J-A07018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

WAYNE M. CHIURAZZI IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

METLIFE INVESTORS DISTRIBUTION 

COMPANY

Appellant No. 1236 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order June 30, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): G.D. 13-003841

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2015

MetLife Investors Distribution Company (MetLife) appeals from the trial 

court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment in this declaratory 

judgment action. After careful review, we quash.

Wayne M. Chiurazzi and his wife at the time, Janna P. Chiurazzi 

(former wife/ex-wife),1 were issued an annuity contract by MetLife; both 

Chiurazzi and his former wife were joint owners of the contract.2 Under the 

contract, a joint owner is defined as “[i]f there is more than one Owner, 

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1 The Chiurazzis subsequently divorced.

2 Chiurazzi put $50,000 into the annuity. The rider guaranteed Chiurazzi his 

minimum income benefit which, as of the date of the reconsideration 

hearing, was $20,000 more than the pure increase in value from the original 

contribution. N.T. Reconsideration Hearing, 7/31/14, at 6.
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each Owner shall be a Joint Owner of the Contract.” Annuity Contract, GMIB 

Termination Provisions - Definitions, 6/5/06, at 4. The annuity had a 

Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit Rider (Rider) which enhanced the 

financial value of the annuity contract. The Chiurazzis paid a quarterly fee 

for the Rider. According to the termination provisions of the annuity 

contract, the Rider “will terminate upon the earliest of . . . [c]hange of 

owner or [j]oint owner, for any reason, subject to our Administrative 

Procedures.” Id. at (e). Although an owner of the contract may be changed 

at any time, the change will become effective on the date notice of the 

change is signed and any change of owner “is subject to [MetLife’s] 

underwriting rules in effect at the time of the request.” Id. at General 

Provisions, at 5.

As part of his marital property settlement agreement, Chiurazzi 

executed a policy service request form asking that MetLife change the 

contract and delete his former wife as a joint owner. In response to this 

request, MetLife stated it would terminate the Rider to the contract after 

Chiurazzi returned an acknowledgement form indicating that the ownership 

change would terminate the Rider. When Chiurazzi failed to return the 

change in ownership form, MetLife proceeded to process his requested 

ownership change, removed ex-wife as a joint owner, and terminated the 

Rider. 

Subsequently, Chiurazzi asked MetLife to reverse the ownership 

change. The request was approved, pending receipt by MetLife of a letter 
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from the Chiurazzis saying that they had consulted a tax advisor and that 

they wished to reinstate the Rider and reverse the ownership change. No 

letter was received so the case was closed. Ultimately, on December 29, 

2011, MetLife restored the Rider, adding Chiurazzi’s ex-wife back onto the 

contract. Subsequently, Chiurazzi asked that ex-wife again be removed 

from the contract and that the Rider remain intact. MetLife refused to 

remove her; the Rider currently remains intact. 

On March 1, 2013, Chiurazzi3filed the underlying declaratory 

judgment action4alleging that MetLife acted in bad faith.5 MetLife filed an 

answer denying any wrongdoing and asserting that the terms of the Rider 

expressly provide for its termination should there be a change of the joint 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court incorrectly states in its opinion that MetLife instituted the 

declaratory judgment action. 

4 Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541.

5

Pennsylvania’s Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. Under section 8371, 

to constitute bad faith it is not necessary that the insurer's conduct be 

fraudulent. However, mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith; 

rather, to support a finding of bad faith, the insurer's conduct must be such 

as to import a dishonest purpose. Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 

1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2006). In other words, a plaintiff must show that 

the insurer breached its duty of good faith through some motive of selfinterest or ill-will. Id.; see Brown v. Progressive Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 493 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (bad faith requires proof that insurer: (1) lacked 

reasonable basis for denying coverage or benefits, and (2) knew or 

recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim). 

Moreover, under section 8371, when an insured proves that an insurer has 

acted in bad faith, he or she can be awarded: (1) interest on the amount of 

the claim from the date the claim was made; (2) punitive damages; and/or 

(3) court costs and attorney fees. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371(1), (2), (3).
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owners for any reason. Chiurazzi claims that his divorce did not constitute a 

“change of ownership” of the contract and that the Rider should be 

reinstated. On November 4, 2013, MetLife filed a motion for summary 

judgment. While a hearing on the motion was scheduled to take place on 

December 16, 2013, the record is devoid of any evidence that a hearing ever 

occurred. 

On June 30, 2014, the trial court denied MetLife’s summary judgment 

motion by way of order, stating:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. 

There are public policy implications in this case that warrant 

denial. The termination of the policy is due to Plaintiff’s divorce 

with no consideration for what has been paid before and no 

effort or even willingness to recalculate, form an actuarial basis, 

the benefit available on premium going forward. Further, this 

case has [a] chilling effect on access to marital law.

Trial Court Order, 6/30/14, at 2.

On July 11, 2014, Metlife filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

court’s summary judgment decision, claiming that nowhere in his complaint 

did Chiurazzi allege that the Rider violates Pennsylvania public policy or that 

it has any “chilling effect on access to marital law,” and that the court sua 

sponte raised those issues at argument.6 Argument on the reconsideration 

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6 Citing its grounds for reconsideration, MetLife argued that the court may 

have misapprehended that the case involved cancellation of the contract 

itself, rather than the true issue -- cancellation of the rider to the annuity 

contract. See Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 7/11/14, at 3. 

Moreover, MetLife claimed that the case dealt strictly with contract 

interpretation and did not involve any public policy considerations. Id. at 4. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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motion was scheduled for July 31, 2014. However, on July 29, 2014, Metlife 

filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying summary 

judgment.7 

Before addressing the merits of the issues raised on appeal, we must 

first examine the apparent interlocutory nature of the order from which the 

appeal is taken. 

Instantly, MetLife appeals from an order denying summary judgment. 

Generally, an order is final and appealable if it disposes of all claims and all 

parties, is explicitly defined as a final order by statute, or is certified as a 

final order by the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 341 (Final Orders). The 

Declaratory Judgment Act provides:

§ 7532. General scope of declaratory remedy

Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have 

power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether 

or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or 

proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 

declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration 

may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and 

such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final 

judgment or decree.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Finally, MetLife asserted that the instant case does not violate public policy 

or have a chilling effect on marital law. Id. at 5.

7

 We note that on July 30, 2014, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the 

case as thirty days elapsed from the date of the underlying summary 

judgment order without the trial court expressly granting MetLife’s motion 

for reconsideration. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)
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42 Pa.C.S. §7532 (emphasis added). Moreover, the appealability of orders 

entered in declaratory judgment actions has been analyzed as follows: 

A trial court order is final and immediately appealable pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2), when the court enters a declaratory 

judgment order either affirmatively or negatively declaring the 

rights and duties of the parties, effectively disposing of the 

claims presented, even if the order does not expressly dispose of 

all claims or specify that the claims were declaratory in nature[.] 

See also General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Allen, 692 A.2d 

1089 (Pa. 1997) (holding trial court's determination of insurer's 

duty to defend was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 

341(b)(2) and Section 7532 as well as Rule 341(b)(1), even 

though trial court did not expressly determine insurer's duty to 

indemnify, where order was final determination as to legal rights 

and obligations of parties arising out of insurance policy, and 

effectively disposed of all claims presented in declaratory 

judgment action). Conversely, if the court makes no such 

declaration, the order is interlocutory. Nationwide Mus. Ins. 

Co. v. Wickett, 763 A.2d 813, 817 (Pa. 2000).

Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Kinney, 90 A.3d 747, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014).

As a general matter, a party seeking summary judgment contends 

that, in considering the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

admissions on file, and affidavits, there exists no genuine issue of material 

fact and, therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment will 

either: (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient 

evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and, 

therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury. Lineberger v. 

Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 146 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Conversely, a record that does not support the grant of summary judgment 
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will either involve disputed material facts or contain sufficient evidence of 

facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense to be submitted to 

a factfinder.

Here, MetLife’s summary judgment motion action alleged that the 

unambiguous and clear language of the annuity contract justified 

termination of the Rider upon a change of ownership for any reason and that 

MetLife’s decision was made in good faith and was reasonable based upon 

the contract’s clear language. By denying summary judgment, the trial 

court essentially concluded that the language of the contract was not so 

clear and unambiguous that, as a matter of law, the Rider should have been 

terminated when Chiurazzi removed his ex-wife as a joint owner. 

Lineberger, supra; Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2 (Note). The order permits the action 

to proceed due to the fact that genuine issues -- regarding MetLife’s duty to 

keep the Rider intact with the removal of ex-wife and whether its actions 

constituted bad faith under section 8371 -- still exist. 

The trial court states in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that “MetLife 

then brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that [it] 

can terminate the Rider.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/14, at 2 (emphasis in 

original). However, the trial court is incorrect in its interpretation of the 

procedural history of this case. Chiurazzi brought this declaratory judgment 

action against MetLife claiming that the Rider should be able to remain intact 

without ex-wife as a joint owner and that MetLife’s actions constituted bad 
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faith. Accordingly, while the trial court may have decided that MetLife was 

not entitled to summary judgment at this juncture in the litigation, there has 

been no final determination as to MetLife’s exact obligations when removing 

an owner under the annuity contract and whether its actions constituted bad 

faith under section 8371 by refusing to permit former wife to be removed 

from the contract with the Rider intact. Cf. Wickett, 763 A.2d 813 (Pa. 

2000) (where trial court sustained defendant’s preliminary objections against 

plaintiffs where that order ended plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action and 

“essentially constituted a declaration that the plaintiffs had no legal basis to 

recover underinsured motorist benefits under the insurance contract against 

these . . . defendants,” order was final and appealable). 

MetLife claims in the Statement of Jurisdiction section of its brief that 

the instant order is final because it has been expressly defined as a final 

order by statute, specifically, the Declaratory Judgments Act (42 Pa.C.S. § 

7531). Our Court addressed this very issue in Kinney, supra, where an 

insurer filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to determine 

whether the insured’s right to seek recovery for personal injuries and 

damages sustained in a motor vehicle accident should be limited to a claim 

under the Workers’ Compensation Act8(where defendants were in the 

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8 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708.
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course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident) and for a 

declaration that it had no coverage obligations relative to any injuries or 

damages sustained by defendants in the accident. When the court denied 

the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, the insurer argued on appeal 

that the order was immediately appealable because it “ended the declaratory 

judgment litigation, leaving no questions of law or disputed issues of 

material fact for resolution.” Id. at 753. 

Relying heavily upon our Supreme Court’s decision, Wickett, supra, 

our Court in Kinney agreed with the insurer, concluding that by denying the 

insurer’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court effectively ruled that 

the insurer had a legal obligation to the insured, where the injured 

defendants were not acting in the course and scope of their employment at 

the time of the motor vehicle accident. Id. at 755. Thus, the Court held 

that “the [trial] court’s order denying summary judgment effectively 

resolved all issues presented in [the insurer’s] declaratory judgment 

action.” Id. (emphasis added).

Instantly, the insured, Chiurazzi, filed the underlying declaratory 

judgment action. Therefore, unlike the procedural posture in Kinney and 

Wickett, the party moving for summary judgment is not the same party 

that originally sought declaratory relief. Therefore, there has been no 

affirmative or negative declaration of rights and duties of the parties or 

effective disposition of the claims presented. Kinney, supra; Wickett, 
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supra. In fact, the public policy implications discussed by the court in its 

order denying summary judgment seem to be one of the genuine issues of 

material fact remaining in the case of potential bad faith on MetLife’s part. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/14, at 2 (action sought by MetLife “struck 

[trial judge] as being against public policy and had a chilling effect on access 

to marital law”). 

Our full Court recently stated that:

[O]ur Supreme Court made clear that its holding in Wickett did 

not render an order, that did not fully release a party or 

completely resolve the dispute, a final order. Rather such an 

order would be deemed a partial declaration of the parties’ rights 

and would not be immediately appealable.

Modern Equipment Sales & Rental Co. v. Main Street Amer. Ass. Co., 

106 A.3d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citing Pa. Bankers Ass'n 

v. Pa. Dep't of Banking, 948 A.2d 790 (Pa. 2008)) (emphasis in original). 

Here, Chiurazzi sought a declaration that MetLife was obligated to keep the 

Rider in effect even with ex-wife being removed from the contract as a joint 

owner and that MetLife engaged in bad faith by refusing to remove ex-wife 

from the contract and uphold the Rider. Because the trial court’s order did 

not completely resolve the dispute in the instant case, we find that MetLife 

has not appealed from a final order. Modern Equipment Sales, supra; 

Pa. Bankers Ass’n, supra. Thus, we quash. See Pa.R.A.P. 301.

Appeal quashed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2015