UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

BISCAYNE CONTRACTORS, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 14-mc-284 (GK) 

JAMES REDDING, 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This case concerns the ongoing efforts of Plaintiff Biscayne 

Contractors, Inc. ("Plaintiff") to collect on a Final Judgment 

entered against Defendant James Redding ("Defendant" or "Redding") 

in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Case 

No. 13-765, Biscayne Contractors, Inc. v. James Redding. See 

Registration of Foreign Judgment [Dkt. No. 1]. As part of 

Plaintiff's collection efforts, on July 30, 2015, it obtained a 

Judgment of Condemnation against Garnishee Mohammed Abu-El-Hawa 

("Garnishee" or "Abu-El-Hawa"). See Order Granting Plaintiff's 

Motion for Judgment of Condemnation [Dkt. No. 13]. 

On September 2, 2015, Abu-El-Hawa filed a Motion to Set Aside 

the Judgment entered against him. Motion to Set Aside ·Judgment 

Entered Against Garnishee Mohammed Abu-El-Hawa ("Garnishee's Mot." 

or "Motion to Set Aside") [Dkt. No. 16]. On September 28, 2015, 

1 
Plaintiff filed its Opposition to Garnishee's Motion ("Opp.") 

[Dkt. No. 19], and on October 15, 2015, Abu-El-Hawa filed his Reply 

("Reply") [Dkt. No. 24]. 

On October 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to 

File Surreply ("Surreply") [Dkt. No. 26]. On December 1, 2015, the 

Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to file a Surreply and ordered 

the parties to file responses to questions the Court posed in the 

Order of December 1, 2015 Order [Dkt. No. 27]. On December 1, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed a Surreply [Dkt. No. 28]. On January 14, 2016, 

Plaintiff and Abu-El-Hawa both filed responses to the Court's 

December 1, 2016 Order. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in 

Opposition to Garnishee's Mot. To Set Aside Judgment ("Pl's Supp. 

Br.") [Dkt. No.· 29]; Garnishee's Response to Questions Posed in 

Court's December 1, 2015 Order ("Garnishee's Resp.") [Dkt. No. 

30] . 

Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and 

Sur reply, and the entire confusing record herein, and for the 

reasons that follow, Abu-El-Hawa' s Motion to set Aside Judgment 

shall be granted in. part.1 

1 Although it was not filed as a motion, Plaintiff's Opposition 

also included a request that the Court amend a previously entered 

Charging Order. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's request 

to amend the Charging Order shall be denied without prejudice. 

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I . BACKGOUND 

On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff Biscayne Contractors, Inc. filed 

with the Clerk of this Court a Final Judgment entered against 

Defendant James Redding in the District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia in Case No. 13-765, Biscayne Contractors, 

Inc. v. James Redding. See Registration of Foreign Judgment. 

On March 31, 2014, Garnishee Mohammed Abu-El-Hawa, along with 

Ahmad Ayyad, entered into an agreement with Defendant Redding to 

purchase an interest in Defendant's company, TMB Holdings, LLC. 

Under the agreement, Defendant transferred to Abu-El-Hawa and 

Mr. Ayyad a 49% interest in TBM Holdings, LLC in exchange for a 

Promissory Note ("the Note") with a principal amount of $350,000 

(i.e., Defendant gave Abu-El-Hawa and Mr. Ayyad a 49% interest in 

TBM Holdings, LLC in exchange for their promise to pay him $350,000 

at a future date) . According to Attachment A appended to the Note, 

Defendant Redding retained a 51% interest in TBM Holdings. 

Garnishee's Aff. at 10 [Dkt. No. 16-2]. 

On April 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Charging 

Order as to Defendant's interests in several companies, including 

TBM Holdings, LLC. Motion for a Charging Order [Dkt. No. 2]. On 

May 5, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for a Charging 

Order. Charging Order of May 5, 2014 ("the Charging Order") [Dkt. 

No. 3]. Among other things, the Charging Order states that "TBM 

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Holdings, LLC shall pay and/ or deliver over to Plaintiff all 

present and future proceeds, distributions, drawings, payments, 

and property to which Defendant may be entitled as a result of 

this interest in TBM Holdings, LLC[.]" Charging Order at 2. 

On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Charging Order with the 

D.C. Department of Regulatory and Consumer Affairs, and on August 

9, 2014, Plaintiff finally delivered a copy of the Charging Order 

to Abu-El-Hawa. 

On June 16, 2015, Plaintiff served on Abu-El-Hawa a Writ of 

Attachment on Judgment Other Than Wages, Salary and Commissions, 

by which Plaintiff sought to garnish the stream of payments due 

under the Note in order to satisfy its Judgment against Defendant. 

See Affidavit of Service [Dkt. No. 11]. Abu-El-Hawa, who was an 

experienced business man, did not retain an attorney and, acting 

pro se, failed to respond to the Writ. 

On July 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment of 

Condemnation Pursuant to Title 16, § 526(b) D.C. Code [Dkt. No. 

12], seeking a Judgment against Abu-El-Hawa in the amount of 

$350,000, i.e., the value of the Note Abu-El-Hawa and his partner 

had executed payable to Defendant. Because Abu-El-Hawa, still 

proceeding pro se, did not respond to Plaintiff's Motion for 

Judgment, on July 30, 2015, the Court entered an Order granting 

the Motion. Order of July 30, 2015 [Dkt. No. 13]. 

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On August 3, 2015, the Clerk of the Court entered a Judgment 

against Abu-El-Hawa in the amount of $350,000. Clerk's Judgment of 

August 3, 2015 ("the Judgment") [Dkt. No. 14]. Slightly less than 

a month later, on September 2, 2015, Abu-El-Hawa, having finally 

retained counsel, filed his Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, 

contending that the Judgment should be vacated under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60(b) because Abu-El-Hawa had already paid the 

$350,000 due on the Note and that his failure to respond to the 

Writ was due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect." Garnishee's Mot. at 4 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). 

After requesting an extension of time, which was granted on 

September 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Opposition, arguing that 

the Court should not vacate the Judgment because Abu-El-Hawa did 

not, in fact, pay off the Note; Abu-El-Hawa's default was willful; 

and Abu-El-Hawa made payments in violation of the Charging Order. 

Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. 

After requesting an extension of time, which was granted on 

October 15, 2015, Abu-El-Hawa filed his Reply. On October 22, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File Surreply along with 

a copy of the Sur reply itself, which was granted on December 1, 

2015 [Dkt. No. 27], and the Surreply was filed the same day. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure a district court is permitted to 'relieve a party or its 

legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding' 

on one of six enumerated grounds." Jarvis v. Parker, 13 F. Supp. 

3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)). What is 

relevant in this case is that Rule 60(b) permits a Court to vacate 

a judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect" or "any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60 (b) . "The party seeking relief under Rule 60 (b) bears the 

burden of showing that he or she is entitled to the relief." 

Jarvis, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (citing Norris v. Salazar, 277 F.R.D. 

22, 25 (D.D.C. 2011). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Garnishee's Motion to Set Aside 

Although Abu-El-Hawa is not the defendant in Plaintiff's 

action, the Judgment against him arose from his failure to respond 

to Plaintiff's filings, and thus, it is properly regarded as a 

default judgment. "Default judgments are not favored by modern 

courts, perhaps because it seems inherently unfair to use the 

court's power to enter and enforce judgments as a penalty for 

delays in filing." Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 

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1980). "Modern courts are also reluctant to enter and enforce 

judgments unwarranted by the facts." Id. 

In exercising the discretion to grant relief from a judgment 

courts should consider (1) whether the alleged defense is 

meritorious, (2) whether the default was willful, and (3) whether 

a set-aside would prejudice the ·plaintiff. Keegel v. Key W. & 

Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (setting 

forth three factors as they apply to motions to set aside under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (c)); Int' 1 Painters & Allied Trades Union & 

Indus. Pension Fund v. H.W. Ellis Painting Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 

22, 26 (D.D.C. 2003) (applying Keegel factors to motion under Rule 

60 (b)) . 

1. Merits of the Alleged Defense 

By his own admission, Abu-El-Hawa failed to respond to 

Plaintiff's filings and to make an appearance when he should have. 

For that reason, he faces a ~udgment in the amount of $350,000. 

However, Abu-El-Hawa claims to have a meritorious defense against 

the Judgement because he paid off the Note that gives rise to that 

Judgment. He claims he has already paid $350, 000 as the Note 

requires, and if the Judgment stands, he will have to pay another 

$350,000 to Plaintiff, Defendant's creditor. 

Needless to say, if he is correct, $350,000 would be a sizable 

"penalty for [a] delay[] in filing." Jackson, 636 F.2d at 835. If 

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Abu-El-Hawa did in fact pay the same debt earlier, and therefore 

would be paying it twice if the Judgment stands, the situation 

would weigh strongly in favor of granting relief. Wrecking Corp. 

of Am., Virginia v. Jersey Welding Supply, Inc., 463 A.2d 678, 680 

(D.C. 1983) ("[A] critical factor for this court [the D.C. Court 

of Appeals] to consider in reviewing the trial court's exercise of 

discretion is whether the garnishee was in fact indebted to the 

judgment debtor or possessed any property belonging to the 

debtor."). 

Many of the payments Abu-El-Hawa states were made in 

satisfaction of the Note were made from accounts bearing the names 

of Abu-El-Hawa's business interests rather than his personal 

account, and the vast majority of those same payments were made to 

Defendant's creditors rather than directly to Defendant himself as 

required in the Note. 

According to Plaintiff, none of these payments count as 

performance in satisfaction of the Note. Plaintiff points to 

language in the Note stating "Ahmad Ayyad and Mohammed Abu-El-Hawa 

[] promise[] to pay to the order of James T. Redding [] . the 

principal amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars and 00/100 

Cents[.]" Garnishee's Aff. at 5. Plaintiff takes this language to 

mean that only a check drawn on Abu-El-Hawa's personal account 

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made payable to James Redding could satisfy the $350,000 debt owed 

under the Note. 

While it is true that the record is not entirely clear as to 

whether all of the payments Abu-El-Hawa claims were made in 

satisfaction of the Note, Plaintiff is wrong that none of them 

were. 

It is black letter contract law that an obligor (in this case, 

Abu-El-Hawa) may fulfill his contractual obligations through 

performance that does not conform precisely to the terms of the 

contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 278 (1) (1981) 

("If an obligee accepts in satisfaction of the obligor's duty a 

performance offered by the obligor that differs from what is due, 

the duty is discharged."). Moreover, the fact that payments might 

have come from Abu-El-Hawa's business interests -- that is, from 

distinct legal persons-or institutions--does not preclude those 

payments from satisfying the Note. See id. § 278 (2) ("If an obligee 

accepts in satisfaction of the obligor's duty a performance offered 

by a third person, the duty is discharged . • II) • 2 

2 Abu-El-Hawa's payments from his business interests to Defendant's 

creditors might also be characterized as a "novation," which the 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines as a substituted 

contract that includes as a party one who was neither the obligor 

nor the obligee of the original duty." See Restatement (Second) 

of Contracts § 2 8 0 ( 1981) . "A novation discharges the original 

duty[.]" Id. Comment b. 

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Thus, as long as Defendant accepted payments made by Abu-ElHawa's business interests (rather than by Abu-El-Hawa himself) as 

well as payments made to Defendant's creditors (rather than to 

Defendant himself), then those payments would serve to satisfy 

Abu-El-Hawa's obligations under the Note. 

Abu-El-Hawa has offered sufficient proof that at least some 

of his payments satisfied these conditions. Abu-El-Hawa states in 

his affidavits that "the $350,000 owed pursuant to the promissory 

note generally went to pay creditors of TBM Holdings, LLC [in which 

Defendant still maintains a 51% interest] as of March 31, 2014," 

Abu-El-Hawa Aff. CJI 10 [Dkt. No. 16-2], and that "[p] ayments against 

the Note were made to creditors of Mr. Redding and his companies 

pursuant to Mr. Redding's explicit request." Abu-El-Hawa Deel. CJI 

Illustrations to § 280 demonstrate clearly that payment from 

someone other than the obligor and payment to someone other than 

the obligee may serve to satisfy a duty owed under the original 

contract. See id. Illustration to Comment d. ("A owes B $1, 000. B 

promises A that he will discharge the debt immediately if C will 

promise B to pay B $1,000. C so promises. There is a novation under 

which B's and C's promises are consideration for each other and A 

is discharged."); id. Illustration to Comment f. ("A owes B $1,000 

and B owes C $1,000. A promises B and C that he will assume B's 

debt to C if B promises to discharge A's debt to Band if C promises 

to discharge B's debt to C and accept A as his. debtor. Band C so 

promise. There is a novation under which A's promise and B's and 

C's promises are consideration for each other, and A's debt to B 

and B's debt to Care discharged."). Accordingly, under a novation 

theory, payments from businesses associated with Abu-El-Hawa to 

Defendant's creditors would have served to satisfy the Note as 

well. 

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1 [Dkt. No. 30-1]. For these reasons, Abu-El-Hawa claims, "I am 

not indebted to Defendant[.]" Abu-El-Hawa Aff. ~ 11. Abu-El-Hawa 

also cites Defendant's deposition testimony, which is not 

challenged by Plaintiff, to show that he accepted Abu-El-Hawa's 

payments on the Note. [Dkt. No. 12-3] at 8. 

Plaintiff does not challenge Abu-El-Hawa' s statements and 

Defendant's deposition testimony with contrary deposition 

testimony or competing affidavits. Instead, Plaintiff relies 

mainly upon its theory that Abu-El-Hawa could not tender -- and 

Defendant could not accept -- any performance in satisfaction of 

the Note other than a personal check from Abu-El-Hawa made out 

directly to Defendant. Pl.'s Opp'n at 10-11. 

For the first time in its Supplemental Brief, Plaintiff cites 

D.C. Code § 28:3-602 and § 28:3-301 in support of its theory. 

Plaintiff argues that a promissory note may only be satisfied 

through payments made to "person [ s] entitled to enforce" the 

promissory note. D.C. Code§ 28:3-602. A "person entitled to 

enforce" means "(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a 

holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who 

is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 28:3-

309 or 28:3-418(d). D.C. Code§ 28:3-301. 

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Although Plaintiff argues that none of the parties allegedly 

paid in satisfaction of the Note and accepted by Defendant fit 

into any of these categories, it has not provided any evidence to 

support that argument. In contrast, Garnishee has provided 

statements and testimony indicating that neither he nor Defendant 

disputes that TBM's creditors were entitled to receive payments on 

the Note. Thus, Plaintiff's mere theory of Abu-El-Hawa's 

obligations under the Note is not enough to condemn Abu-El-Hawa to 

pay the full amount of his substantial obligation twice. 

Nonetheless, the Court does not hold that Abu-El-Hawa has, in 

fact, satisfied all of the terms of the Note. Other defects with 

payments he claims to have made in satisfaction of the Note remain. 

Opp. At 11. Abu-El-Hawa submitted 5 payments totalling $18,855.98 

made before the Promissory Note was signed. The terms of the Note 

do not contemplate satisfaction by past payments, and in fact the 

terms appear to require future payment. See Garnishee's Aff. at 5-

12. Abu-El-Hawa's defense as to these payments would not be 

meritorious and the Judgment of Condemnation will stand against 

these payments. 

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant owned only 51% of TBM 

Holdings, LLC (a.k.a. Driftwood Kitchen), and was only responsible 

for 51% of its debts. Thus, Plaintiff argues that only 51% of the 

payments to creditors of TBM Holdings, LLC can constitute a payment 

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by Abu-El-Hawa on the Note. If this were true, the Court assumes 

that Abu-El-Hawa should only get credit for a portion of the 

payments made by MAAJ, Inc.3 (a.k.a. DarNa Restaurant and Lounge) 

corresponding to Defendant's ownership interest in MAAJ, Inc. 

Abu-El-Hawa asserts that the payments made to creditors of 

TBM Holdings, LLC were for debts incurred prior to the transfer of 

the 49% interest. He makes no parallel assertions with regard to 

the payments made by MAAJ, Inc. The Court finds that this defense 

might be meritorious if it were supported by appropriate 

documentation. At this time, the briefing and evidence submitted 

by both parties is inconclusive on this issue. The Court will 

reverse the Judgment of Condemnation as to these payments, and 

will accept further submissions by both parties as to what 

percentage of these payments can satisfy the Note. 

2. Willfulness 

Although Abu-El-Hawa's payment history and affidavit suggest 

strongly that a Judgment in the full amount of $350,000 is not 

supported by the facts, the Court must next consider whether AbuEl-Hawa's failure to respond to the Writ of Attachment on Judgment 

Other Than Wages, Salary and Commissions and its accompanying 

3 DarNa Restaurant and Lounge is the d/b/a for MAAJ, Inc., another 

restaurant owned in part by both Defendant and Abu-El-Hawa. Twelve 

of Abu-El-Hawa's alleged payments on the Note were made by MAAJ, 

Inc. or DarNa Restaurant and Lounge. 

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.. 

interrogatories ("the Writ") [ Dkt. Nos. 9, 11] was sufficiently 

willful to preclude relief. The Court concludes that it was not. 

"The boundary of willfulness lies somewheie between a case 

involving a negligent filing error, which is normally conside~ed 

an excusable failure to respond, and a deliberate decision to 

default, which is generally not excusable." Int'l Painters, 288 F. 

Supp. 2d at 26 (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Center Jewelry, 158 

F.3d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1998)). In order to discern on which side 

of the boundary Abu-El-Hawa's conduct falls, both Parties point to 

an opinion from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: 

Wrecking Corp. of Am., Virginia v. Jersey Welding Supply, Inc., 

463 A.2d 678 (D.C. 1983). 

In Wrecking Corp., the D. C. Court of Appeals overturned a 

trial court's denial of Wrecking Corporation of America's 

("Wrecking Corp.") motion to reconsider a judgment of condemnation 

in the amount of $5,271.70 entered against Wrecking Corp. 463 A.2d 

at 678-79. Like Abu-El-Hawa, Wrecking Corp. produced evidence 

showing that it neither owed a debt to the judgment debtor nor 

held property belonging to it, but, again like Abu-El-Hawa, 

Wrecking Corp. had failed to respond to the plaintiff's writ of 

attachment. Id. Unlike Abu-El-Hawa, however, Wrecking Corp. did 

respond to the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of condemnation. 

Id. On those facts, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that "the trial 

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court abused its discretion in not vacating the judgment of 

condemnation." Id. at 680. 

Abu-El-Hawa's failure to respond even after being served with 

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Condemnation is significant. 

However, while Abu-El-Hawa, who was unrepresented by counsel until 

shortly before filing his Motion to Set Aside, failed to formally 

respond to Plaintiff's filings, he did cooperate with Plaintiff's 

counsel and provided responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests 

on a number of occasions beginning in late 2014. 

For example, on December 19, 2014, Abu-El-Hawa provided 

documents to Plaintiff. Garnishee's Aff. at 14-38 [Dkt. No. 16-

2]. He provided additional information to Plaintiff in early 2015, 

and on June 23, 2015, sent Plaintiff copies of checks evidencing 

other payments on the Note. Id. at 44-70. Even while Abu-El-Hawa 

was neglecting his duty to respond to Plaintiff's Motion for 

Judgment of Condemnation, which was filed on July 9, 2015, he sent 

Plaintiff additional evidence of payments on the Note on July 15, 

2015 and August 10, 2015. Id. at 72-86. 

Thus, despite Abu-El-Hawa' s failure to formally respond to 

Plaintiff's filings, he actually provided Plaintiff with much of 

the information it sought. Abu-El-Hawa's informal cooperation 

definitely cuts against a finding of willfulness. 

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However, Plaintiff contends that Abu-El-Hawa demonstrated 

willfulness by making a payment to Defendant from the assets of 

TBM Holdings, LLC in violation of the terms of the May 5, 2014 

Charging Order. Plaintiff contends, and Abu-El-Hawa does not deny, 

that Abu-El-Hawa did not receive actual notice of the Charging 

Order until August 9, 2014. The Court has not seen any evidence 

that Abu-El-Hawa, operating pro se, had any knowledge of the 

restrictions of the Charging Order before August 9, 2014 or of any 

obligations associated with these proceedings before that date. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Abu-El-Hawa did not willfully fail 

to respond before he had actual notice of the Charging Order and 

these proceedings. However, Abu-El-Hawa's decision to direct TBM 

Holdings, LLC to make payments in violation of the Charging Order 

after he had actual notice does cut in favor of a finding of 

willfulness. 

Finally, Abu-El-Hawa did not unreasonably delay in his 

attempt to set aside the Judgment after it had been entered. The 

Clerk of Court entered the Judgment against Abu-El-Hawa on August 

3, 2015. Having finally hired an attorney, less than a month later 

on September 2, 2015, Abu-El-Hawa filed his Motion to Set Aside 

Judgment entered against him. 

Thus, the Court finds that Abu-El-Hawa's failure to respond 

was willful after August 9, 2014, when he had actual notice of the 

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Charging Order, and by extension of these proceedings. The Court's 

Judgment of Condemnation will therefore stand as to the $59,000 in 

payments Abu-El-Hawa made after August 9, 2014. 

As to the remaining payments, while Abu-El-Hawa 

unquestionably failed to comply with his duty to respond to 

Plaintiff's filings, his failure was not so willful as to merit 

the penalty of potentially paying the full $350,000 debt twice. 

The Judgement of Condemnation is therefore reversed as to the 

remaining $272,144.02 that was neither paid before the date of the 

Note (see supra at 12) nor after Abu-El-Hawa had actual notice of 

the Charging Order. 

3. Prejudice to the Plaintiff 

Finally, the Court must consider any prejudice to Plaintiff 

that granting Abu-El-Hawa's Motion to Set Aside would cause. As 

the facts above make clear, it would appear that Abu-El-Hawa has 

already paid a large portion of the amount due on the Note. 

Substantively, therefore, setting aside the Judgment would not 

prejudice Plaintiff as much as deny it the opportunity to receive 

a windfall in the form of an additional source from which to 

collect on its Final Judgment against Defendant James Redding. 4 

4 The Court is well aware that Defendant is currently incarcerated 

for two years. However, that information is of no relevance in 

this instance. 

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that partial relief from the 

Judgment entered against Abu-El-Hawa is justified under Rule 

60 (b) . 

B. Plaintiff's Request to Amend the Charging Order 

In its Opposition, Plaintiff requests that the Court clarify 

the Charging Order to state that Plaintiff has a lien on 100% of 

TBM Holdings, LLC rather than just the 51% retained by Defendant. 

Defendant's sale of a 49% interest in TBM Holdings, LLC on March 

31, 2014 preceded issuance of the Charging Order on May 5, 2014, 

so it is not clear why the lien should extend to Abu-El-Hawa's 

interest in TBM Holdings, LLC. Plaintiff appears to contend that 

a lien against Defendant's interest would extend to Abu-El-Hawa's 

interest until the Note was fully satisfied. However, because the 

record and the Parties' briefs on these points remain unclear, the 

Court denies Plaintiff's request without prejudice. Plaintiff 

remains free to renew its request as a separate motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Abu-El-Hawa's Motion to Set Aside 

Judgment shall be granted in part and denied in part; and 

Plaintiff's request that the Court amend the Charging Order shall 

be denied without prejudice. The Judgment entered against Abu-ElHawa shall be reversed and reduced by $272,144.02. The Judgment of 

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Condemnation shall be amended to $77,855.98. An Order shall 

accompany this Memorandum Opinion. 

November ~'f, 2016 

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF 

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