1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ANTHONY KEITH FREENEY,

#31366-177,

§

§ 

 Movant, §

§ No. 3:22-cv-00484-L (BT)

v. § No. 3:17-cr-00664-L-1 

§

UNITED STATES of AMERICA, §

§

 Respondent. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Movant Anthony Keith Freeney, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se

motion to vacate, set-aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

The District Court referred the resulting civil action to the United States 

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of 

reference. For the following reasons, the Court should deny Freeney’s § 2255 

motion. 

I.

A jury found Freeney guilty of (1) possession of a firearm in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); (2) possession with intent to 

distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 

(b)(1)(C); and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The District Court sentenced 

him to a total term of 132 months’ imprisonment—an above-guidelines 

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sentence based on his extensive criminal history. The Fifth Circuit Court of 

Appeals affirmed this Court’s judgment, United States v. Freeney, 815 F. 

App’x 802 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam), and the Supreme Court denied 

Freeney’s petition for writ of certiorari. See Freeney v. United States, 141 S. 

Ct. 1443 (2021). 

Thereafter, Freeney filed his § 2255 motion (CV ECF No. 2), in which 

he argues: 

(1) his trial counsel was ineffective when they failed to

a. file a motion to dismiss after the jury came back with 

an undecided verdict and concerning the process to 

select the “grand jury and jury members,” Mot. 4 (CV 

ECF No. 2); 

b. file a motion to dismiss based on fingerprint analysis 

done by the “ATF”, id.; 

c. present requested witnesses that would have 

supported his claim that he was innocent;

d. object to prejudicial arguments made by the 

Government at trial; and 

e. object to the “sentence process enhancements” and 

the Government’s arguments during the “sentence 

process.” Id.

(2) his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel on direct appeal; 

(3) the indictment was “[d]efective,” Mot. 7 (CV ECF No. 2); 

and 

(4) he was actually innocent of the § 924(c) charge. 

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The Government responds and asks the Court to deny Freeney’s § 2255 

motion because: (1) his actual innocence claim is not cognizable under § 

2255; (2) his collateral attack on the indictment is procedurally barred and 

meritless; and (3) his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are conclusory 

and lack merit. Freeney filed a reply, and his claims are fully-briefed and ripe 

for determination.

II.

A. Freeney’s actual innocence claim is not cognizable under § 2255. 

Freeney argues he is actually innocent of the § 924(c) charge, and a 

“miscarriage of justice took place” because “no such crime [was] 

committed.” Mot. 8 (CV ECF No. 2). He contends that when law 

enforcement found the guns and drugs in his mother’s home, the evidence 

showed he had “departed the home” and was later stopped by a marked 

police car four blocks away. Id. Freeney further contends he was “detained 

and returned to the home” after “SWAT” “had cleared it.” Id. He concludes 

the “[e]vidence shows” he “was not in close proximity” to the guns and drugs 

at the time of his arrest. Id.

The Supreme Court and courts within the Fifth Circuit “do[ ] not 

recognize freestanding actual innocence claims.” United States v. Shepherd, 

880 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 

443, 479 (5th Cir. 2014)); see also In re Swearingen, 556 F.3d 344, 348 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (holding the Fifth Circuit Court does not recognize a freestanding 

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claim of actual innocence on federal habeas review); Burton v. Stephens, 543 

F. App’x 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has not recognized 

actual innocence as an independent ground for federal habeas corpus 

relief.”). That is, actual innocence is not a cognizable federal habeas claim. 

United States v. Scruggs, 691 F.3d 660, 671 n.36 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Foster v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also 

Matheson v. United States, 440 F. App’x 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (“[W]e have consistently held federal habeas law does not recognize 

a freestanding actual innocence claim.”) (citing Foster, 466 F.3d at 367-68). 

Thus, Freeney’s claim that he is actually innocent of the § 924(c) charge is 

not within the power of the court to adjudicate in the context of this habeas 

proceeding. 

Moreover, even if his actual innocence claim were cognizable in this § 

2255 action, it would be barred by the law-of-the-case-doctrine. A claim 

“raised and rejected on direct appeal” cannot be raised in a § 2255 motion 

on collateral review. See United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 791 (5th 

Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Kalish, 780 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 

1986) (“It is settled in this Circuit that issues raised and disposed of in a 

previous appeal from an original judgment of conviction are not considered 

in § 2255 motions.”); United States v. Goudeau, 512 F. App’x 390, 393 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming denial of § 2255 motion under law-of-thecase doctrine after the appellate court dismissed defendant’s direct appeal 

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as barred by an appeal waiver). The law-of-the-case doctrine generally 

precludes reexamination of issues of law or fact decided on appeal. USPPS, 

Ltd. v. Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2011). Freeney 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his § 924(c) conviction 

on direct appeal, Freeney, 815 F. App’x at 803, and the Fifth Circuit rejected 

it. He cannot litigate the issue again now. 

The Government also argues that, to the extent this claim is a different 

theory of factual innocence than the one he raised on direct appeal, it has 

now been procedurally defaulted. Resp. 9 (CV ECF No. 9). Because this claim 

fails on the merits and is barred by the law-of-the-case-doctrine, the Court 

should pretermit consideration of this additional argument. 

This claim fails because it is not cognizable and is barred by the lawof-the case-doctrine. The Court should dismiss it. 

B. Freeney’s attacks on the indictment are procedurally barred. 

Next, Freeney argues his “right to indictment” was violated because 

he had a “defective indictment.” Mot. 7 (CV ECF No. 2). Specifically, he 

contends the indictment failed “to state the offenses on count[s] 2, 3 and 4” 

and “failed to state required information on page 1 of the second superseding 

indictment,” such as “the offenses name, the offenses codes and numbers, 

etc.” Id.

This claim fails because it was procedurally defaulted when Freeney 

failed to raise it during his criminal proceedings through a motion to dismiss 

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or on direct appeal. See United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th 

Cir. 1998) (“Following a conviction and exhaustion or waiver of the right to 

direct appeal, we presume a defendant stands fairly and finally convicted.”) 

(citing United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (en 

banc)). When a movant fails to raise a claim on direct appeal, the claim is 

procedurally defaulted and can only be considered under § 2255 if the 

movant can show cause for his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal and 

actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent. United States v. Placente, 

81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Shaid, 937 F.2d at 231-32 (“The 

Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that a collateral challenge may 

not do service for an appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A movant 

bears the burden of demonstrating either cause and actual prejudice, or that 

he is actually innocent. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 

(1998) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)). Freeney did not 

raise this challenge to his indictment on direct appeal. See Freeney, 815 F. 

App’x at 802. Nor has he shown cause and prejudice or actual innocence. 

See United States v. Vargas-Soto, 35 F.4th 979, 993 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(addressing the prerequisites to overcoming a procedural default) (citing 

Gonzales v. Davis, 924 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)). 

The Government also argues Freeney’s claim attacking his indictment 

is meritless. Resp. 10 (CV ECF No. 9). Because Freeney’s claim is 

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procedurally defaulted, the Court should pretermit consideration of this 

additional argument.

C. Freeney’s claims that his trial attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel are conclusory and meritless. 

Freeney argues his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel throughout the proceedings—that is during the pretrial phase, at 

trial, and during the “sentence process.” Mot. 4 (CV ECF No. 2); see also

Reply 1-7 (CV ECF No. 10). Specifically, Freeney contends his trial attorney 

should have: (1) filed a motion to dismiss after the jury came back with an 

undecided verdict and concerning the process to select the “grand jury and 

jury members,” (2) filed a motion to dismiss based on fingerprint analysis 

done by the ATF, (3) presented requested witnesses that could support his 

claim he is innocent, (4) objected to prejudicial arguments made by the 

Government at trial, and (5) objected to the sentence enhancements and the 

Government’s arguments during the “sentence process.” Mot. 4 (CV ECF No. 

2).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant 

must show that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced his defense so gravely as to deprive him of 

a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In 

Strickland, the Court stated that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s 

performance must be highly deferential” and “every effort [must] be made 

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to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” 466 U.S. at 689. Courts, 

therefore, must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

Freeney’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims fail because 

they are conclusory. See United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 

1993) (“[M]ere conclusory allegations on critical issues are insufficient to 

raise a constitutional issue.”); see also Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 

263 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting where a habeas petitioner fails to brief an 

argument adequately, it is considered waived). Indeed, his claims lack the 

necessary detail this Court needs to properly address them. Freeney’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims are so conclusory that they are legally 

insufficient and should be summarily dismissed. See Green v. Johnson, 160 

F.3d 1029, 1043 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Mere conclusory allegations in support of 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a 

constitutional issue.”) (citing Kinnamon v. Scott, 40 F.3d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 

1994)); see also Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1221 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Freeney contends that his attorney failed to file various motions, such 

as a motion to suppress and that, if his attorney had filed the contemplated 

motions, it “could have changed the outcome of the proceedings.” Mot. 4 (CV 

ECF No. 2). But under Strickland, a court’s review of counsel’s performance 

should be “highly deferential.” 466 U.S. at 698. This is so because “[i]t is all 

too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

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conviction or adverse sentence[.]” Id. at 689. And “[g]iven the almost 

infinite variety of possible trial techniques and tactics available to counsel, 

this Circuit is careful not to second guess legitimate strategic choices.” Yohey 

v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Scott, 

11 F.4th 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2021) (recognizing there are “countless ways to 

provide effective assistance in any given case”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689). Freeney’s allegations here are too conclusory to overcome the 

deference afforded to trial counsel’s conduct. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690

(“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment.”); see also United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 678 F.3d 353, 357 (5th 

Cir. 2012) (“For the deficiency prong [of Strickland], counsel’s performance 

is to be accorded ‘a heavy measure of deference.’”) (quoting Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 197 (2011)). For these reasons, Freeney has failed 

to show deficient performance under Strickland.

Freeney has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. Under the prejudice 

prong, Freeney summarily alleges if his attorney had filed certain motions, 

it “could have changed the outcome of the proceedings.” Mot. 4 (CV ECF No. 

2). Under Strickland, a movant “must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 

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466 U.S. at 694. The movant must “affirmatively prove,” not just allege, 

prejudice. Id. at 693. And if a movant fails to prove prejudice, the court need 

not address the question of counsel’s performance. Id. at 697; see also Amos 

v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 348 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A] court need not address both 

prongs of the conjunctive Strickland standard, but may dispose of such a 

claim based solely on a petitioner’s failure to meet either prong of the test.”); 

see also Okechuku v. United States, 2021 WL 2690091, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June 

14, 2021), rec. adopted 2021 WL 2685283 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2021). Merely 

presenting “conclusory allegations” of deficient performance or prejudice is 

insufficient to meet the Strickland test. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 

(5th Cir. 2000). Thus, Freeney’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims also 

fail under the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. 

Freeney further asserts that his trial attorney should have presented 

“requested witnesses.” Mot. 4 (CV ECF No. 2). However, “[c]omplaints of 

uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review because 

allegations of what a witness would have testified are largely speculative.” 

Lockhart v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Murray v. 

Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Day v. Quarterman, 

566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cockrell, 720 F.2d 1423, 

1427 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th 

Cir. 1978)). To show ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of an 

uncalled witness, a movant must: (1) name the witness he would have called; 

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(2) show the uncalled witness would have been available to testify; (3) show 

the uncalled witness would have testified; and (4) show there is a reasonable 

probability the uncalled witness would have provided testimony that would 

have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Bray v. Quarterman, 265 

F. App’x 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Alexander v. 

McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Gomez v. McKaskle, 

734 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (5th Cir. 1984) (the petitioner failed to meet his 

burden of showing that uncalled witnesses would have testified favorably to 

his case). When “the only evidence of a missing witnesses’ [sic] testimony is 

from the [movant], this Court views the claims of ineffective assistance with 

great caution.” Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Lockhart, 782 F.2d at 1282). Generally, when a movant fails to 

present at least some evidence from an uncalled witness regarding the 

witness’s potential testimony and willingness to testify, it is fatal to an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Harrison v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 

419, 428 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Sayre, 238 F.3d at 636. Here, Freeney’s 

claim fails because he has not (1) named any witnesses that should have been 

called; (2) identified the subject matter of the testimony that would have 

been provided; and (3) shown that the testimony was admissible and would 

have impacted the outcome of the trial. See Bray, 265 F. App’x at 298. 

Freeney also alleges his attorney’s performance was deficient in that 

counsel failed to object to the Government’s “prejudicial” arguments at trial 

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and during sentencing. Mot. 4 (CV ECF No. 2). This claim is so conclusory 

that it is legally deficient and fails as a matter of law. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687 (under the two-pronged test, a movant must show: (a) his 

attorney’s performance was deficient; and (b) the deficient performance 

prejudiced his defense so gravely as to deprive him of a fair trial); see also 

Thomas v. Davis, 968 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2020) (to prevail on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas petitioner must prevail on 

the two-part Strickland test). Freeney fails to identify specifically the 

objectionable arguments and state why objections were necessary or how the 

objections would have impacted the outcome of his trial or sentencing 

hearing. He also fails to include any details about the “sentence process 

enhancements” to which his attorney allegedly should have objected. Mot. 4 

(CV ECF No. 2). And Freeney fails to recognize his attorney filed objections 

to the Presentence Report (PSR), including objections to the recommended 

sentence enhancements. (CR ECF No. 79) (including objections to the 

application of U.S.S.G. §§ 2k2.1, 2k2.1(a)(6), and 2k2.1(b)(1)(A)). 

For these reasons, Freeney’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

are conclusory and fail on the merits. The Court should summarily dismiss 

or deny them. 

D. Freeney has failed to show his appellate attorney provided 

 ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 

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Last, Freeney argues his appellate attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel “during direct appeal.” Mot. 5 (CV ECF No. 2). He 

contends his appellate attorney failed to raise issues that “could have 

changed the outcome of the appeal.” Id. Freeney specifically contends his 

appellate attorney should have raised the following issues: (1) “[t]he 

instructions given to the jury members,”1id. at 4; (2) the admission of jail 

phone calls at trial that violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; 

(3) the introduction of prejudicial evidence of “non-charged crimes of 

alleged assault on a police officer,” id. at 5; and (4) the confidential 

informant information that violated his character and denied him a “fair 

trial.” id. 

A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel on direct 

appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985); see also McMann v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that 

the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). The 

proper standard for evaluating a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 

1 Freeney refers to an issue “stated [in] ground one,” but it is not entirely 

clear what issue he is referring to because “ground one” has several subissues. Mot. 5 (CV ECF No. 2). Most of the issues set forth in the first claim 

are issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Court concludes he is 

referring to the argument about jury instructions. See United States v. 

Haley, 348 F. App’x 996, 997 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims generally cannot be raised on direct appeal 

when they have not been raised before the district court) (citing United 

States v. Cantwell, 470 F.3d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 2006)). 

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is the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. Smith v. 

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1043 

(5th Cir. 1998); see also Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 240 (5th Cir. 

2008) (“In reviewing a claim alleging ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel we apply the traditional Strickland standard[.]”). An appellate 

attorney need not advance every frivolous argument urged by the movant. 

See Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 635 (5th Cir. 1994) (a federal habeas 

petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel failed to 

satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland where the omitted grounds for 

relief on appeal were meritless). 

Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, appellate counsel, like trial 

counsel, is “presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 

Dorsey v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 309, 320 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). When an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is 

based on the failure to raise an issue on direct appeal, the prejudice prong 

under Strickland requires the movant to demonstrate the appellate court 

would have granted relief if the issue had been raised. United States v. 

Phillips, 210 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Freeney’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fail under 

both prongs of the Strickland test. He fails to show deficient performance 

because he has not attempted to demonstrate that the issues he believes his 

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appellate attorney should have raised were stronger than the issues actually 

raised. See Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 2009) (a mere 

allegation of inadequate performance is conclusory and does not allow the 

court to examine whether counsel’s performance was deficient) (citing 

United States v. Irby, 103 F.3d 126 (5th Cir.1996) (unpublished); Lincecum 

v. Collins, 958 F.2d 1271, 1279 (5th Cir.1992)). For example, Freeney alleges 

the evidence he assaulted a police officer and from a “C.I.” was “prejudicial” 

and resulted in him being “denied [ ] a fair trial.” Mot. 5 (CV ECF No. 2). 

However, he has not explained how this evidence was legally inadmissible at 

trial and should have been excluded. Id. Freeney also fails to show prejudice 

because he cannot show the Fifth Circuit would have granted him relief if 

these issues had been raised. See Phillips, 210 F.3d at 348. 

Freeney alleges the admission of his jail telephone calls at trial 

violated the Confrontation Clause. Mot. 5 (CV ECF No. 2). This issue was 

raised on appeal in the Fifth Circuit. See Freeney, 815 F. App’x at 803

(“Freeney also asserts that the admission into evidence [of the jail telephone 

audiotapes] violated the Confrontation Clause, the audiotapes were 

substantially more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403, and they constituted hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 

802.”) Id. However, the Fifth Circuit “decline[d]” to address this issue 

because it was raised for the first time in Freeney’s reply brief. Id. (citing 

United States v. Anderson, 5 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1993)). 

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Freeney’s Confrontation Clause argument lacks merit and was fully 

and fairly addressed by the Court prior to trial. See (CR ECF No. 48 at 2-3; 

CR ECF No. 54; CR ECF No. 98 at 10-17 (pretrial conference).). At a pretrial 

conference on May 21, 2019, the Court concluded that admitting the 

recordings of Freeney’s telephone calls from jail was not a violation of the 

Confrontation Clause. (CR ECF No. 93 at 11-18); see also United States v. 

Octave, 575 F. App’x 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[S]tatements of 

an informant in a recorded conversation with the defendants may be 

admitted for the limited purpose of providing context.”) (citing United 

States v. Rios, 298 F. App’x. 312, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2008)). Freeney has failed 

to explain why the admission of the jail phone calls at his trial was erroneous, 

and he therefore cannot show his appellate attorney provided deficient 

performance under Strickland. Likewise, he has failed to demonstrate 

prejudice. These ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fail under 

Strickland, and the Court should deny them. 

III. 

The District Court should deny Freeney’s § 2255 motion. 

Signed May 4, 2023. 

_________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996)

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