alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CORNELI SEED CO. v. C. D. JARRATT CO.

No. 14339.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

July 23, 1941.

John T. Spann, of Crystal City, for plaintiff in error.

Jackson & Crawford, of Crystal City, for defendant in error.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff below, proponent of this motion, has attempted to appeal by writ of error from a judgment resulting from a trial in which plaintiff was represented by counsel who actively participated in all the proceedings in the case.

The record tendered here by plaintiff discloses that citation in error was not issued until May 5, 1941, or served upon defendant below until May 13, 1941.

Under Art. 2249a, Vernon’s Civ.Stats. Acts 1939, 46th Leg. p. 59, the right of appeal by writ of error was denied to litigants in trials in which they or their counsel participated. The Act was made effective January 1, 1940.

It is now settled by the decisions that under that Act no person affected by it (such as plaintiff in this case) may prosecute appeal by %vrit of error unless petition for writ of error has been filed in the trial court, and service or waiver had thereon, prior to the effective date of the Act, to-wit: January 1, 1940. Newton v. Barnes, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 72, and authorities there cited; United Employers Cas. Co. v. Skinner, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 955.

 The -fact that petition for writ of error and bond thereon are filed prior to *498the effective date of the Act is immaterial and does not control. Under the authorities cited the ultimate act authorizing appeal by writ of error is that of service or waiver of citation in error prior to January 1, 1940. No attempt was made in this case to procure such issuance or service until May S, 1941, fifteen months after plaintiff’s right to that remedy had terminated.

Plaintiff’s motion to require the clerk of this Court to file the record in the attempted writ of error proceeding is overruled.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

CHERYL L. SPIVEY, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-CV-0935-D 

§ 

DART TRANSPORTATION, § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

ORDER 

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a 

recommendation in this case. No objections were filed. The undersigned district judge 

reviewed the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. 

Finding none, the court adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the 

United States Magistrate Judge. 

SO ORDERED. 

May 25, 2022. 

 _________________________________ 

 SIDNEY A. FITZWATER 

 SENIOR JUDGE 

Case 3:22-cv-00935-D-BN Document 7 Filed 05/25/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 21
Case 4:22-cv-00201-Y   Document 3   Filed 04/11/22    Page 1 of 1   PageID 15Case 4:22-cv-00201-Y   Document 3   Filed 04/11/22    Page 1 of 1   PageID 15
Arlington Section 8-5(16). Permits and Fees - Reporting Requirements.

(a) Except as provided below, each permitted stationary air pollution source 

must submit to the Department an annual report that establishes the amount 

of actual emissions of each regulated pollutant, including carbon monoxide, 

for that source. This report will be for the emissions of that source that 

occurred during the calendar year starting in 1991 and continuing for 

succeeding years thereafter. The Department may request, and the air 

pollution source shall provide, additional information on the emissions 

data submitted when the Department determines, the data previously provided 

is inadequate to establish the actual type or amount of emissions from the 

source subject to fees.

(b) Not including air toxics as they are defined in the Clean Air Act 

Amendments of 1990 and the amendments thereto, if the source emits fewer 

than twenty five (25) tons of actual emissions of pollutant during a year, 

it may at its option, use as the actual emissions figure, its permitted 

pollutant levels where available and known. If the source is a "major 

source" under the air toxics provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 

1990 it too must calculate its actual emission of regulated pollutants. 

Failure to provide, on a timely basis, any additional information requested 

shall be considered failure to pay the fees.

8-5(16), p. 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,944,023
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,396,451
<PP&E>                                       3,085,468
<DEPRECIATION>                                 370,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,196,676
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          762,437
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        81,465
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,352,774
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,196,676
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,980,828
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (26,894)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,953,934)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,953,934)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.25)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.25)
        



</TABLE>
#### Maxine Smith, as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert E. Smith, Deceased, Claimant, *v.*State of New York, Defendant.

(Claim No. 32882.)

Court of Claims,

April 16, 1958.

*Meyer Fix*and *Norman Spindelman*for claimant.

*Jacob K. Javits, Attorney-General (Lawrence H. Wagner*of counsel), for defendant. .

Fred A. Young, J.

During the course of the trial claimant moved that the defense of contributory negligence on the part of the decedent be taken out of the case on the grounds that it was an affirmative defense which was not pleaded by the State. (Decedent Estate Law, §§ 119, 131.) Claimant relied on *Dulinak*v. *State of New York*(177 Misc. 372, affd. 262 App. Div. 1064).

Inasmuch as we have found in our accompanying decision that the claimant failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that the State was guilty of any negligence, causing or contributing to Smith’s accident, we did not reach the question of the contributory negligence of Robert E. Smith since such determination was not necessary to the decision herein and we believe the claimant’s motion thus became academic. However, although no finding is made with respect to the contributory negligence of the decedent herein, the State is not precluded from offering evidence of contributory negligence by reason of its failure to so plead in actions of this nature. The State is not required to serve or file any answer at all and loses no rights by its failure to do so. (Court of Claims Act, § 9, subd. 9; Rules of Court of Claims, rule *13; Taylor*v. *State of New York,*302 N. Y. 177, 188.)

Claimant’s motion made on page 325 of the minutes, on which decision was reserved, is hereby denied.

The claim is dismissed in an accompanying decision.
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ No. 3:22-CV-01730-E (BT) 

§ 

RYAN GERARD WALLACE, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

§

Defendant. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF

THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation in 

this case (Doc. 5). No objections were filed. The District Court reviewed the proposed findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. Finding none, the Court ACCEPTS the 

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

SO ORDERED: December 27, 2022. 

Case 3:22-cv-01730-E-BT Document 6 Filed 12/27/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 44
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 27 (Wednesday, February 9, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 6325-6326]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-2897]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 117

[CGD01-00-001]


Drawbridge Operation Regulations: Chelsea River, Massachusetts

AGENCY:  Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION:  Notice of temporary deviation; withdrawal.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY:  The Commander, First Coast Guard District has withdrawn the

[[Page 6326]]

temporary deviation from the drawbridge operation regulations for the 
P.J. McArdle Bridge, mile 0.3, across the Chelsea River between Chelsea 
and East Boston, Massachusetts. This withdrawal was necessary because 
the bridge has been repaired and is operating under its normal 
operating regulations. The normal operating regulations require the 
bridge to open on signal at all times for vessel traffic.

DATES:  This deviation withdrawal is effective January 18, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  John McDonald, Project Officer, First 
Coast Guard District, at (617) 223-8364.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The bridge owner, the City of Boston, 
requested a temporary deviation from the operating regulations to 
facilitate vehicular and pedestrian traffic during electrical repairs 
at the P. J. McArdle Bridge, mile 0.3, across the Chelsea River between 
East Boston and Chelsea, Massachusetts. The submarine electrical cable 
for the bridge was damaged during harbor dredging operations requiring 
emergency repairs to be implemented in order to restore bridge 
operation and facilitate marine traffic.
    The Coast Guard issued a temporary deviation from the operating 
regulations published in the Federal Register (65 FR 2541; January 18, 
2000) effective January 6, 2000 through March 5, 2000. The purpose of 
the deviation was to help facilitate vehicular traffic during the 
weekday rush hours.
    A temporary auxiliary operating system has been installed to open 
the bridge and the bridge is now operating under its normal operating 
regulations.
    The temporary deviation from the operating regulations is no longer 
necessary as a result of the bridge being returned to a fully operable 
status. The bridge owner was advised on January 18, 2000, that the 
deviation has been withdrawn.
    Notice is given that the P.J. McArdle Bridge, mile 0.3, across the 
Chelsea River shall open on signal at all times for vessel traffic.

    Dated: January 25, 2000.
R.M. Larrabee,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commander, First Coast Guard District.
[FR Doc. 00-2897 Filed 2-8-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-15-P
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

EUGENIO VARGAS §

§

VS. § ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-430-Y

§

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL §

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, ET AL. §

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Leave to File a

Surreply Brief to Respond to New Arguments Raised in Plaintiff's Reply

Briefs, or, Alternatively, to Strike Such New Arguments (doc. 64). 

In the motion, defendant/counter-plaintiff Association of Professional

Flight Attendants ("APFA") requests leave to file a surreply regarding

plaintiff/counter-defendant Eugenio Vargas's Motion to Dismiss the

AFPA's counterclaims. In a separate order filed this same day, the

Court ruled on Vargas's Motion to Dismiss and did not consider the

new arguments raised in his reply brief. As a result, the Court

concludes that AFPA's motion for leave should be, and it is hereby,

DENIED as moot.

SIGNED February 22, 2023.

____________________________

TERRY R. MEANS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350) The certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of
satisfying the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and may not be relied upon or used for any other purposes. In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corporation
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2004, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Paul J. Mooney, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 or
other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request. Date: May 11, 2004By:
    /s/ Paul J. MooneyPaul J. MooneyChief Financial Officer The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission as an Exhibit to this report and should not be considered filed as a
part of this report. 33
Exhibit 34.2

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of Directors

The Trust & Agency Services department of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and 

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas:

We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Management’s Assertion of Compliance, that the Trust & Agency Services department of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (collectively the “Company”) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB (Servicing Criteria) for the Honda Auto Receivables 2015-2 Owner Trust asset‐backed securities transaction (the “Platform”), except for Servicing Criteria 1122(d)(1)(i)‐1122(d)(1)(v), 1122(d)(2)(i), 1122(d)(2)(iii)‐1122(d)(2)(vii), 1122(d)(3)(i) and 1122(d)(4)(i)‐1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has determined are not applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the Platform, as of and for the year ended March 31, 2018. With respect to the Platform, servicing criterion 1122(d)(3)(ii) is applicable only as it relates to remittances. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with the Servicing Criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion about the Company’s compliance with the Servicing Criteria based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to obtain reasonable assurance and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the Servicing Criteria specified above and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing selected asset‐backed transactions and securities that comprise the Platform, testing selected servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance with the Servicing Criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have occurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report for the selected transactions or any other transactions. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliance with the Servicing Criteria.

 

In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned Servicing Criteria, as of and for the year ended March 31, 2018, is fairly stated, in all material respects. 

/s/KPMG LLP

Chicago, Illinois

May 31, 2018
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IA

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 158

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States with

respect to the right to life.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 17, 1993

Mr. DORNAN (for himself, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. SMITH

of New Jersey, Mr. HYDE, and Mrs. VUCANOVICH) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the

Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States with respect to the right to life.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
2

•HJ 158 IH

1 States within seven years after the date of its submission

2 for ratification:

3 ‘‘ARTICLE—

4 ‘‘SECTION 1. The right to life is the paramount and

5 most fundamental right of a person.

6 ‘‘SECTION 2. With respect to the right to life guaran7 teed to persons by the fifth and fourteenth articles of

8 amendment to the Constitution, the word ‘person’ applies

9 to all human beings, irrespective of age, health, function,

10 or condition of dependency, including their unborn off11 spring at every stage of their biological development in12 cluding fertilization.

13 ‘‘SECTION 3. No unborn person shall be deprived of

14 life by any person: Provided, however, That nothing in this

15 article shall prohibit a law allowing justification to be

16 shown for only those medical procedures required to pre17 vent the death of either the pregnant woman or her un18 born offspring, as long as such law requires every reason19 able effort be made to preserve the life of each.

20 ‘‘SECTION 4. The Congress and the several States

21 shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate leg22 islation.’’.

Æ
#### In the Matter of Social Services Employees Union Local 371, Appellant, v Personnel Review Board of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered October 16, 1989, denying petitioner’s application to annul the determination of respondent Personnel Review Board and dismissing the CPLR article 78 petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The "appeal” filed with respondent by petitioner seeking an order directing the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation to cease and desist from assigning managerial and nonbargaining unit employees to perform duties which, according to petitioner, should be performed by civil service employees covered by petitioner’s collective bargaining agreements, was properly dismissed. The claims raised are beyond the scope of respondent’s power to review pursuant to McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7390 (8) (b) (New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Act § 9 [8] [b] [L 1969, ch 1016, § 1]). Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Ross, Ellerin and Rubin, JJ.
Case 6:22-cr-00020-H-BU Document 30 Filed 09/27/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 67
Case 6:22-cr-00020-H-BU Document 30 Filed 09/27/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 68
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December 3, 2015 

Randall S. Fiertz, Director 

Office of Airport Compliance and 

Management Analysis 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

SENT VIA U.S. MAIL AND FACSIMILE TO: (212) 267-5257 

Re: Action Plan Pursuant to FAA Policy and Procedures Concerning Use of 

Airport Revenue (79 Fed. Reg. 66282-01, November 7, 2014) 

Dear Mr. Fiertz: 

This letter is in reference to the above referenced policy on restrictions on the use of "local taxes 

on aviation fuel (except taxes in effect on December 30, 1987)." The County of Riverside has 

not imposed any general sales taxes on aviation fuel that were not in effect on December 30, 

1987 and therefore does not require an action plan. 

Please feel free to contact the undersigned should you have any questions. 

Sincerely, 

ACW:ay 

cc: Jeffrey VanWagenen, Managing Director, EDA 

Ivan Chand, Deputy CEO 

Denise Harden, Principal Management Analyst