IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Davine Ahiem, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 398 M.D. 2019

: Submitted: March 11, 2022

Department of Corrections, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: November 30, 2022

Davine Ahiem (Inmate), an inmate at the State Correctional Institution 

at Fayette, acting pro se, filed a petition for review in our original jurisdiction 

asserting that the Department of Corrections (Department) improperly deducted 

funds from his inmate account to pay sentenced costs and fines under Section 9728 

of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9728, commonly referred to as Act 84.

1

 Inmate 

1

In relevant part, Section 9728(b)(5)(i) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(5)(i), 

requires the Department to make monetary deductions of at least 25% of deposits made to inmate 

accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution, costs under Section 9721(c.1) of the Sentencing 

Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9721(c.1), filing fees, and any other court-ordered obligation. Section 

9728(b.2) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b.2), provides that an inmate shall be liable 

for costs even if the trial court fails to issue a court order directing that mandatory costs be paid. 

Section 9728(c) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9728(c), provides that costs and fines may 

be collected even after the maximum term of incarceration. 
2

asks this Court to order the Department to cease all deductions and return all funds 

that were taken. Inmate does not dispute the Department’s authority to make 

deductions or the amount of costs and fines imposed, but disputes only the timing of 

the Department’s deductions. Inmate argues that the Department’s deductions 

violate the trial court’s oral instructions at his sentencing hearings, wherein the trial 

court stated that “fines and costs to be paid during the period of parole.” See 

Inmate’s Petition for Review at unnumbered p. 2, Exhibit A and Exhibit B to

Inmate’s Petition for Review.

2

 

Before us are the Department’s preliminary objections to Inmate’s 

petition for review. In its first preliminary objection (PO 1), the Department avers 

that Inmate’s petition for review failed to conform with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1022 by failing 

to include numbered paragraphs. In its second preliminary objection (PO 2), the 

Department asserts a demurrer under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4), averring that Inmate 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. After careful review, we 

overrule PO 1, sustain PO 2, and dismiss Inmate’s petition for review.

On March 27, 2017, and March 28, 2017, Inmate pleaded guilty to one 

count of aggravated assault and related charges, after which the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) imposed a sentence of 10-20 years’ 

incarceration, costs totaling $749.50, and other conditions not relevant here. See

2

Inmate initiated this action by filing a Motion to Stop Act 84 Deductions, which this Court 

treated as a Petition for Review. Thereafter, the Court ordered Inmate to file an amended Petition 

for Review which named the Department as respondent, and for Inmate to properly serve the 

Department and the Attorney General, which Inmate did. Inmate later sent a letter to the Court 

asking about the status of his case, to which he attached what he termed an Amended Petition for 

Review. Inmate’s motion and petitions are substantively identical, in that each filing seeks relief 

from the timing of the Department’s deductions. For ease of reference, we will refer to Inmate’s 

filings collectively as a petition for review. 
3

Exhibit to Department’s Preliminary Objections.3 In each of the trial court’s 

sentencing orders, under the heading “Mandatory Court Costs-Court Costs,” the trial 

court stated that Inmate “is to pay imposed mandatory court costs.” Id. 

We agree with the Department that Inmate’s petition for review fails to 

comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1022 in that it fails to include numbered paragraphs. 

However, because Inmate’s petition seeks relief on the single ground of the timing 

of the Department’s deductions, and Inmate’s petition for review did not prevent the 

Department from filing a comprehensible response, we overrule the Department’s 

PO 1. 

As to PO 2, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4) permits preliminary objections to 

be filed for “legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer).” When ruling on 

preliminary objections, this Court shall sustain such objections and dismiss the 

petition for review only in cases that are clear and free from doubt that the law will 

not permit recovery. In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, 

this Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the petition and all 

inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. The Court need not accept as true 

conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, 

or expressions of opinion. A demurrer will not be sustained unless the face of the 

petition for review shows that the law will not permit recovery, and any doubts 

should be resolved against sustaining the demurrer. Stone and Edwards Insurance

Agency, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 616 A.2d 1060, 1063 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)

(internal citations omitted). “[D]ocuments attached as exhibits, documents 

3 The Department also attached its preliminary objections and the trial court’s orders as 

Exhibit C to its Brief. By order dated December 2, 2021, this Court directed Inmate to file a brief 

in response to the Department’s preliminary objections, which Inmate did not do. Pursuant to our

December 2, 2021 order, we will proceed without Inmate’s brief. 
4

referenced in the [petition for review], as well as facts already of record may also be 

considered.” Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5, by McNesby v. City of 

Philadelphia, 267 A.3d 531, 542 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). 

Under the applicable standard of review, we must sustain the 

Department’s demurrer. Contrary to Inmate’s averment, the Department did not err 

when it commenced deductions from his inmate account to pay for the mandatory 

costs imposed as part of his sentence, as documented in the trial court’s orders. It is 

well established that Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code authorizes the 

Department “to make monetary deductions from an inmate’s account to pay court 

ordered fines and costs” and does not require “prior court authorization as a threshold 

condition.” Boyd v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 831 A.2d 779, 782 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 

Inmate does not allege that the trial court’s sentencing orders were in

any way ambiguous, incomplete, or improper. In fact, Inmate does not reference the 

trial court’s sentencing orders at all. See Inmate’s Petition for Review. Instead, 

Inmate focuses on the trial court’s statements at his sentencing hearings, where the 

trial court stated that “[f]ines and costs to be paid during the period of parole,” to 

support his claim that the Department should not have collected fines and costs while 

he isincarcerated, and should have delayed collection until Inmate isin parole status. 

We must reject Inmate’s assertion because the clear text of the trial court’s orders 

governs his sentence, including the imposition of costs, and collections from his 

inmate account. Freemore v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 231 A.3d 

33, 39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). 

In Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226-27 (Pa. 2013), our 

Supreme Court stated: 
5

In Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not 

the statements a trial court makes about a defendant’s 

sentence, is determinative of the court’s sentencing 

intentions and the sentence imposed. See Commonwealth, 

ex rel. Powell v. Depart[ment] of Corrections, 14 A.3d 

912, 915-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Commonwealth v. 

Green, [335 A.2d 392, 393 (Pa. Super. 1975)]. As we have 

stated, the “signed sentencing order, if legal, controls over 

oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated 

into the signed judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. 

Isabell, [467 A.2d 1287, 1292 (Pa. 1983)] (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Unlike the factual scenario presented in Lambing v. Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 488 M.D. 2017, filed July 23, 2020),4 where the text 

of the sentencing order was ambiguous on the timing of collecting imposed costs, 

the trial court’s orders here clearly state that Inmate “is to pay imposed mandatory 

court costs” without any reference to a delay in collections. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that Inmate has not established a 

clear right to relief, we overrule the Department’s PO 1 regarding the form of 

Inmate’s petition for review, sustain the Department’s PO 2 in the nature of a 

demurrer, and dismiss Inmate’s petition for review. 

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

4

See Pa. R.A.P. 126(b) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to . . . an 

unreported memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. [] 

Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”). 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Davine Ahiem, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 398 M.D. 2019

: 

Department of Corrections, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2022, we overrule the 

Department of Corrections’ preliminary objection as to the form of Davine Ahiem’s 

Petition for Review, sustain the Department of Corrections’ preliminary objection 

in the nature of a demurrer, and dismiss the Petition for Review. 

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge