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EO12866_RMP Modernization 2050-AG82 NPRM RIA_20151217

Regulatory Impact Analysis

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: 

Risk Management Programs

Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Office of Land and Emergency Management (OLEM)

Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (Mail Code 5104A)

Washington, DC 20460 USA

December 2015
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ACRONYMS

Acronym Definition

CSB Chemical Safety Board

EO Executive Order

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FTE Full Time Equivalent

IST Inherently Safer Technology

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

NAICS North American Industrial Classification System 

OCA Offsite Consequence Analysis

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

P1 Program Level 1

P2 Program Level 2

P3 Program Level 3

PHA Process Hazard Analysis

PSM Process Safety Management 

RFI Request for Information

RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis

RMP Risk Management Plan

SDS Safety Data Sheets

STAA Safer Technology andAlternativesAnalysis

TQ Threshold Quantity
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

INTRODUCTION

In response to catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States, President Obama issued EO 

13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” on August 1, 2013. The EO establishes the 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group (Working Group), co-chaired by the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary of Labor or their designated 

representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or higher, and comprised of senior representatives of 

other Federal departments, agencies, and offices.1 The EO requires the Working Group to carry out a 

number of tasks whose overall goal is to prevent chemical accidents, such as the explosion that occurred 

at the West Fertilizer facility in West, Texas, on April 17, 2013, which killed 15 people, most of whom 

were first responders, caused multiple injuries, and resulted in extensive building damage to the town. 2

Section 6(a)(i) of EO 13650 requires the Working Group to develop options for improved chemical 

facility safety and security that identify “improvements to existing risk management practices through 

agency programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, standards, and 

regulations.’’ Section 6(c) of EO 13650 requires the Administrator of EPA to review the Risk 

Management Program. As part of this effort to solicit comments and information from the public 

regarding potential changes to EPA’s RMP regulations (40 CFR part 68), on July 31, 2014, EPA published 

a “Request for Information” notice or “RFI” (79 FR 44604). 

EPA believes that the RMP regulations have been effective in preventing and mitigating chemical 

accidents in the United States; however, EPA is proposing revisions in order to further protect human 

health and the environment from chemical hazards through advancement of process safety 

management (PSM) based on lessons learned. These revisions are a result of a review of the existing 

Risk Management Program and information gathered from the RFI and EO listening sessions, and are 

proposed under the statutory authority provided by section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)).

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED RULE AND ALTERNATIVES

The RIA analyzed the proposed new requirements and revisions to existing requirements as well as 

several alternatives for each.

 1 The White House. Executive Order – Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. August, 2013. 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facility-safetyand-security 2 CSB. 2015. Final Investigation Report, West Fertilizer Plant Fire and Explosion, West, TX, April 17, 2013. REPORT 

2013-02-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/
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Third-Party Audits—(proposed revisions apply to existing §§68.58 and 68.79 and new §§68.59 and 68.80)

The existing rule requires Program 2 and Program 3 processes to conduct a compliance audit at least 

once every 3 years. The proposed rule would require facilities to contract with an independent thirdparty to conduct the next scheduled compliance audit following an RMP reportable accident or after an 

implementing agency determines that certain circumstances exist that suggest a heightened risk for an 

accident. The third party would have to be someone with whom the facility does not have an existing or 

recent relationship and who meets specific qualification criteria. The proposed alternative is the low 

cost one and would apply only for Program 2 and Program 3 processes after an RMP reportable accident 

or at the request of the implementing agency. The medium cost alternative would apply every three 

years for all compliance audits conducted for all P3 processes. The high cost alternative would apply 

every three years for all compliance audits conducted for Program 2 and Program 3 processes.

Root Cause Analysis—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.60 and 68.81)

The proposed rule would require facilities to conduct a root cause analysis as part of an incident 

investigation following an RMP reportable accident or an incident that could reasonably have resulted in 

an RMP reportable accident (i.e., “near miss”). A root cause analysis is a formal process to identify 

underlying reasons for failures that lead to accidental releases. These analyses usually require someone 

trained in the technique. The low cost alternative would apply the provision only to reportable 

accidents or near misses in P3 processes. The proposed option is the higher cost alternative andwould 

apply to reportable accidents or near misses involving Program 2 and Program 3 processes. 

Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)—(proposed revisions apply to §68.67)

Under the proposed rule, facilities in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and coal 

products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing) with P3 processes would be required to 

conduct a STAA for each process as part of their PHA, which occurs every 5 years. The STAA 

requirement includes two parts: the initial analysis to identify alternatives, and a feasibility study to 

determine the costs and assess the reasonableness of implementing technology alternatives. The 

proposed rule is the low cost alternative, which would apply to all facilities with P3 processes in NAICS 

codes 322, 324, and 325. The medium cost alternative would apply the requirement to all P3 processes. 

The high cost alternative would apply the requirement to all P3 processes and require facilities to 

implement feasible safer technology and alternatives.

Coordination Activities—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.90, new 68.93, and 68.95)

Under the proposed rule, all facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes would be required to 

coordinate with local response agencies annually to determine response needs and ensure that 

response resources and capabilities are in place to respond to an accidental release of a regulated 

substance. The owner or operator would also be required to document coordination activities. The 

proposed rule also includes a provision enabling the LEPC or local emergency response official to require 

that the RMP-facility owner or operator comply with the emergency response program requirements of 
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§68.95. Section 68.95 requires the owner or operator to develop an emergency response program that 

includes an emergency response plan, procedures for use, inspection and maintenance of response 

equipment, training for responding employees, and procedures to review and update the program. As a 

result of improved coordination between facility owners and operators and local emergency response 

officials, EPA believes that some facilities that are currently designated as non-responding facilities may 

become responding facilities (i.e., develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95). 

Alternatives to this provision are similar to the proposed requirements. One alternative would eliminate 

the option for local officials to require that a facility owner or operator comply with the requirements of 

§68.95. This alternative, although the costs analyzed are the same as the proposed option, may result in 

lower actual costs as local officials’ ability to require compliance with §68.95 may increase the likelihood 

of current non-responding facilities converting to responding facilities. These costs of converting are 

estimated in a sensitivity analysis in this RIA. A second alternative is a high cost alternative and would 

require all facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes to comply with §68.95, regardless of local 

response capability. This would be analogous to the requirements under the Oil Pollution Prevention 

regulation (40 CFR Part 112) where all facilities subject to the Facility Response Plan provisions at 

§112.20 are required to prepare and implement an emergency response plan for oil discharges into 

navigable waters or adjoining shorelines.

Exercises—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.96)

Notification Exercises. All facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes would be required to 

conduct a notification exercise annually to ensure that the emergency contact list is complete, accurate, 

and up-to-date. 

Tabletop and Field Exercises. The proposed rule would require responding facilities to conduct annual 

exercises of their emergency response plans and invite local emergency response officials to participate. 

Under the low cost alternative, facilities would conduct tabletop exercises annually. Under the 

proposed option, which is the medium cost alternative, facilities would conduct a full field exercise at 

least once every five years, and tabletop exercises annually in the interim years. Facilities with a 

reportable accident would also have to conduct a full field exercise within a year of an RMP reportable 

accident, but this may not impose any additional burden under the medium alternative as it would 

count as the required field exercise for the next 5-year period. Under the high cost alternative, facilities 

would conduct full field exercises annually.

InformationDisclosure—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.205 and existing §68.210)

The proposed rule would require all facilities to disclose certain chemical hazard information to the 

public. The facility or its parent company, if applicable, would have to make the information available in 

an easily accessible manner, which might be presenting information on a company website, posting the 

information at public libraries, publishing it in local papers, or other means appropriate for particular 

communities and facilities. The information to be disclosed includes names and quantities of regulated 
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substances at the facility; Safety Data Sheets (SDS); accident history information; emergency response 

program information; and LEPC or local response agency contact information.

In addition, facility owners or operators would be required to provide the LEPC or other local response 

agencies with information annually on all of the following that apply to the facility: regulated 

substances; five-year reportable accident history; summaries of compliance audit reports; summaries of 

incident investigation reports; summaries of implementation of inherently safer technology (IST); and 

information on emergency response exercises, including schedules for upcoming exercises. 

Public Meetings—(proposed revisions apply to §68.210)

The proposed rule would require facilities to hold a public meeting for the local community at least once 

every 5 years or within a year of a reportable accident. The low cost alternative applies the requirement 

to facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes. The proposed option is the higher cost alternative 

and would apply to all facilities (i.e., P1 facilities would also be affected).

SUMMARY OF COSTS

Approximately 12,500 facilities have filed current RMPs with EPA and are potentially affected by the 

proposed rule changes. These facilities range from petroleum refineries and large chemical 

manufacturers to water and wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum wholesalers and 

terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage facilities with ammonia 

refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical distributors; midstream gas plants; and a limited number of 

other sources that use RMP-regulated substances.

Exhibit A presents the number of facilities according to the latest RMP reporting as of February 2015 by 

industrial sector and chemical use. 

Exhibit A: Number of Affected Facilities by Sector

Sector NAICS Codes Total 

Facilities

Chemical Uses

Administration of environmental 

quality programs (i.e., governments) 924 1,923

Use chlorine and other chemicals for 

treatment

Agricultural chemical 

distributors/wholesalers

111, 112, 

115, 42491 3,667

Store ammonia for sale; some in 

NAICS 111 and 115 use ammonia as a 

refrigerant

Chemical manufacturing 325 1,465 Manufacture, process, store

Chemical wholesalers 4246 333 Store for sale

Food and beverage manufacturing 311, 312 1,476 Use mostly ammonia as a refrigerant
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Oil and gas extraction 211 741

Intermediate processing (mostly 

regulated flammable substances and 

flammable mixtures)

Other

44, 45, 48, 

54, 56, 61, 

72

247

Use chemicals for wastewater 

treatment, refrigeration, store 

chemicals for sale

Other manufacturing 313, , 326, 

327, 33 384

Use various chemicals in 

manufacturing process, waste 

treatment

Other wholesale 423, 424 302 Use mostly ammonia as a refrigerant

Paper manufacturing 322 70 Use various chemicals in pulp and 

paper manufacturing

Petroleum and coal products 

manufacturing 324 156

Manufacture, process, store (mostly 

regulated flammable substances and 

flammable mixtures)

Petroleum wholesalers 4247 276

Store for sale (mostly regulated 

flammable substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Utilities

221 (except 

22131, 

22132)

343 Use chlorine (mostly for water 

treatment)

Warehousing and storage 493 1,056 Use mostly ammonia as a refrigerant

Water/wastewater Treatment 

Systems

22131, 

22132 102 Use chlorine and other chemicals

Total 12,542

Exhibit B presents a summary of the costs estimated in the analysis. EPA estimates annualized costs of 

$162.6 million at a 3% discount rate, and $165.3 million at a 7% discount rate. Total undiscounted costs 

are $1.6 billion over the ten year time period, or $1.4 billion and $1.2 billion when discounted at 3 and 7 

percent, respectively. Exhibit B presents some elements that are beyond the proposed rule provisions, 

such as rule familiarization.
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Exhibit B: Summary of Costs (Millions, 2014 dollars)

Cost Elements Total 

Undiscounted

Total 

Discounted 

(3%)

Total 

Discounted 

(7%)

Annualized 

(3%)*

Annualized 

(7%)

Third Party Audits $49.5 $42.3 $34.8 $5.0 $5.0

Root Cause Analysis $8.4 $7.2 $5.9 $0.8 $0.8

Safer Technology 

and Alternatives $347.9 $296.7 $244.3 $34.8 $34.8

Coordination $62.7 $53.4 $44.0 $6.3 $6.3

New Responders  ̊ $311.1 $281.6 $250.3 $33.0 $35.6

Notification Drills $13.8 $11.8 $9.7 $1.4 $1.4

Exercise Costs $606.6 $517.4 $426.0 $60.7 $60.7

LEPC Disclosure $129.1 $100.1 $82.4 $11.7 $11.7

Public Disclosure $39.8 $33.9 $27.9 $4.0 $4.0

Public Meetings $47.5 $40.5 $33.3 $4.7 $4.7

Rule Familiarization $2.3 $2.3 $2.2 $0.2 $0.3

Total Cost+ $1,618.8 $1,387.2 $1,161.1 $162.6 $165.3

* When annual costs for different years are equal to one another across the analysis time period, the annualized 

costs calculated using different discount rates (e.g., 3 and 7 percent) are equal. 

 ̊ Reflects costs for some facilities to convert from “non-responding” to “responding” as a result of improved 

coordination with local emergency response officials 

+ Values may not sum due to rounding

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS

EPA had no data to projectthe specific impact of each proposed rule element on the probability and 

magnitude of chemical accidents. Indeed, the frequency and severity of the accidents themselves would 

be challenging to predict. However, a review of the RMP accident data and other data sources 

suggested that chemical accidents impose substantial costs on firms, employees, emergency 

responders, the community, and the broader economy. This RIA constructs and presents data for a 10-

year baseline period, summarizing RMP accident impacts and when possible monetizing them. The 

average annual cost of RMP accidents during the baseline was $274 million. However, the monetized 

impacts omit many important categories of accident impacts including lost productivity, the costs of 

emergency response, transaction costs, property value impacts in the surrounding community (that 

overlap with other benefit categories), and environmental impacts. Also not reflected in the 10-year 

baseline costs are the impacts of non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities and any potential impacts of rare 

high consequence catastrophes. A final omission is related to the information disclosure provision. 

Reducing the probability of chemical accidents and the severity of their impacts, and improving 

information disclosure by chemical facilities, as the proposed provisions intend, would provide benefits 

to potentially affected members of society.

Exhibit C summarizes all of the benefit categories qualitatively described in this RIA. There are four 

broad benefit categories related to accident prevention and mitigation including prevention of RMP 
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accidents, mitigation of RMP accidents, prevention and mitigation of non-RMP accidents at RMP 

facilities, and prevention of major catastrophes. The exhibit explains each and identifiesten associated 

specific benefit categories, ranging from avoided fatalities to avoided emergency response costs. Exhibit 

C also highlights and explains the information disclosure benefit category and identifiestwo specific 

benefits associated with it:improved efficiency of property markets and allocation of emergency 

resources.

Exhibit C: Summary of Social Benefits of Proposed Rule Provisions

Broad Benefit Category Explanation Specific Benefit Categories

Accident Prevention Prevention of future RMP facility accidents • Reduced Fatalities

• Reduced Injuries

• Reduced Property 

Damage

• Fewer People 

Sheltered in Place

• Fewer Evacuations

• Avoided Lost 

Productivity

• Avoided Emergency 

Response Costs

• Avoided Transaction 

Costs

• Avoided Property 

Value Impacts*

• Avoided 

Environmental 

Impacts

Accident Mitigation Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

Non-RMP accident 

prevention and mitigation

Prevention and mitigation of future non-RMP 

accidents at RMP facilities

Avoided Catastrophes

Prevention of rare but extremely high 

consequence events

Information Disclosure Provision of information to the public and 

LEPCs

• Improved efficiency 

of property markets

• Improved resource 

allocation

 * These impacts partially overlap with several other categories, such as reduced health and environmental impacts
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY........................................................................................................... 3

CHAPTER 1:INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND....................................................... 12

1.1 HISTO RY..........................................................................................................................................................................12

1.2 ORGANIZATIO N O F THE ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................17

CHAPTER 2: PROVISIONS AND ALTERNATIVES ........................................................... 19

2.1 ALTERNATIVES ANALYZED ........................................................................................................................................20

2.2 ADDITIO NAL CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH LOCAL COORDINATIO N ACTIVITIES ......................................... 22

2.3 SUMMARY O F ALTERNATIVES....................................................................................................................................23

2.4 IMPACTS TO GOVERNMENTS ......................................................................................................................................25

CHAPTER 3: UNIVERSEOFREGULATED FACILITIES ................................................. 26

3.1 CURRENT RMP FACILITIES .......................................................................................................................................26

3.2 DIVISIO NS USED IN ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................................29

3.3 GO VERNMENT ENTITIES AFFECTED BY THE RULE...............................................................................................34

3.4 LIMITATIO NS..................................................................................................................................................................35

CHAPTER 4: COSTS OF PROPOSED REVISIONS ............................................................. 36

4.1. WAGE RATES .................................................................................................................................................................36

4.2 RULE FAMILIARIZATIO N.............................................................................................................................................37

4.3 PREVENTIO N PROGRAM RULE PRO VISIONS ...........................................................................................................37

4.4. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS RULE PRO VISIONS..............................................................................42

4.5. INFO RMATION DISCLOSURE RULE PROVISIONS ....................................................................................................45

4.6 NEW RESPONDERS........................................................................................................................................................48

CHAPTER 5: TOTAL COSTS ................................................................................................. 52

5.1 ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS.......................................................................................................................................52

5.2 RULE FAMILIARIZATIO N.............................................................................................................................................53

5.3 PREVENTIO N PROGRAM RULE PRO VISIONS ...........................................................................................................54

5.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS REQ UIREMENTS..................................................................................61

5.5 INFO RMATION DISCLOSURE RULE PROVISIONS ....................................................................................................67

5.6 NEW RESPONDERS........................................................................................................................................................69

5.7 TO TAL COSTS ................................................................................................................................................................75

CHAPTER 6: BENEFITS .......................................................................................................... 77

6.1 BENEFIT CATEGO RIES .................................................................................................................................................77

6.2 NUMBER AND COSTS O F BASELINE ACCIDENTS.....................................................................................................82

6.3 BENEFITS CO MPARED TO COSTS...............................................................................................................................90

6.4 AVO IDED CATASTRO PHES...........................................................................................................................................91

6.5 ADDITIO NAL BENEFIT CATEGO RIES ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENT PREVENTIO N AND MITIGATIO N...... 91

6.6 CO NCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................................................95

CHAPTER 7: SMALL ENTITY IMPACTS............................................................................. 97

7.1 RMP AFFECTED SECTO RS..........................................................................................................................................97

7.2 ES TIMATING THE NUMBER O F SMALL ENTITIES .................................................................................................100

7.3 ECO NOMIC IMPACT O N SMALL ENTITIES..............................................................................................................105

7.4 CO NCLUSION................................................................................................................................................................112

CHAPTER 8: ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE...................................................................... 113
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8.1 BACKGROUND AND CO NTEXT..................................................................................................................................113

8.2 IDENTIFYING PO TENTIAL ENVIRO NMENTAL JUSTICE CO NCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH RMP FACILITIES

114

8.3 ACTIO NS TAKEN TO FACILITATE “FAIR TREATMENT” .....................................................................................116

8.4 ACTIO NS TAKEN TO FACILITATE “MEANINGFUL INVO LVEMENT”.................................................................116

CHAPTER 9: OTHER ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS................................................ 119

9.1 UNFUNDED MANDATES REFO RM ACT....................................................................................................................119

9.2 EMPLO YMENT IMPACTS ............................................................................................................................................119

9.3 LIMITATIO NS AND CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................................................................120

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................ 122

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................ 124
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 History

Serious chemical accidents occurring in the 1970s and 1980s, including accidents in Bhopal, India, 

Seveso, Italy, and Pasadena, Texas led to a series of legislative reforms relating to chemical safety in 

industrialized countries.

34 In the United States, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know 

Act (EPCRA) was enacted in 1986 to promote community emergency planning and preparedness and 

provide local responders and the public with information about the chemical hazards in their community

(42 U.S.C. 11002 et seq.). In 1990, sections 112(r) and 304 of the Clean Air Act were enacted to help 

prevent severe chemical facility accidents. Section 304 required the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) to publish a chemical process safety standard to prevent accidental releases of 

chemicals that could pose a threat to employees. Section 112(r) required the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) to publishAccidental Release Prevention Programregulationsto prevent chemical releases

or minimize their consequencesif they occur.

Section 112(r) required EPA to develop a list of at least 100 regulated substances which, in the case of an 

accidental release, are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, injury, or 

serious adverse effects to human health or the environment(42 U.S.C 7412(r)). EPA was also required 

to establish threshold quantities (TQs) for these substances, which would determine the applicability of 

rulesto prevent accidental releases of these substances. Section 112(r)(7)(B) required EPA to 

promulgate reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance to provide, to the greatest extent 

practicable, for the prevention and detection of accidental releases of regulated substances and for 

response to such releases by the owners or operators of the sources of such releases. The section 

mandates that the regulations require the owner or operator of a stationary source “to prepare and 

implement a risk management plan to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases of such 

substances from the stationary source, and to provide a prompt emergency response to any such 

releasesin order to protect human health and the environment.” The section further mandates that the 

plan include:

• A hazard assessment to assess the potential effects of an accidental release of any regulated 

substance. This assessment shall include an estimate of potential release quantities and a 

determination of downwind effects, including potential exposures to affected populations. Such 

assessment shall include a previous release history of the past 5 years, including the size, 

concentration, and duration of releases, and shall include an evaluation of worst case accidental 

releases; 

 3 Federal Emergency Management Agency. Phillips Petroleum Chemical Plant Explosion and Fire. October 1989. 

https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-035.pdf 4 Nature 281, 521 (18 October 1979). http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v281/n5732/pdf/281521a0.pdf
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• A program for preventing accidental releases of regulated substances, including safety 

precautions and maintenance, monitoring and employee training measures to be used at the

source; and 

• A response program providing for specific actions to be taken in response to an accidental 

release of a regulated substance so as to protect human health and the environment, including 

procedures for informing the public and local agencies responsible for responding to accidental 

releases, emergency health care, and employee training measures. 

Finally, the section requires the owner or operator of an affected stationary source to develop and file a 

risk management plan with EPA, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) (also established under the section), 

the State, and local response agencies.

OSHA adopted its process safety management standard (PSM) (codified at 29 CFR 1910.119) in 1992 (57 

FR 6403, Feb. 24, 1992). The PSM standard requires facilities to develop and implement an integrated 

approach to chemical process safety including the following elements: accurate, up-to-date diagrams of 

all process equipment, an analysis of the process hazards, standard operating procedures, training, 

maintenance, pre-startup reviews, management of change, compliance audits, incident investigation, 

employee participation, hot-work permits, contractor training, and emergency response. The 

applicability of the PSM standard is driven by the presence of specific chemicals in quantities above 

thresholdsset in the standard. 

EPA published its section 112(r) regulationsin two stages −a list of regulated substances and TQs in 

1994 (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994), and the risk management program requirements in 1996 (61 FR 

31731, June 20, 1996); both are codified at 40 CFR part 68. As required by section 112(r), part 68

includes several major requirements that were not covered by the PSM standard. These include a 

hazard assessment consisting of an offsite consequence analysis (OCA) and five-year accident history, 

and the development and submission of a risk management plan (RMP) that summarizes a source’s risk 

management program. EPA also required stationary sources to develop a management system to 

oversee the programand included emergency response program requirements beyond those contained 

in the PSM standard. RMPs were first submitted to EPA in June 1999 and must be updated at least 

every 5 years. EPA has amended the rule a number of times to modify the list of substances,to alter 

data requirements, and to address other issues. The primary requirements adopted in 1996, however,

remain in place.

The Risk Management Programrule establishes three program levels and requiresfacility owners or 

operators to conduct hazard assessments and submit RMPs regardless of the program level. Program 1 

(P1) requirements apply to processes that would not affect the public in the case of a worst-case release 

and with no accidents with specific off-site consequences within the past five years. P1 provisions

impose limited hazard assessment requirements and emergency response requirements.

Program 2 (P2) applies to processes not eligible for P1 or subject to Program 3 (P3), and imposes 

streamlined prevention program requirements, including safety information, hazard review, operating 
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procedures, training, maintenance, compliance audits, and incident investigation elements. P2 

provisions also impose hazard assessment, management, and emergency response requirements. P2 

processes are primarily chlorine use at publicly owned water and wastewater facilities, in States without

OSHA-approved State plans. To further reduce the burden on facilities with P2 processes, EPA 

developed and published a number of industry-specific guidance documents 5 and anOCA guidance

document.

P3 requirements apply to processes not eligible for P1 and either subject to OSHA's PSM standard, under 

federal or State OSHA programs, or classified in one of ten specified North American Industrial 

Classification System (NAICS) codes (1997 version) listed at 40 CFR 68.10(d)(1). The ten NAICS codes 

are: 

• 32211 (pulp mills) • 325192 (cyclic crude and intermediate manufacturing)

• 32411 (petroleum refineries) • 325199 (all other basic organic chemical 

manufacturing)

• 32511 (petrochemical manufacturing) • 325211 (plastics material and resin manufacturing)

• 325181 (alkali and chlorine 

manufacturing)

• 325311 (nitrogenous fertilizer manufacturing)

• 325188 (all other basic inorganic 

chemical manufacturing)

• 32532 (pesticide and other agricultural chemical 

manufacturing)

P3 requirements impose elements nearly identical to those in OSHA’s PSM standard as the accident 

prevention program. The P3 prevention program includes requirements relating to the following:

• Process safety information

• Process Hazard Analysis(PHA)

• Operating procedures

• Training

• Mechanical integrity

• Management of change

• Pre-startup review

• Compliance audits

• Incident investigations

• Employee participation

• Hot work permits, and

• Contractors.

 5 There are guidance documents for propane storage, refrigeration, water/wastewater treatment, warehouses, 

chemical distributors, and others. 
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P3 provisions also impose the same hazard assessment, management, and emergency response 

requirements that are required for P2.

The following flow chart demonstrates how facilities determine to which program level they are 

subject6

:

Facilities7 that are exempt from the OSHA PSM standard may be subject to EPA requirements under the 

RMP rule. This occurs for several reasons. First,the lists of substances regulated are not identical; for 

example, EPA lists aqueous ammonia at any solution that is 20 percent ammonia or more; OSHA covers 

it only at concentrations of 44 percent or more. Second, because federal OSHA has no authority over 

State and local governments, the OSHA PSM standard does not apply to publicly owned facilities (mainly 

water and wastewater treatment systems) in States where federal OSHA implements and enforces the 

standard (about half the States). Where States implement and enforce OSHA standards (referred to as 

State-plan States),8 the State is required to impose OSHA standards on State and local government 

 

6 http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/chap-02-final.pdf 7 Facilities are also commonly referred to as stationary sources, and the terms are used interchangeably 

throughout this document. 

8 Twenty-five states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have OSHA-approved State Plans. In these states, publicly 

owned water and wastewater treatment plants are typically in P2. Twenty-two State Plans (21 states and one U.S. 
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employees as a condition of delegation. Lastly, regulatory exemptions are not identical; for example, 

the OSHA PSM standard exempts normally unoccupied remote facilities, but the RMP rule does not.

Approximately 12,500 currently regulated facilities have filed RMPsfor approximately 17,000 processes. 

Most facilities have only one process, but certain industries, such as chemical manufacturing and 

petroleum refining, often have more than one regulated process; about 100 facilities have more than 10 

regulated processes. The population of RMP facilities is dynamic. Several thousand facilities have either 

switched chemicalsto non-regulated substances, reduced chemical inventories below threshold 

quantities, or ceased operations and subsequently deregistered fromthe program since the first RMPs 

were submitted in 1999. However, every year new facilities are registering and submitting new RMPs. 

Although the accident histories submitted with RMPs have shown a reduction in the frequency of 

accidents since the beginning of the program, there continue to be serious chemical releases. RMP data 

for 2004 through 2013, the most recent 10 year period with complete information, showsthat there are 

an average of 150 accidents each year with reportable impacts.

In April 2013, the West Texas Fertilizer Company, an RMP-regulated facility in West, Texas, that stored

anhydrous ammonia (an RMP- and PSM-regulated substance) and ammoniumnitrate (not regulated 

under the RMP rule or the PSM standard) caught fire, which led to a massive explosion of the 

ammonium nitrate. Fifteen people, most of them firefighters, died and more than 160 members of the 

public were injured. Two nearby schools, an apartment building, a nursing home, and much of the 

surrounding town were also damaged. 9 In addition to thistragedy, a number of other serious incidents 

demonstrate a significant risk to the safety of American workers and communities. On March 23, 2005, 

explosions at the BP Refinery in Texas City, Texas killed 15 and injured more than 170. 10 On April 2, 

2010, an explosion and fire at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington killed seven.

11 On August 6, 

2012, a fire at the Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California involving flammable fluids endangered 19 

Chevron employees and created a large plume of chemicals that traveled across the Richmond, 

 

territory) cover both private and state and local government workplaces. Public water and wastewater plants in 

these states are in P3. The remaining five State Plans (four states and one U.S. territory) cover state and local 

government workers only. Their public water/wastewater plants are P2.https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/ 9 CSB. 2015. Final Investigation Report, West Fertilizer Plant Fire and Explosion, West, TX, April 17, 2013. REPORT 

2013-02-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/ 10 U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). March 2007. Investigation Report: Refinery 

Explosion and Fire, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf. 11 CSB. May 2014. Investigation Report: Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes Refinery, 

Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf.
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California area. Nearly 15,000 residents sought medical treatment due to the release. 12On June 6, 

2013, a fire and explosion at Williams Olefins in Geismar, Louisiana killed two and injured many more. 13

These incidents highlight the regulatory need that this proposed rule modernization is addressing. 

Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act aimed to address low frequency and high consequence chemical 

events. These are catastrophic incidents which have large societal impacts when they occur, but very 

little likelihood for any individual chemical facility. As such, market forces may not provide an incentive 

for any given company to invest in measures to prevent such accidents as they’re so unlikely to occur at 

the individual level. However, looking across the United States and universe of regulated facilities, these 

accidents occur with sufficient frequency to warrant regulation.

In response to recent catastrophic chemical facility incidents such as the West explosion and others, in 

2013 PresidentObama issued Executive Order (EO) 13650, entitled Improving Chemical Facility Safety 

and Security,

14 which among other items, required EPA and OSHA to consider whether and how to 

update and modernize the RMP rule and PSM standard. Both EPA and OSHA issued requests for 

information (RFI) to seek input from the public and the regulated community on potential revisions to 

the rules. 15 EPA received a total of 579 public submissions on the RFI. Several public comments were 

the result of various mass mail campaigns 16 and contained numerous copies of letters or petition 

signatures. Approximately 99,710 letters and signatures were contained in these several comments. In 

general, members of the public that submitted commentssupported imposing more stringent 

requirements on facilities, including a requirement for industry to use inherently safer systems to 

prevent chemical disasters. The regulated industry opposed most suggested revisions to the rule as 

unnecessary and costly. The proposed rule is the result of EPA’s consideration of the comments, as well 

as of recommendations from the CSB,the Agency’s experience gained through participation in EO 13650 

listening sessions,

17 and information gained by EPA through inspection of RMP facilities and 

enforcement of the rule over the past sixteen years.

1.2 Organization of the Analysis

This regulatory impact analysis(RIA) is organized as follows:

 12 CSB. January 2014. Regulatory Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Chevron Richmond 

Refinery #4 Crude Unit, Richmond, California, August 6, 2012. Report No. 2012-03-I-CA. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf. 13 CSB. 2013. Ongoing Investigation of Williams Olefins Plant and Fire, Geismar, LA. June 13, 2013. 

http://www.csb.gov/williams-olefins-plant-explosion-and-fire-/. 14 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facility-safetyand-security 15 OSHA’s RFI was published on December 9, 2013 (78 FR 73756) and EPA’s RFI was published on July 31, 2014 (79 

FR 44604).

16 The terms “form letter campaign” and “mass mail campaign” are used interchangeably throughout this report. 17 In 2013 and 2014, as partof the EO 13650 activities, the federal government held a dozen listening sessions, 

supplemented by two online webinars. For a list of locations and link to the notes for these sessions go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=DHS-2013-0075.
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• Chapter 2 describes the provisions that EPA is proposing to add or amend and the alternatives 

that EPA considered for each provision analyzed in this document.

• Chapter 3 discusses the universe of regulated entities and the various divisions used in the 

analysis.

• Chapter 4 discusses the basis for cost estimates for each of the provisions and alternatives and 

presents the unit costs.

• Chapter 5 presents the total costs and 10-year costs.

• Chapter 6 discusses the potential benefits of the rule.

• Chapter 7 presents the small entityimpacts.

• Chapter 8 presents the environmental justice analysis

• Chapter 9 discusses other statutory and related analyses.
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CHAPTER 2: PROVISIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

This chapter presents a summary of the provisions in the proposed rule and the alternatives analyzed. 

The provisions being proposed include revisions to existing prevention program and emergency 

response requirements as well as new requirements related to public disclosure of information. For 

some provisions EPA considered three alternatives, which represent low, medium, and high costs.

The RIA analyzed the following proposed new requirements and revisions to existing requirements as 

well as several alternatives for each:

1. Third-Party Audits—(proposed revisions apply to existing §§68.58 and 68.79 and new §§68.59 

and 68.80): Revising the compliance audit provisions by requiring the next compliance audit 

following an RMP reportable accident18 to be conducted by a third-party.

2. Root Cause Analysis- (proposed revisions apply to §§68.60 and 68.81): Revising the incident 

investigation provisions to require a root cause analysis following an RMP reportable accident 

or an incident that could reasonably have resulted in an RMP reportable accident (i.e., “near 

miss”).

3. Safer Technology and AlternativesAnalysis (STAA)—(proposed revisions apply to §68.67):

Revising the PHA provisions to add a requirement to conduct a STAA - defined as “the 

integration of a variety of risk reduction or risk management strategies that work toward 

making a facility and its chemical processes as safe as possible”19 - for a subset of P3 processes 

in specific NAICS codes.

4. Coordination Activities—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.90, new 68.93, and 68.95):

Reorganizing and clarifying existing requirementsfor all facilities with P2 and P3 processes to 

coordinate emergency response capabilities with local response agencies and adding a new 

requirement to coordinate annually, document these coordination activities, and allow the 

LEPC to require that the chemical facility take responsibility for its own emergency response.

5. Exercises—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.96): Adding new requirements for facilities to 

conduct exercises annually. This includes an annual notification exercise that applies to both 

responding and non-responding facilities. Owners and operators ofresponding facilities must 

conduct a field exercise once every five years (and after a RMP reportable accident) and 

tabletop exercises annually, in the other years.

6. Public Disclosure—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.205 and existing §68.210): Adding a

new requirement to make certain information available to the Local Emergency Planning 

 18 RMP reportable accident means any accident that must be reported under the five-year accident history 

requirements of §68.42, which is an accidental release from a covered process that resulted in deaths, injuries, or 

significant property damage on-site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property 

damage, or environmental damage.

19 EPA Chemical Safety Alert: Safer Technology and Alternatives. June 2015. 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/alert_safer_tech_alts.pdf
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Committee (LEPC) or local response agencies. In addition, the proposed rule would revisethe 

public information availability requirements to simplify the presentation of existing publicly 

available information and help the public better understand the risks at the facility.

7. Public Meeting—(proposed revisions apply to §68.210): Adding anew requirement to hold a 

public meeting at least once every 5 years, as well as after an RMP reportable accident.

2.1 Alternatives Analyzed

Third-Party Audits—(proposed revisions apply to existing §§68.58 and 68.79 and new §§68.59 and 68.80)

The existing rule requires P2 and P3 processes to conduct a compliance audit at least once every 3 years. 

The proposed rule would require facilities with P2 and/or P3 processesto contract with an independent 

third-party to conduct the next scheduled compliance audit following an RMP reportable accident or 

after an implementing agency 20 determines that certain circumstances exist that suggest a heightened 

risk for an accident. The third party would have to be someone with whom the facility does not have an 

existing or recent relationship and who meets specific qualification criteria. The low cost alternative 

(i.e., the proposed option) would apply only for P2 and P3 processes after an RMP reportable accident 

or at the request of the implementing agency. The medium cost alternative would apply every three 

years for all compliance audits conducted for all P3 processes. The high cost alternative would apply 

every three years for all compliance audits conducted for P2 and P3 processes.

Root Cause Analysis—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.60 and 68.81)

The proposed rule would require facilitieswith P2 and/or P3 processesto conduct a root cause analysis 

as part of an incident investigation following an RMP reportable accident or an incident that could 

reasonably have resulted in an RMP reportable accident (i.e., “near miss”). A root cause analysis is a 

formal process to identify underlying reasons for failures that lead to accidental releases. These 

analyses usually require someone trained in the technique. The low cost alternative would apply the 

provision only to reportable accidents or near misses in P3 processes. The medium/high cost alternative

(proposed option)would apply to reportable accidents or near misses involving P2 and P3 processes. 

Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)—(proposed revisions apply to §68.67)

Under the proposed rule, facilities in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and coal 

products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing) with P3 processes would be required to 

conduct a STAA for each process as part of their PHA, which occurs every 5 years. The STAA includes 

two parts: the initial analysis to identify alternatives, and a feasibility study to determine the costs and 

assess the reasonableness of implementing technology alternatives. The proposed rule is the low cost 

alternative, which would apply to all facilities with P3 processes in NAICS codes 322 (Paper 

Manufacturing), 324 (Petroleum and Coal Product Manufacturing), and 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). 

 20 The implementing agency is the federal state, or local agency that is taking the lead for implementation and 

enforcement of part 68 or the state or local equivalent.
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The medium cost alternative would apply the requirement to all P3 processes. The high cost alternative 

would apply the requirement to all P3 processes and require facilities to implement safer technology 

and alternatives that are considered feasible.

Coordination Activities—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.90, new 68.93, and 68.95)

Under the proposed rule, all facilities with P2 or P3 processes would be required to coordinate with local 

response agencies annually to determine response needs and ensure that response resources and 

capabilities are in place to respond to an accidental releaseof a regulated substance. The owner or 

operator would also be required to document coordination activities. The proposed rule also includes a 

provision enabling the LEPC or local emergency response official to require that the RMP-facility owner 

or operator comply with the emergency response program requirements of §68.95. Section 68.95 

requires the owner or operator to develop an emergency response program that includes an emergency 

response plan, procedures for use, inspection and maintenance of response equipment,training for 

responding employees, and procedures to review and update the program. As a result of improved 

coordination between facility owners and operators and local emergency response officials, EPA 

believes thatsome facilities that are currently designated as non-responding facilities may become 

responding facilities (i.e., develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95). For the 

proposed alternative, EPA conducted a sensitivity analysis estimating costs faced by RMP facilities that 

converted from non-responder to responder status (see Section 2.2 below).

Alternatives to this provision are similar to the proposed requirements. One alternative would eliminate 

the option for local officials to require that a facility owner or operator comply with the requirements of 

§68.95. A second alternative is a high cost alternative and would require all facilities with P2 or P3 

processes to comply with §68.95, regardless of local response capability21. Thiswould be analogous to 

the requirements under the Oil Pollution Prevention regulation (40 CFR Part 112) where all facilities 

subject to the Facility Response Plan provisions at §112.20 are required to prepare and implement an 

emergency response plan for oil discharges into navigable waters or adjoining shorelines.

Exercises—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.96)

Notification Exercises. All facilities with P2 or P3 processes would be required to conduct a notification 

exercise annually to ensure that the contact list to be used in an emergency is complete, accurate, and 

up-to-date. 

Tabletop and Field Exercises. The proposed rule would require responding facilities to conduct annual 

exercises of their emergency response plans and invite local emergency response officials to participate. 

Under the low cost alternative, facilities would conduct tabletop exercises annually. Under the 

proposed option, which is the medium cost alternative, responding facilities would conduct a full field 

exercise at least once every five years and tabletop exercises annually in the interim years. Responding 

 21 For this alternative to the proposed option, the sensitivity analysis would not be relevant.
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facilities with a reportable accident would also have to conduct a full field exercise within a year of an 

RMP reportable accident, but this may not impose any additional burden under the medium alternative 

as it would count as the required field exercise for the next 5-year period. Under the high cost 

alternative, responding facilities would conduct full field exercises annually.

Public Disclosure—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.205 and existing §68.210)

The proposed rule would require all facility owners or operators to provide the LEPC or other local 

response agencies with information annually on all of the following that apply to the facility: regulated 

substances; five-year reportable accident history; summaries of compliance audit reports; summaries of 

incident investigation reports; summaries of implementation of inherently safer technology (IST); and 

information on emergency response exercises, including schedules for upcoming exercises. 

In addition, all facilities would be required to disclose certain chemical hazard information to the public. 

The facility or its parent company, if applicable, would have to make the information available in an 

easily accessible manner, which might be presenting information on a company website, posting the 

information at public libraries, publishing it in local papers, or other means appropriate for particular 

communities and facilities. The information to be disclosed includes names and quantities of regulated 

substances at the facility; Safety Data Sheets (SDS); accident history information; emergency response 

program information; and LEPC or local response agency contact information.

Public Meeting—(proposed revisions apply to §68.210)

The proposed rule would require facilities to hold a public meeting for the local community at least once 

every 5 years or within a year of a reportable accident. The low cost alternative applies the requirement 

to facilities with P2 or P3 processes. The medium/high cost alternative would apply it to all facilities 

(i.e., P1 facilities would also be affected). 

2.2 Additional Changes Associated with Local Coordination Activities

As a result of improved coordination between facility owners and operators and local emergency 

response officials, EPA believes that some facilities that are currently designated as non-responding 

facilities may become responding facilities. Therefore, in addition to the provisions listed above, the RIA 

estimates the costs associated with becoming a responding facility. This includes the costs of 

developing an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95, purchasing and maintaining 

appropriate equipment, training personnel, conducting exercises,and preparing the associated exercise 

reports for LEPCs.

In earlier rulemakings, EPA specified that if a facility owner or operator determined that the local 

emergency responders did not have the training and equipment to respond to a release of an RMP 

regulated substance at the facility, then the facility owner or operatormust take responsibility for being 

able to respond; however, it has become clear that in practice this has not always been the case. 

Information from EPA regional offices, State emergency organizations, and local response agencies has 
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shown that facilities are not always coordinating or communicating with local responders, as required, 

and in some cases neither a facility nor its local response agency is prepared to respond to releases of 

regulated substances.

The proposed rule would explicitly require a facility owner or operator with a Program 2 or Program 3 

process to coordinate annually with local emergency responders to determine response needs and 

ensure that response resources and capabilities are in place to respond to an accidental release of a 

regulated substance. When the outcome of the response coordination activities demonstrates that local 

response capabilities are not adequate to respond, or upon the request of local responders, the facility 

owner or operator must develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95.

EPA examined RMP data to estimate the percent of RMP facilities with Program 2 and/or 3 processes

that are non-responders, which means they are relying on local authorities to respond to any releases of 

regulated substances at the facility.22

Approximately 57 percent of facilities fell into this category. Many of these facilities are smaller facilities 

in rural areas. Unlike the other alternatives analyzed, the number and type of facilities that may convert 

from non-responder status to responderis uncertain. A previous FEMA analysis reported that 

approximately 76% of the population is covered by hazmat teams, which provides an indication of which 

facilities might have to become responding facilities.

23 However, the distribution of regulated facilities 

does not necessarily match the US population, so EPA used data from that FEMA report to conduct a 

sensitivity analysis. The RIA presentsthe costs associatedwith 25%, 50%, and 75% of the estimated 

number of non-responding facilities becoming responding facilitieswho are located in counties that do 

not have hazmat teams. The high cost alternative for coordination would require all P2 and P3 facilities 

to become responders.

2.3 Summary of Alternatives

Exhibit 2-1 presents the alternatives by rule requirement. Where cells are merged, the requirements 

are the same across the alternatives covered. For provisions that include alternative options analyzed, 

the proposed rule provisions are highlighted in gray.

 22 EPA. 2016. Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs 

under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).

23 https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/26675
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Exhibit 2-1: Alternatives by Regulatory Provision

Rule Provision Low Alternative Medium Alternative High Alternative

Prevention Program Elements

Third-party Audit

(§§68.58, 68.59, 

68.79, and 68.80))

Next compliance audit 

after RMP reportable 

accident(facilities with 

P2 and P3 processes)

All compliance audits at 

facilities with P3 processes 

conducted every three years 

by a third-party

All compliance audits at 

facilities with P2 and P3 

processes conducted 

every three years by a 

third-party

Root Cause Analysis

(§§68.60 and 68.81)

Applies to RMPreportable accidents and 

“near misses” involving 

P3 processes

Applies to all RMP-reportable accidents and “near misses” 

involving P2 and P3 processes 

STAA

(§68.67)

Facilities with P3 

processes in NAICS codes 

322, 324, 325 conduct

STAA and feasibility 

analyses

All facilities with P3 processes

conduct STAA and feasibility 

analyses

All P3 facilities conduct

STAA and feasibility 

analyses and implement 

feasible alternatives

Emergency Planning and Response

Coordination

(§§68.90, 68.93 and 

68.95)

All facilities with P2 and 

P3 processes coordinate 

with local responders and 

document annually

All P2 and P3 facilities 

coordinate and document 

annually; LEPC may require 

source to implement ER 

program

All P2 and P3 facilities 

must comply with ER 

Program (i.e., become 

responding facilities) 

regardless of local

capability.

Notification

Exercises

(§68.96)

All facilities with P2 and P3 processes must verify their emergency notification contact 

information annually

Tabletop and Field 

Exercises

(§68.96)

Responding facilities 

conduct tabletop exercises

annually

Responding facilities 

conduct: a field exercise at 

least once every 5 years (and 

within one year of an RMPreportable accident); 

tabletop exercises in the

other four years

Responding facilities 

conduct a field exercise 

annually

Information Disclosure

Disclosure to LEPC

(§68.205)

All facilities make certain information available to the LEPC or local emergency response 

officials. 

Disclosureto the 

Public

(§68.210)

All facilities make certain chemical hazard information available to the public in an easily 

accessible manner.

Public Meeting

(§68.210)

P2 and P3 facilities hold a public meeting at least once 

every 5 years and immediately after an RMP-reportable 

accident.

All facilities hold a public 

meeting once every 5 

years and immediately 

after an RMP-reportable 

accident
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2.4 Impactsto Governments

The proposed rule imposes direct costs to local governments that own and operate RMP facilities 

(primarily water and wastewater systems, but also some power plants and swimming pools). The 

proposed rule also imposes indirect costs to local emergency response and planning agencies to review 

new information that would be submitted and to participate in exercises at the invitation of facility 

owners and operators. Although local agencies are not required to participate in exercises or review 

documents, many will do so. The RIA discusses and presentsthese costs separately.
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CHAPTER 3: UNIVERSE OF REGULATED FACILITIES

Approximately 12,500 facilities have filed current RMPs with EPA and are potentially affected by the 

proposed rule changes. These facilities range from petroleum refineries and large chemical 

manufacturers to water and wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleumwholesalers and 

terminals;food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage facilities with ammonia 

refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical distributors; midstream gas plants; and a limited number of 

other sources that use RMP-regulated substances. This chapter describes these facilities and how they 

are categorized for the purposes of the economic analysis.

3.1 Current RMP Facilities 

Exhibit 3-1 presents the number of facilities according to the latest RMP reporting as of February 2015

by industrial sector and chemical use. 

Exhibit 3-1: Number of Affected Facilities by Sector

Sector NAICS Codes Total Facilities Chemical Uses

Administration of 

environmental quality

programs (i.e., 

governments)

924 1,923 Use chlorine and other 

chemicals for treatment

Agricultural chemical 

distributors/wholesalers

111, 112, 115, 

42491 3,667

Store ammonia for sale; some in 

NAICS 111 and 115 use 

ammonia as a refrigerant

Chemical manufacturing 325 1,465 Manufacture, process, store

Chemical wholesalers 4246 333 Store for sale

Food and beverage 

manufacturing 311, 312 1,476 Use (mostly ammonia as a refrigerant)

Oil and gas extraction 211 741

Intermediate processing (mostly 

regulated flammable substances 

and flammable mixtures)

Other 44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 

61, 72 247

Use chemicals for wastewater 

treatment, refrigeration, store 

chemicals for sale

Other manufacturing 313, 326, 327, 33 384

Use various chemicals in 

manufacturing process, waste 

treatment

Other wholesale 423, 424 302 Use (mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant)

Paper manufacturing 322 70 Use various chemicals in pulp 

and paper manufacturing

Petroleum and coal 

products manufacturing 324 156 Manufacture, process, store(mostly regulated flammable 
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substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Petroleum wholesalers 4247 276

Store for sale (mostly regulated 

flammable substances and 

flammable mixtures)

Utilities 221 (except 22131, 

22132) 343 Use chlorine (mostly for water treatment)

Warehousing and storage 493 1,056 Use mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant

Water/wastewater 

Treatment Systems 22131, 22132 102 Use chlorine and other chemicals

Total 12,542

Exhibit 3-2: Chart of Affected Facilities by Sector

The RMP rule applies to processes(i.e., activities involving regulated substancesincluding any use, 

storage, manufacturing, handling, or on-site movement of such substances, or combination of these 

activities) at facilitieswith regulated substances above threshold amounts. Many facilities may handle 

other chemicals that are not RMP-regulated or have processes that are not subject to the rule. In 

general,the cost of implementing the rule provisions varies primarily by the complexity of the processes 

involved. The chemical manufacturers and refineries have more covered processes per facility and more 

complex issues to consider when evaluating hazards, designing exercises, conducting audits, 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000
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investigating incidents, and explaining information to responders and the public compared to facilities 

that simply store or use chemicals in simple processes (e.g., refrigeration systems and water and waste 

treatment systems). For the purposes of the cost analysis, therefore, all facilities in NAICS 324 and 325 

(petroleum and coal productsmanufacturing and chemical manufacturing) are considered complex; all 

other facilities are considered simple.

The proposed STAA provision is limited to P3 processes in three sectors that have had a high frequency 

of accidental releases (NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325). These sectors were selected because they 

represent relatively complex processes that account for 49% of all reportable accidents.24 Exhibit 3-3

presents the number of processes for all facilities by program level and for the three sectors, as well as 

the number of facilities within each program level.

Exhibit 3-3: Number of Processes by Program Level and Sector

Program Level Facilities Processes

1 642 1,096

2 1,272 5,448

3 10,628 14,454

Total 12,542 20,998

STAA Sectors Processes

NAICS 322 (Paper Manufacturing) 97

NAICS 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing) 1,453

NAICS 325 (Chemical Manufacturing) 2,758

Total 4,308

To analyze the STAA provision, EPA separated the processes in the three sectorsinto those that are 

more likely to involve manufacturing and reacting chemicals under more extreme conditions (i.e., high 

temperatures and pressures) from those that involve mixing and using chemicals under less extreme 

conditions. The former are the petroleum operations in NAICS 324, petrochemicals and other basic 

chemical manufacturing in NAICS 3251, and synthetics and resins in NAICS 3252. All other chemicals 

manufacturing sectors (agricultural chemicals, drugs, paints, soaps, and others) were merged with 

pulp/paper mills in the cost analysis and are assumed to mix and use chemicals under less extreme 

conditions. Exhibit 3-4presents the number of processes for the three sectors; NAICS codes 324, 3251, 

and 3252 are further disaggregated by the facility size because the level of effort for a STAA is likely to 

increase as the size of these more complicated processes increases, as measured by the number of FTEs 

involved in the process at the facility.

 24 February 2015 RMP Database.
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Exhibit 3-4: Number of Processes for STAA Sectors by Sector and Facility Size

Sector Processes 

Program 3

0-19 Full Time Equivalents 

(FTEs)

20-99 

FTEs

100+ 

FTEs

NAICS 324 (Petroleum and 

Coal products Manufacturing) 1,453 7 39 1,407

NAICS 325 (Chemical 

Manufacturing)

NAICS 3251 (Basic chemicals) 1,664 144 644 876

NAICS 3252 

(Synthetics/Resins) 400 14 151 235

NAICS 32XX (Other 

Chemicals) 694

NAICS 322 (Paper 

Manufacturing) 97

3.2 Divisions Used in Analysis

The RMP rule imposes different requirements on facilities based on Program levels. P3 processes are 

those that are not eligible for P1 and are subject to the OSHA PSM standard or are in certain NAICS 

codes (refineries, a limited number of chemical manufacturers, and pulp mills). Of the 2,442 processes

in the selected NAICS codes, all but 10 are listed assubject to OSHA PSM; two of the non-PSM processes

appearto have been misclassified (a wastewater treatment facility and farm co-operative) and three or 

four others may be subject to PSM (the substance listed is covered by OSHA at certain concentrations).

25

 25 Some facilities listed only 5-digit NAICS codes, so 10 other processes may be subject only to the RMP rule.
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Exhibit 3-5: Number of Facilities by Program Level

In July 2015, OSHA issued a new interpretation of its retail exemption, a policy that exempted certain 

employers under OSHA’s 1992 definition of “retail facility.” Prior to this change, most facilities that 

classified themselves as agricultural chemical distributors and many other wholesalers listed themselves 

as P2, because they were exempt from the OSHA PSM standard. The effect of the change in 

interpretation will make all of these facilities subject to OSHA’s PSMstandard and, therefore, subject to 

Program 3 of the RMP rule. To take that into account for this RIA, EPA has reclassified all P2 facilities 

that listed themselves in NAICS 11, 12, 15, 424 (wholesalers), and 493 (warehouses) as P3. As a 

consequence almost 85 percent of all RMP facilities (10,628) are now subject to P3 (See Exhibit 3-6). 

Most P2 facilities (935 out of 945) are publicly owned water/wastewater treatment facilitiesin States 

where OSHA (rather than the State) enforces OSHA rules26. As a resultof this difference, approximately

half of the water/wastewater treatment facilities have processes that are subject to P3 and half that are 

in P2 although there is no difference in the processes covered. The remaining P2 facilities are utilities 

that use aqueous ammonia and other facilities that use chemicals not subject to OSHA PSM. 27 Exhibit 3-

 26 For the reason why, please see Section 1.1 History above.

27 There are some facilities that listed themselves as P2 that have either selected the wrong Program level on the 

RMP submission or have incorrectly indicated that they are not subject to PSM, as they handle OSHA PSM 

chemicals in quantities far above the OSHA threshold. Because there are errors in the other direction among the 

public systems (i.e., facilities in States not subject to PSM that listed themselves as P3,), the analysis did not 

attempt to correct the errors.

P1 Facilities (642): 

Limited accident 

effects on public

P2 Facilities (1272): 

Not eligible for P1 or 

subject to P3

P3 Facilities (10628): 

Subject to OSHA PSM 

or in specified NAICS 

codes

Program 1 Program 2 Program 3
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6 presents the number of facilities by sector and Program Level; publicly owned water/wastewater 

treatment systems in the Exhibit are listed under governments (NAICS 92), while privately owned and 

operated systems are listed under NAICS 2213.

Exhibit 3-6: Number of Facilities by Sector and Program Level

Sector P1 P2 P3 Totals

NAICS 311, 312 Food and Beverage 

Manufacturer

3 11 1,462 1,476

NAICS 322 Pulp and Paper 1 1 68 70

NAICS 324 Petroleum 13 3 140 156

NAICS 325 Chemical 53 76 1,336 1,466

Other Manufacturing 62 73 249 384

NAICS 4246 Chemical Distributors 6 0 327 333

NAICS 4247 Petroleum Distributors 14 0 262 276

NAICS 11, 12, 15, 42491 Agricultural 10 0 3,657 3,667

NAICS 211 Oil and Gas Exploration 310 41 390 741

NAICS 2213 Water/Wastewater* 1 10 91 102

NAICS 221, 222 Utilities 38 72 233 343

NAICS 493 Warehousing 70 0 986 1,056

NAICS 423, 424 Other Wholesale 5 0 297 302

NAICS 92 Governments 15 935 973 1,923

Other 41 50 157 247

Total 642 1,272 10,628 12,542

* Except government-owned, which appear as NAICS 92 Government.

3.2.1 Facilities Affected by the STAA Requirement

For the medium cost alternative considered for the STAA (all P3 processes), processes outside of the 

three NAICS sectors discussed above were classified based on the level of effort needed to conduct the 

analysis. Moderate level of effort processes were those in other manufacturing sectors and 

refrigeration systems. Refrigeration systems were considered as moderate because they are usually 

large facilities that cool, chill, refrigerate, orfreeze various food or beverage products. Refrigeration 

systems occur in multiple NAICS codes; the food and beverage manufacturers and refrigerated 

warehouses(NAICS 49312) were the main sectors, but they also occur in agriculture, wholesale, 

terminals, and retail. Exhibit 3-7presents the number of processes in each of these categories. Water 

treatment systems, utilities, and gas plants were estimated to require a relatively low level of effort. 

Facilities that simply store chemicals for sale were estimated to require a very low level of effort to do 

an STAA because they generally have just tanks and loading/unloading equipment. 
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Exhibit 3-7: Number of Other P3 Processes for STAA Alternatives by Type

Process Type/Level of Effort Number of P3 Processes

Manufacturing/Refrigeration Systems/moderate 3,460

Water/Gas/Utilities/low 1,899

Storage/very low 4,881

3.2.2 Universe Breakdown for Emergency Response Coordination and Exercise 

Requirements. 

The proposed requirements associated with emergency response depend on whether a facility responds 

to releaseswith its own personnel (or contractors) or relies on local public emergency responders. As 

explained above, the responding facilities were identified by examining information provided related to 

the emergency response plan in the RMP database. Exhibit 3-8presents the numbers of responding and 

non-responding facilities by complexity of the facility (refineries/chemical manufacturers as complex, all 

other facilities as simple) and by the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees on site, which 

affects the number of people involved in exercises. The large manufacturers were further divided 

because, unlike most of the facilities in the retail and wholesale sectors, they operate 24/7 and 

therefore have fewer workers at the facility at any one time than the FTE count listed in the RMP. For 

the analysis, large manufacturers were considered those with more than 300 FTE or potentially 100 FTE 

or more per shift (in general swing and night shifts have fewer employees onsite than the day shift if 

only because administrative personnel are not usually present). Hence, the analysis assigns costs to the 

773 manufacturers with 100 to 300 FTE the same as if they were in the 20-99 FTE category for the 

response provisions.

Exhibit 3-8: Responding and Non-responding Facilities by FTE and Complexity*

0-19 FTE 20-99 

FTE

100+ 

FTE Total

Responding Facilities

Simple 1,779 944 1,513 4,236

Complex (NAICS 324, 325) 145 480 545 1,170

Total 1,924 1,424 2,058 5,406

Non Responding

Simple 4,943 963 775 6,681

Complex (NAICS 324, 325) 156 245 54 455

Total 5,099 1,208 829 7,136

Non-Responding (not in County

with Hazmat Team)

Simple 3,416 389 297 4,102

Complex 85 144 18 247

Total 3501 533 315 4349

 * Note: Exhibit does not include RMP facilities with only P1 processes
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A different way to classify facilities as small or large is based on the Small Business Administration’s 

standards for firms. The classification of RMP facilities on that basis is presented in Chapter 7.

3.2.3 Universe Breakdown for Provisionsthat Apply After an RMP Reportable Accident

Finally, the proposed third-party audit and root cause analysis provisions would apply only to facilities 

that have a reportable accident (the root cause analysis provision would also apply to facilities that have 

a “near miss”). The existing rule requires reporting for accidental releases from covered processes with 

impacts that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage onsite, or known offsite deaths, 

injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. In practice, 

however, some facilities have reported accidental releases with no reported impacts. For the purposes 

of this analysis, EPA used only the number of reportable accidents, which are those accidents with 

reported impacts. EPA analyzed the number of accidents reported during the prior 10-year period. The 

reason is that prior to 2004, some facilities were still completing initial implementation of the rule; 2013 

is the most recent year for which there are complete data28. Exhibit 3-9presents the number of 

reportable accidents per year for 2004 through 2013. Exhibit 3-10 presents the number of reportable 

accidents by industry sector for the same total 10-year timeframe.

Exhibit 3-9: Reportable (Impact) Accident by Year

Year Impact Accidents

2004 197

2005 152

2006 140

2007 204

2008 168

2009 149

2010 128

2011 138

2012 118

2013 123

Total 1,517

Range 118 - 204

Average/Year 152

 28 A more detailed explanation is provided in Chapter 6.
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Exhibit 3-10: Reportable Accidents by Sector

Sector Total 10-Year Accident Frequency per Facility

(over 10 years)

Refineries (NAICS 324) 169 1.08

Pulp and Paper (NAICS 322) 46 0.66

Chemical Manufacturers (NAICS 325) 530 0.36

Food/Beverage Manufacturers (NAICS 311, 312) 270 0.18

Other Manufacturers (All other NAICS 31-33) 53 0.14

Oil/Gas exploration (NAICS 211) 53 0.07

Warehouses (NAICS 493) 72 0.07

Other wholesalers (All other NAICS 423, 424) 20 0.07

Chemical/petroleum wholesalers (NAICS 4246, 4247) 38 0.06

Water/POTW (NAICS 22131, 22132, 92) 75 0.04

Agricultural Facilities (NAICS 11, 42491) 156 0.04

All Other 35 0.06

3.3 Government EntitiesAffected by the Rule

The rule affects governmental entities both directly and indirectly. Most of the facilities are water or 

wastewater treatment facilities, but there are some large swimming pools covered as well. Most of the 

governmental entities are cities, but the universe includes larger special districts (e.g., the Metropolitan 

Water District of Southern California) as well as some federal facilities. Of the governmental entities 

directly affected, 910 have one RMP facility, 268 have two regulated facilities, 60 have 3 facilities, 27 

have 4 facilities, and 27 have 5 or more. Not all facilities belonging to a governmental entity are located 

in the entity. There are fewer than 1,200 “parent” companies listed for publicly owned systems. 

Because facilities do not always list the owner or list variations of the owner’s name, it is not possible to 

develop an accurate estimate of the number of public entities affected by the rule. It is clear, however, 

that some of the larger cities and counties have a substantial number of facilities. For example, Los 

Angeles County owns and operates at least 33 facilities, which do not include the facilities owned by 

cities within the county.

Additionally, local or county governments will receive new information filed by RMP-regulated facilities

as a result of the proposed rule and may voluntarily participate in exercises held by facilities. Although 

this proposed rule doesn’t specify requirements for these government entities to review the information 

submitted or to take part in exercises, EPA expects that many of them will do so and therefore this 

analysis considers those indirect costs to local governments. The burden on any single local government 

will increase as the number of affected entities in its jurisdiction increases. Our cost estimates will 
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reflect this added burden. There are 6,956 cities that have one or more RMP facilities. Although most 

have only one RMP facility, a number have 20 or more, and there are counties with close to 200 RMP 

facilities(e.g., Harris County, TX). Thus, those counties with many RMP facilities may have greater 

indirect costs due to the additional volume of submitted information and requests for participation in 

exercises.

3.4 Limitations

The analysis assumes that every facility subject to the RMP rule has registered with EPA and filed an 

RMP. EPA recognizes that this may not be true. EPA and delegated implementing agencies search for 

and occasionally identify regulated facilities that have failed to submit RMPs.Historically, relatively few 

of these “non-filers” have been found, butwe have littlebasis for determining the full extent of such 

non-compliance. 

The RMP database may include facilities that are no longer operational. For this analysis, we removed 

one refinery (and nine processes) from the data because the facility appears to have closed in 2001 

without following the requirements to deregister. EPA recognizes there may be other facilities in the 

RMP database that are no longer operating.

The RMP facility population is dynamic. The number of RMP facilities and processes is expected to 

change over the period of analysis because of firms that will grow, shrink, close, or open in the near or 

distant future. Despite these expected changes, the analysis relies on the number and nature of RMP 

facilities and processes that exist as of the February 2015 RMP database as a constant estimate of future 

RMP facilities/processes. 

Finally, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, there are some problems with the data as filed with 

EPA. There are a number of facilities that list NAICS codes that are inaccurately applied, which means 

some facilities have misclassified themselves as P2 instead of P3, and for public facilities as P3 instead of 

P1 or P2. For example: EPA identified storage and terminal areas that were listed as refineries; 

agricultural co-operatives and refrigerated warehouses listed in multiple sectors; and large terminals 

listed as wholesalers, support for transportation, and warehouses. Although EPA has attempted to 

correct the most obvious problems, and the numbers in any category are EPA’s best estimate, they 

should be viewed as approximations. 
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CHAPTER 4: COSTS OF PROPOSED REVISIONS

This chapter outlines the assumptions used to estimate the incremental costs of the proposed revisions 

to the Risk Management Program and the alternative options under consideration. EPA does not 

estimate the baseline costs incurred to comply with the existing RMP regulations. 

The Agency sought to quantify and monetize costs where possible. When we were unable to quantify 

costs – for example, due to a high level of uncertainty about what actions would be taken as a result of 

the proposed change – we present a potential range of costs. The time frame of analysis is 10 years. As 

several of the proposed rule elements are required on a five yearperiod, we included a time span long 

enough to capture two full periods. 

Specific assumptions are outlined foreach rule provision below. The analysis employs a model facility 

approach in which representative facility categories were developed to reflect a variety of features 

expected to influence costs (e.g., process complexity, number of full-time employees, emergency 

response planning activities, etc.). Cost assumptions were developed for each model facility type and

addressed factors such as number of staff hours involved in implementing a provision, equipment costs, 

and fixed costs for contractor involvement. Prevailing wage rates were used to estimate per facility 

costs for rule provisions. With a model facility approach, the unit cost estimates represent averages that 

cover a wide variation in expected costs even within a single sector. Given the high level of uncertainty 

associated with the costs of some of the provisions, however, attempting to project costs for a more 

disaggregated universe would imply a level of knowledge of future costs that does not exist. 

4.1. Wage Rates

The Agency used the Bureau of Labor Statistics May 2014 Occupational Employment and Wage 

Estimates 29 to construct a weighted wage rate for different occupation categories. For all rule 

provisions, labor hours were assumed to be distributed across six general labor categories: 

Management, Corporate Management, Attorneys, Engineers, Production Staff, and Local Responders. 

The weighted wage rates for complex facilities (NAICS codes 324 and 325) were estimated separately 

from simple facilities because wages paid by these facilities are higher than in wholesale and 

government sectors, which dominate the simple facilities category. For each of the NAICS codes 

representing industries in the simple facilities category that are affected by the proposed rule provisions 

(Food and Beverage, Agricultural Facilities, etc.), standardized BLS Occupation Titles were identified to 

correspond to the six general labor categories. The wage rates for each BLS Occupation Title were 

multiplied by a fringe benefits factor of 1.5 to create a loaded wage rate. 30

After loaded wage rates were established for each industry, they were combined to form a weighted 

average based on how prominent each industry waswithin its universe of facilities, eithersimple or

complex. Exhibit 4-1 presents the wage rates.

 29 See http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm. 30 The benefits multiplier is based on an average for the sectors as estimated by BLS in its Employer Costs for 

Employee Compensation. BLS includes items such as sick leave and vacation as benefits.
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Exhibit 4-1: Weighted-Average Loaded Hourly Wage Rates (2014 Dollars)

Labor Category Simple Facilities Complex Facilities

Management $74.99 $99.64

Corporate Management $82.47 $100.71

Attorneys $101.81 $113.33

Engineers $55.22 $76.21

Production Staff $28.51 $41.56

Local Responders $53.43 $53.43

4.2 Rule Familiarization

RMP facility staff would require some time to review the final rule and determine which provisions apply 

to the facility. The time required for this review would be limited because most of the proposed 

provisions amend current requirements as opposed to introducing completely new provisions. Many of 

the provisions are straightforward such as those regarding public disclosure. Others apply only after a 

reportable accident or near miss such as root cause analysis; relatively few facilities have reportable 

releases or near misses. Still others such asthe safer technology alternatives analysis are expected to

take time to understand; however, apply to a limited number of facilities in sectors that are familiar with 

the issues associated with the rule provision. In addition to affected facilities, the analysis also assumed 

that all affected LEPC’s would need to review the rule to familiarize themselves with rules that affect 

facilities in their jurisdiction. EPA projects that all facilities with simple processes would need 2hoursto 

review the rule as would the few complex facilities in P1 and P2. Complex facilities in P3 are projected 

to spend 4 hours reviewing the rule. LEPC’s are projected to spend 1 hour reviewing the rule. The unit 

costs are as follows:

• Simple facilities = 2 hour of management time or $149.97

• P1 and P2 complex facilities = 2 hour of management time or $199.28.

• P3 complex facilities = 4 hours of management time or $398.56.

• LEPC's = 1 hour of time or $53.43

4.3 Prevention Program Rule Provisions

Third Party Compliance Audits

The existing rule requires P2 and P3 facilities to conduct a compliance audit at least once every 3 years. 

The proposed provision requiresfacilities that have had reportable accidents to contract with an 

independent third party to conduct the audit. The analysis estimated the cost of hiring a third party to 

conduct the audit based on the public comments that EPA received through the July 31, 2014, Request 

for Information.Of the 14 comments providing input on the potential economic impacts of third-party 

audits, several comments specifically provided point estimates for the third-party auditor fee. 31 These 

 31 See comments 0638 and 0667 – These two comments from industry specifically provided point estimates on the 

costs of third party audits. One comment placed the cost of the audit between $36,000 and $40,000 and the other 

at approximately $10,000.
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estimates ranged between $10,000 and $20,000 for simpler facilities and up to $40,000 for complex 

facilities. Thus, this RIA assumed $15,000 for simple facilities and $40,000 for complex facilities. These 

expenses are considered incremental to the costs for compliance audits that are covered in the original 

rule, as similar levels of facility staffing would be required to work with the third-party auditor (i.e., EPA 

does not expect the cost of the third-party auditor to be offset by cost savings from reduced staff levels 

of effort related to auditing). In addition, the analysis projects that management time would be devoted 

to identifying auditors, selecting an auditor, and contracting with that entity for third-party audit 

services.

The analysis estimates that the time required to contract for a third-party audit would vary with the 

complexity of the processes to be covered and multiple facility staff would be involved, except for the 

smallest category of facilities. At a minimum, one manager and one engineer would be involved to 

identify potential auditors and write the statement of work on which the auditor would base its bid. For 

larger firms that routinely contract and have contract departments, a contracts specialist and attorney 

would be part of the process. Many large firms and all governments would have standard contract 

language. Governments are estimated to spend more time on the contracting process, however, 

because most are required to solicit competitive bids and document the basis for the selection. Private 

firms may use a similar process but are not required to do so. Private firms are likely to spend time 

negotiating contract language after the award. In total, hourly assumptions and costs for a third-party 

audit are shown in Exhibit 4-2:

Exhibit 4-2: Hourly Assumptions and Unit Costs for Hiring Third Party Auditors

Facility Type Total Hours for Contracting Process Facility 

Labor Cost

Auditor 

Fee

Total Facility 

Cost Management Attorneys Engineers

Simple w/ 0-19 

FTEs 32 4 0 $2,807 $15,000 $17,807

Simple w/ 20-99 

FTEs 44 4 18 $4,701 $15,000 $19,701

Simple w/ 100+ 

FTEs 30 4 56 $5,749 $15,000 $20,749

Complex w/ 0-19 

FTEs 32 4 0 $3,642 $40,000 $43,642

Complex w/ 20-

99 FTEs 44 4 18 $6,209 $40,000 $46,209

Complex w/ 100+ 

FTEs 30 4 56 $7,710 $40,000 $47,710

Small 

Government 30 0 25 $3,630 $15,000 $18,630

Large 

Government 60 0 39 $8,951 $40,000 $48,951
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Incident Investigation (Root Cause Analysis and Near Miss Investigation)

This proposed provision requiresthat facilities in specific program levels that have had a reportable 

accident or near miss incident conduct a root cause analysis, as part of their accident investigation, to 

determine the underlying reasons for the (near) failure. A root cause analysis is a structured process led 

by a person trained in the methodology. The time required may vary considerably based on the 

complexity of the processes involved. This analysis assumes that complex facilities would require 48 

total hours (entirely engineering time) for a root cause analysis and simple facilities would spend 8 total 

hours (split evenly between engineering and production time). For near miss incidents, the analysis 

assumes that complex facilities would require 72 hours (12 hours of management, 36 hours of 

engineering, and 24 hours of production) for a complete near miss incident investigation and 14 hours (6 

hours of management, 4 hours of engineering, and 4 hours production) for simple facilities. 32 Root 

cause analyses for near miss incidents generally require more labor time across all categories because 

there are already investigation activities occurring with baseline accidents.

There are fewer additional hours required for reportable accident root cause analyses because those 

accidents must already be investigated in the baselineand thus the effect of the proposed rule is only 

the net increase in labor for the root cause analysis. The increased labor affects only the engineering 

category for complex facilities, and only the engineering and production labor categoriesfor simple 

facilities. Root cause analyses for reportable accidents are not expected to require additional 

management time beyond that already required for reportable accidents. Management time is 

expected to be devoted primarily to decisions concerning resolution of corrective actions arising from 

the investigation, and these activities should require roughly the same amount of time whether 

corrective actions relate to root causes or other contributing causes. For simple facilities, additional 

labor for root cause analyses was assumed to be evenly distributed between production staff and 

engineers. For complex facilities, all additional labor for root cause analysis was placed in the engineer 

labor category as a conservative estimation approach, as this category has a higher labor rate than 

production.

For near miss incidents that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release, the existing rule 

already requires an incident investigation. However, EPA believes that in the baseline many facility 

owners and operators did not understand or comply with the existing near miss incident investigation 

requirements, so this analysis assumes some additional time will be required across all labor categories 

for near miss investigations.

The estimate of the time required for an incidentinvestigation is based on estimates in the original RMP 

RIA, which relied on best professional judgement and comments on the original rule proposal received 

from industry 33. The estimates in the original RMP RIA involved development of a labor model that 

assumed investigations would involvea team of management, technical, and production staff, and that 

staff at larger and more complex facilities would require more hours to complete an investigation. This 

analysis used reduced labor assumptions for near misses because investigations of incidents that do not 

damage equipment or harm workers would be less difficult to conduct than those that have to recreate 

conditions that existed prior to the release. Simple facility costs are estimated to include $1,000 for a 

 32 Assumptions based on EPA industry knowledge. 33 Economic Analysisin Support of the Final Rule on RMP Regulations for the Chemical Accident Release 

Prevention, as Required by Section 112(r) of the CAA, May 21, 1996.
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trained facilitator to assist with the investigation. Complex facilities generally have staff familiar with 

the methodology and would staff the root cause analysis in-house. Exhibit 4-3 displays the hours 

assumed for each labor category for each type of facility, and the estimated cost per facility.

Exhibit 4-3: Unit Cost for Root Cause Analysis and Near Miss Investigation

Managers Engineers Production Other Costs FacilityCost

Near Miss - simple 6 4 4 $1,000 $1,785

Near Miss - complex 12 36 24 $4,937

Accidents -simple 0 4 4 $1,000 $1,335

Accidents - complex 0 48 0 $3,658

Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)

This proposed provision requiresfacilitieswith P3 processesin NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325 to 

conduct an STAA as part of their process hazard analysis (PHA), which occurs every 5 years. STAA is 

generally a process in which facility staff analyze their current processes and practices to determine if 

there are safer alternatives to their current operating practice. This can range from small changes –

such as upgrading valves –to large shifts like substituting less toxic or volatile chemicals. 

This RIA divides the STAA process into three parts: 

1. The initial analysis to identify alternatives; 

2. A feasibility study to determine the costs and assess the reasonableness of implementing the 

change in light of other costs and programs; and 

3. Implementation of alternatives (implementation is not required under the proposed provision). 

Hourly labor assumptions for the initial analysis and the feasibility study are based on guidelines 

published by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers / Center for Chemical Process Safety 

(AIChE/CCPS) and consultation with engineers who have extensive experience in performing hazard 

analyses. 34 AIChE/CCPS has published several guidelines addressing the subjects of hazard analysis and 

safer technologies. Among these are:

- Inherently Safer Chemical Processes – A Life Cycle Approach, Second Edition (AIChE/CCPS,2009);

- Guidelines for Process Hazard Evaluation Methods, Second Edition (AIChE/CCPS, 1992); and,

- Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Third Edition (AIChE/CCPS, 2008).

In Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Third Edition, CCPS notes that “Inherent safety reviews can 

be conducted as separate studies using a form of HAZOP Study, or they can be incorporated into HAZOP 

studies conducted for other purposes.”35 Inherently Safer Chemical Processes – A Life Cycle Approach

expands on this concept, and also provides information on additional approaches to incorporating safer 

technologies into process hazard analyses, including checklist, “What-If”, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, 

and other analytical methods. Based on this information, EPA developed a labor model for safer technologies 

 34 EPA consulted with engineers at ABS Consulting. 35 “HAZOP” is an acronym for “Hazard and Operability Study,” which is one PHA methodology allowed under the 

RMP rule.
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reviews adapted from the HAZOP study and What-If/Checklist approaches, which are PHA methods 

commonly used by facilities subject to this proposed provision. Guidelines for Process Hazard Evaluation 

Methods, Second Edition contains information on the typical days of effort required to complete HAZOP 

and What-If/Checklist PHAs for small/simple and large/complex facilities.36 EPA adapted this 

information, and incorporated additional labor hours to account for the proposed rule’s requirement to 

determine the feasibility of inherently safer designs considered. 

The estimated laborhours assumed facilitator and scribe labor costs, as well as facility team and 

management participation that increased with process complexity. Facilities in NAICS 322, 324, and 325 

are expected to have staff qualified to conduct the analysis in-house. All other facilities would be 

expected to hire a consultant to lead the team. Most of these other facilities use chemicals or store 

them, but often rely on engineering firms or maintenance contractors to design the equipment and do 

anything other than routine minor maintenance. They may not, therefore, have staff knowledgeable 

enough in the process and design to identify and evaluate alternatives. The technical feasibility 

assessment considers the extent of process redesign, its engineering implications, and possible costs. As 

stated, most facilities except the large facilities in NAICS 322, 324 and 325 are expected to seek help 

from consultants (i.e., engineering firms). Storage and distribution facilities, which generally are very 

simple (mostly large tanks with loading/unloading equipment) are not expected to need a consultant to 

assess feasibility because chemicalsubstitution is not as great a possibility (these facilities usually sell 

the chemical in question) and because the technical issues are limited. For example, most bulk 

anhydrous ammonia distributors are not likely to substitute another chemical for anhydrous ammonia. 

Exhibit 4-4 displays the hours assumed for each task by labor category and type of facility, and the 

resulting per facility cost estimates.

Implementation of safer alternatives is not required under the proposed option. The high cost 

alternative would apply the requirement to all P3 processes and require facilities to implement feasible 

safer technologies and alternatives. However, EPA has not projected implementation costs for this 

option because of the high degree of uncertainty associated with such projections (see Chapter 5 for 

further explanation).

Exhibit 4-4: Hourly Assumptions and Unit Costs for STAA

Sector Labor Hours Facility 

Initial Analysis Cost Corporate 

Manager Engineer Consultant

Large facilities NAICS 324-325 608 $40,240

NAICS 322, Small/Medium 324, 325 252 $13,109

Other Manufacturers, Refrigeration 

Systems 100 $9,808 $17,429

Water/Gas Plants/Utilities 36 $6,000 $8,744

Storage Facilities 36 $6,000 $8,744

Feasibility Analysis

Large facilities NAICS 324-325 24 80 $8,514

NAICS 322, Small/Medium 324, 325 16 80 $8,000 $15,708

 36 See Guidelines for Process Hazard Evaluation Methods, Second Edition (AIChE/CCPS, 1992), Table 5.4.
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Other Manufacturers 16 32 $8,000 $12,050

Water/Gas Plants/Utilities and 

Refrigeration Systems 8 32 $5,200 $8,444

Storage Facilities 8 32 $3,244

4.4. Emergency Response Preparedness Rule Provisions

4.4.1 Emergency Response Program Coordination with Local Responders

This provision would require all facilities with P2 or P3 processesto coordinate with local responders 

annually to make themaware of the hazards at the facility. If the facility is a non-responder and relies 

on the local response force then the coordination would primarily focus on any changes that have 

occurred at the facility and confirm existing response strategies or develop new ones.

If the facility is a responder and in charge of responding to its own chemical emergencies then the 

coordination would primarily focus on informing local entities on what response capabilities are in place 

and how the community may be impacted. The analysis assumes that the coordination effort would 

average 4 hours of facility management time and 4 hours of time from LEPCs to participate in 

coordination activities. 37 EPA based this estimate on input from an EPA regional official38 who regularly 

participated in emergency coordination meetings with local responders and regulated facilities. The 

time required for any particular facility may vary depending on a variety of factors including the 

familiarity of the local responders with the facility and its hazards. For many facilities, this coordination 

may already occur voluntarily in the baseline and would therefore not be an added cost; for others, it 

could take considerable time to arrange a personal meeting. In other words, EPA recognizes that there 

will be variability across facilities in this cost but adopts two cost estimates that vary only depending on 

whether the facility is simple or complex. In addition to the coordination effort, the proposed rule also 

requires documentation of that effort. The analysis uses an average of 4 hours of management time 

and applies it across all applicable facilities, as opposed to estimating current compliance with this 

provision. The estimates of labor hours and unit cost estimates are shown in Exhibit 4-5.

Exhibit 4-5: Hourly Labor and Unit Costs for Coordination with Local Responders

Facility Type Management LEPCs Facility Labor Cost

Complex Facilities 4 4 $514

Simple Facilities 4 4 $612

This proposed provision may lead to some current facilities who are non-responders to convert from 

non-responder to responder status. To estimate a range of possible impacts of non-responder 

conversions, the analysis conducts a sensitivity analysis of how many conversions may happen among 

the population of facilities in counties without existing hazardous materials (hazmat) teams among local 

 

38 September 01, 2015 email communication from Steve Mason, EPA Region 6 to Jim Belke, EPA Office of 

Emergency Management.
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emergency responders. The sensitivity analysis provides cost estimates for the conversion of 25 

percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of current facilities who are non-responders and located in counties 

without a hazmat team.

4.4.2 Notification Drills

The proposed rule requires all facilities with P2 or P3 processes to conduct a notification drill, during 

which a facility member checks each person and agency on its emergency action contact list, to ensure 

that the contact information is accurate (e.g., that the person listed is still in that position and the phone 

numbers and email addresses are correct). As the contact list is somewhat limited (the number of 

organizations to be contacted must be small enough that the primary ones could be contacted quickly), 

the analysis estimated that it would take no more than 2 hours of engineering staff time to verify the 

information. The unit costs are shown in Exhibit 4-6.

Exhibit 4-6: Hourly Labor and Unit Costs for Notification Drills

Facility Type Engineers Facility Labor Cost

Complex Facilities 2 $152

Simple Facilities 2 $110

4.4.3 Facility Exercises

Responding facilities are facilities that intend to develop and implement the emergency response 

program required under §68.95 in order to respond to releases at their site. The proposed rule requires 

such facilities to conduct an annual exercise of their emergency response program developed in 

accordance with §68.95 and in accordance with the community emergency response plan developed 

under 42 U.S. C. 11003. 39 At least once every 5 years, a full field exercise would be required; in other 

years, facilities may conduct a tabletop exercise where the participants work together to identify a 

scenario and then establish objectives for the response without actually mobilizing responders and 

employees. The objectives for both field and tabletop exercises would include: 

1. Identifying who would be contacted in an emergency, 

2. Procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated 

substance (e.g., what equipment would be deployed, who would be evacuated, how decisions 

on public notification would be made, who would contact the public, etc.), and 

3. Proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human 

exposures. 

In a field exercise, all of the steps of a response are carried out (e.g., responders and equipment would 

be deployed). The purpose of a field exercise is to evaluate the ability of the responders and other 

employees to implement the emergency response plan on which they have been trained.

The cost of both types of exercises vary with the size and complexity of a facility. Every phase of the 

process – planning, exercise, and post-action evaluation –would require more time for larger and more 

complex facilities. Smaller facilities have a limited number of possible scenarios (from leaks to slow 

 39 Section 303 of Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title42/html/USCODE-2011-title42-chap116.htm.
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releases to total failure of a storage vessel). Larger facilities, and particularly those with complex 

chemical processes, have more possible failure modes and a greater possibility of the first release 

triggering additional releases or creating other risks. EPA developed estimates of the time associated 

with both types of exercises and the number of people who would be involved by seeking input from 

EPA regional staff who have routinely participated in both types of exercises and by reviewing exercise 

reports provided by EPA regional offices. Labor hours and unit costs for tabletop and field exercises are 

presented in Exhibits 4-7 and 4-8, respectively.
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Exhibit 4-7: Hourly Labor and Unit Costs for Table-Top Exercises

Facility Type Management Engineers Production Emergency 

Responders

Facility

Cost

Simple w/ 0-19 FTEs 24 34 11 26 $5,380

Simple w/ 20-99 

FTEs 29 34 28 31 $6,507

Simple w/ 100+ FTEs 61 61 60 48 $12,218

Complex w/ 0-19 

FTEs 24 34 11 26 $6,829

Complex w/ 20-99 

FTEs 29 34 28 31 $8,301

Complex w/ 100+ 

FTEs 84 92 98 78 $23,621

Exhibit 4-8: Hourly Labor for Field Exercises

Facility Type Management Engineers Production Emergency 

Responders

Facility

Cost

Simple w/ 0-19 FTEs 30 38 23 60 $8,209

Simple w/ 20-99 

FTEs 48 64 72 87 $13,835

Simple w/ 100+ FTEs 78 68 232 129 $23,111

Complex w/ 0-19 

FTEs 30 38 23 60 $10,047

Complex w/ 20-99 

FTEs 48 64 72 87 $17,301

Complex w/ 100+ 

FTEs 136 136 760 192 $65,758

4.5. Information Disclosure Rule Provisions

Public Disclosure

This provision assumes two primary types of activities related to public disclosure: (1) disclosure to the 

community, and (2) disclosure to local emergency planning committees and other emergency 

responders.

For disclosure to the community, facilities would be required to make certain information available to 

the public either on the facility’s website,through file sharing, or through some other means (e.g., 

providing information at a public library, or other public offices, or providing it via e-mail upon request). 
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The proposed information elements should be readily available to facility managers because most of the 

information is already compiled for compliance with various health and safety regulations. The Safety 

Data Sheets are documentsthat OSHA requires every facility to have available for its employees, and

which contain chemical hazard information required under 29 CFR 1910.1200. The names and 

quantities of chemicals and 5-year accident history is already collected for reporting in the RMP. 

Especially for simple facilities, this information is unlikely to change much from year to year; the only 

cost associated with this element is the time required to collect and review the information for 

accuracy. The analysis estimates that simple facilities would spend 2 hours per year reviewing the 

information to ensure that it is up-to-date. Complex facilities may have more information to review 

because they may manufacture, process, and use multiple regulated substances in multiple processes. 

The analysis estimated that small complex facilities would spend 4 hours collecting and reviewing the 

information. Large complex facilities were estimated to spend 16 hours per year because management 

and possibly counsel would need to ensure that the information was not subject to any restrictions 

related to security or confidential business concerns.

For disclosure to local emergency responders, the provision would require facilities to draft and provide 

summaries of certain activities –compliance audits, any incident investigations, any implementation of 

IST, and exercise reports. Facilities would also have to provide the 5-year accident history, but this 

element is reported in the RMP and should require little effort beyond updating. EPA estimates that the 

summaries would require corporate management and legal review to maintain organizational 

consistency (for corporations with multiple facilities) and removal of any legally sensitive materials, such 

as Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) or Confidential Business Information (CBI). 

Complex facilities, which have more covered processes that are subject to provisions, are projected to 

spend more time developing and reviewing information prior to submission to local agencies. The 

analysis further estimates that LEPCs will require time to review materials as they are submitted. The 

amount of time required scales with the complexity of the facility. The labor hour assumptions for each 

type of disclosure to the community and to local emergency responders are shown in Exhibit 4-9.

Exhibit 4-9: Hourly Labor and Facility Costs

For Information Disclosure to the Community and to Local Emergency Responders

Provision/Facility 

Type Management Corporate Management Attorneys Engineers LEPCs

Facility or 

Responder

Costs

Public Disclosure –

Small Complex 2 0 0 2 0 $352

Public Disclosure –

Large Complex 8 0 0 8 0 $1,407

Public Disclosure –

Simple 1 0 0 1 0 $130

Accident History –

Simple 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 $185

Accident History –

Complex 1 1 1 1 0 $390

Audit Report –

Simple 2 2 2 4 0 $739

Audit Report –

Complex 4 4 4 8 0 $1,864
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Investigation 

Reports - Simple 4 4 2 4 0 $1,054

Investigation 

Reports – Complex 8 4 8 12 0 $3,021

IST – Simple 4 4 4 4 0 $1,258

IST – Complex 8 4 8 16 0 $3,326

Exercise Reports –

Simple 2 1 1 4 0 $555

Exercise Reports –

Complex 2 2 2 8 0 $1,237

LEPC Review –

Simple 0 0 0 0 1 $53

LEPC Review –

Small Complex 0 0 0 0 2 $107

LEPC Review –

Large Complex 0 0 0 0 4 $214

4.5.1 Public Meeting

This provision would require all RMP facilities to hold a public meeting at least once every 5 years and 

immediately following an accident. The analysis estimates that each facility would need to spend time 

planning for the meeting –deciding when and where to hold the meeting, arranging the meeting space, 

developing and posting notices of the meeting, and developing materials to be presented and 

distributed. In addition, at least two people from the facility would attend the meeting, which was 

estimated to take 4 hours of the attendees’ time; even if the meeting is only 2 hours, attendees would 

have to arrive early and would stay after the official ending to talk with people, collect extra materials, 

and close up the meeting space.

For simple and small complex facilities, the analysis estimated that total time for preparation would be 

12 hours and attendance would be 8 hours (2 managers for 4 hours each). For large complex facilities, 

where the information presented may be more complicated and subject to legal concerns (security and 

confidentiality), the analysis estimated that the facility staff would spend 24 hours preparing and 

reviewing presentations and handouts; 4 facility staff (2 managers and 2 engineers) would attend the 

meeting. The costs for space are expected to vary from nothing, when the meeting can be held in a 

public building, to between $500 and $1,000 when a meeting space must be rented or where the facility 

has to pay overtime to a custodian (e.g., at a public school). The materials distributed would also 

impose some costs, but most facilities may produce them in-house. It has been EPA’s experience after 

the passage of CSISSFRRA40 that most facilities conducted meetings less than 1 day in length and used 

public facilities. To arrive at a point estimate for the cost of a meeting room, the analysis took a sample 

of meeting room costs from a variety of locations and used the average of $550. 41 The analysis further 

estimated that every facility would need to rent a meeting space, which likely overestimates the cost of 

 40 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act 41 Meeting room price was determined using the average price of 17 meeting venues that could accommodate 20+ 

individuals. The analysis used meeting rooms from Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, Kansas City, Philadelphia, and 

Atlanta. Data were provided by evenues.com.
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this provision. Exhibit 4-10 displays the assumed hours by labor category and facility type, and the 

resulting estimated facility costs.

Exhibit 4-10: Hourly Labor and Unit Costs for Public Meetings

Facility Type Management Engineers Production Other Costs Facility Cost

Simple Facilities 8 8 4 $550 $1,706

Small Complex Facilities 8 8 4 $550 $2,123

Large Complex Facilities 16 16 8 $550 $3,696

4.6 New Responders

This cost provision is not a specific requirement of the proposed rule but addresses situations in which 

current non-responders may convert to being responders. It also addresses one of the alternative 

options (the High Option) under Emergency Response Program Coordination with Local Responders. 

EPA is aware that some facilities have assumed that the public responders could respond to accidents at 

the facility when the communities do not, in fact, have nearby responders with appropriate training and 

equipment for the hazards present at the facility (e.g., a hazardous materials or “hazmat” team). EPA 

used an existing analysis of hazmat team locations obtained from the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA). Those data were compiled for the 2012 National Preparedness Report to characterize 

the existing coverage of hazmat teams 42. The 2012 report found that “the nation has developed a 

mature set of assets for addressing hazardous materials incidents.” There were approximately 1,100 

state and local hazmat teams identified, and the FEMA report concluded that 76% of the population is 

covered by these hazmat response teams 43. EPA used those data to estimate the number of RMP 

facilities that could potentially be required to develop an emergency response program. (See chapter 5 

for more detail on this subject).

The cost estimate for facilities that need to become responders assumes seven types of activities:

• Emergency response plan development, 

• Training, 

• Equipment purchase, 

• Tabletop exercises,

• Field exercises, 

• Emergency response program coordination with local emergency response officials, and 

• Public disclosure of exercise reports. 

For each activity category, the analysis categorizes facilities by complexity and size according to FTEs. 

Emergency response plan development, training, and equipment purchase all use hourly assumptions 

estimated based on the requirements set by the OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 

 42 https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/26675

43 The approach for estimating the 76% was roughly based on the population in proximity to a hazmat team.
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Response (HAZWOPER) Standard (29 CFR 1910.120(q)), which any employer whose employees respond 

to releases of hazardous materials must meet. 44 Any employer whose employees would respond to the 

hazmat incidents must develop an emergency response plan and train the workers on responding to the 

particular hazards they may face. Based on discussions with EPA staff involved in emergency response 

planning, complex facilities are assumed to require 32 hours of manager time, 40 hours of engineering 

time (5 engineers spending 8 hours each), and 32 hours of production staff time to develop an 

emergency response plan. Simple facilities are assumed to require 16 hours of manager time, 16 hours 

of engineering time (4 engineers spending 4 hours each), and 8 hours of production staff time. The 

analysis estimates that all new responders will develop a plan in year 1, and then they will expend 10 

percent of the initial costs every year thereafter to maintain the plan.

Equipment purchase cost estimates were based on publicly available equipment vendor costs and EPA’s 

own experience of what would reasonably be required to respond to an incident. The list of items and 

costs estimates is as follows:

Exhibit 4-11: New Responder Equipment Costs45

Item Cost Per Item Number of Items Total Cost

Level A Suit $1,750 6 $10,500

Tyvek Suit (bulk pack) $200 1 $200

Cryogenic Gloves $180 10 $1,800

Chemical Resistance 

Boots $150 6 $900

Vinyl Boot Covers $7.00 6 $42

Neoprene Boot Covers $100 6 $600

Nitrile Rubber Gloves $12 6 $72

Viton Rubber Gloves $10 6 $60

PVC/Nitrile Gloves $56.95 6 $341.70

Self-contained 

Breathing Apparatus $5,500 6 $33,000

Spare Bottles SCBA $800 6 $4,800

Chlorine Kit “A” $2,300 1 $2,300

Chlorine Kit “B” $2,500 1 $2,500

Non-sparking Tool Kit $900 1 $900

Sledgehammer $55 3 $165

BoltCutter $85 1 $85

Sorbent Pad 

(100/bundle) $64 1 $64

Neutralizer (5 gallon 

bucket) $436 1 $436

Eye Wash Station $129 1 $129

Plastic Pools $10 3 $30

Total $58,925

 44 The HAZWOPER standard uses the phrase “hazardous substances” but defines it to cover all DOT hazmat; 

regulated substances are a small subset of DOT hazmat.

45 Facility equipment costs are based on an estimate developed by EPA Region 6 emergency responders. Costs 

assume open market pricing for equipment needed to equip a six-person hazardous materials response team. See 

email from Steve Mason, EPA Region 6, to Jim Belke, EPA Office of Emergency Management, of June 2, 2015.
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The analysis used a point estimate for equipment costs of $60,000 for complex facilities and local 

government, and $50,000 for simple facilities, based on the number of staff who would be expected to 

use the equipment as fewer accidents occur at simple facilities relative to complex facilities.

In addition to plan development and equipment, the OSHA HAZWOPER Standard requiresthat any 

workers who may respond to hazmat releases to obtain training on proper procedures. At a minimum, 

responders need 24 hours of classroom training; at least two responders in any team need more 

extensive training, 40 hours of classroom training, and 3 days of operational training. A minimum 

hazmat team would include 5 responders; at least 4 responders are needed for any release46, and 1 

other would need to be trained to ensure that a facility had a full complement at any time (to cover 

vacations/sick leave/travel). Complex facilities and governments are estimated to need at least 6 

responders. Because the training is generally available only in major cities, the analysis included travel 

time and per diem costs.

Most of the RMP facilities outside of the manufacturing sector are staffed only during the day, 5 days a 

week. The analysis estimates that they would, therefore, have only one hazmat team comprised of a 

single 5-person team. Manufacturing plants generally operate 24/7. Based on EPA’s experience, the 

analysis estimated that chemical manufacturers and refineries would have hazmat teams of at least 6 

people per shift, with 4 teams needed to cover the entire facility at all times. 47 Other manufacturing 

and large facilities were estimated to have a single 6-person team that is on-call for the off hours.

Based on EPA’s experience, the cost of training ranges from $450 (for the 24-hour course) to $1,600 (for 

the 72-hour course). 48 The analysis, therefore, used $450 and $800 for the training fees and $100 per

day for travel and expenses. Beyond the training fee, the facility would have to pay the employees for 

their time and travel costs. Exhibits 4-12 and 4-13 present the hourly labor assumptions for emergency 

response plan development and training, respectively:

Exhibit 4-12: Hourly Labor for New Responder Emergency Response Plan Development

Facility Type Management Attorney Engineers Production Emergency 

Responders

Facility

Cost

Simple 16 0 16 8 0 $2,311

Complex and 

Local 

Government

32 0 40 32 0 $7,567

 46 This is the minimum number of responders necessary to meet the emergency site entry team and backup 

personnel requirements specified under 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3)(v) and (vi).

47 A 3-shift schedule requires 5 shifts of workers to operate 24/7. 48 Some vendors provide training that is exclusively on-line and consequently considerably less expensive; OSHA 

has indicated in interpretation letters that such training is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the standard.
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Exhibit 4-13: Hourly Labor for New Responder Training

Facility Type Management Attorneys Engineers Production Training Fees and 

Travel Expenses

Facility 

Cost

Simple 0 0 72 80 $4,850 $11,107

Complex w/ 

0-99 FTEs or 

Local 

Government

0 0 96 80 $5,600 $16,241

Complex w/ 

100+ FTEs 0 0 384 320 $22,400 $64,964

New responders have ongoing costs that are different than the initial unit costs. As required by OSHA, 

the analysis estimates that each of 5 trained staff, for simple facilities, will need to undergo a refresher 

course annually that costs $100 per person. For large complex facilities, the analysis estimates that all 

24 trained staff will undergo the training. In addition, it is estimated that staff turnover will create 

additional initial training needs. All facilities are estimated to train one new responder per year. 

Assumptions for Tabletop and Field Exercises, and disclosure activities can be found in those respective 

sections of this chapter.

This portion of the analysis, although not a provision to itself, estimates the costs of non-responders 

converting to responders. Chapter 5 presents the total cost of the rule with a sensitivity analysis of 25 

percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of current non-responders not in a county with a Hazmat team 

converting to responder status. One of the proposed options (the high option) for coordination with 

local responders requires all facilities to be responders (100 percent conversions).
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CHAPTER 5: TOTAL COSTS

EPA considered multiple options representing a range of costs for most of the proposed rule 

provisions.

49 This chapter presents the total costs of provisions by option, as well as total proposed rule 

costs, undiscounted, discounted, and annualized. Costs are projected over 10 years and discounted at 3 

percent and 7 percent. The time period was chosen because it islong enough for two rotations of the 

least frequent required activities (which occur every five years).

This chapter is organized as follows:

• Section 5.1 presents the broad analytical assumptions used in the analysis focusing primarily on 

the annual frequency of rule provision activities. 

• Section 5.2 shows the rule familiarization costs. 

• Section 5.3 describes the total costs associated with the proposed prevention program 

provisions –third party compliance audits, incident investigation, and STAA. 

• Section 5.4 describes the total costs associated with the proposed emergency response 

preparedness provisions –emergency response program coordination with local responders, 

notification exercises, and facility exercises. 

• Section 5.5 describes the total costs associated with the proposed information sharing 

provisions –information sharing with LEPCs, information sharing with the public, and public 

meetings. 

• Section 5.6 describes the sensitivity analysis of total costs associated with the potential for 

current non-responding facilities to convert to responding facilities as a result of the proposed 

changes to the emergency response program coordination provisions. The analysis includes 

varying assumptions of the percentage of non-responding facilities that may become 

responders. 

• Section 5.7 shows the total costs for each rule provision option, as well as the total cost for the 

proposed rule.

5.1 Analytical Assumptions

Annual Frequency

The analysis generally divided total costs into initial year costs and ongoing costs. For provisions or 

options in which the activity occurs in several year increments, the annual frequency is a fraction 

representing what portion of facilities would likely be implementing the provision in any given year. For 

example, if an activity is expected to happen once every 5 years, the annual frequency would be 0.2, as 

20 percent of the applicable facilities would likely be completing the activity in any given year. The 

assumption that implementation would be distributed evenly acrosstime (i.e., if facilities are required to 

conduct an activity once every 5 years, that one fifth would do it in any one year) may overstate the 

 49 See Chapter 2 for detailed presentation of the options considered.
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costs for some years and understate them for others. This issue primarily concerns the STAA and the 

medium and high options for third-party audits. The STAA is part of the PHA, which must be updated 

every 5 years. If facilities have maintained that schedule from the first PHA they conducted (i.e., they 

have not had to update the PHA prior to the 5-year anniversary, which would reset the clock for the next 

update), these costs may be concentrated over 1 to 3 years rather than distributed evenly over 5 years 

because facilities had 3 years to come into compliance with the original rule. The same issue arises with 

third-party audits when applied to all compliance audits in the medium and high options; all of the costs 

could occur in a single year as facilities’ first audit may have occurred in 1999. EPA, however, has no 

information on how frequently facilities have conducted PHAs or audits before the renewal date 

because of process or procedural changes, accidental releases, or information on risks that they thought 

needed to be reconsidered. 

Initial and Ongoing Costs

The analysis only used an ongoing cost when costs for years 2-10 were not the same as the initial cost 

components. If costs for years 2-10 were the same as the initial year (with some variation based on the 

annual frequency), then multiplying the initial cost by the annual frequency accounted for any 

continuing costs. The only proposed rule provisions with ongoing costs different from the initial costs 

are found for new responders (Section 5.5).

Capital Costs

The analysis did not monetize any capital costs (see the discussion on STAA implementation costs). The 

costs of equipment purchased for facilities becoming new responders has not been amortized. Although 

individual items of response equipment are relatively low cost, the overall cost of purchasing response 

equipment may cause some facilities to choose to finance response equipment purchasesin order to 

spread the costs over several years, while others may treatthemas an operating expenseand pay in a 

single year. By not amortizing responder equipment costs in this analysis, EPA is making the 

conservative assumption that facilities will pay these initial costs in a single year.

5.2 Rule Familiarization

EPA did not analyze any options for rule familiarization, as this is not a provision of the rule, but rather a 

necessary cost of any rulemaking. All facilities and local governments are estimated to be affected by 

rule familiarization.
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Exhibit 5-1: Rule Familiarization

Facility Type Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple $150 10,921 $1,637,844

P1 and P2 Complex $199 145 $28,896

P3 Complex $399 1476 $588,278

LEPCs $53 1724 $92,113

Total 14,266 $2,347,130

5.3 Prevention Program Rule Provisions

Third-party Compliance Audits

EPA analyzed three options for the proposed requirement that a facility hire a third-party to conduct the 

compliance audit required under the existing rule. Under the existing rule, P2 and P3 facilities must 

conduct a compliance audit at least once every 3 years. 

Low Option (Proposed): Applicable to P2 and P3 Facilities Following an Accident

The low option would impose the requirement for a third-party auditor only on P2 or P3 facilities that 

had a reportable accidental release. These facilities would be required to contract with a third-party for 

their next scheduled compliance audit. Accident numbers are based on the RMP data fromreportable 

accidents, referenced in Exhibit 3-9, and are estimated based on the 10-year annual average. The RMP 

database contains data on accidents that have had reportable impacts, but also those without. Since

this provision does not require third party audits for accidents without any reportable impacts, we

deducted the number of accidents with no impactsfromthe total number of accidents in the RMP 

database. We also deducted the number of accidents that occurred at P1 facilities, as the proposed 

provision would only apply to P2 and P3 facilities. The analysis projects that the annual number and 

distribution of accidents among types of facilities will remain the same and that in any one year, the 

number of facilities conducting a third-party audit will be equal to the number of accidents. 50 That is, 

although the approximately 148 third-party audits for the P2 and P3 facilities that have a reportable 

release in 2016 may occur up to 3 years after the releases, depending on when the previous audit 

 50 EPA recognizes that subsequent to the current rule taking effect, accident rates may decrease but wishes to 

calculate a conservative cost estimate so assumes a constant accident rate.
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occurred, the analysis projects that over time, about 148 facilities would conduct such an audit each 

year. 51 The breakout for total costs is shown in Exhibit 5-2:

Exhibit 5-2: Total Annual Undiscounted Costs for Third-party Compliance Audits (Low Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple w/ 0-19 FTEs 1 $17,807 19 $338,329

Simple w/ 20-99 FTEs 1 $19,701 15 $295,509

Simple w/ 100+ FTEs 1 $20,749 39 $809,219

Complex w/ 0-19 FTEs 1 $43,642 3 $130,925

Complex w/ 20-99 FTEs 1 $46,209 13 $600,722

Complex w/ 100+ FTEs 1 $47,710 53 $2,528,654

Small Government 1 $18,630 3 $55,890

Large Government 1 $48,951 4 $195,803

Total 149 $4,955,052

Medium Option: Applicable to All P3 Facilities

Under the medium option, all P3 facilities would have to hire a third-party to conduct compliance audits 

at the facility every three years. The analysis projects that a third of P3 facilities would, therefore, be 

conducting a third-party audit every year. Facility numbers are based on the RMP data and can be 

found in Exhibit 3-6. The breakout for total costs is presented in Exhibit 5-3.

Exhibit 5-3: Total Annual Undiscounted Costs for Third-party Compliance Audits (Medium Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple w/ 0-19 FTEs 0.33 $17,807 5,488 $32,248,846

Simple w/ 20-99 FTEs 0.33 $19,701 1,093 $7,105,816

Simple w/ 100+ FTEs 0.33 $20,749 1,582 $10,832,330

 51 The number of audits may be overstated because the number of facilities that had reportable releases over the 

ten-year period considered (1272) is lower than the number of releases reported (1516), according to the RMP 

accident database, as some facilities may have multiple accidents.
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Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Complex w/ 0-19 FTEs 0.33 $43,642 255 $3,672,460

Complex w/ 20-99 FTEs 0.33 $46,209 665 $10,140,641

Complex w/ 100+ FTEs 0.33 $47,710 572 $9,005,826

Small Government 0.33 $18,630 451 $2,772,718

Large Government 0.33 $48,951 522 $8,432,251

Total 10,628 $84,210,888

High Option: Applicable to All P2 and P3 Facilities

Under the high option, all P2 and P3 facilities would have to hire a third-party to conduct compliance 

audits at the facility every three years. The analysis projects that a third of P2 and P3 facilities would, 

therefore, be conducting a third-party audit every year. Facility numbers are based on the RMP data 

and can be found in Exhibit 3-6. The breakout for total costs is presented in Exhibit 5-4.

Exhibit 5-4: Total Annual Undiscounted Costs for Third-party Compliance Audits (High Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple w/ 0-19 FTEs 0.33 $17,807 6364 $37,396,439

Simple w/ 20-99 FTEs 0.33 $19,701 807 $5,246,471

Simple w/ 100+ FTEs 0.33 $20,749 1,262 $8,641,214

Complex w/ 0-19 FTEs 0.33 $43,642 285 $4,104,515

Complex w/ 20-99 FTEs 0.33 $46,209 694 $10,582,865

Complex w/ 100+ FTEs 0.33 $47,710 580 $9,131,781

Small Government 0.33 $18,630 972 $5,975,791

Large Government 0.33 $48,951 936 $15,119,899

Total 11,900 $96,198,975
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Incident Investigation (Root Cause Analysis and Near Miss Investigation)

The RMP rule currently requires the owner or operator of a facility to investigate each incident which 

resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release (i.e., including a near miss). EPA 

is proposing to require a root cause analysis be conducted as part of the incident investigation and 

analyzed three options:

Low Option: Applicable to P3 Accidents and Near Misses

The low option would require P3 facilities to conduct root cause analyses for any reportable incident 

and to investigate and conduct a root cause analysis for near misses. The current rule requires 

investigation of near misses as well, but due to significant noncompliance with this provision, the costs

of near miss investigations are being included in this analysis. The analysis estimates that there would 

be one near miss for each reportable incident. The number of actual near misses is unknown and 

depends on a judgment of the seriousness of an incident and belief that it could reasonably have 

resulted in a catastrophic release. Industry estimates for the cost of incident investigations vary widely. 

Exhibit 5-5: Total Annual Undiscounted Costs for Root Cause Incident Investigation (Low Option)

Facility Type Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

P3 Near Miss – Simple $1,785 75 $133,863

P3 Near Miss – Complex $4,937 68 $335,695

P3 Accident – Simple $1,335 75 $100,119

P3 Accident – Complex $3,658 68 $248,758

Total 286 $818,435

Medium/High Option (Proposed): Applicable to P2 and P3 Accidents and Near Misses

The medium/high option would apply the requirements for root cause analysis and near miss 

investigation to all P2 and P3 facilities. Accident numbers are drawn from the RMP data on reportable 

accidents, referenced in Exhibit 3-9.

Exhibit 5-6: Total Undiscounted Costs for Root Cause Incident Investigation (Medium/High Option)

Facility Type Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

P2 Near Miss – Simple $1,785 5 $8,924

P2 Near Miss – Complex $4,937 1 $4,937
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P3 Near Miss – Simple $1,785 75 $133,863

P3 Near Miss – Complex $4,937 68 $335,695

P2 Accident - Simple $1,335 5 $6,675

P2 Accident - Complex $3,658 1 $3,658

P3 Accident - Simple $1,335 75 $100,119

P3 Accident - Complex $3,658 68 $248,758

Total 298 $842,629

Safer Technology AlternativesAnalysis

EPA analyzed three options for the proposed requirement to conduct an STAA, but monetized costs for 

only two of the options. 

Low Option (Proposed): Applicable to a Subset of P3 Facilities

The low option would apply the rule provision to a subset of P3 processes – those in NAICS codes 322 

(pulp and paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical 

manufacturing) –and require owner/operators to conduct an initial evaluation and feasibility study of 

potential safer technologies every 5 years as part of the PHA. EPA is not proposing to require 

implementation of any particular technology. 

Exhibit 5-7: Total Undiscounted Costs for STAA (Low Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Processes Total Initial Cost

Paper and Small/Medium Complex 0.2 $28,817 1,783 $10,276,120

Large Complex 0.2 $48,754 2,514 $24,513,659

Total 4,297 $34,789,779
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Medium Option:Applicable to all P3 processes

The medium option would impose the requirement to conduct the initial analysis and determine 

feasibility on all P3 processes every 5 years as part of the PHA. Exhibit 5-8 presents the costsfor the 

medium option 

Exhibit 5-8: Total Undiscounted Costs for STAA (Medium Option)

Facility Type Annual 

Frequency

Unit Cost Processes Total Initial Cost

Initial Phase Analysis

Paper and 

Small/Medium 

Complex

0.2 $13,109 1,783 $4,674,512

Large Complex 0.2 $40,240 2,514 $20,232,785

Simple 

Manufacturing 0.2 $17,429 455 $1,586,062

Water/POTW 0.2 $8,744 1,178 $2,060,004

Intermediate 

Gas Processing 

and Utilities

0.2 $8,744 721 $1,260,835

Refrigeration 0.2 $17,429 3,005 $10,474,982

Storage 0.2 $8,744 4,881 $8,535,553

Feasibility Analysis

Paper and 

Small/Medium 

Complex

0.2 $15,708 1,783 $5,601,609

Large Complex 0.2 $8,514 2,514 $4,280,874

Simple 

Manufacturing 0.2 $12,050 455 $1,096,566

Water/POTW 0.2 $8,444 1178 $1,989,522

Intermediate 

Gas Processing 

and Utilities

0.2 $8,444 721 $1,217,695

Refrigeration 0.2 $9,250 3005 $5,559,357

Storage 0.2 $3,244 4881 $3,167,271

Total 14,537 $71,737,628*

*Total may not sum due to rounding
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High Option

The high option for STAA would require all P3 facilities to implement any STAA optionsthat the facility 

determined are feasible. Thus the costs for this option include the annual $71.7million estimated above 

for initial and feasibility analyses plus implementation costs. EPA has not projected implementation 

costs for this option because of several problems that result in a high degree of uncertainty associated 

with such projections. First, what exactly facilities consider to be a safer or inherently safer change has

various interpretations. EPA reviewed the IST implementation reported by New Jersey (NJ)52 and Contra 

Costa County 53, where State and local laws require the analysis, to evaluate what types of changes might 

be expected from facilities. Contra Costa County officials disagreed with categories made by oil 

refineries and reclassified the majority of the items listed by three refineries from inherently safer to 

active or passive changes –active being changes that require operator intervention and passive being 

those that are automatic. NJ and commenters on the NJ program labeled the majority of changesthat

facilities claimed as ISTas not IST. The descriptors applied to IST–minimization,substitution, 

moderation, and simplification –can often be applied to active and passive STAA measures, as well. 

Second, the high option would require facilities to adopt feasible IST changes, and the judgement 

regarding feasibility is subjective and thus very difficult to predict. The proposed rule defines feasible to 

mean “capable of being successfully accomplished within a reasonable time, accounting for economic, 

environmental, legal, social, and technological factors. Environmental factors would include 

consideration of potential transferred risks for new risk reduction measures.” For example, switching 

from chlorine to other water treatment methods is clearly technically possible; about half of the systems 

originally subject to the rule have made the switch away from chlorine and avoided continued coverage 

under the RMP rule. Whether it is feasible for a particular system would be driven by various factors, 

including the risk posed by the facility (e.g., is it close to inhabited areas or at some distance), other 

demands on the operating government (e.g., does the system need to replace aging pipelines, install 

water monitors, increase sewage treatment capacity, etc.), and perhaps other considerations. Most 

RMP facilities pose a variety of risks to workers and the public; any investment in risk reduction would 

be assessed at each facility in the context of those other risks. For example, most of the facilities with 

refrigeration systems subject to the rule are involved in food processing and storage; the risks to the 

public of food contamination or spoilage from less effective refrigerant processesmay outweigh the risk 

of an ammonia release when determining where to invest capital funds. Many facilities subject to the 

rule have a wide range of environmental regulatory requirements, from reducing air emissions and 

avoiding spills, treating effluents, to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Facilities may also have 

 52 NJ DEP. January 15, 2010. Inherently Safer Technology (IST) Implementation Summary. New Jersey Department 

of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), Trenton, NJ. 

http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_SUMWEB.pdf

53 CCHS. December 9, 2014. Annual Performance Review and Evaluation- Industrial Safety Ordinance. Contra 

Costa County Health Services (CCHS), Contra Costa County, CA. http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso-report.pdf.
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requirements related to chemical security. Some alternative refrigerants, such as CFCs and HCFCs, cause

ozone depletion. Changing to a different refrigerant such as carbon dioxide, a cheap and non-toxic 

refrigerant, would require different equipment to accommodate higher working pressures involved and 

may only be cost effective for new systems. All of these, as well as other concerns,mightbe factored 

into a facility owner’s decisions on where best to spend resources. 

Third, the costs of STAA changes range widely. A study of some human factors in the chemical process 

industry, presented in 2001, reported on changes that reduced risks to humans. The cost of these 

reductions ranged from less than $1,000 to about $100,000 (in current dollars). 54 The costs of replacing 

chlorine in water treatment systems are far higher55. Construction costs ranged from $650,000 to $13 

million and operating costs ranged from cost-savings to positive costs of $2.4 million or more a year. 

EPA obtained information on the cost of replacing hydrogen fluoride (HF) at the 47 refineries that use it

for alkylation. It costs approximately $100 million to convert an HF alkylation unit to sulfuric acid. 

Switching refrigerantsfrom an anhydrous ammonia to an ammonia-glycol systemappears to typically 

cost $4 to $6 million. EPA has not projectedwhether the larger quantity of sulfuric acid that a refinery 

would need to replace HF would increase costs or whether there would be other changes in the 

operating costs. It is likely that any switch from ammonia, as the sole refrigerant, would increase the 

basic cost of refrigeration and increase other operating costs, as ammonia is generally more efficient 

(i.e., uses less energy) than other refrigerants. Chemical substitution, in any case, would be possible at 

less than half the facilities; the rest either manufacture the regulated substances or store them for sale. 

Some examples of lower cost measures include removing sampling stations, replacing vessel sight 

glasses withmagnetic level indicators, removing dead-leg piping, using smaller diameter pipe or sealless pumps, lowering storage inventories, andmoderating process conditions such as operating 

temperature and pressure. 

EPA also has little information about the actual costs associated with somewhat larger projects that 

would replace, for example, piping or pumps with those made with stronger materials. The costs of 

these would be facility-specific and could vary widely. In short, as the previous examples indicate, a 

requirement to implement feasible STAA could add substantially to the cost of the rule.

5.4 Emergency Response Preparedness Requirements

5.4.1 Emergency Response Program Coordination with Local Responders

EPA analyzed two options related to coordination. The current rule requires owners or operators of 

regulated facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes to coordinate with local response authorities and in 

some cases develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95 except when the 

stationary source is included in the community emergency response plan developed under section 303 

 54 Attwood, Dennis and David Fennell, “Cost-effective Human Factors Techniques for Process Safety,” CCPS 

International Conference and Workshop, October 2-5, 2001, Toronto, ON, CANADA 55 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-480/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-480.htm .
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of EPCRA (for sources with regulated toxic substances) or has coordinated response actions with the 

local fire department (for sources with only regulated flammable substances) 

Low/MediumOption (Proposed): Applicable to Program 2 and 3 Facilities

The low/medium option enhances existing requirements by requiring Program 2 and 3 facilities to 

coordinate annually with local emergency responders to ensure resources and capabilities are in place 

to respond to an accidental release. This provision also requires facilities to document their

coordination activities including the names of individuals involved, organizational affiliations, and more. 

The purpose of the proposed revisions to the coordination requirement is to improve responders’

understanding of the risks at the facility and to better prepare them for a safe and timely response. 

Coordination activities may include a review of the facility’s emergency action plan, (for non-responding 

facilities) the facility’s emergency response plans (for responding facilities), and local response 

capabilities including providing information for the local community emergency response plan. Facility 

counts are drawn from Exhibit 3-6. This analysis assumes that facilities are not conducting coordination 

activities annually in the baseline, nor are they documenting those activities. The costs for the low and 

medium options are the same (the low option eliminates the provision allowing an LEPC to require that

the facility comply with §68.95) 56. The low and medium optionsmay also cause a portion of current 

non-responding facilities to convert to responders. We estimate this expected additional cost in a 

sensitivity analysis presented in Section 5.6. 

Exhibit 5-9: Total Undiscounted Costs for Coordination (Low/Medium Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple P2/3 1 $514 10,345 $5,313,853

Complex P2/3 1 $612 1,555 $952,099

Total 11,900 $6,265,952

High Option: Applicable to All Current Non-responding Facilities

This high option would require all current non-responding facilities to comply with §68.95 and develop 

emergency response capabilities and an emergency response plan. The numberof non-responding 

facilities can be found in Exhibit 3-8. EPA projects that all nonresponding facilities would develop the 

plan in year one, and then spend 10 percent of the initial development costs maintaining the plan 

annually in years 2-10. EPA projects that all non-responders would purchase the necessary equipment 

in the first year and then spend 10 percent of the initial purchase price annually for years 2-10 for 

maintenance and replacement. In Exhibit 5-10, cost elements are presented by total initial costs, and 

 56 See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of alternative options for the coordination rule provision.
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maintenance costs, if applicable. If a sub-provision has an ongoing maintenance cost, it is assumed that 

the initial cost will be incurred in year 1, and the ongoing cost will be incurred in years 2-10. For 

facilities that do not have an ongoing cost, the initial cost will be incurred with the annual frequency 

provided.

Exhibit 5-10: Total Undiscounted Costs for Coordination and Developing an ER Program (High Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost Maintenance Costs

Plan Development

Simple <20 FTEs N/A $2,311 4,724 $10,918,980 $1,091,898

Simple 20-99 FTEs N/A $2,311 899 $2,077,935 $207,793

Simple 100+ FTEs N/A $2,311 731 $1,689,622 $168,962

Complex <20 FTEs N/A $7,567 144 $1,089,621 $108,962

Complex 20-99 FTEs N/A $7,567 235 $1,778,200 $177,820

Complex 100+ FTEs N/A $7,567 47 $355,640 $35,564

Subtotal $17,909,997 $1,791,000

Training

Simple <20 FTEs N/A $11,107 4,071 $45,215,184 $11,078,537

Simple 20-99 FTEs N/A $11,107 774 $8,596,549 $2,106,310

Simple 100+ FTEs N/A $11,107 721 $8,007,897 $1,962,079

Complex <20 FTEs N/A $16,241 144 $2,338,694 $446,191

Complex 20-99 FTEs N/A $16,241 235 $3,816,619 $880,824

Complex 100+ FTEs N/A $64,964 47 $3,053,295 $582,527

Local Government N/A $16,241 788 $12,797,855 $2,953,571

Subtotal $83,826,094 $20,010,039

Equipment

Simple <20 FTEs N/A $50,000 4,071 $203,550,000 $20,355,000

Simple 20-99 FTEs N/A $50,000 774 $38,700,000 $3,870,000

Simple 100+ FTEs N/A $50,000 721 $36,050,000 $3,605,000

Complex <20 FTEs N/A $60,000 144 $8,640,000 $864,000

Complex 20-99 FTEs N/A $60,000 235 $14,100,000 $1,410,000

Complex 100+ FTEs N/A $60,000 47 $2,820,000 $282,000

Local Government N/A $60,000 788 $47,280,000 $4,728,000

Subtotal $351,140,000 $35,114,000

Table Top Exercise

Simple <20 FTEs 0.8 $5,380 4,724 $20,331,928 $0

Simple 20-99 FTEs 0.8 $6,507 899 $4,679,615 $0

Simple 100+ FTEs 0.8 $12,218 731 $7,144,981 $0

Complex <20 FTEs 0.8 $6,829 144 $786,690 $0

Complex 20-99 FTEs 0.8 $8,301 235 $1,560,535 $0

Complex 100+ FTEs 0.8 $23,621 47 $888,166 $0

Subtotal $35,391,915

Field Exercise

Simple <20 FTEs 0.2 $8,209 4724 $7,756,324 $0

Simple 20-99 FTEs 0.2 $13,835 899 $2,487,452 $0
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Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost Maintenance Costs

Simple 100+ FTEs 0.2 $23,111 731 $3,378,766 $0

Complex <20 FTEs 0.2 $10,047 144 $289,351 $0

Complex 20-99 FTEs 0.2 $17,301 235 $813,139 $0

Complex 100+ FTEs 0.2 $65,758 47 $618,121 $0

Subtotal $15,343,153

LEPC Disclosure – Exercise Report

Simple <20 FTEs 1 $555 4724 $2,622,482 $0

Simple 20-99 FTEs 1 $555 899 $499,071 $0

Simple 100+ FTEs 1 $555 731 $405,807 $0

Complex <20 FTEs 1 $1,237 144 $178,138 $0

Complex 20-99 FTEs 1 $1,237 235 $290,712 $0

Complex 100+ FTEs 1 $1,237 47 $58,142 $0

Subtotal $4,054,354

Total 6,780 $507,665,513 $56,915,039

The initial cost of $507,665,513 is the cost that all facilities will incur when they begin complying with 

this provision and convert from being non-responders to responders. The $56,915,039 is the cost that 

facilities will incur to maintain responder statusin terms of maintaining equipment, response plans, and 

training. Equipment costs make up approximately 70% of the costs of converting to an emergency 

responder. It seems possible that some facilities will finance the initial costs and spread them across 

multiple years. Thus the current assumption that facilities must pay these initial costs in a single initial 

yearis conservative. The initial costs for becoming responders includes training costs – such as course 

fees, labor hours, and travel costs – plus the cost of acquiring equipment, all of which must occur in the 

first year in order to meet OSHA requirements. Maintenance costs include the cost of annualrefresher 

training, the assumption that one new responder per year needs to be trained (to account for turnover), 

as well as costs for equipment that needs to be repaired orreplaced. 

For activities that have an annual frequency rate – all pertaining to facility exercises –the annual 

frequency represents how often facilities will need to implement that activity. As explained in section 

5.1, an annual frequency of 0.2 for field exercises effectively means 20% of facilities will be 

implementing this requirement in the first year of becoming a responder. The total costs for these 

provisions represent the number of facilities that would be implementing that expenditure in the first 

year of becoming a responder.

Notification Exercises

EPA analyzed only one option for this provision.

Low/Medium/High Option: Applicable to all Program 2 and 3 Facilities
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This provision would require all P2 and P3 facilities to conduct an annual notification exercise to verify 

that emergency contact information is up-to-date. This includes verifying that notification contact 

information foremergency responders, Federal, state and local response agencies, and other accidental 

release notification contacts is correct and includesfunctional phone numbers. The breakout of costs is

in Exhibit 5-11.

Exhibit 5-11: Total Undiscounted Costs for Notification Drills (All Options)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple Facilities 1 $110 10,345 $1,142,519

Complex Facilities 1 $152 1,555 $237,021

Total 11,900 $1,379,540

Facility Exercises

EPA analyzed three options for emergency response exercises.

Low Option:Applicable to All P2 and P3 Responding Facilities

The low option would require all P2 and P3 responding facilities to conduct an annual tabletop exercise. 

The breakout of costs are in Exhibit 5-12. 

Exhibit 5-12: Total Undiscounted Costs for Facility Exercises (Low Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple <20 FTEs 1 $5,380 1640 $8,823,127

Simple 20-99 FTEs 1 $6,507 880 $5,725,892

Simple 100+ FTEs 1 $12,218 1467 $17,923,542

Complex <20 FTEs 1 $6,829 141 $962,875

Complex 20-99 FTEs 1 $8,301 459 $3,810,029

Complex 100+ FTEs 1 $23,621 533 $12,590,231

Total 5,120 $49,835,696
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Medium Option (Proposed): Applicable to All P2 and P3 Responding Facilities

The medium option would require all responding P2 and P3 facilities to conduct a field exercise every 5 

years and within one year after a reportable accident and conduct an annual table top exercise in the 

other years. Given this timeline, the analysis used an annual frequency rate of 0.2 for the field exercise 

and 0.8 for the tabletop exercises. The analysis also assumed that facilities with an accident would have 

met their 5-year field exercise requirement by conducting an exercise within one year of the accident, 

effectively pushing their next required field exercise out 5 more years. Therefore, post-accident 

exercises were assumed not to affectthe costs of this option. The breakout of costs is in Exhibit 5-13.

Exhibit 5-13: Total Undiscounted Costs for Facility Exercises (Medium Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Table Top Exercise

Simple <20 FTEs 0.8 $5,380 1,640 $7,058,502

Simple 20-99 FTEs 0.8 $6,507 880 $4,580,713

Simple 100+ FTEs 0.8 $12,218 1,467 $14,338,834

Complex <20 FTEs 0.8 $6,829 141 $770,300

Complex 20-99 FTEs 0.8 $8,301 459 $3,048,023

Complex 100+ FTEs 0.8 $23,621 533 $10,072,185

Subtotal $39,868,557

Field Exercise

Simple <20 FTEs 0.2 $8,209 1,640 $2,692,712

Simple 20-99 FTEs 0.2 $13,835 880 $2,434,880

Simple 100+ FTEs 0.2 $23,111 1,467 $6,780,643

Complex <20 FTEs 0.2 $10,047 141 $283,322

Complex 20-99 FTEs 0.2 $17,301 459 $1,588,217

Complex 100+ FTEs 0.2 $65,758 533 $7,009,760

Total 5,120 $60,658,091

High Option: Applicable to All P2 and P3 Responding Facilities

The high option would require all P2 and P3 responding facilities to conduct an annual field exercise. 

The breakout of costs are in Exhibit 5-14.

Exhibit 5-14: Total Undiscounted Costs for Facility Exercises (High Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Simple <20 FTEs 1 $8,209 1,640 $13,463,560

Simple 20-99 FTEs 1 $13,835 880 $12,174,402

Simple 100+ FTEs 1 $23,111 1,467 $33,903,213

Complex <20 FTEs 1 $10,047 141 $1,416,612
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Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Complex 20-99 FTEs 1 $17,301 459 $7,941,083

Complex 100+ FTEs 1 $65,758 533 $35,048,801

Total 5,120 $103,947,670

5.5 Information Disclosure Rule Provisions

5.5.1 Public Meeting

EPA analyzed two options for imposing a requirement to hold a public meeting at least once every 5 

years.

Low/Medium Option: Applicable to All P2 and P3 Facilities

This option would require that all P2 and P3 facilities conduct a public meeting once every five years and 

immediately following an accident. The analysis uses an annual frequency of 0.2 to account for this. 

The breakout of costs is in Exhibit 5-15.

Exhibit 5-15: Total Undiscounted Costs for Public Meetings (Low/Medium Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Small Complex 0.2 $2,123 528 $224,194

Large Complex 0.2 $3,696 1027 $759,179

Simple 0.2 $1,706 10345 $3,529,077

Total 11,900 $4,512,451

High Option (Proposed): Applicable to All Facilities

This option would require that all facilities conduct a public meeting once every 5 years and immediately 

following an accident (i.e., P1 facilities would also have to comply). The analysis uses an annual 

frequency of 0.2 to account for this. The breakout of costs is in Exhibit 5-16.

Exhibit 5-16: Total Undiscounted Costs for Public Meetings (High Option)

Facility Type Annual Frequency Unit Cost Facilities Total Initial Cost

Small Complex 0.2 $2,123 565 $239,905

Large Complex 0.2 $3,696 1056 $780,617

Simple 0.2 $1,706 10921 $3,725,573

Total 12,542 $4,746,094
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Information Sharing

EPA analyzed one option (with multiple cost outcomes depending on whether the STAA provision would 

apply to a subset of P3 facilities (STAA low option) or whether it would apply for all P3 facilities (medium 

and high options)) for the information sharing provisions for the LEPC or emergency response officials 

and the public. 

LEPC or Emergency Response Officials

This proposed provision would require the facility owner or operator to make information on regulated 

substances, compliance audits, IST, accident history, incident investigations, and exercises available 

annually to the LEPC or emergency response officials. The provision to share compliance audit 

summaries applies to P2 and P3 facilities. The provision for sharing IST implementation information is 

calculated based on the total number of processes for which this provision would apply. The other 

provisions for providing accident histories and investigation report summaries to LEPCs or emergency 

response officials are based on a subset of P2 and P3 facilities that are expected to have reportable 

accidents. Costs of providing emergency response exercise information to LEPCs is based on the 

number of P2 and P3 responding facilities.57 

Information Sharing with the Public 

This provision would require the facility to make information available annually in a manner that is easily 

accessible to the public including: the names, quantities, and Safety Data Sheets of regulated substances 

used at the facility,the facility’s five-year accident history, a summary of the emergency response 

program information reported in the RMP, a summary of emergency exercises conducted and a 

schedule for upcoming exercises, and LEPC contact information.

Low/Medium/High Option: Applicable to All Facilities

This provision would require that all facilities collect information related to RMP compliance and 

disclose itto the public and local emergency response agencies. Thisincludes those with Program 1 

processes. However, facilities in Program 1 are not required to generate some information (e.g., they 

are not required to do compliance audits). The breakout of costs related to public disclosure and local 

emergency responders is in exhibit 5-17:

 57 The provision to share information on the names and quantities of regulated substances is the same as the 

public disclosure provision and no additional costs are estimated for sending this information to the LEPCs or local 

emergency response officials.
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Exhibit 5-17: Total Undiscounted Costs for Information Sharing Provisions (All Options)

Facility Type Annual 

Frequency

Unit 

Cost

Facilities (unless otherwise 

noted)

Total Initial 

Cost

Public Disclosure

Small Complex 1 $459 565 $259,090

Large Complex 1 $1,621 1,056 $1,711,295

Simple 1 $184 10,921 $2,005,498

LEPC Disclosure

Accident History – Simple 1 $185 372 $68,767

Accident History - Complex 1 $390 350 $136,464

Audit Report - Simple 0.33 739 10,345 $2,524,286

Audit Report - Complex 0.33 $1,864 1,555 $956,740

Investigation Reports -

Simple 1 $1,054 372 $392,213

Investigation Reports -

Complex 1 $3,021 350 $1,057,418

STAA – Simple 0.2 $1,258 1,783

processes

$448,591

STAA – Complex 0.2 $3,326 2,514

processes

$1,672,335

Exercise Reports – Simple 1 $555 3,987 $2,213,344

Exercise Reports - Complex 1 $1,237 1,133 $1,401,603

LEPC Review - Simple 1 $53 10,921 $583,509

LEPC Review - Small 

Complex 1 $107 565 $60,376

LEPC Review - Large 

Complex 1 $214 1,056 $225,688

Total $11,741,335

5.6 New Responders

The proposed provision to improve coordination with local responders includes the possibility that local 

emergency response officials with jurisdiction may requirethat the owner or operator of the stationary 
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source maintain an in-house emergency response capability. As a sensitivity analysis, EPA has examined 

different assumptions regarding the number of current non-responding facilities (see Exhibit 3-8for 

numbers) that might develop and maintain such in-house capability and thereby convert to responding 

facilities. 

EPA faced a lack of information regarding the number of nonresponding facilities that might develop 

their own emergency response programsto comply with the proposed rule’s coordination provision. As 

a consequence, EPA performed a sensitivity analysis that examined a facility’s proximity to existing 

hazardous materials (hazmat) teams. While this approach is less than ideal for a number ofreasons 

explained below, the general idea was that proximity to an existing hazmat team reduces the likelihood 

that a facility will need to provide forits own emergency response. EPA used an existing analysis of 

hazmat team locations obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Those data 

were compiled for the 2012 National Preparedness Report to characterize the existing coverage of 

hazmat teams. 58 The 2012 report found that “the nation has developed a mature set of assets for 

addressing hazardous materials incidents.” There were approximately 1,100 state and local hazmat 

teams identified, and the FEMA report concluded that 76% of the population is covered by these hazmat 

response teams. 59

Although the exact location of each hazmat team could not be identified from the FEMA data, it was 

possible to identify the county of each hazmat team (see Exhibit 5-18). Using ArcGIS tools, the maps of 

non-responding facilities and hazmat team counties were merged and appear as Exhibit 5-19. These 

data provide the boundaries for a sensitivity analysis of the number of non-responders that will become 

responders as a result of the proposed rule’s coordination requirements. 

Approximately 38.5% of non-responding facilities are located in counties with hazmat teams. Having a 

hazmat team within the same county makes it more likely that the RMP facility can rely on that team 

and not need to convert to responder status. However, this may be an overestimate of the percent that 

will not convert because being located in a county with a hazmat team does not necessarily mean that 

every chemical handled by a particular facility is covered by that team. On the other hand, it might 

underestimate hazmat team coverage as there are several states that have expended significant effort 

to have their whole state covered by hazmat response. For instance, Florida takes into account the 

location of RMP facilities in the planning of its hazmat response capabilities. 60 EPA’s county analysis does 

not account for such statewide planning and coverage. Since 38.5% of non-responding facilities are in 

hazmat counties, 61.5% are not “covered,”and might potentially have to become responders. This 

represents the upper bound of our sensitivity analysis. Full counts of facilities in and out of hazmat 

counties, broken down by the main facility categories, appear in Exhibit 5-20.

 58 https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/26675 59 The approach for estimating the 76% was roughly based on the population in proximity to a hazmat team 60 http://floridadisaster.org/hazmat/
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Exhibit 5-18: Counties with Hazardous Material Teams
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Exhibit 5-19 Locations of Non-Responding Facilities
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Exhibit 5-20: Sensitivity Analysis of Percent of Non-Responding Facilities that Might Convert to 

Responder Status

Sector In a County with a Hazmat Team

Out In Percent

All Non-Responders 4,349 2,722 38.5%

Food/Bev. Manufacturers 204 294 59.0%

Ag. Facilities 2,328 742 24.2%

Chem Wholesale 113 104 47.9%

Warehouses 162 306 65.4%

Other Wholesale 2,270 645 22.1%

Oil Gas 262 75 22.3%

Water or POTW 654 703 51.8%

Refineries 10 8 44.4%

Chemical Manufacturers 237 184 43.7%

Pulp and Paper 1 4 80.0%

Using 61.5 percent on the high-end, the sensitivity analysis used this portion of the non-responding RMP

facility universe (equivalent to 4112 facilities)to assume that 25%, 50%, and 75% of these nonresponding facilities would need to become responding facilities.

The unit cost breakdown is the same as presented in Exhibit 5-10. Exhibits 5-21, 5-22, and 5-23 present 

new responder costs for 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of current non-responding facilities to 

become responders. The components of the costsfor this sensitivity analysis are described above in 

Section 5.3.1 under the High Option alternative. 

Exhibit 5-21: Total Undiscounted Costs for New Responders: 25% Conversion (Millions, 2014 Dollars)

Provision Type 25% Conversion

Facilities Total Initial Cost Ongoing Costs

Plan Development 1,028 $2.7 $0.3

Training 1,028 $12.8 $3.0

Equipment 1,028 $53.9 $5.4

Table Top Exercise 1,028 $5.0 $0

Field Exercise 1,028 $2.1 $0

LEPC Disclosure – Exercise 

Report 1,028 $0.6 $0

Total* $77.1 $8.7
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 *Totals may not sum due to rounding

Exhibit 5-22: Total Undiscounted Costs for New Responders: 50% Conversion (Millions, 2014 Dollars)

Provision Type 50% Conversion 

Facilities Total Initial Cost Ongoing Costs

Plan Development 2,056 $5.4 $0.5

Training 2,056 $25.7 $6.1

Equipment 2,056 $107.7 $10.7

Table Top Exercise 2,056 $10.1 $0

Field Exercise 2,056 $4.2 $0

LEPC Disclosure – Exercise 

Report

2,056 $1.2 $0

Total* $154.3 $17.4

 *Totals may not sum due to rounding

Exhibit 5-23: Total Undiscounted Costs for New Responders: 75% Conversion (Millions, 2014 Dollars)

Provision Type 75% Conversion 

Facilities Total Initial Cost Ongoing Costs

Plan Development 3,084 $8.0 $0.8

Training 3,084 $38.5 $9.2

Equipment 3,084 $161.6 $16.2

Table Top Exercise 3,084 $15.1 $0

Field Exercise 3,084 $6.3 $0

LEPC Disclosure – Exercise 

Report

3,084 $1.8 $0

Total* $231.4 $26.2

 *Totals may not add due to rounding

For the medium (proposed) option, the analysis assumed 50% conversion of non-responders.
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5.7 Total Costs

The analysis presents total costs as total undiscounted costs over the 10 year period of analysis, total 

discounted (3 percent and 7 percent), and annualized (3 percent and 7 percent). When annual costs for 

different years are equal to one another across the analysis time period, the annualized costs calculated 

using different discount rates(e.g., 3 and 7 percent) are equal. 

Exhibit 5-24 presents the total costsfor all options. Blue cells represent the proposed rule option. 

Exhibit 5-25 presents the total cost for the proposed rule only.
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Exhibit 5-24: Total Costs (Millions 2014 Dollars)

Cost Elements

Low Option Medium Option High Option

Annualized 

(3%)

Annualized 

(7%)

Annualized 

(3%)

Annualized 

(7%)

Annualized 

(3%)

Annualized 

(7%)

Third Party Audits $5.0 $5.0 $84.2 $84.2 $96.2 $96.2 

Root Cause 

Analysis $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 

Safer Technology 

and Alternatives $34.8 $35.8 $71.7 $71.7 $71.7 $71.7 

Coordination $6.3 $6.3 $6.3 $6.3 $108.2 $116.9 

New Responders $16.5 $17.8 $33.0 $35.6 $49.5 $53.5 

Notification Drills $1.4 $1.4 $1.4 $1.4 $1.4 $1.4 

Exercise Costs $49.8 $49.8 $60.7 $60.7 $103.9 $103.9

LEPC Disclosure $11.7 $11.7 $11.7 $11.7 $11.7 $11.7

Public Disclosure $4.0 $4.0 $4.0 $4.0 $4.0 $4.0 

Public Meetings $4.5 $4.5 $4.7 $4.7 $4.7 $4.7 

Rule 

Familiarization $0.2 $0.3 $0.2 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 

Total Cost* $135.0 $136.4 $278.8 $281.5 $452.6 $465.2

 * Totals may not sum due to rounding

Exhibit 5-25: Total Cost of Proposed Rule (Millions, 2014 Dollars)

Cost Elements Total 

Undiscounted

Total Discounted 

(3%)

Total Discounted 

(7%)

Annualized 

(3%)*

Annualized 

(7%)

Third Party 

Audits $49.5 $42.3 $34.8 $5.0 $5.0

Root Cause 

Analysis $8.4 $7.2 $5.9 $0.8 $0.8

Safer Technology 

and Alternatives $347.9 $296.7 $244.3 $34.8 $34.8

Coordination $62.7 $53.4 $44.0 $6.3 $6.3

New Responders

 ̊ $311.1 $281.6 $250.3 $33.0 $35.6

Notification Drills $13.8 $11.8 $9.7 $1.4 $1.4

Exercise Costs $606.6 $517.4 $426.0 $60.7 $60.7

LEPC Disclosure $129.1 $100.1 $82.4 $11.7 $11.7

Public Disclosure $39.8 $33.9 $27.9 $4.0 $4.0

Public Meetings $47.5 $40.5 $33.3 $4.7 $4.7

Rule 

Familiarization $2.3 $2.3 $2.2 $0.2 $0.3

Total Cost+ $1,618.8 $1,387.2 $1,161.1 $162.6 $165.3

 * Totals may not sum due to rounding

In total, the proposed rule would cost $ 162,631,853 (annualized 3 percent) or $165,310,570 (annualized 

7 percent) including 50 percent conversion of new responders. 
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CHAPTER 6: BENEFITS

Facilities subject to the RMP regulation pose significant risks to the public and the environment. These 

risks stem from potential accidental chemical releases that can cause fires, explosions, and harmful 

vapor clouds. Chemical accidents - fires and explosions in particular - notonly kill and injure people, but 

can do great damage to property. Property damage can include damage to goods produced, plant 

equipment and structures, and nearby industrial, commercial, and residential buildings, equipment, and 

furnishings. Damage can also occur to the natural environment and negatively affect nearby ecosystems 

and wildlife. Resources, such as emergency personnel and equipment, are diverted to address the fire, 

explosion, or vapor cloud. Properties located near the accident may lose value as a result ofthe 

perceived risks and other disamenities posed by proximity to the facility. 

Risks posed by RMP facilities are reduced by lowering the probability and magnitude of accidents, which 

is the objective of the proposed rule. Thus,the benefits of the proposed rule include reductions in the 

number of people killed, injured, and evacuated or otherwise inconvenienced by sheltering in place; 

reductions in the damage caused to property on-site and off-siteincluding product, equipment, and 

buildings; reductions in damages to the environment and ecosystems; and reductions in resources 

diverted to extinguish fires and clean up affected areas. The proposed rule would also provide other 

benefits, such as increased public information, which in addition to helping to minimize the impacts of 

accidents on the offsite public, could also lead to more efficient property markets in areas near RMP 

facilities.

6.1 Benefit Categories

Exhibit 6-1 illustrates the social benefits associated with each proposed rule provision. There are four 

primary social benefit categories identified by EPA. These include:

• Prevention of Future RMP Accidents: Several rule provisions would prevent accidents by 

triggering improvements in plant design, equipment, procedures, or operator training. 

Preventing serious accidents avoids numerous direct costs, including worker, responder, and 

public fatalities and injuries, public evacuations, public sheltering-in-place, and property and 

environmental damage. It also avoids indirect costs, such as lost productivity due to product 

damage and business interruption both on-site and off-site, expenditure of emergency response 

resources and attendant transaction costs, and reduced offsite property values.

• Mitigation of Future RMP Accidents: Several rule provisions would reduce the impacts of 

serious accidents by promoting a more rapid and efficient response to these incidents. If a 

serious chemical accident ormajor catastrophe occurs, mitigating its impacts benefits society by 

reducing the number of fatalities and injuries, reducing the magnitude of property damage and 
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lost productivity both on-site and off-site, and reducing the extent of public evacuations, 

sheltering, and expenditure of emergency response resources. 

• Improved Information: Three rule provisions would result in providing improved information to 

emergency planners, emergency responders, and the public. Providing improved information to 

emergency planners and responders is beneficial because it results in more efficient allocation 

of public response resources by improving the ability of planners and responders to make 

appropriate decisions concerning equipment, training, and procedures. Improved information 

will also improve local contingency planning and training of emergency responders. Providing 

better information to members of the public will allow people to make better decisions about 

where to live and work, what to do when an emergency occurs, and how to account for the 

market value of property located near RMP facilities.

• Prevention and Mitigation of Future non-RMP Accidents at RMP Facilities: Actions that prevent 

or reduce the severity of accidents in RMP-covered processes are also likely to prevent or 

mitigate non-RMP accidents at the same facilities because the same or similar actions can be 

taken with regard to processes and equipment not subject to the regulation, often at minimal 

additional cost. For example, if an owner or operator implements operational safety policies to 

prevent or respond to an RMP-related emergency, itwill also improve their ability to respond to 

any emergency or accident at the facility because of the new operational safety policies.
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Exhibit 6-1: Social Benefits of Proposed Rule Provisions

Rule Provision Social Benefits (primary social benefit in bold)

1. Third party audits Prevention of future RMP facility accidents

Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

Prevention of future non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities

2. Root cause analysis Mitigation of future non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities

3. Safer technology and alternatives 

analysis

4. Emergency coordination Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

Improved information

Mitigation of future non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities

5. Emergency response exercises

6. LEPC information disclosure Improved information

Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

Mitigation of future non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities

7. Public information availability Improved information

Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

8. Public meetings Improved information

Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

As Exhibit 6-1 indicates, each rule provision would produce social benefits in multiple benefit categories. 

The primary social benefit category for each rule provision is indicated in bold type. Exhibit 6-1 

indicates, for example, that performing accident root cause analysis primarily will help prevent future 

similar accidents and that improved emergency coordination will primarily helpmitigate future accident 

impacts. The table suggests that providing better information to neighboring residents and businesses 

may improve the efficiency of their decisions about where to locate. Note that the table also identifies 

other benefit categorieslisted below the boldface primary one. For example, better informed neighbors 

may have improved responses to warnings that lower their potential exposure and panic, thereby 
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mitigating damages. Additionally, residents who are extremely risk averse may decide to live further 

from RMP facilities after reviewing improved information, improving the efficiency of local real estate 

markets.

6.1.1 Prevention

Proposed rule provisions 1, 2, and 3 involve changes to the rule’s accident prevention program elements 

and are intended to lower the likelihood of future accidents of the same or similar type. Rule provision 

1, which would require certain compliance audits to be conducted by an independent third party, should 

improve the objectivity of auditors and result in identification of safety problems and necessary process 

improvements before such deficiencies can result in accidents. Rule provision 2, the root cause analysis 

provision (that would apply after a reportable accident or near miss), should prevent future accidents by 

identifying the underlying causes and corrective actions for serious accidents and near misses. Over 

time, implementing the corrective actions and lessons learned through root cause analyses should 

prevent future accidents and result in a reduction of on-site and offsite impacts. Rule provision 3, the 

STAA analysis, should result in identification of potential process changes that, if implemented, would 

result in owners oroperators using less hazardous substances, minimizing the amount of regulated 

substances present in a process, moderating process conditions, or reducing process complexity. Such 

changes, if implemented, help prevent accidents by either eliminating the possibility of an accidental 

release entirely, by making a process more fault-tolerant, such that a minor process upset or equipment 

malfunction does not result in a serious accidental release, and by making releases that may occur less 

severe. The STAA analysis provision does not actually require the owner or operator to implement any 

changes, so it would only provide benefits if the facility voluntarily decides to implement changes. EPA 

has not estimated the costs of implementation in the cost analysis. 61

In addition to preventing future accidents, provisions 1, 2, and 3 have additional social benefits, 

including mitigation of future RMP facility accidents, prevention of future non-RMP accidents at RMP 

facilities, and mitigation of future non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities. These provisions can identify 

process improvements that result in less severe releases (e.g., an audit or investigation that identifies 

improvements to a release detection or mitigation system). 

6.1.2 Mitigation

Proposed rule provisions 4 and 5 are primarily focused on improving emergency response capabilities. 

Faster and better coordinated responses, including effective and efficient notification ofthe public,

should reduce human health impacts and property damage, and limit the number of on-site and off-site 

impacts. Bringing fires and releases under control more quickly and ensuring that workers and 

responders know the most effective actions to take for a particular facility under particular conditions 

could reduce the duration of incidents, the likelihood of injuriesto emergency responders, and limit 

 61 Although the costs associated with those changes may in some cases be high, it is unlikely that a facility would 

implement costly changes unless it determined that its own private benefits (for example, there could be 

production efficiency improvements as well as safety enhancements) would equal or exceed those costs.
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exposures—particularly for long-duration events. For example, a food plant in New Orleans in St. 

Tammany recently experienced an ammonia leak. The plant, a nearby commercial facility, and an 

interstate highway wereshut down for hours while hazardous material crews worked to contain the 

leak.

62

Improved emergency response to control fires could also prevent knock-on impacts, such as additional 

explosions at facilities that store highly flammable gases, potentially resulting in a release of a regulated 

substance. For example, a propane fire at a Texas refinery in 2007 caused a chlorine release, four 

injuries, total refinery evacuation, and a shutdown. 63 A 2009 natural gas explosion at a food 

manufacturing plant led to release of ammonia from the refrigeration system and 71 hospitalizations for 

toxic exposure. 64 Improving emergency response could also reduce the length of offsite exposures, 

which would lower the risk to the public.

The Emergency Coordination provision, number4, would require RMP facilities to keep written records 

of coordination efforts with local response agencies including dates, names, and affiliations of 

individuals contacted. This provision should improve emergency responses by ensuring that appropriate 

capabilities are established to respond to emergencies. The Exercise provision, number5, would require

almost all RMP facilities to perform notification exercises, and all respondingRMP facilities to perform

tabletop and field exercises. Such exercises increase emergency response readiness, both for RMP 

facility owners or operators and local responders, by testing emergency communications systems and 

emergency plans and by ensuring local and facility response personnel know what actions to take during 

various accident scenarios. Together, rule provisions 4 and 5 should mitigate the impact of RMP facility 

accidents that may occur. 

Improved coordination between facility owners and operators and the local emergency response 

officials and emergency exercises (when local responders are involved) also helps ensure that local 

officials know what to tell the public when real accidental releases occur. This improved information 

will lead to more efficient responses by the public.

6.1.3 Information Disclosure

Three of the proposed rule components (6, 7, and 8) directly target information provision. Providing 

information to the public and local agencies has multiple benefits. Betterinforming the public about 

chemicals at an RMP facility enables more efficient decisions in the marketplace for nearby properties. 

Nearby residents will be able to make more informed decisions about where to locate their homes and 

 62 Roberts, Faimon A. (2015) I-12 in St. Tammany and Tangipahoa Reopened After Ammonia Leak. The Advocate. 

Baton Rouge. October 16.

63 CSB Report, Valero Refinery Propane Fire, Final Report, July 9, 2008, http://www.csb.gov/valero-refinerypropane-fire/. 64 CSB Report, ConAgra Natural Gas Explosion and Ammonia Release, Final Report, February 4, 2010, 

http://www.csb.gov/conagra-natural-gas-explosion-and-ammonia-release/.
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businesses. Those people who are more risk averse may prefer locating further away compared to 

people who are less risk averse. 

Better informing LEPCs enables more efficient decision-making regarding expenditures on equipment 

and training for emergency preparedness. By improving information available to the public and LEPCs 

about the chemicals stored and processes used at RMP facilities, equipment, materials and training will 

be better aligned with the risks presented by the RMP facility. In addition, if local residents and 

businesses understand the potential risks from a facility accident, they will be better able to understand 

recommendations for sheltering in place or evacuation and take appropriate actions should an actual 

incident occur, thereby mitigating the impacts of the event. Such knowledge can also help develop trust 

between the facility and the community, which could limit unnecessary concern and make residents 

more willing to act on recommendations.

6.1.4 Conclusion

The discussion in this section has qualitatively explained how the proposed rule provisions could prevent 

and mitigate accidents and improve information available to the public and LEPCs. EPA has no data or 

empirical estimates ofthe precise impact of each rule provision on the probability andmagnitude of an 

accident, or on improved efficiency due to better information. In order to shed light on the existing 

landscape, however, in the next section EPA will describe in detail the number and costs of accidents 

currently associated with RMP facilities. To the extent practicable, the analysis monetizes the costs of 

damages to partially estimate the baseline costs that should decline due to the proposed rule. It also 

qualitatively discusses other benefits that are expected outcomes of the proposed rule.

6.2 Number and Costs of Baseline Accidents

As part of the RMP Program, owners or operators of facilities subject to the rule must submit 

information on accidents that occurred over the previous 5 years if they produced on-site or offsite 

deaths, injuries, or property damage, or if they led to an evacuation,sheltering in place event, or offsite 

environmental damage. The analysis reviewed these data for all facilities that reported accidents that 

occurred from 2004 through 2013 (the last year with complete data) to provide a 10-year baseline.65 The 

beginning of the 10-year period was chosen as the earliest date that would fully reflectthe impacts of 

the most recent RMP rule update. 

Some accidents that occurred at RMP facilities during the 10-year period were not reported to EPA 

either because the facility closed subsequent to the accident, decommissioned the process, or removed 

the regulated substance from the process involved in the accident before it was required to submit a 

report to the RMP database. For example, a Praxair facility in St. Louis, Missouri, had a fire involving 

 65 The accidents included those that occurred at facilities that subsequently deregistered from the RMP Program. 

As such, some accidents analyzed may have occurred at facilities no longer subject to the RMP rule. Offsetting 

this, however, is the registration of new facilities subsequent to 2013.
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propylene cylinders on June 24, 2005, that resulted in one fatality and significant offsite property 

damage. 66 MFG Chemical, in Dalton,Georgia, released a cloud of allyl alcohol on April 12, 2004, that led 

to 154 people being medically treated, 5 hospitalized for chemical exposure, and a community 

evacuation. 67 Both of these facilities either closed or deregistered the affected process before the 

deadline for their subsequent RMP report. Due to the omission of such accidents, the 10-year baseline 

may under-represent the number and magnitude of RMP chemical accidents.

The RMP data indicated that there were 1,517 reportable accidents among the 2,291 total accidents in 

the 10-year baseline. Facilities provided information for774 accidents that had no reportable impacts

so EPA dropped them from the baseline database. The RMP accident database contains information on 

the initiating event and contributing factors for each accident. The impacts reported should be those 

attributable to, or resulting from, direct exposure to toxic concentrations, radiant heat, or overpressures 

from accidental releases or from indirect consequences of a vapor cloud explosion from the accidental 

release. However, EPA determined that there were some accidents where a release of a regulated 

substance was not the cause of the resulting impacts.

To address this difficulty, reportable accidents were reviewed in detail based on industry knowledge and 

other resources, such as reports by the Chemical Safety Board, to ensure that only impacts attributable 

to the release of a regulated substance were included. For example,for one accident, a review of the 

Chemical Safety Board report indicated that the initiating event was an explosion in a natural gas fuel 

line that led to a building collapse, the death of 4 workers, and in combination with a subsequent fire, 

the eventual release of ammonia.68 The analysis included the accident in the 10-year baseline, and 

retained the injuries, but excluded the 4 deaths and the property damage because they preceded the 

regulated substance release. In another case, EPA omits the accident and damages from the analyzed 

data because it appears that a fire was deliberately set.69

We indicate that one potential benefit of the proposed rule is prevention of “non-RMP” accidents at 

RMP facilities. Therefore, it is arguable that EPA should have counted these accidents and accident 

consequences in the baseline. However, EPA chose not to do so because it is a conservative approach to 

estimating the potential benefits of the proposed rule. 

 66 CSB Report, Praxair Flammable Gas Cylinder Fire, Final Report, June 15, 2006, http://www.csb.gov/praxairflammable-gas-cylinder-fire/. 67 CSB Report, MFG Chemical Inc. Toxic Gas Release, Final Report, April 11, 2006, http://www.csb.gov/mfgchemical-inc-toxic-gas-release/. 68 CSB Report, ConAgra Natural Gas Explosion and Ammonia Release, Final Report, February 4, 2010, 

http://www.csb.gov/conagra-natural-gas-explosion-and-ammonia-release/. 69 Fire at Patrick Cudahy meat packing plant in Cudahy, WI on July 9, 2009, 

http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2011/12/23/navy-sued-for-326-million-in-damages.html.
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6.2.1 On-site Reportable Accidents in the 10-Year Baseline

Exhibit 6-2 presents the 10-year data, by year, for on-site impacts of accidents. Deaths and injuries are 

attributed to either employees or members of the public. 

Exhibit 6-2: On-site Impacts by Year

Year Impact 

Accidents

Employee 

Deaths

Employee 

Injuries

Public 

Injuries

Public 

Deaths

Value of 

Property 

Damage

2004 197 6 211 46 0 $124,186,397

2005 152 16 370 6 0 $343,100,280

2006 140 3 193 11 0 $181,088,015

2007 204 5 188 60 0 $207,676,070

2008 168 6 194 11 0 $514,472,444

2009 149 5 221 6 2 $87,029,904

2010 128 9 130 5 0 $114,845,119

2011 138 2 127 0 0 $108,642,919

2012 118 1 159 0 0 $86,245,834

2013 123 3 162 3 0 $287,608,254

Annual 

Average 151.7 5.6 195.5 14.8 0 $205,489,524

Total 

Reportable 1,517 56 1,955 148 2 $2,054,895,236

There were a total of 58 on-site fatalities over the 10-year analysis time period, which amounts to an 

annual average of 6 fatalities. Several accidents involved multiple fatalities. The largest accident during 

the time period was a refinery explosion in Texas City, Texas, in 2005 that killed 15 employees.70 In 

2010, a Tesoro refinery explosion in Anacortes, Washington, killed 7 employees 71, and a 2004 explosion 

at Formosa Plastics in Illiopolis, Illinois, killed 5 employees.72 There were 5 accidents that killed 2 

workers each, and the remaining employee deaths were single-fatality incidents. There were two onsite deaths to members of the public who were truck drivers loading a tank truck with ammoniawhen a 

line failure occurred.

73

The RMP rule does not require facilities to disaggregate on-site injuries by severity so it is not possible to 

determine from the RMP data alone, the severity of the on-site injuries. However, under the RMP 

 70 CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf

71 CSB. May 2014. Investigation Report: Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes Refinery, 

Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf 72 CSB. April 2004. Investigation Report: Vinyl Chloride Monomer Explosion, Formosa Plastics Corp., Illiopolis, 

Illinois, April 23, 2004. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Formosa_IL_Report.pdf. 73 http://www.startribune.com/rosemount-oklahoma-firms-fined-in-2-deaths/95895109/
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accident history requirements, a reportable accident injurymeans “any effect on a human that results 

either from direct exposure to toxic concentration; radiant heat; or overpressure from accidental 

releases or from the direct consequences of a vapor cloud explosion (such as flying glass, debris, or 

other projectiles) from an accidental release and that requires medical treatment or hospitalization.” 

Medical treatmentmeans “treatment, other than first aid, administered by a physician or registered 

professional personnel under standing orders from a physician” (40 CFR 68.3). Forsome accidents, 

where accident reports could be located from other sources, it appears that serious injuries (i.e., those 

requiring hospitalization) range from none (e.g., Leprino Foods August 2013 and Tysons Meats 2012 

where all workers were treated and released) to at least 50 percent of reported injuries(Delek Refining 

2008); in the largest accident (BP 2005), 66 workers were hospitalized, and 110 others were treated for 

minor injuries.74. Injuries described in reports varied from those that were treated with first aid alone at 

the scene to severe burns and permanent disability. Although the RMP rule limits reportable injuries to 

those that require medical treatment other than first aid, in some accidents, minor injuries treated with 

first aid have been reported. Regarding on-site property damage, the property affected included 

buildings, machinery, equipment and other plant infrastructure. Almost $677 million of the $2 billion in 

property damage reported occurred in accidents that had no other reportable impacts on-site or offsite.

6.2.2 Off-Site Reportable Impacts in the 10-Year Baseline

Exhibit 6-3 presents the reported offsite impacts for the 10-year baseline including members of the 

public or emergency responders who were injured or killed offsite, were required to evacuate or shelterin-place, or who incurred property damage as a result of the accidents. Of the 1,517 reportable 

releases, 473 had reportable offsite impacts. One member of the public was killed as a result of a 

release of a regulated substance; that person drove into an ammonia cloud moving across a highway. 

There were approximately 50 incidents that listed offsite environmental damage but no other impacts. 

Because environmental damage is reported only as true/false, there is no basis for estimating the costs 

associated with the damage; they are not presented in either Exhibit 6-2 or 6-3.

 74 CSB, OSHA, and press reports were reviewed for larger accidents. CSB has investigated relatively few of the 

accidents in the database and does not always detail the severity of injuries. OSHA focuses investigations primarily 

on fatal accidents or those involving multiple hospitalizations. 
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Exhibit 6-3: Offsite Impacts by Year

Year

Impact 

Accidents 

with 

Offsite 

Impacts

Number 

of 

Deaths

Hospital 

Visits

People 

undergoing 

Other 

Medical 

Treatment

Number of 

people 

Evacuated

Number 

of people 

Sheltered

in place

Value of 

Property 

Damage

2004 66 0 43 239 5,656 96,958 $1,414,834

2005 54 0 4 32 3,927 135,260 $687,996

2006 53 0 7 26 1,533 11,792 $833,000

2007 61 0 33 212 15,464 32,682 $122,980

2008 45 0 8 74 2,798 4,771 $318,191

2009 44 1 27 37 3,102 8,984 $7,750

2010 36 0 42 112 3,564 4,180 $2,475,500

2011 36 0 2 11 699 47,833 $235,104

2012 36 0 19 14,013 1,008 98,120 $1,536,600

2013 42 0 4 51 838 11,085 $3,720,150

Annual 

Average 47.3 0.1 18.9 1,480.7 3,859 45,167 $1,135,211

Total 

Reportable 473 1 189 14,807 38,589 451,665 $11,352,105

In the 10-year baseline, the total number of off-site people seeking medical treatment, otherthan 

hospitalization, is skewed by a single incident where 14,000 people sought treatment for exposure to 

smoke and particles from a fire at a Chevron refinery in Richmond, CA, in 2012.

75 For sheltering in place, 

six different accidents at the BP refinery in Texas City account for 257,000 people taking shelterwhich 

explainsthe high numbers for 2004 and 2005. 76

6.2.3 Distribution of Accident Impacts across Sectors

In the 10-year baseline, the data indicate that fatal accidents occurred primarily in the petroleum 

refining, chemical manufacturing, and pulp and papersectors. Accidents in these sectors accounted for 

all but 10 of the fatalities and included the three accidents with the greatest impacts. 77 These sectors 

also account for 87 percent of the onsite property damage (refineries alone account for 59 percent of 

the total). This is not surprising as these facilities handle highly flammable gases that can explode and 

burn. These are also large facilities with interconnected processes that can incur extensive damage in 

 75 CSB. January 2014. Regulatory Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Chevron Richmond 

Refinery #4 Crude Unit, Richmond, California, August 6, 2012. Report No. 2012-03-I-CA. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf.

76 CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf.

77 Footnote 51 identifies the three worst accidents. 
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an explosion. The fatalities reported as RMP reportable impacts at refineries represent one third of all 

employee on-the-job fatalities reported to the Bureau of Labor Statistics for that sector for the 10-year 

period of 2004 to 2013. In the chemical manufacturing sector, RMP reported fatalities represent about 

6 percent of worker on-the-job deaths in the sector for the period. 78 Exhibit 6-4presents a breakdown 

of RMP reportable accidents, deaths, and injuries by sector. The food and beverage manufacturers and 

warehouses are generally ammonia refrigeration systems; the agricultural chemical distributorsstore 

ammonia for use as a fertilizer. 

Exhibit 6-4: Accidents, Fatalities, and Injuries by Sector

Sector Total 10-Year 

Accidents

Accidents 

per Facility

Onsite 

Fatalities 79

Injuries 

Onsite

Injuries 

Offsite

NAICS 324- Petroleum and 

Coal Products Manufacturing 169 1.08 29 325 14,026

NAICS 325 - Chemical 

Manufacturing 530 0.36 15 585 378

NAICS 311, 312 -

Food/Beverage 

Manufacturers

270 0.18 3 598 326

NAICS 322 –Paper 

Manufacturing 46 0.66 1 59 2

NAICS 331, 332, 333, 334, 

336, 339 - Other 

Manufacturing

53 0.14 1 66 14

NAICS 11, 12, 15, 42491 -

Agricultural Chemical 

Distributors

156 0.04 2 157 161

NAICS 4246, 4247 -

Chemical/petroleum 

wholesale

38 0.06 0 30 31

NAICS 4244, 4245 -Other 

wholesale 20 0.07 0 62 15

NAICS 493 – Warehouse 72 0.07 2 77 9

NAICS 22131, 22132 -

Water/POTW 75 0.04 1 89 19

NAICS 211 - Oil/Gas 

exploration 53 0.07 1 25 11

Other 35 0.06 1 30 4

Total 1,517 56 2,103 14,996

 78 The BLS data reflect only facility employees killed, not contractors, who are accounted for under other NAICS 

codes. Therefore, these data understate the number of workers who died in refinery accidents.

79 Column excludes 3 public fatalities (see Exhibits 6-2 and 6-3).
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6.2.4 Monetized Costs of Chemical Accidents

While the RMP data base provides values of property damage, itincludes only counts of fatalities, nonfatal injuries, evacuations, and the numberof people required to shelter-in-place. EPA has applied 

estimates of the values of these impacts to better understand the magnitude of accident impacts during 

the 10-year baseline. To monetize fatalities, EPA applied the value of statistical life (VSL) recommended 

in EPA’sGuidelines for Preparing Economic Analysis(2010) (hereafter the Guidelines). For non-fatal 

injuries, EPA gathered data on hospital costs from the US Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) Agency for Healthcare and Research and Quality Data (2012). Finally, for evacuations and shelterin-place events, values of labor time were drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014). 

6.2.4.1 Fatalities and Injuries

Fatalities were valued using the Guideline’s value of a statistical life ($7.9 million in 2008 dollars) inflated 

to 2014 dollars ($8.6 million). 

In principle, valuation of injuries includes multiple components. The Guidelines explain that the

willingness to pay (WTP)to reduce the risk of experiencing an illness is the preferred measure of value 

for morbidity effects: “As described in Freeman (2003), this measure consists of four components:

• “Averting costs” to reduce the risk of illness; 

• “Mitigating costs” for treatments such as medical care and medication; 

• Indirect costs such as lost time from paid work, maintaining a home, and pursuing leisure 

activities; and 

• Less easily measured but equally real costs of discomfort, anxiety, pain, and suffering.”

Unfortunately, data were not available to estimate the components identified in the first, third, and final 

bullets. These cost categories are omitted from EPA’s estimates, which rely solely on the costs of 

medical care. For on-site injury and offsite hospitalization, the analysis reviewed the accident data to 

determine the percentage of the accidents that involved explosions and fires and the percentage that 

involved the release of toxics. The analysis then used the HHS data80 on the current costs for 

hospitalizations for poisoning (other than by medicinal substances) to transfer to injuries from toxic 

releases, for burns to transfer to injuries associated with fire, and foropen wounds to transfer to injuries 

from explosions. Because the costs for open wounds and poisoning were close ($37,700 and $35,300, 

respectively),the analysis used the average of these two valuesfor on-site injuries; the costs for burns 

was $100,000. The analysis then created a weighted value of an on-site injury based on the propensity 

for a burn-related injury versus other impacts (fires were involved in 18 percent of the injury incidents, 

open wounds were assumed to be the remainder of injury costs). This was approximately $50,000. The 

analysis used the cost of hospitalization for poisoning (rounded to $35,000) for hospitalizations 

associated with offsite injuries because in the 10-year baseline these injuries were usually related to 

exposure to toxic chemicals. For medical treatment, other than hospitalization (offsite), the analysis 

 80 http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/
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used an estimate of $1,000, which is above the $750 per person paid to the 14,000 people who sought 

medical treatment from the Richmond refinery fire, and slightly below the average emergency room 

cost; people offsite are generally seeking treatment for exposure to fumes, which usually involves 

relatively low cost treatments (e.g., oxygen, eye washes, skin washes).

The $50,000 cost estimate for on-site injuries is inaccurate for several reasons. As mentioned above for 

all injuries, hospital costs are only one of four categories of social costs incurred. EPA’s estimates are 

conservative by omitting three of the four categories, due to a lack of data. However, as an estimate of 

hospital costs, it is an over-estimate for an unknown percentage of the injuries on-site that did not 

require hospitalizations and may not involve any medical costs 81Orfor injuries and toxic exposures that 

led to hospitalizations andwere minor enough that the person was released within a day (the HHS cost 

estimates are based on 3-day stays for poisonings and injuries, 8 days for burns). However, in the 

opposite direction, the $50,000 cost estimate is understated for those workers who were severely 

injured, for whom the medical costs would certainly have involved more than hospitalization. There 

would be costs associated with further medical treatment, and physical and occupational therapy. 

6.2.4.2 Evacuations and Shelter-in-Place Events

The 10-year baseline data do not provide any basis for estimating the time involved in the average 

evacuation or sheltering. EPA assumes that sheltering-in-place is less disruptive than evacuations. To 

estimate costs for evacuations and sheltering-in-place, the analysis assumed the value of time of 

affected people was $22.65 per hour, and that the shelterings occupied 4hours, and the evacuations 8 

hours. 82

6.2.4.3 Summary of Monetized Accident Impacts

The dominant monetized element of RMP facility reportable accidents is on-site property damage, 

followed by onsite fatalities. The total monetized 10-year cost of the accidents is about $2.7 billion. 

$2.6 billion of that is caused by on-site impacts, and about $2.5 billion is attributed to property damage 

and fatalities. Monetizing the values of accidents during the 10-year baseline involved a high degree of 

uncertainty associated with the estimated unit values for on-site injuries, off-site hospitalization, 

evacuations, and sheltering-in-place. However, these components of cost are small relative to the total 

cost of chemical accidents. Exhibit 6-5summarizes the 10-year baseline reportable accident impacts 

and Exhibit 6-6presents the monetized 10-year baseline accident costs.

 81 Even for widely investigated accidents, few details on injury levels are available. For the most serious accident in 

the RMP data, the March 2005 BP explosion and fire, which killed 15 workers, the level of injury among the 170 

listed (in the facility RMP) is not well described. The CSB report indicates that 180 people were injured in the 

accident, and that 114 of these received only first aid and the injuries for the remaining individuals were serious 

enough to require medical treatment, days away from work, and/or restricted work hours. One press report 

stated that several were severely injured. 

82 BLS data put the mean hourly wage at $22.65 across all workers at the end of 2014.

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t01.htm
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Exhibit 6-5: Average Impacts per Year and Accident

10-Year Total Average/Year Average/Accident

Onsite

Fatalities 58 5.80 0.038

Injuries 2,103 210 1.386

Property Damage $2,054,895,236 $205,489,524 $1,354,578

Offsite

Fatalities 1 0.10 0.001

Hospitalizations 189 19 0.125

Medical Treatment 14,807 1,481 9.76

Evacuations 38,589 3,859 25.44

Sheltering in Place 451,665 45,167 298

Property Damage $11,352,105 $1,135,211 $7,483

Exhibit 6-6: Monetized Accident Costs per Year and Accident

Unit Value 10-Year Total Average/Year Average/Accident

Onsite

Fatalities $8,583,113 $497,820,554 $49,782,055.40 $328,161.21 

Injuries $50,000 $105,150,000 $10,515,000 $69,314 

Property Damage $2,054,895,236 $205,489,524 $1,354,578 

Onsite Total $2,657,865,790 $265,786,579 $1,752,053 

Offsite

Fatalities $8,583,113 $8,583,113 $858,311 $5,658 

Hospitalizations $36,000 $6,804,000 $680,400 $4,485 

Medical Treatment $1,000 $14,807,000 $1,480,700 $9,761 

Evacuations $181 $6,992,327 $699,233 $4,609 

Sheltering in Place $91 $40,920,849 $4,092,085 $26,975 

Property Damage $11,352,105 $1,135,211 $7,483 

Offsite Total $89,459,394 $8,945,939 $58,971 

Total $2,747,325,184 $274,732,518 $1,811,024 

6.3 Benefits Compared to Costs

The 10-year RMP baseline suggests that considering only the monetized impacts of RMP accidents 

would mean that the rule’s costs likely outweigh the portion of impacts from improved prevention and 

mitigation that were monetized. The annualized cost of the proposed rule (estimated to range from 

$130 million with no new responders to $162 million if 50percent of non-responders must become 

responders) is between 47 % and 60 % of the average annual monetized costs in the 10-year baseline. 

However, the monetized impacts of RMP accidents omit important benefit categories including avoided 
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impacts of non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities; the information benefits described above; and 

additional benefit categories not reported in the RMP data that result from accident prevention and 

mitigation. Additional benefit categoriesinclude lost productivity; avoided responder costs; avoided 

transaction costs; protected property values; and avoided environmental impacts;In addition, the 

proposed rule may cause a reduction in the probability or magnitude of a major catastrophe such as the 

toxic gas release at Bhopal or the explosion at Phillips in Pasadena, TX in 1989. No such major 

catastrophes are reflected in the 10-year baseline. The following sections describemajor catastrophes 

and additional benefit categories not covered by the RMP data that derive from accident prevention and 

mitigation.

6.4 Avoided Catastrophes

Congress, in enacting section 112(r), was focused on catastrophic accidents such as Bhopal, which are 

extremely rare, but very high consequence events. The large chemical facility accidents that have

occurred in the US and Europe, since the beginning of the chemical era, have not approached this level 

of damage, although it is possible that one could do so. The single largest U.S. chemical accident, the 

explosion at Phillips, Pasadena, TX, in 1989 killed 23 workers ($197 million in current dollars), injured at 

least 150 more ($7.5 million), and did $1.4 billion in property damage. 83 The 10-year baseline does not 

include a major catastrophe such as these. If the proposed revisions were to prevent or substantially 

mitigate even one accident of this magnitude, the benefits generated would be dramatic. 

6.5 Additional Benefit Categories Associated with Accident Prevention and 

Mitigation

The sections below present a discussion of benefits from the proposed rule provisions for which there is 

either limited or no information in the RMP data. EPA qualitatively describes each category as a cost of 

accidents. The proposed rule is expected to reduce costs in each of these categories by an uncertain 

amount. In each case, data were unavailable to quantify expected impacts of the rule. 

6.5.1.1 Avoided Lost Productivity

A major cost associated with some chemical releases that is not captured in the 10-year-baseline 

estimates presented above, is lost productivity that can result if a facility or process unit must be shut 

down or is destroyed. The RMP data include estimates of property damage but specifically exclude 

estimates of lost productivity.84 EPA has not estimated these costs because of a lack of data. Such costs 

are highly variable based on the type of release, the extent of the damage, the location of the facility, 

and product being produced. Marsh, a risk management and energy consultancy, has collected data on 

 

83 Marsh, The 100 Largest Losses, 1974-2013, Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry,

23rd Edition. 

84 EPA instructions for RMP submissions specifically direct the owner or operator not to include any losses incurred 

as a result of business interruption. See page 74 of the RMP*eSubmit Users’ Manual (EPA, March 2014); 

http://www.epa.gov/rmp/rmpesubmit-users-manual. 
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10,000 accidents in the petrochemical sector over 40 years and published 23 editions of its “100 Largest 

Losses” reports. These limited data suggest that lost productivitymay range from zero to four to five 

times the cost of property damage. 85 Many releases of toxics do not result in property damage and, 

therefore, have a limited impact on business beyond the loss of the chemical itself. Explosions and fires, 

however, can produce substantial damage. 

The Marsh accident summaries provide examples of the extent of damage and the impact on 

production, as well as on the variability in those impacts. One refinery facility had $240 million in 

damage, but continued to operate; another with the same level of damage was shut down for 6 months. 

Production units affected by major explosions have been shut down for weeks or months or more than a 

year. Some accident reports indicate production continued but at a reduced rate for weeks or months. 

A refinery accident that shuts down one or more units will affect the firm involved, especially if it has no 

other refinery in the area or its other units do not have the capacity to increase production. Such 

reduced production may, however, be offset by increased production at other firms. Refining capacity 

in the US is located primarily in the Gulf Coast and West Coast regions; accidents that shut down units in 

those areas are less likely to have economic impacts beyond the firm owning the refinery if other nearby 

refineries can increase production. Accidents at refineries in other regions could impose social costs

because even if other refineries can produce more, there may be higher costs of transporting products 

longer distances. 

Broader losses could occur in the petrochemical sector where some facilities may be one of the only 

sources for some products. Even in that sector, however, losses may be limited to the firm involved. 

For example, the 1989 explosion at the Phillips plant in Pasadena, TX, which destroyed two units at the 

facility appears to have had a limited impact on the economy even though it was the only domestic 

source for one product. 86 Appendix A provides a list of the major US accidents cited by Marsh in its 2013 

publication, with losses adjusted by Marsh to 2013 dollars. These accidents are limited to those that 

might have occurred at RMP facilities (offshore oil and distribution accidents were omitted) and to those 

that were not the result of natural disasters where the damage was the result of flooding or wind, rather 

than chemical releases. The accident list does not include all serious accidents because Marsh excluded 

any accident that produced less than $130 million in property damage. (The publication covers 

accidents worldwide.) Nonetheless, the list indicates the range of property damage and the lost 

productivity. 

6.5.1.2 Avoided Emergency ResponseCosts

EPA was unable to locate data summarizing the costs associated with responding to a chemical release, 

fire, or explosion. Very likely these costs vary widely depending on the incident. A response may 

involve facility fire brigades, community fire departments, volunteer fire departments, and mutual aid 

 85 Marsh, The 100 Largest Losses, 1974-2013, Large property damage losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry

23rd Edition. Marsh provides estimates of property damage in current dollars and in a few cases, business loss 

costs.

86 http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/25/us/reverberations-for-industries-but-not-for-us-households.html
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groups. There is also the cost associated with equipment depreciation and fire suppressant used. The 

level of effort and equipment use can be seen in two incidents reported by Marsh. For a 1999 refinery 

fire in CA, approximately 300 firefighters and 33 fire trucks participated in the two-and-a-half-hour 

effort to control the fire. Foam concentrate consumption totaled 3,200 gallons. A 1989 explosion at a 

Louisiana refinery used approximately 48,000 gallons of foam concentrate, 200 fire brigade members, 

and 13 pumper units during the firefighting effort, which extinguished the fire approximately 14 hours 

after the initial explosion. Foam concentrate costs between $20 and $60 per gallon; the cost of the fire 

suppressant alone for these two fires ranged from $64,000 to almost $2.9 million. In sum, EPA expects 

that these costs are significant.

6.5.1.3 Avoided Transaction Costs

One consequence of chemical accidents is often litigation. Particularly when the public is affected, 

facilities are often sued. For example, a 1988 refinery explosion led to more than 5,000 property 

claims87. There are substantial costs associated with making and responding to such claims and the 

litigation surrounding them, both on behalf of plaintiffs and defendants. Rule provisions that reduce the 

number or severity of accidents could reduce the number of lawsuits and the amount of resources 

directed toward litigation.

6.5.1.4 Avoided Property Value Impacts

Following an explosion or other chemical release at an RMP facility, the marketplace for nearby 

properties will adjust to reflect changes in perceived risk, changes in the aesthetic appeal of the 

surrounding area, and potentially reduced ecological services. An established literature in economics 

has estimated the impacts on nearby property values of a wide variety of contaminated, toxic, or 

potentially toxic sites. 88 A variety of papers have specifically examined the impact on property prices of 

hazardous industrial facilities, usually finding that prices increase with distance from the facility.89 To 

improve understanding of the benefits of the proposed rule, we targeted research on the property value 

impact of accidents, not simply proximity to hazardous facilities. Several studies are particularly 

relevant. Carroll et al (1996) studied property prices in neighborhoods surrounding the Pepcon chemical 

facility in Nevada before and aftera dramatic explosion in 1988. Data were for almost 5,000 property 

transactions from 1986 to 1990. The explosion was followed by a 17.6% decline in property values in 

the two closest towns of Green Valley and Henderson (located a mean distance from the Pepcon plant 

of 3.2 miles and 3.5 miles respectively). It was later announced that the Pepcon facility would be rebuilt 

over 100 miles away. Local home prices rebounded by 38% after the announcement, suggesting that 

proximity to the plant prior to the explosion was suppressing property values. 

 87 See Marsh, Shell Norco explosion. 88 See Boyle and Kiel (2001) or Banzhaf and McCormick (2007) for reviews of the literature. 89 See Grislain-Letremy and Katossky (2014) for a review of the literature. (Their Appendix A.1 summarizes 

findings.) 
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Hansen et al. (2006) studied the effect of a 1999 fuel pipeline explosion in Bellingham, Washington. 

While the explosion was not from a chemical facility, its property value impacts may be comparable. 90

The data analyzed were a sample of Bellingham single family home sales located within a mile of two 

pipelines. The sales transacted from 5 and a half years prior to the explosion to 5 years after. Following 

the event, property prices were significantly adversely affected, with the mean property price 

discounted by 4.6% for a property 50 feet from the pipeline or 2.3% at 100 feet, 1.2% at 200 feet and 

0.2% at 1,000 feet. The authors concluded that the effect diminished over time. 

These studies suggest that preventing or mitigating an accident at a chemical facility may prevent or 

mitigate property value losses in nearby neighborhoods. Note that any avoided property value losses 

represent part of society’s combined valuation of reduced risks to human health, reduced ecosystem 

services, and negative impacts on aesthetic appeal. Property value losses would represent only nearby 

homeowners, not any other affected parties such as employees who do not reside in the immediate 

neighborhood.

6.5.1.5 Avoided Environmental Impacts

In addition to information on deaths, injuries, property damage, evacuations, and sheltering in place, 

the RMP rule requires owners and operators to report within the five-year accident history accidental 

releases that result in environmental damage. However, the environmental damage information 

contained in the RMP database is limited, for two reasons. First, most releases of RMP-regulated 

substances do not result in lingering contamination issues because most regulated substances are either 

highly volatile toxics thatwill rapidly disperse in air, or highly flammablesubstances thatignite if 

released in the presence of an ignition source. The other reason is that RMP accident history reports 

indicate general categories of environmental damage (e.g., fish or animal kills, tree, lawn, shrub, or crop 

damage, etc.), but do not contain any estimates of damage valuation, or other specific information on 

reported impacts. 

Notwithstanding these limitations, some RMP accidents do result in environmental damage. For 

example, in the 10-year baseline there were approximately 50 incidents in which offsite environmental 

damage was the only impact reported. Rule provisions that prevent or mitigate the extent of accidental 

releases are therefore likely to prevent or reduce the environmental impacts associated with those 

releases, but these benefits cannot be quantified using the available data. 

 90 An important difference between a pipeline and a chemical facility is that pipelines may not be as noticeable. 

Parts of the pipelines in Bellingham were buried. Unlike homes near the Pepcon plant, for the five-year period 

prior to the Bellingham pipeline explosion, nearby property prices showed no effect of proximity to a pipeline. 

However, we are interested here in the impact of accidents or, for evaluating the proposed rule, the impact of 

accident prevention, so the house price effects of a pipeline explosion seem informative. 
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6.6 Conclusions

It is not possible to estimate quantitative benefits for the proposed rule. EPA has no data to project the 

specific impact on accidents made by each proposed rule provision. The accidents themselves have 

highly variable impacts that are difficult to predict. However, it is clear from the RMP accident data and 

other data, such as that reported by Marsh, that chemical accidents can impose substantial costs on 

firms, employees, emergency responders, the community, and the broader economy. Reducing the risk 

of such accidents and the severity of the impacts when accidents occur, and improving information 

provision, as the proposed provisions intend, would provide benefits to the potentially affected 

members of society.

Exhibit 6-9 summarizes all of the benefit or accident cost categories described in this chapter. There are 

four broad benefit categories related to accident prevention and mitigation including RMP accidents, 

non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities, and potentialmajor catastrophes. The exhibit explains each and 

identifiesten associated specific benefit categories. Exhibit 6-7also highlights and explains the 

information disclosure benefit category and identifies two specific benefits associated with it. 

Exhibit 6-7: Summary of Social Benefits

Broad Benefit Category Explanation Specific Benefit Categories

Accident Prevention

Prevention of future RMP facility accidents • Reduced Fatalities

• Reduced Injuries

• Reduced Property 

Damage

• Fewer People 

Sheltered in Place

• Fewer Evacuations

• Avoided Lost 

Productivity

• Avoided Emergency 

Response Costs

• Avoided Transaction 

Costs

• Avoided Property 

Value Impacts*

• Avoided 

Environmental 

Impacts

Accident Mitigation

Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents

Non-RMP accident 

prevention and mitigation

Prevention and mitigation of future non-RMP 

accidents at RMP facilities

Avoided Catastrophes Prevention of rare but extremely high 

consequence events

Information Disclosure Provision of information to the public and 

LEPCs

• Improved efficiency 

of property markets

• Improved resource 

allocation

 * These impacts partially overlap with several other categories, such as reduced health and environmental impacts
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To get a sense of the size of the population affected by the proposed rule provisions, EPA determined

the number of people that would be affected by facility worst case scenarios and alternative release 

scenarios. A worst case scenario varies slightly depending on which program level a substance is 

managed under, but generally identifies the largest potential reach and effect of a hypothetical 

accidental release. The alternative release scenario identifies the potential reach and effect under more 

realistic circumstances than the worst-case scenario. Using RMP data and MARPLOT, EPA was able to 

determine that the aggregate U.S. population impacted by worst case scenarios is approximately 177 

million. The aggregate U.S. population impacted by alternative release scenarios is approximately 40 

million.91 Although the 10-year baseline of accidents does not include a major catastrophe – such as the 

Pasadena, TX explosion –the population estimates do demonstrate that a significant portion of the U.S. 

population are at risk for these scenarios. Many of the provisions proposed in this rule are intended to 

reduce the risks and impacts for this large portion of the country.

 91 EPA. 2016. Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs 

under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
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CHAPTER 7: SMALL ENTITY IMPACTS

The Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) requires agencies to determine 

whether a proposed rule will have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 

entities.” The Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the standard for defining a small entity by 5 or 6-

digit NAICS code, for businesses (13 CFR part 121); governments are considered small if they serve fewer 

than 50,000 residents.92 Although “significant economic impact” is not defined by either the RFA or 

SBA, EPA guidance considers thresholds of one percent and three percent of revenues.93 This analysis, 

however, uses the more stringent one percent threshold because almost 39 percent of the small entities 

affected by the rule are agricultural chemical distributors; data from the Department of Agriculture 

indicates that net income in this sector is less than three percent of sales. 94

This chapter presents the analysis of potential impacts of the rule on small entities. The first section 

discusses the industrial sectors reported by RMP facilities. The second section describes the approach 

to determining how many facilities and firms subject to the rule are small based on SBA standards. The 

third section discusses the economic impacts of the rule on small entities.

7.1 RMP Affected Sectors

The RMP rule affects a broad range of sectors (296 separate NAICS codes are listed in RMP filings; 240 of 

these are associated with small entities). The primary sectors subject to the rule and the SBA standards 

for defining a small firm are shown in Exhibit 7-1. A dollar value standard refers to firm revenues in 

millions;the full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees applies to the firm’s total FTE, not the number at any 

one location. For governments, the standard is based on the population served. The NAICS codes are 

presented at the 2 to 6-digit level based on whether the SBA standard varies for the 5 and 6-digit codes 

and whether there are a substantial number of RMP facilities in the sector. 95 For example, the SBA 

standard for the wholesale trade sector, NAICS code 42, is the same across all codes (100 FTE).

 92 Some small governments serve substantial populations associated with businesses, particularly irrigation 

districts that serve large farming areas, but few residences, and small cities that have large tourist-related 

businesses.

93 See Chapter 2 of Final Guidance for EPA Rulewriters: Regulatory Flexibility Act, 

http://www.epa.gov/rfa/documents/Guidance-RegFlexAct.pdf. 94 http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2013/10/0199.xml 95 In some cases, NAICS codes are disaggregated to 5 digits and in others 6 digits. SBA does not include all 6-digit 

codes in its regulation.
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Exhibit 7-1: Industry Sector Small Entity Standards

NAICS Sector Standard NAICS Sector Standard

111 Crop Production $0.75m 3253

Pesticide, Fertilizer, 

and Other Agricultural 

Chemical 

Manufacturing

500 FTE

112 Animal Production and 

Aquaculture $0.75m-$15m 3254

Pharmaceutical and 

Medicine 

Manufacturing

750 FTE

115 Support Activities for 

Agriculture and Forestry $7.5m 3255

Paint, Coating, and 

Adhesive 

Manufacturing

500 FTE

211111 Crude Petroleum and 

Natural Gas Extraction 500 FTE 3256

Soap, Cleaning 

Compound, and Toilet 

Preparation 

Manufacturing

500-750 

FTE

221112 Fossil Fuel Electric Power 

Generation 750 FTE 3259

Other Chemical 

Product and 

Preparation 

Manufacturing

500-750 

FTE

22131 Water Supply and 

Irrigation Systems $27.5m 326

Plastics and Rubber 

Products 

Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

22132 Sewage Treatment 

Facilities $20.5m 327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3111 Animal Food 

Manufacturing 500 FTE 331 Primary Metal Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3112 Grain and Oilseed Milling 500 -1000 FTE 332 Fabricated Metal 

Product Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3113 Sugar and Confectionery 

Product Manufacturing 500-750 FTE 333 Machinery Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3114

Fruit and Vegetable 

Preserving and Specialty 

Food Manufacturing

500 -1000 FTE 334

Computer and 

Electronic Product 

Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3115 Dairy Product 

Manufacturing 500 FTE 335

Electrical Equipment, 

Appliance, and 

Component 

Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3116 Animal Slaughtering and 

Processing 500 FTE 336

Transportation 

Equipment 

Manufacturing

500 -1000 

FTE

3117

Seafood Product 

Preparation and 

Packaging

500 FTE 337 Furniture and Related 

Product Manufacturing 500 FTE

3118 Bakeries and Tortilla 

Manufacturing 500-750 FTE 339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 500 FTE

3119 Other Food 

Manufacturing 500 FTE 42 Wholesale Trade 100 FTE
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3121 Beverage Manufacturing 500 FTE 44422

Nursery, Garden 

Center, and Farm 

Supply Stores

$11m

322 Paper Manufacturing 500-750 FTE 45431 Fuel Dealers 50 FTE

32411 Petroleum Refineries 1500 FTE 48691 Pipeline Transportation 

of Refined Product 1,500 FTE

32412

Asphalt Paving, Roofing, 

and Saturated Materials 

Manufacturing

500 FTE 48821 Support Activities for 

Rail Transportation $15m

32419

Other Petroleum and 

Coal Products 

Manufacturing

500-750 FTE 4931 General Warehousing 

and Storage $27.5m

3251 Basic Chemical 

Manufacturing 750-1000 FTE 56179 Other Services to Buildings and Dwellings $7.5m

3252 Resin and Synthetic 

Rubber Manufacturing 750-1000 FTE 5621

5622 Waste Management $38.5m

92 Governments

<50,000 

residents 

served

The codes that some facilities listed in their RMP filings are problematic. First, many firms list multiple 

NAICS codes for their facilities. Particularly for agricultural chemical distributors there is often no clear 

reason for assigning facilities to different NAICS codes when the activities appear to be the same (e.g., 

facilities named as agricultural co-ops appear in NAICS 111, 115, 32531, 325312, 325313, 325314, 

325193, 42451, 42459, 42491, 444, 453, and 493). For other facilities, the parent firm has listed its 

facilities in the code appropriate for activities occurring at a specific location, but not appropriate for the 

firm (e.g., integrated gas exploration, production, and distribution companies have facilities in NAICS 

211, 424, 486, and 488; integrated oil firms list facilities in NAICS 211, 213, 221, 324, 325, 424, and 541). 

Second, not all of the NAICS codes listed exist; some are clearly earlier versions of current codes (42269 

rather than 42469) and were recoded, but others represent subsectors that do not exist, making them 

difficult to define. Third, checks of some facilities indicate that the sector listed is incorrect; the only 

facility with less than 5 FTEs listed for NAICS 32511 (petrochemicals) is variously described in Internet 

sources as an aerosol packager (an official Missouri report), a paperboard company, or an agricultural 

chemical distributor (it was recoded to NAICS 32599). Finally, almost all of the governmental entities, 

which should be listed under NAICS code 92, listed themselves under other codes, primarily 2213 (water 

and wastewater treatment), but also under chemical manufacturing and waste management; all of 

these were recoded to NAICS 924. Some of the other facilities listed under NAICS 2213 belong to 

manufacturing plants. The decision rules applied to re-categorize firms into correct NAICS codes are 

discussed below.
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7.2 Estimating the Number of Small Entities 

The RFA and the SBA standards apply to firms, not establishments, because the costs of the rule are 

ultimately borne by the firm, rather than the facility. Therefore, to determine the number of small 

entities, the analysis identified the number of firms and the size of those entities. The RMP data include 

facility and parent company name as well as the number of full time equivalents (FTE) for the facility and 

the NAICS codes. Although this information facilitates the small entity analysis, a review of the data 

indicated a substantial number of issues. Parent company information was often missing and when 

present, incorrect. For example, for one company with 68 facilities, 15 listed no parent company, 52 

listed the company name, and only 1 listed the name of the foreign firm that owns the company. Two 

cooperatives with 20 and 30 RMP facilities listed zero FTEs for every facility; research indicated that one 

is among the largest firms in its sector, with revenues of about $1 billion and a senior management team 

of 15 people. The size of the parent cooperative for the second could not be determined and, therefore, 

it was categorized as small. Research on one facility determined that it was owned by another firm; that 

firm in turn was determined to own 8 companies, most of which have RMP facilities but none of which 

had identified the parent company. Particularly in the oil and gas sectors, where corporate structures 

include multiple divisions that are separate legal entities for management and tax purposes, and where 

mergers are frequent, facilities often list the intermediate entities rather than the actual parent 

company or the entity that purchased the site rather than the current owner.

To develop an estimate of the number of small entities, the analysis required a series of reviews of the 

data to identify the large entities and the small entities that were part of small firms owning multiple 

facilities. First, any facility that exceeded 1,500 FTE was categorized as large; 1,500 FTE is the highest 

threshold for large entities when the SBA standard is based on FTE. Based on Economic Census data, it 

was determined that any facility of that size would also generate revenues high enough to exceed the 

highest revenue threshold of any covered sector. Second, SBA sets its standards to ensure that while 

most firms in a sector are classified as small, the largest firms in a sector are not. Any facility that 

belonged to the largest firms in the sector were classified as large (e.g., each of the 96 facilities that 

belong to Tysons Foods). Industry data on the largest firms in each of the major sectors (agricultural 

chemical distributors, food manufacturers, chemical manufacturers, and oil and gas companies) were 

used to identify those firms. The largest government entities were also identified in this screen (e.g., all 

federal entities; any State-owned facility; water systems serving Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, 

etc.). 

The data were reviewed to identify parent companies that were clear from the facility name, but not 

included in the parent company field. That made it possible to determine the total FTE for facilities 

belonging to the same parent company and compare that number to the SBA standard (when in FTEs). 

If the total FTE exceeded the standard, all the facilities were classified as large. Where the facilities 

listed different NAICS codes, the analysis applied either the code used for a majority of the facilities or, if 

no single code dominated, the code with the highest threshold. For example, if a firm had facilities in 
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sectors where the standards were 500 and 1000 FTE, the 1000 FTE standard was used to determine if 

the firm was large. 

For remaining facilities, if there were multiple facilities belonging to a single firm and the total FTE 

approached the threshold or if the name included “USA” or “US holdings”, which implied an 

international company, Internet searches were conducted to identify whether the facilities belonged to 

a firm with other facilities or employees. For example, a chemical company with 7 facilities with a total 

of less than 300 FTE was determined to belong to a Finnish firm with more 4,000 employees. For oil and 

gas exploration facilities (NAICS 211), which often have general names (e.g., gas plant 1), EPA’s facility 

registry system was checked to determine which firm owned the facility. 96

The RFA defines small governments as governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, 

school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.97 Most governmental 

RMP facilities are water and wastewater treatment systems and listed a city or county as the owning 

entity. A check of budgets that were available for some of the smallest cities indicated that the systems

(1) are sub agencies of the city/county and (2) obtain some revenues from the general fund although 

most of their revenues are derived from user fees. To determine which facilities belong to small 

governments, the population for the associated city or county was determined by checking the 2014 

estimates from the Census. For special water and irrigation districts, their Internet sites were checked 

for information on the population served. Exhibit 7-2 presents the number of small and large facilities 

by program level. Exhibit 7-3 presents the small/large breakdown by sectors.

Exhibit 7-2: Number of Facilities Owned by Small and Large Entities by Program Level

RMP Program Small Large Total

Program 3 3,996 6,619 10,615

Program 2 695 590 1285

Program 1 219 423 642

Total 4,910 7,632 12,542

The number of small entities is likely to be overstated. Particularly in the agricultural chemical 

distributor sector, it was not possible to determine common ownership among facilities with common 

names (e.g., Farmers Cooperative). Not all of these facilities have websites and, when they do, they do 

not always provide information on ownership or locations. Unless the names were identical and the 

facilities located in the same State, the analysis assumed that they belonged to separate firms. It is also 

likely that for many of these facilities the FTE reported are too low. A number of the agricultural 

chemical distributors listed multiple facilities at zero FTE even though they are open more than 8 hours a 

day, 5 days a week. 

 96 http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/fii/index.html 97 5 U.S.C. 602.
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The classification of facilities as Program 1, 2, or 3 is based solely on the RMP data submitted, but, as 

explained in Chapter 3, EPA has reclassified the wholesale facilities and certain others based on OSHA’s 

revised interpretation of the PSM retail exemption, which will move these facilities from Program 2 to 

Program 3. A review of other facilities indicates that, in some cases, classifications in the RMP database 

are inappropriate. For example, of the 701 water/wastewater facilities in State-plan states, 661 listed 

themselves correctly as P3, but 40 (including those in a major city) listed themselves as P2. 98Of the 

1,194 publicly owned facilities in States where Federal OSHA implements the PSM standard, 893 listed 

themselves correctly as P2, but 301 said they are P3. In addition, there are more than 500 other 

facilities that listed themselves as P2 (outside of the primary agricultural retail sectors); although many 

of these are, in fact, agricultural chemical distributors, others appear to be facilities that should be 

subject to Program 3. 

Exhibit 7-3: Program Level and Size by Sector

Program 1 Program 2 Program 3

Total NAICS Description Small Large Small Large Small Large

311 Food Mfr 1 2 6 5 357 1,014 1,385

312 Beverage/Ice 0 0 0 0 11 80 91

322 Paper/Pulp 0 1 0 1 5 63 70

324 Petroleum 5 8 0 3 21 119 156

325 Chemical 32 21 49 27 458 878 1,465

313, 321, 326, 327, 33 Other Manufacturing 33 29 34 39 113 136 384

4246 Chemical Distributors 2 4 0 0 91 236 333

4247 Petroleum Distributors 3 11 0 0 69 193 276

11, 12, 15, 42491 Agricultural 9 1 0 0 1,809 1,848 3,667

211 Oil and Gas Exploration 88 222 13 28 104 286 741

2213 Water/Wastewater 0 1 6 4 12 79 102

221 222 Utilities 22 16 35 37 80 153 343

493 Warehousing 11 59 0 0 267 719 1,056

423, 424 Other Wholesale 0 5 0 0 100 197 302

92 Governments 6 9 521 414 451 522 1,923

Other 7 34 31 32 48 96 248

Total 219 423 695 590 3,996 6,619 12,542

 98 About half of the States have accepted delegation to enforce OSHA rules; OSHA refers to these as State-plan 

States. As a condition of delegation, the State must impose OSHA standards on State and local governments. 

Federal OSHA has no authority over those governments, so in States where OSHA enforces the rules, they do not 

apply to governments.
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7.2.1. FIRMS

The RFA applies to firms, not facilities (or establishments, the term used by the Economic Census). For 

facilities owned by small firms, the analysis identified 1,296 parent companies and 1,184 facilities with 

no parent company, for a total of 2,480 firms that are small entities. Because firms own facilities in 

different program levels it is not possible to disaggregate firms by program level accurately. Exhibit 7-4 

presents the data on small firms, disaggregated by the total FTE for all the RMP facilities operated by the 

firms. The exhibit presents firms in four groups: single locations where no parent company was 

identified; firms with single locations whose name indicated that it owned other presumably non-RMP 

facilities at other locations;99 facilities that listed a parent company, but had only one RMP location; and 

firms that listed a parent company and have multiple RMP facilities. Firms with multiple locations were 

separated because the FTE counts for these (and for parent companies) will understate the total FTE of 

the firm and, therefore, the revenue base. Note that this exhibit does not include small governments.

Exhibit 7-4: Small Firms by FTE Totals

Firms <5 FTE 5-19 

FTE

20-99 

FTE

100+ 

FTE

Total 

Firms

Total RMP 

Facilities

No Parent Company

Single Location 187 355 376 230 1,148 1,148

Multiple locations 30 2 5 1 38 38

Parent Company

Single RMP Location 67 238 325 188 818 818

Multiple RMP locations 53 154 193 76 476 1,928

Total 337 749 899 495 2480 3,932*

* Total RMP facilities excludes the 978 small government facilities.

This analysis also divides facilities by responder status. There are a total of 1,404 small responding 

facilities and 3,289 small non-responding facilities (includes governments, but excludes P1 facilities). 

Exhibit 7-5 breaks down the number of small non-government facilities that indicated in their RMPs that 

they are not responders, by FTE. (Government facilities are excluded because FTEs do not reflect the 

size of the governmental entity.) If any current non-responding facilities should become responders as a 

result of the proposed revisions to the regulation, then costs to purchase and maintain equipment, train 

personnel, and conduct exercises increase based on the number of people at the facility. Appendix A 

provides a breakdown of the number of facilities by 3 and 5/6-digit NAICS code by FTE and responder 

status for non-governmental facilities.

 99 For example, X Cooperative, Y terminal/plant/location. 
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Exhibit 7-5: Non-Governmental Non-Responding Facilities by FTE

Non-Responders

0-19 FTE 1,869

20-99 FTE 489

100+ FTE 179

Total 2,537

The proposed rule would impose the STAA requirements on facilities with P3 processes in three NAICS 

codes – 322 (paper and pulp), 324 (petroleum), and 325 (chemicals). Exhibit 7-6 presents the 

breakdown of facilities owned by small firms in those sectors by facility FTE.

Exhibit 7-6: P3 Facilities Owned by Small Firms and Subject to STAA by Facility Size and Sector

Facility Size

STAA Facilities 0-19 FTE 20-99 FTE 100+

NAICS 322 5

NAICS 324 1 9 11

NAICS 3251/3252 39 222 54

NAICS 3253-3259 40 66 37

7.2.2 GOVERNMENTS

As shown in Exhibit 7-3, there are a combined total of 972 facilities with P2 and P3 processes that are 

owned and operated by small governments (i.e., the government serves less than 50,000 residents). 

Because governments that serve populations above 15,000 have revenues well above $10 million so 

that the costs of the rule would never exceed 1%, the analysis focused on those that served fewer than 

15,000 people. Exhibit 7-7 presents the number of all small governments and the number serving less 

than 15,000 by the number of RMP facilities they operate. Three government facilities included in the 

number of small governments and number of small government non-responders could not be classified 

by population; each is a special district for which information could not be located to determine 

residents served. Two are in very small rural areas and likely serve fewer than 5,000; the third is in a 

suburb of Salt Lake City and appears to serve at least 25,000 residents.

Exhibit 7-7: Small Governments by the Number of RMP Facilities (P2 and P3) Operated

Category Number of Governments Number of Facilities

All Small Governments 689 972

Non Responders 524 750

Non Responders <15,000 Residents 257 364

Non Responders <10,000 Residents 165 210

Non Responders <5,000 Residents 58 75
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Unlike the facilities operated by small firms that have multiple RMP facilities, water and wastewater 

systems operated by small governments are generally in the same town. Where a small firm with 

multiple facilities may have to train response teams for each facility it operates, a small city or town is 

more likely to train a single response team to cover all of its facilities. 

In addition to cities and local districts with RMP-regulated facilities, cities and towns where other RMPregulated facilities are located may also incur indirect costs associated with participation in exercises 

and with reviewing information submitted to the LEPCs or emergency response officials. LEPCs are 

organized at both the city and county level depending on the location. RMP facilities are located in 

more than 1,000 counties and more than 5,000 cities/towns/villages. The counties have from 1 to 187 

facilities (the latter is Harris County, TX, which covers Houston). Although in general the smallest 

counties have only one or two facilities, there are a few small counties with more than five.

7.3 Economic Impact on Small Entities 

7.3.1 Costs for Small Entities

Under the proposed rule, all facilities would be required to make certain information available to the 

public and to the LEPC. Practically, P1 facilities would not have to spend more than an hour a year on 

this disclosure because the information disclosed to the public is information every facility should have 

readily available and because the additional information disclosed to the LEPC relates to provisions that 

do not apply to P1 facilities. Therefore, the RIA has not considered P1 small facilities in the analysis of 

impacts.

P2 and P3 facilities would incur the same costs for the other proposed provisions except the STAA. Each 

facility would be required to disclose information annually, hold a public meeting at least once every 5 

years, and coordinate with the local responders and conduct a notification drill annually. If the facility is 

a responder, it would have to hold an annual exercise, including at least one full field exercise every 5 

years. P3 facilities in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325 would have to conduct an STAA as part their PHA 

every 5 years.

If a facility has an accident, it would incur costs for obtaining a third-party to conduct their next 

scheduled compliance audit. It would also incur additional costs to conduct a root cause analysis as part 

of the incident investigation. Facilities would be required to conduct investigations of near misses, 

including a root cause analysis. Finally, if a facility has to become a responder, it would incur costs to 

develop an emergency response plan, train personnel to respond, purchase and maintain equipment, 

and conduct exercises. 

Exhibit 7-8 presents three sets of costs: low year, annualized, and high year (excludes costs incurred 

after an accident or a near miss). Low-year costs represent costs for years in which routine annual costs 

apply. These include costs for coordinating with local responders, conducting notification exercises 

(applies to all P2 and P3 facilities), conducting tabletop exercises (applies only to responders), and 

updating disclosure information to the LEPC and the public. High-year costs represent a year in which 
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every applicable provision would occur, except costs incurred after an accident or “near miss.” This 

includes the routine annual costs and periodic costs that apply either every 3 or 5 years (i.e., field 

exercise in lieu of a tabletop exercise, public meeting, all public disclosure requirements, and STAA). 

Because the STAA provisions would only apply to a subset of facilities (i.e., those in NAICS 322, 324, and 

325), these facilities are broken out separately in the last two rows of the exhibit. Complex facilities are 

those categorized as NAICS 324 or 325 and simple facilities are all others. Annualized costs average the 

low costs incurred for four years with the high costs incurred every fifth year.

Exhibit 7-8: Low, Annualized, and High Year Combined Costs for Small Entities by Group

Low Year Cost Annualized High Year Cost

P2 and P3 facilities (excludes 

P3 facilities subject to STAA) Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex

Non Responder $548 $903 $1,182 $2,027 $3,217 $5,280 

Responder 0-19 FTE $6,577 $8,969 $7,175 $9,471 $12,347 $20,357 

Responder 20+ FTE $7,711 $10,442 $9,899 $13,490 $18,151 $24,437 

P3 facilities subject to STAA

Non Responder n/a $903 n/a $6,190 n/a $26,097 

Responder <20 FTE n/a $8,969 n/a $13,635 n/a $41,174 

Exhibit 7-9 presents the incremental costs that current non-responding facilities would incur to become 

responders. These costs include developing an emergency response programpursuant to §68.95, 

employee training, and purchasing and maintaining response and personal protective equipment, but do 

not include the costof exercises. The incremental cost would be added to the responder costs shown in 

Exhibit 7-8. The high-year costs are the first year costs when the emergency response program would 

be developed, personnel trained, and equipment purchased. The low-year cost covers refresher 

training,training for new employees, and equipment maintenance and replacement. The annualized 

cost is annualized over 10 years assuming the high year costs occur in the first year and the low year 

costs in the nine subsequent years.

Exhibit 7-9: Incremental Costs to Become a Responder

Low Annualized High Year

Simple <20 $5,402 $9,799 $49,367 

Simple 20+ $6,038 $10,689 $52,546 

Complex <20 $8,657 $15,877 $80,853 

Governments $8,010 $14,449 $72,405 

Governments are presented separately in Exhibit 7-9 because they would incur higher costs than other 

simple facilities as a consequence of operating a water treatment facility. This is, in part, because they 

would need more equipment, specifically chlorine cylinder repair kits as well as personal protective 

equipment for a higher number of people. Governments are expected to train more people to ensure 

that an adequate number of personnel are available at all times; firefighters may be busy with other 
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critical responses when a release occurs so backups would be needed. Governments also have fewer 

options than other RMP facility owners/operators. A privately owned facility that is a non-responder 

can choose to remain a non-responder if the local government is capable to respond or if the 

owner/operator can help fund the local government to develop hazmat response capability. If a public 

water system is operated by a city or town that does not have appropriate response capability (e.g., a 

hazardous materials, or hazmat, response team), the local government would need to develop a hazmat 

response capability unless the town is close to another community that has a hazmat team and is willing 

to respond. Both public and private facilities could hire emergency response-action contractors to 

respond, but many and perhaps most of the small RMP facilities are in rural areas that are too far from 

contractors to make that a realistic option for releases that require a rapid response. As discussed in 

Chapter 6, more than three quarters of reportable incidents last less than an hour.

As can be seen in Exhibit 7-8, a non-responder with a simple process 100 would only need revenues of 

$118,000 for the annualized costs to be below one percent of its revenues; the high-year cost would 

require revenues above $320,000. If that facility had to become a responder it would need revenues of 

$1 million to $5 million to have revenues that exceed one percent of costs (based on annualized and 

high-year costs). As seen in Exhibits 7-8 and 7-9, small governments would need revenues of $700,000 

to $1.33 million if they are already responders, but $2.1 million to $8.5 million if they have to become 

responders. Small chemical companies subject to STAA would need revenues above $600,000 to $4 

million if they do not need to become responders and $10 million if they do become responders.

If a simple facility has an accident its one-year cost could be as high $20,696; for a complex facility, the 

cost could be as high as $53,979. Because the third-party audit would not necessarily occur in the same 

year as the accident, however, these costs could be distributed overtime.

7.3.2 Estimating Revenues for Small Entities

As is the case for most rules that affect small entities, almost all of the small entities are privately held 

and little if any information is available on their revenues. To determine revenues, Census data on 

revenue per establishment from the 2007 Economic Census were calculated (by dividing total revenue 

by the number of establishments) and a deflator applied to increase revenues to 2013 dollars. (The 

Economic Census uses “establishment” to describe single locations and presents data on establishment 

and firm levels; it does not, however, provide firm-level data for all sectors.) 

Exhibit 7-10 presents the data for the sectors with entities small enough to have revenues that might fall 

below the one percent threshold. For some sectors, the Economic Census provides data only for 0-4 

FTE; for others, it provides data for 1 FTE establishments, 2 FTE, and 3-4 FTE. The Economic Census does 

not cover the agricultural sectors. As noted above, most of the facilities in the agricultural sector appear 

to be agricultural wholesalers,so the analysis used the revenue estimate for NAICS 42491 for these. The 

values listed for NAICS 325199 are for the chemical sector as a whole (NAICS 325) because the Census 

 100 There are no simple processes at very small facilities that are subject to STAA. 
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did not include data for establishments this small for this sector. Where cells are blank in the Exhibit, 

either there are no facilities that fall into the category or the Census does not list revenue data for the 

category. 101 Shaded cells indicate revenues that would exceed costs of the proposed rule by a factor of 

100 or more even in the highest cost year for facilities that needed to become responders,so any facility 

in that size category or above would not be potentially subject to a cost that would exceed one percent 

of revenues. Because the revenues for NAICS 211 are so high for the smallest facilities, no other data 

are listed for that sector. One percent of the highlighted revenues would exceed the cost of the 

proposed rule even in the highest cost year for facilities that needed to become responders, so any 

facility in that size category or above would not be potentially subject to a cost that would exceed one 

percent of revenues. 

Column 2 provides two numbers: first, the number of facilities in the sector that are in size categories 

with revenues low enough that the cost of the rule could exceed one percent of revenues; and, second, 

the number of non-responders out of that total. For example, there are 1,174 small agricultural 

chemical distributorsin NAICS 42491 with fewer than 10 FTE; 1,062 of them are non-responders. Any 

non-responder that remains a non-responder in that sector or any current responder should have 

revenues above the one percent threshold. Any non-responder that has to become a responder, 

however, would incur first year costs that exceed one percent of revenues.

The analysis used facility rather than firm-level revenue for two reasons. First, firm-level data are not 

available for all sectors, particularly manufacturing. Second, it is not possible to determine firm sizes for 

many of the facilities. Focusing on facility level revenue is conservative. If the costs for individual 

facilities that a firm owns do not exceed one percent of the facility revenues, the costs will not exceed 

one percent at the firm level. For example, if a firm owns three facilities, each of which has costs that do 

not exceed one percent of the revenue generated by the facility, the cost will not exceed one percent at 

the firm level where revenues will be at least the total of revenues from each facility. It may not be the 

case, however, that if a firm owns facilities where the cost of the rule would exceed one percent at 

some facilities but not others that the costs would exceed one percent at the firm level. 

The Census Bureau has not published recent data on revenues for cities (the most recent data are from 

2002) and does not cover cities of less than 25,000 population. The Census provides revenue data for 

total local government revenues by county (covering all governmental entities including special districts 

within the country) and a per capita revenue estimate. The Census data indicated that the lowest per 

capita revenue for a covered county was about $1,024 in 2002 dollars (DeKalb County, MO, with 2 

facilities) ($1350 in 2014 dollars). 102 Two other sources (one of which covers all Massachusetts cities and 

 101 Usually data are not presented because there are too few establishments in the size category and listing the 

data could reveal confidential information.

102 https://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/cc07_tabB13.pdf
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towns) indicated a range of $900 to more than $2,500 for expenditures per person. 103 The smallest town 

covered by the rule has about 150 residents and a number of others have fewer than 1,000, but in many 

of these cases it is not clear whether the town owns and operates the facility or whether it is operated 

by a district that serves multiple communities. In a few cases, EPA was able to locate budget data from 

small towns and special districts. Revenues per resident ranged from $196 for a special district that 

serves 9,200 people to $1400. The sample, however, is so small that it would not be appropriate to 

generalize from it. There are some exceptions on the high end as well. One city with a population of 

less than 8,000 has revenues of close to $200 million (based on tourist business); another small city 

operates a combined water system, power system, and cable system; although the water system

produces revenues of $2.5 million, the combined system reported revenues of $190 million. For the 

purpose of the RFA determination, EPA has assumed that revenues per person would not exceed $1,000 

and that any city of less than 10,000 that might need to become a responder could incur costs in the 

high cost year that would exceed one percent of revenues. As shown in Exhibit 7-7, there are 165 small 

governments operating 210 facilities that are non-responders and that serve fewer than 10,000 people.

There are a number of small governments that operate multiple RMP facilities. Although government 

revenues do not increase based on the number of facilities, costs to local governments are not likely to 

scale in the same way as they do for private companies. A local government that operates two or more 

water and wastewater treatment plants would, if needed, develop a single hazmat team because the 

facilities are generally in the same town. The government could hold a single public meeting, issue 

combined public information, and hold joint exercises.

Small cities and counties may also participate in emergency response exercises held by RMP facilities 

and may review information provided by these facilities to LEPCs or other local agencies. These 

activities are voluntary, but it is reasonable to assume that local agencies will spend some time on them. 

Involvement in exercises would generally require less than 8 hours of any participant’s time or 

considerably less than one percent of any person’s annual working hours. Reviewing information 

disclosed would take only one to four hours per facility. Unless a city has a substantial number of RMP 

facilities the effort required would not impose significant costs.

 103

http://parca.samford.edu/LocalGovernment/municipal/Report%20Montgomery%20Revenue%20Comparisons%20

2010%204.2.10.pdf?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

http://www.mass.gov/dor/local-officials/municipal-data-and-financial-management/data-bank-reports/municipalactual-revenues-and-expenditures.html (expenditures per resident)
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Exhibit 7-10: Average Revenue/Establishment for FTE Class (Economic Census)

Total # 

facilities/ 

# of

nonresponders 

where rule 

costs could > 

1% rev

FTEs

NAICS Code 0-4 1 2 3-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99

111 75/62 $1,495,000 $3,329,000 $5,960,000 $11,640,000 $22,735,000

112 1/1 $1,495,000 $3,329,000 $5,960,000 $11,640,000 $22,735,000

115 130/85 $1,495,000 $3,329,000 $5,960,000 $11,640,000 $22,735,000

211112 0 $13,888,000

221119 17/7 $1,837,168 $3,330,268 $6,225,566 $9,896,888

22121 0 $7,505,716 $22,926,662

32512 3/2 $2,692,000 $6,941,000 $13,381,000 $23,392,000

32518 7/2 $1,652,000 $6,207,000 $11,475,000 $23,285,000

325181 0 $1,652,000 $6,606,000

325188 1/1 $2,257,000 $6,207,000 $11,475,000 $23,285,000

32519 0 $1,424,000 $11,437,000 $34,910,000

325193 0 $14,208,000 $21,051,000 $88,511,000

325199 2/1 $1,424,000 $11,437,000 $34,910,000

325314 18/15 $1,192,000 $3,424,000 $6,211,000 $15,952,000

32532 4/1 $942,000 $28,422,000

32551 4/2 $662,000 $2,381,000 $5,342,000 $13,223,000

32552 1/1 $854,000 $3,099,000 $6,545,000 $16,207,000

32599 6/3 $720,000 $2,507,000 $6,907,000 $14,578,000

325998 6/4 $1,424,000 $3,329,000 $8,379,000 $17,995,000

42399 2/1 $851,039 $1,428,979

42451 11/11 $4,744,000 $9,671,000 $18,349,000 $42,265,000 $74,456,000
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Total # 

facilities/ 

# of

nonresponders 

where rule 

costs could > 

1% rev

FTEs

NAICS Code 0-4 1 2 3-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99

42459 20/16 $1,148,000 $5,184,000 $6,655,000 $15,718,000 $17,531,000 $56,881,000

42469 46/33 $1,973,000 $4,949,000 $5,806,000 $18,120,000 $28,325,000

42471 $11,807,000 $15,665,000 $11,807,000 $19,088,000 $37,556,000 $127,559,000

42491 1174/1062 $1,495,000 $3,329,000 $5,960,000 $11,640,000 $22,735,000

44422 6/5 $305,000 $595,000 $991,000 $1,798,000 $3,681,000 $6,247,000

453998 9/7 $478,000 $675,000 $1,134,000 $2,223,000

49311 14/13 $208,000 $378,000 $529,000 $836,000 $1,422,000 $2,477,000 $3,550,000

49312 53/53 $279,000 $420,000 $579,000 $1,125,000 $2,418,000 $4,516,000 $6,666,000

49313 37/28 $725,000 $781,000 $1,673,000 $2,373,000 $4,018,000

49319 25/12 $444,000 $736,000 $949,000 $1,220,000 $1,906,000

56179 14/14 $132,642 $239,000 $366,000 $661,000 $1,393,000 $3,176,000

Highlighted cells indicate facility categories where 1 percent of revenues, for any facility in that size category, or above, would exceed the costs of the proposed 

rule even in the highest cost year (including costs for non-responders to become responders).
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7.4 Conclusion

It is possible that the costs of the rule would exceed one percent of revenues for some RMP small 

entities that are currently not responders. The maximum number affected would be 1,442. In years 

where the STAA analysis occurs or a field exercise occurs, the cost could exceed the threshold for a 

larger number of facilities. The most significant cost for small entities, however, will be incurred by 

those that have to become responders; in the first year of compliance, when they have to pay for 

training and response equipment, the costs are likely to exceed one percent of revenues for many of the 

facilities with fewer than 20 FTE. Facilities owned and operated by governments serving fewer than 

10,000 people may incur costs above one percent of their revenues in the initial year if the government 

has to train and equip a hazmat team. These governments may be able to obtain funding to cover some 

training costs through grants from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the 

U.S. Department of Transportation; local responders may also attend training courses offered by the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency at no cost (other than travel and expenses).

In developing the proposed rule, EPA considered alternatives to reduce the impacts on small entities. 

The proposal limits the STAA provision to high risk sectors, removing what could be a substantial burden 

on other sectors that would probably have to hire consultants to conduct the analyses. EPA considered 

limiting applicability of some provisions to P3 facilities, but with the shift in OSHA’s interpretation ofthe

retail facility exemption under the PSM standard, the effect of such a change was reduced (most P2 

facilities will shift to P3). A substantial majority of P2 facilities that will remain are government water 

and wastewatertreatment systems; because the only difference between those systems in P2 and those 

in P3 is the applicability of OSHA PSM (i.e., there is no difference in the risk posed), EPA could not justify 

providing regulatory relief to these facilities who are in P3. EPA did not consider exempting small 

facilities or governments from the requirement to become responders if the local agencies are not 

capable of responding or ask the facility to handle any accidents in-house. The smallest facilities that 

are not responders are too often in rural areas where there may be no hazmat response capability 

within a reasonable distance and, in some cases, in areas with no local fire department. When it 

enacted section 112(r), Congress clearly required facilities to ensure that there was a capability to 

respond to releases. 
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CHAPTER 8: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

8.1 Background and Context

Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 

Low-Income Populations” (February, 1994) places a responsibility on federal agencies for “identifying 

and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 

effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations in 

the United States[.]” This section explains how EPA has addressed environmental justice issues 

associatedwith this rulemaking. 

Environmental risks may result from industrial or commercial activities by private actors, or from 

governmental activities or programs. When those risks are disproportionately borne by particular 

subpopulations, environmental justice is achieved through Fair Treatment and Meaningful 

Involvement. 104

Fair treatment refers to efforts to prevent environmental risks and harms from 

disproportionately affecting a particular group of people. 

Meaningful involvementrefers to inclusion of potentially affected populations in decisions 

about activities or programsto address those risks. Meaningful involvement may include 

facilitating the involvement of populations potentially affected by those activities or programs. 

It also entails ensuring that potentially affected populations have an opportunity to participate 

in decisions and influence decisions about those activities or programs. “Empowering 

communities” is a specific goal established by the OSWER Environmental Justice Task Force 105

EPA used these principles in identifying and ameliorating environmental justice issues associated 

with RMP facilities. 

 104 Guidance on Considering Environmental Justice During the Development of Regulatory Actions, US EPA, May 

2015. 

105 “OSWER Environmental Justice Task Force Draft Final Report”, EPA 540/R-94/004, April 1994. Also see 

“Integration of Environmental Justice into OSWER Policy, Guidance, and Regulatory Development” (OSWER 

directive No. 9200, 3-17, Sept 21, 1994) 
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8.2 Identifying Potential Environmental Justice Concerns Associated with 

RMP Facilities 

At all facilities regulated under the Risk Management Program, an accidental release of a regulated 

substance creates a hazard to surrounding communities and environments. These hazards include, for 

example, exposure to toxic substances, fires, explosions, and noxious gas clouds. 

In undertaking actions in response to Executive Order 13650106, EPA sought to determine if there were 

environmental justice concerns associated with these risks from stationary sources regulated under the 

RMP rule. We assessed data using EPA tools and census information, and reviewed existing academic 

and gray literature on risks to populations of concern. 

8.2.1 Assessment of risks to relevant populations, based on proximity

Facilities that are regulated under the Risk Management Program pose risks of fire, explosion, and/or 

exposure to hazardous chemicals. Chemical hazards include burns, corrosive damage to people and 

property, as well as exposure associated with acute toxicity. Exposure from these facilities may put local 

populations at risk through inhalation, ingestion, or dermal contact.

Exhibit 8-1 shows the demographics in the vicinity of RMP sites, using locational data from the RMP 

database and demographic data from EPA’s EJSCREEN tool 107. The analysis shows that minority and lowincome populations are more likely to be in proximity to those facilities (and thus at greater risk) than 

other populations 108. 

Exhibit 8-1: Demographic Profile of Key Populations

Location Population Low-income Minority Linguistically isolated

Total near RMP 

facilities109

31.27 

million

13,757,000 14,770,000 2,482,000

US Total 309.14 

million

104,256,000 112,235,000 15,905,000

Demographics of 

population near 

RMP facilities110

44% 47% 8%

Demographics of 

overall US 

population

34% 36% 5%

 

106 “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” August 2013. 107 See http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-

05/documents/ejscreen_technical_document_20150505.pdf. 

108 Demographic data on populations are from the American Community Survey 2008-2012, US Census Bureau 

109 Not including facilities in Puerto Rico and Guam 110 This analysis counts each person for once for each RMP facility they are near. There is a likelihood of a small 

degree of double-counting, therefore, for those who are in close proximity to two or more facilities. However, this 

effect is likely to be small, as the data shows that less than 5% of the US population is in close proximity to two or 

more RMP facilities. 
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Difference in 

populations near 

RMP sites

29% greater 31% greater 60% greater

44% of people in proximity (defined as living within a one-mile radius) to RMP sites are low-income; the 

average in the US population is 34%. Low-income is defined here as less than twice the Census Bureau’s 

poverty threshold. 

47% of people in proximity to RMP sites are ethnic minorities, including any designation except for 

“Non-Hispanic, White.” It therefore includes those identifying as Hispanic white or as multiracial white. 

The average in the US population (overall) is 36%. 

The other demographic indicator we examined was “linguistic isolation.” This category consists of 

households where no one over age 14 speaks English well, and some other language is spoken at home. 

8% of populations in proximity to RMP facilities are linguistically isolated, compared to only 5% in the 

general US population. This characteristic is important for understanding disproportionate impact, 

inasmuch as these people are less likely to be aware of risks, to understand them, and to know what to 

do to help protect themselves. 

In comparison to the general US population, therefore, we can conclude that populations surrounding 

RMP facilities are 

• 29% more likely to be low-income

• 31% more likely to be minorities, and

• 60% more likely to be linguistically isolated. 

To the extent that populations living closer to facilities are more likely to be exposed if a release occurs, 

RMP facilities pose a greater risk to these key demographic groups. 

8.2.2 Assessment of risks to relevant populations, in existing literature 

Studies external to EPA have also examined these issues. A 2004 analysis by the University of 

Pennsylvania111 examined risk to surrounding minority communities, based on an assessment of the 

potential for releases and property damages and injuries at RMP facilities. The writers also compared 

those risks with the demographics of surrounding communities. They found significant correlations 

between riskier facilities (larger and featuring more complex chemical processes) with location in 

counties with larger African American populations. They concluded:

 111 Elliott, M.R., et al, “Environmental Justice: frequency and severity of US chemical industry accidents and the 

socioeconomic status of surrounding communities” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 2004; 58:24-

30. 
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“Thus, higher risk facilities are more likely to be found in counties with sizeable poor and/or 

minority populations that disproportionately bear the collateral environmental, property, and 

health risks.”

In 2014, the Environmental Justice and Health Alliance for Chemical Policy Reform112 found that the 

populations vulnerable to releases from chemical facilities are disproportionately black or Latino. 

Compared to the US population as a whole, these vulnerable populations have higher rates of poverty, 

lower incomes, and education levels. In particular, this report focuses on the communities closest to the 

facilities (at the “fence line”). 

8.2.3 Conclusions 

Based on analysis of RMP data and other studies, EPA concludes that there is evidence that risks from 

RMP facilities fall on minority and low-income populations, to a significantly greater degree than those 

risks affect other populations. 

8.3 Actions Taken to Facilitate “Fair Treatment” 

Chapter 6 describes the reductions in risk that EPA anticipates to result from this rule. These include 

reducing the frequency of releases and accidents at RMP facilities, mitigating the damages when 

releases do occur, and improved information for affected communities and for emergency planners and 

responders. 

To the extent that this rule results in reductions of risk to US populations overall, EPA anticipates that it 

will result in greaterrisk reductions for minority communities and lower-income communities, since 

they bear a larger portion of the risk. Note that this reduces the absolutedisparity in risks, but not the 

relative disparity in risk that is associated with proximity to RMP facilities. Thus, EPA believes that this 

proposed rule will not have potential disproportionately high and adverse human health or 

environmental effects on minority, low income, or indigenous populations because it increases the level 

of environmental protection for all affected populations without having any disproportionately high and 

adverse human health or environmental effects on any population, including any minority, low-income 

or indigenous populations.

8.4 Actions Taken to Facilitate “Meaningful Involvement” 

Addressing environmental justice concerns entails meaningful involvement by affected communities. 

EPA has taken actions to ensure that these communities have a significant role in characterizing the risks 

 112 Who’s in Danger? A Demographic Analysis of Chemical Disaster Vulnerability Zones, May 2014. The report was 

produced in collaboration with Coming Clean and The Center for Effective Government. 

http://comingcleaninc.org/whats-new/whos-in-danger-report
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associated with RMP facilities. In addition, EPA has facilitated communities’ involvement in assessing 

problems concerning RMP facilities and policy options for addressing these problems. 

EPA took a variety of steps to consult with communities that might be threatened by hazardous 

substances. In coordination with other agencies undertaking reviews regarding EO 13650, EPA, along 

with other key federal agencies, conducted a series of listening sessions and public communication 

efforts regarding addressing potential hazards from RMP stationary sources and other facilities. 

EPA participated in public sessions between November 2013 and January 2014 on the following dates: 

• November 5, 2013, Texas City, TX 

• November 15, 2013, Washington, DC

• November 19, 2013, Springfield, IL 

• December 11, 2013, Orlando, FL

• January 9, 2014, Los Angeles CA 

• January 14, 2014, Washington DC 

• January, 2014 in Sacramento, CA 

• February 27, 2014 in Newark, NJ 

In addition, EPA participated in a webinar on the topic in November, 2013. 

Representatives from a variety of stakeholder organizations presented information and statements to 

the federal agencies convening these sessions. Many of those giving testimony represented 

neighborhood and community groups, and especially groups with information regarding minority, lowincome, and indigenous populations. Presenters from the following organizations provided information 

on the risk to those populations from chemical facilities: 

• Center for Health Environment and Justice

• Center for the Urban Environment 

• Louisiana Bucket Brigade

• Louisiana Environmental Justice Community Organizing Coalition

• Louisiana Environmental Action Network

• Mossville (LA) Environmental Action Now

• Just Transition Alliance 

• East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice 

• Communities for a Better Environment

• Public Citizen 

• Citizens for Clean Air and Clean Water 

• Texas Environmental Justice Advocacy Service

• Environmental Justice Health Alliance 

• Community In-Power and Development Association
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• Coalition for a Safe Environment 

• Air Alliance Houston 

• People not Pozos – Esperanza Community Housing Corporation 

• San Pedro Homeowners United 

• Citizens for Responsible & Equal Environmental Protection

• Ironbound Community Corporation 

As a result of these consultations, EPA gathered important information regarding environmental justice 

at communities impacted by RMP facilities.113 

Topics addressed included: 

• The association between high-risk areas and low-income areas.

• Insufficient information received by local communities about hazards presented by nearby 

facilities, and the need for enhanced information sharing. 

• Cumulative effects of risks in communities affected by multiple RMP facilities.

• The need for local communities to be able to participate in planning activities, and problems 

that occur when those opportunities not available.

• The need to help communities with information and planning to enable them to better 

understand chemical facility hazards and know what to do when a release of hazardous 

materials occurs.

• Emphasizing the particular vulnerability of EJ communities to detrimental effects of disasters, 

especially regarding racial discrimination.

• The effects of existing health disparities, cumulative impacts of facilities, and limited resources 

available to community members to understand and help solve the risk problems. 

• The process of notifying local communitieswhen a chemical accident occursis poor and 

irregular. Alarm and siren systems are often not effective. 

• Inadequate communication between Local Emergency Planning Committees and local citizens.

• The need for addressing and incorporating environmental justice issues within disaster plans, 

such as evacuation, return and rebuilding, and understanding and addressing health 

consequences. 

These consultations provided invaluable information about impacts on poor and minority communities, 

directly from affected community members and environmental justice groups. They also provided a 

means for involvement of these communities in developing policy options to address those risks. 

Several of the components of this proposed rule –and their concomitant benefits –are based on the 

information and issues brought to EPA’s attention in these sessions. 

 113 Notes from the consultations and public comments can be found at: 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2013-0075-0001
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CHAPTER 9: OTHER ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531–1538) requires agencies to conduct a cost 

benefit analysis of any rulemaking that may impose a net costs of $100 million or more for state, local 

and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector in any one year. It is possible that this 

proposal may result in expenditures of $100million or more in a year. The cost-benefit analysis 

presented in this document meets the requirement of the Act.

9.2 Employment Impacts 

Executive Order 13563 “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review” (76 FR 3821; January 18, 2011) 

requires Federal agencies to consider the employment impacts of regulatory policy. Specifically, 

Executive Order 13563 states, “Our regulatory system must protect public health, welfare, safety, and 

our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.” 

Economic research evaluating the employment impacts of environmental regulation has shown that the 

net employment effect is ambiguous. Several impacts are incurred by firms in regulated industries, and 

the net effect of the impacts should be evaluated jointly to determine the overall effect. Increasing 

production costs raise the cost of business operations; some of these new regulatory costs are labor 

costs, while others are capital costs. As production costs increase and firms pass along costs to 

consumers, output may decrease, which could cause a decrease in labor demand. There are also 

operational impacts incurred by regulated firms as they modify operations to comply with new 

regulatory requirements; the direction of that impact on labor demand is a function of the interaction 

between the regulatory requirements and the firm’s labor intensity of production. In general, the net 

effect of an environmental regulation on employment in regulated sectors and the overall economy is 

indeterminate. See Berman and Bui (2001) for a theoretical model of employment effects of 

environmental regulation. 

This RIA does not include a complete analysis of labor market effects of the proposed rule. In general, 

an environmental regulation can be understood as an increase in demand for a particular output: 

environmental quality. Meeting this new demand can result in increased demand for the various factors 

of production (including labor). EPA has determined that the proposed rule is unlikely to have 

significant impacts on employment. Even in a year where a large complex facility would have to conduct 

a field exercise, a third-party audit, a root cause analysis, and a near miss investigation, the total labor 

hours would represent about one FTE, but those hours would be distributed across many employees. 

About half of the total labor hours of that scenario is for the field exercise, which is estimated to involve 

more than 60 facility staff. For simple non-responding facilities the annual labor cost would average less 

than 10 hours distributed among several workers. At most, perhaps a facility might need to hire another 

employee to comply with the rule or to cover the work that would otherwise have been done by those 
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workers involved in compliance activities. The third-party audit and root cause analysis provisions may 

generate work for consultants, but the number of hours involved per facility is less than a single FTE. 

9.3 Limitations and Conclusions 

As discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 7, the data on which this analysis is based are necessarily 

limited. EPA has attempted to correct obvious errors, such as removing accidents reported more than 

once and reclassifying some facilities to more appropriate NAICS codes, but some issues related to 

facility employment size and ownership could not be resolved. EPA could not add accidents that had 

not been reported or correct accident impact data where they may have been inaccurate. 

The estimated costs for third-party audits and root cause analysis project past accident rates into the 

future. The near miss estimates assume one near miss for each accident, but whether this is accurate 

will depend on how individual facilities interpret what constitutes a near miss. Some industry 

publications project much higher ratios of near misses to actual releases. EPA has not defined near 

miss, but even if it had, deciding whether a series of events could have produced a release that would 

meet the definition of catastrophic release will always be a matter of opinion. Similarly, what 

constitutes safer technology is open to interpretation as is what is considered to be feasible. In these 

circumstances, some operators may adopt a narrow interpretation, while others may adopt a broad 

interpretation. Questions related to interpretation apply to most performance-based rules where there 

are few if any bright lines that define what constitutes compliance. The result is that some facilities may 

spend far more than estimated, while others may spend less. 

The number of non-responding facilities that may become responders and the costs they will incur are 

unknown. For the former, the analysis provides a range of conversion estimates to indicate the 

potential total costs. In order to assessthe cost to any individual facility for coming into compliance, 

however, EPA necessarily had to use estimates of the number of people who would be trained and the 

amount of equipment that would be purchased. The analysis does not address the possibility that a 

facility might have to acquire fire-fighting expertise and equipment, which would impose additional 

costs. The sensitivity analysis conducted in Chapter 5 analyzed costs for 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 

percent of current non-responders in counties without a Hazmat team to become responders.

Finally, the analysis used a model facility approach so that each estimate represents the average for a 

group of facilities, not a point estimate for any one facility. This analysis has attempted to develop 

reasonable central estimates recognizing that the range of costs incurred by individual facilities could be 

wide. For example, the third-party auditor cost for a complex facility is the same for all complex 

facilities, but it is unlikely that an auditor would charge the largest facility, which has more than 30 

covered processes, the same amount as it would a facility with only one or two covered processes. The 

number of people who would participate in field exercises will vary considerably based on facility size 

and location. Facilities of any size and complexity in urban industrial areas may involve more people in a 

field exercise than the same facilities would if located at a considerable distance from other facilities. 
***E.O. 12866 Review – Draft – Do Not Cite, Quote, or Release During Review***

Page 121 of 126

The benefits analysis is qualitative. There were no data to connectthe specific rule elements with 

specific reductions in expected probabilities or magnitudes of RMP chemical accidents. In addition, 

many of the accident impacts expected to be reduced by the rule, such as lost productivity or 

emergency response costs, could not be quantified even for the 10-year baseline accident record. Lack 

of data also meant that other benefits of the rule such as improved information could not be quantified.
***E.O. 12866 Review – Draft – Do Not Cite, Quote, or Release During Review***

Page 122 of 126

APPENDIX A

PROPERTY AND BUSINESS LOSSES IN THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
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Page 123 of 126

APPENDIX A—PROPERTY AND BUSINESS LOSSES IN THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Location Date

Property

Damage $M 

(2013 Dollars)

Business 

Loss $M Notes

Refinery Texas City 5/30/1978 $190

Petrochemical Delaware 10/29/1980 $140

Refinery Romeoville 7/23/1984 $450

Petrochemical Pampa 11/14/1987 $480 $240

Petrochemical Henderson 5/4/1988 $640 plant destroyed

Refinery Norco 5/5/1988 $610

Refinery Richmond 4/10/1989 $190 25% of capacity lost for 5 months

Petrochemical Pasadena 10/23/1989 $1,400 full production not restored for 2 years

Refinery Baton 

Rouge

12/24/1989 $140 refinery shut for 3 days, reduced capacity 

for 3 weeks

Petrochemical Sea Drift 3/12/1991 $180 $165 production reduced for a year

Petrochemical Sterlington 5/1/1991 $240 $270 one unit destroyed

Refinery Wilmington 10/8/1992 $150 production reduced by more than half for 7 

months

Petrochemical Belpre 5/27/1994 $330 production unit destroyed

Petrochemical Cedar 

Bayou

10/20/1994 $240 includes business loss

Petrochemical Port Neal 12/13/1994 $370

Petrochemical Deer Park 9/22/1997 $230

Refinery Richmond 3/25/1999 $190 unit shut down for year

Refinery Carson City 4/23/2001 $190 unit shut down for 2 months

Refinery Lemont IL 8/14/2001 $370 unit shut down for year

Petrochemical Illiopolis 4/23/2004 $200 most of plant destroyed

Refinery BP/TX 3/23/2005 $260

Petrochemical TX 4/29/2006 $250 plant closed for 6 months

Refinery TX 2/28/2008 $240 plant continued to operate

Petrochemical Geismar 6/13/2013 $510 plant closed for almost a year

Source: Marsh, The 100 Largest Losses, 1974-2013, Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon 

Industry, 23rd Edition. The table includes 24 accidents that reflect only U.S. incidents in the refinery and 

petrochemical sectors from 1978 forward, only incidents that may have been related to a release of a 

regulated substance, and only damage unrelated to natural disasters. 
***E.O. 12866 Review – Draft – Do Not Cite, Quote, or Release During Review***

Page 124 of 126

APPENDIX B

Number of Small Entities by NAICS Code and Facility FTE

Total and Non-Responders
***E.O. 12866 Review – Draft – Do Not Cite, Quote, or Release During Review***

Number of Small Entities by Facility FTE and NAICS Code, Total and Non Responders

All Non-Responders

NAICS 0-4 FTE 5-9 FTE 10-19 

FTE

20-99 

FTE

NAICS 0-4 FTE 5-9 FTE 10-19 

FTE

20-99 

FTE

111 41 34 14 7 111 34 28 12 6

112 1 0 0 0 112 1

115 61 69 53 53 115 42 43 36 44

211 56 18 22 27 211 36 8 8 11

213 1 1 2 2 213 1

221 8 11 22 70 221 4 11 17 35

2213 9 0 6 2 2213 4 0 4 1

236 1 236 0 0 0 0

311 3 4 9 114 311 1 3 6 52

312 0 0 1 5 312 0 0 1 1

313 1 313 0 0 0 0

324 1 9 324 2

32512 1 2 0 1 32512 1 1 0 0

32518 4 3 6 21 32518 1 1 1 1

325181 0 0 2 3 325181 0 0 2 0

325188 0 1 4 15 325188 0 1 2 4

32519 0 0 2 5 32519 0 0 0 2

325193 0 0 2 110 325193 0 0 1 87

325199 1 1 6 39 325199 0 1 3 11

325314 4 6 8 5 325314 3 6 6 5

32532 2 1 1 7 32532 1 0 0 2

32551 1 1 2 9 32551 0 1 1 1

32552 0 0 1 5 32552 0 0 1 2

32599 1 2 3 6 32599 0 1 2 1

325998 0 1 5 24 325998 0 1 3 9

326 0 1 3 35 326 0 0 1 18

327 1 327 0 0 0 0

331 0 1 2 8 331 1 0 1 4

332 0 0 6 9 332 0 0 4 4

333 0 0 0 2 333 0 0 0 1

334 0 0 0 4 334 0 0 0 2

335 0 0 0 1 335 0 0 0 0

336 0 0 0 1 336 0 0 0 0

339 2 8 339 0 0 1 2

423 2 0 0 2 423 1 0 0 1

424 42 32 18 4 424 33 25 14 4

4246 21 25 21 24 4246 17 16 12 12
***E.O. 12866 Review – Draft – Do Not Cite, Quote, or Release During Review***

All Non-Responders

NAICS 0-4 FTE 5-9 FTE 10-19 

FTE

20-99 

FTE

NAICS 0-4 FTE 5-9 FTE 10-19 

FTE

20-99 

FTE

4247 34 15 13 7 4247 18 6 8 3

4249 766 408 212 79 4249 711 351 189 64

444 4 2 1 444 4 1 0 0

447 1 447 0 0 1 0

453 4 2 3 453 4 1 2 0

484 1 1 5 5 484 0 1 3 1

486 0 0 2 2 486 0 0 0 0

488 0 3 1 1 488 0 1 0 0

49311 3 3 3 5 49311 3 3 3 4

49312 9 5 17 52 49312 9 5 17 52

49313 18 10 3 5 49313 15 5 2 3

49319 6 5 6 12 49319 2 2 2 6

541 0 2 0 2 541 0 1 0 2

561 10 0 4 0 561 10 0 4 0

562 0 1 0 2 562 0 0 0 0