# FILED January 29, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON JANUARY 1999 SESSION
STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) NO. 02C01-9803-CR-00065 Appellee, ) ) SHELBY COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. BERNIE WEINMAN, CHRISTOPHER J. EA CHOLES, ) JUDGE

) Appellant. ) (Second Degree Murder)
FOR THE APPELLANT : ROBERT C. BROOKS 707 Adams Avenue P.O. Box 771558 Memphis, TN 38105 FOR THE APPEL LEE : PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General and Repor ter CLI NTO N J. MOR GAN Assistant Attorney Gener al Cordell Hull Buildi ng, 2nd Floor 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 WILLIAM L. GIBBONS District Attorney General C. ALANDA

HORNE KEVIN R. RAR DIN Asst. District Attor

neys General 201 Poplar Ave, Suite 301 Memphis, TN 38103-1947

OPINION FI LED:
AFFIRMED JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE2 OPINION The defendant, Christopher J. Eachol es, appeals as of right his conviction for second degree murder by a Shelby County jur

y. He received a s

entence of twenty-one years

in the Department of Correcti on. On appeal he contests the sufficiency of the evidence and whether the trial court erred in failing to apply certain mitigating facto rs in sentencing. Fi nding no error below , the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED . FACTS The defendant resided in Memphis with Sharon Nunna lly and her sister, Melissa Stewart. Sh ortly after the defendant moved i n with the sisters, h e and Stewart began a romanti c relations hip. That rel ationship en ded sometime around the first part of September 1996. Stewart and the victim, Montsho Jimerson, also had a previous relationship. Stewart resumed her relationship with the victim i n early October 1996. Stewart and the victi m were watching te levision in Nunnally 's residence on the evening of October 17, 1996.The defendant returned to the residenc e and entered through a side door. Stewart proceeded to the bedr oom to speak with the defendant. The defen dant then walked into the living room, drew a small pistol, and shot the vic

tim four (4) times from the side as he watched televisi on. The victim subsequently died from these wounds. Stewart testified that the defendant had previously argued with the victim about the victim’s prese nce in the residence. Apparently, the defendant was unhappy that Stewart conti nued to have contact with her ex-boyfriend. At one point the defendant told the victim if he continu ed to visit the residence, his mother would "be weari ng a black dress."3 The defendant testified tha t he, in fact, did not approve of the victim's presence at the residence. Defendant testif ied that the victim previously threatened him and appeared to be reaching f or a gun when he shot him. No weapon was

found on the v

ictim. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The defendant contends the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder.
In determinin g the sufficie ncy of the eviden ce, this Court do es not reweigh or reevaluate the evi dence. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). A jury ver

dict approved by the tr

ial judge accredits the state's witnesses and resolves all confli cts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris , 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (T enn. 1992). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all legitimate or reasonable inferences which may be dr awn therefrom. Id. This Court will not disturb a verdict of guilt due to the sufficiency of the evidence unless the defendant demonstrates that the facts contained in the record a nd the inferences which may be dr awn therefrom are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational trier of fact to find th e accused guilty bey ond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brewer , 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1996). Accordingly, it is the appellate court's duty to affirm the conviction if the ev idence, viewed under these standards, was sufficie nt for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Cazes , 875 S.W.2d 253, 25 9 (Tenn. 1994). The state’s proof revealed that defendant knowingly shot and killed the victim. Although the de fendant contended the shooting was in self-defense, the4

jury rejected this and found him guilty of a “know ing killing of another. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1) . Self-defense is a jury q uestion. State v. Ivy , 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (T enn. Crim. App. 1993). The jury was within its prerogative in rejecting self-defense.
This issue is without merit. SENTENCING
The defendant’s second issue addresse s the trial court’s failure to apply any mitigating factors . This Court’s revi ew of the sentence imposed by the trial court is de novo

with a presumption of corr ectness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d). This presumption is conditioned upon an affirmative show ing in the record that the trial jud ge considered the sentencing principles and all rel evant facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). If the trial court fails to c

omply with the statutor y directives, ther

e is no presumption of correctness and our review is de novo . State v. Poole , 945 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997). The defendant received a twenty -one (21) year sentence.The presumptive sentence for the C lass A felony of second degree murder is the midpoint within the rang e; namely, twenty ( 20) years. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). The trial c ourt considered statutory enhancing factors and found that the offense was committed wi th a firearm. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(9). Based upon this factor, the trial court enhanced defendant’s sentence one (1) year. The trial

court noted the mitigating factors submitted by defendant: (1) defendant acted under strong provocation, Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-35-113(2); and (2) defendant was a first- time offender, had a high school education, had a good work record, c

ame from a good family, and was deeply remorseful, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13). The tr ial court rejected these fact ors. The5

sentence of twenty-one (21) years, one year abov

e the presumptive sentence, was well within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the sentence was proper.
This issue is without merit. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

_________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE CONCUR:

______________________________ DAVID G. HA

YES, JUDGE

______________________________ JOHN EVERETT WILLIA MS, JUDGE