UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________ 

RONALD E. RING, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

ART LIGHTLE, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 16-6060 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-01300-F) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL 

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Mr. Ronald Ring pleaded nolo contendere to state burglary charges. 

Years later, he learned that state law required him to serve 85% of his 

sentence before he could be considered for early release. See Okla. Stat. 

tit. 21, § 13.1. Mr. Ring then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

claiming that he should have been told about this requirement when he 

pleaded nolo contendere. The district court dismissed the habeas action as 

time-barred. 

Mr. Ring wants to appeal and requests a certificate of appealability 

and leave to appeal in forma pauperis. We deny both requests. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 18, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. Denial of a Certificate of Appealability 

 Mr. Ring may appeal only if we issue a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To obtain the certificate, Mr. Ring must make 

“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). When a district court disposes of a habeas action as timebarred, the petitioner must show “that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

II. The district court’s ruling on timeliness is not reasonably 

debatable.

 On appeal, Mr. Ring contends that the district court erred by 

dismissing his claims as time-barred. No reasonable jurist would credit that 

contention. 

A one-year limitations period applies to state prisoners who petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period 

begins to run at the latest of four alternative dates. Id. Here, the latest 

potential start date was when Mr. Ring could reasonably have discovered 

the factual predicate of his claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). All 

reasonable jurists would regard that discovery as having been possible 

more than one year before Mr. Ring initiated the habeas action. 
3 

Mr. Ring admitted in district court that he had learned of the 85% 

requirement in 2009. That knowledge was the only factual predicate 

necessary. Nonetheless, he waited roughly five years before seeking any 

relief in state court. In these circumstances, jurists could not reasonably 

debate the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Ring’s habeas claim is timebarred. 

On appeal, Mr. Ring argues that the state-court sentence was void, 

that the court was defrauded, that he was actually innocent, and that the 

federal district court should have addressed the merits before addressing 

the statute of limitations. These arguments are not reasonably debatable. 

First, Mr. Ring argues that the sentence in state court was void. But 

this argument goes to the merits of his claim. See Sherratt v. Friel, 275 F. 

App’x 763, 766 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“[T]he state court’s 

jurisdiction vel non is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional issue, on federal 

habeas.”).1

 Consequently, this argument does not bear on the timeliness of 

the habeas action. 

Second, Mr. Ring contends that the court was defrauded. Courts can 

correct judgments that were based on fraud. United States v. Williams, 790 

F.3d 1059, 1071 (10th Cir. 2015). When alleging fraud on the court, a 

party must show that the adversary acted with intent to deceive or defraud 

 1

 This opinion is persuasive, but not precedential. 
4 

the court. Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th 

Cir. 1995). 

Mr. Ring does not present any allegations or evidence of fraudulent 

conduct. Rather, he alleges only that he was not told that his sentence was 

subject to the 85% requirement. But no reasonable jurist could challenge 

this conduct as a fraud on the court.2 Accordingly, Mr. Ring is not entitled 

to avoid the statute of limitations based on a fraud perpetrated on the 

court. 

Third, Mr. Ring argues that he was actually innocent. When a habeas 

petitioner proves actual innocence, the limitations period does not apply. 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-33 (2013). 

Innocence must be based on the underlying crime rather than the sentence. 

Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1994). 

Mr. Ring does not contend that he is actually innocent of the charge 

(burglary). Mr. Ring’s argument “differs in the fact that it is not based on 

the elements of the crime;” his “argument is based on the minimum amount 

of time to be actually served.” Appellant’s Combined Opening Brief & 

Application for a Certificate of Appealability at 7. Under our precedent, 

 2

 “Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct, such as 

bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a 

party in which an attorney is implicated will constitute a fraud on the 

court. Less egregious misconduct . . . will not ordinarily rise to the level of 

fraud on the court.” Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 

1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 

1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978)).
5 

this argument does not allow Mr. Ring to avoid the time bar in § 2244(d). 

Selsor, 22 F.3d at 1035-36. 

Fourth, Mr. Ring argues that the district court should have addressed 

the merits before addressing the timeliness issue. But the respondent 

moved to dismiss based solely on the limitations issue; the merits had not 

yet been briefed. Thus, the district court naturally addressed timeliness as 

the only issue to be decided. Indeed, even if Mr. Ring could have prevailed 

on the merits, he could not obtain a writ of habeas corpus if the habeas 

action had been untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As a result, the 

district court did not err in deciding the timeliness issue before considering 

the merits. 

For these reasons, none of Mr. Ring’s appeal points are reasonably 

debatable. 

III. In Forma Pauperis 

Mr. Ring seeks leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Because Mr. 

Ring’s appeal points would be frivolous, we deny this request. See Rolland 

v. Primesource Staffing, LLC, 497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 2007). 
6 

IV. Disposition 

We deny the request for a certificate of appealability, dismiss the 

appeal, and deny the request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Robert E. Bacharach 

 Circuit Judge