alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CAGE et al. v. NUECES COUNTY.

No. 10916.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

April 2, 1941.

Boone, Henderson, Boone & Davis, of Corpus Christi, for appellants.

Hal Rachal, Linton Savage, Hayden W. Head, and Keys & Holt, all of Corpus Christi, for appellee.

NORVELL, Justice.

This is an action brought by J. F. Cage and T. C. Cage, appellants, against Nueces County, appellee, upon a contract provide ing for compensation for the hauling of shell for roadway purposes. Trial was to a jury upon special issues and judgment rendered thereon that appellants take nothing.

Appellee’s objections to the consideration of appellants’ propositions and bills of exceptions are not well taken. We have considered all of appellants’ propositions, three in number.

Appellants’ first proposition asserts that appellee’s pleadings were insufficient to support the submission of special issue No. 3, which inquired as to whether or .not appellants, prior to the time of the hauling of the shell here involved, had agreed to look to a third party, Heldensfels Brothers, rather than the County for payment. This proposition is overruled. The County denied liability because of the hauling involved and pleaded that if any debt arose as a result thereof, Heldensfels Brothers were liable for the payment thereof.

'Appellants’ second proposition is overruled. There is no conflict in the jury’s answers to the issues submitted. 41 Tex. Jur. 1224, § 360.

Appellants contend that this cause should be reversed because of an asserted improper argument by counsel for appellee. Counsel stated in substance that this suit was filed in 1933 and not tried until 1940. Upon objection, the trial court admonished the jury not to consider the statement. The date of the filing of the suit was shown by appellants’ amended petition which was presumably read to the jury. The statement was therefore not outside the record. The inference that appellants’ claim was not well founded in fact, which counsel sought to draw from long penden-cy of the case upon the trial court’s docket, may have been an improper deduction from the facts, but we are of the opinion that any prejudice resulting therefrom was removed by the instruction of the trial court. Ramirez v. Acker, 134 Tex. 647, 138 S.W.2d 1054.

Counsel for appellee also stated that if appellants’ claim had been just, the county would have paid it. Appellants objected, but the trial court evidently did not rule upon the objection. A statement by counsel, which is in effect an assertion that his client is honest in his business dealings, is not' ordinarily reversible error and we conclude that no reversible error is shown *191in the particular mentioned here. Appellants’ third proposition is overruled.

Being convinced that our original disposition of this case, affirming the judgment appealed from, was correct, appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled. The foregoing will serve as the opinion of this Court.
## United States Court of Appeals
**For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________

No. 23

- 2171

___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Timothy Ray Smith

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

____________

Submitted: January 8, 202 4 Filed: January 1 2, 2024 [Unpublished]

____________ Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Timothy Ray Smith began his term of supervised release on June 8, 2021, after he completed a 72

- month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Approximately 16 months later, Smith began violating his supervised release conditions related to drug use. At the final revocation hearing, Smith admit ted to drug usage

— specifically the positive urinalysis and blood test results

— and denied-2- all other allegations, including those related to his arrest arising from a car accident on December 30, 2022.

It is undisputed that Smith admitted to Grade C violations, which resulted in

a n advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. The court began explaining its sentencing decision by focusing on Smith’s drug use and then turned to discussing the allegations that Smith had n either admitted to nor that the government had proven. The court imposed a 24

- month sentence, stating there

must be “ramifications” for Smith’s additional unadmitted and unproven conduct.

On appeal, Smith contends the district court improperly sentenced him based

on un admitted and un proven conduct . T he g overnment agrees that the district court plainly erred when it based its sentence on contested facts and requests that we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. We agree with the parties. See United States v. Richey , 758 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a district court commits procedural error when it bases a sentence on unproven, disputed allegations). We vacate Smith’s sentence and remand for resentencing

.

______________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DRUE ALLEN HOLLIS, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00432-O-BP

 §

SWEETWATER, § 

 §

Defendant. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge made Findings, Conclusions, and a 

Recommendation in this case. No objections were filed, and the Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation is ripe for review. The District Judge reviewed the proposed Findings, 

Conclusions, and Recommendation for plain error. Finding none, the undersigned District 

Judge believes that the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and 

they are accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this in forma pauperis action is DISMISSED

with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

SO ORDERED on this 21st day of June, 2022. 

Case 4:22-cv-00432-O Document 14 Filed 06/21/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 34
Case 2:22-cr-00064-Z-BR Document 35 Filed 10/17/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 79
#### STEPHENS v. STUMBO, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 22, 1951.

Mann & Mann, Ben Mann, Paintsville, for appellant.

W. W. Burchett, Prestonsburg, for appel-lee.

CAMMACK, Chief Justice.

More than three years after Floyd County voted dry, a petition was filed seeking an election on the wet and dry question in the Third Magisterial District of the County. The County Judge refused to call the election, and the appellant filed an action seeking a declaration of rights and a writ of mandamus requiring him to do so. The appeal is from a judgment upholding the position of the County Judge.

Since the adoption of the amendment to the Local Option Act, Chapter 21, Acts 1906, known as “The Cammack Act,” this Court has held consistently that, where a county votes dry as a unit, no lesser political subdivision can thereafter vote on the question of discontinuing prohibition. A review of these holdings may be found in the case of Murphy v. Menefee, 288 Ky. 119, 155 S.W.2d 753, wherein we adopted the opinion of Judge K. S. Alcorn, who tried the case below. See also Fuson v. Howard, 305 Ky. 843, 205 S.W.2d 1018. In the Murphy case we held that Chapter 5 of the Acts of 1938, which related to sale of 3.2 beer in certain territory, did not change the effect of the Local Option Act, Chapter 1 of the Acts of 1936, which constituted a substantial reenactment of the Local Option Act. During the course of the opinion it was said: “ * * * As we have seen, a precinct dry by reason of the county including it having voted prohibition, has no voice in invoking a local option election, unless such an election is for the entire county. Its identity as a separate voting unit for local option purposes, has been merged in that of the county. If the Legislature proposed to change this long established public policy of preserving for the entire county, when it had voted dry, the exclusive right, as compared with any of its territorial subdivisions, of determining whether there should be another local option election within its borders, certainly it should have made that purpose unmistakably plain by the *996terms of the amendment. * * * ” [288 Ky. 119, 155 S.W.2d 756.]

Under Chapter 47 of the Acts of 1948, the Legislature authorized the voters in cities of the first four classes to determine for themselves whether or not prohibition should prevail, irrespective of a countywide vote on the question. We upheld that Act in McMullin v. Richmond City Council, 312 Ky. 430, 227 S.W.2d 975. It may be seen, therefore, that, insofar as cities of the first four classes are concerned, the Legislature has made “unmistakably plain” its intent to change the effect of the county unit rule therein. Obviously, the • rule stands, insofar as the remainder of the State is concerned. Therefore, on the authority of the Murphy case, the judgment is affirmed.

COMBS, J., not sitting.
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# image1.png
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-7290
MICHAEL ISIAH LAWRENCE, Petitioner - Appellant, versus S. K. YOUNG, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge. (CA-02-27-7) Submitted: October 24, 2002 Decided: November 26, 2002 Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael Isiah Lawrence, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Drummond Bagwell, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Michael Isiah Lawrence seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Lawrence has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. SeeLawrence v. Young , No. CA-02-27-7 (W.D. Va. filed July 31, 2002; entered Aug. 1, 2002). Accordingly, we deny Lawrence’s motions to vacate the district court’s order and to expand the record, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
        The Schedule  contains summary financial
        information extracted from the financial
        statements for  Independence  Tax Credit
        Plus  L.P.  IV and is  qualified  in its
        entirety by reference to such  financial
        statements
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                          0000940329
<NAME>                         Independence Tax Credit Plus L.P. IV
<MULTIPLIER>                   1
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                 APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                   DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                         9,965,443   
<SECURITIES>                   24,900,000  
<RECEIVABLES>                  0           
<ALLOWANCES>                   0           
<INVENTORY>                    0           
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<PP&E>                         19,422,929  
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>   56,615,412 
<SALES>                        0          
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               1,220,038  
<CGS>                          0          
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>               906,762    
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>             221,013    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                92,263     
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</TABLE>
__________________________________________________________________________ Notice of Appeal Page 1 of 2 NO. DC- 13 -08688

MIKE ARMSTRONG § IN THE 101ST § VS. § DISTRICT COURT OF § JAMES M. SUGGS, JR. AND § SUGGS LAW FIRM, P.C. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, MIKE ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff/Appellant, and hereby

gives notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas, Dallas,

Texas from the Final Summary Judgment of this Court, signed on December

15, 2014.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John D. Nation John D. Nation State Bar No. 14819700 4925 Greenville, Suite 200 Dallas, Texas 75206 214- 800 -5160 214- 800 -5161 (facsimile) nationlawfirm@gmail.com

Attorney for Appellant Shelia Bradley FILED DALLAS COUNTY 1/14/2015 5:05:28 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK__________________________________________ ________________________________ Notice of Appeal Page 2 of 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true copy of this notice of appeal was served on

James M. Sugg s, Attorney at Law, 800 West Airport Freeway, Suite 600, Irving,

Texas 75062 , by first

- class mail, postage prepaid, on this 14 th day of January

2015.

/s/ John D. Nation John D. Nation
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   24,697
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (455)
<INVENTORY>                                    117,325
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               150,186
<PP&E>                                          42,656
<DEPRECIATION>                                (25,006)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 201,881
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           86,346
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                     9,695,768
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   201,881
<SALES>                                         56,290
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                56,290
<CGS>                                           39,151
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   39,151
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,637
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    61
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,731
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,634
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</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § 2:22-CR-00040-Z-BR

§

JA'BAURI SHORTER-JONES (1) §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

JA'BAURI SHORTER-JONES (1), by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 

1997), has appeared before me pursuant to FED. R.CRIM. P. 11, and has entered a plea of guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment.

After cautioning and examining JA'BAURI SHORTER-JONES (1) under oath concerning each of the subjects mentioned 

in Rule 11, I determined that the guilty plea was knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense charged is supported by 

an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend that the plea 

of guilty be accepted, and that JA'BAURI SHORTER-JONES (1) be adjudged guilty of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 

924(a)(2) - POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A PROHIBITED PERSON and have sentence imposed accordingly. After 

being found guilty of the offense by the District Judge,

☒ The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) unless the Court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community 

if released.

☐ The Government does not oppose release.

☐ The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release.

☐ I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community if released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c).

☐ The Government opposes release.

☐ The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release.

☐ If the Court accepts this recommendation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the 

Government.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there is a 

substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or (b) the Government has 

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed, or (c) exceptional circumstances are clearly shown 

under § 3145(c) why the defendant should not be detained, and (2) the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released.

Date: November 3, 2022

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its 

service shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States 

District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Case 2:22-cr-00040-Z-BR Document 46 Filed 11/03/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 94
---

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL
  OFFICER 
  PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

We, Marcus New, and I, Susan Lovell, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

| | (1) | The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for
        the year ended December 31, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the
        requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
        U.S.C. 78m); and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
        in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
        of the Company.                                                                         

/s/ Marcus New
  Marcus New 
  Chief Executive Officer

March 15, 2007

/s/ Susan Lovell
  Susan Lovell
  Chief Financial Officer

March 15, 2007

A signed original of this written statement required by s. 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
#### HINDLEY v. STATE.

No. 22338.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 16, 1942.

*704Aubrey Davee, of Brady, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the unlawful sale of a bottle of whiskey, in a dry area, and by the court fined the sum of $200.

There are no bills of exceptions in the record.

The statement of facts show that Mc-Culloch County is a dry area, and that appellant made a sale of whiskey therein. The court was correct in its judgment, and the same is affirmed.