If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

INFINITY PHYSICAL THERAPY LLC and PRIME 

MEDICAL TRANSPORT LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

July 18, 2024

v No. 364890

Wayne Circuit Court

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

LC No. 22-002812-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

ALIGNED CHIROPRACTIC LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 364896

Wayne Circuit Court

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

LC No. 22-002644-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and BORRELLO and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

A person having the use of a motor vehicle for more than 30 days may be deemed a 

constructive owner of the vehicle and be denied recovery under the no-fault act if the person fails 

to maintain mandatory no-fault coverage. This includes a bar to coverage by assignment under 

the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP) and Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement 

Facility (MAIPF).

Here, Elijah Smith possessed a 2010 Chevrolet Impala for approximately nine months, had 

the only set of keys, and was the only driver. He retained the vehicle for months after its titled 
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owner, Mildred Wainwright, died and Smith exhibited no intent to return the car to her family. 

Even accepting as true that he drove the vehicle only three to four times, Smith had sole control 

and possession of the vehicle and its only set of keys. The trial court properly determined Smith 

was a constructive owner as a matter of law. As a constructive owner, Smith was required to 

ensure the vehicle had mandatory no-fault coverage before driving it. Because Smith was the 

owner and operator of an uninsured vehicle at the time of his November 2020 accident, he cannot 

claim no-fault benefits under any no-fault policy or through the MACP/MAIPF. The medical 

providers who treated Smith and were assigned his right to collect benefits, stand in Smith’s shoes

and also cannot claim no-fault benefits. The trial court properly granted summary disposition in 

favor of defendant, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Nationwide). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Smith was injured in a motor vehicle accident in November 2020, while driving an Impala 

titled to Wainwright. Following the accident, Smith received services from and assigned his right 

to collect benefits to Infinity Physical Therapy LLC, Prime Medical Transport LLC, and Aligned 

Chiropractic LLC (collectively plaintiffs). Smith was not the registered or titled owner of any 

vehicle at the time of the accident and neither possessed a no-fault insurance policy nor lived with 

anyone carrying a no-fault policy. Accordingly, Smith filed an application for coverage with the 

MAIPF. The claim was assigned to Nationwide.

In his MAIPF application, Smith indicated he was driving Wainwright’s Impala during his 

accident and that neither he nor Wainwright possessed no-fault insurance. Smith denied using the 

Impala before the date of the accident, explaining he “was borrowing the vehicle for the day” and 

required permission before using. Smith also denied having “access to a set of keys” for the 

Impala. He denied putting gas in the vehicle or paying any money toward its purchase or 

maintenance. Strangely, Smith checked the “no” box after the question: “Did you have permission 

to use the vehicle/motorcycle on the date of the accident?”

Plaintiffs filed claims with Nationwide, but Nationwide “refused to pay.” Plaintiffs then 

filed this first-party, no-fault action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. In its 

affirmative defenses, Nationwide asserted Smith was not entitled to coverage under MCL 

500.3113 based on Smith’s “ownership of the uninsured motor vehicle involved in the accident.”

During discovery, Smith was deposed over two days. On the first day, Smith testified that 

he had borrowed the Impala from Wainwright “[a]bout three or four times,” with the fourth being 

the day of his accident. Smith was confused about when Wainwright passed away and how long 

he possessed the vehicle. Specifically, Smith believed he borrowed the vehicle about two to three 

weeks before the accident. Smith was attempting to purchase the car and he and Wainwright were 

negotiating a price. The vehicle required a “tune-up,” but Smith could not afford the maintenance 

immediately. Accordingly, Smith asserted he possessed the vehicle but did not drive it. Smith 

claimed that in the weeks he possessed the car before the accident, Wainwright did not mention 

the vehicle. Smith further testified that when she lent him the car, Wainwright “asked me what I 

had to use it for” and “when I was bringing it back,” but “didn’t designate a time for me to bring 

it back.” Smith had the keys to the vehicle while it was in his possession and he put gas in it.
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Smith initially stated Wainwright died in March 2021, and was alive at the time of his 

accident. In actuality, Wainwright passed away on March 5, 2020, nearly nine months before 

Smith’s accident. On the second day of his deposition, Smith agreed that he borrowed the Impala 

before Wainwright passed away and still had the vehicle in his possession after her death. Smith 

conceded he was the only person who drove the Impala during that time period, and he had the 

only set of keys. Smith claimed he did not attempt to insure the vehicle because “[i]t was not my 

car to insure myself.” Smith did not know if Wainwright had any insurance over the vehicle when 

he borrowed it. 

Following discovery, Nationwide sought summary disposition, contending that Smith was 

a constructive owner of the Impala. As an owner, Smith was required to secure no-fault coverage 

for the vehicle but failed to do so. Nationwide contended that Smith was barred from recovering 

no-fault benefits because he was the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle involved in the accident. 

Plaintiffs, as Smith’s assignees, were similarly barred from recovery. Plaintiffs retorted that Smith 

was merely a permissive user who was not required to insure the borrowed vehicle.

Based on the length of time he possessed the car and its only set of keys, was driving a 

vehicle owned by a deceased individual, and was the only person with access to the vehicle, the 

court concluded Smith was a constructive owner as a matter of law. Because Smith was an owner 

who did not insure his vehicle, he was barred from recovering PIP benefits. Because Smith was 

ineligible, the providers to whom he assigned his rights were ineligible as well. 

Plaintiffs now appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a summary disposition motion. El-Khalil v 

Oakwood Healthcare Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). That means we review the 

issue independently, with no required deference to the trial court. Millar v Constr Code Auth, 501 

Mich 233, 237; 912 NW 2d 521 (2018). When deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the 

trial court “must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the 

party opposing the motion.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. If the moving party properly asserts and 

supports its motion for summary disposition, the “burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 

362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). The trial court must only grant summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(10) “when there is no genuine issue of material fact,” meaning that “the record leaves 

open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160 (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

We also review “de novo the interpretation and application of a statute as a question of 

law. If the language of a statute is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed.” Eggleston 

v Bio-Med Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003).

III. ANALYSIS

The trial court correctly determined Smith was a constructive owner of the Impala as a 

matter of law and that he and his assignees were barred from recovering PIP benefits based on 

Smith’s failure to secure statutorily required no-fault insurance.
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A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

MCL 500.3101(1) mandates “the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be 

registered in this state” to “maintain” no-fault insurance including PIP coverage. A vehicle may 

have more than one owner under the no-fault act. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 691-

692; 593 NW2d 215 (1993). An “owner” is defined, in relevant part, as “[a] person renting a motor 

vehicle or having the use of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater 

than 30 days.” MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i). MCL 500.3113 states: “A person is not entitled to be paid 

[PIP] benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident” any one of several 

circumstances existed. Of relevance to this appeal, an “owner . . . of a motor vehicle . . . involved 

in the accident with respect to which” the insurance required by MCL 500.3101 “was not in effect” 

is barred from recovery. MCL 500.3113(b). See Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich 527; 

676 NW2d 616 (2004). Such individuals are also “disqualified from receiving benefits” through 

the MAIPF and MACP. MCL 500.3173.

As a general rule, “[t]he question of ownership is one of fact that is to be decided by the 

factfinder.” Botsford Gen Hosp v Citizens Ins Co, 195 Mich App 127, 133; 489 NW2d 137 (1992). 

Constructive ownership is not defined in the no-fault act. This Court has defined the phrase 

“having the use of a motor vehicle” for purposes of being an “owner” as “using the vehicle in ways 

that comport with concepts of ownership.” Ardt, 233 Mich App at 690. As explained in Ardt, 233 

Mich App at 690-691:

The statutory provisions at issue operate to prevent users of motor vehicles 

from obtaining the benefits of [PIP] without carrying their own insurance through

the expedient of keeping title to their vehicles in the names of family members. 

Because we infer from these provisions that they were enacted in furtherance of the 

sound public policy imperative that users of motor vehicles maintain appropriate 

insurance for themselves as indicated by their actual patterns of usage, we hold that 

“having the use” of a motor vehicle for purposes of defining “owner,” means using 

the vehicle in ways that comport with concepts of ownership. The provision does 

not equate ownership with any and all uses for thirty days, but rather equates 

ownership with “having the use” of a vehicle for that period. Further, we observe 

that the phrase “having the use thereof” appears in tandem with references to 

renting or leasing. These indications imply that ownership follows from 

proprietary or possessory usage, as opposed to merely incidental usage under the 

direction or with the permission of another.

“It is the nature of the right to use the vehicle whether [sic] it is contemplated that the right to use 

the vehicle will remain in effect for more than thirty days that is controlling, not the actual length 

of time that has elapsed.” Twichel, 469 Mich at 532.

B. CASELAW DEFINING OWNERSHIP

The parties each cite various cases to support their positions and disagree regarding their

meaning and importance. We consider each in turn. 
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In Ardt, 233 Mich App at 689, witnesses provided inconsistent testimony about the injured 

party’s use of an uninsured vehicle owned by and titled to his mother. One witness described the 

injured party as a “regular driver of the truck for more than 30 days,” while another stated he

“drove the car only a few times and then normally only for such minor purposes as having it 

washed.” Id. Keeping in mind that a constructive owner must have “proprietary or possessory

usage, as opposed to merely incidental usage under the direction or with the permission of 

another,” this Court determined there remained a question of fact regarding the injured party’s 

pattern of usage and potential ownership. Id. at 691.

In Chop v Zielinski, 244 Mich App 677, 678; 624 NW2d 539 (2001), the injured party was 

driving an uninsured vehicle registered and titled to her ex-husband. The injured party “regularly 

used the car” for approximately six months before the accident, and had its exclusive use. Id. at 

680-681 and n 1. Moreover, the injured party mistakenly believed the divorce judgment required 

her ex-husband to transfer the title to her name. Id. at 681 n 2. The injured party parked the vehicle 

at her separate residence and drove it daily. No evidence supported that she only drove the vehicle 

at her ex-husband’s direction or after securing permission. Further, the injured party’s “claim that 

she merely borrowed the car” failed in light of her admission that she believed she was awarded 

the car. Id. at 681-682. Thus, there was no question of fact that the injured party was a constructive 

owner and was thereby barred from recovering no-fault benefits. Id. at 682.

Kessel v Rahn, 244 Mich App 353, 354-355; 624 NW2d 220 (2001), involved the definition 

of the term “own vehicle” in the former MCL 500.3135, which barred third-party tort recovery by 

an individual driving their “own vehicle” without the statutorily required insurance. The injured 

party in Kessel was driving an uninsured vehicle titled in her mother’s name. Id. at 354. This 

Court looked to caselaw defining constructive ownership for the purposes of PIP entitlement. Id. 

at 355. The injured party admitted she had exclusive use of the vehicle for the past year and drove 

it whenever she needed. The titled owner testified the injured party kept the vehicle at her own 

home, the vehicle was purchased specifically for the injured party’s use, and the injured party was 

responsible for insurance and maintenance. Had the titled owner known the injured party failed 

to maintain insurance, she would have retaken possession of the vehicle. Id. at 357-358. This 

Court determined the injured party was an owner as a matter of law, and was barred from tort 

recovery for driving an uninsured vehicle. Id. at 358. This Court reasoned: “Imposing the 

responsibilities of an owner to maintain insurance on a person who has proprietary or possessory 

use of an automobile for more than [30] days clearly promotes the objectives of the mandatory 

insurance provisions, while not imposing unreasonable burdens on the casual user,” such as a 

person “driving a friend’s car to the store and back.” Id. at 359.

In Twichel, 469 Mich at 526, the decedent was driving a truck he was purchasing from a 

friend. The decedent paid $300 of the $3,600 purchase price and agreed “to pay the remainder at 

a later date.” The decedent took possession, but the friend retained title until all payments were 

made. The decedent had possessed the truck for five days before his fatal accident. Id. Although 

the decedent had not secured no-fault insurance for the truck by the time of the accident, he lived 

with his grandfather, who had a no-fault policy through the defendant insurer. The defendant 

asserted it was not bound to provide coverage for the decedent’s accident because he was the owner 

of an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident. Id. at 527. The Twichel Court held that a person 

may be deemed an owner even if he has not used the vehicle for a full 30 days. “The focus must 

be on the nature of the person’s right to use the vehicle.” Id. at 530. “Nothing in the plain 
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language” of the statute’s definition of “owner” “requires (1) that the person has at any time 

actually used the vehicle, or (2) that the person has commenced using the vehicle at least [30] days 

before the accident occurred.” Id. The decedent was an “owner,” the Court concluded, because 

the sale arrangement “was for the permanent transfer of ownership of the vehicle and it 

contemplated that the deceased would have exclusive use of the truck permanently.” Id. at 531.

In Detroit Med Ctr v Titan Ins Co, 284 Mich App 490, 491; 775 NW2d 151 (2009), the 

injured party was driving an uninsured vehicle titled to the father of her children. Id. at 491-492. 

The vehicle was kept at the injured party’s home (where the titled owner “may have lived with 

her”) and she had driven it approximately seven times in the month leading up to the accident, 

primarily to go grocery shopping. The injured party claimed she had to ask for permission and the 

keys from the titled owner before taking the car, but he never denied permission. She claimed she 

continued to require permission even though the titled owner never used the subject vehicle after 

purchasing another. The injured party had refueled the vehicle in the past, but the titled owner 

handled all other maintenance. Id. at 492. This Court looked to Chop, Ardt, and Twichel to resolve 

the ownership issue:

Here, [the injured party] did not “hav[e] the use” of the vehicle “for a period that is 

greater than 30 days.” There was no transfer of a right of use, but simply an 

agreement to periodically lend. The permission was not for a continuous 30 days, 

but sporadic. Similar to the vehicle in Chop, the car was kept at [the injured party’s]

residence. Moreover, she clearly had a significant relationship with [the titled 

owner] such that permission to use the vehicle apparently was never denied. 

However, unlike the driver in Ardt there was no evidence that [the injured party]

had “regular” use of the car. Also, contrary to the plaintiff in Chop, [the injured 

party] did not believe that she had any right of ownership and she did not have 

unfettered use. She had to ask permission and had to be given the keys. While 

there are facts in common with Chop and Ardt, these facts, by themselves, do not 

establish ownership. The need for permission distinguishes this case from Chop

and Twichel, and the lack of any evidence of regular use distinguishes this case 

from Ardt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it concluded that [the 

injured party] was not an owner of [the] vehicle. [Detroit Med Ctr, 284 Mich App 

at 493-494.]

Finally, plaintiffs rely on the unpublished opinion of Cheema v Progressive Marathon Ins 

Co (On Reconsideration), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 

September 29, 2022 (Docket No. 355910). This unpublished case is not binding, MCR 7.215(J), 

and it is too factually dissimilar to be of any persuasive value. See Paris Meadows, LLC v 

Kentwood, 287 Mich App 136, 145 n 3; 783 NW2d 133 (2010). Cheema involved a plaintiff, 

Harris Cheema, who owned a medical transport company, co-plaintiff, Overland Transportation. 

Cheema, unpub op at 2. Overland was the titled owner and registrant of a fleet of vans used to 

transport clients to medical appointments. Cheema owned and managed the company, and 

assigned employees to drive vans on certain routes. When Cheema served as a driver, he paid 

himself as a driver. Id. at 2, 12. Cheema was injured in an accident in an Overland van. At the 

time, he was running an errand between transporting clients. Id. at 3. Cheema indicated he 

sometimes ran errands on his routes. Id. at 2, 12. However, Cheema had personal vehicles 

registered in his name that he drove for personal reasons. Id. at 12.
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The insurer rescinded Overland’s no-fault policy for reasons not relevant to the issues now 

before us. Id. at 4. The question remained whether Cheema was a constructive owner or co-owner 

of the Overland vans such that he would be barred from PIP recovery for driving an uninsured 

vehicle. The insurer “presented evidence that Cheema controlled access to the [van] and could, in 

theory, make use of the [van] at any time and for any purpose.” Id. at 11. This Court determined 

a question of fact remained, precluding summary disposition:

Cheema’s testimony permitted an inference that[] Cheema did not have 

unfettered use of the [van] for purposes outside of Overland’s business and that he 

respected the limitations on that use. In the absence of evidence that Cheema 

routinely misused his status as the owner of Overland to treat Overland’s vehicles 

as personal vehicles, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude from Cheema’s 

testimony that he did not have more than incidental use of the [van] with the 

permission of his employer, Overland. Stated another way, a reasonable finder of 

fact could conclude that Cheema respected the limitations on his use of the [van] 

imposed by Overland’s policies and, therefore, was not an owner within the 

meaning of MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i). [Id. at 13 (citation omitted).]

C. APPLICATION

The trial court correctly found no triable question of fact regarding constructive ownership 

in this case. Smith essentially converted the Impala from Wainwright’s estate following her death. 

From March 5, 2020, through November 28, 2020, Smith retained the vehicle without paying 

Wainwright’s estate and kept the only set of keys. Even if Smith only drove the vehicle three to 

four times during this period, he did so without asking permission given that the only person who 

could grant permission was dead. He filled the tank with gas and would have secured a “tune-up,” 

but could not afford it. During this nine-month period, Smith acted as the vehicle’s owner.

Wainwright died on March 5, 2020, and Smith was not involved in the accident until 

November 28, 2020. Smith borrowed the car from Wainwright at some point before her death, 

and he and Wainwright were negotiating a price for him to purchase the vehicle. Smith made no 

attempt to return the vehicle or continue negotiating a price after Wainwright’s death. Smith 

admitted, “I was hoping that she would just say go ahead and keep it, it’s yours. . . .” Smith 

retained possession of the vehicle on his property. Wainwright’s widower could not simply retake 

possession because Smith had the only set of keys to the car. By withholding the vehicle, Smith 

essentially converted it.1 This was an overt act of proprietary or possessory usage.

Smith indicated he did not drive the vehicle for an extended period because it needed a 

“tune-up” and he could not afford the maintenance. Smith never suggested that Wainwright, as 

 

1 Common-law conversion involves a person wrongfully exerting dominion over another’s 

property inconsistent with the other person’s ownership or possessory rights. See Aroma Wines & 

Equip, Inc v Columbian Distribution Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 351-352; 871 NW2d 136 (2015).
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the vehicle’s owner, should secure a tune-up. Instead, Smith’s testimony reveals he believed he 

had the duty to secure this maintenance. Smith also testified he filled the vehicle’s gas tank. 

Smith stated he needed permission to drive the vehicle and was required to tell Wainwright 

what he was using the vehicle for. However, after March 5, 2020, Smith could not get permission 

to drive the vehicle as the owner was deceased. Any time Smith drove the vehicle after March 5, 

2020, he did so without permission and without explanation. As described by Nationwide and 

accepted by the trial court, his use became “unfettered.”

Accepting as true that Smith only drove the vehicle three to four times does not negate the 

evidence of constructive ownership. Smith was the only person with access to the vehicle and its 

keys, regardless of whether he acted upon that access. Smith had complete control and sole access; 

his constructive ownership was not based on “theoretical” use as argued by plaintiffs. Smith 

cannot convert a vehicle for his own use, have exclusive access to the vehicle for nine months, and 

then claim he had no duty to insure the vehicle before driving it. There is no question of fact in 

this case that Smith was the constructive owner of the uninsured Impala. The trial court properly 

decided this issue as a matter of law and summarily dismissed plaintiffs’ action for recovery. 

We affirm.

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett