1

Filed 7/2/12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

STATE BUILDING AND )

CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL )

OF CALIFORNIA, AFL-CIO, )

)

Plaintiff and Appellant, ) S173586

)

v. ) Ct.App. 4/1 D052181

)

CITY OF VISTA et al., ) San Diego County

) Super. Ct. No. 37-2007-

Defendants and Respondents. ) 00054316-CU-WM-NC

____________________________________)

A charter city entered into certain contracts for the construction of public 

buildings. A federation of labor unions then petitioned the superior court for a 

peremptory writ of mandate, asserting that the city must comply with California‟s 

prevailing wage law notwithstanding local ordinances stating otherwise. The 

prevailing wage law requires that certain minimum wage levels be paid to contract 

workers constructing public works.

Under the state Constitution, the ordinances of charter cities supersede state 

law with respect to “municipal affairs” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5), but state law is 

supreme with respect to matters of “statewide concern” (California Fed. Savings 

& Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 17 (California Fed. 

Savings)). Here, petitioner contends that the subject matter of the state‟s 

prevailing wage law is a “statewide concern” over which the state has primary 
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legislative authority. (Ibid.) The city responds that the matter is a municipal affair 

and therefore governed by its local ordinances. We agree with the city.

I. FACTS

In 2006, the voters of the City of Vista in San Diego County approved a .5

percent sales tax to fund the construction and renovation of several public 

buildings. The proposed projects involved the seismic retrofit of an existing fire 

station and the construction of two new fire stations, a new civic center, a new 

sports park, and a new stagehouse for the city‟s Moonlight Amphitheatre. At that 

time, Vista was a general law city.1 In February 2007, the Vista City Attorney 

submitted a report to the city council recommending that Vista take steps to 

become a charter city. The report asserted that the conversion would give the city 

the option of not paying prevailing wages on its planned public works projects, 

“result[ing] in millions of dollars of savings over the next few years and beyond.”

The Vista City Council then authorized a special election for residents of 

the city to vote on a ballot measure that would change Vista from a general law 

city into a charter city. In the voter information pamphlet, the “City Attorney 

Impartial Analysis” told the voters that, as a charter city, Vista‟s city council

“replaces the state legislature with regard to the municipal affairs of the 

City[, which] . . . include bidding and contracting procedures . . . .” (City of Vista 

Sample Ballot & Voter Information Pamp., Special Municipal Elec., June 5, 2007, 

 

1 “ „The Government Code classifies cities as either “general law cities” 

(cities organized under the general law of California) or “chartered cities” (cities 

organized under a charter). [Citations.] . . . [A] general law city . . . must comply 

with state statutes that specify requirements for entering into contracts.

[Citations.]‟ ” (City of Orange v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn.

(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 45, 52.)
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analysis of Prop. C, p. 003.) That same point was made in the ballot argument in 

favor of the proposal, signed by the mayor and members of the city council, which 

also noted that the conversion would allow the city to “choose when and if it pays 

„prevailing wages.‟ ” (Id., argument in favor of Prop. C, p. 004.) There was no 

opposing ballot argument.

The ballot measure passed with approximately 67 percent of the votes cast. 

Shortly thereafter, Vista amended a city ordinance to prohibit any city contract 

from requiring payment of prevailing wages unless (a) such payment is compelled 

by the terms of a state or a federal grant, (b) the contract does not involve a 

municipal affair, or (c) payment of the prevailing wage is separately authorized by 

the city council.

In October 2007, Vista‟s city council adopted a resolution approving 

contracts to design and build two fire stations and authorizing the mayor to 

execute the contracts. The contracts did not require compliance with the state‟s

prevailing wage law. A court action by plaintiff followed.

Plaintiff State Building and Construction Trades Council of California, 

AFL-CIO (the Union) is a labor federation composed of 131 local unions, 16 

district labor councils, and 22 local building trades councils that collectively 

represent more than 300,000 men and women working in the construction industry 

in California. The Union petitioned the San Diego County Superior Court for a 

peremptory writ of mandate to direct Vista and its officeholders to comply with 

the state‟s prevailing wage law. Vista countered that prevailing wage issues are 

not a statewide concern, and that “charter cities have the legal right to determine 

whether or not to require „prevailing wages‟ in local public works contracts that 

involve locally funded, „municipal affairs‟ under the California Constitution and 

the laws governing charter cities.” The Union moved for issuance of a peremptory 

writ of mandate. The Union argued that the prevailing wage law “addresses 
4

important statewide concerns” and therefore it applies to charter cities “just as it 

applies to other cities.” In support of its petition, the Union submitted a 

declaration of its president, Robert L. Balgenorth, asserting the regional nature of 

the construction industry and describing apprenticeship training in that industry. 

Vista opposed the motion, arguing that as a matter of law “Charter Cities have 

fiscal control over local „municipal affairs‟ and these Cities can determine whether 

to include „prevailing wage‟ requirements in local public works contracts.”

The trial court denied the Union‟s petition, citing Vial v. City of San Diego

(1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 346. Vial concerned a city council resolution adopted by 

San Diego (a charter city) that barred payment of prevailing wages except in 

specified circumstances. The state sought to compel the city to comply with the 

state‟s prevailing wage law. (Id. at p. 347.) The Court of Appeal in Vial upheld 

the city‟s resolution, stating that the expenditure of city funds on public works 

projects and the rates of pay of workers hired for such projects are municipal 

affairs of a charter city over which the state has no legislative authority. (Id. at 

p. 348.)

The Union here appealed. In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeal 

affirmed the trial court. After observing that both the legislative record and the 

trial court record were inadequate to establish that application of the prevailing 

wage law to charter cities is necessary to protect regional labor markets, the Court 

of Appeal concluded that the Union had failed to prove the existence of a 

statewide concern. In the dissent‟s view, however, the wage levels of contract 

workers constructing public works can have a depressive effect on regional wages, 

and therefore they are a statewide concern.

We granted the Union‟s petition for review to decide whether the state‟s 

prevailing wage law applies to charter cities.
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II. DISCUSSION

A. California’s Prevailing Wage Law

In 1931, the California Legislature enacted the state‟s prevailing wage law.

2

 

That law, which was then entitled the Public Wage Rate Act, required contractors 

on “public works” projects to pay “the general prevailing rate of per diem wages 

for work of a similar character in the locality in which the work is performed.” 

(Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 910.) The term “public works” was defined as work

done for public agencies and work paid for with public funds. (Id., § 4, pp. 911-

912.) The law expressly referred to charter cities in a provision requiring such 

cities to pay prevailing wages in contracts for street or sewer improvement work. 

(Ibid.)

Earlier the same year, Congress had enacted the Davis-Bacon Act (Pub. L. 

71-798 (Mar. 3, 1931) 46 Stat. 1494, codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148); the 

goals of the federal and the state legislation were similar. (See, e.g., California 

Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc. (1997) 519 

U.S. 316, 319.) Simply put, “[p]revailing wage laws are based on the . . . premise 

that government contractors should not be allowed to circumvent locally 

prevailing labor market conditions by importing cheap labor from other areas.” 

(Independent Roofing Contractors v. Department of Industrial Relations (1994) 23 

Cal.App.4th 345, 356.) Many states have adopted some form of a prevailing wage 

law for public construction projects. (See, e.g., 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/1 to 

130/12; N.Y. Labor Law § 220(3)(a); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 165-1 to 165-17; Tex. 

Gov. Code Ann. §§ 2258.001 to 2258.058.)

 

2 The prevailing wage law replaced a law from the late 19th century that 

required payment of at least $2.00 per day for labor on public works. (Stats. 1897, 

ch. 88, § 1, p. 90.)
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When the California Legislature established the Labor Code in 1937, it 

replaced the 1931 Public Wage Rate Act with a revised, but substantively 

unchanged, version of the same law. (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720 et seq., pp. 241-

246.) The 1937 law, like the 1931 law, directed the “body awarding any contract”

to “ascertain the general prevailing rate of per diem wages in the locality . . . for 

each craft or type of workman needed to execute the contract.” (Stats. 1937, ch. 

90, § 1773, p. 243; see also Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 2, p. 910.) As a result of a 1976 

amendment, the prevailing wage law now requires that local wage rates be 

determined by the Director of California‟s Department of Industrial Relations

rather than by the body awarding the contract (Stats. 1976, ch. 281, § 2, p. 587), 

but the prevailing wage law‟s general purpose and scope remain largely 

unchanged.

Here, Vista contends that it need not comply with the prevailing wage law 

because the law invades Vista‟s constitutionally guaranteed autonomy as a charter

city. In resolving the issue, we begin with a brief overview of the home rule 

doctrine set forth in the California Constitution.

B. California’s Home Rule Doctrine

Charter cities are specifically authorized by our state Constitution to govern 

themselves, free of state legislative intrusion, as to those matters deemed

municipal affairs. Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California 

Constitution provides: “It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that 

the city governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations 

in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided 

in their several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to 

general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede 

any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws 
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inconsistent therewith.” (Italics added.) The roots of this provision trace back 

more than 100 years. (See generally Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 

394-398.) It was originally “enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself 

knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that 

municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which 

would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.” (Fragley v. Phelan (1899) 126 

Cal. 383, 387 (lead opn. by Garoutte, J.).) The provision represents an 

“affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of „all powers appropriate for a 

municipality to possess . . .‟ and [includes] the important corollary that „so far as 

“municipal affairs” are concerned,‟ charter cities are „supreme and beyond the 

reach of legislative enactment.‟ ” (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 

p. 12, quoting Ex Parte Braun (1903) 141 Cal. 204, 207.)

In California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1, we set forth an analytical 

framework for resolving whether or not a matter falls within the home rule 

authority of charter cities. First, a court must determine whether the city 

ordinance at issue regulates an activity that can be characterized as a “municipal 

affair.” (Id. at p. 16.) Second, the court “must satisfy itself that the case presents 

an actual conflict between [local and state law].” (Ibid.) Third, the court must 

decide whether the state law addresses a matter of “statewide concern.” (Id. at 

p. 17.) Finally, the court must determine whether the law is “reasonably related 

to . . . resolution” of that concern (ibid.) and “narrowly tailored” to avoid 

unnecessary interference in local governance (id. at p. 24). “If . . . the court is 

persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one of statewide concern and that 

the statute is reasonably related to its resolution [and not unduly broad in its 

sweep], then the conflicting charter city measure ceases to be a „municipal affair‟

pro tanto and the Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5(a), from 

addressing the statewide dimension by its own tailored enactments.” (Id. at p. 17.)
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Here, we reaffirm our view — first expressed 80 years ago (see City of 

Pasadena v. Charleville (1932) 215 Cal. 384, 389 (Charleville)) — that the wage 

levels of contract workers constructing locally funded public works are a 

municipal affair (that is, exempt from state regulation), and that these wage levels 

are not a statewide concern (that is, subject to state legislative control). Our 

reasons are set forth in the course of the analysis given below.

C. Applicability of California’s Home Rule Doctrine Is a Question of 

Law

The Court of Appeal treated the dispute in this case as a factual one, and it 

characterized its decision against the Union in terms of a failure of proof. For 

example, the court observed: “[T]he question we face is whether either the 

Legislature or the [Union] ha[s] demonstrated a fact-bound justification for 

application of the [prevailing wage law] to charter cities. As we explain more 

fully, we do not find any such justification on the record presented.” Later in its 

opinion, the Court of Appeal said: “[T]he Legislature has not articulated any 

rationale which would support the conclusion that complete preemption of 

municipal public works contracting is needed to protect regional labor markets.” 

With regard to the evidentiary record made by the Union, the court said: 

“Plainly . . . [various parts of the trial court record] establish that the labor markets 

in the construction trades are regional rather than local. . . . [However,] the factual 

record presented by the [Union] offers no evidence which suggests the contracting 

activity of municipalities materially impacts regional labor markets.”

Thus, the Court of Appeal here did not hold that the wage levels of contract 

workers constructing a locally funded public work are categorically a municipal 

affair and not a statewide concern. Rather, the Court of Appeal held that the 

legislative record was inadequate to establish a statewide concern and that the 

Union had failed to prove its case in the trial court.
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The Court of Appeal‟s approach raises the question whether the 

determination of a statewide concern presents predominantly a legal or a factual 

question. Fundamentally, the question is one of constitutional interpretation; the 

controlling inquiry is how the state Constitution allocates governmental authority 

between charter cities and the state. The answer to that constitutional question 

does not necessarily depend on whether the municipal activity in question has 

some regional or statewide effect. For example, we have said that the salaries of 

charter city employees are a municipal affair and not a statewide concern

regardless of any possible economic effect those salaries might have beyond the 

borders of the city. (Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County 

of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 316-317 (Sonoma County).)

Of course, the inquiry is not wholly removed from historical, and hence 

factual, realities. In California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 17 to 18, 

for example, we said: “[C]ourts should avoid the error of „compartmentalization,‟ 

that is, of cordoning off an entire area of governmental activity as either a 

„municipal affair‟ or one of statewide concern. Beginning with the observation in 

Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City and County of S.F. [(1959)] 51 Cal.2d [766,] 771, that 

„the constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity . . . 

[but one that] changes with the changing conditions upon which it is to operate,‟ 

our cases display a growing recognition that „home rule‟ is a means of adjusting 

the political relationship between state and local governments in discrete areas of 

conflict. When a court invalidates a charter city measure in favor of a conflicting 

state statute, the result does not necessarily rest on the conclusion that the subject 

matter of the former is not appropriate for municipal regulation. It means, rather, 

that under the historical circumstances presented, the state has a more substantial 

interest in the subject than the charter city.” (Italics added.)
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Nevertheless, the question whether in a particular case the home rule 

provisions of the California Constitution bar the application of state law to charter 

cities turns ultimately on the meaning and scope of the state law in question and 

the relevant state constitutional provisions. Interpreting that law and those 

provisions presents a legal question, not a factual one. (County of Riverside v. 

Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 286-287 (County of Riverside); Sonoma 

County, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 316; Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 

63 (Bishop).) Courts accord great weight to the factual record that the Legislature 

has compiled (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 20-25; Baggett v. 

Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136-137), and also to any relevant facts established in 

trial court proceedings. (California Fed. Savings, at p. 20, fn. 16.) Factual 

findings by the Legislature or the trial court, however, are not controlling. 

(Bishop, at p. 63.) The decision as to what areas of governance are municipal 

concerns and what are statewide concerns is ultimately a legal one.

Therefore, the Court of Appeal here gave too much weight to the Union‟s 

asserted failure to prove its case, implying that the issue before the court was one 

of sufficiency of the evidence. The answer to whether the prevailing wage law 

can be applied constitutionally to charter cities is not conclusively determined 

solely by the evidentiary record in the trial court or by the legislative record. The 

question remains one of state constitutional interpretation. (County of Riverside, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287; Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 316; 

Bishop, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 63.)

D. Application of California Fed. Savings’s Four-Part Test

We now apply the four-part test of this court‟s 1991 decision in California 

Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 16 to 17, which we summarized at page 7, 

ante.
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1. Whether the wages of contract workers constructing locally funded 

public works are a municipal affair

The wage levels of contract workers constructing locally funded public 

works are certainly a “municipal affair.” We said so explicitly in our 1932 

decision in Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. at page 389, which was the test case we 

took immediately after the Legislature‟s 1931 enactment of the prevailing wage 

law to decide whether that law applied to charter cities. Charleville was a 

mandate action brought to compel a charter city‟s manager to sign a contract for 

the construction of a fence around a city-owned reservoir. (Id. at p. 387.) The city 

manager refused to sign the contract, contending (among other things) that the 

contract did not comply with the state‟s newly enacted prevailing wage law. 

(Ibid.) The petition for a writ of mandate asserted that the prevailing wage law did 

not apply to charter cities, and this court agreed.

We there held that the issue of wage levels of contract workers improving a 

city-owned reservoir was, as a matter of law, a “municipal affair.” (Charleville, 

supra, 215 Cal. at p. 389.) We said: “The sole purpose of the contract is the 

construction of a wire fence around a reservoir which is a part of the city‟s 

municipal water system. The supplying of water by a city to its inhabitants is a 

municipal affair. [Citation.] The building of a dam to be used for impounding 

water for a municipal water system is a municipal affair. [Citation.] The 

construction of a reservoir as a part of a municipal water system is a municipal 

affair. [Citation.] The money to be expended for the cost of the improvement 

belongs to the city and the control of its expenditure is a municipal affair. 

[Citation.] The hiring of employees generally by the city to perform labor and 

services in connection with its municipal affairs and the payment of the city‟s 

funds for services rendered to the city by its employees in the administration of its 
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municipal affairs is not subject to or controlled by general laws. [Citations.]” 

(Ibid.)

It is apparent from our analysis in Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. at page 389, 

that the construction of a city-operated facility for the benefit of a city’s 

inhabitants is quintessentially a municipal affair, as is the control over the 

expenditure of a city’s own funds. Here, the two fire stations in the City of Vista,

like the municipal water system in Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384, are facilities 

operated by the city for the benefit of the city‟s inhabitants, and they are financed 

from the city‟s own funds. We conclude therefore that the matter at issue here 

involves a “municipal affair.”

2. Existence of an “actual conflict” between state law and charter city 

law

This court‟s 1991 decision in California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 

pages 16-17, emphasized the importance of determining, as a matter of statutory 

construction, that state law actually conflicts with local law before proceeding to 

the difficult state constitutional question of which law governs a particular matter. 

Here, no party contends that California‟s prevailing wage law exempts charter 

cities from its scope. Indeed, the prevailing wage law makes express reference to 

charter cities, defining “ „public works‟ ” to include “[s]treet, sewer, or other 

improvement work . . . of any political subdivision or district [of the state], 

whether the political subdivision or district operates under a freeholder’s charter 

or not.” (Lab. Code, § 1720, subd. (a)(3), italics added; see also id., subd. (a)(1) 

[applying the law to any construction work “done under contract and paid for . . . 

out of public funds”].) Because the state‟s prevailing wage law does not exempt 

charter cities, and because Vista‟s ordinance prohibits compliance with that law 

(except in circumstances not relevant here), we conclude that an actual conflict 

exists between state law and Vista‟s ordinance.
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3. Whether the wage levels of contract workers constructing locally 

funded public works is a statewide concern

When, as here, state law and the ordinances of a charter city actually 

conflict and we must decide which controls, “the hinge of the decision is the 

identification of a convincing basis for legislative action originating in 

extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative supersession based on sensible, 

pragmatic considerations.” (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 18.) 

In other words, for state law to control there must be something more than an

abstract state interest, as it is always possible to articulate some state interest in 

even the most local of matters. Rather, there must be “a convincing basis” for the 

state‟s action — a basis that “justif[ies]” the state‟s interference in what would 

otherwise be a merely local affair. (Ibid.) Here, that convincing justification is 

not present.

We reached essentially the same conclusion when we addressed the 

question in our 1932 decision in Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384. We there held 

that the wage levels of contract workers improving a city-owned reservoir were 

not a matter of “general state concern.” (Id. at p. 393.) Likewise, the wage levels 

of contract workers designing and constructing two city-operated fire houses do 

not appear to be a matter of “general state concern.” The Union, however, argues 

that circumstances have changed since our 1932 Charleville decision, and that 

what was not a statewide concern then has since become a statewide concern. The 

Union quotes a statement by this court in Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of 

S.F., supra, 51 Cal.2d 766, at page 771: “[T]he constitutional concept of 

municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity. It changes with the changing 

conditions upon which it is to operate. What may at one time have been a matter 

of local concern may at a later time become a matter of state concern controlled 

by the general laws of the state.” (Italics added.)
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The Union points out that as a result of a 1976 amendment to the state‟s 

prevailing wage law (Stats. 1976, ch. 281, § 2, p. 587), the wage levels mandated 

by that law are no longer set by the local body awarding the contract but by the 

Director of the Department of Industrial Relations, and under the amended law, 

these mandatory wage levels reflect regional rather than simply local interests

(Lab. Code, §§ 1770, 1773, 1773.1, 1773.9). In light of these statutory changes, 

the Union argues, the wage levels of contract workers constructing locally funded 

public works have become a matter of statewide concern.

In a related argument, the Union contends that the economy of the state has 

become more integrated during the 80 years since this court‟s 1932 decision in 

Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384, and wage levels in a local area are now more 

likely to have an effect regionally and statewide. The construction industry in 

particular, according to the Union, has followed this trend toward economic 

regionalization, with workers often driving long distances to a job site and multiemployer collective bargaining agreements governing the terms of employment on 

a regional basis. Because of these economic changes, the Union asserts, the 

refusal of charter cities to pay prevailing wages has a depressive impact on 

regional labor standards that was not present in 1932 when Charleville was 

decided. Therefore, the Union argues, the expenditure of city funds on a local 

public work is no longer a purely local concern; rather, in light of our modern 

integrated economy, it has become a statewide concern.

The Union further notes that the state‟s prevailing wage law now requires 

contractors on public works projects to hire apprentices from state-approved 

apprenticeship programs, thereby ensuring the proper training of the next 

generation of skilled construction workers. (Lab. Code, § 1777.5.) The Union 

contends that this requirement of the prevailing wage law is essential to 

California‟s long-term economic health. If the prevailing wage law did not 
15

include this requirement, the Union argues, then construction contractors bidding 

competitively on public works projects would refuse to hire apprentices, in an 

effort to reduce costs; apprentices then might not be able to obtain enough work to 

support themselves and to complete their on-the-job training requirement. The 

Union asserts that the training of the next generation of skilled construction 

workers is a statewide concern, not merely a local concern, and the prevailing 

wage law has become an integral part of the state‟s scheme for training these 

workers.

These arguments by the Union underscore the importance of identifying 

correctly the question at issue. Certainly regional labor standards and the proper 

training of construction workers are statewide concerns when considered in the 

abstract. But the question presented here is not whether the state government has 

an abstract interest in labor conditions and vocational training. Rather, the 

question presented is whether the state can require a charter city to exercise its 

purchasing power in the construction market in a way that supports regional wages 

and subsidizes vocational training, while increasing the charter city‟s costs. No 

one would doubt that the state could use its own resources to support wages and 

vocational training in the state‟s construction industry, but can the state achieve 

these ends by interfering in the fiscal policies of charter cities? Autonomy with 

regard to the expenditure of public funds lies at the heart of what it means to be an 

independent governmental entity. “ „[W]e can think of nothing that is of greater 

municipal concern than how a city‟s tax dollars will be spent; nor anything which 

could be of less interest to taxpayers of other jurisdictions.‟ ” (Johnson v. Bradley, 

supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 407.) Therefore, the Union here cannot justify state 

regulation of the spending practices of charter cities merely by identifying some 

indirect effect on the regional and state economies. (See County of Riverside, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 296 [“No doubt almost anything a county does . . . can have 
16

consequences beyond its borders. But this circumstance does not mean this court 

may eviscerate clear constitutional provisions, or the Legislature may do what the 

Constitution expressly prohibits it from doing.”].)

The Union‟s arguments also conflict with our previous decisions. In 

Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d at page 297, we held that the wages paid by a 

charter city or county to its own employees are a municipal affair and therefore are 

not subject to regulation by the state Legislature. In that case, the state offered to 

distribute surplus state funds to local governments to mitigate the impact of 

Proposition 13.

3

 The Legislature, however, then enacted a special provision 

prohibiting the distribution of surplus state funds to any local agency that granted 

to its employees a cost-of-living wage or salary increase that exceeded the cost-ofliving increase provided to state employees. At issue was whether the latter 

provision violated the home rule doctrine of the California Constitution. (Sonoma 

County, at pp. 314-318.) We emphasized in Sonoma County that the 

determination of what constitutes a municipal affair (over which the state has no 

legislative authority) and what constitutes a statewide concern (as to which state 

law is controlling) is a matter for the courts, not the Legislature, to decide. (Id. at 

p. 316, citing Bishop, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56.) Moreover, that the Legislature chose to 

deal with a problem on a statewide basis, Sonoma County said, does not in itself 

make the problem a statewide concern. (Sonoma County, at p. 316.) Put 

differently, the concept of statewide concern is not coextensive with the state‟s 

police power. Citing numerous cases and an explicit provision of the state 

Constitution, Sonoma County concluded that the salaries of local employees of a 

 

3 Proposition 13, an initiative measure that the California electorate passed 

on June 6, 1978, added article XIII A to the California Constitution, placing 

significant limits on the taxing power of local and state governments.
17

charter city are a municipal affair not subject to the state‟s general laws. (Id. at 

pp. 316-317.)

Similarly, in San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of University of 

California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785 (S.F. Labor Council), we rejected an effort by the 

state Legislature to compel the Regents of the University of California to pay 

prevailing wages to university employees. Under article IX, section 9 of the 

California Constitution, the University of California enjoys an autonomy like that 

of charter cities under article XI, section 5. Specifically, article IX, section 9 

provides that the University of California shall have “full powers of organization 

and government,” subject only to a few narrow exceptions. Significantly, one of 

the exceptions pertains to state legislation that “regulates matters of statewide 

concern not involving internal university affairs.” (S.F. Labor Council, at p. 789, 

italics added.) Relying on Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, we concluded 

that the state‟s prevailing wage requirement was “not a matter of statewide 

concern.” (S.F. Labor Council, at p. 790.) We observed that “while the statute 

purports to establish a minimum wage, it in effect determines the wage.” (Ibid.) 

We then stated: “Although the Legislature has declared that the matter is one of 

statewide concern [citation], the declaration is not controlling . . . .” (Id. at 

pp. 790-791.)

As discussed above, Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, involved the 

autonomy rights of charter cities and counties, and S.F. Labor Council, supra, 26 

Cal.3d 785, applied Sonoma County‟s holding to a case involving a state 

prevailing wage law analogous to the one at issue here. Read together, Sonoma 

County and S.F. Labor Council indicate our continued adherence to the holding in 

Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384, that charter cities are not subject to the state‟s

prevailing wage law.
18

More recently, in County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th 278, we reaffirmed 

that compensation of public employees is not a statewide concern justifying state 

law interference in the autonomy of independent governmental entities. We there 

concluded that state law could not force a county into binding arbitration over the 

compensation paid to county employees. Our decision applied two state 

constitutional provisions: one giving all counties authority to “provide for the . . . 

compensation . . . of [their] employees” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b)), the 

other prohibiting the Legislature from “delegat[ing] to a private person or body 

power to . . . interfere with county or municipal corporation . . . money” (id., § 11, 

subd. (a)). In the course of our analysis, we considered whether the state law at 

issue might be enforceable because it governed a matter of statewide concern. 

(County of Riverside, at pp. 286, 291.) We rejected the Legislature‟s assertion that 

the matter involved a statewide concern. (Id. at pp. 286-287.) Instead, we 

concluded that the state law in question impinged too much on local rights,

“depriving the county entirely of its authority to set employee salaries.” (Id. at 

p. 288; see also id. at p. 293.) We also drew an important distinction between state 

procedural laws governing the affairs of local governmental entities (which by 

their nature impinge less on local affairs) and state laws dictating the substance of 

a public employee labor issue (which impinge much more on local affairs). (Id. at 

p. 289.)

Although the three cases just cited — Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d 

296, S.F. Labor Council, supra, 26 Cal.3d 785, and County of Riverside, supra, 30 

Cal.4th 278 — deal with the wages of public employees rather than, as here, the 

wages of private employees constructing local public works projects, the 

distinction is irrelevant. The Union‟s arguments here do not depend on whether 

the workers constructing the public work are public or private employees. If, as 

the Union contends, the prevailing wage law‟s shift from a purely local focus to a 
19

regional focus has made the wage levels of workers constructing locally funded 

public works a matter of statewide concern, then that would be true whether the 

case involved public employees or private employees. Similarly, if, as the Union 

asserts, the state‟s economic integration during the 80 years since our 1932 

decision in Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384, has made the wages of workers 

constructing local public works a matter of statewide concern, then that would be 

true for both public employees and private employees.

Significantly, this case is not like others in which we found a statewide 

concern to justify the application of a state law to charter cities. For example, our 

cases have suggested that a state law of broad general application is more likely to 

address a statewide concern than one that is narrow and particularized in its 

application. (S.F. Labor Council, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 789-790; Charleville, 

supra, 215 Cal. at p. 390.) We applied this principle in People ex rel. Seal Beach 

Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 600, and 

Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 294-

295. In the latter two cases, we also noted that the state laws at issue set forth 

generally applicable procedural standards, and consequently impinged less on

local autonomy than if they had imposed substantive obligations. In Seal Beach, 

for example, we said: “[T]here is a clear distinction between the substance of a 

public employee labor issue and the procedure by which it is resolved. Thus there 

is no question that „salaries of local employees of a charter city constitute 

municipal affairs and are not subject to general laws.‟ ([Sonoma County], supra, 

23 Cal.3d at p. 317.) Nevertheless, the process by which salaries are fixed is 

obviously a matter of statewide concern and none could, at this late stage, argue 

that a charter city need not meet and confer concerning its salary structure.” (Seal 

Beach, at pp. 600-601, fn. 11; see also County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 

p. 289.)
20

Here, the state law at issue is not a minimum wage law of broad general 

application; rather, the law at issue here has a far narrower application, as it 

pertains only to the public works projects of public agencies. In addition, it 

imposes substantive obligations on charter cities, not merely generally applicable 

procedural standards. These distinctions further undermine the Union‟s assertion 

that the matter here presents a statewide concern and therefore requires Vista, a 

charter city, to comply with the state‟s prevailing wage law on the city‟s locally 

funded public works projects.

We are aware that the Legislature has recently stated that the wage levels of 

contract workers constructing locally funded public works are a matter of 

statewide concern. The Legislature‟s view is expressed in two amendments to the 

prevailing wage law, one in 2002 and the other in 2003, each addressing a

relatively narrow category of public works. Uncodified sections of both 

amendments state: “It is a matter of statewide concern that every public agency in 

California pay the prevailing rate of per diem wages to workers employed on 

public works projects undertaken by those public agencies.” (Stats. 2003, ch. 851, 

§ 1, p. 6247, italics added; Stats. 2002, ch. 892, § 1, p. 5541, italics added; see also 

Stats. 2002, ch. 868, § 1, p. 5455.) Likewise, a 2003 concurrent resolution of the 

Legislature stated in relevant part: “[T]he Legislature reaffirms its intent for the 

state prevailing wage law to apply broadly to all projects subsidized with public 

funds, including the projects of chartered cities, as the law addresses important 

statewide concerns . . . .” (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 49, Stats. 2003 (2003-2004 Reg. 

Sess.) res. ch. 135, p. 6834.)

But as we noted earlier (see pt. II.C., ante), the Legislature‟s view as to 

what constitutes a statewide concern is not determinative in resolving the 

constitutional question before us. This court considered similar legislative 

findings in regard to the statute requiring the Regents of the University of 
21

California to pay prevailing wages, and the court concluded that those findings 

were not controlling. (S.F. Labor Council, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791; see 

also County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287.) Although we give 

such statements by the Legislature great weight (Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 

Cal.3d at p. 136), the resolution of constitutional challenges to state laws falls 

within the judicial power, not the legislative power. (County of Riverside, at 

pp. 286-287; Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 316; Bishop, supra, 1 Cal.3d 

at p. 63.) “ „It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, 

to say what the law is.‟ ” (McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 467, 469, quoting Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 177; see also 

Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1068.) 

Moreover, we are “especially” hesitant to abdicate to the Legislature‟s view of the 

issue “when [as here] the issue involves the division of power between local 

government and that same Legislature.” (County of Riverside, at p. 286.)

In this case, we conclude that no statewide concern has been presented

justifying the state‟s regulation of the wages that charter cities require their 

contractors to pay to workers hired to construct locally funded public works. In 

light of our conclusion that there is no statewide concern here, we need not 

determine whether the state‟s prevailing wage law is “reasonably related to . . . 

resolution” of that concern (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 17) 

and is “narrowly tailored” to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance 

(id. at p. 24). The trial court here was correct to deny plaintiff Union‟s petition for 

a writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal properly affirmed the trial court‟s 

judgment.
22

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which in turn affirmed the 

trial court‟s judgment denying the Union‟s petition for a writ of mandate.

KENNARD, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

BAXTER, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.
1

DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.

This case requires that we resolve a dispute between the Legislature and a 

charter city, two entities granted specific lawmaking authority by our state 

Constitution. On the one hand, “[t]he legislative power of this State is vested in 

the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly . . . .” (Cal.

Const., art. IV, § 1.) The state Legislature wields “the entire law-making authority 

of the state, except the people‟s right of initiative and referendum” and “may 

exercise any and all legislative powers which are not expressly or by necessary 

implication denied to it by the Constitution.” (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. 

Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691.) On the other hand, under what is alternately 

called the “municipal home rule” or “municipal affairs” doctrine, charter cities are 

empowered to “make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to 

municipal affairs,” and such ordinances “shall supersede all laws inconsistent 

therewith.” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (a).)

In this case, the Legislature exercised its lawmaking powers to enact 

sections 1720 to 1861 of the Labor Code, commonly referred to as the prevailing 

wage law, which generally requires payment of the prevailing wage to workers on 

publicly funded construction projects. By contrast, defendant City of Vista 

(Vista), a charter city, exercised its lawmaking powers to enact an ordinance that 

(in most instances) prohibits city contracts from requiring the payment of the 
2

prevailing wage. In this area of overlapping lawmaking authority, a constitutional 

tension exists.

This court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the California Constitution. 

Unlike when we interpret state statutory law or federal constitutional law, where 

our decisions can be overturned by, respectively, the Legislature or the United 

States Supreme Court, we are the last word on the meaning of the state 

Constitution. If we err, our decision can be corrected only by an amendment to 

that Constitution. Accordingly, when approaching a dispute between the 

Legislature and a charter city under the municipal affairs doctrine, we are charged 

with a solemn and delicate obligation to fairly balance conflicting interests and 

reasonably resolve the tension inherent in such disputes.

The majority‟s approach to this case is neither fair nor reasonable. Instead, 

the majority goes astray by making a series of analytical missteps. First, in 

concluding Vista‟s ordinance comes within the protected zone of municipal 

affairs, the majority places unjustified weight on Vista‟s fiscal interest in saving 

money on the construction of public buildings, and relies on an outmoded 

Depression Era decision that interpreted a different law (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-

12) long ago eclipsed by more modern economic ideas.

Second, by failing to appreciate the full impact of the prevailing wage law, 

the majority significantly undervalues the statewide economic concerns the law 

addresses, and fails to accord appropriate weight to the Legislature‟s express 

findings and declarations that the prevailing wage law should apply to charter 

cities and that it addresses a matter of statewide concern. Finally, the majority 

fails to recognize the difference—critical in the context of municipal governance 

and independence—between state regulations affecting public employees and 

those affecting private employees who contract with the city.

For these reasons, I dissent.
3

I. DISCUSSION

As the majority recognizes, we resolve disputes over the scope of the 

municipal affairs doctrine by applying the test set forth in California Fed. Savings 

& Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1 (California Fed. Savings). 

Preliminarily, we ask whether a charter city‟s exercise of legislative power falls 

within the zone of its municipal affairs and, if so, whether compliance with the 

local ordinance conflicts with state law. If a court determines that a local law 

addresses a matter within the municipal affairs of the charter city and that it 

conflicts with a state law, the court must then decide whether the state law 

addresses a matter of “statewide concern”—what the California Fed. Savings

court termed “the bedrock inquiry through which the conflict between state and 

local interests is adjusted.” (Id. at p. 17.) “If the subject of the statute fails to 

qualify as one of statewide concern, then the conflicting charter city measure is a 

„municipal affair‟ and „beyond the reach of legislative enactment.‟ ” (Ibid.) But if 

“the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one of statewide 

concern and that the statute is reasonably related to its resolution, then the 

conflicting charter city measure ceases to be a „municipal affair‟ pro tanto and the 

Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5(a), from addressing the 

statewide dimension by its own tailored enactments.” (Ibid.)

Requiring a showing of “statewide concern” as a condition of “state 

legislative supremacy” requires the state to articulate a dimension to the state law 

that “demonstrably transcend[s] identifiable municipal interests.” (California Fed. 

Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 17.) This in turn tends to ensure that “areas which 

are of intramural concern only” will not be invaded by the state, thereby 

“preserving core values of charter city government.” (Ibid.) 

As the majority acknowledges, the issue we decide today is a legal, not a 

factual, one (maj. opn., ante, at p. 10), and in resolving it we must undertake an 
4

evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each individual case, exercising 

independent review. (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 24, fn. 21.)

“[T]he Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal 

affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern.” (Bishop v. 

City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 63.) “[W]hat constitutes a matter of 

statewide concern is ultimately an issue for the courts to decide . . . .” (Baggett v. 

Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136.) So too, a city‟s claim that some matter falls 

within the protected zone of the municipal affairs doctrine will be decided not by 

the city, but by the courts.

A. Does Vista’s Ordinance Come Within the Protected Zone of 

Municipal Affairs?

The majority asserts that “[t]he wage levels of contract workers 

constructing locally funded public works are certainly a „municipal affair.‟ ” 

(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) No citation to authority is required to conclude that the 

provision and financing of a proper city infrastructure, whether it be housing, 

hospitals, libraries or other civic buildings, is the business of a city, chartered or 

otherwise. Vista has imposed a citywide sales tax increase to pay for the cost of 

the design, construction and renovation of some of its civic buildings. That these 

costs are to be borne by Vista alone, and not shared by the state, is a significant 

factor in favor of finding the public works at issue fall within the municipal affairs 

doctrine. (See Southern California Roads Co. v. McGuire (1934) 2 Cal.2d 115, 

121-122 [because “the entire cost” of an improvement to Sepulveda Blvd. in Los 

Angeles “is to be met and defrayed by the state,” the road project is not strictly a 

municipal affair of the city].)

The question, however, is not whether the design and physical construction 

of Vista‟s civic buildings constitutes a municipal affair, as it does, but whether 

Vista‟s choice not to require the private construction firms with which it has 
5

contracted (or will contract) to pay the state prevailing wage to its construction 

worker employees is also a matter within the city‟s municipal affairs. Vista 

contends a charter city‟s internal fiscal affairs, including labor and employment 

issues, necessarily fall within the municipal home rule doctrine. Of relevance is 

section 5, subdivision (b) of article XI of the California Constitution, which 

provides a nonexclusive list of the types of matters falling within the municipal 

home rule doctrine. That section provides: “It shall be competent in all city 

charters to provide, in addition to those provisions allowable by this Constitution, 

and by the laws of the State for: (1) the constitution, regulation, and government 

of the city police force (2) subgovernment in all or part of a city (3) conduct of 

city elections and (4) plenary authority is hereby granted, subject only to the 

restrictions of this article, to provide therein or by amendment thereto, the manner 

in which, the method by which, the times at which, and the terms for which the 

several municipal officers and employees whose compensation is paid by the city 

shall be elected or appointed, and for their removal, and for their compensation, 

and for the number of deputies, clerks and other employees that each shall have, 

and for the compensation, method of appointment, qualifications, tenure of office 

and removal of such deputies, clerks and other employees.”

In light of this constitutional provision, the salary level of the mayor and 

city council members clearly falls within a city‟s municipal affairs, as does the 

compensation level of the “city police force” as well as those city employees 

involved in the “subgovernment in all or part of a city” such as “deputies, clerks 

and other employees.” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b), italics added; see 

Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56 [the Legislature did not intend the 

prevailing wage law to apply to electricians employed as city workers]; Sonoma 

County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 
6

296, 314-318 [a state law precluding a salary increase for city and county 

employees violated the home rule provisions of the state Const.].) 

But the more removed workers are from the heart of city government, the 

less the city‟s legitimate interest in controlling their compensation. This case, for 

example, involves no Vista employee. Vista has contracted (or intends to 

contract) with private design and construction firms, which in turn have hired (or 

will hire) private construction workers, who will be paid not by Vista but by the 

construction firms. If a firm underbids the project, it is the firm, not the city, that 

must still pay the workers. Accordingly, these contract workers cannot fairly be 

characterized as city employees who are necessary to maintain the 

“subgovernment in all or part of a city” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b), item 

(2)), nor considered “deputies, clerks and other employees” of the city (id., item 

(4)). 

To reach its conclusion that Vista‟s zone of protected municipal affairs 

nevertheless includes the wages of private construction workers, the majority 

relies uncritically on City of Pasadena v. Charleville (1932) 215 Cal. 384 

(Charleville). Charleville involved the Public Wage Rate Act of 1931 (PWRA of 

1931), a law of significantly less scope and statewide impact than the modern 

prevailing wage law at issue in this case. More importantly, Charleville‟s 

reasoning has been overtaken by history. In Charleville the court explained that 

the PWRA of 1931 was a law of limited scope because it did not “purport to fix or 

provide for the fixation of the wage to be paid under all employment contracts, 

public and private” (Charleville, at p. 390, italics added) and suggested that an act 

purporting to impose a broader, statewide regulation on wages would have 

encountered “difficulties of constitutional questions” (ibid., citing Adkins v. 

Children’s Hospital (1923) 261 U.S. 525 [which invalidated a D.C. law imposing 

a minimum wage for women and minors]). Adkins was a notable exemplar of the 
7

late Lochner1 period in which the high court extolled the virtues of the freedom to 

contract over nearly all other freedoms. As is well known, the principles 

animating that bygone era of constitutional jurisprudence were thereafter 

repudiated by the United States Supreme Court, and Adkins itself was specifically 

overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U.S. 379, 400. (See 

generally Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 155-156.)

Contrary to Charleville‟s premise that the United States Constitution 

prohibited state legislatures from imposing a minimum wage law, that the 

California Legislature may provide for minimum wages for workers is now firmly 

established. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 1 [“The Legislature may provide for 

minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees . . . .”].) Accordingly, 

whether a state may enforce laws such as the prevailing wage law to address 

matters of statewide concern has been untethered from the artificially created 

constitutional constraints of the Lochner era.

In light of this erosion of the legal assumptions underlying Charleville, 

supra, 215 Cal. 384, and because the PWRA of 1931 was markedly less extensive 

than the modern prevailing wage law, Charleville cannot be considered persuasive 

today. Moreover, given the obvious changes to our state‟s economy since 1932 

when Charleville was decided, i.e., its growth and interdependence, the case was 

long ago eclipsed by more modern economic ideas. Common sense dictates that 

we abandon Charleville as precedent and consign it to the dustbin of history. (See 

Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S. F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771 [“What 

may at one time have been a matter of local concern may at a later time become a 

matter of state concern controlled by the general laws of the state.”].) 

 

1 See Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45. 
8

Because Vista‟s interest in controlling the wages of private contract 

workers is much less than its interest in dictating wage levels of its own 

employees, and absent the legitimizing effect of Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384,

as precedent, the sole remaining consideration supporting Vista‟s assertion of its 

municipal autonomy is its desire to save money on its planned public works 

projects. Every government, state or local, naturally has an interest in conserving 

public funds. But this general desire is insufficient of itself to invoke the 

municipal affairs doctrine. Were it otherwise, no state law could ever prevail over 

local desires, for all conflicting state laws have the potential to increase a city‟s 

costs, whether it be to allow a city‟s firefighters to unionize (Professional Fire 

Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276), require cities to meet 

and confer in good faith with employee representatives regarding wages and hours 

(People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 

Cal.3d 591), or give peace officers an administrative appeal before demoting them 

(Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128). Vista must point to more than a ledger 

sheet to justify its contention that its ordinance falls within the municipal affairs 

doctrine.

B. Does the Prevailing Wage Law Address a Matter of Statewide 

Concern?

The relative strength of Vista‟s interest in preserving its public fisc aside, 

the crux of this case is the majority‟s conclusion that the prevailing wage law fails 

to address a matter of statewide concern. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.) In reaching 

that conclusion, the majority disregards the prevailing wage law‟s far-reaching 

economic impact on our state economy. The Legislature has recognized the scope 

of the prevailing wage law‟s statewide effect, having explicitly declared its intent 

in 2002 that “[p]ayment of the prevailing rate of per diem wages to workers 

employed on public works projects is necessary to attract the most skilled workers 
9

for those projects and to ensure that work of the highest quality is performed on 

those projects” (Stats. 2002, ch. 892, § 1, subd. (a)(1), p. 5541), that “[p]ublic 

works projects should never undermine the wage base in a community, and 

requiring that workers on public works projects are paid the prevailing rate of per 

diem wages ensures that wage base is not lowered” (id., subd. (a)(2)), and that it is 

a matter of “statewide concern” that public works undertaken by public agencies 

pay workers the prevailing wage (id., subd. (a)(3)). A year later, in a 2003 

concurrent resolution, the Legislature addressed the prevailing wage law 

specifically with regard to charter cities, declaring that “the state prevailing wage 

law [should] apply broadly to all projects subsidized with public funds, including 

the projects of chartered cities, as the law addresses important statewide concerns

. . . .” (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 49, Stats. 2003 (2003-2004 Res. Sess.) res. ch. 135, 

p. 6834, italics added.) 

These legislative statements are entitled to great weight (California Fed. 

Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 24, fn. 21 [give “ „great weight‟ ” to “legislative 

statements of purpose”]; Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 63

[same]), a rule the majority acknowledges (maj. opn., ante, at p. 21) but fails to 

honor. 

Even aside from the Legislature‟s considered views, that the prevailing 

wage law addresses substantial statewide concerns that would be undermined were 

charter cities allowed to opt out of the law is not a close question. As a general 

matter, we have held that the promotion of uniform fair labor standards is an 

important statewide concern sufficient to override local prerogatives. For 

example, we held in People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal 

Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d 591, that the meet-and-confer provision of the MeyersMilias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, § 3505) was enforceable against the City 

of Seal Beach, a charter city, despite its city charter amendment providing, among 
10

other things, for the immediate termination of any city employee who participated 

in a labor strike. We noted that one of the purposes of the MMBA was “to 

improve personnel management and employer-employee relations within the 

various public agencies” (Seal Beach, at p. 597), and that “[t]he meet-and-confer 

requirement is an essential component of the state‟s legislative scheme for 

regulating the city‟s employment practices” (id. at p. 599). As such, that state 

interest outweighed the city‟s admitted power—authorized by the state 

Constitution under article XI, section 3, subdivision (b)—to amend its city charter.

Similarly, in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 

60 Cal.2d 276, the City of Los Angeles, a charter city, argued that application of 

Labor Code section 1960,2 which guarantees firefighters the right to join a union, 

addressed a matter of “purely local concern,” and that prior case law had held 

“that all matters connected with public employment in a chartered city are 

municipal affairs [citations].” (Professional Fire Fighters, at p. 291.) This court 

rejected the argument, explaining that an examination of the Legislature‟s intent 

when enacting section 1960 and several related statutes revealed “the Legislature 

was attempting to deal with labor relations on a statewide basis.” (Professional 

Fire Fighters, at p. 294.) By enacting those state laws, the Legislature “adopted 

general policies and provided general rights and obligations of labor and 

management throughout the state.” (Ibid., italics added.) “The total effect of all 

this legislation was not to deprive local government (chartered city or otherwise) 

of the right to manage and control its fire departments but to create uniform fair 

 

2 “Neither the State nor any county, political subdivision, incorporated city, 

town, nor any other municipal corporation shall prohibit, deny or obstruct the right 

of firefighters to join any bona fide labor organization of their own choice.” (Lab. 

Code, § 1960.) 
11

labor practices throughout the state. As such, the legislation may impinge upon 

local control to a limited extent, but it is nonetheless a matter of state concern.”

(Id. at pp. 294-295, italics added, quoted with approval in Baggett v. Gates, supra, 

32 Cal.3d at p. 139.) “Labor relations are of the same statewide concern as 

workmen‟s compensation, liability of municipalities for tort, [and] perfecting and 

filing of claims . . . , all of which have been held to be governed by general law in 

contravention of local regulation by chartered cities.” (Professional Fire Fighters, 

at p. 295.)

The prevailing wage law is to the same effect. Article XIV of the 

California Constitution is entitled “Labor Relations.” Section 1 of that article 

provides that “[t]he Legislature may provide for minimum wages and for the 

general welfare of employees . . . .” The Legislature is thus granted specific 

constitutional authority to address labor issues on a statewide scale. It exercised 

that power by enacting the Labor Code, providing expressly that “[i]t is the policy 

of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure 

employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful 

conditions or for employers that have not secured the payment of compensation, 

and to protect employers who comply with the law from those who attempt to gain 

a competitive advantage at the expense of their workers by failing to comply with 

minimum labor standards.” (Lab. Code, § 90.5, subd. (a).)

By first enacting the PWRA in 1931, and then replacing it a few years later 

with the much expanded prevailing wage law, the Legislature created an economic 

framework, applicable throughout the state, protecting Californians who work in 

the construction trades and, by extension, the viability of the construction industry 

as a whole. “The overall purpose of the prevailing wage law is to protect and 

benefit employees on public works projects.” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry

(1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985.) “This general objective subsumes within it a number 
12

of specific goals: to protect employees from substandard wages that might be paid 

if contractors could recruit labor from distant cheap-labor areas; to permit union 

contractors to compete with nonunion contractors; to benefit the public through 

the superior efficiency of well-paid employees; and to compensate nonpublic 

employees with higher wages for the absence of job security and employment 

benefits enjoyed by public employees.” (Id. at p. 987, quoted with approval in 

City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 

949.) 

The evolution of the modern prevailing wage law strongly supports the 

Legislature‟s considered view that the wages paid on publicly funded construction 

projects impacts more than local concerns. As the majority recognizes (maj. opn., 

ante, at pp. 14-15), wage schedules are now established at the state rather than the 

local level, and the state Director of the Department of Industrial Relations 

considers wage levels throughout regional economies instead of focusing on a 

particular locality. This “trend toward economic regionalization” (maj. opn., ante, 

at p. 14) makes sense in the modern, post-1932 world (see dis. opn., ante, at pp. 6-

7) where, as an expert for plaintiff State Building and Construction Trades Council 

of California, AFL-CIO (SBCTC) testified below, construction workers travel 

many miles from their homes to jobsites in the region. To allow Oakland to pay 

construction workers significantly less than Berkeley, or Anaheim less than Santa 

Ana, would logically create downward pressure on wages3throughout the 

 

3 The prevailing wage law affects more than just wages. As SBCTC‟s expert 

stated below: “Throughout the State, local craft unions and district labor councils 

have negotiated master labor agreements with contractors‟ associations that 

establish wages, fringe benefits and other terms of employment. These collective 

bargaining agreements provide for uniform hourly wages, regardless of the 

contractor that is employing the worker, and require contractors to contribute to 

(footnote continued on next page)
13

respective regions, leading to an economic race to the bottom, as contractors—

union and nonunion—scramble to underbid competitors for construction contracts. 

When wages are sufficiently depressed, workers leave the construction trades, 

requiring California, when the state‟s economy is flush and construction projects 

could flourish, to import skilled construction workers from outside the state. That 

situation negatively affects not just a city‟s local economy, but California‟s state 

economy as a whole.

The prevailing wage law supports the statewide economy in a second way, 

mentioned but discounted by the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15), requiring 

contractors on public works projects to participate in a statewide apprenticeship 

program. This program allows apprentices in the construction trades to learn on 

the job, ensuring the state will be supplied with a steady stream of skilled and 

semi-skilled workers in the construction industry. “Between April and June 1994, 

California had 175 joint apprenticeship programs . . . .” (California Div. of Labor 

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc. (1997) 519 U.S. 316, 

327, fn. 5.) According to SBCTC‟s expert, “[m]ore than 50,000 men and women 

are currently indentured in State-approved apprenticeship programs in the 

construction trades in California.” The Legislature has declared that 

 

(footnote continued from previous page)

the same multi-employer benefits plans, so workers will enjoy health care and 

pension benefits notwithstanding the lack of continuous employment with a single 

contractor. This labor relations structure enables signatory contractors to respond 

to fluctuating demands for labor and enables construction workers to maintain 

steady employment and to receive health and pension benefits that protect them 

and their families.” (See Lab. Code, § 1773.1, subd. (a) [per diem wages under 

the prevailing wage law “shall be deemed to include employer payments for”

health and welfare, pension, and vacation benefits]; see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. 

Laborers Vacation Trust (1983) 463 U.S. 1, 4, fn. 2 [describing a construction 

workers‟ regional trust fund to permit workers a paid vacation].)
14

“apprenticeship programs are a vital part of the educational system in California” 

(Stats. 1999, ch. 903, § 1, pp. 6605-6606) and that “[t]he state‟s system for 

promoting quality apprenticeship training in the construction trades depends upon 

the incentives provided by the prevailing wage law” (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 49, 

Stats. 2003 (2003-2004 Res. Sess.) res. ch. 135, p. 6834).

Allowing charter cities to opt out of the prevailing wage law undermines 

this program by affording them the benefit of it (by using workers trained in state 

apprenticeship programs) without their paying for the privilege. In his declaration 

below, SBCTC‟s expert explained: “Because of the unstable nature of 

construction-industry employment, a particular contractor might not be willing to 

invest the resources in training an apprentice for a multi-year period and might not 

be able to expose individual apprentices to all the different work processes 

necessary to become a journey-level worker in the craft. The current system of 

multi-employer apprenticeship programs allows the industry to share the costs, 

burdens and rewards of training new workers. The success of apprenticeship 

programs is vital to training the next generation of skilled construction workers in 

California.”

“The prevailing wage law bolsters the State‟s apprenticeship training 

system by requiring contractors on public work who employ workers in 

apprenticeable crafts to use apprentices from state-approved programs to meet a 

specified minimum ratio of apprentice hours to journeyperson hours. The 

contractors are permitted to pay these apprentices at a lower wage rate. In this 

way, the prevailing wage law provides employment for apprentices so they can 

obtain the necessary on-the-job training in a variety of work processes to graduate 

from the programs.” “Absent the prevailing wage law, contractors that invest in 

apprenticeship training would find themselves at a competitive disadvantage to 

contractors that do not invest in apprenticeship training. Non-participating 
15

contractors could seek to hire apprenticeship-program graduates without having 

contributed to the cost of their training.” 

Against the considerable weight of the evidence that the prevailing wage 

law addresses an issue of statewide concern, the majority‟s answer is not to engage 

the issue, but to reframe the question. The majority thus asserts that the question 

is not whether regional labor standards and apprenticeship programs address an 

issue of statewide concern, but whether “the state can require a charter city to 

exercise its purchasing power in the construction market in a way that supports 

regional wages and subsidizes vocational training, while increasing the charter 

city‟s costs.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) What this reframing ignores is that the 

entire premise of the dispute before us, and the one that has continued to vex

courts over the years, is that the state can sometimes override a city‟s local 

choices—even financial ones—so long as it has sufficient reason (i.e., with a state 

law addressed to strong statewide concerns). 

Moreover, in focusing narrowly on Vista‟s costs, the majority fails to 

adhere to the California Fed. Savings test that requires us to use a wide-angle lens, 

cautioning that “courts should avoid the error of „compartmentalization,‟ that is, of 

cordoning off an entire area of governmental activity as either a „municipal affair‟

or one of statewide concern.” (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 17.) 

Thus, while the effect of the prevailing wage law, as the majority laments, may be 

that Vista and other charter cities pay more for their public works projects, the 

purpose of the prevailing wage law, which the majority ignores, is not to make 

them pay more but to stabilize and support the construction trades. The latter is 

unquestionably a matter of substantial statewide concern.

Finally, in reframing the question, the majority gives the prevailing wage 

law a cramped and limited construction, failing to appreciate the sweeping nature 

of the legislation and viewing it instead as an unwarranted control on local 
16

spending priorities. But courts must give the prevailing wage law a liberal 

construction so that the general purpose and goals of the law are not defeated. 

(City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 

p. 950; McIntosh v. Aubry (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1589 [“Courts will 

liberally construe prevailing wage statutes . . .”]; State Building & Construction 

Trades Council of California v. Duncan (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 289, 324 [same].) 

Having reframed the issue to be decided, the majority asserts the case is

controlled by Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of 

Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of 

University of California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785, and County of Riverside v. 

Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16-18.) But one 

key factor distinguishes those cases: all involved the wages of (or labor disputes 

involving) a public entity‟s actual employees. While the municipal home rule 

doctrine is concerned with state intrusion into the affairs of cities, and the state 

Constitution specifically mentions certain city employees (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, 

subd. (b)), neither the home rule doctrine nor the three cases cited have much to 

say about those not employed by the city. 

Unlike the public employees involved in Sonoma County, San Francisco 

Labor Council, and County of Riverside, the workers affected by the instant case 

are not, and cannot be considered, Vista‟s employees. They are workers in the 

construction trades—electricians, plumbers, roofers, landscapers, carpenters—who 

presumably have traveled from many areas in the region, and who have been, or 

will be, hired by the construction firms the city has engaged or will engage. None 

of the trio of cases cited by the majority undermines the conclusion that the 

prevailing wage law addresses a matter of substantial statewide concern for those 

not employed by charter cities, counties or the state‟s public universities. 
17

The majority inexplicably finds this key factor “irrelevant.” (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 18.) But a charter city‟s power to control the compensation of its 

employees, especially those integral to municipal governance, is expressly 

recognized by the state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b).) The 

compensation of private contract workers is not.

II. CONCLUSION

The California Legislature long ago decided that stabilizing the 

construction trades and ensuring a steady supply of skilled and semi-skilled 

workers in those trades was beneficial to our state‟s long-term economic health. 

Accordingly, the Legislature, like many other states,4the federal government,5 and 

even some cities,6 enacted a prevailing wage law, requiring public entities to pay 

 

4 Thirty-one states have enacted a prevailing wage law. (Alaska Stat. 

§§ 36.05.010 to 36.05.900; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 22-9-301 to 22-9-315; Conn. Gen. 

Stat. §§ 31-53 to 31-55a; Del. Code Ann., tit. 29, § 6960; Hawaii Rev. Stat. 

§§ 104-1 to 104-4; 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/1 to 130/12; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 5-16-

7-1 to 5-16-7-5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 68-2317 [for highway contracts]; Ky. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 337.505 to 337.550; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 26, §§ 1303 to 1314; Md. 

Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. Code, §§ 17-201 to 17-226; Mass. Gen. Laws 

ch. 149, §§ 26 to 27H; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 408.551 to 408.558; Minn. Stat. 

§§ 177.41 to 177.44; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 290.210 to 290.340; Mont. Code Ann. 

§§ 18-2-401 to 18-2-432; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 338.020 to 338.095; N.J. Stat. Ann. 

§§ 34:11-56.25 to 34:11-56.47; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4-10.1 to 13-4-17; N.Y. 

Labor Law § 220(3)(a); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4115.03 to 4115.16; Or. Rev. 

Stat. §§ 279C.800 to 279C.870; 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 165-1 to 165-17; R.I. Gen. 

Laws §§ 37-13-1 to 37-13-17; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 12-4-401 to 12-4-415; Tex. 

Gov. Code Ann. §§ 2258.001 to 2258.058; Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 29, § 161 [for state 

construction projects]; Wn. Rev. Code. §§ 39.12.010 to 39.12.900; W.Va. Code 

§§ 21-5A-1 to 21-5A-11; Wis. Stat. § 66.0903; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-4-401 to 

27-4-413; see also Guam Code Ann., tit. 5, ch. 50, § 50105.)

5 See the Davis-Bacon Act (46 Stat. 1494, codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-

3148); U. S. v. Binghamton Construction Co. (1954) 347 U.S. 171, 176-177.

6 See Los Angeles Administrative Code, division 10, chapter 1, article 1, 

section 10.7.1 (requiring payment of the prevailing wage in all city contracts); id., 

(footnote continued on next page)
18

the prevailing wage in the region to construction workers who toil on publicly 

funded construction projects. Allowing charter cities7to opt out of the constraints 

of that state law—not for any reason touching on municipal governance or 

independence, but simply to save the city money—seriously undermines the goals 

of the prevailing wage law and is contrary to the explicit intent of the Legislature.8 

Even were the issue close, which it is not, applicable precedent requires this court 

 

(footnote continued from previous page)

section 10.7 (specifically waiving the city‟s rights under the municipal affairs 

doctrine); see also San Francisco Administrative Code, chapter 6, article II, section 

6.22(E) (“All contractors and subcontractors performing a public work or 

improvement for the City and County of San Francisco shall pay its workers on

such projects the prevailing rate of wages . . .”).

7 There are 120 charter cities in the state of California. SBCTC states in its 

brief that more than half the state‟s population live in charter cities. 

8 The Legislature recently acted to specify that if a charter city‟s ordinance 

prohibits consideration of a project labor agreement (defined by Pub. Contract 

Code, § 2500, subd. (b)(1) as a “prehire collective bargaining agreement that 

establishes terms and conditions of employment,” including wages) for a public 

works project, “state funding or financial assistance shall not be used to support 

that project” (Pub. Contract Code, § 2502). (Both provisions added by Stats. 

2011, ch. 431, § 2, enacting Sen. Bill No. 922 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.).) The 

history of this legislation notes that the law was deemed necessary because 

“[s]everal counties (Stanislaus, Orange, and San Diego) and Charter Cities (Chula 

Vista and Oceanside) have banned [project labor agreements].” (Assem. Com. on 

Business, Professions and Consumer Protection, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 922 (2011-

2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 2, 2011, p. 3.)

Just this year, the Legislature returned to the subject and highlighted its 

commitment to give localities the option of using project labor agreements. 

Section 2503, added to the Public Contract Code, provides that if a charter city‟s 

ordinance “prohibits, limits, or constrains in any way the governing board‟s 

authority or discretion to adopt, require, or utilize a project labor agreement, . . . 

then state funding or financial assistance shall not be used to support any 

construction projects awarded by the city.” (Stats. 2012, ch. 11, § 1.) Both new 

laws are not effective until January 15, 2015, to allow cities to repeal ordinances 

that establish blanket bans on project labor agreements.
19

to err on the side of upholding state power. “There must always be doubt whether 

a matter which is of concern to both municipalities and the state is of sufficient 

statewide concern to justify a new legislative intrusion into an area traditionally 

regarded as „strictly a municipal affair.‟ Such doubt, however, „must be resolved 

in favor of the legislative authority of the state.‟ ” (Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 

Cal.3d at p. 140, quoted with approval in California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 

Cal.3d at p. 24.)

Because the majority mistakenly characterizes Vista‟s interest in saving 

money on its construction projects as falling within the municipal affairs doctrine, 

and concomitantly fails to accord sufficient weight to the obvious statewide 

economic interests served by the prevailing wage law, I dissent.

WERDEGAR, J.

I CONCUR:

LIU, J.
1

DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J.

I join Justice Werdegar‟s dissent. I write separately to highlight additional 

shortcomings in the court‟s analysis that prevent it from properly resolving this case.

The court holds that article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, the municipal 

home rule provision, bars the Legislature from requiring charter cities to pay prevailing 

wages to construction workers on public works projects. While generally stating the 

applicable law correctly, the court fails to bridge the wide analytical gap between that law 

and the result it reaches. The court employs a vague analysis that puts great weight on a few 

factors while refusing to consider other factors that the opinion itself concedes are pertinent 

to determining whether the prevailing wage law should apply to charter cities. As a result, 

no clear legal principle emerges from the court‟s opinion, even as it repeatedly insists that 

the issue before us is a question of law.

Today‟s decision is a misstep as a matter of method as well as result. Unlike cases 

where a state law limits a municipal prerogative specifically protected by constitutional text, 

the instant dispute is one “with no unmistakable signs to guide us between the domain of 

state and local powers.” (Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 640.) Accordingly, our 

instinct toward judicial restraint should be at its peak. The court, however, casts restraint 

aside and arbitrarily curtails the Legislature‟s power. Because the court moves incautiously 

in an area where “it becomes us to exercise more than the usual caution” (ibid.), I 

respectfully dissent.

I.

Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution provides: “It shall 

be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed thereunder may make and 
2

enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to 

restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters 

they shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution 

shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all 

laws inconsistent therewith.” Subdivision (b) further provides: “It shall be competent in all 

city charters to provide, in addition to those provisions allowable by this Constitution, and by 

the laws of the State for: (1) the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police 

force[,] (2) subgovernment in all or part of a city[,] (3) conduct of city elections[,] and 

(4) plenary authority is hereby granted, subject only to the restrictions of this article, to 

provide therein or by amendment thereto, the manner in which, the method by which, the 

times at which, and the terms for which the several municipal officers and employees whose 

compensation is paid by the city shall be elected or appointed, and for their removal, and for 

their compensation, and for the number of deputies, clerks and other employees that each 

shall have, and for the compensation, method of appointment, qualifications, tenure of office 

and removal of such deputies, clerks and other employees.” (Italics added.)

As the court correctly states, under this article “the ordinances of charter cities 

supersede state law with respect to „municipal affairs‟ . . . but state law is supreme with 

respect to matters of „statewide concern.‟ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.) Determining what 

constitutes a “municipal affair” or a “matter of statewide concern” in the course of resolving 

conflicts between state mandates and municipal prerogatives has not been an easy task. 

Nevertheless, several important principles have emerged from our cases.

First, when we have considered California Constitution article XI, section 5 and 

similar constitutional home rule provisions for counties and for the University of California, 

we have been most protective of home rule prerogatives explicitly recognized in the text of 

our Constitution. Most prominently, we have limited or invalidated state laws that unduly 

interfere with the prerogative of local governments to set the salaries of their own 

employees. (See County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278; San 

Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of the University of California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785; 
3

Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 

296 (County of Sonoma).)

Second, in determining whether a state statute may be applied to a charter city, we 

have examined the “extramural” or “extramunicipal” dimension of the statute — that is, the 

reach of the statute beyond merely controlling local matters. (California Fed. Savings & 

Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 17, 23-24 (CalFed).) A strong 

extramunicipal dimension supports the conclusion that the statute may be imposed on charter 

cities. (See ibid.; Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 138-140; Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 

City & County of San Francisco (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 775-776 (Pacific Telephone).) In 

making this determination, we have examined not simply the statute‟s stated goals, but also 

whether the statute is reasonably related to those goals. (Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 

389, 410.) Statutes that seek to micromanage municipal affairs without any clear 

extramunicipal objective have been held inapplicable to charter cities. (See, e.g., County of 

Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 317-318 [finding no extramunicipal statewide concern to 

justify a state law restricting state funds to cities that grant cost-of-living increases to their 

employees].)

Third, courts will also assess the degree to which a state law actually intrudes into 

municipal prerogatives. The fact that a state law constrains local decisionmaking, even in 

traditional areas of home rule, does not by itself establish a sufficient degree of intrusion to 

render the state law inapplicable to charter cities. Thus, for example, we have held that state 

law may govern numerous aspects of employment relations where the state law allows local 

governments the ultimate say in managing and compensating their employees. (See People 

ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 600

(Seal Beach) [“[I]n an unbroken series of public employee cases, . . . it has been held that a 

„general law prevails over local enactments of a chartered city, even in regard to matters 

which would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal affairs, where the subject matter 

of the general law is of statewide concern.‟ [Citation.]”]; id. at p. 601 [statutory duty to meet 

and confer with employees over changes in conditions of employment applies to charter 
4

cities]; Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 140 [Public Safety Officers‟ Procedural Bill 

of Rights applies to charter cities]; International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto

(1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 294-295 [statutory right of firefighters to join unions applies to charter 

cities].)

Fourth, in considering what constitutes a municipal affair or statewide concern, 

“courts should avoid the error of „compartmentalization,‟ that is, of cordoning off an entire 

area of governmental activity as either a „municipal affair‟ or one of statewide concern.” 

(CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 17.) The reason courts should avoid such 

compartmentalization is that “ „the constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed 

or static quantity . . . [but one that] changes with the changing conditions upon which it is to 

operate.‟ ” (Id. at pp. 17-18, quoting Pacific Telephone, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 771.) This 

principle has operated with particular force when the case involves asserted home rule 

prerogatives not explicitly protected by the text of Constitution article XI, section 5. (See 

CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 17-18 [upholding state law displacing municipal tax on 

savings banks]; Pacific Telephone, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 766 [upholding state law displacing 

municipal control of construction and maintenance of telephone lines].)

A corollary of this fourth principle is that in order to determine the shifting boundaries 

between state and municipal legislative power, courts will engage in a factual inquiry to 

understand the nature of historical changes relevant to the determination. In some cases, the 

evidence considered will be general, judicially noticeable facts. (See, e.g., Pacific 

Telephone, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 776 [relying on “a vast change in conditions” related to 

telephone service over the previous 50 years to conclude that placing telephone lines in city 

streets “is not at the present time a municipal affair but is a matter of statewide concern”].) 

In other cases, the factual inquiry has involved an examination of legislative findings and 

evidence in the trial record. (See CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 21-24 & fn. 21 [engaging 

in extensive analysis of legislative and trial court findings to conclude that a statute 

eliminating the power of local entities to tax savings banks applies to charter cities].) As 

CalFed explained: “When a court invalidates a charter city measure in favor of a conflicting 
5

state statute, the result does not necessarily rest on the conclusion that the subject matter of 

the former is not appropriate for municipal regulation. It means, rather, that under the 

historical circumstances presented, the state has a more substantial interest in the subject than 

the charter city.” (Id. at p. 18.) At the same time, “a decision favoring a charter city measure 

[does not] preclude superseding state legislation in a later case if the fact-bound justification 

— the statewide dimension — is subsequently demonstrated.” (Ibid.) “[T]he hinge of the 

decision,” CalFed said, “is the identification of a convincing basis for legislative action 

originating in extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative supersession based on 

sensible, pragmatic considerations.” (Ibid., italics added.)

Finally, and critically, we have long held that “[w]hen there is a doubt as to 

whether an attempted regulation relates to a municipal or to a state matter, or if it be the 

mixed concern of both, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the legislative authority of 

the state.” (Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1960) 53 Cal.2d 674, 681; see CalFed, supra, 

54 Cal.3d at p. 24; Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 140.) The basis for this rule 

was articulated long ago in Ex parte Daniels, supra, 183 Cal. at p. 640: “ „with no 

unmistakable signs to guide us between the domain of state and local powers, it becomes 

us to exercise more than the usual caution not to refuse the sanction of judicial authority 

to legislation which is supposed to have exceeded a boundary so difficult to locate and 

define.‟ ” This principle is a variant of the general proposition, rooted in the separation 

of powers, that “ „ “[i]f there is any doubt as to the Legislature‟s power to act in any 

given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the Legislature‟s action. Such

restrictions and limitations [imposed by the Constitution] are to be construed strictly 

. . . .” ‟ ” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 180, bracketed 

language and italics in Pacific Legal Foundation.)

With these principles in mind, let us now examine today‟s opinion.

II.

The court ignores or misapplies the principles above in conducting its analysis. 

First and foremost, the court discounts as irrelevant the record evidence demonstrating 
6

the state‟s extramunicipal interest in supporting construction labor markets and 

apprenticeship programs. Although the Court of Appeal below concluded that the 

evidentiary record and legislative findings were insufficient to establish that the 

prevailing wage law significantly furthered the state‟s interests, the court rejects this 

approach. It proceeds instead on the theory that the facts demonstrating the state‟s 

interest merit little or no consideration because the issue before us is a question of law. 

“Factual findings by the Legislature or the trial court . . . are not controlling. [Citation.] 

The decision as to what areas of governance are municipal concerns and what are 

statewide concerns is ultimately a legal one.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) 

But the court jousts with a strawman. No one suggests that factual findings by the 

Legislature or trial court should be “controlling.” The important point, amply supported 

by our precedents (see ante, at pp. 4-5), is that such findings are relevant to the inquiry. 

The court actually acknowledges this point, as it must, when it says “[o]f course, the 

inquiry is not wholly removed from historical, and hence factual, realities” (maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 9) and then recites the above quoted guidance from CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d 

at pages 17-18, emphasizing the factual and historical nature of the inquiry. This 

recitation turns out to be an empty gesture, however, for one searches in vain for any 

discernible application of CalFed‟s guidance in the court‟s analysis of the prevailing 

wage law. Simply put, there is none.

That is not to say that the historical and factual justifications for the prevailing 

wage law go unmentioned in today‟s opinion. The court devotes four detailed paragraphs 

to describing a declaration submitted by an expert for plaintiff State Building and 

Construction Trades Council of California, AFL-CIO. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-15.) 

As the court says, the declaration explains the prevailing wage law‟s beneficial effects on 

construction labor markets, the increasing regionalization of those labor markets as 

workers travel long distances to a jobsite, the fact that wages are generally set regionally 

rather than locally, and the importance of the prevailing wage law in supporting 

apprenticeship programs that train the next generation of skilled workers. (Ibid.)
7

After reading this lengthy and quite plausible explanation of why the Legislature 

enacted the prevailing wage law, one might expect some analysis that examines how 

much weight the historical and factual underpinnings of the law should have in 

determining whether it addresses a matter of statewide concern. One might expect some 

explanation, in light of the court‟s holding, of why the record falls short of identifying “a 

convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns, one 

justifying legislative supersession based on sensible, pragmatic considerations.” 

(CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 18.) But rather than assess the record evidence, the court 

simply waves it away and changes the subject: “Certainly regional labor standards and 

the proper training of construction workers are statewide concerns when considered in the 

abstract. But the question presented here is not whether the state government has an 

abstract interest in labor conditions and vocational training. Rather, the question 

presented is whether the state can require a charter city to exercise its purchasing power 

in the construction market in a way that supports regional wages and subsidizes 

vocational training, while increasing the charter city‟s costs. No one would doubt that the 

state could use its own resources to support wages and vocational training in the state‟s 

construction industry, but can the state achieve these ends by interfering in the fiscal 

policies of charter cities? „ “[W]e can think of nothing that is of greater municipal 

concern than how a city‟s tax dollars will be spent; nor anything which could be of less 

interest to taxpayers of other jurisdictions.” ‟ (Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th at 

p. 407.) Therefore, the Union here cannot justify state regulation of the spending 

practices of charter cities merely by identifying some indirect effect on the regional and 

state economies.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15, original italics.)

This passage merits several comments. To begin with, in labeling the state‟s interest 

“abstract,” the court does nothing more than employ a rhetorical device to diminish the 

importance of that interest. The court does not explain in what sense the state‟s interest in 

supporting regional labor markets and apprenticeship programs designed to maintain a 

highly skilled, well-paid construction workforce throughout California is “abstract.” Surely 
8

the court is not faulting the Legislature, the representative body for our entire state, for 

legislating on the basis of labor market trends, public policy goals, and laws of supply and 

demand that have not been particularized to, say, the City of Vista or San Diego County. If 

the court is instead using “abstract” to mean that the Legislature has not sufficiently 

demonstrated that the prevailing wage law will truly benefit regional labor markets and 

support apprenticeship programs, then one would expect the court to hold, with the Court of 

Appeal, that there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish the law‟s efficacy. But 

the court rejects that position, so the sufficiency of the evidence cannot really be the court‟s 

concern.

If the court uses the term “abstract” to mean that the present inquiry requires us to 

consider the statewide concern not in isolation but in relation to the asserted municipal 

interests, then I agree. But if we are to assess the relative strengths of the state and local 

interests, then why should we not look to evidence bearing on the respective strengths of 

those interests? That is precisely the kind of evidence we examined in CalFed to determine 

that the state acted constitutionally in eliminating what had formerly been a local 

prerogative. (CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 21-24 & fn. 21.) It is also the kind of evidence 

pertinent to assessing whether the extramunicipal dimension of the state law at issue is robust 

or trivial. (See ante, at p. 3.) Yet the court simply dismisses the state interest as “abstract” 

without any meaningful evaluation of its factual and historical underpinnings.

The court instead focuses on the fact that the state seeks to regulate a charter city‟s 

purchasing power in a manner that “increas[es] the charter city‟s costs.” (Maj. opn., ante, at 

p. 15.) But it is hardly clear that a charter city‟s interest in how its tax dollars are spent is 

any less abstract for present purposes than the state‟s interest in its legitimate policy goals. 

Our precedents unambiguously indicate that a charter city‟s general interest in controlling its 

tax dollars is not by itself sufficient to render inapplicable a state law that addresses a 

statewide concern. In Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d 591, for example, we held that the “meet 

and confer” requirement of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA; Gov. Code § 3500 et 

seq.) did not conflict with the prerogatives of a charter city to propose charter amendments 
9

affecting employment relations. As a sheer matter of dollars and cents, the marginal cost to 

cities of administering the MMBA, which requires city management to negotiate to impasse 

with its employees regarding compensation and other employment terms, is probably at least 

as great as requiring cities to pay a prevailing wage when they contract out for public works. 

The statutory protections to assure fair labor practices in police departments and fire 

departments that we upheld against home rule challenges in Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 

Cal.3d 128, and International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 60 Cal.2d 

276, respectively, likewise imposed substantial monetary costs on the affected 

municipalities. Indeed, almost every state regulation, including laws specifically directed at 

government entities, impacts the way a city spends its money and other resources. In 

addition to labor and employment laws, environmental laws like the California 

Environmental Quality Act require the expenditure of substantial municipal resources to 

enforce. Unless the court intends to invite home rule challenges to a very broad swath of 

state laws, the fact that a state law increases a charter city‟s costs or otherwise constrains 

what a city can do with its money cannot be the determinative factor, or even the primary 

factor, in the present analysis.

While forcefully invoking the city‟s fiscal interests (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 15 

[“Autonomy with regard to the expenditure of public funds lies at the heart of what it means 

to be an independent governmental entity.”]), the court does not acknowledge, much less 

grapple with, the readily apparent limitations on this rationale for immunizing a charter city 

from an otherwise applicable state law. Instead, the court opts for an undiscriminating, 

categorical approach that holds the prevailing wage law inapplicable to charter cities, no 

matter how strong the state‟s interest or how slight the intrusion into the charter city‟s 

treasury. Notably, the City of Vista has not put forward any evidence indicating how much, 

if at all, the prevailing wage law would increase the city‟s costs for the public works projects 

at issue. One might wonder, on the principle that you get what you pay for, whether the 

higher wages required by the prevailing wage law are at least partially offset by the higher 

productivity of better paid, better skilled workers. (See Mahalia, Prevailing Wages in 
10

Government Contract Costs: A Review of the Research (2008) p. 2.) Because the court‟s 

reasoning does not depend on any facts as to how much the prevailing wage law will actually 

increase the city‟s costs, presumably even an increase of one dollar must be held to invade 

the “heart” of the city‟s autonomy. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)

The extremity of such a conclusion is a symptom of additional problems with the 

court‟s categorical approach. The majority relies on precedent, chiefly this court‟s 80-yearold decision in Pasadena v. Charleville (1932) 215 Cal. 384, 389 (Charleville). (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 13.) But, as Justice Werdegar points out, Charleville‟s reasoning that the 

prevailing wage law does not address a matter of statewide concern is based largely on a 

thoroughly discredited conception of constitutional limitations on economic legislation. (See 

dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at pp. 6-7.) I would add that the Charleville court‟s notion of 

a state law that does address a matter of statewide concern — the Public Works Alien 

Employment Act, which barred aliens from being employed on public works projects (see 

Charleville, at pp. 399-400 [analogizing the statute to California‟s Alien Land Law, which 

prohibited the sale of agricultural land to aliens]) — has been equally discredited. (See 

Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633 [invalidating California‟s Alien Land Law under 

the equal protection clause]; see also Graham v. Richardson (1971) 403 U.S. 365, 372 [state 

classifications based on alienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 

scrutiny”].)

It is beyond dispute that construction labor markets have become increasingly 

regional since Charleville was decided. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14; dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., 

ante, at pp. 12-13.) Given that fact as well as obvious and important changes in the legal 

landscape since 1932, it is mystifying that the court does not flinch in continuing to follow a 

Lochner-era precedent built on Lochner-era premises. (Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 

U.S. 45.) But more than mystifying, the court‟s ready adherence to Charleville is 

indefensible under the very precedents that the court elsewhere recites and even italicizes. If 

Charleville‟s holding is not worthy of reconsideration, then what is left of the precept that 

“ „ “the constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity . . . [but 
11

one that] changes with the changing conditions upon which it is to operate” ‟ ”? (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 9, quoting CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 17-18, quoting Pacific Telephone, 

supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 771, italics added by the court.) The court commits the very “error of 

„compartmentalization‟ ” that CalFed warned against by “cordoning off” the wages paid by 

local public works contractors as a “municipal affair.” (CalFed, at p. 17.) If there is room in 

today‟s opinion for a superseding prevailing wage law to survive home rule challenge “in a 

later case” based on a future “fact-bound justification” (id. at p. 18), I fail to see it — and the 

court does not (because it cannot) say there is.

Even without CalFed‟s specific instruction to analyze the constitutional concept of 

municipal affairs on the basis of changing historical circumstances, there is ample reason to 

reconsider Charleville under the doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine authorizes a court to 

revisit precedent when “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old 

rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine [citation]” and when “facts have so 

changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 

application or justification [citation].” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. 833, 

855 (plur. opn. by O‟Connor, J.); see Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 297 [overturning a nine-year-old precedent on the ground that 

“reexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent developments indicate 

an earlier decision was unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration”].) Charleville

easily satisfies these criteria.

In addition to relying on questionable precedent, the court reaches its categorical 

holding by denying any relevant distinction between a charter city‟s interest in controlling 

the wages of its own employees and its interest in controlling the wages of employees of 

private contractors building public works: “If, as the Union contends, the prevailing wage 

law‟s shift from a purely local focus to a regional focus has made the wage levels of workers 

constructing locally funded public works a matter of statewide concern, then that would be 

true whether the case involved public employees or private employees.” (Maj. opn., ante, at 

pp. 18-19.) This statement is the predicate for the court‟s reliance on our cases holding that 
12

the Legislature may not directly dictate the compensation of charter city employees. (Id. at 

pp. 16-18, discussing County of Riverside v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.4th 278; San 

Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 26 Cal.3d 785; 

County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296.)

But the court‟s position ignores key differences in the nature of the local interest 

involved. Most importantly, municipal control of employee compensation, unlike control of 

the wages of contract employees, is explicitly protected by the text of article XI, section 5, 

subdivision (b) of the California Constitution and similar constitutional home rule 

provisions. (See ante, at p. 2.) Moreover, as a practical matter, the two types of control are 

not comparable. Employee salaries make up the vast majority of a municipality‟s budget. In 

Los Angeles, for example, employee salaries comprise 85 percent of the budgets of city 

departments. (See Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, Mayor‟s Office Web page, 

Balanced Budget, Frequently Asked Questions, 

<http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/BalancedBudget/FrequentlyAskedQuestions/ index.htm> [as 

of July 2, 2012].) Interference with employee salaries would thus have an enormous, 

ongoing impact on city finances. And if the state sought to control the salaries of only some 

city employees, such control would interfere with the city‟s ability to set salary schedules 

and pay differentials for its employees, decisions which in turn affect matters of employee 

morale, retention, and workforce cohesion that indeed go to the heart of municipal 

autonomy. Interference with employee salaries would also likely affect a municipality‟s 

long-term pension obligations. None of these concerns is implicated when the state sets a 

floor for the wages of employees of a company with which a city temporarily does business 

to construct a public work. This is not a case about whether a state law can control employee 

salaries; it is about whether a state law can raise the cost of a municipal public work in order 

to further otherwise legitimate policy goals.

The court relies on two other factors to support its holding. First, it contends that 

“a state law of broad general application is more likely to address a statewide concern 

than one that is narrow and particularized in its application.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) 
13

“[T]he state law at issue is not a minimum wage law of broad general application; rather, 

the law at issue here has a far narrower application, as it pertains only to the public works 

projects of public agencies.” (Id. at p. 20.) This lack of general application “further 

undermine[s] the Union‟s assertion that the matter here presents a statewide concern and 

therefore requires Vista, a charter city, to comply with the state‟s prevailing wage law on 

the city‟s locally funded public works projects.” (Ibid.)

I agree that the general applicability of a state law to public as well as private entities 

supports the conclusion that the law has an important extramunicipal dimension. However, 

as a matter of fact and logic, there is no reason to suppose that a state law‟s lack of general 

applicability means it does not have a significant extramunicipal dimension. The court 

asserts that, in contrast to a minimum wage law, “the law at issue here has a far narrower 

application, as it pertains only to the public works projects of public agencies.” (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 20, italics added.) Yet public works projects are a multibillion dollar annual 

enterprise in California, and charter cities, which contain over half the state‟s population (see 

dis opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 18, fn. 7), no doubt account for a substantial share of 

those dollars. Instead of regulating this vast enterprise by imposing statewide minimum 

wages for construction workers through general legislation applicable to private and public 

entities, the Legislature has chosen to influence such wages through the market-based 

approach of directing the purchasing power of public entities to support union-level wages. 

Instead of indicating that the prevailing wage law is not a matter of statewide concern, the 

application of the law only to public entities plausibly represents a legislative judgment that 

direct regulation of private labor markets is not necessary to accomplish the statute‟s goals 

given the substantial role that public works projects play in influencing private sector 

construction workers‟ wages and in supporting apprenticeship programs. As the court 

acknowledges, prevailing wage laws have long been in use, in California and throughout the 

country, to accomplish these goals. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5-6; see also dis opn. of 

Werdegar, J., ante, at pp. 17-18, fns. 5, 6.) What basis is there for insisting that only more 
14

intrusive state laws that regulate both private and public sectors may be applied to charter 

cities?

The other factor on which the court relies is that “state laws at issue set forth generally 

applicable procedural standards, and consequently impinged less on local autonomy than if 

they had imposed substantive obligations.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) It is true that our 

decision in Seal Beach, upholding the MMBA‟s “meet and confer” requirement, observed 

that the city council “retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own 

decision.” (Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 601.) In a footnote, “[w]e emphasize[d] that 

there is a clear distinction between the substance of a public employee labor issue and the 

procedure by which it is resolved.” (Id. at p. 600, fn. 11, original italics.) But this factor is 

not dispositive. Seal Beach may be read to say that procedural laws will generally survive a 

home rule challenge, not that substantive laws generally won‟t. Both CalFed, supra, 54 

Cal.3d 1, which came after Seal Beach, and Pacific Telephone, supra, 51 Cal.2d 766, which 

remains good law, upheld state statutes that foreclosed municipalities from making 

substantive decisions in important areas of local concern. The substantive nature of the 

prevailing wage law is one factor to be considered together with all the others discussed 

above.

III.

Perhaps the most serious error in the court‟s analysis is its disregard for the principle 

that doubts about whether a law is a matter of statewide concern must be resolved in favor of 

the legislative authority of the state. (Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 

681; Ex parte Daniels, supra, 183 Cal. at p. 640.) Although the present dispute involves a 

contest between two levels of democratic decisionmaking — local and state — one should 

not think that democracy (of some kind) will be the winner no matter how we rule. If we 

were to uphold the prevailing wage law, charter cities could still bring their complaints to the 

Legislature through the ordinary political process, and it seems at least plausible that state 

legislators would be attentive to the concerns of local officials on whom they often depend 

for political support. However, having declared the prevailing wage law unconstitutional as 
15

applied to charter cities, the court has placed the issue beyond the ordinary political process. 

As Justice Werdegar notes, this court‟s decisions on the meaning of the California 

Constitution can be corrected only by a constitutional amendment. (Dis. opn. of Werdegar, 

J., ante, at p. 1.) It is hard to believe that in this case, where the text of our Constitution 

provides no clear answer, the correct outcome is so utterly free of doubt that our usual 

instinct toward judicial restraint may be abandoned.

In fairness, there is no reason to expect that any single factor will properly resolve the 

case before us. The factors that the court does consider — the possible costs to the city, the 

law‟s lack of general applicability, the law‟s substantive as opposed to procedural character 

— may validly be used to assess the state‟s and the city‟s relative interests. But the court 

refuses to undertake a factual or historical inquiry to determine the relative strengths of the 

state and municipal interests, even though that is what our precedents instruct. The court 

refuses to reconsider Charleville, supra, 215 Cal. 384, even though its legal and factual 

underpinnings have been thoroughly eroded over eight decades. The court refuses to see any 

distinction between municipal control of its own employees‟ wages and municipal control of 

the wages of a contractor‟s employees, even though the former is more likely to disrupt local 

autonomy and, unlike the latter, is explicitly protected by the text of our Constitution.

I have no objection to an all-things-considered approach to the present inquiry 

because it is probably the best we can do. But such an approach (1) must truly consider all

relevant aspects of the inquiry, not just an arbitrary few; (2) should lead us to reach fairly 

limited holdings instead of categorical pronouncements; and (3) should cause us “to exercise 

more than the usual caution” before invalidating the work of a co-equal, politically 

representative branch of government (Ex parte Daniels, supra, 183 Cal. at p. 640). Today‟s 

decision violates all three precepts in arriving at a fixed conception of municipal autonomy 

that is neither rooted in the language of our Constitution nor consistent with current realities.

As Justice Werdegar explains (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at pp. 11-15), the 

record evidence indicates that the prevailing wage law is a reasonable means of supporting 

regional construction labor markets and apprenticeship programs. There is no question that 
16

the law interferes with municipal autonomy. But the law does not invade any local 

prerogative expressly protected by constitutional text. And it is not clear that the law‟s 

interference with municipal autonomy is excessive in relation to the legitimate public 

purposes that the Legislature aims to achieve. There is, in this case, “a convincing basis for 

legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative 

supersession based on sensible, pragmatic considerations.” (CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 

p. 18.) But even if there were some doubt, judicial restraint should prevail.

I respectfully dissent.

LIU, J.

I CONCUR: 

WERDEGAR, J.
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 173 Cal.app.4th 567

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S173586

Date Filed: July 2, 2012

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Diego

Judge: Robert P. Dahlquist

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Altshuler Berzon, Stephen P. Berzon, Scott A. Kronland and Peter E. Leckman for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, James M. Humes, Chief Deputy Attorney 

General, Gordon B. Burns, Deputy State Solicitor General, Christopher E. Krueger and Jonathan K. Renner, 

Assistant Attorneys General, Douglas J. Woods and Peter M. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae 

on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Davis, Cowell & Bowe, John J. Davis, Jr., and Andrew J. Kahn for Northern California Mechanical Contractors 

Association, Los Angeles Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association, Air Conditioning, 

Refrigeration and Mechanical Contractors Association of Southern California, California Plumbing and Mechanical 

Contractors Association, California Sheet Metal Air Conditioning Contractors National Association, Associated 

Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors Association and Mechanical Contractors Council of Central California as 

Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Carroll & Scully, Donald C. Carroll and Charles P. Scully II for Southern California Labor 

Management Operating Engineers Contract Compliance Committee as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Law Office of Lawrence H. Kay and Lawrence H. Kay for Construction Employers‟ Association‟s as Amicus 

Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Sandra Rae Benson, Patricia M. Gates, Roberta D. Perkins and Sharon Seidenstein 

for Northern California Basic Crafts Alliance, California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association, Jeff Armstrong, 

Tammy Castillo, Sumaria Love, John Bullock and Mavis McAllister as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Darold D. Pieper, City Attorney, Jonathan B. Stone, Deputy City Attorney; McDougal, Love, Eckis, Smith, 

Boehmer & Foley, Lounsbery, Ferguson Altona & Peak, James P. Lough, David M. Stotland; Richards Watson & 

Gerson and T. Peter Pierce for Defendants and Respondents.
Page 2 – S173586 – continued

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Robert Fried, Elizabeth P. Lind and W. Bryce Chastain for Associated 

Builders & Contractors of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Patrick Whitnell and Kourtney Burdick for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants 

and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Scott A. Kronland

Altshuler Berzon

177 Post Street, Suite 200

San Francisco, CA 94108

(415) 421-7151

Douglas J. Woods

Deputy Attorney General

1300 I Street, Suite 125

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

(916) 323-8405

James P. Lough

Lounsbery, Ferguson Altona & Peak

960 Canterbury Place, Suite 300

Escondido, CA 92025

(760) 743-1201