IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOEL NOONKESTER, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00223-O

 § 

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT §

HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., § 

§ 

Defendants. §

 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are the Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by Plaintiff Joel 

Noonkester (“Noonkester”) (ECF No. 77); the Response in Opposition and appendix in support

filed by Defendants Elite Debt Brokers, LLC, Allied Financial Group, LLC, and Michael Bovino,

collectively (“Defendants”) (ECF Nos. 80, 81); and Noonkester’s Reply (ECF No. 85). By Order 

dated July 20, 2023, United States District Judge Reed O’Connor referred the Motion to the 

undersigned for hearing, if necessary, and final determination if permitted or recommendation 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Having considered the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Judge O’Connor GRANT the Motion (ECF No. 77) in part

and DENY it in part. 

I. BACKGROUND

The Court previously has described the transaction that led to Noonkester’s suit against the 

Defendants under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and Texas Finance Code, 

and for the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion. See ECF No. 84 at 1-2. Judge O’Connor and 

the parties are aware of the underlying facts, and further repetition is unnecessary. On June 28, 

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2023, Noonkester accepted an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure in the amount of $3,000. ECF No. 72. The Offer of Judgment also provided that 

Noonkester “shall be entitled to his reasonable attorney fees and costs on motion to the Court.” Id.

at 2. Noonkester now seeks an award of $131,184.00 in attorney’s fees and $9,796.53 in costs 

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) as the prevailing party. ECF No. 77 at 3, 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

The Court has “broad discretion in setting the appropriate award of attorneys’ fees.” 

Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

436-37 (1983)). The first step in setting an appropriate award is determining the “lodestar” of the 

relevant fees. Id. “The lodestar is the product of the number of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly billing rate.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. 

4552 v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter LULAC] (citing 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). The lodestar is presumably reasonable, but the Court “may adjust it 

upward or downward in exceptional cases.” Id.; see also Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1231 (5th 

Cir. 1987) (“[T]he calculation of the lodestar does not end the inquiry[,] and [] other considerations 

may persuade the district court to increase or decrease a fee award.”). 

After calculating the lodestar, the Court must evaluate the amount considering the twelve 

factors enumerated in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), 

abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). The Johnson factors 

include: (1) “the time and labor required”; (2) “the novelty and difficulty of the questions”; (3) 

“the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly”; (4) “the preclusion of other employment 

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case”; (5) “the customary fee”; (6) “whether the fee is 

fixed or contingent”; (7) “time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances”; (8) “the 

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amount involved and the results obtained”; (9) “the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

attorneys”; (10) “the ‘undesirability’ of the case”; (11) “the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client”; and (12) “awards in similar cases.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Tex. 

Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.04, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, 

app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, §9) (incorporating some of the Johnson factors into the State Bar 

of Texas’s rules of professional conduct). “[O]f the Johnson factors, the court should give special 

heed to the time and labor involved, the customary fee, the amount involved and the result 

obtained, and the experience, reputation and ability of counsel.” Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 

F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998). 

“[I]t will not always be necessary for a district court to address each of the twelve factors 

in explaining the considerations affecting its decision.” Davis v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469, 471 (5th 

Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, “[i]t remains important . . . for the district court to provide a concise but 

clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 

319, 329 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “Courts customarily require the applicant to produce 

contemporaneous billing records or other sufficient documentation so that the district court can 

fulfill its duty to examine the application for noncompensable hours.” Gagnon v. United 

Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324)

(cleaned up). While the absence of contemporaneous billing records “does not preclude an award 

of fees per se,” the evidence must be “adequate to determine reasonable hours.” Id. (quoting same 

at 325) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS

Under the clear terms of the Offer of Judgment, Noonkester is entitled to recover his 

“reasonable attorney fees and costs.” ECF No. 72 at 2. In support of his request for $131,184.00 

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in attorney’s fees and $9,796.53 in costs, Noonkester argues that the Defendants expended “tens 

of thousands of dollars” in defending the suit and are responsible for the large amount of attorney’s 

fees that Noonkester incurred through their aggressive tactics in filing numerous motions and 

opposing reasonable discovery. Id. at 2-10. Defendants respond that Noonkester is not entitled to 

any attorney’s fees, and if he is, the Court should reduce the award due to certain excessive

expenditures of attorney time. ECF No. 80. 

The Court notes at the outset the Fifth Circuit’s admonition that “the FDCPA does not 

support avaricious efforts of attorneys seeking a windfall. Because grossly excessive attorney’s 

fee requests directly contravene the purpose of the FDCPA, these tactics must be deterred.” Davis 

v. Credit Bureau of the South, 908 F.3d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 2018). In analyzing the fees charged 

and expenses incurred here, the Court recalls the contentious hearings in this case and the 

animosity between counsel for the parties reflected in their filings and documentation of 

correspondence between the two sides. In recommending that Judge O’Connor award Noonkester 

attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts discussed below, the undersigned observes that both sides 

of the case aggressively advanced the cause of their clients, with apparent disregard of the realistic 

amount in controversy in this case and the ultimate amount that Noonkester could recover at a trial 

or that the Defendants would have to pay him after entry of an adverse judgment. Regardless of 

the motivating reason for their doing so, the Court’s task here is to identify the reasonable 

attorney’s fees and costs to which Noonkester is entitled under the terms of the Offer of Judgment.

The Court begins by calculating the lodestar, which “is the product of the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly billing rate.” LULAC, 119 

F.3d at 1232. In support of his request for attorney’s fees, Noonkester offers the Declarations of 

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Jeffrey D. Wood, Esq., and Jonathan L. Hilton, Esq. (collectively “the Declarations”) and 

timesheets, receipts, and invoices supporting the Declarations. ECF Nos. 77-1, 77-2, and 77-9.

The Declarations and attached billing records reflect that Mr. Wood is a solo practitioner 

specializing in consumer law cases with offices in both Little Rock, Arkansas and Rockwall, 

Texas. ECF No. 77-1 at 2-3. He was admitted to practice in Arkansas in 2006, and his billing rate 

in this case was $400.00 per hour. Id. Mr. Wood has been counsel in over 500 FDCPA cases, filed 

and unfiled, and he opines that $400.00 per hour is a reasonable billing rate in this case. Id. With 

Noonkester’s permission, Mr. Wood associated Mr. Hilton and his partner Mr. Parker because they 

had previously had cases with Defendants’ counsel, and Mr. Wood feared that Defendants’ counsel 

“would begin a war of attrition over this case.” Id. at 3. Mr. Wood declared that although many 

FDCPA cases could be handled by a single lawyer, this case was different, and “very few solo 

practitioners in the FDCPA sphere would have been able to see the case through to the end and 

achieve a strong result for the client.” Id.

Messrs. Hilton and Parker are attorneys in Hilton Parker LLC and previously worked as 

associate attorneys at Jones Day. ECF No. 77-2 at 4-5. They were admitted to the Ohio Bar in 

2016 and billed at the rate of $330.00 per hour in this case. Id.; ECF No. 77-8. 

Billing statements included with the Motion reflect that Mr. Wood incurred $23,200 in 

attorney’s fees (54.7 hours at $400.00 per hour, plus 6.6 hours “written down to half rate” at 

$200.00 per hour) and $1,044 in expenses (two filing fees of $402.00 each and four process server 

fees totaling $240.00). ECF No. 77-7 at 8 (cleaned up). They also show that Mr. Wood wrote off 

$7,680.00 of attorney’s fees (19.2 hours at $400.00 per hour) from his request for fees in the 

Motion. Id. Billing statements for Messrs. Hilton and Parker show that they incurred over $140,000 

in attorney’s fees, which they “wrote down” to a reduced amount of attorney’s fees claimed of 

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$107,984.00. ECF Nos. 77 at 3, 77-8. This amount of attorney’s fees equates to 349.4 hours of 

attorney time (302.7 hours at $330.00 per hour, plus 46.7 hours that Messrs. Hilton and Parker 

billed at a half rate of $165.00 per hour), and 3.1 hours of paralegal time at a rate of $125.00 per 

hour. ECF No. 77-8. Messrs. Hilton and Parker also billed Nonkester for $8,752.53 in expenses. 

Id. Thus, the lodestar equals $131,184.00. Also, Noonkester seeks to recover $9,796.53 in 

expenses and costs. ECF No. 77 at 3.

The Court can adjust the lodestar up or down based on an analysis of the twelve Johnson 

factors. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. After considering the briefing and supporting evidence 

that Noonkester filed, the Court concludes that no upward adjustment is warranted. Half of the 

Johnson factors are neutral (factors 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 11), and the other half indicate that the 

lodestar amount is unreasonable (factors 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 12). None indicate that the total fees are 

reasonable. Moreover, the most important of the Johnson factors—“the time and labor involved, 

the customary fee, the amount involved and the result obtained, and the experience, reputation and 

ability of counsel,” see Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047—do not suggest that the lodestar amount is 

reasonable. 

To briefly touch on the neutral factors, factor two is not at issue here because this case is a 

FDCPA action involving a single defendant and limited alleged violations of the Act, thus 

presenting no “novel” or “difficult” legal questions. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. Likewise, the 

third factor is not relevant because this case does not require attorneys with highly specific or niche 

competencies, though Noonkester’s counsel did have significant experience in the subject matter 

at issue. See id. And none of Noonkester’s counsel suggested that he was significantly precluded 

from other work by taking this case, rendering the fourth factor inapplicable. See id. Further, there 

was no suggestion that pressing time constraints apply to this action or atypical “time limitations 

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imposed by the client or circumstances.” Id. Because the case presents nothing uniquely 

undesirable from a practitioner’s perspective, the tenth Johnson factor also does not inform the 

Court’s inquiry. See id. at 719. And finally, “the nature and length of the professional relationship 

with the client” does not factor into the Court’s reasonability analysis because nothing of record 

reflects the nature and extent of Noonkester’s relationship with any of his lawyers. Accordingly, 

that factor is irrelevant for the Court’s reasonability analysis. See id. 

As for factors suggesting that $131,184.00 would be a reasonable attorney fee for work in 

this matter, the first Johnson factor is “the time and labor required” for an attorney to prosecute 

the action. Id. at 717. Initially, the Court must determine if the attorney’s fees requested represent 

a reasonable number of hours expended at a reasonable hourly amount. Alexander v. City of 

Jackson Miss., 456 F. App’x 397, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2011). The Court concludes that the $400.00 

hourly rate for Mr. Wood and $330.00 rate for Messrs. Hilton and Parker were reasonable based 

upon the Court’s familiarity with the reasonable, usual, and customary billing rates in the Fort 

Worth Division of the Court for lawyers with similar years of experience and backgrounds. 

However, the Court must conclude that the amount of time spent on this case by 

Noonkester’s attorneys far exceeds the reasonable number of hours that are incurred in the 

prosecution of a case that, at most, involves an amount in controversy of less than $10,000. For 

that reason, Noonkester’s fee award request is exceptional, and an adjustment in the lodestar 

amount is necessary in the interest of justice. Although Noonkester’s lawyers apparently incurred 

the excessive number of hours in this case reflected in their timesheets submitted to the Court, it 

is not reasonable to conclude that they did so solely to represent Mr. Noonkester in his quest to 

recover a few thousand dollars in damages at the conclusion of his case. 

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Their billing records reflect numerous instances of billing for attorney conferences, travel, 

strategy sessions, research, and drafting that far exceed the reasonable requirements of a relatively 

small case. Although hotly contested by counsel, this case is a straightforward suit under the 

FDCPA. It seems like a prime candidate to be tried quickly without the expenditure of large sums 

for extensive discovery. Instead, the case resulting in the filing of numerous motions to dismiss, 

strike, reconsider, stay, and limit discovery and for sanctions and summary judgment, culminating 

in Noonkester’s acceptance of a $3,000 payment, a figure that pales in comparison to the amount 

of time and fees incurred to secure it. See filings summarized at ECF No. 77 at 7-8.

The Court finds that the number of hours incurred by Noonkester’s counsel exceed a 

reasonable amount given the amount in controversy. Having examined the relevant billing records, 

the Court concludes that $40,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $9,796.53 in expenses and costs, 

totaling $49,796.53, is a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to 

Noonkester. This figure provides reasonable, compensation for 100 hours of reasonable and 

necessary legal representation and accompanying expenses and costs. Consequently, the first 

Johnson factor indicates the lodestar amount of requested fees is unreasonable and should be 

adjusted downward. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717.

The fifth Johnson factor, which looks to the “customary fee” in similar cases, also lends 

further support to a downward adjustment to the lodestar. See id. at 718. In this regard, “courts in 

the Northern District [of Texas] have approved regular hourly rates of $345, $350, and $375.” 

Koehler v. Aetna Health Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Paris v. Dallas 

Airmotive, Inc., 2004 WL 2100227, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2004)). While $400.00 exceeds 

these amounts and indeed is a substantial sum of money for an hour’s work, it is not beyond the 

upper range of reasonableness for a lawyer with over ten years of experience in business litigation 

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who regularly appears in the Fort Worth Division of the Court. The fifth factor is naturally 

accompanied by the sixth— “whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” 488 F.2d at 718. Ordinarily, 

larger fees may be justified if the fee is contingent. But here the fee is not relatively large, and the 

fact that Noonkester’s counsel apparently represented him on an hourly basis facilitates efficient 

calculations like the one conducted above. The sixth factor supports an attorney’s fee award of 

$40,000.00 in fees here. 

By far, the most important factor in this case is Johnson’s eighth factor: the “amount 

involved and results obtained.” See id. at 718-19; Northwinds Abatement, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. Of 

Wausau, 258 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he most critical factor in determining an award 

of attorney’s fees is the ‘degree of success obtained’ by the victorious plaintiffs.”). The eighth 

factor makes $40,000.00 seem reasonable (although this amount is still over thirteen times the 

damages that Noonkester will receive under the Offer of Judgment). Given the significant 

reduction in the number of hours incurred to a reasonable number, Judge O’Connor should grant

$40,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $9,796.53 in expenses and costs.

Based on a full review of the pleadings in this consolidated matter, the Court concludes 

that the number of hours incurred by Noonkester’s lawyer was unreasonable. Rarely do attorneys 

avoid duplicating efforts or overlapping tasks in a case, especially when the lawyers are in different 

firms, but this case is beyond the norm. The number of hours incurred far exceed what a reasonable 

amount of time and effort would equal in a case such as this one, which involves only one plaintiff 

and a limited scope of alleged violations of the FDCPA. This is especially so where one of 

Noonkester’s attorneys (Mr. Wood) has an office within a two-hour drive to the Court, while the 

others (Messrs. Hilton and Parker) are in another part of the country, necessitating costly travel in 

a case with such a relatively small amount in controversy.

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The reasonable number of hours expensed would equal 100 total hours. Because this 

significantly reduces the number of hours, the Court applies the higher reasonable billing rate of 

$400.00 per hour to the number of hours and concludes that Nonkester is entitled to $40,000.00 in 

attorney’s fees. The Court does not, by utilizing Mr. Wood’s rate, imply anything about how many 

hours any attorney did or did not work. The Court concludes that an award of $9,796.53 in costs 

and expenses is warranted since these expenses already have been incurred. 

Under the Offer of Judgment, Noonkester is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees 

and costs upon motion to the Court. The Court interprets the offer to include costs that are beyond 

the list of “taxable costs” provided under the law. If the offer provided that he only could receive 

“taxable costs,” these would be limited to (1) fees paid to the clerk and marshal; (2) court reporter 

fees for deposition transcripts; (3) witness fees and related expenses; (4) printing fees; and (5) fees 

for copies of papers necessarily obtained for the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1920. However, the Offer of 

Judgment is not so limited, and Judge O’Connor should award him $9,796.53 in costs as detailed 

in his Motion.

Noonkester’s counsel writes that “[p]erhaps [his] bill is higher than the total amount paid 

by all Defendants. Perhaps it is not. Either way, [his] fees are hardly disproportionate considering 

that he bore the burden of proof—and that he won.” ECF No. 77 at 8. But his recovery of $3,000 

plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs came at a very high price in terms of the attorney’s fees 

incurred. Under the facts and circumstances at issue in the case, the reasonable and just attorney’s 

fees and costs that he should receive, proportionate to the amount in controversy and what he 

recovered in the Offer of Judgment, are $40,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $9,796.53 in costs. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Judge O’Connor GRANT in 

part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (ECF No. 77) and award 

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Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees of $40,000.00 and $9,796.53 in costs.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the 

time to file objections to 14 days).

SIGNED on July 17, 2024. 

____________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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