the telephone 

number of someone who had expressed an interest in holding a fundraiser 

for Orie Melvin. N.T., 1/31/2013, at 824. 

The three remaining emails introduced into evidence were cumulative 

of other evidence already introduced at trial. In an email dated September 

28, 2009 to John Degener (“Degener”), who served as a member of Orie 

 

12 According to Creenan, when she refused to go to a poll site, she was 

informed that she would have to go into the judicial office to answer the 

phones, even though Election Day was a paid holiday for state workers. Id.

at 1374-76. 

13 Exhibit 28, Tab 16. 
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Melvin’s judicial staff from January 1998 through 2009, including as her 

Chief Law Clerk from 2004 through 2009, Orie Melvin asked Degener a 

question about summaries of certain pro-business decisions she had written 

or joined.14 Degener testified only that he had received this email from Orie 

Melvin. N.T., 2/5/2013, at 1520. To the extent that this email reflected 

that Degener assisted Orie Melvin in the 2009 political campaign by 

preparing summaries of her prior judicial decisions, this evidence was 

merely cumulative of Degener’s prior testimony that he performed various 

other political tasks for Orie Melvin’s 2009 campaign, including (without 

reference to this particular email in question) the preparation of various 

summaries of her judicial decisions. Id. at 1499. 

The final two emails at issue were to or from Pavlot. In an email 

dated August 6, 2009 (Exhibit 14, Tab 9), Pavlot forwarded to Orie Melvin 

another email concerning the taking of a family photograph and video that 

were subsequently used in campaign literature. N.T., 1/28/2013, at 229. 

In an email chain in September 2009 relating to a “gun bash” held by an 

organization with ties to the National Rifle Association (Exhibit 14, Tab 17), 

Pavlot suggested to Orie Melvin that 500 “poll cards” relating to her 

candidacy could be distributed to attendees, and Orie Melvin responded by 

inquiring whether Josh Dott (“Dott”), a junior member of Jane Orie’s 

legislative staff, could attend the event to assist her in doing so. Id. at 

 

14 Exhibit 35, Tab 5. 
J-A16007-14 

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246-48. These two emails, however, are merely cumulative of extensive 

testimony by Pavlot regarding a wide range of political activities she 

performed for the benefit of Orie Melvin’s 2009 political campaign, id. at 

207-362, including providing assistance to Orie Melvin at various other 

campaign events, e.g., id. at 212, 216, 263, solicitation at fundraisers, id.

at 238, 258-60, 268, obtaining endorsements from influential political 

organizations, id. at 253, distributing poll cards, id. at 256, filming 

campaign commercials, id. at 228, and sending Dott and other legislative 

staff members to provide assistance at these activities, id. at 260, 267. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to 

suppress the 10 emails seized pursuant to the warrant for Orie Melvin’s 

email accounts and their use at trial by the Commonwealth was harmless 

error, either because the emails were not prejudicial to Orie Melvin or the 

prejudice was de minimis, or because they were cumulative of other 

properly admitted evidence. Moreover, to the extent that these emails tend 

to prove that Orie Melvin diverted the services of members of her judicial 

staff and Jane Orie’s legislative staff for the benefit of her 2009 political 

campaign, we note that the Commonwealth introduced into evidence an 

overwhelming quantum of other uncontradicted evidence, from numerous 

other witnesses and a large volume of other exhibits unrelated to the 10 

emails in question, that likewise demonstrated Orie Melvin’s diversion of 

services. Thus, the prejudicial effect of these 10 emails is insignificant by 
J-A16007-14 

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comparison and in our view could not have contributed to the verdict. As a 

result, no relief is due on Orie Melvin’s third issue on appeal. 

C. Recusal of the Entire Allegheny County Bench 

For her fourth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin contends that the trial 

court erred in denying her motion for recusal of the members of the 

Allegheny County bench in favor of an out-of-county trial judge. In a ruling 

at the time of the preliminary hearing, Orie Melvin moved for the recusal of 

all members of the Allegheny County bench and requested the assignment 

of a trial judge from another judicial district to preside over all future 

proceedings pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 701C. 

The trial court denied the motion, stating that it would be improper to 

recuse all of the members of the Allegheny County bench, as the decision 

regarding whether or not a jurist should recuse is a decision that only the 

individual jurist can make. Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/2012, at 4. Instead, 

the trial court indicated that a request for recusal of the trial judge assigned 

to Orie Melvin’s case should be directed to that jurist. Id. at 5. 

On appeal, Orie Melvin takes issue with the trial court’s contention 

that it is improper to recuse all members of a particular bench, citing to 

Commonwealth ex rel. Armor v. Armor, 398 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super. 

1978) (en banc). In Armor, an en banc panel of this Court ruled that in a 

case where a member of the Montgomery County bench was the spouse of 

a party to a child support matter, no member of the Montgomery County 
J-A16007-14 

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bench could preside over the case. Id. at 356. Specifically, this Court 

ruled that although the record contained no evidence of any bias, prejudice 

or unfairness on the part of any member of the local bench, “it would be 

contrary to the appearance of integrity and independence of the judiciary” 

and would “not promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 

judiciary” to allow a fellow member of the Montgomery County bar to 

preside over the case. Id. at 356-57. 

Orie Melvin argues the same reasoning should apply in this case, 

since she is herself a former member of the Allegheny County bench and 

because an important witness in her case, her former Chief Law Clerk, 

Sasinoski, is the wife of a member of the Allegheny County bench (the 

Honorable Kevin G. Sasinoski). The trial court determined, however, that 

Orie Melvin had not demonstrated the sort of direct conflict that clouded the 

appearance of impartiality and independence in Armor. Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/27/2012, at 4-5. As the trial court noted, Orie Melvin left the 

Allegheny County bench in 1997 and provided no good reasons as to why 

any current members of that bench could not preside over the present case 

with integrity and objectively. Id. Moreover, Armor involved support 

payments to the judge’s spouse, and thus arguably the judge had a direct 

financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. In this case, in significant 

contrast, neither Sasinoski nor her husband, as non-parties, had any direct 

interest in the outcome of Orie Melvin’s case. Id. 
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Orie Melvin posits that having a direct interest in the outcome of the 

case is not the correct test under Armor, and that instead the appropriate 

inquiry is whether “the impartiality of a judge may reasonably be 

questioned if he or she is assigned to preside over a case where the 

defendant is a former member of the court and a key prosecution witness is 

married to a sitting judge on the court.” Orie Melvin’s Brief at 40. We 

disagree, as we do not read Armor to contemplate the recusal of an entire 

bench under the circumstances presented here. Armor involved two key 

facts, namely a current member of the bench with a direct financial interest 

in the outcome of the case. Armor is thus inapposite to the present case, 

as there are no relevant factual parallels. Orie Melvin’s tenure on the 

Allegheny County bench ended in 1997, so she has no current relationship 

as a colleague with any of its members. Moreover, neither Sasinoski nor 

her husband has any direct interest (financial or otherwise) in the outcome 

of Orie Melvin’s trial, and we do not believe that a witness’ spousal 

relationship with a judge, without more, automatically requires the recusal 

of an entire bench, as no appearance of impropriety necessarily arises from 

that attenuated fact. 

In general, our Supreme Court has advised that a motion for recusal 

is not directed to an entire bench, and that decisions regarding recusal must 

be decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. White, 734 A.2d 374, 384 (Pa. 1999). 
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As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially 

directed to and decided by the jurist whose 

impartiality is being challenged. In considering a 

recusal request, the jurist must first make a 

conscientious determination of his or her ability to 

assess the case in an impartial manner, free of 

personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist 

must then consider whether his or her continued 

involvement in the case creates an appearance of 

impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public 

confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and 

unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. 

... In reviewing a denial of a disqualification motion, 

we recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and 

competent. 

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa.) (citations omitted), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810 (1998). “It is the burden of the party requesting 

recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which 

raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially.” 

Id. 

In its ruling at the time of the preliminary hearing, the trial court, 

citing to Abu-Jamal, properly advised that “[w]hether the judge ultimately 

assigned to this case ... should recuse, is a matter that can only be 

addressed by that judge.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/2012, at 5. Orie 

Melvin did not, however, move for the recusal of the trial judge assigned to 

the trial of her case, the Honorable Lester G. Nauhaus, and at no time 

offered any evidence to establish that Judge Nauhaus could not preside over 

her case without bias, prejudice, or unfairness. As a result, no relief is due 

on this issue. 
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D. Statute of Limitations 

For her fifth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin contends that her 

convictions for crimes committed in 2003 were barred by the statute of 

limitations, and that the trial court erred in ruling that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5552(c)(2) extended the limitations period for her crimes. Orie Melvin 

argues that section 5552(c)(2) extends the limitations period only for a 

“public officer or employee” and that judges cannot be so designated. Orie 

Melvin insists that judges are “judicial officers,” as that term is defined in 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 102, and thus section 5552(c)(2) does not apply in her 

circumstance. 

Orie Melvin raises an issue of statutory interpretation. "In examining 

this determination of statutory interpretation, our scope of review is 

plenary, as it is with any review of questions of law." Joseph F. Cappelli 

& Sons, Inc. v. Keystone Custom Homes, Inc., 815 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (quoting Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 

(Pa. 1995)). When asked to construe a statute, "we are guided by the 

principles set out in the Statutory Construction Act, 1 P.S. §§ 1501-1991." 

Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc., 658 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. 

1995). Moreover, [t]he object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain 

and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 P.S. § 1921(a); 

see also Carrozza v. Greenbaum, 866 A.2d 369, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004), 

affirmed, 916 A.2d 553 (Pa. 2007). 
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Section 5552(c)(2) provides as follows: 

(c) Exceptions.--If the period prescribed in 

subsection (a), (b) or (b.1) has expired, a 

prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: 

(2) Any offense committed by a public 

officer or employee in the course of or in 

connection with his office or 

employment at any time when the 

defendant is in public office or 

employment or within five years 

thereafter, but in no case shall this 

paragraph extend the period of 

limitation otherwise applicable by more 

than eight years. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(c)(2). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 defines “judicial officer” as 

“[j]udges, magisterial district judges and appointive judicial officers.” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. The phrase “public officer or employee” does not 

appear to be defined anywhere in Title 42.15

 

 

15 The trial court applied the definition of “public official” in section 1102 of 

the Pennsylvania Ethics Act, 65 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102, when interpreting section 

5552(c)(2). We disagree that this definition is applicable here for two 

reasons. First, our Supreme Court has ruled that the Ethics Act does not 

apply to judges. Kremer, 469 A.2d at 595-96. Second, the language of 

the Ethics Act specifically states that its definitions apply only to the terms 

in the Ethics Act itself. 65 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102 (“[t]he following words and 

phrases when used in this chapter shall have ... the meanings given to them 

in this section ...). 

We likewise disagree with the trial court’s reliance on Commonwealth v. 

O’Kicki, 597 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 626 A.2d 1156 (Pa. 

1991). The issue of whether a judge is a “public officer or employee” was 

never raised in O’Kicki and thus our decision in that case provides no 

binding authority in the present circumstance. 
J-A16007-14 

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When interpreting a statute, the Statutory Construction Act dictates 

that we must give plain meaning to the words therein. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

1901, 1903. “Absent a definition in the statute, statutes are presumed to 

employ words in their popular and plain everyday sense, and the popular 

meaning of such words must prevail.” Centolanza, 658 A.2d at 340 (citing 

Harris-Walsh, Inc. v. Borough of Dickson City, 216 A.2d 329 (Pa. 

1966)). In this regard, our Court, guided by our Supreme Court, has held 

that “dictionary definitions offer adequate direction for statutory 

interpretation consistent with the Statutory Construction Act.” Zator v. 

Coachi, 939 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 961 A.2d 859 

(Pa. 2008); Centolanza, 658 A.2d at 340 (relying on Webster’s Ninth New 

Collegiate Dictionary to interpret an undefined statutory phrase). Black’s 

Law Dictionary defines “Public Official” as “[o]ne who holds or is invested 

with a public office; a person elected or appointed to carry out some portion 

of a government’s sovereign powers.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (8th ed. 

2004). 

Employing the popular and plain everyday sense of the words, the 

phrase “public officer” refers to someone who holds a public office (either by 

election or appointment) or is otherwise entrusted with carrying out 

functions for the Commonwealth. The intent of the legislature in enacting 

section 5552(c)(2) was to extend the statute of limitations for criminal 

offenses for this subset of individuals in recognition of the unique positions 
J-A16007-14 

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that they hold.16 As such, in our view, the legislature intended for judges, 

most of whom are elected and all of whom hold respected public offices and 

carry out the power of the judicial branch of government, to be included 

within the ambit of section 5552(c)(2).17 Accordingly, no relief is due on 

this issue. 

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

For her sixth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin maintains that the trial 

court erred in not dismissing the charges against her based upon an 

egregious instance of prosecutorial misconduct relating to an exhibit 

introduced during the testimony of Sasinoski. The trial court summarized 

the relevant factual background of the incident as follows: 

During the direct testimony of [Sasinoski], the 

Commonwealth entered into evidence without 

objection Exhibit 32, tab #19. (Transcript of Trial 

from January 24, 2013 through February 21, 2013 

(hereinafter referred to as “TT”) at 1180). This 

exhibit was a one-page handwritten document 

stating ‘Lisa Do you have proposed answers for 

Questions 3, 8, & 10? Can I have this Monday.”. 

(TT at 1181). [Sasinoski] testified the document 

was hand-written by [Orie Melvin], and she was 

being asked to answer questions 3, 8, & 10 on a 

 

16 While it is true that Orie Melvin also meets the definition of “judicial 

officer” under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 102, she offers no good reason why the 

phrases “judicial officer” and “public officer” are mutually exclusive of each 

other. For the reasons explained herein, under section 5552(c)(2), judges 

are both “judicial officers” and “public officers.” 

17 Without specifically relying on this fact in reaching our conclusion, we 

note that judicial officers in Pennsylvania receive W-2 statements reporting 

salaries to the federal government as employees of the Commonwealth. 
J-A16007-14 

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political questionnaire. [Sasinoski] was asked, ‘That 

would be an endorsement questionnaire of a special 

interest group?’ and she relied ‘Yes’. (TT at 1181). 

The Commonwealth then went on to ask questions 

about the next exhibit. 

On cross-examination, [Sasinoski] was asked about 

a letter containing a page with eleven questions that 

at some point had been attached to the single 

handwritten document she had testified about on 

direct examination (Commonwealth Exhibit 32 tab 

#19). [Sasinoski] replied that she had not seen the 

eleven-question document before. [TT at 1201-

1203]. 

The next court day, [Orie Melvin] filed a Defense 

Motion to Dismiss Criminal Charges Due to 

Prosecutorial Misconduct. The basis for the motion 

was that the testimony of [Sasinoski] was 

erroneous. The document she had testified about, 

Commonwealth Exhibit 32 tab #19, was actually 

written in 1998 and attached to a letter discussing 

an educational event at which [Orie Melvin] was a 

panel member. The five-page document was 

admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit H. 

The 1998 letter included eleven questions labeled 

Proposed Questions for Professional Development 

Roundtable. [Orie Melvin’s] handwritten note was 

from 1998 and had requested information for a legal 

education event, not a political endorsement 

questionnaire, as [Sasinoski] had incorrectly 

testified to on direct examination. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2013, at 9-10. After hearing oral argument on 

the motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the 

prosecutor was not guilty of intentional misconduct and had instead made a 

“mistake.” N.T., 2/1/2013, at 1237. 
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“Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is 

limited to ‘whether the trial court abused its discretion.’” Commonwealth 

v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 927 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. DeJesus, 787 A.2d 394, 407 (Pa. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1028 

441 (2002)), appeal denied, 928 A.2d 1289 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth 

v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866, 871 (Pa. Super. 2012). “It is within the discretion 

of the trial court to determine whether a defendant has been prejudiced by 

misconduct or impropriety to the extent that a mistrial is warranted.” 

Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 729 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 528 

U.S. 827 (1999). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that 

‘[t]he essence of a finding of prosecutorial 

misconduct is that the prosecutor, a person who 

holds a unique position of trust in our society, has 

abused that trust in order to prejudice and 

deliberately mislead [the factfinder].” 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645 A.2d 189, 197 (Pa. 

1994). ... Prosecutorial misconduct will justify a new 

trial where the unavoidable effect of the conduct or 

language was to prejudice the factfinder to the 

extent that the factfinder was rendered incapable of 

fairly weighing the evidence and entering an 

objective verdict. If the prosecutorial misconduct 

contributed to the verdict, it will be deemed 

prejudicial and a new trial will be required. 

Commonwealth v. Francis, 665 A.2d 821, 824 (Pa. Super. 1995) (some 

internal citations omitted). More recently, our Supreme Court opined on 

the meaning of the phrase, “prosecutorial misconduct,” stating: 
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The phrase ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ has been so 

abused as to lose any particular meaning. The 

claim either sounds in a specific constitutional 

provision that the prosecutor allegedly violated or, 

more frequently, like most trial issues, it implicates 

the narrow review available under Fourteenth 

Amendment due process. See Greer v. Miller, 483 

U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (‘To constitute a due process 

violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of 

sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 

defendant's right to a fair trial.’) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 

U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“When specific guarantees of 

the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken 

special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in 

no way impermissibly infringes them.”). However, 

“[t]he Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for 

prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which 

persons are deprived of their liberty.” Mabry v. 

Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984). The 

touchstone is the fairness of the trial, not the 

culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 

455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 685 (Pa. 2009). 

Given this authority, we focus not on the culpability of the prosecutor 

but rather on whether his actions deprived Orie Melvin of a fair trial by 

prejudicially rendering the jury incapable of fairly weighing the evidence 

and entering an objective verdict. Based upon our review of the certified 

record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Orie Melvin’s 

motion to dismiss. We do so for two reasons. First, the prejudice to Orie 

Melvin was minimal, as three other witnesses testified that law clerks were 

required to fill out political questionnaires. N.T., 2/5/2013, at 1380 
J-A16007-14 

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(Creenan); 1493-94 (Degener); 1629 (Katherine Squires, hereinafter, 

“Squires”). 

Second, the trial court took appropriate steps to reduce any prejudice 

to Orie Melvin. During Sasinoski’s testimony before the jury, the trial court 

questioned Sasinoski directly and made the jury aware of the issues with 

respect to the prior exhibit: 

[THE COURT]: Your testimony was inaccurate. 

[SASINOSKI]: Oh, okay. 

[THE COURT]: Okay. As a matter of fact, the 

document that it was attached to was a four page 

document from Buchanan Ingersoll, which is a 

major law firm in the City of Pittsburgh. They were

doing a continuing legal education seminar. The 

Questions 3, 8, and 10 were proposed questions for 

the judge; is that not accurate? 

[SASINOSKI]: I don’t have a recollection of that. 

[THE COURT]: Okay. This has been marked for 

identification. 

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are to accept 

this as the document, this is the original document 

in which Tab 19 was, along with the attachment, 

which was submitted to Ms. Sasinoski whenever it 

was submitted. At the time that it was originally – 

the District Attorney was in possession of these 

additional pages, and they were not submitted to 

you during Ms. Sasinoski’s testimony. Also be 

aware of the fact that [the] defense was in 

possession of these four pages. They knew they 

were attached. All right. 

There is a question as to how they were attached. 

It is the defense’s belief that they were attached 
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with a paper clip, or a staple, which is the way it is 

now, but when they got it, it was attached with a 

paper clip. And if you look at Tab 19, you will see 

that there is a paper clip. For whatever that means 

to you, take that. 

N.T., 2/4/2013, at 1253-55. 

Moreover, during its charge to the jury, the trial court specifically 

advised the jury that Sasinoski had provided inaccurate testimony and gave 

a “false in one, false in all” instruction: 

One of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, Lisa 

Sasinoski, gave inaccurate testimony concerning a 

handwritten note which was marked and admitted 

into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit 32, Tab 

#19. Ms. Sasinoski testified related [sic] to a 

questionnaire from a special interest group when in 

fact it related to a continuing legal education 

seminar. 

As has been pointed out by one of the attorneys, 

there is a rule in the law which I learned as falsus in 

uno, falsus in omnibus, which translated from Latin 

means false in one, false in all. If you decide that a

witness deliberately testified falsely about a material

point, that is about a matter that could effect [sic] 

the outcome of this trial, you may for that reason 

alone choose to disbelieve the rest of his or her 

testimony, but you are not required to do so. You 

should consider not only the deliberate falsehood, 

but also all other factors bearing on the witness’ 

credibility in deciding whether to believe other parts 

of her testimony. 

N.T., 2/15/2013, at 2806-08. 

For these reasons, even to the extent that the prosecutor here 

committed intentional misconduct (rather than a mere mistake, as the trial 
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court concluded), it was not error to deny Orie Melvin’s motion to dismiss. 

The prejudice to Orie Melvin was minimal and the trial court took 

appropriate steps to clarify for the jury the precise nature of the issues 

relating to the handwritten note associated with the questionnaire.18

 

Nothing in the certified record compels a conclusion that the jury was 

rendered incapable of fairly weighing the evidence and entering an objective 

verdict. 

F. Propriety of Joinder of Case With Janine Orie’s Case 

For her seventh issue on appeal, Orie Melvin claims that the trial court 

erred in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to join her case with that of 

her sister, Janine Orie. According to Orie Melvin, the trial court “failed to 

recognize or appreciate the differences that required separate trials.” Orie 

Melvin’s Brief at 57. 

 

18 In her appellate brief, Orie Melvin details another instance of alleged 

introduction of false evidence by the Commonwealth during the testimony 

of Commonwealth witness Pavlot. Orie Melvin’s Brief at 55-56. The 

certified record does not reflect that Orie Melvin moved for a mistrial or 

other relief, however, and therefore, this issue is waived. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Even 

where a defendant objects to specific conduct, the failure to request a 

remedy such as a mistrial or curative instruction is sufficient to constitute 

waiver.”); Commonwealth v. Jones, 460 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. 1983) (claim 

of prosecutorial misconduct waived where defense counsel immediately 

objected to the prosecutor's conduct but failed to request mistrial or 

curative instructions); Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 524 A.2d 913, 921 

(Pa. Super.) (issue was waived where defense counsel objected to a 

question posed by the prosecutor but failed to ask the trial judge to do 

anything further after the question had been answered), appeal denied, 533 

A.2d 711 (Pa. 1987). 
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Whether cases against different defendants should be consolidated for 

trial “is within the sole discretion of the trial court and such discretion will 

be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear 

injustice to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 635 

(Pa. Super. 1999). Procedurally, Rule 582 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure governs the joinder of separate criminal informations. 

Rule 582 dictates, in pertinent part, as follows: 

(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or 

informations may be tried together if: 

(a) the evidence of each of the offenses 

would be admissible in a separate trial 

for the other and is capable of 

separation by the jury so that there is 

no danger of confusion; or 

(b) the offenses charged are based on 

the same act or transaction. 

Pa.R.Crim.P 582(A). The severance of offenses is governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 

583, which states that the trial court “may order separate trials of offenses 

or defendants, or provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any 

party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. 

Based upon these rules, our Supreme Court has formulated the 

following test for deciding the merits of a motion to sever: 

Where the defendant moves to sever offenses not 

based on the same act or transaction that have 

been consolidated in a single indictment or 
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information, or opposes joinder of separate 

indictments or informations, the court must [] 

determine: [1] whether the evidence of each of the 

offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for 

the other; [2] whether such evidence is capable of 

separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of 

confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are 

in the affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be 

unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses. 

Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 496–97 (Pa. 1988)), cert. denied, 

525 U.S. 1015 (1998). 

For Orie Melvin, the first part of the Collins test requires us to 

determine whether the evidence introduced with respect to each of the 

offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other. In a written 

opinion, the trial court reviewed in considerable detail all of the charges 

against both Orie Melvin and Janine Orie and concluded that joinder of the 

two cases was appropriate. Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2012, at 14. We 

need not review the entirety of this analysis, however, since on appeal Orie 

Melvin challenges just two of the trial court’s determinations. 

First, Orie Melvin argues that the conspiracy allegations against her 

and Janine Orie differ in multiple respects. At docket number CC 

201010286, Janine Orie was charged with conspiring with Jane Orie and 

Pavlot to use the services of Jane Orie’s legislative staff for the benefit of 

Orie Melvin’s 2009 political campaign. In Count 4, Orie Melvin was charged 

with conspiring with Jane Orie and Janine Orie to commit theft of services in 
J-A16007-14 

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connection with Orie Melvin’s 2003 and 2009 political campaigns, including 

with respect to both Orie Melvin’s judicial staff and Jane Orie’s legislative 

staff. Orie Melvin identifies three principle differences with these charges. 

First, Orie Melvin was not alleged to have conspired with Pavlot at any time. 

Second, the Janine Orie-Jane Orie-Pavlot conspiracy was only for the 2009 

political campaign and did not also encompass the 2003 campaign. Third, 

while Orie Melvin was charged with conspiring with Janine Orie to commit 

theft of services, Janine Orie was not similarly charged with conspiring with 

Orie Melvin to do so. Orie Melvin’s Brief at 58-59. According to Orie 

Melvin, “[s]ince the alleged co-conspirators, relevant time period and object 

of the charged conspiracies are not the same, the evidence was not 

universally admissible.” Id. at 59. 

Nothing in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure or the 

Collins test, however, requires a perfect identity of the charges against two 

defendants before their cases may be joined for trial. While Orie Melvin has 

identified certain differences between the charges against the two 

defendants, she has not established that any evidence introduced against 

one of the defendants would not have been admissible in a separate trial for 

the other. Orie Melvin was charged and convicted of conspiring with Janine 

Orie and Jane Orie to commit theft of services with respect to both her own 

judicial staff and Jane Orie’s legislative staff, including in both her 2003 and 

2009 political campaigns. That made Orie Melvin and Janine Orie co-
J-A16007-14 

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conspirators with respect to all of the theft of services charges, and thus 

made admissible against each of them all of the acts of the other in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cimrose, 

478 A.2d 1318, 1324 (Pa. Super. 1984). While Orie Melvin was not charged 

with conspiring with Pavlot, she was charged and convicted, both as a 

principle and by and through two accomplices (Janine Orie and Jane Orie), 

of diverting the use of Jane Orie’s legislative staff for the benefit of her 

2009 political campaign – the object of the conspiracy involving Pavlot. And 

while there was no reciprocal charge against Janine Orie for conspiring with 

Orie Melvin to divert the use of Orie Melvin’s judicial staff for the benefit of 

Orie Melvin’s 2003 and 2009 political campaigns, both were separately 

charged and convicted of doing precisely that (Orie Melvin in Count 3 and 

Janine Orie in Count 1 at CC 201115981). 

Second, Orie Melvin contends that her case should not have been 

joined with Janine Orie’s case because Janine Orie alone was charged and 

convicted of tampering with and altering physical evidence, namely the 

deletion of campaign-related computer files in 2009 and 2010 (Counts 3 

and 4 at docket number CC 201115981). Orie Melvin’s Brief at 60. The 

trial court rejected this argument, stating: 

The alleged acts of [Janine Orie] in attempting to 

destroy or conceal evidence of the conspiracy to 

divert services is likely to be admissible against 

[Orie Melvin] as those acts, if they are proven to 

have occurred, were arguably made in furtherance 
J-A16007-14 

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of the common design of the alleged underlying 

conspiracy. Certainly, the concealment of the 

documents that would constitute direct evidence of 

existence of the conspiracy would further the 

common design of this conspiracy: the diversion of 

the services of public employees to the private 

interests of the defendants. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2012, at 8-9. 

We find no abuse of discretion in this analysis, as Janine’s acts of 

tampering with evidence were in furtherance of her conspiracy with Orie 

Melvin to divert public services to Orie Melvin’s benefit, thereby making 

evidence of Janine’s acts admissible against Orie Melvin. Cimrose, 478 

A.2d at 1324. In particular, we note that at trial, the Commonwealth 

presented evidence to prove the existence of the underlying conspiracy 

between Orie Melvin and Janine Orie, as the jury convicted Orie Melvin of 

this charge (Count 4) and on appeal she does not challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence presented in support of this conviction. The cases cited by 

Orie Melvin in this regard are inapposite, as they involved circumstances in 

which severance should have been granted since one defendant faced 

charges for which the other defendant clearly bore no potential 

responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251, 1257 

(Pa. Super. 2010) (“Significantly, Brookins's conduct appears to bear no 

relationship to the planning and execution of the attempted kidnapping and 

robbery with which Jordan, McKeiver, and Thompson were charged.”), 

appeal denied, 22 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 303 
J-A16007-14 

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A.2d 924, 925 (Pa. 1973) (“Since no evidence was given to link appellant to 

the Oakmont robbery, the fact that the crimes were similar in nature does 

not afford a sound basis for ordering their consolidation at trial.”).19

 

Moving to the second part of the Collins test, Orie Melvin claims that 

the evidence relating to the different charges against her and Janine Orie 

were not capable of separation because “the conspiracies charged in this 

case are complex, involve different persons, relate to different time periods, 

and involve contradictory allegations.” Orie Melvin’s Brief at 60. The trial 

court disagreed, concluding that the jury was capable of separating the 

evidence presented against each defendant and following any instructions 

to consider evidence against only one defendant as necessary. Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/23/2012, at 9. Orie Melvin has offered no convincing argument 

to suggest that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. 

Finally, with respect to the third part of the Collins test, namely 

prejudice to the defendant as a result of the joinder, we likewise conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no such prejudice. 

On appeal, Orie Melvin argues that the “risk was unavoidable that the jury 

would cumulate the evidence of the various crimes and find guilt even 

 

19 Orie Melvin’s citation to Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 

Super. 1983), likewise provides no support for her position. Boyd did not 

involve the consolidation for trial of charges against separate defendants, 

but rather raised the issue of whether a single defendant should have been 

tried separately for wholly unrelated drug charges, as each charge involved 

“a totally discrete set of facts.” Id. at 1295-96. 
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though the evidence, when considered separately and applied to each 

defendant individually, does not support a conviction.” Orie Melvin’s Brief 

at 62. To the extent that the accumulation of evidence resulted in any 

prejudice, it would have been to Janine Orie, as the overwhelming 

preponderance of the evidence introduced at trial related to Orie Melvin’s 

actions. Moreover, we note that on appeal, Orie Melvin has not identified 

any specific testimony or exhibit introduced at trial against Janine Orie that 

could not have been introduced at a separate trial against her alone, or 

otherwise offered any basis for concluding that the introduction of any such 

evidence (if it exists) resulted in any substantial prejudice to her. 

G. Violation of Discovery Rights Regarding Jane Orie’s Computer 

and Electronic Evidence 

For her eighth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin asserts the trial court’s 

denial of her request to inspect and examine original computer hard drives 

and electronic evidence seized from the legislative office of Jane Orie 

violated her rights to discovery under Rule 573(B)(1)(f) of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Criminal Procedure as secured in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 

and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Orie Melvin’s Brief 

at 65. 

In our prior opinion in the Jane Orie case, we described the 

subpoena used to obtain electronic evidence at the former state senator’s 

legislative office as follows: 
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The December 11, 2009 search warrant for Orie's 

district office identified the items to be seized and 

searched as ‘all computer hardware’; ‘software’; 

‘documentation’ to access the computer systems 

and passwords; and electronically stored data 

referencing: Joan Orie Melvin or her 2009 political 

campaign, and checks, campaign contributions, 

thank you letters, and masthead for [Orie Melvin's] 

2009 political campaign, and Orie's 2001–2009 

elections or political campaigns, and checks, 

campaign contributions, thank you letters, and 

masthead for Orie’s 2001 through present political 

campaigns. The accompanying 13–page affidavit of 

probable cause detailed the results of the 

Commonwealth’s investigation and described 

interviews with numerous employees of Orie, 

including [Joshua] Dott, Audrey Rasmussen, and 

Pavlot, who each described political campaignrelated activities conducted in the office. Pavlot 

stated she had done campaign work on legislative 

time for [Jane Orie] since 2001, as well as campaign 

work for Orie's sister, [Orie Melvin], in 2009, and 

she described those duties. Pavlot and other 

staffers indicated that legislative computers and 

other office equipment were used for campaignrelated purposes. 

Orie, 88 A.3d at 1005. 

Jane Orie and the Senate Republican Caucus both asserted various 

claims of privilege with respect to the seized materials, including attorneyclient privilege and the Speech and Debate Clause legislative privilege 

(Article II, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution). On December 29, 

2009, the Honorable John A. Zottola, the Supervising Judge of the Grand 

Jury, appointed a Special Master (former Duquesne Law Professor Bruce 

Antowiak), to review for privilege all of the evidence seized in connection 
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with Orie-related warrants. Id. at 1004. According to Detective Graber, all 

seized evidence was delivered (pursuant to a process established by Judge 

Zottola) to the Special Master. After his review, the Special Master then 

sent the evidence to Judge Zottola, who (after his own review) sent, inter 

alia, “a redacted viewable version” of the seized hard drives back to the 

District Attorney’s office. Id. at 1005 n.23; N.T., 12/13/2010, at 77-78. In 

Orie, we concluded that this process ensured that all of the seized evidence 

was reviewed by the Special Master and Judge Zottola before any of it was 

turned over to the District Attorney’s office, and that the purpose of the 

process was to guarantee that the District Attorney’s office “had access only 

to non-privileged documents.” Orie, 88 A.3d at 1004, 1011. 

In April of 2010, the Senate Republican Caucus obtained forensic 

images of the hard drives seized from Jane Orie’s office. N.T., 12/14/2010, 

at 269. On October 29, 2012, the trial court granted Orie Melvin’s motion 

and directed the Senate Republican Caucus to make available to Orie Melvin 

“all original electronic evidence which, in whole or in part, was examined or 

searched in response to requests made by or subpoenas served by the 

Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office.” Trial Court Order, 10/29/2012, 

at 1. On November 7, 2012, after receipt of a motion for reconsideration 

filed by the Senate Republican Caucus, the trial court vacated its prior order 

and referred the matter to Judge Zottola. On two subsequent occasions, 

Judge Zottola denied requests by Orie Melvin for the original hard drives. 
J-A16007-14 

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N.T., 12/21/2012, at 51-52 (“What it does is eliminate the safeguards that 

the Court put in place with respect to privileged information.”); N.T., 

1/11/2013, at 18-19. 

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 

or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. A Brady violation occurs when: (1) 

the prosecutor has suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence, whether 

exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant; and (3) the 

suppression prejudiced the defendant. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 

A.2d 294, 305 (Pa. 2002). 

Rule 573 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure was 

promulgated in response to the dictates of Brady. Commonwealth v. 

Green, 640 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. 1994). Rule 573 provides, in relevant 

part, as follows: 

Rule 573. Pretrial Discovery and Inspection 

 * * * 

(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth. 

(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the 

defendant, and subject to any protective order 

which the Commonwealth might obtain under this 

rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to the 

defendant's attorney all of the following requested 
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items or information, provided they are material to 

the instant case. The Commonwealth shall, when 

applicable, permit the defendant's attorney to 

inspect and copy or photograph such items. 

(a) Any evidence favorable to the 

accused that is material either to guilt or 

to punishment, and is within the 

possession or control of the attorney for 

the Commonwealth; 

 * * * 

(f) any tangible objects, including 

documents, photographs, fingerprints, 

or other tangible evidence. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B). Upon a finding of violation of Rule 573, the trial court 

“may order such party to permit discovery or inspection, may grant a 

continuance, or may prohibit such party from introducing evidence not 

disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant, or it may enter such other 

order as it deems just under the circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E). 

In this case, Orie Melvin does not deny that she received all of the 

evidence obtained by the Commonwealth after the privilege reviews by the 

Special Master and Judge Zottola. Instead, Orie Melvin argues that 

pursuant to Rule 573(B)(1)(f), she had a right to inspect and examine the 

original computer equipment seized from Jane Orie’s legislative office. Orie 

Melvin’s Brief at 63. She further contends that this is a matter of 

fundamental fairness, as “the Commonwealth was permitted to search the 

computer equipment for potentially relevant information and was permitted 
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to introduce evidence from that equipment at trial but Orie Melvin was 

denied the same opportunity.” Id. at 65. 

We disagree for several reasons. First, Orie Melvin has not cited to 

any evidence in the certified record to support her claim that the 

Commonwealth had any opportunity to search the original computer 

equipment seized from Jane Orie’s office. As set forth hereinabove, the 

District Attorney’s office had no access to the original computer equipment 

or other evidence seized from Jane Orie’s office, as it was within the 

exclusive control of Judge Zottola and the Special Master. Both the District 

Attorney and Orie Melvin received the same access to the same nonprivileged evidence forthcoming after the privilege reviews. In her 

appellate brief, Orie Melvin has not identified for this Court any evidence the 

Commonwealth introduced at trial obtained from Jane Orie’s office to which 

she was denied access (either by the trial court, Judge Zottola, or the 

Commonwealth). 

Second, Brady and Rule 573 set forth the Commonwealth’s 

obligations to provide discovery materials that are within its possession to 

the defense. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1) (“the Commonwealth shall 

disclose to the defendant’s attorney”); Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 

A.2d 237, 253 (Pa. 2008) (the Commonwealth does not violate disclosure 

rules when it fails to disclose to the defense evidence that it does not 

possess and of which it is unaware); see also Commonwealth v. 
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Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 97 (Pa. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Gribble, 703 A.2d 426 (Pa. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by

Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001)). As a result of the 

procedures established by Judge Zottola, the Commonwealth here did not 

have custody or control of the original computer equipment sought by Orie 

Melvin, and had no ability to produce it to Orie Melvin. As a result, Orie 

Melvin has not established a violation of the Commonwealth’s obligations 

under Brady or Rule 573. 

Finally, no Brady violation occurs when the evidence is available to 

the defense through non-governmental sources. Commonwealth v. 

Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 244-45 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 954 

(2007); Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 696 (Pa. 2003); 

Paddy, 800 A.2d at 305. The certified record in this case establishes that 

the non-governmental entities asserting privilege claims with respect to the 

evidence in question, including the Senate Republican Caucus and Jane 

Orie, had duplicate copies of the hard drives removed from Jane Orie’s 

office. N.T., 1/11/2013, at 18-19. Orie Melvin could presumably have 

obtained the requested access to these sources from one or more of these 

entities or individuals. 

H. Violation of Discovery Rights Regarding Superior Court Computer 

and Electronic Evidence 

For her ninth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin maintains that the trial 

court erred in denying her requests to examine the computers used by her 
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judicial staff in the possession of the Superior Court. In response to 

subpoenas issued by the Commonwealth, the Administrative Office of 

Pennsylvania Courts (“AOPC”) performed searches on the Superior Court’s 

computers using key search terms set forth in the subpoena. N.T., 

11/19/2012, at 8-9. The AOPC then provided the documents produced 

from these searches to the Commonwealth and to Orie Melvin. Id. On 

October 29, 2012, the trial court, at the request of, inter alia, Orie Melvin, 

entered an order directing the AOPC to “make available for inspection and 

examination by the computer forensic experts of the Defendants all original 

electronic evidence which, in whole or in part, was examined or searched in 

response to requests made by or subpoenas served by the Allegheny 

County District Attorney’s Office.” Order, 10/20/2012, at 1. 

In response, the AOPC moved for reconsideration, emphasizing that it 

had not granted the Commonwealth physical access to the Superior Court’s 

computers, and that instead it had merely run the searches delineated in 

the Commonwealth’s subpoenas. Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 

October 29, 2012 Order and for a Protective Order, 11/19/2012, at 2. The 

AOPC objected to permitting Orie Melvin’s experts access to the Superior 

Court’s computers on a variety of grounds, including that it exposed all of 

the Superior Court’s judicial data -- much of which is confidential and 

privileged -- to third parties, and indicated that no mechanism existed to 

limit examination and inspection to information relevant to this case. Id. at 
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4. The trial court heard oral argument on November 19, 2012, at which 

time counsel for Orie Melvin renewed the request for access to the Superior 

Court’s computers to “test the authenticity, the validity, and the accuracy of 

the information that the AOPC produced to the Commonwealth which the 

Commonwealth wishes to introduce into evidence against our client.” N.T., 

11/19/2012, at 6. The trial court refused to do so, vacating its October 29, 

2012 order. The trial court permitted Orie Melvin to depose the AOPC 

personnel who conducted the key word searches. 

No Brady or Rule 573 issues are presented here, as Orie Melvin does 

not suggest that the Commonwealth had possession or control of the 

Superior Court’s computers. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s denial 

of Orie Melvin’s discovery motion for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Mendez, 74 A.3d 256, 260 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

(“Generally, on review of an order granting or denying a discovery request, 

an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard.”), appeal denied, 

87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2014). Here we find no abuse of discretion. Orie Melvin 

offered no basis to dispute the AOPC’s contention that permitting access to 

the Superior Court’s computers would provide unauthorized access to a 

myriad of privileged and confidential documents, and offered no specific 

procedures or methods that could have been employed to satisfy the 

AOPC’s confidentiality and privilege concerns. Moreover, to the extent that 

Orie Melvin sought evidence from the Superior Court’s computers that had 
J-A16007-14 

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not been produced by the AOPC in response to the Commonwealth’s 

subpoenas, Orie Melvin could have issued her own subpoena to the AOPC 

requesting the production of such information. The certified record does 

not reflect that she ever did so. 

I. Defects in the Preliminary Hearing 

For her tenth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin claims that at the 

preliminary hearing the Commonwealth failed to make out a prima facie

case to support the charges for theft of services, misapplication of 

government property, or conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate evidence. 

Orie Melvin’s Brief at 68-74. The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to 

avoid the incarceration or trial of a defendant unless there is sufficient 

evidence to establish that a crime was committed and a probability that the 

defendant was connected therewith. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2004). Once a defendant has 

gone to trial and has been found guilty of the crime or crimes charged, 

however, any defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984 (Pa. 2013). 

Because Orie Melvin was convicted of the above-referenced crimes following 

a trial on the merits, she is entitled to no relief on any alleged defects in the 

rulings of the magisterial district judge at the preliminary hearing. 
J-A16007-14 

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J. Evidence of Productivity of Orie Melvin’s Judicial Chambers 

For her eleventh issue on appeal, Orie Melvin argues the trial court 

erred in refusing to permit her to admit into evidence reports relating to the 

productivity of her judicial chambers in 2003 and 2009. Our standard of 

review for a trial court's evidentiary rulings is narrow, as the admissibility of 

evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only if 

the trial court has abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 

A.2d 1094, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 956 A.2d 432 (Pa. 

2008). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is 

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, the exercise of judgment 

that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill will or 

partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. Commonwealth v. 

Mendez, 74 A.3d 256, 260 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 

(Pa. 2014). 

On February 8, 2013, Orie Melvin called Delores Bianco (“Bianco”), 

the Deputy Director for the Superior Court, to testify on her behalf. Bianco 

testified that she had brought with her monthly reports provided to the 

judicial chambers of each Superior Court judge on a monthly basis, from 

2003 through 2009. N.T., 2/8/2013, at 2148-49. These reports begin in 

January of each year and cumulate the included information each month, 

such that the December report shows the information for the full year. Id.

According to Bianco, these monthly reports show, inter alia, the number of 
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cases assigned to, and completed by, each Superior Court judge, including 

Orie Melvin. Id. On cross-examination and through questions posed by the

trial judge, Bianco indicated that the reports contain only “raw numbers,” 

and provide no information about the nature or complexity of the cases, or 

how long or short the memoranda or opinions deciding the cases may be. 

Id. at 2153-53. Similarly, Bianco acknowledged that the reports made no 

attempt to reflect the quality of the memorandum or opinion. Id. at 2154. 

Prior to Bianco testifying about information in the reports specifically 

relating to Orie Melvin or any other Superior Court judge, counsel for Orie 

Melvin moved for the admission into evidence of the exhibits containing the 

monthly reports. The trial court deferred ruling on the admissibility. Id. at 

2161. 

On February 12, 2013, the trial court ruled that these monthly 

reports, and four charts summarizing their contents, were irrelevant and 

thus not admissible. Id. at 2536. 

On appeal, Orie Melvin contends that this evidence was relevant to 

negate the Commonwealth’s accusation that she diverted judicial resources 

to political activity in 2003 and 2009. As her counsel argued, 

In this case, Judge, the determination of whether or 

not the services were properly utilized by my client, 

or whether they were improperly or illegally diverted 

to an illegal exercise or non-judicial exercise is a 

determination that has to be evaluated by the factfinder, the jury. That one measure, one measure, 

there may be others, but one measure is most 
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clearly what cases were decided, whether they were 

decided on time, and whether there was that 

productivity by the chambers. ... That measure of 

productivity indicates that the services are being 

properly applied to the decisions of the cases before 

the Court. 

Id. at 2520-21, 2535. Counsel also asserted that the evidence bore 

directly on the credibility of former members of her judicial staff who 

testified that they spent a significant percentage of their workdays 

performing political, rather than judicial, tasks: 

That is the very point of the argument, Judge. 

Sasinoski testifies, Squires testifies, Ms. Weibel[20]

comes in here and testifies, and they say that there 

has been a theft, there has been a depreciation or a 

taking from the workday. Three hours a day in 

2003 by Squires. For god’s sake, the evidence of 

the productivity of the offices defies what the 

testimony – it’s a credibility challenge. 

Id. at 2533. 

For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the trial court’s 

decision not to admit the proffered evidence because we agree that the 

proffered evidence was not relevant. Evidence is relevant evidence if it 

tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence. Pa.R.E. 401; Commonwealth v. Dillon, 

925 A.2d 131, 136 (Pa. 2007). 

 

20 Jackelyn Weibel is a detective in the Allegheny County District Attorney’s 

office who testified as an expert in forensic accounting. N.T., 2/7/2013, at 

2020. She testified as to the value of the services Orie Melvin allegedly 

diverted to her own use. Id. at 2048 ($27,702.68 in 2003 and $5,773.03 

in 2009). 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the monthly 

reports were irrelevant to the charges against Orie Melvin, as we conclude 

that her relevance arguments misconstrue the nature of the crime of theft 

of services. To establish a theft of services under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926(b), 

the Commonwealth only had to establish that Orie Melvin utilized her 

judicial staff for purposes other than judicial work. The only appropriate 

inquiry under section 3926(b) is whether Orie Melvin required her judicial 

staff to perform, for her personal benefit, non-judicial (i.e., political) 

duties,21 and it is irrelevant that they also performed their judicial tasks. 

The Commonwealth had no obligation to prove that the diversion of services 

resulted in an inability to complete the judicial work for which they were 

employed by the Commonwealth. As the trial court correctly observed, 

“proof of no loss to the Commonwealth is not a defense to the charge of 

theft of services by diversion of services.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/2013, 

at 15. 

In addition, the monthly reports provided only statistics on the output 

of the entire chambers for the relevant time periods, and thus offer no 

indication as to the productivity of any particular law clerk during that 

period or in general. As such, they do not, as Orie Melvin now contends, 

tend to contradict the testimony of a specific law clerk regarding the portion 

 

21 As explained infra at 69-70, no judicial employee testified that he or she 

performed political services at Orie Melvin’s direction on a volunteer basis. 
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of his or her time that was spent on non-judicial tasks.22 In this regard, we 

note that the monthly reports offered no insight into the productivity (or 

lack thereof) of Squires or Janine Orie, who as secretaries had no direct 

responsibility for researching or drafting the judicial decisions generated by 

Orie Melvin’s chambers. 

Finally, even to the extent that the monthly reports in question 

provided some indication of the productivity of Orie Melvin’s Superior Court 

chambers as a whole, the trial court retained broad discretion to exclude 

the evidence as potentially misleading or confusing to the jury. See, e.g., 

Leahy v. McClain, 732 A.2d 619, 624 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 751 

A.2d 192 (1999); Egelkamp v. Egelkamp, 524 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa. Super. 

1987); Gallegor by Gallegor v. Felder, 478 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 

1984). Without a substantial quantum of additional information, the 

monthly reports at issue here may have done more to mislead and confuse 

the jury than to instruct it. For example, the monthly reports did not reflect 

the number or complexity of the issues in the cases assigned to Orie Melvin 

in any relevant time period, and similarly did not show how Orie Melvin’s 

chambers managed its inventory of cases at specific points in time, 

including, for instance, whether decisions on more complex and/or lengthy 

cases were deferred until after elections in favor of simpler, more 

 

22 For example, Degener testified that during election periods “the appeals 

were still being turned out” because the law clerks “just worked hard” at 

“getting it done.” N.T., 2/5/2013, at 1491. 
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straightforward and routine cases. The monthly reports also set forth only 

the number of cases circulated and filed during the relevant time periods, 

but do not specify the length of the individual memoranda and opinions 

produced or the complexity of the analysis involved in each such decision. 

Without this additional foundational information, the monthly reports may 

have presented a highly misleading representation of the productivity of 

Orie Melvin’s judicial staff at any specific point in time, and thus the trial 

court was within its discretion to exclude this evidence on this basis. 

Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to admit these monthly reports into evidence, no relief is due on 

Orie Melvin’s eleventh issue on appeal. 

K. Improper Comments by Trial Judge 

For her twelfth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin contends that the trial 

court deprived her of a fair trial by making the following communications to 

the jury: 

• Expressed personal disbelief that court employees 

had no set or minimum work hours, N.T., 2/6/2013, 

at 1719, and after stating ‘I don’t understand any of 

this,’ proceeded to question the AOPC Human 

Resource Director himself concerning this issue, id.

at 1729-30. Apparently dissatisfied with the 

answers to his own questions, the court then said: 

‘I didn’t clear anything up.’ Id. at 1733. 

• Offered his personal opinion that time spent 

performing political tasks was not de minimis and 

the defense strategy of totaling minutes allegedly 

spent on political tasks was not credible. N.T., 
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2/1/2013, at 1068-69 (‘It really is a 

mischaracterization. It really is. I understand that 

you are taking down two and three minutes, but 

there is so much more being done. It’s a 

mischaracterization.’). 

• Offered his personal opinion that defense strategies 

were not coherent or persuasive. (See, e.g., N.T., 

1/29/2013, at 429-30 (‘[T]o be perfectly honest, I 

have no idea what you are trying to do.’); N.T., 

2/5/2013, at 1463 (‘I would really like to know 

where you are going. This is supposed to be crossexamination. Where are we going with this?’); Id.

at 1466 (‘I’m reluctant to tell any lawyer how to try 

their case, but I need to know where you are going 

with this.’). 

• Improperly limited relevant cross-examination of 

Pavlot concerning a pleading that was filed on her 

behalf in federal court because the pleading was 

signed by her lawyer, not Pavlot. N.T., 1/29/2013, 

at 463-64. 

• Assumed that the introduction of false evidence by 

the prosecutor concerning the ‘Women in the 

Profession’ materials was a mistake, N.T., 2/1/2013, 

at 1237, and reinforced the notion of a mistake in a 

later colloquy with defense counsel, N.T., 2/4/2013, 

at 1276-77. 

• Insisted that Sasinoski was ‘mistaken’ when she 

falsely testified that Orie Melvin took a car 

allowance from the Superior Court. N.T., 

2/12/2013, at 2504-08. 

• Made inconsistent hearsay rulings that favored the 

prosecution. For example, when the defense 

objected to admission of a hearsay statement by a 

former Senate staffer, the trial court ruled that the

testimony must be allowed in front of jury because 

‘you don’t know it’s hearsay until you hear what it 

is.’ N.T., 1/31/2013, at 890. Further, when the 

Commonwealth sought to elicit testimony from a 

former Senate staffer concerning advice that she 
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received, the trial court allowed the testimony 

because ‘somebody told her, it’s called state of 

mind.’ N.T., 2/5/2013, at 1675. By contrast, the 

trial court disallowed legitimate questioning of Judge

Joseph Del Sole concerning the basis for his 

personnel actions concerning Lisa Sasinoski. N.T., 

2/7/2013, at 2102. 

• Shut down questioning of the Commonwealth’s 

expert concerning judicial staffers completing all of 

their assigned work by ruling that the question ‘was 

never asked,’ N.T., 2/7/2013, at 2071, when in fact 

each judicial staffer was asked whether all judicial 

work was completed. N.T., 2/1/2013, at 1215-16; 

N.T., 2/5/2013, at 1586-87, 1591. 

Orie Melvin’s Brief at 79-80. 

Orie Melvin did not specifically raise any of these issues in her Rule 

1925(b) concise statement of issues to be complained of on appeal, and 

thus, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. 

Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 672 (Pa. 2014). Moreover, they are waived for 

lack of argument in Orie Melvin’s appellate brief. A judge’s remarks to 

counsel during trial do not warrant reversal unless the remarks so prejudice 

the jurors against the defendant that “it may reasonably be said [that the 

remarks] deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.”23

 

 

23 We also note that in its charge to the jury, the trial court advised as 

follows: 

I have not attempted to indicate my opinion 

concerning the weight which should be given to any 

of the evidence, or part of it. I do not want you to 

think that I have. If during the course of the trial I 

have asked any questions of the witnesses, you are 

not to attach any more significance to those 
J-A16007-14 

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Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 287 (Pa. 2006) (citing 

Commonwealth v. England, 375 A.2d 1292, 1300 (Pa. 1977)). In her 

appellate brief, Orie Melvin fails to develop these claims by detailing the 

circumstances and context of each trial court statement, or otherwise 

explaining how each of these statement prejudiced her or deprived her of a 

fair trial. Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 

715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding waiver results when appellant fails to 

properly develop issue on appeal) (citing Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 

A.2d 948, 957 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 727 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1998)); 

see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 721 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 

1998) (“We decline to become appellant’s counsel. When issues are not 

properly raised and developed in briefs, when briefs are wholly inadequate 

to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits 

thereof.”); Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Super. 

2006), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. 

Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 

955 (Pa 2007). 

 

questions and answers than to any other questions 

and answers. If during the trial I have exhibited 

what you felt to be annoyance or displeasure 

towards any witness or any lawyers, or I made any 

comment or displayed any facial expressions, you 

are not to assume that I am attempting to lead you 

to render a particular verdict. 

N.T., 2/15/2013, at 2810. 
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L. Sufficiency of Evidence 

For her thirteenth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions for theft of services, 

misapplication of entrusted property, and conspiracy to tamper with or 

fabricate evidence. We apply the following standard of review when 

considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency 

of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence 

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the

verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable 

the fact-finder to find every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above 

test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we 

note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that 

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the finder of 

fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943–44 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

appeal dismissed, 54 A.3d 22 (Pa. 2012). 
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1. Theft of Services 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code is entitled 

“Theft of services.” Its subsection (b) provides as follows:

(b) Diversion of services.--A person is guilty of 

theft if, having control over the disposition of 

services of others to which he is not entitled, he 

knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit 

or to the benefit of another not entitled thereto. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926(b). Subsection (c)(2) states that when the value of 

the services diverted is more than $50, the crime will be graded in 

accordance with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3903. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3926(c)(2). 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3903(a.1) provides that a theft of services with a value in 

excess of $2,000 constitutes a felony of the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3903(a.1). 

With respect to her conviction under Count 1 for diversion of the 

services of her judicial staff, Orie Melvin directs our attention to the trial 

testimony of David Kutz (“Kutz”), AOPC’s Director of Human Resources, 

who indicated that judges on the Superior Court have the authority to set 

office policy for members of their judicial staff, including how many hours 

the law clerks and secretaries work. N.T., 2/6/2013, at 1704-06. Kutz 

further testified that law clerks and secretaries did not have to fill out time 

sheets to get paid. Id. at 1727. Based upon this testimony, Orie Melvin 

contends that she was “vested with complete discretion to direct the work 

of her staff and secretaries” and that there was “no requirement that those 
J-A16007-14 

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employees devote any particular number of hours to their judicial 

assignments.” Orie Melvin’s Brief at 82. 

We cannot agree that Kutz’s testimony precluded a finding that Orie 

Melvin diverted services within the meaning of subsection 3925(b). At 

most, Kutz’s testimony established that Superior Court judges have the 

discretion to set office policy and the number of hours per week that 

employees are expected to work – in other words, to prescribe how and in 

what manner the judicial functions of their office are carried out. This in 

no way leads to a conclusion that Superior Court judges have any authority 

to divert the services of judicial employees to their own personal 

benefit. 

No judicial employee testified that he or she performed political 

services on a volunteer basis. For example, Sasinoski testified that she 

performed political tasks for Orie Melvin’s campaign so that she could keep 

her job, even though she knew that doing so was wrong. N.T., 2/1/2013, 

at 1105. Degener also testified that he thought that doing political work 

was wrong, but that Orie Melvin was his supervisor and he did not believe 

that objecting to doing the work would “stop it.” Id. at 1491, 1497. 

Squires testified that the political work she did was outside her “judicially 

required responsibilities,” but that she performed the political tasks 

assigned to her because “it was given to me by [Janine Orie] to complete 

during my workday.” Id. at 1605-06. 
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With respect to her conviction under Count 3 for diversion of the 

services of Jane Orie’s legislative staff, Orie Melvin claims that the 

Commonwealth offered no evidence to prove that she had control over the 

services of those employees, and that no legislative employee testified that 

Orie Melvin directed them to perform any political work on her behalf. Orie 

Melvin’s Brief at 83. 

In rejecting this argument, the trial court noted that numerous 

members of Jane Orie’s legislative staff testified that they performed a 

substantial quantity of political work on Orie Melvin’s political campaigns. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2013, at 22. The certified record supports this 

finding. In this regard, Pavlot testified that that she received numerous 

directives to perform political activity from both Jane Orie and Janine Orie, 

and that Jane Orie specifically advised her any order she received from 

either Janine Orie and/or Orie Melvin was to be treated as an order directly 

from her: 

Q. Why would you take orders from either 

[Janine Orie or Orie Melvin]? 

A. Because [Jane Orie] told me, she told me 

from the beginning, she said, look, if either of 

my sisters, Janine or Joan, ever give you a 

directive or a request, whatever it might be, 

you need to follow that as though I were 

telling you to do that. 

Q. As a practical matter, did you receive requests 

from either [Janine Orie or Orie Melvin] that 

were political or campaign related? 
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A. Yes sir, I did. 

N.T., 1/28/2013, at 199. 

Furthermore, on appeal Orie Melvin does not challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence in support of her conviction under Count 4 for conspiring 

with Jane Orie and Janine Orie to divert the services of Jane Orie’s 

legislative staff to her political campaigns. Accordingly, even if Orie Melvin 

did not herself direct members of Jane Orie’s legislative staff to perform 

political tasks on her behalf, she is nevertheless responsible for all of the 

acts of both Janine Orie and Jane Orie in doing so. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(“Even if the conspirator did not act as a principal in committing the 

underlying crime, he is still criminally liable for the actions of his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.”), affirmed, 844 A.2d 1228 

(Pa. 2004). 

2. Misapplication of Entrusted Property 

Orie Melvin next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

her conviction under Count 5 for misapplication of entrusted property. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4113(a), entitled “Misapplication of entrusted property and 

property of government or financial institution,” provides as follows: 

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense 

if he applies or disposes of property that has been 

entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the 

government or of a financial institution, in a manner 
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which he knows is unlawful and involves substantial 

risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the 

property or to a person for whose benefit the 

property was entrusted. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4113(a). Subsection (b) provides that the offense is a 

misdemeanor of the second degree if the amount involved exceeds $50, 

and a misdemeanor of the third degree if the amount involved does not 

exceed $50.24 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4113(b). 

The trial court found that the Commonwealth had introduced sufficient 

evidence to support this conviction based upon testimony that Orie Melvin, 

either directly or through others at her direction (including Janine Orie), had 

used Superior Court office facilities and office equipment for political 

campaign activities. Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2013, at 24-25. On appeal, 

Orie Melvin contends that the Commonwealth did not introduce any 

evidence to prove that she applied or disposed of entrusted property “in a 

manner which was unlawful and involved substantial risk of loss or 

detriment to the owner of the property.” Orie Melvin’s Brief at 84. 

We conclude that this issue has not been preserved for appellate 

review. In her statement of errors complained of on appeal, Orie Melvin 

 

24 Orie Melvin’s conviction under this provision was graded as a seconddegree felony, despite the apparent absence of any evidence of record that 

the value of the amount involved exceeded $50. Order of Sentence, 

5/7/2013, at 2 (identifying the conviction as an “M2”). Because Orie Melvin 

has not raised this issue on appeal, however, it is waived. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 903 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 133 

S.Ct. 24 (U.S. 2012). 
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states only that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction 

under subsection 4113(a), but does not identify the specific element of the 

offense for which insufficient evidence was allegedly presented. As a result, 

the trial court did not address in its Rule 1925(a) written opinion the 

specific issue now presented. For these reasons, we find the issue to be 

waived. 

If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the 

evidence was insufficient, then the 1925(b) 

statement needs to specify the element or elements 

upon which the evidence was insufficient. This Court 

can then analyze the element or elements on 

appeal. The instant 1925(b) statement simply does 

not specify the allegedly unproven elements. 

Therefore, the sufficiency issue is waived. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Although the Commonwealth did not object to this defect in Orie Melvin’s 

Rule 1925(b) concise statement, we observed in Williams that such a 

failure is of “no moment, because we apply Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in a 

predictable, uniform fashion, not in a selective manner dependent on an 

appellee’s argument ....” Id. 

3. Conspiracy to Tamper With or Fabricate Evidence

Finally, Orie Melvin claims that the Commonwealth did not introduce 

sufficient evidence to support her conviction under Count 7 for conspiracy to 

tamper with or fabricate evidence. To sustain a conviction for criminal 

conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) 
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entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another 

person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent and (3) an overt act 

was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 

753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa. Super. 2000). “This overt act need not be 

committed by the defendant; it need only be committed by a coconspirator.” Id. With respect to the agreement element, we have 

explained: 

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common 

understanding, no matter how it came into being, 

that a particular criminal objective be accomplished. 

Therefore, a conviction for conspiracy requires proof 

of the existence of a shared criminal intent. An 

explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can 

seldom, if ever, be proved and it need not be, for 

proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably 

extracted from the circumstances that attend its 

activities. Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred 

where it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, 

or circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts 

of the co-conspirators sufficiently prove the 

formation of a criminal confederation. The conduct 

of the parties and the circumstances surrounding 

their conduct may create a web of evidence linking 

the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996-97 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 784–85 (Pa. Super. 

1998) (en banc)). 

Orie Melvin argues that there was no proof of either an agreement 

with Pavlot and/or Jane Orie to tamper with evidence, or that she intended 
J-A16007-14 

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to facilitate or promote the crime of tampering. Orie Melvin’s Brief at 85. 

We disagree. Pavlot testified that after she and others in Jane Orie’s 

legislative office became aware that a student intern (Jennifer Knapp Rioja) 

had reported improprieties to the Allegheny County District Attorney’s 

office, she and Dott removed two boxes of documents from the office file 

drawers. N.T., 1/29/2013, at 330. When they were removing the boxes 

from the office, she thought she saw flashes from a camera, and 

immediately contacted Jane Orie to report that she believed someone had 

taken pictures of the removal of the boxes. Id. at 331. Pavlot testified that 

she took the boxes to her basement and planned to give them to her 

attorney, but before she could do so she received a telephone call from 

Jane Orie and Orie Melvin, which she described as follows: 

I received a phone call from Jane Orie and she said, 

Jamie, this is Jane, I have [Orie Melvin] on the 

phone. [Orie Melvin] said, hi, Jamie. I said, hi, 

Judge. And they said to me, both of them had 

identified themselves and said to me, Jamie, what’s 

in those boxes. And I said, well, there are a 

number of things in the boxes. What are in the 

files? I said it appears to be some expense reports, 

it appears to be some contributors lists, looks like 

some political literature is in there, some other 

miscellaneous things are in there. 

And [Jane Orie] said, Jamie, anything that’s political

of mine, I want you to pull those files out of those 

boxes. And [Orie Melvin] said, Jamie, anything 

political of mine, I want you to pull them out of 

those boxes. And I said, okay. But I didn’t do it. 

Id. at 333-34. 
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Viewing Pavlot’s testimony in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, as our standard of review requires, 

there is sufficient evidence to support a conspiracy between Orie Melvin, 

Jane Orie, and Pavlot to tamper with evidence. Orie Melvin argues that 

phone records do not establish that such a telephone call was ever made, 

but it is not for this Court to pass upon Pavlot’s credibility. Estepp, 17 A.3d 

at 943–44. An argument regarding the credibility of a witness’s testimony 

“goes to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281-82 (Pa. Super. 2009), 

appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010). Orie Melvin has not asserted a 

weight of the evidence claim. 

M. Accomplice Liability Jury Instructions After Commencement of 

Jury Deliberations 

For her fourteenth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin claims that the trial 

court erred in instructing the jury on the topic of accomplice liability after 

closing arguments had been completed and the jury had begun its 

deliberations. Orie Melvin’s Brief a 85. For the reasons that follow, we 

conclude that the trial court’s supplemental instruction to the jury violated 

Rule 647(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. We further 

conclude, however, that Orie Melvin has not demonstrated actual prejudice 

resulting from this violation to be entitled to any relief on appeal. 

On February 14, 2013, the trial court conducted a charging 

conference, at which time it provided the parties with a draft of its proposed 
J-A16007-14 

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charge to the jury and ruled on various requests for additional instructions. 

N.T., 2/14/2013, at 2679-2703. During this charging conference, the 

Commonwealth did not request a charge on “accomplice liability,” ask that 

the term be defined, or otherwise object to the absence of a charge or 

definition. During its charge to the jury, the trial court used the word 

“accomplice” four times, all while summarizing the charges in the 

informations filed against the co-defendants. The first three references 

took place as the trial court reviewed the charges in the information filed 

against Orie Melvin: 

Count 1: Theft of Services. The actor, and when I 

use the term actor, I’m talking about [Orie Melvin]. 

It’s a euphemism the legislature came up with. 

Having control over the disposition of services of 

others, namely actor’s Superior Court Judicial staff, 

which she personally and through Janine Orie and 

[Jane Orie], accomplices pursuant to statute, 

utilized to facilitate and promote the actor’s political 

campaign for higher judicial office during the 

election cycles in both 2003 and 2009.... 

Count 3: Theft of Services. The actor, having 

control over the disposition of services of another, 

namely, the Senatorial staff of [Jane Orie], which 

she personally and through Janine Orie and [Jane 

Orie], accomplices pursuant to statute, utilized 

to facilitate and promote the actor’s political 

campaign for higher Judicial office during the 

election cycles in both 2003 and 2009.... 

Count 5: Misapplication of Entrusted Property or 

Property of Government or Financial Institutions. 

The actor applied or disposed of property valued at 

more than $50, namely, personally and through 

Janine Orie, an accomplice pursuant to statute, 
J-A16007-14 

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used her Superior Court office facilities and office 

equipment to facilitate and promote the actor’s 

political campaign activities in her bid for higher 

judicial office in both 2003 and 2009.... 

N.T., 2/15/2013, at 2776-79. 

The fourth reference to “accomplice” occurred as the trial court 

reviewed the charges in the 2010 information filed against Janine Orie at 

docket number CP-02-CR-0010286: 

Count 2: Theft of Services. [Janine Orie], as an 

accomplice pursuant to the statute, having 

control over the disposition of the services of others, 

namely, certain members of the legislative staff of 

Senator [Jane Orie], did knowingly direct or cause 

to be directed those employees of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ... to engage in 

political fundraising and/or political campaign work, 

... on behalf of [Orie Melvin’s] 2009 Judicial 

campaign, knowingly diverting said services to the 

benefit of another not entitled thereto. 

Id. at 2785.25

 

After the trial court completed its charge, the jury began deliberations 

and later that day it posed a question concerning “the definitions as to what 

[the trial court] read to us.” N.T., 2/15/2013, at 2817. 

THE COURT: What is it you want defined, Mr. [Foreman]? 

 

25 The statute referenced in the trial court’s phrase “an accomplice 

pursuant to statute” is 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306, entitled “Liability for conduct of 

another; complicity.” Section 306 of the Criminal Code provides generally 

that a person “is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct 

or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or 

both,” and defines and explains the parameters of accomplice liability. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 306. 
J-A16007-14 

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FOREMAN: What we are asking is to have the definitions as 

to what you read to us. We all have the counts 

that we wrote down, but what we want is the 

definitions, the one through four which you read 

to us. 

A JUROR: It was the criteria that you read under each, in 

order to meet this, number one, number two, 

number three. 

THE COURT: You want the crimes? 

THE JURY: Yes. 

THE COURT: Here is what I’m going to do. I’ll will [sic] 

basically reproduce what I gave you. I’ll send 

that up, along with the Informations. 

Id. 

In the discussion between counsel and the trial court regarding how 

to respond to the jury’s inquiry,26 counsel for the Commonwealth for the 

first time asked the trial court to offer an expanded jury instruction to 

include a charge on accomplice liability. 

MR. CLAUS: Judge, I have a notice that accomplice was 

obviously read by you as part of the charges. 

That is part of the standard charging, and I 

thought if that’s what — 

THE COURT: Well, you are little late, Mr. Claus, don’t you 

think? 

MR. CLAUS: Well— 

 

26 After a review of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, including 

in particular Rule 646(C)(3), the trial court reconsidered its initial decision 

to provide the jury with the informations. N.T., 2/19/2013, at 2837. 

Instead, the trial court prepared a handout for the jury, agreeable to the 

parties, listing the elements and defenses for each charge. Id. at 2841. 
J-A16007-14 

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THE COURT: Yeah, I do. 

N.T., 2/15/2013, at 2820. 

Although the trial court initially indicated that the request for an 

instruction on accomplice liability was too late, it agreed to consider it over 

the holiday weekend. On the following Tuesday morning, the trial court 

stated that it had reconsidered and would read to the jury an instruction on 

accomplice liability provided in writing by the Commonwealth, to which 

counsel for Orie Melvin immediately objected27: 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Claus would like the charge on 

accomplice given, and I don’t have a problem 

with that. 

MR. CASEY: I would object to Your Honor doing that. I think 

its prejudicial to the defendant. He had the 

opportunity to take exceptions on Friday to the 

charge, and did not take an exception. And I 

understand that the Court — 

THE COURT: Mr. Casey, a song written I heard a long time 

ago that Kenny Rogers sang, To know when to 

hold them, and know when to fold them. I’m 

going to let this go out with the jury. I’m going 

to give them the exact same thing you gave to 

me. And I’m also going to charge them on 

accomplice liability. 

MR. CASEY: I would take exception to accomplice liability. 

THE COURT: You can take all the exception you want. 

MR. CASEY: Thank you. 

 

27 Counsel objected to the giving of the charge itself, but not to any of the 

specific language contained therein. 
J-A16007-14 

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N.T., 2/19/2013, at 2837-38. The trial court then instructed the jury as 

follows: 

I used the term, and you will see in the document 

that you get, of accomplice, and I did not define it 

for you. There is a way that one defendant can be 

proven liable for the conduct of another person or 

persons, and that is when the defendant is an 

accomplice of the person who actually commits the 

crime at issue. To be an accomplice, a person does 

not have to agree to help someone else. The 

person is an accomplice if he or she on his or her 

own acts to help the other person commit a crime. 

More specifically, you may find a defendant is an 

accomplice of another in this case if the following 

two elements are proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

One, that the defendant had the intent of promoting

or facilitating the commission of the offense; and 

two, that the defendant solicits, encourages, 

requests the other person to commit it, or aids the 

other person in planning or committing it. 

Accomplice liability must be assessed separately for 

each crime charged if two or more crimes are 

committed. The defendant before you is being 

charged as an accomplice for each of those crimes. 

He or she may not be found liable unless it is shown 

that each individual crime, that this defendant had 

the intent of promoting the specific crime and then 

solicited, encouraged, requested the other person to 

commit it, or aided the other person in planning or 

committing it. 

In other words, you must decide whether the 

prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 

this defendant was an accomplice for the first crime 

or the second crime, et cetera. 
J-A16007-14 

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It is important to understand that a person is not an 

accomplice merely because he or she is present 

when a crime is committed, or knows that a crime is 

being committed. To be an accomplice, the 

defendant must specifically intend to help bring 

about the crime by assisting another in its 

commission. 

A person who is an accomplice will not be 

responsible for a crime if and only if the person[,] 

before the other person commits the crime[,] either 

stops his or her own effort to promote or facilitate 

the commission of a crime, and either wholly 

deprives his or her previous efforts in effectiveness 

in the commission of the crime, or gives timely 

warnings to law enforcement. 

N.T., 2/19/2013, at 2842-44.28

 

 

28 In Janine Orie’s case only, on February 21, 2013, two days after the 

supplemental charge, the jury asked two questions regarding accomplice 

liability, namely “can we get a more defined explanation of ‘accomplice?’” 

and “[c]an it be applied to any of the charges?” The trial court then 

instructed the jury as follows: 

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, to be an 

accomplice, a person does not have to agree to help 

someone else. The person is an accomplice if he or 

she on his or her own acts to help the other person 

commit the crime knowingly. 

More specifically, you may find the defendant is an 

accomplice of another in this case if the following 

two elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

A, that the defendant had the intent of promoting or 

facilitating the commission of the offense of theft of 

services and, two, that the defendant solicits, 

commands, encourages, requests the other person 

to commit it or aids, agrees to aid or attempts to aid

the other person in planning or committing it. 
J-A16007-14 

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Rule 647(A) provides as follows: 

(A) Any party may submit to the trial judge written 

requests for instructions to the jury. Such requests 

shall be submitted within a reasonable time before 

the closing arguments, and at the same time copies 

thereof shall be furnished to the other parties. 

Before closing arguments, the trial judge shall 

inform the parties on the record of the judge’s 

rulings on all written requests and which 

instructions shall be submitted to the jury in writing. 

The trial judge shall charge the jury after the 

arguments are completed. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(A). 

Rule 647(A)29 was amended in 1985 to change prior practice, 

pursuant to which the trial court did not rule on proposed jury instructions 

until after counsel for the parties had completed their closing arguments to 

the jury. As this Court recognized in Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 546 

A.2d 79 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal denied, 559 A.2d 35 (Pa. 1989), 

The difference in the procedure following the 1986 

amendment is that the court now is required to 

rule on proposed written jury instructions before 

closing arguments and charging the jury whereas 

 

It is important to understand that a person is not an 

accomplice merely because he or she is present 

when a crime is committed or knows that a crime is 

being committed. To be an accomplice, the 

defendant must specifically intend to help bring 

about the crime by assisting another in its 

commission. 

N.T., 2/21/2013, at 2852-53. 

29 On March 1, 2000 (effective July 1, 1985), Rule 1119(A) was 

renumbered as Rule 647(A). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647 Credits. 
J-A16007-14 

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under the old procedure the court ruled on the 

requested jury instructions after closing arguments 

and the charge to jury. 

Id. at 81 (emphasis in original). Noting that Rule 647(A) effectively mirrors 

Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court indicated that 

under both rules, the trial court “is required to rule on all proposed jury 

instructions prior to charging the jury and closing summations.” Id. We 

further recognized that “[t]he purpose of this rule is to require the judge to 

inform [counsel] in a fair way what the charge is going to be, so that they 

may intelligently argue the case to jury.” Id. (citing United States v. 

Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1262 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also Commonwealth 

v. Alston, 748 A.2d 677, 679 (Pa. Super.) (same), appeal denied, 795 A.2d 

970 (Pa. 2000). At bottom, the rule requires the trial court to provide the 

parties with adequate notice of the instruction before closing argument, and 

the rule is plainly violated when the trial court presents a new theory of 

liability, or otherwise materially modifies the original instructions, after 

closing arguments have been completed. See generally United States v. 

Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1986). 

The trial court’s decision to issue a supplemental instruction to the 

jury on accomplice liability in this case after closing arguments violated Rule 

647(A). As indicated hereinabove, at no time prior to closing arguments did 

the trial court advise counsel that it intended to instruct the jury on the 

specifics of accomplice liability, and the Commonwealth did not request a 
J-A16007-14 

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charge on accomplice liability or object to the absence of such a charge. It 

was only after closing arguments and after the jury began deliberating that 

the Commonwealth first requested that the trial court instruct the jury, 

through a supplemental charge, that Orie Melvin could be convicted as an 

accomplice. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the initial charge 

contained an instruction on accomplice liability and that, in any event, the 

jury knew that Orie Melvin could be found liable as an accomplice. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 90 (“In charging the jury Judge Nauhaus 

instructed the jury that [Orie Melvin] had been charged as an accomplice 

but did not define the term.”). id. at 92 (“Accomplice liability had always 

been an issue in the case and the jury had been told that they could find 

[Orie Melvin] guilty as an accomplice.”). We disagree. First, the trial 

court’s initial charge did not instruct the jury that Orie Melvin was subject to 

accomplice liability. As set forth hereinabove, in summarizing the charges 

in the informations filed against Orie Melvin and Janine Orie during its 

charge to the jury, the trial court referred to “accomplice” on four 

occasions. A review of those four references reflects that on no occasion 

did the trial court refer to Orie Melvin as an accomplice. To the contrary, in 

every such reference, the trial court referred to either or both of her sisters, 

Janine Orie and Jane Orie, as the accomplices of Orie Melvin. The 

contention that Janine Orie and Jane Orie were the accomplices of Orie 
J-A16007-14 

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Melvin and/or that Orie Melvin may have acted through accomplices to 

commit various crimes does not, of course, make Orie Melvin herself an 

accomplice. At no time did the trial court ever refer to Orie Melvin as an 

accomplice of her sisters (or anyone else). 

Second, it is simply untrue that Orie Melvin was charged as an 

accomplice or that jury knew Orie Melvin could be found liable as an 

accomplice. In its August 14, 2012 information filed against Orie Melvin, 

the Commonwealth did not charge her as an accomplice in any of the seven 

listed counts. Information, 8/14/2012, at 1-3. Similarly, at trial the 

Commonwealth never referred to Orie Melvin as an accomplice in either its 

opening or closing arguments to the jury, and on appeal it points us to no 

evidence that it introduced at trial to establish her status as an 

accomplice.30 Conversely, Orie Melvin does not suggest or argue that there 

was no evidence to support her conviction as an accomplice; she only 

argues that she was prejudiced by the timing of the charge. 

 

30 In Commonwealth v. Spots, 716 A.2d 580 (Pa.), cert. denied, 526 

U.S. 499 (1998), our Supreme Court held that it was not error for the trial 

court to instruct the jury on accomplice liability even though the defendant 

had been charged only as a principle, “as long as the defendant is put on 

notice that the Commonwealth may pursue theories of liability that link the 

defendant and another in the commission of crimes.” Id. at 588; see also 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 482 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa. Super. 1984) 

(despite being charged only as principal, defendant had sufficient notice of 

potential for accomplice liability theory, and trial court properly instructed 

jury on accomplice liability); Commonwealth v. McDuffie, 466 A.2d 660 

(Pa. Super. 1983) “[T]he record before us shows that appellant should have 

been aware that liability might be imposed on him for the acts and conduct 

of [another].”). 
J-A16007-14 

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For these reasons, the trial court’s supplemental charge on 

accomplice liability advised the jury, for the first time, that Orie Melvin 

could be convicted on a new theory of criminal liability (accomplice liability). 

Because this supplemental charge to the jury occurred after Orie Melvin’s 

closing argument, it violated Rule 647(A). 

The Commonwealth also cites this Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Kidd, 380 A.2d 416 (Pa. Super. 1977), for the 

proposition that where “a jury submits on its own motion a question to the 

court indicating confusion or a request for clarification, the court may 

properly clarify the jury’s doubt or confusion.” Id. at 419 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Peterman, 244 A.2d 723 (Pa. 1968)); see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (“After the jury has retired to consider its verdict, 

additional or correctional instructions may be given by the trial judge in the 

presence of all parties ....”). In this case, however, the trial court’s 

supplemental instruction cannot be categorized as an attempt to clarify any 

“doubt or confusion” expressed by the jury. To the contrary, the jury made 

clear that it wanted to be informed again on the elements of the crimes 

charged, and in response the trial court provided the jury with exactly that, 

namely a handout with a list of the elements of each of the crimes against 

the co-defendants and their corresponding defenses. At no time did the 

jury request any information (definitional or otherwise) about accomplice 

liability, and the definition of accomplice was not an element of any crime 
J-A16007-14 

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charged in this case, as the trial court acknowledged. N.T., 2/15/2013, at 

2821 (originally advising the prosecutor that the “definition of accomplice is 

not an element of the crime” and that as a result it would not be included in 

the handout to be provided to the jury). 

A violation of Rule 647(A), however, does not ipso facto mandate a 

reversal for a new trial. In Alston, this Court reviewed its prior decision in 

Hendricks before concluding that “prejudice is indeed a mandatory 

component” of a Rule 647(A) inquiry. 

[T]he Hendricks court quoted federal case law when 

it stated that ‘[f]ailure of the court to comply with

Rule 30 requires the granting of a new trial if 

“counsel's closing argument was prejudicially 

affected thereby.”’ [Hendricks, 546 A.2d at 81] 

(quoting United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 

1452 (9th Cir. 1983)). Further, the Hendricks court 

analyzed in great detail the jury instruction requests 

made by counsel and the closing argument made to 

the jury, drawing a nexus between the court's error 

and counsel’s specific statements. Finally, the 

Hendricks holding is quite clear: ‘Accordingly, we 

conclude that the court’s failure to inform counsel of 

its ruling on the requested points for charge prior to 

closing arguments and the jury instruction, was 

prejudicial to appellant's defense and warrants that a

new trial be granted.’ Id. at 83. In light of all of 

these factors, we hold that Rule [647] relief is not 

warranted unless prejudice has been established. 

Alston, 748 A.2d at 679.31 Federal courts have likewise held that a 

“violation of Rule 30 requires reversal only when the defendant can show 

 

31

 We reject the trial court’s contention that no prejudice resulted because 

the jury had only been deliberating for a short time before receiving the 
J-A16007-14 

- 90 - 

actual prejudice.” United States v. Benson, 2006 WL 2520612, at *14 

(E.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 547 (4th

Cir. 1990)). In United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1988), 

the federal court framed the question as “whether the district judge’s 

decision to give the aiding and abetting instruction during jury deliberations, 

after initially stating at the Rule 30 hearing that he would not, unfairly 

prevented Gaskin's counsel from arguing against an aiding and abetting 

theory to the jury.” Id. at 460. 

In accordance with this standard, Orie Melvin contends that she was 

prejudiced because she relied upon the absence of an accomplice liability 

instruction in preparing for closing argument. Orie Melvin’s Brief at 89-90. 

Specifically, she argues that “[h]ad the defense known that the trial court 

would reverse course and introduce the concept of accomplice liability after 

closing arguments concluded,” her counsel “would have directly addressed 

the issue in the closing.” Id. at 90. 

 

supplemental instruction. Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2013, at 28 (“Any harm 

that occurred was minimal and not prejudicial since the jury only 

deliberated a short time before this [c]ourt gave the expanded instruction of 

accomplice liability.”). As Hendricks makes clear, the potentially 

prejudicial aspect of a trial court’s decision to provide additional instructions 

after closing arguments is that it interferes with counsel’s ability to tailor his 

or her closing arguments to the trial court’s actual jury charge. Hendricks, 

546 A.2d at 81 (“It [is] the court’s failure to advise counsel of its ruling 

prior to closing argument, not the soundness of that ruling, which violate[s] 

Rule 30 and prejudicially affect[s] counsel’s summation.”) (quoting Wright 

v. United States, 339 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1964)). 
J-A16007-14 

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Before proceeding to consider Orie Melvin’s contention that she 

suffered actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s clear error, we must 

note that Orie Melvin arguably waived this claim by failing to request the 

opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury to address the 

supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given. Although 

this issue has not been discussed by any Pennsylvania appellate court in 

connection with Rule 647(A), federal courts have held that prejudice 

resulting from violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 may in 

some cases be ameliorated or eliminated by permitting counsel the 

opportunity for supplemental argument to the jury. See, e.g., United 

States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994) (when “a new 

theory is presented to the jury in a supplemental instruction after closing 

argument, the court generally should give counsel time for additional 

argument”) (quoting Horton, 921 F.2d at 547)); United States v. Civelli, 

883 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he principles that underlie Rule 30 

may very well require that the district court allow further argument after an 

instruction has been given.”); Gaskins, 849 F.2d at 457 (new trial granted 

for violation of Rule 30 after the district court denied defense counsel’s 

request to reopen closing argument); Vazquez v. Adams, 2011 WL 

3420644, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2011), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2011 WL 3419562 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (same); but see Cruz 

v. State, 963 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Maryland 2009) (“We are not persuaded 
J-A16007-14 

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that a supplemental closing argument would have cured the problem 

created by the court’s eleventh hour insertion of this new theory of 

culpability.”). Because neither party raised or briefed the waiver issue, and 

the novelty under Pennsylvania law of a violation of Rule 647(A), however, 

we will proceed to consider Orie Melvin’s claim of actual prejudice on its 

merits. 

On its merits, we must conclude that Orie Melvin has not established 

sufficient prejudice to entitle her to a new trial. While Orie Melvin contends, 

in the most general terms, that her counsel would have “directly addressed” 

accomplice liability in the closing argument, she offers no explication as to 

what the contents of such an argument would have included or what 

evidence could have been referenced in support thereof. Without so 

stating, she is essentially arguing presumed prejudice. As such, Orie Melvin 

has not provided this Court with any basis to evaluate the degree (if any) of 

any actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s error. 

Moreover, based upon our review of Orie Melvin’s actual closing 

argument to the jury, we are unconvinced that her counsel would have 

“directly addressed” accomplice liability if the trial court had timely 

instructed the jury. In Orie Melvin’s closing argument, her counsel, inter 

alia, attacked the credibility of key witnesses (including in particular 

Sasinoski and Pavlot), emphasized the productivity of her judicial staff 

during her tenure on the Superior Court (including during 2003 and 2009), 
J-A16007-14 

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and reviewed the testimony of the paid professionals (unconnected to her 

judicial staff) who managed her political campaigns. N.T., 2/15/2013, 

2705-27. Counsel began by describing Orie Melvin as a “courageous and 

honorable woman” and ended by insisting that she “got the work done, 

served her job, and ran her campaign with political professionals, and she 

paid for it with private funds.” Id. 

Importantly, the dominant theme of her closing argument was not 

that she bore no responsibility for any wrongdoing, but rather that no 

wrongdoing occurred. As such, even with respect to the three counts 

that alleged that she acted through accomplices (Counts 1, 3, and 5), her 

counsel never directly addressed the Commonwealth’s specific charge that 

she diverted services “personally” and/or through her accomplices (Jane 

Orie and Janine Orie). Also, counsel did not directly address the charge 

that Orie Melvin conspired with others to divert services because it was her 

contention that no services were ever diverted. The certified record simply 

provides no basis on which to conclude that Orie Melvin suffered any 

prejudice as a result of the late instruction. 

Accordingly, in the absence of any showing of prejudice, we decline to 

grant Orie Melvin any relief on this issue. 

N. Letters of Apology and Letters of Apology Inscribed on 

Photograph in Handcuffs 

For her fifteenth issue on appeal, Orie Melvin raises three arguments 

related to the portion of her sentence requiring her to write letters of 
J-A16007-14 

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apology to her judicial staff, and to the judges of the courts of common 

pleas and intermediate appellate courts, and the Justices of the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania on a photograph of her in handcuffs. First, she 

contends that this portion of her sentence violates her rights against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Second, she 

claims that this portion of her sentence is not a lawful component of a 

criminal sentence under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. Third, she argues that the 

requirement that she write apology letters is not a part of her sentence 

because it was not included in the written sentencing order. We address 

these contentions in turn. 

1. Constitutional Violation Claims 

First, in Commonwealth v. Melvin, 79 A.3d 1195 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

this Court granted Orie Melvin’s request for a stay from the apology letters 

requirement on constitutional grounds, indicating that said stay would 

remain in effect “until such time as her direct appeal in this Court has been 

decided” and “pending final resolution by this Court of her claims of 

illegality of sentence.” Id. at 1202, 1203. Apparently, she now seeks to 

extend the stay indefinitely, arguing that “[a]s long as Orie Melvin continues 

to assert her innocence, she cannot be required to apologize.” Orie Melvin’s 

Brief at 95. We cannot agree. In Melvin, this Court reviewed applicable 

decisions of our Supreme Court and determined that the requirement that 
J-A16007-14 

- 95 - 

she write apology letters violated her right against self-incrimination during 

the pendency of her direct appeal. Id. at 1203. We are aware of no federal 

or Pennsylvania state law, and Orie Melvin has not cited to any, that 

supports the notion that the right against self-incrimination extends beyond 

the pendency of a direct appeal. As a result, we must conclude that Orie 

Melvin is not entitled to relief from the apology letters requirement on 

constitutional grounds after her direct appeal has been decided. 

2. Legality of Sentencing Under the Sentencing Code 

Second, Orie Melvin posits that the requirement that she write the 

apology letters is illegal because it is not a lawful component of a criminal 

sentence under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. Whether the trial court had the power 

to impose the challenged condition under the Sentencing Code concerns the 

legality of sentence. Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 

2013); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(en banc). Challenges to an illegal sentence cannot be waived32 and may 

be reviewed sua sponte by this Court. Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 

A.2d 1210, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2009); Commonwealth v. Merolla, 909 A.2d 

337, 347 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

 

32 In its Rule 1925(a) written opinion, the trial court contends that Orie 

Melvin cannot challenge the apology letter requirement on appeal because 

she did not file a post-sentence motion on this issue. Trial Court Opinion, 

9/12/2013, at 31. Because challenges to the legality of sentence, however, 

are non-waivable, Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 486 (Pa. 

Super. 2005), appeal denied, 917 A.2d 844 (Pa. 2007), no post-trial motion 

was necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. 
J-A16007-14 

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The scope and standard of review applied to 

determine the legality of a sentence are well 

established. If no statutory authorization exists for a 

particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and 

subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be 

vacated. In evaluating a trial court’s application of a 

statute, our standard of review is plenary and is 

limited to determining whether the trial court 

committed an error of law. 

Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001–02 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Williams, 868 A.2d 529, 532 (Pa. 

Super. 2005), appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1059 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth 

v. Zampier, 952 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. Super. 2008). A challenge to the 

legality of a sentence “is essentially a claim that the trial court did not have 

jurisdiction to impose the sentence that it handed down. ... A trial court 

ordinarily has jurisdiction to impose any sentence which is within the range 

of punishments which the legislature has authorized for the defendant’s 

crimes.” Commonwealth v. Cappellini, 690 A.2d 1220, 1226 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (quoting Commonwealth v. Catanch, 3581 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. 

Super. 1990)). 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) provides trial courts with seven alternative 

forms of criminal sentences: 

(a) General rule.--In determining the sentence to 

be imposed the court shall, except as provided in 

subsection (a.1), consider and select one or more of 

the following alternatives, and may impose them 

consecutively or concurrently: 

(1) An order of probation. 
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(2) A determination of guilt without 

further penalty. 

(3) Partial confinement. 

(4) Total confinement. 

(5) A fine. 

(6) County intermediate punishment. 

(7) State intermediate punishment. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). The trial court sentenced Orie Melvin to county 

intermediate punishment. This Court has stated that the intent of the 

legislature in adopting intermediate punishment programs was to give trial 

courts another sentencing option which “would lie between probation and 

incarceration with respect to sentencing severity; to provide a more 

appropriate form of punishment/treatment for certain types of nonviolent 

offenders; to make the offender more accountable to the community; and 

to help reduce the county jail overcrowding problem.” Commonwealth v. 

Poncala, 915 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Williams, 868 A.2d 

at 534), appeal denied, 932 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 2007). 

When imposing a county intermediate punishment, the trial court may 

attach specified conditions to the sentence, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9763(b): 

(b) Conditions generally.—The court may attach 

any of the following conditions upon the defendant 

as it deems necessary. 
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(1) To meet family responsibilities. 

(2) To be devoted to a specific 

occupation or employment. 

(3) To participate in a public or nonprofit 

community service program. 

(4) To undergo individual or family 

counseling. 

(5) To undergo available medical or 

psychiatric treatment or to enter and 

remain in a specified institution, when 

required for that purpose. 

(6) To attend educational or vocational 

training programs. 

(7) To attend or reside in a rehabilitative 

facility or other intermediate 

punishment program. 

(8) To refrain from frequenting unlawful 

or disreputable places or consorting with 

disreputable persons. 

(9) To not possess a firearm or other 

dangerous weapon unless granted 

written permission. 

(10) To make restitution of the fruits of 

the crime or to make reparations, in an 

affordable amount, for the loss or 

damage caused by the crime. 

(11) To be subject to intensive 

supervision while remaining within the 

jurisdiction of the court and to notify the 

court or designated person of any 

change in address or employment. 
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(12) To report as directed to the court 

or the designated person and to permit 

the designated person to visit the 

defendant’s home. 

(13) To pay a fine. 

(14) To participate in drug or alcohol 

screening and treatment programs, 

including outpatient and inpatient 

programs. 

(15) To do other things reasonably 

related to rehabilitation. 

(16) To remain within the premises of 

the defendant’s residence during the 

hours designated by the court. 

(17) To be subject to electronic 

monitoring. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b). 

None of the conditions in section 9763(b) provides that the defendant 

may be compelled to write letters of apology or to require the defendant be 

photographed in handcuffs for distribution to a designated group of people 

(here, members of the Pennsylvania judiciary). We therefore we must 

determine whether either of the conditions imposed by the trial court fall 

within the “catchall” provision in subsection (15), namely “[t]o do other 

things reasonably related to rehabilitation.” Id. at § 9763(b)(15). 

In fashioning a sentence, we have acknowledged that trial courts are 

vested with “great, but not unfettered” discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Thier, 663 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 670 A.2d 643 (Pa. 
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1995). In Thier, for example, this Court ruled that imposing as a condition 

of probation “reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant”33 a 

prohibition against engaging in a specific business for one year exceeded 

the trial court’s statutory authority under the Sentencing Code. Id. More 

recently, our Supreme Court ruled that a trial court could not impose a 

condition that the defendant pay a monthly sum to the children of the 

victim of his crime, either for purposes of restitution or rehabilitation. Hall, 

80 A.3d at 1212-18. 

The scope of this catchall provision in subsection 9763(b)(15) is 

undefined, and thus we must apply basic principles of statutory 

interpretation to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. 

The Statutory Construction Act requires penal provisions of statutes to be 

strictly construed, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1), and thus “such language 

should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the accused.” 

Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 868 n.5 (Pa. 2003) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Booth, 766 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. 2001)), cert. denied, 

541 U.S. 1012 (2004); Hall, 80 A.3d at 1212. 

Moreover, 

When possible, every statute should be construed to 

give effect to all its provisions. Courts must read 

 

33 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(13) provides that a sentencing court may require 

the defendant to “satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the 

rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or 

incompatible with his freedom of conscience.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(13). 
J-A16007-14 

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and evaluate each section of a statute in the context 

of, and with reference to, the other sections of the 

statute, because there is a presumption that the 

legislature intended the entire statute to be 

operative and effective. 

Poncala, 915 A.2d at 104. In so doing, we apply two closely related 

principles of interpretation. Noscitur a sociis (“it is known by its 

associates”), provides that the meaning of a word or phrase may be 

determined by reference to the provisions immediately surrounding it. 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1087 (8th ed. 2004); Mountain Village v. Bd. of 

Supervisors of Longswamp Twp., 874 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. 2005). Similarly, 

ejusdem generis (“of the same kind or class”), dictates that when a list of 

two or more specific descriptors is followed by a more general descriptor, 

the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptor must be restricted to 

the same general class of the specific descriptors that preceded it. BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY, 556 (8th ed. 2004); Tech One Associates v. Bd. of Prop. 

Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny County, 53 A.3d 685, 

697 (Pa. 2012). 

The vast majority of the conditions in section 9763(b) are not punitive 

in nature, although some may have ancillary punitive effects. In the 

broadest sense, the first three conditions all benefit the family of the 

defendant and make him or her more accountable to his or her community, 

and the tenth condition benefits the victim of the crime. The fourth, fifth, 

sixth, seventh, and fourteenth conditions provide for rehabilitation through 
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consultation with professionals, and the eighth, ninth, eleventh and twelfth 

conditions all aim to prevent the defendant from committing additional 

crimes. Only the thirteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth conditions are 

purely punitive in nature, providing the sentencing court with the authority 

to impose fines or to impose lesser alternatives to total confinement. 

In interpreting the permissible scope of the conditions that may be 

imposed under subsection 9763(b)(15) as “things reasonably related to 

rehabilitation,” we begin by concluding that the requirement that Orie 

Melvin send letters of apology to both her former staff and the members of 

the judiciary is a permissible condition under subsection 9763(b)(15). Much 

like the condition of restitution or reparations for the loss or damage caused 

by the crime, as permitted by subsection 9763(b)(10), these letters of 

apology force Orie Melvin to acknowledge the harm caused by her crimes. 

This condition is also is reasonably tailored to Orie Melvin’s rehabilitation, as 

it may force her to accept responsibility for the harm she caused and, as 

such, is consistent with the goals of rehabilitation. See Hall, 80 A.3d at 

1215 (identifying the goals of rehabilitation as “recognition of wrongdoing, 

deterrence of future criminal conduct, and encouragement of future lawabiding conduct”). 

We turn to the condition imposed by the trial court that Orie Melvin 

write the apology letters to the members of the judiciary on photographs 

while posed in handcuffs. The certified record reflects that this condition 
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was not imposed to promote her rehabilitation, but rather merely to shame 

and humiliate her in the eyes of her former colleagues in the judiciary. The 

trial court unquestionably staged the photograph for maximum effect. At 

the time it was taken (immediately after sentencing), Orie Melvin was no 

longer in police custody and was otherwise free to go home to begin house 

arrest. She was not in restraints at that time, and the trial court directed 

that she be placed in handcuffs only to take the photograph. N.T., 

5/7/2013, at 66 (“This is the picture. Put handcuffs on her.”). The trial 

court’s use of the handcuffs as a prop is emblematic of the intent to 

humiliate Orie Melvin in the eyes of her former judicial colleagues. 

Our conclusion that the trial court’s decision to force Orie Melvin to 

write apology letters on the degrading photograph was solely intended to 

shame her is further buttressed by the fact that it did not require her to do 

so for the apology letters to those most directly affected by Orie Melvin’s 

wrongdoing, namely the members of her judicial staff required to do 

political work and risk their jobs in the process. Instead, the trial court only 

ordered the use of the highly embarrassing photograph for the apology 

letters to the far broader and more dispersed group of recipients (members 

of the judiciary). As such, this condition was imposed solely for the purpose 

of humiliating and shaming her. 

In no sense can this unorthodox gimmick be construed as legitimately 

intended for her rehabilitation, but rather as another form of punitive 
J-A16007-14 

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sanction for her crimes – not one authorized under the Sentencing Code. In 

this regard, we emphasize that the only catchall condition in section 

9763(b) is its subsection (15), which authorizes “things reasonably related 

to rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(15). The statute does not 

authorize forms of punishment other than those specifically enumerated. 

While a defendant may conceivably (or idiosyncratically) experience some 

degree of shame from any of the section 9763(b) conditions, inflicting 

shame or humiliation on the defendant is not the primary purpose of any of 

the specifically defined conditions. Applying noscitur a sociis and ejusdem 

generis in this context, we must conclude that while a sentencing court has 

wide latitude under subsection 9763(b)(15) to design conditions to assist in 

efforts at rehabilitation, no condition may be imposed for the sole purpose 

of shaming or humiliating the defendant. Nothing in section 9763(b), or for 

that matter, anywhere else in the Sentencing Code, provides (or even 

suggests) that shaming or humiliating a defendant is consistent with either 

penological policies of this Commonwealth in general or the goals of 

rehabilitation in particular. 

In this regard, we note that the highest courts in at least five sister 

states have reached similar conclusions, namely that shaming is not 

reasonably related to rehabilitation and may in many circumstances 

overshadow any possible rehabilitative effects that the punishment might 

otherwise provide. See, e.g., State v. Schad, 206 P.3d 22, 35 (Kansas 
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2009); State v. Mohammad, 43 P.3d 318, 325 (Montana 2002); People 

v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Illinois 1997); State v. Burdin, 924 

S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 

148-49 (N.Y. 1995); but see United States v. Genentera, 379 F.3d 596, 

607 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The broad discretion under subsection 9763(b)(15) to fashion creative 

conditions to county intermediate punishment to promote efforts at 

rehabilitation does not extend to permit drastic departures from the 

sentencing concepts reflected in our Sentencing Code. The decision to 

permit shaming sentences, if determined to be appropriate, is best left to 

the realm of our legislature employing its usual safeguards of legislative 

study and debate. At present, however, conditions on criminal sentences 

designed solely to shame and humiliate the defendant are not expressly or 

implicitly authorized by statute, and thus such conditions are illegal and 

subject to correction. 

Because the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in requiring 

Orie Melvin to write apology letters to the state’s judges on a photograph of 

herself in handcuffs, this condition of Orie Melvin’s sentence of county 

intermediate punishment is hereby stricken as illegal. As ordered by the 

trial court, Orie Melvin will be required to write letters of apology both to 

the members of her judicial staff and to every judge in Pennsylvania, but 

such apology letters do not need be written on the photograph of Orie 
J-A16007-14 

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Melvin in handcuffs. This Court has the authority to correct an illegal 

sentence directly rather than to remand the case for re-sentencing so long 

as we do not disrupt the trial court’s sentencing scheme in doing so. See, 

e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 997 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Pa. Super. 

2010); Commonwealth v. Dobbs, 682 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. Super. 1996); 

Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 476 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. 1984). Here, we 

conclude that this amendment to the trial court’s sentence does not disrupt 

the sentencing scheme. During sentencing, the trial court made clear that 

the apology letters were necessary to address Orie Melvin’s refusal to 

accept responsibility for her crimes: 

I don’t believe that [Orie Melvin] is an evil person. 

I’ve never believed that. I mean, you watch 

television, you see really, really evil people. I don’t 

believe she is evil. But I do believe her arrogance is 

stunning. Her arrogance is stunning. 

She is a person of privilege and, unfortunately, she 

believes she can pick and choose what rules she 

wishes to follow, and which are inconvenient and 

can be ignored. 

Truth be told, I honestly believe that in your heart

of hearts, you don’t think you did anything wrong. 

Which is more of a pity. You have consistently 

refused to accept any responsibility for any of the 

harm you have done to the people who worked with 

you, the electoral process, to your colleagues in the 

Judiciary, and most of all your family. It’s real 

simple to say that just she violated the law. She 

ruined an awful lot of people. The victims of her 

crime [are] enormous. This was not a single error 

in judgment. This went on for an awfully long 

period of time. Two elections. 
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 * * * 

The defendant has left a trail of victims. 

Unbelievable. Your sister’s staff, your staff, you 

made them do things that you knew jeopardized 

their jobs and their livelihoods. You brought shame 

to the Judiciary. There are 500, at least 500 

members of the Judiciary who have been tarnished 

by your behavior. 

N.T., 5/7/2013, at 49, 51. 

In our view, the trial court’s requirement that Orie Melvin write letters 

of apology to her judicial staff and to every judge in Pennsylvania directly 

addresses the trial court’s intent to rehabilitate her by requiring her to 

acknowledge her wrongdoing. Because our amendment of the sentence 

does not disrupt the trial court’s overall sentencing scheme, including its 

efforts to have Orie Melvin accept responsibility for her crimes and their 

impact, remand for resentencing is unnecessary. 

3. Written Sentencing Order 

Finally, we reject Orie Melvin’s contention that the requirement that 

she write apology letters is not a part of her sentence because it was not 

included in the written sentencing order. As explained hereinabove, the 

certified record on appeal reflects that the requirement of writing letters of 

apology was expressly set forth in a written Amended Order of Sentence 

and again later in a Corrected Amended Order of Sentence. See supra at 

5. Accordingly, Commonwealth v. Foster, 324 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. 
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1974), and its progeny have no application here. Id. at 539 (“Oral 

statements made by the judge in passing sentence, but not incorporated in 

the written sentence signed by [the sentencing judge], are not part of the 

judgment of sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1010 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (“It is well settled that, where there is a discrepancy 

between the sentence as written and orally pronounced, the written 

sentence generally controls.”). 

II. Sua Sponte Stay of Sentencing During Pendency of Appeal 

We turn to Orie Melvin’s appeal at 1974 WDA 2013 from the trial 

court’s sua sponte order dated November 15, 2013 staying her criminal 

sentence in its entirety. For her first issue in this appeal, Orie Melvin insists 

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and authority to sua sponte suspend 

Orie Melvin’s sentence while her direct appeal was pending in this Court. 

We agree and reverse the trial court’s November 15, 2013 order staying 

Orie Melvin’s sentence. 

In Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. 1994), 

appeal dismissed, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1996), this Court set forth the general 

rules with respect to a trial court’s jurisdiction over its orders after an 

appeal has been taken. 

Trial courts have the power to alter or modify a 

criminal sentence within thirty days after entry, if no 

appeal is taken. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Generally, 

once the thirty-day period is over, the trial court 

loses the power to alter its orders. Also, when an 
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appeal is taken, the trial court has no jurisdiction to

modify its sentence. Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a). 

Id. at 1238 (case citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. 

Walters, 814 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 831 A.2d 

599 (Pa. 2003). 

Based upon this general rule, the trial court had no jurisdiction to 

enter a stay of its sentencing order.34 In its opinion pursuant to Rule 

1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, the 

trial court explained it acted in accordance with appellate Rule 1701(b)(1), 

which provides trial courts with limited exceptions from the general rule to, 

inter alia, preserve the status quo during the pendency of an appeal. The 

trial court stated: 

Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(1), the trial court is 

authorized to grant supersedeas after an appeal is 

taken. Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(1) states as follows: 

(b) Authority of a trial court or agency 

after appeal. After an appeal is taken or 

review of a quasijudicial order is sought, 

the trial court or other government unit 

may: 

 

34 The 30-day period for modifications under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 expired 

well before the trial court entered its November 15, 2013 stay order. While 

this Court has recognized an exception to section 5505’s 30-day period for 

modifications to correct clerical or other formal errors clear on the face of 

the record and which do not require an exercise of discretion, ISN Bank v. 

Rajaratnam, 83 A.3d 170, 172-73 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Stockton v. 

Stockton, 698 A.2d 1334, 1337 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1997)), that exception is 

not at issue here. 
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(1) Take such action as may be 

necessary to preserve the status quo, 

correct formal errors in papers relating to 

the matter, cause the record to be 

transcribed, approved, filed and 

transmitted, grant leave to appeal in 

forma pauperis, grant supersedeas, and 

take other action permitted or required 

by these rules or otherwise ancillary to 

the appeal or petition for review 

proceeding. 

This [c]ourt has attempted to make it clear that the 

sentence imposed on May 14, 2013, was an entire 

sentencing scheme. (HT at 4). The conditions 

imposed on the sentence of intermediate punishment 

were all essential to the sentencing scheme. The 

sentencing conditions were imposed pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §9763(b)(15) and are required by the 

sentence. 

[Orie Melvin] cannot select the parts of her sentence 

that she wants to serve, and the parts that she 

doesn’t want to serve. This court imposed a 

sentence with multiple conditions, each of which was 

an essential component of the sentencing scheme. 

The Superior Court granted stay of the conditions 

imposed on house arrest requiring [Orie Melvin] to 

write apology letters to [Orie Melvin’s] staff and send

a photograph with a short apology written thereon to

the Pennsylvania judiciary. This [c]ourt’s sentence 

cannot be bifurcated. The sentence imposed on May 

14, 2013, was an entire sentencing scheme. The 

conditions are integral to the sentence of house 

arrest. [Orie Melvin] stopped serving this Court’s 

sentence when the Superior Court stayed the 

apology requirement. Therefore, this [c]ourt stayed 

the entire sentence to preserve the status quo. This 

[c]ourt properly granted supersedeas of the entire 

sentence in the instant matter, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1701(b)(1). 
J-A16007-14 

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Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/2014, at 3-5. 

A supersedeas order “is an auxiliary process designed to supersede or 

hold in abeyance the enforcement of the judgment of an inferior tribunal.” 

Goodstein v. Goodstein, 619 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting 

Young J. Lee, Inc. v. Com., Dept. of Revenue, 474 A.2d 266 (Pa. 

1983)), appeal dismissed, 639 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1994). Because the trial 

court’s November 15, 2013 order suspended its own sentencing order, 

rather than the “judgment of an inferior tribunal,” we question whether said 

order is properly designated as a “supersedeas.” We need not decide this 

question, however, since whether the November 15, 2013 order was a 

“supersedeas” or merely a stay to preserve the status quo, the trial court 

lacked any jurisdiction to enter it for at least two reasons. First, the trial 

court’s order did not preserve, but rather disrupted, the status quo. At the 

time of its entry, Orie Melvin was serving her sentence of house arrest and 

complying with all of the conditions of said sentence with the exception of 

the requirement to write apology letters, which condition this Court stayed 

on November 6, 2013 during the pendency of her direct appeal. The trial 

court’s order altered the status quo. 

Second, and more importantly, in its November 6, 2013 opinion 

granting the stay of the apology letters requirement, this Court expressly 

rejected any contention that its stay either disrupted the trial court’s 
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sentencing scheme or provided any basis for the trial court to revisit or 

modify its sentencing order at that time. 

In its Response to Application for Stay, the 

Commonwealth requests that if this Court grants 

the stay, the case should be immediately remanded 

to the trial court for resentencing because the 

‘entire sentencing scheme has been disrupted.’ We 

decline to do so for two reasons. First, the 

Commonwealth cites to no rule or other authority 

that would permit us to remand the case to the trial 

court at this time, even if we were otherwise 

inclined to do so. Second, and more importantly, 

the grant of the Application for Stay does not 

disrupt the trial court's sentencing scheme. 

Instead, it only stays a portion of the sentencing 

order pending resolution by this Court of 

constitutional and statutory arguments regarding its 

legality. The appropriate audience for the 

Commonwealth's argument is the merits panel of 

this Court. If it determines that the requirement 

that Orie Melvin write and send apology letters is 

illegal, and that eliminating the requirement 

disrupts the sentencing scheme, the case will be 

remanded to the trial court for resentencing 

(including, if appropriate, a term of incarceration). 

At this juncture, we do no more than postpone the 

performance of this part of the sentence until Orie 

Melvin's direct appeal is decided. 

Melvin, 79 A.3d at 1204-05. 

On appeal, Orie Melvin contends that the trial court entered its sua 

sponte order staying the entire sentence “in defiance of this Court’s ruling 

on November 6, 2013.” Orie Melvin’s Brief at 25. We agree. We note that 

in its appellate brief, the Commonwealth also agreed, indicating that “a 

panel of this Court refused to give Judge Nauhaus the opportunity to stay 
J-A16007-14 

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the entire sentence, explicitly rejecting the argument that the stay of the 

apology letters would disrupt the sentencing scheme.” Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 14. At oral argument of this appeal on May 30, 2014, the 

Commonwealth declined to support the trial court’s contention that it had 

any jurisdiction to enter the November 15, 2013 stay order.35

 

III. CONCLUSION 

On the appeal at 844 WDA 2013, we affirm the judgment of sentence 

after modification of the sentence as described in detail hereinabove. As 

ordered by the trial court, Orie Melvin will be required to write letters of 

apology to the members of her judicial staff and to every judge in 

Pennsylvania, but no apology letter need be written on photographs of 

herself in handcuffs. 

On the appeal at 1974 WDA 2013, we reverse the trial court’s order 

staying Orie Melvin’s criminal sentence and reinstate the sentence set forth 

in the written sentencing order dated May 7, 2013 except that the condition 

that the letters of apology to members of the Pennsylvania Judiciary be 

written on a photograph of Orie Melvin in handcuffs is eliminated. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 

35 In light of our disposition of Orie Melvin’s first issue in the appeal at 

1974 WDA 2013, it is unnecessary to address her second issue on appeal. 
J-A16007-14 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/21/2014