COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Elder and Petty

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JILL MATTHEWS WILLSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION∗ BY

v. Record No. 1187-12-2 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY

APRIL 23, 2013

ROBERT GARDNER WILLSON

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE

Edward L. Hogshire, Judge

W. Mark Dunn (Leah E. Hernandez; Shaheen Law Firm, P.C.; 

Dygert, Wright, Hobbs, & Heilberg, PLC, on briefs), for appellant.

William C. Scott, IV (MichieHamlett, on brief), for appellee.

Jill Willson (“wife”) appeals the trial court’s final divorce decree, which granted her a 

divorce from Robert Willson (“husband”). On appeal, wife assigns thirteen errors to the trial 

court’s rulings. For the sake of brevity, we summarize the assignments of error: (1) the trial 

court erred by refusing to grant wife a continuance; (2) the trial court erred by not allowing wife 

to state or file objections contemporaneously with the entry of the divorce decree; (3) the trial 

court erred in ruling that wife’s marriage to husband condoned sexual abuse that preceeded the 

marriage; (4) the trial court erred in ordering property held by the parties in Nelson County to be 

sold instead of divided in kind; and (5) the trial court erred in calculating the amount of spousal 

support awarded to husband. In his brief, husband also assigns error to the trial court’s rulings, 

 ∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

UNPUBLISHED
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arguing that the trial court erred in failing to calculate husband’s tax consequences of receiving 

spousal support.

For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

I.

Because the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and this 

memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite below only those facts and 

incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of 

this appeal. “On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the party 

prevailing below, ‘and grant all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Johnson v. 

Johnson, 56 Va. App. 511, 513-14, 694 S.E.2d 797, 799 (2010) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 

29 Va. App. 673, 678, 514 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1999)). “On interpretations of the law as it applies 

to [the evidence], however, we review the circuit court’s ruling de novo . . . .” Lewis v. Lewis, 

53 Va. App. 528, 536, 673 S.E.2d 888, 892 (2009).

II.

A. Motion for a Continuance

Wife first argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a continuance. We 

disagree.

The decision to grant a motion for a continuance is within the 

sound discretion of the [trial court] and must be considered in view 

of the circumstances unique to each case. The [trial court’s] ruling 

on a motion for a continuance will be rejected on appeal only upon 

a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the 

movant.

Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34, 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007).

This case began with a bill of complaint, which was filed on November 2, 2005. The 

case was actively litigated from the date of the bill of complaint until March 2009. At that time, 

the case lay dormant until wife’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which was 
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granted on August 9, 2010. The case again lay dormant until August 15, 2011, when the trial 

court set the date for trial for March 9, 2012. Wife retained new counsel on January 20, 2012. 

On January 24, 2012, five months after the date for trial was set, wife filed her motion for a 

continuance. The trial court denied her motion.

Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion because she was not able to retain 

counsel until January 20, 2012 due to medical issues. Wife further argues that because of the 

medical issues she was able neither to assist her counsel in preparation for trial nor to personally 

participate in the trial. At the motion hearing, wife did not present any evidence—in the form of 

expert testimony or otherwise—that supported her argument. Instead, wife merely argued the 

motion before the trial court without any corroborative evidence. The trial court heard the 

arguments, considered the arguments, and denied the motion for a continuance. Further, wife 

has shown no prejudice from the denial of her motion. Although she alleged the trial court file 

could not be found by the clerk’s office when her attorney attempted to review it on January 20, 

2012, she did not indicate when the file was located or allege how the delay adversely impacted 

counsel’s preparation. Further, wife was in fact present and testified at trial, and she had the 

opportunity to present her case and be represented at trial. Based on the record before us, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.

B. Objections to Divorce Decree

Wife next argues that the trial court erred by not allowing her to state or file objections 

contemporaneously with the entry of the divorce decree. Specifically, wife argues that she was 

deprived of a meaningful opportunity to address the terms of the divorce decree. We disagree.

Contrary to wife’s argument, she had ample opportunity to file objections and address the 

terms of the divorce decree. Wife was allowed to make closing argument on the last day of the 

trial. Wife filed a proposed divorce decree with findings that she asked the court to adopt. Wife 
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also filed a rebuttal to husband’s proposed divorce decree. Nothing in the record indicates that 

the trial court ignored the parties’ proposed divorce decrees. The trial court merely decided to 

draft its own divorce decree. Finally, after entry of the trial court’s divorce decree, wife filed 

objections to the decree and a motion to reconsider.

Although the trial court dispensed with the endorsement requirements of Rule 1:13, as 

expressly permitted by the rule,1 it is clear from the record that wife had the ability to note her 

objections to the trial court’s divorce decree by filing objections with the court and making her 

motion for reconsideration. Wife stated her objections. We are now considering those 

objections. The trial court did not err in refusing to hold another hearing to allow wife to state

her objections. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the 

final order without an additional hearing.

C. Grounds for Divorce and Condonation

1. Grounds for Divorce

The trial court granted wife a divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart 

continuously and without interruption since June 27, 2004. Wife argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion because it did not grant her a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and 

constructive desertion. 2

 Wife claims that she presented sufficient evidence to prove cruelty and 

 1 Rule 1:13 provides

Drafts of orders and decrees shall be endorsed by counsel of 

record, or reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting 

such drafts together with copies thereof shall be served pursuant to 

Rule 1:12 upon all counsel of record who have not endorsed them. 

Compliance with this Rule and with Rule 1:12 may be modified or 

dispensed with by the court in its discretion.

2 Wife argued that the trial court erred in applying the condonation defense to the grounds 

for divorce. We need not address this argument because multiple grounds for divorce existed, 

and the trial court was free to choose between those grounds for divorce.
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constructive desertion on the part of husband. Nevertheless, wife does not argue that there was 

insufficient evidence to support a finding that the parties had lived separate and apart for over a 

year. Accordingly, even if we assume that the record supports wife’s argument, the trial court

had two equally legitimate grounds for granting the divorce.

“‘Where dual or multiple grounds for divorce exist, the trial judge can use his sound 

discretion to select the grounds upon which he will grant the divorce.’” Fadness v. Fadness, 52 

Va. App. 833, 840, 667 S.E.2d 857, 861 (2008) (quoting Konefal v. Konefal, 18 Va. App. 612, 

613-14, 446 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1994)). Trial courts are not required “‘to give precedence to one 

proven ground of divorce over another.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. App. 217, 

219, 415 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1992)); see also Robertson v. Robertson, 215 Va. 425, 426, 211 

S.E.2d 41, 43 (1975).

Therefore, assuming without deciding that multiple grounds for divorce existed, the trial 

court was free to choose between those grounds for divorce. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by granting the divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart for more 

than one year because the evidence supported such a ruling.

2. Condonation

Wife further argues that the trial court erred by applying the legal defense of condonation

to husband’s premarital conduct. Wife argues that because the court is required to consider the 

grounds for divorce in determining spousal support and equitable distribution, its failure to 

consider this alleged ground constituted error. In support of her argument, wife points to an 

isolated statement in the trial court’s final decree,

[Wife] presented evidence of wrongdoing on the part of [husband]

prior to the parties’ marriage, this evidence was irrelevant except 

as to show factors contributing to [wife]’s emotional state at the 

time of separation; that due to the parties subsequent marriage, any 

wrongdoing on the part of [husband] was clearly condoned.
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Wife argues that the trial court used the word condoned in the legal sense of condonation, i.e.,

“‘the [forgiveness or] remission, by one of the married parties, of an offense which he knows the 

other has committed against the marriage, on the condition of being continually afterward treated 

by the other with conjugal kindness.’” Cutlip v. Cutlip, 8 Va. App. 618, 621, 383 S.E.2d 273, 

275 (1989) (quoting Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 191, 195, 31 S.E. 72, 74 (1898)). In so doing, wife 

argues the trial court did not consider the evidence presented concerning husband’s pre-marital 

wrongdoing in calculating its equitable distribution and spousal support awards.

In Virginia, “we presume [trial] judges know the law and 

correctly apply it.” An appellant can rebut the presumption by 

showing, either by the ruling itself or the reasoning underlying it, 

the trial judge misunderstood the governing legal principles. We 

are particularly skeptical, however, of appellate efforts to piece 

together such a conclusion from fragmented remarks from the 

bench.

White v. White, 56 Va. App. 214, 217-18, 692 S.E.2d 289, 290-91 (2010) (alteration in original) 

(quoting de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 445, 680 S.E.2d 297, 306 (2009)); see also

Damon v. York, 54 Va. App. 544, 555, 680 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2009) (holding it improper to “fix 

upon isolated statements of the trial judge taken out of the full context in which they were made, 

and use them as a predicate for holding the law has been misapplied”).

Wife fixed upon an isolated statement by the trial court in asserting that the trial court 

misapplied the legal defense of condonation. It is apparent that the trial court did not use the 

word condoned in the legal sense of condonation. Instead, the context suggests that the trial 

court used the word in the common usage of “to pardon or forgive.” Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 473 (1981). Indeed, the trial court was saying that over twenty-three 

years of marriage demonstrated that wife pardoned or forgave husband’s pre-marital 

wrongdoing.
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Further, the trial court did not completely ignore wife’s evidence concerning husband’s 

pre-marital wrongdoing. To the contrary, the trial court specifically stated that it considered this 

evidence “to show factors contributing to [wife]’s emotional state at the time of separation.” 

And in determining an equitable distribution award under Code § 20-107.3(E)(5), the trial court 

is required to consider “[t]he circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of 

the marriage, specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of subdivisions 

(1), (3) or (6) of § 20-91 or § 20-95.” In determining an award of spousal support under Code 

§ 20-107.1(E), the trial court “shall consider the circumstances and factors which contributed to 

the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including adultery and any other ground for divorce 

under the provisions of subdivision (3) or (6) of § 20-91 or § 20-95.”3

The trial court considered the evidence as relevant regarding its equitable distribution and 

spousal support awards. Accordingly, we reject wife’s argument and hold that the trial court 

properly considered wife’s pre-marital evidence in calculating its equitable distribution and 

spousal support awards.

D. Sale of Nelson County Property

Wife next argues that the trial court erred in ordering property held by the parties in 

Nelson County to be sold instead of divided in kind. We disagree.

“Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the sound discretion of the trial 

judge and that award will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

 3 Appellant’s only argument on brief is that the trial court failed to consider the quarter 

century old events which she alleges contributed to the dissolution of the marriage as required by 

Code § 20-107.3(E). However, “[c]ircumstances that lead to the dissolution of the marriage but 

have no effect upon marital property, its value, or otherwise are not relevant to determining a 

monetary award, need not be considered [under this subparagraph].” Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. App. 

1, 5-6, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1986). Of course, “[i]f the evidence of misconduct is relevant under 

any other factor than subparagraph (5), it may in the judge’s discretion be considered when 

making an equitable award.” O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 20 Va. App. 522, 527, 458 S.E.2d 323, 

326 (1995).
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support it.” Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). 

Accordingly, we will not reverse an award “[u]nless it appears from the record that the [trial 

court] has abused [its] discretion, . . . has not considered or misapplied one of the statutory 

mandates, or that the evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying [the] resolution of 

the conflict.” Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 443, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987).

Wife’s argument centers on the equitable distribution statute, Code § 20-107.3. Under 

the equitable distribution statute, the trial court, after considering the factors listed in Code 

§ 20-107.3(E), is authorized to “divide or transfer or order the division or transfer, or both, of 

jointly owned marital property, jointly owed marital debt, or any part thereof.” Code 

§ 20-107.3(C). The trial court is given further authorization to effectuate the division of the 

marital property: 

As a means of dividing or transferring the jointly owned marital 

property, the court may transfer or order the transfer of real or 

personal property or any interest therein to one of the parties, 

permit either party to purchase the interest of the other and direct 

the allocation of the proceeds, provided the party purchasing the 

interest of the other agrees to assume any indebtedness secured by 

the property, or order its sale by private sale by the parties, through 

such agent as the court shall direct, or by public sale as the court 

shall direct without the necessity for partition.

Code § 20-107.3(C). Accordingly, the trial court may, in its discretion, choose one of the 

options given to it under Code § 20-107.3(C): division in kind, purchase by either party, or 

private or public sale.

Here, wife asked the trial court to divide the Nelson County property in kind. The Nelson 

County property consisted of several parts in two separate locations; the locations were called the 

Cascades property and the George Carter Hollow property. Husband testified that the Cascades 

property would be easier to sell because it was nicer and included a cabin. The George Carter

Hollow property, however, would be more difficult to sell and could not be divided because one 
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part of it provided access to the other parts. After reviewing the evidence, the trial court chose to 

order the sale of the Nelson County property, instead of dividing it in kind.

On appeal, wife argues that the trial court erred in ordering the sale of the Nelson County 

property because the trial court mistakenly concluded that the Cascades and George Carter 

Hollow properties could not be sold separately. The language of the trial court’s decision does 

not support this argument. The trial court held,

[W]ith respect to the real property, the land in Nelson County is 

mountainous, difficult to access and, except for one lot, is best 

suited for sale as an entire parcel, and given the significant debts of 

both parties, the Court finds that the property should be sold and 

the proceeds divided equally between the parties.

Throughout the trial, the Cascades and George Carter Hollow properties were referred to as the 

Nelson County properties. The trial court’s holding reflects this terminology. The trial court’s 

decree does not require the parties to sell the Cascades and George Carter Hollow properties as 

one piece of property. Instead, the divorce decree contemplates multiple sales.

Wife further argues that the trial court erred in ordering the sale of the Nelson County 

properties because the value of the property was depressed due to prevailing market conditions. 

Wife states that she presented evidence to support this assertion. The only evidence presented on 

this issue, however, was testimony by wife that it would be a “crime” to sell the property at that 

time. But wife also testified that she did not actually know what the property was worth: “I 

mean, we[ have] agreed to value, but nobody knows what they[ are] worth right now or what 

they would sell for . . . .” The trial court heard the testimony, reviewed the evidence, considered 

the the factors listed in Code § 20-107.3(E), and decided the best course of action was to order 

the sale of the property, the remedy husband specifically requested. Based on the record before 

us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.
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E. Spousal Support

Wife’s assignments of error five through thirteen are placed in one section of her brief. 

The section is entitled, “the trial court erred in ordering wife to pay spousal support to husband.” 

Although this section of her brief is divided into nine assignments of error, the crux of wife’s 

argument is that the trial court erred in failing to properly evaluate the evidence concerning her

physical and mental condition, erred in assessing the property interests of the parties, and erred 

in calculating the obligations, needs, and financial resources of the parties, all as required by 

Code § 20-107.1(E)(1), (4) and (7). Of course, these are merely three of thirteen factors that the 

trial court is required to consider when awarding spousal support. See Bristow v. Bristow, 221 

Va. 1, 3, 267 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1980) (holding that a trial court is required to consider all the factors 

enumerated in Code § 20-107.1(E)). Significantly, however, wife fails to cite even a single 

principle of law or authority to support her argument that the trial court’s allegedly erroneous 

evaluation of the evidence requires a reversal of the judgment.

“Rule 5A:20(e) requires that an appellant’s opening brief contain ‘[t]he principles of law, 

the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented.’ Unsupported assertions of 

error ‘do not merit appellate consideration.’” Fadness, 52 Va. App. at 850, 667 S.E.2d at 865 

(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 730, 734, 660 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2008)). Indeed, 

“A court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and 

to be cited pertinent authority. The appellate court is not a 

depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of 

argument and research. To ignore such a rule by addressing the 

case on the merits would require this court to be an advocate for, as 

well as the judge of the correctness of, [appellant’s] position on the 

issues he raises. On the other hand, strict compliance with the 

rules permits a reviewing court to ascertain the integrity of the 

parties’ assertions which is essential to an accurate determination 

of the issues raised on appeal.”
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Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 51 Va. App. at 734-35, 660 S.E.2d at 345). 

Accordingly, if a party fails to strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e), and that 

failure is significant, then we may treat the assignment of error as waived. Id.

Wife failed to provide any guiding legal authority. One does not simply walk into an 

appellate court without legal authority to guide the way. There is a plethora of legal authority on 

spousal support awards that wife could have used to support her arguments. It is apparent that 

wife abdicated her burden of research to this Court. We refuse to be an advocate for wife. 

“Appellate courts are not unlit rooms where attorneys may wander blindly about, hoping to 

stumble upon a reversible error. If [wife] believed that the trial court erred, it was [her] duty to 

present that error to us with legal authority to support [her] contention.” Id. Because wife’s 

failure to provide legal argument or authority is significant, she has waived her right to have 

these assignments of error reviewed by this Court.

F. Tax Consequences of Husband’s Spousal Support Award

Husband argues that the trial court erred in failing to calculate the tax consequences that 

he would incur as a result of receiving spousal support. We disagree.

“The determination whether a spouse is entitled to support, and if so how much, is a 

matter within the discretion of the [trial] court . . . .” Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 27, 

341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986). “On appeal, a trial court’s decision on this subject will not be 

reversed ‘unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’” Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 

255, 262, 578 S.E.2d 833, 836 (2003) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 194-95, 

480 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1997)).

In awarding spousal support, the trial court is required to consider all the factors 

enumerated in Code § 20-107.1(E)—“failure to do so is reversible error.” Bristow, 221 Va. at 3, 

267 S.E.2d at 90. Further, the trial court is required to make written findings of fact regarding 
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the statutory factors. See Code § 20-107.1(F) (“In contested cases in the trial courts, any order 

granting, reserving or denying a request for spousal support shall be accompanied by written 

findings and conclusions of the court identifying the factors in subsection E which support the 

court’s order.”).

When making a spousal support determination, “[t]he requirement that the trial court 

consider all of the statutory factors necessarily implies substantive consideration of the evidence 

presented as it relates to all of these factors.” Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 

S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). However, “[w]hile a trial judge must consider all the factors, the judge 

is not ‘required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to each 

of the statutory factors.’” Pilati v. Pilati, 59 Va. App. 176, 183, 717 S.E.2d 807, 810 (2011) 

(quoting Duva v. Duva, 55 Va. App. 286, 300, 685 S.E.2d 842, 849 (2009)). “‘What weight, if 

any, to assign to this [or any given] factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s 

sound discretion.’” Id. (quoting Robbins v. Robbins, 48 Va. App. 466, 481, 632 S.E.2d 615, 622 

(2006)).

In awarding spousal support, Code § 20-107.1(E)(13) requires the trial court to consider 

“[s]uch other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider 

the equities between the parties.” The trial court considered the tax consequences to husband in 

its divorce decree:

Expert testimony as to the tax consequences for each party of 

payment and receipt of spousal support was presented by 

[husband] through his expert . . . . Although [the expert’s] 

opinions were based on expense figures and spousal support 

amounts not accepted by the Court, [the expert’s] testimony 

regarding the methods of computing the Federal and State tax 

consequences to the parties was not disputed and is accepted by the 

Court.

(emphasis in original).
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Factor thirteen is one of the thirteen factors that the trial court was required to consider. 

The trial court made extensive findings regarding all of the spousal support statutory factors. 

Nevertheless, the trial court’s decision does not indicate what weight, if any, it accorded to factor 

thirteen. It is enough that the trial court considered the proffered evidence introduced concerning 

the factor in making its decision. The trial court was not required to, and did not, elaborate on 

the weight accorded to the factor. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err, but instead 

properly considered the proffered evidence regarding factor thirteen of Code § 20-107.1(E).

G. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

Finally, both parties seek an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. 

The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to 

determine the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees for efforts 

expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the 

opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine 

whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for 

requiring additional payment.

O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). After considering 

the record, we do not deem either party’s appeal to be frivolous or see other sufficient reasons to 

warrant an award of attorney’s fees. Therefore, we decline to award attorney’s fees to either 

party on appeal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.