COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgar dner and Senior Judge Overton Argued at Rich mond, Virginia

OTTIS LEE WAINWRIGHT MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0166-99-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON MAY 16, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Margaret P. Sp encer, Judge Gregory W. Frankl in, Assistan t Public Defender (David J. John son, Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Kathleen B. Martin , Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. Ottis Lee Wain wright, appellan t, appeals his convictions for rape, forcible sodomy, abductio n with intent to defile, and robbery. Appe llant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutio n to use appell ant's previously suppressed statement for a pu rpose other than impeachm ent. For th e following reasons, we find no error and affirm the convictions.

Facts On the morning of April 11, 19 98, the victim wa s walking near the intersection of "1st Street and Jame s" when appe llant grabbed her and forced her to walk with him. Appe llant threaten ed to killthe victim if sh e screamed, and to ld her to act li ke they were "girlfriend and bo yfriend" as they walked . Appellant took the victim directly to a nearby abandoned ho use where th ere was a mattress on the floor. Appellan t, while promis ing not to do anything to his victim if she stayed quiet, put her on the mattress and removed some of her cl othing. Appe llant put his tongue on the vi ctim's vagina. Thereafter, he pu t his penis into her vagina. The victim was crying and begging to leave so she could see her "lit tle girl" again. Appellant said he would not kill her if she stayed quiet. Then appell ant sat on top of his victim and forced her to suck his penis. Af ter several other acts of sodomy, appell ant had sexual intercourse again with his victim. When appellant was fi nished, he helped th e victim dress. Appellant took $3 35 and a pack of bus ti ckets from the victim's pocketbook. As appellant and the victim walked away from the abandoned hous e, he told her "to walk out here li ke nothing happened." Appellant walked up "Saint James Street," and the victim fled to a friend's house. At trial, appellant admitted having sexu al intercourse with the victim, "playi ng" with her vagina, and putting his penis into her mouth, but denied th at he threatened or forced her to commit these acts. Appellant claimed that wh en he saw the victim walking on the street, she pr oposed to have sex with him for $15. According to appellant, the victim told him to follow her and she led him to a mattress located at the back of a house. Appellant

- 2 -claimed he did not know where they were going or that a mattress was at the house. Af ter the encounte r, the victim asked for her $15, but appellant on ly had $5. Appellan t claimed th e victim refused to accept his $5 and said she wanted her money if she ever saw him again. Appellant denied taking anything fr om the victim's pocketbook. During cross-examinat ion, appellant explai ned that a "smitty" was "an old house that's not used for anyt hing." The prosecutor questioned appellant ab out his knowledg e of abandone d houses in the vicinity of th e house where the victim was raped. He admitted that during the weeken d of the incide nt, he had slep t in an empty house, but denied that it was in the "Saint James" area where the incident occurred. Th e prosecutor confront ed appellant with a statement appe llant had made to the police, and that was later suppressed because of a Miranda violation, that on the night before the incident, he had stayed in a "smi tty" in "Saint James bottom." Analysis Appellant conten ds on appeal that th e trial cour t erred in allowing the prosecut ion to use his prev iously suppressed statement duri ng cross-examinatio n about where he stayed the night before the incident. It is well settled that a statemen t obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be used by the gove rnment to impeac h the defendant's credibility if he or she choose s to testify. See Harris v. New York , 401 U.S.
- 3 -222, 226 (1971); Blaylock v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 579, 596-97, 496 S.E. 2d 97, 105-06 (1998). Appellant's statement to the police that he stayed in an abandoned house in Saint James bottom the night before the offenses contradicted his testimony on direct that he was not familiar with the location where the crimes occurred. Appellant's knowledge of the area where the crimes occurred and his knowledge of whether a mattress was located in the abandoned house was relevant to the validity and accuracy of his denials that he accosted the victim and forced her to go to the abandoned house. This subject was relevant to the proof of the charged offenses, was not a collateral matter, and was a proper subject of cross-examination and impeachment once appellant offered himself as a witness. See Talbert v. Commonwealth , 17 Va. App. 239, 243, 436 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1993). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting appellant's statement for impeachment purposes. 1 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.

1 Assuming, arguendo , that the trial judge misspoke in saying the evidence went to "motive," appellant's statement was clearly admissible impeachment evidence. Therefore, the judgment should be affirmed. See Driscoll v. Commonwealth , 14 Va. App. 449, 451, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (judgment upheld where court reached right result for the wrong reason). - 4 -