The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering Financial Action Task Force Groupe d’action financière

Vulnerabilities of Casinos 

and Gaming Sector

March 2009

FATF Report
2 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG
THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF)

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes 

policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Recommendations issued by the FATF define criminal justice and regulatory measures that should be 

implemented to counter this problem. These Recommendations also include international co-operation and 

preventive measures to be taken by financial institutions and others such as casinos, real estate dealers, 

lawyers and accountants. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering 

(AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard.

For more information about the FATF, please visit the website:

WWW.FATF-GAFI.ORG

ASIA PACIFIC GROUP ON MONEY LAUNDERING

The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) is an autonomous and collaborative international 

organisation founded in 1997 in Bangkok, Thailand consisting of 39 member jurisdictions and a number of 

international and regional observers. The member jurisdictions and observers of the APG are committed to the 

effective implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted standards against money laundering 

and the financing of terrorism, in particular the Forty Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations 

on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

For more information about the APG, please visit the website:

WWW.APGML.ORG

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG. All rights reserved

No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission.

Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to 

the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France 

(fax +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: contact@fatf-gafi.org).
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

4 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................................................7

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................9

Scope of Research ............................................................................................................................9

Project scope / methodology ..........................................................................................................11

.............................................................................................................................................

CHAPTER 1: THE CASINO SECTOR.........................................................................................13

Introduction....................................................................................................................................13

Regional Overviews.......................................................................................................................14

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................21

.............................................................................................................................................

CASINO SECTOR RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST 

FINANCING..................................................................................................................................22

The need for casino sector-specific risk assessments.....................................................................22

Guidance on Typologies Risk Assessments...................................................................................22

Sources of information...................................................................................................................23

Risks for jurisdictions without a casino sector...............................................................................23

Models for casino sector risk assessments.....................................................................................23

.............................................................................................................................................

CHAPTER 2: MONEY LAUNDERING METHODOLOGIES AND INDICATORS.................25

Broad risks in casinos.....................................................................................................................25

Criminal interest in casinos – players and infiltration of casinos...................................................26

Money laundering methods and techniques in Casinos .................................................................27

Casino value instruments ...............................................................................................................28

Indicators of ML using casino value instruments ..........................................................................31

Structuring......................................................................................................................................33

Refining..........................................................................................................................................33

Indicators of ML using structuring/refining methods ....................................................................34

Casino accounts & facilities...........................................................................................................36

Indicators of ML using casino accounts:........................................................................................38
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Winnings........................................................................................................................................39

Indicators of ML using winnings: ..................................................................................................40

Currency exchange.........................................................................................................................41

Indicators of ML using currency exchange:...................................................................................41

Employee complicity .....................................................................................................................42

Indicators of employee complicity:................................................................................................42

Credit cards / debit cards................................................................................................................43

Indicators of ML using credit/debit cards: .....................................................................................44

False documents.............................................................................................................................45

Indicators of ML using false documents and counterfeit currency:...............................................45

.............................................................................................................................................

CHAPTER 3 – SECTOR VULNERABILITIES AND EMERGING ISSUES .............................47

Introduction....................................................................................................................................47

Casino-based Tourism – “Junkets” ................................................................................................47

Vulnerabilities................................................................................................................................48

Terrorist Financing.........................................................................................................................57

.............................................................................................................................................

CHAPTER 4 - POLICY IMPLICATIONS....................................................................................58

Online gaming / online casinos......................................................................................................58

Lack of AML/CFT coverage for casino sectors.............................................................................58

Lack of regulatory tools.................................................................................................................58

Implementation of CDD measures.................................................................................................59

Application of AML/CFT controls to casino foreign branches, offices or subsidiaries.................59

Application of AML/CFT controls to casino foreign holding accounts.........................................59

Control of junket operators and their agents..................................................................................59

Regulatory controls over VIP rooms and related facilities ............................................................60

Regulatory coverage of „foreigners only‟ casino models...............................................................60

Regulatory control over high-seas gaming.....................................................................................60

Controls over significant contractors, systems and equipment ......................................................60

Lack of AML/CFT capacity / experience by casino regulators .....................................................60

Coordination between AML/CFT and casino-sector supervisors..................................................61

Building compliance culture in casino sectors...............................................................................61

Law enforcement / FIU / Regulator access to information and investigation of ML/TF...............62

International Cooperation...............................................................................................................63

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................63
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6 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................65

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS & GLOSSARY ............................................................67

GLOSSARY OF COMMON CASINO TERMS...........................................................................68

APPENDIX 1. REGIONAL DATA ON CASINO SECTORS......................................................69
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The vulnerability of casinos was recognised in the revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations, with 

obligations on casinos being significantly enhanced. However, there remained a lack of recent 

regional or global typologies on casinos and gaming, which this report seeks to address. 

This APG/FATF report considers casinos with a physical presence and discusses related money 

laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) methods, vulnerabilities, indicators to aid detection and 

deterrence, international information exchange. The report considers vulnerabilities from gaps in 

domestic implementation of anti-money laundering / combating the financing of terrorism 

(AML/CFT) measures. Data in the report was derived from members of the FATF, APG, other 

FSRBs and open sources.

Online gaming and illegal gambling are beyond the scope of this study. 

Overall, there is significant global casino activity that is cash intensive, competitive in its growth and 

vulnerable to criminal exploitation. This paper identifies significant gaps in awareness of ML 

typologies, gaps in regulatory and law enforcement responses, gaps in online gaming typologies, 

issues with controls over junkets / VIP programs, and significant issues with controls over „high seas‟ 

gaming. The report identifies significant gaps in global coverage of AML/CFT controls over the 

sector, which represents a significant vulnerability. The report is a resource for policy formation.

The report identifies significant ML vulnerabilities and related case studies and typologies, but does 

not identify any instances of TF through the sector. 

Chapter 1, The Casino Sector, presents a global overview of casinos organised by regions (some 100 

countries). The overview sets out the numbers, locations and, in some cases, ownership of each 

sector and coverage of AML/CFT controls. The chapter discusses some statistics and estimates of 

revenues (over USD70 billion globally) and profits (where known). The chapter discusses emerging 

casino markets, including a number of developing countries with governance and capacity 

challenges.

Chapter 1 briefly discusses casino sector risk assessments as a basis for allocating regulatory and law 

enforcement resources. The report highlights the need to identify ML risks for both those 

jurisdictions with or without a casino sector. 

Chapter 2, Money laundering Methodologies and Indicators, considers vulnerabilities such as casino 

chips, casino cheques, casino accounts and facilities, structuring through the casino, currency 

exchange, employee complicity, etc. The paper describes typologies, case studies, and includes a 

summary of practical indicators for the industry, regulators and law enforcement. 

Casinos undertake high volume/speed financial activities that are similar to financial institutions, but 

in an entertainment context. Casinos are generally large cash-based businesses. Foreign exchange 

facilities and reduced transparency of „high rollers‟ in VIP rooms present substantial challenges. The 

use of foreign holding accounts where funds in one jurisdiction are available for use in a casino in 

another jurisdiction without the need for a cross border remittance presents further issues.

Chapter 3, Sector Vulnerabilities and emerging Issues, explores a number of additional 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

8 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

vulnerabilities and emerging issues. Casino-based tourism or “junkets” are identified as a 

vulnerability as they involve the cross border movement of people and funds and often target high 

net-worth / VIP clients. Transparency of the movement of funds is an issue with junkets, due to gaps 

in controls, and weak implementation and supervision. 

The emerging issue of high-seas cruise ship casinos and associated junkets is a challenge for 

regulators and law enforcement. The question of who has jurisdiction is prominent, including where 

the vessel is registered, where it operates from and where it visits. The paper notes that few 

jurisdictions regulate this sector.

With respect to VIP rooms and „high roller‟ customers, vulnerabilities are noted with identifying 

source of funds and movement of funds. In many casino markets high-roller clients make up a large 

majority of casino turnover, yet only a very small percentage of casino patrons. 

Other vulnerabilities discussed include corrupt or inadequately trained staff, new markets opening 

and terrorist financing.

Chapter 4, Policy Implications, reiterates various key findings of the report and discusses a number 

of policy implications, including: 

 Online gaming requires further typologies study and sharing of cases and regulatory models 

is needed;

 A significant number of jurisdictions do not subject their casino sector to AML/CFT 

controls;

 When casinos are subject to AML/CFT controls, many jurisdictions lack effective 

implementation of preventative measures (CDD, STRs, internal controls);

 There is a lack of regulatory tools that carry effective, proportionate and dissuasive 

sanctions;

 AML/CFT controls over casino foreign branches, offices or subsidiaries are not well 

regulated and there is a need for international guidance and best practice;

 Casino foreign holding accounts are not clearly covered for AML/CFT, which allows 

movement of funds without sending a cross-border wire transfer;

 Controls over VIP rooms vary and some jurisdictions lack clear powers regarding collecting 

and sharing information of VIP program participants; 

 High-seas gaming is a large market over which there is little regulatory control;

 Many jurisdictions‟ casino regulators lack AML/CFT capacity and experience; 

 International cooperation between casino regulators on AML issues is lacking and it is not 

always clear who are the competent authorities for information sharing.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

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INTRODUCTION 

1. The APG and FATF have undertaken a joint study of vulnerabilities in the gaming and 

casinos sector. The project is led by New Zealand, with Ms Rachael Horton of New Zealand 

Department of Internal Affairs leading the work, including the drafting of this report. The work arose 

due to FATF and APG mutual evaluations and earlier typologies work, which noted a range of ML/FT 

risk factors related to gaming and casinos. 

2. The project has examined and illustrated areas of vulnerabilities in the gaming and casino 

sectors with an emphasis on legal sectors that have a physical presence. The project has sought to 

identify sector-specific money laundering or terrorist financing indicators; and to highlight possible 

policy implications for effective implementation of the FATF standards to cover casinos and gaming. 

Scope of Research

3. Typologies produced by the FATF and APG over the last 10 years have consistently 

identified a money laundering risk from casinos and gaming. The casino and gaming sector is 

characterised by diverse types of gambling activity, size and rate of development, as well as public and 

private sector ownership models. 

4. Within the sector, the FATF recognised that casinos represent the greatest risk for money 

laundering activities and this was reflected in the revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations 2003, 

with obligations on casinos being significantly enhanced in relation to Customer Due Diligence 

(CDD), record keeping, reporting of suspicion, and comprehensive regulation and supervision. 

5. Casinos are the only form of gaming or gambling explicitly covered by the FATF standards, 

however the FATF standards do not define casinos or gaming, nor do they set out the activities 

undertaken by casinos. It is left to each jurisdiction to determine the forms of gaming included in its 

coverage of “casinos”.

Magnitude of casino sector globally

6. Statistics from 2007 show that over 150 countries participate in some kind of legal gambling, 

100 of those countries have legalised casino and card room gambling. Over 100 countries offer some 

kind of lottery product and over 60 countries participate in the race and sports betting industry.1 

7. Casinos generate enormous revenue streams for providers and for government through 

taxation and licensing fees. The size of the global casino business was estimated at over 

USD 70 billion in revenue in 2006, although a figure for overall turnover of funds was not available. 

Casinos in North America (US and Canada) account for almost half of that figure. Macao China is the 

fastest growing casino jurisdiction, and recorded more than USD 10 billion in gaming revenue in 

2007. In addition there is a proliferation of Internet gambling sites, with global revenues estimated 

 

1

“Overview of Gaming Worldwide", Casino City, Global Gaming Almanac, 2007, 

http://www.casinocitypress.com/GamingAlmanac/globalgamingalmanac.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

10 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

around USD 15 billion,2plus a significant amount of illegal gambling occurring around the world, 

which is largely unmeasured. 

8. The nature and expanding scope of the casino sector presents a number of challenges for 

AML/CFT implementation. In particular:

 Casinos are cash intensive businesses, often operating 24hrs per day, with high volumes of 

large cash transactions taking place very quickly. 

 Casinos offer many financial services (accounts, remittance, foreign exchange, cash issuing 

etc), but in some jurisdictions may only be regulated as „entertainment‟ venues, rather than 

financial institutions.

 In some jurisdictions casinos are poorly regulated or unregulated for AML/CFT.

 A number of jurisdictions with well regulated casino sectors continue to identify significant 

levels of money laundering. 

 Many casinos are located in geographic areas characterised by poor governance, political 

instability or bordering regions with significant crime or terrorist problems. 

 The movement of funds associated with gaming-related tourism is poorly understood and 

may pose particular money laundering risks, e.g. international movement of funds for casino 

„junket‟ operations3.

 In some jurisdictions casino staff turnover is high, sometimes due to seasonal factors, which 

can lead to weaknesses in staff training and AML/CFT competencies.

9. A significant number of countries have recently established, expanded, or are considering 

expanding their gaming and casino sectors.

10. In response to these issues the FATF and APG began a project to consider money laundering 

and terrorist financing vulnerabilities in the Casino and Gaming sector. 

11. This paper examines ML and TF vulnerabilities with legally operating casinos. The paper 

does not consider issues related to online gaming, but rather is concerned with casinos that have a 

physical presence. The aim of the project is to share information on the casino sector for the following 

purposes:

 Assist jurisdictions to understand money laundering and terrorist financing methods.

 Increase understanding in the casino sector of money laundering and terrorist financing 

vulnerabilities.

 

2

“eGaming Data Report: Global Internet Gambling Revenue Estimates and Projections”, Christensen 

Capital Advisors 2005, http://www.cca-i.com.

3 The term Junket has its origins in Chinese where Jin literally means introducing and Ke means 

customers. It is a method of casino marketing developed in the late 1930s for introducing customers to 

the expanding Macao, China gaming industry. Over time this method has been adopted elsewhere and 

the term has gradually evolved to be known as Junkets.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 11

 Assist law enforcement and gatekeepers in the industry to detect and deter forms of money 

laundering.

 Strengthen capacity and international information exchange.

 Provide evidential basis to support domestic implementation of AML/CFT measures in the 

sector.

12. The following chapters will: 

 Examine the scope and nature of regional casino sectors.

 Identify and examine money laundering methodologies from known cases.

 Identify related indicators to support operational and policy objectives.

 Examine sector vulnerabilities and emerging issues.

 Highlight possible policy implications for effective implementation of the revised FATF 

40 + 9 recommendations to cover casino operations.

13. Unless otherwise referenced, all data contained in this report is sourced from jurisdictional 

reports and research questionnaires submitted to APG and FATF.

Project scope / methodology

14. The APG began initial work on money laundering typologies in the casino sector in 

November 2006 during the Annual Typologies Workshop in Jakarta. At that time the APG 

commenced some preliminary scoping work and a number of APG jurisdictions shared their 

experience of AML/CFT issues in casino and gaming sectors. 

15. The 2007 FATF/APG Typologies Meeting included a workshop on casinos and gaming. The 

workshop was very well supported by members of the FATF, APG and other FSRBs. The following 

jurisdictions were involved in the 2 day breakout session which considered issues in depth: Australia; 

Austria; Belgium; Canada; Ireland; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Spain; United States; China; 

Hong Kong, China; India; South Africa; OECD; Cambodia; Macao, China; Malaysia; Papua New 

Guinea; Philippines; Thailand; and Vietnam.

16. Following on from the workshop in Bangkok, the FATF and APG distributed a short survey 

to FATF and FSRB members. The survey results were in addition to materials provided by APG 

member jurisdictions. The following jurisdictions provided a response to the survey:

Austria Latvia Spain

Belgium Malta Sweden

Brazil Mexico Ukraine

Finland Poland United Kingdom

Germany Romania

Iceland Slovenia
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12 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

17. This project would like to acknowledge the particular input of New Zealand (Department of 

Internal Affairs), Australia (NSW Casino Control Authority and AUSTRAC); Canada (RCMP); 

Macao, China (Gaming Inspection & Coordination Bureau and Financial Intelligence Office); Hong 

Kong, China; Belgium; Austria; Spain; Vietnam; US; and the OECD. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

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CHAPTER 1: THE CASINO SECTOR

Introduction

18. There is very wide range of legal gaming / gambling across the globe. This includes various 

games of chance and gambling forms ranging from casino and card room gaming, lotteries, online 

gaming, race and sports wagering and charitable gaming, such as raffles, bingo and other low 

technology games. Legalised gambling has become more prevalent over the last 25 years as more 

jurisdictions take advantage of the revenue sources from the taxation and regulated gambling 

industries. Over this time many governments have allowed for the expansion of legal gambling, 

including casinos, or introduced regulatory regimes over existing gambling. 

19. Based on information generated by the gaming sector, it is estimated that over 150 countries 

participate in some form of legal gambling and 100 of those countries participate in legalised casino 

and card room gambling. The broad AML/CFT network of FATF and FATF-style regional bodies 

includes over 180 jurisdictions globally. At least 77 of these 180+ jurisdictions have been indentified 

from the responses to research questionnaires and other requests for information, as having legally 

operating casino sectors. 

20. Appendix 1 provides summary tables of each the casino sectors operating in each region. 

21. The casino market is in a major growth phase in most regions. At least three jurisdictions 

(Albania, Singapore and Papua New Guinea) have newly passed legislation and a greater number have 

recently expanded their casino sectors (South Korea; Macao, China; and Chile are examples). At least 

five jurisdictions have been identified as taking active steps towards legalising or giving consideration 

to legalising casinos (see section Emerging Markets). 

22. A number of jurisdictions report significant problems from illegal gaming. Illegal gaming is 

largely beyond the focus of this study. It is recognised that illegal gaming is a factor in governments 

considering regulated gambling. A number of jurisdictions have casinos operating outside of legal 

frameworks. These include Sri Lanka (not clearly legal) and Myanmar. 

23. A number of countries, recognising the social harms associated with gambling, have recently 

moved to restrict gambling growth in an effort to curb rising social costs (UK in relation to its „super‟ 

casino and Russia through its four designated gaming zones). 

24. There are a significant number of jurisdictions where gambling is illegal for religious and 

other reasons. In a number of these jurisdictions proponents are making a case for legal and regulated 

gambling to be introduced. 
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14 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Regional Overviews

Africa

25. Sector studies view Africa as a significant growth region for casinos. This is the case in both 

the major casino market in South Africa and in smaller developing markets in other African 

jurisdictions. A number of casino jurisdictions in Africa do not regulate the sector for AML/CFT and a 

greater number appear to be poorly regulated. A number of jurisdictions have sought to restrict casinos 

only to foreigners. 

26. Based on information from FSRBs, commercial databases and commercial studies casinos 

are known to be legally operating in Egypt (25), Morocco (8+) and Tunisia (4) (MENAFATF 

members). 

27. Casinos operate in Cameroon (3), Central African Republic (2), Gambia, Ghana (3), Liberia 

(1), Mali (1) and Senegal (4) (all GIABA countries). Casinos operate in Botswana (11), Comoros (3), 

Kenya (15+), Malawi (1+), Mauritius (7+), Mozambique (3), Namibia (3), Seychelles (3), 

Swaziland (5+), Tanzania (7+), Uganda (3), and Zimbabwe (6) (ESAAMLG region). 

28. South Africa is the only FATF member of this region and has over 40 legal casinos 

operating, making it by far the biggest casino sector in Africa. Casinos in South Africa are covered by 

AML/CFT controls There are a number of cases reported in the press of criminals attempting to 

launder proceeds of crime through one or a number of South Africa‟s casinos. 

Middle East

29. Online commercial directories4list casinos operating in Iraq and Lebanon (1), both 

jurisdictions members of MENAFATF, but the nature and extent of casino gambling in these countries 

is unknown. Israel operates licensed cruise-ship casinos as well as land-based casinos. 

Asia/Pacific 

30. The Asia/Pacific region has the world‟s fastest growing economies, the world‟s strongest 

growth in tourism, and a vast array of cultures, languages, religions, political structures and consumer 

preferences. The region is also characterised by significant differences in wealth distribution ranging

from well developed economies with strong governance and AML/CFT controls to some geographic 

areas characterised by poor governance, political instability or bordering regions with significant 

crime or terrorist problems. Some legal casino sectors are located in jurisdictions that have 

predominant cash-based economies and weak regulatory controls and/or no controls for AML/CFT. 

These factors present a significant challenge for governments and regional bodies committed to 

ensuring effective AML/CFT controls. 

31. Within Asia there are legal casino sectors in: Korea (17); Lao PDR; Macao, China, China 

(29); Malaysia (1); Nepal (6); Philippines (14); and Vietnam (2). Sri Lanka has nine large casinos 

which are not regulated and are not subject to AML/CFT controls, but pay a levy to the government to 

operate pursuant to the Betting and Gaming Levy Act. Casinos in India are only permitted in one state 

and are not yet subject to AML controls. Press reports from late 2005 noted a draft bill had been 

prepared to regulate casinos in Nepal but this has not been enacted. Casinos in the Philippines are 

 

4 Casino City.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 15

regulated, but there is no competent authority for AML/CFT matters, although the Philippine 

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) have voluntarily agreed to submit suspicious 

transaction reports (STRs) to the Anti Money Laundering Council. 

32. There is a mix of state and private ownership of casinos across the region. For example, in 

the Philippines, all casinos are state owned. 

33. Some jurisdictions, such as Cambodia (21), Korea, Nepal and Vietnam restrict citizen access 

to casinos, only permitting foreign tourists to enter the casinos and gamble. 

34. Hong Kong, China does not have a legal casino sector; many residents favouring travel to 

Macao, China due to its proximity and ease of access. Although the operation of casinos is illegal 

within the jurisdiction, Hong Kong, China is the home port for several cruise ships offering cruises 

into international waters principally to provide casino operations (see Chapter 3 for more information 

on „high seas gambling‟). 

35. Singapore is due to open its first casinos in 2009. Jurisdictions considering legalising casino 

gambling include Indonesia, Japan, Palau, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Timor Leste (see box 2 

below). 

36. Casinos are illegal in Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, 

Mongolia, Myanmar, and Pakistan. 

Box 1. A Closer Look at Macao, China

Macao, China is a Special Administrative Region of China. Macao, China‘s population is just 0.5 million. The 

majority of the economy is linked to the tourism and casino industries. The casino industry now outstrips Las 

Vegas with casino revenue. Tax collected in 2008 made up over 70% of government total revenue. Macao, China 

holds the monopoly over casino-style gaming in the region with 31 casinos in operation.5There are 

approximately 30 million total visitor arrivals in 2008. Over half are from mainland China, the remaining 

predominantly from Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei and South East Asia. In 2002 Macao, China ended the gaming 

monopoly which had been dominated by Mr Stanley Ho‘s Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macao, China

(STDM) for 40 years. It liberalised the gaming industry by granting three casino gaming concessionaires and 3 

sub-concessionaires. 

The competent authorities responsible for the regulation of the casino sector are the Gaming Inspection and 

Coordination Bureau (DICJ) and the Judiciary Police. Criminal investigation of money laundering activities is 

undertaken by the Judiciary Police, whilst the preventative measures against money laundering are the 

responsibility of the DICJ. For currency exchange activities inside the casinos, they are under the supervision of 

the Monetary Authority of Macao.

Macao, China has introduced a licensing system to regulate junket operators. All licensed junket operators are 

obliged to file their information with the government, with their names published in the Official Gazette. Their 

licence will be reviewed periodically to see whether they are properly complying with the legislation and see 

whether they still fit the requirements of a junket operator. All casinos, junket operators and currency exchange 

counters inside the casinos have the duty to report Suspicious Transaction Reports to the Financial Intelligence 

Office of Macao, China. At the same time, casinos and junket operators have to submit large transaction reports 

to the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau.

37. There are seven jurisdictions with legal casino sectors in the Pacific. These include Australia 

(13), New Caledonia, New Zealand (6), Northern Mariana Islands, La Réunion (France), Solomon 

Islands, and Vanuatu (1). Papua New Guinea passed legislation in 2007 for 23 land-based and online 

 

5

 As at September 2008, reported by The Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau.
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16 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

casinos and Palau and Timor Leste are considering legalising casinos. All of the jurisdictions with 

casino sectors or considering legalising casinos are APG members, except for New Caledonia, 

Northern Mariana Islands, and, La Réunion (France). Casinos are not operating in Niue, the Cook 

Islands, Fiji, Tonga or Samoa. 

38. Cruise ships operating in the Pacific include offshore gaming, but do not operate while in 

harbour on pacific islands. Pacific jurisdictions indicate that they lack clear information on the 

operation and regulation of these gaming cruise ships. 

39. Australia is the largest casino sector in this region with 13 legally operated casinos, the first 

opening in Tasmania in 1973, and each state and territory having a least one. The casinos vary in size 

from 18 tables and 250 gaming machines to 350 tables and 2 500 gaming machines. Total gaming 

revenues from Australian casinos was recorded as AUD 2.8 billion in 2005/06.6 Gaming revenue, the 

largest component of casino revenue, has experienced a 4.1% cumulative annual growth and average 

annual growth rate since 2002/03. Each state and territory has its own regulatory and licensing control 

over casinos, which includes investigation and enforcement. In addition, all casinos are classified as 

“regulated entities” under law and supervised by the FIU (AUSTRAC) for compliance to AML/CFT 

laws. Casinos are commercially owned and operated in Australia and open to both citizens and 

tourists.

40. New Zealand has six legally operated casinos, the first opening in 1994. Gambling revenue 

in casinos was reported at NZ469 million in 2007.7 They are all commercially owned and operated and 

open to both citizens and tourists. New Zealand, however, does not have AML/CFT supervision of 

casinos, but has draft legislation underway to rectify this. Current laws provide financial reporting 

responsibilities to the FIU. General casino supervision is the responsibility of the Department of 

Internal Affairs, but casino licensing is the responsibility of a separate Gambling Commission. In 1997 

the New Zealand Government passed a moratorium on new casinos, capping the number of legal 

casinos allowed to operate at six.

Central Asia

41. The Eurasian Group (EAG) report casinos operating in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (18). In 

Kazakhstan laws passed in April 2007 limit casinos to two provincial cities – Kapchagai and 

Shchuchinsk, but it is unknown if any regulation of AML controls are in place. The 18 casinos 

reported in Kyrgyzstan are regulated, including for AML/CFT, however a recent ME noted the casinos 

are showing some resistance to these laws. 

42. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan report no casinos operating, although it is 

uncertain if this is because of legal restrictions or market limitations. 

Europe

43. Europe has long-established casino and gaming sectors and has experienced large-scale 

growth in recent years. Within Europe European Union (EU) members have responsibility to 

implement AML/CFT measures on casinos following the relevant EU directives. There are 

 

6

“Australian Casino Economic Report 2005/06”, July 2007, Australian Casino Association, 

http://www.auscasinos.com/documents/publicationsSubmissions/ACAFinalReport200506v3.pdf

7 Department of Internal Affairs. Gambling Expenditure Statistics 1983 – 2007, 

http://www.dia.govt.nz/Pubforms.nsf/URL/Expendstats07.pdf/$file/Expendstats07.pdf
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

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39 jurisdictions in the Europe with reported legal casino sectors in operation. These include: Austria 

(12), Belgium (9), Cyprus (20+), Czech Republic (158), Denmark (6), France (161), Finland (1+), 

Georgia (2), Germany (62), Greece (9), Hungary (6), Italy (4), Latvia (14), Luxembourg (1), Malta 

(4), Poland (27), Portugal, Romania, Russia (348), Slovakia (4), Slovenia (14), Spain (39), Sweden 

(4), Switzerland (19), and the United Kingdom (165 licensed 140 operating). See Annex A for full 

details. 

44. Casino ownership across Europe varies between state and private ownership, but some 

jurisdictions, such as Germany, Slovenia and Sweden have a mix of both. There is no citizenship 

prohibition reported. Most casino sectors are regulated and all are subject to AML/CFT controls. 

Casino jurisdictions rely less on junket or casino tourism operations and few European jurisdictions 

report commercial arrangements between casinos and junket promoters to support casino tourism. 

45. In most European countries there exists alongside traditional casinos a low stakes gaming 

machine market. These machines can be found in many places, including sports betting shops and 

poker clubs.8 With regards to the size of each sector, Russia has the largest sector with 348 operating 

casinos. After 1 July 2009, all gaming in Russia will be prohibited except within four newly created 

special gaming zones in Kalingrad, Rostov-na-Donu, Altai and Primorie Krai (Vladivostok), France, 

the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom follow closely with 160, 158 and 140 respectively. 

46. Austria has 12 casinos which generated approximately Euro 190 million in revenue in 2007 

from 2.44 million visitors. Finland has just one casino which recorded annual turnover of EUR 30.9 

million in 2007. Germany has 62 casinos which generated 944 million revenue in 2005 from 

7.7 million visitors. Germany‟s casino sector employees approximately 5 000 staff. Slot machines 

account for 75% of gross earnings in German casinos. Malta has three casinos which employ over 600 

people. Spain has 39 casinos which attracted 3.3 million visitors in 2006. 

47. Ireland has a number of private gaming clubs operating casino-like facilities that create an 

AML/CFT risk, but which fall outside the scope of their AML laws. Casinos are reported to be illegal 

in Iceland, Norway and Turkey.

South America

48. Many Central and South American jurisdictions have well established gaming sectors 

(lotteries, sports betting, etc) but fewer have well established casino sectors. GAFISUD and online 

directories report casino sectors operating in Argentina (70+), Chile (17+), Uruguay (18), Peru (7), and 

Venezuela (5), however it is unknown the extent of regulation and/or AML controls over these sectors. 

Uruguay and Venezuela also report casino sectors, but no further information is available. It is unclear 

the extent to which South American casinos rely on introduced junket operations. 

49. Argentina has a well established gaming market with further expansion taking place in the 

casino sector. Casinos do not operate in Bolivia, and it is unknown if Colombia, Ecuador and 

Paraguay have casino sectors. 

50. Bolivia and Brazil prohibit casinos. 

 

8 Rich Geller. “Saturation or Malaise?” Global Gaming Business, June 2008, p. 40.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

18 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

The Caribbean and Central America

51. The Caribbean has more than 120 casinos on 15 islands. The CFATF reports casinos 

operating in the Bahamas (4), Belize (2), Costa Rica (35), Dominican Republic (44), Jamaica (10), 

Panama (14), and Suriname (9), but the level of regulation and AML controls is not clear. 

52. Trinidad and Tobago have no legal casinos but have 72 registered Private Members Clubs 

that operate like casinos, but are not supervised by the government. 

53. Open source material reports that Panama has 14 full-scale casinos with three additional 

licences being recently granted, and 29 gaming machines halls. Combined with non-casino gaming 

revenues, Panama has the second-largest gaming market in Latin America behind Argentina. 

AML/CFT controls appear to be lacking in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua despite recent 

attempts by their respective governments to better control and regulate the industries. The Dominican 

Republic does not extend AML controls to the sector. 

54. In Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Guatemala and Guyana casinos are illegal. 

North America

55. Canada and the United States account for almost 50% of the global casino market. 

56. Casinos in Canada are relatively recent with most opening in the early 1990s (except for 

Yukon where a charity casino was legalised in 1973). Canada now has 63 casinos operating in seven 

provinces and one territory (Yukon). 29 of these are commercial casinos which are usually stateowned or operated through service contracts with private corporations. There are 24 charity casinos 

licensed in Alberta, and one in Yukon, which are all privately owned. In Alberta, only religious or 

charitable groups may hold a casino licence. Also in Canada there are nine First Nations9casinos 

operating in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The provincial and territorial authorities are 

responsible for regulating all casinos, as well as municipal, provincial and federal law enforcement 

agencies. The Canadian FIU (FINTRAC) is responsible for ensuring that casinos are compliant with 

their responsibilities under AML/CFT laws. 

57. Cruise ships operate out of Canadian waters and do offer casino facilities (except within five 

nautical miles of a Canadian port). As with many FATF/APG jurisdictions AML/CFT measures do not 

apply to cruise ship gambling. 

58. The 2005 revenues and profits for commercial and charity casinos in Canada are shown in 

Table 2 below:

Table 1

Revenues 2005 Profits 2005

Commercial Casinos CAD 3.7 billion CAD 1 billion

Charity Casinos in Alberta CAD 1.2 billion CAD 147 million

 

9. TBD.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 19

59. The United States has approximately 845 casinos and card clubs operating in at least 

30 jurisdictions (including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Tinian). Casino ownership in the 

United States is a mix of commercial and tribal ownership. In 2003, more than USD 800 billion was 

wagered at casinos and card clubs in the United States. In particular, there has been a rapid growth in 

riverboat and tribal casino gaming as well as card room gaming over the last ten years (see Box 5 for 

more on Indian Gaming in the United States). Collectively, tribal casinos took in USD 25.7 billion in 

revenue in 2006, compared with Nevada‟s revenues of USD 12.06 billion for the same year. 

60. Gambling is primarily a matter of state/territory law and responsibility for regulating casinos 

falls on state gaming commissions and the National Indian Gaming Commission. All legally licensed 

casino and card clubs with gross annual revenues greater than USD 1 million are subject to Federal 

AML requirements in the BSA. Covered gaming establishments (state licensed land based, riverboat, 

tribal casinos and card clubs) are subject to AML requirements. The US FIU (FINCEN) administers 

the BSA but does not directly examine casino for compliance with the law. That is delegated to the 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS). For floating casinos, i.e. gambling “cruises to nowhere” which 

operate out of certain states along the East Coast of the US to conduct gambling beyond the 3 nautical 

miles limit, customers are subject to reporting currency and monetary instruments of $10,000 or more 

when sailing both in and out of US territorial waters ships. Moreover, the operators of the “cruises to 

nowhere” are required to file tax notices for jackpot wins of USD 1200 or more.

Box 2. Indian Gaming in the United States

Tribal government-sponsored gaming is an evolution dating back to the late 1970‘s. After the Supreme Court 

confirmed (in 1987) the right of the tribal governments to establish gaming operations, Congress passed in 1988 

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25 USC 2701) which recognized, but limited, the right of tribes "to 

conduct gaming operations" and embodies a compromise between state and tribal interest. According to the 

IGRA, the states are given a voice in determining the scope and extent of tribal gaming by requiring tribal-state 

compacts for all forms of casinos style gambling and other gaming activities. Most recently tribal casinos have 

moved rapidly from relative obscurity within the casinos industry to prominent position with ample potential for 

money laundering and other types of financial crimes. There are 567 federally recognised Indian Tribes, half of 

which are in Alaska, and 225 of them operate 411 gaming facilities in 28 states.10 Of these 307 are considered 

casino operations, while the remainder are basically bingo halls. Collectively, the tribal casinos took in USD 25.7 

billion in revenue in 2006, more than twice the amount generated by Nevada casinos.11 If the tribal gaming 

industry were a single company, rather than 307 casinos, it would rank near the top 100 corporations in America. 

Tribal gaming interests have what is currently the largest casino in the United States, Foxwoods Resort and 

Casino, located in Mashantucket, Connecticut and owned by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. The west coast, 

primarily California, represents the fastest growing region for the Indian gaming industry.

61. Mexico reports a growing gaming industry; however, the only casino-style of gambling 

authorised is in betting game halls exclusive to regional fairs with cards, dice and roulette. These are 

Temporary permits for large-scale “salones de Apuestas “, regulated by the Secretaría de Gobernación 

(Ministry of Interior), but not subject to AML controls. The Mexican government do not foresee any 

permanent casinos being located or permitted to operate within national territory. 

 

10 “An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Indian Gaming in 2006”, National Indian Gaming 

Association, http://www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/press-releases-2007/NIGA_econ_impact_2006.pdf

11 “Tribal casino revenue up 5 percent nationwide”, Associated Press. June 19 2008, 

http://blog.mlive.com/kzgazette/2008/06/tribal_casino_revenue_up_5_per.html
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

20 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Emerging Markets 

62. Given the scope of potential revenue and the interest in foreign direct investment, a number 

of regions have significant emerging markets in the casino and gaming sectors. This is particularly the 

case in the Asia/Pacific region and in Africa. 

63. A number of developing countries with predominantly cash-based economies and weak or 

limited AML/CFT capacity are giving active consideration to establishing casino sectors. Some of the 

smaller less developed countries considering legalising casinos include Palau and Timor Leste. 

64. Singapore has passed legislation which provides for granting two licences for large-scale 

casinos. The licensing remains subject to confirmation of suitability of the two casino operators. 

65. Papua New Guinea passed legislation in 2007 for approximately 20 land-based and online 

casinos. 

66. Japan has indicated has organised crime groups running casino-like operations for online 

gaming, but is giving consideration to establishing luxury casino resorts by 2012 if liberalisation of the 

gaming market goes ahead. 

67. Chinese Taipei is considering proposals to open up the island nation‟s gambling business by 

revising legislation that may allow casinos on the offshore islands of Chinese Taipei..12 

68. Thailand is also considering legalising gambling after the findings of a detailed study on the 

prevalence of illegal casinos at the border between Thailand and Myanmar and related flows of funds 

to neighbouring casino jurisdictions. Thailand estimates USD 4-17 billion in illegal gambling turnover 

annually and 100 000 people arrested per annum for illegal gaming. 

Box 3. Drivers for Change in Asia

Market analysts consider that the Asia region has an undersupply of quality legal casino venues. Such analysts 

view Asia as having the greatest potential for growth in casino revenue and venue development. The key drivers 

for regulatory change in the Asia region include: 

1. Economic growth resulting in increased disposable income.

2. Changing social attitudes.

3. Increased media and government attention on existing illegal gambling industries.

4. Need for increased taxation revenues.

5. Need for tourism infrastructure development.

6. Availability of private sector capital for foreign direct investment.

However, issues that drive resistance to regulatory change include:

1. Social conservatism.

2. Religion.

3. Corruption in government.

4. Incumbent illegal and legal operators.

5. Government inefficiency or insufficient capability to affect change.

6. Voter/communities lack of faith in government to effectively regulate and control the industry.

 

12 Global Gaming Business, “Asia Update”, June 2008, p. 30.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 21

Conclusion

69. What is shown in this chapter and in detailed tables at Annex A is the extent of casino 

gambling around the world and the diversity of each region‟s sector. Demand for casino gambling 

services is high and increasing and is associated with high revenues for government. This is leading 

some jurisdictions to legalise gambling particularly in developing countries. 

70. There are established casino sectors in jurisdictions with government oversight, but are 

unregulated for AML/CFT. 

71. The next two chapters set out a number of vulnerabilities of casinos to money laundering by 

describing the methods and indicators of money laundering from past cases and the casino sector 

vulnerabilities and emerging AML-related issues.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

22 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

CASINO SECTOR RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST 

FINANCING

The need for casino sector-specific risk assessments

72. The casinos project group considered the need to conduct periodic assessments of ML/TF 

risks in the casino and gaming sector. The project group discussed the benefits of understanding the 

nature of the ML/TF environment to allow regulatory and enforcement agencies to better allocate 

resources to address priority risks in the casino sector. 

73. ML/TF is one aspect of criminal risk. Risk assessments of the casino sector may look at 

broader risks including organised crime, loan sharking, prostitution, drug dealing, human trafficking 

etc. 

Guidance on Typologies Risk Assessments

74. The FATF WGTYP June 2008 paper on Risk Assessments identifies factors that may 

influence the ML/TF risk in a county and suggests information to access when conducting a risk 

assessment. The WGTYP paper highlights a wide range of factor to be covered in a risk assessment. 

For the casino and gaming sector, these may include:

 Legal and regulatory environment.

 Characteristics of the economy as well as the casino/gaming sector.

 Ownership structure, integrity, internal controls and corporate governance of casino/gaming 

institutions.

 Ownership structure, integrity internal controls and corporate governance of intermediaries 

and associated businesses (junket promoters, agents, gaming equipment, financial service 

providers).

 Types of products and services offered and clients served.

 Criminal activities and proceeds of crime generated domestically as well as generated abroad 

but laundered domestically.

 Financial services offered by casino/gaming institutions and by casino intermediaries (junket 

promoters, agents etc). 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 23

Sources of information

75. Responses received from FATF/APG questionnaires indicate that many jurisdictions are 

receiving suspicious activity reports from casinos or that relate to casino activity. Casino regulators, 

law enforcement, bank regulators and FIUs hold useful information to assess risk areas. 

76. The project group noted that a number of commercial companies provide baseline 

information on national and regional casino and gaming trends, including size, scope and nature of 

markets; trends in investment and regulation and criminal exploitation, including money laundering. 

This information can assist competent authorities understand the nature of their sector as well as 

offshore sectors. 

Risks for jurisdictions without a casino sector

77. The casinos project group discussed why and how a jurisdiction without a casino sector may 

undertake an ML/TF risk assessment. These may be undertaken in response to illegal gaming as well 

as the movement of persons and funds to another gaming jurisdiction to launder the proceeds of crime. 

Models for casino sector risk assessments 

78. A number of countries have recently undertaken casino sector risks assessments. The models 

of assessment have varied, depending on the agency undertaking the assessment and the purpose (e.g.

policy settings, law enforcement responses, regulatory compliance). 

Police-led assessment - e.g. Canada

79. Canada‟s RCMP has recently undertaken a police-led assessment of ML risks in the casino 

sector. This involved working with a very wide range of stakeholders to identify national sectorspecific risks. As with other risk assessments, the RCMP drew on a wide range of information sources 

to understand risks in the sector. These included typologies trends derived from the FIU; interviews 

with operators in the sector, including staff of casinos (pit bosses, owners, security etc); and 

information collected from intelligence databases on related crime trends.

80. The assessment aimed to understand:

 The scope of the casino sector: number, type, location, ownership, risk profile etc of casinos.

 How Casinos are used as financial intermediaries.

 Law enforcement cases / intelligence of how casinos are used for ML or are associated with 

predicate offences (fraud, loan sharking etc).

 Criminal trends linked to casinos. 

Academic Sectors – e.g. Thailand

81. Thailand is a jurisdiction where casinos and gaming are illegal. Thai authorities have long 

recognised a very significant illegal gaming problem and the large scale movement of Thai nationals 

to foreign casino jurisdictions. 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

24 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

82. In order to better understand background issues, Thailand sought the assistance of the 

academic sector to undertake a scoping study of the impact of illegal gaming on Thailand, including 

ML and TF risks to the country. Thai authorities have given some consideration to regulatory reform 

and the possible licensing of some forms of gaming, including casinos. 

83. The scope of the Thai assessment included the value of gaming sector (illegal and offshore 

gaming); scope of illegal gaming; movement of Thai people to foreign jurisdictions for gaming; risks 

for ML/TF and other predicate offences (smuggling, drugs, human trafficking etc); and impact on the 

community from illegal gaming. 

 Over 100 000 people are arrested each year for illegal gambling offences.

 It is estimated that there are 200 to 300 illegal gambling houses in Bangkok.

 Annual turnover for illegal gambling houses in Bangkok is estimated at between USD 4 to 

17 billion and for those outside Bangkok is USD 2 to 4 billion.

 There are 27 legal or semi-legal casinos operating in neighbouring countries within very 

close proximity of the Thai border servicing Thai gamblers. 

 Thai junket operators offer casino tourism services in major Thai cities to move people and 

funds to these ‘offshore’ casinos. 

 Movement of Thai citizens to border casinos increases risks associated with currency 

smuggling and cross-border crime risks including smuggling, human trafficking and drug 

trafficking.

Regulator-led assessments – e.g. Australia

84. In Australia, AUSTRAC, as the AML/CFT regulator, and various state-based casino 

regulators have worked together to conduct a preliminary assessment of key typologies and regulatory 

risk related to money laundering and terrorist financing. This has involved considering a range of law 

enforcement information, regulatory information and sector information to identify areas of specific 

risk and to supporting preparation of AML guidelines and AML/CFT supervision and monitoring. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 25

CHAPTER 2: MONEY LAUNDERING METHODOLOGIES AND INDICATORS 

85. This chapter will identify and examine money laundering methods from known cases and 

draw out related indicators to support the detection of money laundering activity.

Broad risks in casinos

86. Casinos are by definition non-financial institutions. As part of their operation casinos offer 

gambling for entertainment, but also undertake various financial activities that are similar to financial 

institutions, which put them at risk of money laundering. Most, if not all, casinos conduct financial 

activities akin to financial institutions including: accepting funds on account; conducting money 

exchange; conducting money transfers; foreign currency exchange; stored value services; debit card 

cashing facilities, cheque cashing; safety deposit boxes; etc. In many cases these financial services are 

available 24 hours a day. 

87. It is the variety, frequency and volume of transactions that makes the casino sector 

particularly vulnerable to money laundering. Casinos are by nature a cash intensive business and the 

majority of transactions are cash based. During a single visit to a casino a customer may undertake one 

or many cash or electronic transactions, at either the „buy in‟ stage, during play, or at the „cash out‟ 

stage.13 It is this routine exchange of cash for casino chips or plaques14, TITO tickets15, and certified 

cheques, as well as the provision of electronic transactions to and from casino deposit accounts, 

casinos in other jurisdictions and the movement of funds in and out of the financial sector, which 

makes casinos an attractive target for those attempting to launder money. 

88. As this research is solely focused on casinos, the data collected is not wide enough to carry 

out statistical trend analysis. Chapter 3, however, does provide specific sector vulnerabilities and 

emerging issues as a start to this broader study. It is also recognised that methods and indicators are 

immediately useful to private sector organisations seeking to develop effective AML/CFT processes.

 

13 The „buy in‟ stage is when a customer enters a casino and purchases casino chips, tickets, or gaming 

machine credits in order to commence gambling. The „cash out‟ stage is when a customer converts 

casino chips, tickets or gaming machine credits for cash, casino cheque, credits an account or transfers 

funds to another casino.

14 The term „casino chip‟ also refers to plaques and other wagering instruments provided by the casino.

15 Ticket In/Ticket Out (TITO) is a gaming machine system that allows a gaming machine to accept 

either banknotes or tickets with a credit value printed on them (Ticket In) to commence play. TITO

also prints tickets with a credit value when a player wishes to „cash out‟ of the gaming machine 

(Ticket Out). The player can them redeem his/her ticket for cash at a cashier‟s desk, ticket redemption 

kiosk, or insert the ticket into another TITO machine and continue playing. A ticket redemption kiosk 

machine is a multifunctional device, connected to a gateway or kiosk server, that can perform a 

variety of financial transactions for customers, such as redeeming slot machine/video lottery tickets 

for currency, exchanging currency for currency (i.e., breaking bills or paper money), redeeming player

slot club points, purchasing slot machine vouchers (i.e., tickets), and initiating electronic transfers of 

money to or from a wagering account including currency withdrawals from a casino ATM.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

26 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

89. The importance of studying money laundering methods – the “how to” – cannot be 

overstated. Such studies provide government decision-makers and operational experts with the 

material to target policies and strategies for combating financial crime. The sharing of these methods, 

together with indicators to detect money laundering activity, with responsible financial and nonfinancial organisations is equally important. They are a necessary tool for financial institutions, other 

financial intermediaries and gatekeepers who are on the front line in confronting activities that may or 

may not be suspicious (and thus may or may not be related in some way to money laundering, terrorist 

financing or some other financial crime). 

90. For the private sector, and in this case casino owners and operators, valid money laundering 

indicators are therefore essential in establishing and “calibrating” mechanisms that help to identify 

suspicious or unusual transactions which must then be reported to a financial intelligence unit. 

91. For the purposes of this chapter the following definitions apply:16

 Method: a particular procedure for carrying out money laundering activity. There are further 

distinctions in the concept of a money laundering method:

o Technique: a particular action or way that the activity is carried out, for example, 

purchasing a cashier‟s cheque.

o Mechanism: a system or thing that carries out part of the process. An example of a 

money laundering mechanism is a casino. 

o Instrument: an object of value (or representing value) that is somehow used in the 

money laundering process, for example, a casino cheque or casino chips.

92. For example, the action of depositing funds into a casino account relates to all three 

concepts: i) depositing the funds is a technique, ii) the casino managing the account is a mechanism

and iii) the funds deposited are an instrument. It should be noted as well that, for the most part, the 

examples provided for each of these concepts may not in and of themselves represent illegal activities. 

Indeed it is only when these techniques, mechanisms and instruments are put together to form a money 

laundering activity that they become illegal.

93. With regards to indicators, there is sometimes confusion between a money laundering 

indicator and a money laundering method. While it is sometimes true that the methods defined below 

could indicate money laundering activity, they are not synonymous. For example, exchanging chips 

for cash is not by itself an indicator of money laundering. By the same token, indicators are not all 

necessarily money laundering methods.

Criminal interest in casinos – players and infiltration of casinos

94. Casinos are attractive venues for criminals. Casinos are consistently targeted by criminals for

criminal influence and criminal exploitation. Organised crime groups seek to control or own casinos or 

aspects of casino operations. Criminals attempt to infiltrate or influence casinos to facilitate theft, 

fraud, money laundering and other crimes. 

95. A core function of all casino regulators is making certain that gaming is conducted honestly 

by approving the rules of the games and requiring the operator to provide a high standard of 

 

16 Financial Action Task Force. Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Trends and Indicators Initial 

Perspectives.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 27

surveillance and security systems. This ensures public confidence in the gaming product, minimises 

opportunities for criminal activity and provides certainty of government revenue streams. 

96. Criminal influence and exploitation of casinos appears to be both for possible money 

laundering, but also for recreation and in some cases enhancing their criminal endeavours outside the 

casino. Casinos have been noted as a place where criminals and organised crime figures like to 

socialise and particularly like to spend and launder their criminal proceeds. 

97. Feedback from police also indicates that large casinos with sophisticated security and 

surveillance systems may be viewed by criminals as providing a safe haven to meet and associate in 

without fear for their personal safety.

98. Gaming venues attract ancillary criminal activities including loan sharking, vice and other 

crimes. 

Box 4. Loan Sharking

Loan Sharking (also known as usury) is prevalent in casinos in a number of jurisdictions. Loan sharking is a crime 

that involves loaning money to individuals at an interest rate that is above a maximum legal rate, sometimes 

collected under blackmail or threats of violence. Loan sharks may be financed and supported by organised crime 

networks who are also involved in money laundering activities. A loan shark usually preys on individuals who are 

problem gamblers, struggling financially or, for some reason, are unwilling to seek credit from legal sources.

Persons in debt to loan sharks may be coerced into assisting with money laundering schemes in the casino.

Box 5. Credit card scam using the casino

A jurisdiction reported a credit card point scam where casino chips are purchased using credit cards. The chips 

are then cashed out and instead of crediting the credit card, casinos usually issue cash or a casino cheque. The 

balance on the credit card is eligible for consumer points. The balance on the credit card is paid back using the 

cash or cheque received from the casino. This method enabled large amounts of credit card points to be 

accumulated in a short period of time and can be used for merchandise purchases. 

Money laundering methods and techniques in Casinos

99. The money laundering methods outlined in this chapter are: 

 Use of Casino Value Instruments (cash / casino chips / TITO / gaming machine credits / 

cashier‟s orders / casino cheques / gift certificates / chip purchase vouchers / casino reward 

cards).

 Structuring / Refining.

 Use of Casino Accounts (credit accounts, markers17, foreign holding accounts) / facilities.

 Intentional losses.

 Winnings / intentional losses.

 

17 Casino markers act as a credit line through a personal checking account, no transaction occurs, but are 

issued once a patron submits their checking account number and a cheque to the casino. The casino 

has the right to deposit the marker at any time but usually waits a few months to allow for customers 

to pay back the credit if the losses are high. Money launderers will pay back the debt with the 

proceeds of crime.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

28 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

 Currency Exchange.

 Employee Complicity.

 Credit Cards / Debit Cards.

 False Documents.

100. Each method is illustrated by representative cases18 and followed up with related indicators 

that can be used to detect suspicious or unusual transactions by casino owners and operators. The 

methods, cases and indicators have been generated from the following research material:19

 Sanitised case material from regulatory, law enforcement and security organisations.

 International case study and typology reports including FATF, APG and the Egmont Group.

 Open source research. 

Casino value instruments

Cash / Casino Chips / TITO / Gaming Machine Credits / Cashier’s Orders / Casino Cheques / Gift 

Certificates / Chip Purchase Vouchers / Casino Reward Cards

101. Casinos utilise various value instruments to facilitate gambling by their customers. The type 

and use of the value instruments listed above differs between casinos and is influenced by local 

regulation and casino operating structures. Casino value instruments are most often used for money 

laundering by converting illicit funds from one form to another. 

102. Casino chips are the most common casino value instruments. Casino chips are issued by 

casinos and used in lieu of cash in gaming transactions between the house and players. Chips are 

round and marked with the denomination and name of the casino and are negotiable within the casino, 

or, in some cases, within casinos in the same group. Casinos may issue „credit chips‟ which are 

different in colour and only used by patrons playing on credit. Casinos may issue „dead chips‟ which 

are only used by junket patrons (see section below on junkets). 

103. Buying chips for cash or on account, then redeeming value by way of a casino cheque, 

bank draft of money transfer. Launderers typically buy chips with cash or through their casino 

account. Chips bought on account may use a Chip Purchase Voucher (CPV) or similar value 

instrument. Repayment is then requested by a cheque, draft or transfer drawn on the casino‟s account. 

This method can be made more opaque by using a chain of casinos where the chips that were 

purchased with illicit cash are converted to credit, and transferred to another jurisdiction in which the 

casino chain has an establishment; the credit is then converted into in the form of a casino cheque at 

the second casino. 

 

18 The cases outlined are provided from jurisdictions contributing to the project research, and while 

some countries may appear to be over/under-represented in the cases, this is not an indicator of high or 

low levels of money laundering within that country, but merely a reflection of that government‟s 

willingness to share money laundering information to support global AML awareness. 

19 It is important to note that this chapter does not provide a description of all methods used to facilitate 

money laundering. It is limited to those methods that have been reported to FATF or APG and from 

cases that have been approved for use in the public forum. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 29

104. Money launderers may hold the chips for a period of time, either using the chips to gamble 

in hopes of generating certifiable winnings or later redeeming the chips for cash/ cheque / transfer. 

105. Purchase of chips from ‘clean’ players at a higher price – Money launderers may purchase 

chips from other money launderers or un-associated casino patrons with „clean‟ backgrounds. This is 

done at a price greater than the chips‟ face value. This is referred to as value tampering.

106. Casino cheques payable to cash – in some jurisdictions, casinos allow winning cheques to 

be made payable to „cash‟. High-value casino cheques payable to cash have been observed in 

secondary circulation as bearer negotiable instruments and used as payment for goods or for 

reinvestment in criminal ventures, such as purchasing drugs. High-value casino cheques may originate 

from VIP rooms, which may provide alternative remittance services between player‟s home 

jurisdictions and the casino VIP room.

107. Combining winnings and cash into casino cheques – although few jurisdictions allow this, 

money launderers seek to add cash to casino winnings and then exchange the combined cash and 

winnings for a single cheque.

108. Use of chips as currency in illegal transactions – money launderers may retain casino chips 

to be used as currency to purchase drugs or other illegal goods. Carrying chips from a drug transaction 

may also contribute to an alibi for the predicate offence. The recipient of the chips will later cash them 

at the casino. 

109. Casino chips to be used as currency may be taken across borders and exchanged for payment 

of an illegal enterprise then returned by the third parties and cashed at the issuing or honouring casino 

in amounts below a reporting threshold. Most jurisdictions do not list casino chips as money value 

instruments and therefore do not require Customs declaration. 

110. In some jurisdictions, casino chips from one casino can be utilised in another associated 

casino. Cases showed that the money launderers will take advantage of this arrangement to avoid 

attracting attention to their activities at the one casino. This may take in another jurisdiction. To 

prevent this some jurisdictions require casinos to have casino-specific chips and do not allow intercasino chip cashing. 

111. Purchase of large numbers of ‘casino gift certificates’ – Cases have been detected of 

money launderers purchasing high value or numerous low value casino gift certificates which can be 

redeemed by 3rd parties. The certificates are then sold or given to other persons distancing the money 

launderer from the illicit funds.

112. Purchase of casino reward cards – Money launderers use illicit funds to purchase casino 

reward cards from legitimate customers paying them a premium above the value of the reward. 

Case 1. Casino used as preferred method to launder millions

Offence: Money Laundering

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Chip purchase and cash out, claiming credits as jackpot wins, playing games 

with low return and high win.

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips, casino cheques

Information identified alleged money launderers using the casino as a preferred method of laundering millions of 

dollars accumulated from criminal activities. The methods used to launder the money included purchasing and 

cashing out chips without playing, putting funds through slot machines and claiming credits as a jackpot win and 

playing games with low returns but higher chances of winning. The same group were also utilising bank 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

30 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

accounts and businesses to launder funds.

Case 2. Purchase of chips and gambling without clear intention to win

Offence: Money Laundering

Jurisdiction: Belgium

Technique: Chip purchase and cash out, claiming credits as jackpot wins, playing games 

with low return and high win.

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips, casino cheques

Two Asian males residing in Belgium went to a Belgian casino twice to purchase chips for a total amount of 

almost 25 000 EUR. When visiting they did not play at the tables and immediately collected funds through a third 

person, also an Asian national. 

Investigations indicated that the three persons were students and lived at a common address with other Asian 

students. It appeared that the transactions were likely to be linked to human trafficking. By not playing at the 

casino and collecting the money through a third person they wanted to leave a paper trail in order to justify the 

origin of the funds.

Case 3. Proceeds of drugs used to purchase chips and claim funds as winnings

Offence: Drug importation

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Chip purchase and cash out

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips, chip to cash transfer, casino cheques

A cargo consignment addressed to a person contained approximately 3.4 kilograms of black opium resin, 

concealed within the contents. The person was arrested when attempting to collect the consignment. Further 

investigation revealed the person to be a regular customer of a casino, having conducted approximately 

50 betting transactions, predominantly chip cash outs totalling AUD 890 000. Very little casino gaming play was 

recorded for the person and it was assumed that he used the proceeds from previous importations to purchase 

chips and claim the funds as winnings.

Case 4. Proceeds from stolen cheques used to purchase casino chips

Offence: Money Laundering 

Jurisdiction: United Kingdom, India

Technique: Purchase casino chips

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips

In November 2007 two men were convicted for their part in a GBP 25 000 cheque scam. The victim was robbed 

at New Delhi Railway Station in India in March 2006 and among the items stolen were two Barclays cheque 

books. The money laundering trail led authorities to a casino in London where cash withdrawn from the 

defendants account was used to purchase gambling chips. Both men claimed gambling addictions. STRs were 

not submitted by the casino in this case.

Case 5. Cash laundered through casino used to bribe officials

Offence: Money Laundering 

Jurisdiction: Korea

Technique: Cash to chip to cash/cheque transfers

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips, casino cheques

Early 2006 a bribery case involving money laundering at a casino was investigated by the Public Prosecutor‘s 

Office. A legal broker bought casino chips with cheques to a total of KRW 20 billion (approx USD 20 million) from 

2003 to 2005 and then changed the chips with cash and cheques issued by the casino. He then used the money 

to bribe politicians and senior government officials.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 31

Case 6. Casino reward cards traded for gold coins

Offence: Money Laundering 

Jurisdiction: United States

Technique: Purchase casino reward cards from legitimate customers

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino reward cards, gold coins

A suspect purchased casino reward cards from legitimate customers at a US casino. The cards increase in value 

with each casino visit and with each gambling session. The cards were purchased with illicit funds and were then 

traded for gold coins at the casino‘s store. An employee at the store was an accomplice in the laundering 

scheme.

Case 7. Embezzled money laundered through casino

Offence: Money Laundering 

Jurisdiction: United States

Technique: Purchase and cash out with little or no gaming activity

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips

A lawyer was sentenced in New Jersey for embezzling more than USD 500 000 and laundering USD 250 000 of 

it through an Atlantic City casino. The defendant wire transferred USD 250 000 to the casino and arrived at the 

casino later the same day to launder the funds. He purchased casino chips and gambled for an hour on a 

roulette table losing USD 10 000. He then cashed out the remaining USD 240 000 into currency and left the 

casino.

Case 8. Embezzled money laundered through casino

Offence: Money Laundering 

Jurisdiction: Spain

Technique: Purchase and cash out with little or no gaming activity, casino cheques in the 

name of 3rd parties

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips

Different people entered separately in a casino and bought chips. After playing minor amounts of chips they tried 

to change chips and requested a cheque paid to the name of a third person. They tried to do the same operation 

with different people and lower amounts one day later, which raised suspicion of casino operators.

Indicators of ML using casino value instruments

 Inserting funds into gaming machines and immediately claiming those funds as credits.

 Customers claiming gaming machine credits/payouts with no jackpot.

 Customers claiming a high level of gaming machine payouts.

 Noticeable spending/betting pattern changes.

 Customers frequently inserting substantial amounts of banknotes in gaming machines that 

have high payout percentages and do not play "max bet" to limit chances of significant losses 

or wins, thereby accumulating gaming credits with minimal play.

 Frequent even-money wagering when conducted by a pair of betters covering both sides of 

an even bet (e.g., in roulette, baccarat/mini-baccarat, or craps).

 Customer‟s intention to win is absent or secondary.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

32 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

 Two or more customers frequently wagering against one another on even-money games.

 Customer in possession of large amounts of coinage or bills.

 Customer befriending/attempting to befriend casino employees.

 Purchasing and cashing out casino chips with little or no gaming activity.

 Customer requests to add cash to casino winnings and then exchanging the combined cash 

and winnings for a single cheque.

 Multiple cheques being requested or drawn on account.

 High volume of transactions within a short period.

 Multiple chip cash outs on the same day.

 Structuring of chip/cheque transactions.

 Chip cash out is same/similar to chip purchase.

 Requests for credit transfers to other casinos.

 Use of multiple names to conduct similar activity.

 Use of third parties to purchase casino chips.

 Use of credit cards to purchase casino chips.

 Use of personal cheques, bank cheques and traveller‟s cheques to purchase casino chips.

 Customer due diligence challenges, e.g. refusals, false documents, one-offs, tourists passing 

trade.

 Customer purchases chips and leaves casino shortly after.

 CPV, TITO, ticket or voucher dated prior to date of redemption.

 Large chip purchases.

 Frequent purchase of casino gift certificates.

 Unexplained income inconsistent with financial situation/customer profile.

 Supposed winnings do not correspond with recorded winnings.

 Dramatic or rapid increase in size and frequency of transactions for regular account holder.

 Detection of chips brought into the casino.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 33

Structuring 

113. Structuring or „smurfing‟ involves the distribution of a large amount of cash into a number of 

smaller transactions in order to minimise suspicion and evade threshold reporting requirements.

Common methods of structuring include:

 Regularly depositing or transacting similar amounts of cash, which are below a country‟s 

reporting disclosure limit.

 The use of third parties to undertake transactions using single or multiple accounts.

 Using cheques from multiple financial institutions or branches of a financial institution to 

„buy in‟ while the amount of each cheque is below the reporting threshold.

 Utilising shift changes to systematically „cash in‟ chips or other value instruments to avoid 

threshold reporting.

 Regularly switching gaming tables, gaming rooms, junkets or casinos within a chain when 

the wagering amounts are approaching the reporting threshold.

 Requesting the division of winnings or prize money, which exceeds the reporting threshold, 

to be broken down into cash and chips below the reporting threshold in order to exchange it 

at the cashier‟s desk.

114. While money launderers will often structure their transactions to avoid financial institutions 

filing reports to authorities, it has been found that some money launderers using casinos have the 

opposite strategy and seek to trigger a cash transaction report to further authenticate a transaction.

Case 9. Using reporting thresholds to legitimise suspicious transactions

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: United States

Technique: Use of third parties, triggering transaction reports to legitimise suspicious 

transactions

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino chips, casino cheque

A number of persons purchased chips with illicit cash in amounts below the CTR threshold, but then passed the 

chips to one individual who cashed out, receiving a casino cheque and triggering the filing or a CTRC that gave 

the appearance of further authenticating the transaction. Over a twelve-month period, one individual was named 

in casino CTRCs reporting UDS1.1million paid out, but was not named in a single CTRC for cash taken in.

Refining 

Exchanging low denomination for high denomination currency

115. Individual launderers or organised groups use casino services to refine large amounts of low 

denomination bank notes into more manageable high denomination notes. Some countries note this as 

being associated with drug dealers who accumulate large amounts of small denomination bills from 

drug sales. In cases of groups, they may seek to refine money by dividing it amongst the group before 

entering the casino. The group enter the casino, individually refine their portion of the money and 

meet again outside the casino to assemble the total amount. The refining techniques most commonly 

identified are listed below:
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

34 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

116. Refining using the cashier’s desk – money launders exchange coins or small denomination 

bills for larger denomination bills at the cashier‟s desk. 

117. Refining using ‘note acceptors’ or gaming machines that accept cash – Most casinos with 

gaming machines have „note acceptors‟. Money launderers will feed currency notes into the machine 

to accumulate credit with little or no play before redeeming the credits. As the amount can be quite 

large, it requires a „ticket‟ or similar document provided by the slot attendant as proof to enable the 

exchange for cash or cheque at the casino cashier‟s desk. Gaming machines, Video Lottery Terminals 

(VLTs) and Ticket In/ Ticket Out (TITO) machines are used to refine currency. Gaming machines, 

TITO machines and VLTs are fed large sums of low denomination cash. Launderers redeem credits 

with minimal play. The ticket is then cashed at the cashier‟s desk, ticket redemption kiosk, for high 

denomination bills. 

118. Use of casino account for refining – launderers pay low denomination cash into their casino 

accounts and withdrawn funds with cash of higher denominations.

Case 10. Refining low denomination notes

Jurisdiction: Spain

Technique: Refining, Use of third parties

Mechanism: Casino 

Instrument: Cash, casino chips, remittance arrangement

A group of three foreign people entered separately in a casino and bought chips, paying with low denomination 

notes. They didn‘t play any game, and after they changed the chips that they had bought trying to obtain high 

denomination notes.

Case 11. Drug proceeds converted into casino chips by third parties

Offence: Drug importation

Jurisdiction: Australia, Vietnam

Technique: Use of third parties

Mechanism: Casino, remittance agent

Instrument: Casino chips, remittance arrangement

A person was involved in the importation and distribution of heroin into Australia from Vietnam. The person 

gambled a large proportion of the proceeds at casinos and used third parties to purchase gaming chips on his 

behalf. Reports from the casino noted multiple chip cash outs on the same day, with some of these transactions 

being structured to avoid the AUD 10 000 reporting threshold.

Further investigations noted that he would send large cash payments to various entities in Vietnam through a 

remittance dealer. The remittance dealer was a trusted associate of the person and had been non-compliant with 

his reporting obligations. 

Indicators of ML using structuring/refining methods

 Activity was inconsistent with the customer‟s profile.

 Associations with multiple accounts under multiple names.

 Use of multiple names to conduct similar activity.

 Depositing multiple amounts of cash and receiving multiple cheques drawn on that account.

 Multiple individuals sending funds to the one beneficiary.

 Cheque issued to a family member of the person.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 35

 Third party presents for all transactions but does not participate in the actual transaction.

 Transferring funds into third party accounts.

 Transactions on casino accounts conducted by persons other than the account holder.

 Use of third parties to undertake structuring of deposits and wire transfers.

 Use of a remittance dealer / junket operators to deposit or withdraw cash.

 Use of third parties to purchase gaming chips.

 Use of third party to conduct wagering.

 Cash handed to third party after cash out.

 High volume of transactions within a short period.

 Purchasing and cashing out casino chips with no gaming activity.

 Exchanging large quantities of quarters from non-gaming proceeds for paper currency.

 Frequent betting transactions just under thresholds.

 Frequent „buy in‟ and „cash out‟ transactions just under thresholds.

 Cash deposits / withdrawals just under thresholds.

 Wire transfers / currency exchanges just under thresholds.

 Requests for winnings in separate cash or chip amounts under reporting threshold.

 Cashing in winnings in a multiple combination of chips, cheque and cash.

 Customer conducts several transactions under reporting thresholds over several shift 

changes.

 Customer moving from table to table or room to room before the wagering amounts reach 

the reporting threshold.

 Opening a casino account or purchasing casino chips with small denominations bills.

 Customer gambling with large amounts of small denomination bills.

 Currency exchange from small denomination bills to larger denomination bills.

 Frequent „cash out‟ transactions without corresponding „buy in‟ transactions or vice versa.

 Customer due diligence challenges, e.g. refusal, false documents, one-off/tourist or passing 

trade.

 Dramatic or rapid increase in frequency of currency transactions for regular account holders.

 Noticeable spending/betting pattern changes.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

36 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

 Insert banknotes in electronic gaming devices with no gaming activity, press the “cash out” 

button which generates a TITO ticket, and redeem ticket at cashier‟s desk or ticket 

redemption kiosk machine.

Casino accounts & facilities

Credit accounts / Markers / Foreign holding accounts / safe deposit boxes

119. Casino accounts provide criminals further opportunities to attempt to laundering crime 

proceeds. Many casinos offer deposit accounts and lines of credit with less scrutiny and CDD 

requirements than financial institutions. The frequent movement of funds between financial 

institutions and casinos, or between casino accounts held in different casinos may be vulnerable for 

money laundering. Many casinos offer private safe deposit boxes, particularly to VIP/‟high roller‟ 

customers. 

120. Cashing cheques into casino accounts – Some casinos allow customers to cash various 

types of cheques and use the proceeds for gambling. Cheques could be signed over to the bearer by the 

cheque recipient. In the cases studied, proceeds from illegal activity were initially used to draw these 

cheques with the aim of avoiding the casino‟s suspicion. 

121. Deposits into casino accounts by wire transfers or bank cashier’s cheque – funds are 

deposited by wire transfer of bank cheque, then cashed out or moved to other accounts with minimal 

or no gambling activity. 

122. Cashed out funds are stored in casino safety deposit boxes or held in the form of safekeeping 

markers and then cashed out.

123. Foreign Holding Accounts (FHAs) – Accounts that are held in one jurisdiction by the 

casino, but the funds can be used to gamble in another jurisdiction under the same casino group. For 

example, funds held in a FHA account in Macao, China can be used to gamble at a casino in Las 

Vegas. The money held in the account does not physically leave the country and is not subject to cash 

declarations. Large casinos may operate marketing offices in jurisdictions other than where the casino 

is located. Patrons are able to pay in funds to their casino account to be played when they travel to the 

casino without sending a cross-border wire transfer. See the Junkets section for further details. 

124. Wire transfers from Casas de Cambio to casino accounts – Casas de Cambio in another 

jurisdiction may wire transfer funds to casinos. As an example, in the United States Casas de Cambio 

businesses are concentrated along the southwest border, with over 1 000 located along the border from 

California to Texas. These businesses are generally unregistered and do not comply with AML 

reporting requirements, and are suspected of being a significant money laundering risk. These Casas 

de Cambio have corresponding bank accounts which allow them wire transfer of large amounts of 

cash to casinos and other institutions throughout the world. 

125. Safety deposit boxes – A number of casinos offer safety deposit boxes to patrons, in 

particular to „high roller‟ patrons in VIP rooms. These present a risk due to the lack of transparency 

with the use of such boxes and the possibility for 3rd parties to be given access to safety deposit boxes 

via a password or key, to facilitate financial transactions. Very few jurisdictions regulate the safety 

deposit boxes in casinos. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 37

Case 11. Large money laundering conspiracy

Offence: Money laundering, VAT fraud, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, drug trafficking

Jurisdiction: United Kingdom, Dubai

Technique: Use of casino accounts, placement via gambling

Mechanism: Bank, casino

Instrument: Cash

The money laundering conspiracy involved millions of UK pounds from organised criminal gangs being laundered 

by a group of men from West Midlands. The money laundered included the profits from a number of activities 

including drug trafficking, multi-million pound VAT conspiracies in the mobile phone industry, counterfeiting and 

credit card fraud. The monies were a mixture of Scottish and English notes. The defendants would transfer large 

amounts of money to a back account in Dubai, which would then be accessed by their associates. The 

defendants received the proceeds of crime in the UK and made equivalent amounts of criminal monies available 

in Dubai. They then utilised the gambling industry to launder the money. Money was placed on a deposit at a 

casino and withdrawn a day or so later. Other sums would be gambled. Thousands of pounds would be passed 

over the tables in order to disguise the original source of the banknotes. Monies gambled or exchanged at the 

casino provided the defendants with an apparently legitimate explanation as to their source.

Case 12. Bank employee gambles millions from clients’ accounts

Offence: Fraud, money laundering

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Use of casino accounts, structuring

Mechanism: Bank, casino

Instrument: Bank cheques

An investigation into a bank employee who gambled millions of dollars from clients‘ accounts was initiated as a 

direct result of information submitted by the casino. The suspect used his knowledge of the bank‘s internal 

procedures to discreetly transfer funds from customer accounts to his own personal account. Over a period of 

time, these funds were deposited into his casino account in the form of bank cheques made out in his name. The 

casino reported the regular deposit of bank cheques. The same casino had also previously reported bets placed 

by the suspect of AUD 9 000 to avoid the AUD 10 000 reporting threshold. As a result of the investigation the 

suspect was charged with three counts of money laundering and 37 counts of fraud.

Case 13. Avoiding liquidation action

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Placement via gambling

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Cash

A person was a director of a company that was subject to liquidation. Contrary to liquidator‘s instructions, the 

person began transferring large amounts of cash between company accounts and depositing the money into a 

casino account. The funds were used to gamble at the casino and subsequent ―winnings‖ taken as cash.

Case 14. Cigarette Fraud

Offence: Money laundering, bank fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy

Jurisdiction: United States

Technique: Use of third parties and casino accounts to facilitate fraud

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Cash, Casino Cheques

A suspect in New York lured foreign buyers into ordering large quantities of cigarettes. Suspect did not have 

cigarettes and had no intention of providing them to the buyers. The casino was used to launder the funds from 

the fraud as below:

 Buyer 1 paid USD 100 000 up front in a casino cashier‘s cheque. Suspect had accomplice deposit the 

cheque at the casino. Accomplice was permitted to gamble with USD 10 000 and cash out remainder 

and give to suspect.

 Buyer 2 provided a USD 60 000 certified cheque up front. Accomplice deposited the cheque at the same 

casino and was permitted to gamble, but lost USD 50 000 and gave remaining USD 10 000 in cash to 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

38 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

defendant. Buyer 2 sent another USD 100 000 certified cheque.

 Buyer 3 deposited USD 600 000 cheque into an account against which a cheque in the amount of 

USD 180 000 was made payable to the same casino. Accomplice then tried to withdraw all of the 

money, but the casino refused and permitted only a USD 50 000 withdraw. Accomplice then gambled 

with some funds and won USD 15 000. Casino then permitted withdrawal of funds and allowed 

accomplice to cash out.

Case 15. Loan-sharking profits laundered at casino

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: Japan, United States

Technique: Purchase and cash out with little or no gaming activity

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Cash, casino chips, casino credit 

A boss of a loan-shark business ordered his associates to convert the profits from Yen into US currency using 

false names. These funds were then distributed to numerous bank accounts around the world. Some of the 

money was also invested with a foreign agent of a Las Vegas casino, who kept the money in a safety deposit box 

in the head office of a major Tokyo bank. Against the security of this money, the boss played frequently at Las 

Vegas casinos as a VIP player. Although he gambled in the VIP room, he would never place big bets and, after 

minimal play, would frequently cash in his chips for US currency. His associated were also circulated through a 

number of Las Vegas casinos cashing in chips worth USD 2 000 or less.

Indicators of ML using casino accounts:

 Frequent deposits of cash, cheques, bank cheques, wire transfers into casino account.

 Funds withdrawn from account shortly after being deposited.

 Significant account activity within a short period of time.

 Account activity with little or no gambling activity.

 Casino account transactions conducted by persons other than the account holder.

 Funds credited into account from country of concern.

 Large amounts of cash deposited from unexplained sources.

 Associations with multiple accounts under multiple names.

 Transfer of funds from/to a foreign casino/bank account.

 Transfer of funds into third party accounts.

 Funds transferred from casino account to a charity fund.

 Multiple individuals transferring funds to a single beneficiary.

 Structuring of deposits / withdrawals or wire transfers.

 Using third parties to undertake wire transfers and structuring of deposits.

 Use of an intermediary to make large cash deposits.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 39

 Use of gatekeepers, e.g. accountants and lawyers to undertake transactions.

 Use of multiple names to conduct similar activity.

 Use of casino account as a savings account.

 Activity is inconsistent with the customer‟s profile.

 Unexplained income inconsistent with financial situation.

 Transfers with no apparent business or lawful purpose.

 Transfer of company accounts to casino accounts.

 Use of false and stolen identities to open and operate casino accounts.

 Customer name and name of account do not match.

 U-turn transactions occurring with funds being transferred out of country and then portions 

of those funds being returned.

 Customer due diligence challenges, e.g. refusal, false documents, one-off/tourist or passing 

trade.

 Requests for casino accounts from Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).

Winnings

126. Use of illicit funds to gamble – this is the simplest method of gambling illicit funds in the 

home hopes of generating certifiable winnings. One way to do this is to play gaming machines or other 

games with low payout higher win/loss ratios. The money launderer will then receive a casino cheque 

for the total amount of credits remaining on the machine plus the jackpot. 

127. Some jurisdictions require casinos to endorse the casino cheques from jackpots as „winnings‟ 

in order to differentiate it from a cheque generated as a result of cashing out large amounts of machine 

credits. 

128. Buying winnings from legitimate customers - is another method used across the gaming 

sector. Money launderers will approach customers and offer them cash at a premium above their 

winnings. This was evident with customers who had won gaming machine jackpots, or accumulated a 

large amount in casino chips from winnings on table games, or customers that had won in other forms 

of betting offered by some casinos, such as electronic lotteries, horse racing and sports betting.

129. Parallel Even money betting – In cases where gambling is undertaken to launder funds, it is 

usually on low odds, low risk games such as the even money options on roulette. This would involve 

two or more persons placing opposite equivalent bets on even money wagers in the same game. As an 

example Person A places USD 1 400 on red, while Person B places USD 1 400 on black in a game of 

roulette. The bet is „double or nothing‟. In this case the winning party would win just under 

USD 3 000 which could be paid out with a „winnings‟ cheque and the size of the win would not trigger 

CDD requirements at the roulette table. 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

40 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

130. Betting against associates / intentional losses – This is also the case in games where which 

provide money launderers the option to bet against an associate so that in most cases one party will 

win. These „intentional losses‟ where money launderers are intentionally losing to one of the party, 

who is able to receive a casino issued cheque or wire transfer of „legitimate‟ winnings. 

Case 16. Overseas nationals purchase winning jackpots with illegal proceeds

Offence: Drug trafficking & money laundering

Jurisdiction: Spain

Technique: Buying winning lottery tickets

Mechanism: Lotteries

Instrument: Winning jackpots, cash

Investigations in Spain related, mainly with drug trafficking, corruption and tax fraud identified the use of gaming 

to launder funds. The technique consisted of buying winning lottery tickets from legitimate gamblers.

Case 17. Overseas nationals purchase winning jackpots with illegal proceeds

Offence: Money Laundering

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Buying winning jackpots

Mechanism: Gambling clubs

Instrument: Winning jackpots, casino cheques

A group of overseas nationals were identified buying winning jackpots from other persons at various clubs in 

Sydney, Australia. The suspects deposited approximately AUD 1.7 million in winning cheques within a year, 

immediately withdrawing money in cash afterwards. The source of the funds used to buy winning jackpots was 

suspected to be from illegal means.

Indicators of ML using winnings:

 Frequent claims for winning jackpots.

 Frequent deposits of winning gambling cheques followed by immediate withdrawal of funds 

in cash.

 Customers watching/hanging around jackpots sites but not participating in gambling.

 Multiple chip cash outs on the same day.

 Customers claiming gaming machine credits/payouts with no jackpot.

 Customers claiming a high level of gaming machine payouts.

 Purchasing and cashing out casino chips with no gaming activity.

 Requests for winnings in separate cash or chip amounts under reporting threshold.

 Frequent „cash out‟ transactions without corresponding „buy in‟ transactions.

 Cashing in winnings in a multiple combination of chips, cheque and cash.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 41

Currency exchange

131. Given the popularity of casino-based tourism and the willingness of customers to travel to 

legal casino sectors, most casinos offer currency exchange services. 

132. Conversion of large sums of foreign currency – launderers may use large, one-off, or 

frequent foreign currency exchanges or deposits of a foreign currency. This may not appear suspicious 

in jurisdictions with high numbers of foreign players. 

133. Reported cases indicate that criminals involved in the distribution and supply illegal drugs 

are using casino currency exchange services to convert their criminal proceeds from one currency to 

another, in order to alter its original form. 

134. Individuals and groups will also employ structuring methods to undertake currency 

exchanges without triggering threshold reports. They will use multiple casino locations and once the 

currencies are exchanged, will meet again to assemble the total amount. 

135. Casino play is undertaken in foreign currency – in some poorly regulated jurisdiction, 

customers are able to purchase chips directly in a foreign currency (for example in Nepal with USD 

and Indian Rupees). 

Case 18. Overseas nationals purchase winning jackpots with illegal proceeds

Offence: Money Laundering

Jurisdiction: Spain

Technique: Currency conversion

Mechanism: Casino 

Instrument: Cash – various currencies

A group of foreign people entered separately in a casino to buy casino chips using Swiss Francs (CHF). The 

purpose of the syndicate was not to play in the casino, but to redeem the chips in Euros. The casino detected the 

operations, stopped the transactions and filed an STR. 

Indicators of ML using currency exchange:

 Bank drafts/cheques cashed in for foreign currency, e.g. Euros, USD.

 Multiple currency exchanges.

 Dramatic or rapid increases in size and frequency of currency exchange transactions for 

regular account holders.

 Currency exchange for no reasonable purpose.

 Currency exchanges with low denomination bills for high denomination bills.

 Currency exchanges carried out by third parties.

 Large, one-off, or frequent currency exchanges for customers not known to the casino.

 Requests for casino cheques from foreign currency.

 Currency exchanges with little or no gambling activity.
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42 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

 Structured currency exchanges.

Employee complicity

136. Employee complicity is another method in which third parties are used to facilitate money 

laundering. Individual employees or organised groups comprising of staff from different departments 

conspire with customers to enable money laundering transactions to go undetected. Methods include:

 Failing to file suspicious transaction reports or threshold transaction reports.

 Destroying documents/transactions reports related to due diligence or reporting processes.

 Falsifying player ratings and other gambling records to justify the accumulation of casino 

chips/gaming machine credits.

137. Some jurisdictions have raised vulnerabilities from providers of gaming equipment and 

machines as well as contractors that supply goods with a potential to impact on the integrity of the 

operation. Major contracts can be an avenue for criminal exploitation of the operation (e.g. through 

corrupt purchasing and under supply of contract goods). Criminals will try to exploit gaming 

equipment and associated computer systems to achieve theft and money laundering in the casino. 

Case 19. Suspected falsified player ratings

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Falsifying player ratings to legitimise criminal proceeds

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Cash

An ex-employee of one casino was investigated by Australian authorities after he was able to purchase a house 

for cash. The family of this person is alleged to be involved in illegal drug activity and it was suspected that the 

funds used to purchase the house were provided by his family. The person, however, was able to show  ̳player 

ratings‘ from a second casino to show how he had turned NZD 20 000 into over NZD 400 000 in two weeks. It is 

suspected that an accomplice at the second casino falsified these  ̳player ratings‘, but this was not able to be 

proven.

Case 20. Back door corruption

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: United States (Indian casino)

Technique: Casino staff bribed to facilitate money laundering 

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Cash, jackpots

In Florida drug proceeds were laundered through gaming machines. Some gaming machines are controlled by 

software that have certain override features, or  ̳back doors‘ that give key casino staff the ability to force jackpot 

payouts. In Florida drug dealers bribed casino staff who accessed the override features and rigged a number of 

machines for the drug dealers to play and win jackpots from their drug proceeds.

Indicators of employee complicity:

 Contact between patrons and casino staff outside of the casino. 

 Supposed winnings do not correspond with recorded winnings.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 43

 Dramatic or rapid increases in size and frequency of currency transactions for regular 

account holders.

 Large sums of cash from unexplained sources.

 Large sums credited into accounts from other jurisdictions or countries of concern.

20

 Associations with multiple accounts under multiple names.

 Transactions on casino accounts conducted by persons other than the account holder.

 Deposits into casino account using multiple methods.

 Cheques issued to a family member of the person.

 Multiple individuals sending funds to a single beneficiary.

 Third party presents for all transactions but does not participate in the actual transaction.

 Transferring funds into third party accounts.

 Use or third parties to undertake wire transfers.

 Use of an intermediary to make large cash deposits.

 Use of gatekeepers, e.g. accountants and lawyers to undertake transactions

 U-turn transactions occurring with funds being transferred out of a country and then portions 

of those funds being returned.

 Use of remittance agents to move funds across borders.

 Use of third parties to purchase gaming chips.

 Use of third party to conduct wagering.

 Wire transfers from third parties in tax haven countries.

 Junket tours where funds can be concealed amongst the pool for the group.

 Cash handed to third party after cash out.

Credit cards / debit cards

138. Laundering proceeds from stolen credit cards – Casinos in some jurisdictions allow 

customers to purchase casino chips using credit cards. In cases where the cards are not stolen or 

fraudulently obtained, the outstanding credit card balances are paid by the card holder at the bank 

using the illicit funds. 

 

20. TBD.
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44 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

139. Credit cards – criminals use of credit cards provides an opportunity for authorities to follow 

the money trail more readily.

Case 21. Debit card scheme

Offence: Fraud, money laundering

Jurisdiction: Belgium

Technique: Use of credit cards to conduct money laundering transactions

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Credit cards, casino chips. 

A person residing in Belgium, originally from Eastern Europe, visited a casino on the Belgian coast on two 

occasions and bought gaming chips for a total value of EUR 400 000 paid for in cash and with credit cards. The 

casino reported these transactions to the FIU. 

Based on the history of gambler‘s purchases using credit cards it was determined that his account had been 

extremely active: it had been inundated with various transfers from companies and, in particular, with many cash 

deposits. The spouse of the party concerned ran a business in Belgium and maintained underworld links with 

organised crime from Central and Eastern Europe. The party concerned received citizens from those countries at 

his personal address and that financial transactions were carried out in cash. The gambler was in frequent 

contact with a person who was being investigated for the laundering of money deriving from organised crime.

140. Debit cards – are another value instrument used to conduct fraud and money laundering 

crimes. In the case below, criminals would join a casino and use their debit card to draw up to the 

casino‟s maximum standard daily limit and purchase casino chips. The subjects either do not put any 

funds at risk or there would be minimal play. The subjects would then typically cash out. In similar 

cases, plaques would be passed to an associate for play. Sometimes all the funds would be put at risk. 

The major operators quickly identified this trend and put risk control mechanisms in place to limit the 

initial debit card transaction to a much lower limit for first time transactions in high risk situations.

Case 22. Debit card scheme

Offence: Fraud, money laundering

Jurisdiction: United Kingdom

Technique: Use of debit cards to conduct money laundering transactions

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Casino plaques 

An existing member of a casino introduced a number of people over a period of time. Suspicious was raised as 

the new members were completing debit card transactions to the maximum limit and receiving gaming plaques in 

exchange, which in turn were passed to the existing member. Most of the new members never returned to the 

casino after the initial visit. The nationalities of the new members varied widely, but all are believed to have 

recently arrived from foreign jurisdictions. The transactions varied from GBP 1 000 to 7 000. Some money was 

put at risk and lost by the existing main member.

Indicators of ML using credit/debit cards:

 Purchasing casino chips using credit card.

 Purchasing casino chips using debit card.

 Purchasing and cashing out casino chips/plaques with no gaming activity.

 Customer purchases chips and leaves casino shortly after.

 Use of stolen or fraudulently obtained credit card.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

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 Use of multiple credit/debit cards to purchase casino chips.

 Use of third parties to purchase chips using credit/debit card.

 Structuring of credit card transactions.

 Conducting debit card transactions up to the maximum limit.

 Chip cash out is same/similar to chip purchase.

 Customer due diligence challenges, e.g. refusals, false documents, one-offs, tourists passing 

trade.

False documents 

141. As with financial institutions, money launderers use false documentation to disguise the 

origin of criminal proceeds and to protect the identity of those laundering the proceeds. 

142. False identification documents – often used to conduct financial transactions at the casino, 

open casino accounts, undertake gambling transactions and redeem winnings. 

Case 23. Money launderer uses third parties and false identities to launder drug proceeds

Offence: Money laundering, identity fraud

Jurisdiction: United States

Technique: Use of 3rd parties and false identities to structure gambling transactions 

Mechanism: Casino

Instrument: Cash, casino chips

A Person of Interest (POI) of a drug trafficking organisation, utilising both the money he was paid for his services 

and the large sums of money put into his possession to be laundered, elevated his previously modest gambling 

practices to that of a high-roller. The person would recruit third parties at the casino to purchase, or cash in, chips 

for him, paying them a nominal fee to do so. After gambling, he would cash some of these third-party purchased 

chips back out again, claiming they were his gambling winnings. According to the CTRs a USD 313 000 

discrepancy was found to exist between chip purchases and cash out. Twenty-four of the CTRCs recording his 

activities revealed the use of aliases and multiple social security numbers. On numerous other CTRCs he had 

refused to provide a social security number.

Indicators of ML using false documents and counterfeit currency:

 Associations with multiple accounts under multiple names.

 Purchasing chips or undertaking cash transaction and immediately leaves casino.

 Transferring funds into third party accounts.

 Use of multiple names to conduct similar activity.

 Use of altered/fraudulent or stolen identification to conceal identity.

 Customer due diligence challenges, e.g. refusal, false documents, one-off/tourist or passing 

trade.
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 Inconsistent identity information presented.

 Refusal to provide identification / false identification or Social Security numbers.

 Using false or multiple Social Security numbers.

 Refusing to provide required identification.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 47

CHAPTER 3 – SECTOR VULNERABILITIES AND EMERGING ISSUES

Introduction

143. This chapter identifies some of the sector vulnerabilities and emerging issues within the 

global casino sector, as reported by members of the FATF, APG and other FATF-style regional bodies 

(FSRBs).

Casino-based Tourism – “Junkets” 

144. Casino junkets or casino-based gaming tours are derived from casino marketing programs. A 

junket is an organised gaming tour for people who travel to the casino primarily to gamble. The junket 

may include transport, accommodation, incentives to play at the casino and the movement of funds to 

and from the casino. 

145. Casino junkets may be part of the casino‟s in-house marketing operation or may be run by 

independent operators who have a contract with the casino. In jurisdictions where the role of junkets is 

limited, they may still operate in travel agent roles with an added service of moving funds to the 

jurisdiction. In such cases, junkets may have no direct connection to the casino, but just bring the 

players and their funds to the front door of the casino. Junket agents are persons or companies who 

have a role to sign up casino patrons to take part in junkets. Junket representatives work to organise 

the junket. 

146. In house marketing by casinos may include representative offices of the casino being located 

in foreign jurisdictions in order to organise junket gaming tours to the casino jurisdiction. 

147. Junkets appear to be common in casino jurisdictions in the Americas, Caribbean and Asia, 

but are less common in European casinos. The extent of junket operations in casinos in Africa, the 

Middle East and Central Asia is unclear. 

Regional junket patterns

148. A number of casino sectors in the Asia/Pacific region have a sizable junket industry to 

attract gambling tourists to their sector. As at 28 January 2009 Macao, China has 153 licensed junket 

operators, made up of 107 companies and 46 individuals. The patterns of casino-based tourism in the 

Asia Pacific region vary but source jurisdictions include China, India, Hong Kong, Japan, Chinese 

Taipei, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

149. Junkets do not operate in Canada and it is reported that junkets do not operate in much of 

Europe, although Malta reported EUR 28 million in revenues from junkets operations in 2006 and 

Austria reports that there is only small-scale activity in the sector, due to tight regulations applicable to 

casino customers. While casino-linked junkets are not a feature of some casino sectors in Europe, it is 

likely that junkets are a relatively recent development for this region and authorities may not yet 

recognise junket-type operations or the level of risk they present.
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Features of Junkets

150. Junket operators provide incentives for patrons to play at a particular casino. As part of this, 

the junket provider may organise all aspects of a player‟s tour to the casino, including the movement 

of funds to be played in the casino. Junkets generally target the high net worth clients. In some 

jurisdictions, junket operators and their agents have a role in conducting CDD on junket patrons.

151. In house marketing by casinos may include representative offices of the casino being located 

in foreign jurisdictions in order to organise gaming tours to the casino jurisdiction. In such cases, 

players can organise all aspects of their visit to the casino, including depositing funds into their casino 

account. An example is Wynn Resorts, which has casinos in Las Vegas and Macau and has marketing 

executives located in local offices in, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei and Vancouver. Other 

large-scale casinos operate similar networks of offices.

152. Junket representatives / agents serve as an agent between casino marketing departments and 

proven premium players. VIP junkets do not tend to be advertised. Region specific junkets often do 

not deal with the general public, but rely on introductions from intermediaries. Junket representatives / 

agents rely on commissions or fees to support their business. These commissions vary, but may 

include:

 A percentage of front money.

 A commission on „dead chips‟.

 A commission on „live chips‟.

 A commission on players‟ losses.

 A percentage of the casino's theoretical win.

Vulnerabilities

Movement of people and money to casinos 

153. A vulnerability of junket programmes is that they involve the movement of large amounts of 

money across borders and through multiple casinos by third parties. Junket participants generally rely 

on the junket operators to move their funds to and from the casino. This creates layers of obscurity 

around the source and ownership of the money and the identities of the players. This is made more 

difficult if the junket operator is complicit in any money laundering activity by the players, or is 

solicited by criminals to blend illicit funds with the pool of legitimate funds. 

154. Foreign marketing offices/branches of casinos may accept deposits to a patron‟s casino 

account before they travel to the casino. The study of casino vulnerabilities could not identify cases 

where the foreign marketing offices of a casino were subject to local AML/CFT controls, despite their 

role in taking deposits to player accounts. In such cases there is, in effect, no cross border wire transfer 

to move the funds to the casino. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 49

Case 24. Criminal control of junket operations

Offence: money laundering

Jurisdiction: Australia

Technique: Use of a junket agent to move funds and purchase chips

Mechanism: Casino agent

A gambler used gambling contacts and knowledge of high-stakes gambling to become a registered and 

successful junket operator, bringing millions of dollars of revenue to a casino. All of the money gambled by the 

junket went through the operator‘s accounts in order to calculate commission from the group‘s turnover. This way 

the casino bypassed the necessity for identifying the source and beneficial owner of the funds. It was not until the 

junket operator began stealing from her customer‘s winnings that this situation came to the attention of the 

authorities. 

155. Junket operators may use wire transfers to move funds on behalf of clients. The identity of 

the junket patrons may be unknown to the sending and receiving financial institution or the receiving 

casino. 

Regulation of Junkets

156. Relatively few casino jurisdictions regulate junkets. While the US has a long history of 

regulating junkets, as an example Macao, China has only recently taken steps towards clear regulation 

of junkets and their representatives. 

157. In the US, a number of states require registration of junket representatives. As an example, 

the State Gaming Control Board of Nevada requires a fingerprint check and detailed information 

including military record and criminal arrests. Macao, China requires licensing and registration as well 

as fit and proper tests of junket operators, as does Australia. Very few gaming jurisdictions have 

controls on whether or not junket operators are permitted to extended credit to the players taking part 

in the junket. 

158. In cases where junket operators are strongly regulated, jurisdictions require junket operators 

to be vetted, licensed and operate according to regulations; some with specific AML/CFT controls that 

compel junket operators to report suspicious transactions by its players. In addition some legal 

frameworks place the responsibility for junket activities on the casino operator, with their license at 

risk if players‟ funds are found to be unlawful. Strong regimes oblige the casino operators to report 

any suspicion that a junket promoter may be involved in illegal activity. 

159. Some casinos and junket providers operate in a number of jurisdictions and offer services 

from the same casino group in a number of jurisdictions. It is not clear what obligations are placed on 

junket operators or casinos when they operate in a number of jurisdictions. In relation to junkets 

offered by independent operators and by casinos, there are a number of issues with foreign branches or 

subsidiaries of casinos operating in another jurisdiction to the one where the casino is located.

160. Such issues vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but include the following:

 Over-reliance on junket operators, especially in markets with resident populations that are 

too small to normally support casinos can pose a heightened money laundering risk. In 

these instances, casinos can become overly dependent on junket operators for business, a 

potential misuse of these services. 

 In some jurisdictions, a casino may enter into a contractual agreement with a junket 

operator to rent a private room within a casino and in some situations, it is the junket 

operator, not the casino, which monitors player activity and issues and collects credit. 
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50 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

 Junket operators that provide premium players may exert commercial pressures on 

casinos, which may result in reducing scrutiny of individual spending patterns, or unduly 

influence or exercise control over licensed casino operations. 

 Junket operators may engage in lending or the facilitation of lending to players outside 

casinos‟ knowledge. 

 In some jurisdictions, junket operators are allowed to „pool‟ and therefore obscure the 

spending of individual customers, thus preventing casinos from making any assessment of 

customers‟ spending patterns. 

 In certain jurisdictions, licensed junket operators act as fronts for junket operators in 

another country. The front operators supply players to a casino through a casino‟s licensed 

junket companies which may not qualify for licensure in the country where the players 

will be gambling. Such unlicensed sub-junket operators can act as unlicensed collectors of 

credit and may have ties to organized crime networks. 

161. All the above issues pose serious risks, and can lead a casino to engage in informal 

arrangements with junket operators that are inconsistent with risk-based AML/CFT policies, 

procedures and internal controls as well as hinder authorities‟ ability to recognize the level of risk that 

certain operators pose.

Junkets use of alternative remittance

162. In some jurisdictions junket operators may use formal or informal systems to remit money. 

The nature of junket business assists them to facilitate informal alternative remittance. The Junket 

operators may have agents in a number of jurisdictions. Junkets / casino agents may utilise their 

branch offices in foreign jurisdictions to organise movement of funds to the casino jurisdiction. It is 

not clear if these agents are responsible to their home jurisdiction for reporting STRs on junket 

patrons. 

Case 25. Cash smuggling and underground remittance

Offence: Cash smuggling, money laundering

Jurisdiction: Macao, China

Technique: Use of an casino agent to move funds and purchase chips, structuring

Mechanism: Casino, casino agent, remittance arrangements

Instrument: Cash, cashier‘s order

A casino agent received large amounts of cash in PR China from a mainland customer who wanted to gamble at 

a Macao, China casino. The agent took the cash to a shop at Zhuhai, which is adjacent to Macao, China. The 

shop divided the sum into small lots, which would be carried to Macao, China by many  ̳professional commuters‘. 

Another agent collected these lots and handed them to the casino agent by depositing the monies into his 

account in the form of cash, cheque, bank transfer and remittance. When the full sum was received, the casino 

agent converted it into a cashier‘s order for receipt by the VIP room of the casino. The VIP room then issued nonnegotiable chips to the mainland customer who could start gambling. When the customer won from the table, the 

gain in cash is given to the casino agent who would remit the funds back to China via underground banks.

Case 26. Use of junket promoter and casino VIP room to move cash between countries

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: Macao, China

Technique: Use of third parties to move illicit funds 

Mechanism: Casino, junket operators

Instrument: Cash

A merchant in country A could not perform a large remittance to country B due to its foreign exchange control. 

With the help of a junket promoter, he transferred the monies to the VIP room of a local casino, which informed 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 51

an underground remitter in country B about the amount and beneficiary of the funds. The remitter would then 

arrange payment of the fund to the beneficiary. For country B citizens who wished to gamble in this casino of 

country A, but had difficulty in bringing in the cash, they would arrange alternative remittance through this remitter 

who would then inform details of these customers to the VIP room. When these citizens arrived at the VIP room 

they could immediately obtain the amount required for gambling. Both the VIP room and the remitter would 

perform reconciliation for net settlement, and basically no transfer of monies between two sides was required.

Case 27. Junket promoter use of underground banking

Jurisdiction: South Korea

Technique: Alternative remittance 

Mechanism: trade-based settlement mechanism

A casino in Las Vegas,  ̳A‘ operated a marketing team entirely responsible for Korean customers. This team lent 

gambling money to Koreans in form of card (coupon) not cash so that the loan would be spent only for the 

purpose of gambling at  ̳A‘. The members of this team visited Korea to collect debts or made their relatives in 

Korea do so on behalf of them. 

The collected money was paid to trading companies in Korea for the goods that these companies sold to 

importing companies in the United States. And the importing companies paid the amount to  ̳A‘.

Junket incentives – ‘Dead chips’ 

163. Casinos in some regions offer junket agents a commission on non-negotiable, or “dead”, 

chips. The use of dead chips requires the junket operator to account for their use. These „dead chips‟ 

cannot be redeemed for cash from the casino, but are only negotiable with the junket promoter. In 

general, dead chips can be wagered only in the game of baccarat.

164. Players purchase large amounts of these chips from the junket operator at a discounted price

based on an operator‟s terms. They cannot redeem the chips for cash or for live chips but must play the 

chips until they lose them or win replacement live chips. The live chips can be redeemed for cash with 

the casino. At the conclusion of gambling, „dead chips‟ can be redeemed with the junket operator. A 

junket operator requires players periodically to roll their “live chips” into “non-negotiable” dead chips 

so that an operator can receive a commission from a casino based on the total value of the dead chips. 

Because „dead chips‟ are offered at a premium to junket patrons, there is an incentive for players to 

purchase additional „dead‟ chips and players receive live chips in exchange as well rebates equal to the 

product of the agreed-upon rebate percentage and total dead chips purchased. 

165. ‘Dead chips’ being used by criminals as currency – jurisdictions report „dead chips‟ being 

used in drug deals and to settle other criminal transactions. 

166. ‘Dead chips’ being smuggled out of a jurisdiction – such chips are a safe way for criminals 

to move value as they are difficult for customs agencies to detect in cross border movements. 

Case 28. ‘Dead chips’ associated with loan sharks

Offence: money laundering, criminal coercion

Jurisdiction: Hong Kong; China; Macao, China

Technique: Use of  ̳dead chips‘

Mechanism: Junket  ̳dead‘ chips 

Dealing in junket chips (colloquially known as  ̳mud-chips‘) is closely connected to other forms of criminality, and 

it is particularly ripe for exploitation by loan sharks often with a triad element, who are attracted by lucrative profits 

and the ease of finding potential borrowers amongst gamblers, with loans being offered in the form of  ̳mudchips‘. 

In Hong Kong, China for example, stooge or nominee corporate accounts are often used for settlement purposes 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

52 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

by loan shark syndicates operating offshore. A common scenario involves victims being induced to gamble more 

than they can afford in the VIP rooms at offshore casinos by mud-chip (dead chip) syndicates, which often work 

with loan sharks. The victims are then escorted back to Hong Kong, China and held pending settlement. Family 

members are induced to make settlement by bank transfers, which are structured through a series of stooge 

accounts.

Case 29. Diversion of illicit funds to casino agents and junket operators

Offence: Fraud, money laundering

Jurisdiction: Hong Kong, China, China, United States

Technique: Use of third parties to move illicit funds 

Mechanism: Casino agents, junket operators

Instrument: Cash

In 2006, three provincial managers of a bank in another jurisdiction were indicted for embezzling in excess of 

USD 3.5 billion that was subsequently channelled through shell companies and personal and investment 

accounts in Hong Kong, China with the help of associates and intermediaries. Approximately HKD500 million was 

deposited with the representative agents and junket promoters of various South East Asian and North American 

casinos for the groups‘ personal use.

167. Indicators of money laundering through junket operations include:

 Players refusing to provide identification.

 Use of representatives/third parties to conduct cash buy-in.

 Junket chips redeemed without any gambling activity.

 Source of funds for buy-in not disclosed.

 Source of funds for buy-in from companies.

 Buy-in of junket chips by a person whose occupation is not commensurate with the buy-in 

value.

 Junket issuing cheques to rival casinos.

 Junket transferring funds to players with no verifiable proof of winnings.

 Player frequently requesting cheques from junket operator below threshold amounts.

Emerging Issue – Cruise Ship junkets

168. A growing number of independent casino junket representatives now offer junkets to cruise 

ships. These escorted cruise casino junkets tend to be on ships of the same lines and the packages 

offered by independent operators range from cruises that are entirely complimentary (with the 

exception of port charges and taxes) to packages offering reduced player rates. In most cases, players 

deposit a significant amount of money up front with the independent junket operator. Once aboard, the 

player can then draw this money for gambling in the cruise ship casino. Very few jurisdictions 

regulate junket operations linked to cruise ship gaming. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 53

VIP Rooms and ‘High-Roller’ Customers 

169. VIP customers or „high rollers‟ are highly valued casino customers who gamble in private 

and exclusive rooms within the casino complex and are afforded special treatment by the casino. VIP 

rooms are closely tied to the junket business, and, like junkets, the vulnerability is with identifying the 

high rollers, and being able to know where their money is coming from and going to. A concern 

shared by many jurisdictions is that casino staff view very high cash use or large deposits and 

withdrawals by VIPs, and especially within VIP rooms, as 'normal'. In addition casinos offer VIP 

customers financial facilities akin to any banking institution, yet many jurisdictions do not have the 

level of AML controls over casinos as they do their banking industry. If there are no requirements to 

conduct CDD on VIPs, particularly those associated to junkets, and/or regulators and law enforcement 

cannot access membership information on operations and if required the money trail associated with 

their gambling, it poses a serious risk.

170. VIP customers represent high revenue streams for most casinos. A Canadian study in 2007 

showed VIP customers are responsible for 80% of casino turnover in Canada, but only represented 1% 

of casino patrons. Macao, China also reports 50-70% of all casino revenue comes from VIP rooms. 

171. A number of jurisdictions report major risks from persons in their jurisdiction who travel to 

Macao China as VIP customers. Jurisdictions have raised concerns that criminal groups could make 

use of VIP gaming rooms and could be associated with activities such as racketeering, loan sharking 

and prostitution. In the past, under Macao, China‟s old monopoly system the VIP rooms catered to 

clients seeking anonymity and were shielded from official scrutiny. With the changes to the gaming 

industry in 2002 and passing of new AML/CFT laws in 2006, the casino industry has been placed 

under the AML/CFT regime with casinos (including gaming intermediaries and junket operators) 

having obligations to report STRs to the FIU in the main areas and VIP rooms – and with respect to all 

customers. Macao, China reports that supervisors and casinos are aware of the risk that VIP rooms 

could be associated with crimes, and have been tightening the control of junket activities. At the same 

time, all casinos do not cede control of their VIP gaming facilities to outside organisations, which 

impedes organised crime‟s ability to operate in the casino sector.

172. The following two cases illustrate the risks presented by VIP players:

 In Australia a high profile Asian organised crime figure became a member of the high rollers 

club at an Australian casino. The person was running a heroin trafficking network from 

suites in the casino‟s hotel and using his gambling activities to mask the illicit profits. He 

was a VIP player with an extremely high turnover. Over a two-year period he was given 

gambling incentives by the casino of more than AUD 2.5 million dollars and spent two years 

as a non-paying guest of the casino‟s hotel. It was not until he was investigated by law 

enforcement agency that the casino looked more closely at his gambling transactions. 

 In the United States a foreign national travelled frequently to Las Vegas to gamble. He was 

well-known to a Las Vegas casino and had a gambling loss of approximately USD 1 million 

over a four year period. Over a subsequent three year period his losses increased to more 

than USD 125 million. On his behalf the casino conducted wire transfers and direct bank to 

bank transfers from corporate accounts. The casino on occasion would extend him 

USD 10 million line of credit and frequently offered him extravagant perks including use of 

hotel suites, cars, and the casino jet. There were no SARs filed by the casino and no 

verification of his source of funds was undertaken. Yet open source documents show the 

company owned by the person could not have generated income sufficient to sustain his 

gambling losses. 
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54 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Corrupt or Inadequately Trained Staff

173. Effective AML/CFT controls require casinos (and support industries) to be free from 

corruption and influence and casino employees to be adequately trained to prevent and detect money 

laundering activity. However, high staff turnover is characteristic of many casino sectors, particularly 

in the regions that are poorly regulated for AML/CFT, AML training and experience being lost from 

the sector as a result. And the potential for corruption in a cash intensive industry, characterised by 

high employee turnover, is ever-present. Reported cases demonstrate that casino employees, either 

individually or acting in concert with others, intentionally do not file suspicious/threshold reports, 

destroy records and falsify documents to disguise money laundering activities. However, inadequate 

systems and poor employee training also account for large-scale money laundering in the casino 

sectors. 

 In 2007 a number of casino employees were charged for their role in running an illegal 

gambling ring out of a casino, taking in USD 22 million in sports betting. The casino 

employees included poker room supervisors, dealers, and a bartender and their roles mostly 

involved not filing suspicious reports on transactions.

 A Las Vegas compliance officer was charged with failure to file approximately 

15 000 CTRCs between 2001 and 2003. He stated that he did not file the reports because he 

was having personal problems, was behind in his work, and the importance of filing CTRCs 

was never explained to him.

 In 2006 a drug dealer admitted to distributing approximately 100 pounds of crystal 

methamphetamine between Las Vegas and Hawaii. In court, he admitted to gambling 

millions of dollars in cash through Las Vegas Casinos, mostly carried in to the casino in 

duffle bags. Law enforcement authorities were never notified of this activity.

 USD 207 million in cash was found in a home in Mexico. It is believed to be the proceeds of 

a drug kingpin who reportedly lost between USD80 – 120 million at Las Vegas Casinos. 

However, law enforcement authorities were unaware of this person until the cash seizure.

174. Most well-regulated jurisdictions require casino operators to certify an employee‟s 

competence to perform the functions authorised by their employment license. This can include 

reporting of suspicious and significant transactions to the FIU and reporting of illegal and undesirable 

activity by patrons. Some jurisdictions require regulators to approve the content of training courses run 

by the casino operator. Yet inadequate employee training, as demonstrated by the cases above, is a 

significant vulnerability within the casino sector, regardless it seems of the level of regulation 

imposed.

New Casino Markets

175. As discussed in Chapter 1, new and emerging casino markets are vulnerable to money 

laundering activities, particularly in the Asia/Pacific and African regions where casino sectors are 

being rapidly established in developing countries. Many of these jurisdictions have predominantly 

cash-based economies, poor governance and weak or limited AML/CFT capability. Often the growth 

of the casino industry will outpace the country‟s ability to put in place sufficient AML controls, as 

well as regulatory and enforcement capacity, leaving the sector vulnerable to corruption and money 

laundering by organised crime groups. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 55

176. Macao, China is another area of vulnerability due to rapid market growth. Revenues in 

Macao, China started to surge in 2004 when new casinos opened after the 2002 decision to end the 40 

year monopoly by the STDM. Now the majority of Macao, China‟s economy is linked to the casino 

industry. In less than 6 years, Macao, China has become the biggest casino market in the world. Prior 

to regulatory reforms in 2002, Macao, China‟s casino industry was under-regulated, despite the 

presence of high cash transactions and lucrative junket and VIP room contracts. Since 2002, Macao, 

China has sought to reform its legal regulatory framework for AML/CFT in the casino sector, 

however, like many jurisdictions, effective implementation of FATF standards remains a challenge.

177. Like all jurisdictions, Macao, China continues to face threats from organised crime. Whilst 

AML/CFT implementation in the casino sector is occurring, the scale and speed of growth 

experienced in the market may result in even greater vulnerabilities for ML. 

178. The United States has noted that the rapid growth of new casino markets can provide money 

laundering opportunities. A US threat assessment in 2005 considered the most notable development in 

this field is the striking growth of Native American casinos, which have enjoyed double-digit revenue 

growth for the last ten years, collectively taking in USD 25.7 billion in revenue in 2006, more than 

twice the amount generated by Nevada casinos.21 

179. A challenge to establishing effective AML/CFT controls for tribal casinos is coordinating the 

various regulatory bodies. Tribal gaming is regulated on three levels:

a) Indian Nations (Tribal Government – Gaming Regulatory Commissions).

b) State Gaming Agencies.

c) The National Indian Gaming Commission and federal government agencies, including the 

U.S. Justice Department, the U.S. Treasury Department and the Department of the Interior.

180. The growth of the Indian gaming market, coupled with overlapping regulatory jurisdictions 

and limited enforcement resources, has generated concern over the potential for large-scale criminal 

activity in the Indian gaming industry. 

High Seas Gambling

181. High seas gambling (also called boat gambling or floating casinos) involves gaming vessels 

that travel to international waters to conduct gaming/casino activities. These may be long-distance 

cruises that have gaming/casinos as side entertainment, or short distance trips that are directed solely 

at gaming. 

182. The phenomenon of gambling in international waters is an issue for all countries with cruise 

ships registered or operating within their jurisdiction. While many countries prohibit casinos on ships 

from operating in territorial waters, cruise ship gambling in international waters is not well regulated. 

183. Few jurisdictions have regulatory oversight over cruise ship casinos registered to their 

jurisdiction and fewer have AML/CFT controls over cruise ship casinos. Since cruise ship casinos, 

with only minor exceptions, are allowed to operate only when in international waters the casinos are 

largely unregulated. Some steps have been taken within the cruise line sector to self regulate (see 

 

21 Associated Press., “Tribal casino revenue up 5 percent nationwide”, June 19 2008, 

http://blog.mlive.com/kzgazette/2008/06/tribal_casino_revenue_up_5_per.html
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

56 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

guidelines published in 1999 by the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL).)22 It is unknown 

what general record-keeping or due diligence processes, if any, are carried out by cruise lines or if 

they report suspicious activities to appropriate authorities.

184. Little is known about the level of risk presented by gambling that is undertaken in 

international waters. For example, it is unknown what methods are used to transfer funds to and from 

the cruise ship and any associated money laundering risks.

185. Regulatory control over „High seas gambling‟ raises complex questions of international law. 

If AML/CFT laws were to apply, which jurisdictions would have oversight; the jurisdiction from 

which the ship is operating from, or the jurisdiction where the vessel is registered? 

186. Some jurisdictions impose tax and AML regulations on cruise ship lines, such as the United 

States. Ships registered in the US are subject to income tax and money laundering legislations, 

meaning that US citizens and permanent residents must declare any income from cruise-ship gambling 

with Customs on returning to the US and through yearly tax returns. The cruise line is also required to 

file tax notices for jackpots of over USD 1200However, there is some question as to whether all US 

registered ships comply with these requirements, and it is unknown the nature or level of oversight by 

US authorities. 

187. High seas gambling is an issue for many jurisdictions, for example Hong Kong, China, 

where a number of cruise ships or large luxury vessels, operate from their harbours, with the sole or 

primary purpose of providing casino gaming in international waters. These vessels sail under foreign 

flags, so port jurisdictions have difficulty in imposing AML/CFT controls on these “foreign” vessels 

due to the limitation of extra-territorial jurisdiction.

Case 30. High Seas casinos used to launder proceeds of fraud

Offence: Money laundering

Jurisdiction: Hong Kong, China; Australia

Mechanism: High-seas casino; bank accounts,

Instrument: Casino 

In 2005 five Australian citizens defrauded a superannuation scheme of AUD 150 million. Two of the five men flew 

to Hong Kong, China and boarded a cruise ship, drawing on the illicit funds while gambling at the ship‘s casino. 

After losing approximately AUD 3 million, they cashed in their casino chips and had the remaining funds sent to 

their personal accounts in Hong Kong, China.

188. The case above highlights how „high seas gambling‟ poses a money laundering risk to port 

jurisdictions. The lack of supervision of casinos operating in international waters leaves port 

jurisdictions exposed to casino-related money laundering risks. 

189. It should be noted that the FATF and a number of FSRBs, including the APG, consider 

AML/CFT controls on cruise ship casinos in the context of a country‟s ME evaluation if this activity 

presents a risk of money laundering. 

190. Jurisdictions have raised the challenges faced by the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction 

over gambling activities beyond flag-flying vessels, as per the current status of international law. 

There appears to be a need for further consideration of the issue and possible multilateral solutions. 

 

22 Further information can be found at http://www.cruising.org/industry/tech-intro.cfm
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 57

Terrorist Financing

191. Throughout this report, the term money laundering has also referred to terrorist financing. It 

should be pointed out that the research undertaken failed to find any reported cases of terrorist 

financing in the casino sector. This may be due to the characteristics of terrorist financing that make it 

difficult to detect, characteristics such as the relatively low value of transactions involved in terrorist 

financing, or the fact that funds can be derived from legitimate as well as illicit sources. 

192. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that terrorist financing has not and could not 

occur in the casino sector. Where funds are derived from criminal activity, then traditional monitoring 

mechanisms that are used to identify money laundering may also be appropriate for terrorist financing 

and includes the methods and indicators described in Chapter 2, though these indicators would only 

support suspicious activity, and may not be identified as or connected to terrorist financing once 

further investigation is undertaken. 

193. It should be noted that transactions associated with the financing of terrorism may be

conducted in very small amounts, which may not be the type of transactions that are reflected in the 

indicators for money laundering. Where funds are from legal sources, it is even more difficult to 

determine if they could be used for terrorist purposes. Therefore, while terrorist funds may be derived 

from criminal activity as well as from legitimate sources, transactions related to terrorist financing 

may not exhibit the same traits as conventional money laundering. 

194. The ability of casinos to detect and identify potential terrorist financing transactions without 

guidance on terrorist financing typologies or unless acting on specific intelligence provided by the 

authorities is significantly more challenging than is the case for potential money laundering and other 

suspicious activity.

195. Detection efforts, absent specific national guidance and typologies, are likely to be based on 

monitoring that focuses on transactions with countries or geographic areas where terrorists are known 

to operate or on the other limited typologies available (many of which are indicative of the same 

techniques as are used for money laundering). Particular individuals, organisations or countries may 

be the subject of terrorist financing sanctions, in a particular country. In such cases a listing of 

individuals, organisations or countries to which sanctions apply and the obligations on casinos to 

comply with those sanctions are decided by individual countries. 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

58 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

CHAPTER 4 - POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

196. A number of issues and policy implications have been identified by the APG/FATF casinos 

project. Many of these relate to implementation issues with the current FATF standards. 

Online gaming / online casinos

197. While this study has not included online gaming / online casinos in its scope of enquiry, it is 

clear that there are a number of related risks and vulnerabilities from online casinos. A number of 

jurisdictions license physical casinos and online casinos under a similar process. This report notes a 

significant gap with understanding regional money laundering risks and vulnerabilities from online 

casinos and online gaming. There is a need for further study in this area and for sharing case studies 

and regulatory models. 

Lack of AML/CFT coverage for casino sectors

198. A number of jurisdictions clearly lack awareness of money laundering and terrorist financing 

risks in the casino and gaming sectors.

199. A significant number of jurisdictions have limited regulatory controls, including „fit and 

proper‟ tests for casino owners, managers and staff, internal controls, etc. A greater number of casinos 

sectors are not yet subject to any AML/CFT controls, in particular in developing countries. Very few 

jurisdictions regulate junket operators. 

200. Vetting, licensing and training relevant employees – jurisdictions raised the need to ensure 

that staff with a potential to impact on the integrity of the casino operation should be vetted and 

appropriately trained in AML/CFT. There are significant gaps in coverage of staff in some gaming 

jurisdictions. 

201. Internal controls – Most jurisdictions require casinos to have a documented set of internal 

controls over almost all aspects of casino operations. Some require the regulator to approve these 

whilst others require the documented controls to meet a set of specified standards.

Lack of regulatory tools

202. Law enforcement agencies and regulators report the need for and implementation of suitable 

tools that carry effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to use in the regulation of casinos, 

which are wilfully negligent in AML. Results of Mutual Evaluations indicate a lack of effective 

regulatory tools for casinos across members of the FATF and FSRBs.

203. There is a need for further guidance and sharing of best practice models for AML/CFT 

regulation, supervision and monitoring of the casino and gaming sectors. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 59

Implementation of CDD measures

204. Many jurisdictions have struggled to implement CDD measures in casinos in keeping with 

the international standards. A number of jurisdictions have not followed the thresholds outlined in the 

FATF standards (for example opting for a USD 10 000 threshold for CDD). 

205. A number of jurisdictions are relying on customers being issued with a casino membership 

cards for which CDD information is collected at the start of the relationship. Customers are then only 

required to present the card to identify themselves when transacting over the threshold of USD/EUR

3 000. 

206. A number of jurisdictions have noted challenges with determining a suitable timeframe for 

determining whether transactions are linked for the purposes of determining whether the USD 3 000 is 

met. Cases have illustrated criminals‟ awareness of change of shifts with casino staff to seek to avoid 

reporting requirements. 

207. A key issue is that in general casinos are not doing enough to establish source of funds and 

failing to recognise suspicious activity by their customers. Casino security and marketing systems tend 

to pay particular attention to customer‟s financial transactions and gambling behaviours, but mostly in 

terms of patterns of winning and opportunities to encourage greater participation. There is a need for 

greater vigilance of patterns of transactions and play, unusual transactions and possible indicators of 

suspicious transactions. 

208. There is a need for jurisdictions to share more case examples of money laundering cases and 

experience of ways in which effective AML/CFT preventative measures have contributed to detecting 

and prosecuting cases of money laundering. 

Application of AML/CFT controls to casino foreign branches, offices or subsidiaries

209. A number of casino operations are owned or controlled in a jurisdiction other than the one in 

which the casino is established. It is not clear what AML/CFT obligations are placed on junket when 

they operate in another jurisdiction. There is an issue in a number of jurisdictions of equivalent 

AML/CFT controls not being implemented by branch or subsidiary casinos. There is a need for further 

international guidance and best practice experience with regulating branches and subsidiaries. 

Application of AML/CFT controls to casino foreign holding accounts

210. It is not clear what AML/CFT controls are in place over accounts operated in a jurisdiction 

foreign to the location of the casino. Large casinos may operate marketing offices in jurisdictions 

other than where the casino is located. Patrons are able to pay in funds to their casino account to be 

played when they travel to the casino without sending a cross-border wire transfer. 

Control of junket operators and their agents

211. A number of jurisdictions that allow junket play do not require registration/licensing and 

regulation of junket organisers and their agents. The vulnerabilities identified in the previous section 

raises concerns about the need to ensure that junkets and their agents are not under criminal 

control/influence and to ensure that financial transactions are transparent and subject to relevant 

AML/CFT measures. 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

60 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

212. The international standards do not clearly address junket operations, but their role as 

intermediaries or third parties is a significant concern in many jurisdictions. 

213. Issues with foreign branches or subsidiaries of junkets – as outlined above, a number of 

junket providers operating in a number of jurisdictions and offer services from the same casino group 

in a number of jurisdictions. It is not clear what obligations are placed on junket operators when they 

operate in another jurisdiction. 

Regulatory controls over VIP rooms and related facilities

214. There are significant issues with implementation of CDD controls over VIP rooms. In some 

jurisdictions there are not clear powers for the regulator, FIU or law enforcement to have access and to 

share information regarding members of casino VIP programs. 

215. In some cases VIP gaming rooms are leased to junket operators, who provide the gaming 

equipment, staff and funds to play in the room. This may be done outside of the CDD and other

internal controls of the casino. 

216. VIP rooms may offer safety deposit boxes and other facilities that are not subject to 

AML/CFT controls, but which might represent a vulnerability for AML/CFT. 

Regulatory coverage of „foreigners only‟ casino models 

217. As indicated above, a number of jurisdictions have sought to establish casino sectors, but to 

ban nationals from entering or playing in the casino. This is viewed as a risk management and harm 

reduction strategy. In some cases this leads to weakened oversight by authorities as there is a 

perception that risks from money laundering are less under this model. In some cases of very weak 

supervision, only basic licensing criteria and foreign exchange obligations are enforced on such 

casinos. 

Regulatory control over high-seas gaming

218. As outlined in the previous section, there is a large-scale high seas or cruise ship casino and 

gaming market, but few jurisdictions regulate or impose AML/CFT controls over the sector. There are 

significant issues of legal jurisdiction. In very few cases do the „flag‟ jurisdictions of cruise ships 

offering gaming services extend their regulation to gaming conducted aboard the vessels in 

international waters. 

Controls over significant contractors, systems and equipment

219. Jurisdictions raised concerns about contractors that supply goods with a potential to impact 

on the integrity of the casino operation (e.g. gaming equipment and computer systems) should be 

required to be subject to probity assessment.

Lack of AML/CFT capacity / experience by casino regulators

220. In some jurisdictions where casinos have recently been brought under AML/CFT controls, 

the AML supervisor lacks technical expertise of the casino sector to effectively supervise. There are a 

number of technical issues specific to casinos and gaming that require sector-specific technical 

knowledge and experience to support effective regulation and supervision. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 61

Coordination between AML/CFT and casino-sector supervisors

221. Many jurisdictions lack effective coordination between AML/CFT authorities and casino 

regulatory authorities for setting policies, implementing preventative measures and investigating ML 

and TF in the sector. 

222. In some jurisdictions, a gambling supervisor audits gambling operations in casinos for 

compliance to gambling laws, but may have a limited role in assessing the casino‟s level of AML 

compliance, despite their day to day role. Given the number of financial and non-financial sectors to 

be supervised, as well as other agencies involved, AML supervision of casinos without the direct 

involvement of casino regulators may present problems. Joint supervision depends on a high level of 

inter-agency collaboration to be effective. 

223. As shown in the diagram below, New Zealand is an example of a jurisdiction in AMLrelated policy and operations are invested across a number of agencies. 

224. A number of federal systems report state/provincial-level casino regulation, but national 

level AML/CFT regulation. Effective inter-agency coordination and cooperation is needed to achieve 

consistent national coverage of casino and gaming sectors for AML/CFT. 

Building compliance culture in casino sectors

225. Precluding criminal involvement in casinos and gambling involves addressing both criminal 

influence and criminal exploitation. Successfully minimising criminal influence of casino operations is 

dependent upon a licensing and regulatory regime to preclude criminal involvement in the 

management and operation of casinos and effective preventative measures to detect ML and TF. A 

number of jurisdictions have struggled to establish an appropriate casino management compliance 

culture, including for AML/CFT.

226. Persons with large amounts of disposable cash are attractive customers casinos and this 

makes it imperative that the operator has not only integrity but a commitment to preserving a crimefree environment. Importantly commercial reward systems often provide bonuses or remuneration for 

“middle management” based on revenue-based performance criteria. These may not take into account 

the protection of the primary asset (the casino licence) and unless an appropriate management culture 

is in place within the operator these may work against maintaining a crime-free environment.

Casino Sector

Department of Internal Affairs

 Regulate compliance to 

Gambling Act

 AML supervision

 Key Person licensing

Gambling Commission

 Licensing of casinos

 Appeals

 Commission of Inquiry

Police

 Predicate offending

 ML investigations

 Key person vetting

FIU

 AML reporting entity

 ML information and 

intelligence 

Department of Justice

 AML Policy

Other regulatory / law 

enforcement agencies

 Predicate offending 

 AML supervision
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

62 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

227. There is a need for greater cooperation between AML/CFT regulators and enforcement 

agencies and the front line compliance staff within casinos who are responsible for AML/CFT 

regulation within casinos. 

Law enforcement / FIU / Regulator access to information and investigation of ML/TF

228. Legislative system for gathering information for law enforcement: Many jurisdictions 

provide a legislated system for the regulator to receive requests for casino information (such as patron 

records) and then direct the casino operator to supply that information to the regulator. The regulator 

then provides the information to the law enforcement agency without the casino being made aware of 

which law enforcement agency requested the information.

229. In some jurisdictions this provision is regularly used to obtain lists of the casinos‟ major 

players for a set time period.

230. There is a reported need for regulations to oblige casinos to adopt AML- systems, 

particularly when current arrangements hinder the detection and investigation of money laundering. 

As an example, most casinos operate player tracking systems (or player loyalty schemes) that record 

customer‟s levels of gambling, and can include data such as, capital introduced, wagering amounts, 

win and loss totals, and turnover. This type of information is critical to identifying and prosecuting 

money laundering; however, these systems are not calibrated to provide the calculations necessary for 

investigations or to the evidential standard required of prosecutions. Some jurisdictions report casinos 

showing very little interest in supporting AML efforts by addressing this issue. 

231. Dedicated police squads or intelligence units: – In jurisdictions with large urban casinos it 

is common for there to be a dedicated police squad (sometimes located on site) or a specific police 

casino intelligence/investigation unit.

232. An important intelligence function for this type of body is being a gathering point of all 

available criminal intelligence related to casino operations (including from the casino operator and 

regulator). It is important that such specialist functions should work closely with AML investigations 

units.

233. Police barring of undesirable patrons: – A number of jurisdictions have provided the head 

of the Police with the power to require casinos to bar specified patrons where there are grounds to 

believe the person might attempt to criminally exploit the casino if allowed to attend. This is generally 

on the basis of criminal history or in some cases intelligence information. In some jurisdictions this 

has been made non-appealable and non-reviewable.

234. Regulator barring of undesirable patrons: – A number of jurisdictions have provided the 

casino regulator with the power to bar or require – casinos to bar specified patrons. This is generally a 

power reserved for patrons who have not given the casino or police adequate reason to bar the person 

but owing to information available to the regulator, the regulator is of the opinion that the person is an 

unacceptable risk to the integrity of the operation of the casino. In some jurisdictions this has been 

made non-appealable and non-reviewable.

235. Casino regulator assistance to FIU: – In many jurisdictions the casino regulator proactively 

assists the flow of AML/CTF information to the FIU by conducting inspection programs or audits 

which seek to identify suspicious activity which the casino operator or regulator then reports to the 

FIU and/or law enforcement. There needs to be close cooperation between the FIU and gaming 

regulators. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 63

International Cooperation

236. Effective international cooperation remains a challenge for AML and casino regulatory 

authorities on AML issues in many jurisdictions. Jurisdictions responses indicated relatively low 

levels of international cooperation between casino regulatory authorities on issues relevant to AML. In 

addition, several Asian jurisdictions report the difference in legal frameworks between jurisdictions as 

a factor, as well as their inexperience in AML/CTF supervision and international information 

exchange. 

237. Effective mechanisms are not always in place, in particular to share information related to 

junket operators and patrons of junket businesses. There is a need for both casino jurisdictions and 

those jurisdictions whose citizens regularly travel to casino jurisdictions to ensure clear channels for 

information sharing and cooperation. This is a challenge when a number of the large casino sectors, 

such as that in the US, are characterised by a large number of state/provincial/city based regulators. 

238. The issues described above in no way represent all of the problems encountered by 

jurisdictions. 

Conclusion 

239. While it is estimated that 100 countries participate in casino and card room gambling,23 this 

research was able to confirm 77 jurisdictions with legalised casino sectors and 8 jurisdictions who 

have recently legalised or are giving consideration to legalising casinos. This represents a significant 

global activity that is cash intensive, competitive in its growth and vulnerable to criminal exploitation.

What is encouraging is that all 77 jurisdictions are members of FATF or other related FSRBs, 

requiring those jurisdictions to meet an international standard in their AML programmes. 

240. Mutual Evaluations have shown that globally, that while low, the casino sector has shown 

relatively higher levels of compliance with FATF standards than other DNFPBs. This is largely 

because of historical concerns many government have over the perceived levels of criminality and 

social consequence inherent in casino operations. Governments also tend to impose more stringent 

supervision and record keeping on casino operations in order to track and secure government 

revenues. For these reasons, it is often less politically difficult to apply AML/CFT measures to casino 

sectors, compared to other DNFPBs. Despite this there are many jurisdictions that are yet to fully 

extend AML controls to the casino sector, and as demonstrated by this research, not all jurisdictions 

have effective controls over the casino sectors even if they are included in AML frameworks. 

241. There are significant regional and global sector vulnerabilities and emerging issues that have 

weakened AML controls and provide opportunity for money laundering and other financial crimes to 

flourish. 

242. A key issue is casinos not doing enough to establish source of funds and failing to recognise 

suspicious activity by their customers. Casinos have to pay particular attention to customer‟s financial 

transactions and gambling behaviours, particularly if it does not correspond to that of a normal 

gambler or the intention to play to win is apparently absent or secondary. The methods and indicators 

in Chapter 2, the sector vulnerabilities and emerging issues in Chapter 3, and the policy implications in 

Chapter 4 are written to provide government decision-makers and supervisors with the base material 

from which they can properly target policies and interventions based on the pervasiveness of these 

methods and issues in their country. But more importantly the material in these chapters, specifically 

 

23 Casino City.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

64 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

the methods, case studies and indicators, can and should be shared with casino operators and their staff 

who are on the front line in confronting these activities, so they may put effect to the AML controls 

imposed on their operation. 

243. Indicators are not of themselves evidence of money laundering and it is not the casino's 

responsibility to determine that money laundering activity is taking place, rather it is the casino‟s role 

is to identify and report the suspicious activity. It is then up to the FIU and law enforcement 

authorities to examine the matter further and determine if there is a link to money laundering or 

terrorist financing. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 65

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© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 67

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS & GLOSSARY

AML/CFT Anti Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism

APG Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering

AUSTRAC Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre

BSA Bank Secrecy Act (United States)

CFTAF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force

CDD Customer Due Diligence

CPV Chip Purchase Voucher

CTRC Currency Transaction Report - Casino

DICJ Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (Macao, China)

DNFPB Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions

ESAAMLG The Eastern and South African Money Laundering Group

EAG The Eurasian Group 

EU European Union

FATF Financial Actions Task Force

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations (United States)

FINCEN The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (United States)

FHA Foreign Holding Account

FINTRAC The Financial Transactions Report Analysis Centre of Canada

FIU Financial Intelligence Unit

FSRB FATF-Style Regional Body

GIABA Intergovernmental Anti Money Laundering Group in Africa

IGRA Indian Gaming Regulation Act (United States)

IMF International Monetary Fund

IRS Internal Revenue Service (United States)

ME Mutual Evaluation

MONEYVAL The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and 

the Financing of Terrorism (Europe)

MENAFATF Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force

PACGOR Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

PEP Politically Exposed Person

POI Person of Interest

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SAR Suspicious Activity Report

STDM Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macao, China

TITO Ticket In/Ticket Out

VLT Video Lottery Terminal

VIP Very Important Player
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

68 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

GLOSSARY OF COMMON CASINO TERMS

The bank The casino

Barred / banned A person who is not permitted to enter a casino (may be banned 

by the casino itself or the regulator)

Betting Limit For table games, the minimum and maximum amount of money 

that a player is allowed to wager in a single bet

Bill changer A machine which accepts coins or currency notes and 

exchanges them for currency notes or coins

Blackjack A casino card game. Players bet against the dealer

The Cage (cashier‘s cage / casino cage) A secure area within the casino which has custody of funds and 

provides banking services to casino patrons

Chips Casino value instruments. Issued by casinos and used in lieu of 

cash in gaming transactions between the house and player. 

Chips are round and marked with the denomination and name of 

the casino and are negotiable within the casino

Dead chips Promotional or junket associated casino chips that cannot be 

exchanged for cash. See Mud Chips and non-negotiable chips

Even money bet A wager what pays back the same amount that was originally 

wagered, plus the original wager.

Even money exchange Exchanging two items of equivalent value in the casino, such as 

purchasing USD 100 in chips for USD 100 cash

Float The amount of value (chips + cash) on a table game

High rollers Premium players who consistently gamble high stakes and large 

sums of money – see also VIPs and whales

House The casino

Junket A group of people who travel to the casino primarily to gamble. 

The junket may include transport, accommodation, incentives to 

play at the casino and the transportation of funds to and from 

the casino

Junket agent A person or company who signs up casino patrons to take part 

in junkets

Junket representative The person who organises the junket

Mud chips Promotional or junket associated casino chips that cannot be 

exchanged for cash. See Dead Chips and Non-negotiable 

chips...

Non-negotiable chips Promotional or junket associated casino chips that cannot be 

exchanged for cash. See Dead Chips and Mud Chips

Pit An area in the casino where gaming tables operate

Pit boss A casino supervisor responsible for gaming on the casino floor

Plaques Casino value instruments. Issued by casinos and used in lieu of 

cash in gaming transactions between the house and player. 

Rectangular, square-shaped or oval cheque primarily used in 

European casinos

Slot machines Gaming machines that accept coins or vouchers and pay out 

winnings either in coins or via cashier‘s cheque

Ticket-in-ticket-out A cashless slot machine that uses vouchers instead of chips or 

coins

VIP Premium players who consistently gamble high stakes and large 

sums of money – see also Highrollers and whales

Wager A bet of value

Whale A high-stakes player
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 69

APPENDIX 1. REGIONAL DATA ON CASINO SECTORS 

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Africa

Benin Yes 1 No

Botswana Yes 10 None

Only two casinos operate gaming tables with the 

reminder operating only slot machines. Both the 

casinos with gaming tables are subsidiaries of South 

African casinos.

A bill to include casinos under AML/CFT regime is 

being drafted.

Cameroon Yes 3

Central African 

Republic Yes 2

Comoros Yes 3 Unclear

Cote d‘Ivoire Yes 1 Unknown Abidjan 

Hotel Ivoire Inter-Continental & Casino

Democratic 

Republic of the 

Congo

Yes 1 No
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

70 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Djibouti Yes 1 Unknown

Egypt Yes 25

Gambia Yes Kololi Casino, African Gaming Co. Ltd. – Royal 7‘s

Ghana Yes 3 Run by KaiRo International.

Kenya Yes 15 Controlled by the Betting Control & Licensing Board, 

Mombasa

Liberia Yes 1

Madagascar Yes 2 No

Malawi Yes 1+ No

Mali Yes 1 No Run by KaiRo International.

Mauritius Yes 7+ No

Morocco Yes 8? Yes

Mozambique Yes 3 No

Namibia Yes No

Nigeria Yes 2

Reunion Yes 4

Senegal Yes 4
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 71

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Seychelles Yes 3

Sierra Leone Yes 1 No Licensed, but no supervision by government.

South Africa Yes 45 Yes **More details**

Swaziland Yes 3 Yes licensed online operators

Tanzania Yes 3

Tunisia Yes 3 No Only open to foreigners.

Uganda Yes 3

Zambia Yes 3

Zimbabwe Yes 6 Yes Lotteries and Gaming Act, 2000 -Ministry of Home 

Affairs is the regulator. Limited CDD obligations

Middle East

Israel Yes 4 NB – two of these casinos are cruise-ship based 

casinos

Lebanon Yes 1

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Yes 28 Since April 2007 laws passed to limit casinos to two 

provincial cities — Kapchagai (near Almaty) and 

Shchuchinsk.

Kyrgyzstan Yes 18 Yes Yes MER noted that casinos are showing some 

resistance to AML/CFT implementation.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

72 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Turkmenistan Yes 2

Asia/Pacific

Cambodia Yes 21 No No Cambodian nationals are prohibited from entering 

casinos

Chinese Taipei No Yes

Press reports indicate that in late 2007 the Chinese 

Taipei legislature was considering a draft gambling 

bill which, if passed, would legalise casinos and 

gaming in Chinese Taipei

Hong Kong, China No No Foreign registered vessels operate casinos in 

international waters.

India Yes 6 No Offshore – limited to the state of Goa

Japan No Possibly No

Korea, South Yes 17 Yes No

Korea, North Yes 1 No

Lao PDR

Macao, China Yes 31 Yes No

3 concessionaires and 3 sub-concessionaries 

operate all the casinos in Macao, China.

Annual revenue is over USD 13.8 billion per annum

Malaysia Yes 1 Yes No

Myanmar Yes 4 No The established casinos are not clearly legal.

Nepal Yes 6 No No Yes Nepal nationals are prohibited from entering.

No  ̳fit and proper‘ tests for licensees
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 73

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Palau No Yes No Proposals for legalising casino sector have not been 

supported.

Philippines Yes 14 No Yes

All 14 casinos are government owned and operated 

by PAGCOR. PAGCOR operates an internet casino 

run in conjunction and cooperation with PhilWeb 

Corp

Approximately 20% of patrons are foreign nationals -

Chinese Taipei, Japan and Hong Kong, China.

Singapore No Yes Yes No

Sri Lanka Yes 9 No

Nationals are not allowed into Sri Lankan casinos. 

Casinos are not clearly regulated by the government, 

although tax is paid. There is no  ̳fit and proper‘ test 

for casino licensees. 

Thailand No Possibly Initial risk assessment from illegal gaming sector 

undertaken

Vietnam Yes 2 Yes No

Australia Yes 13 No Yes Yes State-based casino regulation, with FIU national 

AML/CFT regulator.

New Caledonia 3

New Zealand Yes 6 No Yes No Regulator is 

Northern Mariana 

Islands 1

Papua New Guinea Yes No Yes Newly passed legislation, May 2007

Solomon Islands 2

Vanuatu Yes 2 Yes Yes No No  ̳fit and proper‘ tests for casino licensees. Vanuatu 

licensed an online casino, but it no longer in 
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

74 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

operation since 2002. 

Europe

Albania Yes 1

Austria Yes 12 Yes

Belarus Yes Approx 

25 Yes

Belgium Yes 9 Yes

Bosnia & 

Herzegovina Yes 1

Bulgaria Yes 7

Croatia Yes 15

Northern Cyprus 

(Area of)

Approx. 

20

Czech Republic Yes 158 No 2004 -27 licenses for 158 casinos across the country. 

15 licensed for foreign exchange

Denmark Yes 6 Yes

Estonia Yes 75

Finland Yes 1 + some 

in Åland

Yes Unclear if 

Åland is 

covered.

Some in Åland. Casinos also operating on ships.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 75

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

France Yes 161 Yes Widespread casino and gaming industry

Georgia Yes 10 Yes

Germany Yes 62 Widespread casino and gaming industry. Casino 

regulators at state level. AML/CFT is a federal role

Gibraltar Yes 1 Yes 19 online casino licensees offering 166 sites.

Greece Yes 9 No

Hungary Yes 6 Yes

Ireland No No A number of private gaming clubs operate casino-like 

facilities that create an AML/CFT risk, but which fall 

outside the scope of the CJA (1994). 

Italy Yes 5 Yes Although legislation has been adopted bringing 

casinos within the scope of the AML Law, further 

regulations are required to implement it.

Latvia Yes 14 Yes Yes

Lithuania Yes 18 Yes

Luxembourg Yes 1

Malta Yes 3 Yes Yes

Regulated by the Lotteries and Gaming Authority

266 online gaming sites are operating. 

Malta regulates junket providers 

Moldova Yes
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

76 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Monaco Yes 4

Netherlands Yes 167 Yes

Poland Yes 27 Yes

FIU is the casino regulator for AML/CFT purposes

The Ministry of Finance gives licenses, approves

rules of the games in casinos, issues certificates 

of profession and registers gambling devices.

Portugal Yes Yes No

Romania Yes 20 Yes The number of tourists who come especially to 

gamble in the Romanian casinos is very little, even 

insignificant (approximately 40-50 persons/month).

Russia Yes 169 Yes – the FIU Yes

After 1 July 2009, all gaming will be prohibited in 

Russia, except within 4 newly created special gaming 

zones in Kaliningrad, Rostov-na-Donu, Altai and 

Primorie Krai (Vladivostok).

Serbia & 

Montenegro Yes 7

Slovakia Yes 4 1

Slovenia Yes

23

+ 36 

gaming 

saloons

Yes Office for Gaming Supervision is the regulator. 

The 23 licenses for Casinos are mainly owned 

Spain Yes 39 + 2 

branches Yes No

Approx 3.5 million visitors per annum to Spain‘s 

casinos.

Regulator is the Ministry of Interior through the 

National Police. 
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 77

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Sweden Yes 4

No. 

Casinos Act 

allows for a 

maximum of 6 

casinos

AML only No

Sweden does not permit internet casinos. MER noted 

Swedish businesses marketing Malta-based internet 

casinos in Sweden. 

Swedish National Gaming Board is the regulator -

www.lotteriinspektionen.se

Switzerland Yes 19 No Yes No

Ukraine Yes 45 Yes Over 50 000 patrons visit Ukrainian casinos daily. 

Ministry of Finance is the licensing body. 

United Kingdom Yes

140 

operating 

casinos

Yes Yes

Regulations have permitted operators to apply for an 

online casinos license only since 2007. 

Regulator: The Gambling Commission -

http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk

The Americas & Caribbean

Antigua & Barbuda Yes 6 yes

Argentina Yes 80 Regulated at the provincial level

Aruba Yes 10

Bahamas Yes 4 Yes No Tourism Board is the general and AML regulator

Barbados Yes 2

Belize Yes 2 Yes

Canada Yes 63 Yes No Cruise ship casinos. Cruise ships can offer casino 

facilities under strict conditions in Canadian waters, 

but are not covered by the AML/CFT legislation.
 Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009

78 - © 2009 FATF/OECD and APG

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Chile Yes 17 In 2005 a new Casino Law was passed for a 

maximum of 24 casinos

Colombia Yes 20 ETESA regulates all gambling

Costa Rica Yes 35 No Yes more than 250 sports betting companies operate as 

online casinos

Dominican Republic Yes 32 No There is no monitoring of the financial behaviour of 

casinos or supervision of their AML compliance.

Ecuador Yes 13

El Salvador Yes 2

Guyana No

Haiti Yes 2

Honduras Yes 3

Jamaica Yes 10 No

Martinique Yes 2

Mexico Yes Up to 5 No

Temporary permits for large-scale ―salones de 

Apuestas―. Regulator is the Secretaría de 

Gobernación (Ministry of Interior)

Netherlands Antilles Yes 26

Nicaragua Yes 10

Panama Yes 36 Yes 1 not yet 

functioning
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector – March 2009 

© 2009 FATF/OECD and APG - 79

Jurisdiction Casinos 

operating

Number of 

Casinos

Proposals for 

new Casinos

Regulated for 

AML/CFT

Online 

casinos Miscellaneous

Paraguay Yes 3

Peru Yes 7

Puerto Rico Yes 18

Saint Vincent & the 

Grenadines Yes 2

St Kitts and Nevis Yes 2

Suriname Yes 9 No

Trinidad & Tobago No No No legal casinos but the 72 Private Members Clubs 

(registered) seem to operate like Casinos, but are not 

supervised.

USA Yes 845 Yes No Various US gaming jurisdictions regulate junket 

operators and their agents. 

Uruguay Yes 18

Venezuela Yes 5