alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IA

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 147

To designate the month of April 1993 as ‘‘Civil War History Month’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 10, 1993

Mr. SHAW introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate the month of April 1993 as ‘‘Civil War History

Month’’.

Whereas the period of American history known as the ‘‘Civil

War’’ is universally recognized as one of the most significant landmark eras in our Nation’s heritage;

Whereas the continuous growth of the public’s awareness of

and interest in the Civil War period remains an integral

part of America’s cultural heritage;

Whereas the study, preservation, and interpretation of literature and sites associated with this period are

imbedded in the educational and cultural heritage of our

country;
2

•HJ 147 IH

Whereas the beginning of the Civil War occurred in April of

1861 with the firing on Fort Sumter in Charleston,

South Carolina, and the effective ending of the Civil War

occurred in April of 1865 with the surrender of the Army

of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, Virginia, making

April the most important month of the year in Civil War

history; and

Whereas the heritage of the Civil War deserves the attention

and respect of all individuals in the United States: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That April of 1993 is designated as ‘‘Civil War History

4 Month’’, and the President is authorized and requested

5 to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the

6 United States to observe the month with appropriate cere7 monies and activities.

Æ
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.



# United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2009-1016 DEERE & COMPANY,

Appellant,

v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellee, and BOURDEAU BROTHERS, INC., OK ENTERPRISES,

and SUNOVA IMPLEMENT CO.,

Intervenors. On appeal from the United States International Trade Commission

in Investigation No. 337-TA-487.

ON MOTION Before NEWMAN 

### Circuit Judge. ORDER Upon consideration of the appellee's motion for an extension of time to file its brief, and the intervenors' motion for an extension of time to file their brief, IT IS ORDERED THAT: The motions are granted. The briefs are due July 8, 2009. FOR THE COURT 

# MAY 2 9 2009 /s/ Jan Horbalv Jan Horbaly Clerk UFOR THE FINEWS HIT Date
MAY 2 9 2009
ciziaccc: Bassam N. Ibrahim, Esq.

Mark B. Rees, Esq. David P. Miranda, Esq. s8

2009-1016 - 2 -
#### THOMPSON v. STATE.

No. 26365.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 15, 1953.

D. H. Massie, Borger, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

■ The offense is willfully refusing to provide for the support and, maintenance of minor children; the punishment, 30 days and a fine of $250.

Appellant’s former wife testified that they were divorced in 1948; the custody of their four minor children was awarded to her by the decree, and the appellant was thereby ordered to pay the sum of $30 per month for the support and maintenance of said children. She testified that for approximately a year after the divorce the appellant made the required payments, but that he then ceased to make further contributions.

Appellant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted that he sometimes made as much as $5 an hour pursuing his.trade as a welder. He further admitted that he had sent money to his stepfather, with instructions that clothes be bought for the children. Appellant’s testimony concerning, the amount of such contributions was very hazy and uncertain. He further admitted that he had been arrested in the State of Michigan and returned to Texas for trial.

Appellant gave as his reason for ceasing to support his children that his wife had remarried, and he did not like the way she had been spending the money which he had contributed.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the allegation that he “willfully” neglected and refused to support his children.

Appellant’s position at the close of the State’s case might have been tenable, but his testimony showing his ability to pay and his reasons for not doing so, together with the State’s proof, amply warranted the jury in concluding that his action was willful.

Bill of exception No. 1 complains of proof concerning the -child support payments provided for in the-divorce decree. Appellant admits that he knows o'f no authority holding such proof inadmissible. We think that such .was properly admitted as a part of. the State’s case and that no error is reflected by the bill.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

The certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and may not be relied upon or used for any other purposes.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul J. Mooney, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.



|                        |  |  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Dated: November 6, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Paul J. Mooney     
|                        |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an
Exhibit to this

report and should not be considered filed as a part of this report
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. AP -77,016

EX P ARTE MICHAEL BRUCE LAPE, Applicant
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 12-05-05234-C R IN THE 221 DISTRICT COURT ST F ROM MONTG OMERY COUNTY
Per curiam . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Art i cl e 1 1
. 0 7 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967)
. Applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substanc e and se ntence d to twenty -five year s’ imprisonment. Applicant contends that he is actua lly innocent based on labora tory testing that reve aled the substance he possessed was not a controlled substance. The trial court found that t he substance Applicant posses s ed wa s not a controlled substance and conclude d that Applicant is actua lly innocent of the offense. The trial court recommended that relief be gra nted. After a rema

nd to the2

t ri al court, the habea s rec ord now contains the repor t of the labora tory testing from th e T ex as Depa rtment of Public Safety , which re flec ts that no controlled substanc e wa s detec ted. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex parte Elizondo , 947 S.W .2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Relief is g rante d. The judgme nt in Cause No. 12-05-05234- CR in the 221 J udicial District st Court of Montgome ry County is se t a side, and Applicant is r emande d to the custody of the Sheriff of Montgome ry County to answe r the char g es as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any nece ssary

bench w arr ant within 10 day s after the mandate of this Court issues. Copi e s o f this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice-Corr ectional I nstitut ions Division and Parole Division.

Deliver ed: April 24, 2013 Do Not Publish
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 §

 Plaintiff §

§

§

 v. § Case No. 

§

§

 §

 Defendant §

ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE

The Court has considered the Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of 

 .

 

It is ORDERED that:

the application is granted. The Clerk of Court shall deposit the admission fee to the

account of the Non-Appropriated Fund of this Court. It is further ORDERED that, if the

Applicant has not already done so, the Applicant must register as an ECF User within 14

days. See LR 5.1(f) and LCrR 49.2(g).

the application is denied. The Clerk of Court shall return the admission fee to the

Applicant.

 

DATE PRESIDING JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-01184-E Document 24-1 Filed 08/08/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 725
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

BRIAN BROADFIELD, §

BOP Register No. 18618-026, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:22-cv-860-K

§

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a 

recommendation in this case. Objections were filed by Plaintiff. The District Court 

reviewed de novo those portions of the proposed findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation to which objection was made, and reviewed the remaining proposed 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. Finding no error, the Court 

ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States 

Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s Objections are OVERRULED.

SO ORDERED.

Signed May 10th, 2022.

 

ED KINKEADE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-00860-K-BN Document 9 Filed 05/10/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 68
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 1, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DARRYL L. HINTON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DONNA BOWERS, in her personal

capacity; JANET DOWLING, in her

personal capacity,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-6259

(D.C. No. 5:11-CV-00192-R)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

Darryl Hinton, an Oklahoma state inmate, filed this pro se 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action against two prison officials who allegedly violated his

constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Mr. Hinton’s claims because he

failed to exhaust the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’s (ODOC) grievance

*

 After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.

34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This

order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
process as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Mr. Hinton now appeals.

After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that Mr. Hinton

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Although Mr. Hinton filed several

grievances, these were all returned unanswered because of noncompliance with

the ODOC’s grievance rules. Despite being given the opportunity to do so, Mr.

Hinton never appropriately refiled any of these grievances, and this is enough to

bar his claims under the PLRA. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)

(“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural

rules.’”) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). 

Neither can we accept Mr. Hinton’s alternative argument on appeal — that

failure to exhaust administrative grievance procedures is not an affirmative

defense under the PLRA. It’s true that in Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,

355 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2003), we held that failure to exhaust is not an

affirmative defense, but that’s only because we concluded it is an essential

element of the plaintiff’s claim that must be pleaded in the complaint. Even this

is beside the point, though. The Supreme Court has since overturned Steele, and

it’s now quite clear that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense in § 1983

cases, like this one, covered by the PLRA. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216-17.

- 2 -
The district court’s dismissal of Mr. Hinton’s § 1983 claims is affirmed. 

We grant Mr. Hinton’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs

or fees and remind him that he must continue making partial payments until the

entire filing fee is paid in full.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch

Circuit Judge

- 3 -
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

SAYBREE FILLYAW, ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) No. 3:22-CV-1112-N (BH) 

 ) 

COMMUNITY NATIONAL BANK & ) 

 TRUST, et al., ) 

 Defendants. ) Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

 Before the Court is the plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In District Court Without 

Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), received October 26, 2023 (doc. 45), which is liberally 

construed as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

(X) The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal should be DENIED

because the Court should certify under Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(3) that the appeal is not taken in good faith, and that it presents no legal 

points of arguable merit and is therefore frivolous for the reasons set forth in the 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation, filed in this case on August 22, 2023 

(doc. 45). 

If the Court denies the request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, the 

plaintiff may challenge the denial by filing a separate motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis on appeal with the Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit, within thirty days after service of the notice required by Fed. 

R. App. P. 24(a)(4). See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5). 

 SIGNED this 27th day of October, 2023. 

1

By 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Amended Miscellaneous Order No. 6 (adopted by Special Order No. 2-59 on May 5, 

2005), requests to proceed in forma pauperis are automatically referred. 

Case 3:22-cv-01112-N-BH Document 46 Filed 10/27/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 583
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

October 4, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00454

- CV

Billie O. STONE d/b/a Stobil Enterprises, Appellant

v.

K CLARK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC and Trans Ventura, LLC Series B, Appellees

Fr om the 224th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2022CI03480

Honorable H. Paul Canales , Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant seek s to appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment order signed on July 1, 2022. On September 30, 2022, the trial court clerk filed the clerk’s record. After reviewing the record, we cannot determine whether the summary judgment order is a final, appealable

order.

A n order granting summary judgment is not final for purposes of appeal “unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). Here, the trial court’s order does not unequivocally state that it finally disposes of all claims and parties , and it is unclear from the order and the record whether appellees’ request for attorney’s fees remains pending. Appellees requested attorney’s fees in their answer

and in their motion for summary judgment . The trial court’s order states that appellees’ motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety; however, the order does not award attorney’s

fees. See Farm Bureau Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers , 455 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. 2015) (holding trial court’s summary judgment order did not dispose of parties’ requests for attorney’s fees); see also In re Educap, Inc. , No. 01

– 12

– 00546

– CV., 2012 WL 3224110, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (determining tr ial court did not render final judgment when judgment failed to address claim for attorney’s fee, which was expressly asserted in party’s answer and motion for summary judgment).

Accordingly, we sua sponte ABATE this appeal and ORDER the trial court to clarify whether it intended to render a final judgment and, if so, to sign a judgment that is final forpurposes of appeal. See Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 206 (“If the appellate court is uncertain about the intent of the order, it can abate the appeal to permit clarification by the trial court.”)

.

We further ORDER the trial court to cause a supplemental clerk’s record containing any pleadings, orders, and judgment relating to this order to be filed in this court by November 3,

2022

. All other appellate deadlines are suspend ed pending further order of this court.

_______ __________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 4th day of October, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>        5
<LEGEND>
The  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information   extracted  from  the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corporation Consolidated Financial Statements as of June 30,
1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>      1,000

<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                       DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                          APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                            JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                                            0
<SECURITIES>                                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                47,285
<ALLOWANCES>                                                  1,448
<INVENTORY>                                                 286,475
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                            350,935
<PP&E>                                                    1,137,099
<DEPRECIATION>                                              481,373
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                            1,288,764
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                       326,823
<BONDS>                                                     354,399
<COMMON>                                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                             0
<PREFERRED>                                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                                  145,565
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                              1,288,764
<SALES>                                                     255,799
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                            255,799
<CGS>                                                       218,189
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                               253,918
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                            9,231
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                             (7,128)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                (1,678)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                         (5,450)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                   0
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<NET-INCOME>                                                (5,450)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                   0.0
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</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-51062 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus WILLIAM FOURIE, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-97-CR-160-1-SS

-------------------- February 15, 2001 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent William Fourie (“Fourie”) has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Fourie has filed a response. Our independent review of the brief, the response, and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.