UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

PAUL MUHIRWA GITWAZA,

Gitwaza,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00434-P

MERRICK B GARLAND, ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Muhirwa Gitwaza’s Complaint 

seeking a de novo review of his Form N-400 Naturalization Application, 

which was filed on September 16, 2020, and denied initially by 

Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(“USCIS”). ECF No. 1. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS

Gitwaza’s Application for naturalization.

BACKGROUND

Gitwaza is a pastor and the founder of Authentic Word Ministry, 

which has established churches worldwide, including in several U.S. 

states. Gitwaza has resided continuously in Dallas, Texas, since 2013, 

and has filed tax returns regularly. In September 2020, Gitwaza filed 

his naturalization application to become an official United States 

citizen. Gitwaza demonstrated his ability to read, write, and speak 

English, as well as his knowledge of U.S. history and government during 

his naturalization interview in January 2022.

However, USCIS denied Gitwaza’s application, citing a March 2019

conviction for disorderly conduct in New York. This conviction stemmed 

from a June 2017 arrest where Gitwaza was initially charged with 

Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and Forcible Touching. The charges 

were later reduced, and Gitwaza pleaded guilty only to disorderly 

conduct, a minor violation under New York law. Gitwaza was required 

to attend a sexual offender counseling program as part of his plea 

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agreement, which was terminated after three months following a 

polygraph test in Texas. Mr. Bruce Cameron, the program 

administrator, concluded that Gitwaza was not a sex offender and could 

not be treated as such.

In May 2022, Gitwaza filed a Complaint seeking de novo review of 

his denial and requested a hearing by this Court on his Form N-400 

Naturalization Application. During a trial before this Court in February 

2024, Gitwaza emphasized that he only agreed to plead to disorderly 

conduct because he believed it would not impact his immigration status 

as it qualified as a “petty crime” under the immigration statute. The 

Court is now prepared to rule on Mr. Gitwaza’s Application.

LEGAL STANDARD

When an applicant’s naturalization is denied, they may seek review 

in the United States District Court where they reside, as per 8 U.S.C. § 

1421(c). This statute mandates a de novo review by the court, which 

means the Court will independently assess the facts and legal 

conclusions without deference to the previous administrative decision. 

Unlike many administrative reviews which apply a deferential 

“arbitrary and capricious” standard, the court’s de novo review here 

requires a fresh, comprehensive evaluation of the evidence presented at 

trial. See Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2013). If the 

court finds that the denial was improper and that the applicant qualifies 

for naturalization, it will typically grant the naturalization application 

and instruct USCIS to schedule the applicant’s oath ceremony. See

Vahid-Dastjerdi v. Mueller, No. CV M-09-84, 2011 WL 13135580, at *3–

4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011) (Crane, J.) (finding that the plaintiff satisfied 

all requirements for naturalization and directing the plaintiff to file a 

proposed final judgment reflecting the court’s findings). 

Regarding the criteria for naturalization, Congress holds the 

authority to establish rules for the process. See Kariuki, 709 F.3d at 503.

In reviewing a denial, the court ensures that all statutory requirements 

for naturalization are strictly met. Id. at 504. The burden of proof lies 

with the applicant to demonstrate eligibility for citizenship in all 

respects. See Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 385 

U.S. 630, 637 (1967). The government maintains a vested interest in 

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ensuring that only qualified individuals are granted citizenship, with 

any doubts being resolved in favor of the United States. Id.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an applicant 

must meet specific requirements, including:

1. Continuous residence in the United States for at least 

five years immediately preceding the application;

2. Continued residence in the U.S. from the application 

date until citizenship is granted;

3. Demonstration of good moral character, adherence to 

the principles of the Constitution, and a disposition 

toward the good order and happiness of the United States 

throughout the relevant period.

8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a). Applicants must prove their 

eligibility for naturalization by a preponderance of the evidence. See 8 

C.F.R. § 316.2(a). While some cases have suggested a higher burden of 

proof, the Fifth Circuit has maintained that the statutory standard of a 

preponderance of the evidence is applicable. See Oropeza v. Napolitano, 

No. CIV.A. H-09-2604, 2010 WL 4878837, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2010)

(Werlein, Jr., J); see also Morales v. Limon, No. CIV.A. 7:19-CV-319, 

2020 WL 4463094, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2020) (Alvarez, J.). This 

means the applicant must show that it is more likely than not that they 

meet all the requirements for naturalization.

ANALYSIS

Gitwaza argues that his conviction for disorderly conduct is a “petty 

crime” that should not bar him from establishing good moral character. 

See ECF No. 1 at 5. The “petty offense” exception exempts “an alien who 

committed only one crime,” which interrupts the period, if “the 

maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was 

convicted . . . did not exceed imprisonment for one year and . . . the alien 

was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). Disorderly conduct under New York law is a 

violation, not a crime, and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days. 

See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.20, 70.15. He asserts that his plea to 

disorderly conduct, which he argues falls under this “petty offense 

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exception,” should not adversely reflect upon his moral character. See 

ECF No. 1 at 5.

The Government, however, argues that Gitwaza’s conduct leading to 

his conviction constitutes an unlawful act that adversely reflects upon 

his moral character, citing the “catch-all” provision in 8 C.F.R. § 

316.10(b)(3)(iii). The “catch-all” provision in the statutory scheme 

provides that non-enumerated acts or characteristics can, in the absence 

of extenuating circumstances, demonstrate that an applicant lacks good 

moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (“The fact that any person is not 

within one of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for 

other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.”); 8 

C.F.R § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) (explaining that in the absence of extenuating 

circumstances an “applicant shall be found to lack good moral character 

if, during the statutory period, the applicant: . . . (iii) [c]ommitted 

unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicant’s moral 

character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts, although the 

acts” are not specifically enumerated in the statute or regulations).

Defendants contend that Gitwaza’s story regarding the events that 

led to his arrest lacks credibility, further undermining his claim of good 

moral character. See ECF No. 48 at 5–6. Therefore, the Court must 

determine whether Gitwaza’s story is credible and, even if credible, if 

the incident that occurred in New York, and his plea, reflect poor moral 

character to preclude him from being eligible for United Sates 

citizenship. The Court does so below. 

A. March 2017 Arrest

The Court finds that while disorderly conduct is a minor offense, the 

circumstances surrounding Gitwaza’s arrest and subsequent plea do 

raise questions concerning his moral character that must be addressed. 

Moreover, the requirement to attend a sexual offender counseling 

program, albeit terminated early, is no small thing.

During the trial, Gitwaza testified that the charges against him were 

the result of a misunderstanding and that he never engaged in any 

inappropriate conduct with the alleged victim. See ECF No. 50 at 17–24. 

He maintained that his actions were misinterpreted and that he agreed 

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to the plea deal to avoid the stress and uncertainty of a trial. Id. at 24.

Gitwaza’s testimony was supported by Mr. Bruce Cameron, his sex 

offender program administrator, who stated that Gitwaza did not 

exhibit any behavior consistent with that of a sex offender and that the 

polygraph test supported the notion that Gitwaza did not require more 

counseling. Id. at 39.

The Government presented evidence to the contrary, including the 

affidavit of Detective Shields who conducted the initial investigation. 

See ECF No. 27 at 4. Detective Shields’ affidavit detailed the alleged 

victim’s account of the incident, in which she claimed that Gitwaza

forcibly touched her breasts during a prayer session. Id.

The Court must, however, scrutinize the reliability of the evidence 

presented. It is significant to note that the alleged victim did not testify, 

either during the investigation or at trial. The only statements from the 

victim were unsworn statements made to Detective Shields, and 

Gitwaza was never presented the opportunity to confront his accuser in 

an adversarial proceeding. The absence of direct testimony from the 

alleged victim casts doubt on the robustness of the claims against 

Gitwaza. The Court is left to rely solely on Detective Shields’ recounting 

of the alleged victim’s statements, which lacks the corroborative 

strength of direct testimony under oath. Gitwaza has given multiple 

statements under penalty of perjury that the alleged incidents 

stemming from his arrest were a misunderstanding and he only took the 

plea deal to avoid disrupting his citizenship chances. The Court 

concludes that Gitwaza has satisfied his burden by a preponderance of 

the evidence and does not discern any evidence from the government 

that properly challenges the veracity of those sworn statements. For 

these reasons, the Court views his plea to disorderly conduct a “petty 

offense” and must now determine whether pleading guilty to a petty 

offense precludes Gitwaza from having good moral character. It does so 

below.

B. Moral Character

To determine whether Gitwaza meets the good moral character 

requirement, the Court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances.

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The statutory period for which the applicant must show good moral 

character begins five years prior to the date the applicant filed the 

application for naturalization and continues through the date the 

applicant takes the oath of citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (3); 8 

C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1). The determination of good moral character, 

however, is not limited to the statutory five-year period. Rather, USCIS 

“may take into consideration, as a basis for its determination, the 

applicant’s conduct and acts at any time prior to” the five-year period. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2). Whether an applicant exhibits the requisite 

good moral character is evaluated “on a case-by-case basis taking into 

account the elements enumerated in this section and the standards of 

the average citizen in the community of residence.” Id.

The regulations provide general guidelines as well as specific 

examples of acts that demonstrate a lack of good moral character. For 

example, an applicant will be considered as lacking good moral 

character if he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or

engaged in other specified conduct. Id. at (b)(1)-(2). In a type of “catchall” provision, the regulations also provide that, absent a showing by the 

applicant of extenuating circumstances, the applicant shall be found to 

lack good moral character if, during the statutory period, the applicant:

(iii) Committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the 

applicant’s moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned 

for such acts, although the acts do not fall within the purview 

of § 316.10(b)(1) or (2).

Id. at (b)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Mwalumba, 688 F. Supp. 2d 565, 

570 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Fish, J.) (Recognizing 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) 

is a “catch-all” provision). 

Here, it is clear from Gitwaza’s background that he has been actively 

involved in his community, as a spiritual leader in his community 

through his ministry. With respect to his alleged conduct, the Court 

must determine whether (1) his conviction of disorderly conduct charge 

itself precludes citizenship and (2) whether the underlying allegations 

immune his character. 

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First, while disorderly conduct is a violation under New York law and 

not a crime, the context of the conviction must be considered. Gitwaza 

testified under oath that his plea deal was a strategic decision to avoid 

the uncertainty of a trial, a common legal tactic. See ECF No. 50 at 24. 

The requirement to attend a counseling program, which was later 

terminated, does not necessarily reflect negatively on his character, 

especially given Mr. Cameron’s testimony that the program was 

discontinued because Gitwaza was not a sex offender. See id. at 39. 

Gitwaza has maintained a clean record before and since his plea, with 

no further incidents of legal trouble. His continuous residence, regular 

tax filings, and active participation in the community demonstrate a 

commitment to upholding the principles of good moral character 

required for naturalization. 

Second, while the Government argues that his disorderly conduct 

plea is a crime involving moral turpitude, the Court once again notes 

that the only direct evidence of the alleged incident comes from 

Detective Shields’ affidavit based on his interview with the alleged 

victim. See ECF Nos. 48 at 5; 27 at 4. The alleged victim did not testify, 

and there was no corroborative evidence presented to substantiate her 

claims. This lack of direct testimony from the alleged victim raises 

questions about the reliability and completeness of the account provided 

by the Defendants. Gitwaza was not convicted of the initial charges of 

Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and Forcible Touching. These charges 

were reduced to disorderly conduct, a minor violation. Importantly, the 

plea to disorderly conduct does not equate to an admission of the far 

more serious charges initially brought against him. The absence of a 

plea or conviction for a sexual crime significantly undermines the 

Governments’ argument that Gitwaza conduct should bar his 

naturalization.

The termination of the sexual offender counseling program and the 

results of the polygraph test also weigh in favor of Gitwaza. Mr. 

Cameron, who administered the counseling program, testified that 

Gitwaza did not exhibit any behavior consistent with a sex offender, and 

the program was terminated early because Gitwaza passed a polygraph 

test, supporting his recollection of the incident. See ECF No. 50 at 39. 

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While the Court acknowledges that polygraphs tests can be unreliable, 

and the Court does not rely on the results here for their own sake, the 

test combined with the professional opinion of Mr. Cameron support 

Gitwaza’s argument. In particular, the testimony of Mr. Cameron most 

strongly supports Gitwaza’s argument that the disorderly conduct plea 

was not indicative of poor moral character. See id. at 24. 

Furthermore, Gitwaza’s consistent involvement in his ministry and 

community highlights his dedication to living a life of integrity and 

service. This along with all the testimony presented by Mr. Gitwaza and 

Mr. Cameron reinforces the Court’s assessment of Gitwaza’s good moral 

character and that he has made a showing beyond a preponderance of 

the evidence that he possesses moral character becoming of United 

States citizenship.

Given the denial of his application was predicated on this 2017 

arrest, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. 

Gitwaza has met and satisfied all of the requirements to achieve his 

American citizenship. Accordingly, Mr. Gitwaza is eligible for 

naturalization and his application for that benefit is hereby approved. 

The Court REMANDS the case to USCIS solely for the purpose of 

naturalizing Mr. Gitwaza. USCIS shall schedule an oath ceremony for 

him as soon as possible and shall issue a Certificate of Naturalization to 

Mr. Gitwaza that same day.

C. Attorney’s Fees

The Court notes that Gitwaza seeks an award of his attorneys’ fees 

incurred in prosecuting this action. See ECF No. 44 at 9; see generally 

28 U.S.C. § 2412. Accordingly, to facilitate a Final Judgment 

incorporating the appropriate fees and costs, the Court ORDERS

Gitwaza to submit appropriate evidence of the relevant fees and costs, 

along with briefing regarding the reasonableness of same, on or before 

July 22, 2024. Thereafter, should Defendants wish to contest Plaintiff’s 

requested fees or costs, they shall file responsive briefing on or before 

July 29, 2024.

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CONCLUSION

After considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds 

that Mr. Gitwaza has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he possesses the requisite good moral character for naturalization. 

This Country has been principled on the idea that every man, woman, 

and child is innocent until proven guilty. The Government wants to hold 

Mr. Gitwaza legally responsible for actions that were never proven in a 

court of law and never supported by concrete evidence. The incident 

leading to his plea for disorderly conduct and the dearth of corroborative 

evidence cannot and will not be used to prevent Mr. Gitwaza from 

earning citizenship. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Gitwaza’s

application for naturalization.

SO ORDERED on this 8th day of July 2024.

REGINALEA KEMP,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:23-cv-00841-P

REGIONS BANK ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File 

Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion 

and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.

______________________________________________

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATED DISTRICT JUDGE

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