J. S63044/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ALAN JOSEPH WARD, : No. 739 WDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 25, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County

Criminal Division at No. CP-43-CR-0001906-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2017

Alan Joseph Ward appeals the judgment of sentence in which the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County sentenced him to serve a term of 

27 to 60 months’ imprisonment for possession with intent to deliver (heroin)

(“PWID”). The trial court also sentenced appellant to a term of 27 to 

54 months for criminal conspiracy to commit PWID to run concurrently with 

the PWID sentence. After careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant procedural history, as recounted by the trial court, is as 

follows:

[Appellant] was arrested on December 12, 

2015, and charged with [PWID], Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia and Criminal Conspiracy. These 

charges arose out of the discovery of 22.02 grams of 

heroin during a search of 928 Fruit Avenue in the 

City of Farrell that same day.
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. . . .

On September 12, 2016, the Commonwealth 

filed a Notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Evidence 404(b)(3) of its intent to introduce . . .

three prior uncharged unlawful deliveries to a 

confidential informant.

On September 26, 2016, [appellant] filed a 

motion seeking disclosure of the confidential 

informant’s identity. 

Both motions were heard before Judge 

Robert G. Yeatts on September 30, 2016. 

Judge Yeatts entered an order granting the 

Commonwealth leave to introduce the three 

uncharged undercover buys at trial and denying the 

motion to disclose the identity of the confidential 

informant.

A jury trial commenced on February 21, 2017. 

On February 22, 2017, the jury returned GUILTY 

verdicts on the charges of [PWID] and Criminal 

Conspiracy of [PWID] and NOT GUILTY of Possession 

of a Controlled Substance and Criminal Conspiracy to 

Possession of a Controlled Substance.

On April 25, 2017, [appellant] was sentenced 

to concurrent terms of imprisonment of not less than 

27 months nor more than 60 months. This sentence 

was in the standard range of the Sentencing 

Guidelines.

On May 3, 2017, [appellant] filed a Motion for 

Judgment of Acquittal. The motion was denied 

without a hearing that same day.

On May 4, 2017, [appellant] filed a Motion to 

Modify Sentence alleging that the sentence imposed 

was manifestly excessive in length because it was 

not specifically tailored to the nature of the offense, 

the ends of justice and society and the rehabilitative 

needs of [appellant]. That motion was denied that 

same day without a hearing.
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Trial court opinion, 6/14/17 at 1-3 (footnote omitted).

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court on May 19, 2017. On 

May 19 2017, the trial court directed appellant to file a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely 

filed his statement of errors on appeal. The trial court then filed its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues for this court’s review:

[1.] Challenge to 404(b)(3) Evidence – Whether 

the Pre-Trial Court erred when it allowed 

evidence of three prior controlled buys as prior 

bad acts against [appellant] where appellant 

was only involved in one of the three and 

whether such evidence’s prejudicial effect 

outweighed it probative value.

[2.] Challenge to Denial of Confidential Informant 

Identity – Whether the Pre-Trial Court erred 

when it granted the admission of prior bad act 

evidence in the form of three controlled buys 

and also denied [appellant’s] request to reveal 

the identity of the confidential informant as the 

confidential informant’s testimony was the only 

direct evidence of the prior controlled buys and 

access to such witness was [appellant’s] only 

means to properly defend against said 

evidence.

[3.] Challenge to the Sufficiency of Evidence –

Whether the Trial Court erred when it denied 

[appellant’s] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 

when the Commonwealth clearly failed to 

produce sufficient evidence to prove the 

element of possession in regard to the charge 

of [PWID] and the conspiracy thereof.
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[4.] Challenge to the Discretionary Aspect of 

Sentence – Whether the Trial Court erred when 

it issued a clearly unreasonable sentence to 

[appellant] for [PWID] resulting in a 27 month 

to 60 month state penitentiary sentence and 

Conspiracy to Possess a Controlled Substance 

with the Intent to Deliver resulting in a 27 to 

54 month concurrent state penitentiary 

sentence and weather [sic] it violated the 

fundamental norm that a sentence of 

confinement should address a defendant’s 

rehabilitative needs.

Appellant’s brief at 13-14.

Initially, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed 

evidence of three prior controlled buys as prior bad acts against appellant 

where appellant was only involved in one of the three buys and such 

evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

On September 12, 2016, prior to trial, the Commonwealth notified 

appellant pursuant to Rule 404(b)(3) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 

that the Commonwealth intended to introduce at trial evidence of appellant’s 

participation in prior crimes and prior bad acts for purposes of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of 

mistake or lack of accident.

The Commonwealth alleged that on December 10, 12, and 13, 2015, 

the Mercer County Drug Task Force made a series of controlled buys from 

appellant and his cousin, Gregory George Weidner (“Weidner”). The 

Commonwealth further alleged that the uncharged buys demonstrated the 

conspiracy of appellant and Weidner to possess large amounts of heroin with 
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intent to deliver and are prior bad acts that help explain why the search 

warrant was issued and why appellant and Weidner were tied to the search 

location. (“Commonwealth’s Notice Pursuant to PA.R. [sic] 404(b)(3)” at 

7-8, ¶¶ 54-55.) In the December 10, 2015 buy, a confidential informant 

(“CI”) telephoned Weidner to set up a purchase. Appellant arrived at the 

meeting site driving Weidner’s mother’s BMW X5. Appellant exited the BMW 

and walked to the CI’s vehicle and entered it. Two minutes later, appellant 

left the vehicle. He drove back to the house on Federal Street. The CI 

produced what appeared to be heroin. (Id. at 9, ¶¶ 56-72.) The other two 

buys were set up with Weidner near 928 Fruit Avenue. The residence at 

Fruit Avenue, where the heroin was found, was owned by Valerie Balbirsingh 

in care of her mother, Verna McKeithan, who had an oral agreement to sell 

the property to Heidi Harris, aka Heidi Williams, who was Weidner’s mother 

and appellant’s aunt. (Id. at 12-13, ¶¶ 107-109.)

In an order dated September 30, 2016, the trial court permitted 

evidence of the controlled buys and reasoned:

After review, the Court has determined that 

the Commonwealth will be permitted to enter the 

evidence of the controlled buys under the 

res gestae exception to the prohibition, on prior bad

acts. Res gestae evidence describing other crimes 

or bad acts is admissible to tell the complete story 

only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs 

its potential for unfair prejudice. The controlled buys 

allow the prosecution to tell the complete story of 

the case, as they are part of the same chain as the 

charged crime, and form an integral part of the 

police investigation. The controlled buys were used 
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as the basis for the search warrant that led to the 

seizure of 22.04 grams of heroin from the residence 

at 928 Fruit [Avenue], Farrell. These three 

uncharged instances of selling narcotics to 

undercover agents are necessary to establish the 

background of the search warrant, and to show the 

course of investigative conduct leading up to 

[appellant]’s arrest. Not allowing the 

Commonwealth to introduce such evidence would 

lead [sic] a large gap in the history of the 

investigation, and is not unfairly prejudicial to 

[appellant].

Trial court order, 9/30/16 at 2 (citation omitted).

Appellant argues that his only connection to the buys involving 

Weidner is that he is Weidner’s cousin and suggestions that appellant is 

related to a person who is involved in criminal activity would have the effect 

of prejudicing appellant in front of a jury.

“On appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court, our 

standard of review is limited. A trial court’s decision will not be reversed 

absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 

1181, 1184 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted). “Abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that 

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. at 

1184-1185 (citations omitted).

Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or 

unrelated criminal activity is inadmissible to show 

that a defendant acted in conformity with those past 

acts or to show criminal propensity. 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of prior bad 
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acts may be admissible when offered to prove some 

other relevant fact, such as motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and 

absence of mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).[1] 

In determining whether evidence of other prior bad 

acts is admissible, the trial court is obliged to 

balance the probative value of such evidence against 

its prejudicial impact.

Id. at 1185 (citations to case law omitted).

 

1 Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other 

Acts

. . . .

(b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a 

crime, wrong, or other act is not 

admissible to prove a person’s 

character in order to show that on 

a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the 

character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence 

may be admissible for another 

purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence 

of mistake, or lack of accident. In 

a criminal case this evidence is 

admissible only if the probative 

value of the evidence outweighs its 

potential for unfair prejudice.

(3) Exceptions for a Witness.

Evidence of a witness's character 

may be admitted under Rules 607, 

608, and 609. 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(3). Rules 607-609 address the impeachment of 

witnesses.
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The evidence was admissible as part of the natural development of the 

facts of the case. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 770 A.2d 771, 778 

(Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 868 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2005), overruled 

on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 

2002) (evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is admissible where 

they were part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of 

the case and were part of its natural development, also known as the 

“complete story” rationale). This court finds that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion. As the trial court stated, allowing the admission of this 

evidence provides the jury with the necessary background as to why the 

search at the Fruit Avenue address was conducted. Further, the 

Commonwealth alleged that there were much closer connections between 

appellant and his cousin with respect to drug transactions than just their 

familial relationship. 

Appellant also challenges the admission of evidence concerning the 

one controlled buy in which the Commonwealth alleged that he did play a

part. Once again and for the same reasons, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce this evidence.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his 

request to reveal the identity of the CI as the CI’s testimony was the only 

direct evidence of the prior controlled buys and access to the witness was his 

only means to properly defend against such evidence. Appellant argues that 
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because the CI was the only eyewitness to the buys and that testimony from 

the police officers would be circumstantial, fairness required that he be given 

the identity of the informant prior to trial.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to disclose the identity of a CI, 

our standard of review is “to determine whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying appellant’s request for discovery.” Commonwealth v. 

Belenky, 777 A.2d 483, 487 (Pa.Super. 2001), citing Commonwealth v. 

Roebuck, 681 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa. 1996).

The ability to compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential 

informant flows from the right to discovery contained in the Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 (B)(2)(a)(i), 42 Pa.C.S.A. A 

defendant has a qualified right to discovery of the names of eyewitnesses. 

However, when the eyewitness is a confidential informant, police 

departments have a well-placed reluctance to disclose the identity of such 

eyewitnesses and, in fact, a recognized privilege to refuse disclosure of the 

identity of informants. Commonwealth v. Bing, 713 A.2d 56, 58 (Pa. 

1998). The privilege is not absolute, however, and must give way under 

appropriate circumstances. 

When moving for disclosure, the defendant must first show “that the 

information sought is material and the request is reasonable.” Interest 

of D.B., 820 A.2d 820, 822 (Pa.Super. 2003). If the defendant satisfies this

burden, then the trial court must apply a balancing test, with “the balance 
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initially weigh[ing] in favor of maintaining confidentiality of the informant’s 

identity in order to preserve the public’s interest in effective law 

enforcement.” Commonwealth v. McCulligan, 905 A.2d 983, 989 

(Pa.Super. 2006).

“The defendant need not predict exactly what the informant will say, 

but he must demonstrate a reasonable possibility the informant could give 

evidence that would exonerate him. More than a mere assertion that 

disclosure of the informant’s identity might be helpful is necessary.” 

Belenky, 777 A.2d at 488 (citation omitted). “[T]he defendant must lay an 

evidentiary basis or foundation that the confidential informant possesses 

relevant information that will materially aid the defendant in presenting his 

or her defense and that the information is not obtainable from another 

source.” Commonwealth v. Hritz, 663 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa.Super. 1995). 

See Commonwealth v. Eicher, 605 A.2d 337, 348 (Pa.Super. 1992), 

appeal denied, 617 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1992) (appellant seeking disclosure of 

informant must have “concrete evidence” corroborating defense theory 

“other than his own self-serving allegations”; absent “more specific 

evidence,” the trial court is not required to compel disclosure and allow the 

defense to conduct a fishing expedition). Only if the defendant makes this 

threshold showing must the trial court weigh the competing interests to 

determine whether the informant’s identity should be revealed. 
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Commonwealth v. Marsh, 997 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 2010) (plurality); Bing, 

713 A.2d at 58; Belenky, 777 A.2d at 488.

In the same September 30, 2016 order where the trial court permitted 

the admission of evidence of the controlled buys, the trial court denied 

appellant’s motion to disclose the identity of the CI. The trial court 

reasoned:

Although the Commonwealth argues that the 

identity of the [CI] is not material to the present 

case, the Court must disagree. The Commonwealth 

believes that because the buys themselves are 

uncharged, there is no material evidence to be 

brought from these incidents. However, it is 

apparent from the record that the informant was an 

integral part of the conspiracy case against the codefendants, making his identity material to the 

present matter. Having reached this determination, 

the Court balanced the parties[’] interest[s] and 

concluded that the Commonwealth is not required to 

disclose the witness[.] The Commonwealth asserts 

that it can make its case based entirely on the 

testimony of police officers, and that it does not need 

any direct statement from the informant. Moreover, 

this testimony is not that of a lone officer, but the 

combination of several officers’ testimony concerning 

the situation surrounding the controlled buys and 

other corroborating evidence such as unmarked bills. 

Not only is the testimony of the informant not 

necessary to the prosecution of the case, but 

revealing the identity of the informant raises a risk of 

harm to the informant and has the potential to 

disincentivize [sic] other citizens to participate in this 

form of police reconnaissance. Both defendants in 

this case possess substantial criminal records, 

including aggravated assaults and weapons 

convictions. The Commonwealth is reasonably 

concerned about preserving its informant’s safety, 

and ensuring that other informants feel safe working 

with law enforcement.
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Trial court order, 9/30/16 at 3-4.

Here, the trial court determined that appellant met the threshold that 

the CI’s testimony would be material and the request was reasonable. The 

trial court then determined that the testimony of several police officers as 

well as other evidence could prove the Commonwealth’s case such that the 

testimony of the CI would not necessarily prove helpful to appellant. 

Further, the trial court reasoned because both appellant and Weidner had a 

history of aggravated assault and weapons convictions that the CI could be 

in some danger if his or her identity were revealed. Appellant does not 

persuade this court that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not 

allow the identity of the CI to be revealed.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion for judgment of acquittal when the Commonwealth clearly failed to 

produce sufficient evidence to prove the element of possession in regard to 

the charge of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver 

and the conspiracy thereof. 

Before addressing the merits of appellant’s argument, this court notes 

that in his statement of errors complained of on appeal, appellant only 

stated that there was not sufficient evidence to establish a conviction for 

conspiracy. Appellant did not raise a sufficiency issue concerning the PWID 

conviction. The failure to include an issue in the statement of errors 

complained of on appeal results in a waiver of that issue. See 
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Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998). Consequently,

appellant waived the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the 

conviction for PWID.

We shall now review the merits of appellant’s appeal as it pertains to 

the conspiracy conviction.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence is a question of law. Commonwealth v. 

Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751 

(2000). In that case, our Supreme Court set forth 

the sufficiency of the evidence standard:

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to 

support the verdict when it establishes 

each material element of the crime 

charged and the commission thereof by 

the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 533 Pa. 

412, 625 A.2d 1167 (1993). Where the 

evidence offered to support the verdict is 

in contradiction to the physical facts, in 

contravention to human experience and 

the laws of nature, then the evidence is 

insufficient as a matter of law. 

Commonwealth v. Santana, 460 Pa. 

482, 333 A.2d 876 (1975). When 

reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is 

required to view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner 

giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from 

the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630 

(1991).

Id. at 319, 744 A.2d at 751.

Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 910 (Pa.Super. 2006).

Conspiracy is defined in Section 903 of the Crimes Code as follows:
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A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person 

or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons 

that they or one or more of them will 

engage in conduct which constitutes such 

crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or 

persons in the planning or commission of 

such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.

The underlying offense, possession with intent to deliver, is defined as:

(a) The following acts and the causing thereof 

within the Commonwealth are hereby 

prohibited:

. . . .

(30) Except as authorized by this act, 

the manufacture, delivery, or 

possession with intent to 

manufacture or deliver, a 

controlled substance by a person 

not registered under this act, or a 

practitioner not registered or 

licensed by the appropriate State 

board, or knowingly creating, 

delivering or possessing with intent 

to deliver, a counterfeit controlled 

substance.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the 

Commonwealth must establish that the defendant 

(1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an 

unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with 
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a shared criminal intent and (3) an overt act was 

done in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 

(Pa.Super. 2000). “This overt act need not be 

committed by the defendant; it need only be 

committed by a co-conspirator.” Id.

As our Court has further explained with respect to 

the agreement element of conspiracy:

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a 

common understanding, no matter how it 

came into being, that a particular 

criminal objective be accomplished. 

Therefore, a conviction for conspiracy 

requires proof of the existence of a 

shared criminal intent. An explicit or 

formal agreement to commit crimes can 

seldom, if ever, be proved and it need 

not be, for proof of a criminal partnership 

is almost invariably extracted from the 

circumstances that attend its activities. 

Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred 

where it is demonstrated that the 

relation, conduct, or circumstances of the 

parties, and the overt acts of the 

co-conspirators sufficiently prove the 

formation of a criminal confederation. 

The conduct of the parties and the 

circumstances surrounding their conduct 

may create a web of evidence linking the 

accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Even if the 

conspirator did not act as a principal in 

committing the underlying crime, he is 

still criminally liable for the actions of his 

co-conspirators in furtherance of the 

conspiracy.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 784-

785 (Pa.Super. 1998).

Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa.Super. 2006). 
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Appellant argues that there was no evidence to suggest that there was 

a conspiracy between Weidner and appellant to possess the heroin that was 

recovered at the Fruit Avenue address. 

The trial court determined that the following evidence was sufficient to 

establish a conspiracy:

In the case at hand, [appellant] and Weidner 

are cousins. In the first buy, [appellant] shows up in 

a vehicle owned by Weidner’s mother. The phone 

number used is linked to a phone found with 

Weidner. The second and third buys are set up 

using the same telephone number for the first buy 

and occurred at the residence where the drugs at 

issue were found. [Appellant] and Weidner are 

together when they [sic]search warrants are issued.

Trial court opinion, 6/14/17 at 9.

Appellant argues that these facts are insufficient to establish a 

conspiracy. However, the same phone number was used to arrange the buy 

handled by appellant and the two handled by Weidner. The two buys 

handled by Weidner were conducted at or near the Fruit Avenue address 

where the heroin was found. Further, appellant drove to the buy in a vehicle 

owned by Weidner’s mother. As appellant himself admits, a conspiracy can 

be proven by circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 

A.2d 703, 708 (Pa.Super. 2007). Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, the evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth was sufficient to establish conspiracy.
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Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a 

clearly unreasonable sentence in violation of a fundamental norm where a 

sentence of confinement should address a defendant’s rehabilitative needs. 

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

[T]he proper standard of review when 

considering whether to affirm the sentencing court’s 

determination is an abuse of discretion. 

. . . .

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing 

do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. 

Commonwealth v. Sierra, [752 A.2d 910, 912 

(Pa.Super. 2000)]. An appellant challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has 

filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-170 (citation omitted).

Here, we begin our analysis by determining whether appellant has 

complied with the procedural requirements of challenging the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. First, appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. 
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Second, appellant raised the issue that the trial court imposed a sentence 

that was excessive and did not take into account his rehabilitative needs in 

his post-sentence motion which essentially is the issue before this court. 

However, appellant included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief in which 

he avers that even though he was sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines, it is clearly unreasonable to stay within the guidelines because 

his convictions were highly speculative. Similarly, in the argument section of 

his brief, appellant addresses the speculative nature of his convictions. 

While appellant does not strictly comply with Rule 2116(a) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure in that the issue raised is not 

exactly raised in the argument section of the brief, this court will address the 

issue raised in the argument and in the Rule 2119(f) statement because we 

can render meaningful appellate review. 

Appellant does not cite to any statute or case law to indicate that he 

has raised a substantial question in that his role in the possession of heroin 

and the conspiracy to possess heroin is highly speculative such that he 

should receive a lighter sentence. This court does not find that he raised a 

substantial question. Appellant was found guilty by a jury of his peers and 

was sentenced by the trial court within the standard range. Appellant’s 

belief that the facts of the case were speculative does not raise a substantial 

question that the trial court imposed a sentence that was not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/2017