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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46689

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KURT ALLEN MOROZKO,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: September 28, 2020

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Shoshone County. Hon. Scott L. Wayman, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for three counts of discharging a firearm at a dwelling

house and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, affirmed. 

Kurt Allen Morozko, Boise, pro se appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge 

Kurt Allen Morozko appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction for three 

counts of discharging a firearm at a dwelling house and two counts of possession of a controlled 

substance. Morozko sets forth twenty-six arguments challenging his underlying judgment of 

conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCUDURAL BACKGROUND

Morozko was charged with three counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling 

house, Idaho Code § 18-3317, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-

2732(c)(1). The charges arose after residents in Mullan, Idaho reported hearing gunfire 

throughout December 2017, and two property owners reported to the Shoshone County Sheriff’s 
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Department that they had discovered various bullet holes in their homes. As a result of an

investigation, the State charged Morozko with the above-listed offenses. 

Morozko was represented by counsel. However, at Morozko’s request, counsel 

withdrew1and Morozko continued pro se. Morozko’s case proceeded to trial on December 11-

13, 2018, and a jury convicted Morozko on all five counts. After trial, Morozko filed a motion to 

arrest judgment and a motion for new trial. The district court denied Morozko’s motions. 

Thereafter, the court sentenced Morozko to concurrent sentences of fifteen years with seven 

years determinate for each conviction of unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling house, and 

seven years with three years determinate for both counts of possession of a controlled substance.

Morozko timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

Morozko asserts a plethora of pretrial, trial, and post-trial errors. Based on these alleged 

errors, Morozko asks this Court to vacate his judgment of conviction and remand the case back 

to the district court for a new trial. We will address each of Morozko’s claims below.

A. Motions to Suppress2

Morozko claims that the evidence the State presented at trial should have been 

suppressed. Specifically, he contends that suppression was appropriate because: (1) his property 

was seized without a warrant and he was arrested without a warrant or probable cause; (2) the 

search warrants for Morozko’s home and person were not supported by sufficient probable cause

and were otherwise illegal; (3) the search warrants lacked particularity as to the places to be 

searched and the items to be seized; (4) the search of his person, home, and vehicle were 

unconstitutional; (5) the officers executing the search warrants were acting outside their 

 

1 The order allowing Morozko’s counsel to withdraw was entered November 28, 2018.

2 The Court interprets Morozko’s appellate issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 12 to raise suppression

claims, which are included in this section. It appears that Morozko’s first issue also includes 

allegations relating to his conditions of confinement following his arrest and prior to trial. To the 

extent that is the case, such claims are not preserved and are otherwise not cognizable on direct 

appeal. See Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 439 n.2, 163 P.3d 222, 228 n.2 (Ct. App. 2007) 

(noting that conditions of confinement claims are properly brought in a habeas corpus action or 

perhaps a post-conviction case, but not on direct appeal).
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territorial jurisdiction and seized improper items;

3

and (6) the officers trespassed on his property. 

Morozko also presents sub-issues and arguments within these overarching suppression issues. In 

response, the State argues that Morozko’s suppression claims fail because the district court 

denied Morozko’s claims as untimely and Morozko failed to challenge the district court’s 

determination. We agree with the State. 

We conclude that Morozko has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 

motions to suppress as untimely. A motion to suppress “must be filed within 28 days after the 

entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days before trial whichever is earlier.” Idaho Criminal Rule 

12(b)(3), (d). Prior to trial, Morozko filed various pro se motions to suppress while represented 

by counsel and while representing himself. None of these motions were noticed for hearing. On 

the second day of trial, Morozko orally renewed the previously filed written motions to suppress. 

The State objected to the district court considering the merits of Morozko’s motions because

both the oral and written motions were untimely. The district court sustained the State’s 

objection. The district court concluded that Morozko’s motions, which were filed prior to trial,

were not timely filed or noticed for hearing. On appeal, Morozko does not directly challenge the 

court’s ruling that his motions were untimely.4 Rather, Morozko presents arguments on the 

merits of his motions. Because the basis of the district court’s ruling is not challenged on appeal,

we must affirm the district court on its unchallenged ruling. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 

 

3 Morozko raised the issue of the authority of the officers from the Osborn Police 

Department to participate in the investigation in this matter not as a motion to suppress but in his 

motion for new trial filed after the verdict. The district court held that the evidence presented 

demonstrated that the Osborn Police officers did have authority and Morozko failed to show that 

the issue constituted a factual or legal basis for a new trial. Morozko has failed to challenge this 

ruling on appeal and we will not further address it. 

4 To be clear, Morozko did challenge the district court’s finding of untimeliness as to a 

variety of motions, and the series of motions referenced contains, among others, motions to 

suppress on various grounds. However, Morozko’s argument regarding the court’s finding that 

his motions were untimely is only that the district court did not file a scheduling order and some 

of the motions were not governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b). While a court may issue a 

scheduling order, it is not error to rely upon the rules governing procedure instead of issuing a 

scheduling order. Morozko does not address which motions he contends were not covered by 

I.C.R. 12(b).
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366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err 

in determining that Morozko’s motions to suppress were untimely.5

B. Charging Documents6

Morozko argues that his judgment of conviction should be vacated because there were 

multiple errors in the charging documents. Morozko claims that (1) some of the charges brought

against him were multiplicitous, (2) it was improper to join the possession charges with the

unlawful discharge of a firearm offenses, and (3) the complaint was improperly amended at the 

preliminary hearing. Morozko also presents sub-issues and arguments within these overarching 

charging documents issues. In response, the State contends that Morozko’s arguments in relation 

to the charging documents were untimely and not preserved for appeal.

To the extent Morozko attempted to raise any of these arguments before trial, he did so 

while represented by counsel. Neither trial counsel, nor Morozko filed notices of hearings for 

the motion. The district court properly refused to consider documents Morozko filed while 

represented by counsel or motions that were never properly noticed for hearing. Because 

Morozko never properly filed a motion to challenge the charging documents, as required by 

I.C.R. 12(b)(2) and I.C.R. 12(d), he has failed to preserve his arguments for appeal. See

I.C.R. 12 (stating that “defenses and objections based on defects in the complaint, indictment or 

information” “must be filed within 28 days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days 

before trial whichever is earlier”). 

In his post-trial motions, Morozko argued, among other issues not relevant here that his 

charges were not part of a common scheme or plan. The district court correctly concluded that 

the charges were properly joined and that Morozko never filed a motion to sever prior to trial. 

 

5 The district court was correct in its determination that Morozko’s motions to suppress 

were untimely filed without good cause or excusable neglect. As noted, the motions were 

required to be filed “within 28 days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days before 

trial whichever is earlier.” I.C.R. 12(d). The earliest of those dates in this case was twenty-eight 

days after the entry of his plea. Morozko pled not guilty on July 30, 2018, and did not file a 

motion to suppress within twenty-eight days. Morozko has provided no argument or citation to 

the record to support a showing of good cause.

6 The Court interprets Morozko’s appellate issues 13, 14, and 21 to raise challenges to the 

charging documents, which are included in this section.
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These issues were not timely raised, and in any event, were properly rejected by the district 

court.7

C. Pretrial Procedural Errors8

Morozko argues that his judgment of conviction should be vacated because various 

aspects of the pretrial proceedings were conducted in error. 

First, Morozko claims that there was not a proper probable cause finding to hold him 

after his arrest and that a probable cause hearing was not held within forty-eight hours as 

required by I.C.R. 5(d). To support this claim, Morozko cites documents that he attached to his 

notice of appeal. In response, the State argues that the magistrate court entered a probable cause 

finding which is in the record and Morozko did not preserve this argument for appeal, citing 

State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 500, 660 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1983). In reply to the State’s 

argument, Morozko claims that this issue was preserved for appeal. He redirects the Court to a 

different portion of the record in support of his argument. However, the page to which Morozko 

directs this Court is a subpoena and does not relate to his claim that a proper probable cause 

finding was not made by the magistrate court. Aside from the magistrate court’s finding, dated 

January 12, 2018, which is contained in the record, Morozko’s argument that the magistrate 

court failed to make a probable cause finding to hold him after his arrest is not preserved for 

appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992) (explaining that issues not 

raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal). Morozko did not make a 

proper and timely objection in the trial court to any alleged violation of I.C.R. 5(d). State v. 

Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Thus, we will not consider his 

argument on appeal. 

Second, Morozko claims that his speedy trial rights were violated because he was not 

provided a timely preliminary hearing, the information was not timely filed with the court, and 

his trial did not occur until nearly a year after his arrest. Morozko raised speedy trial issues in 

pretrial filings, however, the district court determined, during trial, that Morozko’s pretrial 

 

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In his reply brief, Morozko claims that his multiplicitous argument was raised before trial 

and during the sentencing hearing. In so arguing, Morozko points this Court to a portion of the 

record to show that he raised this argument before trial. However, that portion of the record, 

which is a motion to dismiss filed by Morozko, does not contain any such argument and the 

argument was not made post-trial.

8 The Court interprets Morozko’s appellate issues 6, 7, 8, 15 (part), 17, and 22 to raise 

pretrial procedural errors, which are included in this section.
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motions were untimely and not properly noticed for hearing. Following his conviction, Morozko 

filed various motions, including a motion for new trial. That motion was based, in part, on a 

claim that a preliminary hearing was not conducted in accordance with I.C.R. 5.1 resulting in a 

violation of his speedy trial rights. The district court addressed the various motions at the 

sentencing hearing before going forward with the sentencing.

When arguing his motion for new trial, Morozko acknowledged that the preliminary 

hearing was originally set for January 25, 2018, within the fourteen-day period, but was stayed to 

determine his competency. Morozko complained that a preliminary hearing should have 

occurred while his competency was being determined even though he was found incompetent for 

purposes of proceeding in his criminal case and was committed to the Idaho Department of 

Health and Welfare on April 3, 2018, for treatment to restore his competency. Consequently, he 

argued the information, which was filed in July 2018, was outside the six-month allowable 

timeframe. On appeal, Morozko additionally argues at length that the competency proceedings 

were illegal, based on false testimony and a ruse by the prosecutor to buy more time. These 

arguments were not made below and will not be considered on appeal. The district court 

correctly found that the preliminary hearing was originally scheduled within the fourteen-day 

period, the question of Morozko’s competency at the time resulted in a stay of proceedings, and 

Morozko thereafter waived a timely preliminary hearing. In fact, a termination of commitment 

was filed June 15, 2018, and a preliminary hearing was set for June 28, which was within 

fourteen days of terminating Morozko’s commitment. On June 22, 2018, Morozko’s new 

counsel filed a motion to vacate the preliminary hearing and a “Waiver of Timely Preliminary 

Hearing.” The preliminary hearing was thereafter held on July 19, 2018, and the information

was filed on July 23, 2018. Trial occurred within six months, resulting in no speedy trial 

violation.

Third, Morozko claims that the prosecutor failed to disclose various pieces of evidence in 

violation of Brady9and the sheriff’s office did not comply with a public records request. In 

response, the State argues that Morozko failed to raise these claims below. We agree with the 

State and conclude that Morozko failed to preserve these arguments for appeal. Other than the 

public records request, which Morozko briefly mentioned in the course of an unrelated argument

 

9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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at the sentencing hearing,10 Morozko does not cite the Court to the record to show where these 

issues were presented to the district court or explain how or when the evidence was discovered 

which he alleges was not produced. Instead, in his reply brief, Morozko responds to the State’s 

contention by simply stating “much of this suppressed evidence was not known by the Defendant 

until after the trial.” Morozko has not preserved his Brady arguments for appeal because he did 

not present them to the district court and did not obtain an adverse ruling for this Court to 

review. Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 841, 203 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2009); Fodge, 121 Idaho at 

195, 824 P.2d at 126.

Fourth, Morozko argues that the magistrate court erred by admitting “lab and forensics 

reports” and allowing a deputy to testify at his preliminary hearing. In addition, Morozko argues 

that the “Trial Court erred in not hearing multiple pretrial motions filed by Defense Counsel in 

this case.” Morozko’s arguments fail. The Idaho Supreme Court explained in Mitchell, 104 

Idaho at 500, 660 P.2d at 1343 that even if “the magistrate erred in relying on evidence at the 

preliminary hearing that is ultimately determined to be inadmissible, the error is not a ground for 

vacating a conviction where the appellant received a fair trial and was convicted, and there is 

sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.” As set forth herein, Morozko has not shown that 

he did not receive a fair trial, and sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict was produced at trial.

Consequently, even if the evidence was improperly admitted at the preliminary hearing, it 

provides no ground for vacating Morozko’s conviction. Next, as explained above, the district 

court properly ruled that it would not consider motions that Morozko made (1) while represented 

by counsel, or (2) a few days prior to trial but were not noticed for hearing. 

Fifth, Morozko contends that he was denied all discovery prior to his preliminary 

hearing. We conclude that Morozko’s claim is without merit. It is clear from the record that 

Morozko was provided with appropriate discovery prior to his preliminary hearing. It appears 

from his briefing that Morozko takes issue with the State not providing discovery directly to him 

in addition to the discovery that the State provided to his counsel. To the extent that Morozko is 

 

10 Morozko filed a motion before trial contending that since a public records request 

concerning events on his property prior to the charged incidents was denied, any such records 

were exempt and could not be used by the prosecution. This motion was not noticed for hearing 

and no ruling was made thereon. In addition, as mentioned by the prosecutor at sentencing, a 

public records request is not the same as discovery and Morozko pointed to no such records 

relevant to the criminal matter that had not been produced.
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claiming that an error occurred because he was not personally given the discovery material that 

the State had already provided to his defense counsel, Morozko’s claim is without merit and he 

cites no authority to support such a proposition. See I.C.R. 16(a).

Sixth, Morozko argues that the preliminary hearing transcript was not timely prepared. 

In response, the State argues that this claim was not preserved. In his reply brief, Morozko 

points the Court to the record and argues that he raised this issue below through an objection 

during trial and during sentencing. However, the portions of the record to which Morozko cites

do not contain any such objection or discussion regarding the preparation of the preliminary 

hearing transcript. As such, we conclude that Morozko’s claim is not preserved for appeal. 

Fodge, 121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126.

D. Trial Errors11

Morozko contends that his judgment of conviction should be vacated because of various 

trial errors. 

First, Morozko claims that the State did not lay adequate foundation for three of its 

exhibits (Exhibit 15, Exhibit 20, and Exhibit 28) because the police improperly collected the 

evidence.

12 The State argues that Morozko did not preserve these claims for appeal. We agree 

with the State. Morozko did not object to admission of Exhibit 15, Exhibit 20, or Exhibit 28. To 

the contrary, after the State moved to admit each of the exhibits, the district court asked Morozko 

if he objected to its admission and Morozko explicitly stated that he did not have an objection. 

Because Morozko did not object to the exhibits for lack of foundation below, he did not preserve 

his argument for appeal. Fodge, 121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126.13

 

11 The Court interprets Morozko’s appellate issues 9, 10, 11, 15 (part), 16, 18, 20, and 23

(part) to raise trial errors, which are included in this section.

12 Morozko cites to the police evidence number rather than the State’s exhibit number. For 

ease of reference, we cite to the State’s exhibit number.

13 Morozko complains about the collection, documentation, and presentation of much of the 

evidence in his case. However, Morozko did not object to each specific piece of evidence that he 

takes issue with at trial. On appeal, he fails to challenge specific pieces of evidence and 

similarly fails to cite to the record or transcript to show an objection and the basis therefore. 

Consequently, his complaints regarding such evidence will not be considered on appeal. See 

State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) (explaining “It is a 

fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial 

court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”).
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Second, Morozko argues that the method of forensic identification that was used to match 

the bullets to his firearm was flawed and documentation of testing was lacking. In addition, he 

points to testimony from the Idaho State Lab analyst who testified regarding the method of 

forensic identification, and argues that the analyst’s testing was flawed because the analyst 

admitted during trial that one of the dates in his report was inaccurate. First, we conclude that 

Morozko failed to preserve an argument regarding the method of forensic identification because 

he did not object to its use or presentation at trial. Carlson, 134 Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76. 

However, Morozko did “move to suppress” the test results after he questioned the analyst about 

the inconsistencies in the report and the analyst conceded that a date in his report was incorrect. 

We will assume, without deciding, that this was a proper objection and Morozko preserved his 

argument that the test results should not have been admitted because of an inconsistent date in 

the report. Regardless, Morozko has failed to show error. Morozko’s argument that the report’s

conclusions are unreliable because of the analyst’s testimony that a date in the report was 

incorrect does not, on its own, make the report inadmissible. This inconsistency in the report 

merely goes to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility. State v. Barber, 157 Idaho 822,

824, 340 P.3d 471, 473 (Ct. App. 2014) (concluding “defects in the foundation go to the weight, 

not admissibility, of the evidence”). As such, we conclude that the district court did not err by

admitting the report.

Third, Morozko alleges that the State’s witnesses gave inconsistent statements, false 

testimony, or committed perjury. In response, the State argues that Morozko has failed to show 

error because he does not challenge the district court’s ruling in relation to these arguments and 

fails to cite relevant authority. We agree with the State. Morozko’s appellate brief on this issue 

consists primarily of factual allegations regarding inconsistencies in the testimony of the State’s 

witnesses which are unsupported by legal argument or authority. Morozko does not set forth a 

ruling that he is challenging and does not attempt to explain why or how the district court erred. 

Because Morozko’s argument on this issue is not supported by cogent argument or authority, we 

will not consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (concluding 

that a party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking). 

However, as noted above, Morozko filed a motion for new trial after the jury verdict. 

During the hearing on the motion, Morozko claimed several instances of false evidence or 

perjury at trial. First, Morozko claimed that the State forensic expert submitted false evidence 
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because the report showed (a) the test firings of the firearm occurred before the firearm was 

actually sent to the lab, and (b) three solid point bullets from the firearm were reported fired 

when the firearm was actually fully loaded with hollow point bullets when seized. Second,

Morozko claimed the chain of custody and testimony regarding property details from Shoshone 

County officers was false. Third, Morozko claimed Officer Lee presented false testimony about 

three versus two bullets being found and linked to Morozko. Finally, Morozko claimed a police 

department employee testified falsely that the she drove the firearm to the lab on a particular date

because there is no evidence that the firearm was signed out or signed back in to the evidence 

locker.14 The district court ruled that none of the testimony was false, Morozko had not satisfied 

the standards of State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976) for granting a new trial 

based upon newly discovered evidence and that the evidence was simply impeachment. 

Morozko does not directly challenge any of the district court’s determinations, instead arguing 

the factual evidence demonstrates perjury. While we need not consider the unchallenged denial 

of the motion for new trial, we agree with the district court’s analysis.

Fourth, Morozko argues that the district court erred by failing to allow him to present 

evidence of an alibi. The State argues that Morozko did not preserve this argument for appeal. 

We agree with the State.15“[B]oth the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised 

before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,

98, 439 P.3d 1267 1270 (2019). At the end of trial, Morozko moved to admit defense Exhibits B 

through K (which included the evidence of Morozko’s alibi that he contends was improperly 

excluded). The district court addressed each exhibit and asked the State if it objected to 

admission of the exhibits. The State objected to admission of each of the exhibits for lack of 

foundation, failure to authenticate, and hearsay. Morozko was given the opportunity to address 

the State’s objections. Morozko did not argue that the exhibits were not hearsay or attempt to 

present an exception to the rule against hearsay. He did not argue that adequate foundation had 

been laid or attempt to lay adequate foundation. Instead, Morozko responded that he did not 

 

14 In his appellate brief, Morozko additionally asserts that Ms. Sands-Weimer and 

Mr. Chisholm’s testimony was perjured. He did not raise that claim in the motion for new trial;

however, for the same reasons the district court denied his motion as to the other witnesses, 

Morozko’s claim fails. 

15 Prior to trial, Morozko filed notices of alibi. However, he did so either while represented 

by counsel or without noticing any associated motion for hearing.
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wish to address the State’s objections for a majority of the exhibits presented. Consequently, the 

district court sustained the State’s objections and excluded the exhibits.16 Because Morozko did 

not argue below that the evidence was authenticated, had foundation, or was not precluded by the 

rule against hearsay, he has not preserved those arguments for appeal. Id.

Fifth, Morozko argues that his due process rights were violated “when the Defendant’s 

motion to subpoena witnesses went ignored by the Court.” The State argues that Morozko has 

failed to show error because he does not challenge the district court’s ruling in relation to this 

argument. We agree with the State. While represented by counsel, Morozko filed a document

with the district court titled “Notice to Subpoena” in which he “g[ave] notice to the Court” to 

subpoena thirteen individuals. In Morozko’s motion for new trial, he argued that the district 

court erred in failing to subpoena witnesses for the defense. The district court denied Morozko’s 

motion because Morozko did not assert viable grounds for a new trial and Morozko failed to 

present any evidence or argument to show that the witnesses would have aided in his defense. 

On appeal, Morozko does not challenge the district court’s conclusions or argue why he is 

entitled to a new trial based upon the district court’s alleged errors, arguing only that he was 

entitled to subpoenas because he had a due process right “to present a defense.” Because he does 

not challenge the district court’s ruling, Morozko has failed to show that the district court erred. 

Goodwin, 131 Idaho at 366, 956 P.2d at 1313.

Sixth, Morozko argues that the district court erred by overruling his objections to Deputy 

Lee’s testimony. At trial, Deputy Lee testified on behalf of the State regarding his training and 

experience in law enforcement and his investigation of this case. During Deputy Lee’s 

testimony, the State moved to admit State’s Exhibits 24-27. The exhibits were photographs of 

dowels which investigators used to track the general trajectory of the bullets that struck the 

houses. Morozko objected. He argued that Deputy Lee was not qualified to testify and use of 

the dowels was not reliable. Later, Morozko objected to Deputy Lee’s assertion that, based on 

Deputy Lee’s investigation, he believed the shots came from Morozko’s residence. Morozko 

argued that Deputy Lee was not qualified to make that assertion. In both instances, the district 

court overruled Morozko’s objection. 

 

16 The district court did admit one exhibit, Exhibit B1, because the State did not object to its 

admission. 
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“A district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an 

expert.” Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007) 

“Admissibility of expert testimony is also a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court 

and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.” Id. When a trial court’s 

discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry 

to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 

acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards 

applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 

State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 sets forth the standard related to expert testimony as follows: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the 

expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of 

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

I.R.E. 702. “Formal training is not necessary, but practical experience or special knowledge 

must be shown to bring a witness within the category of an expert.” Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 

153 P.3d at 1183. 

On appeal, Morozko argues that the district court erred in overruling his objections 

because Deputy Lee did not have the qualifications or “specialized knowledge” to testify about 

“gunshot reconstruction” or “ballistics.” We conclude, however, that the deputy had sufficient 

expertise and the defendant inaccurately characterizes the evidence as “gunshot reconstruction”

and “ballistics.” In our view, using a straight line (such as a dowel) protruding from a bullet hole 

to visualize and determine which general direction shots were fired from is not particularly 

technical or arcane. See State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130, 134, 344 P.3d 910, 914 (Ct. App. 2014) 

(concluding that “[t]he mushrooming of bullets and the relative size of entrance and exit holes 

[wer]e not particularly technical or arcane subjects” for individuals who have experience with 

firearms). That is true because “[o]ne need not engage in extensive technical study, take 

specialized measurements, or employ specialized tools of scientific analysis to make these 

simple observations.” Id. Here, Deputy Lee established that he had appropriate training and 

experience in law enforcement. His training included the use of firearms. In addition, he 

explained that he was trained in conducting crime scene investigations and a part of his training 

included bullet trajectory. Because Deputy Lee had adequate training and the ability to engage 
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in on-scene investigations, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Deputy Lee 

to testify about his investigation and his opinion regarding the direction of the shots.

Seventh, Morozko contends that the jury verdict form created an unconstitutional 

presumption of guilt because the prosecution “knowingly altered” the verdict form to present the 

jury’s option of “Guilty” before “Not Guilty.” Morozko points to broad sources of law, such as 

the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to support his 

assertion. However, he does not provide cogent argument to show how these broad sources of 

law apply to the facts of his case or explain how each of these laws were violated. Instead, he 

makes a conclusory allegation unsupported by argument or appropriate authority. As such, he 

has waived this issue on appeal. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (concluding that a 

party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking). Moreover, we note 

that placing “guilty” before “not guilty” on the verdict form does not lead to the conclusion that 

the jury ignored the instructions specifically addressing the presumption of innocence and the 

State’s burden of proof. To the contrary, we assume the opposite--that the jury followed the 

court’s instructions. See State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (noting 

presumption that jury follows court’s instructions).

Eighth, Morozko argues that there were defects in the jury instructions which affected his

conviction. In response, the State argues that Morozko’s claims fail because he did not object to 

the jury instructions at trial and does not argue that fundamental error applies on appeal. We 

agree with the State. In his reply brief, Morozko concedes that he did not object to the jury 

instructions. Nonetheless, Morozko fails to argue that fundamental error applies. As such, 

Morozko’s claim regarding the jury instructions fails.

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct 17

Morozko argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in a variety of ways. First, 

Morozko contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by submitting evidence that was 

exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act. The State claims that Morozko’s 

argument is without merit. We agree. The Idaho Rules of Evidence govern the admission of 

evidence at trial, not the Public Records Act. See I.R.E. 101(b). In addition, it is the district 

 

17 The Court interprets Morozko’s appellate issues 19 and 25 to raise prosecutorial 

misconduct claims, which are included in this section. Morozko’s arguments regarding other 

prosecutor actions are also addressed within other sections. 
14

court’s duty to determine whether evidence should be admitted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 

Evidence, not the prosecutor. Morozko has persisted in his mistaken belief that his Public 

Records Act request has bearing on this matter. The Public Records Act has its own avenue for 

appeal from a claim of exemption from production of requested records. Records exempt under 

the Public Records Act may still be relevant and admissible in a separate criminal matter and 

there is no prohibition on the prosecution from seeking admission of such documents. 

Morozko’s contention that the prosecutor committed misconduct by admitting evidence exempt 

from disclosure under the Public Records Act is without merit.

Second, Morozko contends that the prosecutor failed to present certain evidence to the 

jury, relied on unreliable evidence, and provided false evidence to obtain a conviction. In 

making these arguments, Morozko makes factual allegations which are unsupported by argument 

or authority. He does not cite a relevant legal standard or provide cogent argument. Thus, we 

will not consider these arguments. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. We note, 

however, that the evidence Morozko contends the prosecutor improperly used is addressed 

elsewhere herein and we have found no error in its admission. 

Third, Morozko contends that the prosecutor deliberately delayed the trial in violation of 

Morozko’s due process rights by moving for a competency evaluation in order to gain a tactical 

advantage over him. Before a due process violation can be found, the defendant must show that 

the pre-accusation delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial and 

that the delay was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over the accused. State v. Kruse, 100 

Idaho 877, 879, 606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842, 118 P.3d 160, 174 

(Ct. App. 2005). Here, the State moved for a competency evaluation and the district court 

granted the State’s motion. Thereafter, Morozko was evaluated and hospitalized as a result of 

the evaluation. The State’s interest in ensuring Morozko’s competency to stand trial is not a 

deliberate device to gain an advantage over Morozko. Moreover, after Morozko was released 

from the hospital, he stipulated to a waiver of a timely preliminary hearing. On appeal, Morozko 

does not argue that he suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the delay and has not shown 

that the delay was a deliberate device to gain an advantage by the State. As such, Morozko has 

not shown that his due process rights were violated. 

Fourth, Morozko contends that the government tampered with evidence. Morozko claims 

that his Bond Arms .357 pistol was seized but a Taurus .357 was photographed and that the 
15

documentation of the transport of the Bond Arms .357 is lacking. Morozko’s argument consists 

solely of factual allegations. He provides no evidence or argument in his opening brief of how 

the issues with the .357 matter at all to his conviction. He does not cite any legal authority nor 

does he provide cogent argument to support his claim. Accordingly, we will not consider the 

merits of his tampering claim on appeal. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.

Fifth, Morozko contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 

arguments. In response, the State argues that Morozko’s claims fails because he did not object to 

the statements at trial and does not argue on appeal that fundamental error applies. We agree 

with the State. In his reply brief, Morozko concedes that he did not object to the statements that 

he challenges on appeal because he was “unable to hear [the prosecutor’s] comment.”

Nonetheless, Morozko fails to argue that fundamental error applies. As such, Morozko has 

failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments.

F. Sufficiency of the Evidence18

Morozko argues, for multiple reasons, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in 

scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence 

upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden 

of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 

131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 

822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact 

as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. 

Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 

P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 

First, Morozko argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the time element of

Count II, discharging a firearm at a dwelling house. Specifically, Morozko claims that the State 

failed to prove this element because the person living at the dwelling at the time “had no idea

when the damage may have occurred.” We disagree. On the count in question, the State alleged 

 

18 The Court interprets Morozko’s appellate issues 23 (part) and 24 to raise sufficiency of 

the evidence challenges, which are included in this section.
16

that Morozko discharged a firearm at a dwelling house “on, about, or between the dates of 

December 9, 2017 and December 30, 2017.” At trial, the occupant of the dwelling testified that 

she started hearing shots around mid-December, saw a flashing red muzzle coming from 

Morozko’s house one evening around December 19, and reported the shots to police around 

December 20. She testified that she knew that the shots occurred before Christmas. In addition, 

the witness testified that four of the shots hit her home. Based on this testimony, we conclude 

that the State provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the time element of Count II.

Second, Morozko argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he intended 

to discharge his firearm at inhabited dwellings. Idaho Code § 18-3317 states that “It shall be 

unlawful for any person to intentionally and unlawfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited 

dwelling house.” The element of intent need not be shown by direct evidence but may be 

inferred from circumstantial evidence. Criminal intent may be inferred from the defendant’s 

actions and surrounding circumstances. State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827, 831, 54 P.3d 470, 474 

(Ct. App. 2002). The State presented ample evidence that Morozko shot at two of his neighbors’

houses and the shootings occurred throughout December 2017 and January 2018. The jury could 

have reasonably inferred that this repeated behavior was intentional. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Morozko intended to 

discharge his firearm at inhabited dwellings.

Third, Morozko argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that one of the houses 

was an inhabited dwelling house. Specifically, Morozko claims that the house, which was a 

former bed and breakfast, was not being occupied by its owner or anyone else and therefore was 

not an inhabited dwelling house. However, I.C. § 18-3317 explains that “‘inhabited’ means 

currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.” The State presented

evidence that the home was being used as a dwelling and the owner had recently evicted the 

family that was living in the house. Although the home was not being occupied when the shots 

were fired, it was being used for dwelling purposes and satisfied the definition set forth in I.C. 

§ 18-3317. Based on the definition and the State’s evidence, we conclude that sufficient 

evidence supports the jury’s verdict that the house was an inhabited dwelling house.19

 

19 In denying Morozko’s motion to arrest judgment, the district court also found substantial 

evidence supported the jury’s determination that the house was an inhabited dwelling house.
17

Fourth, Morozko argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he was guilty of 

possessing a controlled substance. Specifically, he contends that the State did not adequately 

prove the knowledge element because the substance, U-47700, had been made illegal some 

eleven months prior to Morozko’s charge and “no reasonable person would be aware this 

substance had been made illegal.” In addition, he claims that the State failed to prove, under 

Count VI, that he possessed the drug because it was found in his home while he was not there

and not on his person. Morozko’s former argument is without merit. Morozko was convicted 

under I.C. § 37-2732, which makes it illegal to possess controlled substances. The Idaho 

Supreme Court has held that “the offense requires a general intent, that is, the knowledge that 

one is in possession of the substance.” State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866, P2d 181, 183 

(1993). However, the individual need not know the substance possessed is a controlled 

substance. Id. Morozko’s latter argument likewise lacks merit. A defendant need not have 

actual physical possession of a drug to sustain a conviction for possession of it, but the State 

need only prove that he has such a dominion and control over it as to establish constructive 

possession. State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 594, 598, 468 P.2d 660, 664 (1970). Here, the State 

presented evidence that officers discovered U-47700 residue on a scale which was located on the 

living room coffee table inside of Morozko’s home. From all the evidence and surrounding 

circumstances, we conclude that the record reflects there was substantial and competent evidence 

to support the jury’s determination that Morozko had possession of the illegal substance.

G. Sentencing20

Finally, Morozko argues that the district court imposed an excessive sentence. An 

appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 

Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant 

has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 

Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse 

of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 

89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the 

time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 

protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 

 

20 The Court interprets only Morozko’s appellate issue 26 to raise a sentencing challenge, 

which is included in this section.
18

retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 

(Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 

harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record having regard for the nature of 

the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. 

Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length 

of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 

170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

Here, the district court sentenced Morozko to concurrent sentences of fifteen years with 

seven years determinate for each count of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and 

seven years with three years determinate for both counts of possession of a controlled substance. 

We conclude that the sentence imposed by the district court is not unreasonable upon review of 

the facts of the case. The district court considered the sentencing objectives, the facts underlying 

Morozko’s charges, and the impact of the crimes on the citizens of Mullan. The district court 

also expressly considered mitigating factors such as Morozko’s lack of criminal history.

However, the district court, after citing to the goals of sentencing, determined that a prison 

sentence was appropriate “[i]n order to protect the public.” The district court adequately 

articulated its reasoning for imposing Morozko’s sentence. Accordingly, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in imposing Morozko’s sentence.

III.

CONCLUSION

Morozko has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motions to 

suppress or preserve his claims regarding the errors in the charging documents. In addition, 

Morozko has failed to show errors in the pretrial proceedings or errors in the trial proceedings.

Finally, Morozko has failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct, there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, or the district court imposed an excessive sentence. 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence for three counts of 

discharge of a firearm at a dwelling house and two counts of possession of a controlled substance 

is affirmed.

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.