alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS,

DAVID GONZALEZ.GALLEGOS

True Name "JUAN DAVID GONZALEZ

-GALLEGOS

$

$

s

$

s

X

tr

E a aarer'?Pv-K

CASE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

. CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

DAVID GONZALEZ-GALLEGOS, by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125

F.3d 261 (5th Cir. lggT),has appeared before me pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.P. I l, and has entered a plea of

guilty to tire One Count Indictment, filed on June 21,2022. After cautioning and examining Defendant

David Gonzalez-Gallegos, under oath concerning each of the subjects mentioned in Rule 11, I determined

that the guilty plea wai knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense charged is supported by an

independ-ent Uasis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend

that ihe plea of guilty be accepted, and that Defendant David Gonzalez-Gallegos, be adjudged guilty of

Illegal ieentry After Removal From the United States, in violation of 8 USC $ 1326(a) and (b)(1) and

havE sentence imposed accordingly. After being found guilty of the offense by the district judge.

The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to l8 U.S.C. $ 3la3(a)(l) unless the Court finds by clear

and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the

communify if released.

n The Government does not oppose release'

n The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release.

I I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to

any othlr person or the comriunity if released and should therefore be released under $ 3142(b) or

(c).

n The Government oPposes release.

tr The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release.

r If the Court accepts this recommindation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the

Government.

The defendant must be ordpred detained pursuant to l8 U'S'C.

is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be i

shown under $ 3l45(c) why the defendant should

convincing evidence that the defendant is not li$dly'

community if released.

Signed September 29, 2022'

NOTICE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date

of its service shall bar an aggrieved party from atta&ing such Report and Recommendation before the assigned united

States District Judge. 28 U.S.C. $636(b)(lXB).

sEP 29 2A22

$ 3la3(aX2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there

ial will be granted, or (b) the Government has

(c) exceptional circumstances are clearly

and (2) the Court finds bY clear and

pose a danger to any other person or the

Case 3:22-cr-00236-K Document 22 Filed 09/29/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 28
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE CONSOLIDATED
BALANCE SHEET AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FILED AS PART OF THE
ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-Q
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                              OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                             355
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      3,112
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,673
<PP&E>                                          84,506
<DEPRECIATION>                                  26,379
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  64,877
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,597
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            43
<OTHER-SE>                                      39,003
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    64,877
<SALES>                                         23,903
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                23,903
<CGS>                                            6,281
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   22,516
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    16
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 419
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    952
<INCOME-TAX>                                       366
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                586
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       586
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.13
        

</TABLE>
Case 3:22-cr-00240-S Document 32 Filed 01/24/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 62
#### DAVIS v. STATE.

No. 26313.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 18, 1953.

Pat Beene, Snyder, for appellant.'

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the County Court of Scurry County for the unlawful possession for the purpose of sale of an alcoholic beverage, to-wit, • whisky. The information also alleges facts showing that an election had been held in said County which resulted in the prohibition of such possession. Howéver,- the statement" of facts contains no testimony of any kind relative to the dry status of Scurry County. It was shown therefrom that appellant objected to certain evidence which was read to the jury as shown in Volume 2,. pages 34 and 43 of the Minutes of the Commissioners’ Court of Scurry County. Such objection was overruled by the court and exception taken but it is not shown from the record what such proof was, and nowhere does it appear in the statement of facts what proceedings were had relative to such election in Scurry County. We have held in many instances that this being a special law such status must not only be pleaded but must also be proven. See Lawrence v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 621, 210 S.W.2d 159, and cases cited; also Brigham v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 55, 225 S.W.2d 176, and Jones v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 88, 225 S.W.2d 190. '

Under the record as it appears before us, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
AO 458 (Rev. 06/09) Appearance of Counsel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.

Defendant

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

.

Date:

Attorney’s signature

Printed name and bar number

Address

E-mail address

Telephone number

FAX number

Plaintiff

v.

 Northern District of Texas

DANIEL P. KELLY, JR.

PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC

 3:22-cv-01412-N

DANIEL P. KELLY, JR.

06/30/2022 s:/ Nathan C. Volheim

Nathan C. Volheim #6302103

2500 S. Highland Ave., Ste. 200, Lombard, IL 60148

nvolheim@sulaimanlaw.com

(630) 575-8181

(630) 575-8188

Case 3:22-cv-01412-N Document 3 Filed 06/30/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 12
#### CASTILLO v. STATE.

No. 21258.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 27, 1940.

Russell & Decker, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*175BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appellant was convicted on a charge of theft and was assessed a penalty of thirty days in jail.

The proceedings appear to be regular. The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception and nothing is presented for our consideration.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of iPass Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Steven H. Gatoff, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |     |  |                                                                                                                
|------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 3, 2011 |  |  |  | By: |  | /S/    STEVEN H.
GATOFF                                                                                        
|                    |  |  |  |     |  | Steven H. Gatoff Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal
Financial and Accounting Officer)

This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is
not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of iPass Inc. under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made
before or after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
Exhibit 34.8



LOGO

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Board of Directors and shareholders of CoreLogic, Inc.:

We have examined managements assertion, included in the accompanying Report on Assessment of Compliance, that CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services,
Inc. (the Company), an indirect subsidiary of CoreLogic, Inc. complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Regulation AB for all loans for commercial mortgage loan
outsourcing customers for which the Company served as the commercial tax service provider (the Platform), as of December 31, 2015 and for the year then ended, only including 1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(2)(ii), 1122(d)(2)(v),
1122(d)(2)(vi), 1122(d)(2)(vii), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii) and 1122(d)(4)(xiii), which the Company has determined are applicable to the servicing activities performed by it with respect to the Platform. Management is responsible for the
Companys compliance with the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on managements assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly,
included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Companys compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of
selected servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our procedures were limited to the selected servicing activities
performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances or amounts
calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Companys compliance with
the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, managements assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of
and for the year ended December 31, 2015 for all loans for commercial mortgage loan outsourcing customers for which the Company served as the commercial tax service provider is fairly stated, in all material respects.

February 4, 2016



LOGO



LOGO

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 1800, Dallas, Texas 75201

T: (214) 999-1400, F: (214) 754-7991, www.pwc.com/us
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-05-190-CV

WILBERT CLEWIS	APPELLANT

	V.

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA	APPELLEE

	------------

	FROM THE 96TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Wilbert Clewis attempts to appeal from a trial court judgment affirming a decision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals Panel.  We will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

	On June 3, 2005, this court informed appellant that it was concerned it may not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the notice of appeal was untimely filed and that the appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction unless appellant or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed with the court a response showing a reasonable explanation for the late filing of the notice of appeal.  Clewis filed a response stating that his motion for new trial was heard and denied on December 10, 2004, but he filed several other motions for new trial, which the trial court did not set for hearing.  He argues that this court has jurisdiction because at the time that he filed his notice of appeal, his fifth motion for new trial was still pending. 

	Here, the trial court's order was signed on October 11, 2004, and Clewis filed a motion for new trial on November 4, 2004.  Because a motion for new trial must be filed within thirty days after the trial court enters judgment, the only timely filed motion for new trial was the one that Clewis filed on November 4, 2004.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a).  Therefore, Clewis’s notice of appeal was due January 10, 2005, but was not filed until May 26, 2005.  See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). 

	The times for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in this court, and absent a timely filed notice of appeal or an extension request, we must dismiss the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 2, 25.1(b), 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (holding that once extension period has passed, party can no longer invoke appellate court's jurisdiction).  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

							PER CURIAM

PANEL D:	WALKER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MCCOY, J.

DELIVERED: July 14, 2005
, J. # 

### 4/n/J•fir Douglas/ Cherry IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
STANLEY EARNEST RIMER, Petitioner, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, Respondent, and THE STATE OF NEVADA, Real Party in Interest. No. 69326 

# FILED FEB 1 0 2016

TRACEKAJNOEMAN CLERKOFSUPREMECCURT DEPUTYCLERK

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 

### ORDER DENYING PETITION This is a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner seeks an order directing the district court to vacate a conviction of child neglect. We have reviewed the documents submitted in this matter, and without deciding upon the merits of any claims raised therein, we decline to exercise original jurisdiction in this matter. See MRS 34.160; NRS 34.170. A challenge to the validity of the judgment of conviction must be raised in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the district court in the first instance.' NRS 34.724(2)(b); NRS 34.738(1). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Parraguirre

'We express no opinion as to whether petitioner could meet the procedural requirements of NRS chapter 34. J.

(0) 1947), le-OW/2cc: Stanley Earnest Rimer Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 

### e
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

S. James Miller, Chief Executive Officer of ImageWareSystems, Inc. (the “Company”), and Wayne Wetherell, Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, each hereby certifies pursuant to the requirement set forth inRule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “ExchangeAct”), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United StatesCode (18 U.S.C. Section 1350) that, to the best of his knowledge:

1. The QuarterlyReport on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended September 30, 2007fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theExchange Act; and

**2****.**The information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2007 fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end ofthe period covered by the Quarterly Report and the results of operations of theCompany for the period covered by the Quarterly Report.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF,**theundersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 14th day of November, 2007.
| /s/   S.  James Miller             |
|---------------------------------------------------|
| **S.  James Miller**                              |
| **Chief  Executive Officer**                      |
|                                              |
| /s/   Wayne  Wetherell             |
| **Wayne  Wetherell**                              |
| **Chief  Financial Officer**                      |
| **(Principal  Financial and Accounting Officer)** |

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to ImageWare Systems, Inc. and will beretained by ImageWare Systems, Inc. and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
Case 3:22-cr-00297-L Document 27 Filed 05/11/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 57
#### FITCH v. MAYER et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 5, 1953.

Wurmser & Goldberg, Louisville, for appellant.

Wallis Downing, James G. Bowman and Hunter Short, Louisville, for appellees.

WADDILL, Commissioner.

The appellant, Mrs. Loretta Fitch, instituted this action against the appellees, Frances and William Mayer, d/b/a White Crescent System, for damages resulting from injuries received while performing her duties -as a waitress in appellees’ restaurant. At the conclusion of the appellant’s proof the court directed the jury to find a verdict for appellees. This appeal is from the judgment entered pursuant to the directed verdict.

Mrs. Fitch described the accident causing her injuries as follows:

> “Well I had a customer come in and ask for coffee; I walked over to where we keep these coffee makers. I picked the cup up in my left hand and raised the pot from the stove and just as I was about to pour this loose handle fell out and broke the pot and the coffee fell out and went into my shoe.”

As a result thereof Mrs. Fitch suffered a rather severe burn to her right foot. It was shown that the coffee maker was an oval shaped, heat resistant pyrex glass bowl having a narrow neck, the type generally used in restaurants., A plastic handle was fastened by screws to a metal band around the neck of the bowl. At the top of the neck of the bo-wl there is a glass flange or rim. On cross-examination Mrs. Fitch admitted that the bowl was not cracked and that she did not know what caused the -hole to appear in the glass bowl.

Since it was shown that appellees were not • operating under our Compensation Act, they could not interpose the defenses óf (1) contributory negligence; (2) negligence of a fellow"servant; nor (3) assumption of risk. KRS 342.410; Man-*924nington Fuel Co. v. Ray’s Adm’x, 250 Ky. 736, 63 S.W.2d 933; O’Brien & Co. v. Shelton’s Adm’r, 246 Ky. 537, 55 S.W.2d 352. Nevertheless, it was incumbent upon Mrs. Fitch to allege and prove that negligence of her employer caused the injury before she was entitled to have her cause submitted to a jury. Skinner v. Smith, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 621; Ward, v. Marshall, 293 Ky. 18, 168 S.W.2d 348; Helton v. Gunn Coal Mining Co., 258 Ky. 168, 79 S.W.2d 695.

 After considering appellant’s evidence and the deductions that may he drawn therefrom, we conclude that the evidence of causation as well as negligence was insufficient to sustain the burden of proof.

“Evidence merely furnishing the basis of conjecture, surmise, or speculation does not establish proximate cause, with certitude, sufficient upon which to rest a verdict of a jury. * * * A plaintiff 'is never entitled to rest a verdict in his favor on mere supposition ,or conjecture; that is, on the possibility the thing could have happened, or on an idea or notion founded on the probability that a thing may have occurred, without proof that it did occur, from the act of negligence upon which his recovery is based.” Wigginton’s Adm’r v. Louisville Ry. Co., 256 Ky. 287, 75 S.W.2d 1046, 1050. Also see: Shearman-Red-field on Negligence, Section 46.

For the reasons indicated, the judgment is affirmed.
Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

VS, § CASE NO.: 3:22-CR-227-K (04)

§

MANUEL ARREOLA CAMPOS §

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

After reviewing all relevant matters of record, including the Notice Regarding Entry 

of a Plea of Guilty, the Consent of the defendant, and the Report and Recommendation 

Concerning Plea of Guilty of the United States Magistrate Judge, and no objections 

thereto having been filed within fourteen days of service in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1), the undersigned District Judge is of the opinion that the Report and 

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge concerning the Plea of Guilty is correct, and it 

is hereby accepted by the Court. Accordingly, the Court accepts the plea of guilty and 

Plea Agreement and the Defendant is hereby adjudged guilty. Sentence will be imposed 

in accordance with the Court’s scheduling order.

SO ORDERED.

Signed December 21st, 2022.

_____________________________

ED KINKEADE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:22-cr-00227-K Document 86 Filed 12/21/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 220