alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4393

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus STEVEN ANTHONY LAMONDS, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:06-cr-00244-JAB; 1:06-cr-00282-JAB-1) Submitted: October 18, 2007 Decided: October 23, 2007 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Steven Anthony Lamonds pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to six offenses arising out of a bank robbery and a robbery of a Food Lion grocery store. Lamonds was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 180 months of imprisonment on all counts except Count Three of the bank robbery indictment (brandishing a short-barreled shotgun during a bank robbery), for which he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum consecutive term of ten years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(B), (e)(1) (2000). Lamonds’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending that no meritorious issues exist for appeal but suggesting that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence under United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Although informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Lamonds has not done so. Lamonds was sentenced to a total term of 300 months imprisonment, the statuto ry mandatory minimum sentence. The district court possessed no discretion to sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, because “Bookerdid nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence.” United States v. Robinson , 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 546 U.S. 916 (2005). In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for- 3 - appeal. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>

                               FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
                   BENTHOS, INC. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN
             AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1987

         AMENDMENT adopted this 28th day of April, 2000, by Benthos, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the "Company"):

                                   WITNESSETH:

         WHEREAS, the Company has heretofore adopted a defined contribution plan
known as the "Benthos, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan", which was amended
and restated effective as of October 1, 1987 (the "Plan"); and

         WHEREAS, the Company, pursuant to Section 16.1 of the Plan, has
reserved the right to amend the Plan at any time by vote of its Board of
Directors; and

         WHEREAS, the Company wishes to amend further the Plan to credit past
service for vesting and eligibility purposes for former employees of Datasonics,
Inc.; and

         WHEREAS, the Company wishes to amend further the Plan to change the
eligibility section and definition of "Year of Service"; and

         NOW, THEREEFORE, effective as of October 1, 1999, unless otherwise
specified, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:

         1. Article III, Section 3.1 is amended by adding the following
            paragraph at the end of the section:

            (d) Each former employee of Datasonics, Inc. who was an Employee on
                October 1, 1999, will be eligible to participate in the Plan as
                long as the Employee has met the eligibility requirements in
                subsection (a).

         2. The definition of "Year of Service" set forth in Article II is
            amended by adding the following paragraph:

            (c) Years of Service shall also include past service with
                Datasonics, Inc., which shall be credited in accordance with
                paragraphs (a) and (b) as though it were service with the
                Company.

         In all other respects the terms of the Plan remain unchanged and are in
full force and effect.

<PAGE>

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Company has caused this Amendment
to be executed by its duly authorized officer as of the day and year set forth
above.

                                            BENTHOS, INC.

                                            By: JOHN L. COUGHLIN
                                               ------------------
                                            Title: President
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 222 (Thursday, November 16, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 69300]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-29344]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER01-388-000]


WFEC GENCO, L.L.C.; Notice of Filing

November 9, 2000.
    Take notice that on November 7, 2000, WFEC GENCO, L.L.C., 
petitioned the Commission for acceptance of its Rate Schedule FERC No. 
1, the granting of certain blanket approvals, including the authority 
to sell electricity at market-based rates, and the waiver of certain of 
the Commission's Regulations.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest such filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in 
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such motions and 
protests should be filed on November 20, 2000. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission to determine the appropriate action to be 
taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection. This filing may also be viewed on 
the Internet at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-
2222 for assistance). Comments and protests may be filed electronically 
via the internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and 
the instructions on the Commission's web site at http://www.ferc.fed.us/efi/doorbell.htm

Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-29344 Filed 11-15-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1651

ROBERT LEE DAVIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ROBESON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; ROBESON COUNTY

BOARD OF EDUCATION, in its individual capacity; BETH WILLIAMSON, in her individual and

official capacities; ABNER HARRINGTON, in his

individual and official capacities; MIKE

SMITH, in his individual and official capacities; PAUL BROOKS, in his individual and

official capacities; ROBERT DEESE, in his

individual and official capacities,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Chief

District Judge. (CA-97-42-7-F)

Submitted: August 14, 1997 Decided: August 20, 1997

Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Lee Davis, Appellant Pro Se.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint, under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)

(West Supp. 1997), and denying his motion to recuse. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find that

this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the district court. Davis v. Robeson County Pub.

Schs., No. CA-97-42-7-F (E.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 1997). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3541 

To prevent a taxpayer bailout of health insurance issuers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas (for himself and Mr. GARDNER) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prevent a taxpayer bailout of health insurance issuers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Obamacare Taxpayer 

5 Bailout Prevention Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PREVENTION OF BAILOUT OF HEALTH INSURANCE 

7 ISSUERS. 

8 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is 

9 amended by striking section 1342 (42 U.S.C. 18062). 

Æ 


PWALKER on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
III

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 160

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 7 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 27), 1993

Received

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To correct the enrollment of H.R. 3123.

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That, in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 3123,

3 to improve the electric and telephone loan programs car4 ried out under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, and

5 for other purposes, the Clerk of the House shall make the

6 following correction:

7 On page 4, line 16, of the House engrossed bill,

8 strike ‘‘urban’’ and insert ‘‘urbanized’’.

Passed the House of Representatives October 6,

1993.

Attest: DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

Clerk.
#### Shahmoon Industries, Inc., Plaintiff, *v.*Day & Zimmerman, Incorporated, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

December 24, 1957.

*Leonard Speier*for plaintiff.

*Taggart Whipple*for defendant.

Vincent A. Lupiano, J.

Appearing specially, the defendant cross-moves pursuant to section 237-a of the Civil Practice Act, to set aside the service of the summons and complaint, and similarly, by separate motion, cross-moves further to set aside the service of the order to show cause, dated December 4, 1957, *120and of the summons and complaint. The summons was properly-served on the defendant by service upon the Secretary of State at Albany, New York. The defendant is a foreign corporation licensed to do business here and has designated the Secretary of State for the service of process. With respect to the order to show cause, which granted short time to make service on the defendant, it is admitted that the order and supporting papers, including the summons and complaint, were left at defendant’s office by inserting them in the mail slot. It is also admitted that defendant has no officer in this State qualified to receive service and that its office was closed shortly before the expiration of time granted for service at noon on December 16,1957. Plaintiff made numerous other efforts and did bring notice to the defendant of such service and knowledge of the papers was seemingly obtained. Service on the defendant was thus made on the Secretary of State or in all the circumstances service was adequate and any defect is curable (see *Valz*v. *Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp.,*249 N. Y. 122, 129, and *Catholic Women’s Benevolent Legion*v. *Burke,*253 App. Div. 261, 265). More important, the defendant no doubt acknowledging the urgency of the matter and the technical difficulties involved in the service and apparently having had ample opportunity to prepare its defense, has actually submitted in opposition on the merits to plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction, despite the fact such opposing affidavit was embraced within the claim of special appearance. The urgency in the matter arises from the fact that there is pending an arbitration proceeding in this State initiated by the plaintiff and two actions instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff in a foreign jurisdiction and having to do with the subject of the arbitration. Such urgency and the necessity for maintenance of the *status quo*was no doubt the motivation of the temporary stay granted by the order of December 18, 1957. Seemingly, too, defendant acted in good faith and properly in accordance with advice in that direction in declaring its special appearance and thereupon sufficient time having elapsed to prepare a defense to the main motion, it did so and has interposed the affidavit in opposition thereto.

The cross motions are accordingly denied and the stay contained in the order of December 18, 1957, is continued until the determination of plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction.
#### HAMILTON v. STATE.

No. 26372.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 15, 1953.

No attorney on appeal.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the. State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted for the offense of driving an automobile upon a public highway while intoxicated, and his punishment was assessed at a fine of $100.

The complaint and information, as well as all matters of procedure, appear regular. The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception, in the absence of which nothing is presented for review.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
|                                                                                   
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                   
|View History: Annual Download Data (XLS File)                                     
|View History: Annual                                                               
|View History: Annual                                                               
|View History:                                                                      
|                                                                                   
|Midwest (PADD 2) Refinery Shell Storage Capacity as of January 1 (Thousand Barrels)
|                                                                                   
|                                                                                   
|Midwest (PADD 2) Refinery Shell Storage Capacity as of January 1 (Thousand Barrels)
|                                                                                   

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0  | Year-1  | Year-2  | Year-3  | Year-4  | Year-5  | Year-6  | Year-7  | Year-8  | Year-9 
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | -------
|1980's                                                                                                                            |         |         | 169,781 | 194,921 | 186,824 | 196,512 | 193,874 | 183,419 | 175,414 | 177,411
|1990's                                                                                                                            | 175,603 | 183,038 | 179,318 | 177,395 | 176,541 | 166,075 | NA      | 156,970 | NA      | 151,425
|2000's                                                                                                                            | 155,841 | 142,190 | 139,207 | 136,437 | 136,233 | 136,299 | 136,662 | 136,146 | 134,501 | 135,728
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 126,570 | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      | --     
|2020's                                                                                                                            | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      |         |         |         |         |        
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 6/14/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: June 2025
#### Charlie COOPER et al. v. STATE.

No. 23150.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 6, 1945.

Percy Foreman, of Houston, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the County Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County in a- bond forfeiture case.

The record in this case is in the same condition as the one in Cause No. 23147, Millard Tatum et al. v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 187 S.W.2d 989, this day decided. The State’s Attorney has filed a like motion in this case as in Cause No. 23,147, and for the reasons therein stated, the motion to dismiss the appeal is sustained and the appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

ALFRED C. DIZON, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-00040-O-BP

 §

VECTRUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, §

 §

Defendant. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition (ECF No. 

35), filed January 9, 2023; United States Magistrate Judge Ray’s Findings, Conclusions, and 

Recommendation (ECF No. 55), filed April 27, 2023; and Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 59), filed 

May 9, 2023. 

The Plaintiff’s sole objection is the Magistrate Judge’s “failure to provide comments, 

justifications, or clarifications” regarding the reasoning supporting his Findings, Conclusions, and 

Recommendation. Pl.’s Response 3, ECF No. 59. “In the event that the party objecting to the FCR 

fails to assert specific objections, the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections.” Thompson v. Bumpas, No. 4:22-cv-0640-P, 2022 WL 17585271, at *1 (N.D. 

Tex. Dec. 12, 2022) (citing Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.3d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987)). For 

an objection to be specific enough to warrant de novo review, it “must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the 

place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found.” United States v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 3d 559, 564 (E.D. Tex. 2020), R. & R. adopted 

by 458 F. Supp. 3d 559 (E.D. Tex. 2020). 

Case 7:22-cv-00040-O-BP Document 64 Filed 05/30/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 727
Here, even affording the Plaintiff the proper leniency given to a pro-se litigant, the 

objection does not meet this specificity standard required to invoke de novo review. The Plaintiff 

does not identify the specific finding or recommendation to which he is objecting. Pl.’s Response 

3, ECF No. 59. Therefore, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and 

Recommendation for plain error.1 Finding none, the undersigned District Judge believes that the 

Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and they are accepted as the 

Findings and Conclusions of the Court. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to File 

Supplemental Petition (ECF No. 35).

SO ORDERED on this 30th day of May, 2023.

1 Even under de novo review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Magistrate 

Judge Ray’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation clearly states the applicable legal standards, 

rules, and analysis. See generally ECF No. 55.

Case 7:22-cv-00040-O-BP Document 64 Filed 05/30/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 728
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

COURTNEY DAVON ADKINS, §

TDCJ No. 2075216, §

§

Petitioner, §

§

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1063-M

§

DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, §

§

Respondent. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The United States Magistrate Judge made Findings, Conclusions, and a 

Recommendation in this case. No objections were filed. The District Court reviewed 

the proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation for plain error. Finding 

none, the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the 

United States Magistrate Judge.

Insofar as a certificate of appealability (COA) is required, considering the 

record in this case and pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing §§ 2254 and 2255 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), 

the Court DENIES a COA. The Court adopts and incorporates by reference the 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation filed in this case in 

support of its finding that Petitioner has failed to show that reasonable jurists would 

find “it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

Case 3:22-cv-01063-M-BN Document 7 Filed 06/22/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 23
2

constitutional right” or “debatable whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural 

ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).1

But if Petitioner does elect to file a notice of appeal, he must also either pay 

the appellate filing fee ($505.00) or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 2022.

1

 Rule 11 of the Rules Governing §§ 2254 and 2255 Cases, as amended effective on 

December 1, 2009, reads as follows: 

(a) Certificate of Appealability. The district court must issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. Before 

entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a 

certificate should issue. If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue 

or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the court denies a 

certificate, the parties may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of 

appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22. A motion to reconsider a denial does 

not extend the time to appeal.

(b) Time to Appeal. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) governs the time 

to appeal an order entered under these rules. A timely notice of appeal must be filed even if 

the district court issues a certificate of appealability.

Case 3:22-cv-01063-M-BN Document 7 Filed 06/22/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 24