Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

LEO ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

v. 

WELLS FARGO BANK NA, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-0601-B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION

June 4, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo 

Bank, NA ("Wells Fargo")'s Motion to Strike (Doc. 

14). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff Leo Robinson's amended complaint 

is futile and that granting leave to amend would 

cause undue delay. Therefore, the Court 

GRANTS Wells Fargo's motion and STRIKES

Robinson's amended complaint (Doc. 13). 

Additionally, the Court ORDERS Robinson to 

SHOW CAUSE, in writing and by no later than 

JUNE 18, 2021, why the Court should not 

dismiss his original petition (Doc. 1-4) for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted.

I.

BACKGROUND1

 This lawsuit arises from Defendants Wells 

Fargo and US Bank NA ("US Bank")'s alleged 

foreclosure sale of a property located in Dallas, 

Texas ("the Property"). Doc. 13, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 9-

14. Robinson claims that he purchased the 

Property and "rehabbed the home to a habitable

Page 2

condition, spending over $400,000.00 in 

repairs[.]" Id. ¶ 8. Robinson claims that at some 

point, "the previous owner . . . attempted to 

regain ownership of the [P]roperty," but that "a 

[j]udgment was issued awarding [Robinson] 

ownership of the [P]roperty on September 13, 

2016." Id. ¶¶ 8-9. After receiving the judgment, 

Robinson claims that he "made several attempts 

to pay off the balance of the loan" on the Property 

but that Defendants—who held a mortgage loan 

on the Property—rejected his attempts. Id. ¶ 10. 

He also claims that he "notified Defendants of the 

. . . [j]udgment awarding him the [P]roperty," but 

that Defendants "entered into foreclosure 

proceedings on the [P]roperty" anyway. Id. ¶ 11. 

Robinson alleges that he "was never notified of 

this foreclosure proceeding, and Defendants 

produced fraudulent documents to accomplish 

their action to wrongfully foreclose on 

[Robinson]'s property." Id. ¶ 12.

 On January 27, 2020, Robinson filed a pro se

petition against Wells Fargo in Texas state court, 

alleging that Wells Fargo violated Texas Property 

Code (TPC) § 51.002. Doc. 1-4, Original Pet., 1-4. 

Namely, Robinson's petition alleges that Wells 

Fargo rejected Robinson's attempts "to pay off 

leins [sic] on the [P]roperty" and "fail[ed] to 

notify" Robinson of the foreclosure sale. Id. at 3. 

Wells Fargo removed the case to this Court on 

March 10, 2020, invoking diversity jurisdiction. 

Doc. 1, Notice of Removal, 1. Robinson 

subsequently retained counsel, who filed a notice 

of appearance with the Court on June 18, 2020. 

See generally Doc. 5, Notice of Appearance. The 

Court issued a scheduling order on July 20, 2020, 

requiring all pleading amendments to be filed by 

December 23, 2020. Doc. 8, Scheduling Order, 1.

 On December 23, 2020—the last day to 

amend pleadings—Robinson filed an amended 

complaint (Doc. 13). Despite the fact that the 

scheduling order requires parties to comply with

Page 3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), Doc. 8, 

Scheduling Order 2, Robinson did not receive the 

Court's leave or Wells Fargo's consent to amend. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The eight-page 

amended complaint adds US Bank as a defendant 

and again alleges a violation of TPC § 51.002 for 

Defendants' alleged "[f]ailure to send notice" of 

the foreclosure sale. Doc. 13, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 16-

18. It also adds new claims under the Texas Debt 

Collection Act (TDCA). Id. ¶ 20. The amended 

Exhibit 1
Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

complaint does not allege any claims against US 

Bank individually. See generally id.

 On January 6, 2021, Wells Fargo moved to 

strike Robinson's amended complaint on the 

grounds that it was filed without the Court's leave 

and is otherwise futile. Doc. 15, Def.'s Br., 4-5. 

Robinson failed to respond to Wells Fargo's 

motion within twenty-one days, as required by 

local rules. See N.D. Tex. Local Civ. R. 7.1(e). After 

the Court ordered Robinson to show cause for his 

failure to timely respond to the motion, see Doc. 

18, Electronic Order, Robinson explained that his 

failure to respond "was due to a 

miscommunication on [Robinson]'s counsel's 

part." Doc. 19, Pl.'s Resp. to Order, 1. Yet, 

Robinson still did not file a response for another 

two months. Only after the Court ordered a 

response, see Doc. 24, Electronic Order, did 

Robinson respond to Wells Fargo's motion. See 

generally Doc. 25, Pl.'s Resp. In his response, 

Robinson seeks leave to admit his amended 

complaint. Doc. 25, Pl.'s Resp., 3. Wells Fargo 

timely filed a reply (Doc. 27) in support of its 

motion on May 11, 2021. The motion to strike is 

now ripe for review.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

 "Whether leave to amend should be granted 

is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district 

court[.]" Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 

139 (5th Cir. 1993). Under Rule 15(a),

Page 4

courts "should freely give leave [to amend] when 

justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But 

this "generous standard is tempered by the 

necessary power of a district court to manage a 

case." Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 

F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003). Although Rule 15 

indicates "a bias in favor of granting leave to 

amend, it is not automatic." Southmark Corp. v. 

Schulte Roth & Zabel (In re Southmark Corp.), 

88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted). A district court must have 

a "substantial reason" to deny leave, but the 

decision remains within the court's discretion. 

Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 

2004) (citations omitted). In applying its 

discretion, the Court considers several factors, 

including "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure 

to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by 

virtue of the allowance of the amendment, and 

futility of the amendment." Rosenzweig v. Azurix 

Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003) 

(alterations incorporated) (quoting Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Absent one of 

these factors, leave should be freely given. Id. 

(citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182).

III.

ANALYSIS

 Wells Fargo argues that Robinson's amended 

complaint should be stricken because Robinson 

failed to seek leave and the amended complaint is 

futile. Doc. 15, Def.'s Br., 4-5. In his response, 

Robinson argues that he "should be granted leave 

to file an amended complaint regarding his claims 

against Defendant[s], to give him the opportunity 

to allege his best case." Doc. 25, Pl.'s Resp., 3. 

Robinson concedes "that he failed to timely file 

his motion for leave to amend." Id. at 2. However, 

he points to Rule 15(a)(2) and related caselaw, 

and claims that "justice would entail that" his

Page 5

amended complaint "be allowed[.]" Id. at 2-3. 

Upon review, the Court concludes that Robinson's 

amended complaint is futile. Moreover, the Court 

finds that due to Robinson's failure to respond to 

Wells Fargo's motion to strike, permitting the 

amendment would cause undue delay. 

Accordingly, Robinson's amended complaint 

should be stricken.

A. Robinson's Amended Complaint Is Futile.

 "The district court may deny leave to amend 

if the amendment would be futile because 'the 

amended complaint would fail to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted.'" McGee v. 
Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

Citi Mortg., Inc., 680 F. App'x 287, 291 (5th Cir. 

2017) (per curiam) (quoting Stripling v. Jordan 

Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 

2000)). In other words, an amended complaint is 

futile if it could not withstand a Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Accord Searcy v. CitiMort., Inc., 2019 WL 

935587, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2019) ("Rule 

12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a 

plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted.").

 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 

a plaintiff "must plead facts sufficient to show 

that [his] claim has substantive plausibility." 

Johnson v. City of Shelby, 547 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). 

That means "enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard "is not 

akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557). "Threadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. When 

well-pleaded facts fail to meet

Page 6

this standard, "the complaint has alleged—but it 

has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to 

relief." Id. at 679 (quotation marks omitted and 

alterations incorporated). In considering a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he [C]ourt accepts 

all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re 

Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 

(5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area 

Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 

2004)). However, the Court will "not look beyond 

the face of the pleadings to determine whether 

relief should be granted based on the alleged 

facts." Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

 Wells Fargo argues that Robinson's amended 

complaint "cannot withstand scrutiny under Rule 

12(b)(6)" and is therefore futile. Doc. 15, Def.'s 

Br., 4. The Court agrees.

 1. Robinson fails to sufficiently plead a 

violation of the TPC.

 In his amended complaint, Robinson claims 

that "Defendants failed to notify" him of the 

foreclosure sale in violation of TPC § 51.002. Doc. 

13, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 16-17. Pursuant to the TPC, 

"notice of the [foreclosure] sale . . . must be given 

at least 21 days before the date of the sale by . . . 

serving written notice of the sale by certified mail 

on each debtor who, according to the records of 

the mortgage servicer of the debt, is obligated to 

pay the debt." Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(b). 

Robinson fails to assert a claim under the TPC for 

two reasons.

 First, Robinson's amended complaint does 

not sufficiently allege Robinson was entitled to 

the twenty-one-day notice of the foreclosure sale 

because it does not allege facts showing that he 

was a "debtor" under § 51.002. Robinson's 

amended complaint states only that he 

"purchased the [P]roperty" and that he "made 

several attempts to pay off the balance of the 

loan," but that

Page 7

Defendants rejected these attempts. Doc. 13, Am. 

Compl., ¶¶ 8, 10. However, Robinson does not 

allege or provide evidence that he was the 

borrower under the loan with Defendants or that 

he otherwise assumed the loan when he 

purchased the Property. See generally id. 

Robinson's amended complaint provides no 

factual allegations to inform the Court of the 

nature of Robinson's claim to the Property, his 

relationship to Defendants, or the legal rights that 

Robinson may possess. See generally id. 

Accordingly, Robinson has not sufficiently alleged 

that he was entitled to notice.
Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

 Second, even if Robinson had alleged he was 

a debtor under the TPC and that Defendants 

failed to notify him, § 51.002 does not provide a 

private right of action. See Carey v. Fargo, 2016 

WL 4246997, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2016) 

(citation omitted); Ashton v. BAC Home Loan 

Servicing, L.P., 2013 WL 3807756, at *4 (S.D. 

Tex. July 19, 2013) ("This Court has not found any 

cases that interpret section 51.002 to establish an 

independent right of action for damages. The 

section also does not contain its own enforcement 

mechanism." (citations omitted)); Solis v. U.S. 

Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 4479957, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 

June 23, 2017) ("Section 51.002 of the [TPC] . . . 

does not provide a private right of action." 

(citations omitted)); Anderson v. CitiMortgage, 

2014 WL 2983366, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2014) 

("Under Texas law, there is no independent cause 

of action for breach of section 51.002" (citation 

omitted)). Instead, "courts have construed claims 

for violation of section 51.002 as claims for 

wrongful foreclosure." Carey, 2016 WL 4246997, 

at *3 (collecting cases). This Court does the same 

and finds that Robinson fails to state a claim for 

wrongful foreclosure.

 The elements of a wrongful-foreclosure claim 

are "(1) a defect in the foreclosure sale 

proceedings; (2) a grossly inadequate selling 

price; and (3) a causal connection between the 

two." Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 

L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2013). Under 

Texas law, "a

Page 8

grossly inadequate price would have to be so little 

as 'to shock a correct mind.'" Id. (quoting F.D.I.C. 

v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1990)). 

Although Robinson alleges a defect in the 

foreclosure proceedings—lack of notice—he fails 

to allege that the Property was sold at a grossly 

inadequate price and that the lack of notice 

caused the grossly inadequate selling price. See 

generally Doc. 13, Am. Compl. Therefore, 

Robinson's amended complaint fails to 

adequately allege a claim for wrongful 

foreclosure. See Biggers v. BAC Home Loans 

Servicing, LP, 767 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 (5th Cir. 

2011) ("[U]nder Texas law an inadequate selling 

price is a necessary element of a wrongful 

foreclosure action[.]").

 In sum, Robinson does not plead an 

actionable claim under the TPC. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that Robinson's TPC claim could not 

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and that 

his amended pleading is therefore futile as to this 

claim. See McGee, 680 F. App'x at 291 (citation 

omitted).

 2. Robinson fails to sufficiently plead a 

violation of the TDCA.

 In his amended complaint, Robinson claims 

that "Defendants are liable to [Robinson] for 

violating portions of the" TDCA. Doc. 13, Am. 

Compl., ¶ 20. Specifically, Robinson claims that 

Defendants violated §§ 392.304(a)(8) and 

392.304(a)(19) of the Texas Finance Code. Id. 

However, Robinson's amended complaint fails to 

plead a claim for either violation that would 

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

 Section 392.304(a)(8) prohibits 

"misrepresenting the character, extent, or amount 

of a consumer debt, or misrepresenting the 

consumer debt's status in a judicial or 

governmental proceeding[.]" Tex. Fin. Code § 

392.304(a)(8). To state a claim for a violation of § 

392.304(a)(8),

Page 9

Robinson "must show [Defendants] made a 

misrepresentation that led [him] to be unaware 

(1) that [he] had a mortgage debt, (2) of the 

specific amount [he] owed, or (3) that [he] had 

defaulted." Rucker v. Bank of Am., N.A., 806 F.3d 

828, 832 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Miller v. BAC 

Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 726 F.3d 717, 723 

(5th Cir. 2013)).

 However, Robinson's amended complaint is 

completely devoid of any mention of 

misrepresentations made by Defendants, except 

for a single, conclusory statement that 

"Defendants produced fraudulent documents to 
Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

accomplish their action to wrongfully foreclose on 

[Robinson]'s property." Doc. 13, Compl., ¶ 12. 

Robinson cannot therefore succeed on a claim 

under § 392.304(a)(8) because he has not plead 

any facts to support that any alleged 

misrepresentation "led [Robinson] to be unaware 

(1) that [he] had a mortgage debt, (2) of the 

specific amount [he] owed, or (3) that [he] had 

defaulted." See Rucker, 806 F.3d at 832; Smith v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 3324195, at *12 

(N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) ("To withstand a 

motion to dismiss, a court must be able to discern 

not only that there was a misrepresentation but 

also how the defendant allegedly misrepresented 

the character, extent, or amount of the plaintiffs' 

debt." (citations omitted)).

 Nor has Robinson adequately pleaded a 

violation of the catch-all provision, § 

392.304(a)(19), which prohibits "using any other 

false representation or deceptive means to collect 

a debt or obtain information concerning a 

consumer." Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(19). "As 

with Section 392.304(a)(8), for a statement to 

constitute a misrepresentation [under § 

392.304(a)(19)], a defendant must have made 'a 

false or misleading assertion.'" Smith, 2013 WL 

3324195, at *13 (quoting Thomas v. EMC Mortg. 

Corp., 499 F. App'x 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2012); Cox. 

v. Hilco Receivables, 726 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 

(5th Cir. 2010)). However, Robinson "do[es] not 

allege how

Page 10

Defendant[s] used a false representation or 

deceptive means or even what false 

representations were made." See id. Accordingly, 

Robinson's amended complaint fails to allege 

facts that would state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted under the TDCA. Thus, his TDCA 

claims are futile. See McGee, 680 F. App'x at 291 

(citation omitted).

 3. Robinson fails to sufficiently plead a claim 

for exemplary or punitive damages.

 In his amended complaint, Robinson 

requests exemplary and punitive damages 

because "[t]he conduct of Defendants . . . has 

been done willfully, recklessly, wantonly, 

maliciously and/or intentionally." Doc. 13, Am. 

Compl., ¶ 24. Insofar as Defendants' "conduct" 

refers to Robinson's claims for violations of the 

TPC and TDCA, the Court has already found that 

Robinson failed to allege sufficient facts to plead 

those violations. And Robinson offers no 

additional facts or claims to form the basis of his 

request for exemplary and punitive damages. See 

generally id. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Robinson has failed to allege facts to show that he 

is entitled to exemplary or punitive damages. 

Robinson's amended complaint is therefore futile 

in this request. See McGee, 680 F. App'x at 291 

(citation omitted).

 4. Robinson fails to sufficiently plead a claim 

for injunctive relief.

 Robinson does not have a plausible 

underlying legal claim, so he is not entitled to 

injunctive relief. Under Texas law, injunctive 

relief is an equitable remedy, not an independent 

cause of action. Cook v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

2010 WL 2772445, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2010) 

(citing Brown v. Ke-Ping Xie, 260 S.W.3d 118, 

122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no 

pet.)).

 Here, Robinson has failed to allege enough 

facts to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted under the TPC or TDCA. Accordingly, he 

is not entitled to relief on any of his substantive

Page 11

claims or on his claim for injunctive relief. See 

Anderson, 2011 WL 1113494, at *7 ("As all of 

Plaintiffs' causes of action should be dismissed, 

and Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts 

to support their claims, Plaintiffs are not entitled 

to injunctive relief."). Robinson's amended 

complaint is therefore futile in his request for 

injunctive relief. See McGee, 680 F. App'x at 291 

(citation omitted).

 5. Robinson fails to sufficiently plead a claim 

for declaratory judgment.
Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

 Having failed to allege a viable underlying 

claim, Robinson is not entitled to declaratory 

judgment either. Declaratory judgment is 

"remedial only." Collin Cnty. v. Homeowners 

Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods, 915 

F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court may only 

grant such a remedy "based on an underlying 

claim." DeFranceschi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

837 F. Supp. 2d 616, 626 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 

Robinson has failed to state a claim that could 

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, he is not entitled to declaratory 

judgment in this case. See id. at 627 ("[T]here is 

no genuine dispute of material fact regarding 

Plaintiffs [sic] claims; thus, there is no underlying 

claim for the Court to adjudicate."). Robinson's 

amended complaint is therefore futile in its 

request for declaratory judgment. See McGee, 680 

F. App'x at 291 (citation omitted).

 6. Robinson fails to sufficiently plead a claim 

for attorney's fees.

 Finally, Robinson cannot succeed on his 

request for attorney's fees. See Doc. 13, Am. 

Compl., ¶ 33(g). In Texas, plaintiffs are not 

entitled to attorney's fees unless they state a 

viable cause of action. See Avila v. Mortg. Elec. 

Reg. Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 6055298, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 

Dec. 5, 2012) ("[W]ithout a viable cause of action, 

[the plaintiff] is not entitled to recover attorney's 

fees."); see also Everhart v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 

2013 WL 264436, at * 6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2013) 

("[Plaintiffs]

Page 12

are not entitled to their requested attorney's fees . 

. . because they have not pled any viable cause of 

action against Defendant"). Because there is no 

viable claim alleged, Robinson is not entitled to 

attorney's fees. Robinson's amended complaint is 

therefore futile in its request for attorney's fees. 

See McGee, 680 F. App'x at 291 (citation 

omitted).

 Robinson's amended complaint fails to allege 

facts sufficient to state any claim upon which 

relief could be granted.2 Therefore, his amended 

complaint is futile. See id.

B. Undue Delay Weighs Against Granting Leave 

to Amend.

 While not determinative in the Court's 

decision to strike Robinson's amended complaint, 

the Court also finds that undue delay weighs 

against permitting the amendment. The Court 

may deny leave to amend for "undue delay[.]" 

Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 864 (citation omitted). 

While the "mere passage of time need not result 

in refusal of leave to amend," it is "undue delay 

that forecloses amendment." Dussouy v. Gulf 

Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 

1981).

 Robinson filed his amended complaint on 

December 23, 2020. See generally Doc. 13, Am. 

Compl. Although the amendment was filed within 

the period permitted by the scheduling order, see

Doc. 8, Scheduling Order, 1, the amendment ran 

afoul of the Court's requirement to comply with 

Rule 15(a). See id. at 2. Specifically, Robinson 

failed to obtain "the opposing party's consent or 

the [C]ourt's leave." see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

And while Robinson's filing of his amended 

complaint did not unduly delay this case, 

Robinsons' failure to respond to Wells Fargo's 

motion to strike the amended complaint did.

Page 13

 Indeed, Robinson filed his response in 

support of his amended complaint 113 days after 

Wells Fargo filed its motion to strike—only after 

the Court issued two separate orders related to his 

failure to respond. See generally Doc. 14, Def.'s 

Mot.; Doc. 18, Electronic Order; Doc. 24, 

Elecronic Order; Doc. 25, Pl.'s Resp. Between the 

end of the twenty-one-day period that Robinson 

should have responded to the motion to strike 

and the time he actually did so, the deadlines 

passed for Wells Fargo's expert designation and 

report and for the completion of mediation. See

Doc. 8, Scheduling Order, 1. By the time Robinson 

responded, only twenty-three days remained until 

the deadline for completion of discovery. See id. 
Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Tex. 2021)

When Wells Fargo timely filed its reply to 

Robinson's response, only nine days remained. 

See id. The discovery deadline has now passed. 

See id. Permitting Robinson's amended complaint 

would likely require amending the scheduling 

order and prolonging this case further, as Wells 

Fargo would need additional time to address 

Robinson's new claims and conduct additional 

discovery, and US Bank—a new defendant—would 

need to begin the litigation process in this case 

anew.

 This delay is undue in light of Robinson's 

initial failure to respond to Wells Fargo's motion, 

as well as his failure to respond after the Court's 

first order regarding that initial failure. See Doc. 

19, Pl.'s Resp. to Order, 1 (explaining that 

Robinson's failure to respond "was due to a 

miscommunication on [Robinson]'s counsel's 

part"); see also Thrasher v. Amarillo, 709 F.3d 

509, 511 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Proof of good cause 

requires 'at least as much as would be required to 

show excusable neglect, as to which simple 

inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance 

of the rules usually does not suffice.'" (quoting 

Winters v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 776 

F.2d 1304, 1306 (5th Cir. 1985))). While undue 

delay is not the Court's sole reason for denying 

leave to amend in

Page 14

this case, it certainly weighs in favor of the Court's 

decision.

IV.

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, Robinson's 

amended complaint is futile, and granting leave to 

amend would cause undue delay in this case. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo's 

motion (Doc. 14) and STRIKES Robinson's 

amended complaint (Doc. 13).

 Finally, Robinson's original petition (Doc. 1-

4) does not appear to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. Therefore, the Court 

ORDERS Robinson to SHOW CAUSE, in 

writing and by no later than JUNE 18, 2021, 

why the Court should not dismiss his original 

petition (Doc. 1-4).

 SO ORDERED.

 SIGNED: June 4, 2021.

 /s/_________

 JANE J. BOYLE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Footnotes:

 

1. The Court derives the factual background 

from Robinson's amended complaint (Doc. 13) 

and the docket.

 

2. Wells Fargo also argues that Robinson's 

amended complaint is futile insofar as Robinson 

alleges claims of superior title to the Property, 

constitutional violations, and fraud. Doc. 15, 

Def.'s Br., 12-16. The Court does not construe 

Robinson's amended complaint as asserting such 

claims and thus does not reach a decision on 

those arguments. See generally Doc. 13, Am. 

Compl.

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