COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

OTTIS LEE WAINWRIGHT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0166-99-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 MAY 16, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Margaret P. Spencer, Judge 

 Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Public 

Defender (David J. Johnson, Public Defender, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Ottis Lee Wainwright, appellant, appeals his convictions for 

rape, forcible sodomy, abduction with intent to defile, and 

robbery. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by 

allowing the prosecution to use appellant's previously suppressed 

statement for a purpose other than impeachment. For the following 

reasons, we find no error and affirm the convictions. 

Facts

 On the morning of April 11, 1998, the victim was walking near 

the intersection of "1st Street and James" when appellant grabbed 

her and forced her to walk with him. Appellant threatened to kill 
the victim if she screamed, and told her to act like they were 

"girlfriend and boyfriend" as they walked. Appellant took the 

victim directly to a nearby abandoned house where there was a 

mattress on the floor. Appellant, while promising not to do 

anything to his victim if she stayed quiet, put her on the 

mattress and removed some of her clothing. Appellant put his 

tongue on the victim's vagina. Thereafter, he put his penis into 

her vagina. The victim was crying and begging to leave so she 

could see her "little girl" again. Appellant said he would not 

kill her if she stayed quiet. Then appellant sat on top of his 

victim and forced her to suck his penis. After several other acts 

of sodomy, appellant had sexual intercourse again with his victim. 

When appellant was finished, he helped the victim dress. 

Appellant took $335 and a pack of bus tickets from the victim's 

pocketbook. As appellant and the victim walked away from the 

abandoned house, he told her "to walk out here like nothing 

happened." Appellant walked up "Saint James Street," and the 

victim fled to a friend's house. 

 At trial, appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with 

the victim, "playing" with her vagina, and putting his penis into 

her mouth, but denied that he threatened or forced her to commit 

these acts. Appellant claimed that when he saw the victim walking 

on the street, she proposed to have sex with him for $15. 

According to appellant, the victim told him to follow her and she 

led him to a mattress located at the back of a house. Appellant 

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claimed he did not know where they were going or that a mattress 

was at the house. After the encounter, the victim asked for her 

$15, but appellant only had $5. Appellant claimed the victim 

refused to accept his $5 and said she wanted her money if she ever 

saw him again. Appellant denied taking anything from the victim's 

pocketbook. 

 During cross-examination, appellant explained that a "smitty" 

was "an old house that's not used for anything." The prosecutor 

questioned appellant about his knowledge of abandoned houses in 

the vicinity of the house where the victim was raped. He admitted 

that during the weekend of the incident, he had slept in an empty 

house, but denied that it was in the "Saint James" area where the 

incident occurred. The prosecutor confronted appellant with a 

statement appellant had made to the police, and that was later 

suppressed because of a Miranda violation, that on the night 

before the incident, he had stayed in a "smitty" in "Saint James 

bottom." 

Analysis

 Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 

allowing the prosecution to use his previously suppressed 

statement during cross-examination about where he stayed the night 

before the incident. It is well settled that a statement obtained 

in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be 

used by the government to impeach the defendant's credibility if 

he or she chooses to testify. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 

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222, 226 (1971); Blaylock v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 579, 

596-97, 496 S.E.2d 97, 105-06 (1998). 

 Appellant's statement to the police that he stayed in an 

abandoned house in Saint James bottom the night before the 

offenses contradicted his testimony on direct that he was not 

familiar with the location where the crimes occurred. 

Appellant's knowledge of the area where the crimes occurred and 

his knowledge of whether a mattress was located in the abandoned 

house was relevant to the validity and accuracy of his denials 

that he accosted the victim and forced her to go to the 

abandoned house. This subject was relevant to the proof of the 

charged offenses, was not a collateral matter, and was a proper 

subject of cross-examination and impeachment once appellant 

offered himself as a witness. See Talbert v. Commonwealth, 17 

Va. App. 239, 243, 436 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1993). Accordingly, the 

trial court did not err in admitting appellant's statement for 

impeachment purposes.1 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

 1

 Assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge misspoke in 

saying the evidence went to "motive," appellant's statement was 

clearly admissible impeachment evidence. Therefore, the 

judgment should be affirmed. See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 

Va. App. 449, 451, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (judgment upheld 

where court reached right result for the wrong reason). 

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