IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

LANE B. RAVEY, §

(TDCJ No. 02146893), §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-056-M-BP

§

BRYAN COLLIER, Executive Director, §

TDCJ, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant Bryan Collier’s Motion to Dismiss with Brief in Support 

(ECF Nos. 11, 12) and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18). After 

considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn GRANT the Motion and DISMISS Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant Collier with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Lane Ravey (“Ravey”) is an inmate confined at the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice (“TDCJ”) Allred Unit in Iowa Park, Texas. ECF No. 1 at 1. Ravey filed suit against 

Defendant Bryan Collier (“Collier”), in his capacity as Executive Director of TDCJ, and others on 

June 16, 2022. Id. at 1, 3. Ravey alleges that TDCJ officers at the Allred Unit used excessive force 

against him in violation of the Eight Amendment, and that Collier is liable for this constitutional 

violation as the TDCJ’s policymaker. Id. at 3-4. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for dismissal 

of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

The Rules require that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint must 

include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts 

must “take all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 

. . . and ask whether the pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

When dealing with a pro se party, courts are to liberally construe the pleadings, taking all 

well-pleaded allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). “[A] pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But “even a liberally-construed pro se . . . complaint must set 

forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El 

Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Thus, 

a court inquires “whether within the universe of theoretically provable facts there exists a set which 

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can support a cause of action under [the] complaint.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th 

Cir. 1976).

B. Qualified Immunity 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from 

liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he immunity issue must be resolved at 

the earliest possible stage of the litigation since it entails an entitlement to immunity from suit and 

not merely a defense to liability.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991)). Qualified 

immunity can be decided at the motion to dismiss stage as it is the earliest possible stage in 

litigation. Carswell v. Camp, 37 F.4th 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 2022).

To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official 

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the 

time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citations omitted). 

A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual burden of proof, shifting it to the 

plaintiff to show that the defense is not available. Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th 

Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 376 (2020). 

C. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice

There exists a “well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state 

a claim.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). As a result, courts generally 

allow plaintiffs at least one opportunity to amend. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean 

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (2002). Nonetheless, courts may appropriately dismiss an action 

with prejudice if a court finds that the plaintiff has alleged his best case. Jones v. Greninger, 188 

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F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). Likewise, a court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice, thus 

foreclosing the plaintiff’s opportunity to amend, whenever amendment of the pleadings would be 

futile. Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2016). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ravey has not pleaded that Collier violated a clearly established constitutional 

right. 

Ravey’s allegations against Collier rest on Collier’s position as Executive Director of 

TDCJ. ECF No. 1 at 3. Collier’s liability, therefore, is predicated on his supervisorial role and 

perceived complacency in allowing the alleged unconstitutional restraint to occur. Id.; ECF No. 7

at 3. In response, Collier moved to dismiss Ravey’s claims and asserted a qualified immunity

defense. ECF No. 11 at 3. Thus, the burden shifts to Ravey to show that Collier violated a clearly 

established constitutional right. Ratliff, 948 F.3d at 287.

To state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ravey must allege facts showing “two 

vital elements: (1) that he has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and the laws’ 

of the United States; and (2) that the persons depriving him of this right acted ‘under color of any 

statute’ of the State of Texas.” Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

§ 1983).

Plaintiff must plead the defendant’s personal involvement to show the second element of a 

§ 1983 claim. See Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983); Creekmore v. Att’y Gen.

of Tex., 341 F. Supp. 2d 648, 659 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (citing Thompson, 709 F.2d at 382) (analyzing 

“personal involvement” under the second element). To sufficiently plead that Collier violated his

Eight Amendment Rights, Ravey must first establish a causal connection between the alleged 

constitutional deprivation and Collier’s actions. Thompson, 709 F.2d at 382. Personal involvement 

is an essential element of any civil rights cause of action. Id. Ravey cannot establish liability under 

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the theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978). Instead, to plead liability on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must show that the 

supervisor affirmatively participated in the acts that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation 

or implemented an unconstitutional policy that causally resulted in the plaintiff’s injury. Mouille 

v. City of Live Oak, Texas, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). 

Ravey did not plead facts demonstrating that Collier deprived him of a constitutional right 

as he does not state how Collier was personally involved in the assault. See generally ECF Nos. 1, 

7, 18. Alleging that Collier “oversees the training of the corrections officer” or is responsible for 

“making [sure] that [the] guidelines, laws, and safe prison professional standards are . . . followed 

on a day to day basis” is not enough to show that Collier participated in the constitutional 

deprivation. ECF No. 18 at 1; See Creekmore, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 659.

Supervisory liability also can exist without overt personal participation in the offensive act 

if the supervisory official implemented a policy so deficient that the policy “itself is a repudiation 

of constitutional rights” and is “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Grandstaff v. 

City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1985). The supervisor must have known that the 

jail's system was so deficient as to expose prisoners to a substantial risk of an unconstitutional

harm but he “failed to properly attempt to correct the unconstitutional harm.” Thompkins v. Belt, 

828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). Moreover, the supervisor’s failure to correct the harm must 

have caused the prisoner’s injuries. Id. A one-time failure of the system is not enough to suggest 

that the policy maker implemented an unconstitutional policy. Id.; O’Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 

605, 610 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a constitutionally deficient policy cannot be inferred from a 

single wrongful act). 

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Ravey states that Collier “has established policy procedures of official behavior and 

standards [at the TDCJ],” that “the officers’ acts and behavior are a reflection of [Collier’s] 

leadership,” and that “[Collier] should be aware of this behavior.” ECF No. 7 at 3. However, he

has not alleged any facts with sufficient specificity to show that Collier had actual knowledge that 

the officers were unconstitutionally restraining prisoners. Additionally, he has not properly 

pleaded that the alleged unconstitutional restraint was not a one-time failure. Thus, the facts that 

Ravey has pleaded are not sufficient to establish that Collier implemented an unconstitutional

policy permitting officers to assault a prisoner who is compliant and in restraints. 

Qualified immunity shields Collier because Ravey cannot establish a causal connection 

between the alleged constitutional violation and Collier’s actions. Collier was not present during 

the alleged unconstitutional act, and Ravey has not pleaded any policy that Collier established that 

led to an unconstitutional act. Accordingly, Ravey has not pleaded facts to overcome Collier’s 

qualified immunity defense.

B. The Court should dismiss Ravey’s claims against Collier with prejudice 

because Ravey has pleaded his best case given the facts alleged. 

The Fifth Circuit has long recognized that “[g]enerally a district court errs in dismissing a 

pro se complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend.” Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). But this rule is not 

absolute, as the Court explained in Jacquez v. R. K. Procunier:

If the protections afforded public officials are not to ring hollow, plaintiffs cannot be 

allowed to continue to amend or supplement their pleading until they stumble upon a 

formula that carries them over the threshold. Such a protracted process is likely to disrupt 

public officials from their duties.... At some point a court must decide that a plaintiff has 

had a fair opportunity to make his case; if, after that time, a cause has not been established, 

the court should finally dismiss the suit.

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801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986). The Court gave Ravey an opportunity to amend his complaint 

by providing him with a questionnaire. See Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 

94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (answers to a questionnaire act as an amendment to pro se plaintiff’s 

complaint). The questionnaire asked Ravey specific questions regarding the alleged 

unconstitutional act, giving him a fair opportunity to make his best case. ECF No. 7. After 

receiving Ravey’s answers, the undersigned liberally construed his Complaint and Questionnaire 

Answers in evaluating his claim. 

The facts in Ravey’s pleadings do not give rise to any possible plausible claim against 

Collier, and the Court would not err in dismissing those claims with prejudice. Id.; Bazrowx, 136 

F.3d at 1054. Indeed, dismissal with prejudice would be preferable as it would allow the 

protections afforded to officials like Collier “not to ring hollow.” Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 792. The 

undersigned can “perceive of no viable claim [Ravey] could include in an amended petition with 

regard to these underlying facts,” and any additional amendments would prove futile. Judge Lynn

therefore should dismiss Ravey’s case against Collier with prejudice. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 

F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999).

IV. CONCLUSION 

Because Ravey has not sufficiently pleaded that Defendant Collier either participated in 

the alleged unconstitutional acts or implemented an unconstitutional policy, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn GRANT Collier’s 

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) and DISMISS with prejudice Ravey’s claims against Defendant 

Collier.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

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and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

SIGNED on February 14, 2023. 

______________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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