F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

H I G H ER T AS TE , I

NC ., a Washing ton Non-Profit Corporation,

Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v.
C I T Y O F T AC OMA , a Metropolitan Municipal Corporation; M ETR OP OL I TAN P A RK D I S TR I C T OF T AC OMA , a

De pa rtme nt o f t

he City of Ta c oma ; E XECUTI VE D I R EC TOR J A CK C. W I L S ON , Ex ecutive D irec tor of the Metr opolitan Park District of the City of Tac oma, Defendants-A

ppellees

. No. 11-36046

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05252- BH S

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the Wester

n District of Washington Be njamin H. Settle, District J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted Dec ember

5, 2012—Seattle, Washington Filed June 3, 2013H I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 2

T he H o no rable Sharo n L. G l eason, U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he * D i st ri ct of A l aska, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. B e fo re : Ric ha

rd C. T a llm an a

nd Pa ul J. Watf or d, Cir c uit J udg es, and Shar on L . Gleason, D istrict J udg e. *

Opinion by

J udg e Watford

SUMMAR

Y **

Civil Rights/Attorney’s F ees The panel reve rsed the district court’s denia l of a motion for attorney ’s fe es broug ht purs uant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), afte r dete rmining that the distr i ct cour t’s preliminary injunction in plaintiff’s favor and the parties’ subsequent settlement ag ree ment confe rre d preva iling par ty st atus on plaintiff for pur

poses of a n attorney ’s fe e aw ard.
Pla int if f H ig he r T a ste , Inc ., br ou g ht t he un de rl yingsu it
un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 98 3 se e kin g to c on tin ue to s e ll messag e-be aringT-shirts on public walkwa y s in front of and le a d i n g t o th e e n tr an c e o f th e T a c o m a Z o o
. T h e p ane l he ld that the district court’s pr eliminary inju nction ruling , which
wa s b a se d o n a

fi nd ingtha

t H ig he r T a ste was li kely to succe ed on the mer its of its Fir s t Am endment cla im, was sufficie ntly

on the merits to satisfy the “judicial imprimatur” require ment for pr evailingparty s t at us. The pane l further held that the par

ties’ subsequent se ttlement ag ree ment, whichH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 3

a llo we d Hig he r T a ste to c on tin ue se lli ngt- sh ir

ts o n th e pu

bli c walkwa y , was suff

iciently enduring t o satisfy

the “mate rial
a lte ratio n o f t

he pa rt ie s’ le g a l r e latio ns hip ” re qu ir e me nt.
Th e pa ne l r e mand e d fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt to de te rm ine in the first instance wheth erspecia l circumstanc es existed that would rende r an attorney ’s fe e aw ard u n j ust and if such circ umstances did not exist , to calculate t h e re asonable fee that Hig her Ta ste is entitled to recove r.

CO UN SEL
Rob e rt C. M oe st ( argue d) , L aw O ff ic e s o f Rob e rt

C. M oe st, Santa Monica, California; David M. L iberman, L aw Of fice s of David M. L iberman, L os Ang eles, California, forPlaintiffAp pe lla nt.
Adam Rosenber g (ar g ued), Keating , Buc klin & Mc Cormack, Inc ., P.S. , Se a ttl e , Wa sh ing ton , f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

OP IN ION WATFORD, Circuit J udg e: Plaintiff Highe r Taste I nc. is a non -prof it relig ious org aniza ti o n d e d ic a te d to pr omoting non-violenc e, community

harmony , spiritual ecol o gy , and the humane treatment of animals. I t seeks to dis seminate its messag e and raise f unds by selling T-shirts adorne d with me ssag es re lated to its spi ritual mission. For y ear s Hi gh er Taste sold its Tsh ir ts at a pu bli c zoo op e rate d b y the pr inc ipa l de fe nd ant i n thi s c a se , the Me tr op oli tan Pa rk Di str ic t of

Ta c oma , f

ro m aH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 4 table set up a long the main walkwa y leadingfrom the pa

rking
are a to t he zoo ’s e ntr anc e . T his prove d to be a pr ime location, ensuringthat a stea dy stream of

the zoo’s 500,000–600,000 annual visitors would be exposed to Hig her Ta ste ’s te a c hin g s.
In 2005, the Park District a dopted R esolution 40-05, which banne d the sale of any merc handise ne ar the zoo’s entra nce, a lo n g the walkwa

y s leadingto the zoo’s entranc e, or in the zoo’s pa

rking are a. At first, the Park Di s t ri ct allowed Hig her Ta ste to cont i n u e selling its T-shirts at the zoo, albeit not at the prime location Hig her Ta ste had prev io usly

oc c up ie d. B ut i n M arc h 2 01 0, the Park Di str ic t, taking an expansive view of its power under

the re solutio n, banned H ighe r Taste from selling T -s h irts any wher e on zoo g ro un ds

. Soon there afte r, Higher Taste sue d the Park District unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requestinga dec larat i o n that Resolution 40 -0 5 vio late d its ri g hts un de r the F ir st and Fourte e nth Amendments and a

n injunction barringthe re solution’s enfor ceme nt. The di strict court denied Hig her Taste’s motion for a temporar y restra ining or der but ordere d supplemental briefing on whether it should issue a pre liminary injunction. Six wee ks later, a fter r ece iving bri efs a nd supporting decla rations from the parties, the c ourt g rante d Hig her Ta ste’s motion for a pre liminary injunc t i o n , expressly

ruling that Hig her Taste had de monstrated a likelihood of suc cess on the merits. The c ourt enjoined enfor ceme nt of Resolution 40-05 pe nd ing fi na l re so lut ion of the c a se , wh ic h, in the in ter im, allowed Hig her Ta ste to resume selling its messag e-be aring T-shirts alongthe main walkway leadingfrom the pa

rking
are a to the zoo’s entra

nce.H I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 5
The Park D istrict did not seek interlocutory revie w under 28 U.S. C. § 1292(a)( 1), so the pre liminary injunction
rema ined in eff

ect while the litigation procee d ed. Early on, the par ties ag ree d to suspend discovery while they

engage d in settlement discussions

. Af ter leng thy

neg otiations that spanned the next six teen months, the parties’ eff ort s b ore fruit. The Par

k District agr ee d to enac t new re g ulations allowing org anizations li ke Hi g her Ta ste to sell messag ebear ing me rcha

ndise alongthe main walkwa y leading fr om the pa rk ing are a to the zoo ’s e ntr anc e , amon g oth e r l oc a tio ns
. The pa rties executed a

written sett l ement agr eeme nt signe d by Hig her Ta st e, the Park District, and the other defe ndants named in the a ction. As consideration for the dismiss al of Hig her Taste’ s lawsuit, the Park District a g ree d to “allow Hig her Ta ste to sell its m essag e- b ear ing
merc handise (T -shirts) on the wa lkway s
. . . betwee n the Z oo an d t h e parking lot, or in the parkinglot area s of the Z oo,” pursuant to the new

regulations, which were attac hed to the settlement ag ree ment as an e x hibit. T h e p ar t ies could not
rea ch agree ment on attorney ’s fe es; that issue was lef t for the district court to resolve by separ ate motion.

In acc ordanc e with the par ties’ stipulation , the district
c ourt e nte re d a n o rd e r d ism iss ingHi g he r T a ste ’s a c tio n w ith prejudice . The orde r did not incorporate the ter ms of the parties’ settlement ag ree ment nor provide f or t he cour

t’s rete ntion of jurisdiction, other than over the issue of
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Hig her Ta ste then moved for attorney ’s fe es under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which pe rmits an awa rd to the “pre vailing pa

rty ” in ce rtain civil rig hts actions, including those b r o u g h t u

n d e r 4 2 U

. S. C. § 1 9 8 3

. T h e d is tr ic t c ourtH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 6
denied Hig her Ta ste’s motion on the g round that neither the preliminary

i n j un ct i o nn o r t h e s u

b s equ en ts et t l em ent rendere d Hig her Ta ste a pre vailing pa rty within the me aningof § 1988. We review that ruling de novo beca use it turns on an issue of statutory construction—th e mea

ning of “pre vailing pa

rty .” Carbo ne ll v . I

NS , 429 F.3d 894, 897–98 ( 9th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff “pr evails” f

or purpose s of § 1988 “whe n actua l rel i ef on the merits of his claim mater ially alters the le g al relationship between the pa rties by modifying the defe ndant’s behavior in a way that direc tly benef its the plaintiff.” Farrar
v. Hobby , 5 0 6 U

. S. 1 0 3 , 1 1 1

– 1 2 ( 1 9 9 2 )

. Re li e f “ o nthe
mer its” oc c ur s w he n th e mate ri a l a lte ratio n o f t he pa rt ie s’ le g a l r e latio ns hip is a c c omp anie d by “ jud ic ia l imprimatur

on the cha ng e.” Buck

hannon Bd

. & Ca re Home , Inc. v . W

. Va. D e p ’ t o f H e a l th &H

u m a n R es. , 5 3 2 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). Judic ia l im

pr imatur c an c ome in t

he fo rm of an enf

or c e a ble judgme nt on the merits or a c ourt-orde red c onsent dec ree (the two examples the Court ga ve in B u c k

h a nnon ), but those are
no t th e e xclu siv e me ans of satis fy ingthe re qu ir e me nt. Carbo ne ll , 429 F.3d at 898; W atson v. County of Riverside , 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 ( 9th Cir. 2002). Other c ourt-appr oved actions will suffice , provided they entail a judicial deter mination that the claims on which the plaintiff obta ins relief are potentially

meritorious. See B uckhannon , 5 32 U. S. at 606.
L ower court s have strug g led to decide whether the require ments for pre vailing- party status are met by a plaintiff who wins a pre liminary

injunction but does not li tigate the
c a se to f

ina l ju dg me nt. The dif fi c ult y ari se s b e c a

us e p r e li mi n ar

y in ju n c ti v e r e li e f is s o me ti me s is s u e d afte r a h ear ing that is “nece ssarily hasty and abbr eviated,” befor e any rea l a ssessment of the merits of the plaintiff’s cla ims canH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 7

W e w i l l p ut to o ne sid e so - ca l l ed “stay p ut” o r “status q uo ” injun cti o ns, 1

w h ic h d o no t en ta il a ju d ic ia l d e te rm ina tio n re g a r d ing the p la intiff ’s l i ke li ho o d of success
. So m e ci rcui t s have hel d t hat t hese i njunct i o ns c a n n o t sa tisf

y Buck hannon ’s ju d ic ia l i m p rim a tur re q u ire m e n t. See 2 M A R T I N A. S C H W A R TZ & J OHN E. K IR K L IN , S E C T I ON 1983 L I T I G A T I ON : S T A T UT OR Y A TT O RN EY ’ S F EE S § 2. 04, a t 2- 33 t o 2- 46. 1 ( 4t h e d. 2003 & Sup p
. 20 1 2

- 2 ) ( co l l ect i ng c ases ). B ecause t he d i st ri ct c o urt d i d no t i ss ue a “ s t ay put ” or “ s t at us quo” i nj un ct i on he r e, we nee d not deci de whe t her
s uch i nj un ct i ons s houl d be t r eat ed di f f er ent l y f

r om mer i t s - b ased p reli m i na ry i nju nc t i o ns. b e made. Sole v. W

yner , 5 5 1 U

. S. 7 4 , 8 4 ( 2 0 0 7 )

. A n d s u ch
re lie f is, by its ve ry natur e , inte nd e d to be te mpo ra ry . Thu s, tw o r e c ur r e n tqu e s t i o n s ar i s e w h e nm ak i n g p r e v a i l i n g - p a rt y deter minations in t his context : First, is the cour t’s pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n r

uli ngsu ff ic ie ntl y “ on the me ri ts” to s a t i s f y Buck hannon ’s “

jud ic ia l impr imatur ” re qu ir e me nt? An d s e c on d, ha s th e pla int if f o bta ine d r e lie f s uf

fi c ie ntl y e nd ur ingto s a tis fy

the “ mate ri a l a lte ratio n o f t he pa rt ie s’ le g a l r e latio ns hip ” re qu ir e me nt? We beg in with the first question, to which the answ er, at le a st o n th e fa c ts o f t

his c a se , is c le ar. S evera l c ir c uit s, including our s , have he ld that a pre liminary injunction satisfies the judicial imprimatur require ment if it is based on
a fi nd ingthat th e pla int if

f h a s sh ow n a lik e lih oo d o f s uc c e ss on the me ri ts. Whe n c on fr on te d with tho se c ir c ums tanc e s in W atson v. County of Riverside , 30 0 F. 3 d 1092 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ) , w e h e l d

th a t“ [ a ] p r e l i m i n ar

y i n j un c t i o ni s s u e d

b y a judge car ries all the ‘judicial i mprimatur’ necessa ry to satisfy Buck hannon .” Id. a t 10 96 ; ac c or d Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups , 5 54 F .3 d 1 34 0, 13 55 –5 6 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 9) ; De ar

mo re v. City of Garland , 519 F.3d 517, 523–24 ( 5th Cir. 2008). 1H I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 8
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

in t his c a se e xpre ssl y

base d it s pr e lim ina ry -i nj un c tio n r

uli ngon a fi nd ingthat H ig he r T a ste was likely

to succe ed on the mer its of its First Amendment cla i m , afte r a he aringthat was not “ha sty and abbr eviated.” So le , 5 51 U. S. at 84 . T he c ourt ’s lik e lih oo d- of -s uc c e ss fi nd inge ns ur e s th a t th e pr e lim ina ry re lie f H ig he r T a ste o b t a i n e d w a s th e p r o d

u c to f m o r e th anm e r e l y a “nonfr ivolous but nonethe less potentially meritless lawsuit.” Buck hannon , 532 U.S. at 606. Thus, as was true in W atson , the pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n s a tis fi e s Buck hannon ’s j udicial imprimatur require ment. 300 F.3d at 1096. We turn now to the second que stion, which invol v es deter mining whe ther the r elief obta ined mater ially altere d the parties’ legal re lationship. No one disputes that, at least for the time it remains in eff ec t , a preliminary

injunction normally satisfies t his require ment. A mater ial alteration of the par tie s ’ leg al re lationship occurs whe n “the plaintiff c an forc e the defenda

nt to do something he otherwise w ould not have to do.” Fischer v . SJB-P .D. Inc

. , 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). That is ty pically the whole point of an injunction, which is why in the usual ca se injunctive re lief

“ wo rk [s] the re qu isi te mate ri a l a lteration i n th e pa rt ie s’ relationship.” Lefemine v . W ideman , 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (per curiam).
This is the usual case

. Ar m ed with the pre liminary injunction, Highe r Taste forc ed the Par k District to do
s o m e th i n g i tw o u l d

n o to th e r w i s e h av e h a d

t o d o

— n am e l y, allow Hig her Ta ste to resume selling it s messag e-be aringTshirts on z oo g rounds. But that does not end the inquiry , for the pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n is su ed h e re wa s inte nd e d ( a s in most c ases) to a ffor d only temporar y relief pendingfinal resolution of the c ase.H I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 9 Precisely beca use the re lief a ff

o rded by a pre liminary inj un c tio n ma

y be un do ne a t th e c on c lus ion of the c a se , s ome inq uir y int o e ve nts po st- datin g the inj un c tio n’ s is su anc e wi ll g ener ally be nec essar

y
. For example, a plaintiff who
succe eds at the preliminary injunction stag e but l oses on the
me ri ts a ft e r t

he c a se is li ti gate d to fi na l ju dg me nt i s not a preva iling party under § 1988; in those circ umstance s , she
s ec ure s o n l y

an “e p h em er al ” v i ct o ry

an d gai n s n o “e n d

uri n g” chang e in the leg al re lationship of the parties. So le , 5 51 U. S. at 86. Still , t h er e m ay be cir cumstance s in which a p re l i m i n ary

i n j u n ct i o nre s u l t s i n s u ff

i ci en t l y en d

uri n g ch an ge to w ar rant an awa

rd of f ees, e ven in the abse nce of a fina l judgme nt on the merits. The S upreme Court did not resolve that issue in So le , so we must look to circuit-leve l prec edent for guidance

. We h ave pr e vio us ly

he ld t hat w he n a

pla int if f wins a preliminary

injunction and the ca se is rende re dmoot before f in a l ju d g me n t, e it

h e r b y th e p a s s a g e o f ti me or other
c ir c ums tanc e s b e y on d th e pa rt ie s’ c on tr ol, the pl aint if f i s a p re v ail ing pa

rty elig ible for a

fee awa rd. S e e W a tson , 30 0 F .3 d at 10 96 ; W

ill iam s v . A lio to , 625 F.2d 845, 847–48 (9 th C ir . 1 98 0) (p e r c ur iam) ; ac c or d N. Ch eye nne Tribe v. Jack son , 433 F .3 d 1 08 3, 10 86 (8 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Y ou ng v . Ci ty of Chicago , 202 F. 3 d1000, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2000) (pe r c ur iam) ; Haley v . Pataki , 106 F.3d 478, 483–84 ( 2d Cir. 1997). In those ca ses, althoug h the pl aintiff never secure d a final judgment g rantingperma nent injunctive re lief, the preliminary

injunction ended up af

fordingall the re lief that proved ne cessa

ry
. S e e W a ts on , 3 00 F .3 d at 10 96 ; W illiams , 625 F.2d at 847–48. The plaintiff ther efor e received relief that was as enduring as a perma nent injunction would h ave been a nd, by virtue of the case ’s mootness, that relief w as no lon g e r s ub

je c t to be ing “reve rs e d, dis so lve d, or oth e rw iseH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 10 undone by

the final de cision i n t h e s ame c ase.” So le , 55 1 U .S. a t 83 ; se e als o Ra dv an sk y v . Ci ty of O lm ste d F

all s , 496 F.3d 609, 620 ( 6th Cir. 2007); Dupuy v . S am ue ls , 423 F.3d 714, 719, 723 ( 7th Cir. 2005).
Other c ircuits have a

pplied the s ame reasoning when the pla int if f w ins a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n a

nd the c a se is
su bs e qu e ntl y

re nd e re d mo ot b y the de fe nd ant’ s o wn a c tio ns
. (A ty pical sce nario: The pla in t i ff wins a pre liminary injunction prohibiti ng enfor ceme nt of a par ticular statute, a

nd the de fe nd ant r e nd e rs the c a se moo t by re pe a lin g the statut e befor e fina l judgment is ente red.) I n that circ umstance, too, courts have held that the plaintiff is a preva iling par ty under § 1988. S

e e, e

. g. , Common Cause/Ga. , 554 F.3d at 1356; People Against Poli ce Violence v . City of Pitt sburgh , 52 0 F. 3d 22 6, 23 3– 34 (3 d Ci r. 20 08 ); De ar mo re , 519 F.3d at 523–24. There is ag ain no conc ern that the relief the plaintiff won at the pr eliminary -injunction st age will prove to be
e ph e me ra l. T he de fe nd ant’ s a c tio n in re nd e ri ngthe c a se moo t e ns ur e s th a t th e inj un c tio n’ s a lte ratio n o f t he pa rt ie s’ le g a l r e latio ns hip wi ll not be un do ne by su bs e qu e nt r

uli ng s in the litigation.
The rea soning in the se case s persua des us that Hi g her Taste is a p re v ailing pa

rty here . I t is true that the district court dismissed this c as e u pon the par ties’ stipulation following settlement, rathe r than upon a determ i nation of mootness. B ut the question is whether H ighe r Taste achie ved relief sufficie ntly enduring to satisfy the “mate rial alter ation of the pa rties’ leg al re lat i o nship” requir ement. In our view, just as mootness provided as s uranc e in the ca ses discussed above that the plaintiff’s initial victory was e nduring rathe r than epheme ral, so too the settlement provides that a ssuranc e he re . It tr ans fo rm e d w hat ha d b e e n te mpo ra ry re lie f c a pa bleH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 11
of bein g un d o n e ( h a d

th e c a s e b e e nli ti g a te d to f ina l judgme nt) into a last i ng alteration of the parties’ leg al
re latio ns hip . Ind e e d, by se c ur ingHi g he r T a ste ’s ri g ht to
c on tin ue se lli ng its me ssa g e -b e ari ngT- sh ir ts a lon gthe ma in walkwa y leadingfrom the parking are a to the zoo’s entra nce, the settlem en t ag ree ment g ave H ighe r Taste what it had hoped to obtain throug h a per manent i n

junction. See W illiams , 625 F.2d at 847.
T h e P ar k D i s tr i c tr e s p o n d s b y a r g u i n g th a t , i n a c tu a l i ty, the sett l em ent agr eeme nt did not secur e any

enduringrelief for Hig her Ta ste. The Par k District notes that the new regulations it agr eed to e nact a s part of the settlement expressly rese rved its rig ht “to chang e, modify or re voke the above Rules a

nd Reg ulations if it deems it nec essar y .” Unde r thi s p ro vis ion , th e Park

Di st ri c t c on te nd s, it r e ma ins fr e e to unilatera lly

repe al the re g ulations in their e ntirety at any time.
The Park District undoubtedly reta ins the power to repe al the new regulations it has ena cted, a nd such ac tion would of
c ours e a ff e c t me mbe rs of the g e ne ra l publ ic wh o w ish to s e ll messag e-be aringmerc handise on zoo g rounds. But a re peal of the re g ulations would have no e ffe ct on the per sonal rig ht to sell messag e-be arin g

me r c handise Hig her Ta ste secur ed for it s elf by neg otiating the se ttlement ag ree ment. That contra ctual rig ht was the considera tion Highe r Taste rec eived in exchang e for

dismiss ing its § 1983 lawsuit with prejudice, a rig ht that w ould r emain enfor cea ble even if the Park District repe aled the ne wly

enac ted regu l at i ons in full. Under the Park District’s implausible re adingof the settl ement ag ree ment, the day

afte r the district cour

t dismi s s ed the action, the P ark District could have r epea led the new regulations a

nd once ag ain banned Hig her Taste f rom selling its me ssa g e -b e ari ngT- sh ir ts a ny wh e re on zoo g ro un ds —inH I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 12
eff ect putting the parties back to squar e one. We do not believe the parties spe nt six teen months hammeringout that illusory “agree ment.” Finally , the Park District a rgues t h at the settlement ag ree ment cannot c onfer p reva iling-pa

rty status on Highe r Taste be cause th e district cour t did not endorse or a dopt the
se ttl eme nt a g re e me nt o r o the rw ise re ta in j ur isd ic tio n to e nf or c e it

. W e a c kn ow le dg e that ou r c a se law s ug g e sts a settlement ag ree ment must be judicially enfor cea ble to meet Buck hannon ’ s ju d ic ia l i mp r im a tu r r e qu ir e me n t. Se e St. John’s Organic Farm v. Ge m Cnty. Mo squito Abatement Di st. , 574 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 ( 9th Cir. 2009)

. Bu t Highe r Taste doe s not r ely on the settlement ag ree ment to satisfy the judicial imprimatur require ment; the preliminary injun ct i on “ca rries all the ‘judicial imprimatur’ nece ssary to s ati sfy Buck hannon .” W

atson , 3 00 F .3 d at 1096. Highe r T a ste instead re lies on the settlement agree ment to establish that the
re lie f i t w on

a t th e pr e lim ina

ry -i nju nc tio n s ta g e is s uf

fi c ie ntl y e nd ur ingto s a tis fy

the “ mate ri a l a lte ratio n o f t he pa rt ie s’ leg al re lationship” require ment. For the rea sons g iven above , we c onclude that the se ttlement ag ree ment does so.
Be cause Hig her Ta ste is a pre vailing pa rty wit h i n the meaningof § 1988, it “should ordinarily rec over a n attorney ’s fee unless specia l circ umstances would r ender such an a war d
un ju s t.” He ns le

yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) ( c i t a t i o nan d

i n t e r n a l qu o t a t i o nm ar

k s o m i t t e d ); see also Mende z v. County of San Bernardino , 5 4 0 F. 3 d 1109, 1126–30 (9th Cir. 2008). On re mand, the di s t rict cour t should deter

mine in the first instance whether such spec ial
c ir c ums tanc e s e xist. I f the y do no t, t he c ourt sh ou ld c a lc ulate the re asonable fee Hig her Ta ste is entitled to recove r.H I G H ER T AS TE , I NC

. V

. C I T Y O F T AC OMA 13
REVERSED AND REMAND ED.