IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Veniamin Y. Kolosov, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, : Nos. 1324 C.D. 2021, 1325 C.D. 2021

Bureau of Driver Licensing : Submitted: August 12, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: November 30, 2022

Veniamin Y. Kolosov (Licensee) appeals from the November 1, 2021 

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court) that dismissed 

Licensee’s statutory appeals1from a 12-month driver’s license suspension and a 12-

month commercial driving privilege disqualification2imposed by the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver 

1 This matter involves appeals from two lower court docket numbers, a 12-month driver’s 

license suspension docketed at CP-49-CV-983-2021 and a 12-month commercial driving privilege 

disqualification docketed at CP-49-CV-984-2021. As both the license suspension and the 

commercial driving privilege disqualification arose from the same set of facts, this Court 

consolidated the matters by order dated March 24, 2022, and exited March 25, 2022. 

2

75 Pa. C.S. § 1613 (relating to implied consent requirements for commercial motor 

vehicle drivers).
2

Licensing (DOT), pursuant to what is commonly known as the Vehicle Code’s 

Implied Consent Law, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b) (Implied Consent Law), as a result of 

Licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing upon his arrest for driving under the 

influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI).3 Upon review, we affirm.

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on February 18, 2021, Pennsylvania State 

Police Trooper Cody Doran was on patrol and returning to the police barracks when 

he pulled into a large, snow-covered parking lot in Benner Township, Centre 

County. See Notes of Testimony 10/29/2021 (N.T.) at 6-8 & 16-17; Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 10a-12a & 20a-21a. The parking lot was approximately 30 yards 

wide with trucks parked on either side and a drivable area in the middle. See N.T. 

at 16-17; R.R. at 20a-21a. In this parking lot, Trooper Doran observed a large black 

Ford pickup truck performing donuts in the snow. See N.T. at 7 & 16-17; R.R. at 

11a & 20a-21a. Trooper Doran viewed this as an unsafe activity as he felt the truck 

could possibly hit one of the parked trucks. See N.T. at 18; R.R. at 22a.

Trooper Doran pulled his patrol vehicle up to the Ford pickup, which 

had parked in a parking stall. See N.T. at 8 & 18; R.R. at 12a & 22a. As Trooper 

Doran approached, Licensee got out of the driver’s side of the Ford pickup. See N.T. 

at 8; R.R. at 12a. Trooper Doran asked Licensee to come over to the driver’s side 

of the patrol vehicle so that he could have a word with Licensee about the donuts, 

and Licensee complied. See N.T. at 8 & 18; R.R. at 12a & 22a. Upon Licensee’s 

approach, Trooper Doran immediately observed that his eyes were glassy and 

bloodshot and that his speech was slurred. See N.T. at 8; R.R. at 12a. Trooper Doran 

exited the vehicle and asked Licensee whether he had been drinking. See id.

Licensee denied drinking. See id. However, while speaking to Licensee, Trooper 

3

75 Pa. C.S. § 3802.
3

Doran could smell a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Licensee’s breath. See

id. Trooper Doran made these observations while standing two feet from Licensee. 

See N.T. at 19; R.R. at 23a.

Based on his observations, Trooper Doran requested that Licensee 

participate in certain field sobriety tests. See N.T. at 8; R.R. at 12a. Licensee agreed

and exhibited signs of intoxication during the field testing.4 See id. Trooper Doran 

also attempted to administer a preliminary breath test (PBT) to Licensee, but 

Licensee would not provide an adequate breath sample for the PBT machine to 

properly register a reading. See N.T. at 10; R.R. at 14a. 

Following the field sobriety testing and failed PBT, based on his 

experience and training, Trooper Doran concluded that Licensee was under the 

influence of alcohol. See N.T. at 11; R.R. at 15a. He placed Licensee under arrest 

for DUI, requested that Licensee submit to a blood draw, and transported Licensee 

to a local hospital. See N.T. at 11-12; R.R. at 15a-16a. Once at the hospital, Trooper 

Doran read Licensee the warnings contained in the DOT’s Form DL-26B Chemical 

Testing Warnings5in their entirety. See N.T. at 12-13; R.R. at 16a-17a. After 

4 Trooper Doran conducted three field sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, 

during which Licensee exhibited six signs of intoxication; the walk-and-turn test, during which 

Licensee exhibited one indicator of intoxication; and the one-leg stand test, during which Licensee 

exhibited no signs of intoxication. See N.T. at 9-10; R.R. at 13a-14a.

5 The DL-26B Form’s blood testing warnings read as follows:

It is my duty to as a police officer to inform you of the following:

1. You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or 

a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle 

Code. 

2. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of blood. 
4

Trooper Doran read the warnings, Licensee confirmed that he understood the 

warnings and verbally refused to submit to testing. See N.T. at 13-14; R.R. at 17a18a.

Thereafter, DOT notified Licensee that, as a result of his refusal to 

submit to chemical testing, his driving privilege would be suspended and his 

commercial driving privilege disqualified for a period of 12 months. Licensee 

appealed both the suspension and the disqualification. The trial court conducted a 

hearing on October 29, 2021, and dismissed the appeals by order dated November 

1, 2021.6 Licensee timely appealed to this Court.

3. If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating privilege 

will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused 

a chemical test or were previously convicted of driving under the 

influence, your operating privilege will be suspended for up to 18 

months. If your operating privilege is suspended for refusing 

chemical testing, you will have to pay a restoration fee of up to 

$2,000 in order to have your operating privilege restored. 

4. You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before 

deciding whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with 

an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or 

you remain silent when asked to submit to a blood test, you will have 

refused the test. 

The parties stipulated to the contents of the DL-26B Form and that Licensee was fully appraised 

of his rights. See N.T. at 13; R.R. at 17a. The DL-26B Forms were entered into evidence without 

objection before the trial court as part of two separate evidence packets – one evidence packet 

pertaining to the license suspension case and a second evidence packet pertaining to the 

commercial driver’s license disqualification case. See N.T. at 15; R.R. at 19a.

6 The trial court orally dismissed the appeals on the record at the end of the October 29, 

2021 hearing. See N.T. at 22; R.R. at 26a. The trial court signed written orders denying Licensee’s 

statutory appeals on October 29, 2021, but those orders were not filed until November 1, 2021. 

See R.R. at 29a-30a.
5

Licensee raises one claim on appeal before this Court:7 that the trial 

court erred by determining that Trooper Doran had reasonable grounds to request 

that Licensee submit to chemical testing. See Licensee’s Brief at 2 & 5-8. Licensee 

argues that Trooper Doran’s observations of the operation of Licensee’s vehicle, 

Licensee’s glassy/bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and Licensee’s performance 

during the field sobriety tests were insufficient evidence of intoxication to allow 

Trooper Doran to request that Licensee submit to chemical testing. See id. at 5-8. 

Licensee is not entitled to relief.

Initially, we note:

To sustain a license suspension under [the Implied 

Consent Law], DOT has the burden of establishing that (1) 

the licensee was arrested for drunken driving by a police 

officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the 

licensee was driving while under the influence, (2) the 

licensee was requested to submit to a chemical test, (3) the 

licensee refused to do so and (4) the licensee was warned 

that refusal would result in a license suspension. Once 

DOT meets this burden, the burden shifts to the licensee 

to establish that he or she either was not capable of making 

a knowing and conscious refusal or was physically unable 

to take the test.

Giannopoulos v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 82 A.3d 1092, 1094 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quoting Wright v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing,

788 A.2d 443, 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)). In the instant matter, no dispute exists as 

to three of these elements: Trooper Doran requested that Licensee submit to 

chemical testing, Trooper Doran warned Licensee – through the reading of the DL7

“Our standard of review in a license suspension case is to determine whether the factual 

findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court 

committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Negovan v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing, 172 A.3d 733, 735 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
6

26B Form – that his refusal to submit to chemical testing would result in a license 

suspension, and Licensee clearly refused to submit to the requested testing. Licensee 

challenges only the trial court’s determination that Trooper Doran had reasonable 

grounds to believe that Licensee was driving while under the influence of alcohol at 

the time he arrested Licensee for DUI.

“The question of whether an officer had reasonable grounds to arrest a 

licensee is a question of law fully reviewable by this court on a case-by-case basis.” 

Yencha v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 187 A.3d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018). In assessing whether DOT has met its burden of proving reasonable 

grounds to believe that a licensee drove while intoxicated, this Court considers the 

totality of the circumstances to determine, as a matter of law, whether a person in 

the position of the arresting officer could have reasonably reached this conclusion. 

See Yencha, 187 A.3d at 1044. As this Court has explained, 

[a]n officer has reasonable grounds to believe an 

individual was operating a motor vehicle under the 

influence of alcohol if a reasonable person in the position 

of the police officer, viewing the facts and circumstances 

as they appeared to the officer at the time, could conclude 

that the driver drove his car while under the influence of 

alcohol. The test for determining if reasonable grounds 

exist is not very demanding. An officer may acquire 

reasonable grounds to believe that a licensee was driving 

under the influence of alcohol at any time during the 

course of interaction between the officer and the licensee.

Kachurak v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 913 A.2d 982, 985 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 

original); see also Yencha, 187 A.3d at 1044. Further, 
7

[t]he standard of reasonable grounds to support a license 

suspension does not rise to the level of probable cause 

required for a criminal prosecution. A driver’s guilt or 

innocence of a criminal offense is not at issue in the license 

suspension proceedings. It is axiomatic that the legality of 

a driver’s underlying DUI arrest is irrelevant for purposes 

of a license suspension proceeding for refusal to submit to 

chemical testing.

Kachurak, 913 A.2d at 985-86 (internal citations omitted); see also Yencha, 187 

A.3d at 1044 (“The test for whether a police officer has reasonable grounds to 

believe that a licensee drove while intoxicated is not demanding; it requires even 

less proof than what is necessary to establish probable cause for a criminal 

prosecution.”). Moreover, 

[a]n arresting officer need not prove that he was correct in 

his belief that the licensee was operating the vehicle while 

under the influence. Even if later evidence proves the 

officer’s belief to be erroneous, this will not render the 

reasonable grounds void. Further, an officer need not 

witness the licensee operating a vehicle to place him under 

arrest for driving under the influence. Additionally, an 

officer’s reasonable belief that the licensee was driving 

while under the influence will justify a request to submit 

to chemical testing if one reasonable interpretation of the 

circumstances as they appeared at the time supports the 

officer’s belief. Further, courts appropriately defer to an 

investigating officer’s experience and observations where 

reasonable grounds exist to support the officer’s belief 

based on the totality of the circumstances.

Yencha, 187 A.3d at 1044-45 (internal quotation marks citations omitted); see also

Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Dreisbach, 363 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1976) (“The only valid inquiry on this issue at the de novo hearing is 

whether, viewing the facts and circumstances as they appeared at the time, a 
8

reasonable person in the position of the police officer could have concluded that the 

motorist was operating the vehicle and under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” 

(footnote omitted)). Thus, “[a]t trial, the only relevant factual defense would be a 

showing that the motorist’s behavior was not, in fact, as the officer testified. It would 

then be for the trial court to resolve issues of credibility.” Dreisbach, 363 A.2d at

872.

Here, Trooper Doran testified that he observed what he considered to 

be unsafe driving and so stopped his vehicle to discuss the matter with Licensee. 

Upon approaching Licensee, Trooper Doran immediately observed signs of 

intoxication, to wit: glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of 

alcohol on the breath. Trooper Doran then conducted multiple field sobriety tests, 

some of which yielded indicators of intoxication in Licensee. Additionally, Trooper 

Doran testified that Licensee failed to provide an adequate breath sample for the 

PBT. As the trial court noted, “[i]t was the[se] observations[], along with his training 

and experience, that [led] Trooper Doran to believe [Licensee] was intoxicated and 

incapable of safe driving.” Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion dated March 2, 2022 (Trial 

Court Opinion) at 3; R.R. at 34a. Based on these observations by Trooper Doran, 

the trial court concluded as follows:

The [trial c]ourt believes the unsafe driving, bloodshot 

eyes, slurred speech, indicators on certain of the field 

sobriety tests, uncooperative conduct with respect to the 

breathalyzer, and strong odor of alcohol, viewed in 

totality, provided reasonable grounds for Trooper Doran 

to believe [Licensee] was operating his truck while under 

the influence.

Trial Court Opinion at 3-4; R.R. at 34a-35a.
9

We agree with the trial court. Trooper Doran’s observations, as 

described above, provided reasonable grounds for Trooper Doran to believe that 

Licensee was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol and to arrest 

Licensee based on that suspicion. See Yencha; Kachurak; Dreisbach. Licensee’s

arrest for suspected DUI then warranted Trooper Doran’s request that Licensee 

submit to chemical testing pursuant to the Implied Consent Law, which request 

Trooper Doran accordingly made and Licensee refused, despite having been warned 

of the consequences of such a refusal. See 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b). Accordingly, DOT 

met each element of its burden of proving its case, and the trial court appropriately 

denied Licensee’s statutory appeals.

For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of 

Licensee’s statutory appeals challenging his driver’s license suspension and 

commercial driver’s license disqualification. Accordingly, we affirm.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Veniamin Y. Kolosov, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, : Nos. 1324 C.D. 2021, 1325 C.D. 2021

Bureau of Driver Licensing :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2022, the November 1, 2021 

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County are AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge