IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

ROBERT (BOB) ROSS, 

 Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

v.

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL 

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al., 

 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

AND

EUGENIO VARGAS,

 Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

v.

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL 

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al., 

 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-343-Y

Consolidated with 4:22-CV-430-Y

Judge Terry R. Means

APFA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RULES 30(d) AND 37(b) SANCTIONS

AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

JEFFREY A. BARTOS (pro hac vice)

D.C. Bar No. 435832

Guerrieri, Bartos & Roma, PC

1900 M Street, N.W. Suite 700

Washington, DC 20036

Tel.: (202) 624-7400; Fax: (202) 624-7420

Email: jbartos@geclaw.com 

JAMES D. SANFORD

Tex. Bar No. 24051289

Gillespie Sanford LLP

4803 Gaston Ave.

Dallas, TX 75246

Tel.: (214) 800-5111; Fax.: (214) 838-0001

Email: jim@gillespiesanford.com

Counsel for the APFA Defendants

CHARLETTE L. BRODERICK (pro hac 

vice)

Tex. Bar No. 24133870

Association of Professional Flight 

Attendants

1004 W. Euless Blvd.

Euless, TX 76040

Tel.: (682) 301-8454

Email: Cbroderick@apfa.org

Counsel for APFA

Dated: February 16, 2024 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................ii

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT..........................................................................1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.....................................................3

ARGUMENT...................................................................................................8

RELIEF REQUESTED......................................................................................12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page 

Carter v. Burlington Northern Santa, LLC, 

15-cv-366, 2016 WL 3388707 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2016).........................................8

Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Corp. Pines Realty Corp., 

355 Fed. App’x 778 (5th Cir. 2009)................................................................3

Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

788 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1986)......................................................................9

Dondi Prop. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 

121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988)...................................................................3

Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 

758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).....................................................................8

Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 

16-CV-03198, 2018 WL 4610533 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2018)............................10, 12

Murillo Modular Group, Ltd. v. Sullivan, 

13-cv-3020, 2016 WL 6139096 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016)......................................8

Nieman v. Hale, 

12-cv-2433, 2014 WL 4375669 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2014)......................................9

Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 

685 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2012)......................................................................2, 9

VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

10-cv-417, 2012 WL 7997962 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2012)........................................8

Whalen v. Roe, 

429 U.S. 589 (1977)............................................................................10 n.8

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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The Association of Professional Flight Attendants (“APFA”), its President Julie Hedrick, 

and Treasurer Erik Harris, hereby move, pursuant to Rules 30(d) and 37(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for 

sanctions against Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions based on disruptive conduct during, and 

premature termination of, their depositions which were properly noticed and ordered by this 

Court.

1

It is with considerable reluctance that the APFA Defendants file this motion given the 

already abundant discovery disputes that have burdened the Court in this action, but Plaintiffs’

conduct here has been so egregious as to violate fundamental norms of orderly Federal 

procedure. Plaintiffs recalcitrant and obstructive conduct both before and during depositions has

imposed undue costs on the APFA Defendants and – without the relief requested herein – will

impair the APFA Defendants’ ability to move for, and oppose, summary judgment.

2 Plaintiffs’

delay and disruption tactics are particularly harmful to Defendants since the March 29, 2024,

deadline for dispositive motions is now looming. The APFA Defendants do not seek to further 

extend that deadline, but instead seek limited relief which will preclude Plaintiffs from benefiting 

from the refusal to sit for full depositions as ordered.

As set forth more fully below, Plaintiffs were ordered to appear for depositions on the 

agreed dates of February 1 and 2, 2024. However, their conduct and the conduct of their counsel 

during the depositions “imped[ed], delay[ed], [and] frustrat[ed] the fair examination of the 

1 Subsequent to the depositions, the Court ordered cases 4:22-cv-340-Y and 4:22-

cv-430-Y consolidated on February 12, 2024. Doc. 204 (Ross); Doc. 195 (Vargas). 

2 Plaintiffs filed motions for partial summary judgment on January 8 and 9, 2024, 

and to which Defendants had been preparing oppositions due March 29, 2024. Although the 

Court unfiled Plaintiffs’ motions on February 13 (Doc. 203 (Ross); Doc. 194 (Vargas)), Plaintiff 

could re-file at any time.

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deponent[s]” in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2), and their unilateral premature termination of 

their depositions constituted an effective refusal to obey the order to appear for deposition on the

noticed dates. This disruption included: 

• Obstructing the deposition questioning in both cases, including improper instructions by 

Plaintiffs’ counsel to her clients not to answer questions regarding documents Plaintiffs 

filed in support of summary judgment; and unwarranted and repetitive frivolous

objections which disrupted and delayed questioning as well as Plaintiffs evasive 

responses to even straightforward foundational questions (83 objections during Mr. Ross’ 

deposition, and 47 in Mr. Vargas’);

• Repeated and lengthy delays and breaks in the deposition of Mr. Ross resulting in less 

than three-and-a-half hours of examination on the record, coupled with an adamant

refusal to appear the next day to complete the deposition in the time allotted; and

• The abrupt termination of Mr. Vargas’ deposition by counsel after only 58 minutes of 

being on the record.

We respectfully submit that these are only the most recent episodes in a well-documented

sequence of efforts to delay and postpone depositions, which now clearly warrant judicial 

intervention. Accordingly, pursuant to Rules 30(b)(2) and 37(b)(2)(A)(ii), Fed R. Civ. P., as well 

as the Court’s inherent authority, the APFA Defendants respectfully move for an order in these

consolidated cases which provides the following relief:

a) Barring the submission of Declarations or Affidavits from Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas, as 

well as reliance on previously-filed Declarations or Affidavits from either Plaintiff, in 

connection with any motion for summary judgment filed in these cases;

b) Permitting the APFA Defendants to complete the depositions of Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas 

in the event that any issues in the case proceed to trial after resolution of summary 

judgment motions; and 

c) Awarding the APFA Defendants the costs and fees in connection with the two depositions 

and for the preparation and filing of this motion.

Such focused and limited relief is commensurate with the nature of the Rule violations, 

see Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2012);

Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Corp. Pines Realty Corp., 355 Fed. App’x 778, 780 

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y Document 205 Filed 02/16/24 Page 5 of 17 PageID 4784
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(5th Cir. 2009), and would vindicate the Court’s “inherent power to regulate the administration of 

justice,” Dondi Prop. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 287 (N.D. Tex. 

1988).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The APFA Defendants have been attempting to depose Plaintiffs Ross and Vargas for 

months. The depositions were initially noticed for October 25 and 26, 2023, but were postponed 

after Plaintiff moved to quash the deposition notices and to extend the deadlines for filing 

dispositive motions, in part based on pending motions to compel production of documents. Doc. 

120 (Ross); Doc. 117 (Vargas). This Court granted that relief in part, extending the discovery 

deadline to February 29, 2024, and setting a March 29, 2024, deadline for dispositive motions. 

Doc. 155 (Ross); Doc. 150 (Vargas). In that Order, the Court observed that “It appears clear ... 

that the parties will need additional time to complete discovery and file dispositive motions until 

after the magistrate judge rules on the pending discovery motions.” Ibid.

The APFA Defendants then issued amended Notices of Deposition for January 10, 2024 

(for Mr. Ross) and January 11, 2024 (for Mr. Vargas). Plaintiff promptly moved to quash those 

deposition notices as well. Doc. 176 (Ross); Doc. 169 (Vargas). Plaintiff “ask[ed] that the court 

Quash the pending Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff and allow depositions to take place during 

February of 2024.” Doc. 176 ¶ 8 (Ross); Doc. 169 ¶ 8 (Vargas).

Magistrate Juge Cureton held a hearing on all pending discovery motions on December 

26, 2023. At the hearing, after discussion regarding the need of defense counsel to depose 

Plaintiffs no later than early February, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to depositions of her clients on 

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February 1 and 2, 2024, and Magistrate Judge Cureton ordered that the depositions take place on 

the agreed-upon dates. Doc. 187 (Ross); Doc. 178 (Vargas).3

Defendants then issued notices of deposition for the agreed-upon and ordered dates. 

Appx. 1-2 (Notice of Ross Deposition), 3-4 (Notice of Vargas Deposition). After the notices were 

issued, Plaintiffs filed motions for partial summary judgement under seal, relying heavily on

their own affidavits. Defendants sought an extension of time to oppose summary judgment in 

order to take Plaintiffs’ depositions, and this Court found good cause and granted the motions.

Doc. 193 (Ross); Doc. 184 (Vargas). 

The depositions were noticed for a hotel conference room near the Dallas-Fort Worth 

International Airport, to commence at 10:00 a.m. on February 1 for Mr. Ross, and 10:00 a.m. on 

February 2 for Mr. Vargas. Mr. Ross and his counsel were at the designated location by 10:00

a.m., but refused to proceed, claiming for the first time that the hotel was not a “neutral” location

because several APFA representatives were staying there on other business (Appx. 7 (Tr. 6:5-

14)), and further objected to the presence of all four APFA National Officers in the deposition, 

despite the fact that APFA is a party. After much discussion, APFA agreed, as an accommodation, 

that two Officers would absent themselves from the deposition. Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed and the 

examination finally began at 11:17 a.m. Appx. 6 (Tr. 5:1-6), Appx. 7 (Tr. 7:18-25).4

Questioning was interrupted by frequent breaks requested by Plaintiff, such that by 5:00

p.m., the time on record was a mere 3 hour and 25 minutes, Appx. 30 (Tr. 163), at which time 

3 The Court’s December 26, 2023 Order stated: “Defendants shall issue a new 

notice of deposition for February 1-2, 2024”. Doc. 187 (Ross); Doc. 178 (Vargas). 

4 Excerpts of the two deposition transcripts, with redactions for testimony 

describing medical records, are included in the appendix. Full transcripts can of course be 

provided should the Court deem that helpful. In addition, a video file of Mr. Vargas’ deposition 

will be submitted to the Court.

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Plaintiffs’ counsel became unavailable. During that time of questioning, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

repeatedly interfered with questioning through improper objections based on frivolous grounds 

including hearsay, leading questions, relevance, and even complaining about the subject matter 

of the questioning.5 The deposition index reflects a total of 83 objections during the short time of 

the deposition. Appx. 30 (Excerpt of Ross Deposition Tr. Index). In addition, when counsel 

sought to question Mr. Ross regarding his own statements referenced in medical records he had

submitted in support of summary judgment, his attorney directed him not to answer based on 

what she called “medical privilege”. Appx. 26-27 (Tr. 149:20-150:16); Appx. 27 (Tr. 151:19-

152:12); Appx. 27-28 (Tr. 153:3-156:5).

Mr. Bartos: Does that [statement in the medical record] accurately reflect your selfunderstanding?

Ms. Phillips: Objection; obscure, form.... Medically privileged; objection. Bob, you 

don’t have to answer that.

Mr. Bartos: Are you directing him not to answer?

Ms. Phillips: I’m directing him not to answer.

Mr. Bartos: So just to be clear, you’ve submitted about a hundred pages of medical 

records. And your position is I’m not allowed to ask questions about 

them?

Ms. Phillips: You can compel it if you want it.

Appx. 27-28 (Tr. 153:10-154:10).

5 Hearsay objections were made at Appx. 9 (Tr. 22:2-3; 23:13-19; 24:3-25); Appx. 

12 (Tr. 36:5-11); Appx. 15 (Tr. 47:18-22); Appx. 17 (Tr. 54:10-12); Appx. 18 (Tr. 58:4-7); Appx. 

19 (Tr. 63:6-22; 64:19-20); Appx. 25-26 (Tr. 145:21-146:10); Appx. 26 (Tr. 148:17-22); 

Objections to the subject matter of the questioning were made at: Appx. 10 (Tr. 29:17-22); Appx. 

11(Tr. 33:6-13); Appx. 20 (Tr. 66:3-8); Objections to relevance were made at Appx. 24 (Tr. 

135:15-136:22); and objections to supposedly “leading” questions were made at Appx. 14 (Tr. 

29:18-20, 44:11-13, 45:1-3), Appx. 15 (Tr. 46:4-6; 46:14-18; 49:3-6), Appx. 16 (Tr. 50:3-5,

51:16-21); Appx. 17 (Tr. 55:3-4; 55:10-11); Appx. 20 (Tr. 66:22-25, 68:23-25); Appx. 21 (Tr. 

91:1-4); Appx. 24 (Tr. 137:14-17). 

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Ross was also repeatedly evasive in the extreme, for instance in claiming he was unable 

to attest to whether signatures he was shown were his or not (Appx. 14 (Tr. 45:18-25), Appx. 17

(Tr. 54:1-6)), claiming he was unable to confirm if documents he produced in discovery had been 

in his possession (Appx. 17 (Tr. 54:7-16)), and claiming to be unable to recognize that an 

affidavit filed in Court was in fact his affidavit (Appx. 24 (Tr. 134:21-25, 135:1-4)). 

When Plaintiffs’ counsel announced that she had to leave the deposition at 5:00 p.m., 

defense counsel requested that the deposition be continued to the next day and be completed

before beginning Mr. Vargas’ deposition. Plaintiffs’ counsel refused, stating that “you need to renotice and give 5 days’ notice” for completion of the deposition; that continuing the deposition 

would conflict with the scheduled deposition of Mr. Vargas; and that “Mr. Ross has his work 

schedule.” Appx. 29 (Tr. 159:12-159:25).6 (Mr. Ross’ American Airlines work schedule reflects 

that he was not scheduled to work on February 2.)

Mr. Ross failed to appear for completion of his deposition the next day and we were 

constrained to begin Mr. Vargas’ deposition. However, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct was even

more combative and disruptive than the day before. In less than an hour of questioning, counsel 

lodged 47 objections, Appx. 42 (Excerpt of Vargas Deposition Tr. Index), again repeating

improper objections that questions to an adverse party were “leading” or involved hearsay, and 

otherwise suggesting answers to her client.

7 And after Mr. Vargas and his counsel conferred 

6 Plaintiffs’ Counsel sought to take breaks approximately every 30 minutes, and 

despite also starting nearly an hour late and taking a 72 minute lunch break, then had to leave at 

5:00 p.m. Appx. 19 (Tr. 62:1-8); Appx. 22 (Tr. 94:8-12). With regard to some of the breaks, when 

advised that Mr. Ross may need to stand periodically due to a prior injury, counsel suggested he 

could simply stand as needed so the deposition could proceed efficiently. Appx. 23 (Tr. 112:16-

113:2).

7 Objections based on “leading” are found at Appx. 34 (Tr. 26:10-11, 27:2-3, 27:13-

14, 27:21-22, 28:24); Appx. 35 (Tr. 32:4-24, 33:8); hearsay objections are at Appx. 34 (Tr. 29:11-

12, 29:17-30:5). Statements interfering with questions and suggesting answers to Mr. Vargas are 

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regarding his answer to a particular question, his counsel repeatedly interrupted questions in an 

effort to suggest answers or change the line of questioning. Appx. 36 (Tr. 37:18-21); Appx. 37

(Tr. 38:22-39:4); Appx. 38 (Tr. 42:22-43:13).

Defense counsel repeatedly requested an end to the interruptions, and pointed out that 

Plaintiffs’ counsel would have ample opportunity to ask her own questions, e.g. Appx. 38 (Tr.

43:1-13), but rather than waiting her turn, after an extended disruption shown on Transcript 

pages 42-50, Plaintiffs’ counsel abruptly stopped the deposition: “I’m going to stop the 

deposition at this point because I think that you are creating a circumstance that is hostile at this 

point. This is not the way to conduct a deposition.” Appx. 39 (Tr. 46:16-19) see also Appx. 39

(Tr. 49:12-21) (“I am going to end this if you don’t allow him to clarify his testimony.... If you 

don’t, we’re done.”); Appx. 40 (Tr. 50:4-10) (“We’re done. Let’s go .... I object to this entire 

situation.”). Mr. Vargas and his counsel left the deposition at 11:47 a.m., after less than an hour 

of actual questioning. Appx. 40 (Tr. 50:5-18).8

Thereafter, Plaintiffs preemptively filed for sanctions against APFA Defendants, based on 

wholly unfounded allegations that Plaintiffs were “intimidated” during their questioning, and 

seeking entry of summary judgment in their favor. Doc. (197) (Ross); Doc. 188 (Vargas).

found at Appx. 36 (Tr. 36:16-37:4). In an attempt to justify her intrusive conduct as an 

intermediary, Plaintiffs’ counsel even resorted to claiming just prior to terminating the deposition

that Vargas (who she represented as himself being “employed at American Airlines as a 

translator,”) needed “a translator here” so he could “understand the words fully.” Appx. 38 (Tr. 

44:12-18). That issue had not been raised at any time in this matter, much less in connection with 

depositions.

8 Because the written transcript does not capture the tenor of this exchange, the 

APFA Defendants have submitted the recorded videorecording of Mr. Vargas’ deposition. The 

portion transcribed at pages 42-50 begins at minute 54:33 of the video.

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ARGUMENT

The APFA Defendants have a basic right to depose Plaintiffs Ross and Vargas and have 

repeatedly and diligently attempted to exercise that right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1)(“[a] party 

may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court ....”)

(emphasis added)). Plaintiffs chose to bring this action, and Defendants are entitled to complete 

discovery in an orderly fashion and to file a dispositive motion. See Farnsworth v. Procter & 

Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (“trial preparation and defense ... are 

important interests, and great care must be taken to avoid their unnecessary infringement”).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) provides that “[t]he court may impose an appropriate sanction –

including the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by any party – on a person who 

impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” “The meaning of 

‘appropriate sanction’ in Rule 30(d)(2) has been broadly interpreted as the full scope of sanctions 

available under rule 30(d)(2) is not expressly described in the text of the rule.” Carter v. 

Burlington Northern Santa, LLC, 15-cv-366, 2016 WL 3388707, n.2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2016) 

(internal citation omitted); see also Murillo Modular Group, Ltd. v. Sullivan, 13-cv-3020, 2016 

WL 6139096,*7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016) (“Many courts have construed Rule 30(d)(2) to apply 

to circumstances where a party’s conduct at a deposition warranted remedial action.”) (internal 

citation omitted). 

Sanctionable conduct thereunder includes violations of Rule 30(c)(2), which provides

that when an objection is made “the examination still proceeds ... subject to any objection ... 

[and that counsel] may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a 

privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 

30(d)(3)”. Rule 30 “places strict limits on when an attorney may instruct a deponent not to 

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answer a question [...]. The underlying purpose of a deposition is to find out what a witness saw, 

heard, or did – what the witness thinks .... There is no proper need for the witness’s own lawyer 

to act as intermediary, interpreting questions, deciding which questions the witness should 

answer, and helping the witness to formulate answers.” VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 10-cv417, 2012 WL 7997962, *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“Merely disagreeing with a particular line of questioning is not justification to shut down the 

deposition.” Id.; see also Nieman v. Hale, 12-cv-2433, 2014 WL 4375669 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 

2014) (Court sua sponte ordered defendant to show cause why he should not be sanctioned under 

Rule 30(d)(2), including paying costs of plaintiff’s travel to deposition, for conduct that impeded, 

delayed, or frustrated the examination and included unilaterally terminating the deposition after 

only 70 minutes). 

Similarly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) provides that “[i]f a party ... fails to obey an order 

to provide or permit discovery ... the court where the action is pending may issue further just 

orders [including]: ... (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 

designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking 

pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) further provides that “[i]nstead of or 

in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising 

that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the 

failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of 

expenses unjust.” Such monetary sanctions “serve the dual function of reimbursing the moving 

party and deterring the violator of the discovery orders (as well as other potential violators).” 

Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1986). District Courts thus have broad 

discretion to “fashion remedies suited to the misconduct.” Smith & Fuller, P.A., 685 F.3d at 488. 

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This Court’s Order of December 26, 2023, provided that “Defendants shall issue a new 

notice of deposition for February 1-2, 2024.” Doc. 187 at ECF 2 (Ross); Doc. 178 at ECF 2 

(Vargas).

9 This Court has deemed its discovery orders violated and has imposed sanctions in the 

form of striking pleadings where, despite attending a deposition as ordered by the Court, the 

deponent provided testimony that was “evasive, combative, and misleading.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. 

Co. v. Maxwell, 16-CV-03198, 2018 WL 4610533, *1-3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2018). 

Here, the APFA Defendants initially noticed Plaintiffs Ross and Vargas for depositions to 

be held in October 2023, but Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to agree to dates offered until ordered to 

attend the February 1st and 2nd deposition dates by the Court’s December 26, 2023 Order. Doc. 

187 (Ross); Doc. 178 (Vargas). Despite Ross and Vargas each appearing at their depositions, 

counsel for APFA was able to conduct only very limited examinations, especially for Vargas, 

and neither deposition was completed. 

On both dates Plaintiffs manifestly and willfully “imped[ed], delay[ed], [and]

frustrate[d]” their depositions in a manner prohibited by Rule 30(b)(2). On February 1, the 

deposition of Ross involved a late start due to Plaintiff’s reluctance to begin, streams of baseless 

objections, frequent breaks coupled with a refusal to allow the deposition to continue, and a lack 

of forthright responses.

10 Plaintiff’s misconduct during the deposition was then compounded by 

Ross’ refusal to return the following day to continue the examination. 

9 While the letter of the December 26, 2023 Order was directed at APFA 

Defendants to issue new deposition notices, the reciprocal responsibility of Plaintiffs was to both 

attend and meaningfully participate in the depositions. 

10 Counsel’s numerous claims of “medical privileged information and 

conversations,” e.g., Appx. 27 (Tr. 150:13-20, 152:2-9); Appx. 28 (Tr. 155:2-11), are without 

foundation as there is no such federal physician-patient privilege, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 

602 n.28 (1977), and Plaintiffs put their medical condition at issue and submitted medical 

records into the docket in support of summary judgment. Plaintiff would have waived any such 

privilege when he filed over a hundred pages of medical records in affirmative support of his 

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On February 2, the deposition of Vargas involved similar continual baseless objections, a 

lack of forthright responses, and a failure to reach completion when Plaintiff unilaterally 

terminated examination mid-questioning and left the location. 

Plaintiffs’ conduct during both depositions, as well as Ross’ failure to return the next day 

to complete his deposition and Vargas’ sudden inexcusable termination of his deposition, was 

deliberate, unjustified under any Rule or Order, and exemplary of the precise conduct 

sanctionable under Rules 30(d)(2) and 37(b)(2)(A).11 Defendants’ counsel travelled round-trip 

from Washington, D.C. to Dallas, Texas, but was able to conduct only 4 hours and 25 minutes of 

total actual examination (3 hours 25 minutes for Ross and 58 minutes for Vargas) due to 

Plaintiffs’ misconduct and despite being entitled to seven hours per deposition under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 30(d)(1). Dispositive motions are currently due March 29, 2024, and the APFA Defendants 

are now faced with the prospect of having to support such motions, and oppose Plaintiffs’ own 

motions for summary judgment, without having had an ability to complete the depositions of 

either Plaintiff. As demonstrated above, there was great reluctance by Plaintiffs to testify about 

the most fundamental facts of the case during the depositions, including Ross’ refusal to 

acknowledge his own signature. Plaintiffs have engaged in a pattern of delay tactics and 

obstruction designed to frustrate Defendants’ efforts to file a dispositive motion.

motion for partial summary judgment and claimed damages based on those records. Docs. 190-5, 

190-6 (now unfiled per Doc. 203 Order).

11 Defendants do not seek to punish Mr. Ross for his need to address any physical 

limitation on sitting for an extended period, nor for counsel’s need to attend to family 

obligations. But they do seek to vindicate their right to take full discovery in the cases brought by 

Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas, free from the disruption and interference which occurred.

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RELIEF REQUESTED

Rather than seek to further prolong these proceedings, the APFA Defendants seek as their

primary relief an Order barring the submission of Declarations or Affidavits from Mr. Ross and 

Mr. Vargas, as well as reliance on any previously-filed Declarations or Affidavits from either 

Plaintiff, in connection with any motion for summary judgment filed in these cases. Such relief is 

calibrated to remedy the specific violations here and is well within the Court’s authority to grant. 

See Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) (appropriate sanction includes “prohibiting the disobedient party from 

supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in 

evidence”); see also Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 16-CV-03198, 2018 WL 4610533, *4 (striking 

pleadings where deponent was evasive, combative, and misleading).

12

The APFA Defendants also seek their costs and fees arising from the improper 

obstruction and termination of the depositions, including the costs of bringing this motion, the 

costs for APFA’s counsel’s travel from Washington, D.C. to Dallas, Texas, and such other

sanctions as will adequately penalize Plaintiffs and their counsel and deter them others from 

engaging in similar conduct as the Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: February 16, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ James D. Sanford

JAMES D. SANFORD

Tex. Bar No. 24051289

Gillespie Sanford LLP

4803 Gaston Ave.

Dallas, TX 75246

12 The APFA Defendants also request an order permitting Defendants to complete 

the depositions of Mr. Ross and Mr. Vargas in the event that any issues in the case proceed to 

trial after resolution of summary judgment motions. In such event, defendants also seeks costs 

and fees for any continued depositions, including those for APFA counsel’s return travel from 

Washington, D.C. to Dallas, Texas if needed. 

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y Document 205 Filed 02/16/24 Page 15 of 17 PageID 4794
13

Tel.: (214) 800-5111; Fax.: (214) 838-0001

Email: jim@gillespiesanford.com 

JEFFREY A. BARTOS (pro hac vice)

D.C. Bar No. 435832

Guerrieri, Bartos & Roma, PC

1900 M Street, N.W. Suite 700

Washington, DC 20036

Tel.: (202) 624-7400; Fax: (202) 624-7420

Email: jbartos@geclaw.com 

Counsel for the APFA Defendants

CHARLETTE L. BRODERICK (pro hac 

vice)

Tex. Bar No. 24133870

Association of Professional Flight 

Attendants

1004 W. Euless Blvd.

Euless, TX 76040

Tel.: (682) 301-8454

Email: Cbroderick@apfa.org

Counsel for APFA

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14

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I certify that on February 8, 2024, counsel for the APFA Defendants conferred with Kerri 

Phillips, counsel for Plaintiff, by telephone regarding this motion. Ms. Phillips indicated that 

Plaintiffs will oppose this motion.

/s/ Jeffrey A. Bartos

JEFFREY A. BARTOS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February 16, 2024, I electronically submitted this document to the clerk 

of the court for the U.S. District for the Northern District of Texas using the court’s electronic 

case filing system. The electronic case filing system sent a “Notice of Electronic Filing” to the 

following individuals, who have consented to accept this Notices as service of this document by 

electronic means:

KERRI PHILLIPS

K.D. Phillips Law Firm, PLLC

6010 W. Spring Creek Parkway

Plano, TX 75024

Phone: (972) 327-5800

Fax: (940) 400-0089

Email: kerri@KDphillipslaw.com

notice@KDphillipslaw.com

MICHAEL R RAKE

Michael R. Rake, Attorney at Law

PO Box 1556

Lake Dallas, TX 75065

Tel.: (940) 498-2103

Fax: (940) 498-2103

Email: mrake1@mrakeattorney.com

/s/ James D. Sanford

JAMES D. SANFORD

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y Document 205 Filed 02/16/24 Page 17 of 17 PageID 4796