UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-2256

MICHAEL BILLINGSLEY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

 Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cv-00755-LO-IDD)

Submitted: May 27, 2021 Decided: June 7, 2021

Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

A.J Dhali, DHALI PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Howard Lindenberg, 

Managing Associate General Counsel, Lisa Anne MacVittie, Associate General Counsel, 

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, McLean, Virginia; 

Maureen R. Knight, CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP, Fairfax, 

Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Billingsley filed suit against his former employer, Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 asserting that it did not 

hire him as a senior producer because of his race and that it terminated his employment in 

retaliation for filing an ethics complaint. Freddie Mac filed a counterclaim alleging that 

Billingsley failed to repay his signing bonus in accordance with Billingsley’s agreement to 

repay the bonus if his employment was terminated for corrective action within the first year 

of his employment. Billingsley now appeals the district court's order granting Freddie 

Mac’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. We affirm.

“We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same legal standards as the district court, and viewing all facts and reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Carter v. 

Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary 

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). “[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether there are any genuine factual issues that properly 

can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor 

of either party.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make 

and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . 

as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. §1981(a). A plaintiff may ultimately prove 
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race discrimination under § 1981 through “direct or circumstantial evidence showing that 

an adverse employment action was [caused] by

intentional discrimination aimed at the plaintiff’s [race],” or through the “burden-shifting 

framework” of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Guessous v. 

Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that McDonnell 

Douglas framework applies to both § 1981 and Title VII discrimination claims). Under 

this framework, a plaintiff alleging discrimination bears “the initial burden of proving his 

or her prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.” Abilt v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 

848 F.3d 305, 315 (4th Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff meets his prima facie burden, “[t]he 

burden then shifts to the employer to . . . provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the adverse employment action.” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 

203 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer satisfies this 

requirement, “the plaintiff resumes the burden of persuading the factfinder that the 

employer’s proffered explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id. 

We have thoroughly reviewed the parties’ briefs and the joint appendix and

conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Billingsley failed to establish a 

prima facie case of racial discrimination or retaliation, and that, even if he had established 

a prima facie case, he did not show that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Freddie 

Mac’s legitimate reasons for not hiring him as a senior producer and for terminating his 

employment were pretextual. 

Lastly, in Virginia, a breach of contract claim requires (1) a legally enforceable 

obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff, (2) the defendant’s violation or breach of the 
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obligation, and (3) an injury or harm to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach. 

Ulloa v. QSP, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 43, 48 (Va. 2006). Billingsley concedes that he and Freddie 

Mac had an enforceable contract requiring Billingsley to repay his $4000 sign-on bonus if 

Freddie Mac terminated his employment pursuant to its corrective action policy within the 

first year of Billingsley’s employment. We conclude that the district court did not err in 

granting summary judgment to Freddie Mac on its breach-of-contract counterclaim.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED