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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

THE GRAY CASUALTY & SURETY 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOLD STANDARD MOVING AND 

STORAGE LLC et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-0467-X

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Gray Casualty & Surety Company (“Gray”) filed this interpleader action. 

Gray now moves to discharge itself as a plaintiff in this matter. [Doc. No. 53]. For 

the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

I. Factual Background

Gray acted as a surety for a moving company called Gold Standard Moving and 

Storage LLC (“Gold”). To do so, Gray wrote a bond for $75,000 that was effective from 

May 4, 2021 to October 28, 2021. The upshot was that, if Gold incurred liability 

during the relevant timeframe and then defaulted on a claim against it, Gray would 

be on the hook for up to $75,000.

As it happens, between May 4, 2021 and October 28, 2021, Gold incurred 

liability—lots of liability. According to several aggrieved individuals who sought 

Gold’s help moving, Gold is not a moving company at all; it’s “a broker” that acts as a 

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middleman between the customer and the actual moving company.1 And according 

to those aggrieved individuals, Gold price gouged days before scheduled moves2 and 

lost items in transit.3 For instance, one individual claims that the truck carrying his 

belongings was “repossessed” and that his “possessions were donated and disposed 

of.”4

Reading the writing on the wall, Gray filed the instant interpleader action, 

seeking to deposit the value of its bond—$75,000—“into the registry of this Court” 

and naming all known claimants as defendants (the “Defendants”).5 On May 2, 2022, 

Gray deposited that $75,000 into the Court’s registry. Several claimants have now 

appeared, and, collectively, they seek significantly more than $75,000.6

Gray now asks the Court to discharge it from the instant action.

II. Legal Standard

District courts have jurisdiction over interpleader actions filed by a company 

that “issued a [] bond . . . of $500 or more.”7 Such actions “protect a stakeholder . . . 

from the possibility of multiple claims upon a single fund.”8 To resolve an 

1

 Doc. No. 17 at 2; accord Doc. No. 31 at 1.

2

 Doc. No. 31 at 1 (alleging that Gold changed the price of moving services “from $3500 total to 

nearly $12,000”).

3

 Doc. No. 21 at 4 (“[M]ost of these items never arrived at their end destination. Most of the 

items were either lost or stolen, and the few items that did make it . . . were severely damaged.”).

4

 Doc. No. 31 at 2.

5

 Doc. No. 1 at 4–5.

6 See, e.g., Doc. No. 21 at 5 (seeking to recover “$140,642.51 . . . from and against Gold, to the 

extent that such damages are not paid from the interpleader funds”).

7

 28 U.S.C. § 1335.

8 Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Gifford, 954 F.2d 1098, 1100 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1335).

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interpleader action, a court must (1) determine “whether the requirements for [a] 

statutory interpleader action have been met,” and, if so, (2) determine “the respective 

rights of the claimants.”9 If the Court “concludes that the requirements for 

interpleader have been met, it may discharge the plaintiff-stakeholder.”10

III. Analysis

“Statutory interpleader is proper when a (1) stakeholder has a single fund 

worth at least $500; (2) where two or more adverse claimants with diverse citizenship 

are competing for that fund; and (3) the stakeholder has deposited the fund in the 

Court’s registry.”11 The Court considers each element in turn.

First, “a single, identifiable fund is a prerequisite to an interpleader action.”12 

Unlike some cases involving multiple “funds encompassing different periods during 

a [multiple]-year span,”13 the fund at issue is $75,000, the “penal sum” of a single 

bond that “Gray wrote . . . on behalf of Gold” and that covered the time period between 

May 4, 2021 and October 28, 2021.14 That’s a single fund.

Second, at least two claimants are diverse. As Gray notes, at least one 

claimant “is a citizen of Texas” while another “is a citizen of New York.”15 Further, 

9 Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc. v. King Const. of Hous., L.L.C., 782 F.3d 186, 193 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(cleaned up).

10 Berry v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 718 F. App’x 259, 263 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

11 Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Corzo, No. 3:20-CV-3572-B, 2021 WL 1222135, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 

1, 2021) (Boyle, J.) (cleaned up).

12 Gifford, 954 F.2d at 1100.

13 Id. at 1101.

14 Doc. No. 1 at 4.

15 Id.

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those claimants are “adverse” and “competing for th[e] fund.”16 Each claimant wants 

a portion of the fund, and yet each claimant cannot get the amount he seeks since, 

together, they seek more than $75,000.17

Third, Gray has deposited that $75,000 into the Court’s registry.

In sum, because Gray meets the requirements for statutory interpleader, the 

Court “may discharge the plaintiff-stakeholder.”18 Accordingly, the Court 

DISCHARGES Gray from this action.19

Gray also asks the Court to issue injunctive relief. A district court may “issue 

a permanent injunction in an interpleader action when it discharges a plaintiff from 

further liability.”20 Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 authorizes the Court to restrain all 

claimants “from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding . . . affecting the property 

. . . involved in the interpleader action until further order of the court.” Accordingly, 

the Court ORDERS the following injunctive relief:

(1) Gray is discharged from liability to the Defendants—and to all other 

claimants—in any way related to The Gray Casualty & Surety Company Bond 

No. GSC0602441 issued to Gold (“the Bond”) or to the handling or processing 

16 Corzo, 2021 WL 1222135, at *1.

17 The fact that each potential claim arises from a different set of facts is irrelevant. See Auto 

Parts, 782 F.3d at 193 (“Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the 

conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to and 

independent of one another.” (cleaned up)).

18 Berry, 718 F. App’x at 263; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (recognizing that the “district court . . . 

may discharge the plaintiff from further liability”).

19 See Auto Parts, 782 F.3d at 196 (recognizing that the district court should discharge the 

interpleader-plaintiff “from the action” (emphasis added)).

20 Id. at 192.

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of claims made under the Bond.

(2) Defendants—and all other claimants—may not institute against Gray any 

proceeding in any state or United States Court or administrative tribunal in 

any way related to the Bond.

(3) Gray is dismissed with prejudice from all further appearances or actions in this 

case and from all liability for costs in this matter.

IV. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Gray’s motion, DISCHARGES Gray as provided above, 

and ENJOINS the claimants as provided above.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of January, 2023.

___________________________________

BRANTLEY STARR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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