IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

IR AIR, INC., §

 § 

Plaintiff, §

 § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1703-D

VS. §

 §

JOHN PETROS, et al., § 

 §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

Plaintiff IR Air, Inc. (“IR”) moves to strike the answer of defendant San Jose

Enterprise Co. (“San Jose”) and for entry of a default as to defendants San Jose, Juan

Morales (“Morales”), and Skywolf Aviation Services, LLC (“Skywolf”). The court denies

the motion to strike, denies the motion for entry of a default as to defendant San Jose, and

grants the motion for entry of a default as to defendants Morales and Skywolf.

I

IR filed a complaint on August 5, 2022 against defendants John Petros (“Petros”),

Morales, Tailwheel Management Company, San Jose, and Skywolf. Responding to a court

order that required that IR adequately plead diversity jurisdiction, IR filed its first amended

complaint on August 11, 2022.

On August 15, 2022 Petros, acting pro se, filed a “Defendant’s Original Answer”

(“Answer”) that referred in the body of the pleading to plural “Defendants” and denied IR’s

allegations using the familiar language of a Texas-law general denial. On September 15,

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2022 Petros filed another pro se pleading (“Reply”): this one entitled “defendant’s first

amended reply to plaintiff’s first amended complaint and defendant’s motion for declaratory

judgment.” Petros Reply (ECF No. 17) at 1.

IR moves to strike the Answer and Reply in their entirety insofar as they apply to San

Jose. It maintains that these pleadings are legally insufficient to the extent that they purport

to relate to San Jose, a corporation, that is not represented by licensed counsel. IR also

moves for entry of default against defendants San Jose, Morales, and Skywolf. Defendants

have not responded to IR’s motion.

II

A

The court denies IR’s motion to strike the Answer and Reply of San Jose because it

is unclear from the record that Petros intended to file responsive pleadings on San Jose’s

behalf. In fact, the email exchange that IR cites in its appendix reflect Petros’ assertion that

San Jose is “not involved,” P. App. 9, which suggests that he did not intend to file on behalf

of San Jose.

Moreover, as IR recognizes in its motion, Petros cannot make such filings on behalf

of San Jose. Therefore, the Answer and Reply should not be deemed to have been filed on

San Jose’s behalf.

In the federal courts of the United States, “parties may plead and conduct their own

cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. But it is well-established that, although

individuals have the right to represent themselves or proceed pro se under this statute,

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corporations are fictional legal persons who can only be represented by licensed counsel.

Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993); Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR,

385 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Sw. Express Co. v. Interstate Comm.

Comm’n, 670 F.2d 53, 54-56 (5th Cir. 1982). “This is so even when the person seeking to

represent the corporation is its president and major stockholder.” In re K.M.A., Inc., 652 F.2d

398, 399 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) (citation omitted). The rationale for this long-standing

rule applies equally to “all artificial entities,” such as partnerships and associations. 

Rowland, 506 U.S. at 202. When the court provides notice to a corporation that it must

obtain counsel to represent it, and the corporation declines to do so, the court may properly

dismiss its claims, if it is a plaintiff, see Memon, 385 F.3d at 873 n.5, or strike its defenses,

if it is a defendant, see Donovan v. Rd. Rangers Country Junction, Inc., 736 F.2d 1004, 1005

(5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The court therefore concludes that San Jose has not filed a

responsive pleading, so there is no basis to strike the Answer and Reply as to San Jose.

B

The court declines to enter a default as to San Jose, however, because the record does

not demonstrate that San Jose has been properly served with process.

III

The court grants IR’s motion to enter a default against Morales and Skywolf. The

record reflects that both have been served. See ECF No. 16. And the Answer and Reply

filed by Petros should not be interpreted to be filed on behalf of either defendant. These

pleadings should not be deemed applicable to Skywolf for the reasons explained above

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concerning San Jose. See supra § II(B). And they should not be deemed to have been filed

on behalf of Morales because one pro se party cannot represent another pro se party: this

would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021

(5th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n federal court a party can represent himself or be represented by an

attorney, but cannot be represented by a nonlawyer.”). The court thus concludes that neither

Morales nor Skywolf has filed a responsive pleading.

* * * 

Accordingly, for the reasons explained, the court denies IR’s December 14, 2022

motion to the extent it seeks to strike the Answer and Reply of San Jose and seeks the entry

of a default against San Jose, and it grants the motion to the extent IR seeks the entry of a

default against Morales and Skywolf.

SO ORDERED.

January 20, 2023.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

SENIOR JUDGE

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