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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JANE DOES 1–9 and PARENT 

DOES 1–5,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KAPPA ALPHA THETA 

FRATERNITY INC.; BETA SIGMA 

FACILITY CORPORATION; BETA 

SIGMA CHAPTER,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-1782

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs in this case seek an extension or modification of a state-court 

temporary restraining order against the defendants. [Doc. No. 7.] For the reasons 

explained below, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs’ motion.

I. Background

The plaintiffs are nine students at Southern Methodist University and five 

parents of those students. The defendants are Kappa Alpha Theta Fraternity, Inc.; 

Beta Sigma Facility Corporation; and Beta Sigma Chapter—which the Court will 

refer to collectively as “the sorority.” The plaintiffs allege that in February 2022 they 

signed housing agreements with the sorority, and that the sorority promised to 

provide on-campus housing at the sorority house beginning on August 20, 2022. 

In the summer of 2022, the sorority told the plaintiffs that their spots at the 

sorority house may not be available and encouraged the plaintiffs to find alternative 

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housing. In response, the plaintiffs filed suit against the sorority in Dallas County 

Court on July 26, alleging breach of contract, fraud and/or fraudulent inducement, 

negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and money had and received. The 

plaintiffs allege that the sorority repeatedly represented to them that they could live 

at the on-campus sorority house and that Southern Methodist University requires 

them to live on-campus for two years. They also allege that on-campus housing is at 

capacity.

The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order against the sorority, 

which the state court granted. The state court found that the sorority had entered 

into a valid contract with the plaintiffs to provide housing to them, and that the 

plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm absent a temporary restraining order. So, 

the state court enjoined the sorority and all of its agents from “1. Not providing 

residential housing to the Student Does [Jane Does 1–9] at the house located at 3108 

University Boulevard, Dallas, Texas 75205; and 2. Assigning or transferring the 

rights of the Student Does [Jane Does 1–9] to reside at 3108 University Boulevard, 

Dallas, Texas 75205.”

1 The state court entered the temporary restraining order on 

July 31, 2022, which was set to expire today, August 17, 2022 at 2:00 pm—when the 

state court was to hold a hearing on the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary injunction.

But the sorority had other plans. On August 15, it removed the case to this 

Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Yesterday, August 16, the plaintiffs filed 

1 Doc. No. 1-5 at 231.

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an emergency motion to remand and an emergency motion for a temporary 

restraining order. The sorority has not responded to either motion.

In their motion for a temporary restraining order, the plaintiffs ask the Court 

to extend or modify the state-court’s temporary restraining order to the earliest date 

of a preliminary injunction hearing in this Court, fourteen days, or two full business 

days after this Court rules on their motion to remand. 

II. Governing Law

Temporary restraining orders are a “highly accelerated and temporary form of 

preliminary injunctive relief.”2 Thus, movants must establish the same four elements 

as for a preliminary injunction: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 

(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury, which 

would occur if the injunction is denied, outweighs any harm that will result if the 

injunction is granted; and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the 

public interest.3 Unlike preliminary injunctions, temporary restraining orders are 

restricted to “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long 

as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.”4

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1450 states that “[a]ll injunctions, orders, and other 

proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect 

2 Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc. v. A&A Sec. Grp., LLC, No. 3:21-CV00528-M, 2021 WL 1400979, 

at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2021) (Lynn, J.).

3 Id.

4 Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Holley, No. 3:21-CV-3241-N, 2022 WL 827126, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 

18, 2022) (Godbey, J.).

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until dissolved or modified by the district court.” “Section 1450 was simply designed 

to deal with the unique problem of a shift in jurisdiction in the middle of a case which 

arises whenever cases are removed from state to federal court.”5 “[I]njunctions[] and 

other orders . . . obtained in state court all remain effective after the case is removed 

to federal court.”6 This is to make sure that the “various rights of the parties will not 

lapse upon removal.”7

Now enter Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. “Rule 65(b) allows a Court to 

extend the temporary restraining order once for a total of fourteen days” if the Court 

finds good cause for an extension.8 “Ultimately, the relationship between [section] 

1450 and Rule 65 has been narrowed to one simple proposition: ‘[a]n ex parte

temporary restraining order issued by a state court prior to removal remains in force 

after removal no longer than it would have remained in effect under state law, but in 

no event does the order remain in force longer than the time limitations imposed by 

Rule 65(b), measured from the date of removal.’”9

5 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 

of Alameda Co., 415 U.S. 423, 435 (1974).

6 Id. at 436.

7 Id.

8 Elepreneurs Holdings, LLC v. Benson, No. 4:21-CV-00026, 2021 WL 134098, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 

Jan. 14, 2021).

9 Id. at *1 (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc., 415 U.S. at 439–40). Obviously, Granny Foods

involved a state-court-issued ex parte temporary restraining order. Here, the state court’s order was 

not granted ex parte, while this extension will be. But this fact makes no difference for the analysis; 

if anything, it makes the plaintiffs’ argument for an extension even stronger, because the sorority 

already had an opportunity to oppose the initial temporary restraining order—and the sorority lost. 

The fact that the sorority has not yet responded to the plaintiffs’ motion(s) in this Court is a 

consequence of the sorority’s removal strategy and timeline. 

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III. Analysis

The Court finds that good cause exists to extend the state court’s temporary 

restraining order. There are at least two reasons. First, less than forty-eight hours 

before the state court’s temporary restraining order was to expire, the sorority

removed the case to federal court—even though the sorority could have done so at 

any time since July 26. Because the state court’s order is set to expire today but the 

sorority has deprived the state court of the opportunity to extend its order (or to 

provide any other just relief) at the hearing that was also set for today, the Court 

finds that the only way to prevent a manifest injustice is to extend the state court’s 

order and give the parties more time to brief and the Court more time to consider the 

plaintiffs’ motion to remand and other pleas for relief. As another court explained in 

similar circumstances: “It would be inequitable for Plaintiff to lose a lawfully obtained 

injunction issued by the state court simply based on the circumstances of scheduling 

issues. The injunction should continue or not based on its merits, not as a result of 

strategy.”10

Second, the state court has already determined not only that the plaintiffs 

meet the requirements for a temporary restraining order, but also that the plaintiffs 

have “clearly” done so.11 “Although pre-removal state-court rulings cannot set the law 

of the case in federal court, they are entitled to some deference during post-removal 

10 Am. Sys. Consulting, Inc. v. Devier, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2007).

11 Doc. No. 1-5 at 230.

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proceedings.”12 Here, appropriate deference to the state court’s order requires 

extending it to prevent injustice.

IV. Conclusion

Because the Court finds good cause to extend the state court’s temporary 

restraining order, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs’ motion. The Court ORDERS

that the existing temporary restraining order shall remain in full force and effect 

through the earliest of (a) the Court’s ruling on the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to 

remand, (b) the expiration of the fourteenth day following issuance of this Order, or 

(c) the Court’s ruling on the plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of August, 2022.

BRANTLEY STARR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12 Xtria, LLC v. Int’l Ins. All., Inc., No. 309-CV-2228-G, 2009 WL 4756365, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 

Dec. 11, 2009); see also Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2002).

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