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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SHEDRICK THORNTON, §

 #220003389, 

 Plaintiff,

§

§

§

v. § No. 3:22-cv-00605-C (BT)

§

DR. MICHAEL PITTMAN, et al., §

 Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Shedrick Thornton, an inmate at the Dallas County Jail, 

brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court 

granted Thornton leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but withheld issuance 

of process pending judicial screening. Ord. (ECF No. 13). For the reasons 

stated, the Court should dismiss Thornton’s amended complaint under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Background

In this lawsuit, Thornton claims that he is being “imprisoned 

unconstitutionally” because Dr. Michael Pittman, a court-appointed 

psychiatrist, found him incompetent to stand trial in Dallas County Criminal 

Court No. 1, apparently in a case where Thornton is accused of violating a 

protective order/assault/stalking. See State v. Thornton, F14-76804-H 

(Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 1, Dall. Cnty., Tex.). 

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Since he initiated this action on March 15, 2022, Thornton has 

amended—or attempted to amend—his complaint multiple times, see ECF 

Nos. 6, 10, 30, 36, provided answers to a Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire, 

see ECF No. 23, and supplemented the record with additional facts and 

exhibits, see ECF Nos. 9, 16, 17, 28, 33, 34, 35. However, the Court struck his 

most recent amended complaint (ECF No. 38) because it was filed without 

leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“A party may amend its pleading 

once as a matter of course,” and thereafter “only with the opposing party's 

written consent or the court's leave.”). 

Earlier, the Court permitted Thornton to amend his complaint to 

“finalize [the] defendants” and clarify that the only parties against whom he 

seeks to assert a claim are Dr. Pittman; Assistant Dallas County District 

Attorney Jessie Allen (ADA Allen); Judge Tina Y. Clinton, for Dallas County 

Criminal Court No. 1; and Chief Justice Robert Burns, III, for the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals. Am. Compl. 2 (ECF No. 36). According to 

Thornton, ADA Allen, Judge Clinton, and Justice Burns are liable to him for 

“conspiratorial conduct.” Id. Thornton seeks total damages in excess of $50 

million. Id.

Legal Standards

Thornton’s pleadings are subject to preliminary screening under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part:

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The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, 

a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress 

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity [and,] [o]n review, the court shall identify 

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) 

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

suit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may summarily dismiss a 

complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous 

or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) 

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is deemed frivolous when “it lacks an 

arguable basis in law or fact.” Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th 

Cir. 1997). A court can dismiss a claim as “factually frivolous only if the facts 

alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a category encompassing allegations that are 

‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 

32-33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)); see 

also Caldwell v. Raines, 2022 WL 2209932, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2022). 

A complaint is said to lack an arguable basis in the law when it relies on an 

“indisputably meritless legal theory.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th 

Cir. 1999); see also Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993) (a claim 

is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact). 

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The Court liberally construes Thornton’s pleadings with all deference 

due a pro se litigant. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (pro se

pleadings are “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”); Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be 

construed so as to do justice”). But even under this liberal standard, 

Thornton’s civil claims are frivolous and should be dismissed. 

1. Dr. Pittman 

According to Thornton, Dr. Pittman, a court-appointed psychiatrist, 

conducted competency evaluations on Thornton in 2015 and 2022. See 

Compl. 4, 6 (ECF No. 3). Both times, Dr. Pittman concluded Thornton was 

not competent to stand trial. Id. 6. As a result of the latest competency 

determination, Thornton has been unable to obtain a bond and remains in 

custody until he can be admitted for “competency restoration.” Id. Indeed, 

Thornton alleges that Dr. Pittman engaged in “conspiratorial conduct” with 

the prosecutor (ADA Allen) and the trial judge (Judge Clinton) in his 

pending criminal action to deny him bond. Mot. 2. (ECF No. 36). He also 

speculates that Dr. Pittman violated his HIPPA rights because Dr. Pittman 

allegedly inquired about Thornton’s prior hospitalizations at the Terrell 

State Hospital and Green Oaks Hospital and obtained medical records from 

these institutions without first obtaining Thornton’s consent or 

authorization. MJQ Resp. 1 (ECF No. 23).

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Thornton’s allegations against Dr. Pittman “lack[ ] an arguable basis 

in law or fact.” Siglar, 112 F.3d at 193; see also Booker, 2 F.3d at 115. His 

conclusory assertion that Dr. Pittman engaged in “conspiratorial conduct” 

is not supported by the facts, as they are set forth in his pleadings and 

response to the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire. Likewise, the facts do not 

support Thornton’s assertion that Dr. Pittman violated his confidentiality 

rights under HIPPA. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Thornton’s 

claims against Dr. Pittman.

2. Assistant District Attorney Jessie Allen 

Thornton alleges that ADA Allen served him with process on 

November 15, 2022—after Dr. Pittman determined he was not competent—

in violation of “Art. 46B.” Am. Compl. 1 (ECF No. 36). He contends that state 

law requires all criminal proceedings against a defendant must cease when 

the defendant is found incompetent; and the proceedings cannot resume 

until a medical examiner determines the defendant’s competency has been 

restored. Id. Thornton further alleges that ADA Allen acted with Dr. 

Pittman, Chief Justice Burns, and Judge Clinton in “conspiratorial conduct.” 

Id. 2. But ADA Allen is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to 

Thornton’s claims.

A prosecutor is absolutely immune when “[he] acts in [his] role as an 

advocate for the state by initiating and pursuing prosecution,” or “[his] 

conduct is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 

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process.’” Beck x. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 637 

(5th Cir. 2000) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1991)). Here, 

ADA Allen served process on Thornton with process in his role as a state 

prosecutor, and his act of serving Thornton was “intimately associated with 

the judicial phase” of the criminal proceedings against Thornton. ADA Allen 

is thus entitled to absolute immunity, and the Court should dismiss with 

prejudice Thornton’s claims against ADA Allen. Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 

279, 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a dismissal based on absolute immunity 

was properly dismissed with prejudice).

3. Judge Tina Y. Clinton and Chief Justice Robert Burns, III 

Thornton also alleges that Judge Clinton, the presiding judge for 

Criminal District Court No. 1, and Justice Burns, the Chief Justice at the 

Fifth District Court of Appeals, engaged in “conspiratorial conduct.” 

Thornton makes very few specific allegations against Judge Clinton, but he 

apparently believes Judge Clinton tortiously failed to empanel a jury to 

determine his competency, Mot. 8 (ECF No. 30), and she issued a legal 

document after Dr. Pittman determined Thornton was not competent. Am. 

Compl. 1 (ECF No. 36). Thornton makes no specific allegations against 

Justice Burns. Rather, it appears that Thornton believes Justice Burns is 

liable to him because ADA Allen acted “during the tenure of [Justice] Burns.” 

Id. 2.

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It is well-established that judges are generally protected by absolute 

immunity for judicial actions they take within the scope of their jurisdiction. 

See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 

U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam); Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 

221-22 (5th Cir. 2009); Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 124, 

125 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). In fact, “[j]udicial immunity is an immunity 

from suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.” Ballard v.

Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11). 

Moreover, “[t]he fact that it is alleged that the judge acted pursuant to a 

conspiracy and committed grave procedural errors is not sufficient to avoid 

absolute judicial immunity.” Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th 

Cir. 1991).

Judge Clinton, a state trial judge, and Justice Burns, a state appellate 

judge, are both judges in the state of Texas, and they engaged in the conduct 

of which Thornton complains in their roles as a state court judges. Judge 

Clinton and Chief Justice Burns are entitled to absolute immunity with 

respect to Thornton’s claims. Therefore, the Court should dismiss 

Thornton’s claims against Judge Clinton and Chief Justice Burns. See 

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10. 

4. Habeas Claims 

Finally, Thornton attacks the legality of his pretrial detention at Dallas 

County Jail, and he seeks release from his unlawful confinement. For 

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example, he argues that he is being unlawfully confined at the Dallas County 

Jail. Am. Compl. 4 (ECF No. 10). He further argues that they are “keeping 

[him] confined on a nonexistent trial.” Compl. 3 (ECF No. 3). A pretrial 

detainee’s claims are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which applies 

to a person in custody, regardless of the present status of the case pending 

against that person or whether a court has rendered a final judgment. See

Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Dickerson v. 

State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987)). Thornton’s habeas claims 

under § 2241 will be severed from this civil rights action. 

Conclusion

The Court should DISMISS Thornton’s civil claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Additionally, the Court SEVERS Thornton’s habeas claims under § 

2241 from this civil rights action and directs the Clerk of Court to open a new 

habeas case (nature of suit 530) for the now-severed claims and file a copy 

of this order in that case. ECF Numbers 3, 4, 10, 23, 30 and 36 should also 

be docketed in that new case, and the new case should be assigned to the 

same District Judge and Magistrate Judge as this civil rights case. Finally, 

all future pleadings related to the severed habeas matter should be filed in 

the new case.

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SO RECOMMENDED. 

December 22, 2022. 

____________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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