IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

QUENTIN MILES, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1120-K-BN 

§ 

INNOVATIVE RECOVERY INC., § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Quentin Miles filed this pro se action under the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., on May 20, 2022, paying the $402 filing fee to 

do so. See Dkt. No. 3. Miles was issued a summons on that day. See Dkt. No. 4. A 

summons as to the sole defendant was reissued on June 15, 2022. See Dkt. No. 8. And 

United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade has referred Miles’s lawsuit to the 

undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

By paying the filing fee, Miles assumed the responsibility to properly serve the 

named defendant with a summons and a complaint in compliance with Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 4. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h) (setting forth procedures for serving 

a corporation, partnership, or association); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (regarding a 

defendant’s waiving service). As such, proper service was to have been made (or a 

waiver obtained) by the 90th day after the filing of this action that was not a 

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, which was on August 22, 2022. See FED. R. CIV.

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P. 4(m). 

Because Miles did not comply with this requirement, the Court entered an 

order on August 25, 2022 [Dkt. No. 9], notifying Miles that “[t]his case is therefore 

subject to dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 

unless Miles shows both (1) good cause for the failure to timely and properly effect 

service and (2) good cause for the Court to extend the time for service for an 

appropriate period.” Id. at 1-2 (citation omitted). 

The order continued: 

Rule 4(m) authorizes a district court to, after providing notice, 

dismiss a case sua sponte without prejudice for a plaintiff’s failure to 

effectuate service on a defendant within 90 days of filing the complaint. 

See, e.g., Davis v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 3:12-cv-1036-M-BF, 2012 WL 

4795591 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2012); see also Drgac v. Treon, No. H-07-4283, 

2008 WL 4746984, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2008) (“A pro se plaintiff is 

entitled to notice before a district court dismisses an action, sua sponte, 

for failure to timely serve the defendants under Rule 4(m).... [But, a] 

plaintiff’s pro se status and ignorance of the law do not constitute cause 

for his failure to effect service in compliance with the rules.” (citations 

omitted)). 

Miles must therefore file a response to this order by September 

15, 2022 that establishes both (1) good cause for the failure to timely 

and properly effect service and (2) good cause for the Court to extend the 

time for service for an appropriate, specified period. See FED. R. CIV. P. 

4(m). Failure to do so will result in a recommendation that this case be 

dismissed without prejudice. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 

Id. at 2. 

It is now more than one month past the deadline set by the Court’s order, and 

Miles has failed to obey that order or otherwise contact the Court. The Court should 

therefore dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice under Rule 4(m). 

Further, Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua 

sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a 

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court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing 

McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord 

Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure 

to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 

2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 

798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a 

failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify 

as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th 

Cir. 1992))). 

This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and 

prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. 

Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 

626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 

1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the 

defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua 

sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 

cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well 

established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant, 

but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 

251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))). 

And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding 

pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance 

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with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality, 

754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 

168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 

Nov. 1981))). 

A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons, 

77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice 

are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) 

dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or 

contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would 

not serve the best interests of justice.’” 

Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th 

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t, 

757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with 

prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the 

result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser 

sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser 

sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, 

conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting 

Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))). 

“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of 

limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is 

reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting 

Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming 

dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he 

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district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second 

chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”). 

By not complying with the August 25 order – in addition to leaving the 

impression that he no longer wishes to pursue these claims – Miles has prevented 

this action from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit. A Rule 41(b) 

dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted under these 

circumstances. Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be 

futile, as the Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time 

as Miles decides to obey the Court’s order or contact the Court, the Court should 

exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending 

cases and sua sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b). 

It is not apparent based on the record here that dismissal of this lawsuit 

without prejudice at this stage would effectively be a dismissal with prejudice – for 

example, because a statute of limitations would prevent Miles’s refiling these claims. 

But, insofar as this dismissal may somehow prejudice Miles, these findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation afford notice, and the opportunity to file objections 

(further explained below) affords an opportunity to respond, to explain why this case 

should not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 

494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim 

on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, 

‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an 

opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations 

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omitted)). 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 4(m) and 41(b). 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: October 24, 2022 

 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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