Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

AILENN D. ALBA, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-01060

§

CANOPY GROWTH USA, LLC, and §

EB TRANSACTION SUB II, LLC, §

§

Defendants. §

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ailenn D. Alba (“Plaintiff”) files this Original Complaint against Canopy Growth USA, 

LLC and EB Transaction Sub II, LLC (“Defendants”) and respectfully shows as follows.

II.

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff is an individual and a citizen of Tarrant County, Texas.

2. Defendant Canopy Growth USA, LLC is a limited liability company organized 

under the laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 35715 US 

Highway 60, Units D101-103, Evergreen, Colorado 80439. This Defendant may be served with 

process, including citation and a copy of this lawsuit, by serving its registered agent for service 

of process, Tina Webb, 35715 US Highway 60, Units D102, Evergreen, Colorado 80439.

3. Defendant EB Transaction SUB II, LLC is a limited liability company organized 

under the laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 35715 US 

Highway 60, Units D101-103, Evergreen, Colorado 80439. This Defendant may be served with 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 1 of 18 PageID 1
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 2

process, including citation and a copy of this lawsuit, by serving its registered agent for service 

of process, Tina Webb, 35715 US Highway 60, Units D102, Evergreen, Colorado 80439.

III.

JURISDICTION

4. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because 

Plaintiff asserts a claim arising under federal law.

IV.

VENUE

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which 

provides that “[e]ach United States district court and each United States court of a place subject 

to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this 

subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the 

unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which 

the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the 

judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful 

employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action 

may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For 

purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has 

his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been 

brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)

6. Employment discrimination actions asserting a violation of federal law based on 

race, color, and national origin implicate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 

contains special venue provisions that “displace[] the general rules for venue.” Dabney v. A&R 

Logistics, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-788-BAJ-RLB, 2015 WL 4210988, at *2 (M.D. La. July 10, 

2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 432-33 (5th Cir. 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 2 of 18 PageID 2
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 3

2003)); accord Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 F. App’x 811, 817 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“The 

venue provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3) were intended to be the exclusive venue provisions for Title 

VII employment discrimination actions and ... the more general provisions of [28 U.S.C.] § 1391 

are not controlling in such cases.” (cited in Allen v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 514 F. App’x 

421, 422 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam))). 

V.

BACKGROUND FACTS

7. Plaintiff was born in Colombia and is Hispanic/Latina. Spanish is Plaintiff’s first

language, but she speaks English with an accent. Plaintiff was constantly mocked and criticized 

for her accent and English skills, and Plaintiff was not the only Hispanic/Latino employee that 

was mocked because of race and national origin.

8. Plaintiff worked for Defendants from on or about December 18, 2019 until she

was wrongfully terminated on or about February 8, 2021. Plaintiff was hired as a contract 

employee for the position of Events Manager on December 18, 2019 and was brought on as a 

permanent employee on January 13, 2020. The entire time Plaintiff worked for Defendants, she

worked remotely from home. In July 2020, the company restructured, and Plaintiff’s title was 

changed to Events & Trade Shows Manager. Plaintiff also supported the Trade Marketing and 

Sales Departments during her employment with Defendants.

9. In May 2020, prior to the restructure, Plaintiff began having problems with her

supervisor Paul Frank (White/South African), who is Director, Shopper & Trade Marketing. Mr. 

Frank would constantly belittle and mock Plaintiff because of her accent and pretended to not 

understand what she was saying when she did not pronounce a word perfectly. Mr. Frank would

repeat everything Plaintiff said after she said it. Mr. Frank would also interrupt Plaintiff in their

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 3 of 18 PageID 3
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 4

one-on-one meetings to tell her to work on her grammar. Mr. Frank removed Plaintiff from 

meetings and refused to allow her to work with other departments.

10. Mr. Frank had a different standard for Plaintiff than the other managers and team 

members, which were White and/or non-Hispanic. Mr. Frank would blame Plaintiff for the poor 

performance of White and/or non-Hispanic workers and praise White and/or non-Hispanic 

workers for Plaintiff’s good performance. When he criticized Plaintiff, he focused on her

English, commenting on her accent and vocabulary instead of her skills or performance. 

11. Mr. Frank began giving Plaintiff assignments outside of her role, which had 

previously been assigned to other departments or team members. Although Plaintiff had 

occasionally performed additional assignments for these other departments, Mr. Frank assigned 

Plaintiff the tasks on a full time basis and would then become upset that these assignments took 

time away from her core role and position. Plaintiff asked Mr. Frank and HR for guidance, a

scorecard, and/or coaching several times, but her requests were never met. Instead, Mr. Frank 

prohibited Plaintiff from asking any questions or making any comments during meetings. Mr.

Frank removed Plaintiff from meetings and refused to allow her to work with other department 

directors or ask for clarification if she was unclear or considered needing clarification.

12. Even though Plaintiff sought guidance from HR, instead of addressing Mr. 

Frank’s discriminatory and harassing behavior, HR seemed focused on “fixing” Plaintiff. HR 

offered English lessons to Plaintiff even though Plaintiff is fully fluent in English and has been 

for many years. While Defendants will claim that Plaintiff never accepted this “help” from HR, 

Plaintiff did attempt to take the English class, but there were IT issues with Defendants’ online 

English class offered by Defendants. However, Plaintiff was able to hear the online lessons. At 

the end of the day, the real issue was not Plaintiff’s English skills, since Plaintiff’s English 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 4 of 18 PageID 4
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 5

language skills were not lacking or causing Mr. Frank to mock her accent. Further, Defendants’

offer of basic English lessons to a fully fluent English speaker is further evidence of the insulting 

and discriminatory behavior tolerated and perpetuated at Defendants’ management level.

13. In June 2020, Plaintiff advised Chrissy McHardy, Senior Director of HR, that she 

suffers from multiple mental health issues including Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD).

14. For example, on June 11, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Sol Clahane, VP and U.S. 

General Manager, asking for guidance on her role and job duties because Mr. Frank was not 

allowing Plaintiff to work within her job role. Then, on June 15, 2020, Plaintiff had a phone call 

with Laura Vincent, HR Business Partner, to discuss what tools HR had to better work with Mr. 

Frank. On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff went to HR and spoke with Chrissy to discuss the

discrimination, the additional duties and responsibilities that Mr. Frank was assigning her, and 

the fact that she was not getting support from Defendants or Mr. Frank. Instead of investigating 

her complaints, HR shifted the responsibility to Plaintiff to determine what the solution should

be. Defendants never made any investigation or resolution into Plaintiff’s complaints about Mr. 

Frank.

15. A month later, in a meeting with other employees, Mr. Frank started berating 

Plaintiff for asking questions. Mr. Frank’s boss, Sol Clahane, witnessed his behavior. Ms.

Clahane texted Plaintiff after the meeting and let her know that she now understood Plaintiff’s

complaints. Mr. Frank’s behavior improved for about two weeks, but by September, he had 

reverted to his same discriminatory behavior. 

16. In September 2020, Plaintiff began having issues with another employee, Ms.

Burnae Hanser, Director of Sales. Mr. Frank and Ms. Hanser are close friends and worked 

together previously.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 5 of 18 PageID 5
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 6

17. On October 14, 2020, HR held two diversity focus groups. During these focus 

groups, Plaintiff raised her concerns about situations where coworkers and management were 

disrespectful. Plaintiff expressed complaints about the derogatory comments made to her because 

of her accent. Plaintiff also complained about how the female employees were ignored or 

undermined by the rest of the team members. Plaintiff disclosed her disabilities to Mr. Frank, as 

was recommended during the meeting.

18. In October 2020, Plaintiff began having suicidal thoughts because of Mr. Frank 

and work, among other things. Plaintiff sought in-patient treatment for multiple mental health

issues including PMDD. Plaintiff advised Mr. Frank and HR of what happened and asked for 

help. Plaintiff provided paperwork regarding the PMDD crisis to HR on October 22, 2020. 

Plaintiff advised HR of the mistreatment and presented a request from her doctor for mental 

health and therapy accommodations on October 22, 2020. Plaintiff’s physician wanted her to 

stay for in-patient treatment, but because she was scared to lose her job if she was admitted for 

in-patient treatment, her physician placed restrictions on her work instead. The restrictions

required that Plaintiff only work 8-9 hours a day and two days off a month for mental health 

treatment. Mr. Frank became upset that, due to her accommodation, Plaintiff could no longer

work the same 12-hour days she had previously been working. Plaintiff requested FMLA leave

to accommodate her disabilities, but Defendants denied her request.

19. After Plaintiff presented HR with her accommodation request, in a telephone

conference on October 22, 2020, Defendants told Plaintiff they were unsure how to

accommodate Plaintiff’s request for two days off per month because they was unsure whether to 

provide the leave as FMLA leave or short-term disability (STD) leave. Plaintiff then followed up 

the phone conference from that day with an email with all the necessary information to make the 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 6 of 18 PageID 6
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 7

decision for the accommodation request. However, Defendants refused to accommodate 

Plaintiff.

20. On November 11, 2020, Plaintiff contacted HR to ask if her leave would be 

FMLA or STD. On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff followed up with Ms. Vincent in HR to find 

out if Defendants had decided to process the claim as FMLA or STD. HR advised her that the 

STD provider had all the necessary information and was processing everything. However, HR 

questioned Plaintiff over why she wanted Defendants to pay for her disability leave in the first 

place instead of Plaintiff simply using her own vacation time for the disability leave. 

Furthermore, Defendants did not provide the required documents to the STD provider, and 

Plaintiff was forced to provide the documents herself in December 2020.

21. Plaintiff’s accommodations were denied in December 2020, and in January 2021, 

Plaintiff discovered that her STD leave was also denied. Plaintiff was informed by the STD 

provider that Defendants’ own policy prohibited her from qualifying from STD because Plaintiff 

was required to be off work for two full weeks before applying for STD. However, Defendants

refused to provide Plaintiff with this information. Plaintiff was reluctant to take the time off that

she needed because she was concerned that she would lose her job. Plaintiff against requested

intermittent FMLA leave for mental health treatment, but Defendants again denied her request.

22. In December 2020, Ms. Hanser told Plaintiff that there would be no further 

budget for any events for her position and that her position may be eliminated. Mr. Frank told 

Plaintiff that her position was uncertain and forced her to work more hours than she was allowed 

under her accommodations, in order to ensure that her position was safe and would be included

in the 2021 budget. 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 7 of 18 PageID 7
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 8

23. In early January 2021, Defendants still denied Plaintiff the requested 

accommodations. On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff spoke with Ms. Vincent about the status of her 

FMLA or STD leave. Ms. Vincent told Plaintiff that she needed to communicate with SunLife 

regarding her STD claim. Plaintiff asked why she could not use FMLA since her anniversary was 

quickly approaching. Ms. Vincent questioned Plaintiff about why she did not use her vacation 

time instead of disability time. Plaintiff also followed up on the status of her standing desk 

accommodation request. Ms. Vincent told her to speak with Ms. Ella Rodman, Manager of 

Office Services, who ended up getting it approved that day. On January 25, 2021, Plaintiff found 

that Defendants had a job posting for a Trade Marketing Manager, which was essentially 

Plaintiff’s position and what Plaintiff has expertise on. Plaintiff attempted to talk to Mr. Frank,

but he declined her meeting requests. She then asked Ms. Clahane about the job posting. The 

position was advertised for almost $30,000 more than what Defendants paid Plaintiff. Plaintiff 

approached HR about the job posting. HR claimed that it was a new position created because the 

team needed more employees. HR claimed this was a different role than Plaintiff’s role with 

additional requirements that she allegedly did not meet. However, Plaintiff was already 

performing this role at the time that this “new position” was posted.

24. Mr. Frank engaged in discriminatory conversations with Ms. Hanser concerning

another Hispanic/Latino employee over his English skills, and the fact that English was his 

second language. The week before Plaintiff’s termination, Ms. Hanser called Plaintiff,

complaining about the English skills of another Hispanic employee, Carlos Galeano. Ms. Hanser

complained asking, “Why can’t we hire someone who really understands English or can read

English?” Plaintiff told Ms. Hanser that she was being racist and asked her who else she speaks

about in this way. Ms. Hanser told Plaintiff that she and Mr. Frank talk about hiring employees 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 8 of 18 PageID 8
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 9

who speak and understand English. While Ms. Hanser was Mr. Galeano’s supervisor, and not 

Mr. Frank, Mr. Frank was Ms. Hanser’s subordinate and they worked together for a previous 

employer. Mr. Frank and Ms. Hanser have an extensive history and friendship. 

25. Plaintiff approached Mr. Frank’s boss, Sol Clahane, but Ms. Clahane told Plaintiff

to raise her concerns with Mr. Frank. Plaintiff was verbally told that her job was being 

eliminated, but her termination paperwork says she was terminated for failure to perform.

However, Plaintiff was never given a performance review to discuss any performance issues. 

26. Near the of Plaintiff’s employment, Mr. Frank finally responded to Plaintiff’s 

complaints of how she was treated by other employees and he attempted to de-escalate the issue.

At this time, and in December 2020 and January 2021, Plaintiff was working the same 12-hour

shifts to complete the tasks and assignments required from Mr. Frank, because Mr. Frank and 

Defendants refused to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability or grant her requests for 

accommodations.

27. Two weeks later, on February 8, 2021, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. A 

few weeks after Plaintiff’s termination, Defendants terminated another Hispanic/Latino

employee, Carlos Galeano.

VI.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

28. Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission, and this Charge was dual filed with the Texas Workforce 

Commission.

29. The Charge was filed within 180 days after Plaintiff was terminated.

30. The EEOC issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter on March 10, 2022. 

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 9 of 18 PageID 9
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 10

31. More than 180 days have passed since the charge was filed and the TWC has not

issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter.

32. Plaintiff has timely exhausted all of her administrative remedies. 

VII.

CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Cause of Action—Disability Discrimination—Failure to Accommodate—ADA 

33. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

34. Plaintiff requested a reasonable medical accommodation.

35. Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable medical 

accommodation.

36. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability and/or 

perceived disability and/or record of a disability and/or because they regarded her as disabled. 

Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

B. Cause of Action—Discrimination—ADA

37. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

38. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability and/or 

perceived disability and/or record of a disability and/or because they regarded her as disabled.

39. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

C. Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination—Discrimination—ADA

40. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

41. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her disability and/or 

perceived disability and/or record of a disability and/or because they regarded her as disabled.

42. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 10 of 18 PageID 10
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 11

D. Cause of Action—Discrimination—Title VII

43. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

44. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race.

45. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

E. Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination—Discrimination—Title VII

46. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

47. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her race.

48. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

F. Cause of Action—Discrimination—Title VII

49. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

50. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her national origin.

51. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

G. Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination—Discrimination—Title VII

52. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

53. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her national origin.

54. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

H. Cause of Action—Unlawful Retaliation—ADA

55. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

56. Plaintiff engaged in protected activity as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12203.

57. In response, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff and ultimately terminated her

employment.

58. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 12203.

I. Cause of Action—Unlawful Retaliation—Title VII

59. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 11 of 18 PageID 11
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 12

60. Plaintiff engaged in protected activity as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

61. In response, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff and ultimately terminated her

employment.

62. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

J. Cause of Action—FMLA Interference 

63. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

64. Defendants denied Plaintiff leave that should have been covered by the Family 

and Medical Leave Act.

65. Defendants’ actions violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615.

K. Cause of Action—FMLA Discrimination 

66. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

67. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment while she was on leave that should 

have been covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act.

68. Defendants’ actions violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615.

L. Cause of Action—Disability Discrimination—Failure to Engage in Required 

Interactive Process—TCHRA1

69. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

70. Plaintiff informed Defendants of her disability and need for reasonable medical 

accommodation.

71. Defendants refused to engage in the required interactive process with Plaintiff 

concerning her request for a reasonable medical accommodation.

72. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

1 Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 12 of 18 PageID 12
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 13

M. Cause of Action—Disability Discrimination—Failure to Accommodate—TCHRA

73. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

74. Plaintiff requested a reasonable medical accommodation.

75. Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable medical 

accommodation.

76. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

N. Cause of Action—Disability Discrimination—TCHRA2

77. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

78. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability and/or

perceived disability and/or record of a disability and/or because they regarded her as disabled.

79. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

O. Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination—Disability Discrimination—TCHRA

80. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

81. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her disability and/or 

perceived disability and/or record of a disability and/or because they regarded her as disabled.

82. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

P. Cause of Action—Discrimination—TCHRA

83. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

84. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race.

85. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

Q. Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination—Discrimination—TCHRA

86. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

87. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her race.

2 Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 13 of 18 PageID 13
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 14

88. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

R. Cause of Action—Discrimination—TCHRA

89. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

90. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her national origin.

91. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

S. Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination—Discrimination—TCHRA

92. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

93. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her national origin.

94. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code.

T. Cause of Action—Unlawful Retaliation—TCHRA

95. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

96. Plaintiff engaged in protected activity as set forth in Texas Labor Code section 

21.055.

97. In response, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff and ultimately terminated her

employment.

98. Defendants’ actions violated section 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code.

VIII.

DAMAGES

99. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

100. Defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

and 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and 42 U.S.C. § 12203, which entitles Plaintiff to recover from 

Defendants back pay, front pay, as well as pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

101. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover from Defendants compensatory damages as 

provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 14 of 18 PageID 14
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 15

102. Because Defendants’ actions were done with malice and/or reckless indifference 

to Plaintiff’s federally-protected rights, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants punitive 

damages as provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) and (b)(1).

103. Defendants’ actions violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615, which, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 

2617, entitles Plaintiff to recover from Defendants any wages, salary, employment benefits, or 

other compensation denied or lost.

104. Plaintiff is entitled to recover liquidated damages from Defendants equal to the

amount awarded to Plaintiff as wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation 

denied or lost, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(iii).

105. Plaintiff seeks all damages available to her under federal law.

106. Defendants’ actions also violated the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, 

which entitles Plaintiff to recover from Defendants back pay, front pay, compensatory damages,

as well as pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

107. Because Defendants’ actions were done with malice and/or reckless indifference

to Plaintiff’s state-protected rights, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants punitive

damages.

108. Plaintiff seeks all damages available to her under the TCHRA.

IX.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

109. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

110. Plaintiff retained the services of undersigned counsel to prosecute her claims.

111. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 12205, Plaintiff is entitled to 

recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee from Defendants, including reasonable expert fees and costs.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 15 of 18 PageID 15
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 16

112. Pursuant to Texas Labor Code section 21.259, Plaintiff is entitled to recover a 

reasonable attorneys’ fee from Defendants, including reasonable expert fees.

X.

INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

113. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

114. Plaintiff requests the Court enter an order providing injunctive and declaratory 

relief including, but not limited to:

a. Prohibiting Defendants from engaging in unlawful discrimination;

b. Reinstating Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants with backpay;

c. Reporting to the Court on the manner of compliance with the terms 

of a final order issued by this Court; 

d. Paying court costs; 

e. A declaration that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under state 

and federal law, engaged in unlawful employment discrimination, 

and considered an illegal factor in terminating Plaintiff’s 

employment; and 

f. Any additional equitable relief the Court deems proper.

XI.

ALTER EGO/JOINT ENTERPRISE

115. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

116. Defendants formed multiple companies and entities.

117. Defendants are owned and/or operated together.

118. Defendants are the alter egos of each other.

119. Defendants integrated their resources to achieve a common business purpose.

120. Plaintiff’s injuries arose out of that common business.

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 16 of 18 PageID 16
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 17

121. The separate corporate entities or partnerships must be disregarded and they must 

be treated as one entity to prevent the corporate fiction as an unfair device to inflict injustice on 

Plaintiff.

122. Defendants are therefore jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for her damages.

XII.

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

123. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

124. Defendants act as agents for each other.

125. Defendants are therefore jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff’s injuries and 

damages.

XIII.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

126. Plaintiff incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs.

127. Defendants are liable for the acts and/or omissions of their respective agents, 

representatives, employees, servants, and officers.

XIV.

JURY DEMAND

128. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

XV.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

129. Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants be cited to appear and answer, and 

that upon final trial of this matter, the Court enter judgment awarding Plaintiff:

A. Back pay and front pay (including benefits);

B. Compensatory damages;

C. Punitive damages;

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 17 of 18 PageID 17
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Page 18

D. Injunctive and declaratory relief, including but not limited to, an 

Order:

a. Prohibiting Defendants from engaging in unlawful 

discrimination;

b. Reinstating Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants with 

backpay;

c. Reporting to the Court on the manner of compliance with

the terms of a final order issued by this Court; 

d. Paying court costs; 

e. A declaration that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights

under state and federal law, engaged in unlawful 

employment discrimination, and considered an illegal 

factor in terminating Plaintiff’s employment; and 

f. Any additional equitable relief the Court deems proper;

E. Court costs;

F. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate set by law; and

G. All legal or equitable relief this Court deems proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jamie J. Gilmore

Jamie J. Gilmore

Texas Bar No. 24045262

jgilmore@galyen.com

Brittney L. Thompson

Texas Bar No. 24104618

bthompson@galyen.com

BAILEY & GALYEN

2777 N. Stemmons Fwy, Suite 1150

Dallas, TX 75207

Telephone: 214-252-9099

Facsimile: 214-520-9941

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

Case 3:22-cv-01060-L Document 1 Filed 05/11/22 Page 18 of 18 PageID 18