Filed 5/25/21 In re A.M. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re A.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B309354

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05447)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AR.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Temporary Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Law Offices of J. Jeff Chambliss and J. Jeff Chambliss for 

Defendant and Appellant.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Ar.M. (father) repeatedly sexually abused his son, A.M. As 

a result of father’s sexual abuse, the juvenile court assumed 

jurisdiction over A.M., denied father reunification services, and 

ultimately granted mother sole custody of A.M. A criminal 

protective order and civil restraining order prevented father from 

contacting A.M., and father had no visits during the pendency of 

the juvenile court proceedings.

Father filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 

petition in which he sought full custody of A.M., despite court 

orders preventing him from contacting A.M. Father, who never 

acknowledged his conduct and never attempted to reform, 

identified no changed circumstances and no evidence supporting 

the conclusion that it was in A.M.’s best interest to award father 

full custody and place A.M. in the home of the person who 

sexually abused him. On appeal, we reject father’s argument 

that the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his 

section 388 petition. 

Father also argues the following: (1) The commissioner 

should have stepped aside when father requested a judge at the 

October 21, 2020 hearing; and (2) the juvenile court erred in 

requiring father to participate in a hearing remotely by WebEx 

under a protocol implemented to address the COVID-19 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
3

pandemic. Neither argument has merit. Finally, father’s 

argument that a judge was required to sign the commissioner’s 

order removing A.M. from father’s custody is not cognizable on 

appeal because father did not timely appeal from the relevant 

order. 

We affirm the order summarily denying father’s section 388 

petition. We also affirm the judgment terminating juvenile court 

jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

A.M. was born in 2007. Mother and father were divorced in 

2015. Their child, A.M., lived with father until approximately 

August 2, 2019 when A.M. revealed that father sexually abused 

him. On August 6, 2019, police arrested father based on the 

sexual abuse of A.M. Father was charged with lewd and 

lascivious acts with a child under 14. The Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) reported 

that if father were convicted, the criminal court could sentence 

him to prison for life. 

On August 4, 2019, A.M. told police that father sexually 

abused and molested him for five years. When A.M. was five 

years old father slept with him in the same bed, and father 

always slept naked. Father would touch and caress A.M.’s 

thighs. When A.M. was six and seven years old, father touched 

him on a daily basis. Father asked A.M. to kiss father’s penis. 

Father also put his penis in A.M.’s mouth approximately six 

times. A.M. reported that father would masturbate in front of 

A.M. One time, A.M. saw father ejaculate and asked if the 

emission was milk. Father responded, “No, this is how you were 

made.” Approximately 12 times, father rubbed his hands on 

A.M.’s penis and father’s penis simultaneously. A.M. reported 
4

that he sometimes woke up naked and was suspicious that father 

had removed his clothing while he slept. 

Also on August 4, 2019, mother told police that father 

wrote her love letters when mother was 13 years old. Mother 

later reported that father was 20 years older than she, and that 

they married when mother was 20 years old. 

Police searched father’s house August 6, 2019. The police 

removed flash drives, laptops, hard drives, cameras, recording 

equipment, and firearms. Two of father’s flash drives contained 

videos of child pornography. “The videos included young boys 

having anal sex, masturbating, touching each other’s penises, 

and performing oral sex on each other.” The videos also showed 

an adult inserting his penis in a young boy’s mouth. 

On August 6, 2019, A.M. and mother called father at the 

police’s request. A.M. directly confronted father about the sexual 

abuse, and father did not deny it. When A.M. asked father why 

he made him “ ‘suck his penis in bed,’ ” father did not deny that 

conduct. 

A forensic interviewer interviewed A.M. on August 7, 2019. 

A.M. indicated that when he was six years old, he wanted to play 

on an iPad and father insisted that A.M. put his mouth on 

father’s penis. Father “made it sound like it was normal.” A.M. 

said that father touched his leg, thigh, hips, and “around” his 

genitals. A.M. would push father away, but father would 

continue. Father touched A.M.’s penis when A.M. was in bed. 

A.M. was not naked; Father was naked. 

A.M. told the forensic interviewer that he remembered 

waking up with no clothes, and when he asked father, father 

responded that A.M. had a “bad habit of taking off” his clothes. 

A.M. said that father put his penis in A.M.’s mouth six times. 
5

Father started doing this when A.M. was six and a half or seven 

years old. Father also put his mouth on A.M.’s penis. As he had 

told the police, A.M. told the interviewer that father masturbated 

in front of A.M. One time, father ejaculated and told A.M., 

“[T]his [is] just how you were made.” A.M. saw father look at 

naked bodies online. A.M. denied that father sodomized him, but 

he was not certain because he was a “deep sleeper” and thought 

father might have “drugged” him. 

A.M. told the interviewer that he did not want to attend the 

school father had selected for him to attend. A.M. wanted to go to 

the school where his friends attended. 

On August 7, 2019, police reported the incident to DCFS. 

A.M. reported a description of father’s conduct to a social worker 

consistent with what he told to the police and the forensic 

interviewer. Father’s attorney told a social worker that father 

refused to answer any questions because of his pending criminal 

case. 

On August 9, 2019, the Los Angeles County Superior Court 

issued a temporary criminal protective order protecting A.M. A 

permanent criminal protective order subsequently issued 

protecting A.M. until August 8, 2022. On August 28, 2019, the 

juvenile court entered a restraining order protecting A.M. and 

mother from father. The juvenile court entered a permanent 

restraining order on December 11, 2019. The order gave father 

no visitation. The permanent restraining order was set to expire 

on December 11, 2022. 

1. DCFS files a petition and the juvenile court assumes 

jurisdiction over A.M.

On August 22, 2019, DCFS filed a petition naming A.M., 

who was then 11 years old. The petition alleged that father
6

“repeatedly sexually abused the child for a period of 7 years by 

forcing the child to orally copulate the father’s penis while the 

father fondled the child’s thighs, legs and buttocks. On prior 

occasions, the father exposed the father’s penis and masturbated 

in the presence of the child. . . . On prior occasions, the father 

fondled the child’s penis and masturbated the child.” Father also 

rubbed his naked body against the child and orally copulated the 

child’s penis. 

On August 23, 2019, the juvenile court ordered A.M. 

released to mother under DCFS’s supervision. The court further 

ordered no visitation for father unless the criminal protective 

order were modified. 

The juvenile court sustained the petition on December 11, 

2019.2 The court again ordered no contact between father and 

A.M. Specifically, the court ordered: “No visits for father so long 

as criminal protective order/lawful restraining order exists.” 

The court ordered no reunification services for father 

pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). Section 361.5 

provides in pertinent part: Reunification services are not 

required when “the child has been adjudicated a dependent 

pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of severe 

sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, 

a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian, as defined in 

this subdivision, and the court makes a factual finding that it 

would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with 

the offending parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).)

A.M. told social workers he wanted no contact with father. 

2 The record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the 

jurisdictional hearing. The minute order reflects that father 

did not testify at the jurisdictional hearing. 
7

2. A.M. felt safe with mother

A.M. repeatedly told social workers he felt safe living with 

mother. A.M. liked the school he attended while in mother’s 

custody, and made new friends. Mother walked A.M. to school 

every day. Social workers reported A.M. was safe in mother’s 

home. Mother was able to provide for A.M.’s health and 

education. A social worker observed a bond between mother and 

A.M. A.M. reported that mother took “good care” of him. A.M. 

“thriv[ed] in the home and care of his mother.” 

3. Father obtains new counsel and files a section 388 

petition

On September 18, 2020, father retained new counsel. The 

minute order from the September 18, 2020 hearing indicated that 

the section 364 hearing, was set for October 21, 2020.3 The 

minute order required father “to be available to participate via 

WebEx.” 

3 Section 364, subdivision (c) provides: “After hearing any 

evidence presented by the social worker, the parent, the 

guardian, or the child, the court shall determine whether 

continued supervision is necessary. The court shall terminate its 

jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her department 

establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions 

still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction 

under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if 

supervision is withdrawn. Failure of the parent or guardian to 

participate regularly in any court ordered treatment program 

shall constitute prima facie evidence that the conditions which 

justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist and that 

continued supervision is necessary.” 
8

On October 13, 2020, father filed a petition to change a 

court order pursuant to section 388. Father requested “[f]ull 

custody of [A.M.] with Father.” Father stated that the requested 

action would be better for A.M. because “Mother has exposed 

[A.M.] to the risk of Co-Vid infection.” Father stated that “a 

witness . . . can testify as to inaccuracies in the testimony of [a 

person who testified at the jurisdictional hearing] and a motive to 

fabricate on [A.M.’s] part.” Father did not further identify the 

witness or the challenged testimony. 

On October 15, 2020, the juvenile court denied the 

section 388 petition without a hearing. 

Five days after the juvenile court denied his petition, father 

filed N.S.’s declaration in support of his section 388 petition. N.S. 

declared that she was father’s girlfriend and had been introduced 

to A.M. She observed A.M. “to be very comfortable around his 

father, smiling often.” She observed them joking and working 

together on A.M.’s homework. She heard A.M. say he was not 

afraid of father. She also observed A.M. and father argue about 

where A.M. would attend school. “It was obvious to me [N.S.] 

that [A.M.] was extremely upset and unhappy about his father’s 

decision to send him to private school.” A.M. said he would “ ‘do 

ANYTHING’ ” not to attend the school father wanted him to 

attend. The declaration does not reflect that N.S. was aware of 

the basis for jurisdiction in this case.

4. The juvenile court continues the section 364 hearing

The section 364 hearing was scheduled for October 21, 

2020. On September 25, 2020, father was served notice of the 

hearing. The notice DCFS served on father included a flyer 

stating that due to COVID-19, the juvenile court was conducting 
9

remote hearings and that the parties could participate by 

telephone or videoconference. 

A status review report dated October 21, 2020 indicated 

that mother continued to parent A.M. and that they shared a 

bond. DCFS reported that “[a]s with most children during this 

COVID19 Pandemic, he [A.M.] has become bored with not having 

in-person contact with friends and even family.” Mother 

“scheduled a couple of outings and a vacation to relieve [A.M.] of 

the stress of the isolation caused by the COVID19 Pandemic.” 

A.M. “has remained healthy and CSW observes he is comfortable 

in mother’s care and he has extended family relatives who have 

continued to be supportive . . . .” 

On October 21, 2020, at the time scheduled for the hearing, 

counsel for father requested that he and father appear in the 

courtroom rather than appearing remotely. The juvenile court 

denied the request. The court found no extraordinary 

circumstances existed to allow father to appear in person. 

Counsel and father appeared via WebEx. 

Father’s counsel stated that he did not stipulate to the 

matter being heard by a commissioner and requested that the 

matter be heard by a judge. Commissioner Navarro, who had 

presided over the entire case, denied the request to transfer the 

case to another judicial officer. 

The court granted father’s requested continuance of the 

section 364 hearing and continued the hearing to November 6, 

2020. The court again ordered the parties to appear via WebEx. 

5. The juvenile court holds a section 364 hearing

On November 6, 2020, the juvenile court held a section 364 

hearing to determine whether continued juvenile court 

supervision was necessary. Father’s counsel argued that father 
10

had concerns about A.M.’s safety in mother’s custody because 

mother exposed A.M. to COVID-19 and mother may leave the 

United States. Counsel provided no evidence to support these 

contentions. 

The juvenile court found no need for continued dependency 

jurisdiction. “The mother has shown that she has a protective 

capacity to protect this child . . . .” The court found “because of 

the significant trauma, physical, psychological trauma that this 

child suffered,” that visits with father would be detrimental. 

6. Final judgment

On November 6, 2020, the court issued a final judgment 

awarding mother full custody of A.M. The juvenile court denied 

father visitation. The judgment indicates that a criminal 

protective order and a restraining order were in effect. 

Father filed a notice of appeal on November 25, 2020. The 

notice indicates that father was appealing from the denial of his 

section 388 petition and the judgment terminating jurisdiction. 

DISCUSSION

A. Father Demonstrates No Error In the Summary 

Denial of His Section 388 Petition

Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his 

section 388 petition without setting a hearing. Father cites no 

legal authority in support of his argument, and therefore has 

forfeited the argument. (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 

672 [‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but 

fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 

authority, we treat the point as waived.’ [Citation.]”].) Father 

also fails to summarize any of the relevant facts in contravention 
11

of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), which requires 

that an appellant’s opening brief “[p]rovide a summary of the 

significant facts . . . .” 

On its merits, father’s argument fares no better. “A 

section 388 petition must show a change of circumstances and 

that modification of the prior order would be in the best interests 

of the minor child. [Citations.] To support a section 388 petition, 

the change in circumstances must be substantial.” (In re Ernesto 

R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.) If the section 388 petition 

does not make a prima facie showing of a change of 

circumstances since the prior order, and that a modification of 

the order is therefore in the child’s best interest, the petition may 

be denied without an evidentiary hearing. (In re Elizabeth M.

(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 323; In re Angel B. (2002) 

97 Cal.App.4th 454, 461; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d) 

[petition may be denied ex parte if it does not show that the 

change would promote the child’s best interests].) This court 

reviews the juvenile court’s decision not to hold a hearing for an 

abuse of discretion. (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 

1158.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. 

First, the juvenile court could not award father full custody 

of A.M. A criminal protective order, as well as a civil restraining 

order, prohibited father from having any contact with A.M., much 

less full custody over A.M.

Second, father demonstrated no change of circumstances, a 

necessary element of a section 388 petition. Father, moreover, 

fails to cite any authority allowing this court to consider N.S.’s 

declaration, which he filed only after the juvenile court denied 

father’s petition. In any case, it does not show any change in 

circumstances. 
12

Third, father failed to show that it would be in A.M.’s best 

interest to award him full custody of A.M., the second 

requirement of a section 388 petition. In short, the section 388 

petition was frivolous because father presented no evidence or 

cogent authority in support of either element of his petition. 

B. Father Demonstrates No Error in the Denial of His 

October 21, 2020 Request for a Judge Rather Than a 

Commissioner to Preside

Commissioner Pete R. Navarro presided over the entire 

case. On October 21, 2020, father objected to Commissioner 

Navarro’s participation “for this hearing,” meaning the 

October 21, 2020 hearing.4 On appeal father argues that the

commissioner sat as a referee, not a temporary judge, and as a 

referee, had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Father recognizes 

that if the commissioner sat as a temporary judge, the 

commissioner would have the same authority as a judge. In re 

Brittany K. supports father’s acknowledgment; it states: “ ‘[a] 

temporary judge has full judicial powers, and his [or her] orders 

are as final and nonreviewable as those of a permanent judge.’

[Citation.]” (In re Brittany K. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 805, 812.) 

The powers of a referee, however, are more limited. (Id. at 

p. 811.)

Father’s argument lacks merit for two independent 

reasons. First, he impliedly waived any challenge to the 

commissioner by failing to make a timely challenge. (In re 

Brittany K., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 813; In re Horton (1991) 

54 Cal.3d 86, 98 [full participation in proceedings and treatment 

4 Father’s counsel stated, “We’re not stipulating to a

commissioner for this hearing.” 
13

of “the commissioner as competent to rule on matters which rest 

solely in the discretion of a superior court judge” constitutes an 

implicit stipulation to the commissioner]; In re Courtney H.

(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227.) Father participated in the 

proceedings before Commissioner Navarro beginning on August 

23, 2019. He did not object to the Commissioner until over a year 

later, on October 21, 2020. It was too late. (In re Brittany K., 

supra, at p. 813.) 

Second, father’s premise that the commissioner sat as a 

referee and not as a temporary judge is incorrect. By order dated 

November 27, 2019, signed by Presiding Judge Kevin C. Brazile, 

and effective January 2, 2020, “each commissioner of [the Los 

Angeles County Superior] Court, in addition to his or her 

assignment, if any, is designated and assigned as Judge Pro 

Tempore of the Juvenile Court.” (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 

Jud. Order No. 2020-JUD-005-00, 2020 Juvenile Court 

Assignment Order (Nov. 27, 2019) eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) At the time 

father objected to the commissioner, the commissioner sat as a 

temporary judge, not as a referee. 

C. Father Does Not Show He Had a Right to Be 

Personally Present During the October 21, 2021 

Hearing and Even if He Did, Father Demonstrates No 

Prejudice

Father argues that the juvenile court erred in refusing to 

allow him to appear personally at the October 21, 2020 hearing. 

Specifically, father contends: “While it’s perhaps laudable due to 

the Pandemic that apparently all the other attorneys involved in 

this case had agreed with the Los Angeles County Superior Court 

to handle Dependency Hearings through WebEx, absent an Order 
14

from the Presiding Judge and notice, Petitioner had a right to 

personally appear.” 

Father’s argument is based on incorrect premises. There 

was both an order from the Presiding Judge and notice to father. 

At the time of the hearing there was an order from the Presiding

Judge of the Superior Court stating: “Judicial officers are urged 

to avoid in-person hearings to the greatest extent possible and to 

use technology to conduct hearings and other court proceedings 

remotely for the duration of the state of emergency related to the 

COVID-19 pandemic. However, when the interests of justice 

require, judicial officers retain the discretion to require in-person 

appearances.” (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Gen. Order 

No. 2020-GEN-023-00, Administrative Order of the Presiding 

Judge re COVID-19 Pandemic (Oct. 9, 2020) § 1(e), p. 2.) 

In addition, the juvenile court’s minute order dated 

September 18, 2020 recites: “364 Judicial Review Hearing is set 

to [sic] October 21, 2020 at 8:30 AM in Edmund D. Edelman 

Children’s Court Dept.-413. DCFS is to provide notice. Father is 

ordered to be available to participate via WebEx.” (Boldface 

omitted.) On September 25, 2020, DCFS served father with 

notice of the October 21, 2020 hearing. The notice also states: 

“Due to Covid-19, hearing dates are subject to change. In 

addition, courts are conducting remote hearings, which means 

that you do not need to appear in court, if you are able to 

participate by telephone or video conferencing.” 

Assuming arguendo that the juvenile court should have 

allowed father to participate in person, father demonstrates no 

prejudice. Father and his counsel participated in the hearing 

through WebEx. The only ruling the juvenile court made was to 

grant father’s request for a continuance of the section 364 
15

hearing. Thus, father obtained the relief he requested on the 

only issue considered at the hearing. 

D. Father’s Purported Challenge to the Removal Order 

Is Not Cognizable in this Appeal

Section 249 states, “No order of a referee removing a minor 

from his home shall become effective until expressly approved by 

a judge of the juvenile court.” Relying on section 249, father 

argues that the commissioner’s order removing A.M. from father’s 

custody was void because a judge did not review the order. 

Father’s challenge is not cognizable in this appeal. “ ‘A 

challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency 

matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory 

time for filing an appeal has passed.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jesse W.

(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) “The rule serves vital policy 

considerations of promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in 

a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and preventing late-stage 

‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier 

orders.” (Ibid.) A parent who fails to appeal from a removal 

order forfeits the right to challenge that order and the issue 

cannot be considered in an appeal from a subsequent order. 

(Id. at p. 359.) Commissioner Navarro ordered A.M. removed 

from father’s custody on December 11, 2019. Father never 

appealed from that order, and his appeal from the denial of his 

section 388 petition and from the judgment dated November 25, 

2020, does not resurrect a foregone appeal from the December 11, 

2019 order removing A.M. from father’s custody.

Father’s statement that the commissioner’s order was void 

also lacks merit. “[T]he statute says a referee’s removal order 

is not ‘effective’ until approved by a judge (§ 249); it does not say 

the order is ‘void’ or ‘invalid’ if not approved.” (In re Jesse W., 
16

supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 357.) “Because a referee acts ‘with 

the same powers as a judge of the juvenile court’ (§ 248), with or 

without a judge countersigning, and the countersignature does 

not reflect substantive review by the judge but only attests to the 

order’s authenticity [citation], we reject the notion that lack of 

compliance with section 249 deprives a referee of fundamental 

jurisdiction and, in turn, invalidates further orders in the 

proceedings.” (In re Jesse W., supra, at p. 359.) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying father’s Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 388 petition is affirmed. The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

FEDERMAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.