IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

ROBERT (BOB) ROSS §

§

VS. § 

§

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL §

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al., §

§ Case No. 4:22-CV-343-Y

AND §

§ Consolidated with

EUGENIO VARGAS § Case No. 4:22-CV-430-Y

§

VS. §

§

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL §

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al. §

______________________________________________________________________________

APFA DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON ALL CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS

JAMES D. SANFORD

Tex. Bar No. 24051289

Gillespie Sanford LLP

4803 Gaston Ave.

Dallas, TX 75246

Tel.: (214) 800-5111; Fax.: (214) 838-0001

Email: jim@gillespiesanford.com 

JEFFREY A. BARTOS (pro hac vice)

D.C. Bar No. 435832

Guerrieri, Bartos & Roma, PC

1900 M Street, N.W. Suite 700

Washington, DC 20036

Tel.: (202) 624-7400; Fax: (202) 624-7420

Email: jbartos@geclaw.com

Counsel for the APFA Defendants

CHARLETTE L. BRODERICK (pro hac vice)

Tex. Bar No. 241133870

Association of Professional Flight Attendants

1004 W. Euless Blvd.

Euless, TX 76040

Tel.: (682) 301-8454

Email: cbroderick@apfa.org

Counsel for APFA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN 

CONNECTION WITH THE APFA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT. .................................................................................................1

A. Summary Of Undisputed Material Facts. ......................................................................1

B. Plaintiffs’ Objections To The APFA’s Summary Judgment Evidence 

Are Meritless..................................................................................................................4

1. Declaration Of Josh Black .................................................................................5

2. Declaration Of Erik Harris ................................................................................6

3. Declaration Of Hal O’Neil.................................................................................7

II. THE APFA DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON 

PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW ..........................................................8

A. Judgment Should Be Entered On The Claims Which Plaintiffs Have 

Abandoned. ..............................................................................................................8

B. The APFA Defendants Are Entitled To Summary Judgment On 

Plaintiffs’ LMRDA Claims......................................................................................9

1. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown Any LMRDA Due Process 

Violations...........................................................................................................9

2. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Protected Speech Was The “But For” 

Cause Of The Arbitrator’s Decisions...............................................................11

C. Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims Fail As A Matter Of Law ........................................12

1. Mr. Ross’ Breach of Employment Contract Claim..........................................12

2. Mr. Vargas’ Fraud Claim.................................................................................14

3. Mr. Ross’ Defamation Claim...........................................................................15

III. APFA IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS 

FIDUCIARY DUTY COUNTERCLAIMS.......................................................................17

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................21

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page(s)

Adams-Lundy v. APFA,

844 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1988) .............................................................................................18, 19

Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.,

343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2003), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 355 F.3d 

356 (5th Cir. 2003)...................................................................................................................14

Blueitt v. Crestbrook Ins. Co.,

643 F. Supp. 3d 651 (N.D. Tex. 2022) ......................................................................................4

City of El Paso, Tex. v. El Paso Ent., Inc.,

382 F. App’x 361 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................20

Fowler v. S. Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965) ...................................................................................................19

Halsell v. Local Union No. 5, Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen,

530 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Tex. 1982) .........................................................................................10

Holschen v. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades/Painters Dist. Council #2,

598 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2010) .....................................................................................................9

Hudson v. Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps.,

630 F. Supp. 3d 214 (D.D.C. 2022).........................................................................................11

IDA Eng’g, Inc. v. PBK Architects, Inc..

No. 05-15-01418-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 4, 2016).......................................................................13

Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & 

Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Hardeman,

401 U.S. 233 (1971)...........................................................................................................3, 6, 9

Keenan v. Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aero. Workers,

937 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Maine 2013) .................................................................................11, 12

Kirk v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO,

934 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Tex. 1995)..........................................................................................16

Lewis v. AFSCME,

407 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir. 1969)...............................................................................................3, 10

LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

835 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2016) .............................................................................................4, 5, 7

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y Document 248 Filed 06/07/24 Page 3 of 27 PageID 8491
iii

Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,

749 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1984).........................................................................................................12

Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,

814 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1987).................................................................................................12

McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp.,

131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................14

Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,

787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1990)....................................................................................................13

Perdido Properties LLC on Behalf of Bremer v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P.,

669 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. App. 2023)...........................................................................................13

Ray v. Young,

753 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1985) .............................................................................................18, 19

Serafinn v. Local 722, IBT,

597 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................11

Smith v. Spizzirri,

No. 22-1218, 2024 WL 2193872 (U.S. May 16, 2024)...........................................................14

United States v. Herron,

825 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1987) .....................................................................................................17

Yager v. Carey,

910 F. Supp. 704 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 159 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1998)..................................10

STATUTES

UNITED STATES CODE

Fair Credit Reporting Act

15 U.S.C. § 1681........................................................................................................................8

Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act

29 U.S.C. § 411....................................................................................................................9, 10

29 U.S.C. § 431 .......................................................................................................................12

29 U.S.C. § 501............................................................................................................17, 18, 19

29 U.S.C. § 529........................................................................................................................11

TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICES & REMEDIES CODE

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§ 16.051....................................................................................................................................13

RULES

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 9.......................................................................................................................................14

Rule 56...............................................................................................................................4, 5, 7

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 201.....................................................................................................................................6

Rule 801.....................................................................................................................................6

Rule 803.....................................................................................................................................8

Rule 1006...................................................................................................................................8

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We demonstrated in our opening Memorandum, as well as in our Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, that Plaintiffs cannot show facts which would warrant a 

trial on any of their claims, that the APFA Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on Plaintiffs’ claims, and that APFA is entitled to judgment on its fiduciary duty counterclaims. 

We respectfully submit that Plaintiffs’ Opposition Brief, to which we Reply herein, confirms that 

conclusion. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating a genuine issue as to any material 

fact, nor of establishing legal grounds upon which they may proceed on the undisputed record. 

The APFA Defendants respectfully submit that—with full discovery and full briefing complete—

the Court should enter judgment in their favor on all claims.

I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN CONNECTION WITH

THE APFA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A. Summary Of Undisputed Material Facts.

The essential dispositive facts are not disputed. Without rehashing the factual discussion 

in our Opening or our Opposition Memoranda, we note here only that non-party Union members

filed internal Union charges against Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas, which led to final and binding 

arbitrations under Article VII of the APFA Constitution. APFA Appx. 4-5 (Black Decl.) ¶¶ 10-13.1

The independent Article VII Arbitrator conducted hearings in which witnesses testified and 

documentary evidence was submitted, and ultimately issued awards in both cases which held that 

Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas, while Union officers, had misused and improperly received tens of 

thousands of dollars in violation of the APFA Constitution and Policy Manual. APFA Appx. 6-8 

(Black Decl.) ¶¶ 15-23; APFA Appx. 282-284 (Ross Supp. Decision); APFA Appx. 504-506 

1 The APFA Defendants’ Appendix (“APFA Appx.”) is filed at Doc. 236.

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(Vargas Supp. Decision). The Arbitrator barred Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas from holding Union 

office based on what he concluded were egregious breaches of their duty to the Union and its 

members. Id.; see also APFA Appx. 240, 242 (Ross Award); APFA Appx. 480 (Vargas Award).

Arbitrator Armendariz concluded that Mr. Ross had improperly used APFA funds for:

§ Personal housing expenses and furniture purchases. 

§ A family vacation to the Grand Canyon. 

§ Costs for personal rental cars. 

§ Expenses related to commuting to Ross’ California home 

§ Inflated vacation and sick leave payments which he refused to repay. 

Mr. Ross was ordered to repay APFA for the $5,436.47 sick and vacation overpayment, as well as 

over $8,000 for leasing an apartment “where he had no intention of occupying,” and an additional 

$3,600 in unauthorized expenditures. APFA Appx. 241-242. Mr. Ross was barred from holding 

any positions in APFA. APFA Appx. 241. After an independent financial review revealed that Mr. 

Ross had charged thousands of dollars to the Union for additional personal expenses during his 

two-year tenure, Arbitrator Armendariz ordered Mr. Ross to repay an additional $20,336.19 for 

unauthorized and inappropriate costs charged to APFA for personal expenses. APFA Appx. 282-

84. 

With regard to Mr. Vargas, Arbitrator Armendariz found Mr. Vargas guilty of violating the 

APFA Constitution and Policy Manual in dereliction of his duties as National Treasurer in several 

ways including regularly charging personal meals to the Union, while accepting fixed meal 

allowances. After an independent financial review, Arbitrator Armendariz determined that Mr. 

Vargas had made approximately $14,000 in “[i]nappropriate credit card charges related to meals.” 

APFA Appx. 505. Mr. Vargas was ordered to repay that amount, the cost of the independent 

financial review, and half of the arbitrator’s fee and he was “prohibited from serving in any APFA 

National Officer position or Regional Officer position for life.” Id.

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Plaintiffs seek to generate a dispute over the core facts of the arbitration process by offering 

arguments and fragments of evidence which, they say, contradict some of the Arbitrator’s findings 

and conclusions. See Doc. 246 at ECF 18-19. But judicial review of union discipline is not de 

novo; the question is whether “the charging party ... provide[ed] some evidence at the disciplinary 

hearing to support the charges made.... A stricter standard ... would be inconsistent with the 

apparent congressional intent to allow unions to govern their own affairs, and would require courts 

to judge the credibility of witnesses on the basis of what would be at best a cold record.” Int'l Bhd. 

of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Hardeman, 401 

U.S. 233, 245–46 (1971) (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. AFSCME, 407 F.2d 1185, 1198 (3d 

Cir. 1969). Plaintiffs do not even remotely establish a genuine issue under this standard .

Nor does Plaintiffs’ effort to impugn the Arbitrator’s findings succeed under a lesser 

standard of proof. Plaintiffs assert, for example, that the Arbitrator made contradictory findings in 

the Ross and Vargas cases with respect to the disposition of certain furniture. Doc. 246 at ECF 19-

20 (claiming that Arbitrator concluded in Vargas that “all of the Ashley furniture has been fully 

explained and accounted for,” but in Ross held that “Ross wrongfully took the Ashley’s furniture 

and moved it into his house”). An examination of the decisions, however, shows there was no 

such contradiction. While both arbitrations examined purchases of furniture from a company 

named Ashley, Mr. Ross’ arbitration involved Ross’ use of the APFA credit card to purchase 

“$3637.00 worth of furniture on August 13, 2016” for his own use, Doc. 239-3 at ECF 3, while 

Mr. Vargas’ arbitration involved Vargas’ use of his APFA credit card “on May 18, 2016, in the 

amount of $8733.89 ... for the corporate apartments for the three (2) newly appointed APFA 

National Department Chairs,” not Mr. Ross. Doc. 239-7 at ECF 35. There was no contradiction 

between the findings in the two matters.

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We respectfully submit that the facts presented in support of the APFA’s motion are not

genuinely at issue, as further discussed in regard to the relevant arguments below.

B. Plaintiffs’Objections To The APFA’s Summary Judgment Evidence Are Meritless.

Confronted with an inability to genuinely dispute the dispositive facts, most of which are 

from the undisputed record of the Article VII arbitrations, Plaintiffs object to the underlying source 

material in an attempt to avoid judgment. Plaintiffs object to the Declarations of Josh Black, Erik 

Harris, and Hal O’Neil, and to a number of the exhibits thereto generally on the grounds of hearsay, 

lack of personal knowledge, and as improper “summations” of other evidence. Doc. 246 at ECF 

8-17.

Plaintiffs’sweeping challenges are without merit.

Rule 56(c)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., lists the wide variety of materials which can be used to 

support a fact at summary judgment, and Rule 56(c)(4) specifies that declarations “must be made 

on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the ... 

declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” All such evidence is subject to the 

limitation in Rule 56(c)(2) that “A party may object that that material cited to support ... a fact 

cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Importantly here, “[a]t the 

summary judgment stage, materials cited to support ... a fact need only be capable of being 

‘presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016). “Put simply, the Court may consider evidence at 

the summary judgment stage if that evidence contains facts which would be admissible at trial, 

even if that evidence is unsworn or in a presently inadmissible form.” Blueitt v. Crestbrook Ins. 

Co., 643 F. Supp. 3d 651, 654 (N.D. Tex. 2022).

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The APFA Defendants’ summary judgment evidence readily meets the Rule 56 standard, 

and Plaintiffs’ objections should be overruled. 

To begin with, the challenged Declarations are all based on both personal knowledge and, 

in the case of Mr. Black and Mr. Harris, Declarants’ positions within the APFA. See APFA Appx. 

2 (Black Decl.) ¶ 1; APFA Appx. 522 (Harris Decl.) ¶ 1; APFA Appx. 544 (O’Neil Decl.), ¶ 1.

1. Declaration Of Josh Black. With respect to Mr. Black, he has been the National

Secretary of the APFA since April 2020, APFA Appx. 2, ¶ 2, and under the APFA Constitution is 

“responsible for all administrative records of the Association,” including records of meetings of 

the Board of Directors and Executive Committee, and is responsible to “administer Article VII 

procedures.” APFA Appx. 27, Art. III, Section 6.D(1), (4) and (8); see also APFA Appx. 30-31 

(APFA Const. Art. VII, Section 2.A-C (describing role of National Secretary in Article VII 

process)). Reflecting that role, Mr. Black’s Declaration provides, as exhibits, the main 

documentary record of the Article VII proceedings at issue here (which took place during his time 

in office), from the charges to the arbitration awards. These are official records of the Union, of 

which Mr. Black has both personal knowledge and the institutional responsibility to maintain. His 

Declaration and all its exhibits are not objectionable. See LRS Consulting, 835 F.3d at 534 (even 

when affidavit did not state it was based on personal knowledge, provision of “sufficiently specific

statements ... to infer that the affiants had personal knowledge of the acts attested therein” was 

sufficient to use for summary judgment purposes.).

Plaintiffs list ten exhibits to Mr. Black’s Declaration they claim are objectionable hearsay, 

Doc. 246 at ECF 10-12, but these objections are patently without merit. To begin with, as described 

above, these are all records of the Article VII proceedings of which Mr. Black has personal 

knowledge and are admissible on that basis alone. Moreover, the Court has already taken judicial

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notice of two of the objected-to exhibits (the Supplemental Arbitration Awards which are Exhibits

T and Z to the Black Declaration) under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Ross Doc. 45; Vargas

Doc. 46. The Post-Hearing briefs of Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas (Black Exhs. O and V) are not 

hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2), because they are statements by an opposing party. And the Article 

VII Awards and transcripts in both matters(Black Exhs. R, U, W) have been submitted by Plaintiffs 

themselves in the record of this matter. See, e.g., Ross Doc. 1 -3 (Ross Art. VII Award); Doc. 239 

(Pls.’ Appx. Supp. Summ. J.) at Appx. 101-138 (Ross Art. VII Tr.), Appx. 255-62 (Vargas Art. VII 

Tr.) and Appx. 309 (Vargas Art. VII Award).2 Plaintiffs’ objections should be rejected.

2. Declaration Of Erik Harris. With respect to Mr. Harris, he has been the National 

Treasurer of APFA since April 2020, APFA Appx. 522, ¶ 2. Under the APFA Constitution he is, 

among other things, “responsible for all financial records of the APFA,” and “assist[s] the National 

Secretary in the discharge of all duties.” APFA Appx. 28-29 (Art. III, Section 6.E(2) and (14)). 

Under the APFA Policy Manual he has a role in providing union members with access to union

financial records. APFA Appx. 61 (Section 7.G.1.). His Declaration describes formal resolutions 

by the APFA Board of Directors regarding APFA finances, official correspondence and records

regarding Mr. Vargas and others, his involvement in responding to member requests to review 

financial information, and actions taken by him and others at his direction to evaluate whether Mr. 

Ross had been overpaid. APFA Appx. 523-527 (Harris Decl.) ¶¶ 6-21. All of those statements are 

either within his direct personal knowledge or based on documents over which he has professional 

2 Plaintiffs also object to the reports of the independent financial review ordered by the Arbitrator 

in both cases, Black Exhs. S and Y. These reports establish, among other things, there was some 

evidence, under LMRDA standards, for the Arbitrator’s findings, see Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 245-

46, and are undoubtably admissible for that purpose in addition to being capable of being presented 

in a form which is admissible for other purposes.

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oversight. As with Mr. Black, his Declaration and all its attachments are admissible. See LSR 

Consulting, 835 F.3d at 534.

With respect to the exhibits to Mr. Harris’ Declaration, Plaintiffs contend that “APFA’s 

record-keeping system is not reliable,” and therefore that the “documents within APFA’s 

possession are unreliable.” Doc. 246 at ECF 12, 13. This contention is baseless. Plaintiffs do not 

dispute the authenticity of any of the documents submitted by APFA. In any event, the sole basis 

for this contention is Mr. Harris’ testimony in the Article VII proceeding that when he took office 

in April 2020 the Union’s financial records were “in bad shape.” Doc. 239-6 at ECF 9 (Pls.’ Appx. 

270), and an email from August 2021 stating that a box of documents was at that time missing, 

Doc. 239-8 at ECF 32 (Pls.’ Appx. 385). Mr. Harris testified in the hearing that at least some of 

those items had since been located, Doc. 247-4 at ECF 45:4-21 (Pls.’ Appx. 195), and Plaintiffs 

present no evidence to support their sweeping claim that the record-keeping system as a whole or 

as it relates to any of the documents at issue here is “unreliable” in any way, much less so as to 

affect summary judgment.

3. Declaration Of Hal O’Neil. Mr. O’Neil is a Certified Public Accountant who 

personally analyzed the overpayments to Mr. Ross and others, and who drafted the “Confidential 

Memorandum” upon which Plaintiffs focus their case. APFA Appx. 544-45 (O’Neil Decl.) ¶ 1-2, 

8. His Declaration is based on his personal knowledge, ibid., and describes analysis he personally

conducted in the normal course of his business, his conclusion with respect to Mr. Ross, and what 

he meant in the “Confidential Memorandum.” APFA Appx. 544-546, ¶¶ 4-8. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ 

misreading of his Memorandum, Mr. O’Neil specifically affirms the he had “concluded ... that 

Mr. Ross had been overpaid in the amount of $5436.47.” APFA Appx. 546. Mr. O’Neil’s 

Declaration, based on his personal knowledge, is plainly appropriate under Rule 56.

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Plaintiffs object that Mr. O’Neil’s analysis of the overpayment, which is a document he 

prepared and provided to APFA prior to his litigation, is in some way an “improper summation of 

evidence” and that the underlying documents upon which he based his analysis were in some way 

improperly withheld. Doc. 246 at ECF 16-17.

3

 But the overpayment schedule is not presented as 

a “summation” under Rule 1006, Fed. R. Ev., but is instead the analysis conducted by Mr. O’Neil 

in the normal course of his business as the longtime CPA for APFA, which is admissible under 

Rule 803(B)(6), Fed. R. Evid., at a minimum. (We also note that Plaintiffs have themselves 

submitted this document as evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment, see, e.g., 

Doc. 239 at ECF 23-31.) 

II. THE APFA DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’

CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

A. Judgment Should be Entered On The Claims Which Plaintiffs Have Abandoned.

The APFA Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims, Doc. 234, 

and fully briefed its arguments as to each such claim, Doc. 235. In opposition, Plaintiffs have 

totally failed to address three of those claims – the breach of fiduciary duty; violation of the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act; and intentional interference with contract. Plaintiffs have therefore 

abandoned those claims. 

In addition, while Plaintiffs asserted a claim for breach of the APFA’s Constitution, see

Ross Doc. 75, ¶¶ 41-47 ; Vargas Doc. 133, ¶¶ 41-47, their opposition brief explains that they are 

3 Plaintiffs’ contention that supporting documents were in some way withheld is not supported 

by the record: the motion to compel they cite for that proposition, Doc. 113, was denied by the 

Court (after being refiled as Ross Doc. 136). See Ross Doc. 187 (Order).

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not raising an independent claim for breach of the APFA Constitution, but rely on that document 

only as context for their LMRDA Title I claim. Doc. 246 at ECF 36. 

B. The APFA Defendants Are Entitled To Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ LMRDA 

Claims. 

1. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown Any LMRDA Due Process Violations. 

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, and as demonstrated in our opening submission (Doc. 

235 at ECF 35-42) and in our opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 243 

at ECF 15-31), the undisputed evidence shows that the arbitration process was fully consistent 

with the requirements of the LMRDA, including its requirement that discipline be supported by 

“some evidence” and only after a “full and fair hearing.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(C); Int’l Bhd. of 

Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 246-47 (1971). 

While Plaintiffs raise a laundry-list of various meritless after-the-fact procedural 

complaints about the hearing process, it bears emphasis that, with the exception of the 

“Confidential Memo,” none of these issues was raised by either Mr. Ross or Mr. Vargas at the 

hearing or in their post-hearing briefs to the Arbitrator. See APFA Appx. 185-213 (Ross Brief); 

APFA Appx. 404-41 (Vargas Brief). These claims were fully addressed in our opposition to 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 243) at the pages referenced below and need to 

not be repeated here:

• Alleged “discovery” issues, including allegations that the APFA “concealed” the 

“Confidential Memorandum.” Addressed at Doc. 243 at ECF 20-23 4

4 Plaintiffs continue to focus on only the overpayment of Mr. Ross’ sick and vacation pay and the 

alleged impact of the “Confidential Memorandum” on this charge. It also bears emphasis, 

however, that this related to only one of the many charges for which they were found guilty. See 

Holschen v. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades/Painters Dist. Council #2, 598 F.3d 454, 462 

(8th Cir. 2010) (upholding discipline when there is “some evidence to support some of the charges 

brought against him”). While Plaintiffs summarily dismiss the other serious charges (involving 

the unauthorized use of Union funds for various personal expenses) as “inventive story-tell[ing],” 

(Doc. 246 at ECF 19), the record does not support their claim. A more detailed discussion of 

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• Alleged inability to discuss transition agreement. Addressed id. at ECF 23-25.

• Alleged inability to discuss “evidence of harassment.” Addressed id. at ECF 27-28.5 

• Alleged inability to call witnesses. Addressed id.. at ECF 25.

• Alleged deprivation of “proportionate time.” Addressed id, at ECF 25-26.

• Alleged admission of “unreliable hearsay.” Addressed id. at ECF 26-27.6

Moreover -- and independently fatal to their LMRDA claims -- Plaintiffs entirely fail to 

explain to the Court how the alleged procedural shortfalls (if they occurred), could have affected 

the outcome of their arbitrations. Even if “an internal union rule has been violated, Section 

411(a)(5)(C) gives union members a cause of action only when that violation severely impairs the 

member’s ability to prepare and present a defense, or by increasing the risk that a decision maker 

will reach an erroneous determination.” Yager v. Carey, 910 F. Supp. 704, 714 (D.D.C. 1995), 

aff’d, 159 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs’ due process claims fail as a matter of law. 

these charges, the evidence offered at the hearing in support, and the Arbitrator’s decision on them 

can be found in our opening Memorandum, Doc. 235 at ECF 20-33.

5 While Plaintiffs allege that “a substantial amount of evidence” was “not submitted” because the 

Arbitrator “expedited” Mr. Vargas’ arbitration proceedings (Doc. 246 at ECF 27), their only 

supporting citation is to an email correspondence between Nena Martin and Defendant Harris from 

May-June 2022 (Pls.’ Appx. 539) -- after the Ross and Vargas decisions had been issued -- about 

separate proceedings. Also wholly unsupported is their allegation that the Arbitrator “disallowed” 

“evidence on key issues like charges, expenses, calculations, etc.” Id. at ECF 27-28.

6 Plaintiffs newly complain that the discipline imposed against them “appears disproportionate” to 

the charges (Doc. 246 at ECF 28), but it is emphatically not the role of the judiciary to second 

guess the internal penalties imposed by a union for found wrongdoing. See Lewis v. AFSCME, 

407 F.2d 1185, 1198 (3d Cir. 1969); Halsell v. Local Union No. 5, Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, 

530 F. Supp. 803, 807 (N.D. Tex. 1982). Plaintiffs also newly claim (incorrectly) that “APFA’s 

counsel submitted amicus briefs” against Ross and Vargas in their arbitration hearings. Doc. 246 

at ECF 44. In support, they cite to the Confidential Memorandum and the Affidavits of Heidi 

Morgan and Nena Martin, none of which remotely support this unfounded claim. 

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2. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Protected Speech Was The “But For” Cause Of 

The Arbitrator’s Decisions. 

Plaintiffs contend that the discipline assessed by the Arbitrator in 2022 was in retaliation 

for some form of protected free speech related to their views expressed in 2016 against merging 

APFA with another union, in alleged violation of 29 U.S.C. § 529. Doc. 246 at ECF 45-47. They 

provide nothing more than pure speculation for this theory, which is insufficient to defeat a 

properly supported motion for summary judgment. 

As shown in our opening submission, the burden is on Plaintiffs to produce evidence on 

which a jury could find that the exercise of free speech rights “was not merely a motivating factor, 

but a necessary condition or a ‘but-for’ cause” of the discipline. Serafinn v. Local 722, IBT, 597 

F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2010); Hudson v. Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps., 630 F. Supp. 3d 214, 225 (D.D.C. 

2022); Keenan, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 109. Plaintiffs gratuitously suggest that the “but for” standard 

“should not apply here,” Doc. 246 at ECF 45-46, but they notably fail to offer any argument or 

authority in support of this assertion (except to incorrectly state that none of the “but-for” LMRDA 

cases cited by APFA Defendants involved free speech “retaliation” claims when, in fact, they all 

did). And, as spelled out in in our opening submission (Doc. 235 at ECF 40-42) and our opposition 

to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 243 at ECF 28-31), Plaintiffs have failed to 

show any causation at all -- much less the required “but for” causation -- between the alleged 

speech and the discipline imposed by the neutral third-party arbitrator six years later.7 Plaintiffs 

offer neither direct nor indirect evidence of causation. See Keenan v. Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & 

7 None of the conduct purportedly “evidencing” the claimed “stifling” of free speech has anything 

to do with Arbitrator Armendariz and very little of the alleged conduct has anything to do with any 

of the APFA Defendants. See, e.g., Doc. 246 at ECF 46 (discussing, for example, disputes between 

Ms. Chinery and her husband and Mr. Ross; “social medial” reports by “unknown APFA 

members;” and “anonymous complaints to AA human resources”). 

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Aero. Workers, 937 F. Supp. 2d 93, 109-111 (D. Maine 2013) (reviewing both direct and indirect 

evidence and concluding that the evidence failed to show a fact issue on “but for” causation). 

Accordingly, their LMRDA free speech claim fails as well. 

Plaintiffs were charged with, and found guilty of, financial malfeasance during their tenure 

as APFA officers and not for the exercise of any right enumerated in Title I of the LMRDA. Their 

retaliation claims fail.

C. Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims Fail As A Matter of Law.

1. Mr. Ross’ Breach of Employment Contract Claim.

Mr. Ross contends the APFA Defendants breached his Transition Agreement by disclosing

it to union members and by allegedly underpaying him for sick leave in 2018. Doc. 75, ¶¶ 52-59. 

With respect to the disclosure, we demonstrated that since federal law requires unions to 

disclose documents underlying union officer salary and benefits, any claim of breach in this regard 

cannot be sustained. See Doc. 235 at ECF 46-47; Doc. 243 at ECF 37-38. Mr. Ross contends that 

since the amount he “was paid under the TA was disclosed in the LM-2s,” no further disclosure of 

the TA was required. Doc. 246 at ECF 34-35. But this is incorrect – the statute requires unions to 

provide members, upon showing of just cause, the underlying “books, records, and accounts 

necessary to verify” the federal report. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c). Mr. Ross does not, and cannot, show 

why his TA should have been shielded from union member review.8

8 Mr. Ross here relies solely on Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 

1984), Doc. 246 at ECF 35, but that decision does not support his position. The cited language in 

Mallick goes solely to the issue of what may or may not constitute “just cause” in a particular 

context, 749 F.2d at 783, and held that “political opposition to union officials” does not by itself 

establish “just cause” for such review. The Mallick court ultimately held that the union members 

there did have just cause to review a litigation settlement agreement the union had attempted to 

maintain in confidence. See Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 674, 679-683 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987). Here, the union determined based on consultation with its outside counsel that 

disclosure was required to comply with the LMRDA, see APFA Appx. 509 (Hedrick Decl.) ¶ 9; 

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With respect to the sick leave payment, we showed and it is not disputed that Mr. Ross was 

paid the contested amount of sick leave payment on March 29, 2018, more than four years before 

this suit was filed, APFA Appx. 525 (Harris Decl.) ¶ 13, making this claim untimely under Tex. 

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051. Doc. 235 at ECF 47. Plaintiff argues that the limitations period 

did not begin to run until he received “final payment” in December 2019, Doc. 246 at 33, but the 

cited document (Doc. 247-11 at ECF 7 (Pls.’ Appx. 507)), does not relate to payment of the 

contested sick leave which had, it is undisputed, been paid in full from APFA’s perspective, in 

March 2018. As Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates, the 2019 payment was only for moving 

expenses, which are not at issue here. Doc. 239-4 at ECF 41 (Gunter Decl.) ¶ 1.d. Mr. Ross does 

not challenge the amount of the December 2019 payment, but instead challenges the payment that

he received in March 2018. A cause of action in a breach of contract case accrues when the alleged 

breach occurs, see Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990), which in the 

case of the sick leave was more than four years before suit was filed.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on IDA Eng’g, Inc. v. PBK Architects, Inc.. No. 05-15-01418-CV (Tex. 

Appx. Oct. 4, 2016) (Pls.’Appx. 660), to extend the limitations period is misplaced. As that case 

held, when, as here, a contract calls for multiple separate payments over time, a cause of action 

accrues when the payment has come due or has been paid incorrectly. Id. at Pls.’Appx. 662; see 

also Perdido Properties LLC on Behalf of Bremer v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 669 S.W.3d 

535, 556 (Tex. Appx. 2023). Here, Mr. Ross knew or should have known of the alleged incorrect 

payment when he received his payout in March 2018. Later payments under other provisions of 

the TA do not extend the limitations period. Id.

APFA Appx. 524 (Harris Decl.) ¶ 11, and there has been no showing of an improper motivation

by either the members requesting access, nor the union in providing it.

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Mr. Ross also observes that the APFA did not list the statute of limitations as an affirmative 

defense in its Answer, Doc. 246 at ECF 34. He does not argue that the defense has been waived, 

however, nor has he contended that litigating the issue at summary judgment has caused any 

prejudice. Absent such a showing, the Court may properly rule on the fully-briefed limitations 

issue. McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1998).

Finally, while we contended in our opening Memorandum that the Federal Arbitration Act 

required dismissal of this claim, Doc. 235 at ECF 46, the Supreme Court has since abrogated Fifth 

Circuit precedent in this regard, Smith v. Spizzirri, No. 22-1218, 2024 WL 2193872 at *3 (May 16, 

2024), and APFA accordingly withdraws this argument. (A copy of the Smith decision was 

submitted by APFA in its Supplemental Appendix, Doc. 244 at ECF 42).

2. Mr. Vargas’ Fraud Claim.

Mr. Vargas’ Amended Complaint includes a count labelled “Common Law Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty and Fraud.” Doc. 133 at ECF 9. We demonstrated that the fraud claim was not 

pled with particularity, and that in his deposition he failed to provide any examples of any allegedly 

fraudulent statement by any Defendants. Doc. 235 at ECF 44 n.27.9 He has abandoned his 

fiduciary duty claim, but attempts now to salvage the fraud claim in a rambling 4-page argument, 

9 Apparently in response to the APFA’s showing, Vargas contends in opposition that he “asserted 

the elements of fraud in his original petition,” but cites only to a declaration by Mr. Ross and some 

of its attachments in support of this claim. Doc. 246 at ECF 46 (citing Doc. 239, PAGEID 6679-

6700). Neither the Amended Complaint nor the documents he now cites satisfy Rule 9(b), Fed. R. 

Civ. P., which “[a]t a minimum, ... requires allegations of the particulars of time, place, and 

contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the 

misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby. Put simply, Rule 9(b) requires ‘the who, what, 

when, where, and how’ to be laid out.” Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 

719, 724 (5th Cir. 2003), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 355 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (cleaned 

up).

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Doc. 246 at ECF 47-50, which demonstrably fails to set forth even the elements of a claim that Mr. 

Vargas was defrauded.

First, Mr. Vargas has not alleged, much less provided evidence upon which the Court could 

find, that he was defrauded in any way. The gist of his Opposition appears to be the claim that 

various APFA representatives wrongly claimed that Mr. Vargas had overpaid Mr. Ross, and that 

therefore Mr. Ross was wrongly found to have owed money back to APFA. See Doc. 246 at ECF 

49 (“When Vargas was told that APFA’s outside accountant ... determined Ross was overpaid 

under the TA, he believed this misrepresentation to his detriment.”). But he does not even allege 

any “detriment” to himself, but rather only alleges a supposed detriment to Mr. Ross. Id. at ECF 

50 (“the plan was to ban Ross for life .... They got Vargas to get to Ross.”). This creative thinking, 

even if supported by any evidence, does not state a claim for fraud on behalf of Mr. Vargas.

Second, Mr. Vargas has not provided evidence upon which the Court could find that any 

APFA Defendant made a false or fraudulent statement. The core “misrepresentation” he points to 

is the determination that Mr. Ross had been overpaid by $5400 when he left office. Doc. 246 at 

ECF 49 (“Harris, Hedrick, and APFA misrepresented the accounting firm’s conclusion that Ross 

was overpaid.”). Of course, this was not a misrepresentation. Mr. O’Neil had calculated the 

overpayment to Mr. Ross, and provided APFA with the “Overpayment Calculation” for Mr. Ross 

showing “Total overpayment – due to APFA” of $5436.47 APFA Appx. 545 (O’Neil Decl.) ¶ 7 

and APFA Appx. 559 (Overpayment Calculation). The challenged representation was true, and 

believed to be true. There was no fraud and no plausible claim of fraud.

3. Mr. Ross’ Defamation Claim.

With respect to Mr. Ross’ defamation claim, we demonstrated that (a) the claim failed for 

want of evidence because Mr. Ross refused in his discovery responses to identify the alleged 

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defamatory statements, Doc. 235 at 48; and failed in any event because (b) the APFA “Hotline” 

alluded to by Mr. Ross in his deposition was not false and (c) Mr. Harris accurately reported the 

findings of CPA O’Neil regarding the overpayment to Mr. Ross. Doc. 235 at ECF 48-50.

In response, Mr. Ross not only fails to address how his claim survives his refusal to even 

plead or identify the alleged defamatory statements in discovery (which is fatal to his claim), he 

compounds the error by largely failing to do so even in his brief. See Doc. 246 at ECF 51-54 

(providing only general characterizations of alleged statements). The only statements he now 

specifically calls out as ostensibly defamatory are described as follows:

• “the defamatory statement Harris made was that Ross owed a debt to APFA 

of $5,436.47 based on an overpayment made under the TA.” Doc. 246 at 

ECF 51; and

• “The statement that Ross owed the debt ... is false and defamatory” 

Doc. 246 at ECF 52.

As we have demonstrated, however, it is undisputed that, prior to the Arbitration, Harris 

believed that Ross did owe a debt to APFA, based on the analysis of CPA Hal O’Neil. See APFA 

Appx. 544-45 (O’Neil Decl.) ¶¶ 5-8; APFA Appx. 525-26 (Harris Decl.) ¶¶ 13-17. And it is 

likewise undisputed that the Article VII Arbitrator held, in a binding determination, that Mr. Ross 

owed the same debt and had failed to repay it. See APFA Appx. 239, 241. Mr. Ross can neither 

show falsity nor meet the “actual malice” standard applicable here, see Kirk v. Transp. Workers 

Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 934 F. Supp. 775, 787 (S.D. Tex. 1995), and his claim fails as a matter of 

law.10

10 Mr. Ross now also assails a Board of Directors resolution which “condemns the action Bob Ross 

took to defraud the members of APFA,” on the ground that the Article VII Arbitrator did not find 

he had committed fraud. Doc. 246 at ECF 52. But the Arbitrator did conclude that, through a range 

of financial transactions which personally benefited him, Mr. Ross “intentionally and willfully

ignored the provisions of the APFA Policy Manual and thus, has violated and abused his fiduciary 

duty entrusted to him by the AFPA membership,” and that he was required to repay APFA for 

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III. APFA IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY 

COUNTERCLAIMS. 

We demonstrated in our opening memorandum, and further explained in opposition to 

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, that APFA is entitled to summary judgment on its breach 

of fiduciary duty counterclaims brought under Section 501 of the LMRDA against both Mr. Ross 

and Mr. Vargas, based on the final and binding determinations of Arbitrator Armendariz and the 

application of 29 U.S.C. § 501. See Doc. 235 at ECF 50-56; Doc. 243 at ECF 40-46. These two 

filings address essentially all the points raised in Plaintiff’s opposition, which we will therefore 

address only briefly here.

To summarize, the Article VII arbitrations (which Plaintiffs agreed to be bound by) 

conclusively determined that Plaintiffs spent and received funds for their personal benefit, in 

violation of the APFA Constitution and Policy Manual. Plaintiffs’ refusal to comply with the 

mandate to return their ill-gotten gains has necessitated the Counterclaims here. We emphasize 

that the Union here is not seeking to enforce the Arbitration Awards in and of themselves, but 

instead seeks to enforce the federal fiduciary duty. The Arbitrator has conclusively determined that 

the disputed expenses by and for Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas were unauthorized under the Union 

Constitution and Policy Manual, and that determination is final and binding on the parties. Based 

on that undisputed material fact, we respectfully submit that this Court should hold that Mr. Ross 

many thousands of dollars wrongfully obtained. APFA Appx. 240, 283. Such conduct falls well 

within both the legal and common usage definitions of “defraud,” even if the Arbitrator did not 

use that word. See United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 54 (5th Cir. 1987) (“the term ‘defraud’ 

literally means ‘wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes’”)( citation 

omitted); American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1992) (“fraud” – A 

deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair ... gain.”; “defraud” - “To take 

something by fraud; swindle.”).

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and Mr. Vargas violated their fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). See Adams-Lundy v. APFA, 

844 F.2d 245, 248-50 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal of § 501 claim alleging that officers had, 

among other things, “fail[ed] to expend money in accordance with the union constitution” and 

“without the authorization of the governing board”).

With respect to Mr. Ross, the Arbitrator found he violated the Union’s Constitution and 

Policy Manual by misappropriating tens of thousands of dollars in Union funds for his own 

personal benefit and in violation of the Union’s written governing documents and procedures. This 

included, among other things, using Union funds to pay for his family vacation and other personal 

expenses, including travel, rental cars, meals, furniture, and other personal items, as well as the 

overpayment of his sick and vacation payout. All of these expenses were directly contrary to the 

express provisions of the Constitution and Policy Manual, as found by the Arbitrator. APFA 

Appx. 219-242; 282-84. 

With regard to Mr. Vargas, the Arbitrator found that he violated the APFA Constitution 

and Policy Manual by, inter alia, regularly charging personal meals to the Union, while accepting 

fixed meal allowances, totaling more than $14,000. APFAAppx. 504-506.

These expenditures constitute a breach of the federal fiduciary duty. Officers violate their 

fiduciary duty if they spend or receive union funds not authorized under the union’s constitution 

or other governing documents. Local No. 92, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental 

Iron Workers, 383 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Ray v. Young, 753 F.2d 386, 389 (5th

Cir. 1985).

Plaintiffs launch an array of unfounded or misguided responses to this showing, none of 

which meet their burden to avoid summary judgment.

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First, they contend repeatedly that all of their expenditures were properly authorized and 

approved. See Doc. 246 at ECF 23-24. Of course, the Article VII Arbitrator has made final and 

binding determinations to the contrary, which cannot now be challenged. And, in any event, 

Plaintiffs offer no viable support for the claim. The only support cited in their brief on this point 

does not even address this contention.

11 Plaintiffs have not met their burden. See Clark v. Am.'s 

Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Unsupported allegations or affidavit or 

deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are 

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.").

Second, they seek to impugn the Article VII proceedings or dispute that they may be the 

basis for a federal fiduciary duty claim as a matter of law. Doc. 246 at ECF 24, 27-8. As we have 

demonstrated in connection with Plaintiffs’ LMRDA Title I challenges, the Article VII Arbitrations 

here met or exceeded the procedural and substantive standards for internal union discipline and 

can thus not be overturned judicially. They are final and binding on the parties. See Doc. 235 at 

ECF 35-42. And the binding determination that Plaintiffs spent and received funds without 

authorization, for their personal benefit and in contravention of the APFA Constitution and 

Policies, is an archetypical predicate for the Court to conclude, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs

breached their federal fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Adams-Lundy v. APFA, 844 F.2d 245, 248-50 (5th 

Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal of § 501 claim); Ray, 753 F.2d at 392.

11 In this section of their Opposition, when contending that they adhered to APFA procedures and 

had authorization, Plaintiffs cite to the APFA’s Opposition to Mr. Ross’s Motion to Dismiss 

APFA’s Counterclaims (Doc. 119), and the APFA’s Amended Answers in both Ross (Doc. 134) 

and Vargas (Doc. 108-1). See Doc. 246 at ECF 24. None of these documents establishes the fact 

asserted by Plaintiffs. And the blanket conclusory assertion by Mr. Vargas in his Declaration to 

this effect (Doc. 239-6 at ECF 28 (Vargas Decl.) ¶ 8 (Pls.’ Appx. 289)), is not sufficient to create 

a genuine issue of material fact. See Fowler v. S. Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 343 F.2d 150, 

154 (5th Cir. 1965) (sworn, conclusory statements that party acted within scope of employment 

did not support summary judgment where unsupported by specific facts).

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Third, Plaintiffs contend that the Union’s federal financial reports (on Form LM-2s), which 

were founded on audits conducted by CPA O’Neil, demonstrate that the APFA did not lose any 

money as a result of the spending which the Article VII Arbitrator had found to be improper. Doc. 

246 at ECF 29-31. We demonstrated the fallacy of this argument in our Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 243 at ECF 44-45. Plaintiffs in this regard digress 

into a speculative effort to dispute Mr. O’Neil’s analysis that Mr. Ross had been overpaid by 

approximately $5400 in connection with his Transition Agreement, Doc. 246 at ECF 30-31, but 

that argument does not go to the fiduciary duty counterclaim and in any event involves but a small 

fraction of the total amount determined by Arbitrator Armendariz (who had been provided the 

O’Neil Memorandum) to be owed by Mr. Ross.12

Finally, Plaintiffs contend, as they did in their own Motion for Summary Judgment that 

the APFA “fail[ed] to prove the equitable doctrine of laches applies.” Doc. 246 at ECF 31-32. As 

we have addressed more fully our Opposition, Doc. 243 at 45-46, Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas – as 

counterclaim defendants on this claim -- have the burden to prove their affirmative defense of 

laches, City of El Paso, Tex. v. El Paso Ent., Inc., 382 F. App’x 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010), and they 

have failed to do so here.

12 Nor does Plaintiffs’strained assault on Mr. O’Neil’s Declaration raise a genuine issue of material 

fact with regard to what Mr. O’Neil determined. As the undisputed record showed, Mr. O’Neil 

was tasked both with determining whether Mr. Ross had been paid the correct number of days of 

accrued sick and vacation pay and with whether he had been paid at the correct daily rate. He 

concluded that the correct number of days had been paid, but that the wrong daily rate had been 

used – which is why he prepared a Schedule of this “Overpayment Calculation” which reflected a 

“Total Overpayment – due to APFA.” APFA Appx. 559; APFA Appx. 544-545, ¶¶ 5-7.

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CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, and in our opening Memorandum, Defendants 

respectfully urge the Court to enter summary judgment in their favor on all claims, including 

APFA’s counterclaims against Plaintiffs. 

Dated: June 7, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ James D. Sanford _

JAMES D. SANFORD

Tex. Bar No. 24051289

Gillespie Sanford LLP

4803 Gaston Ave.

Dallas, TX 75246

Tel.: (214) 800-5111; Fax.: (214) 838-0001

Email: jim@gillespiesanford.com 

JEFFREY A. BARTOS (pro hac vice)

D.C. Bar No. 435832

Guerrieri, Bartos & Roma, PC

1900 M Street, N.W. Suite 700

Washington, DC 20036

Tel.: (202) 624-7400; Fax: (202) 624-7420

Email: jbartos@geclaw.com 

Counsel for the APFA Defendants

CHARLETTE L. BRODERICK 

(pro hac vice)

Tex. Bar No. 24133870

Association of Professional Flight 

Attendants

1004 W. Euless Blvd.

Euless, TX 76040

Tel.: (682) 301-8454

Email: cbroderick@apfa.org 

Counsel for APFA

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on June 7, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 

upon all persons who have requested notice and service of pleadings in this case via the Court’s 

ECF system.

KERRI PHILLIPS

K.D. Phillips Law Firm, PLLC

6010 W. Spring Creek Parkway

Plano, TX 75024

Phone: (972) 327-5800

Fax: (940) 400-0089

Email: kerri@KDphillipslaw.com

notice@KDphillipslaw.com

MICHAEL R RAKE

Michael R. Rake, Attorney at Law

PO Box 1556

Lake Dallas, TX 75065

Tel.: (940) 498-2103

Fax: (940) 498-2103

Email: mrake1@mrakeattorney.com

/s/ James D. Sanford

JAMES D. SANFORD

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