UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. No. 4:22-cr-0214-P

ADRIAN DANTRELL WESLEY.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Adrian Dantrell Wesley’s Motion to 

Suppress (“Motion”). ECF No. 19. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court DENIES the Motion. 

BACKGROUND

In June 2022, the Fort Worth Police Department (“FWPD”) received 

a tip regarding narcotics sales around Griggs Avenue. ECF 19-1 at 11.

FWPD Officer Darty investigated the area and obtained a search 

warrant for a residence at 3005 Griggs Avenue (“Griggs Residence”). Id.

While executing the warrant, the FWPD found large quantities of 

narcotics and money. Id. at 11–12. During the search of the residence, 

officers also found registration paperwork for a blue Nissan Altima

(“Vehicle”). Id. at 12. Darty further recalled that Defendant was a 

bystander near the scene and that he told Darty that he was friends 

with owner of the Griggs residence. Id. at 11.

After the search, the FWPD surveilled the Griggs Residence and 

noted a high volume of short-term traffic at the house. Id. at 12. In his 

report, Officer Harris states that based on his knowledge, training, and 

experience, this kind of traffic reflects narcotics-related activity. Id.

Harris also noted seeing Defendant approach the house on multiple 

occasions for short periods of time. Id. 

On July 26, 2022, officers saw Defendant arrive at the Griggs 

Residence in a blue Nissan Altima—the same vehicle identified by its 

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registration during the search. Id. at 10. Officers saw Defendant engage 

in quick a hand-to-hand transaction before departing in the Altima. Id. 

After leaving the residence, FWPD conducted a routine traffic stop 

in a residential neighborhood. Id. During the stop, the officers were 

informed that the Vehicle belonged to Defendant’s girlfriend and 

Defendant contacted her multiple times during the stop. See ECF Nos. 

19-2 at 14:32–40; 19-3 at 14:26–39. Defendant offered to have his 

girlfriend rush to the scene to deliver his identification and the vehicle’s 

insurance information. ECF No. 19-2 at 14:26-43. He even told the 

officers “she finna get it done, she about to pull up.” Id. Before the 

girlfriend arrived, the officers arrested Defendant pursuant to an 

outstanding warrant for possession of marijuana. Id. 

Mere minutes after the arrest, Officer Darty searched the trunk of 

the Altima and found drugs. ECF No. 19-1 at 11; 19-2 at 14:50:00–

15:00:00. Defendant’s girlfriend arrived at the scene ten minutes after 

Defendant’s arrest. ECF No. 19-3 at 15:00–03. Darty prevented her from 

accessing the vehicle because officers and narcotics agents were already 

at the scene conducting an extensive search. ECF No. 19-3 at 15:02:05–

48.

Defendant now moves to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle,

arguing that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Warrantless searches “are per 

se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United 

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). If a warrantless search occurred, “the

burden shifts to the government to justify the warrantless arrest or 

search.” United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977). 

The Government must prove the constitutionality of the search by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Guerrero-Barajas, 

240 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). 

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MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant seeks to suppress all evidence seized from the vehicle’s

search. Because the Government conducted a warrantless search, the 

Government bears the burden of proving that the search was lawful. 

Coolidge v. NH, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). The Government asserts that 

the search falls under five exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s 

warrant requirement: (1) inevitable discovery; (2) community caretaker; 

(3) inventory search; (4) search incident to lawful arrest; and (5)

probable cause. See ECF No. 19. The Court addresses each in turn. 

A. Inevitable Discovery 

For the inevitable discovery exception to apply, the Government 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) there is a 

reasonable probability that the contested evidence would have been 

discovered by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct, and (2) 

the [G]overnment was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of 

investigation at the time of the constitutional violation.” United States

v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1991).

The Government produced no evidence on the active pursuit of an 

alternative line of investigation. Further, the Government did not

adequately brief the issue—it merely concluded the exception applied in 

its introduction and conclusion paragraphs. See ECF No. 21 at 1, 12; 

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“In our 

adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party 

presentation.”).

Without more, the Government has not met its burden of proof and 

the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement does not apply. 

B. Community Caretaker Exception and Inventory Search

Inventory searches are conducted pursuant to community caretaking 

responsibilities. See United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 208–10

(5th Cir. 2012). The Court thus combines the analysis.

The “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement 

applies to vehicle impoundments in three circumstances: (1) to reduce 

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police department liability for lost or stolen items; (2) leaving a vehicle 

locked and parked presented a risk of theft or vandalism; and (3) the 

vehicle could not be driven away from the scene. Id. at 208. 

When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, officers may conduct an 

inventory search of the car to protect the owner’s property and protect 

police from potential hazards and liability over lost or stolen 

property. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 366 (1976).

Inventory searches may not exceed their limited purposes thus, Courts 

require that departments put standard policies in place for these

searches. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987). Officers must

follow their department’s policy for impounding and inventorying—a 

failure to do so renders the inventory invalid. United States v. Como, 53 

F.3d 87, 92 (5th Cir. 1995). Though officers have discretion in how to 

follow department policies, where a policy is strict and unambiguous, 

officers are bound to follow it narrowly. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367

(holding that officers were not required to choose the least invasive 

option where the policy provided two options).

Here, the Government contends that the officers were engaged in 

community-caretaking when they impounded the vehicle and conducted 

an inventory search. To show this, the Government contends that 

leaving the vehicle locked and parked presented a risk of liability and 

theft because it was in a high-crime area, there was cash in the front 

cupholder, and the vehicle was brand new. ECF No. 21 at 9. FWPD’s 

inventory search policy states that officers may conduct a standard

inventory search when: (1) The driver is removed from the vehicle and 

placed under arrest; (2) there is reasonable connection between the 

arrest and the vehicle; and (3) no other alternatives are available other 

than impoundment to ensure the protection of the vehicle. ECF No. 19-

4 at 171. 

Clauses (2) and (3) of the FWPD policy are at issue.1 As always, the 

Court starts with the text. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 

1

Body cam footage shows Defendant being removed from the vehicle and 

arrested. See ECF No 19-2. Whether Defendant was removed from the vehicle 

and placed under arrest is therefore not disputed by either party.

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580 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (“[W]e turn first, as always, to the text[.]”). If 

the officers’ conduct does not follow the requirements of the policy, the 

inventory search is invalid. Como, 53 F.3d at 92. 

1. Whether there is a reasonable connection between the arrest and 

the vehicle

Defendant contends that “a reasonable connection between the 

arrest and the vehicle” requires that the vehicle be linked to the 

commission of the arrestable offense. ECF No. 19 at 9. The Court 

disagrees. “Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday 

meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical 

sense.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 69 (2012).

Because the drafters of the FWPD policy use the noun “arrest” with no 

other context, its plain meaning applies. Cf. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 

872, 873 (C.C. Va. 1813) (Marshall, J.), aff'd, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 

(1815) (“[In the legislative branch] is confided, without revision, the 

power of deciding on the justice as well as wisdom of measures relative 

to subjects on which they have the constitutional power to act. 

Wherever, then, their language admits of no doubt, their plain and 

obvious intent must prevail.”). The noun “arrest” is defined as:

1. A seizure or forcible restraint, esp. by legal authority.

2. The taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal 

authority, esp. in response to a criminal charge; specif., the 

apprehension of someone for the purpose of securing the 

administration of the law, esp. of bringing that person 

before a court.

Arrest, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). 

The ordinary meaning of the word “arrest” refutes Defendant’s 

interpretation as the definition focuses on the physical nature of the act 

—not the reason leading to it. The ordinary meaning of the text broadly 

provides that there must be a reasonable connection between the vehicle 

and the physical seizure, restraint, taking, or keeping of the Defendant. 

See, e.g., United States v. Lozano, No. CR B-09-825, 2009 WL 10678894, 

at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2009), aff'd, 435 F. App'x 399 (5th Cir. 2011)

(“While the vehicle had not been used in the literal commission of the 

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offense of public intoxication, it had a substantial connection to the 

arrest.”). 

Defendant was pulled over in the vehicle, questioned in the vehicle, 

physically removed from the vehicle, and arrested shortly thereafter. 

See ECF No. 19-2. Accordingly, there is clearly a “reasonable connection 

between the arrest and the vehicle.”

2. Whether no other alternatives are available other than 

impoundment to ensure protection of the vehicle

The Court now looks to the plain meaning of the third clause. While 

“reasonable connection to the arrest” is a broad and inclusive phrase, 

“no other alternatives are available” is not. The restrictive language 

requires officers to contemplate available alternatives before seizing and

searching a car. The evidence shows that the officers disregarded this 

responsibility. Two minutes after arresting Defendant, Officer Darty 

searched the trunk of the vehicle. See ECF No. 19-3 at 14:49:49. In the 

body cam footage of this short period, neither officer contemplated nor

discussed alternatives to impoundment.2 See ECF Nos. 19-2, 19-3. 

As evidence of “no other alternatives,” the Government states: (1) 

Defendant was not the registered owner; (2) there were no alternative 

drivers available to drive the vehicle; (3) the vehicle was new and in good 

condition; and (4) there was cash in the cupholder of the front seat. ECF 

No. 21 at 10. The Government argues that these four facts presented “an 

invitation to theft or burglary” and that “the officers had no choice but 

to impound the vehicle.” Id. The Court is unconvinced by these 

assertions. 

First, the officers knew the vehicle belonged to Defendant’s 

girlfriend, given that he mentioned her to the officers and was in contact

with her during the stop. See ECF Nos. 19-2 at 14:32–40; 19-3 at 14:26–

39. To be certain, a potentially stolen car or an unknown owner justifies 

an inventory search. See McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 208. That said, the 

2Officer Darty’s camera cut out after the arrest and Officer Garcia’s audio 

turned off. See ECF Nos. 19-2, 19-3. Before this, the officers do not mention or 

discuss alternatives. The evidence and report likewise do not testify to either 

officer considering available alternatives. 

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Government’s argument that Defendant’s non-owner status impacted 

the decision to inventory the vehicle—despite knowing its owner—is 

weak. 

Second, Defendant offered to have his girlfriend rush to the scene to 

deliver his identification and the vehicle’s insurance information. ECF 

No. 19-2 at 14:26-43. He told the officers “she finna get it done, she about 

to pull up.” Id. The option of contacting her to retrieve the vehicle was 

available the whole time. Indeed, the girlfriend showed up 10 minutes 

after Defendant’s arrest. ECF No. 19-3 at 15:00–03. Officer Darty 

prevented her from accessing her vehicle because officers and narcotics

agents were already at the scene conducting an extensive search.3 ECF 

No. 19-3 at 15:02:05–48. To diminish her presence in the area, the 

Government claims that the girlfriend did not have a valid license and 

was not able to legally drive. While this could be relevant, the search

was already well underway before either officer found this out. ECF 19-

3 at 15:03–10. At bottom, the evidence shows that officers made no effort 

to identify an alternative driver and actively ignored the best available 

option—the vehicle’s legal owner. 

Third, the traffic stop and subsequent arrest occurred at 2:00 p.m. in 

broad daylight, the vehicle was legally parked in a residential area, and 

Defendant fully cooperated during the arrest. See generally ECF Nos. 

19-2, 19-3. The Government counters that the vehicle was in a “crime 

ridden . . . high crime area” and that leaving the new vehicle was an 

“invitation for theft.” ECF No. 22 at 19:8–17. While this would be a valid 

reason for impounding a car, it does not excuse the duty to ensure “no 

other alternatives” exist—especially in a low-risk situation. See Bertine, 

479 U.S. at 369–70.

Fourth, according to the narrative report, Officer Darty did not notice 

the cash in the cupholder until the inventory search was underway.4

3Officer Darty stated that if the girlfriend went near her car “they’ll draw 

guns on [her].” ECF No. 19-2 at 15: 

4“Officer Darty observed that there was money loose in the center console 

of [the vehicle] as he began to inventory it.” ECF No. 19-1 at 11 (emphasis 

added). 

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Based on this, the rationale of visible cash in the vehicle had no bearing 

on the officers’ decision to inventory the vehicle.

In sum, FWPD had the option to draft a broad inventory policy but 

chose to adopt a narrow one. The policy’s language of “no other 

alternatives” gives officers a responsibility to—at the very least—

evaluate alternatives to impoundment before executing an inventory 

search. Based on an objective view of the officers’ actions, both officers 

neglected their responsibility to follow the policy.

The Government does not meet its burden of proving that the search 

was conducted under the community caretaker inventory exception. 

C. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

A search of a vehicle incident to lawful arrest is valid if the arrestee 

is unsecured and within reaching distance of the car’s compartments at 

the time of the search or if the police have a reasonable belief that 

evidence of the crime of arrest is in the vehicle. Arizona v. Gant, 556 

U.S. 332, 350 (2009). This exception serves three justifications: (1) to 

protect officers; (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence; and (3) to help 

officers gather evidence related to the crime of the arrest. Id. The Court 

must analyze “whether application of the search incident to arrest 

doctrine to this category . . . would untether the rule from the

justifications underlying the . . . exception.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 

373, 386, (2014) (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 342) (quotations omitted). A 

search incident to lawful arrest under all three justifications generally 

excludes the trunk of a vehicle and is limited to the “passenger 

compartment.” See Gant, 556 U.S. at 332, 343–44; Smith v. Kenny, 678 

F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1181 (D.N.M. 2009) (holding that the third 

justification does not allow officers to search a trunk.).

In Gant, police searched a car after they removed the driver from his 

vehicle and arrested him for a traffic violation. Gant, 556 U.S. at 350. 

The Supreme Court ruled this search invalid because none of the 

justifications for the search were met as (1) he was secured and not a 

threat to officers; (2) he was secured and not a threat to evidence; and 

(3) he was arrested for a traffic violation. Id. 

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Unlike the driver in Gant, who was arrested for a traffic violation, 

Defendant was arrested based on an outstanding warrant for possession 

of marijuana. Thus, even though defendant was removed from the 

vehicle before the search, the officers likely had an objectively 

reasonable belief that the evidence of drugs might be found in the 

vehicle. But despite their ability to search the vehicle pursuant to the 

lawful arrest, the officers exceeded their scope by searching the trunk of 

the vehicle—an off-limits area under the exception. ECF No. 19-1 at 11; 

19-2 at 14:50:00–15:00:00. Thus, all evidence found in the trunk by the 

officers is not subject to the search incident to lawful arrest exception.5 

Therefore, the Government does not meet its burden of proving that 

the search was conducted under a valid search incident to lawful arrest. 

D. Probable Cause – Automobile Exception

If officers have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains 

contraband, the automobile exception allows them to search the car and 

all containers inside it—including the trunk. Carroll v. United States, 

267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). Probable cause exists where “facts and 

circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of 

prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, 

it is sufficient.” Id. at 61. The relevant circumstances leading to the 

search are “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 

police officer.” United States v. Freeman, 914 F.3d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 

2019) (citing Ornelas v. US, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (quotations

omitted). So “[t]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind

which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal 

justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken

as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that

action.” United States v. Robinson, 436 U.S., at 136, 138 (1973).

Hand-to-hand transactions viewed by an experienced officer are

often considered in the analysis of probable cause. Pennsylvania v.

5Officer Miller also found a stolen handgun in the glove compartment. ECF 

No 19-1 at 11. Though the Government is not pursuing charges related to this 

evidence, the gun’s presence in the passenger compartment makes it 

admissible under the search incident to lawful arrest exception. 

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Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“All these

cases have unique factual wrinkles . . . but the core fact pattern is the

same: experienced police officers observing hand-to-hand exchanges . . . 

in high-crime neighborhoods.”). Where a hand-to-hand transaction is the

only evidence offered, it is generally not enough to justify probable

cause. United States v. Guzman, No. SA-13-CR-00089-DAE, 2013 WL

4097433, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013), aff’d (Feb. 3, 2015). But if other 

factors suggestive of criminal activity or contraband are present, a handto-hand transaction in a suspicious context reinforces probable cause.

Id.

Though none of the law enforcement officers involved with the case 

asserted probable cause at the beginning of the search,6 the Court looks 

through the eyes of an objectively reasonable officer with the same set 

of facts before him. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, (1996)

(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 

Amendment analysis.”). 

An objective and prudent officer could reasonably believe that

Defendant’s vehicle contained contraband. The vehicle was connected to 

the following: (1) a search of a drug house—pursuant to a tip—where 

large quantities of drugs were found; (2) a person who frequented the 

drug house; (3) a hand-to-hand transaction outside of the drug house; 

and (4) a driver who had an active warrant for possession of drugs.7 All 

of these circumstances point to a connection between the car and 

narcotics. Thus, these circumstances—viewed objectively through the

eyes of a reasonable officer—support a finding of probable cause. See

Guzman, 2013 WL 4097433, at *6 (finding probable cause where there

was an anonymous tip, a hand-to-hand transaction, a connection with a 

vehicle to drug transactions, and suspicious conduct by the defendant). 

6Officer Harris’ report states that the probable cause search began after 

Officer Darty found drugs in the trunk of the car. ECF No. 19-1 at 12. 

7The Government also contends that on July 26, 2022, another vehicle was 

searched after leaving the Griggs Residence and the driver admitted to 

obtaining drugs from the location. ECF No. 21 at 11. Though this is relevant 

to the Court’s probable cause analysis, the Government produced no evidence 

in support of this assertion. As a result, the Court cannot consider it. 

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Thus, the automobile exception applies, and the Government has met

its burden of proving a valid exception to the warrant requirement.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 

Motion to Supress. ECF No. 19. 

SO ORDERED on this 3rd day of November 2022.

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