IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DRUE ALLEN HOLLIS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00432-O-BP

§

SWEETWATER, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Drue Allen Hollis’s Amended Complaint, filed May 

27, 2022. ECF No. 9. Hollis’s case was automatically referred to the undersigned pursuant to 

Special Order 3. ECF No. 5. On May 20, the Court granted Hollis leave to proceed in this matter 

in forma pauperis, with service of process withheld until the completion of judicial screening under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). ECF No. 7. As part of the screening process, the Court ordered Hollis to 

file an Amended Complaint containing a short and plain statement of his alleged cause of action. 

ECF No. 8. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint and applicable legal authorities, the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Reed O’Connor DISMISS this 

case with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

Because Hollis’s original Complaint lacked enough facts to ascertain a colorable legal 

claim, see ECF No. 1, the Court directed him to refile an Amended Complaint consistent with 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 15(a). See ECF No. 8. He did so, filing the Amended 

Complaint on May 27. ECF No. 9. Nevertheless, the Amended Complaint—set forth in largely 

illegible handwriting—failed to articulate a viable legal claim. See id. From what the undersigned 

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could gather, Hollis sues an online retailer of musical equipment called “Sweetwater.” Id. at 2. He 

claims Sweetwater failed to appropriately process the return of one of his items and asserts 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1339 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 2-3. Sweetwater apparently failed 

to cooperate with Hollis’s prior correspondence, and although he does not explain precisely what 

Sweetwater did, the Amended Complaint states that “Sweetwater has extended its violations of 

delay beyond the history of my existence as a Sweetwater customer to that of a ‘civil death’ as 

defined by myself.” Id. at 3. He further alleges Sweetwater acted “in excess of jurisdiction.” Id. at 

4. For these wrongs, Hollis seeks $700,000 in damages. Id. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“In enacting the federal in forma pauperis statute, Congress ‘intended to guarantee that no 

citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or 

criminal, in any court of the United States, solely because . . . poverty makes it impossible . . . to 

pay or secure the costs.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Adkins v. E. I. 

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). But Congress recognized that “a litigant 

whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an 

economic inventive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Therefore, the in forma pauperis statute authorizes district 

courts to dismiss cases sua sponte if they are: (1) “frivolous or malicious”; (2) “fail[] to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted”; or (3) “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Complaints are frivolous if they “lack[] an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 325; see also Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009). A complaint lacks 

an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 

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U.S. at 326-27; see also Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint lacks an 

arguable basis in fact “if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations 

that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. And a complaint fails to 

state a claim on which relief can be granted if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

556 (2007)). 

While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, the 

complaint must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Courts 

liberally construe pro se pleadings when making this determination. Perez v. U.S., 312 F.3d 191, 

194-95 (5th Cir. 2002). “‘However inartfully pleaded,’ pro se complaints must be held to ‘less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). 

III. ANALYSIS

Because he appears pro se, Hollis’s pleadings must be liberally construed. Perez, 312 F.3d 

at 194-95; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520). Having done so for the 

Amended Complaint, the undersigned nevertheless concludes Hollis’s complaint is frivolous 

because it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Brewster, 

587 F.3d at 767. Liberally construed, the crux of Hollis’s complaint concerns a product return 

dispute, with Hollis claiming he returned a particular item and Sweetwater denying such return. 

See ECF No. 9 at 2. Beyond that, the Amended Complaint generates more questions than answers, 

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such as what Hollis means when he says he suffered a “civil death” or how Sweetwater, a private, 

non-judicial entity, acted “in excess of jurisdiction.” See id. at 3-4. 

Such assertions typify the Amended Complaint’s allegations, all of which fall into the camp 

of “clearly baseless.” See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. Even assuming the truth of the pleadings and 

liberally construing them in Hollis’s favor, the Amended Complaint does not remotely establish 

how his dispute with Sweetwater amounts to a cause of action or why that cause of action belongs 

in federal court. See ECF No. 9 at 2. Even going that far and liberally construing a colorable legal 

claim rightly brought in this Court, no amount of liberal construction could explain how the alleged 

dispute gave rise to Hollis’s claim for $700,000 in damages. See id. at 3. To liberally construe a 

colorable claim from the Amended Complaint, the Court would have to conclude Sweetwater, a 

private entity, “acted in excess of jurisdiction” by conspiring with other unknown entities to 

deprive Hollis’s basic civil rights—all because they contested whether he returned certain 

unidentified pieces of musical equipment. See ECF No. 9. Such a conclusion would venture far 

beyond “liberal construction” to the realm of claim manufacturing, a realm the Court is not 

permitted to enter. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. 

Even if the Court liberally construed the pleadings as articulating a colorable legal claim 

implicating $700,000 in damages, Hollis asserts federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1339 and 

42 U.S.C. § 1985. The former states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 

any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to the Postal Service.” 28 U.S.C. §

1339. Thus, by its very terms, § 1339 “grants jurisdiction only when a separate statute relating to 

the postal service affords a cause of action.” Snapp v. U.S. Postal Serv.-Texarkana Mgmt. Sectional 

Ctr., 664 F.2d 1329, 1332 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). But neither the other statute Hollis 

cites, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, nor any other statute, creates a federal cause of action related to the postal 

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service which covers Hollis’s claims. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 88-89 (1971)

(explaining § 1985 creates a cause of action when private entities conspire to deprive a citizen of 

basic civil rights). Considering the Amended Complaint lacks a basis in law and in fact, Judge 

O’Connor should dismiss this action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 325; Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767.

Courts typically prefer dismissals without prejudice when a complaint fails to convey a 

colorable legal claim. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). But an 

opportunity to amend is “unnecessary in cases where the facts alleged are ‘fantastic or delusional 

scenarios’ or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is ‘indisputably meritless.’” Eason v. 

Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 8-9 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). In such 

situations, like the instant case, “it is clear that no amendment can cure the defect.” Denton, 504 

U.S. at 34. The undersigned is mindful that some allegations may be “strange, but true; for truth is 

always strange, Stranger than fiction.” LORD BYRON, DON JUAN, canto XIV, stanza 101 (T. 

Steffan, E. Steffan & W. Pratt, eds. 1977). But that is not the case here, where Hollis’s contentions 

against Sweetwater, even if true, would never create a viable cause of action. Thus, because no 

subsequent amendments could manufacture a colorable claim in this matter, Judge O’Connor 

should dismiss Hollis’s action with prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Amended Complaint lacks an arguable basis in law and fact and no further 

amendments could change that, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Judge O’Connor 

DISMISS this case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

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and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

SIGNED on June 6, 2022. 

____________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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