[Cite as In re C.B. , 2019-Ohio-5023.]

COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN RE: C.B., : JUDGES: : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. A MINOR CHILD, : Hon . Craig R. Baldwin, J. : Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. : : : Case No. 2019-COA-009 : : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Court Division, Case No. 20142293

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: December 5, 2019

APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL ABIGAIL CHRISTOPHER Ashland County Assistant State Public Defender Prosecuting Attorney 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400 Columbus, Ohio 43215 By: COLE F. OBERLI Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 110 Cottage Street Ashland, Ohio 44805Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 2

Baldwin, J. {¶1} C.B. appeals the Ashland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Di vision’s decision to classify him as a Tier II Sex Offender. Appellee i s the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE {¶2} This matter was before this court in In re C.B ., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 15- COA-027, 2016-Ohio-4779, and while we remanded the case for red etermination of Appellant's Juvenile Offender Registration status, the facts re main unchanged, so we restate the facts and the case as described within that case. {¶3} On October 23, 2014, E.O., a nine year-old student in Ashland C ity Schools, met with Officer Kim Mager of the Ashland Police Department. Kr is Manley, a Principal in the Ashland City School District, called the Ashland Police Dep artment to report E.O. alleged she had been the victim of repeated sexual assaults by two neighbors, C.B., and his brother, M.B. E.O. Interview with Detective Mager {¶4} Detective Mager first interviewed E.O. on October 23, 2014, whe n she was in the fourth grade. E.O. understood the purpose of the intervi ew was to discuss her neighbors, C.B. and M.B. {¶5} E.O. informed Officer Mager M.B., her fifteen year old neighbor , touched her vaginal area, which she referred to as her “bottom.” E.O. t old Officer Mager M.B. and his brother, C.B., touched her vaginal area behind the shed at the rear of M.B.'s residence. E.O. related both M.B. and C.B. inserted their finge rs inside her vagina on numerous occasions. E.O. said M.B. digitally penetrated her “fi ve to ten times ... I'm notAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 3
sure, but he does it a lot.” She said the incidents with M.B. a lmost always ended with his fingers inside her vagina. She said the incidents always occurr ed behind the shed. {¶6} E.O. estimated the incidents began in first grade, about three years prior, putting her at age six. She averred M.B. and C.B. both touched her vagina on the outside of her clothes and put their hands up her shirt. {¶7} E.O. described an incident during which S.B., M.B. and C.B.'s m other, witnessed M.B. touching her. She stated the incident occurred “ right before school started,” she believes in late August, 2014, when she was playi ng in the backyard. E.O. said M.B. told her to “come here,” and while they were trying t o “spy” on someone, M.B. was “touching me with his fingers inside me.” C.B. was “watchin g to make sure nobody saw it.” E.O. stated at the same time, S.B. appeared behind the shed and saw her with her pants and panties down and M.B. sitting in front of her. M. B. had his fingers inside her. E.O. stated S.B. saw M.B. with his fingers inside her beca use “I was right there where she looked and I saw her looking at me.” S.B. yelled at M.B., s tating, “That's it! You're grounded and you can't play with her anymore! {¶8} E.O. also described incidents during which M.B. and C.B. attemp ted to take videos of her with their cell phones while touching her vaginal area. {¶9} Detective Mager wrote a narrative summarizing her interview wit h E.O.

C.B. Interview with Lieutenant Icenhour Initial Interview {¶10} On October 23, 2014, Lieutenant Joel Icenhour of the Ashland Po lice Department met with C.B., a sixteen year-old student at Ashland High School. Assistant Principal Jon Walter removed C.B. from class and escorted him t o his office, whereAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 4
Lieutenant Icenhour was waiting. Principal Walter sat behind th e desk, while C.B. and Lieutenant Icenhour sat in two chairs in front of Principal Wal ter. C.B. was told Lieutenant Icenhour was there to talk to him, he was not under arrest, he didn't have to talk to him if he didn't want to, and he was free to leave. Principal Walter d id not engage in the interview, but remained present according to school board polic y. C.B. orally consented to the interview with Lieutenant Icenhour. {¶11} Lieutenant Icenhour informed C.B. he was at the school to discu ss allegations made by E.O. concerning inappropriate sexual contac t with C.B. and M.B. C.B. denied ever touching E.O., but admitted E.O. would come cl ose to him and “rub up against him.” He stated M.B. played often with E.O. {¶12} C.B. became emotionally upset during the interview, again reite rating E.O. would sometimes get close to him and “rub up against him.” He s tated he didn't like it and would just walk away. He stated she would often walk around sho wing her underwear. He repeatedly stated he would never commit this type of offense because he feared the consequences. He said he would never commit a sex offense as it would impede his future plans, including going to the military and a career in l aw enforcement. He also feared juvenile detention. {¶13} As the interview concluded, Lieutenant Icenhour told C.B. to ta ke some time alone before returning to class. Lieutenant Icenhour informed C .B. he intended to interview his brother, M.B., and may need to speak with him aga in.

M.B. Interview with Lieutenant Icenhour {¶14} Lieutenant Icenhour then interviewed M.B. M.B. stated his date of birth was September 28, 1999. Lieutenant Icenhour told M.B. he had come t o the high school toAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 5 discuss statements made by E.O. M.B. indicated he knew E.O., sh e was his neighbor, and he knew her age. He stated they were friends, and often pla yed together, until he was told he should not be playing with her because he was “in h igh school.” {¶15} M.B. initially denied sexual conduct with E.O., but eventually admitted to touching E.O.'s vaginal area behind the shed. M.B. said C.B. ac ted as the look-out playing basketball in front of the shed, while he engaged in the touchi ng. He denied C.B. ever witnessed him touching E.O. {¶16} When asked about C.B.'s role in the conduct, M.B. initially ind icated he knew nothing about any of the incidents, but then described his role as the “undergoer” or “side operation.” He stated E.O. told him C.B. touched her, but he did not talk to C.B. about the incidents. {¶17} M.B. guessed C.B. engaged in touching E.O. “five or six times” based on the accounts E.O. related to him.

C.B. Second Interview with Lieutenant Icenhour {¶18} Following his interview with M.B., Lieutenant Icenhour then cal led C.B. back to the interview room. He informed C.B. he had talked to M.B. a nd M.B. had indicated C.B. had a role in M.B.'s conduct with E.O., and M.B. had indic ated C.B. had himself engaged in touching E.O. C.B. again denied the touching. {¶19} Lieutenant Icenhour engaged C.B. in further conversation, expla ining the situation to C.B. and his experience as a law enforcement inves tigator. C.B. then admitted to touching E.O. during a walk at the Church of God. C.B. claim ed E.O. “rubbed up against him.” He then admitted he stuck his finger inside her vagina an d put his hands down her pants. C.B. claimed to have stopped because it “felt weird” and “people can go to jail forAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 6 that.” C.B. initially stated he was fifteen years-old at the ti me the incident occurred. He later stated, the sexual conduct had not occurred for three yea rs, and he believed he was thirteen years of age at the time. {¶20} C.B. maintained the sexual conduct was not a continuing course of conduct, and had not happened again for three years. He denied the occur rence of a second incident. {¶21} After Lieutenant Icenhour discussed the situation with C.B., C. B. was eventually sent to a period of “chill out time” and then back t o class. {¶22} C.B. was charged by complaint filed in the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, on October 30, 2014. The compl aint alleged C.B. delinquent of one count of Rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A )(1)(b), a felony of the first degree, if committed by an adult. {¶23} On December 26, 2014, C.B. filed a Motion to Suppress all the s tatements made to Lieutenant Icenhour on October 23, 2014 at Ashland High School. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to suppress on J anuary 8, 2015. {¶24} The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress o n January 14, 2015. C.B. did not testify at the suppression hearing. Via Opinion and Judgment Entry of January 27, 2015, the trial court overruled C.B.'s motion to suppress. {¶25} The State filed an Amended Complaint on February 19, 2015. The Amended Complaint alleged C.B. to be delinquent of: Count 1. R ape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); Count 2. Rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02( A)(1)(b); Count 3. Gross Sexual Imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Count 4. Gross Sexual Imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4).Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 7 {¶26} The Amended Complaint alleged the offenses occurred between Mar ch 11, 2011, and October 21, 2014. {¶27} On May 29, 2015, the State filed an Evidence Rule 807 Notice pe rtaining to statements made by E.O. at Ashland City Schools to Detective Ki mberly Mager. The Notice stated, in the event E.O. could not, refused or claimed lack of memory about events charged, the State intended to introduce the testimony of Detec tive Mager in regards to the victim's statements about the events. Adjudication {¶28} The matter proceeded to an Adjudication Hearing on June 9, 2015 . At the adjudication hearing, E.O. testified C.B. walked her home from the Church of God, which was three houses down from her home. She testified it was durin g summer, but she could not recall what year it occurred. She recalled the two sat down on the ground and he touched her “bottom,” which she explained meant her vaginal are a. She said his hands went underneath her clothes, touching her skin, and his fingers went inside her vagina. She indicated it felt “bruised” when his fingers were inside. S he claimed he put his phone close to her pants when he did it. {¶29} When asked if C.B. had touched her another time, E.O. said he h ad touched her at Toppers, a haircut place close to her house. She also co uld not remember when this had occurred. She claimed the incident was just like the i ncident at Church of God when C.B. put his finger inside her vagina. She indicated the f eeling of bruising as feeling the same. {¶30} Lieutenant Joel Icenhour of the Ashland Police Department testi fied at the adjudication hearing as to his interview with C.B. at Ashland H igh School:Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 8 Q. Can you describe for the Court [C.B.'s] statements to you ab out the incident that you were investigating? A. Well, he was very evasive to begin with, and as the intervi ew went on, he eventually admitted, at one time we were talking about [E.O. ] and he admitted to touching her privates one time, putting his hand do wn her pants and inserting the tip of his finger into her vaginal cavity, an d he gave a variance of ages of when it occurred. At one point he said around age 15, earlier in a[sic] interview he said 14 to 15, and then he said throughout age 13, previous to that, which to me indicated that was probably more than a one time incident and–– – *** A. From there, he described it as the incident, the one that h e admitted to of walking [E.O.] around the building, the Church of God, and [ E.O.] kept brushing up against him and rubbing into him, he mentioned at o ne point it was at a spot at the Church of God that nobody could see, and I talked about the consistency of this going on, and he got upset at tha t point and he said none of this inconsistent [sic] crap, and he said it wa s one time. And I said, was it one time that you put your had down her pant s and inserted your finger into her vagina, and he said, yes, that wa s just one time, and reiterated, and there was nothing with that consistency lik e it was an on going situation. Adjudication Hearing, Tr. at 104–105. {¶31} Lieutenant Icenhour continued in his testimony:Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 9

BY MS. BATES: Q As far as the time period that you talked to C.B. about, you said that he stated that he was about 14 or 15, does that sound right? A Yeah, he gave different statements about a couple years ago, and he mentioned age 13, and then mentioned age 14 to 15 and then 15, so. Adjudication Hearing, Tr. at 111–112. {¶32} Detective Kimberly Mager testified as to her interview with E.O . She testified as to E.O.'s allegations, but did not provide information as to the incidents at Church of God or at Toppers. She did not provide dates or a time frame as to when the events occurred. {¶33} C.B. testified on his own behalf at the adjudication hearing. A t the hearing, C.B. denied touching E.O. sexually. When asked why he had told Lieutenant Icenhour he had touched E.O. once, C.B. testified he felt like he was being broken down and was tired of being drilled. He also stated he thought admission to the be havior would get him out of the office. Adjudication of Delinque ncy and Classification {¶34} Via Judgment Entry of June 12, 2015, the trial court adjudicate d C.B. delinquent of two counts of rape and two counts of gross sexual imposition. {¶35} The trial court conducted a dispositional hearing on July 16, 2 015, and via Judgment Entry of the same date the trial court entered disposi tion. The trial court merged the two counts of gross sexual imposition finding the offenses allied offenses of similar import with the two counts of rape as the offenses did not have a separate animus;Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 10
therefore, the trial court did not enter a separate disposition al order with regard to the two counts of gross sexual imposition. {¶36} As to the first count of rape, the trial court committed C.B. t o the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) for institutionalization in a secure facility for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of two years and a maximum period not to exceed his attainment of the age of twenty-one years. {¶37} As to the second offense of rape, the trial court committed C.B . to ODYS for institutionalization in a secure facility for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of one year and a maximum period not to exceed his attai nment of the age of twenty one years. {¶38} The trial court ordered the sentences on Counts One and Two to run consecutively. {¶39} Via Judgment Entry of July 28, 2015, the trial court classified C.B. a Tier III Juvenile Offender Registrant. The trial court's entry states: 2) The Court finds that the offenses of Rape, in violation of S ection 2907.02(A)(1)(b) of the Ohio Revised Code, are Tier III sexuall y oriented offenses as defined by statute. The Court further recognizes an d finds, however that under present Ohio law while classification may be mandatory the Tier upon which the juvenile is placed is discretionary wit h the Court and the Court has the discretion to classify the juvenile pursuant to whatever Tier the Court determines to be appropriate in this case. The C ourt finds no basis in the evidence or any of the material received by the Co urt to classify the juvenile at the present time in any Tier other than as note d above.Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 11 3) The Court does hereby classify [C.B.] a Tier III Sex Offende r. (Emphasis added.) {¶40} The Appellant filed an appeal and submitted five assignments of error. We overruled four of the assignments of error and with regard to t he Appellant's Third Assignment of Error which claimed "THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHE N IT CLASSIFIED C.B. AS A JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRANT BECAUSE T HE RECORD DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS ELIGIBLE FOR REGISTRATION. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; OHIO CONSTITUTIO N, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 16" we held that: However, the trial court's Judgment Entry states “The Court fur ther recognizes and finds, however, that under Ohio law while classi fication may be mandatory, the Tier upon which the juvenile is placed is dis cretionary with the Court and the Court ...” The trial court seemed to loo k to the offense of Rape as a Tier III offense. At the adjudication hearing here in, C.B. testified at one point he was 15 years old at the time of the o ffense, and at another point he states he was 14 or 15, and another time he st ates he was 13. Therefore, the trial court had discretion as to whether to classify C.B. a JOR subject to registration and the trial court erred in findin g classification mandatory. See, In Re: D.S., 5th Dist. 13 CA 58, 2014 Ohio 867.

In re C.B ., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 15-COA-027, 2016-Ohio-4779, ¶ 89, fn. omitted. {¶41} We remanded the case for "redetermination of Appellant's JOR st atus. Id

. at ¶ 105.Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 12 {¶42} The trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.83 to redetermine Appellant's Juvenile Offender Registration Status as directed b y this court. Appellant contended that the evidence presented at the adjudication was i nsufficient to establish his age and thus his eligibility for registration and suggested a continuance to allow Appellee to obtain and present evidence regarding that issue. The Appellee declined the offer, contending the age of Appellant was resolved at the adju dicatory stage and that no additional evidence was necessary {¶43} The Appellant presented the testimony of Dee Pendlebury, Appell ant's parole officer. She informed the court that Appellant remained in DYS custody because he had refused to participate in court-ordered sex offender tre atment. (Sex Offender Classification Hearing Transcript, p. 24), but otherwise noted that Appellant behaved very well. Appellant scored as a low risk to reoffend on the Ohio Y outh Offender System Risk Assessment Tool (OYAS) without completing sex offender treatmen t. Appellant has strong family support, does not use drugs or alcohol, and did n ot exhibit negative behaviors while in DYS. Further, C.B. graduated high school an d completed classes through the Ashland College program while in DYS custody. {¶44} The Trial Court noted, in the preamble of its entry that all pa rties were present at the hearing and had the opportunity to present evide nce and argument. Exhibits were offered at the hearing and the trial court notifi ed the parties that it would "take judicial notice of all prior proceedings in this case and the entire file, which includes all evidence presented at several hearings conducted in this ca se, as well as reports prepared and filed with the court."(Opinion and Judgment Entry, March 6, 2019, Docket # 20, p. 1). Within that entry, the trial court summarizes the history of the case and notesAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 13
prior to the aforementioned appeal, it had found that appellant "was subject to a classification hearing and subject to classification pursuant t o Section 2152.83 of the Ohio Revised Code.” {¶45} The trial court reviewed Appellant's behavior while confined at the Ohio Department of Youth Services and found that Appellant: has been an exemplary resident at any facility in which he was placed. He has completed all other programs in which he was placed. He has completed school; he enrolled in the college program at the Ohi o Department of Youth Services; and has completed nearly two year s of college work. He has not violated rules and regulations at the facility. He has, to the contrary, followed all rules; he has worked regular ly, including outside the facility; he has completed risk assessments, includ ing the OYAS; and has always scored as a low risk to recidivate. In sho rt, he has successfully completed all things asked of him except completin g the sex offender program. (Opinion and Judgment Entry, March 6, 2019, Docket # 20, p. 4). {¶46} The sex offender program was a court ordered program that Appel lant refused to complete, as he continued to maintain his innocence. This refusal concerned the trial court, which noted that Appellant "is not taking resp onsibility for his actions and has not indicated any understanding of the wrongfulness of his actions. He has also expressed no remorse for his conduct, again maintaining that he had done nothing wrong and that he had not committed any of the acts with which he was charged and upon which he was adjudicated." (Opinion and Judgment Entry, March 6, 2019 , p. 4).Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 14 {¶47} The trial court then reviewed the factors set forth in R.C. 215 2.83(D) and/or (E), acknowledged that it has considered the factors of R.C. 29 50.11(K) and R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) and the results of any treatment provided or any follow up professional assessments. The trial court noted again the Appellant's refus al to participate in a sex offender program. {¶48} The trial court then described its discretionary authority and concluded that Appellant is eligible to be classified and found that it was ap propriate to classify him a Tier II sex offender, one tier lower than his classification prior t o the initial appeal. {¶49} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and submitted two ass ignments of

error: {¶50} “I. THE JUVENILE COURT VIOLATED C .B.'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT C.B. WAS AT LEAST 14 YEARS OLD AT THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE; THEREFORE, C.B. WAS NOT A GE ELIGIBLE FOR CLASSIFICATION, IN VIOLATION OF FIFTH AND FOURTEEN TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, OHI O CONSTITUTION; AND R.C. 2152.83.” {¶51} “II. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CLASSIFIED C.B. AS A TIER II SEX OFFENDER INSTEAD OF A TIER I SEX OFFENDER UNDE R R.C. 2152.83.

STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶52} Appellant's first assignment of error attacks the sufficiency o f the evidence, so our review for that issue is provided by State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does notAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 15
ask whether the evidence should be believed. “The relevant inqu iry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime prove n beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio St.3d 474, 2018- Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. {¶53} We review the trial court’s decision regarding the second assig nment of error for abuse of discretion. We must examine the entire recor d and determine whether there is sufficient competent and credible evidence to support the judgment rendered by the trial court. Seasons Coal Company v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1978). Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952). The trial court must resolve disputed issues of fact and weigh the testimony an d credibility of the witnesses. Bechtol v. Bechtol , 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 23, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990). We defer to the trial court's discretion because the trial court had the op portunity to observe the witnesses and parties in weighing the credibility of the proffe red testimony in a way a reviewing court cannot. {¶54} The Supreme Court has defined the term abuse of discretion as demonstrating the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbit rary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Further, if the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorab le to sustaining the juvenile court's verdict and judgment. In the Matter of: M.D. & A.D. (D.D., DefendantAppellant), 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 2019-Ohio-3674, ¶¶ 32-33.Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 16 {¶55} We will not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’ ” State v. Ketterer , 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoti ng State v. Dennis , 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997).

ANALYSIS {¶56} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the eviden ce before the Court does not support a conclusion that he was at least fourte en years of age at the time any of the offenses were committed. This argument attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, but we find that this matter has been previously pres ented to the trial court, decided and subject to appeal and thus further consideration is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. {¶57} The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion “holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous a ction, and was *** passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may n ot be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privie s, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different.” Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd. , 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 692 N.E.2d 140 (1998); see also Norwood v. McDonald , 142 Ohio St. 299, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67(1943), paragraph three of the syllabus. Essentially, collateral estoppel prevent s parties from relitigating facts and issues that were fully litigated in a previous case. State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts ., 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 64, 765 N.E.2d 345 (2002). However, in ord er for the doctrine to apply, the issues must have been determined by a final, appeala ble order. State v.Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 17

Williams , 76 Ohio St.3d 290, 294, 667 N.E.2d 932 (1996). Anderson v. Eyman, 180 Ohio App.3d 794, 2009-Ohio-102, 907 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 28 (5th Dist). {¶58} In the case sub judice, the trial court initially classified Ap pellant as a Tier III Juvenile Offender Registrant after concluding that the Appe llant was at least fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offenses. ( Opinion and Judgment Entry, July 28, 2015, Docket # 9, p. 4). Appellant appealed th e decision asserting as part of his third assignment of error that "the trial court erred in classifying him a Juvenile Offender Registrant/Tier III Sex Offender as the record does no t establish he is age eligible for registration." In re C.B., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 15-COA-027, 2016-Ohio-4779, ¶ 82. In that case we noted that "The trial court found C.B. wa s either fifteen or sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offenses." Id . While we remanded the case to the trial court because we held that the trial court mi sunderstood the breadth of its discretion to classify Appellant as a juvenile offender reg istrant, we affirmed the trial court's factual finding that Appellant was fifteen or sixteen w hen the offenses were committed when we held that " [t]herefore, the trial court had discretion as to whether to classify C.B. a JOR subject to registration and the trial court erred in finding classification mandatory." In re C.B ., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 15-COA-027, 2016-Ohio-4779, ¶ 89. If the record had contained insufficient evidence to establish the App ellant was age eligible, we would have concluded that the trial court had no discretion to classify Appellant eligible for classification. {¶59} Appellant’s first assignment of error includes the same age eli gibility issue raised in the third assignment of error in his prior appeal. T he parties are identical, no new facts have been introduced and there has been no intervenin g change in the law.Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 18 The trial court issued a final appealable order regarding this issue, the appellant asserted in his appeal that the record did not support a finding that he was age eligible for classification under R.C. 2152.83 and this court rejected his a ppeal. These facts lead to the inexorable conclusion that this assignment is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. {¶60} Because Appellant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate t he issue of his age in the prior appeal and the hearings preceding that appeal, and because a final appealable order was issued and affirmed, we hold that the firs t assignment of error is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. {¶61} Appellant's second assignment of error purports to assert that the trial court abused its discretion by classifying him as a Tier II Juvenile Offender Registrant, but the argument offered in support focuses upon the rational for R.C. 2152.83 and fails to address how the trial court abused its discretion in the contex t of the statute. {¶62} Much of Appellant's argument is directed toward "the psychologi cal damage and social stigmas that exist when a child is placed on the sex offender registration” and makes reference to a study that is not part of the record in th e underlying case. His argument focuses upon the rational and impact of the statute an d is a legislative and not a judicial matter. The trial court and this court are bound to apply the law as drafted within constitutional boundaries, so we are unable to consider much of Appellant's argument. To the extent that we can consider his assertions regarding the trial court's exercise of discretion, we find appellant's argument unsupported by the rec ord. {¶63} The trial court provided a detailed recitation of the facts, do cuments and law considered, and did not overlook Appellant's positive attribute s, but included those in itsAshland County, Case No. 2019-COA-009 19 analysis. The trial court made express reference to all the ele ments that were considered in its analysis and expressed concern that Appellant steadfastl y refused to comply with its order to complete a sex offender class, holding stubbornly to his declaration of innocence. Appellant's release from confinement was delayed as a result of his behavior and this fact was considered by the Court when it classified hi m as a Tier II offender and not a Tier III offender, which was the initial classification. {¶64} We have reviewed the record and we cannot find support for a co nclusion that the trial court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. The trial court completed a careful analysis of the facts in the record a nd the applicable law and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge

. Berk v. Matthews , 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 559 N.E.2d 1301, 1308 (1990). {¶65} The Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. {¶66} The decision of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Juven ile Division is affirmed. By: Baldwin, J. Gwin, P.J. and Wise, Earle, J. concur.