IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

The STATE OF TEXAS, et. al., §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22–cv–00780-X

 vs. §

§

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., §

in his official capacity as §

President of the United States, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

PROPOSED INTERVENORS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION TO INTERVENE [ECF No. 19]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................1

A. At Minimum, Proposed Intervenors Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention ...............1

B. Proposed Intervenors Are Entitled to Intervene as of Right ................................................3

1. Neither Presumption of Adequate Representation Applies..............................................3

2. Even if the Presumptions Apply, Proposed Intervenors Have Met Their “Relatively 

Minimal” Burden ...........................................................................................................6

C. Rosa and Jesus Properly Seek to Intervene in This Case.....................................................9

CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Brumfield v. Dodd,

749 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2014)............................................................................................2, 5, 6

Doe v. Glickman,

256 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2001)........................................................................................ 3, 4, 5, 9

E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius,

No. H-12-3009, 2013 WL 4678016 (S.D. Tex. Aug 30, 2013) .................................................3

Entergy Gulf States La., L.L.C. v. EPA,

817 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2016)........................................................................................ 4, 5, 7, 8

Gratz v. Bollinger,

183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998)...........................................................................................3

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements,

884 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1989)....................................................................................................4

Miller v. Vilsack,

No. 21-11271, 2022 WL 851782 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) ...................................................4, 5

Second Baptist Church v. City of San Antonio,

No. 5:20-CV-29-DAE, 2020 WL 6821324 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2020) ....................................1

Sierra Club v. Espy,

18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994)....................................................................................................1

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Texas at Austin,

338 F.R.D. 364 (W.D. Tex. 2021)............................................................................................1

Texas v. United States,

No. 6:21-cv-00003, 2021 WL 411441 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2021) .......................................1, 7, 8

United States v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp.,

923 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991)....................................................................................................2

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n,

834 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2016)....................................................................................................7

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6..........................................................................................................................2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24............................................................................................................ 1, 3, 7, 8

Loc. Civ. R. 7.1...........................................................................................................................2

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Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1158...........................................................................................................................5

8 U.S.C. § 1182...........................................................................................................................5

8 U.S.C. § 1254a.........................................................................................................................5

 

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Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene should be granted. At minimum, Proposed 

Intervenors should be granted permissive intervention: it is undisputed that the Court has discretion 

to permit such intervention, this circuit’s case law weighs in favor of it, the federal Defendants do 

not oppose it, and the Plaintiff States’ opposition amounts to unsupported handwringing that 

Proposed Intervenors would impose an undue burden. Additionally, Proposed Intervenors have 

met their “minimal” or alternatively “relatively minimal” burden under this circuit’s precedent to 

intervene as of right. The Parties’ oppositions are directed to just one factor of the Rule 24(a) test—

whether the federal Defendants may inadequately represent Proposed Intervenors’ interests—and 

Proposed Intervenors have already outlined why such inadequacy exists here. As the Fifth Circuit 

has made clear, intervention should be allowed “where no one would be hurt and greater justice 

could be attained.”1Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A. At Minimum, Proposed Intervenors Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention

The federal Defendants do not oppose permissive intervention, and the States do not 

dispute that this Court has discretion to permit intervention. The States’ cases showing that courts 

have substantial discretion to deny permissive intervention, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 19-20, ECF No. 36, 

are irrelevant to the question of whether the Court should exercise its discretion here.

The States’ main argument against permissive intervention is that Proposed Intervenors 

would “inject[] factual, collateral, unnecessary issues, including credibility, into this case and will 

1

In similar circumstances, some courts grant both intervention by right and by permission, see, 

e.g., Second Baptist Church v. City of San Antonio, No. 5:20-CV-29-DAE, 2020 WL 6821324, at 

*5-6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2020); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 

338 F.R.D. 364, 372-73 (W.D. Tex. 2021), and others grant permission to intervene and decline to 

reach intervention as of right, see, e.g., Texas v. United States, No. 6:21-cv-00003, 2021 WL 

411441, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2021).

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require additional proceedings,” based on their claim that the pending pseudonym motion will 

“undu[ly] burden” the existing parties, see id. at 21. But the federal Defendants consented to that 

motion, and the States declined to file a brief in opposition, and the time to do so has passed.2

Proposed Intervenors moved to intervene when this case was still in its infancy, and courts in this 

circuit have held that permissive intervention does not impose an undue burden on the existing 

parties under analogous circumstances. See Mot. at 15 (collecting cases). Proposed Intervenors 

committed to adhere to any future briefing schedule and to act so as not to delay the progress of 

the litigation. Id. To the extent that Proposed Intervenors’ intervention would “inject” additional 

facts and arguments into this case, this is precisely the point of intervention. See Brumfield v. Dodd, 

749 F.3d 339, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2014) (the “purpose of intervention is to allow interested parties to 

air their views so that a court may consider them before making potentially adverse decisions”). 

The States fail to identify any reason why Proposed Intervenors’ intervention at this stage in the 

litigation would impose an undue burden on them.

The States’ only other argument against permissive intervention is that Proposed 

Intervenors “cannot rebut the presumption of adequate representation.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 20. But the 

cases that the States cite demonstrate only that representation is one of several factors courts 

consider. See, e.g., United States v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1991)

(noting other reasons for denial). While Proposed Intervenors have rebutted either or both 

presumptions to the extent they apply, see infra Section B(1), permissive intervention is 

appropriate even where the intervenors are unable to meet the inadequacy of representation 

2

See Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d), (e) (“A response to an opposed motion must be accompanied by a brief 

that sets forth the responding party’s contentions of fact and/or law, and argument and authorities,” 

and such response “must be filed within 21 days from the date the motion is filed”); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6(b)(1)(B) (time may be extended after deadline only “if the party failed to act because of 

excusable neglect”).

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requirement, see Mot. 16-17 (collecting cases); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, No. H-12-3009, 

2013 WL 4678016, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug 30, 2013) (permitting intervention although intervenors’ 

interests were “very similar” to those of existing parties because they “will add a different 

perspective that will contribute to the development of the issues”).

Here, the permissive intervention factors weigh in favor of permitting intervention. Mot. 

at 15-17. Indeed, the States do not dispute that Proposed Intervenors bring different perspectives 

and facts to this case, and, as they note, Proposed Intervenors’ counsel from the International 

Refugee Assistance Project are counsel in S.A. v. Trump, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 9 n.6, and have relevant 

experience and knowledge that bear on this case. Under Fifth Circuit law, the fact that Proposed 

Intervenors are likely to provide significant contributions to the development of the underlying 

factual issues is also a factor weighing in favor of permitting intervention. See Mot. at 16.

B. Proposed Intervenors Are Entitled to Intervene as of Right

All of the Parties’ arguments against intervention as of right are directed at the fourth and 

final Rule 24(a) factor, and thus the only question to resolve is whether Proposed Intervenors may

be inadequately represented by the federal Defendants.3 Proposed Intervenors have met their 

“minimal” or “relatively minimal” burden, and they are entitled to intervene by right. 

1. Neither Presumption of Adequate Representation Applies 

As previously noted, under certain circumstances, Fifth Circuit precedent imposes two 

3 While the States assert that Proposed Intervenors’ motion is untimely because it is premature, 

see Pls.’ Opp’n at 11-13, prematurity is more appropriately analyzed as part of inadequacy of 

representation—as the States’ own cited case reflects, see Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 212 

n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that intervention was timely and construing argument about 

prematurity of motion to go to inadequacy), rev’d on other grounds, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); 

see also Doe v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2001) (courts must consider Stallworth 

factors in assessing the timeliness of a request to intervene, none of which relate to prematurity). 

The motion is timely under Fifth Circuit precedent. See Mot. at 8-9.

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presumptions of adequate representation that can be rebutted on a “relatively minimal” showing 

that representation by the existing parties “may” be inadequate based on “something more than 

speculation.” Mot. at 11 (internal citations omitted). If the presumptions do not apply, a “minimal” 

showing is required. Id. The Parties argue both presumptions apply, but they are incorrect.

First, the government legal representative presumption does not apply, and the Parties’ 

arguments to the contrary find no basis in this circuit’s precedent. The presumption arises when a 

party to the case “is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests 

of the intervenor,” see id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added), and it is “restricted . . . to 

those suits involving matters of sovereign interest,” such as where a state is presumed to represent 

the interests of all its citizens, see Entergy Gulf States La., L.L.C. v. EPA, 817 F.3d 198, 203 & n.2 

(5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The federal Defendants assume that the 

presumption applies because they purport to represent “the interests of all applicants and 

beneficiaries in this administrative challenge to CAM.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 37. The States 

argue, without supporting caselaw, that the presumption applies because “in no area is the 

‘sovereign interest’ presumption more relevant than in an immigration case,” and “[t]his, alone, 

should result in a denial of the Purported Intervenors’ intervention.”4 Pls.’ Opp’n at 19. 

The Parties’ arguments ignore that the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that the 

presumption does not apply in cases involving governmental agencies because the agencies “must 

represent the broad public interest” and cannot be presumed to represent the particular legal 

interests of proposed intervenors. Glickman, 256 F.3d at 380-81; see, e.g., Entergy, 817 F.3d at 

203-04 n.2; Miller v. Vilsack, No. 21-11271, 2022 WL 851782, at *2-3 & n.4 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 

4 As an initial matter, the States misstate the legal standard: the presumption is rebuttable based 

on a “‘relatively minimal’” showing based on “‘something more than speculation.’” See Mot. at 

11 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1989)). 

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2022). Just as in Glickman, Entergy, and Miller, the federal Defendants cannot be presumed to 

represent the legal interests of the Proposed Intervenors. In recent years, they have taken actions 

directly adverse to Proposed Intervenors’ interests, such as shutting down the CAM Program for 

the children of Rosa, Jesus, and Timoteo, and thus prolonging their separation from their families 

and the dangers their families face. See Mot. at 2-3, 5-6. Even today, the federal Defendants have 

authority to take actions that would eliminate Proposed Intervenors’ permission to be in this 

country and to be united with their families in safety here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (asylum 

“may” be granted in federal government’s discretion); id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (same for parole for 

urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit); id. § 1254a(b)(3) (requiring government 

to review Temporary Protected Status designations to determine whether to extend them).

Second, the ultimate objective presumption does not apply in this case. The States assume 

that the presumption applies because, they assert, that Proposed Intervenors and the federal 

Defendants “share in the same ultimate objective” to defend CAM, Pls.’ Opp’n at 16. But, the 

Fifth Circuit has squarely rejected this gloss: the Brumfield court held the presumption “d[id] not 

apply” even where “both” the state and intervenors “vigorously oppose[d] dismantling the voucher 

program” at issue. 749 F.3d at 345. The court reasoned that the state had “many interests” at stake, 

whereas the intervenors were solely concerned with their ability to benefit from the program; as 

such, the intervenors and the state’s ultimate interests “may not align precisely.” Id. at 345-46. 

While the federal Defendants assert that Proposed Intervenors have not sufficiently shown 

the government has more extensive interests, Defs.’ Opp’n 2-3 & nn.1-2, they ignore the 

arguments in Proposed Intervenors’ motion, see Mot. 12-14; and they misread Brumfield when 

they suggest that more than these interests is necessary to determine whether the presumption 

applies. Here, as in Brumfield, the federal Defendants have broad institutional interests, which 

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include preserving an expansive interpretation of executive authority that enables the federal 

government to reopen and expand the CAM Program as well as to close the Program and stop 

processing pending applications, in response to political and policy priorities that change over 

time.5See Mot. at 12-14. Proposed Intervenors do not share this interest; their ultimate objective 

is to reunite and remain united with their families in safety in the United States, and the CAM 

Program is one potential means by which they might achieve their objective. See id. at 12. That 

the ultimate objectives differ is highlighted by the fact that while re-opening CAM, the federal 

Defendants have continued to close the southern border as another means by which families 

seeking refuge from violence in Central America could seek to reunite in safety in the United 

States. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 4-5 (citing Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department 

of State, Restarting the Central American Minors Program (Mar. 10, 2021)). Even the federal 

Defendants’ articulation of their ultimate objective differs from that of Proposed Intervenors in 

ways that may affect their advocacy: they argue that they seek to defend the 2021 

“reimplementation and expansion of CAM,” id. at 2, while Proposed Intervenors seek to defend 

the CAM Program in all its iterations that may enable them to reunite and remain with their 

families, including continued CAM parole processing under the 2019 S.A. settlement and CAM 

re-parole. Because the federal Defendants and Proposed Intervenors’ ultimate interests “may not 

align precisely,” the ultimate interest presumption does not apply. Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 345-46.

2. Even if the Presumptions Apply, Proposed Intervenors Have Met Their 

“Relatively Minimal” Burden

Even if one or both of the presumptions of adequate representation apply (they do not), 

5 The federal Defendants’ argument that their prior termination of CAM is outside the scope of 

“this litigation,” see Defs.’ Opp’n at 5, misses the point: the federal Defendants’ prior actions and 

arguments are likely to constrain the arguments they make in this case, because to do otherwise 

would call into question the legality of their actions and tie the government’s hands in the future. 

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Proposed Intervenors have met their “relatively minimal” burden to demonstrate, based on more 

than speculation, that their interests diverge from the federal Defendants’ interests in a manner 

germane to the case. See Mot. at 11-14. All the States’ arguments amount to an effort to graft a 

new requirement on to the Rule 24(a) standard that proposed intervenors must wait until after the 

responsive pleading is filed before moving to intervene on the theory that to do so earlier would 

be “premature” as a matter of law. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 18-19 (arguing Proposed Intervenors’ 

arguments are “without any basis” because “Defendants have filed no pleadings” and “[a]ny 

speculation as to future contingencies, given that no pleadings have been filed, is not sufficient”). 

But the States’ own caselaw demonstrates that their position is incorrect. See Entergy, 817 F.3d at 

201-02, 206 (reversing denial of motion to intervene as of right where motion was filed less than 

a month after the complaint filing and before the defendants had filed any responsive pleading).

The States attempt to distinguish several cases in which the Fifth Circuit has reversed a 

district court’s denial of intervention as of right, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 17-18, but they fail to recognize 

that appellate courts in those cases were able to pinpoint the reasons that representation proved to 

be inadequate given the time that had passed between the district court decision and appeal—

notwithstanding that the intervention standard requires only that representation may be inadequate. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 834 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 2016)

(“Because intervention necessarily occurs before the litigation has been resolved, the [intervenor] 

need only show that the representation may be inadequate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

For example, the Parties argue that Texas is distinguishable because the federal government took

a position “directly adverse” to the proposed beneficiaries: that the States may refuse driver’s 

licenses to DAPA beneficiaries. See Pls.’ Opp’n 17-18; Defs.’ Opp’n 3-4. But the government first 

took this position after the intervention motion was filed, and it was not until the briefing on appeal 

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that the parties’ divergent objectives were fleshed out. See Appellants’ Reply Br. at 12, Texas v. 

United States, 805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40333), 2015 WL 4040957, at *11-12

(describing how government’s opening brief on appeal showed government had abandoned its 

defense of part of the DAPA program, while proposed intervenors sought to defend all of DAPA);

see also Entergy, 817 F.3d at 204-05 (describing developments that took place after intervention 

motion filed in reversing district court’s denial of intervention of right). Rule 24(a) does not expect 

or require perfect foresight as to how inadequate representation will manifest throughout the case.

Here, as in Texas and Entergy, Proposed Intervenors have satisfied their burden based on 

the “lack of unity in all objectives, combined with real and legitimate additional or contrary 

arguments[.]” Texas, 805 F.3d at 663 (internal quotation marks omitted). They describe how their 

narrow interests in reuniting with their families diverge from the broader, institutional interests of 

the federal Defendants, including in maintaining “an expansive interpretation of executive 

authority” that would allow for CAM to be both reopened and closed. See Mot. at 12-14. And they 

explain why these divergent interests are germane to this case: specifically, Proposed Intervenors 

are prepared to argue that terminating or dismantling CAM will result in irreparable harm to 

beneficiaries—with important implications for the appropriate remedy in this case—and they have 

access to concrete evidence of such irreparable harm, see Mot. at 5-7, 13-14, which is most 

appropriately submitted on the record by a party. The federal Defendants, in contrast, are unlikely 

to make such arguments that would tie the federal government’s hands in the future and call into 

question the legality of prior government actions.

In addition, the federal Defendants lack access to specific concrete evidence of irreparable 

harms that CAM beneficiaries have suffered and will suffer if the program is terminated, and their 

attempt to argue otherwise is unpersuasive. They rely on two public statements about the CAM 

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reopening to argue that the “Government is aware of the humanitarian and personal value of CAM 

and the harm its loss would cost[] to beneficiaries,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 4, but the statements are silent 

about the fact that CAM was shut down in the recent past by their own actions, let alone the harms 

beneficiaries suffered as a result and continue to suffer. Similar to the States, the federal 

Defendants conflate the Administration’s current policy interest in reopening CAM with the 

absence of any competing interests that may impact their advocacy in this case. Pls.’ Opp’n at 15-

18; Defs.’ Opp’n at 4-5. But the cited statements speak to the federal Defendants’ broad 

institutional and political interests that Proposed Intervenors do not share and that may result in 

inadequate representation. See, e.g., Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Restarting 

the Central American Minors Program (describing CAM reopening as “another concrete step in 

implementing our comprehensive regional migration management strategy,” which includes 

closing southern border to migrants fleeing violence in Central America).

Finally, the federal Defendants’ argument that the prior CAM shutdown is not germane to 

the case, Defs.’ Opp’n at 5, misunderstands Proposed Intervenors’ argument. Proposed Intervenors 

have explained why the federal Defendants’ prior shutdown of CAM and arguments in recent 

litigation may limit the arguments they are willing to make in this case, such that their 

representation may be inadequate in this case. These arguments are grounded in fact and are more 

than speculation—and satisfy their “relatively minimal” burden. See, e.g., Glickman, 256 F.3d at 

380-81 (holding inadequacy prong met based in part on fact that agency took position in another 

federal case “contrary to the [proposed intervenor]’s contention and the position it now takes”). 

C. Rosa and Jesus Properly Seek to Intervene in This Case

Last, the States imply that certain Proposed Intervenors should not be granted intervention 

in this case because they are among the S.A. settlement beneficiaries and Rosa is already in the 

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United States. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 5-6. This is a red herring: the States do not dispute that Rosa and 

Jesus have the requisite protectable interest in this case or that their ability to protect their interest 

may be impaired absent intervention. See Mot. at 9-11. Nor could they; the plain language of the 

States’ Amended Complaint threatens all iterations of parole under CAM, including those aspects 

of CAM that Rosa and Jesus seek to rely upon to reunite with their families and to remain together 

in safety in the United States. Am. Compl. at 35-36, ECF No. 14 (Prayer for Relief) (requesting 

this Court to “[e]njoin . . . Defendants’ use of the parole authority under the Central American 

Minors Program” and to “set [the CAM Program] aside to the extent that it provides any benefits 

outside of the contours of the Refugee Admissions Program” (emphasis added)).

On April 20, 2022, Proposed Intervenors met and conferred with the States to clarify 

whether they plan to narrow the scope of their legal challenge given the substantial disconnect 

between their Prayer for Relief and their representations in their opposition brief that they do not 

seek to terminate the CAM Program for Rosa and Jesus. See infra, Certificate of Conference. The 

States indicated that their Amended Complaint speaks for itself, and they have no current plans to 

amend it. Id. Therefore, Proposed Intervenors have no choice but to rely upon the plain language 

of the Amended Complaint, which broadly extends its reach to Rosa and Jesus.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Proposed Intervenors respectfully request that this Court grant 

their motion to intervene in this case using their pseudonyms.6 

6 Proposed Intervenors respectfully request that the Court adjudicate their pending motion to 

proceed under pseudonyms based on the papers before it, given the States’ failure to oppose in a 

timely manner, see supra 3 & n.2, and they note that the federal Defendants have consented to 

Proposed Intervenors’ use of pseudonyms.

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Dated: April 22, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Debra J. McComas /s/ Linda B. Evarts

Debra J. McComas Linda B. Evarts 

HAYNES & BOONE LLP NYS Bar #5236948 (pro hac vice)

State Bar No. 00794261 Kathryn C. Meyer 

2323 Victory Ave., Suite 700 NYS Bar #5504485 (pro hac vice)

Dallas, Texas 75219 Mariko Hirose 

Tel. (214) 651-5000 NYS Bar #4802674 (pro hac vice)

Fax (214) 651-5940 INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE 

debbie.mccomas@haynesboone.com ASSISTANCE PROJECT 

One Battery Park Plaza, 4th Floor 

New York, NY 10004

Tel. (516) 838-1655

Fax: (929) 999-8115

levarts@refugeerights.org

kmeyer@refugeerights.org

mhirose@refugeerights.org

Counsel for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

On April 12, 2022, Proposed Intervenors’ counsel requested to meet and confer with 

Plaintiffs’ counsel to clarify whether Plaintiffs intend to narrow the scope of their legal challenge 

in light of the substantial disconnect between the broad relief requested in their Amended 

Complaint’s Prayer for Relief and their representations in their opposition brief that Plaintiffs 

request more narrow relief. On April 20, 2022, Proposed Intervenors’ counsel conferred

telephonically with counsel for Plaintiffs. The identities of the attorneys conferring were as 

follows: Ryan D. Walters, Michelle W. Ghetti, and Gene P. Hamilton for the Plaintiffs, and Linda 

B. Evarts, Kathryn C. Meyer, Mariko Hirose, and Debra J. McComas for the Proposed Intervenors. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Proposed Intervenors’ counsel that their Amended Complaint 

“speaks for itself” and they were “not in a position to elaborate” further. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

represented that Plaintiffs have no current plans to amend their complaint. Proposed Intervenors 

responded that there are “extreme inconsistencies” between the Prayer for Relief and the 

representations in Plaintiffs’ opposition, explained why the two documents are inconsistent, and 

said that Proposed Intervenors would have to bring the inconsistencies to the Court’s attention in 

their reply. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the reply was the “proper vehicle” for Proposed 

Intervenors to address their concerns.

/s/ Linda B. Evarts

Linda B. Evarts

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on April 22, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using 

the CM/ECF system. I hereby certify that I have served the document on all counsel by a manner 

authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2) via the Court’s CM/ECF filing system. 

/s/ Linda B. Evarts

Linda B. Evarts

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