IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

KEVIN JEROME JONES, § 

TDCJ No. 1169005, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1361-B-BN 

§ 

CAPTAIN WARD, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Kevin Jerome Jones, a Texas prisoner, filed a pro se complaint 

construed as making claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkt. No. 2 at 11-14 

(grievances concerning an alleged strip search). He moves for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP). See Dkt. No. 3. And United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle 

referred Jones’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for 

pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should summarily dismiss this action without 

prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) unless, within the time for filing objections to 

this recommendation or by some other deadline established by the Court, Jones pays 

the full filing fee of $402.00. 

Prisoners may not proceed IFP if, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 

they have filed three or more civil actions or appeals in federal court that were 

dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915(g). 

Jones is subject to this three-strikes bar. See Jones v. Spurlock, No. 3:19-cv-66-

G-BT (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. No. 6 at 2 (finding that Jones “has accrued three strikes under 

§ 1915(g)” (citing Jones v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, No. 18-11555 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 

2019) (finding that he was barred from proceeding IFP due to three strikes and 

dismissing appeal for failure to pay the filing fee))); id., Dkt. No. 9 (judgment 

dismissing Jones’s action as barred by Section 1915(g)).1

The only exception to this bar is when the prisoner is “under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But, in order to meet the “imminent 

danger” exception, “the ‘threat or prison condition [must be] real and proximate.’” 

Valdez v. Bush, No. 3:08-cv-1481-N, 2008 WL 4710808, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2008) 

(quoting Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003)). “Allegations of past 

harm do not suffice – the harm must be imminent or occurring at the time the 

complaint is filed.” Id.; see also McGrew v. La. State Penitentiary Mental Health Dep’t, 

459 F. App’x 370, 370 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“The determination whether a 

prisoner is under ‘imminent danger’ must be made at the time the prisoner seeks to 

file his suit in district court, when he files his notice of appeal, or when he moves for 

IFP status.” (citing Baños v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1998))). 

1 See also, e.g., Jones v. Roberts, No. 9:19-CV-65, 2019 WL 2521141 (E.D. Tex. 

May 15, 2019), rec. adopted, 2019 WL 2515316 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2019) 

(recognizing that Jones is barred by Section 1915(g)); Jones v. Hutto, No. 3:19-cv1359-N-BN, 2019 WL 3307068 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2019), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 

3304791 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2019) (same); Jones v. Johnson, No. 9:19-CV-95, 2019 

WL 3782137 (E.D. Tex. June 10, 2019), rec. adopted, 2019 WL 3776375 (E.D. Tex. 

Aug. 10, 2019) (same). 

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A prisoner must also “allege specific facts” to support the imminent-danger 

exception. Valdez, 2008 WL 4710808, at *1. “General allegations that are not 

grounded in specific facts which indicate that serious physical injury is imminent are 

not sufficient to invoke the exception to § 1915(g).” Id. (quoting Niebla v. Walton Corr. 

Inst., No. 3:06-cv-275-LAC-EMT, 2006 WL 2051307, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 20, 2006)). 

The “specific allegations” must therefore reflect “ongoing serious physical injury” or 

“a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical 

injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). For example, as to 

allegedly inadequate medical care, use of “the past tense when describing” symptoms 

(which should be corroborated by medical records or grievances) does not allege 

imminent danger. Stone v. Jones, 459 F. App’x 442, 2012 WL 278658, at *1 (5th Cir. 

Jan. 31, 2012) (per curiam). And there must be a nexus between the claims made and 

the imminent danger alleged. See Stine v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons Designation & 

Sentence Computation Unit, No. 3:13-cv-4253-B, 2013 WL 6640391, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

Dec. 17, 2013) (citations omitted), aff’d, 571 F. App’x 352 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 

As Jones’s current civil action falls under the three-strikes provision, he may 

not proceed without the prepayment of fees unless he shows that he is subject to 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. But his construed complaint lacks 

substantive factual allegations to show that he currently is in imminent danger of 

serious physical injury as to overcome Section 1915(g). The Court should therefore 

bar Jones from proceeding IFP. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th 

Cir. 1996). 

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Recommendation

The Court should summarily dismiss this action without prejudice under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) unless, within the time for filing objections to this recommendation 

or by some other deadline established by the Court, Plaintiff Kevin Jerome Jones 

pays the full filing fee of $402.00. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: June 24, 2022 

 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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