PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DONALD WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiffs, 

v.

STEPHEN BARASA; AMERICAN

HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.; and

HONDA MOTOR CO. LTD., 

Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. _____________

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Donald Williams and hereby files this Original Complaint against 

Defendants Stephen Barasa (“Defendant Barasa”), American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“AHM”), 

and Honda Motor Co. LTD (“HMC”) (collectively “Defendants”). In doing so, Plaintiff 

respectfully shows the Court the following: 

I.

PARTIES

1.01 Plaintiff Donald Williams is a citizen and resident of Dallas, Dallas County, Texas. 

1.02 Defendant Stephen Barasa is a citizen and resident of Auburn, Washington, and 

may be served with process at 29216 S. 32nd Place, Auburn, Washington 98001, or wherever he 

may be found. 

1.03 Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is a foreign business corporation that 

regularly sells products and does business in the State of Texas and is organized and existing under 

the laws of the State of California, whose principal place of business is 1919 Torrance Blvd., 

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 1 of 8 PageID 1
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 2

Torrance, California 90501-2746. AHM may be served with process through its registered 

service agent CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75201. 

1.04 Defendant Honda Motor Co., LTD is a Japanese corporation and citizen which 

regularly sells products and does business in the State of Texas. HMC may be served with process 

pursuant to the Hague Convention by serving a copy of Plaintiff’s Original Petition and a copy of 

the Citation on Honda Motor Co., LTD, whose principle place of business is 2-1-1 Minami 

Aoyama, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8556, Japan, and by serving a copy of Plaintiff’s Original 

Petition and a copy of the Citation on its wholly-owned and controlled alter ego and 

subsidiary, American Honda Motor, Co., Inc., by and through its registered service agent at 

CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas, 75201. 

1.05 American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is the wholly-owned subsidiary of Honda Motor 

Co., Ltd. and is the alter ego and conduit by which Honda Motor Co., Ltd does business in the 

United States. These two entities are referred to collectively as “Honda” in this Petition.

II.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

2.01 Since complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, and the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000), exclusive of interest and 

costs, this court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332.

2.02 The Honda Defendants reside in the Northern District of Texas—Dallas Division, 

as the term is defined in 28 U.S.C. §1391 (c) (for venue purposes, a corporation is deemed to reside 

in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 

commenced). Additionally, Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas—Dallas Division, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as a substantial part of the events or omission giving rise to the claim 

occurred in Dallas County, Texas, which is within the Northern District Dallas Division. Plaintiff

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 2 of 8 PageID 2
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 3

would show that the incident made basis of this suit occurred on at the intersection of Montfort 

Drive and Interstate Highway 635 in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3.01 On or about May 1, 2022, Plaintiff Donald Williams was the lawfully restrained 

driver of a 2020 Blue Acura RDX, VIN#: 5J8TC1H72LL012618, (the “Vehicle”). Mr. Williams

was traveling North on Montfort Drive near the intersection of Montfort and I-635 service road. 

Mr. Williams entered the intersection under the protection of a green traffic light. Defendant 

Barasa was located in the middle straight traffic only lane facing South on Montfort. Defendant 

Barasa attempted to make a left turn from a straight only lane and without the protection of a left 

turn signal and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle as he traveled through the intersection. The impact from 

the vehicle unnecessarily caused the airbags to deploy. As a result of the wreck, Plaintiff suffered 

severe injuries.

IV.

NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST HONDA

4.01 The Vehicle at issue in this suit was designed, tested, manufactured, constructed, 

marketed, distributed, sold and/or placed into the stream of commerce by and through the agents 

and/or representatives of Defendants Honda.

4.02 Defendants Honda were regularly engaged in the business of supplying or placing 

products, like the Vehicle in question, in the stream of commerce for use by the consuming public, 

including Plaintiff. Further, such conduct was solely for commercial purposes.

4.03 The Vehicle in question remained unchanged from the time it was originally 

manufactured, distributed and sold by Defendants Honda until it reached Plaintiff and ultimately 

led to his injuries. Stated another way, the Vehicle in question was defective and in an 

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 3 of 8 PageID 3
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 4

unreasonably dangerous condition at all times until it ultimately caused the injuries and damages 

asserted herein.

4.04 At the time the Vehicle was placed into the stream of commerce, it was, or should 

have been, reasonably expected and foreseeable that the Vehicle would be used by persons such 

as Plaintiff in the manner and application in which it was being used at the time Plaintiff suffered 

his injuries. 

4.05 There were no mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and promulgated 

by the federal government or an agency of the federal government that were applicable to the 

Vehicle at the time of manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm. 

Alternatively, the design of the Vehicle did not comply with mandatory safety standards or 

regulations adopted by the federal government that were applicable to the vehicle model at the 

time of the manufacture and governed the risks that caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Again, in the 

alternative, in the event that such standards were in effect, and they were complied with, they were 

nonetheless inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or danger, or the 

manufacturer, before or after marketing the Vehicle, withheld or misrepresented the information 

or material irrelevant to the federal governments or agencies determination of adequacy of the 

safety standards or regulations at issue in the action.

4.06 With respect to the design of the Vehicle, at the time it left the control of Defendants 

Honda, there were safer alternative designs. Specifically, there were alternative designs that, in 

reasonably probability, would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of injury to Plaintiff. 

Furthermore, such safer alternative designs were economically and technologically feasible at the 

time the product left the control of Defendants Honda by the application of existing or reasonably 

achievable scientific knowledge.

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 4 of 8 PageID 4
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 5

4.07 At the time the Vehicle left the control of Defendants Honda, it was defective and 

unreasonably dangerous in that it was not adequately designed, manufactured or marketed to 

minimize the risk of injury. By way of example and without limitation, the product in question 

was unreasonably and dangerously defective in the following ways:

a. the airbag system was defectively designed because it should not have deployed; 

b. the airbag system was defectively designed because it should not have deployed 

with enough force to injure Plaintiff’s eye; 

c. the airbag system was defectively designed because it failed to protect a 

driver/passenger, such as Plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable accident;

d. the interior padding was defectively designed, manufactured or marketed because 

it failed to reasonably minimize Plaintiff’s injuries; and

e. the warnings and instructions for the Vehicle were inadequate.

4.08 The above unreasonably dangerous defects in the Vehicle in question were the 

proximate and producing cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

4.09 Defendants Honda breached its duty of care and was thus negligent by: 

a. designing and distributing the Acura RDX model with a design standard that was 

intended to meet the minimum government regulations, instead of safely designing 

the vehicle to reasonably minimize injuries in foreseeable accidents;

b. failing to adequately monitor the performance of Honda’s Acura vehicles in the 

field to ensure that they were reasonably minimizing injuries in foreseeable 

accidents;

c. failing to adequately test the Acura RDX model to ensure that it would be 

reasonably safe in foreseeable accidents; 

d. failing to adequately test the airbag system for the Acura RDX model to ensure that 

it would be reasonably safe in foreseeable accidents;

e. failing to design the airbag system to protect occupants such as Plaintiff in 

foreseeable accidents;

f. failing to design the airbag system in compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standards;

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 5 of 8 PageID 5
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 6

g. failing to provide adequate warnings and instructions with the Acura RDX; 

h. failing to provide adequate post-sale warnings, recalls or retrofits after Defendants

Honda knew, or should have known, that the Acura RDX model was defective and 

unreasonably dangerous;

i. failing to recall, retrofit, or issue post-sale warnings after Honda knew, or should 

have known, that the Acura RDX model was defective and unreasonably 

dangerous.

4.10 The above negligent acts and/or omissions were a proximate and producing cause 

of the injuries and damages alleged by Plaintiff, herein.

V.

NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT BARASA

5.01. Plaintiff would show that at the time of the incident in question and immediately 

prior thereto, Barasa through negligent acts and/or omissions, caused injury and damage to the 

Plaintiff. One or more of the following acts or omissions of Barasa constitutes negligence and/or 

negligence per se and was a proximate cause of the incident made the basis of this lawsuit:

a. Barasa failed to maintain a proper lookout for the safety of the Plaintiff and of 

others, contrary to what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the 

same or similar circumstances; 

b. Barasa failed to turn his vehicle to the left or to the right in an attempt to avoid the 

collision that is the subject of this lawsuit, contrary to what a reasonably prudent 

person would have done under the same or similar circumstances;

c. Barasa failed to yield the right-of-way to Plaintiff, contrary to what a reasonably 

prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, by 

attempting to occupy the space occupied by Plaintiff in violation of Texas 

Transportation Safety Code §545.152;

e. Barasa failed to control the speed of his vehicle, contrary to what a reasonably 

prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, in 

violation of §545.351 of the Texas Transportation Code; 

f. Barasa failed to utilize the designated left turn lane in violation of Texas 

Transportation Code §545.101; and 

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 6 of 8 PageID 6
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 7

g. Barasa failed to safely turn his vehicle in violation of Texas Transportation Code 

§545.151, contrary to what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the 

same or similar circumstances.

5.02. Each of the aforementioned acts and omissions of Barasa constitute negligence 

and/or negligence per se and are a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for 

which this lawsuit is brought.

VI.

DAMAGES

6.01 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff has suffered 

damages. Pursuant to TRCP 47, seeks monetary relief in excess of $1,000,000.00. The elements 

of damages suffered by Plaintiff include, but are not necessarily limited to: 

a. Past and future physical pain; 

b. Past and future medical care and treatment; 

c. Past and future mental anguish; 

d. Impairment;

e. Disfigurement; 

f. Lost wages and loss wage earning capacity; and

g. Costs of court.

VII.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST HONDA DEFENDANTS

7.01 Plaintiff alleges that each and every negligent act or omission of Honda and its

agents, as set forth above, when viewed objectively from the standpoint of policymakers, involved 

an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the physical harm to others 

and that Honda had actual subjective awareness of the risks involved, but nevertheless proceeded 

with conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of Plaintiff and others like him, and 

therefore, such conduct amounts to gross negligence or malice, as those terms are defined by law, 

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 7 of 8 PageID 7
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Page 8

so as to give rise to an award of exemplary or punitive damages, for which Plaintiff now pleads

against Honda. Additionally, by reason of such conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to, and therefore assert,

a claim for punitive and exemplary damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Honda, 

and others like it, from such conduct in the future.

VIII.

PRE-JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST

8.01 Plaintiff claims prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum rate 

allowed by law.

IX.

JURY DEMAND

9.01 Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court impanel a jury to decide all fact issues in 

this case.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendants be cited to 

appear and answer this Petition and that upon final hearing, Plaintiff recover judgment against 

Defendants for his damages as they appear at trial hereof together with costs of court, prejudgment 

and post-judgment interest, and for such general and equitable relief as Plaintiff may be entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ James L. Mitchell

JAMES L. MITCHELL

State Bar No. 14214300

Jim@PayneMitchell.com

ANDREW S. BULLARD

State Bar No. 24104622

abullard@paynemitchell.com

PAYNE MITCHELL RAMSEY

3500 Maple Avenue, Suite 1250

Dallas, Texas 75219

214/252-1888 Telephone

214/252-1889 Facsimile

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

Case 3:22-cv-01264-E Document 1 Filed 06/10/22 Page 8 of 8 PageID 8