IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

LUBBOCK DIVISION 

DONNA A., 1 § 

§ 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:22-CV-111-H-BQ 

§ 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED ST ATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Donna A. seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security 

Commissioner's decision denying her applications for supplemental security income and disability 

insurance benefits. Under Special Order 3-251, the United States District Judge referred this case 

to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. The parties did not 

unanimously consent to proceed before a magistrate judge. The undersigned has considered the 

parties' briefing and arguments, the administrative record, and applicable law, and in accordance 

with the order of referral, makes the following findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the 

United States District Judge. Specifically, the undersigned recommends that the district judge 

vacate the Commissioner's decision and remand the case for further administrative proceedings. 

I. Statement of the Case 

On January 30, 2020, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income benefits, alleging a disability onset date of December 15, 2016. Tr. 13. The Social 

Security Administration (SSA) denied her applications on May 5, 2020, and again upon 

1 To protect the privacy of plaintiffs in social security cases, the undersigned identifies Plaintiff only by first name and 

last initial. 

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reconsideration on October 22, 2020. Id. Represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared 

tclephonically and testified before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on August 2, 2021. Tr. 13, 

28- 39. An impmiial vocational expe1i (VE) also appeared and testified. Tr. 13, 28- 39. 

The ALJ determined on August 26, 2021, that Plaintiff was not disabled because she is 

capable of performing past relevant work. Tr. 10-27. The Appeals Council denied Plaintifrs 

request for review. Tr. 1. Consequently, the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final 

decision and is therefore properly before the Court for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 

(2000); see also Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 

Commissioner's final decision necessarily incorporates the Appeals Council's denial of a 

claimant's request for review). 

II. Standard of Review 

A court reviewing the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits is limited to 

determining whether: ( 1) the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record; and 

(2) the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2020); see, e.g., 

Higginbotham, 405 F.3d at 335. "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion." Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). A 

reviewing court must examine the entire record, including evidence favorable to the Commissioner 

as well as contrary evidence. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). The court 

'·may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [the Court's] 

judgment for the [Commissioner's]." Bowling v. Sha/ala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (per 

curiam) (quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 47 1, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)). If substantial evidence 

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supports the Commissioner's findings, they are treated as conclusive and will be affirmed. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). 

Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of' any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). The Commissioner makes a disability determination by 

conducting a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether: (1) the claimant is currently 

working; (2) the claimant has a "severe impairment''; (3) the impairment meets or equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations; ( 4) the claimant is capable of performing past 

relevant work; and (5) the claimant, after taking into account age, education, previous work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, is capable of performing any other work. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404. l 520(a)(4); see Aud/er v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007). If the Commissioner 

makes a disability determination at any step in the process, the finding is conclusive and the 

analysis terminates. See Greenspan v. Shala/a, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the analysis. Id. If the 

claimant can satisfy that burden, the Commissioner must then demonstrate that the claimant is 

capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

After making such a showing, the burden ultimately shifts back to the claimant to rebut the 

Commissioner's finding. See Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2000). 

III. Facts 

Plaintiff claims she became disabled on December 15, 2016, due to myriad health issues. 

Tr. 13, 15- 17. She was 57 years old on the alleged onset date and is now 63. Tr. 22. Plaintiff 

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has a seventh-grade education and her past relevant work as a hospital cleaner is categorized as 

"unskilled." Tr.22,31 - 33 . 

. \t step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged onset date. Tr. 15. The ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff has the following 

severe impairments: bilateral knee osteoarthritis, hypertension, degenerative joint disease of the 

lumbar spine, cervical stenosis, and osteoarthritis. Id. The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff has 

several medically determinable impairments that are not severe, including hyperlipidemia, anxiety 

d isordcr, bipolar disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. Tr. 16- 17. Despite the 

existence of severe impairments, the ALJ found at step three that Plaintiff does not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal the Listings in 20 C.F.R. part 404, 

subpart P, appendix 1. Tr. 17- 18 (discussing Listings 1.15 and 1.18). 

The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) and found that, 

although Plaintiff has "impairments that limit her," she can "perform the full range of medium 

work." Tr. 18-21 (emphasis omitted). The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff could perform 

past relevant work as a hospital cleaner. Tr. 22. Alternatively, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is 

capable or performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy based on 

Plaintiff's RFC and with consideration of Plaintiffs age, education, and work experience. Tr. 22-

23. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 23. 

Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: (1) the AL.T's RFC determination is erroneous 

because he "failed to perform a function-by-function analysis''; and (2) " [t]he ALJ made his 

determination with no medical opinions in the record, improperly basing his conclusions solely on 

his own lay opinion." Pl. 's Br. 1, ECF No. 20. 

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JV. Discussion 

.\. The Parties' Positions 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's physical RFC determination.

2 She first contends that the 

ALJ erred because he fai led to perform a function-by-function analysis in accordance with Social 

Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. Pl. 's Br. 7-10. According to Plaintiff, "[t]he Fifth Circuit has 

consistently held that SSR 96-8p is satisfied when the ALJ's determination is supported by 

substantial eYidence and is based on the function-by-function analysis of the state examiner's 

medical repo1i." Id. at 9. Here, however, Plaintiff argues that the .\LJ's "decision must be 

reversed" because the state "examiners provided no opinions." Id. at l 0. 

In her second point of error, Plaintiff asserts that the record "here is unique due to its 

complete lack of medical opinions." Id. The initial level reviewers failed to provide an opinion 

as to Plaintiffs RFC, Plaintiff's consultation consisted only of clinical testing, and there are no 

opinions from any treating providers. Id at 10- 11. The record therefore contains only "raw 

medical evidence" and an "ALJ is not permitted to draw his own medical conclusions regarding 

an impairment from the medical records alone." Id. at 11. As a result, Plaintiff claims that the 

ALJ erred and his decision "must be reversed" because he "improperly formulated an RFC based 

on no evidence, much less anything substantial." Id at 12. 

The Commissioner counters that the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiffs RFC and substantial 

evidence supports the finding. Def. 's Br. 5, ECF No. 21. Regarding Plaintiff.,s first point of error, 

the Commissioner argues that "the ALJ properly considered the relevant medical and other 

evidence regarding Plaintiff's physical limitations" and "properly accounted for this evidence by 

limiting Plaintiff to medium, rather than heavy, work." Id at 7. The Commissioner then 

2 Plaintiff's briefing does not address the mental RFC determination. The Court therefore understands Plaintiff as 

challenging only the physical RFC finding. 

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challenges Plaintiffs position that the alleged error requires remand "because Plaintiff has pointed 

to no evidence of physical limitations beyond the restrictions included in the .\LJ's RFC 

assessment," meaning that Plaintiff "failed to demonstrate prejudice from any error the AU may 

have made with respect to SSR 96-8p's function-by-function requirement." Id. at 8. 

Second, the Commissioner contends that " [a] medical opinion is only one type of evidence 

that an adjudicator considers when assessing an individual's RFC," and that "the ALJ was not 

required to derive his RFC finding from a medical opinion." Id. at 8- 9. According to the 

Commissioner, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision because there is evidence such as 

"numerous observations throughout the relevant period documenting that Plaintiff had a normal or 

steady gait and normal strength and range of motion," and the Com1 should therefore affirm. Id. 

at 9- 10. 

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner attempts to provide an "improper post hoc 

rationalization" to justify the ALJ's "lack of articulated [function-by-function] analysis" by 

providing his "own explanation as to how th[e] evidence represents a presumed analysis." Pl.'s 

Reply 2, ECF No. 22. Plaintiff further maintains that "[t]he AL.T's failure to contemplate 

limitations beyond those strictly exertional, such as handling, reaching, fingering, feeling, 

kneeling, stooping, crouching, and cmwling[,] certainly caused harm to the Plaintiff' because her 

past work as a hospital cleaner requires "occasional and frequent postural requirements prohibited 

by Plaintiff's back and knee limitations." Id. Moreover, Plaintiff avers that the ALJ's RFC 

determination is unsupported because an ALJ cannot interpret raw medical evidence and "the 

record contains not one functional opinion or evaluation." Id. at 3. She further claims that due to 

her advanced age and limited education, ·'Rules 201.01 and 202.01 of the medical-vocational 

guidelines would both have resulted in a finding of disability for anything less than medium work 

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had the ALJ proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation." Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff asks 

the Court to vacate the decision and remand the case for further administrative proceedings. Id. 

In the undersigned's view, resolution of Plaintiffs second argument obviates the need to 

address the first. The Court therefore examines the second issue, i.e., whether the record contains 

substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALJ's RFC determination concerning Plaintiffs 

medical condition and its impact on her ability to work.3 

B. Residual Functional Capacity and the Ripley Standard 

"Determining a claimant's [RFC] is the ALJ's responsibility, and he has the authority and 

duty to weigh the evidence and reach any conclusion supported by substantial evidence." Gonzales 

,·. Astrue. 231 F. App'x 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). The ALJ 

must consider "the totality of evidence in the record" including the claimant's "medical history, 

medical signs and laboratory findings, statements about the impact of symptoms, daily activities, 

medication, and other treatment." Garner v. Kij"akazi, No. 1 :22-CV-0563-DH, 2023 WL 1976713, 

at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)-(d)). Under the current 

regulations, ALJs do "not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling 

weight·, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s)." 20 C.F.R. 

; Through her first point of error, Plaintiff contends that the A LJ erred because his "decision demonstrates no 

consideration of her impairments on a function-by-function basis" and the SAM Cs similarly "provided no opinions." 

PL's Br. 9- 10. Plaintiffs two arguments likely involve common elements. See Beck v. Barnhart, 205 F. App'x 207, 

213--14 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (rejecting similar challenge because "an RFC assessment based in part on the 

function-by-function analysis of claimant's exertional limitations contained in a state examiner's medical report 

satisfies ... SSR 96-Sp" (citation omitted)); McGowen v. Barnhart, No. 5:02-CV- 247- C, 2003 WL 24151722, at *3 

(N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2003) (remanding where ALJ did not perform a function-by-function analysis and " the record d[id] 

not contain a clear medical statement regarding [plaintiffs] ability to perform the physical requirements of light 

work"). The Cou11, however, need not consider Plaintifrs first point of error because the second requires remand. 

Nevertheless, to the extent re-evaluation of the record and medical evidence in relation to Plaintifrs RFC requ ires or 

involves " function-by-function" analysis of Plaintifrs impairments, the Court has every confidence the J\LJ will 

follow applicable regulations and case law. 

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§ 404. I 520c(a); see Winston v. Berryhill, 755 F. App'x 395, 402 n.4 (5th Cir. 201 8); Stephens v. 

Saul, No. 3:20-CV-823 -BH, 2020 WL 7122860, at *5 & n.4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2020). 

"·There is no requirement that an ALJ's RFC finding must mirror or match a medical 

opinion." Nie R. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-cv-00106-K-BT, 2023 WL 2529930, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 

21, 2023) (citation omitted), R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 2531492 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2023). 

'·Even the absence of medical opinions does not necessarily render a record inadequate to support 

an .\LJ's RFC determination." Id. at *5 (citing Ripley v. Chafer, 67 F.3d 552,557 (5th Cir. 1995) 

and Joseph-Jack v. Barnhart, 80 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). The court's 

'•inquiry focuses upon whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the 

existing record." Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. 

In Ripley, the Fifth Circuit observed that the record included "a vast amount of medical 

evidence establishing that [the claimant] ha[ d] a problem with his back," but it did "not clearly 

establish" what effect that "condition had on his ability to work." Id. Not only were there no 

'·reports from qualified medical experts" as to the claimant's ability to work, but "[t]he only 

e\'idcnce regarding [the claimant's] ability to work came from [his] own testimony." Id. at 557 & 

n.27. As a result, substantial evidence did not support the .\LJ's RFC determination because the 

court could not "determine the effects [the claimant's] conditions, no matter how 'small,' on his 

ability to . .. work." Id. at 557-58 & n.27. Later discussing Ripley, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed 

that "an J\LJ may not-without opinions from medical experts- derive the applicant's residual 

functional capacity based solely on the evidence of his or her claimed medical conditions." 

Williams v. Astrue, 355 F. App'x 828, 832 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). "Thus, an ALJ may 

not rely on his own unsupported opinion as to the limitations presented by the applicant's medical 

conditions." Id. The comt ultimately held that "the ALJ impermissibly relied on his own medical 

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opinions as to the limitations presented by" the claimant's conditions because there was "no 

evidence supporting the ALJ's finding that" she "could perform light work with [those] 

conditions." Id. at 831-32. 

Simply stated, an ALJ may not "independently decide the effects of Plaintiffs ... 

impairments on her ability to perform work-related activities." Thornhill v. Colvin, No. 3: 14-cv335-M, 2015 WL 232844, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2015). Substantial evidence requires 

'·evidence of the effects the claimant's medical conditions have on her ability to work." Moreno 

,·. Astrue, No. 5:09-CV-123-BG, 2010 WL 3025525, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2010) (citing 

Ripley. 67 F.3d at 557), R. & R. adopted by 2010 WL 3025519 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2010); see 

Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 (reversing because "the record d[id] not clearly establish ... the effect [the 

claimant's] condition had on his ability to work"). 

C. The record does not clearly establish the effects of Plaintifrs severe impairments on 

her ability to work. 

The AU found that Plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments, including bilateral 

knee osteoarthritis, hypertension, degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine, cervical stenosis, 

and osteoarthritis. Tr. 15. At the RFC stage, the ALJ reiterated that Plaintiff has " impairments 

that limit her" and "may cause pain or other difficulty." Tr. 21. He concluded, however, that 

Plaintiffs "symptoms may not be accurately reported, may not exist at the level of severity alleged, 

and/or may have other mitigating factors against their negative impact on [her] ability to engage 

in work activity." Id. As a result, the ALJ "accommodated" Plaintiffs limitations by limiting her 

to ·'the full range of medium work." Tr. 18, 21 (emphasis omitted). 

The .\LJ did not specify which of Plaintiffs claimed ailments are limiting, but his 

discussion covered Plaintiffs knees, hands, lower back, and hypertension. Tr. 19-21. He 

seemingly rejected Plaintiff's allegation "that she is unable to use her hands" because she had not 

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reported difficulties with the use of her hands and the medical records generally show she "had no 

swelling, normal strength, and normal range of motion." Tr. 20 (citing Tr. 208, 174, 178, 397, 

537, 565). Conversely, the ALJ found support for Plaintiffs claims about her knees, lower back, 

and hypertension. He first observed that x-ray and CT results confirm Plaintiffs back and knee 

problems. Tr. 19-20 (citing Tr. 295-96, 675-76). The ALT also noted, however, that Plaintiffs 

treatment notes show she has a normal gait, strength, and range of motion. Id. ( citing Tr. 525- 26, 

537, 565 , 577, 703). Concerning the hypertension, the ALJ reviewed evidence confirming the 

condition but opined that there is evidence suggesting Plaintiff "has not always been compliant" 

with medication and noted that Plaintiffs "overall health was good" at a December 2020 

appointment. Tr. 20 (citing Tr. 504, 574, 700, 703). 

The .-\ LJ then rejected findings from the non-examining state-agency medical consultants 

(SAMCs). The SAMC at the initial determination stage considered Plaintiffs impairments nonsevere (Tr. 44, 52), which the ALJ found "unpersuasive" and "not supported by the record as a 

whole. " Tr. 21. At reconsideration, the SAMC concluded that there was " insufficient evidence 

on file to make a determination of disability" (Tr. 62, 71), but the ALJ disagreed with this 

conclusion and found it unpersuasive. Tr. 22. Because there were no other medical opinions in 

the record, the ALJ's RFC finding rests only on Plaintiffs testimony and self-reporting history, 

observation and examination records from treatment notes, and clinical test results. Tr. 19- 22. 

The problem with this approach is that an ALJ may not "draw his own medical conclusions 

from some of the data, without relying on a medical expert's help." Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 

618, 621-22 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see Fitzpatrick v. Colvin, No. 3: l 5-CV-3202-D, 2016 

WL 1258477, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31 , 2016) (finding error where the ALJ "attempted to 

compensate for" the claimant's disorder, "[b]ut other than the opinions of the two SAMCs (which 

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the AU rejected), the record lack[ed] medical evidence that would support a determination that" 

the claimant could work despite that impairment). An ALJ is free to reject medical opinions 

provided that he does not "then independently decide the effects of a claimant's impairments on 

ht.:r ability to perform work-related activities." Greer v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., No. 7:2 l-cv-00032-

O-BP, 2022 WL 4239356, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2022) (cleaned up), R. & R. adopted by 2022 

WL 4240948 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2022). Indeed, R;pley stands for the proposition that an RFC 

finding is not supported by substantial evidence where the record confirms the existence of a 

claimant's medical condition, but it does not otherwise make clear what effect that condition has 

on the claimant's ability to work. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. 

Here, the ALJ relied on evidence that merely describes Plaintiffs conditions rather than 

demonstrating her ability to work despite those impairments. See Jim S. v. Saul, No. 3: 18-CV2179-BH, 2019 WL 4694943, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25,2019) (finding error where the ALJ relied 

on medical records to assess the claimant's RFC without identifying the medical opinions that 

were the source of the imposed limitations); Turner v. Colvin, No. 3:13- CV- 1458-B, 2014 WL 

4555657, at* 5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2014) ("[E]vidence which merely describes Plaintiff's medical 

conditions is insufficient to support the AL.T's RFC determination."). The record does not clearly 

establish how Plaintiffs conditions impact her ability to perform medium work and there are no 

medical opinions to otherwise serve as a foundation for that decision. See Cary G. T v. Comm 'r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin. , No. 3:20-CV-1948-BK, 2022 WL 954341, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2022) 

(concluding that although "the RFC is ultimately the AL.T's determination," there was no apparent 

'foundational basis for that decision" where "no treating, examining, or consultative resource 

reviewed the impact of [p]laintiff's conditions on his ability to work"). It therefore "appears the 

AU relied on his own interpretation of the medical and other evidence, which he may not do." 

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Alexander v. Saul, No. 7: l 9-cv-00127-M-BP, 2020 WL 4573847, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2020), 

R. & R. adopted by 2020 WL 4569034 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2020). Accordingly, the ALJ erred in 

making a physical RFC determination without evidence in the record clearly establishing the 

impact of Plaintiffs impairments on her ability to work. 

Nevertheless, reversal is warranted only if Plaintiff was prejudiced by the error. Nlorris v. 

Bowen. 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). "Procedural errors in the disability 

determination process are considered prejudicial when they cast doubt onto the existence of 

substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's decision." McNair v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

537 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (N.D. Tex. 2008). In similar cases, courts in the Northern District have 

found that the .\LJ's failure to rely on a medical opinion concerning the claimant's RFC 

necessarily casts doubt on the disability determination. See, e.g. , Kirkland v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 4:22-cv-759-O-BP, 2023 WL 3357597, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2023), R. & R. adopted by 

2023 \VL 3362633 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2023); Lozano v. Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4:21-CV1365-P, 2023 WL 2618 I 32, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2023), R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 2619311 

(N.D. Tex. Mar. 23 , 2023); Graves v. K(iakazi, No. 3:22-CV-0107-L-BH, 2023 WL 2025247, at 

* 17 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2023), R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 2025052 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2023); 

Martinez v. K!Jakazi, No. 3:20-CV-3282-BH, 2022 WL 4590577, at *22 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 

2022). "Harmless error exists when it is inconceivable that a different administrative conclusion 

vmuld have been reached absent the error"- here, reversal is required because "it is not 

inconceivable that the AU" may have reached a different conclusion. Alexander, 2020 WL 

4573847, at *4 (citation omitted). The district judge should remand the case for further 

administrative proceedings. 

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V. Recommendation 

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the United States District 

Court V AC\ TE the Commissioner's decision and REMAND the case for further administrative 

proceedings. 

VI. Right to Object 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) (2016); FED. R. Clv. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding, conclusion, or recommendation to which the objection is made, 

state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. 

Failure to file specific written objections \.\·ill bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual 

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district 

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass ·n, 79 F.3d 

1415, 1417(5thCir.1996). 

Dated: July --t-..::2, 2023. 

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