2008 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-5-2008

ET Browne Drug Co v. Cococare Prod Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 06-4543

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

Nos. 06-4543 & 06-4658

 

E.T. BROWNE DRUG CO.,

a New Jersey corporation,

Appellant / Cross-Appellee

v.

COCOCARE PRODUCTS, INC.,

a New Jersey corporation,

Appellee / Cross-Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-05442)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

 

Argued December 13, 2007
 Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District *

Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by

designation.

2

Before: SLOVITER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

POLLAK, District Judge *

Opinion filed: August 5, 2008

Arnold B. Calmann, Esquire

Saiber, Schlesinger, Satz & Goldstein

One Gateway Center, Suite 1300

Newark, NJ 07102-5311

Edward M. Laine, Esquire (Argued)

David A. Prange, Esquire

Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly

45 South Seventh Street

3400 Plaza VII

Minneapolis, MN 55402-0000

Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Robert Mahoney, Esquire (Argued)

Jeanne Hamburg, Esquire

Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus

721 Route 202-206

P.O. Box 1018

Somerville, NJ 08876-1018
 The term appears with and without capitalization throughout 1

the parties’ briefs and the District Court’s opinion. It appears in

all capitals on the products depicted in various exhibits and in

Browne’s registrations. We use “Cocoa Butter Formula” for

consistency but attach no significance to this choice. 

3

Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge 

This case involves a dispute between two manufacturers

of personal care and beauty products that contain cocoa butter.

E.T. Browne Drug Co., Inc. (“Browne”) claims that it has a

protected trademark interest under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1051 et seq., in the term “Cocoa Butter Formula,” which 1

features prominently on its products. Cococare Products, Inc.

(“Cococare”) disputes the validity of this asserted trademark.

The District Court entered summary judgment in Cococare’s

favor after concluding that the term is generic and thus may not

receive protection from the trademark laws. We agree that

Browne has not demonstrated that “Cocoa Butter Formula” is a

protectable trademark, but reach that conclusion by a different

path. We believe that a genuine issue of material fact exists as

to whether “Cocoa Butter Formula” is generic. But even
4

assuming it is descriptive, this term must have a secondary

meaning to be protectable. Because Browne failed to identify

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on

that point, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of

Cococare. We remand, however, to allow the District Court to

enter an appropriate order under 15 U.S.C. § 1119. 

I. Background and Procedural History

Browne, a New Jersey corporation, markets personal care

and beauty products containing cocoa butter under the brand

name “Palmer’s.” The “Palmer’s” line of cocoa butter products

is the sales leader among personal care and beauty products

containing cocoa butter. The packaging containing those

products displays “Palmer’s” and “Cocoa Butter Formula.”

“Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula” is on the principal register of

the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), and

thus this term is presumptively valid as a trademark. See 15

U.S.C. § 1057(b). In contrast, “Cocoa Butter Formula” is on the

PTO’s supplemental register but not on the principal register.

The statutory presumption of validity accordingly does not

attach to that term. See id. § 1094. 

Cococare, a New Jersey corporation, also sells personal

care and beauty products containing cocoa butter, although its

sales are far smaller than those of Browne. In 1994, it

introduced new products formulated with cocoa butter and

Vitamin E, labeling them “Cococare Cocoa Butter Formula.”
5

This use of “Cocoa Butter Formula” gave rise to its dispute with

Browne. 

“[T]he parties agree that Browne knew of its claims

against Cococare since 1993 but did not prosecute them because

Cococare sales were ‘de minimis’; and Browne could only

confirm two ‘sightings’ of Cococare from 1994 - 2000.”

Amended Opinion Granting Summary Judgment at 4, E.T.

Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Prods., Inc., No. 03–5442 (PGS)

(D.N.J. Sep. 20, 2006) (“Dist. Ct. Op.”) (footnote omitted).

Browne first objected to Cococare’s use of the term “Cocoa

Butter Formula” in 2002 after it became aware of a product flyer

from a seller of Cococare’s products. 

Browne then brought suit in the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey after a cease-and-desist

letter sent to Cococare failed to cause it to stop using the

contested term. Browne alleged, inter alia, that Cococare had

violated the Lanham Act and equivalent New Jersey law by its

use of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula.” Cococare

counterclaimed, inter alia, for cancellation of Browne’s

supplemental registration of “Cocoa Butter Formula” and

amendment of Browne’s principal registration of “Palmer’s

Cocoa Butter Formula.” It moved for summary judgment on the

grounds that “Cocoa Butter Formula” is not a protectable

trademark because it is a generic term, that Browne’s claims are

barred by the defenses of laches and unclean hands, and that

those claims should be dismissed because Cococare’s use of
 Browne does not discuss the claims it brought in District 2

Court under New Jersey law. Those claims therefore do not

feature in our analysis of this appeal. 

6

“Cocoa Butter Formula” was a fair use of a product descriptor.

Browne cross-moved for summary judgment on the genericness

and fair use issues, and on Cococare’s counterclaims.

The District Court concluded that “Cocoa Butter

Formula” is a generic term and entered summary judgment in

favor of Cococare. It rejected Cococare’s counterclaims,

concluding that no “substantive evidence” supported the

allegations that Browne made deliberately fraudulent statements

to the PTO. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12–13. The Court noted that

Cococare had admitted it suffered no actual damages as a result

of Browne’s alleged actions, and reasoned that, because

“supplemental registration provides no substantive rights, []

there would be no reason to force the cancellation of a

supplementally registered mark.” Id. at 13.

Browne appeals. It argues that the District Court erred in

concluding that the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” is generic.2

Cococare appeals the District Court’s refusal to direct the PTO

to cancel the supplemental registration of “Cocoa Butter

Formula” or to direct the addition of a disclaimer to that term on

the principal registration of “Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula.”

Cococare also renews the arguments that it is entitled to entry of

summary judgment in its favor because “Cocoa Butter Formula”
7

has not acquired secondary meaning, Browne waited too long to

act and made misrepresentations to the PTO such that its action

is barred, respectively, by the defenses of laches and unclean

hands, and its (Cococare’s) use of the term “Cocoa Butter

Formula” amounts to fair use.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction over the Lanham Act

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and pendent jurisdiction

over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b). We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is

plenary. Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975,

978 (3d Cir. 1993). On appeal from a grant of summary

judgment, our Court exercises the same standard of review as

the District Court and considers whether genuine issues of

material fact exist that preclude entry of summary judgment. Id.

III. Discussion

A. The Protectability of the Mark “Cocoa Butter

Formula”

To establish trademark infringement in violation of the

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, a plaintiff must prove that (1)

the mark is valid and legally protectable, (2) it owns the mark,

and (3) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to create

confusion concerning the origin of goods or services. Freedom
8

Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 469–70 (3d

Cir. 2005). We thus begin our analysis by asking whether

“Cocoa Butter Formula” is a valid, legally protectable

trademark. 

Terms asserted as trademarks may fall in four categories:

[1] arbitrary (or fanciful) terms, which bear no

logical or suggestive relation to the actual

characteristics of the goods; [2] suggestive terms,

which suggest rather than describe the

characteristics of the goods; [3] descriptive terms,

which describe a characteristic or ingredient of

the article to which it refers[;] and [4] generic

terms, which function as the common descriptive

name of a product class.

A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir.

1986) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The

Lanham Act protects only some of these categories of terms.

Working backward, it provides no protection for generic terms

because a first-user of a term “cannot deprive competing

manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its

name.” Id. at 297 (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting

World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also Park ‘N Fly,

Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)

(“Generic terms are not registrable and a registered mark may be

cancelled at any time on the ground[] it has become generic.”).
9

In contrast, the Lanham Act protects descriptive terms if they

have acquired secondary meaning associating the term with the

claimant. Canfield, 808 F.2d at 292–93, 296; see also Berner,

987 F.2d at 979. Finally, trademark law protects suggestive and

arbitrary or fanciful terms without any showing of secondary

meaning. Berner, 987 F.2d at 979 (citing Canfield, 808 F.2d at

297).

Browne has the burden in this case of proving the

existence of a protectable mark because “Cocoa Butter

Formula” does not appear on the PTO’s principal register.

Canfield, 808 F.2d at 297. It contends that “Cocoa Butter

Formula” should receive protection from the trademark laws as

a descriptive term that has acquired secondary meaning.

Cococare responds that the term should receive no protection

because it is generic. The parties thus pose a difficult question

of trademark law. See id. at 296 (“Courts and commentators

have recognized the difficulties of distinguishing between

suggestive, descriptive, and generic marks.”). 

Whether “Cococare Butter Formula” is generic or

descriptive, and whether that term has acquired secondary

meaning, are questions of fact. See id. at 307 n.24 (noting that

“Courts of Appeals have generally held that a designation’s

level of inherent distinctiveness is a question of fact”); DranoffPerlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992)

(identifying secondary meaning as a question of fact). We

therefore ask whether Browne has presented sufficient evidence
10

to create a genuine issue of material fact as to those questions.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Berner, 987 F.2d at 978.

As noted, we conclude that Browne has produced

evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on

its claim that the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” is not generic,

but descriptive. But as we also conclude that Browne has failed

to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the term has acquired secondary

meaning, we reach the same result as the District Court –

“Cocoa Butter Formula” may not receive the protections of the

Lanham Act.

1. Is “Cocoa Butter Formula” Generic?

a. The Primary Significance Test

and the Limited Circumstances

in Which Canfield’s Alternative

Test Applies

This appeal raises the initial question of the proper test

under which to evaluate whether the term “Cocoa Butter

Formula” is generic and thus not protectable as a trademark.

“The jurisprudence of genericness revolves around the primary

significance test, which inquires whether the primary

significance of a term in the minds of the consuming public is

the product or the producer.” Canfield, 808 F.2d at 292–93. We

ask “whether consumers think the term represents the generic
 The District Court treated this question in a somewhat 3

confusing manner. It first stated that it is a “fundamental

question in this case . . . whether ‘cocoa butter’ or ‘cocoa butter

formula’ is the relevant product genus for evaluating

genericness.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. It then acknowledged that “the

product genus in this action, however, is not in dispute.” Id.

This accorded with its previous statements that Browne

describes the genus as “skin care products in the cocoa butter

category” and that Cococare describes it as “personal care and

beauty aid products in the cocoa butter market,” id. at 5

(quotation marks omitted), and that any distinction between

“skin care products” and “personal care and beauty aid

products” is one without a difference, id. 

The Court continued in apparent agreement with the

11

name of the product [or service] or a mark indicating merely one

source of that product [or service].” Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs.,

967 F.2d at 859 (alterations in original) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). If the term refers to the product (i.e., the

genus), the term is generic. If, on the other hand, it refers to one

source or producer of that product, the term is not generic (i.e.,

it is descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary or fanciful). To give an

example, “Cola” is generic because it refers to a product,

whereas “Pepsi Cola” is not generic because it refers to the

producer. To repeat, Cococare contends that “Cocoa Butter

Formula” is generic whereas Browne argues it is descriptive.

The District Court did not apply the primary significance

test. It instead applied an alternative test stated in Canfield.3
parties, reasoning that the products bearing the term at issue “are

part of [a] new genus; consisting of personal care and beauty aid

products, including creams, lotions, skin moisturizers and soaps,

formulated with cocoa butter.” Id. at 7. It then departed from

the submissions of the parties and its own prior recognition of

their agreement, however, by stating that “cocoa butter formula

is the relevant product class.” Id. at 8. 

We varied in our inclusion and exclusion of the word “Diet” 4

in Canfield. We use that word throughout for consistency but

attach no significance to that choice.

 Canfield refers to the primary significance test as if it differs 5

from the consumer understanding test. See id. at 299 (referring

to “the primary significance test and its related test of consumer

understanding”). More recently, we have treated the concept of

consumer understanding as included in primary significance.

See Berner, 987 F.2d at 982 (referring to the primary

12

Neither party disputed that approach. We conclude, however,

that the District Court should not have ventured beyond the

primary significance test to any alternative gloss.

Canfield addressed situations in which a manufacturer

created a new product and it was not clear if it also had created

a new product genus. It involved a dispute over the term “Diet

Chocolate Fudge Soda.” “[A] fundamental question . . . [was] 4

whether chocolate soda or chocolate fudge soda is the relevant

product genus for evaluating genericness.” Id. at 298–99. The

primary significance test could not answer that question, we 5
significance test as focusing on “consumer understanding”).

Either way, the primary significance test remains the central test

of genericness in our Circuit. See Canfield, 808 F.2d at 299.

Yet we see nothing in the record indicating that either party has

asked that we or the District Court use the consumer

understanding test to gauge whether a term is generic.

13

reasoned, since it applied “only after we have determined the

relevant genus.” Id. at 299. 

Our Court concluded that the following rule would help

us fill in this gap of identifying the appropriate genus for

analysis: “If a producer introduces a product that [1] differs

from an established product class in a particular characteristic,

and [2] uses a common descriptive term of that characteristic as

the name of the product, then the product should be considered

its own genus.” Id. at 305–06. In those circumstances,

“[w]hether the term that identifies the product is generic then

depends on the competitors’ need to use it. At the least, if no

commonly used alternative effectively communicates the same

functional information, the term that denotes the product is

generic.” Id. at 306 (internal citation omitted). See generally

Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 145

(2d Cir. 1977) (discussing Canfield and describing its test as a

complement to, rather than a rejection of, the primary

significance test when a court cannot readily determine the

genus of a new product). 
14

Canfield does not control here for a simple reason: this

case does not pose the question addressed in Canfield. The

“question . . . at the core” of Canfield was whether “the relevant

product category or genus for purposes of evaluating

genericness is chocolate soda or chocolate fudge soda.” Id. at

293. We do not face a comparable question, as the parties

before us do not dispute whether we should use an existing

genus or a new genus in our analysis. They instead agree, with

only insignificant quibbles over wording, that “Cocoa Butter

Skin Care Products” or an equivalent term defines the category.

To understand why this distinction matters, we return to

the principles underlying Canfield. It addressed a weakness in

the primary significance test – the presumption that a court

knows the product’s genus. In most cases, that genus will be

obvious, even for new products. A slight change in a

detergent’s formula, for example, likely will not create a new

product genus. Problems may arise, however, if a product

differs from existing products in what Canfield calls a

“particular characteristic.” Examples may include the addition

of a new flavor or a new featured ingredient (such as honey in

the “Honey Brown Ale” at issue in Genesee Brewing Co.). The

manufacturer then likely has created a new type of product.

That manufacturer may well need to use descriptive terms in the

product name to identify the product to consumers. This raises

the question of the proper genus for the Court’s genericness

analysis: the established product class or a new product class

that modifies the established product class with the new
15

characteristic. 

Canfield addressed this problem by articulating a test that

supplies the proper genus for a genericness analysis. Its test

applies when a manufacturer uses the following equation: name

of new product = name of the established product class (“Diet

Chocolate Soda” in Canfield) + name of the new characteristic

(“Fudge” in Canfield). See id. at 305–06. 

The established product class in our case is “Skin Care

Products” or “Lotion.” The new characteristic is “Cocoa

Butter.” Browne could have called its new products “Cocoa

Butter Skin Care Products” or “Cocoa Butter Skin Care Lotion.”

Use of these terms would have satisfied Canfield’s equation

(name of the new characteristic + name of the established

product class) and triggered its test. Canfield stated that the

primary significance test would not have been useful because

the genericness determination would have depended on the

unresolved threshold definition of the genus (“Cocoa Butter

Skin Care Products” vs. “Skin Care Products”). 

Of course, when it introduced skin-care products

containing cocoa butter (i.e., adding a new characteristic),

Browne did not label those products with the term “Cocoa

Butter Skin Care Products” or “Cocoa Butter Lotion.” Instead,

it used “Cocoa Butter Formula.” This term does not frustrate

the application of the primary significance test because it does

not raise the question whether to use “Cocoa Butter Formula” or
 The public need not know the identity of the producer for 6

the primary significance of the term to be the producer.

Canfield, 808 F.2d at 300 (citing S.Rep. No. 98–627, at 5

(1984)).

16

“Formula” as the proper genus for our analysis. Cococare also

has not suggested that “Formula” identifies the established

product class. Browne does not make baby formula after all, or

sell algorithms or recipes. Nor does any record evidence

suggest that consumers use “Formula” to describe the skin care

product category. Browne’s use of a different equation to name

its product (“Cocoa Butter Formula” = name of the new

characteristic (“Cocoa Butter”) + a term not describing the

established product class (“Formula”)) does not bring into play

the weakness in the primary significance test that Canfield

addressed because it does not raise the question of the proper

genus for our analysis. Applying Canfield here amounts to

attempting to remedy a non-existent problem. We therefore will

evaluate the genericness of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula”

under the primary significance test only. 

b. Is the Term “Cocoa Butter

Formula” Generic Under the

Primary Significance Test?

“[T]he primary significance test . . . inquires whether the

primary significance of a term in the minds of the consuming

public is the product or the producer.” Id. at 292–93. We 6
Under this analysis, the District Court should not have 7

broken up the term for purposes of its analysis and considered

“Cocoa Butter” separately from “Formula.” See Dist. Ct. Op. at

5, 7.

17

applied that test in Berner, asking whether the evidence

demonstrated that the term at issue primarily signified the

product genus to consumers. Berner, 987 F.2d at 980–81. Like

the term under dispute in Berner, the meaning of “Cocoa Butter

Formula” should be “evaluated by examining its meaning to the

relevant consuming public.” Id. at 981. That evaluation

requires looking at the mark as a whole, not dissecting it into

various parts. Id. We therefore inquire whether the consuming 7

public understands “Cocoa Butter Formula” to refer to a product

genus or to a producer. We ask specifically if the evidence

submitted by Browne creates a genuine issue of material fact as

to its contention that the consuming public does not understand

the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” to refer to a product genus

(i.e., that it is not generic, but descriptive in this case). 

Plaintiffs seeking to establish the descriptiveness of a

mark often use one of two types of survey evidence. J. Thomas

McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

(4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter McCarthy on Trademarks] describes

a “Teflon survey” as “essentially a mini-course in the generic

versus trademark distinction, followed by a test.” 2 McCarthy

on Trademarks § 12:16. That survey runs a participant through

a number of terms (such as “washing machine” and
18

“Chevrolet”), asking whether they are common names or brand

names. After the participant grasps the distinction, the survey

asks the participant to categorize a number of terms, including

the term at issue. Id. (discussing survey created for E. I. DuPont

de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502

(E.D.N.Y. 1975)). 

A “Thermos survey,” on the other hand, asks the

respondent how he or she would ask for the product at issue. If,

to use the term under dispute in the case from which the survey

gets its name, the respondents largely say the brand name

(“Thermos”) rather than the initial product category name

(“Vacuum Bottle”), the survey provides evidence that the brand

name (“Thermos”) has become a generic term for the product

category. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 12:15 (discussing

survey used in American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus.,

Inc., 207 F.Supp. 9 (D.Conn. 1962)). To put this in the terms of

the primary significance test, the term would be generic because

the consumers would be using it to refer to the product category

rather than a producer who makes products within that product

category. 

Browne conducted a survey in this case that generally

adheres to the “Thermos survey” model. The survey posed a

number of open-ended questions asking respondents to “identify

or describe the product category” in which its products fall. It

asked each of the 154 valid respondents “[w]hat word or words

would you use to identify or describe a skin care product which
19

contains cocoa butter?” and “[i]f you needed to identify or

describe a skin care product containing cocoa butter, what word

or words would you use instead of or in addition to just saying

cocoa butter, if any?” Neither “Cocoa Butter Formula” nor any

form of the word “Formula” appeared among the respondents’

answers. 

The District Court appears to have admitted the survey.

Cococare does not suggest on this appeal that we should exclude

it. Nor do we see a reason to do so. We therefore ask whether

the survey evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether “Cocoa Butter Formula” is not generic, but

descriptive. 

The District Court concluded that the survey had “little

or no probative value” and “should be afforded little or no

weight.” We understand the Court to have made that

determination within the summary judgment framework rather

than to have engaged in any inappropriate weighing of the

evidence at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Universal

City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.

1984) (holding a survey to be “so badly flawed that it cannot be

used to demonstrate the existence of a question of fact”).

Cococare argues that we should review this decision for clear

error. It points to our decision in Johnson & Johnson-Merck

Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 135–36 (3d Cir. 2005),

where we employed that standard of review. Rorer did not
 We have explained the importance of the distinction 8

between the preliminary injunction and summary judgment

stages of litigation: 

In the posture before us–a trademark case in

which summary judgment proceedings follow a

grant of a preliminary injunction in the plaintiff’s

favor–the distinction between the standards for

summary judgment and preliminary injunction

become critical. Failure to strictly observe the

principles governing summary judgment becomes

particularly significant in a trademark or

tradename action, where summary judgments are

the exception. [I]nferences concerning credibility

that were previously made in ruling on [a] motion

for a preliminary injunction cannot determine [a]

Rule 56(c) motion and should not be used to

support propositions that underpin the decision to

grant the motion for summary judgment.

Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812,

820 (3d Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). The distinction between the two

standards remains as important in the context of weighing the

results of a survey as in making credibility determinations (the

issue in Doebler).

20

come to us at the summary judgment stage, however. It

involved a District Court that had weighed survey evidence

during the course of a four-day evidentiary hearing on a motion

for a preliminary injunction. 

8
 We reject Browne’s argument that we should use an abuse 9

of discretion standard of review because we do not agree that

this is a question of the admissibility of the surveys. See In re

Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir.

1994) (applying a deferential standard of review to rulings on

admissibility of expert opinions).

21

Our case involves no such weighing of evidence or

factual findings. The District Court’s role here was to evaluate

the record evidence to determine whether Browne’s claims

could proceed to trial under the summary judgment standard. In

this context, we do not defer to the District Court’s resolution of

that legal question. Instead, we will conduct plenary review as

we have on other occasions when a District Court has granted

summary judgment. See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d

298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Nintendo, 746 F.2d at 115, 118

(showing no deference to District Court opinion). 

9

The District Court faulted the survey for what it

perceived as two errors. It criticized the survey for not using the

term “Palmer’s,” believing that this omission “undermine[d]

Browne’s theory of the case” and made the questions “flawed

and misleading.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9. The Court also believed

that the survey contained leading questions. For example, it

considered the question “What word or words would you use to

identify or describe a skin care product which contains cocoa

butter?” to be highly suggestive in order to evoke a specific

response.
Cococare presents expert evidence indicating that “Cocoa 10

Butter” may have discouraged the use of those words in the

answers. But this does not deprive the survey of probative

value. It merely creates a question as to how much weight a jury

should give the survey.

 In addition to this substantive difference, those cases differ

11

procedurally from this case. In both of those cases we reviewed

the weight given to surveys by District Courts considering

motions for entry of preliminary injunctions. See supra note 8

(discussing procedural distinction between preliminary

injunction and summary judgment stages of trademark

litigation). 

22

We do not agree these questions were so misplaced. The

survey was intended to reveal whether customers use the word

“Cocoa Butter Formula” to describe cocoa butter skin care

products or lotions. The parties’ genericness dispute turns on

that question. We thus steer away from the criticism that “some

of the survey questions use two of the three words (cocoa butter)

of Browne’s source identifier (cocoa butter formula).” Id. We

struggle to conjure how Browne could have pursued the core

genericness inquiry without doing so. As we believe the 10

questions are not highly suggestive or misleading, this case does

not, as the District Court suggests, find similarities in Novartis

Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer

Pharmaceuticals Co., 290 F.3d 578, 592 (3d Cir. 2002), and

Rorer, 19 F.3d at 135. 

11
 Cococare does not distinguish in its opening brief between 12

“Teflon surveys” and “Thermos surveys.” It implicitly argues,

however, that Browne should have conducted the former rather

than the latter when it contends that “[t]he proper question

would have asked survey respondents in a straightforward

fashion whether the designation ‘cocoa butter formula’

identified a brand, or a common name.” Cococare does not

explain why Browne had to conduct a “Teflon survey” rather

than a “Thermos survey.”

23

We also do not perceive any reason for Browne to have

included the word “Palmer’s” in its survey. This litigation

focuses on the term “Cocoa Butter Formula,” not on the

registered trademark “Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula.” The

inclusion of the word “Palmer’s” in the survey would have

confused matters and would have taken the survey outside the

“Thermos survey” model.12

Browne’s survey does have non-trivial flaws, however.

Only 30% of valid respondents used a noun identifying the

product genus (e.g., lotion, cream). The majority of respondents

either answered with an adjective describing the product class

(e.g., healing, moisturizing) or did not answer. This suggests

that the questions confused many respondents. The survey may

have caused this confusion by deviating from the standard

“Thermos survey” model by asking respondents for terms

describing the products in addition to asking (as a “Thermos

survey” should) for terms identifying the products. The survey
24

likely would have been strongest if it had asked respondents, as

the “Thermos survey” also did, how they would ask at a store for

the type of product at issue. 

These flaws nonetheless do not deprive the survey of

probative value. The survey raises a reasonable inference that

“Cocoa Butter Formula” does not describe the product genus in

the opinion of the 46 respondents who described the product

class. A reasonable jury could rely on that inference to conclude

that consumers do not use the words “Cocoa Butter Formula” to

describe the category of skin care products containing cocoa

butter. Cococare could attack the inference at trial, but that does

not stop the survey from creating a genuine issue of material

fact. It is premature for us now to conclude that the survey does

not provide probative evidence that “Cocoa Butter Formula” is

not generic. Browne could have performed a better survey.

Indeed, it might have rued the survey’s design flaws after a trial.

But the survey is strong enough to allow Browne to survive

summary judgment on the genericness issue.

Browne also points to evidence that competitors use

terms other than “Cocoa Butter Formula.” This evidence tends

to prove that the term is not generic. See Canfield, 808 F.2d at

306 n.20 (“Courts have long focused on the availability of

commonly used alternatives in deciding whether a term is

generic.” (citing Holzapfel’s Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen’s

American Composition Co., 183 U.S. 1 (1901))). It indicates

that other competitors (and thus Cococare) did not need to use
 In contrast, we struggle to perceive the relevance ascribed 13

by Browne to the fact that dictionaries do not include the term

“Cocoa Butter Formula.” Not all generic terms appear in

dictionaries, a fact so obvious Browne makes no effort to

disprove it. 

 The District Court appeared to reason that the registration 14

of “Cocoa Butter Formula” on the PTO’s supplemental register

rather than its principal register weakens Browne’s claim that

the term is descriptive. We know of no support for that view.

As the District Court correctly explained elsewhere, the validity

of a term that does not appear on the principal register and is not

distinctive (i.e., one that is descriptive rather than suggestive, or

arbitrary or fanciful) depends on its acquisition of secondary

meaning. See Berner, 987 F.2d at 979 (explaining that arbitrary

or suggestive terms are distinctive and automatically qualify for

trademark protection, while descriptive terms only receive

trademark protection after a showing of secondary meaning). 

We also note that Browne is not entitled to summary

judgment in its favor on the question of genericness. The

weaknesses in the genericness survey alone create a genuine

issue of material fact on that point.

25

the word “Formula” to communicate to consumers the type of

products that it sold. This bolsters our conclusion that a genuine

issue of material fact exists on the question of genericness, and 13

thus the District Court should not have entered summary

judgment that “Cocoa Butter Formula” is generic. Instead, it 14

should have proceeded to a secondary meaning analysis.
26

2. Assuming “Cocoa Butter Formula” is

Descriptive, Has it Acquired Secondary

Meaning?

Because a genuine issue of material fact exists on the

question whether “Cocoa Butter Formula” is generic, the parties

normally would need to proceed to trial to resolve that issue.

Even assuming that Browne prevailed and proved “Cocoa Butter

Formula” to be descriptive, it also would need to show that the

term had acquired secondary meaning which associated it with

Browne. 

Cococare moved for summary judgment on the basis that

Browne had not produced evidence creating a genuine issue of

material fact on the secondary meaning question. The District

Court set out in its opinion how a secondary meaning analysis

would proceed and laid out relevant factors from our case law.

But it did not go further. Instead, the Court concluded that “[i]n

this case [there] are other controlling factors which taken as a

whole show that cocoa butter formula is generic.” Dist. Ct. Op.

at 12. The parties presented the secondary meaning question to

the District Court, however, and we have their arguments before

us. We thus resolve that question because of our interest in

judicial economy, and affirm on this basis the District Court’s

entry of summary judgment. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798,

805 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that we may affirm on any ground

supported by the record). 
27

Secondary meaning is a new and additional meaning that

attaches to a word or symbol that is not inherently distinctive.

See generally 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 15:1. We have

explained:

Secondary meaning exists when the trademark is

interpreted by the consuming public to be not only

an identification of the product, but also a

representation of the product’s origin. Secondary

meaning is generally established through

extensive advertising which creates in the mind of

consumers an association between different

products bearing the same mark. This association

suggests that the products originate from a single

source. Once a trademark which could not

otherwise have exclusive appropriation achieves

secondary meaning, competitors can be prevented

from using a similar mark. The purpose of this

rule is to minimize confusion of the public as to

the origin of the product and to avoid diversion of

customers misled by a similar mark.

Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,

1228 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). 

We have identified an eleven-item, non-exhaustive list of

factors relevant to the factual determination whether a term has

acquired secondary meaning:
28

(1) the extent of sales and advertising leading to

buyer association; (2) length of use; (3)

exclusivity of use; (4) the fact of copying; (5)

customer surveys; (6) customer testimony; (7) the

use of the mark in trade journals; (8) the size of

the company; (9) the number of sales; (10) the

number of customers; and, (11) actual confusion.

Commerce Nat’l Ins. Services, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency,

Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d Cir. 2000). “[T]he evidentiary bar

must be placed somewhat higher” when the challenged term is

particularly descriptive. Id. at 441. 

Browne’s proffered showing of secondary meaning

includes the following evidence:

• its use and promotion of the term “Cocoa

Butter Formula” continuously for 20 years;

• the substantial amounts of money it has

spent promoting the term “Cocoa Butter

Formula;”

• the nature and quality of the advertising in

support of the term “Cocoa Butter

Formula;”

• Cococare’s alleged intent to copy the term
29

“Cocoa Butter Formula;” and

• the increase in the sales of products

bearing the term “Cocoa Butter Formula.”

This evidence may seem, at first blush, to support

Browne’s claim that the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” has

gained secondary meaning. But serious flaws cause it to fail to

create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of

secondary meaning.

The evidence’s core deficiency is that while it shows

Browne used the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” on many

occasions over a long period of time, it does not show Browne

succeeded in creating secondary meaning in the minds of

consumers. Although the evidence leaves no doubt that Browne

hoped the term would acquire secondary meaning, nothing

shows that it achieved this goal. Jurors would have to make a

leap of faith to conclude that the term gained secondary meaning

because the record fails to provide meaningful support. A jury

could evaluate the quality of the advertising or consider the rise

in product sales, but it would have to guess what lasting

impression the advertising left in the mind of consumers or what

portion of Browne’s revenue growth it caused. 

We indicated in Commerce National Insurance Services

that a plaintiff might establish secondary meaning through
 We do not suggest that a party attempting to establish 15

secondary meaning always must show that marketing materials

succeeded in creating buyer association or that the term

contributed to sales growth. 

30

evidence of advertising and sales growth. See id. at 438. A 15

plaintiff could create a reasonable inference, for example, that

a term had gained secondary meaning by showing that it had

appeared for a long period of time in a prevalent advertising

campaign. Evidence of revenue growth simultaneous with such

marketing would strengthen that inference, particularly if

supported by evidence of other factors among those we listed in

Commerce National. 

This case, however, differs in an important way from

such an example. Browne has introduced no evidence

indicating that it ever used “Cocoa Butter Formula” as a standalone term in marketing or packaging. Instead, it always used

the term connected with the “Palmer’s,” forming the phrase

“Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula.” For example, Browne’s

lotion bottles bore logos with “Palmer’s” immediately above the

words “Cocoa Butter Formula,” creating one visual presentation

for the consumer. The marketing and sales evidence thus likely

would raise a reasonable inference that “Palmer’s Cocoa Butter

Formula” has gained secondary meaning in the minds of the
 This case does not put that question at issue. The parties do 16

not dispute that Browne has a valid, registered trademark in the

term “Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula.” Cococare does seek

alteration of the principal registration of that term, but only to

the extent it includes the term “Cocoa Butter Formula,” which

it asserts is generic.

31

public. 

16

But Browne wants to do something more complicated: it

wants to establish that a portion (“Cocoa Butter Formula”) of

the larger term (“Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula”) has acquired

an independent secondary meaning. Nothing in the record

would allow a jury to evaluate the strength of the term “Cocoa

Butter Formula” independently from the larger term including

“Palmer’s.” We thus conclude, under the specific circumstances

presented by this case, that the marketing and sales evidence

provided by Browne does not create a reasonable inference that

“Cocoa Butter Formula” has acquired secondary meaning.

Nor does Browne’s asserted evidence of Cococare’s

intent to copy the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” create a genuine

issue of material fact as to secondary meaning. This evidence

pertains almost exclusively to trade dress (i.e., the overall

appearance of labels, wrappers, and containers used in
 See generally 1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 8:1 (comparing 17

trade dress and trademarks).

Browne apparently dropped a trade dress claim because 18

Cococare presented unrebutted evidence that it adopted the

contested trade dress earlier than Browne.

 Cococare conducted a secondary meaning survey that it 19

argues tends to prove a lack of secondary meaning in the term

32

packaging a product), an issue not presented by this case. 17 18

Browne only identifies one piece of evidence that conceivably

suggests an intent to copy. Cococare’s founder testified that he

may have known about Browne’s use of “Cocoa Butter

Formula” when Cococare began using that term on its own

products. But he also testified that he decided to use the word

“Formula” because it is a standard descriptor in the cosmetics

industry. He never testified that he copied Browne and nothing

in the record suggests that he did. Even viewing this evidence

in the light most favorable to Browne, we cannot discern how a

reasonable jury could conclude that Cococare intended to copy

Browne’s use of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula.”

Browne could have overcome these deficiencies in its

evidence by conducting a secondary meaning survey in the same

way it conducted its genericness survey. It could have used

survey evidence to show that “Cocoa Butter Formula” had

acquired secondary meaning in the minds of consumers, thus

creating a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. We 19
“Cocoa Butter Formula.” That survey does not support

Browne’s position. Instead, it arguably provides evidence

against Browne and would be used by Cococare to rebut any

evidence of secondary meaning offered by Browne. We need

not attempt to discern, however, whether Cococare’s survey

undercuts any evidence by Browne. That is not our role at the

summary judgment stage. Instead, we ask whether Browne has

identified sufficient evidence to allow a jury to resolve the

secondary meaning question in its favor. We conclude that it

has not. Accordingly, we need not consider here any evidence

offered in support of Cococare’s position. 

33

never have held, and do not hold today, that a party seeking to

establish secondary meaning must submit a survey on that point.

However, Browne’s failure to conduct a secondary meaning

survey leaves it without evidence of any sort in this case of the

secondary meaning of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula.” 

We thus conclude that Browne has failed to identify

evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on the

question whether “Cocoa Butter Formula” has acquired

secondary meaning. Cococare is entitled to entry of summary

judgment on the basis that Browne lacks a protectable trademark

interest in the term “Cocoa Butter Formula.”

B. Cancellation or Alteration of Registrations and

Remaining Arguments

Having held “Cocoa Butter Formula” to be generic, the
 Since this case falls squarely within Ditri’s requirements,

20

we need not define the exact contours of “controvers[ies] as to

the validity of or interference with a registered mark.” For

example, we do not decide whether, in the absence of an

34

District Court briefly considered whether (as Cococare

requested in a counterclaim) it should require a disclaimer of the

“Cocoa Butter Formula” portion of the principal registration of

“Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula” and cancel the supplemental

registration of “Cocoa Butter Formula.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1119.

This provision states in relevant part: “In any action involving

a registered mark the court may determine the right to

registration, order the cancellation of registrations, in whole or

in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the

register with respect to the registrations of any party to the

action.” Id. We have explained that “a controversy as to the

validity of or interference with a registered mark must exist

before a district court has jurisdiction to grant the cancellation

remedy.” Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc.,

954 F.2d 869, 873 (3d Cir. 1992). A controversy clearly existed

as to the validity of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” and its

place on the supplemental register. This raises the question of

the need for a disclaimer on the principal register of that portion

of the larger mark “Palmer’s Cocoa Butter Formula.”

Moreover, Cococare explicitly counterclaimed for modification

of that larger mark. These circumstances meet Ditri’s

requirement that “a controversy as to the validity of or

interference with a registered mark must exist.” 

20
appropriate counterclaim, a District Court may order the

addition of a disclaimer to a term (e.g., “Palmer’s Cocoa Butter

Formula”), including a portion found to be generic (e.g., “Cocoa

Butter Formula”). 

35

The District Court declined to order relief under § 1119,

however. It apparently believed that a disclaimer of “Cocoa

Butter Formula” on the principal registration of “Palmer’s

Cocoa Butter Formula” would not benefit Cococare. See

generally 15 U.S.C. § 1119; 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 19:63

(explaining effect of a disclaimer). Yet, even if Cococare will

not benefit from that disclaimer, we should not allow the

absence of a disclaimer on the principal register to confuse a

future business into believing that it may not use the term

“Cocoa Butter Formula.” Cf. Berner, 987 F.2d at 979. As such,

on remand the District Court should order that an appropriate

disclaimer should be entered on the principal register.

The treatment of the supplemental registration is more

complicated since a descriptive term lacking secondary meaning

may not appear on the principal register, but may appear on the

supplemental register. See, e.g., In re Bush Bros. & Co., 884

F.2d 569, 570 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The District Court should not

enter any order regarding the supplemental registration unless

for some reason Cococare proceeds to trial on its counterclaim

and prevails on the issue of the genericness of the term “Cocoa

Butter Formula.” If Cococare does prove “Cocoa Butter

Formula” to be generic, the District Court then could order the
36

removal of that term from the supplemental register. 

Cococare argues that Browne’s trademark claim must fail

because of Browne’s failure to assert its rights in the term

“Cocoa Butter Formula” in a timely fashion and, because of

alleged misrepresentations to the PTO, Browne has “unclean

hands.” Cococare also argues that it should receive summary

judgment on its affirmative defense that its use of the term

“Cocoa Butter Formula” constitutes fair use. We need not reach

these arguments in light of our conclusion that Browne does not

have a protectable trademark right in the term “Cocoa Butter

Formula.”

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all

respects but one. We remand to allow the Court to enter an

order addressing Cococare’s request for relief under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1119.