J-S90001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.W. A/K/A C.M.W., FATHER

No. 1596 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000314-2016

CP-51-DP-0002301-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C.Q.C., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.W. A/K/A C.M.W., FATHER

No. 1598 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000315-2016

CP-51-DP-0002302-2014

BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

S.W. A/K/A C.M.W. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered April 

26, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family 
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Court Division,1that involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his 

daughter, T.D.C., born in February of 2013, and his son, T.C.Q.C., born in 

August of 2014 (collectively “Children”).2 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the testimony presented at the termination 

hearing, as follows:

On April 26, 2016, this Court held a Goal Change/Termination 

Hearing and heard testimony on DHS’s [Department of Human 

Services] Petition to Terminate both Mother and Father’s Rights 

as to their two (2) Children, and Change the Permanency Goal to 

Adoption. Both Mother and Father appeared and were 

represented by their respective attorneys.

The first witness for the Department of Human Services (DHS), 

Tyrone Jessie, CUA [Community Umbrella Agency] Case 

Manager, testified that CUA became involved in February 25, 

2015. He testified that single case plan meetings were held and 

that the parents did not attend those meetings.

Mr. Jessie testified the Children came into care in November 

2014, because of neglect going on with the family. The Children 

were living with Mother, although Mother and Father were 

together but living in separate homes. 

He testified Father’s objectives were to maintain a drug-free 

status, to submit to three (3) random drug screens prior to 

Court, to continue going to Nu-Stop and continue to show clean 

screens. For his mental health, Father’s objective was to 

schedule a BHS assessment and follow through with all 

recommendations, and finally, to maintain regular contact with 

the Children. 

____________________________________________

1 By order of June 17, 2016, this Court consolidated the above-captioned 

appeals sua sponte.

2 Mother’s parental rights to T.D.C. and T.C.Q.C. were also involuntarily 

terminated by the trial court. Mother has filed an appeal at 1630 EDA 2016.
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Mr. Jessie stated Father was referred to the CEU [Clinical 

Evaluation Unit] for a screen and assessment. Father did not 

comply however has complied since November 2015. He is 

receiving drug screens, completed a psychiatric evaluation on 

1/11/2016, and was placed on Seroquel, Depakote, Dioxin and 

Xanax. He was also referred to anger management on 

3/17/2016, and also referred to parenting classes. Father did 

test positive for marijuana on a screen on 10/7/2014. 

Mr. Jessie opined the Children are in a safe environment now, 

and does not believe irreparable harm would come to the 

Children if Father’s parental rights are terminated. He reasoned 

that Father has only attempted compliance since November 

2015, and prior to that had not attempted to resolve the issues 

effecting his neglect of the Children. 

He stated the Children are currently placed with the foster 

mother, A.B., and have been there since November 2014. They 

are safe and their needs are being met. They are attached to the 

foster mother. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Jessie stated that on 6/18/2015 the 

compliance level of Mother and Father for their objectives of the 

plan were minimal and at the next Court date of 9/15/2015, 

there was a rating of non-compliance for both parents. The only 

report received by the Agency from CEU was 10/7/2014 and 

confirms the parents have not gone to CEU since that date. 

Regarding BHS, Mr. Jessie testified the parents have not 

complied with that objective either. 

Further on cross-examination, Mr. Jessie acknowledged that he 

was aware Father was incarcerated from May 2015 to September 

2015, and knew Father could not comply with objectives during 

this period. He stated Father had signed releases for Nu-Stop 

and was getting drug screens there. He further testified he 

observed Father during a visit with the Children and opined that 

Father arrived on time and acted appropriately with the Children. 

On re-direct examination, Mr. Jessie stated Father did not 

comply with the BHS goals of attending biweekly visits after 

November 2015, did not comply with attending CEU after 

November 2015, did not comply with CUA’s single case plan 

goals, and Father’s only compliance was with Nu-Stop. 
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The next witness was Portia Bailey, Visitation Coach at Turning 

Points for Children, who testified she has been the visitation 

coach since March of 2015. She testified that based on Mother 

and Father’s sporadic visits with the Children, visits were 

changed from weekly for two hours to one hour weekly, then 

when the parents continued to miss visits, they were changed to 

a one hour visit biweekly. Based on her notes, the parents 

attended overall half the scheduled visits. She observed that 

when the parents first missed their scheduled visits, the Children 

were sad and disappointed, however, as missed appointments 

became more frequent, the Children did not seem affected, and 

would be fine going back to their foster home. The Children call 

the foster mother “Mom”, and case mother reacts to that by 

correcting them. She doesn’t want the kids to call her Mom and 

tells them she is the Mother. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Bailey testified the Children are 

bonded with the foster mother, and look to her to have their 

needs met. Foster mother takes the Children to their medical 

appointments, and is well-informed about T.D.C.’s asthmatic 

condition, administering treatments when necessary. She 

testified that out of 17 or 18 scheduled visits that she covered, 

the parents kept only 8 or 9 of them. Finally, she stated that 

during the visits Father and Children did interact well. 

Father testified next, and stated he signed releases and attended 

Nu-Stop. He attended group and individual therapy sessions. He 

also attends anger management once a week at Nu-Stop on 

Thursdays. He further testified he goes to GPHA and his 

therapist is attempting to locate a parenting class for him. He 

admitted he missed visits with the Children, but stated he was 

working.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/2016, at 11–14 (record citations omitted).

On April 26, 2016, the trial court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated as to T.D.C. and 

T.C.Q.C., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and 
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2511(b). Furthermore, the trial court changed the goal to adoption. This 

appeal by Father followed.

Father presents five issues for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 5.

Our standard of review is well established:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 
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Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The burden rests upon the petitioner 

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for 

seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 

273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a), along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, the trial 

court terminated Father’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), 

(a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). We will focus on Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which 

provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: ...

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 
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beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

We first address whether the trial court erred by terminating Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The 

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8)[] does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 

led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Here, the trial court reasoned:

The Record demonstrates Father’s ongoing inability to provide 

care or control for the Children or perform any parental duties 

and also his failure to remedy the conditions that brought the 

Children into care. Father was incarcerated during a period when 

the Children were in placement,[3] however, the evidence shows 

he failed to comply with the plan objectives once he was 

____________________________________________

3

Father was incarcerated from May, 2015, to September, 2015. See N.T., 

4/26/2016, at 21.
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released, as shown by the documents and testimony provided to 

this Court.

After hearing the credible testimony of the CUA Case Manager, 

and the Visitation Coach from Turning Points for Children, the 

Court found by clear and convincing evidence, that their 

observations and conclusions regarding Father’s non-compliance 

with the FSP [Family Service Plan] objectives, and lack of ability 

and or refusal to fulfill his parental responsibilities were 

persuasive.

****

As discussed above, the Trial Court found that Father failed to 

comply with plan objectives and showed an incapacity to parent. 

He attended therapy at Nu-Stop after November 2015, after 

being released from incarceration and attended approximately 

half of the scheduled visitations. The Court was not persuaded 

that Father could or would resolve these issues in the near 

future.

This Court finds credible the testimony from the agency workers 

that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if father’s 

rights were terminated and that termination of Father’s parental 

rights would be in the best interest of the Children.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/2016, at 16–17, 18.

With regard to the requirements of Section 2511(a)(8) that “[t]he 

child has been removed from the care of the parent,” we agree with the trial 

court that “[C]hildren were effectively in the care of both parents when they 

were removed, the parents, at times, having lived together. Although they 

claim that they were living across the street from one another, its effective 

proximity supports the finding that the Children were in the care of both 

parents.” N.T., 4/26/2016, at 63. Specifically, the record showed that at 

the time Children were removed, Father and Mother “were together, but not 
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living in the same home.” Id. at 9. Mother testified that when their younger 

child, T.C.Q.C. was born, she and Father “lived right across the street,” and 

Father was “there all the time.” Id. at 55. Furthermore, the record shows 

that Children have been removed for a period of “12 months or more from 

the date of removal.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).

In addition, “the conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist,” id., because Father has been noncompliant with 

his reunification plan. Mr. Tyrone Jessie, CUA Case Manger Supervisor for 

Turning Points for Children, testified Father’s objectives were:

To maintain a drug-free status, [F]ather to submit three random 

drug screens prior to court, to continue going to Nu-Stop and 

continue to show clean screens. 

For his mental health, [F]ather will – will schedule a BHS 

assessment and follow through – all recommendations. Those 

were his – and as well maintain – along with mom – to maintain 

regular contact with the children.

N.T., 4/26/2016, at 10. In addition, he testified Father was referred to the 

CEU for a screen and assessment. Id. at 11.

Mr. Jessie specified that Father was compliant based on going to NuStop, but he was not complying with all the court orders. Id. at 23. Mr. 

Jessie testified Father was not initially compliant, but since November, 2015, 

Father had attended Nu-Stop where he had drug screens, completed a 

psychiatric evaluation on January 11, 2016, was referred for anger 

management on March 17, 2016, and parenting classes, as well. Id. at 12. 

However, he stated Father did not go up to CEU after November 2015, and 
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did not go to BHS after November 2015. Id. at 23. In addition, he stated 

Father was not compliant with CUA’s single case plan goals. Id. 

Furthermore, Ms. Portia Bailey, Visitation Coach for CUA, testified that 

she had been in charge of the visitation for Father and Mother for the past 

year, that initially, they had visits on a weekly basis for two hours, but the 

visits became sporadic and were changed to one hour weekly, and then 

changed to bi-weekly because parents started to miss more and more visits. 

Id. at 24–25.

Finally, the record confirms that “termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.”4 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).

This Court has stated that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a 

parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

____________________________________________

4 With regard to Section 2511(a)(8) and 2511(b), it is important to note that

Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the 

“needs and welfare of the child” prior to proceeding to Section 

2511(b), which focuses on the “developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis 

under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in 

addition to the behavior of the parent. ... Accordingly, while both 

Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate 

the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve 

the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing 

the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Section 

2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address 

Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citations omitted).
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responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a 

child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress 

and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra, 901 A.2d at 

513. Here, the record shows that T.D.C. – age three – has an asthma 

condition that requires careful attention, that T.C.Q.C. – age one and onehalf – was removed from parents’ care three months after birth, and that 

Children are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster parent and their needs 

are being met. See N.T., 4/26/2016, at 15–16, 17, 31–32, 38. At this point 

in their young lives Father’s limited compliance with his objectives leaves 

Children in a prolonged state of limbo. Furthermore, Children’s need for 

permanency must be weighed against concerns about Father’s ability to 

meet Children’s “needs and welfare” when the circumstances that led to 

Children’s removal from parents’ care was neglect evidenced by T.D.C.’s 

near-fatal asthma attack. See Id. at 8, 18–19.

Father contends DHS (petitioner) failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that his parental rights should be terminated pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(8), since he “has appropriate housing, was involved in 

Nu-Stop since November 2015 and visited the children to the best of his 

ability.” Father’s Brief at 17. This argument, however, is irrelevant. 

“Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to 

evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions 

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency 
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services.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). This Court has explained:

We recognize that the application of Section (a)(8) may seem 

harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward 

resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children. 

... However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that 

led to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the 

statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot 

and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for 

permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and 

hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case 

law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit 

eighteen (18) months, in which to complete the process of 

either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed 

in foster care.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra, 901 A.2d at 513 (emphasis in original) 

(citations omitted). 

Here, at the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court 

stated on the record:

Well, taking the evidence as a whole, and taking the exhibits 

that came in as part of the evidence in this petition to terminate, 

a few things stand out, and that is that the parents somehow try 

to blame the system because the system didn’t reunite them 

with their children, when the parents had, and have, the 

obligation to do all they can to be reunited with their children.

And instead of making efforts to reunite themselves with the 

Children, they make excuses because the system didn’t do 

enough for them. And when asked about documentation to 

substantiate their claims, the documents are not presented.

The reason they don’t have records is because it was somebody 

else’s job to get the records and present the records on behalf of 

them. And in the issues where there’s a conflict between the 
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testimony, the Court finds the credibility to be with the witnesses 

for the Commonwealth, the Department of Human Services, and 

against the parents.

Therefore, taking the evidence into consideration, the Court 

finds, by clear and convincing evidence — this is with respect to 

both children — that the parents failed to remedy the issues that 

brought the children into Court, brought the children into DHS, 

and are not in a position to remedy, nor will they be in a position 

to remedy the issues that brought the children into care in the 

near future.

Considering that, under [Sections] 2511(a) (1), (2), (5) and (8), 

(8) because the children have been in care for one year, and (5) 

because the children were effectively in the care of both parents 

when they were removed, the parents, at times, having lived 

together. 

Although they claim that they were living across the street from 

one another, its effective proximity supports the finding that the 

Children were in the care of both parents.

N.T., 4/26/2016, at 62–63.

Based upon our careful review of the record, the trial court’s opinion, 

the briefs on appeal, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court’s 

findings are supported by competent and sufficient evidence, and that it 

properly concluded grounds for involuntary termination of Father’s parental 

rights exist pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). 

We next consider whether the trial court erred by terminating Father’s 

parental rights under Section 2511(b). We have discussed our analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b) as follows:

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 
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analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with 

the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has stated, “Common sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

In re T.S.M, supra, 71 A.2d at 268 (citation omitted). The Court directed 

that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

“courts must keep the ticking clock of Childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. 

The T.S.M. Court observed that “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of 

years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development 

quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically 

maladjusted children.” Id.
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Here, the trial court opined on the record:

Also under [Section] 2511(b), it is in the best interest of the 

children that the parents’ rights be terminated, and the goals be 

moved to adoption, and any harm that would be caused would 

be remedied. 

There would be no irreparable harm, based upon the clear and 

convincing evidence on those issues. So, the parents’ rights are 

terminated – both children – and the goal is moved to adoption 

for both children.

N.T., 4/26/2016, at 63–64. The only argument presented by Father to 

contest the trial court’s Section 2511(b) determination is the bald assertion 

that “[t]he evidence presented by Petitioner did not rise to the level of clear 

and convincing evidence as required by the applicable case law.” Father’s 

Brief at 19. We disagree. 

Mr. Jessie testified Children are currently in a safe environment. N.T., 

4/26/2016, at 14. He testified he did not believe any irreparable harm 

would be done to Children if Father’s rights were terminated. Id. Mr. Jessie 

explained Father had only been compliant since November 2015, and he 

noted “the length of the case and the basis that the case came in.” Id. He 

stated Children have been with their foster mother, A.B., since November, 

2014, and they were safe with their needs being met. Id. at 15. Mr. Jessie 

testified that T.D.C. has a loving relationship with A.B., and T.D.C. is 

attached to her. Id. He further stated T.C.Q.C. has a very good relationship 

with A.B., and is very attached to her. Id. at 16. Mr. Jessie testified he 

observed one visit where T.C.Q.C. was very weepy when he left A.B., but 
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was able to calm down for the rest of the visit with Father and Mother, and 

the visit went very well that day.5 Id. He further testified that T.C.Q.C. has 

been with A.B. for most of his life. Id. at 17. He stated that DHS had 

become involved with this family in 2013 because there were neglect issues, 

that when T.C.Q.C. was born, he tested positive for marijuana and 

benzodiazepines and had to remain hospitalized, and services were put into 

the home in September of 2014. Id. at 18. He testified that, from his 

understanding, Father and Mother were living together at that time. Id. He 

stated on September 25, 2014, T.D.C. almost died from an asthma attack, 

and was “lifeless” when she was rushed to the hospital. Id. at 18–19. He 

testified DHS then obtained an order of protective custody on September 29, 

2014. Id. at 19. He stated Father and Mother have not gone to CEU since 

October 7, 2014, and throughout the life of the case Father and Mother had 

not gone to BHS. Id. at 20.

Ms. Portia Bailey testified that she was the visitation coach for Father 

and Mother’s visits since March, 2015, that the initial visits were on a weekly 

basis for two hours, but became sporadic and decreased to one hour weekly, 

and then biweekly, in June, 2015. Id. at 24–25. She explained the cause 

for the change was that Father and Mother attended half of the visits. She 

testified Children were happy to see Father and Mother and the snacks, toys 

____________________________________________

5 Mr. Jessie did not indicate the date of the visit. 
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and clothes they brought Children; when Father and Mother did not visit, 

Children seemed to be sad. Id. at 25–26. She further stated, “as time went 

on, it didn’t really seem to affect them” when Children came to the office 

and there wasn’t a visit, and they were fine with just going back home with 

the foster parent. Id. at 26. She testified that the visits went from Children 

having a hard time transitioning and going back to the foster parent to 

Children looking forward to seeing the foster parent and happy to see the 

foster parent, A.B. Id. at 28. She stated Children call A.B. “mom.” Id. 

She also stated she was aware Father was incarcerated from May 2015 to 

November 2015. Id. at 30. 

She testified Children are bonded to the pre-adoptive foster parent, 

A.B., they look to her for their needs, they are ages three and one and onehalf, and A.B. takes appropriate action for T.D.C.’s asthma. Id. at 31–32. 

She stated T.C.Q.C. cries when he leaves his pre-adoptive parent, and when 

he is picked up by her after a visit, he is excited. Id. Ms. Bailey testified 

that of the 17 or 18 visits she covered from March, 2015, Father and Mother 

only made eight or nine. Id. at 35. She testified Father interacted very well 

with Children during visits. Id. at 35–36.

Finally, Mr. Jessie testified that the children are more bonded with A.B. 

than with Father and Mother because they have been with her for the last 16 

months, and the reason Children have been in care is Father and Mother’s 
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failure to follow through with all court recommendations or court orders that 

have been set for them. Id. at 38.

The trial court found under Section 2511(b), it was “in the best 

interest of [Children] that the parents’ rights be terminated, and the goals 

be moved to adoption, and any harm that would be caused would be 

remedied[, and t]here would be no irreparable harm, based upon the clear 

and convincing evidence on those issues.” Id. at 63–64. While Father 

testified he “provide[s] for my kids and do the best I can, and ... I’ve always 

got something for them ... that’s my world,”6competent, sufficient evidence 

of record supports the trial court’s decision that termination of Father’s 

parental rights best serves Children’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), supra.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that DHS proved 

grounds for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to T.D.C. 

and T.C.Q.C. pursuant to §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b).

Orders affirmed. 

____________________________________________

6 N.T., 4/26/2016, at 58–59.
J-S90001-16

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016