1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r:

____

____ ____ ___ 3 Fi lin g D at e: O ct obe r 16, 201 4 4 N O. 32, 905 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v. 8 TREVOR M., 9 Ch il d- App el la nt . 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF LEACO UN TY 11 Gary L. Clingm an, D istrict Jud ge 12 G ar y K
. K ing , A tto rn ey

G en er al 13 Jam es W . G ray son, Assistant Attorney Ge neral 14 San ta Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Law O ffice s of the Public De fender 17 Jorge A. Alvar ado, Chief Public De fender 18 Kim berly Chavez C ook, Assistant Appellate D efender 19 San ta Fe, NM 20 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 BUS TAM AN TE, Judge. 3 { 1} Ch ild

appe al s th e re voc at ionof his pr oba tio n. W e con cl ude that C hil d ha d a 4 statut or

y r igh t t o c onf

ro nt t he w itn es se s a ga ins t hi m that w as vio la te d w he n th e 5 district court perm itted a witness to testify by teleph o n e with out determ ining that 6 te le phon ic te sti m ony w as ne ce ssary to fur the r an im

portant publ ic int er es t. W e al so 7 conclude that the adm issib le evidence w as insufficient to sup port a conclusion that 8 Ch il d wi ll fu ll y

vi ol at edhi s co nd it io ns of p ro ba ti on . W e rev ers e an d re m an d. 9 BACKGRO UND 10 { 2} Child pled g uiltyto residential burglary and was s en t en ced to supervised 11 probation for tw o y ears. Roughlysix m on t h s later, Child adm itted that he vio lated 12 the c ondi tio ns o f pr oba tio n and w as se nte nc ed to one y ea

r co m m itm en t t o th e 13 Children, Y outh and Fam ilies Departm ent, which was suspende d i n favor of a new 14 tw o- y ear te rm

of sup er vis ed pr oba tio n. O ne of

the te rm s of

the pr oba tio n a gr ee m en t 15 signed b y

Child required him

to “ [a] ttend and su ccessfully com plete an [o] ut[-] of[- 16 h] om e [p ] la cem ent. ” Ch ild w as pla ce d w ithN ewV isi ons G ro up H om e in C lov is, 17 New Mex ic o. 18 { 3} Af

ter Ne w Visions staf

f susp ected Child of taking drugs or al co h o l , they 19 de ci de d to dis ch ar ge him fr om the pr ogr am . Whil e Chi ld w as be ing dis ch ar ge d, he2

1 w a l ke d ou t of t he gr ou p ho m e , a nd a w a rr a nt w a s i ss ue d f or hi s a rr e st . Child was 2 arre sted nine day s later. T he State f iled a petition to revoke Child’ s probation based 3 on h is f

ai lur e to c om

ple te the out -o f- hom e pla ce m ent. A n a dj udi cator y he ar ing on 4 the petition wa s held before a special m aster. T he Stat e p re s ented testim ony of a 5 so ci al work er at New Vis io ns Grou p Ho m e an d t he juv en il e pr ob at io n o ffi cer (J PO) 6 as s i g n ed t o Ch i l d ’s c a s e . Th e s o ci al wo rk ert es t i fi ed b y t el ep h o n e o v erCh i l d ’s 7 ob jecti on . 8 { 4} T he spe ci al m as te r fo und that C hil d ha d w ill fu lly viola te d the pr oba tio n 9 ag re em en t by

f ai lin g to suc ce ssf

ull y c om ple te the out -o f- hom e pla ce m en t, a nd the 10 dis tr ic t c ourt ad op te d th e spe ci al m as te r’ s f ind ing s and r ev oke d C hil d’ s pr oba tio n. 11 Child’s e xceptions to the special m aster’ s report w ere denied. A dditi onal facts ar e 12 pr ov id edas n eces sa ry to ou r di sc us si on . 13 DISC US SION 14 { 5} Ch ild

m ak es f our a rg um en ts fo r re ve rs al of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r

uli ng and/ or

f or 15 a ne w he ar ing
. Fi rs t, Ch ild m ai nta ins that hi s r igh t t o c onf ro nt w itn es se s a ga ins t hi m 16 was vi ol at edwhen th e so ci al wor ke r te st ifi ed by tel ep ho ne . See U
. S. Co nst . a m en ds. 17 V I, X IV
. S ec ond, he c ont en ds tha t the St ate f ai le d to de m onstrate that he w ill fu lly 18 vio la te d hi s pr oba tio n c ondi tio ns. T hir d, he a rg ue s th at the dis tr ic t cou rt erred in 19 adm itting hearsay

testim ony

by both o f the State ’ s witnesses. Finally , C hild argues3

1 that the hearing was f

aulty because he did not consent to the appointm ent of a special 2 m as te r as r equir ed

by the Ch ildre n’ s Co de
. W e co nc lud e that C hil d’ s c onf ro ntatio n 3 rights were violated and that th ere wa s insu fficient evidence supporting the special 4 m as t er ’s d et er m i n at i o n t h at Ch i l dwi l l fu l l y v i o l at ed h i s p r o b a t i o n co n d i t i o n s . We 5 ad dr es s C hil d’ s e vid en tiary a rg um en ts in our

dis cu ssi on o f the suf

fi ci en cy of the 6 ev i d en ce . B e c a u s e i twa s n o tp re s er v ed fo r ap p ea l , we d o n o tco n s i d erCh i l d ’s 7 argum ent as to the appoin tm ent of a special m aster. W e re verse and rem and for a new 8 he ari ng . 9 { 6} “ Th e . . . i s s u e o f w h et h erth e a d m i s s i o n o f e v i d en ce v i o l at es an ac cu s ed ’s 10 ri ght s un de r the [ Si xthA m en dm en t] is a que sti on of laww hic h is r ev ie w ed

de nov o 11 on appeal.” In re D arc y S. , 19 97 -NMCA- 02 6, ¶ 13, 123 N
. M. 206 , 936 P
. 2d 8 88. 12 Ch ild a rg ue s th at

( 1) the S ixth Am en dm en t’ s guar an te e of the r igh t t o c onf

ro ntatio n 13 ap pli es to j uve nil e pr oba tio n re voc at ion he ar ing s; (2 ) he is en tit le d to due pr oc es s of 14 law—i nc lud ing co nf

ro ntatio n of w itn es se s—b y the F ourte en th A m en dm en t; an d ( 3) 15 regardless of whether the Sixth Am endm ent applies here as a m atter of c onsti tutio nal 16 law , the L eg isl at

ur e ha s guarante ed the r igh t t o c onf ro ntatio n th ro ugh N MS A 197 8, 17 Sect io n 3 2A- 2- 24 (B) (2 00 9)
. See U. S. Const. am ends. VI , X IV
. Beca use we agree 18 wit h t he lat te r arg um en t, we n eedno t ad dr es s t he fir st two .4

1 { 7} It

is w el l e sta

bli she d th at

j uve nil es have th e sa m e ri ght s a t tri al a s a dul ts, 2 in cl ud in g t he “ rig ht t o n o t i ce o f ch arg es , to co un se l, to c onf rontati on a nd to c ros s3 examination of witn esses , and to th e privilege against self-incrim ination [. ] ” State v. 4 Rud y B. , 2010 -N MS C- 045, ¶ 55, 149 N
. M. 22, 243 P
. 3d 7 26 ( em pha sis a dde d) ( ci tin g 5 In re G aul t , 387 U
. S. 1, 33- 34, 41, 55- 56 ( 1967 )) ; see NMSA 1 97 8, § 32 A-2 -1 4( A) 6 (2 009) ( “ A c hil d su

bj ec t t o th e pr ovi sio ns o f the D el inque nc y A ct is en tit le d to the 7 sam e basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise providedin the Children’ s Code, 8 includi ng rights provided by the De linqu ency Ac t[.] ”); § 32A-2-1 (20 07) (stating that 9 “ Chapter 32A, Ar

ticle 2 NMS A 197 8 m ay be cited as t he ‘ De linqu ency Ac t.’ ”); F orm 10 10- 424 N MR

A ( “ A dvi ce of

r igh ts b y j udge ” fo rm lis tin g the ri ght s ac hil d gi ve s up 11 by entering a plea or consent decr ee, includi ng “ the right to confront t h e witnesses 12 ag ai nst

the c hil d and t o c ro ss- ex am ine the m ”)
. U nli ke ad ult pr oba tio n r ev oc at ion s, 13 w hich are de ci de dly

dif fe re nt f ro m tr ia ls, “ [a ] n a lle ga tio n of aj uve nil e pr oba tio n 14 violatio n is treated as if it we re a charge brou ght in a d elinquency proceeding.” Sta te 15 v. Erick

son K. , 200 2- N MC A -0 58, ¶ 15, 132 N
. M. 25 8, 46 P.3d 12 58; see State v. 16 G uth rie , 2011 -N MS C- 014, ¶ 10, 150 N
. M. 84, 257 P
. 3d 9 04 ( dis cu ssi ng a dul t 17 pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionhe ar ing s and sta tin g that “ [b ] ec au se los s of pro ba tio n is lo ss o f 18 onlyconditio nal liberty , ‘ the full panop ly of rights due a d ef

en dant in a [crim inal 19 tr ia l] do [ ] not

appl y ’ ” ( quot ing Morrissey v. Bre wer , 408 U. S. 471, 480 (197 2)).5

1 T his appr oa chto pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionhe ar ing s is r eflect ed in the Ch ildre n’ s C ode 2 and Children’ s Court rules. F or instance, S ectio n 32A-2-24(B) provides that 3 “ p r o c e e d i n g s t o r e v o k e p r o b a t i o n s h a l l b e g o v e rn e d b y t h e p r o c e du r e s , r i g h ts a nd 4 du ti es a

ppl ic ab le to pr oc ee din gs o n ade lin que nc y pe tit ion
. ” S im ilarl y , Ru le 10- 5 261(C) NM RA provides that “ [p] roceedings to revoke probation s hall be conducted 6 in the sam e m an ne r as pr oc ee din gs o n pe tit ion s a lle gi ng d el inque nc y . T he c hil d 7 w hose pr oba tio n is sou ght to be r ev oke d sh al l be e nti tle d to a ll ri ght s th at ac hil d 8 al le ge d to be de lin que nt i s en tit le d to unde r lawa nd the se r ule s[
. ] ” T he e ff

ec t of thi s 9 languag e is plain : s inc e j uve nil es have the r igh t t o c onf ro nt w itn es se s duri ng 10 de lin que nc y

pr oc ee din gs, th ey

m ust be a cc or de d th at

r igh t i n pr oba tio n r ev oc at ion 11 he ari ng s. 12 { 8} The S tate concedes that “ [b] y virtue of the [fa ct that] Sec tion 3 2A-2-24[(B)] 13 [provides] that a j uvenile has th e sam e rights at a probation revocation hearing as an 14 adj udication of delinquency , C hild u ndou btedly had a statutory

right to f ace- to-face 15 co nf ro ntatio n a t the he ar ing
. ” T he S ta te m ai nta ins , how ev er , that this Co urt sh oul d 16 not address Child ’ s statuto ry argum ent because Child failed to preserve it. In 17 response to th e State ’ s m otion for per m issio n for its w itness to testify by telephone, 18 Ch ild f ile d aw ri tte n ob

j ec tio n c iti ng his ri ght

to co nf ro nt w itn es se s un de r the S ixth 19 A m en dm en t. T he obj ec tio n di d no t m en tio n the Ch ildre n’ s C ode or S ec tio n 32 A -2
-6

1 24( B)
. The di st rict c ourt gr an te d th e St at e’ s m oti on w ith out ahe ar ing
. A t the 2 pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionhe ar ing be fo re the spe ci al m as te r, Ch ild ob je ct ed a ga in o n 3 co nf ro ntatio n gr ound s bu t di d no t sp ec if y the ba sis fo r the ri ght as se rt ed
. T he S ta te 4 argues that because Child did no t ci t e Se ct ion 32 A- 2-24(B), his objection was 5 ins uf fi ci en t t o a le rt

the dis tr ic t cour

t or spe ci al m as te r to the a rg um en t tha t hi s r igh t 6 to co nf ro nt at io n d eri ve s fr om

st atut e. See Sta te v . V

are la , 199 9- NMSC -0 45, ¶ 25, 7 128 N.M. 454, 993 P. 2d 1280 ( “ In order to pre serve an error for appeal, it is essential 8 that the gr ound

or gr ound s of

the obj ec tio n or

m oti on b e m ad e w ithsuf fi ci en t 9 specificity

to alert the m ind of the trial cou rt to the claim ed error or err ors, and that 10 a ruling thereon then be inv oked.” (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted)). 11 W e disagree. 12 { 9} Here, i nh eren t i n C hi ld ’s in vo cat io n o f t h e Si xt h Am en dm en t wer e two 13 que sti ons: ( 1) w he the r Ch ild ha d a r igh t t o S ixth A m en dm en t- lik e co nf ro ntatio n in 14 a pr oba tio n r ev oc at ionhe ar ing , a nd ( 2) w he the r the r igh t w oul d be vio la te d by 15 te le phon ic te sti m ony . I n our vie w , it w as thu s no t ne ce ssary to re fe r spe ci fi ca lly

to 16 the statut e to r ai se the f ir st que sti on b ec au se , a lthou gh in th is c ont ex t the spe ci fi c 17 so u rc e of the right is statutory , the nature and scope of the right is the sam e as that 18 un de r th e Si xt h Am en dm en t.7

1 { 10} T he S ta te c ite s St at e v. Ja so n F. , 199 8- N MS C- 010, ¶ ¶ 8- 9, 125 N
. M. 111 , 957 2 P. 2d 11 45 for the proposi ti o n t h at “ [w ] hen a statute or rule provides greater 3 pr ote ct ionthan th e co nst itu tio n, a n a ppel la nt d oe s no t f

ai rl y inv oke ar

uli ng o n th e 4 greater protection byexclus i v el y arguing a constit ution al violation .” Ja so n F. is 5 ina ppos ite
. I n th at

c as e, the c hil d ob

j ec te d to appoi nt m en t of a spe ci al m as te r on 6 co ns ti tu ti on al gro un ds
. Id

. ¶ 8. On appeal, h e argued that appoin tm ent of the special 7 m as te r w as e rr or

be ca use the appoi ntm en t di d no t c om ply w iththe r

ule gov er nin g 8 su ch m at te rs . Id

. ¶ 7. T he Co urt he ld tha t “ [the c hil d] did not inv oke ar

uli ng o n th e 9 ap pl ic at io n o f [t he rul e]” a n d t he refo re t he is su e was no t p res erv ed
. Id

. ¶ 9. T he 10 di stingu ish ing f

eatur e be tw ee n Ja so n F. and the present case is that the ch i l d ’s 11 co nst itu tio na l ob

j ec tio n a t tri al w as e nti re ly unr el at ed to his r ule -b as ed a rg um en t on 12 ap pe al
. I n c ontra st, he re , the rig ht pr ov id ed by S ec tio n 32 A -2 -2 4( B) is the r igh t 13 guar a nt e e d by

the S i xth A m e ndm e nt

a nd , c on se qu e nt l y , t he a na l y si s of a n a lleged 14 vio la tio n of

the r igh t is the sa m e w he the r Ch ild inv oke d th e Si xthA m en dm en t a lon e 15 or Sect io n 32 A-2 -2 4( B). Cf

. Sta te v . G uth rie , 2009-NMC A- 036, ¶¶ 10, 13, 145 N. M. 16 761, 204 P. 3d 1271 ( re co gni zi ng tha t the c onf ro ntatio n r igh ts g uarante ed und er the 17 Sixth Am endm ent and Fourteenth Am endm ents differ, distin g u i s h i ng between an 18 objec tion b ased on the co n frontation clause and one based on a “ m ore genera l 19 constitu tional argum ent regarding confrontation,” and holdi ng t hat the latter w as8

1 su ffi ci en t t o p res erv e a due pro ces s ch al le ng e fo r ap pe al ), re v’d on oth er gro unds , 2 2011 -N MS C- 014. W e co nc lud e that the dis tri ct co urt w as suf fi ci en tly appr ise d of 3 Ch il d’s ar gu m en t. 4 { 11} Hav in g c on cl ud edth at Ch il d was ent it le d to co nf ro nt th e St at e’s wit ne ss es , we 5 tur n no wto w heth er

that r igh t w as vio la te d w he n th e soc ia l w orke r te sti fi ed by 6 te le phon e. “ [T ] he [ c] onf ro ntatio n [ c] lause [ of

the S ixth A m en dm en t] guarante es the 7 de fen da nt a face -to -fac e m eet in g wi th wit ne ss es ap pe ari ng be fo re t he tri er of fac t.” 8 M ary lan d v

. Craig , 497 U
. S. 836, 844 (1 990) (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks and c itatio ns 9 om itt ed ). T he r igh t i s no t a bsol ute a nd d ev ia tio n f

ro m li ve , f ac e- to- fa ce te sti m ony 10 m ay be pe rm itt ed

w he n an “ ex ce pti on i s ne ces sa ry to furthe r anim

portant p ubl ic 11 policy .” Sta te v . Sc hw art z , 20 14 -NMCA- 06 6, ¶ 6, 3 27 P.3d 11 08 , cert. denied , 201 4- 12 N MC E RT -0 06, 328 P
. 3d 1 188 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). A ny 13 exception m

ust be supp orted by “ a p articularize d showing o f nece ssity[by the district 14 court] .” Sta te v . Sm ith , 20 13 -N M C A
- 0 8 1 , ¶ 8, 3 08 P.3d 13 5, cert. denied , 201 3- 15 N MC E RT -0 06, 304 P
. 3d 4 25. “ Whe re the re a re r equir em en ts o f im portant p ubl ic 16 pol ic y an d show ing of ne ce ssi ty , m er e inc onve nie nc e to the w itn es s is not suf fi ci en t 17 to disp ense with fa ce-to-f ace c onfrontation .” Sta te v . A lm anza , 200 7- N MC A -0 73, 18 ¶ 1 2, 1 41 N.M. 75 1, 1 60 P.3d 93 2.9

1 { 12} H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt did not m ak e an y fi ndi ngs on the ne ce ssi ty of te le phon ic 2 testim ony . Moreover, the State’ s m otion stated onlythat telephoni c testim ony wa s 3 “ in the be st i nte re st of jud ic ial e co nom y . ” T he S ta te a dvi se d th e co urt a t the 4 proba tio n r ev oc at ionhe ar ing that, if the m oti on w as not

gr an te d, it

w oul d ne ed

a 5 co nti nua tio n to a la te r da te in ord er to h av e the soc ia l w orke r pr es en t. T his pos iti on 6 im pli es that the w itn es s c oul d be pr es en t bu t jus t no t onthe day of the he ar ing a nd 7 am ount s to “ m ere inconv enience. ” Id

. T he re be ing no p ar

tic ulari ze d f

ind ing s of 8 necessity

and the State’ s justification being ins ufficient, we conclude that the social 9 wor ke r’s te st im on y

by te le ph on e vi ol at ed Ch il d’s rig ht to co nf ro nt th e wit ne ss . See 10 id. (h old ing that “ the [ w itn es s’ s] bus y sc he dul e an d th e inc onve nie nc e that w oul d be 11 ca use d by ei the r re qui ri ng his t es tim ony or pos tpo nin g th e tr ia l un til he w as able to 12 te sti fy a re j ust the sor t of c onsi de rations th at do not sa tis fy the e xc ep tio ns t o th e 13 [c]on fro nt at io n [c ]lau se .”). 14 { 13} “ A violation [of the right to confrontation] alone, however, does not require a 15 ne wtr ia l. Rathe r, onl y w he n a vio la tio n of the c onf ro ntatio n c lause is harm fu l t o th e 16 defendant does the violation require a newtrial. ” Sc hw art z , 201 4- N MC A -0 66, ¶

15. 17 T he bur de n is on the state to de m onstrate that adm iss ionof the te le phon ic te sti m ony 18 was ha rm le ss . Id

. H er e, the St at e’s onl y

a rg um en ts r el at ed

to the c onf

ro ntatio n 19 clause a r e t hat i t do e s no t app l y i n j uv e ni l e pr ob a t i on r e vo c a t i on he a r i ng s a nd that10

1 Ch ild f ai le d to pr es er

ve the iss ue pro pe rly. T he S ta te did not a ddr es s w he the r an y 2 vi ol at io n was ha rm le ss an d t he refo re fai le d t o m eetit s b ur de n. 3 { 14} W e next address Chi l d ’ s contentio n that there w as insufficient evidence that 4 he w ill fu lly

vio la te d th e co nd it ions of his pr oba tio n. Mo re spe ci fi ca lly , Ch ild 5 m aintains that th e State failed to prove that it was C hild’s w illful behavio r that caused 6 hi m t o b e di sc ha rg edfro m

New Vis io ns Grou p Ho m e. See In re Br un o R. , 200 3- 7 NMC A- 057, ¶ 11, 133 N. M. 566 , 66 P. 3d 33 9 (“ To establish a violation of a 8 pr oba tio n a gr ee m en t, the obl igatio n is on the [ s] ta te to pr ove w ill fu l c ondu ct on the 9 part of the pr oba tio ne r so as to s at isf y the appl ic ab le bur de n of

pr oof
. ”)
. “ T he te st f

or 10 suf fi ci en cy of the e vid ence is w he the r subs tanti al e vid en ce of e ith er adir ec t or 11 ci rc um stanti al na tur e ex ist s to sup port a ve rd ic t of

gui lt be y ond a re as onabl e doub t 12 with respect to ever

y elem ent essential to a convictio n.” Sta te v. D uran , 200 6- 13 N MS C- 035, ¶

5, 140 N
. M. 94, 140 P
. 3d 5 15 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itat ion 1 4 o m i t t ed ). We ex amin e t h e e v i d en ce i n t h e l i g h t m o s t fa v o rab l e t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 15 ru li ng . See id. In ou r an al y si s, we fo cu s o nl y on ad m is si bl e ev id en ce. See E ric ks on 16 K. , 200 2- N MC A -0 58, ¶ 22. 17 { 15} Beca

use we have alrea dy

determ ined that the social worker’ s test i m o n y wa s 18 im pr ope rl y a dm itt ed , w e co nsi de r onl y the JP O ’ s te sti m ony . C hil d arg ue s th at the 19 JPO’ s testim ony

“ consist ed largely

of inadm issib le hearsay , which shou ld have been11

1 excluded.” See Ru le s 11 -8 01, - 802 N MR A ; Erick son K. , 200 2- NMCA-0 58 , ¶ 20 2 (h old ing that the r

ule s of e vid en ce appl y

in the a dj udi cator

y ph as e of

j uve nil e 3 pro b at i o n re v o cation hearings). H e points to the JPO’ s testim ony that she is based 4 i n Ho b b s wh i l e New Vi s i o n s Gr o up Ho m e is i n Cl o v i s , a n dm ai n t ai n s t h at t h e J PO ’s 5 testim ony

about Child ’ s conduct anddischarge wa s based on what Ne w V ision s staff 6 tol d he r. F or

ins tanc e, the JP O te sti fi ed that 7 [her] understandin g [] is that t h e i n ci dent occurred w hile they we re 8 try ing to take him to school , he got off the van, they found him

a short 9 tim e later

under the influence. At that tim e was when th ey had inform ed 10 m e abo ut t hat , a nd t hat t he y w e r e go i ng t o di sc har ge hi m . A nd I had 11 as ke d him , I’ m lik e, w el l, if he ’ s unde r the inf lue nc e of Sp ic e, can y ou 12 please obtain that UA for m e. And shortly after that is when they called 13 m e ag ai n st at ing that he le ft the pr em ise s. 14 { 16} The State argues that this ar gum ent was not preser ved for re view. W e disagree. 15 Ch ild m ove d f or adir ec te d ve rd ic t at the co nc lus ionof e vid en ce . I n hi s m oti on, he 16 ar gue d th at

the JP O ’ s te sti m ony

w as both nons pe ci fi c an d “ se co ndhand. ” H e state d, 17 “ [T he J PO ] w as n o t supervisin g [Child] , so w hat she presented to y ou in large part 18 wa s . . . what h ad been relay ed to her from people in Clovis .” T hese statem ents are 19 sufficient to alert the district court of the basis of the objection and preserve a hearsay 20 ob jecti on forap pe al
. See Sta te v. J ohns on , 1995 -N MC A -1 27, ¶ 6, 121 N
. M. 77, 908 21 P. 2d 7 70 (ho ldi ng tha t eve n though the de fe ndant d id n ot m en tio n th e spe ci fi c ri ght 22 at iss ue , the “ [d ef

en dants ] a rg um en ts . . . w er e ade qua te to a le rt the tr ia l c ourt t o th e12

1 ba si s for [th e d]efen da nt ’s pro ffer ”), re v’d on oth er gro unds , 199 7- N MS C- 036, 123 2 N.M. 64 0, 9 44 P.2d 86 9. 3 { 17} Inw ha t w e unde rs tand to be a re que st tha t we ap ply the “ ri ght fo r an y r ea son” 4 pr inc ipl e, the S ta te a lso a rg ue s th at it “ lik el y w oul d have so ught to a dm it the 5 state m en ts unde r the bus ine ss r ec or ds e xc ep tio n to the he ar say r ule ” ha d C hil d 6 ob jecte d d ur in g t he tes ti m on y . Se e Sc ott v. M urph y Co rp. , 196 8- N MS C- 185, ¶ 10, 7 79 N
. M. 697 , 448 P
. 2d 8 03 ( “ It is hor nboo k lawthat the de ci sio n of a tr ia l c ourt w ill 8 be upheld if it is right for any reason.” ); Rule 11-803 (6) NMR A. W e note, however , 9 that the S ta te did

not se ek to adm it an y

doc um en ts tha t w oul d f

it w ith in the bus ine ss 10 reco rd s ex cep ti on . See Erick son K. , 200 2- N MC A -0 58, ¶ 22 ( “ [T ] he [ s] ta te m ad e no 11 attem pt to present do cum entation th at m ight h ave been adm issib le under a re cognized 12 he ar say

e xc ep tio n. ”)
. N or

doe s it pr ovi de on a

ppe al a ny f ound at ionf

or a dm iss ionof 13 an y ev id en ce as a b us in es s re co rd
. See Ru le 11- 803( 6) ; Sta te e x re l. E le c. Sup

plyCo

. 14 v. Kitchens Const r ., Inc. , 198 8- N MS C- 013, ¶ ¶ 10- 11, 106 N
. M. 753 , 750 P
. 2d 1 14 15 (d isc uss ing the f

ound at ion al r equir em en ts f or bus ine ss r ec or ds)
. F urthe r, the S ta te 16 doe s no t e xpl ai n how th e JP O ’ s st at em en ts w oul d have be ena dm iss ibl e unde r the 17 b u s i n e s s reco rdex cep ti on . This arg um en t i s t he refo re u na va il in g. Cf

. G ra c i a v. 18 Bittner , 199 5- N MC A -0 64, ¶ 1, 120 N
. M. 191, 900 P. 2d 3 51 ( “ E ve ry li tig at ed c as e is 19 tr ie d a t l ea st thr ee ti m es : the re is the tr ia l the a tto rn ey s in te nde d to c ondu ct ; the re is13

1 the tr ia l the a tto rn ey s ac tua lly c ondu ct ed ; and the re is the tr ia l tha t, a ft er the ve rd ic t, 2 th e at to rn ey s wi sh edth ey ha d c on du ct ed .”). 3 { 18} A ft er

ar ev ie w of the te sti m ony , w e ag re e w ithCh ild that the JP O ’ s te sti m ony 4 as to the ev en ts i n C lov is w as im pr ope rl y a dm itt ed be ca use it w as ba se d onw ha t sh e 5 ha d b een to ldb y o th ers . See E rickson K. , 2002-NMC A- 058, ¶ 22 (concluding that 6 the te sti m ony

of aj uve nil e pr oba tio n of

fi ce r w as ins uf

fi ci en t t o pr ove that a

j uve nil e 7 de fe ndant f

ai le d to c om

ple te a n ou t- of

-h om e pla ce m en t w he re the of f i ce r did not have 8 fi rs thand kn owl ed ge that the de fe ndant h ad be endis ch ar ge d and why , a nd “ [t ] he 9 [s ] ta te did

not pr es en t the te sti m ony

of a [g ro up hom e] sta ff m em be r w ho m igh t have 10 ha d f ir sth an d kn ow le dge of [th e d] ef en dant’ s si tuatio n” ). T hus, sin ce a ll of the 11 te sti m ony

pr es en te d by

the JP O a nd the soc ia l w orke r on C hil d’ s c ondu ct be fo re he 12 was di sc ha rg edfro m New Vis io ns Grou p Ho m e was im pr o pe rly adm it te d, we 13 co nc lud e that the e vid en ce w as ins uf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t a f ind ing that C hil d’ s di sc harg e 14 was th e res ul t o f wil lfu l co nd uc t. Se e id. 15 { 19} N ev er

the le ss, w e re m an d f

or ane whe ar in g. “ Whil e it is tru e that the S ta te 16 fa ile d to pr es en t suf

fi ci en t adm iss ibl e ev ide nc e to s uppo rt the r ev oc at ionof

[ Ch ild ’ s] 17 pr oba tio n, w e m

ust co nsi de r al l of the ev ide nc e pr es en te d, inc lud ing the w ro ngf ull y 18 adm itted e vidence, to dete rm ine whether to r em and for a new hearing.” Id

. ¶ 25; see 19 Sta te v . P ost , 198 9- N MC A -0 90, ¶ 22, 109 N
. M. 177 , 783 P
. 2d 4 87 (“ If al l of the14

1 evidence, includi ng the wr ongfull y adm itted e vidence, is suff icient, t h en re trial 2 following appeal is not barre d.”)
. He re, t h e so cial w orker testified that Child had 3 “ absconded” from

school and was not com pliant with the group hom e’ s rules 4 pr ohi bit ing sub stanc e ab use . T his e vid en ce sup ports a de te rm inatio n th at

Ch ild 5 willfully

violated his conditi ons of probation
. W e note that Child argues that there 6 wa s inadequate f

ound ation f

or the social worker ’ s opin ion testim ony that Child was 7 un de r th e in flu en ce o f “ so m et hi ng ” whe n h e ret urne d t o t he gro up ho m e. See Ru le 8 11-701 NMR

A. W e need not address this con tention , how ever, because, even if that 9 te sti m ony

w as im pr ope rl y a dm itt ed , w e sti ll co nsi der it in o ur a na ly sis of

the 10 ap pr op ria te ne ss of r em an d fo r a n ew he ari ng . 11 { 20} Fi na lly , w e do n ot a ddr es s C hil d’ s arg um en t tha t r ev oc at ionof his pr oba tio n 12 shou ld b e reversed because he did not consent to app ointm ent of a special m aster. 13 See Ru le 10 -1 63 (C) NM RA (“ [T]he sp eci al m as te r sh al l n o t p r e s i d e a t a[n ]
. . . 14 adj udicatory

hearing or dispo sition al hearing without concurrence of the parties.”)
. 15 Child did not ob

j ect to the appointm ent of the special m aster when the district court 16 or de re d th e he ar ing be fo re aspe ci al m as te r, nor at an y ti m e bef or e or dur ing the 17 he ar ing
. Chil d’ s fa ilure to obj ec t and pa rt ic ipatio n in the he ar ing w ith out obj ec tio n 18 is ak in to a waiv er o f an y ob jecti on to th e ap po in tm en t. See Ja so n F. , 1998-NMS C19 010, ¶ 10 (stating that th e child’ s failure to obje ct to appoin tm ent of a special m aster15

1 ba se d onnon -c om

pli an ce w iththe ru le w as aw ai ve r of the obj ec tio n)
. I n a ddi tio n, 2 Ch ild obj ec te d to the sp ecial m as te r onl y a ft er the he ar ing w as c om

ple te d and the 3 spe ci al m as te r’ s r ep or

t f ile d. T his unt im el y

obj ec tio n w as insuf

fic ient to p re se rv e 4 Ch il d’s ar gu m en t. 5 CON CLU SION 6 { 21} Ch ild ’ s rig ht to conf ro nt the w itn es se s aga ins t him w as vio la te d whe n on e of 7 the witnesses testified by telephone without th e district court’ s det er m ination that 8 telephoni c testim ony

wa s necessary

to further an i m

portant pub lic interest. In 9 ad dit ion , the a dm iss ibl e ev ide nc e w as ins uf fi ci en t to prove the re qui re d ele m en ts o f 10 a pr oba tio n vi olatio n. W e the re fo re r ev er se the r ev oc at ionof Ch ild ’ s pr oba tio n. B ut 11 be ca use the en tir ety

of the e vid en ce sup ports a

c onc lus ionthat C hil d vi olate d hi s 12 co nd it io ns of p ro ba ti on , we rem an d fo r a n ew he ari ng . 13 { 22} Fi na lly , both part ie s a gr ee that the j udgm en t and d isp osi tio n e rron eo usl y 14 inc lud ed

ac ount that w as dis m iss ed

pur suant t o th e ple a ag re em en t. O n r em an d, the 15 di st ric t co ur t s ho ul d c orrect th e jud gm en t t o re fle ctth e p le a ag reem en t. 16 { 23} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

17 18 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e16

1 WE CO NCUR:
2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 3 M IC HA EL E. V IG IL , Ju dg e
4 M. MON ICAZ AM ORA , Jud ge (spec ially concu rring).17

1 Z A M OR

A , Ju dg e (s pe ci all y c on cu rr in g)
. 2 { 24} I concur in Judge Bustam ante’ s opin ion as it pertains to Chi ld’s fi rs t three 3 ar gum en ts. I und er stand tha t Ja so n F. , 1 99 8- N MS C- 010, ¶ 10 i s c ontro lli ng a s it 4 applies to Chil d’ s fo u rt h ar g u m en t that he did no t consent to th e appointm ent of a 5 sp eci al m as te r to pre si de ov er h is pro ba ti on rev oc at io n h eari ng . See Tr uji llo v . Ci ty 6 of A lbu que rque , 1998 -N MS C- 031, ¶ 33, 125 N
. M. 721, 965 P. 2d 305 (“ St ar e de ci sis 7 is the judicial obligation to follow prece dent, and it lies at t he very core of the j udicial 8 pr oc es s of

int er pr et ing a nd announc ing law . ”)
. T his sp eci al c onc ur re nc e is f or the 9 purpos es of re questin g that the Suprem e Court i n vite the Children’ s Court Rules 10 Com m ittee to m odify

Children’ s Court Rule 10-163(C) to clarify who has the burden 11 of requesting and showing that there wa s concurrence of the parties allowing a special 12 m aster to preside over the proceedings. Rule 10-111(C) NM RA (1995) as it applied 13 in Ja so n F. a nd i ts r ec om pi la ti on as Ru le 10- 163( C) a re ide nti ca l. My c onc er n, in 14 both Ja so n F. an d th is c as e, li es w iththe Ch ild ’ s f ai lur e to e ith er

pr es er ve the iss ue 15 for appeal or to tim ely objec t to the appo i n t m en t . The question raised is whether a 16 Child ’ s r igh t t o tr ia l by aj udge c anbe so c as ua lly w ai ve d, w he re the int en t of 1 7 ap p o i n t i n g a s p ec i al m as t erwa s fo r p u rp o s es o f e x p ed i t i o u s h an d l i n g o f c h i l d re n ’s 18 co ur t ca se s an d was m ean t t o b e th e ex cep ti on rat he r th an th e ru le
. 19 20 M . M ON IC A Z A M OR A , Ju dg e18