Filed 5/30/13 In re V.O. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re V.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B243585

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
ALEX M.,
Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LASC NO. CK93153)

APPEAL from an order of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Donna Levin, Judge. Affirmed.

William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Tracey F. Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, for De fendant and Respondent.

_____________ _____________2 Alex M. (father) appeals from the orde r adjudicating his son, V.O., a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code s ection section 300, subd ivisions (a) and (b). 1 Father contends the true finding on the su bdivision (a), nonaccidental harm, allegation, was not supported by substantial evidence. He does not challenge the true finding on the identical subdivision (b), failure to su pervise, allegation. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND
V.O. was born in Septembe r 2007. Mother and father were not married and father
had little to do with V.O. until August 2011, when he invited mother to live with him in the paternal grandparents’ home. Mother and V.O. moved out in January 2012. One month later, father referred mother to the De partment of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for general neglect; speci fically, mother’s failure to obtain necessary dental work for V.O. Mother explained to a social worker that she wa s in the process of obtaining Medi-Cal coverage for V.O. because she coul d not afford the $600 it would cost to have
V.O.’s 11 cavities filled. Moth er also told the social wo rker that she moved out of father’s home because of his increasing ab usiveness towards her and V.O., including one
incident in which father tried to choke moth er while V.O. was asleep in the room; and a
second incident in which father ripped V.O.’s shirt, spat on mother and pulled her hair.
V.O. told the social worker th at father yelled at him and mother, and he saw father spit at mother; he never saw father hit mother, but fa ther had hit him. Father admitted arguing with mother, but told the social worker that the arguments never got out of control. Father said he was in the proce ss of seeking custody of V.O. On March 9, 2012, mother obtained a temporary restra ining order against father from the family law court. On April 4, mother told the social worker that her request for a permanent restraining order had been deni ed, but the family la w court ordered no visitation for father until after a custody hear ing scheduled for Apr il 27. When father went to maternal grandmother’s home afte r the April 4 hearing and demanded to see

1 All future undesignated statutory refe rences are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 V.O., mother called the police. Father acknowle dged to the social wo rker that the issue of visitation was to be adjudicated at a late r hearing, but claimed mother had invited him to the house to see V.O. after the hearing. The social worker tr ied to obtain domestic
violence services for mother and V.O., but was told by a ca seworker that they did not qualify because the police report lacked suffi cient evidence of domestic violence. On April 14, mother took V.O. to the museum for a visit with father. The visit went well and mother agreed to take V.O. to the park for another visit the next day. At the park, a verbal argument over custody of V.O. escalated into a physical altercation. According to the police report of the incident, father said th at when mother refused his request to extend the visit, fa ther picked up V.O. and bega n to carry him away. Mother grabbed V.O. and struggled w ith father over the child. During the struggle, mother slapped father. When a bystander approached and asked if they were alright, mother told him to call the police, which he did. Mother told a responding polic e officer that father
had hit her in the stomach with a closed fist. Although moth er and father each denied hitting the other, the report stated fa ther was the primary aggressor. After receiving the police report on April 18, the social worker interviewed V.O., who said: “I went to the pa rk with my mom and dad. We were happy but then my dad punched my mom in the stomach, and my mom st arted to cry a lot and got sick.” V.O. was detained that day and placed in foster ca re. At the DCFS office later that day, a social worker explained to mother that V.O. was detained because, by taking him to the park, mother exposed him to another incide nce of domestic violence, thus endangering
him. While the social work ers were meeting with mothe r, father entered and started yelling at the social workers. When he refu sed to leave, security had to be called to escort father out of the room. During a meeti ng with father later that same day, father accused the social worker of making false accu sations against him; when confronted with
the fact that V.O. corroborated mother’s vers ion of events at the park, father accused V.O. of lying. DCFS filed a section 300 pe tition alleging that V.O. wa s a person described by subdivisions (a) and (b) of that section. As eventually sustained, paragraph a-1 and b-14 of the petition alleged that mother and father “have a history of engaging in violent physical altercations in the presence of the ch ild. On April 17, 2012, the father struck the
mother’s stomach with the fath er’s fist, inflicting pain to the mother’s stomach. The mother slapped father. On [M arch 3, 2012], the father gr abbed and pulled the mother’s hair. The father spat on the mo ther’s face in the presence of the child. On [December 31, 2011], the father chok ed the mother. The father ripped the child’s shirt during the violent
altercation with the mother. The mother failed to protect the child. The mother allowed
the father to have unlimited acce ss [to] the child. Such vi olent conduct by the father against the mother, and the mo ther’s failure to protect th e child, endangers the child’s physical health and safety, and places the chil d at risk of physical harm, damage, danger and failure to protect.” Mother and father denied the petition. Following a detention hearing on April 23, the dependency court found DCFS had establis hed a prima facie case for detaining V.O. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). V.O. was released to mother on the
condition that she continue liv ing with maternal grandmother. Mother’s request for a temporary restraining order against father wa s granted, and father was given weekly twohour monitored visits. At a contested jurisdictional hearing on July 11, 2012, father te stified that he was at the park with mother and V. O. on April 17. At about 4:00 p.m., father realized he had to be home by 6:00 p.m. under the terms of his then existing house arrest relating to a charge concerning an ex-girlfriend’s husband. Father began walking quickly to his car
with V.O. Mother followed them and called fa ther’s name, but father did not respond. When father picked up V.O., mother tried to grab th e child away. Because V.O. was getting scared, father put him down and mother slapped father on the face. Father called the police. After the responding officers to ld father that mother described the event differently and they were going to arrest both of them, father decided to drop the matter. Father denied punching mother in the stomac h with his fist. Father was not aware that
V.O. told two different social workers that he saw father pu nch mother in the stomach. He denied the prior instances of domestic vi olence alleged in the petition. Finding father5 not credible, the dependency cour t sustained paragraphs a-1 a nd b-1 of the pe tition. V.O. remained placed with mother, and father wa s given twice weekly two-hour monitored visits. The court issued a permanent restraini ng order against father, set to expire on July 11, 2015. Father timely appealed. Mother did not appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Support s the Jurisdiction Order
The court based jurisdiction on two sepa rate grounds. First under section 300, subdivision (a), which requires proof that the “ch ild has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physic al harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian. For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may
find there is a substantial risk of serious futu re injury based on th e manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (a).) The second jurisdictional ground was under section 300, subdivis ion (b) which, in part, requires proof that the “child has suffered, or there is a substantia l risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failu re [of a parent] to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .” Father does not challenge the sufficien cy of the evidence to support the finding
that as a factual matter he committed the various acts alleged in paragr aphs b-1 and a-1 of the petition. Nor does he contend that th ese acts cannot support jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300. On appeal , he argues only that such conduct is not sufficient to support jurisdicti on under section 300, subdivisio n (a). Father is incorrect.

1. The Unchallenged True Finding on Sec tion 300, Subdivision (b) Obviates the Need to Review the True Finding on Subdivision (a)
If any one of several enumerated statutor y bases for jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court need not consider whether other alleged statutory bases are also supported by the evidence. ( In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438,6 451.) As father acknowledges, because fa ther does not contest jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), we need no t decide whether jurisdiction was also appropriate under subdivision (a). (See In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415, fn. 6.) Father nevertheless argues that we shou ld reach the merits of his contention because the jurisdictional findings under subd ivision (a) could adversely affect him in future custody and/or dependency proceedings. We are not persuaded. “[W]e generally
will exercise our discretion and reach the me rits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) se rves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedi ngs [citations]; or (3) ‘could have other consequences fo r [the appellant], beyond ju risdiction’ [citation].” ( In re
Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.) In Drake M. , the court exercised its discretion to consider the father’s challenge to jurisdiction because the outcome of the appeal would mean the difference between the father being an “offending” versus a “nonoffending” parent, and that di stinction could affect father’s custody rights. There are no similar implications in this case since father will remain an offending parent regardless of the outcome of this appeal. Father’s assertion that the challenged fi nding will result in his name being placed on the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) is in correct. As DCFS po ints out, it is the agency’s duty, not the court’s, to report known or susp ected cases of child abuse to the Department of Justice. That duty is trigge red by an investigator determining that it is more likely than not that ch ild abuse or neglect occurred, not by the sustaining of a section 300 petition. (Pen. Code, § 11169, su bd. (a); see also Pen. Code, § 11165.6 [“child abuse or neglect” includes physical in jury inflicted nonaccidentally]; Pen. Code, § 11165.12, subd. (b) [a “substantiated report” of child abuse or neglect is one based upon evidence the investigator believes makes it more likely than not child abuse occurred].) The only CACI-rela ted consequence of the juri sdictional finding is that father cannot challenge his listing on the index. (Pen. Code , § 11169, subd. (e).)7 2. Substantial Evidence Supports the True Finding on Section 300, Subdivision (a)

Even if we were to exercise our discretion to consider father’s appeal on the merits of the subdivision (a) finding, we would affirm. Upon a cha llenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support dependency jurisdicti on, we apply the usual rules of conflicting evidence, giving full effect to the respondent’s evid ence, however slight, and disregarding appellant’s evidence however strong. ( In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578.)
In In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598
, the court recently held that jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) was supporte d by evidence that the child was exposed to a series of incidents of dom estic violence between his parents, including one incident in which the father physically attacked the mother wh ile she was holding the
child. In this case, father does not challenged the finding that V.O. was exposed to a series of incidents of domestic violence, in cluding father choking mother, hitting mother
in the stomach with a closed fist, grabbing and pulling mothe r’s hair, spitting in mother’s face, and ripping V.O. ’s shirt during one such alte rcation with mother. Under Giovanni , these facts support the jurisd ictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a). Father’s argument that the domestic violence in Giovanni was more severe than that here, and that maternal grandmother told the social wo rker that she never observed any domestic violence, does not compel a contrary result. The issue is not whether some other case might have more egregious facts but whet her substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding in this case. We hold that it does.8 DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional order is affirmed.

RUBIN, J. WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

FLIER, J.