[Cite as State v. Taylor-Hollingsworth, 2023-Ohio-4435.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

 No. 22AP-527

v. : (C.P.C. No. 18CR-4855)

Richard J. Taylor-Hollingsworth, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on December 7, 2023

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Michael A. Walsh for appellee.

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Robert D. 

Essex for appellant.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

MENTEL, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Richard J. Taylor-Hollingsworth, appeals from the 

August 10, 2022 judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentencing 

him to an aggregate term of 16 years in prison for committing the offenses of aggravated 

robbery and felonious assault. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On September 28, 2018, appellant was indicted by a Franklin County Grand 

Jury for aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, a felony of the first degree (Count 

One); felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony of the second degree (Count 

Two); and having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of the third 

degree (Count Three). Counts One and Two also included firearm and repeat violent 

offender specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A) and 2941.149(A), respectively.
No. 22AP-527 2

{¶ 3} On October 10, 2018, appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,

to aggravated robbery and felonious assault with firearm specifications, in exchange for 

dismissal of the having weapons while under disability count and the repeat violent 

offender specifications. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea and immediately moved 

to a sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced

appellant to serve an aggregate term of 16 years in prison. Specifically, the trial court 

ordered appellant to serve ten years of incarceration for aggravated robbery, with a 

consecutive three-year sentence for the firearm specification, and seven years for felonious 

assault, with a consecutive three-year sentence for the firearm specification. The trial court

ordered the felonious assault and aggravated robbery sentences to be run concurrent with

each other, and the firearm specifications to run consecutive to the primary convictions.

Appellant appealed the trial court’s sentence arguing that the plea was not made knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court did not give any advisement concerning 

the mandatory imposition of post-release control. On January 30, 2020, this court found 

the trial court plainly erred during the plea colloquy by failing to advise appellant that the 

sentence included a mandatory term of post-release control. State v. TaylorHollingsworth, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-873, 2020-Ohio-278, discretionary appeal not 

allowed, 2020-Ohio-3018. Accordingly, we vacated appellant’s plea and remanded the 

matter back to the trial court. 

{¶ 4} On August 10, 2022, the trial court held a second sentencing hearing in this 

matter. Appellant, after being advised of his rights pursuant to Crim.R. 11, entered a plea 

of guilty to the aggravated robbery and felonious assault offenses with firearm 

specifications. The having weapons while under disability charge and repeat violent 

offender specifications were dismissed nolle prosequi. 

{¶ 5} The parties proceeded to a sentencing hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.19. 

During the hearing, the state delivered an oral summary of the case. Counsel for the 

appellant raised no objection to the state’s recitation of the underlying facts. (Aug. 10, 2022 

Tr. at 6-7.)

{¶ 6} According to the state, on August 27, 2017, at approximately 1:32 a.m., the 

victims in this case, M.B. and G.T., stopped at the Sunoco gas station located at 2281 

Sullivant Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. As M.B.—wearing a large gold chain—exited his 
No. 22AP-527 3

vehicle, he observed G.T. speaking with two individuals, one of which was later identified 

as appellant. G.T. heard the two individuals state that they could rob M.B. Appellant then

proceeded to brandish a firearm. To avoid an altercation, M.B. continued into the Sunoco 

gas station store. Surveillance video showed that appellant followed M.B. and chased him

around the inside of the store. Appellant pursued M.B out of the store and down a nearby 

alleyway. Appellant then shot M.B. in the back. While on the ground, appellant ripped the 

chain off M.B.’s neck. While the unidentified individual told appellant to kill M.B, appellant

declined and fled the scene.

{¶ 7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 

16 years in prison. Specifically, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years of 

incarceration for aggravated robbery with an additional three-year sentence for the firearm 

specification. The trial court also imposed seven years of incarceration for the felonious 

assault with an additional three-year sentence for the firearm specification. While trial 

court determined that the aggravated robbery and felonious assault convictions did not 

merge, it ordered the convictions to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to the 

firearms specifications. The trial court found appellant was entitled to 225 days of jail-time 

credit.

{¶ 8} Appellant filed a timely appeal in this matter.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 9} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:

The trial court erred in failing to merge Mr. Taylor Hollingsworth’s 

convictions in counts one and two at sentencing in violation of R.C. 2941.25, 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 

Article I, Section 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 10} A trial court’s decision as to whether multiple offenses merge, pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.25, is a judicial determination, which we review de novo. State v. Bailey, __ 

Ohio St. __, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 6, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio5699, ¶ 1; State v. McKnight, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-595, 2022-Ohio-591, ¶ 34, citing State v. 

Flood, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-206, 2019-Ohio-2524, ¶ 25. 
No. 22AP-527 4

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Appellant’s Sole Assignment of Error

{¶ 11} In appellant’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred by 

failing to merge the aggravated robbery and felonious assault convictions.

{¶ 12} The legal doctrine of merger is rooted in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Pendleton, 163 Ohio St.3d 114, 2020-Ohio6833, ¶ 8. The Ohio Constitution similarly provides, “[n]o person shall be twice put in 

jeopardy for the same offense.” Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. Among the 

protections afforded under the Double Jeopardy Clause, is the protection against multiple 

punishments for the same offense. State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 13} The General Assembly codified the judicial doctrine of merger in 

R.C. 2941.25. The statute precludes the “cumulative punishment of a defendant for the 

same criminal act where his conduct can be construed to constitute two statutory offenses, 

when in substance and effect, only one offense has been committed.” State v. Roberts, 62 

Ohio St.2d 170, 172-73 (1980). R.C. 2941.25 directs:

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two 

or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may 

contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of 

only one.

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the 

same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to 

each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 

and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

{¶ 14} Ohio’s felonious assault statute, R.C. 2903.11(A), provides: “(A) No person 

shall knowingly do either of the following: (1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to 

another’s unborn; (2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s 

unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” Additionally, the offense of 

aggravated robbery, as set forth under R.C. 2911.01, is defined as:

(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 

section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the 

attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
No. 22AP-527 5

(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the 

offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that 

the offender possesses it, or use it;

(2) Have a dangerous ordnance on or about the offender’s person or under 

the offender’s control;

(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another.

{¶ 15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has shaped the nature of our allied-offenses 

analysis under R.C. 2941.25 through its evolving interpretations of the statute. See, e.g.,

State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126 (1979); State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170 (1980); State 

v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254 (1980); State v. Donald, 57 Ohio St.2d 73 (1979); State v. 

Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116 (1988); State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632 (1999); State v. 

Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625; State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-

Ohio-6314. 

{¶ 16} In Ruff, the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Johnson to resolve when

two or more offenses are allied offenses of a similar import as contemplated under 

R.C. 2941.25. State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 1. The Ruff court found

that when engaging in R.C. 2941.25 analysis, “courts must evaluate three separate factors—

the conduct, the animus, and the import.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. 

Harris, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-683, 2016-Ohio-3424, ¶ 42. The Supreme Court explained that

when determining whether two or more offenses are allied offenses of a similar import as 

contemplated under R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions: 

(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they 

committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus 

or motivation? 

Ruff at ¶ 31.

{¶ 17} An answer in the affirmative to any of the above questions will permit 

separate convictions. State v. Bailey, __Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 10, citing State 

v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12, citing Ruff at ¶ 31. “At its heart, the 

allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses 

on the defendant’s conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26. When determining whether multiple offenses 

merge pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, a court must review the entire record. State v. Junod, 3d 
No. 22AP-527 6

Dist. No. 10-18-08, 2019-Ohio-743, ¶ 60, citing State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 

2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 18} Since Ruff, the Supreme Court has rejected “a bright-line rule for analyzing 

the issue of multiple punishments because a one-size-fits-all rule will not work in every 

situation. [Ruff] at ¶ 30. Rather, an allied-offenses analysis must be driven by the facts of 

each case.” State v. Ramunas, __Ohio St.3d__, 2022-Ohio-4199, ¶ 22 (Fischer, J., 

dissenting). “[B]ecause an offense may be committed in a variety of ways[,] and the 

offenses committed may have different import,” the Ruff analysis must focus on the 

appellant’s conduct to resolve whether one or more convictions may result. Ramunas at

¶ 22 (Fischer, J., dissenting). While a court’s R.C. 2941.25 analysis has been properly 

applied as a legal question, “it necessarily turns on an analysis of the facts, which can lead 

to exceedingly fine distinctions.” Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, at ¶ 11.

{¶ 19} Whether two offenses merge is a sentencing question and not an additional 

burden of proof shouldered by the state. Washington at ¶ 18. The defendant holds the 

burden to establish their entitlement to the protections under R.C. 2941.25 against multiple 

punishments for a single criminal act. Id.; see also State v. Morris, 12th Dist. No. CA2019-

12-205, 2020-Ohio-4103, ¶ 15, citing State v. Conrad, 12th Dist. No. CA2018-01-016, 2018-

Ohio-5291, ¶ 44 (finding defendant failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that his 

convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping were allied 

offenses as the facts indicated that the crimes were each committed separately and with a 

separate animus).1

1 There is no dispute regarding the underlying facts that form the basis for the felonious assault conviction, 

i.e., appellant shooting M.B. in the back causing him serious physical harm. However, the state contends there 

are three separate incidents that could constitute aggravated robbery: (1) when M.B. saw appellant outside 

the Sunoco and overheard, “we can rob this guy” before appellant pulled out a gun, which resulted in M.B. 

fleeing into the store; (2) when appellant chased M.B. around the interior of the store while brandishing a 

firearm; and (3) when appellant, while holding a gun and having just shot M.B, ripped the chain from the 

victim’s neck. While appellant solely discusses the third theory in its brief, the state argues the first two 

theories are equally available as a basis to find that the felonious assault and aggravated robbery convictions 

were separate offenses. The state reasons that because appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01, felony of the first degree, the nature of the aggravated robbery was never narrowed 

to a single theory. The state also points to the language in the indictment and bill of particulars that support 

both R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (A)(2) analysis. Concerning the first two theories, the state posits that because the 

aggravated robbery was completed before the felonious assault, the offenses were committed separately and 

do not merge. “[I]f one offense is completed before the other begins, the offenses are considered separately 

for sentencing purposes even though the two offenses may have been committed in close proximity in time.” 

State v. Fields, 12th Dist. No. CA2014-3-025, 2015-Ohio-1345, ¶ 18. However, because we find that the 
No. 22AP-527 7

1. Offenses dissimilar in import or significance

{¶ 20} Our analysis begins and ends with the first prong of the Ruff analysis—

whether the offenses were dissimilar in import and significance. There are two 

circumstances in which offenses will be considered dissimilar in import making sentences 

of multiple counts permissible. The first is “ ‘[w]hen a defendant’s conduct victimizes more 

than one person [because] the harm for each person is separate and distinct.’ * * * The 

second circumstance is when a defendant’s conduct against a single victim constitutes two 

or more offenses and ‘the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable 

from the harm of the other offense.’ ” Ramunas at ¶ 23 (Fischer, J., dissenting), quoting

Ruff at ¶ 26. As this case concerns a single victim, we will focus our analysis on whether the 

harm from the offenses of felonious assault and aggravated robbery was separate and 

identifiable. 

{¶ 21} Offenses are “ ‘not allied offenses of similar import if neither [offense] is 

incident to the other.’ ” State v. Bishop, 1st Dist. No. C-220231, 2023-Ohio-947, ¶ 18, 

quoting Ruff at ¶ 23. In conducting an analysis of whether two offenses are allied offenses 

of similar import, we must look beyond the statutory elements and focus on the defendant’s 

conduct. Flood, 2019-Ohio-2524, at ¶ 29. The evidence at trial, or during a plea and 

sentencing hearing, will determine whether the offenses are of a similar import. Ruff at 

¶ 26. 

{¶ 22} In the present case, first harm occurred when appellant committed the 

felonious assault by shooting M.B. in the back as he fled down an alleyway. This harm 

would have occurred had appellant elected not to steal the victim’s chain. The second harm,

derived from the aggravated robbery, occurred when appellant stole M.B.’s chain resulting

in the loss of property. These are two, separate and identifiable harms that preclude merger 

under R.C. 2941.25(B). 

{¶ 23} Likewise, the resulting harms are fundamentally distinct in their import. The 

word “import” in the context of allied offenses means “ ‘offenses of similar importance, 

consequence and signification.’ ” Thundercloud v. Ross Corr. Inst., S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv4747, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48869, *21 (Mar. 16, 2021), quoting State v. Baer, 67 Ohio 

felonious assault and aggravated robbery do not merge under the third theory, which is the basis for 

appellant’s argument, we decline to resolve the state’s alternative arguments.
No. 22AP-527 8

St.2d 220, 226 (1981). “[O]ffenses are not allied offenses of similar import if they are not 

alike in their significance and their resulting harm.” Ruff at ¶ 21. Here, the harm from the 

felonious assault was a serious bodily injury, i.e., a bullet wound to M.B.’s back, while the 

harm suffered from the aggravated robbery was the loss of a gold chain. Due to the disparity 

in the resulting harm caused by a bullet wound as compared to the loss of property, we 

cannot find that these offenses are of a similar import.

{¶ 24} Our resolution of the first prong in the Ruff analysis aligns with numerous

Ohio courts that have found the offenses of felonious assault and aggravated robbery were 

dissimilar in import and significance. See, e.g., State v. Gambino, 11th Dist. No. 2021-T0018, 2022-Ohio-1554, ¶ 49 (finding the “grave injuries” inflicted upon the victim during 

the felonious assault and the subsequent harm from the aggregated robbery—the loss of a 

wallet, keys, and cellphone after appellant shot the victim—were separate, identifiable

harms); State v. Gillespie, 12th Dist. No. CA2021-01-004, 2021-Ohio-3650, ¶ 46-47

(finding merger did not apply to appellant’s aggravated robbery and felonious assault 

convictions as the harm from depriving the victim of $18 cash was separate and identifiable 

from the harm of repeatedly hitting the victim with a revolver); State v. Martin, 6th Dist. 

No. L-19-1133, 2021-Ohio-1615, ¶ 37 (concluding the harm from the felonious assault—

physical injury to the victim caused by several strikes to his head and body—and the harm 

from the aggravated robbery—loss of property—were separate and identifiable); State v. 

Shannon, 5th Dist. No. 2020 CA 51, 2021-Ohio-1396, ¶ 18-19 (concluding the offenses of 

aiding and abetting felonious assault and aiding and abetting aggravated robbery resulted 

in separate, identifiable harms); State v. Tellis, 6th Dist. No. WD-19-050, 2020-Ohio-6982, 

¶ 80 (finding the harm and injuries from the felonious assault—striking the victim with a 

pistol and causing her to hit the concrete floor—prior to the harm caused by the aggravated 

robbery—the loss of her cellphone and $1,200—were separate and identifiable harms);

State v. Evans, 8th Dist. No. 108648, 2020-Ohio-3968, ¶ 123 (finding the offenses of 

felonious assault and aggravated robbery were dissimilar in import, and therefore did not 

merge, as they caused separate, identifiable harms); State v. McLaughlin, 5th Dist. No. 

CT2017-0104, 2018-Ohio-2333, ¶ 30 (finding the felonious assault did not merge with the 

aggravated robbery, kidnapping, or theft offenses as the harm to the victim was separate 

and distinct); State v. Harmon, 2d Dist. No. 26883, 2017-Ohio-8106, ¶ 65 (concluding the 
No. 22AP-527 9

offense of felonious assault—brandishing the firearm and shooting the victim in the face—

prior to the robbery—taking a t-shirt from the victim’s bedroom—resulted in separate and 

identifiable harms); State v. Knight, 12th Dist. No. CA2016-02-028, 2016-Ohio-7991, ¶ 19 

(finding merger did not apply to appellant’s felonious assault and aggravated robbery 

convictions when the harm of robbing the victim at gunpoint while stealing money from a 

vault was separate from the harm of striking the victim in the head with a gun); State v. 

Napier, 5th Dist. No. CT2015-0044, 2016-Ohio-2967, ¶ 32 (finding the commission of the

felonious assault offense—striking the victim in the mouth knocking out his tooth—prior to

the aggravated robbery offense—using a firearm to take the victim’s money—caused 

separate, identifiable harms).

{¶ 25} Appellant alleges that the “felonious assault was incidental to and in 

furtherance of the aggravated robbery.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9.) Appellant cites the Eighth

District Court of Appeals decision in State v. Sutton, 8th Dist. No. 102300, 2015-Ohio-4074

as instructive. Appellant acknowledges that while Sutton did not find the felonious assault 

and aggravated robbery merged, the facts of this case fill in the gaps that were fatal to the 

analysis in Sutton. A brief review is instructive.

{¶ 26} In Sutton, the defendant lured the victim to her home for the alleged purpose 

to have sex for hire but with the true intention of robbing him by force. Once the victim 

entered the home and undressed in the bedroom, the defendant’s boyfriend entered the 

room. Upon the boyfriend entering the bedroom, Swanson reached for his firearm, which 

was located in his discarded pants. An altercation ensued over control of a firearm. Id. at 

¶ 4. During the altercation, the boyfriend obtained control of the gun and shot the victim 

from a distance of ten feet. Sutton then threw the victim’s car keys outside and left the 

residence with the boyfriend, who was carrying the victim’s firearm. Id. at ¶ 6. Sutton was 

later found guilty of, among other offenses, aggravated robbery and felonious assault. The 

trial court concluded that the offenses did not merge as they were not allied offenses. While 

the Eighth District Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the felonious assault 

and aggravated robbery did not merge as the offenses were committed with a separate 

animus, it did find that because the serious physical harm element in both counts reference 

the same gun-related injuries suffered by the victim, the offenses were of a similar import.

Id. at ¶ 60.
No. 22AP-527 10

{¶ 27} Upon review, Sutton is distinct from the instant case in several ways. In 

Sutton, the shot occurred after an altercation over control of the gun. Here, the felonious 

assault and resulting harm, i.e., gunshot wound, occurred after M.B. attempted to evade

appellant by fleeing down an alleyway. Moreover, unlike Sutton, the indictment in this case 

was not specific as to the serious physical harm element in the aggravated robbery charge.

As such, even under appellant’s theory of the case, the possession or brandishing of the 

firearm while taking the chain could just as easily form the basis for an aggravated robbery 

conviction as utilizing the serious physical harm element, i.e., the gunshot wound. Finally, 

Sutton was charged with setting up the victim while her boyfriend committed the

aggravated robbery. Here, appellant acted alone in shooting M.B. before stealing his gold 

chain. As often is the case when resolving whether offenses are of a similar import, the 

R.C. 2941.25 analysis turns on the particular facts, “which can lead to exceedingly fine 

distinctions.” Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, at ¶ 11. Given the differing fact patterns, as well as 

the abundance of caselaw that has found felonious assault and aggravated robbery offenses

resulted in separate, identifiable harms, appellant’s reliance on Sutton is misplaced.

{¶ 28} Accordingly, we find that the offenses of felonious assault and aggravated 

robbery were dissimilar in their import and significance. Because appellant has failed to 

demonstrate all the elements under the Ruff analysis, we decline to examine the remaining 

factors. McKnight, 2022-Ohio-591, at ¶ 35 (“We note again that Ruff directed that if any 

one of the three prongs is met, the counts do not merge.”).

{¶ 29} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

V. CONCLUSION

{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s sole assignment of 

error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.

_____________