# IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S

N O . P D - 0 5 7 0 - 1 1
GENOVEVO SALINAS, Appellan t

v. THE S TATE O F TEXAS

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW F ROM THE FOUR TEE NTH COURT OF A P P EALS

HARRIS COUNTY

W omack , J., delive red the opinion of the Court, in w hich Keller, P.J., and Pric e, Keasler, Herv ey, Coc hran, and Alcala, JJ., joined. J ohnson, J., dissented. Me

yers, J ., did not parti cipate.
The a ppellant was c onvicted of murde r. The F ourtee nth Court of Appea ls affirme d the 1 

## conviction. We gr anted the a ppellant’s petition for discr etionary revie w on one g round: whethe r 2

T h e F o u r t e e n t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s ’ s o p i n i o n s t a t e s t h a t t h e j u r y f o u n d t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o f t w o c o u n t s o f 1 m u r d e r . S e e S a l i n a s v . S t a t e , 2 0 1 1 W L 9 0 3 9 8 4 , 2 0 1 1 T e x . A p p . L E X I S 1 9 2 3 ( T e x . A p p . – H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t
. ] M a r . 1 7 , 2 0 1 1 )

. B o t h p a r t i e s ’ b r i e f s , a s w e l l a s t h e c l e r k ’ s r e c o r d , h o w e v e r , i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s f o u n d g u i l t y o f o n e c o u n t o f m u r d e r . S e e T E X . P E N A L C O D E § 1 9

. 0 2

.

S a l i n a s , 2 0 1 1 W L 9 0 3 9 8 4 , 2 0 1 1 T e x . A p p . L E X I S 1 9 2 3

. 2

## 2

the Court of Appe als err ed in holding tha t the Fifth Ame ndment rig ht ag ainst compelled self

incrimination does not apply to pre-a rre st, pre- Miranda silence use d as substantive evide nce of 3 

## g uilt in cases in which a de fenda nt does not testify . Holding tha t such silence is a dmissibl e, we will affirm the Court of A ppeals’s de cision and uphold the appe llant’s conviction.

I. BACKG ROUND Houston police off

icer s discovere d two homicide victims on the morning of Dec ember 18, 1992. An investig ation led to the appe llant, and he voluntar ily acc ompanied off

icer s to the police station for que stioning. F or appr ox imately one hour, the appellant a nswere d ever

y question asked. The n, when a sked whe ther shotg un shells found at the c rime sce ne would match a shotg un found at his home, the a ppellant re mained silent, and, a ccor ding to the inter rog ating office r, demonstra ted sig ns of dec eption. A ballistics analy sis later matche d the shotg un with the casing s left at the murde r sce ne. Subsequent investig ation led police to a w itness who stated that the appe llant had admitted murder ing the victims. On March 4, 1993, the appellant wa s char g ed with murder, thoug h police could not loca te him at the time. After evading arr est for ne arly

15 y ear s, the appe llant was ca ptured in 2007. His first trial ended in a

mistrial. I n the appe llant’s second tria l, the State soug ht to introduce evide nce of his silence w hen he w as questioned a bout the shotgun she lls in t he 1992 intervie w. The a ppellant’s trial counsel objec ted to the State’s introduction of this evidenc e, ar g uing tha t the appellant c ould “invoke the F ifth Amendment privileg e whe ther he was in custody or not.” The trial court

overr uled the objec tion and allowed the e vidence to be introduce d. The jury found the a

ppellant g uilty of murder

and asse ssed punishment of twenty y ear s’ imprisonment and a $5,000 f ine.

M i r a n d a v . A r iz o n a , 3 8 4 U

. S

. 4 3 6 ( 1 9 6 6 )

. 3

## 3

On appe al to the Four

teenth Court of Appe als, the appe llant arg ued that the tria l court

err ed in admitting e vidence of his pre- arr est, pre- Miranda silence. The Court of Appea ls noted that this iss ue had not y et bee n addre ssed by our Court or the United States Supre me Court, and that other state c ourts and fe dera l courts of a ppeals we re divided on w hether such silence was admissible. The Court of Appe als sided with those courts holding that it is. Now, in one g round

4 

## for r eview, the appellant a rg ues that the Court of Appe als err ed in its holding, citing the dec isions of those cour

ts that have he ld that such silence w as inadmissible. The State re sponds that the Court of Appea ls corre ctly held that his silence wa s admissible, citing the de cisions of those courts that have held so. II. DISCUSS ION The F ifth Amendment to the United States Constituti on states, “No pe rson ... shall be compelled in any

criminal ca se to be a

witness ag ainst himself.” The United States Supre me 5 

## Court has interpre ted this as prohibiting the State f rom commenting on a def endant’ s ref

usal to testify at trial. A def

endant’ s silence before trial, howeve r, is considera bly less protec ted from 6 

## being commented upon a t trial. We read the rele vant ca selaw a s holding that the le vel of protec tion provided by

the Fif th Amendment to pre- trial silence va ries ac cording to severa l fac tors: (1) whe ther the de fenda nt was in police c ustody ; (2) whe ther he was infor med of his Miranda rig hts; and (3) whe ther e vidence of such silenc e is offe red a s substantive evidenc e of g uilt or elicited from a

testify ing de fenda

nt.

S a l i n a s , 2 0 1 1 W L 9 0 3 9 8 4 , 2 0 1 1 T e x . A p p . L E X I S 1 9 2 3 ; s e e a l s o S t a t e v . L e e , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 9 2 1 , 9 2 4 n . 5 4 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 0 )

.

U

. S

. C O N S T . a m e n d

. V

. 5
G r i f f i n v . C a l i f o r n i a , 3 8 0 U

. S

. 6 0 9 , 6 1 4 ( 1 9 6 5 )

. 6

## 4

The Supreme Court has held that a de fenda nt’s Fifth Ame ndment rig ht ag ainst compelled self-inc rimination is viol ated if the State is allowed to impeac h the def endant’ s testimony

by using his post-ar

rest, post- Miranda silence. The State doe s not violate a de fenda nt’s Fifth 7 

## Amendment rig hts, however , by cross-e x amining a

defe ndant as to post-ar

rest, pre
-Miranda silence w hen a de fenda

nt chooses to testify

. Fur thermore , the Supreme Court ha s held that pre- 8



## arr est, pre-

Miranda silence c an be use d to impeach a defe ndant who testifies. 9 

## Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has dec ided whethe r pre -ar rest, pre
Miranda silence ( which is at issue her e) is admissible evidenc e ag ainst a non-testify ing defe ndant. As the F ourtee nth Court of Appea ls noted, the courts that ha ve we ighe d in on the

1 0 

## issue are split. Those cour ts holding such silenc e to be a dmissibl e, g uided by J ustice Stevens’s 1 1



## concur ring opinion in Jenk

ins v. Anderson , g ener ally rea son that the Fifth Ame ndment rig ht 1 2 

## ag ainst compulsory

self-inc rimination is “irreleva nt to a citizen’s decision to remain silent whe n

D o y l e v . O h i o , 4 2 6 U

. S

. 6 1 0 ( 1 9 7 6 )

. 7
F l e t c h e r v . W

e i r , 4 5 5 U

. S

. 6 0 3 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; b u t s e e a l s o S a n c h e z v . S t a t e , 7 0 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 5 , 5 7 9

- 8 0 ( T e x . C r . 8 A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e T e x a s C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s m o r e e x p a n s i v e p r o t e c t i o n t o a d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e ; s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h a t o n c e a d e f

e n d a n t h a s b e e n a r r e s t e d

– r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r h e h a s r e c e i v e d h i s M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s

– h i s s i l e n c e m a y n o t b e u s e d a g a i n s t h i m f o r a n y p u r p o s e , e v e n i m p e a c h m e n t
. ( c i t i n g T E X . C O N S T . a r t
. I , § 1 0 ) )

.

S e e J e n k i n s v . A n d e r s o n , 4 4 7 U

. S

. 2 3 1 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; C i s n e r o s v . S t a t e , 6 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d 7 8 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 5 )

. 9
A t l e a s t o n e n o t a b l e T e x a s t r e a t i s e h a s p r e s u m e d t h a t i t i s . S e e 4 1 G e o r g e E

. D i x & J o h n M

. S c h m o l e s k y , 10 T e x a s P r a c t i c e : C r i m i n a l P r a c t i c e a n d P r o c e d u r e § 1 6

. 1 9 0 ( 3 d e d

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ [ A ] d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f

y i n g a t t r i a l m a y b e c r o s s - e x a m i n e d c o n c e r n i n g h i s f a i l u r e t o m a k e e x c u l p a t o r y c l a i m s t o p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n p r e a r r e s t c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h a d e f

e n d a n t w o u l d b e e x p e c t e d t o d o s o . P r e s u m a b l y , s u c h m a t t e r s c o u l d a l s o b e p r o v e d a s e v i d e n c e o f t h e a c c u s e d ’ s g u i l t
. ” )

.

S e e S a l i n a s , 2 0 1 1 T e x . A p p . L E X I S 1 9 2 3 , n . 2 ( c i t i n g S t a t e v . L e e , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 9 2 1 , 9 2 4 n . 5 ( T e x . C r . 11 A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) , o u r e a r l i e r o p i n i o n i n w h i c h w e d i s c u s s e d , b u t d i d n o t d e c i d e , t h i s i s s u e )

.

J e n k i n s , 4 4 7 U

. S

. , a t 2 4 1 ( S t e v e n s , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g )

. 12

## 5

he is under no of

ficial c ompulsion t o speak.” Those cour ts holding such silenc e to be 1 3 

## inadmissible view the Fif th Amendment rig ht more expansively , rea soning tha t “once a defe ndant invokes his rig ht to remain silent, it is i mpermissible for the pr osecution to ref er to a ny Fifth Ame ndment rig hts which [the] defe ndant exercised.” Nea rly all of the c ourts that have 1 4 

## addre ssed this issue have noted the conspicuous split and the lac k of g uidance from the Supre me Court. I n deter

mining that the a

ppellant’s silence could be a dmitted as substantive evidenc e of g uilt, the Court of Appeals – citing the dec isions of many state and f

eder al cour

ts – pointed to 1 5 

## the re asoning in J ustice Stevens’s Jenk ins concur

renc e. We ag ree with the Court of Appea ls.

1 6 1 7 

## The plain lang uag e of the Fifth Ame ndment protec ts a defe ndant from compe lledselfincrimination. I n pre- arr est, pre- Miranda circ umstances, a suspect’s inter action with police 1 8 

## office rs is not compelled. Thus, the F ifth Amendment rig ht ag ainst compulsoryselfincrimination is “simply

irrele vant to a citizen’s dec ision to remain silent when he is under no

S e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v . O

p l i n g e r , 1 5 0 F

. 3 d 1 0 6 1 , 1 0 6 6

- 6 7 ( 9 C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) ( c i t i n g J e n k i n s , 4 4 7 U

. S

. , a t 2 4 1

. )

. 13 t h
S e e C o m b s v . C o y l e , 2 0 5 F

. 3 d 2 6 9 , 2 8 3 ( 6 C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) ( c i t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B u r s o n , 9 5 2 F

. 2 d 1 1 9 6 , 14 t h 1 2 0 1 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 )

.

S e e O p l i n g e r , 1 5 0 F

. 3 d , a t 1 0 6 6

- 6 7 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) , o v e r r u l e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , U n i t e d S t a t e s v . 15 C o n t r e r a s , 5 9 3 F

. 3 d 1 1 3 5 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 1 0 ) ( p e r c u r i a m ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Z a n a b r i a , 7 4 F

. 3 d 5 9 0 , 5 9 3 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . R i v e r a , 9 4 4 F

. 2 d 1 5 6 3 , 1 5 6 8 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ; S t a t e v . L e e c a n , 5 0 4 A

. 2 d 4 8 0 , 4 8 4 ( C o n n . 1 9 8 6 ) ; K e y - E l v . S t a t e , 7 0 9 A

. 2 d 1 3 0 5 , 1 3 1 0

- 1 1 ( M d

. 1 9 9 8 ) , o v e r r u l e d b y W e i t z e l v . S t a t e , 8 6 3 A

. 2 d 9 9 9 , 1 0 0 2 ( M d

. 2 0 0 4 ) ; S t a t e v . M a s s l o n , 7 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 6 1 8 , 6 2 6 ( M o . C t
. A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) ; S t a t e v . D r e h e r , 6 9 5 A

. 2 d 6 7 2 , 7 0 5 ( N

. J

. A p p . D i v . 1 9 9 7 ) , d i s a

p p r o v e d b y S t a t e v . B r o w n , 9 1 9 A

. 2 d 1 0 7 , 1 1 6 n . 1 ( N

. J

. 2 0 0 7 ) ; S t a t e v . H e l g e s o n , 3 0 3 N

. W

. 2 d 3 4 2 , 3 4 8

- 4 9 ( N

. D

. 1 9 8 1 )

.

J e n k i n s , 4 4 7 U

. S

. , a t 2 4 1 ( S t e v e n s , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g )

. 16
W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e f a c t s o f J e n k i n s d i f

f e r f r o m t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . W e n o n e t h e l e s s f i n d t h e r e a s o n i n g i n 17 J u s t i c e S t e v e n s ’ c o n c u r r e n c e t o b e r e l e v a n t a n d p e r s u a s i v e .

U

. S

. C O N S T . a m e n d

. V

. 18

## 6

officia l compulsion to speak.” 1 9 

## III. CONCLUSION We hold that pre-a

rre st, pre- Miranda silence is not protec ted by the Fif th Amendment rig ht ag ainst compelled self -incrimination, and that pr osecutors ma y comment on such silence reg ardle ss of whethe r a de fenda nt testifies. The trial c ourt did not err in a llowing the State to do just that. W e af

firm the appe llant’s conviction.
Deliver ed Apr il 25, 2012. Publis h.

J

e n k i n s , 4 4 7 U

. S

. , a t 2 4 1 ( S t e v e n s , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ; s e e a l s o J e n k i n s , 4 4 7 U

. S

. a t 2 5 0 n . 4 ( M a r s h a l l , J

. , 19 d i s s e n t i n g ) ( “ O f c o u r s e t h e v o l u n t a r y d e c i s i o n t o r e m a i n s i l e n t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y o f f i c i a l c o m p u l s i o n d o e s n o t
‘ r a i s e a n y i s s u e u n d e r t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t ’ ” )

.