Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67693

released October 27, 2000. The full text

of this Commission decision is available

for inspection and copying during

normal business hours in the FCC

Reference Information Center (Room

CY–A257), 445 12th Street, SW.,

Washington, DC. The complete text of

this decision may also be purchased

from the Commission’s copy contractor,

International Transcription Service,

Inc., (202) 857–3800, 1231 20th Street,

NW., Washington, DC 20036.

Provisions of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act of 1980 do not apply to

this proceeding.

Members of the public should note

that from the time a Notice of Proposed

Rule Making is issued until the matter

is no longer subject to Commission

consideration or court review, all ex

parte contacts are prohibited in

Commission proceedings, such as this

one, which involve channel allotments.

See 47 CFR 1.1204(b) for rules

governing permissible ex parte contacts.

For information regarding proper

filing procedures for comments, see 47

CFR 1.415 and 1.420.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73

Radio broadcasting.

For the reasons discussed in the

preamble, the Federal Communications

Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR

part 73 as follows:

PART 73—RADIO BROADCAST

SERVICES

1. The authority citation for part 73

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 334 and 336.

§ 73.202 [Amended]

2. Section 73.202(b), the Table of FM

Allotments under West Virginia, is

amended by adding Glenville, Channel

299A.

Federal Communications Commission.

John A. Karousos,

Chief, Allocations Branch, Policy and Rules

Division, Mass Media Bureau.

[FR Doc. 00–28910 Filed 11–9–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA–00–8248]

RIN 2127–AF36

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards; Fuel System Integrity

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: We are proposing to upgrade

the rear impact test in the Federal motor

vehicle safety standard on fuel system

integrity. That standard currently

specifies that the rear of the test vehicle

is to be impacted with a flat rigid barrier

at speeds up to 48 km/h (30 mph).

Under the proposal, we would replace

that full rear impact test procedure with

an offset rear impact test procedure

specifying that only a portion of the

width of the rear of vehicles would be

impacted, that a deformable and lighter

barrier would be used, and that the test

would be conducted at 80 km/h (50

mph). We tentatively conclude that the

new, more stringent test procedure

would save lives and prevent injuries.

We are also proposing to change the

standard’s procedure for side impact

tests. Currently, the standard specifies a

side impact test procedure that differs

from that specified in our standard on

side impact protection. We are

proposing to specify that the test

procedure in the side impact protection

standard be used for both standards. We

tentatively conclude that this change

would provide a more realistic test,

increase safety and reduce testing costs.

DATES: You should submit your

comments early enough to ensure that

Docket Management receives them not

later than January 12, 2001.

ADDRESSES: You may submit your

comments in writing to: Docket

Management, Room PL–401, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC,

20590. You may also submit your

comments electronically by logging onto

the Dockets Management System

website at http://dms.dot.gov. Click on

‘‘Help & Information’’ or ‘‘Help/Info’’ to

obtain instructions for filing the

document electronically.

Regardless of how you submit your

comments, you should mention the

docket number of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

non-legal issues, you may call Dr.

William J. J. Liu, Office of Vehicle

Safety Standards, (Telephone 202–366–

2264) (FAX 202–366–4329).

For legal issues, you may call Mr.

Stephen Wood, NCC–20, Assistant Chief

Counsel for Rulemaking, Office of Chief

Counsel, (Telephone 202–366–2992)

(FAX 202–366–3820).

You may send mail to both of these

officials at National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 400 Seventh St.,

SW, Washington, DC, 20590.

You may call Docket Management at

202–366–9324. You may visit the

Docket from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,

Monday through Friday.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Overview of this Rulemaking

II. Existing Standard

III. Current Safety Problem

IV. 1995 Advanced Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM)

A. Component Performance (Phase 1)

B. System Performance (Phase 2)

C. Environmental and Aging Effects (Phase

3)

V. Public Comments on ANPRM

A. Comments on Component Performance

B. Comments on System Performance

C. Comments on Environmental and Aging

Effects

VI. Agency’s Response to Comments on

ANPRM

A. NHTSA’s Component Performance

Activities

B. NHTSA’s System Performance Activities

1. Analyses of FARS and NASS Data on

Fire-Related Rear Impact Crashes

2. Offset Rear Impact Vehicle Crash Tests

3. Analysis of Side Impact Test Procedure

C. Environmental and Aging Effects

D. Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Fuel

System Safety Requirements

VII. Proposal to Replace Standard No. 301’s

Rear and Lateral Impact Test Procedures

A. Proposed Offset Rear Impact Test

Procedure

B. Proposed Side Impact Test Procedure

C. Additional Considerations

1. Door System Integrity

2. Lead Time

3. Request for Comments on Particular

Issues

VIII. Rulemaking Analyses

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. National Environmental Policy Act

D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

E. Unfunded Mandates Act

F. Civil Justice Reform

G. National Technology Transfer and

Advancement Act

H. Paperwork Reduction Act

I. Plain Language

IX. Submission of Comments

X. Proposed Regulatory Text

I. Overview of this Rulemaking

On April 12, 1995, we published an

Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM) (60 FR 18566)

67694 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

1Previously, on December 14, 1992, we published

a Request for Comments notice (57 FR 59041,

Docket No. 92–66, Notice 1) stating that we were

‘‘considering initiating rulemaking to upgrade the

protection currently provided by’’ Standard No.

301. The notice also requested answers to specific

questions related to test impact speeds, impact

barriers, effect of vehicle aging on the likelihood of

fire, contribution of occupant entrapment to the

likelihood of fire-related injuries, etc.

2On December 2, 1994, the Secretary of

Transportation announced a settlement of an

investigation by NHTSA of an alleged safety defect

in certain GM pickup trucks with fuel tanks

mounted outside the frame rails. Under that

settlement, GM is contributing over $51.3 million

for a variety of safety initiatives. Among other

things, the settlement is funding research on ways

to reduce the occurrence and effects of post-crash

fires. All relevant results of this research are being

placed in dockets NHTSA–98–3585, NHTSA–98–

3588, Docket No. 96–GMRSCH–GR, and Docket No.

95–20-GR.

In addition, GM is conducting an extensive

research program related to engine component fires

and its propagation into the occupant compartment.

Depending on the results of GM’s research (which

was officially completed in April 2000), we may

revisit our decision with respect to Phase 1. 3As part of the GM settlement, GM is conducting

research on environmental factors and aging effects

on fuel system integrity and is preparing a report

of its findings. Depending on the results of GM’s

research, we may also revisit this issue in the

future.

4These fatalities included fatalities due to burns

and/or impact injuries, but not those due to

asphyxiation.

announcing our plans to consider

upgrading Standard No. 301, Fuel

system integrity.1 Specifically, we

announced our plans to consider

research and rulemaking activities

related to amending Standard No. 301

to:

• define performance criteria for fuel

system components directed at reducing

the occurrence and spread of vehicle

fires;

• modify the existing Standard No.

301 crash test procedures and

performance criteria to better simulate

the events that lead to serious injury

and fatalities in fires; and,

• define the role of environmental

and aging factors such as corrosion and

vibration as they affect fuel system

integrity, and, if appropriate, specify

performance criteria related to this area.

Due to the varying complexity of the

above three activities, we also

announced that we were considering

pursuing a three-phase approach to

upgrading the standard:

• Phase 1 would focus on

requirements for component

performance.

• Phase 2 would address system

performance.

• Phase 3 would address issues

related to environmental and aging

effects.

After evaluating the research related

to the frontal and rear impact

requirements and the comments

submitted in response to the ANPRM,

we have decided not to pursue

rulemaking related to Phases 1 and 3 at

this time. Further analysis by NHTSA of

the results of research related to fuel

system components conducted by the

agency and General Motors (GM) is

needed before we can determine

whether rulemaking is appropriate and,

if so, what form it should take.2 In

addition, we believe that further studies

are needed to define the problems

associated with environmental and

aging effects and determine whether

rulemaking would be appropriate to

address them.3

After evaluating the research related

to Phase 2 and the comments submitted

in response to the ANPRM, we have

tentatively concluded that a more

stringent rear impact test procedure

would save lives and reduce injuries.

We are, therefore, proposing to

strengthen the current crash

requirements applicable to vehicles

with a gross vehicle weight rating

(GVWR) of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or

less. Specifically, we are proposing to

replace Standard No. 301’s current rear

impact test procedure with one that

involves striking the rear of the test

vehicle at 80 km/h (50 mph) with a

1,368 kg (3,015 lb) moving deformable

barrier at a 70 percent overlap with the

test vehicle. We are also proposing to

replace Standard No. 301’s lateral

impact test procedure with the current

side impact test procedure of Standard

No. 214, Side impact protection. We

tentatively conclude that these changes

would help to preserve fuel system

integrity in a crash, thereby helping to

prevent fire-related fatalities and

injuries. In addition, we tentatively

conclude that the specification of a

single lateral impact test procedure

instead of two different test procedures

would reduce manufacturer certification

and agency enforcement costs.

II. Existing Standard

Standard No. 301 sets performance

requirements for the fuel systems of

light vehicles, i.e., vehicles with a gross

vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536

kg (10,000 pounds) or less. The

standard, which was issued in the

1970s, limits the amount of fuel spillage

from fuel systems of vehicles during and

after being subjected to a frontal, rear, or

lateral impact test.

In the frontal impact test, a vehicle is

driven forward into a fixed barrier at 48

km/h (30 mph), while in the side impact

test, a 1,814 kg (4,000 lb) barrier moving

at 32 km/h (20 mph) is guided into the

side of a stationary vehicle, and in the

rear impact test, a 1,814 kg (4,000 lb)

barrier moving at 48 km/h (30 mph) is

guided into the rear of a stationary

vehicle. The standard limits fuel

spillage from crash-tested vehicles to 28

grams (1 ounce) by weight during the

time period beginning with the start of

the impact and ending with the

cessation of vehicle motion and to a

total of 142 grams (5 ounces) by weight

during the 5-minute period beginning

with the cessation of motion. During the

25-minute period beginning with the

end of the 5-minute period, fuel spillage

during any 1-minute interval is limited

to 28 grams (1 ounce) by weight.

Similar fuel spillage limits apply to

vehicles tested in accordance with the

standard’s static rollover test procedure.

The rollover test is conducted after

frontal, rear and lateral impact tests.

III. Current Safety Problem

Preserving fuel system integrity in a

crash to prevent occupant exposure to

fire is critical. Although vehicle fires are

relatively rare events (occurring in only

one percent of vehicles in towaway

crashes), they tend to be severe in terms

of casualties. According to an analysis

of the agency’s Fatality Analysis

Reporting System (FARS) in 1998, four

percent (1,411) of light vehicle occupant

fatalities occurred in crashes involving

fire.4 Overall, the fire itself was deemed

to be the most harmful event in the

vehicle for about 20 percent (282) of

these fatalities.

An analysis of 1991–1998 National

Automotive Sampling System (NASS)

data shows that about 12,941 occupants

per year were exposed to fire in

passenger cars and light vehicles (vans,

pickup trucks, and multipurpose

vehicles with GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000

lb) or less) that were towed away from

the fire. Of those occupants, about 1,062

(8 percent) received moderate or severe

burns (AIS 2 and greater). Threequarters of those with moderate and

more severe burns had second or third

degree burns over more than ninety

percent of the body; maximum-severity

(AIS 6) burns are nearly always fatal.

These statistics underscore the

importance of preserving fuel system

integrity in a crash in order to prevent

vehicle fires.

IV. 1995 Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM)

In the 1995 ANPRM, we announced

our plans to consider upgrading

Standard No. 301. We explained that we

were considering using a three-phase

approach to upgrade the requirements of

Standard No. 301. Phase 1 would focus

on requirements for component

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67695

5For example, in some vehicles, sensors detect

the consequence of severe engine damage (rotation

stops for camshaft, crankshaft or alternator) and

immediately shut off the fuel pump. Often, signals

from more than one sensor are used to determine

if the engine has stopped running and the decision

for fuel pump shut-off is left up to the vehicle’s

onboard computer (such as the Engine Control Unit

or Electronic Control Module).

6 Inertia switches operate on sudden impact to

open the electrical circuit to the fuel pump or the

battery during the crash. An inertia switch can be

designed to operate at various levels of impact

intensity and direction, and, therefore, could be

effective in all crash modes.

performance, Phase 2 would address

system performance, and Phase 3 would

address issues related to environmental

and aging effects. We sought comment

on this approach as well as several other

issues.

A. Component Performance (Phase 1)

We explained that our focus in Phase

1 was on developing component

performance criteria aimed at shutting

down the fuel supply and potential fire

ignition sources in a crash to help

reduce the occurrence and effects of a

fire should a breach in the fuel system

occur. Quickly shutting off the fuel flow

during or immediately after a crash

would eliminate a major fire and fuel

source and should, therefore, both

reduce fires and limit the spread of fire,

if one were to start. Phase 1 would also

focus on minimizing the possibility of

an electrical spark of sufficient intensity

to act as an ignition source. Finally, it

would explore other means for reducing

fires (e.g., engine fire extinguishers).

While these criteria would primarily

address fires that originate in the engine

compartment due to frontal impacts,

they would also help to shut off the fuel

flow for all crash modes, including a

rollover crash.

In the ANPRM, we sought comment

about component test requirements for

fuel tanks, fuel pumps, the vehicle’s

electrical system, and engine fire

extinguishers. We requested information

on the performance, cost, and

practicability aspects of various systems

for shutting off the fuel flow and the

electric power. We also requested

comments on ways to develop

practicable test procedures and to define

specific criteria with sufficient

objectivity that test variability would be

minimal.

We also explained that we believed

that the technology already existed for

detecting and identifying conditions

when the fuel flow should be shut off.

Most new vehicles sold in the United

States were already equipped with

devices that shut off the fuel pump in

any collision that causes the engine to

stop.5 Other vehicles were equipped

with inertia switches that shut off the

fuel flow and/or the electric current.6

We also discussed how fuel system

components had to operate in a realworld environment surrounded by

extreme conditions imposed by modern

engine technology. We explained that

the materials and parts used to assemble

fuel system components were already

subject to manufacturers’ specifications,

which were often derived from or

directly related to other engineering

standards such as those of the American

Society for Testing and Materials

(ASTM). Some of the test requirements

are generic to many of the ASTM

standards, for example: vibration, shock,

endurance testing, temperature cycling,

temperature extremes, and compatibility

with other materials.

Finally, we also sought comment

regarding the extent and scope of

component test requirements that could

be developed for inclusion in Standard

No. 301. We identified the following

fuel system and vehicle components as

potential candidates for this approach:

fuel tank, including filler pipe; fuel

pump(s); vehicle’s electrical system; and

engine fire retardant/extinguisher. We

did not include fuel lines in the list

because the potential to shut down the

entire fuel delivery system when the

fuel pump shuts down already exists.

B. System Performance (Phase 2)

While Phase 1 focused on shutting

down fuel supply and potential ignition

sources in a crash to help prevent or

mitigate vehicle fires if a breach in the

fuel system occurs, Phase 2 focused on

preventing fuel system failures in the

first instance. We explained that Phase

2 would focus on the process of

upgrading crash test performance in

frontal, side, and rear impacts. Phase 2’s

purpose was to identify tests that

represent the crash conditions

associated with fires that cause fatal and

severe injury.

We explained that available

information indicated that the present

tests in Standard No. 301 may not be

representative of the crash conditions

associated with fatal and severe injurycausing fires. We also explained that

further tests were needed to define

specific upgrades to these crash

conditions. We noted that offset/oblique

tests in the frontal mode, use of the

Standard No. 214 barrier in the rear test

mode, and a pole impact or use of the

Standard No. 214 barrier for the side

impact test all appeared promising for

possible inclusion in Standard No. 301.

We explained that a key objective for

such tests may be to limit the

engagement of the struck vehicle to a

narrower area than is engaged using

current barriers. We explained that we

needed to define the specific crash

conditions that cause fuel system loss of

integrity and understand which crashes

would be survivable if fire were

avoided. We explained that we were

considering performing crash data

analyses and crash testing to further

explore these issues. We requested

comments on the performance aspects

and practicability of this approach.

C. Environmental and Aging Effects

(Phase 3)

We explained that the third phase

would explore the issue of

environmental and aging effects on

vehicle condition and the possible

relationship to fire occurrence. Our

preliminary analyses of FARS and State

crash files indicated that the likelihood

of fire increases with the age of the

vehicle. The analysis also attempted to

determine the possible differences, if

any, in the occurrence of fire in fatal

crashes in states that typically

experience more inclement weather

(i.e., snow and ice) and as a result, use

more salt and other corrosive substances

on public roadways, when compared to

other states.

Passenger cars registered in the ‘‘salt

belt’’ states and involved in fatal crashes

were found to have an approximately 25

percent greater rate of fire occurrence in

fatal crashes, compared with passenger

cars in fatal crashes in the ‘‘sun belt’’

states. When the fire itself was deemed

to be the most harmful event in the

vehicle, however, the ‘‘salt belt’’ states

had a lower rate compared to the ‘‘sun

belt’’ states. Consequently, it was not

clear whether the possible relationship

between vehicle aging, weather and use

of salt and similar substances and fire

occurrence was due to environmental

characteristics, to changes in vehicle

design, to differences in operator

characteristics, or a combination of

these factors. We explained that if the

disparity could be attributed to

environmental factors, it might be

possible to add environmental tests,

such as a corrosion test, to Standard No.

301.

V. Public Comments on ANPRM

NHTSA received 40 comments on the

April 1995 ANPRM. Of the comments,

twenty were one-page form letters that

supported the proposal and were signed

by individuals affiliated with various

businesses and organizations. The

remaining 20 comments were submitted

by: eight manufacturers (1 component

manufacturer and 7 vehicle

manufacturers), 6 associations, and 6

other organizations (2 separate

67696 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

comments from a consulting firm, 1

state agency, 1 consumer advocacy

organization, 1 research institute, and 1

individual). The comments are

summarized below.

A. Comments on Component

Performance

The First Inertia Switch Company

(First Inertia) stated that it first

introduced a crash activated fuel pump

shut-off switch for the 1981 vehicle

models in the U.S. First Inertia argued

that an inertia switch is the most direct

and effective means of shutting off the

fuel pump in a crash. It estimated that

during the 1995 model year, 9.5 million

inertia switches would be installed in

vehicles manufactured in the U.S.,

Canada, Europe, and Japan. First Inertia

believes that its inertia switches can

easily be designed for shutting off the

electric power in a crash and performing

other functions (e.g., unlocking vehicle

doors).

While GM expressed interest in the

potential benefits that could be derived

from possible fuel system component

upgrades, it suggested that we conduct

careful studies to ensure that we

selected proposed countermeasures that

would not be ‘‘counterproductive.’’

Specifically, GM pointed out that the

agency’s crash data analysis of vehicle

fires showed no statistically significant

difference in the rate of crash related

fuel leakage and/or fire between the GM

vehicles that used an engine rotation

sensing device for shutting off the fuel

flow and the peer Ford vehicles that, in

addition to the engine rotation sensing

device, used inertia switches as a

redundant fuel pump shut-off device.

GM opposed using a battery shut-off

device to interrupt the vehicle’s electric

power. GM argued that the potential

negative side effects (e.g., potentially

getting stranded on the road if the

engine shuts off while driving) of a

crash-activated electrical system shutoff preclude the incorporation of such a

device. GM suggested conducting

additional research on the nature and

relative frequency of real-world crash

fire ignition sources.

GM stated that it considered the

concept of using fire extinguishers and

fire retardant blankets for extinguishing

engine compartment fires intriguing and

supported doing a thorough evaluation

to determine their feasibility. GM also

stated that it planned to research means

to reduce or delay engine fire

propagation into the occupant

compartment to help provide occupants

with additional time to exit a vehicle

and avoid burn injuries.

Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VW)

was concerned with potential reliability

problems associated with inertiaactivated fuel cut-off switches. VW

explained that it was using an engine

rotation sensing device for cutting-off

fuel flow in its vehicles. VW also stated

that additional fuel tank filler valve

systems were unnecessary. In addition,

VW recommended that we refer to ECE

Regulation No. 34 for possible

component test requirements, but did

not specify particular tests.

Mitsubishi Motors America, Inc.

argued that the proposed Phase 1

approach could put undue emphasis on

the performance of particular isolated

components in resisting post-impact

fires. Mitsubishi argued that such an

approach could have unanticipated

negative consequences on maximizing

over-all fire resistance in real-world

crashes.

Ford Motor Company (Ford) stated

that fuel system integrity in a crash is

a vehicle/system phenomenon in which

the vehicle and its components work as

a unit. Ford disagreed with the

proposed Phase 1 approach of

incorporating separate component tests

into Standard No. 301. Ford stated that

it uses redundant fuel shut-off devices

(an engine speed sensing device and an

inertia sensing device) to stop the flow

of electric current to the fuel pump in

certain conditions.

Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler)

argued that fuel system integrity should

be evaluated as a system and expressed

its opposition to any initiative to

introduce component design or

performance requirements into Standard

No. 301. Chrysler explained that it used

a fuel shut-off device that senses engine

rotation for stopping the fuel flow and

stated that additional protection had not

been shown to be any more effective in

reducing fuel related fires. Chrysler

stated that it was premature to consider

using an electrical power shut-off device

for reducing fuel induced fires. Chrysler

argued that more research is needed to

verify that the proposed mitigation

approach will not harm other systems

that are critical to occupant protection,

during and after the crash event.

Chrysler opposed the concept of using

fire extinguishers and fire retardant

systems for engine compartment fires

and stated that the ignition of a vehicle

fire does not necessarily occur at a

predictable point in time during a

vehicle crash. In addition, Chrysler

stated that, in some fires, a ‘‘second

ignition’’ is encountered that would not

be mitigated by these proposed systems.

Volvo Cars of North America, Inc.

(Volvo) stated that shutting off fuel flow

quickly during and after a crash could

help to reduce the risk of engine fires

and the spread of fires once one had

started. Volvo stated that since a

number of methods could be employed

to stop the flow of fuel, there should be

no requirement mandating certain

equipment. Volvo stated that we should

give manufacturers the freedom to

design their own systems by specifying

performance criteria for them to meet.

Volvo suggested that we incorporate the

plastic fuel tank test requirements of

ECE Reg. No. 34 into Standard No. 301.

Stilson Consulting submitted two sets

of comments in favor of the proposed

approach. Stilson suggested in its first

set of comments (Stilson-1) that the

upgrading effort concentrate on

preventing fuel siphoning from fuel line

and fuel tank failure due to

undercarriage impact and requiring a

fuel pump shut-off switch for all crash

directions. Stilson-1 provided a draft

amendment to Standard No. 301 for

consideration. Stilson’s second set of

comments (Stilson-2) contained

recommendations for examining vehicle

components and testing fuel lines, fuel

filler necks and caps, and inertia

switches.

The Insurance Institute for Highway

Safety (IIHS), Advocates for Highway

and Auto Safety (Advocates), National

Truck Equipment Association (NTEA),

National Association of State Fire

Marshals (NASFM), and North Carolina

Department of Crime Control and Public

Safety (North Carolina) supported the

proposed approach. IIHS stated that we

should move rapidly to incorporate

component testing. IIHS argued that

since the fuel flow shut-off technology

is readily available, the agency should

require manufacturers to demonstrate

that their vehicles will automatically

interrupt the fuel flow in a crash. IIHS

also stated that the technology to

interrupt the flow of electrical current

was readily available and supported

including in the Standard test

requirements that assure that electrical

sparks do not ignite spilled fuel in

crashes. IIHS reiterated its suggestion

that we specify additional requirements

for nonmetallic fuel tanks.

B. Comments on System Performance

Chrysler, GM, Mitsubishi, Ford, and

Volvo expressed general support for

upgrading Standard No. 301’s test

procedures. GM, Ford, and Chrysler

stated, however, that more research was

needed before the test procedures for

frontal and rear impacts were upgraded.

The American Automobile

Manufacturing Association (AAMA)

also stated that additional research and

analysis was needed for some of the

proposed upgrades. Mitsubishi argued

that we should look at the entire

spectrum of real-world impact speeds

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67697

7A ‘‘moderate’’ fire is defined as fire damage to

between 25 percent and 50 percent of the vehicle

surface, a ‘‘severe’’ fire has fire damage to between

50 percent and 75 percent of the vehicle surface,

and a ‘‘very severe’’ fire has fire damage to more

than 75 percent of the vehicle surface.

and modes and consider whether the

proposed upgrades would yield negative

side-effects on other aspects of overall

crashworthiness. Volvo stated that

Standard No. 301 should adopt the

proposed ECE R94 tests using an offset

crash condition with a fixed deformable

impact barrier. IIHS and Advocates

suggested using a deformable barrier for

frontal and rear impact offset tests. VW

opposed including any additional crash

tests in the standard.

For side impact, GM, VW, Ford,

Chrysler, AAMA, Advocates, and IIHS

all supported replacing the current

Standard No. 301 side impact test with

the current Standard No. 214 dynamic

test. GM, VW, Ford, Chrysler, and

AAMA stated that the moving

deformable barrier (MDB) used in

Standard No. 214 is more realistic than

the one currently used in Standard No.

301’s lateral moving barrier crash test.

They also argued that no new test

development was needed because

Standard No. 214’s test was more

stringent and more representative of

real-world crash conditions than

Standard No. 301’s side impact test.

Chrysler, GM and AAMA stated that no

other side impact tests were justified for

the upgrade and opposed including a

side impact pole test in Standard No.

301. AAMA, GM and Chrysler all noted

that a December 1994 NHTSA report

indicates

that the side collision fire rate for cars,

light trucks, and vans is highest when a

narrow object is struck. However, there are

approximately two to eight times as many

side collision fires (depending on vehicle

type) when the object struck is another

vehicle compared to a narrow object such as

a pole. Thus, it would appear to be more

effective in terms of vehicle side collision fire

mitigation to concentrate on the vehicle-tovehicle collision conditions in the standard.

They argued that Standard No. 214’s

test procedure would do this.

For rear impacts, GM supported

efforts to develop a repeatable and

objective rear impact test, using a

realistic moving deformable barrier to

replace the existing Standard No. 301

rear moving barrier test. However, GM

cautioned that, because of the uniaxial

nature and construction of the Standard

No. 214 barrier, the representativeness

of this barrier face in a primarily off-axis

crush mode (e.g., in an angled rear

impact) had to be evaluated.

Three of the commenters, Stilson,

IIHS, and Advocates, supported the

system level approach to upgrade

Standard No. 301. Stilson-1 argued that

since automobile manufacturers were

already conducting 80 km/h (50 mph)

offset vehicle-to-vehicle impact tests for

examining fuel systems, incorporating

higher test speeds into Standard No. 301

would not pose an unreasonable burden

on the automotive manufacturers.

Stilson-2 reiterated the comments in

Stilson-1 and stated that the minimum

test requirements should be: 56 km/h

(35 mph) frontal barrier (NCAP type)

and 88 km/h (55 mph) vehicle-tovehicle 50 percent offset impact tests, 48

km/h (30 mph) rear fixed barrier impact

tests, and 88 km/h (55 mph) vehicle-tovehicle side impact tests.

Advocates stated that all barrier tests

at any crash angle should be conducted

at least 56 km/h (35 mph). Advocates

supported using a more aggressive test

barrier design to simulate narrow

objects. Advocates expressed support

for replacing the current Standard No.

301 side impact test with the current

Standard No. 214 dynamic test as a near

term upgrade. Advocates also

recommended using heavier barrier

weights for testing LTVs than those used

for cars. Advocates also stated that we

should require fuel tanks on light

passenger vehicles to be placed forward

of the rear axle.

C. Comments on Environmental and

Aging Effects

Ford, Mitsubishi and GM all said that

additional research and analysis was

needed to determine if an association

between fire and environmental and/or

aging factors exists. Chrysler argued that

it was premature to suggest that

environmental and aging factors degrade

fuel system components and lead to an

increase in vehicle fires. Chrysler, Ford

and GM stated that manufacturers were

already upgrading fuel and evaporative

emission components to comply with

the regulations of the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) and the

California Air Resources Board. These

regulations require the vehicle’s fuel

system to comply with specified

emission performance requirements for

a specified period of time (ten years or

100,000 miles for cars and 11 years or

100,000 miles for trucks). The

regulations also require manufacturers

to install an on-board diagnostic system

that detects evaporative emissions.

Mitsubishi also stated that the agency

needed to do more work to define

possible performance tests and said that

such tests would have to address issues

such as how to ‘‘age’’ vehicles or vehicle

parts. Advocates argued that we should

adopt performance tests that ensure that

fuel systems are designed and

manufactured to maintain their integrity

over the life of the vehicle.

VI. Agency’s Response to Comments on

ANPRM

A. NHTSA’s Component Performance

Activities

We examined the effectiveness of fuel

pump shut-off devices in reducing postcrash vehicle fires, using the data in

NHTSA’s 1992 to 1996 NASS file. We

compared post-crash fire occurrence in

light vehicles with and without inertia

activated fuel pump shut-off devices.

According to estimates based on the

NASS data, 1,552 Ford vehicles that had

inertia switches were involved in postcrash fires. In addition, 2,020 GM and

1,008 Chrysler vehicles that did not

have inertia switches were involved in

post-crash fires. These crash fires

accounted for 0.32 percent of all Ford

towaway crashes during that period, as

compared to 0.34 percent for GM, and

0.41 percent for Chrysler. The fires were

classified as minor or major fires with

the following results: Ford (0.23 percent

minor, 0.09 percent major), GM (0.06

percent minor, 0.28 percent major), and

Chrysler (0.35 percent minor, 0.06

percent major), respectively. It appears

that Ford and Chrysler vehicles had

more minor fires than the GM vehicles.

Based on the foregoing, we have

decided not to pursue rulemaking with

respect to fuel system component

performance at this time. Our own

review of NASS data did not reveal a

significant difference in the rate or

severity of post crash fire occurrence in

vehicles with and vehicles without

inertia activated fuel pump shut-off

devices. GM crash test data support this

conclusion. GM monitored the fuel

pump circuitry in all of the crash tests

that it conducted for its abovementioned research. All of the crashes

caused electrical circuitry shorting that

disabled the fuel pump before the

inertia switch could be activated.

B. NHTSA’s System Performance

Activities

In response to the comments and to

follow-up on earlier activities, we

decided to investigate the feasibility and

practicability of upgrading Standard No.

301’s current rear and side impact

requirements. We reviewed real world

crash data to determine what types of

rear impact crashes result in

‘‘moderate,’’ ‘‘severe,’’ and ‘‘very

severe’’ fires.7 Next, we analyzed the

data to determine whether it was the fire

or the impact of the crash that caused

67698 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

8 ‘‘Fuel System Integrity Upgrade—NASS & FARS

Case Study,’’ DOT Contract No. DTNH–22–92–D–

07064, March 1994. 9The study is summarized in the paper, ‘‘A Case

Study of 214 Fatal Crashes Involving Fire,’’ by Carl

Ragland and Hsi-Sheng Hsia, Paper No. 98–S4–O–

08, The Sixteenth International Technical

Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles,

Windsor, Canada, June 1998.

the fatalities and injuries in the firerelated crashes. We then examined the

data to determine the types of rear

crashes that were causing fire-related

fatalities and injuries and developed a

new crash test procedure to simulate the

most frequent crash scenario that leads

to fire and fire-related fatalities and

injuries in rear impact crashes. We then

performed seventeen crash tests using

the new crash test procedure. The

following two sections summarize the

results of the studies and crash tests.

1. Analyses of FARS and NASS Data on

Fire-Related Rear Impact Crashes

In the April 1995 ANPRM, we

discussed the results of a detailed

NHTSA-sponsored research study of a

sample of crash cases involving fire

from NASS and FARS conducted by

GESAC, Inc.8 The GESAC study selected

150 NASS cases for detailed analysis.

They were selected from recent years

and involved fire that caused any

occupant injury of AIS 2 or greater. One

of the objectives of the analysis was to

suggest a laboratory simulation for

crashes that cause vehicle fires. The

suggested crash simulations include

impact mode, speed, barrier, location,

and orientation.

For vehicles receiving rear damage,

the report indicates that a moving

deformable barrier with a partial overlap

(a partial width of the vehicle involved

in the crash) would simulate the most

common type of fire-producing crash.

The GESAC study also presented

information on impact speed for crash

simulations. For rear impacts, the deltav ranged from 11 km/h to 73 km/h (7 to

45 mph) with a 42 km/h (26 mph)

median delta-v. Overlap, which is

defined as the percentage of the rear

width engaged in a crash, ranged from

30 percent to 95 percent with an average

level of 71 percent. The rear impact

estimates were based on 11 cases in the

1979 to 1986 NASS data. Due to data

limitations, we were unable to derive a

more detailed and statistically

significant delta-v versus occupant burn

injury (e.g., 8 km/h (5 mph) delta-v

intervals vs. different AIS levels of

occupant injury). Therefore, we

concluded that further study was

needed.

A detailed case study of 214 firerelated fatal crashes was conducted to

determine whether the death was

caused by the fire or blunt trauma and

to determine the specific crash

conditions which caused the fire.9

Fatality Analysis Reporting System

(FARS) data for 1990, 1991, 1992, and

1993 were queried to obtain a listing of

cases in which fire occurred. Cases were

selected from seven states (Illinois,

Florida, Colorado, Arizona, Ohio,

Delaware, and West Virginia) because

the crash records of these states include

case history information. The crash

records may have included all or part of

the following: (1) Photographs which

documented the crash site and the

vehicle damage, (2) ‘‘police accident

reports’’ (PARs) that described the crash

based on the opinion and findings of the

investigating officer, (3) witness

statements, sometimes indicating the

intensity, location, and timing of the

fire, and (4) medical records that stated

whether an autopsy was performed and

the findings of the autopsy describing

the cause of death, typically

differentiating between conflagration

and blunt trauma. Based on these data,

NHTSA determined the cause of death.

Generally, we gave priority to death

certificates issued by a medical

examiner. We also used witness

statements in a few cases to determine

the immediate post crash state of the

burn victim. This study did not use the

FARS’ variable for most harmful event.

The 214 fire-related fatal crashes

involved 251 vehicles and 293 total

fatalities. The distribution of these 214

crashes was 58 percent (124) frontal

impacts, 15 percent (33) side impacts,

10 percent (22) rollover crashes, 10

percent (22) rear impacts, and 6 percent

(13) coded as other impact types. At the

crash level, NHTSA’s analysis found 21

percent of the crashes (45) resulted in

one or more fatalities due to burnrelated trauma. Of these 45 crashes, 16

were rear impacts.

At the occupant level, NHTSA’s

analysis found 22 percent of the 293

occupant fatalities (65) were due to

burn-related trauma while the

remaining 78 percent (228) were due to

impact-related trauma. The subset

consisting of the 65 burn-related trauma

occupant fatalities was categorized by

crash type. The resulting distribution

shows that 46 percent (30) of the

fatalities occurred from rear impacts, 23

percent (15) from front impacts, 15

percent (10) from side impacts, 11

percent (7) from rollover crashes, and 5

percent (3) were coded as other impact

types.

Although the majority of crashes in

which fire occurs are frontal crashes (58

percent), an analysis of fatalities due to

burn-related trauma shows that rear

impacts account for the majority (46

percent). Therefore, a fatal rear impact

involving fire is more likely to result in

a burn-related fatality than fire-related

crashes in other modes.

Based on the methodology used in

this analysis, we estimate that 309 burnrelated trauma fatalities occurred in

1995 in the United States. Further,

based on the distribution of burn-related

trauma fatalities, about 143 (46 percent)

of these would have occurred in rear

impact crashes.

A thorough review of the crash

conditions in the rear impact cases

revealed a consistent crash and fire

scenario. According to the study, ‘‘[i]n

all 16 rear impact cases the vehicle

[was] struck in the rear causing loss of

fuel from the tank area which ignites

during impact and results in a rapidly

spreading fire and resulting fatalities.’’

The study concluded that striking a

stationary vehicle at 50–55 mph with a

moving deformable barrier (MDB) at a

70 percent overlap (width of vehicle

engagement) would provide a

reasonable crash simulation of real

world rear impact fatal burn cases.

As discussed earlier in this notice, the

April 1995 ANPRM described the

results of a research study GESAC, Inc.

conducted for NHTSA on 150 selected

NASS cases for detailed analysis. One of

the objectives of the analysis was to

suggest a laboratory simulation for each

crash that led to vehicle fire. For rear

impacts, the GESAC study suggested

using a moving deformable barrier with

a partial overlap to simulate the most

frequent crash scenario. The overlap

ranged from 30 percent to 95 percent

with an average level of 71 percent. The

GESAC study accumulated a delta-v

range from 11 to 72 km/h (7 to 45 mph)

with a recommended 42 km/h (26 mph)

delta-v, if the crash could be simulated

by an equal mass vehicle-to-vehicle

collision (i.e., where the weights of the

two vehicles are equivalent).

According to 1991 to 1997 NASS–

CDS estimates of occupant injuries vs.

delta-v, there were no occupant burn

injuries when the delta-v was lower

than 32 km/h (20 mph) in light

passenger vehicles involved with fire

and in nonrollover rear-impact towaway

crashes. The NASS–CDS estimates also

show that the majority of fatal and

nonfatal occupant burn injuries were

crashes with a 34 to 48 km/h (21 to 30

mph) delta-v range. For those occupants

that suffered both burn and impact

injuries, NASS–CDS does not specify

whether the most severe occupant

injury (MAIS) listed in NASS–CDS is

due to burn or impact.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67699

10The barrier was built to behave like a vehicle

in a real-world crash. Unlike the flat faced barrier

currently used in Standard No. 301’s rear impact

crash test, the moving deformable barrier absorbs

some of the crash energy and distributes crash

forces in the striking vehicle in the same way a

vehicle would in a real crash. While there is less

crush and deformation to the struck vehicle with

the MDB, the deformation is uneven and more

realistic than the flat, even deformation caused by

the current flat-faced barrier.

11 Vehicles in the range of 907 to 2,041 kg (2,000

to 4,500 pounds).

12The delta-v of an 80 km/h (50 mph) impact

between a 1,368 kg (3,015 pounds) moving barrier

and a 1,368 kg (3,015 pounds) test vehicle is half

of the impact speed, specifically, 40 km/h (25 mph).

The same test conducted with a lighter test vehicle

would yield a higher delta-v; a crash into a heavier

vehicle would yield a lower delta-v.

13The test results are available in the docket for

this rulemaking.

14Fully instrumented Hybrid III dummies were

placed in the driver and right front passenger

seating positions during the crash tests. The dummy

measurements are available in the docket of this

rulemaking.

15The test weights of the three failed vehicles

were 1,370, 1,360, and 1,326 kg (3,020, 2,997, and

2,923 lb), respectively.

16Between July and November 1995, NHTSA

conducted three more rear impact crash tests on

1993 Ford Mustangs through the Transportation

Research Center of Ohio (TRC). The tests used the

MDB at 80.3, 79.6, and 80.1 km/h (49.9, 49.5, and

49.8 mph) impact speeds and with 88 percent, 80

percent, and 50 percent overlaps, respectively. Only

the second of the three tested vehicles passed the

Standard No. 301 fuel leakage requirements.

17The test weights of the three passed vehicles

were 1,628, 1,946, and 1,906 kg (3,588, 4,289, and

4,201 lb), respectively.

18Further investigation revealed that the

honeycomb supplier had changed the procedure in

manufacturing the assembly. The change in

assembly procedure reduced the bonding strength

of the epoxy. The honeycomb supplier

subsequently replaced all untested honeycomb

faces.

Crash data analyses revealed a

consistent crash scenario that causes fire

and fire-related fatalities and injuries

that can be simulated with the following

test procedure: a moving deformable

barrier (MDB) of 1,368 kg (3,015

pounds) impacting the rear of the test

vehicle at 80 km/h (50 mph) with a 70

percent overlap of the vehicle. The

1,368 kg (3,015 lb) moving deformable

barrier is the same barrier used for

Standard No. 214, except that the

barrier’s face is situated two inches

lower than the face of the Standard No.

214 barrier to simulate pre-crash braking

in rear impact crashes.

The lowering of the face of the barrier

by 2 inches is consistent with the results

of panic braking tests that were

performed by the agency as part of its

underride research. It is also supported

by annualized estimates from NASS–

CDS 1995 to 1999 data regarding the

frequency of braking by the drivers of

striking vehicles in rear impact crashes

involving two light vehicles. Based on

those data, we estimate that 72% of

drivers of striking vehicles involved in

those crashes applied the brakes. Based

on the same data, we estimate that 36%

of drivers applied the brakes in frontal

and 54% in side impact crashes,

respectively.

According to the October 30, 1990

final rule that adopted the Standard No.

214 barrier, the barrier is intended to

simulate a 2,700 pound vehicle

containing 300 pounds of passengers or

cargo, which we estimated would be the

average weight of the striking vehicle in

crashes.10 Using the Standard No. 214

barrier as the rear impact striking device

on a range of small, mid-size, and large

vehicles 11 at 80 km/h (50 mph)

produces a delta-v range of about 32 to

48 km/h (20 to 30 mph). That is the

range in which the majority of fatal and

nonfatal occupant burn injuries are

occurring, according to NASS–CDS

estimates.12

2. Offset Rear Impact Vehicle Crash

Tests

We conducted several series of

vehicle crash tests to determine the

feasibility and practicability of the offset

rear impact test procedure for the types

of vehicles to which it would apply.13

All of the tests used a 1,368 kg (3,015

pounds) MDB with the barrier lowered

by 50 mm (2 inches) to simulate precrash breaking. The MDB impacted the

test vehicle at 80 km/h (50 mph)

(parallel to the longitudinal centerline

of the tested vehicle) with a 70 percent

overlap on the side of the vehicle where

the fuel filler neck is located. This test

condition approximates the findings of

both the GESAC study and the FARS

case study with respect to delta-v and

vehicle-to-barrier overlap. Once the tests

were performed, we looked to see

whether the vehicles met the fuel

leakage requirements of Standard No.

301. A discussion of the test results

follows.14

Between February and April 1996 at

the Transportation Research Center of

Ohio (TRC), we conducted six rear

impact tests on 1996 model vehicles

using the offset rear impact test

procedure. The vehicles tested included

a Suzuki Sidekick, Dodge Neon, Geo

Prizm, Ford Mustang, Plymouth

Voyager, and Chevrolet Blazer. The

Suzuki Sidekick, Dodge Neon, and Geo

Prizm all leaked fuel in excess of

Standard No. 301’s requirements.15 The

Ford Mustang,16 Plymouth Voyager, and

Chevrolet Blazer all passed the fuel

leakage requirements.17

In light of the failure of the smaller

vehicles to pass the test, we decided to

perform additional crash tests on small

compact and light-passenger vehicles to

assess the practicability and

repeatability of the offset rear impact

test procedure with respect to small

vehicles.

GM, in cooperation with the agency,

conducted five rear impact crash tests

between December 1997 and January

1998. The five GM tests were funded by

the GM C/K pickup truck settlement

research fund. All of the five tested

vehicles, a Honda Civic, Chevrolet

Cavalier, Nissan Sentra, VW Jetta, and

Ford Escort, were 1998 models. The

vehicles’ test weights ranged from 1,344

to 1,468 kg (2,962 to 3,236 pounds). The

Honda Civic and the Nissan Sentra

passed Standard No. 301’s fuel leakage

requirements. The Chevrolet Cavalier,

Ford Escort, and VW Jetta all leaked fuel

in excess of Standard No. 301’s

requirements.

We also conducted two additional

tests on two mini-cars, a 1998 Chevrolet

Metro and a 1999 Mazda Miata, through

Veridian (formerly Calspan Corp.). The

Metro weighed 996.5 kg (2,196 pounds)

and the Miata weighed 1,225.5 kg (2,701

pounds). Both of the vehicles passed the

fuel leakage requirements,

demonstrating the feasibility of the

smallest cars passing the proposed rear

impact test procedure.

To assess the repeatability of the

offset rear impact test procedure, we

conducted additional tests of previously

tested vehicles. We decided to retest the

Honda Civic, which had passed the test,

and the Chevrolet Cavalier, which had

failed the test. Between September and

October 1998, the agency conducted

these two tests through TRC. The Honda

Civic passed the TRC test and repeated

the results of the GM test. The Chevrolet

Cavalier, which failed the GM test, also

passed the TRC test and, therefore, did

not repeat the results of the GM test.

An examination of the TRC test

results revealed that the damage

patterns of the TRC tests were nearly

identical to the damage pattern of the

GM tests, but that the extent of the

damage was less. The impact velocity of

the TRC test was 1 km/h lower than the

GM test. This difference, however,

would not account for the difference in

crush. Further examination revealed a

defective honeycomb barrier assembly.

The barrier’s honeycomb bumper

assembly delaminated during the TRC

crash test, which led to more

honeycomb crush and less vehicle

crush. 18 Because of the consistent crush

pattern to both of the vehicles and the

MDBs in the two tests of the Cavalier,

we decided not to retest the Chevrolet

Cavalier at TRC if we obtained a

67700 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

19This Standard is identical to NHTSA’s

Standard No. 301.

repeatable outcome in the Veridian

testing.

In November 1998, we conducted two

additional tests of the Honda Civic and

Chevrolet Cavalier through Veridian.

The Honda Civic passed and the

Chevrolet Cavalier failed the Veridian

test. Both the Cavalier and the Civic

repeated the results of the GM tests.

3. Analysis of Side Impact Test

Procedure

Since 1994, a small number of

vehicles have exceeded the limits on

fuel leakage in Standard No. 301 in

Standard No. 301 lateral and Standard

No. 214 compliance tests (one out of

more than 100 vehicles in Standard No.

214 compliance tests and one out of 43

in Standard No. 301 compliance tests).

In addition, in 1997, the agency’s New

Car Assessment Program (NCAP) began

conducting NCAP side impact tests at a

higher impact speed. To date, two out

of 76 of the NCAP tested vehicles leaked

fuel in excess of Standard No. 301’s fuel

leakage requirements.

We compared the crash test results of

a Standard No. 301 lateral impact

compliance test and a Standard No. 214

compliance test for the same vehicle

model. According to our analysis, the

Standard No. 214 crash test exposes the

subject vehicle to higher crush energy

and higher crash forces, and to greater

changes in velocity than the existing

Standard No. 301 test. The data show

that the fuel system components are

exposed to more stringent forces in the

Standard No. 214 test than in the

present Standard No. 301 lateral test.

C. Environmental and Aging Effects

At this time, we have decided not to

pursue rulemaking related to

environmental and aging effects. While

we agree with Advocates that preserving

fuel system integrity over the life of a

vehicle is important, we also agree with

the comments of Mitsubishi, GM and

Ford that further studies are needed to

define the problems associated with

environmental and aging effects and

determine whether rulemaking would

be appropriate to address them.

GM has conducted research on

environmental factors and aging effects

on fuel system integrity as part of the

GM Settlement Agreement and has

prepared a report on its findings. A

review of this findings, based on a

limited number of vehicles from the

‘‘salt belt’’ regions, indicates some

significant degradation of metal

components including fuel tanks.

Additionally, a significant degradation

of rubber components from the ‘‘sun

belt’’ regions was observed. There was

little degradation of plastic fuel tanks or

lines in either region. Upon further

study, we may revisit this issue in the

future.

As stated in the 1995 ANPRM, the

number of cases in the data base is

insufficient to produce statistically

significant results using vehicle age as a

variable. Further studies are needed to

relate degradation of components to firerelated occupant injuries. The agency

seeks comments on the magnitude of the

problem and the need for future

rulemaking action. The agency also

seeks comments on what procedure and

requirements are appropriate to be used

in testing for problems associated with

older vehicles.

D. Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Fuel

System Safety Requirements

The following discussion summarizes

the results of our comparison of

Standard No. 301’s requirements with

the following foreign fuel system

integrity standards:

(1) The Canadian CMVSS No. 301,

Fuel System Integrity (Gasoline,

Diesel); 19

(2) The Economic Commission for

Europe (ECE) Regulation No. 34,

Uniform Provisions Concerning the

Approval of Vehicles with Regard to the

Prevention of Fire Risks (01 Series,

Amendment 1, January 29, 1979)

(Thirteen European countries have

agreed to adopt ECE Reg. No. 34,

including Germany, France, Italy,

Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium,

Czechoslovakia, United Kingdom,

Luxembourg, Norway, Finland,

Denmark, and Romania); and

(3) The Japanese Standard, Technical

Standard for Fuel Leakage in Collision,

etc. (Amended on August 1, 1989).

In terms of the vehicles covered:

Standard No. 301 applies to all vehicles

4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less GVWR

and school buses over 4,536 kg (10,000

pounds) GVWR. ECE Reg. No. 34 only

applies to passenger cars, and the

Japanese standard applies to passenger

cars and multipurpose passenger

vehicles 2,540 kg (5,600 pounds) or less.

In terms of required impact tests: As

described above, Standard No. 301

requires frontal, rear and side impact

tests at 48, 48 and 32 km/h (30, 30, and

20 mph), respectively, plus a static

rollover test, for vehicles 4,536 kg

(10,000 pounds) or less GVWR.

Standard No. 301 also requires a 48 km/

h (30 mph) impact test for school buses

over 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) GVWR.

The ECE Reg. No. 34 requires a 48 to

53 km/h (30 to 33 mph) frontal fixed

barrier impact test and a 35 to 38 km/

h (22 to 24 mph) rear moving flat rigid

barrier impact test. The ECE test device

weighs 1,100±20 kg (2,425±44 pounds).

A pendulum can be used as the

impactor. ECE Reg. No. 34 does not

require a rollover test. The standard

requires a hydraulic internal-pressure

test for all fuel tanks and special tests

(impact resistance, mechanical strength,

and fire resistance) for plastic fuel tanks.

The Japanese standard requires a 50±2

km/h (31±1 mph) frontal fixed barrier

impact test and a 35 to 38 km/h (22 to

24 mph) rear moving flat barrier impact

test. The flat rigid barrier weighs

1,100±20 kg (2,425±44 pounds). A

pendulum can be used as the impactor.

In terms of test performance

requirements: all three standards limit

fuel spillage. As in Standard No. 301,

the ECE Reg. No. 34 and the Japanese

standard, in general, also limit fuel

spillage to about 28 grams/min (1

ounce/min). The Japanese standard lists

the ECE Reg. No. 34 and Standard No.

301 as equivalent standards.

In summary, Standard No. 301 applies

to more vehicle classes and to higher

vehicle weights than the ECE Reg. No.

34 or the Japanese standard. Standard

No. 301 requires testing in all crash

modes (frontal, side, rear, and rollover).

ECE Reg. No. 34 and the Japanese

standard require only frontal and rear

impact tests. Standard No. 301 uses a

much heavier moving barrier for impact

tests than the ECE and Japanese

standards (1,814 kg vs. 1,100 kg).

However, Standard No. 301 does not

specify a hydraulic pressure test for fuel

tanks, a battery retention requirement,

or additional tests for plastic fuel tanks;

ECE Reg. No. 34 does. In addition, the

ECE Reg. No. 34 requires that ‘‘no fire

maintained by the fuel shall occur’’ and

does not allow failure of the battery

securing device due to the impact. ECE

Reg. No. 34 also requires filling the

impacted vehicle’s fuel tank ‘‘either

with fuel or with a non-inflammable

liquid.’’ We understand that, in practice,

when the ECE Reg. No. 34 tests are

conducted, the fuel tank is filled with

non-inflammable liquid. Therefore,

compliance with the no-fire requirement

is based on a judgment about whether

a fire would occur given the amount of

observed fuel leakage.

VII. Proposal to Upgrade Standard No.

301’s Rear and Lateral Impact Test

Procedures

A. Proposed Offset Rear Impact Test

Procedure

Based on our analysis of real-world

fire-related fatal crash data and the

results of various vehicle offset crash

tests, we are proposing to replace

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67701

20The Ford Mustang test series demonstrated the

technical feasibility of redesigning a failed 1993

Ford Mustang so that it would pass the proposed

upgrade test procedure (the 1996 Ford Mustang

test). It demonstrated that structural and component

design are critical, regardless of the fuel tank

location, for passing the proposed upgrade.

21 In a recent notice regarding Standard No. 214,

NHTSA stated:

While the current moving deformable barrier

used in Standard 214’s dynamic test may be too

small and too light to represent the future U.S. fleet,

the barrier used in EU 96/27/EC is even smaller in

size and mass. Instead of adopting the smaller ECE

barrier, NHTSA plans to consider adopting a more

representative barrier than the current barrier used

in Standard 214.

We note that further research and development

would have to be done before a heavier MDB could

be developed and proposed for use in any test

procedure.

Standard No. 301’s current rear impact

test procedure with one that specifies

striking the rear of the test vehicle at 80

km/h (50 mph) ± 1 km/h with a 1,368

kg (3,015 lb) MDB at a 70 percent

overlap with the test vehicle. The MDB

face would be located 50 mm (2 inches)

lower than the face of the Standard No.

214 barrier to simulate pre-crash

braking. We have tentatively concluded

that this more stringent test procedure

would reduce fire-related deaths and

injuries from rear impact crashes.

The greatest number of fatalities due

to fire occur in rear impacts. The

proposed test procedure simulates a

type of rear vehicle-to-vehicle collision

that can result in post-crash fire in an

otherwise survivable crash: a high speed

offset rear strike to the vehicle that

results in fuel leakage from a breach in

the fuel system; the fuel can ignite

during or following impact and lead to

a rapidly spreading fire which results in

fatalities and injuries. NASS estimates

show that the majority of fatal and

nonfatal occupant burn injuries in rear

impact crashes were in the 34 to 48 km/

h (21 to 30 mph) delta-v range. The

proposed test procedure simulates the

vehicle-to-vehicle crashes that result in

delta-v’s of 32 to 48 km/h (20 to 30

mph).

We have tentatively concluded that

replacing the current Standard No. 301

rear impact test procedure with the

proposed upgraded test procedure is

practicable. Crash test results indicate

that large, medium and small vehicles

could be designed to meet the standard

under the proposed upgraded rear

impact procedure. In those tests, some

small as well as large existing light-duty

vehicles already meet the proposed

upgrade. Several larger light-duty

vehicles, including passenger cars,

multipurpose passenger vehicles, and

light trucks, all passed the proposed

upgrade. In addition, several small

vehicles, the Mazda Miata, Chevrolet

Metro, Nissan Sentra, and Honda Civic,

passed the proposed upgrade. While we

are aware that some existing smaller

vehicles leaked fuel when tested under

the proposed upgraded test procedure

(e.g., the 1996 Suzuki Sidekick, Dodge

Neon, Geo Prizm, and the 1998

Chevrolet Cavalier, VW Jetta, and Ford

Escort), we believe that relatively minor,

inexpensive design changes would

correct the vast majority of the

failures.20 For example, the fuel lines in

the Dodge Neon could be rerouted and

the area on top of the tank around the

fuel sender unit plastic sealing plate

could be reinforced on the VW Jetta.

We are not proposing to require

manufacturers to place each vehicle’s

fuel tank forward of the rear axle as

suggested by Advocates. We believe

such a requirement is unnecessary and

would be design restrictive. We note

that the fuel tank of the 1996 Ford

Mustang, which passed the proposed

rear impact test requirement, is located

behind the rear axle. We believe that

this test demonstrates that structural

and component design is a more critical

factor than fuel tank location in

maintaining fuel system integrity.

We are also not proposing to use a

heavier barrier for light trucks and sport

utility vehicles, as suggested by

Advocates. As noted above, in a 80 km/

h (50 mph) rear impact offset crash test,

a 1,368 kg (3,015 lb) MDB effectively

reproduces the damage profile seen in

real world crashes that can lead to fires.

If a heavier barrier were used, the

proposed rear impact crash test would

no longer reproduce that profile.21

As to the comments concerning other

aspects of crashworthiness, NHTSA

plans to upgrade Standard No. 202,

‘‘Head restraints,’’ and is considering

the possibility of upgrading Standard

No. 207, ‘‘Seating systems.’’

B. Proposed Side Impact Test Procedure

Commenters on the ANPRM

supported replacing Standard No. 301’s

current lateral crash test with Standard

No. 214’s side impact crash test, stating

that the latter test would impose

requirements that are more stringent for

evaluating fuel system integrity than the

current lateral crash test requirements in

Standard No. 301. Manufacturers, safety

advocates, and others agreed that this

replacement would be beneficial from

both a safety and cost perspective. In

addition, in November 1992,

Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VW)

petitioned the agency to replace

Standard No. 301’s lateral crash test

with Standard No. 214’s dynamic test.

We granted that petition very shortly

after it was received.

We are proposing to replace Standard

No. 301’s current lateral crash test with

the side impact crash test of Standard

No. 214. Test analyses show that that

Standard No. 214 crash test exposes the

subject vehicle to higher crush energy

and crash forces, and to greater changes

in velocity than the existing Standard

No. 301 lateral test. The data show that

the fuel system components are often

exposed to greater forces in the

Standard No. 214 test.

Replacing the current Standard No.

301 lateral test with the Standard No.

214 test would both increase safety and

reduce certification testing costs for

manufacturers. These costs would be

reduced because manufacturers would

only have to conduct one type of side

impact test instead of two.

In proposing to adopt the Standard

No. 214 test, we are also proposing a

slight change to that test, both as it

appears in Standard No. 214, and as it

would appear in Standard No. 301.

Instead of specifying that the test would

be conducted ‘‘at’’ 54 km/h (33.5 mph),

we are proposing to specify that the test

would be conducted at 53 km/h + 1.0

km/h. This is very close to the speed

(52.9+0.8 km/h) at which our Office of

Vehicle Safety Compliance has been

conducting Standard No. 214 tests. In

addition to proposing this change to

Standard No. 214, we are also deleting

several paragraphs of outdated

requirements relating solely to vehicles

manufactured in the mid-1990s.

C. Additional Considerations

1. Door System Integrity

As discussed previously, NASS data

from 1991 to 1998 indicate that

potential escape from the fire was made

more difficult for most occupants (87

percent for all impacts) with moderate

or more serious burns because they (1)

were sitting next to a door that was

jammed shut by crash forces, (2) did not

have a door at their position, or (3) had

a part of their body physically

restrained by deformed vehicle

structure. Real-world crash reports

indicate that there were instances in

which fire suddenly started several

minutes after the vehicle was impacted.

Thus, it is critical that occupants are

able to quickly and easily exit the

vehicle after a crash that could lead to

a fire.

We examined the results of the

vehicle crash tests we conducted using

the offset rear impact test procedure to

determine whether the front and rear

doors were operable. The driver and

passenger side doors in the Ford

Mustang, Plymouth Voyager, Chevrolet

Blazer, Geo Prizm, Chevrolet Metro and

67702 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

the Veridian-tested Honda Civic were

all easy to open after the test. The driver

side door in the Veridian-tested

Chevrolet Cavalier was operable while

the passenger side door was not. In the

TRC-tested Honda Civic, the driver side

door was easy to open; the passenger

side door required tools. Tools were

needed to open both the driver and

passenger side door in the TRC-tested

Chevrolet Cavalier. The driver and

passenger side doors in the Mazda Miata

were reported closed/inoperable.

Information was not available on the

GM tests of the Honda Civic, Chevrolet

Cavalier, Nissan Sentra, VW Jetta, and

the Ford Escort. Several of the vehicles

had at least one door that was ‘‘easy’’ to

open or ‘‘operable.’’ Several, however,

had doors that were inoperable or

required tools to open.

In light of these data, we are

considering adding a door opening test

requirement to Standard No. 206. The

purpose of this requirement would be to

reduce the risk of injury in the event

that a crash results in a fire. The

requirement would accomplish this by

increasing the chance that vehicle

occupants can exit or be extricated from

the vehicle after a crash. We request

comment on whether such a

requirement is necessary and, if so,

what type of requirements would be

appropriate, objective, and repeatable.

Do any manufacturers currently perform

post-crash door opening/egress

capability tests? If so, how much force

is applied to the door? How is the force

applied? The ECE’s frontal offset crash

test requirement (ECE Regulation No.

94, S5.2.5.1, Amendment 2, September

18, 1998) requires that at least one door

per row be openable after that frontal

crash. Should we include a similar

requirement in Standard No. 206 for the

Standard No. 301 rear impact crash test?

Should we go further and require

openability after each type of crash

specified in Standard No. 301?

2. Lead Time

The agency proposes a lead time of

approximately three years for the rear

impact test requirements. This proposal

is based on the following analysis:

• All vehicles must be tested with the

new requirements, which specifies a

higher speed than the one currently

used by most manufacturers in their

testing. Thus, essentially all make/

models that a manufacturer intends to

sell after the effective date of these

requirements would have to be tested to

determine compliance. NHTSA

estimates such testing will take at least

five months.

• For all vehicles that did not

currently comply (6 of 13 vehicles

tested failed at least one test), a remedy

must be determined, a prototype

solution fabricated and incorporated in

the vehicle, and the vehicle retested.

With potential iterations, this process

could take ten months. The design

changes we believe are necessary for the

vehicles we have tested have been

moderate, not requiring retooling.

• Finally, the changes must be

implemented on the production line.

This is about a 12 month process.

These three factors indicate that a

lead time of about 27 months is

reasonably necessary. However, if

retooling is necessary for some vehicles

(we tested 13 make/models), at least an

additional 6 months must be added to

the process, making the total 33 months.

Thus, as noted above, we propose a lead

time of approximately three years for

the rear impact test requirements. These

estimates are based on a study

conducted for NHTSA by Ludtke &

Associates and documented in a report

titled ‘‘FMVSS 301 Fuel System

Integrity Rear Impact Test Upgrade:

Cost, Weight and Lead Time Analysis,’’

dated September 21, 1999. This report is

available in the docket for this

rulemaking.

As to the new side impact test

requirements, few, if any, design

changes would be necessary. However,

manufacturers would need to certify

compliance using the new procedure.

Therefore, we propose to put the side

impact test requirements into effect on

the first September 1st that occurs at

least 12 months after the issuance of the

final rule.

Between the issuance of the final rule

and the effective date of the upgraded

Standard, the manufacturers would be

allowed the option of certifying to the

Standard No. 301 rear and/or side

impact requirements based either on the

current test procedure or the new

procedure. However, consistent with

our other recent amendments adding

options to our safety standards, a

manufacturer would have to select

irrevocably a particular option when it

certifies the vehicle.

3. Request for Comments on Particular

Issues

In addition to the matters discussed

above, we seek responses to the

following questions:

a. Are there any real-world data, other

than the data that the agency has

already analyzed for this proposed

upgrade, that may better describe the

relationship between the risk of

occupant injury due to fire and crash

severity?

b. Vehicle manufacturers.

i. How many of your vehicle models

would need some redesign to comply

with the proposed offset rear impact test

procedure? Describe the type and extent

of design changes. What costs would be

associated with those redesigns? Would

you have any significant problems

completing necessary redesigns within

the three-year lead time? If so, please

identify those problems and indicate

how much lead time would you need.

ii. How many of your vehicle models

would need some redesign to comply

with the proposed side impact test

procedure? Describe the type and extent

of design changes. What costs would be

associated with those redesigns? Please

indicate how much lead time you would

need and why.

c. What impact would the proposed

changes have on vehicle safety?

d. Are the proposals sufficient and

appropriate for the different sizes and

types of vehicles?

e. In the various crash tests that were

performed during the research for this

rulemaking, the values of head and neck

injury criteria measured by the

responses of the two front Hybrid III

anthropomorphic test devices were

much higher than acceptable thresholds.

Direct contact of the head of the dummy

with the interior of the vehicle

compartment, which occurred when the

front seat rotated backward excessively

due to the rear impact, contributed to

these high values. These high values

raise concerns about head and neck

protection of the occupants. The rear

impact testing also raised concerns are

also raised about the seat back strength

as most seat backs collapsed in those

tests. What do the high HIC values and

neck loadings registered by the test

dummies in those tests indicate about

the real world potential for trauma

injury to vehicle occupants in rear

impacts? Could future vehicles be

designed to provide both the improved

fuel system integrity necessary to meet

the more stringent requirements

proposed in this NPRM and, at the same

time, provide improved occupant

protection in such impacts?

f. How do seat back failures influence

the injury potential in rear impacts?

Please provide data and other

information that would aid the agency

in determining the need for improving

seat back strength and the appropriate

requirements for doing so.

g. Should we require vehicles to

retain fuel system integrity in tests with

5th percentile female dummies, as well

as with 50th percentile male dummies,

as is currently required?

h. We are proposing to eliminate the

second sentence in S7.1.6(b) from

Standard No. 301. That sentence reads:

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67703

‘‘If the weight on any axle, when the

vehicle is loaded to unloaded vehicle

weight plus dummy weight, exceeds the

axle’s proportional share of the test

weight, the remaining weight shall be

placed so that the weight on that axle

remains the same.’’ Given the

specifications in S7.1.6(a) concerning

the placement of rated cargo and

luggage capacity weight in the luggage

area and the placement of dummies, is

the second sentence in S7.1.6(b) needed

for conducting Standard No. 301

compliance tests?

i. For the rear offset moving

deformable barrier test conditions, we

are proposing that the barrier be the

same as the one shown in Figure 2 of

Standard No. 214, 49 CFR 571.214 and

specified in 49 CFR part 587, with one

exception. The exception is that the face

of the barrier would be positioned in the

rear impact test so that it is 50 mm (2

inches) lower than the barrier face

height specified in the current Standard

No. 214, Figure 2. Positioning the

barrier face in that manner might make

it necessary for us to change slightly the

center of gravity and moment of inertia

specifications in paragraphs 587.6(d)

and (e) of Part 587 of Title 49 CFR for

the purposes of testing under Standard

No. 301. The agency is in the process of

determining the necessary changes to

the specifications and plans to docket

its findings during the comment period

on this notice. Comments are requested

on any necessary changes.

j. With respect to side impact crashes

that result in fires, this proposal to

upgrade Standard No. 301 addresses

vehicle-to-vehicle crashes. As noted

above, there are approximately two to

eight times as many side collision fires

(depending on vehicle type) when the

object struck is another vehicle

compared to a narrow object such as a

pole. However, as also noted above, the

side collision fire rate for cars, light

trucks, and vans is highest when a

narrow object is struck. Would it

therefore be reasonable to consider a

pole side impact test as part of a

subsequent upgrading of the Standard?

k. Should the agency amend FMVSS

No. 301 to prohibit fuel leakage in any

crash test under FMVSS No. 208?

VIII. Rulemaking Analyses

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

NHTSA has considered the impact of

this final rule under E.O. 12866 and the

Department of Transportation’s

regulatory policies and procedures. This

rule was not reviewed under E.O.

12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and

Review’’ and is not considered

significant under the Department of

Transportation’s regulatory policies and

procedures.

The agency has prepared a

Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation

(PRE) describing the economic and

other effects of this proposal. The

average cost for vehicles that would

need to be modified to meet the

proposed rear seat requirements is $5

per vehicle. Based on our estimate that

46 percent of the fleet does not currently

meet the proposal and on an estimated

15.2 million total sales, we estimate that

the total cost for the fleet would be $35

million annually.

The target population of crashes

includes multi-vehicle crashes in which

a passenger vehicle is struck in the rear

by another passenger vehicle and the

fire starts in the struck vehicle. There

are an estimated 57 fatalities and 119

non-fatal injuries annually in the target

population. The non-fatal burn injuries

in that population of crashes were

mostly minor and were typically not the

most severe injury to the occupant. Our

estimate of benefits ranges from 8 to 21

lives saved annually, once all vehicles

on the road meet the proposed rear

impact test.

While we believe the FMVSS 214 side

impact test is somewhat stricter than the

existing side impact test in FMVSS 301,

we could not quantify any benefits in

side impacts. There are less than 100

fatalities annually in multi-vehicle side

impacts resulting in fire. More

important, only one out of more than

100 vehicles tested failed the proposed

fuel leakage requirements using the

FMVSS 214 proposed test. Based on

those test results, it appears that few

vehicles would have to be modified to

meet the proposed side impact test.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has also considered the

effects of this proposed rule under the

Regulatory Flexibility Act. I hereby

certify that it would not have a

significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

Further, the amendments primarily

affect passenger car and light truck

manufacturers which are not small

entities under 5 U.S.C. 605(b). The

Small Business Administration’s

regulations at 13 CFR part 121 define a

small business, in part, as a business

entity ‘‘which operates primarily within

the United States.’’ (13 CFR 121.105(a)).

The agency estimates that there are at

most five small final stage

manufacturers of passenger cars in the

U.S. and no small manufacturers of light

trucks, producing a combined total of at

most 500 cars each year. It is unknown

how many of their vehicle models

currently meet the proposed

requirements. Comments are requested

on the impact of this proposal on small

vehicle manufacturers.

There are a large number of secondstage manufacturers that could be

affected by this proposal. Second-stage

manufacturers buy a chassis from a firststage manufacturer and finish it to the

consumer’s specifications. The

manufacturers that put a work-related

body on a pickup truck chassis (like a

small tow truck) often perform

manufacturing operations affecting the

fuel system, both in the structure

around the fuel tank and where the fuel

filler neck attaches to the body. Other

second-stage manufacturers use a van

chassis or an incomplete vehicle for

ambulances, small mobile homes, small

school buses, etc. Typically, the firststage manufacturer provides the secondstage manufacturer with a body

builder’s guide which tells the secondstage manufacturer what it can do and

still either pass along the original

equipment manufacturer’s certification

for compliance with Standard No. 301

(for chassis cabs) or otherwise be

confident that the vehicle will comply

(for other types of incomplete vehicles).

To the extent that a second-stage

manufacturer deviates from the guide, it

would have to certify compliance on

their own. The agency tentatively

concludes that few final stage

manufacturers would do so and that

therefore this would not result in a

significant economic impact on these

companies. Comments are requested on

this tentative conclusion.

C. National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking

action for the purposes of the National

Environmental Policy Act. The agency

has concluded that implementation of

this action would not have any

significant impact on the quality of the

human environment.

D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

The agency has analyzed this

rulemaking in accordance with the

principles and criteria contained in

Executive Order 13132 and has

determined that it does not have

sufficient federalism implications to

warrant consultation with State and

local officials or the preparation of a

federalism summary impact statement.

The proposal would not have any

substantial effects on the States, or on

the current Federal-State relationship,

or on the current distribution of power

and responsibilities among the various

local officials.

67704 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

E. Unfunded Mandates Act

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a

written assessment of the costs, benefits

and other effects of proposed or final

rules that include a Federal mandate

likely to result in the expenditure by

State, local or tribal governments, in the

aggregate, or by the private sector, of

more than $100 million annually

(adjusted for inflation with base year of

1995). As indicated above, NHTSA

anticipates that this proposed rule

would not result in an annual

expenditure of $100 million.

F. Civil Justice Reform

These amendments would not have

any retroactive effect. Under 49 U.S.C.

30103, whenever a Federal motor

vehicle safety standard is in effect, a

State may not adopt or maintain a safety

standard applicable to the same aspect

of performance which is not identical to

the Federal standard, except to the

extent that the state requirement

imposes a higher level of performance

and applies only to vehicles procured

for the State’s use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets

forth a procedure for judicial review of

final rules establishing, amending or

revoking Federal motor vehicle safety

standards. That section does not require

submission of a petition for

reconsideration or other administrative

proceedings before parties may file suit

in court.

G. National Technology Transfer and

Advancement Act

Under the National Technology

Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995

(NTTAA) (Public Law 104–113), ‘‘all

Federal agencies and departments shall

use technical standards that are

developed or adopted by voluntary

consensus standards bodies, using such

technical standards as a means to carry

out policy objectives or activities

determined by the agencies and

departments.’’ We surveyed several

voluntary standards organizations to see

whether there were any voluntary

standards that were applicable to this

rulemaking. Standard No. 301’s current

rear and lateral moving barrier crash test

requirements are the same as the Society

of Automotive Engineer’s (SAE)

Standard for rear and side barrier

collision tests, SAE, J972. Today’s

notice proposes to amend Standard No.

301’s current rear and lateral moving

barrier crash test requirements. The

American National Standards Institute

(ANSI) and the International Standards

Organization (ISO) do not have any

automobile fire protection standards

relevant to this rulemaking. We seek

comment on whether there are any other

voluntary standards that may be

applicable to this rulemaking.

H. Paperwork Reduction Act

This rule does not contain any

collection of information requirements

requiring review under the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995 (Public Law 104–

13).

I. Plain Language

Executive Order 12866 and the

President’s memorandum of June 1,

1998, require each agency to write all

rules in plain language. Application of

the principles of plain language

includes consideration of the following

questions:

—Have we organized the material to

suit the public’s needs?

—Are the requirements in the rule

clearly stated?

—Does the rule contain technical

language or jargon that is not clear?

—Would a different format (grouping

and order of sections, use of headings,

paragraphing) make the rule easier to

understand?

—Would more (but shorter) sections

be better?

—Could we improve clarity by adding

tables, lists, or diagrams?

—What else could we do to make the

rule easier to understand?

If you have any responses to these

questions, please include them in your

comments on this NPRM.

IX. Submission of Comments

How Can I Influence NHTSA’s Thinking

on This Proposed Rule?

In developing this NPRM, we tried to

address the concerns of all our

stakeholders. Your comments will help

us improve this rule. We invite you to

provide different views on options we

propose, new approaches we have not

considered, new data, how this

proposed rule may affect you, or other

relevant information. We welcome your

views on all aspects of this proposed

rule, but request comments on specific

issues throughout this document. We

grouped these specific requests near the

end of the sections in which we discuss

the relevant issues. Your comments will

be most effective if you follow the

suggestions below:

Explain your views and reasoning as

clearly as possible.

• Provide solid technical and cost

data to support your views.

• If you estimate potential costs,

explain how you arrived at the estimate.

• Tell us which parts of the NPRM

you support, as well as those with

which you disagree.

• Provide specific examples to

illustrate your concerns.

• Offer specific alternatives.

• Refer your comments to specific

sections of the NPRM, such as the units

or page numbers of the preamble, or the

regulatory sections.

• Be sure to include the name, date,

and docket number with your

comments.

How Do I Prepare and Submit

Comments?

Your comments must be written and

in English. To ensure that your

comments are correctly filed in the

Docket, please include the docket

number of this document in your

comments.

Your comments must not be more

than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). We

established this limit to encourage you

to write your primary comments in a

concise fashion. However, you may

attach necessary additional documents

to your comments. There is no limit on

the length of the attachments.

Please submit two copies of your

comments, including the attachments,

to Docket Management at the address

given above under ADDRESSES.

In addition, for those comments of 4

or more pages in length, we request that

you send one copy on computer disc to:

Dr. George Mouchahoir, Chief, Special

Vehicles & Systems Division, NPS–12,

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590. We emphasize

that this is not a requirement. However,

we ask that you do this to aid us in

expediting our review of all comments.

The copy on computer disc may be in

any format, although we would prefer

that it be in WordPerfect 8.

Comments may also be submitted to

the docket electronically by logging onto

the Dockets Management System

website at http://dms.dot.gov. Click on

‘‘Help & Information’’ or ‘‘Help/Info’’ to

obtain instructions for filing the

document electronically.

How Can I Be Sure That my Comments

Were Received?

If you wish Docket Management to

notify you upon its receipt of your

comments, enclose a self-addressed,

stamped postcard in the envelope

containing your comments. Upon

receiving your comments, Docket

Management will return the postcard by

mail.

How Do I Submit Confidential Business

Information?

If you wish to submit any information

under a claim of confidentiality, you

should submit three copies of your

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67705

complete submission, including the

information you claim to be confidential

business information, to the Chief

Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given

above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT. In addition, you should

submit two copies, from which you

have deleted the claimed confidential

business information, to Docket

Management at the address given above

under ADDRESSES. When you send a

comment containing information

claimed to be confidential business

information, you should include a cover

letter setting forth the information

specified in our confidential business

information regulation. (49 CFR part

512.)

Will the Agency Consider Late

Comments?

We will consider all comments that

Docket Management receives before the

close of business on the comment

closing date indicated above under

DATES. To the extent possible, we will

also consider comments that Docket

Management receives after that date. If

Docket Management receives a comment

too late for us to consider it in

developing a final rule (assuming that

one is issued), we will consider that

comment as an informal suggestion for

future rulemaking action.

How Can I Read the Comments

Submitted by Other People and Other

Materials Relevant to This Rulemaking?

You may view the materials in the

docket for this rulemaking on the

Internet. This materials include the

written comments submitted by other

interested persons and the preliminary

regulatory evaluation prepared by this

agency. You may read them at the

address given above under ADDRESSES.

The hours of the Docket are indicated

above in the same location.

You may also see the comments and

materials on the Internet. To read them

on the Internet, take the following steps:

(1) Go to the Docket Management

System (DMS) Web page of the

Department of Transportation (http://

dms.dot.gov/).

(2) On that page, click on ‘‘search.’’

(3) On the next page (http://

dms.dot.gov/search/), type in the fourdigit docket number shown at the

beginning of this document. Example: If

the docket number were ‘‘NHTSA–

2000–1234,’’ you would type ‘‘1234.’’

After typing the docket number, click on

‘‘search.’’

(4) On the next page, which contains

docket summary information for the

materials in the docket you selected,

click on the desired comments. You

may download the comments.

Please note that even after the

comment closing date, we will continue

to file relevant information in the

Docket as it becomes available. Further,

some people may submit late comments.

Accordingly, we recommend that you

periodically check the Docket for new

material.

X. Proposed Regulatory Text

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and

record keeping requirements, Tires.

In consideration of the foregoing, the

agency is proposing to amend 49 CFR

part 571 as follows:

PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR

VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

1. The authority citation for part 571

would be revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at

49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 571.214 would be amended

by revising S3(b) to read as follows and

by removing and reserving S3(c) and

S3(d).

§ 571.214 Standard No. 214; Side impact

protection.

* * * * *

S3. Requirements. ***

(b) When tested under the conditions

of S6, each passenger car manufactured

on or after September 1, 1996 shall meet

the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3

in a 53 km/h (± 1.0 km/h) impact in

which the car is struck on either side by

a moving deformable barrier. 49 CFR

part 572, subpart F 50th percentile male

test dummies are placed in the front and

rear outboard seating positions on the

struck side of the car. However, the rear

seat requirements do not apply to

passenger cars with a wheelbase greater

than 3302 mm, or to passenger cars

which have rear seating areas that are so

small that the part 572, subpart F

dummies cannot be accommodated

according to the positioning procedure

specified in S7.

(c) [Reserved]

(d) [Reserved]

3. Section 571.301 would be amended

by revising S6.1, S6.2, S6.3, S7.1.6(b),

S7.2, and S7.3, and adding a new figure

3 at the end of the section to read as

follows:

§ 571.301 Standard No. 301; Fuel system

integrity.

* * * * *

S6.1 Frontal barrier crash. When the

vehicle traveling longitudinally forward

at any speed up to and including 48 km/

h impacts a fixed collision barrier that

is perpendicular to the line of travel of

the vehicle, or at any angle up to 30

degrees in either direction from the

perpendicular to the line of travel of the

vehicle, with 49 CFR part 572 50th

percentile male test dummies at each

front outboard designated seating

position, under the applicable

conditions of S7, fuel spillage must not

exceed the limits of S5.5.

S6.2 Rear offset moving barrier

crash. When the vehicle is impacted

from the rear by an offset moving

deformable barrier at 80 km/h (± 1.0 km/

h) with 49 CFR part 572 50th percentile

male test dummies at each front

outboard designated seating position,

under the applicable conditions of S7,

fuel spillage must not exceed the limits

of S5.5.

S6.3 Side moving barrier crash.

When the vehicle is impacted on either

side by a moving deformable barrier at

53 km/h (± 1.0 km/h) with 49 CFR part

572 50th percentile male test dummies

at positions required for testing to S7 of

Standard No. 214, under the applicable

conditions of S7, fuel spillage must not

exceed the limits of S5.5.

* * * * *

S7.1.6 * * *

* * * * *

(b) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a

multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck,

or bus with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less

is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight,

plus the necessary test dummies, as

specified in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated

cargo and luggage capacity weight,

whichever is less, secured to the vehicle

and distributed so that the weight on

each axle as measured at the tire-ground

interface is proportional to its GAWR.

Each dummy is restrained only by

means that are installed in the vehicle

for protection at its seating position.

* * * * *

S7.2 Side moving deformable barrier

test conditions. The side moving

deformable barrier crash test conditions

are those specified in S6 of Standard

No. 214, 49 CFR 571.214.

S7.3 Rear offset moving deformable

barrier test conditions. The moving

deformable barrier is the same as the

one shown in Figure 2 of Standard No.

214, 49 CFR 571.214 and specified in 49

CFR part 587, except as otherwise

specified in paragraph S7.3(b). The

barrier and test vehicle are positioned so

that at impact—

(a) The test vehicle is stationary;

(b) The deformable face of the barrier

is mounted on the barrier 50 mm lower

than the height specified in Standard

No. 214, Figure 2;

(c) The barrier is traveling at 80 km/

h (± 1.0 km/h); and

(d) The barrier impacts the test

vehicle with the longitudinal centerline

67706 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules

of the vehicle parallel to the line of

travel and perpendicular to the barrier

face within a tolerance of ± 5 degrees.

The test vehicle and barrier face are

aligned so that the barrier strikes the

rear of the vehicle with 70 percent

overlap toward either side of the

vehicle. So aligned, the barrier face fully

engages one half of the rear of the

vehicle and partially engages the other

half. At impact, the vehicle’s

longitudinal centerline is located

inboard of the side edge of the barrier

face by a distance equal to 20 percent

of the vehicle’s width ± 50 mm. (See

Figure 3.) The vehicle’s width is the

maximum dimension measured across

the widest part of the vehicle, including

bumpers and molding but excluding

such components as exterior mirrors,

flexible mud flaps, marker lamps, and

dual rear wheel configurations.

* * * * *

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 219 / Monday, November 13, 2000 / Proposed Rules 67707

Issued on: November 6, 2000.

Stephen R. Kratzke,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 00–28984 Filed 11–9–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–C