Opinion filed April 15, 2010

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

Nos. 11-09-00085-CR & 11-09-00086-CR

__________

STEPHEN TROUTZ, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 396th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 1006175D & 1116279W

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

These are appeals from judgments adjudicating guilt. Stephen Troutz originally entered 

pleas of guilty to the offenses of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon1and assault causing 

bodily injury to a public servant in retaliation for an official duty.2 The trial court deferred the 

adjudication of appellant’s guilt. For the aggravated assault offense, the trial court placed 

appellant on community supervision for five years and assessed a $500 fine. For the assault 

 

1

11-09-00085-CR.

2

11-09-00086-CR.
2

causing bodily injury to a public servant, the trial court placed appellant on community 

supervision for three years and assessed a $300 fine. At the hearing on the State’s motions to 

adjudicate, appellant entered pleas of true to several of the State’s allegations. In each case, the 

trial court found that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his community 

supervision, revoked his community supervision, adjudicated his guilt, and imposed a sentence 

of confinement for five years. We affirm.

In his first point, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support 

the trial court’s decision to adjudicate his guilt for each offense. Appellant is asking this court to

apply the standard stated in Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We note 

that the Clewis factual sufficiency standard is not applicable to revocation of community 

supervision. Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref=d); 

Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.); Becker v. State, 33 

S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.

App.—Waco 1996, pet. ref=d).

Moreover, in a community supervision revocation hearing, the State has the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a condition of community supervision has been 

violated. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cobb v. State, 851 

S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof of one violation of the terms and conditions of 

community supervision is sufficient to support the revocation. McDonald v. State, 608 S.W.2d 

192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Moses v. 

State, 590 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The trial court is the trier of the facts and 

determines the weight and credibility of the testimony. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1981); Barnett v. State, 615 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A plea of true 

alone is sufficient to support the trial court’s determination to revoke. Moses, 590 S.W.2d at 

470; Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Appellate review of an order 

revoking community supervision is limited to the issue of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763; Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1984).

Appellant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion. In each case, the 

first point is overruled.
3

In his second point, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

assessed his punishment at confinement for five years in each case. Appellant contends that, 

while the punishment assessed was within the statutory limits, the length of punishment was 

“outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” We disagree.

Appellant failed to raise his objection at trial and specifically stated that there was no 

reason that the sentences could not be imposed. His complaints have not been preserved for 

appellate review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1986); Thompson v. State, 243 S.W.3d 774, 775-76 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d).

Moreover, we note that the trial court assessed punishment within the range authorized by 

the legislature under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. '' 12.33, 12.34, 22.01(b), and 22.02(a) (Vernon

Supp. 2009). A penalty assessed within the range of punishment established by the legislature 

will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); 

Bradfield v. State, 42 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.CEastland 2001, pet. ref’d). The second point

is overruled in each case.

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

April 15, 2010

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.