IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of: Tristram Heinz From a :

Decision of City of Philadelphia :

Bureau of Administrative Adjudication :

: No. 1231 C.D. 2022

Appeal of: Tristram Heinz : Argued: April 11, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 20, 2024

Tristram Heinz, Esquire (Heinz), representing himself, appeals from 

the Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) October 24, 2022 order

denying his appeal from the City of Philadelphia’s (City) Office of Administrative 

Review’s (OAR) December 23, 2021 Notice of Determination that found Heinz 

liable for a $100.00 fine pursuant to Section 3370 of the Vehicle Code (Section 

3370).1 The issue before this Court is whether Section 3370 is unconstitutional as 

written and as applied, where it permitsthe imposition of a civil fine without offering 

a fine recipient attendant due process protections. After review, this Court affirms.

Heinz is the registered owner of a motor vehicle bearing Pennsylvania 

Registration Plate JZX8034. At 3:45 p.m. on October 6, 2020, the City’s automated 

speed enforcement system (Speed Camera Program) photographed Heinz’s vehicle 

traveling 61 miles per hour in the northbound lane of the 9900 block of Roosevelt 

Boulevard, which was in excess of the posted 45 mile per hour speed limit. On 

October 14, 2020, the City issued a Notice of Violation (Violation Notice) and an 

1

75 Pa.C.S. § 3370 (pertaining to automated speed enforcement system on designated 

highways). Section 3370(d)(7) was added by Section 2.1 of Act 38 of 2023, effective February

12, 2024. Because Heinz was found liable under Section 3370’s former language, this Court shall 

consider the relevant statutory language effective as of the violation date. 
2

accompanying $100.00 fine pursuant to Section 3370, Section 3362 of the Vehicle 

Code,

2

and Chapter 12-3400 of Title 12 of The Philadelphia Code3(Traffic Code).

4

Heinz timely appealed from the Violation Notice to the OAR, a local 

agency within the City’s Office of the Director of Finance, which provides 

administrative hearings for, inter alia, the adjudication of Speed Camera Program 

Violation Notice appeals. Heinz requested a hearing pursuant to Section 12-3409 of 

the Traffic Code.5 On November 13, 2020, OAR granted Heinz’s hearing request. 

On December 23, 2021, an OAR Hearing Officer conducted, and Heinz 

participated in, a telephonic hearing pursuant to the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 551-555, 751-754. At the hearing, Heinz argued, inter alia, that: the Violation

Notice was not timely issued; the evidence did not establish he was the vehicle’s 

driver; he was denied the constitutional right to confront his accuser; he was denied 

his constitutional right to a speedy trial; and, although characterized as a civil 

violation, because the fine was a criminal penalty, criminal procedures should apply. 

See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a. That same day, the Hearing Officer concluded 

that Heinz was liable for the violation (Decision).

On January 18, 2022, Heinz appealed from the Decision to the trial 

court. On October 24, 2022, following oral argument, the trial court denied Heinz’s

appeal. On November 1, 2022, Heinz appealed to this Court.

6 On November 8, 

2022, the trial court ordered Heinz to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained 

2

75 Pa.C.S. § 3362 (imposing maximum speed limits).

3 The Philadelphia Code, Title 12, as amended, added by ordinance effective May 6, 1958.

4 Chapter 12-3400, added by Bill No. 190184 (approved June 5, 2019), pertains to the “Use 

of an Automated Speed Enforcement System to Improve Safety on Roosevelt Boulevard.”

5 Section 12-3409(1)-(2) of the Traffic Code requires a hearing be scheduled upon request

of a Violation Notice recipient. See Traffic Code § 12-3409(1)-(2).

6 This Court’s review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been 

violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. See Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §

754(b).
3

of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(b)

(Rule 1925(b) Statement). Heinz filed his Rule 1925(b) Statement on November 30, 

2022. On July 7, 2023, the trial court issued its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) 

(Rule 1925(a) Opinion).

Heinz argues that Section 3370 (and the Traffic Code Section based 

thereon) imposes a criminal penalty,

7

and lacks due process protections necessary 

for criminal penalties. Heinz further asserts that the trial court failed to properly 

apply the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court-mandated two-pronged analysis in 

United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), when it determined that Section 3370 

imposed a civil penalty. Heinz contends that the trial court’s error implicated his 

rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution (respectively, 

Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment).

8

Initially, this Court has explained:

Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at 

least initially, a matter of statutory construction.

Helvering [v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,] 399 . . . [(1938)]. A 

court must first ask whether the legislature, “in 

establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 

expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the 

other.” Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 . . . . Even in those cases 

where the legislature “has indicated an intention to 

establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether 

7 Section 3370(d)(5) states:

A penalty imposed under this section [(relating to automated speed 

enforcement system on designated highways)] shall not be deemed 

a criminal conviction and shall not be made part of the operating 

record under [S]ection 1535 [of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 

1535] (relating to schedule of convictions and points) of the 

individual upon whom the penalty is imposed, nor may the 

imposition of the penalty be subject to merit rating for insurance 

purposes.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(d)(5) (emphasis added).

8 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
4

the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 

effect,” id.[] at 248-249, as to “transfor[m] what was 

clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal 

penalty[.]” Rex Trailer Co. v. [U.S.], 350 U.S. 148, 

154 . . . (1956).

Commonwealth v. CSX Transp., 708 A.2d 138, 140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (quoting 

Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

observed:

[The U.S. Supreme] Court’s traditional two-pronged test. 

. . first inquires whether the legislature’s intent was to 

impose punishment, and, if not, whether the statutory 

scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or 

effect as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent.

See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 . . . (1986)

(analyzing state legislation); [] Ward, 448 U.S. [at] 248-49

. . . (analyzing federal legislation). To make this latter 

determination, the [U.S.] Supreme Court has used a multifactored balancing analysis, see Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . . 

. , involving several considerations that were first 

enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 

144 . . . (1963) (the []Mendoza-Martinez [F]actors[]).

Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 971 (Pa. 2003) (superseded by statute).

The Williams Court explained:

Although “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” this list of 

[Mendoza-Martinez F]actors has proved helpful in 

considering whether a civil, remedial mechanism 

“nevertheless provides for sanctions so punitive as to 

transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into 

a criminal penalty.” [] Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . . . (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see Smith [v. Doe], [538] U.S. 

[84,] 92 . . . [(2003)]; Commonwealth v. McGee, . . . 744 

A.2d 754, 757 ([Pa.] 2000) (stating that the MendozaMartinez [F]actors are “useful guideposts” in determining 

whether prison disciplinary confinement constitutes 

criminal punishment); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 

. . . 690 A.2d 222, 226 ([Pa.] 1997) (applying MendozaMartinez [F]actors in deeming civil forfeitures nonpunitive). The Mendoza-Martinez Court identified the 

following considerations: (1) whether the sanction 
5

involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether 

it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) 

whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 

(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims 

of punishment - retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the 

behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether 

an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 

connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears 

excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 

See id. at 168-69. 

Williams, 832 A.2d at 972-73.

The Williams Court expounded:

In applying these [Mendoza-Martinez F]actors, the [U.S.] 

Supreme Court has stated that only the “clearest proof”

that a law is punitive in effect may overcome a legislative 

categorization to the contrary. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 

531 U.S. 250, 261 . . . (2001); Hudson[,] . . . 522 U.S. [at]

100 . . . ; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 . . .

(1997); accord Wingait Farms, . . . 690 A.2d at 226 n.5.

While a precise definition of what constitutes the “clearest 

proof” is rarely articulated, such requirement mirrors the 

general presumption of validity enjoyed in Pennsylvania 

by all lawfully enacted legislation. See Commonwealth v. 

Stern, . . . 701 A.2d 568, 571 ([Pa.] 1997). Thus, for 

present purposes we understand the “clearest proof”

standard to indicate that the Mendoza-Martinez [F]actors 

must weigh heavily in favor of a finding of punitive 

purpose or effect in order to negate the General 

Assembly’s intention that [a statute] be deemed civil and 

remedial.

Williams, 832 A.2d at 973.

Here, the trial court distinguished Ward based on the factual differences 

between Section 311(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 

1321(b)(6), referenced in Ward, and Section 3362 of the Vehicle Code. Specifically, 

the trial court reasoned: 

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Ward and 

its progeny, as [Heinz] was charged with the single traffic 

offense of speeding. Moreover, it has been widely 
6

accepted that speed enforcement cameras had been 

installed along the Roosevelt Boulevard in response to its

correct designation as one of the most dangerous roads to 

travel particularly due to excess speeding. The intent 

behind camera installation was to prevent accidents and 

the resulting injuries and deaths that have routinely 

occurred along the [Roosevelt] Boulevard. To date, there 

has been zero evidence of any punitive effect of imposition 

of the minor $100.00 fine. Moreover, zero points or 

driving restrictions are attached to the issuance of the 

subject violation.

At present, there are no criminal penalties attached to the 

referenced [S]ection 3362 . . . of the . . . Vehicle Code.

If[,] on the other hand[,] [Heinz] had been charged with 

reckless driving or driving under the influence of alcohol 

or narcotics, then constitutional protections would have 

applied. Gratefully, [Heinz’s] conduct had not risen to 

those levels and charges such as those do not apply.

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 6-7 (R.R. at 49a-50a).

Given Heinz’s challenge to Section 3370’s characterization of the fine 

as a civil penalty, this Court does not agree with the trial court that the factual 

differences between the instant matter and Ward are sufficient to conclude that 

Section 3370 is a civil penalty. Rather, this Court must apply the Mendoza-Martinez

Factors to determine “‘whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in 

purpose or effect,’ Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49, as to ‘transform what was clearly 

intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.” CSX 

Transp., 708 A.2d at 140 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99);see, e.g., Commonwealth 

v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020); Wingait Farms; Factor v. Dep’t of Transp.,

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 199 A.3d 492 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); Kozieniak v. Dep’t 

of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 100 A.3d 326 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
7

At the outset, Section 3370 imposes numerous guidelines for the Speed 

Camera Program. It provides, in relevant part:

(b) Owner liability. -- For each violation under this 

section, the owner of the vehicle shall be liable for the 

penalty imposed unless the owner is convicted of the same 

violation under another section of this title or has a defense 

under subsection (g).

(c) Certificate as evidence. -- A certificate, or a facsimile 

of a certificate, based upon inspection of recorded images 

produced by an automated speed enforcement system and 

sworn to or affirmed by a police officer employed by the 

city of the first class[9]shall be prima facie evidence of the 

facts contained in it. The [C]ity must include written 

documentation that the automated speed enforcement 

system was operating correctly at the time of the alleged 

violation. A recorded image evidencing a violation of 

[S]ection 3362 [of the Vehicle Code] shall be admissible 

in any judicial or administrative proceeding to adjudicate 

the liability for the violation.

(d) Penalty. -- The following shall apply:

(1) The penalty for a violation under subsection (a) shall 

be a fine of $150[.00] unless a lesser amount is set by 

ordinance. The ordinance may create fines for first 

offense, second offense and third and subsequent 

offenses, but no single fine shall exceed $150[.00].

(2) A penalty is authorized only for a violation of this 

section if each of the following apply:

(i) At least two appropriate warning signs are 

conspicuously placed at the beginning and end and at 

two-mile intervals of the designated highway 

notifying the public that an automated speed 

enforcement device is in use.

(ii) A notice identifying the location of the automated 

speed enforcement system is posted on the 

[D]epartment [of Transportation]’s [(Department)]

9 The City is the Commonwealth’s only city of the first class.
8

publicly accessible Internet website throughout the 

period of use.

. . . .

(5) A penalty imposed under this section shall not be 

deemed a criminal conviction and shall not be made part 

of the operating record under [S]ection 1535 [of the 

Vehicle Code] (relating to schedule of convictions and 

points) of the individual upon whom the penalty is 

imposed, nor may the imposition of the penalty be 

subject to merit rating for insurance purposes.

(6) No surcharge points may be imposed in the 

provision of motor vehicle insurance coverage. 

Penalties collected under this section shall not be 

subject to [Section 3571 or 3573 of the Judicial Code,]

42 Pa.C.S. §[§] 3571 (relating to Commonwealth 

portion of fines, etc.) or 3573 (relating to municipal 

corporation portion of fines, etc.).

(e) Liability. -- Driving in excess of the posted speed limit 

along the designated highway by 11 miles per hour or 

more is a violation of this section.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(b)-(e).

Section 3370(f) also provides numerous limitations, including, in 

relevant part: 

(2) . . . . Recorded images collected as part of the 

automated speed enforcement system must only record 

traffic violations and may not be used for any other 

surveillance purposes, but may include video of the area 

enforced when triggered by a violation. The restrictions 

set forth in this paragraph shall not be deemed to preclude 

a court of competent jurisdiction from issuing an order 

directing that the information be provided to law 

enforcement officials if the information is reasonably 

described and is requested solely in connection with a 

criminal law enforcement action.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 

information prepared under this section and information 

relating to violations under this section which is kept by 

the city of the first class . . . shall be for the exclusive use 
9

of the city . . . for the purpose of discharging their duties 

under this section and under any ordinances and 

resolutions of the city. The information shall not be 

deemed a public record . . . . The information shall not be 

discoverable by court order or otherwise, nor shall it be 

offered in evidence in any action or proceeding which is 

not directly related to a violation of this section or any 

ordinance or resolution of the city. The restrictions set 

forth in this paragraph shall not be deemed to preclude a 

court of competent jurisdiction from issuing an order 

directing that the information be provided to law 

enforcement officials if the information is reasonably 

described and is requested solely in connection with a 

criminal law enforcement action.

(4) Recorded images . . . shall be destroyed within one 

year of final disposition of any recorded event except that 

images subject to a court order under paragraph (2) or (3) 

shall be destroyed within two years after the date of the 

order, unless further extended by court order. . . . 

(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, registered 

vehicle owner information obtained as a result of the 

operation of an automated speed enforcement system . . .

may not be used for any purpose other than as prescribed 

in this section.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(f).

In addition, Section 3370(g) provides the applicable defenses thereto:

(1) It shall be a defense to a violation under this section 

that the person named in the notice of violation was not 

operating the vehicle at the time of the violation. The 

owner may be required to submit evidence that the owner 

was not the driver at the time of the alleged violation. The 

city of the first class may not require the owner of the 

vehicle to disclose the identity of the operator of the 

vehicle at the time of the violation.

(2) If an owner receives a notice of violation pursuant to 

this section of a time period during which the vehicle was 

reported to a police department of any state or 

municipality as having been stolen, it shall be a defense to 

a violation under this section that the vehicle has been 

reported to a police department as stolen prior to the time 
10

the violation occurred and had not been recovered prior to 

that time.

(3) It shall be a defense to a violation under this section 

that the person receiving the notice of violation was not 

the owner of the vehicle at the time of the offense.

(4) It shall be a defense to a violation under this section 

that the device being used to determine speed was not in 

compliance with [S]ection 3368 [of the Vehicle Code]

(relating to speed timing devices) with respect to testing 

for accuracy, certification or calibration.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(g). Moreover, the Department must approve any camera system 

used as part of the Speed Camera Program. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(h). 

The Speed Camera Program’s system administrator must send a notice 

of violation by first-class mail to the vehicle’s registered owner within the later of 

30 days after the violation or 30 days after the vehicle owner’s identity is determined. 

See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(k), (l). A recipient of a notice of violation may either admit 

responsibility and pay the fine or request a hearing to contest liability. See 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3370(m)(1), (n)(1). The Department must use fines received from the Speed 

Camera Program for the Transportation Enhancement Grants Program (relating to 

automated red-light enforcement systems in first class cities). See 75 Pa.C.S. §

3370(m)(2). Hearings are held before a hearing officer designated by the City and 

are conducted in accordance with the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-

508, 701-704, and the Local Agency Law. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(n). Decisions 

sustaining Violation Notices may be appealed to the courts of common pleas. 
11

Although Pennsylvania appellate courts have not yet addressed

constitutional challenges to Section 3370, numerous federal and state courts have 

considered such challenges to similar statutes. While not binding on this Court,10

this Court finds them instructive. In particular, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 

Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have considered the nature of similar statutes. 

In Worthy v. City of Phenix City, Alabama, 930 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 

2019), motor vehicle operators cited for red-light camera violations challenged the

Phenix City ordinance’s constitutionality. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

explained:

Because [the a]ppellants allege that the ordinance’s 

constitutional infirmity stems from its failure to provide 

adequate procedures to challenge a citation, the threshold 

question is whether the red-light ordinance provides for 

civil sanctions or criminal punishment. Only after making 

that determination can we glean whether the procedures 

provided in the ordinance are constitutionally sufficient.

Id. at 1217.

Considering Hudson, the Worthy Court observed:

[T]he Alabama legislature explicitly labeled the sanction 

as civil. It specifically authorized “automated traffic light 

enforcement in the City of Phenix City, Alabama, as a 

civil violation.” The legislature then described the penalty 

for this civil violation as “the payment of a civil fine, the 

enforceability of which shall be accomplished through 

civil action.” The legislature went on, stating that “[t]he 

10 This Court has explained:

[This Court is] bound by decisions of the [U.S.] Supreme 

Court . . . .. Although we are not bound by the decisions of federal 

district courts, federal circuit courts, or the courts of other states in 

applying federal substantive law, we may cite such decisions when 

they have persuasive value.

In re Appeal of The Gun Range, LLC, 311 A.3d 1242, 1248 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (citation 

omitted).
12

prosecution of a civil violation created hereby shall carry 

reduced evidentiary requirements and burden of proof . . .

and [in] no event shall an adjudication of liability for a 

civil violation be punishable by a criminal fine or 

imprisonment.” Additionally, the ordinance itself 

provides that a red-light violation caught on camera shall 

carry with it “a civil penalty of $100.00.” And the 

ordinance also devotes an entire section to describing the 

effect of a violation - stating, among other things, that the 

civil penalty is “not a criminal conviction for any purpose” 

and that no “record of [the] civil penalty made under [the 

ordinance will] be listed, entered, or reported on any 

criminal record or driving record.” The text thus makes 

clear that both the Alabama legislature and Phenix City 

intended for the red-light-camera ordinance to be civil in 

nature.

Id. at 1217-18 (no citations in original).

Nonetheless, the Worthy Court noted that, in accordance with Hudson, 

it must inquire further to “ensure that the sanction prescribed in the ordinance is not 

a criminal penalty masquerading as a civil sanction.” Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1218. 

The Worthy Court then examined the Mendoza-Martinez Factors and concluded that 

the first and second factors 

suggest that this penalty is civil because monetary 

penalties do not involve an affirmative disability or 

restraint and they have not historically been regarded as 

punishment. See [Hudson] (noting that a monetary fine 

does not constitute an affirmative restraint because such a 

sanction is “certainly nothing approaching the infamous 

punishment of imprisonment” (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 

. . . (1960))); id. (“[T]he payment of fixed or variable sums 

of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized as 

[enforceable] by civil proceedings since the original 

revenue law of 1789.”[11](second and third alterations in 

original) (quoting Helvering . . . , 303 U.S. [at] 400, . . .

(1938))).

11 Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, s 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47.
13

Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1218.

The Worthy Court determined that because the ordinance did not have 

a scienter requirement, the third Mendoza-Martinez Factor weighed towards a 

conclusion that the penalty was civil. The Court further concluded that the fourth 

Mendoza-Martinez Factor - whether the ordinance’s purpose is to punish - did not 

weigh in favor of the fine being a criminal penalty since a “scheme . . . designed to 

deter . . . violations . . . alone is not sufficient to transform a civil penalty into a 

criminal sanction.” Id. at 1219. 

The Worthy Court also reasoned that “the fifth [Mendoza-Martinez 

F]actor - whether the regulated behavior is already a crime - does not weigh in favor 

of finding that the civil penalty is a criminal punishment.” Id. Explaining its basis 

for that conclusion, the Worthy Court considered related consequences of conduct 

underlying the red-light violation at issue before it, many of which are like those 

underlying Heinz’s Violation Notice at issue before this Court.

While a traditional red-light violation in Alabama can 

result in a misdemeanor conviction, see [Section 32-5A-8

of the Alabama Code,] Ala. Code § 32-5A-8, that alone 

does not render a sanction criminally punitive, see [United 

States v.] Melvin, 918 F.3d [1296,] 1300 [(11th Cir. 2017)]

(“[T]hat the conduct triggering penalties is also criminal 

in nature is alone ‘insufficient to render the money 

penalties . . . criminally punitive.’” (quoting Hudson, 522 

U.S. at 105, . . . )). The vast difference between the 

punishments provided for a red-light violation under the 

criminal statute and under the ordinance is illuminating.

As noted above, the civil penalty assessed under the 

ordinance does not result in a conviction, nor is it reported 

on a driving record. On the other hand, violating the 

criminal statute can result in a misdemeanor conviction, 

which can lead to a series of increasing fines and even 

imprisonment. And obviously such a conviction would 

carry with it the usual repercussions inherent in criminal

traffic convictions, including a report of the conviction on 

the driver’s criminal and driving records. That the 
14

ordinance provides for a far less severe punishment than 

the criminal statute further indicates that the civil penalty 

is not a criminal punishment.

Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1219 (citation omitted).

With respect to the final two Mendoza-Martinez Factors, the Worthy 

Court stated:

Evaluating the sixth [Mendoza-Martinez F]actor requires 

examining whether the sanction has an alternative, noncriminal purpose and whether the sanction is rationally 

related to that non-criminal purpose. Here, an alternative 

purpose is the promotion of public safety and the reduction 

of accidents caused by red-light violations. See Smith . . .

(noting that public safety is a legitimate, nonpunitive 

purpose for a legislative enactment); accord United States 

v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 859 (11th Cir. 2011). And a 

$100.00 civil penalty is certainly rationally related to that 

alternative purpose, as the reasonable fine could deter 

motorists from running red lights, thereby reducing 

accidents and promoting public safety.

Finally, the seventh [Mendoza-Martinez F]actor probes 

whether the penalty is “excessive in relation to th[e] 

alternative purpose.” Cole v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 133 

F.3d 803, 807 (11th Cir. 1998). A modest $100.00 fine is 

not excessive in relation to the goal of promoting public 

safety and reducing traffic accidents. These final two 

factors thus further indicate that the ordinance provides for 

a civil sanction and not a criminal punishment.

Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1219.

In Bevis v. City of New Orleans, 686 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth 

Circuit Court of Appeals similarly considered whether an ordinance providing for a 

digital camera traffic enforcement program was civil in nature. The Bevis Court 

described the relevant camera enforcement program as follows:

The [c]ity engaged a private contractor, [d]efendant-

[a]ppellee American Traffic Solutions ([]ATS[]) to install 

and maintain the cameras. ATS staff view the footage and 

forward potential violations to the New Orleans Police 
15

Department, whose officers then decide whether to issue a 

citation to the vehicle’s owner. The [subject o]rdinance 

states that “[t]he imposition of a civil penalty . . . is an 

alternative method of detecting and deterring red-light 

violations and speeding.” Accordingly, no fine may be 

imposed if at the time of the violation the operator of the 

vehicle was pulled over and either arrested or issued a 

traffic ticket. Also, no fine may be imposed on the 

vehicle’s owner if the vehicle was reported stolen and had 

not been recovered at the time the violation occurred. If 

the police decide to issue a citation, a notice is sent to the 

vehicle’s registered owner charging that the violation

occurred and stating the amount of the fine. The fine is 

$105[.00] for entering an intersection against a red light, 

and $300[.00] for overtaking a school bus while it’s [sic] 

stop signals are active. For speeding, the fine is between 

$45[.00] and $205[.00], depending on the excess speed. 

The fine can also include up to $80[.00] in enforcement 

costs.

The notice relates the date, time, and location of the 

violation, and it includes images from the video recording 

of the violation, and a website address where the full video 

can be viewed. The notice also explains procedures for 

contesting the fine, and procedures for payment by mail, 

telephone, or through the website. The owner may contest 

the violation by appearing before an administrative officer 

on or before a hearing date stated in the notice. If the 

hearing date passes and the owner has failed to either pay 

the fine or to appear and contest liability, then $75[.00] is 

added to the fine and the [c]ity may initiate collection 

efforts. The notice is presumed to have been received by 

the owner five days after it was sent, but it is an affirmative 

defense if “[t]he person who received the notice of 

violation was not the owner of the motor vehicle at the 

time of the violation . . . .”

An administrative officer employed by the city presides at 

the hearing, where the owner may “respond and present 

evidence on all issues of fact involved and argument on all 

issues of law involved.” The owner may request that 

witnesses be subpoenaed, and examine witnesses who 

testify. No mens rea is required for liability. [The o]wner 

and operator are jointly and severally liable for the fine, 

except that it is an affirmative defense if the operator was 
16

driving the vehicle without the owner’s consent. A nonoperating owner who is held liable may recover the 

amount of the fine from the operator. The owner may seek 

judicial review of an adverse decision by filing a petition 

in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court within 30 days.

Id. at 279-80 (no citations in original).

The Bevis Court reasoned: 

The only [Mendoza-Martinez F]actor favoring [the 

p]laintiffs’ position is the fact that some of the conduct that 

violates the ordinance would also be punishable as a 

crime, if done with the requisite mental state. That is not 

enough to overcome legislative intent. [] Ward, 448 U.S. 

[at] 249-50 . . . . We agree with the district court that the 

[o]rdinance imposes a civil penalty.[12]

Bevis, 686 F.3d at 280 (footnote omitted). 

Here, considering the first two Mendoza-Martinez Factors, the Speed 

Camera Program provides only for monetary fines. As the Worthy Court observed, 

“monetary penalties do not involve an affirmative disability or restraint and they 

have not historically been regarded as punishment.” Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1218. With 

respect to the third Mendoza-Martinez Factor, the Speed Camera Program requires 

no scienter. Rather, a violation occurs when a vehicle operator drives “in excess of 

the posted speed limit along the designated highway by 11 miles per hour or 

more . . . .” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(e). Thus, the third Mendoza-Martinez Factor weighs

in favor of a civil penalty. Regarding the fourth Mendoza-Martinez Factor, the 

program is designed to deter speeding on the designated highway. Such intent is 

12 The Worthy and Bevis Courts’ holdings are consistent with federal court decisions in 

other jurisdictions which have concluded that similar penalties were civil in nature. See Balaban 

v. City of Cleveland, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10227, 2010 WL 481283 (N.D. Ohio, E. Div. 2010); 

Ware v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97836, 2009 WL 5876275 

(W.D. La. 2009); Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D. N.C. 2003), vacated 

on other grounds sub nom. Shavitz v. Guilford County Bd. of Educ., 100 F. App’x 146 (4th Cir. 

2004).
17

evidenced by the mandated posted signs informing drivers of the Speed Camera 

Program before drivers enter the subject area. Notice is also posted on the 

Department’s website. As the Worthy Court observed: “a “scheme . . . designed to 

deter . . . violations . . . alone is not sufficient to transform a civil penalty into a 

criminal sanction.” Id. at 1219. Accordingly, the fourth Mendoza-Martinez Factor

weighs in favor of the Speed Camera Program imposing a civil penalty.

With respect to the fifth Mendoza-Martinez Factor, this Court 

acknowledges that the General Assembly has established that exceeding the speed 

limit shall be a summary offense. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362. Nonetheless, as the Worthy

Court observed, “the civil penalty assessed under the ordinance does not result in a 

conviction, nor is it reported on a driving record.” Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1219. This 

distinction suggests that the Speed Camera Program imposes a civil penalty. With 

respect to the final two Mendoza-Martinez Factors, this Court notes that the Speed 

Camera Program and the attendant fine have an alternative, non-criminal purpose -

to preserve public safety, and the threat of a fine to encourage compliance with the 

posted speed limits is rationally related to that non-criminal purpose. Finally, 

regarding the seventh Mendoza-Martinez Factor, this Court concludes that the fine 

imposed is “modest [and] is not excessive in relation to the goal of promoting public 

safety and reducing traffic accidents.” Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1219. Because each 

factor weighs in favor of the Speed Camera Program imposing a civil penalty, this 

Court concludes that the penalty is indeed civil.13

Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained:

The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal 

penalty is of some constitutional import. The Self13 Other state courts have reached the same conclusion regarding similar ordinances and 

statutes. See Glass v. City of Montgomery, 360 So.3d 1021 (Ala. 2022); City of Richardson v. 

Bowman, 555 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App. 2018); Krieger v. City of Rochester, 978 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. 

2013); Titus v. City of Albuquerque, 252 P.3d 780 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). 
18

Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for 

example, is expressly limited to “any criminal case.” [U.S. 

Const. amend. V.] Similarly, the protections provided by 

the Sixth Amendment are available only in “criminal 

prosecutions.” [U.S. Const. amend. VI.] Other 

constitutional protections, while not explicitly limited to 

one context or the other, have been so limited by decision 

of this Court. See, e.g., Helvering[,] . . . (Double Jeopardy 

Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] protects only against two 

criminal punishments); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 

37, 47-48 (1914) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

required only in criminal cases).

Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. Having concluded that Section 3370 is not a criminal statute 

but, rather, that it imposes civil penalties, Heinz’s claims that his rights under the 

Fifth and Sixth Amendments were violated to the extent he has asserted them to this 

Court fail.14

Heinz also asserts that he was denied due process protections. “The 

Fourteenth Amendment to the [U.S.] Constitution [(Fourteenth Amendment)] 

provides that no state may ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 

due process of law.’ U.S. Const. amend. XIV.” Shoul v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau 

of Driver Licensing, 173 A.3d 669, 676 (Pa. 2017).

This Court has stated:

“[T]he basic elements of procedural due process are 

adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the 

chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial 

tribunal having jurisdiction over the case.” 

Com[monwealth] v. Turner, . . . 80 A.3d 754, 764 ([Pa.]

2013). Procedural due process is a flexible concept that 

“imposes only such procedural safeguards as the situation 

warrants.” In re McGlynn, 974 A.2d 525, 531 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2009).

14 Although Heinz’s brief does mention the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and his arguments 

to the OAR relating thereto, the majority of Heinz’s brief to this Court focuses on his argument 

that Section 3370 imposes a criminal penalty, that the trial court failed to properly apply Ward, 

and that his due process rights were violated.
19

Water Polo I, L.P. v. W. Hanover Twp. Sewer Auth., 301 A.3d 1009, 1022-23 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2023).

Here, Section 3370 includes numerous procedural due process 

protections. A Violation Notice must be sent by first-class mail to the vehicle’s 

registered owner within 30 days of the violation. The maximum fine imposed under 

Section 3370 is $150.00, which may not be imposed unless the vehicle operator 

exceeds the posted speed limit by at least 11 miles per hour. Further, the vehicle’s 

owner will not be liable for Section 3370’s penalty if he has been convicted of such 

violation under another Vehicle Code section. The penalty is not deemed a criminal 

conviction, and no points or insurance consequences may be imposed. A notice of 

violation recipient may request a hearing with the OAR to challenge the notice of 

violation. A notice of violation recipient may defend him or herself by providing 

evidence that the recipient was not the driver, that the vehicle had been reported 

stolen, that the notice of violation recipient was not the vehicle owner at the time of 

the incident, or that the device used to detect the violation was not compliant with 

the law. Hearings are held before a City hearing officer and are conducted in 

accordance with the Administrative Agency Law and the Local Agency Law. 

Decisions sustaining violations may be appealed to common pleas courts.

“The substantive protections of due process are meant to 

protect citizens from arbitrary and irrational actions of the 

government.” Gresock v. City of Pittsburgh Civ. Serv. 

Comm’n, 698 A.2d 163, 169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). Like

procedural due process, “forsubstantive due process rights 

to attach[,] there must first be the deprivation of a[n] . . . 

interest that is constitutionally protected.” Khan v. State 

Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, . . . 842 A.2d 936, 946 ([Pa.]

2004).

Water Polo I, 301 A.3d at 1023-24.
20

In Shoul, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:

Claims that a statute violates either the federal or state 

right to substantive due process are subject to the 

following “means-end review”:

[C]ourts must weigh the rights infringed 

upon by the law against the interest sought to 

be achieved by it, and also scrutinize the 

relationship between the law (the means) and 

that interest (the end). Where laws infringe 

upon certain rights considered fundamental, 

such as the right to privacy, the right to 

marry, and the right to procreate, courts apply 

a strict scrutiny test. Under that test, a law 

may only be deemed constitutional if it is 

narrowly tailored to a compelling state 

interest.

Alternatively, where laws restrict . . . other 

rights . . . which are undeniably important, 

but not fundamental, . . . courts apply a 

rational basis test.

Nixon [v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare], 839 A.2d [277,] 286-87 

& n.15 [(Pa. 2003)] (collecting federal and state cases).

Thus, while statutes abridging fundamental rights are 

subject to strict scrutiny and are constitutional only where 

they are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental 

interest, statutes limiting other rights are subject to a 

rational basis test. Notably, the federal rational basis test 

differs significantly from our own in terms of the degree 

of deference it affords to legislative judgment. The [U.S.

Supreme] Court has described its rational basis test, albeit 

in the context of a claim that a statute violated the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as 

broadly deferential[.]

Shoul, 173 A.3d at 676-77.
21

Notwithstanding the aforementioned federal jurisprudence, the Shoul

Court emphasized:

This Court, by contrast, applies what we have deemed a 

“more restrictive” test. Nixon, 839 A.2d at 287 n.15. 

Specifically,

a law which purports to be an exercise of the 

police power must not be unreasonable, 

unduly oppressive[,] or patently beyond the 

necessities of the case, and the means which 

it employs must have a real and substantial 

relation to the objects sought to be attained. 

Under the guise of protecting the public 

interests[,] the legislature may not arbitrarily 

interfere with private business or impose 

unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon 

lawful occupations. The question whether 

any particular statutory provision is so related 

to the public good and so reasonable in the 

means it prescribes as to justify the exercise 

of the police power, is one for the judgment, 

in the first instance, of the law-making 

branch of the government, but its final 

determination is for the courts.

Gambone v. Commonwealth, . . . 101 A.2d 634, 636-37 

([Pa.] 1954) (citation and footnotes omitted) . . . . Thus,

under our state charter, we must assess whether the 

challenged law has “a real and substantial relation” to the 

public interests it seeks to advance, and is neither patently 

oppressive nor unnecessary to these ends. Nevertheless, 

we bear in mind that, although whether a law is rationally 

related to a legitimate public policy is a question for the 

courts, the wisdom of a public policy is one for the 

legislature, and the General Assembly’s enactments are 

entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality 

rebuttable only by a demonstration that they clearly, 

plainly, and palpably violate constitutional requirements.
22

Shoul, 173 A.3d at 677-78. Accordingly, this Court must consider whether Section 

3370 has “a real and substantial relation to the public interests it seeks to advance[.]” 

Id. at 678. 

Section 3370’s legitimate public interest is to deter speeding on the 

designated highway. In the furtherance of such purpose, it requires that the City post 

two conspicuous warning signs notifying the public that an automated speed 

enforcement device is in use. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3370(d)(2)(i). Additionally, Section 

3370’s fine could have a deterrent effect. See Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1219 (concluding 

that “a $100.00 civil penalty is certainly rationally related to that alternative purpose, 

as the reasonable fine could deter motorists from running red lights, thereby reducing 

accidents and promoting public safety”). Further, this Court concludes that a 

$100.00 or $150.00 fine with no further penalty or criminal liability, and no impact 

on an individual’s driving or insurance records, is not oppressive.15

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.16

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

15 Heinz’s due process challenges are like those raised and rejected in numerous federal 

appellate cases. See Downey v. City of Toledo, Ohio, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 11173, 2021 WL 

5143918 (6th Cir. 2021); Knutson v. Vill. of Lakemoor, 932 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019); Worthy; 

Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2016); Snider Int’l Corp. v. Town 

of Forest Heights, Md., 739 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2014); Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 374 F. App’x 

598 (6th Cir. 2010); Idris v. City of Chi., Ill., 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009); Bevis; Agomo v. Fenty, 

916 A.2d 181 (D.C. 2007).

16

“[This Court] ‘may affirm on other grounds where grounds for affirmance exist.’” FP 

Willow Ridge Assocs., L.P. v. Allen Twp., 166 A.3d 487, 496 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting 

Kutnyak v. Dep’t of Corr., 748 A.2d 1275, 1279 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of: Tristram Heinz From a :

Decision of City of Philadelphia :

Bureau of Administrative Adjudication :

: No. 1231 C.D. 2022

Appeal of: Tristram Heinz :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2024, the Philadelphia County 

Common Pleas Court’s October 24, 2022 order is AFFIRMED.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge