alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed 

July 9, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-24-00411-CV

IN RE TELGE ROOFING, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

165th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2020-46142

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On Friday, June 7, 2024, relator Telge Roofing, Inc. filed a petition for writ 

of mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. 

App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Ursula 

Hall, presiding judge of the 165th District Court of Harris County, to rule on 

relator’s motion for summary judgment.
2

Relator has filed a motion to withdraw its petition for writ of mandamus 

because the parties have settled. We grant the motion and dismiss the petition.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.
FILED

July 26, 1999

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JAMES SHIELDS, )

) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9809-CR-00383

Appellant, )

) DAVIDSON COUNTY

VS. ) (No. 98-C-2220 Below)

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) The Hon. J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

)

Appellee. ) (Dismissal of Habeas Corpus Petition)

) AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court upon the state's motion to affirm the judgment

of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

After reviewing the state’s motion, the appellant’s brief, and the record on appeal, the Court

finds that this is an appropriate matter for affirmance under Rule 20.

The petitioner is appealing the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus. In his petition, the petitioner alleged that two prior convictions were void

and improperly used to enhance his sentence in a later conviction. The trial court

summarily dismissed the petition because no record of the named convictions or how they

were used to enhance his subsequent conviction was attached to the petition, nor was a

satisfactory reason given for its absence as mandated by T.C.A. § 29-21-107(b)(2).

T.C.A. § 29-21-107(b)(2) provides that if the petitioner in a petition for writ of

habeas corpus is restrained of his liberty "by virtue of any legal process, a copy thereof

shall be annexed, or a satisfactory reason given for its absence." This provision of the

statute is "mandatory and the failure to comply with same may be grounds for dismissing

the petition." State ex rel. Wood v. Johnson, 216 Tenn. 531, 534, 393 S.W.2d 135, 136

(Tenn. 1965); see State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 500, 503, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291

(Tenn. 1964). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition.

In addition, in his appellate brief, the petitioner contends that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. A claim of ineffective counsel may not be litigated in a
-2-

habeas corpus proceeding. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 628 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994). Moreover, this Court has appellate jurisdiction only. T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a). Issues

not raised in the petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. ‘

Based on the reasons discussed in this order, this Court concludes that the

state’s motion to affirm the judgment should be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the state’s motion to affirm the

judgment pursuant to Rule 20 is granted. The judgment of the trial court is hereby

affirmed. The petitioner being indigent, costs of this appeal are taxed to the state.

_____________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE

CONCUR:

_____________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

_____________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
`[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 236 Engrossed in House (EH)]

103d CONGRESS

  2d Session

                            H. CON. RES. 236

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the 1994 Special Olympics Torch Relay to be run through the 
                            Capitol Grounds.






103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 236

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF RUNNING OF SPECIAL OLYMPICS TORCH RELAY 
              THROUGH CAPITOL GROUNDS.

    On May 20, 1994, or on such other date as the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate may 
jointly designate, the 1994 Special Olympics Torch Relay may be run 
through the Capitol Grounds, as part of the journey of the Special 
Olympics torch to the District of Columbia Special Olympics summer 
games at Gallaudet University in the District of Columbia.

SEC. 2. RESPONSIBILITY OF CAPITOL POLICE BOARD.

    The Capitol Police Board shall take such action as may be necessary 
to carry out section 1.

SEC. 3. CONDITIONS RELATING TO PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS.

    The Architect of the Capitol may prescribe conditions for physical 
preparations for the event authorized by section 1.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 18, 1994.

            Attest:






                                                                 Clerk.`
TEMPLATE 1 – For Civil Forfeiture Cases Only, Step 1

** Use when moving 25% of forfeited funds to the TFF and keeping 75% in SUSPENSE 

pending final decision from DOJ or TEOAF Counsel on transfer to USVSST
 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN FARLEY 

ACTING DIRECTOR 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ASSET FORFEITURE 

FROM: 

SUBJECT:	 Request to transfer funds relating to 

& , USVSST 

Recently, the seizure relating to the / was forfeited. The 

total forfeited amount was . This case is being reviewed for eligibility for 

transfer to the Fund for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism (USVSST 

Fund). See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-113 (Div. O, Tit. IV, 

§ 404(e) (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 20144)). Accordingly, at this time, we are requesting 

that 75% of the [net proceeds, if an item was sold], 

remain in the suspense account pending further determination under 34 U.S.C. § 

20144(e)(2)(A)(2). 

The remaining amount is to be transferred into the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) 

pursuant to the enclosed Form 2. 

If there are any questions, or in need of additional documentation, please contact 

. 

Attachments: 

Final Order of Forfeiture or Declaration of Administrative Forfeiture 

TEOAF - Form 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6602

PATRICK E. O’NEILL, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

EARL BESHEARS, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA97-3790-DKC)

Submitted: August 11, 1998 Decided: August 26, 1998

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Patrick E. O’Neill, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Annabelle Louise Lisic, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s order denying relief on

his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.

1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. O’Neill v. Beshears, No. CA-97-3790-DKC (D. Md. Apr.

2, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 35.1





SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT





I, Alyson M. Mount, Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer of Entergy New Orleans, Inc. (the “Servicer”), certify that:





(a) A review of the Servicer's activities during the reporting period covered by this Report on Form 10-K and of its performance under that certain Storm Recovery Property Servicing Agreement dated as of July 22, 2015 between Entergy New Orleans Storm Recovery Funding I, L.L.C., as the Issuing Entity, and the Servicer (the “Servicing Agreement”) has been made under my supervision.





(b) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period.





Date: March 29, 2016





Entergy New Orleans, Inc., as servicer





By:  /s/ Alyson M. Mount





Name:  Alyson M. Mount


Title:  Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 00 50

_____________________________
D AVID E. Z IPPERER , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Russell Healey , Judge

. June 26, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R OBERTS , R OWE , and K ELSEY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Refik W. Eler of Elerlaw, LLC, Jacksonville
, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris
, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 1 of 12 PageID 388
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 2 of 12 PageID 389
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 3 of 12 PageID 390
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 4 of 12 PageID 391
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 5 of 12 PageID 392
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 6 of 12 PageID 393
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 7 of 12 PageID 394
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 8 of 12 PageID 395
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 9 of 12 PageID 396
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 10 of 12 PageID 397
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 11 of 12 PageID 398
Case 1:22-cv-00046-H Document 33 Filed 12/21/22 Page 12 of 12 PageID 399
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LETICIA AIDEE ROSALES-ESCOBEDO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 15-50371 

D.C. No. 3:12-cr-03942-AJB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2017**

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

Leticia Aidee Rosales-Escobedo appeals from the district court’s denial of 

her motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 19 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-50371 

Rosales-Escobedo contends that the district court had authority under 

Rule 36 to strike the stipulation of removal provision from her plea agreement, and 

that it erred in failing to do so. The record reflects that Rosales-Escobedo 

voluntarily entered into the plea agreement knowing it contained the stipulation of 

removal. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that relief 

is not available to Rosales-Escobedo under Rule 36. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36;

United States v. Dickie, 752 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating standard of 

review); United States v. Kaye, 739 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1984) (Rule 36 “is a 

narrow provision limited to correction of errors of no more than clerical 

significance”). 

AFFIRMED.
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<ARTICLE>                5
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The Schedule contains summary financial information extracted
from the financial statements for Independence Tax Credit Plus
L.P. IV and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                0000940329
<NAME>  Independence Tax Credit Plus L.P. IV
<MULTIPLIER>                    1

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#### Edwin Friedman et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*George Linsay et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Pretrial Term, Kings County,

February 6, 1958.

*850
      *David A. Goldner*for plaintiffs.

*Berman & Frost*for defendants.

Benjamin Brenner, J.

When the court at pretrial orders an impartial medical report as to a doubtful claim of protracted injuries common decency demands that the doctor be informed of Ms impartial status prior to the examination. It seems to me quite reprehensible for plaintiffs’ attorney, as an officer of the court, to deliberately withhold such information from the doctor and to present Ms client for the court-directed examination in the guise of one seeking expert opirnon preparatory to trial, particularly when the cost for the examination is to be paid by the defendants. While I entertain the highest regard for the integrity of the neurologist chosen by me and am satisfied that his report would be the same whether or not he was made aware that his examination was court directed, its nature is altered and the estimate of injury becomes suspect by defendants if the examination is conducted by the doctor on a doctor-patient basis or as a prospective medical expert upon trial. I would not hesitate to grant defendants’ motion to revoke the rule 9 calendar preference (Kings County Supreme Court Trial Term Rules), heretofore granted, which I believe the court has ample power to do under rules 2, 8 and 9 of the rules of this court, but for the fact that I am constrained to believe that, based on all the current medical proof, plaintiffs deserve to retain their calendar preference. In my view, a revocation of plaintiffs’ preference because of their attorney’s questionable practice would constitute undue punishment of the parties rather than of the attorney, and, in any case, would be unwarranted as beyond the power of the court. Motion to revoke preference denied. This disposition is without prejudice to any application defendants may be advised to make upon trial concerning the aforesaid court-directed examination or concerning the cost thereof.

Submit order.
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<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          816,513
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               626,797
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<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 14,379,706
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<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        10,464,200
<LOANS>                                    110,372,819
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