United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-1559

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Robert John Farrell, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 08-1561 District Court for the 

___________ District of South Dakota.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Angelita Magat Farrell, *

*

Appellant. *

____________

Submitted: November 11, 2008

Filed: April 17, 2009

___________

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
1

The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

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___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Robert John Farrell and Angelita Magat Farrell of four counts

of peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1581, one count of conspiracy to commit

peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, two counts of making false statements in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, one count of visa fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1546, and one count of document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592. The

Farrells appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict

as to the charges of peonage, conspiracy to commit peonage, and document servitude.

The Farrells further argue that the district court1

 erred in admitting certain expert

testimony. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the convictions. 

I.

The Farrells own and operate the Comfort Inn & Suites in Oacoma, South

Dakota. In both 2005 and 2006, the Farrells contracted to bring nine non-immigrant

workers from the Philippines to the United States under temporary visas for the stated

purpose of working as housekeepers in their hotel. The Government charged the

Farrells with committing crimes against four of the nine. The Farrells assert that the

Government presented insufficient evidence at trial to allow a reasonable jury to

convict them of peonage, conspiracy to commit peonage, and document servitude. 

“This court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction de

novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving

conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that

support the verdict.” United States v. Phythian, 529 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2008) 
-3-

(quotation omitted). This court will “reverse only if no reasonable jury could have

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus,

we recount the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict.

A. First Application for Non-Immigrant Workers—2005

While visiting family in the Phillippines in 2005, the Farrells began actively

recruiting Filipino workers to come and work for them in the United States. After

soliciting several individuals, the Farrells submitted an I-129 Petition for a

Nonimmigrant Worker (“Petition”) to the Department of Homeland Security on

August 17, 2005. The Petition stated that they were seeking housekeepers from

October 1, 2005, until January 31, 2006, at a salary of $300 per week. The Farrells

were required to pay the government a one-time processing fee of $1200 with the

submission of the Petition. 

In addition to the Petition, the Farrells drafted employment contracts for each

of the nine workers they had solicited. As with the Petition, these contracts stated that

the Farrells would employ the workers as housekeepers and that the workers would

work six days per week for eight hours each day. The contracts set compensation at

$6.05 per hour and also provided for holiday and overtime pay. In addition to these

provisions, the contracts stated that the Farrells were responsible for housing the

workers and that each worker would reimburse the Farrells $150 per month for this

expense. The contracts also provided that the Farrells were responsible for the cost

of transportation to and from the United States, as required by law. After the Farrells

submitted the Petition and drafted the employment contracts, the workers filed their

applications for non-immigrant visas with the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Phillippines.

The applications reflected the terms of the employment contracts as recounted above,

including the promise that the Farrells would pay for the workers’ transportation to

and from the United States. 
-4-

Prior to the consular officers’ adjudication of the workers’ visa applications, the

workers met with the Farrells in a Manila hotel. During this meeting, the Farrells

prepped the workers for the visa interviews at the Embassy. The Farrells also revealed

additional details about the job, including the fact that despite the provisions in the

employment contracts and the requirements of U.S. law, the Farrells would not

reimburse the workers for transportation to and from the United States. The Farrells

stressed, however, that the workers’ visas would be denied if the workers told this

information to the consular officers and that they should refrain from mentioning it.

The Farrells further stated that despite the contractual provisions, the workers would

not receive holiday or overtime pay. Finally, the Farrells informed the workers that

the $1200 Petition-processing fee would be divided equally among them. 

Thus, upon leaving for the United States, the workers were under the

impression that they would be making $6.05 per hour and working eight-hour days

for six days each week. They also knew that they would be responsible for

reimbursing the Farrells for the cost of transportation to and from the country, as well

as one-ninth of the processing fee. Despite beginning the employment relationship

financially indebted to the Farrells, the workers anticipated being able to pay back the

money soon after their employment began. Many looked forward to working in the

United States because the Philippines is a “poor country” with a “high unemployment

rate” and “great corruption,” and they anticipated that even with the debt payments,

they would be able to send money home to their families. The U.S. Embassy

approved the visas.

When the workers arrived in South Dakota in November 2005, the employment

situation was not as they had anticipated. Angelita immediately required the workers

to surrender their passports, visas, and immigration documents. Many of the workers

were reluctant to do so but obeyed out of the “honor and respect” Filipino culture

demanded they show their employers. Upon starting their jobs, the Farrells informed

the workers that instead of an hourly wage they would be paid $3 per room. Because
-5-

it took around one hour to clean a room to the Farrells’ standards, the workers were

making approximately one-half the wage the Farrells had promised (and had included

in the paperwork), which was well under minimum wage. If the rooms were not up

to the Farrells’ standards, Robert told the workers they would not be paid at all. The

Farrells further informed the workers that each of the nine would be individually

responsible for the entire amount of the $1200 processing fee, despite the fact that the

Farrells only paid the fee once.

In addition to the processing fee, the Farrells began charging the workers for

transportation to and from work (which had not been agreed to in the employment

contract) and began charging them for personal items that the workers neither

requested nor desired. Thus, once in the United States, the workers’ debt increased

dramatically while the income with which they anticipated being able to pay down

that debt had decreased by at least one-half. Recognizing that the workers would not

be able to pay their increasing debt from their hotel paychecks, the Farrells required

that the workers obtain outside employment. The Farrells facilitated the workers’

interviews at local fast-food restaurants and other service-industry establishments.

Many of the locations where the workers interviewed eventually employed the

workers, in direct violation of their visas.

Other than when at their non-hotel employment, the workers spent little time

away from the hotel. This was, in part, because of the manner in which the Farrells

controlled the workers’ free time. The workers were not permitted to leave their

shared apartment, even to visit the drug store, without asking permission from either

the Farrells or the hotel manager, Alma Navarro. Frequently, the Farrells told the

workers that they were not to speak with anyone outside of the hotel and that they

were prohibited from socializing with Americans. The prohibition against speaking

to other people went so far as to preclude the workers from speaking to the nonFilipino workers who were employed at the same hotel.
-6-

When American co-workers at one of the fast-food restaurants invited several

of the workers to go bowling, Robert insisted on driving the workers to the alley and

remained there to supervise them. This was despite the fact that a co-worker had

volunteered to drive the workers home when they were finished. At one point,

without asking permission, several of the workers accepted an invitation from the fastfood-restaurant shift manager to visit a local bar. The workers did not miss their

scheduled shifts at the hotel, and there was no evidence that the activity otherwise

interfered with the workers’ employment there. When the workers returned from the

outing, however, the Farrells summoned them into the hotel office and proceeded to

reprimand them for disobeying the rules against socialization. The workers testified

that they were afraid of Robert. The Farrells even told the workers that they were not

to accept rides from their co-workers, meaning that many were required to walk home

from work in the freezing cold and snow.

In addition to the explicit prohibitions the Farrells placed on the workers, the

workers’ use of their free time was also constricted by the fact that they had very little

of it. Far from the eight-hour days the workers had anticipated, they regularly worked

upwards of thirteen hours per day, seven days a week, frequently traveling directly

from the hotel to their outside employment or vice versa. The workers’ living

situation was also not as anticipated. The Farrells did provide housing, but seven

workers were required to share one two-bedroom apartment. The Farrells paid only

$375 per month for the lease but still charged the workers $150 per person per month.

The workers were not given a key to the apartment; rather, Angelita and Navarro

retained possession of the key. The workers were thus forced to leave the door to the

apartment unlocked at all times. Frequently, Angelita would arrive at the residence

unannounced, enter the premises, and search through the workers’ belongings. In

another invasion of the workers’ privacy, Navarro would watch while the workers

opened their personal mail, all of which was sent to the hotel. The Farrells had told

the workers that the apartment was not registered with the post office and that their

mail would be lost if sent directly there. 
2

A balikbayan box is a small cardboard or wooden box that Filipinos living

abroad use to send gifts back to the Philippines. Given its purpose and size, it is

clearly not an appropriate method of travel for a living human being. 

-7-

Despite the volume of work, the workers’ income was still insufficient to meet

their mounting debt obligations. Motivated by the workers’ inability to pay their

debts, the Farrells instituted a debt-prioritization scheme. As part of this plan, the

Farrells required each of the workers to provide a breakdown of all of the paychecks

that they had received while in the country, including those from their outside

employment. In this accounting, the workers were also required to indicate how much

they had sent back to the Philippines and the purpose for which the money had been

sent. The Farrells also required a breakdown of each of the worker’s expenses in

South Dakota, including food, personal items, and telephone calls. The Farrells told

the workers that this accounting would allow the Farrells to determine how much

money they would allow each worker to spend and send home. One worker testified

that these requirements meant that she gave the Farrells over ninety percent of her

weekly income. When another worker pleaded to be allowed to keep more money so

she could pay for her sister’s tuition in the Philippines, the Farrells refused. 

To ensure that the workers adhered to their debt-prioritization scheme, the

Farrells forced the workers to sign contracts guaranteeing repayment and kept detailed

records of each worker’s debt. The Farrells would regularly hold meetings with the

workers during which they consulted their debt logs and severely berated the workers

for missteps at the hotel or spending money without permission. Robert always

emphasized the importance of debt repayment at these meetings, and to punctuate his

point, he frequently threatened to ship the workers back to the Philippines in a

“balikbayan box”2

 if they attempted to run away or do anything behind the Farrells’

backs. The Farrells also stressed that the workers were in the United States by their

grace and that if the workers avoided their payment obligation the Farrells would call

immigration authorities. Following each group meeting, the Farrells held individual

meetings with the workers to discuss each person’s debt in detail. The workers
-8-

testified that they were frequently scolded for spending too much money. Ultimately,

prior to the workers’ first departure from the United States, the Farrells required those

employed at the fast-food restaurant to endorse their last paychecks to the Farrells.

Despite paying the Farrells the majority of their earnings, as the workers’ visas

were set to expire, they were all in much greater debt than they had been upon arriving

in the country. Each worker initially had been promised two trips to work at the hotel,

but the Farrells made them write letters establishing why they deserved to return.

Begrudgingly, the workers wrote letters requesting re-employment. The workers

testified that they had no interest in working for the Farrells but that it would have

been impossible to repay the debt by working in the Philippines. Because the Farrells

had made each worker sign a debt contract and had threatened the workers with

physical harm if they defaulted, the workers testified that they believed they had no

other option but to return to the United States again and fulfill their contractual duties

or face imprisonment or worse in the Philippines. The workers testified that they

would never have come to the United States in the first place had they known the

extent of debt for which they would be responsible. 

B. Second Application for Non-Immigrant Workers—2006 

The Farrells submitted their second I-129 Petition in early 2006. This time, the

Petition listed the workers’ salaries as $242 per week. Again, prior to the workers’

consular interviews, the Farrells met with the group. They explicitly told the workers

not to list their prior outside employment on the visa applications because the

applications would be denied. The Farrells also told the workers to tell the

government that the Farrells would pay for transportation to and from the United

States. The Farrells then proceeded, however, to require each worker to acknowledge

an additional $1200 debt for the transportation cost. At that meeting, the Farrells also

provided the workers with copies of fake checks as evidence that the Farrells had paid

the workers in accordance with the previous contract. The workers testified that they

had neither received nor previously seen these checks.
-9-

Upon the workers’ second arrival in the United States, the Farrells again

required the workers to turn over their passports and immigration documents. As

before, the workers did so in deference to their employers. The workers faced the

same cramped living situation, and some of them were without a bed on which to

sleep. Again, the Farrells prohibited the workers from socializing and required that

they even ask permission before making phone calls. 

The Farrells required the workers to sign a second debt contract, and in addition

to recording the workers’ income and mounting debt, the Farrells instituted a rigid

schedule of mandatory bi-weekly payments. To cover these payments, the Farrells

required that each worker surrender his or her hotel paycheck to them and post-date

additional checks in the amount of the bi-weekly payment obligation. The payment

amounts depended on the individual’s indebtedness, but they ranged from $361 to

$431 every two weeks. With a salary of only $242 per week, of which the workers

were required to pay $150 toward housing per month, plus additional amounts for

non-requested expenditures and personal items, the bi-weekly payments constituted

an amount greater than the workers’ salaries.

As the workers’ debts mounted and their ability to pay diminished, the Farrells’

debt-focused meetings became increasingly hostile. The Farrells would spontaneously

call the meetings late at night and require those who were not working at the hotel to

come from home to attend, even if that meant rousing them from sleep. The workers

were not compensated for their attendance at the meetings. As before, the Farrells

would berate the workers for anything they had done wrong at the hotel and

emphasize the necessity of repayment. Robert frequently warned the workers not to

go “TNT” or “tago ng tago,” a Tagalog saying commonly used to refer to

undocumented immigrants in hiding. He told the workers that if they went TNT he

would find them and ship them back to the Philippines in a balikbayan box. Severely

frightened, the workers believed the Farrells would find them no matter where they

were. Robert repeated this threat several times per month both outside of and during

meetings. At least once, the threat appears in the minutes of a meeting.
-10-

The Farrells’ tirades against the workers would often last into the early hours

of the morning. On at least one occasion, after one worker refused to provide postdated checks in the amount of the bi-weekly payment, the Farrells kept her in the

meeting room until six in the morning. During that time, Robert continually yelled

at her despite the fact that the worker was extremely frightened and crying. Because

she was scheduled to work the next morning’s shift at the hotel, once the Farrells

released her she began her shift without having slept. Two other workers testified that

when they sent money back to their families without asking permission, they were

called into the office and reprimanded, being told that the Farrells were the only ones

who would decide how the workers spent their money. One of the workers testified

that Robert was so angry during this meeting that he feared Robert would punch him.

The worker further testified that he was unable to do anything to stop the abuse

because he was paralyzed by fear and did not “know anything about [how it works]

here in America.” He was convinced that Robert had the power to do to the workers

whatever he wanted to do. 

During this entire time, only one worker was able to leave the United States.

After lying about how her mother was in the hospital and dying, the Farrells allowed

her to return to Manila, but they controlled her every movement up until her departure.

Angelita escorted the worker to the airport and only returned her passport when it was

required to pass through security and board the plane. The woman never returned to

the United States to work for the Farrells, but she testified that they harassed her via

e-mail and telephone to ensure that she paid her debt. Eventually, as a result of the

harassing conduct, the worker contacted the U.S. Embassy in Manila and an

investigation was started. 

In June 2006, two other workers attempted to leave after the Farrells accused

them of stealing tips from the hotel rooms and humiliated them in front of the other

workers as punishment. Their desire to return to the Philippines caused immediate

conflict. Following a verbal altercation at the hotel, the Farrells accompanied the
-11-

workers to their apartment, rushing them to get their belongings together so that the

Farrells could take them to the airport. The Farrells informed the workers that

immigration authorities were waiting to deport them, and when the workers attempted

to call someone and ask for help, Angelita confiscated the telephone. Eventually,

Robert called the chief of police and the FBI seeking to have the workers arrested. The

chief of police arrived and talked to the workers, informing them that they could stay

until their scheduled return flight, which was less than one week later. The police

chief acknowledged that the workers were “terrified” of the Farrells and refused to

speak in front of them. When the police chief left, the Farrells stayed outside of the

apartment to prevent the workers from leaving. When the workers expressed concern

about being able to purchase food, the Farrells said they would have to make do with

what was in the refrigerator. 

Still without their passports and thus unable to leave on their own, but fearful

of what would happen, the workers found an old phone from the hotel, plugged it in,

and called the manager of the fast-food restaurant (where some of the workers were

employed) to ask for help. The workers also called the county attorney. Sometime

thereafter, the chief of police returned to the apartment because, upon reflection, he

felt as though the Farrells had used him to intimidate the workers. Sensing something

was wrong, both he and the county attorney arranged for the workers to be removed

from the apartment and the Farrells’ control. The county attorney testified that it was

“very apparent” that the workers were living in fear of the Farrells.
3

 Jury Instruction 16 defined “involuntary servitude” as follows: “[A] condition

of compulsory service in which the alleged victim is compelled to perform labor or

services against the alleged victim’s will for the benefit of another person due to the

use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of arrest,

prosecution, or imprisonment. . . . The use or threat of a civil lawsuit does not make

the labor involuntary.”

-12-

II. 

A. Peonage

Peonage is “compulsory service in payment of a debt.” Bailey v. Alabama, 219

U.S. 219, 242 (1911). “[C]ompulsory service” is the equivalent of “involuntary

servitude,” id. at 243, which the Supreme Court has defined as “a condition of

servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat

of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law

or the legal process.” United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).3

 Thus,

in order to prove peonage, the government must show that the defendant intentionally

held a person against his or her will and coerced that person to work in order to satisfy

a debt by (1) physical restraint or force, (2) legal coercion, or (3) threats of legal

coercion or physical force. See id. at 952–53. In determining whether “physical or

legal coercion or threats thereof could plausibly have compelled the victim to serve,”

the jury is entitled to consider “evidence of other means of coercion, or of poor

working conditions, or of the victim’s special vulnerabilities.” Id.

In this case, a reasonable jury could have found that the Government proved the

elements of peonage beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed above, the workers

testified extensively about their treatment while in the Farrells’ employment. They

testified that Robert threatened them with physical force; namely, that if they

attempted to “run away” he would find them, “put them in a balikbayan box,” and ship

them back to the Philippines. Despite the Farrells’ argument to the contrary, it is

indisputable that this statement was a threat of physical force. The evidence thus
-13-

supports a finding that the workers were reasonable in inferring from these statements

that the Farrells were willing to harm them if they attempted to stop working and

leave.

The workers also testified about the Farrells’ threats to have immigration

authorities arrest and deport the workers if they did not “comply” with the Farrells’

directives. The Farrells also threatened to call immigration authorities (and did

ultimately call the FBI and the chief of police) after two workers expressed a desire

to leave. These threats of arrest and deportation came despite the fact that the workers

gave no indication that they would resist returning to the Philippines. The Farrells

argue that they were legally entitled to explain to the workers that their visas were

contingent on continued employment at the hotel. It is another thing entirely,

however, to threaten to have immigration authorities arrest the workers as a

consequence of failing to abide by the Farrells’ rules—rules that included a

prohibition on speaking with people outside of the hotel, presumably for fear that the

workers would reveal the conditions of their employment—or as a tactic to keep the

workers until the end of their contracts by exploiting their fears of being imprisoned

by immigration authorities if they left early. See United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d

1128, 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction

for involuntary servitude, based, in part, on the employer’s statement that “the police

in the United States would arrest [the victim] as an illegal alien were [the victim] to

seek their help”). 

In addition to showing the Farrells threatened the workers with physical force,

arrest, and imprisonment, the evidence further supports the jury’s finding that these

threats actually compelled the workers to serve in order to satisfy their debt when

viewed in conjunction with the workers’ working and living conditions, as well as

their particular vulnerabilities. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952. The evidence is

clear that the workers subjectively feared the Farrells. They believed Robert when he

threatened to hunt them down and ship them back to the Philippines in a balikbayan
-14-

box, and they feared for their lives and the lives of their children if they were not able

to meet their debt obligations or left the Farrells’ employment. Their fear of Robert

was not unfounded as the evidence shows he regularly lost his temper during meetings

at the hotel, revealing to the workers his volatile temper and sparking fears that he

would resort to physical violence. There was also sufficient evidence to show that the

workers reasonably believed that their employers were “powerful people” and could

indeed “hunt them down” if the workers left. For example, after the Farrells had some

initial trouble obtaining visas in Manila, Robert showed the workers a letter from

congresspersons in South Dakota and told them that the letter would fix the problem.

The visas were subsequently approved, leading the workers to believe that the Farrells

were well connected politically.

The workers’ employment and living conditions also provide support for the

jury’s conclusion that the Farrells’ threats “plausibly . . . compelled the victim[s] to

serve.” Id. at 952. In short, the conditions were difficult. The workers labored

lengthy back-to-back shifts at the hotel and their outside jobs—employment facilitated

and required by the Farrells—to meet their mandatory bi-weekly debt payments. One

worker testified that this rigorous schedule precluded sleep at least four times per

week. See Veerapol, 312 F.3d at 1130–31 (discussing circumstances such as

“excessive working hours” that supported a jury finding of involuntary servitude).

The Farrells also denied the workers time off when the workers so requested. See

United States v. Sabhnani, 539 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (recounting

numerous “abuses” that served as a basis for a conviction, including twenty-hour work

days and no regular days off). In addition to the long hours, the workers were not paid

in accordance with their contract and were at times paid below minimum wage. 

The Farrells continually isolated the workers from others in the community by

refusing to allow them to speak or socialize with non-Filipino co-workers, by

channeling all mail through the hotel where it had to be opened in the presence of the

hotel manager, by refusing to allow them to leave the apartment to perform even the
4

 While debt is an element of the peonage charge, we also cannot ignore the

creditor–debtor relationship as a source of vulnerability. Far from simply owing the

Farrells money, the workers relationship with their employers was more akin to one

of debt bondage rather than simple debt. Given the continually mounting expenses,

at no point was the value of the workers’ labor sufficient to liquidate the debt and

there was, in effect, no limit to the length of the services required to satisfy the

obligation or even a limit on the amount owed.

-15-

most mundane tasks without asking for permission, and by refusing to allow the

workers to travel or otherwise spend their free time outside the hotel or apartment.

See, e.g., Veerapol, 312 F.3d at 1130–31 (“Veerapol isolated her workers . . . by

prohibiting them from . . . going to stores, speaking with her houseguests and the

customers at the restaurant . . . or using the telephone or mail.”); United States v.

Djoumessi, 538 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 948 (2009);

Sabhnani, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 620. In addition to this social isolation, the Farrells

attempted to control every other aspect of the workers’ lives. They dictated the

amount of money the workers were able to send back to the Philippines and for what

purpose; required the workers to post-date checks that the workers knew they would

not be able to cover unless they continued working at the hotel; and kept a key to the

workers’ residence so that they could conduct random inspections of the premises

while refusing to allow the workers a key of their own.

Furthermore, the coercive nature of the threats is amplified by the workers’

“special vulnerabilities,” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952, which include the fact that the

workers were in the United States under temporary-work visas sponsored by the

Farrells.4

 Many of the workers arrived in the United States with very little money and

were entirely dependent upon the Farrells for their housing and transportation. The

fact that the Farrells required the workers to have outside jobs also added to their

vulnerability. Even if the workers believed that they could leave the Farrells’

employment and seek help, the Farrells made them acutely aware that they could have

them deported for holding jobs outside of the scope of their visas. This fear was not
-16-

unfounded. At some point during July 2006, even after she was under investigation,

Angelita sent a letter to Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials at the

Minneapolis airport to inform the agency that several of the workers (who lawenforcement officials had already removed from the Farrells’ control) had taken

unauthorized employment at various locations while they were working for the

Farrells. 

The Farrells argue that the possibility of deportation alone was insufficient to

provide the requisite compulsion for peonage because being deported to the

Philippines was not the equivalent of “imprisonment or worse,” and they cite a First

Circuit case for that proposition. See United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1004 (1st

Cir. 1995) (“[T]he evidence must establish that the victim reasonably believed she was

left with no alternative to continued servitude that was not the equivalent of

imprisonment or worse.” (citation omitted)). In other words, the Farrells contend that

the workers could have simply stopped working and been deported. 

Even assuming, as the Farrells’ argument requires, that the only thing that kept

the workers laboring was a fear of being deported, we are not persuaded. Here, the

threat of deportation was more than a threat of removal from the United States or a

threat to legitimately use the legal process to ensure that the workers abided by the

terms of their visas. The Farrells had made it clear during various meetings that they

would seek to collect the money the workers owed no matter where the workers went.

It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the workers to meet their

debt obligations on salaries in the Philippines. Based on Robert’s threats that he

would hunt the workers down and harm them if they failed to pay their debts, it was

not unreasonable for the workers to believe that failure to pay their debt, even when

back in the Philippines, would result in physical harm. As a consequence, here the

threat of deportation was, in essence, a threat of force. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at

948 (“[I]t is possible that threatening . . . an immigrant with deportation could

constitute the threat of legal coercion that induces voluntary servitude . . . .”); see also
-17-

Djoumessi, 538 F.3d at 552; Alzanki, 54 F.3d at 1004–05 (finding that the victim’s

awareness of the “severely restrictive conditions” that she would encounter in the

country to which she would be deported enabled the jury to conclude that “threatened

with deportation . . . [the victim] confronted an alternative to continued involuntary

service which she reasonably considered at least as severe as imprisonment”).

The Farrells repeatedly claim that the workers’ employment was voluntary and

because voluntariness is a defense to the peonage charge, it is impossible for the

workers’ employment to have constituted involuntary servitude. As evidence of the

voluntary nature of the employment, they cite the workers’ return to the United States

in the spring of 2006 for a second contractual term and to the fact that they allowed

one worker to return to the Philippines to care for her ailing mother. Despite their

argument, however, based on the evidence recounted above, a reasonable trier of fact

could have concluded that the workers were not, in fact, free to leave and that it was

the Farrells’ coercive acts that compelled the workers to stay in the United States and

return on a second work visa in order to satisfy their debts. 

The fact that the workers left the country and then returned does not

automatically make their employment voluntary. As discussed above, the workers

would not have been able to pay their debt by working in the Philippines, and they

believed that the Farrells would physically harm them if they failed to pay. Thus, a

reasonable jury could conclude that the workers believed they had no choice but to

return to United States and did not do so voluntarily. See United States v. Bibbs, 564

F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[A] defendant is guilty of holding a person to

involuntary servitude if the defendant has placed him in such fear of physical harm

that the victim is afraid to leave, regardless of the victim’s opportunities for escape.”).

Even assuming that there were points at which the workers could have escaped the

Farrells’ control, a rational jury could have concluded that the workers’ employment

“was involuntary for at least some portion of [their] stay. And that involuntary portion

would suffice to sustain the conviction.” Djoumessi, 538 F.3d at 552–53 (emphasis
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in original) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which requires the involuntary servitude be for

“any term”). Furthermore, once in the United States, it is undisputed that the workers

needed their passports and immigration documentation to leave the country. It is also

undisputed that these documents remained in the possession of the Farrells during the

workers’ entire stay. Realistically, without these documents, the workers were

required to remain in the command, if not the employment, of the Farrells. 

Given the above, a reasonable jury could have found that the Government

presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Farrells’

threats of physical force and arrest compelled the workers to serve in order satisfy

their debts. The evidence establishes that the workers reasonably believed that they

had no option but to continue working for the Farrells. Accordingly, the conviction

for peonage is affirmed.

B. Conspiracy to Commit Peonage 

The jury concluded that the Farrells engaged in conspiracy to commit peonage

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Farrells again contest the sufficiency of the

evidence stating that they did not hold the workers in a condition of peonage and had

no agreement to do so. To prove conspiracy under § 371, the Government must show

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Farrells knowingly “entered into an agreement or

reached an understanding to commit a crime,” and that at least one of the Farrells

“overtly acted in furtherance of the agreement.” United States v. Bertling, 510 F.3d

804, 808 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “An agreement forming a conspiracy

may be either explicit or implicit.” United States v. Boesen, 541 F.3d 838, 853 (8th

Cir. 2008).

The jury’s conviction of the Farrells of conspiracy to commit peonage was

sufficiently supported by the Government’s evidence. The jury could infer from the

Farrells’ joint and extensive involvement in the visa application procedure, in the

running of the hotel, and in the administration of the housing that the Farrells
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knowingly entered into an agreement to hold the workers in a condition of peonage.

See United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591, 595–96 (discussing the evidence of joint

involvement of the co-conspirators). Additionally, any of the acts described in detail

above are sufficient to satisfy the overt-action element once the jury determined that

there was an agreement. See id. We thus affirm the conviction for conspiracy to

commit peonage.

C. Document Servitude 

The Farrells also contest the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to their

conviction for document servitude. In order to prove that the Farrells committed

document servitude, the Government must show that the Farrells (1) concealed,

removed, confiscated, or possessed the workers’ passports, visas, or other immigration

documents; (2) did these acts in the course of violating the peonage statute with the

intent to violate the statute; and (3) acted knowingly and intentionally. 18 U.S.C. §

1592(a). 

The evidence at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict the Farrells

of document servitude. The Farrells do not contest that Angelita confiscated the

workers’ passports, visas, and entry cards upon their arrival in the United States in

both 2005 and 2006. The Farrells also do not contest that they knowingly retained

possession of these documents throughout the workers’ entire stay. Numerous

workers testified that they did not possess their passports while working at the hotel

and that the Farrells took the documents to “control” them. Angelita only returned

one worker’s passport when that worker was at the airport and ready to board the

plane. The chief of police further indicated that even after he specifically requested

that Robert turn the workers’ immigration documents over to the workers, Robert still

refused. It was only after the chief of police threatened to arrest him for theft that

Robert complied. 
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In addition to having confiscated and knowingly possessed the passports, as

outlined extensively above, there was sufficient evidence that the Farrells had the

intent to commit peonage and retained the documents while committing peonage.

Because the evidence was such that a reasonable jury could have concluded that the

Farrells committed document servitude, we affirm the conviction.

III. 

The Farrells also challenge the district court’s admission of expert testimony

by government witness Joy Zarembka. They allege that her testimony invaded the

province of the jury to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, and factfind. When a defendant “fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, we

review for plain error.” United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). The

defendant has the burden to prove that there was an error, that it was plain, and that

the error affected substantial rights. Id. “If all three conditions are met, we may then

exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error seriously affects

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

While expert testimony may be used to “assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” Fed. R. Evid. 702, an expert witness may not

usurp the jury’s function to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations.

United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339–40 (8th Cir. 1986). The Government

called Zarembka, an expert in human trafficking and domestic-worker exploitation,

as its first witness. Zarembka testified about various warning signs in

employer–employee relationships that often indicate the employee is not laboring

voluntarily but rather in a “climate of fear” or psychological coercion. She further

testified that she believed several of these warning signs were present in the Farrells’

relationships with the workers and that the workers did, in fact, labor in a “climate of

fear.” 
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Zarembka’s testimony was relevant insofar as it provided this broader context

for the jury to understand the workers’ actions, to understand the conditions in which

they may have labored, and to assess the truthfulness of their allegations. Cf. United

States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowing testimony “regarding

characteristics of sexually abused children in general and as they compared with the

characteristics exhibited by the victim in this case”). The expert testimony went

further than this, however, and it usurped the jury’s function when Zarembka opined

on the strength of the Government’s case and the credibility of its witnesses through

references to the “incredible” and “strong” nature of the evidence against the Farrells.

The testimony also invaded the fact-finding function of the jury when Zarembka

testified that the workers “were not controlling their money” and that they were

“forced to pay [the debt].” One of the issues before the jury with regard to the

peonage charge was whether or not the workers stayed voluntarily. Given this

required finding, the expert’s testimony was not simply a factual conclusion but rather

an attempt to express an opinion as to the guilt of the Farrells and a manner of stating

that the forthcoming worker witnesses were telling the truth. See United States v.

Whitted, 11 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that a doctor’s “diagnosis of sexual

abuse was only a thinly veiled way of stating that [the witness] was telling the truth”).

Thus, we agree with the Farrells that portions of the expert testimony invaded

the province of the jury. We do not believe, however, that the error affected their

substantial rights. Other than the expert-witness testimony, there was ample evidence

upon which a jury could have found that the Farrells committed the substantive

offenses charged. Furthermore, to the extent that the jury relied on the “climate of

fear” theory, testimony from the victims, the police chief, the county prosecutor, and

other witnesses readily established the existence of the factors that Zarembka

discussed. See United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1993) (en

banc) (requiring that the error prejudicially affect the district court proceedings). As
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a result, the district court’s error in not excluding portions of the expert testimony is

an insufficient basis upon which to overturn the jury’s verdict.

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

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