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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

BRENT ALAN ETHRIDGE, §

(TDCJ No. 02406773), §

 §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-469-O

§

TARRANT COUNTY § 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., §

 §

Defendants. §

 MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) 

This case is before the Court for review of pro-se inmate Brent Alan Ethridge’s 

(“Ethridge”) case under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 

1915(e)(2)(B). Having reviewed the operative pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims 

and allegations against some defendants must be DISMISSED with prejudice under authority of 

these provisions, but that he may obtain service of process on the remaining claims. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Ethridge initially filed a form civil rights complaint with attachments and 

exhibits. Compl., ECF No. 1. At the time he filed suit, Ethridge was housed in the Tarrant 

County Jail, but he is now imprisoned in a TDCJ unit. Id. at 1; Notice of Address Change, ECF 

No. 10. In the complaint he named as defendants the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office, John Peter 

Smith (“JPS”) Community Healthcare, Corrections Officer Miles, Corrections Officer Poore, 

Corrections Officer Irvin, Medical Director Dr. Shaw, and Physician’s Assistant Heather 

Johnson. Id at 1-2. In that complaint Ethridge provided the following statement of claim: 

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On November 21, 2021, I was injured working in the kitchen at the Tarrant 

County Jail- Green Bay facility. This injury was a direct result of not be [sic] 

provided proper protective gear (heavy duty gloves) for washing pots and pans. 

Kitchen supervisor Miles also did not send me to medical. Neither did the housing 

unit officer. I had to have surgery and have permanent damage to my fingers and 

do not have full range of motion and constant pain. Failure to carry out medical 

needs by officers and staff caused further injury due to neglect.

Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. After review of the original complaint, the Court issued an order for 

Ethridge to answer the Court’s questions in the form of a more definite statement of the facts 

related to his claims, and he responded by filing a handwritten more definite statement.1 Order 

for More Definite Statement (“MDS”), ECF No. 8; MDS, ECF No. 9. 

In review of the more definite statement, in response to the Court’s question about “not 

being provided protective gear,” Ethridge alleged that he asked Officer Miles for heavy duty 

gloves but received only latex gloves. MDS 2, ECF No. 9. As to when he received medical care, 

Ethridge alleged that although Office Miles and an Officer Poore told him he would be taken for 

medical care, he was not taken until the next day. Id. at 2-3. Ethridge explained that the injury 

occurred on November 21, 2021 at about 4p.m. and he was not taken to medical until the next 

day at 10:00 a.m. Id. at 3, Ethridge, however, acknowledged that he was able to sleep all of that 

night. Id. at 2. As to the medical care received, Ethridge informs that although he was sent for xrays, and had an orthopedic consultation, he was not given pain medications (Tylenol and 

Ibuprofen) for almost 72 hours. Id. at 3. 

As to his claims against Officer Miles, Ethridge contends that as he is in charge of all 

kitchen staff, Miles was “obligated to the ‘duty of care’ of all inmates in care of Tarrant County 

1Although the MDS is twelve pages, it includes two copies of the same answers in one document, 

such that the MDS is actually contained only on pages 1-6. ECF No. 9. Also, pages 5 and 6 of the MDS 

are out of order on the docket, such that the Court will cite to the page numbers assigned by the CM/ECF 

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Jail.” Id. at 3. As to Officer Poore, Ethridge contends he “failed to make sure I was seen for an 

injury that occurred in the kitchen and required immediate medical attention.” Id. As to Officer 

Irvin, Ethridge alleges that Irvin ultimately “carried out [him] being seen by medical.” Id. at 3-4. 

But he still complains that no report was written regarding the failure to have him seen by 

medical “at the time injury occurred.” Id. at 4. With regard to his naming of Dr. Shaw, Ethridge 

wrote that he “is generally in charge of ensuring provision of medical care to prisoners,” [and 

that he] “should have been seen for a minimum of triage and evaluation of my injury.” Id. at 4. 

With regard to defendant Physician’s Assistant Heather Johnson, Ethridge contends that she 

“would not allow me to get Ibuprofen prescribed by the orthopedic MD Sara Haynes until almost 

72 hours after my injury . . ..” Id. Ethridge also expressly contends that Shaw and Johnson were 

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to timely approve his medications 

consistent with an orthopedic surgeon’s plan of care. Id. at 4, 6. For relief in this proceeding, 

Ethridge seeks “monetary compensation as well as other relief as itf may appear plaintiff is 

entitled to.” Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) 

Plaintiff Ethridge is an inmate who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a 

part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which 

requires a district court to review and screen a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee as soon as possible after docketing. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Because Ethridge is proceeding in-forma-pauperis, his pleadings are also subject to 

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A provide for sua sponte

system.

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dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). 

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is 

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in 

fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. A complaint fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, 

plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action” do not suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. No Allegation of Deliberate Indifference - Several Defendants 

As noted above, Plaintiff has named several individual defendants in their individual 

capacities, including Officers Miles, Poore, and Irvin, as well as Medical Director Dr. Shaw and 

Physician’s Assistant Heather Johnson.2 Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. When Ethridge filed this action 

on a prisoner complaint form, he invoked the Court’s federal question jurisdiction by seeking 

2Ethridge also expressly named the individual defendants in an official capacity. Those claims 

will be separately addressed in Section III (C) of this order.

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relief against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of 

action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 

132 (1994). It “afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional 

norms.” Id.

In order to support a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts in 

support of both of its elements: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws 

of the United States; and (2) the deprivation of such right by a person acting under color of law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citing cases); Resident Council of Allen Parkway 

Village v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th

Cir.1993). Screening review reveals that as to several defendants, Ethridge has failed to state a 

plausible claim of a violation of a constitutional right. 

As Ethridge filed suit while he was detained in the Tarrant County Jail, it appears he was 

a pretrial detainee for the time period made the basis of his complaint. Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. 

Thus, treating Ethridge as a pre-trial detainee at the time of the events made the basis of this 

case, his rights flow from the procedural and substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1999). The 

Fourteenth Amendment protects a detainee’s right to be free from punishment prior to an 

adjudication of guilt. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). The Fourteenth 

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“Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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Amendment also requires the state to provide for the basic human needs of pre-trial detainees, 

including the right to adequate medical care. Lacy v. Shaw, 357 F. App’x. 607, 609 (5th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hare, v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996)). “The Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right ‘not to have their serious medical needs met 

with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials.’” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 

374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)).

 In order to establish a violation of this constitutional right, a detainee must show that the 

defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Lacy, 357 F. App’x at 

609. To make a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant 

official has actual subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm but responds with 

deliberate indifference to that risk. Id. (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 647-48). Such a finding of 

deliberate indifference, though, “must rest on facts clearly evincing ‘wanton’ actions on the parts 

of the defendants.” Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). In the medical care context, a detainee must show that the 

defendant “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or 

engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious 

medical needs.” Lacy, 357 F. App’x at 609 (citing Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238). A delay in 

providing medical care is not a violation of this constitutional right unless it results in substantial 

harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). 

In the Court’s order for a more definite statement, after asking Ethridge to state the 

particular basis of his claims against each of the individual defendants, the Court asked this 

question:

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(7) Do you believe the facts you have provided in response to questions 1-6 above 

amount to a failure to provide reasonable care/negligence, or do you believe the 

facts show deliberate indifference to your health and safety or to your serious 

medical needs? If you believe the facts show deliberate indifference to your 

health and safety or to your serious medical needs, state exactly what actions 

listed in your answers to other questions show deliberate indifference by any 

defendant. 

Order for MDS 3, ECF No. 8. Ethridge provided the following answer:

Failure to provide reasonable care/neglect is evident by not being seen at the time 

of injury and not given any over the counter pain meds for a broken bone for close 

to 72 hours while in severe pain for a serious injury. The deliberate indifference is 

evident when Heather Johnson and Shaw on 2 occasions do [sic] not follow the 

orthopedic surgeons plan of care by not updating or approving my medications for 

the nerve damage to my finger caused by the incisions form the surgery. I was in 

severe pain that could have been prevented by updating my medications in a 

timely 

manner. 

MDS 4-6, ECF No. 9. This answer shows that as to defendant Officers Miles, Poore, and Irvin, 

Ethridge has expressly declined to recite any facts or basis to support any claim of deliberate 

indifference on the part of any of these defendants. At most as to these three individual 

defendants, Ethridge’s other allegations might support a claim that each official was negligent. 

Allegations of negligence are not sufficient to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, 

e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (concluding that the constitution “is simply 

not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, 

liberty, or property”); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) (stating that “lack of 

due care . . . simply does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct” which rises to 

the level of a constitutional violation); Thompson, 245 F.3d at 458-59 (noting that deliberate 

indifference cannot be inferred from “negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a 

substantial risk of serious harm.”) Similarly, Ethridge’s claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

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against Officers Miles, Poore, and Irvin fail to state any claim of the violation of a constitutional 

right. Ethridge’s claims against these defendants thus must be dismissed.4

 B. Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office -No Jural Existence

Tarrant County, Texas and JPS Community Healthcare 

- No Sufficient Claim of Municipal Liability 

As noted above, Ethridge named as a defendant the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office. 

Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. But “[f]ederal courts in Texas have uniformly held that entities without a 

separate jural existence are not subject to suit.” Torti v. Hughes, Civ. A. No. 3:07-cv-1476-M, 

2007 WL 4403983, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2007) (citing cases). Because Ethridge has failed 

to show that the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office is a separate legal entity with the capacity to be 

sued, all of his claims against this defendant must be dismissed. See Hicks v. Tarrant Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 352 F. App’x 876, 878 (5th Cir. 2009) (dismissing claims against Tarrant County 

Sheriff’s Department and County Commissioners where plaintiff failed to show that defendants 

were separate legal entities amendable to suit). After the Court explained to Ethridge the doctrine 

of jural existence in the Order for an MDS, Ethridge answered in the MDS that “[i]f the Sheriff’s 

Department is not liable for my injury then I would like to sue Tarrant County.” MDS 6, ECF 

No. 9. Thus, Ethridge has abandoned his claims against the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office, and 

that defendant must be dismissed.

Ethridge alternatively names Tarrant County, Texas and the “JPS Community 

Healthcare” because “when I asked who Shaw and Heather Johnson worked for that was the 

response I got.” MDS 5, ECF No. 9. Although a city or county is a “person” within the meaning 

4Conversely, the Court finds that Ethridge has listed sufficient facts to state a claim of a 

constitutional violation by defendants Dr. Shaw and Physician’s Assistant Johnson. As such, Ethridge 

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of § 1983 a municipal government may not be held liable “unless action pursuant to official 

municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The Supreme Court, in Monell, emphasized that a 

local government entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis:

will be entitled to effect service of process on these defendants. See Section IV. 

[T]herefore . . . a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury 

inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a 

government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that 

the government entity is responsible under § 1983.

Id. at 694. Thus, to the extent Ethridge claims that Tarrant County, Texas or John Peter Smith 

Community Healthcare (“JPS”) is responsible to him due to the actions of the individual 

defendant employees, as such claims are essentially that Tarrant County or JPS is responsible on 

a vicarious liability or respondeat superior basis, such claims are without legal merit.

Instead of vicarious liability for the actions of government employees, § 1983 liability 

attaches against a local government entity only “if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a 

person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692); City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (liability “only where the municipality itself causes the 

constitutional violation at issue”) (emphasis in original). An official municipal policy “includes 

the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices 

so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Prince v. Curry, 423 F. 

App’x 447, 450 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 60.) 

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Although Ethridge identified Tarrant County and JPS as municipal defendants after the 

Court informed him of the doctrine of jural existence, he has wholly failed to provide any “facts 

of a custom or policy . . . that relates to your harm.” Order for MDS 4, ECF No. 8. Ethridge did 

not provide any responsive information asserting any facts against Tarrant County, Texas or JPS. 

MDS 4-6, ECF No. 9. Ethridge has provided no facts to support any claim that Tarrant County 

or JPS acted through a policy or custom that related to any violation of his constitutional rights 

on the facts as stated. Therefore, Eithridge’s claims against Tarrant County, Texas and JPS must 

be dismissed. See generally Morgan v. City of Fort Worth, Nos. 4:13-cv-004-Y and 4:13-cv-017-

Y, 2013 WL 3196580, *3 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 25, 2013) ( “Plaintiff Morgan has not provided any 

factual allegations whatsoever of any such policy or custom against JPS . . . [a]s Morgan has not 

included factual allegations of any policies and/or practices of JPS associated with these 

unrelated medical care incidents, he has not sufficiently alleged liability against JPS.”) 

C. Dismissal of Official Capacity Claims for Relief under § 1983 

In his MDS, Ethridge expressly identified claims under § 1983 against the defendants in 

an official capacity. MDS 4-5, ECF No. 9. When a government employee is sued in his or her 

official capacity the employing entity is the real party in interest for the suit. See Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (explaining that official-capacity suits generally represent 

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent” and are 

“treated as a suit against the entity”) (citations omitted). As a result, Ethridge’s claims against the 

defendants in their official capacities as employees of Tarrant County, Texas or as employees of 

JPS must be construed as claims against Tarrant County and JPS. As such, Ethridge’s official 

capacity claims must be dismissed for the reasons already provided in review of his claims 

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against these municipal entities. 

IV. SERVICE OR REMAINING CLAIMS 

Construed liberally, Ethridge has alleged facts against individual defendants Medical 

Director Dr. Shaw and Physician’s Assistant Heather Johnson, that entitle him to service of the 

complaint and more definite statement on them. Thus, the Court will allow service of Ethridge’s 

remaining claims against these two persons through the assistance of the officers of the Court 

under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Rochon v. Dawson, 

828 F.2d 1109-1110 (5th Cir. 1987).5

V. CONCLUSION and ORDER

It is therefore ORDERED that all plaintiff Brent Alan Ethridge’s claims for relief in this 

action against defendants Officer Miles, Officer Poore , Officer Irvin, the Tarrant County 

Sheriff’s Office, Tarrant County, Texas, and JPS Community Healthcare, and all claims for relief 

against any defendant in an official capacity, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

SO ORDERED this 13th day of October, 2022.

5A separate order will issue regarding service of Ethridge’s remaining claims.

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