[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14043

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cr-00415-WTM-GRS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO FRANKLIN JOHNSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(June 20, 2016)

Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Antonio Franklin Johnson appeals his 120-months sentence, imposed after 

pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He argues that the district court 

erred by applying a four-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B),

for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony. He also contends that 

the district court erred by indicating in the Statement of Reasons that the sentence 

was not greater than 24 months and the district court was not required to give 

specific reasons for the sentence. 

I.

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing 

guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Smith, 

480 F.3d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Evaluating whether a 

firearm was used “in connection with” a felony offense is a factual determination 

and we evaluate for clear error. United States v. Whitfield, 50 F.3d 947, 949 & n.8 

(11th Cir. 1995). 

In calculating the guideline range for a firearm possession offense, U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level enhancement where the defendant “used 

or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony 

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Section 2K2.1 Application Note 14 states 

that subsection (b)(6)(B) applies “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had 

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the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 comment. 

(n.14(A)). 

We have held that the term “in connection with” in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) 

should be given its ordinary and natural meaning, and we have expressly rejected a 

more restrictive interpretation that required the firearm to serve a purpose related 

to the crime. Smith, 480 F.3d at 1280 (citation omitted). Moreover, in interpreting 

Guideline provisions that contain an “in connection with” requirement identical to 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), we have held that, “in certain circumstances, mere 

possession of a firearm can be enough to apply a sentencing enhancement. Id.

(quotation and citation omitted). Generally, we have held that drugs and guns go 

together. United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011). 

The district court did not clearly err by applying a four-level enhancement, 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B), because Johnson had possession of the

firearm and a felonious amount of marijuana at the same time in his car. Mere 

possession of a firearm can be enough to apply a sentencing enhancement because

drugs and guns generally go together, and the firearm was not required to serve a 

purpose related to the crime. Therefore, we affirm the application of the four-level 

enhancement. 

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II.

We review the question of whether a district court complied with 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(c)(1) de novo, even if the defendant did not object below. United States v. 

Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir.2006).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), the sentencing court must explain its reasons 

for imposing a sentence at a particular point in the guideline range “when the range 

exceeds 24 months.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1); United States v. Veteto, 920 F.2d 

823, 826 (11th Cir. 1991). A sentence may be imposed at any point within the 

applicable guideline range, provided that it is not greater than the statutorily 

authorized maximum sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c). When the statutory 

authorized maximum sentence is less than the maximum of the guideline range, the 

guideline range becomes the statutory maximum and the low end of the guideline 

range. See id. 

The district court did not err by indicating in the Statement of Reasons that 

the sentencing range was not greater than 24 months. Because of the statutory 

authorized maximum sentence of 120 months, Johnson’s range was no longer 120 

months to 150 months but merely 120 months. Thus, there was a range of zero. 

Therefore, the district court did not err by indicating that the sentence was within 

an advisory range that was not greater than 24 months, and thus was not required 

to give specific reasons for the sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

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AFFIRMED.

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