Filed 1/8/15 In re Juan A. CA2/8 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION EIGHT 

In re JUAN A., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B252829 

 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JUAN A., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. GJ29983) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Nancy S. Pogue and Robert Leventer, Commissioners. Affirmed. 

 Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee 

J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

__________________________________________ 
2

 The juvenile court found appellant Juan A. committed the crime of using force or 

violence to resist an executive officer in the performance of his duty. (Pen. Code, § 69.) 

We affirm. 

FACTS 

 At around 3:30 in the afternoon, Los Angeles County Deputy Probation Officer 

Thomas Wilcox was supervising a group of four youths in a restroom at Challenger, a 

Probation Department camp in Lancaster, when Juan left his bed without permission and 

walked into the restroom without permission. Deputy Wilcox told Juan to return to his 

bed. Juan did not comply. Deputy Wilcox told Juan a second time to return to bed. Juan 

again did not comply. Instead, Juan walked over to and faced a toilet, and either prepared 

to urinate or did begin to urinate. Deputy Wilcox again ordered Juan to leave the 

bathroom. At about this same time, Deputy Wilcox “gave [Juan] a left touch prompt on 

the side” to get him to leave. Juan shrugged his shoulders, turned around, and started to 

walk out of the bathroom. Deputy Wilcox began walking next to Juan and “didn’t think 

there was a problem,” but then Juan abruptly turned and punched the deputy on the side 

of his face with a closed fist. A struggle ensued and continued until Deputy Wilcox 

subdued Juan with pepper spray.1

 

 

1 The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the lower court’s judgment. 

(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.) Deputy Wilcox testified he could 

not see whether Juan started to urinate, as the deputy was seeing Juan’s back. Deputy 

Wilcox did not hear Juan urinating. Another ward did hear Juan start to urinate. Juan 

testified that he was “peeing in the toilet” when Deputy Wilcox pulled him away from the 

toilet by the back collar on his shirt. Juan testified he threw a punch while he was being 

pulled away from the toilet. We accept Deputy Wilcox’s testimony that he gave Juan a 

“touch prompt” on the side, and that Juan shrugged his shoulders and turned around 

himself, the reasonable inference being that Juan had either finished urinating or stopped 

himself urinating, and turned away from the toilet on his own. Basically, the evidence, 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, shows that Deputy Wilcox was 

walking Juan back out of the bathroom after effectively telling him, “C’mon, you cannot 

be in here right now,” and that Juan threw a punch at the deputy as he had just started to 

escort Juan out of the restroom. 
3

 The People filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging that Juan had 

committed the crime of using force or violence to resist an executive officer in the 

performance of his duty. (Pen. Code, § 69.) The charge was tried to the juvenile court, 

at which time the People presented evidence establishing the facts summarized above. 

At the conclusion of trial, the court found Juan committed the charged crime and declared 

him a ward of the court. At the disposition hearing which followed, the court terminated 

a previous order placing Juan in a community camp placement. The court ordered that 

“conditions of probation [were to] remain in effect.” The court ordered Juan suitably 

placed under the supervision of the probation department. As custody was taken from 

Juan’s parents, the court set a maximum term of confinement of four years and eight 

months. 

 Juan filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Deferred Entry of Judgment 

 Juan contends the District Attorney erred in determining that he was ineligible for 

a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program. He asks our court “to remand his case to 

the juvenile court for a determination of suitability” for a DEJ program. Inexplicably, the 

respondent’s brief filed by the People does not address this contention. We decline to 

find error on the record before us on appeal. 

 The DEJ process in juvenile proceedings is governed by sections 790 through 795 

of the Welfare and Institutions Code.2

 Under this statutory scheme, the prosecutor has a 

mandatory statutory duty to undertake an initial assessment and to make a determination 

of whether a minor is “eligible” for a DEJ program.3

 When the prosecutor determines 

that a minor is eligible for a DEJ program, the minor may agree that he or she wants to 

accept DEJ. In such a case, the matter is presented to the juvenile court for a hearing on 

 

2

 All further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise specified. 

3

 In making the initial eligibility determination, the prosecutor must make findings 

on whether six identified circumstances apply. (See § 790, subds. (a)(1)-(a)(6).) 
4

whether the minor is “suitable” for a DEJ program based upon the consideration of 

certain statutory factors. The juvenile court has discretion in determining whether a 

minor is or is not suitable for a DEJ program. (In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276, 

283-284.) As part of the DEJ process, the minor must admit a charged offense. Upon his 

or her successful completion of a DEJ program, the charge is dismissed in accord with 

statutorily prescribed procedures. (§§ 791, 793.) On the other hand, an eligible minor 

may decide to reject DEJ, obviating the need for a hearing on the issue of his or her 

suitability for a DEJ program, and a trial ensues on a charged offense. (See In re Kenneth 

J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 979-980.) 

 Section 790, subdivision (b), states: “The prosecuting attorney shall review his or 

her file to determine whether or not [a minor is eligible for deferred entry of judgment in 

that] paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a) apply. If the minor is [determined 

to be] eligible for deferred entry of judgment, the prosecuting attorney shall file a 

declaration in writing with the court or state for the record the grounds upon which the 

determination is based, and shall make this information available to the minor and his or 

her attorney. Upon a finding that the minor is . . . suitable for deferred entry of judgment 

and would benefit from education, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts, the court may 

grant deferred entry of judgment. . . . The court shall make findings on the record that a 

minor is appropriate for deferred entry of judgment pursuant to this article in any case 

where deferred entry of judgment is granted.” 

In Juan’s current case, the prosecutor submitted a declaration in conjunction with 

the filing of the section 602 petition stating that she had determined Juan to be ineligible

for a DEJ program.4

 Based on our review of the record, it does not appear that Juan 

objected to or otherwise challenged the prosecutor’s DEJ ineligibility determination prior 

to the trial of the charged offense, or any other time. Accordingly, there was no record 

developed on the issue of DEJ eligibility, there was no hearing or court finding on Juan’s 

 

4 Section 790, subdivision (b), does not expressly speak to what procedures are to 

be followed when the prosecutor determines that a minor is ineligible for a DEJ program. 
5

suitability for a DEJ program, no occasion for Juan to admit the charged offense, and no 

indication he was willing to do. 

 On appeal, Juan contends the prosecutor’s determination that he was ineligible for 

a DEJ program “was wrong.” The implication inherent in Juan’s contention is that the 

prosecutor’s determination should be changed to indicate that he is eligible, meaning that 

his case should be remanded to the juvenile court so that it can evaluate his suitability and 

exercise its discretion whether to grant him a DEJ program. 

 On the record before us on appeal, we decline to find error in the prosecutor’s 

determination on the issue of Juan’s DEJ eligibility. The prosecutor’s allegedly 

erroneous determination that Juan was ineligible for a DEJ program was the type of error 

which could have been addressed and corrected had Juan pointed out the error. (See, e.g., 

People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103.) Further, had Juan raised a timely 

objection, the issue would have been developed, preserving a record for review. In this 

vein, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Juan was willing to admit the charged 

offense. To permit him to raise the DEJ issue on appeal would mean that a juvenile could 

forego admitting a charged offense, and take a chance at trial. Then, if the risk 

succeeded, there would be no charge. If the risk proved unsuccessful, a juvenile could 

appeal and claim an error associated with a DEJ eligibility determination without a 

developed record, and seek to undo the finding of guilt, and then seek a DEJ program 

with the end goal of having the charges dismissed after the successful completion of the 

program. We are satisfied that the record before us does not allow for meaningful 

examination of the DEJ eligibility issue. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Juan contends the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding 

that he committed the charged crime. Specifically, Juan contends the evidence did not 

establish that Deputy Wilcox was engaged in the performance of a legal or lawful duty at 

the moment that Juan first punched him. In Juan’s words: “Although [he] had disobeyed 

an order, there was no [lawful] need for Wilcox to touch him while he was in the process 
6

of relieving himself.” We find the evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination 

that Juan violated Penal Code section 69. 

 Juan is correct that Penal Code section 69 may be violated in two different ways, 

and that the theory upon which his case was litigated required the prosecution to prove 

that Deputy Wilcox was engaged in the performance of a legal or lawful duty when Juan 

used force or violence to resist the deputy. (See In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 

815-816.) Penal Code language concerning an official’s “performance of his duty” has 

long been interpreted to mean that an aggressor who uses force or violence to resist an 

official may be found to have committed a public offense. If, however, the 

official/victim is ultimately determined to have been engaged in an unlawful act, the 

aggressor may be found to have committed a simple assault or battery, but not an act of 

violence against an official “‘in the performance of his duty.’” (Cf. People v. Curtis

(1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 355-356 [discussing Penal Code section 148]; and see also In re 

Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 815-816.) In short, Penal Code section 69 requires 

the prosecution to present evidence proving a person resisted an executive officer who 

was engaged in the “performance of his legal or lawful duty.” 

 We have no doubt that Deputy Wilcox was performing his legal or lawful duty at 

the time he was supervising a group of camp wards in the restroom area, including when 

he was giving orders to Juan to leave the restroom and return to his bed, and acting to get 

Juan to comply with the deputy’s directives. 

 Nonetheless, Juan argues that Deputy Wilcox’s actions inside the restroom may be 

parsed into discretely-examined, moment-by-moment increments. Further, that at the 

precise moment Deputy Wilcox “touched” Juan, the deputy was acting in an unlawful 

manner. Basically, Juan argues a probation camp deputy is acting in an unlawful manner 

whenever he applies any type of physical contact upon a ward who is engaged in the act 

of urinating. Assuming without deciding that a probation camp deputy is never lawfully 

permitted to impart any type of physical contact upon a urinating ward (whether the 

contact is a yanking by the shirt collar, or a “prompt touch” on the side), it does not 

follow that the juvenile court’s finding that Juan violated Penal Code section 69 must be 
7

reversed.5

 As we discussed above, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the judgment, shows that Juan was not urinating, that he had turned around, and that he 

had begun walking out of the restroom, when he sucker-punched Deputy Wilcox, who 

was escorting Juan out of the bathroom. Juan’s use of force or violence did not take 

place during a time that Deputy Wilcox was purportedly engaged in an unlawful act. 

 For similar reasons, we reject Juan’s argument that the evidence failed to prove 

that at the instant he punched Deputy Wilcox, Juan acted with the intent to interfere with 

or impede the deputy in the performance of his legal or lawful duty. Again using Juan’s 

own words: “[My] punching [Deputy Wilcox] was not . . . an attempt to resist the 

officer’s performance of his duties, it was a post hoc angry and inappropriate response to 

being physically touched or grabbed while [I] was in the act of urinating.” In our view, 

Juan’s argument is an invitation to our court to reweigh the evidence, and substitute a 

different conclusion for that of the juvenile court. This is not our role on appeal. (In re 

Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-

1089 [a reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence; it examines the record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there is credible evidence, including 

reasonable inferences from the evidence, which supports the trier of fact’s findings].) 

 A person’s intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof. For this reason, the law has 

long allowed intent to be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a charged offense, 

and recognizes that a trier of fact’s reasonable inferences from the evidence are sufficient 

to constitute substantial evidence in support of a finding of a particular intent. (See, e.g., 

People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138-

1139; People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) Stated another way, evidence of 

a person’s state of mind “‘is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence 

is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rios

(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 567-568.) 

 

5 Juan has not cited any case which directly holds that a camp deputy may never 

lawfully touch a urinating ward; the People have not cited any case which directly holds 

that a camp deputy may lawfully touch a urinating ward. 
8

 Here, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that Juan intended to disrupt and 

interfere with Deputy Wilcox’s performance of his legal and lawful duty. The evidence 

supports an inference that Juan wanted to disrupt the orderly operation of the restroom 

area and that he accomplished his intent. We have no doubt that Juan was, as he says, 

“angry” when he punched Deputy Wilcox, but the presence of anger does not defeat the 

further reality that he intended to disrupt and interfere with the deputy’s performance of 

his duty. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 BIGELOW, P.J. 

We concur: 

 RUBIN, J. 

 FLIER, J.