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PAUL GREENAN v. SUZANNE GREENAN

(AC 34320)

Beach, Robinson and Sheldon, Js.*

Argued December 9, 2013—officially released May 20, 2014
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Calmar, J. [motion to seal,

judgment]; Emons, J. [motion to seal, motion for

attorney’s fees].)

David V. DeRosa, with whom were Paul Greenan

and, on the brief, Austin B. Johns, for the appellant

(plaintiff).

Norman A. Roberts II, for the appellee (defendant).

Karen L. Dowd, with whom, on the brief, was Melissa

J. Needle, for the minor children.
Opinion

BEACH, J. In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff, Paul Greenan, challenges certain orders entered by

the trial court in the course of the proceedings dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Suzanne Greenan.

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) denying

his motion to seal the trial court’s memorandum of

decision, (2) mentioning his erased arrest record in its

decision and improperly drawing an adverse inference

from his assertion of the fifth amendment privilege

against self-incrimination, (3) declining to award him

alimony, (4) finding him to be in contempt of the court’s

automatic orders pursuant to Practice Book § 25-5, (5)

ordering the parties to pay the fees submitted by the

attorney for the parties’ two minor children and by the

children’s guardian ad litem, and (6) entering certain

orders regarding his 529 college savings plan account.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in denying his request to issue a sealed memorandum of decision.1 We disagree.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In September, 2011,

the plaintiff filed a motion to seal, among other things,

any written decisions concerning any sensitive and/or

personal information about the parties and their children. The court denied this motion. On November 30,

2011, the plaintiff filed a second motion to seal the

memorandum of decision.2 At a hearing on January 17,

2012, the court, Calmar, J., stated that the ‘‘decision is

something that can be generally handled with some

sensitivity.’’ The next day, on January 18, 2012, the court

issued an unsealed memorandum of decision in which

it rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage.

The plaintiff filed this appeal on February 7, 2012. On

August 30, 2012, the court filed a corrected memorandum of decision; the court noted that the corrected

decision incorporated clarifications requested in the

plaintiff’s August 10, 2012 motion for articulation. The

opinion did not further explain the court’s reasons for

denying the motion to seal.

During the pendency of this appeal, on September

26, 2012, the court, Emons, J., heard argument on the

plaintiff’s November 30, 2011 motion to seal. The plaintiff’s attorney requested that the entire memorandum

of decision be sealed. The court denied the motion. In

a January 14, 2013 articulation, the court, Emons, J.,

explained that it denied the plaintiff’s November 30,

2011 motion to seal because ‘‘the plaintiff offered and/

orfurnished no new reasons to alter Judge Calmar’s two

(or more) rulings and/or decisions that are presently on

appeal. The motion was not properly before this court.’’

‘‘We review a trial court’s decision granting or deny-
ing a motion to seal to determine whether, in making

the decision, the court abused its discretion. . . .

Inherent . . . in the concept of judicial discretion is the

idea of choice and a determination between competing

considerations. . . . When reviewing a trial court’s

exercise of the legal discretion vested in it, our review

is limited to whether the trial court correctly applied

the law and reasonably could have concluded as it did.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Vargas v. Doe, 96 Conn. App. 399, 408–409, 900 A.2d

525, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 546 (2006).

‘‘The presumption of openness of court proceedings

. . . is a fundamental principle of our judicial system.

. . . This policy of openness is not to be abridged

lightly. In fact, the legislature has provided for very few

instances in which it has determined that, as a matter of

course, certain privacy concerns outweigh the public’s

interest in open judicial proceedings.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 406. The

legislature, however, statutorily permits closed hearings and sealing ofrecords in ‘‘family relations matters’’3

where ‘‘the welfare of any children involved or the

nature of the case so requires. . . .’’ General Statutes

§ 46b-11.4

The plaintiff argues that the ‘‘children’s interest in

avoiding stigmatization and permanent psychological

harm from the highly charged information revealed in

the [memorandum of decision] overrides any public

interest.’’ He argues that the personal family details

included in the memorandum of decision require that

it be sealed.

‘‘[The public] policy of openness is not to be abridged

lightly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vargas v.

Doe, supra, 96 Conn. App. 406; see also Practice Book

§ 25-59A (a) (‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,

there shall be a presumption that documents filed with

the court shall be available to the public’’). We have

carefully reviewed the materials in question and decline

to hold that the court abused its discretion in implicitly

finding that the privacy interests in the case did not

outweigh the presumption of openness and, thus, the

court did not improperly deny the motion to seal.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in (1)

mentioning his erased arrest record in its memorandum

of decision and (2)improperly drawing an adverse inference from his assertion of his rights and privileges under

the fifth amendment. We disagree.

General Statutes § 54-142a (e)(3) provides that ‘‘[a]ny

person who shall have been the subject of such an

erasure shall be deemed to have never been arrested

within the meaning of the general statutes with respect

to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under

oath.’’ ‘‘[Section] 54-142a refers by its terms to records
of criminal proceedings, mandating in subsection (a)

the erasure of all police and court records and records

of any state’s attorney pertaining to charges which have

been dismissed, and prohibiting in subsection (e) the

disclosure of the contents of those records by judicial

or law enforcement personnel. There is no reference

in the statute to disclosures by private parties or to

matters extraneous to the records themselves. . . .

[T]he [purpose of the] erasure statute . . . is to protect

innocent persons from the harmful consequences of a

criminal charge which is subsequently dismissed. . . .

Prohibiting the subsequent use of records of [a] prior

arrest [that has been erased under § 54-142a] and court

proceedings adequately fulfills this purpose by insulating such an individual from the consequences of the

prior prosecution. The statute does not and cannot insulate [an individual] from the consequences of his [or her]

prior actions.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morowitz,

200 Conn. 440, 449–51, 512 A.2d 175 (1986).

A

In its January 18, 2012 memorandum of decision, the

court mentioned that the plaintiff had been arrested

on February 8, 2010, on drug related charges, that the

resultant criminal case was resolved by way of a courtordered diversionary program and that the plaintiff

reported that these charges had been erased pursuant

to § 54-142a (e) (3).

The plaintiff’s claim requires us to review the applicability of a statutory provision to the present case and,

thus, our review is plenary. See Perry v. Perry, 130

Conn. App. 720, 724, 24 A.3d 1269 (2011).

The plaintiff argues that the decision in the dissolution case was issued ‘‘in contravention of the erasure

statute’’ and ‘‘created a new public record of the plaintiff’s erased arrest after the plaintiff had successfully

completed a diversionary program.’’ Evidence was

admitted at trial to support the court’s findings regarding the plaintiff’s arrest. The plaintiff has not established

that this evidence was admitted in contravention of

§ 54-142a, or, in other words, that the evidence supporting the court’s finding constituted ‘‘records’’ within the

reach of § 54-142a. The erased records themselves were

not admitted into evidence. The plaintiff testified on

direct examination that he was arrested and that, as a

result,5 his visitation with his children became supervised and his employment was terminated. The plaintiff’s testimony about his arrest was based on his

recollection, independent of erased records and, thus,

was not within the scope of § 54-142a. See, e.g., State

v. Morowitz, supra, 200 Conn. 440 (§ 54-142a not bar to

victim’s testimony regarding memory of assault, which

was based on personal knowledge independent of

erased records); see also Rado v. Board of Education,

216 Conn. 541, 550–52, 583 A.2d 102 (1990) (§ 54-142a
did not bar testimony regarding observation of events

where witnesses did not use any record subject to erasure in testifying).

The plaintiff’s attorney introduced further evidence

of his arrest. The plaintiff’s attorney elicited testimony

on direct examination from Dr. Eric Frazer, the courtappointed evaluator, regarding the plaintiff’s arrest and

drug related involvement in the context of their effect

on supervised visitation and his reputation at his children’s school. The plaintiff’s attorney also entered into

evidence Frazer’s custody evaluation, which referred

to statements the plaintiff made regarding his arrest.

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s attorney referenced the

plaintiff’s arrest during closing argument. The plaintiff

cannot now complain that the court found facts in its

opinion regarding his arrest, which facts are supported

by his testimony and other evidence submitted by his

attorney.

B

On direct examination, the plaintiff testified as to his

arrest. On cross-examination, the plaintiff was asked,

‘‘[w]here were you on the evening of February 8, 2010,’’6

and was further questioned regarding the details of

that night. The plaintiff invoked the fifth amendment

in response to these questions. The defendant’s attorney

questioned the applicability of the fifth amendment due

to the fact that the criminal case stemming from those

charges had been disposed of and records relating to

it erased. In its August 30, 2012 decision, the court noted

that the plaintiff was cross-examined at trial regarding

the events leading up to the arrest, and regarding drug

use generally, and that he invoked his fifth amendment

privilege. The court stated that it drew a negative inference from the plaintiff’s refusal to testify concerning

the February, 2010 incident.

Despite being able to testify lawfully that he had

never been arrested; see General Statutes § 54-142a (e)

(3); the plaintiff testified about his arrest on direct

examination. On cross-examination, the defendant’s

attorney did not ask if the plaintiff had been arrested,

but rather sought to elicit information regarding his

actions on the night of the arrest. Although the erasure

statute protects persons from the harmful consequences of criminal charges that are subsequently dismissed, it does not insulate an individual from the

consequences of his or her prior actions. State v. Morowitz, supra, 200 Conn. 451.

The court did not err in drawing an adverse inference

from the plaintiff’s refusal to testify as to the events of

February 8, 2010, because such adverse inferences are

permitted in civil actions.7

‘‘The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination not only protects the

individual against being involuntarily called as a witness

against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privi-
leges him not to answer official questions put to him

in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or

informal, where the answers might incriminate him in

future criminal proceedings. . . . The privilege does

not, however, forbid the drawing of adverse inferences

against parties to civil actions8 when they refuse to

testify in response to probative evidence offered against

them. The prevailing rule is that the fifth amendment

does not preclude the inference where the privilege is

claimed by a party to a civil cause.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis omitted; footnote added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Olin Corp. v. Castells, 180 Conn. 49,

53, 428 A.2d 319 (1980). There also was other evidence

from which the court could have concluded that the

plaintiff had been involved in drug use.9

It was not

error for the court to draw an adverse inference about

substance abuse from the plaintiff’s refusal to testify

on that subject and to rely on that adverse inference

in crafting its orders.

III

The plaintiff next claims thatthe court erred in declining to award him alimony. He argues that the court,

Calmar, J., abused its discretion in determining ‘‘without any explanation’’ that the plaintiff was not to receive

alimony in light of the fact that Judge Shay had previously ordered an increase in a pendente lite alimony

award to the plaintiff. We disagree.

In April, 2009, the court, Shay, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for alimony and child support pendente

lite, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff unallocated alimony and child support in the amount of

$1500 per month. In its April, 2011 decision on motions

to modify filed by the parties, the court, Shay, J., determined that there had been a substantial change in circumstances and ordered that the defendant pay the

plaintiff $4000 per month in unallocated alimony and

child support.

In its August 30, 2012 decision, the court did not

award alimony to either party. The court found that the

plaintiff intentionally and wilfully violated the automatic orders required under Practice Book § 25-5 by

depleting assets that otherwise would have been available for distribution; the court stated that, rather than

issue a specific order to restore the funds, it took the

plaintiff’s actions into consideration when fashioning

its orders. The court noted that it ‘‘carefully considered’’

the statutory criteria in General Statutes § 46b-8210

regarding the awarding of alimony and decided not to

issue an award of periodic alimony to either party. The

court stated that ‘‘[s]pecifically, but by no means exclusively, the court considered the causes of the breakdown, the plaintiff’s pre- and postseparation behaviors

and actions, the plaintiff’s passive aggressive personality and confrontational approach, the custodial arrangements, the plaintiff’s dissipation of the estate, and the
abilities and needs of the parties in fashioning the equitable distribution of the available resources.’’

In Wolk v. Wolk, 191 Conn. 328, 464 A.2d 780 (1983),

our Supreme Court adjudicated a claim similar to the

one presented in the present case. The court stated:

‘‘The claim thatthe court erroneously disturbed alimony

pendente lite orders without a clear basis for doing

so appears to misunderstand the difference between

temporary orders prior to the dissolution of a marriage

and final orders at the time of the dissolution of a

marriage. The purpose of an award of alimony and

support pendente lite is to provide [a party with support

during the pendency of the dissolution action].11 The

final orders of alimony and support granted at the time

of the dissolution necessarily address the long term

conditions under which the reorganization of the family

is to take place and include distribution of assets such

as the family home and other significant assets. Since

the purposes of pendente lite awards and final orders

are different, there is no requirement that the court

give any reason for changing the pendente lite orders.’’

(Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 330–31. The court did not err in

declining expressly to discuss the reasons for changing

the pendente lite orders.

The trial court has broad discretion in its award of

alimony. See McMellon v. McMellon, 116 Conn. App.

393, 397, 976 A.2d 1 (so long as trial court considers

all statutory criteria, it may exercise broad discretion

in awarding alimony), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 926, 980

A.2d 911 (2009). The court specifically stated that it

considered the statutory factors set forth in § 46b-82.

After reviewing the record, we are not persuaded that

the court abused its discretion in its award of alimony.

IV

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in finding him to be in contempt of the court’s automatic

orders pursuant to Practice Book § 25-5. We disagree.

‘‘The abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial

court’s decision on a motion for contempt. . . . A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard

of review is to determine whether the court abused its

discretion in [finding] that the actions or inactions of

the [party] were in contempt of a court order. . . . To

constitute contempt, a party’s conduct must be wilful.

. . . Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment

of contempt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Traystman v. Traystman, 141 Conn. App. 789, 799, 62

A.3d 1149 (2013).

Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The

following automatic orders shall apply to both parties,

with service of the automatic orders to be made with

service of process of a complaint for dissolution of

marriage . . . . (b) (1) Neither party shall sell, trans-
fer, exchange, assign, remove, or in any way dispose

of, without the consent of the other party in writing,

or an order of a judicial authority, any property, except

in the usual course of business or for customary and

usual household expenses or for reasonable attorney’s

fees in connection with this action. . . . (5) Neither

party shall incur unreasonable debts hereafter, including, but not limited to, further borrowing against any

credit line secured by the family residence, further

encumbrancing of any assets, or unreasonably using

credit cards or cash advances against credit cards.

. . .’’

The court noted that the defendant claimed in her

motion for contempt that the plaintiff, ‘‘without the

knowledge or consent of the defendant, and in violation

of the automatic orders: (1) drew on the credit lines

secured by the [parties’] investment property [on Maryanne Lane] in Stamford and expended all of those funds

in the approximate amount of $420,000; (2) borrowed

approximately $400,000 from his mother since the commencement of the dissolution action; (3) expended

approximately $80,000 to make improvements to the

Maryanne Lane property, which improvements were

not made in the usual course of business or for customary and usual household expenses; (4) expended over

$400,000 to pay legal fees since the commencement of

the action; and (5) withdrew over $50,000 from his

retirement accounts and converted one of his retirement accounts from a traditional IRA account to a Roth

IRA account, incurring a significant tax expense.’’ The

court stated that, in sum, the defendant alleged that

‘‘the plaintiff transformed his family estate, which had

no debt and $1.5 million in equity in real estate, into

an estate with $1.5 million in mortgage obligations and

little equity.’’

The plaintiff argued before the trial court that ‘‘he

did not violate the automatic orders because he drew

down $420,000 on the property [on Maryanne Lane],

borrowed $400,000 from his mother and withdrew over

$50,000 from his retirement accounts to make $80,000

worth of necessary repairs to the property [on Maryanne Lane], pay necessary legal fees and cover his living

expenses.’’ The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument.

The court stated, ‘‘Although extra expenses were necessary to establish the plaintiff’s separate housing and

secure legal representation, the plaintiff, without the

knowledge or consent of the defendant, mortgaged

assets, took out loans and converted assets, all the while

exercising little restraint over his spending and acting

with a sense of entitlement. . . . The court finds the

plaintiff intentionally and wilfully violated the automatic orders, and his unilateral expenditures depleted

assets that would have otherwise been available for

distribution. The court finds the plaintiff in wilful contempt of court. Rather than issue a specific order to

restore the funds at this time, the court has taken the
plaintiff’s self-help into consideration in fashioning its

orders.’’ (Citations omitted.)

The plaintiff argues that the court erred in finding

him in contempt of the automatic orders because there

was no evidence that he expended funds on anything

other than legal fees, modest living expenses and emergency property repairs. We disagree.

The court found that, although some degree of extra

expense was necessary to establish the plaintiff’s separate housing and secure legal representation, the plaintiff, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant,

mortgaged assets, took out loans and converted assets,

exercising little or no restraint on his spending. Such

spending reasonably could be found to be beyond the

usual course of business or ‘‘for customary and usual

household expenses’’ and assets were undisputedly

encumbered. For example, the plaintiff himself testified

that approximately $80,000 was spent for repairs to the

Maryanne Lane property, including fixing the foundation, removing walls to fix the foundation, repairing

electrical problems found as a result of removing the

walls, and cutting the foundation in order to install

larger windows downstairs. He further testified to taking out a $420,000 equity line of credit on the Maryanne

Lane property; borrowing $400,000 from his family and

expending over $400,000 in legal fees. The court reasonably could have determined that the plaintiff wilfully

violated the automatic orders without the defendant’s

knowledge or permission of the court. The court did

not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff

violated the automatic orders.

V

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in ordering the parties to pay the fees submitted by the attorney

for the minor children and by the guardian ad litem.

The plaintiff argues that the fees were unreasonable in

light of counsels’ level of diligence in representing the

interests of the parties’ minor children and the absence

of an evidentiary hearing with respect to the reasonableness of their fees. We are not persuaded.

The court ordered that the parties each pay one-half

of the outstanding fees and costs to the attorney for

the minor children and to the guardian ad litem. The

court determined that the attorney for the minor children was owed $74,131.68 as of November 30, 2011,

and the guardian ad litem was owed $52,683.73 as of

November 29, 2011. The court stated that it had

reviewed the affidavits regarding fees submitted by the

attorney for the minor children and by the guardian ad

litem and found them ‘‘fair and reasonable under the

circumstances of this difficult and lengthy case.’’

‘‘The court may order either party to pay the fees for

[a] guardian ad litem [and the attorney for the minor

children] pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62, and
how such expenses will be paid is within the court’s

discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion in granting

[guardian ad litem] fees will be found only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court could not

reasonably have concluded as it did. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion

in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its

action. . . .

‘‘The statutory authority for the award of fees for a

court-appointed guardian ad litem is found in § 46b-62.

. . . Section 46b-62 provides in relevant part: If, in any

proceeding under this chapter . . . the court appoints

an attorney for a minor child, the court may order the

father, mother or an intervening party, individually or

in any combination, to pay the reasonable fees of the

attorney. . . . The order for payment of [guardian ad

litem] fees under General Statutes § 46b-62 requires

consideration of the financial resources of both parties

and the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82.

. . . Section 46b-82 instructs the court to consider,

inter alia, the age, health, station, occupation, amount

and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,

estate and needs of each of the parties . . . . Although

the trial court is not required to find expressly on each

of the § 46b-82 factors, it must have sufficient evidence

to support each factor.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lamacchia

v. Chilinsky, 79 Conn. App. 372, 374–76, 830 A.2d 329

(2003), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 942, 861 A.2d 514

(2004).12

‘‘[Trial] courts have a general knowledge of what

would be reasonable compensation for services which

are fairly stated and described. . . . Because of this

general knowledge, [t]he court [is] in a position to evaluate the complexity of the issues presented and the skill

with which counsel had dealt with these issues. . . .

While the decision as to the liability for payment of

such fees can be made in the absence of any evidence

of the cost of the work performed . . . the dollar

amount of such an award must be determined to be

reasonable after an appropriate evidentiary showing.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 107 Conn. App. 488, 503,

945 A.2d 1043, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 948, 960 A.2d

1037 (2008).

We are constrained by our standard of review, which

dictates that a court has broad discretion in such matters and that, in the absence of an abuse of discretion,

we defer to the judgment of the trial court, which is in

a better position than we are to assess the entire scenario. In this case, the guardian ad litem and attorney

for the minor children presented evidence from which

the court could have determined the amount of the

fees and the reasonableness of the fees. See Hartford
Electric Light Co. v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 85, 91–92, 438

A.2d 828 (procedural due process requirements satisfied when party opposing reasonableness of attorney’s

fees is afforded opportunity to present evidence and

cross-examine opposing parties’ witnesses on question

of reasonableness), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837, 102 S.

Ct. 143, 70 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1981).13 Attorney Eric J. Broder,

the guardian ad litem for the parties’ children, testified

as to the complexity of the case, the services he rendered and the resulting amount of his outstanding bill.

He testified that in the approximately two years

between the time of his appointment as guardian ad

litem and the time of trial, he had interacted with the

children and had met with the plaintiff ‘‘many’’ times.

He noted the ways in which he kept up with the progress

of the case and explained that he did not have extensive

meetings with the children because ‘‘they don’t want

to see me.’’ He testified that he had attended almost

every court proceeding. His affidavit regarding fees was

entered into evidence as a full exhibit. He testified that

he billed at $500 per hour and that his total charges

had amounted to approximately $142,575 through the

previous day of trial, October 27, 2011. On November

3, 2011, he testified that he had provided an affidavit

of fees and that the updated balance still outstanding

was ‘‘just under’’ $53,000. He furthertestified that, as the

proceedings progressed, ‘‘an overwhelming majority’’ of

his time was spent on issues related to the plaintiff.

Melissa J. Needle, the attorney who represented the

minor children during the eleven day trial, also submitted an affidavit regarding her fees.14 On the first day of

trial, much of the plaintiff’s testimony was related to

his motion to remove Needle as the attorney for the

minor children. In her closing argument to the court,

Needle noted that ‘‘this has been a very difficult case.

It’s been going for almost three years . . . .’’ She

detailed herinvolvement in the case, including meetings

with counsel, reviewing Frazer’s reports, reviewing

e-mails between the parties’ attorneys, dealing with correspondence, pleadings, court transcripts, financial affidavits, attendance at ‘‘numerous’’ pendente lite

hearings, and spending some time with the minor

children.

The plaintiff has not specifically attacked any individual item included in the lists of hours and rates submitted by Needle and Broder in their affidavits. Rather,

his claim centers on their level of diligence and their

conduct during the case. On the first day of trial, the

court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remove Needle

as the attorney for the minor children. As noted, Broder

and Needle both provided affidavits regarding fees and

both described to the court, either in testimony or in

closing argument, their involvement in the case. The

court determined that the fees submitted by the guardian ad litem and the attorney for the minor children

were reasonable. In light of the length and complexity
of the trial, the protracted and adversarial nature of the

proceedings on the whole, and the testimony of Broder

and Needle as to the work performed, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in its

findings.

VI

The plaintiff last claims that the court erred in its

orders regarding his 529 college savings plan accounts.

We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. The court ordered that the minor children’s 529

accounts15 shall continue to be maintained for the benefit of the minor children and that the defendant shall

be the custodian of those accounts.

The plaintiff argues that the court’s orders regarding

the 529 accounts violated General Statutes § 46b-56c

(f) because the amount in the 529 accounts far exceeds

tuition at the University of Connecticut for both children.16 He argues that the court improperly disguised

the assignment of his property (the 529 accounts) as

an educational order. He further argues that the court,

in fashioning this order, failed to take into account the

first factor of § 46b-56c (c),17 the parents’ income.

Although 529 accounts pertain to education

expenses; see 26 U.S.C. § 529; the court’s orders regarding the plaintiff’s 529 accounts were not educational

support orders pursuant to § 46b-56c. Section 46b-56c

(a) defines the ‘‘educational support order’’ to be ‘‘an

order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide

support for a child or children to attend for up to a

total of four full academic years an institution of higher

education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or other undergraduate

degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction

. . . .’’ The court’s orders with respect to the 529

accounts did not require the plaintiff to provide support

in the future for the children to attend college. Rather,

the court ordered that the plaintiff continue to maintain

the accounts, which he had previously established and

in which he had elected to place more than $280,000.

The court further ordered that the defendant, to whom

the court had granted sole custody of the minor children, be the custodian of the 529 accounts. The court

ordered, pursuant to § 46b-56c, that the defendant, not

the plaintiff, ‘‘be responsible for the educational

expenses of the minor children . . . .’’ The accounts,

per the court’s order and 26 U.S.C. § 52918 were for the

benefit of the minor children. The court’s order simply

changed the person who was the custodian of the

accounts, which were previously existing property,

from the plaintiff to the defendant.

The 529 accounts were marital property pursuant to

General Statutes § 46b-81, under the broad definition

given to that term by our legislature.19 ‘‘Rather than
narrow the plain meaning of the term property from its

ordinarily comprehensive scope, in enacting § 46b-81,

the legislature acted to expand the range of resources

subject to the trial court’s power of division, and did

not intend that property should be given a narrow construction. . . . [O]ur broad definition of property was

not entirely without limitation, and . . . property

under § 46b-81 includes only interests that are presently

existing, as opposed to mere expectancies.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopiano v.

Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 364–66, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998).

The accounts were existing property, though payments

were contemplated to be made from the accounts in

the future.

The court did not err in its distribution of the 529

accounts. It is afforded broad discretion in its award

of property. See, e.g., id., 374–75 (trial court afforded

broad discretion when distributing marital property as

long as it takes into account statutory factors in § 46b81). ‘‘Generally, we will not overturn a trial court’s division of marital property unless it misapplies, overlooks,

or gives a wrong orimproper effect to any test or consideration which it was [its] duty to regard. . . . We must,

however, consider, the paramount purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding

[which] is to unscramble existing marital property in

order to give each spouse his or her equitable share

at the time of dissolution.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn.

348, 355, 880 A.2d 872 (2005).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 The defendant argues that this issue is moot because the decision has

been available to the public since the issuance of the initial decision in

January, 2012. ‘‘Mootness implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction

and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled

general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential

requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts

to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief

or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An

actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also

throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of

an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from

granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has

become moot. . . . Because mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a question of law over which ourreview is plenary.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cornelius, 131 Conn.

App. 216, 219–20, 26 A.3d 700, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946, 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

On the record before us, it has not been shown that absolutely no practical

relief can be granted.

2 The court, Calmar, J., did not directly and expressly deny the motion

to seal, but did issue the decision without having ordered it to be sealed.

3 General Statutes § 46b-1 (1) includes dissolution of marriage within the

ambit of family relations matters.

4 General Statutes § 46b-11 provides: ‘‘Any case which is a family relations

matter may be heard in chambers or, if a jury case, in a courtroom from

which the public and press have been excluded, if the judge hearing the

case determines that the welfare of any children involved or the nature of

the case so requires. The records and other papers in any family relations
matter may be ordered by the court to be kept confidential and not to be

open to inspection except upon order of the court or judge thereof for

cause shown.’’

5 During some of the plaintiff’s direct examination, the arrest was referred

to as a February, 2010 ‘‘incident.’’ Later in direct examination, the plaintiff

used the word ‘‘arrest.’’

6 The arrest occurred on February 8, 2010.

7 The plaintiff’s claim involves a question of law, over which our review

is plenary. See Rhode v. Milla, 287 Conn. 731, 737, 949 A.2d 1227 (2008)

(whether invocation of fifth amendment privilege constitutes admissible

evidence is question of law over which our review is plenary).

8 There are statutory exceptions to this rule that are not implicated in this

case. See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-138a; General Statutes § 52-146k (f).

9 For example, Frazer testified that the plaintiff had reported to him that

he refused to take a hair follicle test because ‘‘it would compromise his

criminal case. So, my interpretation of that is that it would only compromise

his criminal case if the test result would have been positive. . . . So, that

would have been relevant to form my opinion about the presence or absence

of substance abusing behavior.’’

10 General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In determining

whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the

award, the court . . . shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes

for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age,

health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,

education, employability [and the] estate and needs of each of the parties

. . . .’’

11 See, e.g., Gong v. Huang, 129 Conn. App. 141, 151 n.16, 21 A.3d 474,

cert. denied, 302 Conn. 907, 23 A.3d 1247 (2011).

12 The appointment of a guardian ad litem, specifically authorized by General Statutes § 45a-132 (a), is governed by the same standards as those

pertaining to an attorney for minor children, and the standards regarding

payment of fees are the same for both categories. Lamacchia v. Chilinsky,

supra, 79 Conn. App. 373 n.1, 374–76.

13 The plaintiff was afforded such opportunities. His argument to the effect

that a separate and distinct hearing was necessary has no merit.

14 The plaintiff argues that the court improperly approved of the reasonableness of the fees of the attorney forthe minor children given her‘‘behavior

in this case . . . .’’ He argues that the attorney for the minor children

had solicited a bribe from him in exchange for the guardian ad litem’s

recommendation of joint custody. The court declined to grant the plaintiff’s

motion to remove the counsel for the minor children on the basis of this

testimony, reasoning, in part, that the plaintiff did not have standing to

make claims against the attorney for the minor children. His argument

before us regarding inappropriate behavior does not pertain directly to

the reasonableness of the fees, but rather is an attack on the continued

appointment of the guardian ad litem. See, e.g., Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 81

Conn. App. 382, 405–406, 840 A.2d 557 (2004) (parent lacks standing to make

claims against court-appointed attorney who represented interests of minor

children during divorce proceedings), aff’d, 274 Conn. 533, 877 A.2d 773

(2005). Although a parent may lack standing to assertrights regarding competent representation, because the parent is not the client and the attorney

has duties both to the court and to the child, the parent of course may point

to ineffectiveness or other shortcomings in arguing over fees. In this case,

the court clearly found the plaintiff’s position unpersuasive, and we do not

find the court’s findings to have been clearly erroneous.

15 Funds in a 529 account receive favorable tax treatment and are available

for qualified education expenses only. See 26 U.S.C. § 529. The plaintiff’s

February 16, 2011 financial affidavit indicates that the total amount in the

529 account exceeded $280,000.

16 General Statutes § 46b-56c (f) provides: ‘‘The educational support order

may include support for any necessary educational expense, including room,

board, dues, tuition, fees, registration and application costs, but such

expenses shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of

Connecticut for a full-time in-state student at the time the child for whom

educational support is being ordered matriculates, except this limit may be

exceeded by agreement of the parents. An educational support order may

also include the cost of books and medical insurance for such child.’’

17 General Statutes § 46b-56c (c) provides: ‘‘The court may not enter an

educational support order pursuant to this section unless the court finds

as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parents would
have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact. After making such finding, the court,

in determining whether to enter an educational support order, shall consider

all relevant circumstances, including: (1) The parents’ income, assets and

other obligations, including obligations to other dependents; (2) the child’s

need for support to attend an institution of higher education or private

occupational school considering the child’s assets and the child’s ability to

earn income;(3)the availability of financial aid from other sources, including

grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the higher education to be

funded considering the child’s academic record and the financial resources

available; (5) the child’s preparation for, aptitude for and commitment to

higher education; and (6) evidence, if any, of the institution of higher education or private occupational school the child would attend.’’

18 See footnote 15.

19 ‘‘There are three stages of analysis regarding the equitable distribution

of each resource: first, whether the resource is property within § 46b-81 to

be equitably distributed (classification); second, what is the appropriate

method for determining the value of the property (valuation); and third,

what is the most equitable distribution of the property between the parties

(distribution).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247

Conn. 356, 364–66, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998).