IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AMARILLO DIVISION 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

ALEJANDRO MA YORKAS, in his 

official capacity as Secretary of 

Homeland Security, et al., 

Defendants. 

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2:22-CV-094-Z 

OPINION AND ORDER 

l 1.S. /)/.<.; IR .. . -- NO/ff/// l< N I )/'-i /( I _CO{IRf FIL'E'H OFn_:XI\S 

CLERK, ~ U.S. DISTRICT CO 

By · URT 

Before the Court is Defendants'

1 Motion to Transfer and Stay Pending Resolution of the 

Motion ("Motion") (ECF No. 7), filed on April 29, 2022. Having considered the Motion, 

pleadings, and relevant law, the Court DENIES the Motion. 

BACKGROUND 

An alien claiming asylum may do so after having entered the United States illegally. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(l) (stating "[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or 

who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival ... ), irrespective of 

such alien's status, may apply for asylum"). On March 29, 2022, the United States Department of 

Justice and the United States Department of Homeland Security published an interim final rule 

1 Defendants include Alejandro Mayorkas, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Ur Jaddou, in her official capacity as Director of U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services; Christopher Magnus, in his official capacity as Commissioner of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection; the U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Tae Johnson, in his official capacity as Acting 

Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Merrick Garland, in his official capacity as U.S. Attorney 

General; the U.S. Department of Justice; David Neal, in his official capacity as Director of the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review; the Executive Officer for Immigration Review; Joseph Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as 

President of the United States; and the United States of America. 

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("IFR"). See Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding 

of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18,078 (Mar. 29, 2022). 

The IFR relates to Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). See 

generally id Under Section 235 - codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225 - if an alien subject to expedited 

removal· possesses a credible fear of persecution, "the alien shall be detained for further 

consideration of the application for asylum." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(ii). An alien who fails to 

persuade an asylum officer of his credible fear of prosecution may seek further-consideration 

review before an immigration judge. Id. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(iii)(III). The "IFR addresses how that 

further consideration, including of the noncitizen's related claims to statutory withholding of 

removal and [Convention Against Torture] protection, will occur." 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,080. 

The IFR "establishes a new process by which such 'further consideration' may occur, 

wherein a noncitizen will have their asylum claim adjudicated following an Asylum Merits 

interview before a [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services] asylum officer in the first 

instance, rather than by an [immigration judge] in a section 240 removal proceeding." Id at 18,085. 

The IFR also changes the process by which Defendants will parole aliens who would not be 

lawfully permitted to enter the United States, or who are otherwise subject to mandatory detention. 

See id at 18,082 (stating "this rule establishes the regulatory authority for consideration for parole 

of noncitizens in expedited removal or in expedited removal with pending credible fear 

determinations"). 

The State of Texas ("Plaintiff') challenges the IFR. Plaintiff asserts the IFR "violates the 

Administrative Procedure Act ('APA'), the Homeland Security Act, and the Immigration and 

Nationality Act ('INA'), and it violates the Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 

of the United States Constitution." ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff requests the Court: (1) "[s]tay, 

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postpone, or preliminarily enjoin" Defendants' implementation of the IFR; and (2) decree the IFR 

violates the APA, "hold it unlawful, set it aside, and remand it for further consideration or, in the 

alternative, permanently enjoin" its implementation. Id at 20-21. 

Defendants move to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District 

of Columbia. See generally ECF No. 7. Defendants argue "u]udicial review of determinations 

under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)] and its implementation is available in an action instituted in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia" alone. Id at 7 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(e)(3)(A)) (alterations in original). Defendants claim "[t]his includes review of whether 'any 

regulation issued to implement' § 1225(b) 'is constitutional,' and of 'whether such a 

regulation ... issued by or under the Authority of the Attorney General to implement such section 

is not consistent with applicable provisions of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation oflaw. "' 

Id (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i}--(ii)). Defendants thus contend Plaintiffs' claims fall 

within the transfer provision's scope. Accordingly, Defendants argue, "this Court must either 

transfer this case to the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, or dismiss it." Id at 8. 

Defendants also ask the Court to "stay this case in its entirety pending resolution of [transfer]." Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they possess only power authorized by the 

Constitution and federal statutes. Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429,435 (5th Cir. 

2019). "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter 'springs from the 

nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is 'inflexible and without 

exception."' Id (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)); see 

also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) ("Article III generally requires a 

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federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits 

of a case."). 

A federal district court "has a general discretionary power to stay proceedings before it in 

the control of its docket and in the interests of justice." McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F .2d 4 77, 4 79 

(5th Cir. 1982). A "stay is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception that 

its force will be spent within reasonable limits, so far at least as they are susceptible of prevision 

and description." Landis v. N Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,257 (1936). 

ANALYSIS 

The IFR implements Section 1225(b)(l)(B)(ii). See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(ii) ("If the 

officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution 

(within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the 

application for asylum."); 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,080 ("The IFR addresses how that further 

consideration, including of the noncitizen's related claims to statutory withholding of removal and 

[Convention Against Torture] protection, will occur."). 

Section 1252(a)(2)(A) largely precludes matters relating to Section 1225(b)(l) from 

judicial review. But despite Section 1252(a)(2)(A)'s exclusion, Section 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) permits 

courts to review some matters as detailed in Section 1252(e). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), 

(a)(2)(A)(iv) ("Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw (statutory or nonstatutory) ... no court 

shall have jurisdiction to review ... except as provided in subsection ( e ), procedures and policies 

adopted by the Attorney General to implement the provisions of section 1225(b)(l) of this title.").2 

2 Sections 1225(b) and 1252(e) refer to the Attorney General. But those functions have been transferred to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. § 251 (transferring control over certain programs "from the 

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalizations to the Secretary [of Homeland Security]"); 6 U.S.C. § 552(d) 

("References to an agency that is transferred to the Department [of Homeland Security] in statutes, executive orders, 

rules, regulations, directives, or delegations of authority that precede such transfer of the effective date of this chapter 

shall be deemed to refer, as appropriate, to the Department [of Homeland Security] .. .. "); Clark v. Martinez, 543 

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Section 1252(e)(3) concerns "[c]hallenges on validity of the system." Section 1252(e)(3) 

provides: 

(A) In general. Judicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this 

title and its implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations 

of-

(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such 

section, is constitutional; or 

(ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy 

guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the 

Attorney General to implement such section, is not consistent with 

applicable provisions of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i}-(ii). 

Based on Section 1252(e)(3), Defendants argue the Court lacks jurisdiction and that 

Plaintiff should have brought this case in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia. See generally ECF No. 7. Plaintiff disagrees. It argues Section 1252 applies only to 

denials of relief for individual aliens and does not strip this Court of jurisdiction over 

programmatic decisions. See generally ECF No. 14. 

The Court evaluates Section 1252 in its proper context.3 See Yates v. United States, 574 

U.S. 528, 537 (2015). Section 1252 is titled "Judicial review of orders of removal." That title 

"indicates the section applies to individual aliens (who are subject to orders of removal) rather than 

programmatic decisions." Texas v. Biden ("Texas MPP"), 20 F.4th 928,977 n.11 (5th Cir. 2021), 

U.S. 371, 374 n.l. (2005) (recognizing authorities at issue in the case "as having been exercised by the Attorney 

General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) now reside in the Secretary of Homeland 

Security ... and divisions of his Department .... "). And as Defendants note, "the IFR ... was jointly issued by DOJ 

and OHS under the authority of both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security." ECF No. 7 at 13. 

3 See James C. Phillips, The Overlooked Evidence in the Title VII Cases: The Linguistic (and Therefore Textua/ist) 

Principle ofCompositiona/ity l-2 (May 11, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) ("Compositionality is the notion that the 

meaning of a complex expression is a compositional function of the meaning of its semantic parts. Sometimes what 

you see is what you get: apple pie is a pie made from apples. But sometimes the combination of words has a meaning 

of its own that is not a reliable amalgamation of the components at all, such as for good or at all." ( emphasis added) 

(internal marks omitted)). 

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 ...  

rev 'don other grounds,_ S. Ct._,_ (2022);4 see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 527-

28 (2002) ("[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution 

of doubt about the meaning of a statute."); House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982, 988 (5th Cir. 

1972) (noting "meaning should be given to the section heading of a statute"). And Section 1252 is 

broken into several additional sections, each addressing removal orders. Section 1252(a) addresses 

removal orders generally, identifies particular types of removal orders not subject to judicial or 

discretionary review, and makes Section 1252 the sole means to review such orders. 

Section 1252(b) discusses requirements a petitioner must meet to invoke a court's jurisdiction to 

review a removal order. Section 1252(c) lists two requirements a petition for review must satisfy. 

Section 1252(d) limits when a court may review a final order. Section 1252(e)- titled "Judicial 

review of orders under section 1225(b )( 1 )" - is the only section Defendants address ( and will be 

discussed later). Section 1252(f) prohibits courts from awarding injunctive relief except to "an 

individual alien against whom proceedings ... have been initiated." And Section 1252(g) is a 

catch-all provision denying courts jurisdiction to hear cases "by or on behalf of any alien arising 

from the decision .. . to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." 

In the same way, the provisions of Section 1252(a)(2)(A) - which refers back to 

Section 1252(e) - appear to apply to individual-removal decisions rather than broad, 

programmatic decisions. "Section 1252(a)(2)(A) repeatedly refers to an 'individual 

4 In Texas MPP, the Fifth Circuit considered a jurisdiction-stripping provision of Section 1252 as applied to 

Section l 225(b )(2). When doing so, the Fifth Circuit concluded "[t ]he entirety of the text and structure of Section 1252 

indicates that it operates only on denials of relief for individual aliens." Texas MPP, 20 F.4th at 977. A contrary 

holding "would bury an awfully large elephant in a really small mousehole." Id. Although the Fifth Circuit did not 

consider Section 1252(e) in Texas MPP, Section 1252(e) fits within the Texas MPP decision. On appeal, the United 

States Supreme Court did not question the Fifth Circuit's contention that "[t]he entirety of the text and structure of 

Section 1252 indicates that it operates only on denials of relief for individual aliens." Texas MPP, 20 F.4th at 977. 

Instead, after acknowledging "the District Court clearly had federal question jurisdiction over respondent's [28 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(b)(2)] suit," the Supreme Court asked whether Section 1252(t)(l) stripped the district court of subject-matter 

jurisdiction over a Section 1225(b)(2) claim. Biden v. Texas, _ S. Ct. _, _ (2022). The Supreme Court 

determined it did not. Id. at 

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determination,' § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i), 'individual aliens,' § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii), and to the provisions 

of§ 1225(b)(l) that apply to inspection and asylum for individual aliens." Texas MPP, 20 F.4th at 

977 n.11. And as the Fifth Circuit has noted, other subsections repeatedly reference individual 

proceedings. See id. (discussing Sections 1252(a)(2)(C) and 1252(a)(2)(D)). Therefore, all sections 

surrounding Section 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) - "and hence the structure of the statute" - imply "it 

applies to removal decisions affecting individual aliens and not broad programmatic decisions 

made by the Secretary ofDHS." Id. 

The text of Section 1252( e) - titled "Judicial review of orders under section 1225(b )( 1 )" 

- also indicates it applies only to individual determinations. See United States v. Lauderdale 

County, 914 F.3d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining "section headings .. . can be used as 

evidence when interpreting the operative text of the statute"). Section 1252(e)(l) prohibits a court 

from awarding equitable relief "in any action pertaining to an order to exclude an alien" ( except 

as otherwise authorized by Section 1252) and governs class certification. Section 1252(e)(2) 

permits aliens to challenge removal orders through petitions for habeas corpus in certain 

circumstances. Section 1252(e)(3) - titled "Challenges on validity of the system" - is the only 

provision Defendants address. That provision does not use individual determination-focused 

language. Section 1252(e)(4) limits the remedies a court may order if it makes one of two specific 

findings in a removal proceeding. And Section 1252(e)(5) limits the scope of a court's inquiry "to 

whether [a removal] order in fact was issued and whether it relates to petitioner," stating "[t]here 

shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from 

removal." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(4); cf Make the Road NY. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 643 (Rao, J., 

dissenting) (interpreting Section 1252( e) to apply to "limited review only of individual 

determinations"). 

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. 

 ..  

Although Section 1252(e)(3) itself does not include language specific to 

individual-removal proceedings, all other sections - 1252(e)(l), 1252(e)(2), 1252(e)(4), and 

1252(e)(5) - do. See generally id. § 1252. To read Section 1252(e)(3) as stripping all but the 

District for the District Columbia of jurisdiction to hear an AP A challenge does not comport with 

the text of Section 1252, taken as a whole and provided proper context. The text Defendants invoke 

- "D]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its implementation 

is available in an action instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia" 

- is surrounded by language affecting only individual aliens. Id. § 1252(e)(3); see also Texas 

MPP, 20 F.4th at 977 n.11.5 

CONCLUSION 

The Court has an obligation to construe a statute "as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory 

scheme" that "fit[s], if possible, all parts into [a] harmonious whole." FDA v. Brown & Williamson 

Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal marks omitted). "[U]nder the statutory canon 

ejusdem generis, 'when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that 

general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows."' Murphy v. 

s Defendants cite several cases in support of the proposition that Section 1252(e)(3) requires challenges to 

Section I 225(b )(I)' s implementation to be brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Many of these 

cases involve individual aliens facing removal or an association suing on an alien's behalf. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. 

Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2016) (involving individuals who sought to "prevent, or at 

least postpone, their expedited removal from this country"); Brumme v. I.N.S., 275 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(involving individual who "was subjected to ... expedited removal upon her attempted reentry"); United States v. 

Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 201 I) (filing collateral attack against "an expedited removal order"); 

Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 326 (7th Cir. 20 IO) (stating individuals "were placed in expedited removal proceedings 

and ordered to return immediately to Pakistan"); S.L. V. v. Rosen, No. 5:21-CV-0017, 2021 WL 243442, at *I (W.D. 

Tex. Jan. 25, 2021); Rodrigues v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 3:20-CV-0139, 2020 WL 777278, at *I (N.D. 

Tex. Feb. 18, 2020); Reyes v. Nielsen, No. 4:18-CV-3971, 2020 WL 1442349, at *I (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2020); Shah v. 

Director, No. 3:19-CV-1164, 2019 WL 4254139, at •1 (W.D. La. Sept. 6, 2019). And in many of these cases, Section 

1252( e )(3) arguments were irrelevant because the suits were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 

See, e.g., MM V. v. Garland, IF.4th 1100, 1106, (D.C. Cir. 2021); Gracev. Barr, 965 F.3d 883,890 (D.C. Cir. 2020); 

Kiakombua v. Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d I, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2020); Las Ams. Immig. Advoc. Ctr. v. Wolf, 507 F. Supp. 3d 

1, 14 (D.D.C. 2020); L.M-M v. Cuccinel/i, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12-14 (D.D.C. 2020); Vijender v. Wolf, No. 19-CV3337, 2020 WL 1935556, at •1 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2020); Dugdale v. U.S. Customers & Border Prot., 88 F. Supp. 3d 

I, 2 (D.D.C. 2015); Am. Immig. Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

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Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 587 F. App'x 140, 144 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. 

v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,586 (2008)). 

Almost all the specific terms listed in Section 1252 refer to removal, removal orders, or 

removal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reads Section 1252(e)(3) to "apply only to persons 

or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis)." ANTONIN 

SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 199 (2012); 

cf Texas MPP, 20 F.4th at 977 n.11 (applying ejusdem generis in holding that Section 1252 

"operates only on denials of relief for individual aliens"). 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Motion. 

July ~ , 2022 

MA HEW J. KACSMARYK 

TED STA TES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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