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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CHASITY C.,

Plaintiff,

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v. Case No. 3:22-cv-01143-D-BT

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff Chasity C.’s1 civil action seeking judicial review 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final adverse decision by the Commissioner of 

Social Security (ECF No. 1). The District Court referred the case to the United 

States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a 

standing order of reference. For the reasons explained below, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court REVERSE the Commissioner’s decision and 

REMAND the case to the Commissioner.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled due to ailments including bipolar 

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, diabetes, and musculoskeletal 

1 The Court uses only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial as instructed by the 

May 1, 2018, Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and 

Immigration Opinions issued by the Committee on Court Administration and Case 

Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

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disorders. Admin. R. 64, 251 (ECF No. 15-1).

2 Plaintiff was born in 1982, and she 

claims that she has been disabled since April 9, 2018. Admin. R. 61-62. Plaintiff is 

a high school graduate. Admin. R. 252. She has past relevant work experience as 

a front desk receptionist. Admin. R. 106.

Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income benefits on February 5, 

2019. Admin. R. 72. Her claim was denied initially on May 30, 2019, and it was 

later denied again upon reconsideration on December 3, 2019. Admin. R. 72, 90. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ), who conducted a telephonic administrative hearing on January 7, 2021, and 

a supplemental telephonic administrative hearing on June 23, 2021, at which Dr. 

Julie Duncan, a consultative psychologist, appeared and testified.

3 Admin. R. 7-38, 

39-55. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled and thus not entitled to disability 

benefits. Admin. R. 91, 95. Utilizing the five-step sequential evaluation,4 the ALJ 

2 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF page numbers at the top of each page 

rather than page numbers at the bottom of each filing.

3 Because of the extraordinary circumstances presented by the COVID-19 

pandemic, the ALJ was unable to conduct the hearing by video.

4 “In evaluating a disability claim, the [ALJ] conducts a five-step sequential 

analysis to determine whether (1) the [plaintiff] is presently working; (2) the 

[plaintiff] has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an 

impairment listed in appendix 1 of the social security regulations; (4) the 

impairment prevents the [plaintiff] from doing past relevant work; and (5) the 

impairment prevents the [plaintiff] from doing any other substantial gainful 

activity.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of establishing a disability through the first four steps of

the analysis; at the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that there is 

other substantial work in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform. Id.

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first found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her

application date. Admin. R. 96. At the second step, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff 

experienced severe impairments of “ankle fracture status post ORIF; bipolar 

disorder; borderline personality disorder; and a substance abuse disorder, 

currently in remission.” Admin. R. 96.

5 At the third step, although she 

acknowledged the medical evidence establishing that Plaintiff suffered from 

bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments do not meet or medically equal any listed 

impairment in appendix 1 of the social security regulations. Admin. R. 100. 

Next, the ALJ conducted a residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment. 

She found that Plaintiff has the RFC to “perform less than the full range of light 

work,” including the capacity to “occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 

crawl.” Admin. R. 97. The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s severe mental 

impairments of bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder cause 

at 448; Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 

A finding that the plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step 

review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923 (citing 

Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995)); Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 

55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Barajas v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1984)

(per curiam)).

5 While the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s physical impairment relating to her ankle 

fracture, in her Appellant brief before this Court, Plaintiff only addresses her 

alleged disability related to her mental impairments. The Court, therefore, limits 

its discussion to Plaintiff’s allegations of disability related to mental impairments. 

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limitations in her ability to interact with others, found that she has moderate 

limitation in this functional domain, and concluded that Plaintiff 

can perform simple and routine tasks; can tolerate occasional changes 

in a work setting; [can] make simple work-related decisions; [and] can 

perform jobs that require no more than occasional and superficial 

interaction with co-workers, i.e. no collaborative or tandem tasks; and 

can perform work that does not require direct interaction with the 

general public as part of job duties. 

Admin. R. 102. 

Finally, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined 

that while Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work as a front desk 

receptionist, she could perform other substantial gainful activity such as a price 

marker, small products assembler, or mail clerk, and that such jobs existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy. Admin. R. 107-08. Therefore, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act and not 

entitled to benefits. Admin. R. 108.

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council. Admin. R. 6. 

The Appeals Council found that the appeal did not provide a basis for modifying 

the ALJ’s decision. Admin. R. 6-11. Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district 

court.

Legal Standard

The Court’s “review of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited to two 

inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the 

record as a whole, and (2) whether the [ALJ] applied the proper legal standard.’” 

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Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perez v. Barnhart, 

415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere 

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 

(1971); see Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923 (“Substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla and less than a preponderance.”). 

The ALJ, and not the courts, resolves conflicts in the evidence; the Court 

may not “reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 

F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Hence, the Court may not substitute its 

own judgment for the ALJ’s, and it may affirm only on the grounds that the 

Commissioner stated to support her decision. Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923. If the 

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are 

conclusive, and the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed. Martinez, 64 F.3d 

at 173. A reviewing court must defer to the ALJ’s decision when substantial 

evidence supports it, even if the court would reach a different conclusion based on 

the evidence in the record. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995).

Nevertheless, the substantial evidence review is not an uncritical “rubber 

stamp” and requires “more than a search for evidence supporting the [ALJ’s] 

findings.” Hill v. Saul, 2020 WL 6370168, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020)(quoting 

Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)), adopted by 2020 WL 

6363878 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2020) (Lindsay, J.). The Court “must scrutinize the 

record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the 

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evidence supporting” the ALJ’s decision. Id. (quoting Martin, 748 F.2d at 1031). A 

no-substantial-evidence finding is appropriate only if there is a “conspicuous 

absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Analysis

Plaintiff challenges the hearing decision on the grounds that (1) the ALJ’s 

RFC assessment pertaining to her limitations in social functioning resulting from 

her severe mental impairments is not supported by any medical opinion of record 

and, therefore, is not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ erred in 

failing to make a separate finding on Plaintiff’s ability to sustain employment. Pl.’s 

Br. 16-26 (ECF No. 18). With respect to Plaintiff’s first argument, the 

Commissioner disputes Plaintiff’s characterization and responds that the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ does not need to 

endorse a specific medical opinion to support her RFC finding; instead, the ALJ 

relied on objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s reported daily activities, and the 

less restrictive findings of the state agency psychological consultants to support her 

ruling. Def.’s Br. 7-10 (ECF No. 20). With respect to Plaintiff’s second argument, 

the Commissioner argues that no separate sustainability finding was required. 

Def.’s Br. 16-18.

1. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s mental RFC is not supported by substantial 

evidence. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ did not identify any functional 

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assessment by a medical expert that provided a basis for her determination of 

Plaintiff’s limitations in social functioning. Instead, Plaintiff argues, the ALJ relied 

on her own unsupported opinion as to the limitations presented by Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments and, as such, her mental RFC finding is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Pl.’s Br. 16. The Court agrees.

The ALJ bears the “sole responsibility for determining the [plaintiff’s] 

disability status.” Thibodeaux v. Astrue, 324 F. App’x 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2009)

(citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Determining a 

[plaintiff’s RFC] is the ALJ’s responsibility, and [the ALJ] has the authority and 

duty to weigh the evidence and reach any conclusion supported by substantial 

evidence.” Gonzales v. Astrue, 231 F. App’x 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 

A reviewing court must defer to the ALJ’s decision when substantial evidence 

supports it, even if the court would reach a different conclusion based on the 

evidence in the record. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564.

An ALJ’s RFC analysis determines the most that a person can still do despite 

recognized limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The RFC determination is a 

“combined medical assessment of an applicant’s impairments with descriptions by 

physicians, the applicant, or others of any limitations on the applicant’s ability to 

work.” Hill, 2020 WL 6370168, at *6 (cleaned up) (quoting Hollis v. Bowen, 837 

F. 2d 1378, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). It “is an assessment of an 

individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a 

work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-

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8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). An individual’s RFC should be 

based on all of the relevant evidence in the case record, including opinions 

submitted by treating physicians or other acceptable medical sources. 20 C.F.R. at 

§ 404.1545(a)(3) (2012); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1.

ALJs may weigh competing medical opinions, see Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 

600, 603 (5th Cir. 2012), but may not substitute their lay opinions for the 

uncontroverted medical opinion of examining medical professionals who opine on 

the effects of Plaintiff’s mental impairments. See Williams v. Astrue, 355 F. App’x 

828, 832 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Demarcus G. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 6297778, at 

*4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2021) (Rutherford, M.J.) (“An ALJ may weigh competing 

medical opinions, but may not substitute his lay opinion for the uncontroverted 

medical opinion of examining medical professionals who opined concerning the 

effects of Plaintiff’s mental impairments . . . .” (internal citation omitted)), adopted 

by 2022 WL 60333 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2022) (Scholer, J.). ALJs need not accept 

expert medical opinions “verbatim nor accept[] the testimony of [a medical 

expert],” but they must have substantial evidence in support of their RFC 

determination. Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021). “The 

principle that an ALJ should not substitute his lay opinion for the medical opinion 

of experts is especially profound in a case involving a mental disability.” Salmond 

v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 

310, 319 (3rd Cir. 2000)). 

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In Ripley v. Chater, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

found that the ALJ’s determination was not substantially supported when there 

was copious evidence in the record indicating that the claimant suffered from, and 

received treatment for, his medical condition, but no medical professional’s 

assessment pertaining to the effects of that condition on the claimant’s ability to 

work. See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). The same is true here.

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments 

included bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder. Admin. R. 96. At 

step four, the ALJ determined, in pertinent part, that Plaintiff 

can perform simple and routine tasks; can tolerate occasional changes 

in a work setting; [can] make simple work-related decisions; [and] can 

perform jobs that require no more than occasional and superficial 

interaction with co-workers, i.e. no collaborative or tandem tasks; and 

can perform work that does not require direct interaction with the 

general public as part of job duties. 

Admin. R. 102.

In determining Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ reviewed, among other 

evidence, the medical opinions of two state agency psychological consultants, Don 

B. Johnson, Ph.D. and Matthew Turner, Ph.D., each of whom evaluated Plaintiff’s 

medical records and concluded she had moderate limitations in the functional 

domain of interacting with others. Admin R. 104-05. 

At the initial level on May 29, 2019, Dr. Johnson concluded that Plaintiff

“can maximally understand, remember, and carry out only simple instructions, 

make simple decisions, attend and concentrate for extended periods, interact 

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adequately with co-workers and supervisors, and respond appropriately to 

changes in a routine work setting.” Admin. R. 104. He also opined that Plaintiff 

“had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information; 

moderate limitations in interacting with others and concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace; and no limitations in adaptation or self-management.” Admin. 

R. 104. While the ALJ found Dr. Johnson’s opined limitations “generally 

supported” and “somewhat persuasive,” with regard to the discrete issue of 

Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others, the ALJ found that his opinion was 

“internally inconsistent to assess moderate limitation in the paragraph B 

criterion of interacting with others[,] but not assess functional capacity limitations 

in this area.” Admin. R. 104 (emphasis added).

At the reconsideration level on December 3, 2019, Dr. Turner concluded that 

Plaintiff “can maximally understand, remember, and carry out detailed but not 

complex instructions, make decisions, attend and concentrate for extended 

periods, interact adequately with coworkers and supervisors, and respond 

appropriately to changes in routine work settings.” Admin. R. 105. He also opined 

that Plaintiff “had moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and 

applying information; moderate limitations in interacting with others and 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and no limitations in adaptation or 

self-management.” Admin. R. 105. The ALJ found that the limitations assessed by 

Dr. Turner were “unpersuasive and inconsistent with the moderate B criteria that 

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he assessed, particularly as to interacting with others and understanding, 

remembering, and applying information.” Admin. R. 105.

Additionally, the ALJ reviewed the examining psychologist Dr. Duncan’s 

opinion. Dr. Duncan opined, among other things, that Plaintiff “does not have the 

abilities to relate to and work with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” Admin. 

R. 105. The ALJ found that Dr. Duncan’s opinion on Plaintiff’s inability to relate to 

and work with supervisors, coworkers, and the public was unpersuasive based 

upon the “longitudinal records,” noting that Plaintiff “was able to establish rapport 

and be cooperative with providers, to include Dr. Duncan.” Admin. R. 105.

Notably, the ALJ failed to identify any evidence clearly establishing the 

actual effect Plaintiff’s mental conditions had on her ability to work. See Ripley, 67 

F.3d at 557. It is improper for the ALJ to infer what Plaintiff’s mental capabilities 

to work are based on her own interpretation of those records, at least without the 

assistance of an examining or treating physician. See id. at 557 n.27 (“Without 

reports from qualified medical experts, however, we cannot agree that the evidence 

substantially supports the conclusion that Ripley was not disabled because we are 

unable to determine the effects of Ripley’s condition, no matter how ‘small,’ on his 

ability to perform sedentary work.”); see also Tyria R. v. Saul, 2020 WL 10050779, 

at *11 (N.D. Tex. March 6, 2020) (finding the ALJ’s mental RFC was not supported 

by substantial evidence where the ALJ made an RFC determination without 

medical evidence addressing the effects of Plaintiff’s impairment on her ability to 

work), adopted by 2020 WL 1434516 (Mar. 20, 2020) (Scholer, J.); compare

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Steven K. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1056920, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2022)

(Rutherford, M.J.) (finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment where she did not use her own lay interpretation of the medical record 

to determine a claimant’s RFC; she partially relied on expert medical opinions to 

determine the impairment’s effects on the claimant’s ability to work), adopted by

3:20-cv-1655-G-BT (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2022) (Fish, J.), ECF No. 21 (sealed). 

The Court rejects the Commissioner’s argument that the state agency 

psychological consultants’ assessments provide medical opinion evidence to 

support the ALJ’s finding on the extent of Plaintiff’s limitations in social 

functioning resulting from her severe mental impairments. See Def.’s Br. 7. 

Although the Commissioner is correct that the ALJ considered certain portions of 

Dr. Johnson’s assessment as “somewhat persuasive,” see Def.’s Br. 7, her findings, 

at least insofar as they relate to Plaintiff’s limitations in social functioning, are to 

the contrary. The ALJ rejected the social functioning limitations assessed by Dr. 

Johnson because his opinion was “internally inconsistent to assess moderate 

limitation in the paragraph B criterion of interacting with others[,] but not assess 

functional capacity limitations in this area.” Admin. R. 104. She found that the 

limitations assessed by Dr. Turner were “unpersuasive and inconsistent with the 

moderate B criteria that he assessed, particularly as to interacting with others and 

understanding, remembering, and applying information.” Admin. R. 105. 

While other medical records discuss the range of Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments, none describe the effects of those impairments on Plaintiff’s ability 

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to work. Without any analysis of the effects of her mental limitations on her ability 

to work included in any medical records, the ALJ relied on her own assessment of 

the raw medical data and her own opinion as the basis for finding at step four that 

Plaintiff can perform work that does not require “more than occasional and 

superficial interaction with co-workers, i.e. no collaborative or tandem tasks[,]” 

and “does not require direct interaction with the general public as part of job 

duties.” Admin. R. 104. Although the ALJ may choose to reject medical sources’

opinions, she cannot then independently decide the effects of Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments on her ability to perform work-related activities, as that is prohibited 

by Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557-58, even if the ALJ believes she is “simply giving 

[Plaintiff] the benefit of the doubt as to what limitations might apply.” Thornhill v. 

Colvin, 2015 WL 232844, at *1o (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2014), adopted by 2015 WL 

232844 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2015) (Lynn, J.) Rather, at that point, it became 

incumbent upon the ALJ to obtain an expert medical opinion about the types of 

work tasks that Plaintiff could still perform given her impairments. See Ripley, 67 

F.3d at 557. 

Finally, the Commissioner argues that this decision is not aligned with the 

Social Security Administration’s (SSA) promulgated regulations and Social 

Security Rulings (SSR). Def.’s Br. 5-6. The SSA regulations and policies do not 

necessitate medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2); SSR 96-8p, supra.

6

6 The Commissioner also relies on the July 2, 1996, Social Security Ruling 96-5p,

Def.’s Br. 5, but this was rescinded in March 2017, see Rescission of Social Security 

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The SSA regulations do not require medical opinions be included in the record nor 

do they require specific weight be given to any specific opinion. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.1520c(a). But, as previously explained, what the ALJ may not do is make her

own decisions about the extent of effects of medical impairments without evidence 

to determine a plaintiff’s RFC. See Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. As previously stated, the 

ALJ here rejected Dr. Duncan’s medical opinion about the effects of Plaintiff’s 

mental limitations, acknowledged that both state agency psychological consultants 

failed to account for any limitation in interacting with others despite concluding 

that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in this functional domain, and made her own 

determination of the effects of Plaintiff’s mental limitations on her ability to work. 

Consequently, substantial evidence does not support the mental aspect of the ALJ’s 

RFC finding with respect to the effects of Plaintiffs’ mental conditions on her ability 

to interact with others in the workplace. See Williams, 355 F. App’x at 831-32

(reversing and remanding where the ALJ rejected the opinions of the claimant’s 

treating physicians and relied on his own medical opinions as to the limitations 

presented by the claimant’s back problems in determining RFC).

2. Prejudice

Because “[p]rocedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not 

required” and a court “will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a 

Rulings 96-2p, 96-5p, and 06-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. 15263, 15263 (Mar. 27, 2017); see 

also Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. 

Reg. 5844, 5845 (Jan. 18, 2017).

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party have been affected,” Plaintiff must show she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s 

failure to rely on medical opinion evidence in assessing her RFC. See Mays v. 

Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). To establish prejudice, 

she must show that the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion as to the effects 

that her impairments had on her ability to work casts doubt on the existence of 

substantial evidence supporting her disability determination. See McNair v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 537 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (N.D. Tex. 2008)

(“Procedural errors in the disability determination process are considered 

prejudicial when they cast doubt onto the existence of substantial evidence in 

support of the ALJ’s decision.”) (citing Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th 

Cir. 1988)).

The ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, 

specifically as to her social functioning, casts doubt as to whether substantial 

evidence exists to support the finding that she is not disabled. See Williams, 355 F. 

App’x at 832 (finding the decision denying the claimant’s claim was not supported 

by substantial evidence when the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence 

because the ALJ rejected the opinions of the claimant’s treating physicians and 

relied on his own medical opinions as to the limitations presented by the claimant’s 

back problems in determining the RFC); see also Tyria R., 2020 WL 10050779, at 

*13 (reversing and remanding for further proceedings for lack of substantial 

evidence because of the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion in determining 

the plaintiff’s RFC); Thornhill, 2015 WL 232844, at *11 (finding prejudice and 

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remanding “where the ALJ could have obtained evidence that might have changed 

the result—specifically, a medical source statement”). Accordingly, the error is not 

harmless, and remand is required on this issue. 7 

Recommendation

For the reasons stated, the Court should REVERSE the Commissioner’s 

decision and REMAND for further proceedings.

SO RECOMMENDED.

July 5, 2023.

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and 

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being 

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to 

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in 

the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual 

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted 

by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Svcs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

7 Because the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC on remand will likely affect 

the remaining issue of whether a separate finding on Plaintiff’s ability to sustain 

employment is required, the Court pretermits consideration of this issue.

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