J-S73042-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RONALD D. WEAVER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

SUSAN SHOFF, OFFICER EVANISKO, 

EUGENE SANTORELLA, TREVOR 

WINGARD, AND DORINA VARNER

Appellee No. 608 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order March 31, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County

Civil Division at No(s): 610 Civil 2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2016

Appellant Ronald D. Weaver appeals from the order entered in the 

Somerset County Court of Common Pleas, which revoked his In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) status upon motion of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees Susan Shoff, Officer 

Evanisko, Eugene Santorella, Trevor Wingard, and Dorina Varner 

(collectively “DOC Appellees”). We transfer this appeal to Commonwealth 

Court.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

On September 27, 2013, Appellant filed a civil complaint against Appellees 

along with an application to proceed IFP. On December 30, 2015, the trial 

court granted Appellant’s application. On February 18, 2016, DOC Appellees 
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filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s IFP status. On March 10, 2016, 

Appellant filed a response to this motion. On March 29, 2016, the trial court 

conducted a hearing to address this motion along with Appellant’s motion for 

medical treatment. After the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying 

Appellant’s application for medical treatment and an order granting DOC 

Appellees’ motion to revoke Appellant’s IFP status. On April 27, 2016, 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the court’s order revoking his IFP 

status.1, 2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVOKING 

APPELLANT’S [IFP] STATUS AND BY MISSTATING THE 

INTENT OF THE CONFLICTING LAWS THAT GRANTS THE 

ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR ALL 

CITIZENS WHILE DENYING ACCESS TO THE COURTS 

UNOBSTRUCTED TO INDIGENT PRISONERS WHO ARE 

SUBJECT TO THE ABUSE OF CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES; 

AND, DOES THE CRIME OF BARRATRY PROVIDE THE 

PUBLIC WITH A MEANS FOR PROTECTION FROM UNJUST, 

INTENTIONAL FRIVOLOUS OR HARASSING LAWSUITS?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

____________________________________________

1 On May 2, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

After the court granted Appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file his 

statement, Appellant complied, and the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion on June 22, 2016.

2 See Grant v. Blaine, 868 A.2d 400, 403 (Pa.2005) (holding “an order 

denying in forma pauperis status is a final, appealable order.”).
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Before we address Appellant’s claim, we must decide whether to 

transfer this appeal to the Commonwealth Court. Although the parties do 

not contest this Court’s jurisdiction, we may sua sponte address whether to 

transfer a case to the Commonwealth Court. See Trumbull Corp. v. Boss 

Const., Inc., 747 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa.Super.2000). “Transfers between the 

intermediate appellate courts may be effected by the Superior Court and the 

Commonwealth Court on their own motion or upon petition of any party, to 

transfer any appeal to the other court for consideration and decision with a 

matter pending in such other court involving the same or related questions 

of fact, law or discretion.” Karpe v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 461 A.2d 

859, 860–61 (Pa.Super.1983) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 705) (internal quotations 

omitted).

When deciding whether to transfer an appeal to Commonwealth Court, 

this Court must weigh the following factors: “(1) whether the case has 

already been transferred; (2) whether our retention will disrupt the 

legislatively ordained division of labor between the intermediate appellate 

courts; and (3) whether there is a possibility of establishing two conflicting 

lines of authority on a particular subject.” Trumbull Corp., 747 A.2d at 399 

(internal citations omitted).

Here, the case has not yet been transferred between the courts. The 

Commonwealth Court has an established line of authority on interpreting the 
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Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),3 which governs a prisoner’s 

opportunity to proceed IFP. Appellant and Appellees cite to the 

Commonwealth Court to support their legal propositions. Further, 

Commonwealth government DOC employees filed the motion to revoke 

Appellant’s IFP status, which is the subject of this appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

762(a)(1)(ii) (giving Commonwealth Court exclusive jurisdiction over

appeals from final orders of courts of common pleas in civil actions or 

proceedings by the Commonwealth government); See also 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa.Super.2004) (the DOC 

is the Commonwealth government).

Accordingly, we transfer this appeal and the accompanying record to 

Commonwealth Court. 

Appeal TRANSFERRED to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction 

RELINQUISHED.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2016

____________________________________________

3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6601-08.