IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50117

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

TAYLOR BREANN MOOREFIELD, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:14-CR-209

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Following a jury trial, Taylor Breann Moorefield was found guilty of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual 

methamphetamine. Moorefield appeals the district court’s judgment, 

specifically challenging: (1) the exclusion of evidence related to her cooperation 

with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); (2) the sufficiency of the 

evidence; and (3) the court’s jury instructions. We affirm.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 1, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Exclusion of Evidence

This court reviews a district court’s exclusion of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion, and if such abuse is found we review for harmless error. United 

States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1998). 

The Government filed a motion in limine requesting that the court 

exclude evidence of Moorefield’s cooperation with the DEA. To support its 

motion, the Government argued that such evidence was irrelevant and that 

Moorefield did not file a notice of intent to assert a public authority defense

(i.e., defendant was actually trying to help enforce the law) as required under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.3. At a bench conference, defense 

counsel responded that Moorefield did not comply with the Rule because she 

was not asserting that her behavior was authorized by the DEA. Instead, 

defense counsel argued that this evidence would be used to show her state of 

mind related to the inherent dangers of being a DEA informant, and requested 

a jury instruction to that effect. When questioned by the court as to why her 

state of mind was relevant to the charge, defense counsel asserted that 

Moorefield did not change her behavior or stop her involvement in the drug 

business because she feared her life was at risk if she was discovered as an 

informant. 

The district court responded by citing the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of the

matter in a number of cases, specifically United States v. Smith, 481 F.3d 259, 

262-63 (5th Cir. 2007). The district judge reasoned that while the Smith court

dealt with a different issue – entrapment – it discussed the rule that is 

applicable to the instant case. Similarly, Smith involved a motion in limine to 

exclude evidence that defendant had been a police informant. Id. at 262. Like 

here, the Smith court granted the motion in limine because defendant did not 

provide notice of his intent to use a public authority defense. Id. Also, the 

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court in Smith opined that the district court did not err in failing to give the 

entrapment instruction, stating:

Before the district court, Smith’s counsel never clearly asserted 

entrapment as a possible defense. Even though Smith asserts that 

his proffered testimony was relevant to entrapment, he did not 

make a prima facie showing that would require either the 

government to prove that it did not entrap the defendant or the 

district court to offer an instruction on entrapment. 

Id. at 263. The same may be said here. Moorefield’s counsel did not clearly 

assert duress as a possible defense and did not make a prima facie showing to 

support a duress instruction. While defense counsel’s statement that 

Moorefield feared for her life if discovered to be a DEA informant may imply

duress, it was not enough to warrant the instruction. To merit a duress 

instruction, defendant must show:

(1) that the defendant was under an unlawful and “present, 

imminent, and impending [threat] of such a nature as to 

induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious 

bodily injury”;

(2) that defendant had not “recklessly or negligently placed 

himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would 

be [forced to choose the criminal conduct]”;

(3) that defendant had no “reasonable legal alternative to 

violating the law; a chance both to refuse to do the criminal 

act and also to avoid the threatened harm”; and

(4) “that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably 

anticipated between the [criminal] action taken and the 

avoidance of the [threatened] harm.”

United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998).

Moorefield contends on appeal that these requirements set the bar too 

high because the Supreme Court has held that “a defendant is entitled to an 

instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Mathews v. United States, 

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485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S. Ct. 883, 887 (1988). This argument works against 

Moorefield, however. Without more, defense counsel’s general statements of 

Moorefield’s angst about being found out as a government informant is not 

sufficient evidence to necessitate the duress instruction. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 

evidence of Moorefield’s DEA cooperation.

Insufficiency of the Evidence

Next, Moorefield contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support 

the jury’s conviction. This court in Vargas-Ocampo restated the Supreme 

Court standard that a conviction must be affirmed “if after viewing the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 

F.3d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 2014 (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 170 (2014) (citing

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-14, 99 S. Ct. 2781-2786 (1979)). 

To show that Moorefield conspired to possess methamphetamine with 

intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, the Government 

“must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an agreement that 

entails a violation of the narcotics laws, the defendants’ knowledge of the 

agreement, and their voluntary participation in it.” United States v. Ayala, 

887 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Hernandez-Palacios,

838 F.2d 1346, 1348 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Gardea Carrasco, 830 F.2d 

41, 44 (5th Cir.1987)). Moorefield only challenges the “voluntariness” of her 

participation in the conspiracy, stating that “the evidence does not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Moorefield’s intent was borne of a ‘bad purpose’

rather than fear of retribution from some dangerous people.” She further 

argues that the evidence proves that she lacked the specific intent to commit 

the offense. 

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On the contrary, the evidence supports the assertion that Moorefield 

voluntarily and actively participated in furthering the drug conspiracy. 

Multiple witnesses testified to having personal knowledge of Moorefield 

dealing meth. One of those witnesses was Michael Brewer, an admitted meth 

dealer who testified to providing her with enough meth to distribute, and on 

several occasions, personally driving her to the locations to complete the deals. 

Another witness, Brandy Zaliauskas, testified that Moorefield and several 

other individuals regularly distributed meth from a hotel room that was 

usually paid for by Zaliauskas. 

Moreover, the Government presented audio recordings and text 

messages that reflected Moorefield’s conversations about drug dealing with 

Brewer. Some of these conversations revealed Moorefield seemingly bragging 

about her ability to sell meth. Brewer testified that Moorefield was referring 

to meth as “work” when she stated “I can get rid of work like getting rid of 

candy on Halloween.” Also, Moorefield admitted telling Brewer “I can sell a 

whole ball all by myself. I’m a big girl. I’ve done it before.” Her explanation 

for this apparent boasting was that she was not proud of it, but that she sold 

meth because she needed the money. 

In light of the compelling evidence at trial, we conclude that a reasonable 

jury could find that Moorefield possessed the requisite intent to further the 

drug conspiracy and that her participation was voluntary.

Jury Instructions

Moorefield’s final argument is that the district court committed plain 

error by failing to define “willfully” as requiring a “bad purpose” according to 

the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions. 

“The trial judge is given substantial latitude in tailoring the instructions 

so long as they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented.” United States 

v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 558 (5th Cir. 1981). It is undisputed that conspiracy to 

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possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance “is a specific intent 

crime.” United States v. Burroughs, 876 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1989). The 

phrase “specific intent” need not be used in the jury instruction; what matters 

is whether the jury is instructed that the defendant intended to break the law. 

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 449 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the jury was required to find “[t]hat the defendant knew of the 

unlawful purpose of the agreement; and [t]hat the defendant joined in the 

agreement willfully, that is, with the intent to further its unlawful purpose.” 

Thus, unlike in Burroughs, the district court did not wrongly treat the 

conspiracy charge as a general intent crime. See 876 F.2d at 368. Because the 

jury was “required to find that [Moorefield] intended to do something 

unlawful,” the instruction was proper. See id. at 369. 

AFFIRMED.

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