1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

SEAN ALEXANDER HARRIS, 

 Movant, 

 NO. 4:22-CV-214-O 

v. (4:20-CR-305-O) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent. 

RESPONSE TO MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

Sean Harris is fortunate. Despite being the leader of a methamphetamine 

distribution conspiracy and having a guideline range of 240 months, the government 

agreed to and the Court accepted a downward-variance sentence of 144 months. (See 

Sent. Tr. at 3-4, 5-6; CR 56 at 1, 3.)1

 Nonetheless, he has filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 contending that he was the victim of ineffective assistance by his attorney. (CV 

3.) The motion should be summarily denied because his claims are wholly conclusory. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

In March 2020, investigators began looking into Harris’s drug-dealing activities 

based on suspicious mailings he made from the Dallas/Fort Worth area. (PSR ¶ 10.) 

They determined that Harris had been obtaining methamphetamine, marijuana, and other 

drugs from sources in California and, along with his mother, resold those drugs using the 

1

 The government cites documents in the underlying criminal proceedings, United States 

v. Harris, No. 4:20-CR-305-O, by docket entry number as “CR [#].” Documents filed in the 

instant civil proceedings are cited by docket entry number as “CV [#].” In a few instances, such 

as the presentence investigation report and hearings transcripts from the criminal proceedings, 

the government cites by reference to the document title. 

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“dark web” Internet. (Id.) The investigation identified more than 8,000 suspicious 

mailings. (Id.) Several packages were intercepted between March and September 2020 

and were found to contain controlled substances. (PSR ¶ 12.)

A grand jury issued an indictment charging Harris with conspiracy to possess 

methamphetamine with intent to distribute. (CR 15.) He entered into a written plea 

agreement whereby he pled guilty to that same charge brought in a superseding 

information that also contained forfeiture provisions for about $26,000. (See CR 22; CR 

25; CR 26.) Due to the government’s decision not to charge a threshold quantity of 

methamphetamine, Harris was subject to a punishment range of up to 20 years, with no 

mandatory minimum sentence. (See CR 26 at 2.)

The PSR determined that Harris was accountable for a total converted drug weight 

of 486,905 kilograms. (PSR ¶ 30.) That placed him in base offense level 38 under 

USSG § 2D1.1. (PSR ¶ 36.) The PSR added two levels for maintaining a premises for 

drug distribution and subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a

total offense level of 37. (PSR ¶¶ 37-45.) That, combined with his criminal history 

category of II, produced an advisory imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, which 

was then truncated by the statutory maximum to 235 to 240 months. (PSR ¶ 94.)

Harris’s attorney made three objections to the PSR. (CR 40.) He objected to a 

criminal history point (although it did not change the guideline range), the enhancement 

for maintaining a premises, and the absence of a “safety valve” reduction. If the Court 

had granted the latter two objections, his range would have been 151 to 188 months. (CR 

40 at 1.) The government, however, explained why those objections should be overruled. 

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(CR 41.) A subsequent addendum to the PSR did not accept Harris’s objections and 

added a two-level enhancement based on Harris’s leadership role in the conspiracy, 

elevating the guidelines range to the statutory cap of 240 months. (CR 42-1.) Harris’s 

attorney objected to that enhancement as well. (CR 46.) Harris’s attorney also moved 

for a downward-variance sentence based largely on his childhood trauma, mental health 

issues, and elevation of the guidelines range based the purity levels of the 

methamphetamine he distributed. (CR 44.)

The Court was prepared to conduct a sentencing hearing when the case was called 

on April 22, 2021. (See Sent. Tr.) When called upon to present evidence in support of 

his PSR objections, however, Harris’s attorney informed the Court of a proposed 

agreement with the government to recommend a downward-variance sentence of 12 

years. (Id. at 3-4.) After inquiring about the implications of that agreement, the Court 

indicated that it would accept that recommendation. (Id. at 4-5.) Harris was given an 

opportunity to allocute, and he used that time to simply thank the Court for accepting the 

recommended sentence. (Id. at 5.) The Court then memorialized its decision to impose a 

downward-variance sentence of 12 years. (Id. at 5-6.)

The Court entered its judgment on April 22, 2021. (CR 55.) Harris did not file a 

notice of appeal, meaning that his judgment became final 14 days later on May 6, 2021. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), therefore, he had until May 6, 2022 to file a motion 

challenging his conviction or sentence. On March 24, 2022, Harris timely filed his first 

motion. (See CV 1.)

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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 

Standard of Review 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner may move the convicting court to vacate, set 

aside, or correct his conviction or sentence. It provides four grounds for relief: “(1) the 

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the 

court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the 

statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is ‘otherwise subject to collateral 

attack.’” United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

“It has, of course, long been settled law that an error that may justify reversal on 

direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” United 

States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979). “Section 2255 does not offer recourse to 

all who suffer trial errors.” United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 

1981). And it “may not do service for an appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

165 (1982). After conviction and the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, the Court is 

“entitled to presume” that the prisoner “stands fairly and finally convicted.” Id. at 164. 

 Section 2255 is “reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that 

narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, 

would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Capua, 656 F.2d at 

1037. In other words, the “scope of relief under § 2255 is consistent with that of the writ 

of habeas corpus.” Placente, 81 F.3d at 558. 

To obtain relief under Section 2255 based on a claim that counsel was ineffective, 

a movant must satisfy the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

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U.S. 668 (1984). First, he must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient by 

pointing to specific acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional 

judgment. Id. at 687, 690. Second, he must prove prejudice by establishing that 

“counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the 

proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

Stated another way, he must prove that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, “there is a 

reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy 

task,” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010), and a movant’s inability to satisfy 

either prong dooms his claim in its entirety, see United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d 750, 

751 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Section 2255 motions do not automatically require a hearing. United States v. 

Hughes, 635 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981); see also Rule 8 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. “When the files and records of a case make 

manifest the lack of merit of a Section 2255 claim, the trial court is not required to hold 

an evidentiary hearing.” Hughes, 635 F.2d at 451. A prisoner is not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing on his Section 2255 motion unless he “presents ‘independent indicia 

of the likely merit of [her] allegations.’” United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 373 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (alteration brackets omitted). 

Discussion 

The Fifth Circuit and this Court have made clear that a conclusory claim that 

counsel was ineffective fails to raise a constitutional issue. See, e.g., United States v. 

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Demik, 489 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 2007); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th 

Cir. 2000); Suarez v. Lumpkin, No. 4:21-CV-147-O, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *8 

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2022). A Section 2255 movant must, among other things, “state the 

facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(b)(2) of Rules Governing Section 2255 

Proceedings for the U.S. District Courts.

Harris’s motion should be denied because it is entirely conclusory and fails to 

allege any facts supporting his numerous claims of ineffectiveness. His memorandum is 

simply what appears to be a boilerplate laundry list of things he asserts his attorney did or 

failed to do: failed to investigate, failed to apprise Harris of unspecified facts, misled 

Harris about unspecified vital case information, rendered half-hearted performance, failed 

to explain PSR objections, failed to properly present “the plea document,” failed to 

adequately consult with Harris, exhibited a desire for a speedy disposition of the case, 

intentionally gave inaccurate and misleading advice, and the list goes on. (See CV 3.)

After reviewing the motion, memorandum in support, and Harris’s declaration, the 

only facts the government can glean about Harris’s claims that counsel did not visit 

Harris as frequently as he apparently wanted and did not explain the PSR process to 

Harris’s understanding. (See CV 2.) These allegations simply do not allege a claim for 

ineffectiveness.

The conclusory nature of Harris’s claims is evident from the absence of any facts 

explaining why his attorney performed deficiently or how that deficient performance 

resulted in any prejudice. For example, Harris’s allegation that counsel failed to 

investigate is simply that: “Counsel failed to investigate.” (CV 3 at 4.) He does not 

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allege any facts about what counsel should have investigated, what that investigation 

would have revealed, or explain why that additional investigation would have changed 

the outcome of the case. See United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 461 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(“[A] defendant who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his counsel must allege 

with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have 

altered the outcome of the trial.” (emphasis added)). Similarly, Harris’s claims that 

counsel misled or lied to him do not even specify the subject matter of the purported

misinformation or deception, much less detail what that information was, how it misled 

Harris, or how it was material to Harris’s decision to plead guilty to an offense capped at 

20 years rather than face the possibility of a trial on charges carrying a much higher 

maximum sentence plus the possibility of a mandatory minimum sentence.2

 Harris’s 

motion contains no specificity with respect to any of his claims, and his motion is subject 

to summary denial for that reason alone.

Moreover, Harris’s assertions of prejudice are unmeritorious. In similar 

conclusory fashion, he claims that, had his attorney not performed deficiently in the ways 

he alleged, he would have either “proceeded to trial or sought the most favorable plea 

offer.” (CV 3 at 4.) That falls far short of showing a reasonable probability of prejudice. 

See United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 

2 The government notes that the PSR recorded more than one kilogram of Ice seized from 

Harris and his coconspirator mother. (PSR ¶ 29.) Had the government proved at trial that Harris 

knowingly participated in a conspiracy involving more than half that much, he would have been 

subject to a minimum ten-year sentence and a statutory maximum of life. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).

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474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). First, he does not insist that he would have gone to trial, let 

alone support such an assertion with contemporaneous evidence as he must to prevail 

under Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017). See Valdez, 973 F.3d at 403. 

Second, he has not shown that there was any more favorable plea offer to be had. 

Harris pled guilty to a serious drug-trafficking crime that could have been charged 

as an offense carrying a statutory punishment range of 10 years to life. He received a 

benefit from a favorable charging decision, which capped his sentencing exposure to 20 

years. Nonetheless, his conduct and criminal history yielded an advisory guideline range 

at that maximum. Yet his attorney successfully procured an agreement whereby the 

parties agreed to recommend a sentence that was eight years below that advisory range. 

Harris should be expressing appreciation to his lawyer for obtaining a favorable outcome 

instead of alleging that his performance fell below professional standards. In any event, 

his conclusory claims of ineffective assistance fail. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court should deny Harris’s Section 2255 motion. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Chad E. Meacham 

United States Attorney 

/s/ Brian McKay

Brian McKay 

Assistant United States Attorney

Texas Bar No. 24046395 

1100 Commerce Street, Third Floor 

Dallas, Texas 75242 

Telephone: (214) 659-8600 

brian.mckay@usdoj.gov 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on May 19, 2022, I filed this response with the clerk of court for the 

U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas. I also certify that a copy of this response 

was sent to Sean Alexander Harris, Register Number 11537-509, Texarkana FCI, P.O. 

Box 7000, Texarkana, Texas 75505, by certified mail. 

. 

/s/ Brian McKay 

Brian McKay 

Assistant United States Attorney

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