21-6076

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A208 374 248

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 22 3 nd day of August, two thousand

4 twenty-three.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 JON O. NEWMAN,

8 DENNY CHIN,

9 MICHAEL H. PARK,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 SARABJIT SINGH,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 21-6076

17 NAC

18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.
2

1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney 

2 General; Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant Director; 

3 Corey L. Farrell, Trial Attorney, Office of 

4 Immigration Litigation, United States 

5 Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

7 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

8 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

9 Petitioner Sarabjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a 

10 January 26, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a May 8, 2018 decision of an 

11 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

12 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sarabjit 

13 Singh, No. A 208 374 248 (B.I.A. Jan. 26, 2021), aff’g No. A 208 374 248 (Immigr. Ct. 

14 N.Y.C. May 8, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 

15 and procedural history.

16 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the 

17 BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005); Xue Hong Yang v. 

18 U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 

19 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative 

20 findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
3

1 compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 

2 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination “under the substantial 

3 evidence standard”). 

4 The IJ may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, . . . base a 

5 credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the 

6 applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s 

7 written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and 

8 considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the 

9 internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements 

10 with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such 

11 statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

12 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. 

13 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 

14 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

15 make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 

16 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. “Where the IJ’s adverse 

17 credibility finding is based on specific examples of inconsistent statements or 

18 contradictory evidence, a reviewing court will generally not be able to conclude 
4

1 that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 

2 F.3d at 166 (cleaned up). “Even where the agency relies on discrepancies or 

3 lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the 

4 claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential.” Hong 

5 Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (quotation marks omitted). “A petitioner must do more 

6 than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

7 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 

8 testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 

9 omitted). 

10 Singh claimed that members of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Akali Dal 

11 Badal parties attacked him in February and April 2015 and threatened to kill him 

12 if he did not leave the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar party (“Mann Party” or 

13 “SADA”). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

14 determination. 

15 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s statements 

16 in his affidavit and his hearing testimony, as well as his failure to corroborate his 

17 medical treatment, the fact that he omitted discussion of his medical treatment in 

18 his affidavit, the fact that his father omitted it in his letter, and the contradiction 
5

1 between Singh’s testimony and a letter from a Mann Party official. See 8 U.S.C. 

2 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

3 First, Singh made inconsistent statements about his interaction with the 

4 police after alleged attacks by rival party members in February 2015. His 

5 affidavit says that the “[p]olice inspector asked his constable to push me out of the 

6 police station” and the “[p]olice inspector and constable were very rough and aloof 

7 with me.” In contrast, he testified about three, not two officers and that he did 

8 not know the ranks of the officers who threw him out of the station. He explained 

9 that he did not know the ranks of the officers, but that they wore the uniforms of 

10 regular policemen. Singh argues that this was not a discrepancy, and that the IJ 

11 improperly relied on word usage. This explanation is plausible, but so too is the 

12 IJ’s contrary conclusion. We thus defer to the IJ’s choice between two permissible 

13 views of the evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007) 

14 (holding that we defer to the factfinder “[w]here there are two permissible views 

15 of the evidence” even where a “contrary inference” would be “more plausible or 

16 more natural” (quotation marks omitted)).

17 Moreover, other inconsistencies and omissions bolster the adverse 

18 credibility determination. Singh testified that he went to the village doctor after 
6

1 the first attack because he had scratches and internal injuries, and the doctor gave 

2 him balm and medication; then, after the second attack, he again went to the 

3 village doctor and received balms and medications. His affidavit, however, does 

4 not mention treatment by a doctor at all, and his father’s letter says “[m]y wife 

5 treated him with home remedies after . . . both harms.” The IJ reasonably relied 

6 on these discrepancies. Although omissions are generally less probative than 

7 inconsistencies, the affidavit identified injuries and other actions taken after the 

8 attack, so it would have been natural to mention medical treatment obtained 

9 between the attack and going to the police. And Singh’s father’s letter not only 

10 omitted treatment by a doctor but inconsistently stated that Singh’s mother treated 

11 him. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78-79 (holding that omissions are generally less 

12 probative than direct inconsistencies but that the probative value of omissions

13 turns on whether those “facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been 

14 expected to disclose”).

15 Moreover, because Singh’s credibility was in question as to his alleged 

16 medical treatment, the IJ reasonably relied on the absence of corroborating medical 

17 documentation. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 

18 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 
7

1 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

2 question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Singh’s father’s 

3 letter did not corroborate either the medial treatment or Singh’s explanation that 

4 his father had tried to obtain medical evidence, but the doctor did not keep 

5 records. 

6 In addition, Singh testified that no one else in his family had problems with 

7 the local administration or rival political groups; but he submitted a supporting 

8 letter from a Mann Party official that states, “Due to his involvement in our party 

9 activities [Singh] and his family had problems with local administration and other 

10 political groups. So, [] Singh was forced to flee the country.” Singh argues that 

11 the agency should not have relied on this letter because he submitted it to show 

12 the treatment of Sikhs and Mann Party members, not to document his own claim. 

13 In Amardeep Singh v. Garland, an IJ discredited the petitioner partially because a 

14 letter from a Mann Party official omitted the fact that the petitioner had visited the 

15 party official. 6 F.4th 418, 429 (2d Cir. 2021). We found agency error because the 

16 purpose of the letter “was to report on the brutal treatment that Sikhs and 

17 members of SADA receive in India,” and the party official “was not in a position 

18 to attest to the veracity of [the petitioner’s] account of his beatings, and did not 
8

1 undertake to do so.” Id. But Amardeep Singh addressed a letter that did not 

2 purport to document the petitioner’s personal claim; in contrast, here—while the 

3 letter talks about the general mistreatment of party members—the letter is specific 

4 to Singh, discusses his father’s membership in the party, and states that Singh and 

5 his family had problems with rival parties, thereby directly contradicting Singh’s 

6 testimony that he was the only member of his family to have problems with the 

7 local administration and political groups. 

8 In sum, in light of the various inconsistencies and omissions, the record does 

9 not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s decision. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 

10 F.3d at 165-66; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination 

11 is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because all 

12 three forms of relief were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. 

13 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

15 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

16 FOR THE COURT: 

17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

18 Clerk of Court