[Cite as State v. Evans, 2015-Ohio-3208.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

LEONARD EVANS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-140503 

TRIAL NO. B-0510014 

O P I N I O N.

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed as Modified and Cause Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 12, 2015 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Leonard Evans, pro se. 

Please note: we have removed this case from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Per Curiam. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Leonard Evans appeals the Hamilton County 

Common Pleas Court’s judgments overruling three postconviction motions. We 

affirm the judgments as modified, but remand for correction of errors in the 

imposition of postrelease control and in the statement of the sum of his prison 

sentences. 

{¶2} Evans was convicted in 2006 of murder with a firearm specification, 

carrying a concealed weapon, and having weapons under a disability. He 

unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal, State v. Evans, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-060392 (Jan. 23, 2008), and in postconviction motions filed in 

2014. He appeals here from the overruling of his May 2014 “Motion for Sentencing 

and Issuance of a Final Appealable Order,” June 2014 “Motion for Establishment of a 

Date Certain for Oral Hearing Pursuant to * * * Crim.R. 43(A),” and July 2014 

“Motion for Resentencing Pursuant to * * * Crim.R. 32(A)(1).” On appeal, he presents 

two assignments of error. The assignments of error essentially restate the claims 

advanced in his motions and may thus be read together to challenge the denial of the 

relief sought in those motions. 

No Jurisdiction under the Postconviction Statutes

{¶3} In his motions, Evans contended that his judgment of conviction was 

void because it did not satisfy the requirements for a final appealable order, because it 

did not correctly state his sentence for murder or his “total aggregate sentence,” and 

because his sentences did not conform with the statutory mandates concerning 

postrelease control. He did not designate a statute or rule under which the relief 

sought might be granted. R.C. 2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings on a petition 

for postconviction relief, provide “the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case.” 

R.C. 2953.21(J). Therefore, Evans’s motions were reviewable under the standards 

provided by the postconviction statutes. See State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 

2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12. 

{¶4} But Evans filed his motions well after the time prescribed by R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2) had expired. R.C. 2953.23 closely circumscribes a common pleas 

court’s jurisdiction to entertain a late or successive postconviction claim. The 

petitioner must show either that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the 

facts upon which his claim depends, or that his claim is predicated upon a new, 

retrospectively applicable federal or state right recognized by the United States 

Supreme Court since the time for filing his claim had expired. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). 

And he must show “by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional 

error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense of 

which [he] was convicted.” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). 

{¶5} The record on appeal does not, as it could not, demonstrate that but 

for the alleged errors, “no reasonable factfinder would have found [Evans] guilty of 

the offense[s] of which [he] was convicted.” See R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). Thus, because 

he satisfied neither the time strictures of R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) nor the jurisdictional 

requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A), the postconviction statutes did not confer upon the 

common pleas court jurisdiction to entertain his postconviction claims on their 

merits. 

Jurisdiction to Correct Void Portion of Sentence

{¶6} Nevertheless, a court always has jurisdiction to correct a void 

judgment. See State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 
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856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 18-19. And Evans’s sentences are void to the extent that 

postrelease control was not properly imposed. 

{¶7} The trial court sentenced Evans to consecutive prison terms of 15 years 

to life for murder and three years for the accompanying firearm specification, 18 

months for carrying a concealed weapon, and five years for having weapons under a 

disability. The court also, at sentencing and in the judgment of conviction, imposed 

a mandatory five-year period of postrelease control. 

{¶8} Evans’s judgment of conviction was not, as he insists, subject to 

correction as void on the grounds that it lacked finality or improperly sentenced him 

for murder. The judgment satisfied the requirements for a final appealable order. 

See R.C. 2303.08, 2303.10, 2505.02, and Crim.R. 32(C). And Evans was properly 

sentenced for murder to an indefinite term of imprisonment of 15 years to life. See

R.C. 2903.02(D) and 2929.02(B)(1). 

{¶9} But Evans’s sentences are void to the extent that the trial court failed 

to properly impose postrelease control. The postrelease-control statutes in effect in 

2006, when Evans was sentenced, provided that a prison sentence imposed for a 

felony that is classified by degrees must “include a requirement that the offender be 

subject to a period of post-release control.” And the statutes required that the 

offender be notified, both at the sentencing hearing and in the judgment of 

conviction, of the length and mandatory or discretionary nature of postrelease 

control, of the consequences of violating postrelease control, and of the length of 

confinement that could be imposed for a postrelease-control violation. See former 

R.C. 2929.14(F), 2929.19(B)(3)(c) through (e), and 2967.28(B) and (C) (superseded 

in 2011 by R.C. 2929.14(D), 2929.19(B)(2)(c) through (e), and 2967.28(B) and (C)); 

State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 77-79; State 
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v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 69; State v. 

Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, paragraph one of the 

syllabus. Accord State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120163, 2012-Ohio-5965, ¶ 

10-11. To the extent that a sentence is not imposed in conformity with the statutory 

mandates concerning postrelease control, it is void, and the void portion of the 

sentence is subject to review and correction at any time. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraph one of the syllabus and ¶ 26-

27. 

{¶10} The trial court notified Evans at sentencing that upon his release he 

would be subject to a mandatory period of postrelease control of five years and 

incorporated that notification into the judgment of conviction. But the postreleasecontrol statutes authorized a mandatory five-year period of postrelease control only 

for a first-degree felony or felony sex offense. See former R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and 

2967.28(B)(1) (superseded by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and 2967.28(B)(1)). The 

statutes did not authorize postrelease control for a special felony like murder. State 

v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 36; accord State v. 

Baker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050791, 2006-Ohio-4902, ¶ 4-6. And for the thirddegree felony of having weapons under a disability and the fourth-degree felony of 

carrying a concealed weapon, the statutes authorized only a discretionary three-year 

period of postrelease control. See former R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(d) and 2967.28(C) 

(superseded by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and 2967.28(C)). 

{¶11} To the extent that Evans’s sentences were not imposed in conformity 

with the postrelease-control statutes, they are void. And the common pleas court 

had jurisdiction to review and correct the offending portions of the sentences. State 

v. Long, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100285, 2010-Ohio-6115. 
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Correction of Clerical Error

{¶12} A court also may, at any time, correct a clerical error in a judgment. 

Crim.R. 36. Evans’s judgment of conviction states that “[t]he total aggregate 

sentence [was] twenty-four (24) years and six (6) months in the department of 

corrections.” But the sum of his prison sentences was 241⁄2 years to life. The 

judgment’s misstatement of the sum of his prison sentences constituted a clerical 

error subject to correction under Crim.R. 36. 

Affirmed as Modified, but Remanded

{¶13} Evans’s postconviction motions were subject to dismissal, because the 

postconviction statutes did not confer on the common pleas court jurisdiction to 

entertain the motions on their merits. Accordingly, upon the authority of App.R. 

12(A)(1)(a), we modify the judgments appealed from to reflect dismissals of the 

motions. And we affirm the judgments as modified. 

{¶14} But Evans’s sentences are void to the extent that they were not 

imposed in conformity with the statutory mandates concerning postrelease control. 

And the judgment of conviction did not accurately state the sum of his prison 

sentences. We, therefore, remand this cause for correction of the offending portions 

of his sentences and for correction of the clerical error in the judgment of conviction, 

in accordance with the law and this opinion. 

Judgments affirmed as modified and cause remanded. 

CUNNINGHAM, P.J., FISCHER and STAUTBERG, JJ. 

Please note: 

The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.