* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable James Ware, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JAIME SUNIGA, Defendant - Appellant. No. 10-30013 D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00075-LRS-4

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Lonny R. Suko, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 19, 2010 ** Seattle, Washington Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and WARE, District Judge. *** Jaime Suniga appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on the grounds that the Government violated the Double 

# FILED

APR 22 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS1 Suniga appeals only his Double Jeopardy claim and not his claims of preaccusatory delay or violations of the Speedy Trial Act.
2 On appeal, Suniga asks us to considerevidence not presented to the district court. Our review of the district court’s denial of Suniga’s motion to dismiss is limited to the evidence that was actually presented to the district court. See Lippi v. City Bank , 955 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Stricklin , 591 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The ruling by the District Court . . . merely decides whether or not, upon the evidence then before the court , double jeopardy appears. On an Abneyappeal, the correctness of that ruling, alone, will be reviewed.”). 2 Jeopardy Clause and his right to a speedy trial. 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Abney v. United States , 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, United States v. Ziskin , 360 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm. The district court correctly concl uded, based on the evidence before it 2that the Superseding Indictment did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In the context of conspiracy charges, “[it] prohibits the government from splitting a single conspira[torial agreement] into separate charges and bringing successive prosecutions against a [criminal] defendant.” Ziskin , 360 F.3d at 943; see also United States v. Stoddard , 111 F.3d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1997). It also “ prohibits subdivision of a single conspiracy into multiple violations of one conspiracy3 statute.” United States v. Smith , 424 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). To prove that the Government violated the Clause, “[t] he defendant bears the burden of showing that the two conspiracies charged actually arise from a single agreement.” Ziskin , 360 F.3d at 943. We consider the five factor analysis set forth in Arnold v. United States , 336 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964), to determine wh ether the two independently charged conspiracies are in fact the same conspi racy. We examine: (1) the differences in the periods of time covered by the allege d conspiracies; (2) the places where the conspiracies were alleged to occur; (3) th e persons charged as co-conspirators; (4) the overt acts alleged to have been committe d; and (5) the statutes alleged to have been violated. See id . at 349–50; see also Stoddard , 111 F.3d at 1454. The district court properly considered these factors and correctly found that Suniga failed to meet his burden. Suniga claims that the August 1, 2007 conspiracy to which he pled guilty in the District of Minnesota (“Minnesota c onspiracy”) is part and parcel of the conspiracy charged in the Superseding Indictment. To prove this, Suniga presented the district court with a copy of the indictment setting forth the Minnesota conspiracy (“Minnesota indictment”), as well as evidence that law enforcement officials in Washington had received information from an informant4 that aided in Suniga’s arrest in Minneso ta and that they were “familiar with” the vehicle involved in the Minnesota conspir acy. The district court correctly found that this evidence is insufficient for Suni ga to meet his burden of establishing that the Minnesota conspiracy is “indistingui shable in law and in fact” from the conspiracy alleged in the Superseding Indictment. See Ziskin , 360 F.3d at 943. First, the Minnesota indictment alleged a conspiracy which started and ended on a single day (August 1, 2007) while the Superseding Indictment charges a conspiracy beginning around January 1, 2005, and continuing until March 25, 2009. While the conspiracy charged in the Superseding Indictment temporally overlaps the conspiracy charged in the Mi nnesota indictment, the different start dates militate against finding the two conspiracies identical. See United States v. Montgomery , 150 F.3d 983, 990–91 (9th Cir. 1998). Second, the Minnesota indictment alleges a conspiracy that took place in Minnesota; the Superseding Indictment, by c ontrast, alleges a conspiracy that took place in the Eastern District of Washington. Even if Suniga had supported his contention that the illegal conduct underlyi ng the Minnesota conspiracy originated in Washington, this would not have comp elled a finding that the two conspiracies are the same because when two charged conspiracies share common source5 locations, different transfer or destination locations militate against a single conspiracy. See Ziskin , 360 F.3d at 945–46. Third, different persons are charged as co-conspirators in the two conspiracies. The Minnesota Indictment alleged that Suniga conspired with one other individual, Maribel Mejia Carrasc o. The Superseding Indictment, by contrast, alleges that Suniga conspire d with six individuals and does not name Carrasco as a co-conspirator. Neither the Superseding Indictment northe Minnesota indictment charges overt acts; therefore, we cannot evaluatethis factor at the present time. See United States v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 15–16 (1994). While th e Government cites Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and acknowledge s it “may use [the] underlying factual basis of prior conviction and conviction its elf to prove the current charge,” this does not mean the two conspiracies are the same. See Ziskin , 360 F.3d at 947; see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing eviden ce of other crimes to demonstrate “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”). Additionally, that Suniga’s Minnesota arrest was aided by an informant in Washington and thatDrug Enforcement Agency Officers in Washington were “familiar with” the vehicl e involved in the Minnesota conspiracy at most demonstrates that law enfor cement officials were familiar with both6 conspiracies; it does not establish that onewas “part and parcel” of the other. See United States v. Ingman , 541 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (“The fact that there is some interrelationshi p between conspiracies does not necessarily make them the same criminal enterprise.”). Finally, while there is an overlap in the statutory provisions charged, the Superseding Indictment charges a conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and methamphetamine while the conspiracy charged in the Minnesota indictment involved only distribution of cocaine. Cf. Montgomery , 150 F.3d at 991 (finding conspiracies distinct where one c onspiracy was to manufacture low quality methamphetamine and the other was to distribute high quality methamphetamine). In addition, the Superseding Indictment charges a distinct statutory violation: laundering of monetary instruments in vi olation of 18 U.S.C.§ 1956. As a result, despite the overlap in one of the statutes charged in the Superseding Indictment, the respective indictments suggest conspiracies with very different goals. See United States v. Guzman , 852 F.2d at 1121; see also United States v. Lorenzo , 995 F.2d 1448, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court properly denied Suniga’s motion without prejudice to renewing it at an appropriate time. Suni ga may renew his claim of double jeopardy7 before the district court after the record is more fully developed. See United States v. Bendis , 681 F.2d 561, 568 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981). We grant the Government’s Motion for Issuance of Mandate Forthright. No petition for rehearing will be entertained and the mandate shall issue forthwith. See Fed. R. App. P. 2, 41(b); 9th Cir. R. 41-1 Circuit Advisory Committee Note. We deny the Government’s Urgent Motion for Disposition as moot. AFFIRMED.