DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

100 EMERALD BEACH WAY LC,

Appellant,

v.

JOHN THORNTON, MARGARET THORNTON, and

SMM REALTY, LLC,

Appellees.

Nos. 4D20-2792 and 4D21-508

[June 8, 2022]

Consolidated appeal of nonfinal orders from the Circuit Court for the 

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Gerald Joseph Curley, Jr., 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2017-CA-008154-XXXX-MB.

Kristen M. Fiore of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, David P. Ackerman of 

Akerman LLP, West Palm Beach, and E. Raul Novoa, Jr. of Akerman LLP, 

West Palm Beach (withdrew after briefing), for appellant.

Eric D. Isicoff, Teresa Ragatz, and Christopher M. Yannuzzi of Isicoff 

Ragatz, Miami, and J. Chris Bristow of Critton Luttier Coleman, LLP, West 

Palm Beach, for appellees.

CONNER, C.J.

In this consolidated appeal, 100 Emerald Beach Way LC (“100 LC”) 

appeals a nonfinal contempt order and a nonfinal order granting the 

appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment and entering a permanent 

injunction. The injunction prohibits 100 LC and its guests or invitees from 

parking or stopping on the easement running across the appellees’ 

property.

We affirm the trial court’s rulings without discussion except to briefly 

explain the reason why we affirm the trial court’s decision that the private 

easement for ingress and egress in this case does not permit 100 LLC and 

its invitees from stopping or parking on the easement property or engaging 

in other activities (such as unloading vehicles). Based on the evidence 

presented, we agree that the trial court properly found: no implied or 

secondary easement rights for such activities; the easement property is 
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not a public or private street; and 100 LC is estopped from claiming the 

property has such status.1

We also write to address a conflict between the decisions of this Court 

and our sister courts on the question of whether we have jurisdiction to 

review a pre-judgment contempt order under Florida Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 9.130, rather than certiorari jurisdiction.

The underlying suit revolves around a recorded access easement 

granting use of a portion of the appellees’ property to 100 LC. In part, the 

parties dispute the extent to which vehicles used by 100 LC’s guests and 

invitees can park or stop on the easement property while waiting for a 

security gate to open to gain access to 100 LC’s property. While the suit 

was pending, the trial court entered temporary orders regarding use of the 

easement by 100 LC.

The appellees moved for contempt, alleging multiple violations of the 

temporary orders. The appellees also moved for summary judgment on 

their claim for a permanent injunction. The trial court found 100 LC in 

contempt and imposed a monetary fine with a purge provision that the fine 

was not payable if there were no further violations. The trial court also 

found entitlement to attorney’s fees as a contempt sanction. Finally, the 

trial court granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, imposing 

a permanent injunction against 100 LC.

For at least three decades, this Court has reviewed civil contempt 

orders issued prior to final judgment as nonfinal appeals. See Castelli v. 

Castelli, 159 So. 3d 271, 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Alves v. Barnett Mortg. 

Co., 688 So. 2d 459, 460 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 

Morgan, 445 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Langbert v. Langbert, 

409 So. 2d 1066, 1067 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). However, in Calicchio v. 

1 We particularly note the arguments in this case, as well as taking judicial notice 

of the arguments and record in Case No. 4D21-2038, also pending in this Court.

In 4D21-2038, 100 LC did not reply to the argument that it is estopped from 

relitigating whether this is a “street” within the meaning of the Town Code 

because the Town Council decided the issue in the appellees’ favor in a 

proceeding regarding tow away signs and the circuit court denied a petition for 

certiorari. 100 LLC has also acknowledged that the appellees own the easement 

property as private property, and 100 LC has previously taken the position that 

the appellees have the responsibility for maintaining the cul de sac. The appellees 

accepted that responsibility, as the record reflects they repaved the easement.

100 LLC then withdrew a claim in its fourth amended complaint that the 

appellees were allowing the easement to fall into disrepair with potholes 

throughout.
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Calicchio, 693 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we noted “a question as 

to the jurisdictional basis to review this [type of] non-final order.” Id. at 

1124 n.1.

Our sister courts contend Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 

9.130(a)(3) does not authorize review of pre-judgment contempt orders, 

and instead have determined that such orders may be reviewed by 

petitions for certiorari. See Juravin v. DCS Real Est. Invs., LLC, 313 So. 3d 

924, 924–25 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (treating an appeal from a civil contempt 

order for failing to abide by a temporary injunction as a petition for 

certiorari); Tarantola v. Henghold, 233 So. 3d 508, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) 

(“A civil contempt order entered in an ongoing proceeding is subject to 

certiorari review.”); Menke v. Wendell, 188 So. 3d 869, 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2015) (observing that “a prejudgment civil contempt order entered in an 

ongoing proceeding is subject to certiorari review”); Blades v. Dep’t of 

Revenue ex rel. Stewart, 943 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (rejecting 

contention that rule 9.130 authorized nonfinal appellate review).

Although 100 LC’s notice of appeal in this case contends that the 

contempt order is an appealable nonfinal order determining the right to 

immediate possession of property because it orders 100 LC to pay a 

monetary fine and money is property, arguably rule 9.130(a)(3) does not 

apply because 100 LC does not have to pay the monetary fine unless 

violations continue.

100 LC’s notice of appeal also contends the contempt order is subject 

to nonfinal review because the trial court essentially refused to dissolve 

prior orders that effectively operated as injunctions. We do not agree with 

that contention. Treating the contempt order broadly as an order which

essentially refuses to dissolve an injunction would mean that any order 

finding a party failed to comply with a prior order would be reviewable by 

nonfinal appeal.

If we were writing on a clean slate, we would not conclude that we have 

nonfinal review authorized by rule 9.130(a)(3). However, constrained by 

our prior caselaw, we have reviewed the instant contempt order as a 

nonfinal appeal. We certify conflict with the First, Second, Third, and Fifth 

Districts based on Tarantola, Menke, Blades, and Juravin as to whether 

appellate review of the pre-judgment contempt order in this case is proper 

pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3). 

The orders imposing contempt sanctions and granting partial summary 

judgment and a permanent injunction are affirmed.
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Affirmed.

KUNTZ, J., concurs.

FORST, J., concurs specially with opinion.

FORST, J., concurring specially.

I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s orders. I 

would recede from our traditional jurisdictional approach to requests for 

review of civil contempt orders, and follow the course taken by our sister 

courts, as discussed in the majority opinion. As such, I would treat 100 

LC’s filing as a petition for writ of certiorari and dismiss it.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.