UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-00780

Hon. Barbara M.G. Lynn

BRIEF OF ILLINOIS, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT, 

DELAWARE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, HAWAI‘I, MAINE, MARYLAND, 

MASSACHUSETTS, MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, NEVADA, NEW JERSEY, 

NEW YORK, OREGON, RHODE ISLAND, AND WASHINGTON AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

KWAME RAOUL

Attorney General

State of Illinois

KATHRYN HUNT MUSE

Deputy Chief, Public Interest 

Division

ALEX HEMMER

Deputy Solicitor General

JOHN HAZINSKI

Assistant Attorney General

100 West Randolph Street

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 814-5968

John.Hazinski@ilag.gov

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 1 of 25 PageID 2691
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................................................................ii

IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE.................................................... 1

BACKGROUND............................................................................................................. 2

LEGAL STANDARD...................................................................................................... 4

ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................. 5

I. The Central American Minors Program Falls Squarely Within the Executive’s 

Parole Power............................................................................................................... 5

A. Congress granted broad Executive authority to parole noncitizens. .......... 6

B. The CAM program is within the Executive’s statutory authority. ............. 9

II. Dismantling the CAM Program Could Call Other Longstanding Executive 

Programs into Question and Harm Amici States ................................................... 12

A. Plaintiffs’ arguments could upend the Executive’s longstanding practices 

for administering parole. ...................................................................................... 12

B. Ending the CAM program would harm the amici States and their 

residents. ............................................................................................................... 16

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 19

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 2 of 25 PageID 2692
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................... 4

Arizona v. Biden, 31 F.4th 469 (6th Cir. 2022)............................................................. 7

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).............................................................. 7

Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2020) ........................................................ 4

Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022).......................................................................... 6

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017).................................. 14

Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 2011).................................................... 4

Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109 (5th Cir. 2006) ............................................ 12

Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015)................................................. 10

Statutes

305 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-1............................................................................................. 17

6 U.S.C. § 251................................................................................................................. 6

8 U.S.C. § 1101............................................................................................................... 1

8 U.S.C. § 1103............................................................................................................... 5

8 U.S.C. § 1182..................................................................................................... passim

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11205 .................................................................................. 18

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 16500.5 ............................................................................... 18

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-689 ...................................................................... 6

Regulations

8 C.F.R. § 212.5.................................................................................................... 7, 8, 10

Central American Minors (CAM) Refugee and Parole Program, USCIS, 

https://bit.ly/38pSb3A (last updated June 23, 2023)................................................. 3

Central American Minors Program, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 

88 Fed. Reg. 21,694 (April 11, 2023)........................................................................ 19

Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,588 (Nov. 21, 2007) 13

Filipino World War II Veterans Parole Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,097-02 (May 9, 2016)

................................................................................................................................... 13

Form I-131, Travel Document Applications for the Haitian Family Reunification 

Parole (HFRP) Program; Applications Accepted, Denied, Approved, and Pending 

as of December 31, 2019, USCIS (Jan. 2020), https://bit.ly/3K88Tls...................... 13

Guidance on Evidence for Certain Types of Humanitarian or Significant Public 

Benefit Parole Requests, USCIS, https://bit.ly/3xRCMUq (last updated June 23, 

2022)............................................................................................................................ 8

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 3 of 25 PageID 2693
iii

Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,266 (Jan. 9, 2023) . 14

Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,243 (Jan. 9, 2023) 14

Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,255 (Jan. 9, 

2023).......................................................................................................................... 14

Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. 63,507 (Oct. 19, 

2022).......................................................................................................................... 14

Implementation of Changes to the Parole Process for Venezuelans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,279 

(Jan. 9, 2023) ............................................................................................................ 14

Implementation of Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 

75,581-01 (Dec. 18, 2014) ......................................................................................... 13

Implementation of the Uniting for Ukraine Parole Process, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

87 Fed. Reg. 25040 (Apr. 27, 2022).......................................................................... 14

Memorandum of Agreement between USCIS, ICE, and CBP for the Purpose of 

Coordinating the Concurrent Exercise by USCIS, ICE, and CBP, of the Secretary’s 

Parole Authority Under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) with Respect to Certain Aliens Located 

Outside of the United States at 2 (Sept. 29, 2008), https://bit.ly/3BYtVQQ......... 7, 8

Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, 

ICE (Dec. 8, 2009), https://bit.ly/3q3JK43................................................................. 9

Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 38926 

(Aug. 16, 2017)...................................................................................................... 4, 10

USCIS I-131, Application for Travel Document Cuban Medical Professional Parole 

(CMPP) Program Approvals from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2017, USCIS 

(Dec. 2, 2019), https://bit.ly/36Yj6mr ....................................................................... 15

Other Authorities

2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Off. of Immigr. 

Stats. (Sept. 2004), https://bit.ly/3Iy1SKi.................................................................. 9

Immigrants Are Vital to the U.S. Economy at 5, U.S. Cong., Joint Econ. Comm. (Apr. 

6, 2021), https://bit.ly/3IFNJed. ............................................................................... 18

Lydia DePillis, Immigration Rebound Eases Shortage of Workers, Up to a Point, 

N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2023), https://bit.ly/48YfWL0 .................................................. 19

Medecins Sans Frontieres, Forced to Flee Central American’s Northern Triangle: A 

Neglected Humanitarian Crisis at 8–9 (May 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6pxmlp6

................................................................................................................................... 17

Molly O’Toole, How a Guatemalan asylum seeker who may lose both hands to Texas 

frostbite tests Biden’s immigration policy, L.A. Times (Feb. 26, 2021), available at 

https://lat.ms/3Oy0ABH ........................................................................................... 16

Preserving Families, Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Services, 

https://bit.ly/46hMnlH=............................................................................................ 17

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 4 of 25 PageID 2694
iv

U.S. Dep’t of State, Restarting the Central American Minors Program (Mar. 10, 

2021), https://bit.ly/32o9gYs..................................................................................... 17

UNICEF, Death threats and gang violence forcing more families to flee northern 

Central America – UNHCR & UNICEF survey (Dec. 17, 2020), 

https://bit.ly/40eCMtS .............................................................................................. 17

Uniting for Ukraine, USCIS, https://bit.ly/3vl2aQH (last updated Sept. 20, 2023).. 14

Zoya Gubernskaya & Joanna Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy and the Case for 

Family Unity, 5 J. Migration & Hum. Sec. 417, 422–23 (2017), 

https://bit.ly/3FbOiMF.............................................................................................. 18

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 5 of 25 PageID 2695
1

IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

The States of Illinois, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District 

of Columbia, Hawai‘i, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,

Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington (collectively, 

the “amici States”) submit this brief in support of defendants’ motions to dismiss.

The amici States are home to millions of immigrants and noncitizens.1 These 

state residents contribute in our classrooms, serve in the military, and care for the 

sick and older adults in our communities. Many fill important jobs that United 

States-born workers cannot or do not want to take. Together, they add billions of 

dollars to federal, state, and local economies by paying taxes and spending income. 

The amici States thus have a significant interest in ensuring that these individuals, 

who are valued members of their communities, have an opportunity to reunite with 

their children and other close family members.

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Central American Minors (CAM) program threatens 

this interest in multiple respects. Created in response to a surge in perilous border 

crossings by children from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, CAM gives 

qualifying children and certain family members the chance to be considered in their 

home country for refugee or parole status if a qualifying parent or guardian lawfully 

resides in the United States. Plaintiffs seek to invalidate the executive branch’s 

 

1 This brief uses “noncitizen” in place of the statutory term “alien,” which refers to 

“any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The 

brief also uses “immigrant” to refer more broadly to all foreign-born individuals, 

including those who have been naturalized.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 6 of 25 PageID 2696
2

exercise of its parole authority to reunite these families. Without the CAM program, 

many of the impacted individuals—including many residents of the amici States—

would not be able to reunite with their children and family members, harming the 

amici States’ interest in ensuring the safety and unity of families in their States.

The amici States are further interested in ensuring that the Executive 

maintains its historical authority to exercise enforcement discretion in immigration 

law with respect to its parole power. The States and their residents rely on the 

exercise of that discretion in a range of contexts, as many individuals who receive 

parole live, work, and support resident family members in the amici States. Plaintiffs’ 

claims seek to severely limit the Executive’s long-established discretion in several 

ways, including in their apparent—and wholly unprecedented—assertion that the 

Executive cannot consider parole eligibility on a programmatic basis for a specified 

category of people. Amici States thus urge this Court to dismiss Counts A and D of 

plaintiffs’ complaint.2

BACKGROUND

The Central American Minors program was initially developed in 2014 in 

response to an “exponential rise” in the number of unaccompanied minor children 

attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Am. Compl. ¶ 52 (hereinafter “Compl.”). 

The program is intended “to reduce unlawful and dangerous migration to the United 

 

2 This brief addresses only the claims that the CAM program exceeds defendants’ 

authority under the INA. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 14) (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 85–88 (Claim 

A); id. ¶¶ 109–13 (Claim D). These claims correspond to claims I and IV in plaintiffs’ 

supplemental complaint See Supp. Compl. (ECF No. 110) ¶¶ 48–52, 70–74.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 7 of 25 PageID 2697
3

States,” id. ¶ 52, and to reunite parents with their children, see id. ¶¶ 55–56. The 

CAM parole program also aims to protect children from smuggling networks, reduce 

strain on limited U.S. resources at the southwest border, and promote national 

foreign policy priorities. Supp. Compl. ¶ 33.

Under the CAM program, the Executive first considers whether applicants 

qualify as refugees. Id. ¶ 6. A parent or guardian lawfully residing in the United 

States files an “affidavit of relationship” for their Central American child or child’s 

family member. Id. ¶ 59. If the affidavit demonstrates that they qualify for the 

program, data is collected and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) conducts a refugee eligibility interview. Id. If USCIS denies refugee status, 

the child or family member is then considered for parole into the United States. Id.

¶¶ 6–7, 60. Parole is temporary and does not constitute admission to the United 

States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Because the CAM parole program is designed to 

mitigate the risk that these children will make dangerous treks to the United States, 

the application and adjudication processes occur while the child is still residing in 

their home country. See Compl. ¶ 52. 

Under the CAM program, parole will be granted only on a case-by-case basis

for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. See Compl. ¶ 53 (and 

link to 2014 Department of State (DOS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

press release cited therein); see also Central American Minors (CAM) Refugee and 

Parole Program, USCIS, https://bit.ly/38pSb3A (last updated June 23, 2023)

(describing how grants continue to issue on a case-by-case basis). Ultimately, the 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 8 of 25 PageID 2698
4

parole determination depends “on each individual’s unique circumstances,” id., such 

as whether “the individual is at risk of harm, he/she clears all background vetting, 

there is no serious derogatory information, and someone has committed to financially 

support the individual while he/she is in the United States,” see Compl. ¶ 53 (and link

cited therein to 2014 DOS and DHS press release).

The CAM program “was established based on the [Secretary of Homeland 

Security’s] discretionary parole authority and the broad authority to administer the 

immigration laws” reflected in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a) and 1182(d)(5). Termination of the 

Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 38926 (Aug. 16, 2017). 

Because the plaintiffs challenge only the exercise of the parole power under section 

1182(d)(5), see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 86, 110, this brief focuses on the Executive’s 

authority to make parole determinations under that provision. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To withstand a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

plaintiffs must allege sufficient factual matter which, when accepted as true, states 

a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 

616 (5th Cir. 2022). “While the court must accept the facts in the complaint as true, 

it will not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or 

legal conclusions.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In addition to the allegations in the complaint, the Court 

may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 

777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 9 of 25 PageID 2699
5

ARGUMENT

The CAM program reflects a proper exercise of the executive branch’s authority 

to make case-by-case parole determinations under the Immigration and Nationality 

Act (INA). Plaintiffs’ claims that the program violates the INA both misread the 

statute and disregard decades of practice across multiple administrations. If

accepted, plaintiffs’ novel theory could call into question numerous parole programs 

that serve critical humanitarian, foreign-policy, and public-interest goals in which 

the amici States also have a direct interest. Because the exercise of discretion under 

the CAM program is authorized by the INA, defendants’ motion to dismiss should be 

granted.

I. The Central American Minors Program Falls Squarely Within the 

Executive’s Parole Power

The INA gives the Executive broad discretion to parole noncitizens for 

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1103(a), 1182(d)(5). For decades, the Executive has used this statutory authority 

to develop programs like CAM, under which individuals may be considered for and 

obtain parole in part on the basis of shared characteristics, such as (in the case of 

CAM) residence in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras and having a qualifying 

family member lawfully residing in the United States. Plaintiffs contend that the 

CAM program violates the requirement that the Executive grant parole only on a 

“case-by-case” basis, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). But plaintiffs do not allege that the 

Executive is failing to consider each parole application individually. Instead, they rely 

on a novel interpretation of section 1182(d) that would prohibit the Executive from 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 10 of 25 PageID 2700
6

using shared criteria to invite and consider parole applications. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 87, 

106–107, 110; Supp. Compl. ¶ 50. This theory has no basis in the INA, and it ignores 

decades of targeted parole programs that have similarly used shared criteria to guide

administrative decision-making.3 Plaintiffs therefore have not stated plausible 

claims for relief.

A. Congress granted broad Executive authority to parole 

noncitizens.

Since its enactment, the INA has authorized the Executive to grant “parole”—

that is, official permission to enter and remain temporarily in the United States—to 

noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Specifically, the statute authorizes the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to “in his discretion parole into the United States 

temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis 

for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for 

admission to the United States.” Id.4

 

3 Indeed, plaintiffs pressed an identical argument before the Supreme Court, see 

Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022), which declined to accept it, observing instead 

that the parole power fits within a longstanding tradition of executive discretion over 

whether to detain noncitizens. Id. at 2543 (“Every administration, including the 

Trump and Biden administrations, has utilized this [parole] authority to some 

extent.”).

4 Although the INA has authorized parole since its enactment in 1952, the “case-bycase” requirement was added to section 1182(d)(5)(A) in 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 

110 Stat. 3009-689. Additionally, section 1182(d)(5)(A) refers to the Attorney General, 

but Congress later transferred responsibility for the detention of noncitizens to the 

Secretary. 6 U.S.C. § 251(2). The Secretary’s parole authority, in turn, has been 

delegated to USCIS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Memorandum of 

Agreement between USCIS, ICE, and CBP for the Purpose of Coordinating the 

Concurrent Exercise by USCIS, ICE, and CBP, of the Secretary’s Parole Authority 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 11 of 25 PageID 2701
7

The Secretary and his delegees have wide discretion when exercising this 

authority or declining to do so. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] principal 

feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration 

officials,” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012); see also Arizona v. Biden, 

31 F.4th 469, 479 (6th Cir. 2022) (describing the “considerable discretion already 

baked into the immigration system”), and the parole authority is a key component of 

that system. Indeed, Congress expressly committed the decision whether to grant 

parole to the executive branch’s “discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Congress, 

moreover, set out broad standards rather than narrow, inflexible definitions to govern 

parole eligibility, authorizing parole based on either “urgent humanitarian reasons” 

or “significant public benefit” grounds. Id.

When exercising its discretion in making parole decisions, the Executive has 

for decades balanced multiple factors, including “immediate human concerns” and 

“policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations.” Arizona, 567 U.S. 

at 396. For example, the Executive has promulgated regulations that flesh out some 

of the circumstances under which releasing certain noncitizens from detention on 

parole would constitute an “urgent humanitarian” reason or confer a “significant 

public benefit.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). One of these circumstances includes releasing a 

detained minor to their family. Id. § 212.5(b)(3). Consistent with the statutory 

directive that parole be granted on a “case-by-case basis,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), 

 

Under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) with Respect to Certain Aliens Located Outside of the United 

States at 2 (Sept. 29, 2008), https://bit.ly/3BYtVQQ.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 12 of 25 PageID 2702
8

the regulations also provide that a detained noncitizen falling within these categories 

will be granted parole only if it is “justified” in his or her case, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b), 

and further provide that other noncitizens may be granted parole only if immigration 

officials deem it appropriate “after review of the individual case,” id. § 212.5(c).

The Executive has also established different categories of parole through 

policies and administrative practice. These categories span a range of circumstances

and provide noncitizens with an opportunity to show that they should receive parole.5

For instance, under appropriate circumstances, individuals who are vulnerable due 

to age or living circumstances, or seeking treatment in the U.S. for a serious medical 

condition, may be granted “humanitarian parole” to enter the United States to 

reunite with their families.6

While different procedures and guidelines may apply in different contexts, all

parole adjudications mandate individual “case-by-case” decision-making, as the INA 

demands. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). For instance, USCIS has promulgated detailed 

guidance informing individuals outside of the United States seeking parole for 

specific reasons (such as to provide care for a seriously ill family member) what 

information to submit in support of their applications.7 In the context of parole 

determinations for arriving asylum-seekers, ICE maintains a policy under which a 

 

5 See Memo. of Agreement Between USCIS, ICE, and CBP, supra note 4, at 2.

6 Guidance on Evidence for Certain Types of Humanitarian or Significant Public 

Benefit Parole Requests, USCIS, https://bit.ly/3xRCMUq (last updated June 23, 2022).

7 Id.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 13 of 25 PageID 2703
9

credible fear of persecution or torture weighs heavily in favor of granting parole, but 

each request for “parole should be considered and analyzed on its own merits and 

based on the facts of the individual [non-citizen’s] case.”8 The guidelines for exercising 

discretion under the CAM program are similar. See supra pp. 2–4.

Each year, across all of its parole programs, the Executive considers 

applications in large numbers. Driven by the humanitarian and other public interests 

presented, many of the applications are granted. During the first three years of 

President George W. Bush’s administration, for example, hundreds of thousands of

individuals received parole.9 And, for the reasons explained, this use of “discretion” 

to grant parole on a “case-by-case basis,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), albeit to many 

individual applicants, not only reflects longstanding practice over multiple 

administrations but is also consistent with Congress’s grant of statutory authority to 

the Executive under the INA.

B. The CAM program is within the Executive’s statutory 

authority.

Because the INA provides broad authority to grant parole for urgent 

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter 

of law. Through the CAM program, the Executive has created a procedural 

mechanism based on general criteria to expedite its parole review within its larger 

process that nonetheless requires individualized determinations of refugee status 

 

8 Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture

at 3, ICE (Dec. 8, 2009), https://bit.ly/3q3JK43.

9 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics at 81, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Off. of 

Immigr. Stats. (Sept. 2004), https://bit.ly/3Iy1SKi.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 14 of 25 PageID 2704
10

and parole eligibility. See Compl. ¶¶ 5–6, 59–60. This mechanism represents an 

appropriate use of Executive authority, and plaintiffs’ own allegations show that the 

CAM program involves lawful case-by-case discretion.

First, plaintiffs acknowledge that the CAM program “on its face” requires “case 

by case” determinations of whether each applicant should be granted parole. Compl.

¶ 110. Indeed, the authorities cited in the complaint explain that the Executive, from 

the outset, has conducted an individualized review of all CAM parole applications. 

See id. ¶ 66 (citing Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 

Fed. Reg. 38926 (Aug. 16, 2017), which describes “case-by-case” CAM parole 

determinations); see also supra pp. 3–4 (discussing this process). Moreover, as 

discussed, the Executive has promulgated regulations that mandate this case-by-case 

consideration in all contexts, including the CAM program. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) 

(requiring that a grant of parole to an immigrant detainee be “justified only on a caseby-case basis”); id. § 212.5(c) (directing that parole be granted to an arriving 

noncitizen who is not detained only “after review of the individual case”).

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Executive is failing to follow its procedures.

Instead, plaintiffs make a novel argument: that the CAM program violates the INA 

because the Executive has established a process under which it automatically 

considers certain individuals for parole. See Compl. ¶¶ 60, 87, 106–107, 110.10 

 

10 Indeed, plaintiffs’ only factual allegation related to the process of adjudicating

CAM applications is that the previous version of the program had a high approval 

rate. See Compl. ¶ 77. But a high approval rate is insufficient to support a reasonable 

inference that DHS did not evaluate the merits of each application. See Texas v. 

United States, 809 F.3d 134, 173–174 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that low denial rates for 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 15 of 25 PageID 2705
11

According to plaintiffs, this feature of the CAM program, by which qualifying 

noncitizens are “automatically considered” (not automatically approved) “for 

significant interest parole [sic] into the United States,” id. ¶ 60; accord id. ¶¶ 106–

107, purportedly renders decision-making under the CAM program “automated” 

rather than “case-by-case,” and thus unlawful. In plaintiffs’ words, “the automation 

of the program, without the need to apply separately for parole, makes it a de facto

categorical parole program” in contravention of the INA. Id. ¶ 110.

These allegations fail to state a claim for relief because nothing in the INA 

dictates a specific application process or prohibits the Executive from automating the 

process of choosing which parole applications will be considered before making

individualized parole decisions. As plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge, the INA simply 

requires an individualized determination about whether to grant parole. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(d)(5)(A); Compl. ¶ 48 (“Congress has directed that parole may only be granted

on a case-by-case basis . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 86 (arguing that the existence 

of “urgent humanitarian reasons” and “significant public benefit” must “be 

determined on a case-by-case basis”). Nothing in the statute or regulations prevents 

the Executive from using general criteria to identify individuals for parole 

consideration. The statute and regulations also do not require DHS to engage in a

case-by-case pre-screening before it evaluates each individual’s application on its 

merits. To the extent plaintiffs’ legal theory rests on the premise that a parole 

 

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program would not be surprising 

because of self-selection and the fact that younger people are less likely to have 

backgrounds that would warrant discretionary denial).

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 16 of 25 PageID 2706
12

program may not use criteria to guide decision-making or target certain populations 

for parole consideration, that premise is belied by numerous other parole programs 

that have done so, as discussed further below. 

II. Dismantling the CAM Program Could Call Other Longstanding

Executive Programs into Question and Harm Amici States

Plaintiffs’ argument that the CAM program exceeds defendants’ statutory 

authority thus lacks a legal basis. If accepted, it would not only upend the critically 

needed CAM program itself but could yield serious broader consequences for amici 

States and their residents, as well as the many other parole programs that benefit 

the amici States.

A. Plaintiffs’ arguments could upend the Executive’s longstanding 

practices for administering parole.

Pursuant to its broad authority under § 1182(d)(5)(A) to grant parole to 

arriving noncitizens, the Executive has for decades established administrative 

structures to guide the exercise of its parole power in particular contexts—i.e., largescale parole “programs.” Many of these, like the CAM program, give weight to shared 

characteristics in determining whether someone may apply for or receive parole. 

Enjoining the CAM program on plaintiffs’ statutory theory thus has the potential to 

carry serious consequences for all of these programs.

The Executive has established several programs aimed at family reunification, 

which is an underlying principle of our Nation’s immigration system. See, e.g., 

Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 119 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that separation 

from family is an extreme hardship that may warrant immigration relief).

Individuals who must wait years in unsafe conditions for family-based visas to join 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 17 of 25 PageID 2707
13

their relatives in the United States may resort to dangerous migration attempts in 

the hopes of reuniting with their families. In response to these concerns, parole 

programs provide a safe, legal, and orderly path to expedite family reunification

pending visa approval.

The Haitian Family Reunification Parole program, for example, was 

established in 2014 to reunite families following a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti.11

Eligible U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents receive invitations to apply for 

parole for relatives living in Haiti. But an invitation does not guarantee parole. 

Instead, USCIS exercises its “discretion[]” to grant parole on a “case-by-case” basis.12

This program has been used to grant parole to more than 8,300 noncitizens under 

Presidents Obama and Trump.13 Similar initiatives include the Cuban Family 

Reunification Parole program and Filipino World War II Veterans Parole program.14

The Executive has also used its parole power to allow foreign nationals fleeing 

persecution or violence to enter the country. The practice dates to 1956, when 

President Eisenhower allowed the parole of 15,000 Hungarian refugees fleeing their 

 

11 Implementation of Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 

75,581-01, 75,582 (Dec. 18, 2014).

12 Id.

13 Form I-131, Travel Document Applications for the Haitian Family Reunification 

Parole (HFRP) Program; Applications Accepted, Denied, Approved, and Pending as of 

December 31, 2019, USCIS (Jan. 2020), https://bit.ly/3K88Tls.

14 Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,588 (Nov. 21, 2007); 

Filipino World War II Veterans Parole Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,097-02 (May 9, 2016).

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 18 of 25 PageID 2708
14

country following a Soviet invasion.15 In 2022, DHS created a parole program for 

Ukrainians fleeing the Russian military invasion.16 Similar to the CAM program, 

“Uniting for Ukraine” establishes eligibility criteria to allow certain Ukrainian 

nationals to apply for a “discretionary grant of parole.”17 DHS then must make a 

“case-by-case, discretionary determination” of whether to grant parole upon arrival 

at a port of entry.18 And most recently, the Executive has established parole programs 

for Venezuelans, Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans in response to humanitarian 

crises in those countries, foreign policy priorities, and the “perilous conditions” faced 

by migrants who attempt to unlawfully enter the United States.19

The Executive has thus for decades used its parole authority under 

§ 1182(d)(5)(A) to offer parole on a programmatic basis to noncitizens. These 

programs have yielded parole grants in large numbers.20 These grants confer a wide 

 

15 Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2017).

16 Uniting for Ukraine, USCIS, https://bit.ly/3vl2aQH (last updated Sept. 20, 2023).

17 Implementation of the Uniting for Ukraine Parole Process, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

87 Fed. Reg. 25040, 25040 (Apr. 27, 2022).

18 Id.

19 Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,243 (Jan. 9, 2023); 

Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,255 (Jan. 9, 2023); 

Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,266 (Jan. 9, 2023); 

Implementation of Changes to the Parole Process for Venezuelans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,279 

(Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. 

63,507 (Oct. 19, 2022).

20 As noted above, more than 8,300 Haitians were aided under the Haitian Family 

Reunification Parole program, supra p. 13, while the Cuban Medical Professional 

Parole program benefitted more than 9,600 Cuban medical professionals who had 

been forced to work in inhumane conditions for minimal compensation, USCIS I-131, 

Application for Travel Document Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 19 of 25 PageID 2709
15

range of benefits on noncitizens and their communities—from access to safe living 

conditions to family reunification—and they enable the Executive to accomplish 

numerous policy objectives. 

Plaintiffs’ legal theory, if accepted, could call many of these longstanding and 

valuable programs into question. Plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that the Executive 

cannot place heavy weight on shared characteristics in determining whether someone 

may apply for or receive parole—for instance, by inviting individuals with those 

characteristics to apply for parole. See Compl. ¶¶ 60, 87, 106–107, 110. But as 

explained above, the Executive has consistently established parole programs of 

exactly that nature. All of these programs incorporate case-by-case decision-making, 

but, like the CAM program, they are also programmatic in the sense that they use

categorical judgments about who should be considered for parole. Under plaintiffs’ 

theory, the Executive could be prohibited from establishing programs that consider

granting parole to Haitian earthquake survivors, Ukrainian nationals fleeing 

Russian military aggression, and other groups with urgent humanitarian needs or 

whose protection is critical to federal foreign-policy goals. That result would 

significantly curtail the Executive’s statutory authority and be profoundly 

destabilizing for the many thousands of individuals who receive parole through these 

programs each year, as well as the families, communities, and States to which they 

contribute.

 

Program Approvals from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2017, USCIS (Dec. 2, 2019), 

https://bit.ly/36Yj6mr.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 20 of 25 PageID 2710
16

B. Ending the CAM program would harm the amici States and 

their residents.

The humanitarian relief provided under the CAM program and other parole 

initiatives is critical to the amici States and their residents. Enjoining the CAM 

program would harm the States’ interests.

The story of a Guatemalan immigrant named Douglas illustrates the grave 

conditions underlying the CAM program.21 Douglas hoped to escape the extreme gang 

violence in Guatemala and to be reunited with his father, who was lawfully residing 

in California. In June 2017, Douglas’s father received notice that Douglas would be 

interviewed for the CAM program. But when the Trump Administration terminated 

the parole portion of the CAM program just two months later, all contact about his 

parole eligibility abruptly ended. Desperate to flee threats from gangs and see his 

father for the first time in five years, Douglas undertook a dangerous journey to cross 

the U.S.-Mexico border with the help of a smuggler. During his border crossing, 

Douglas was caught in Texas’s historic winter storm of February 2021. He was 

eventually found unconscious and brought to a hospital, his hands suffering from 

frostbite so severe that they were “swollen to the size of baseball gloves; fingers lumpy 

and gray; oozing, raw skin seemingly ready to fall off in chunks.”22

Douglas’s story reflects the harsh reality for countless Central American 

children seeking to reunite with family in the United States, and the needs to which 

 

21 See Molly O’Toole, How a Guatemalan asylum seeker who may lose both hands to 

Texas frostbite tests Biden’s immigration policy, L.A. Times (Feb. 26, 2021), 

https://lat.ms/3Oy0ABH.

22 Id.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 21 of 25 PageID 2711
17

the CAM program responds. Immigration from Guatemala, El Salvador and 

Honduras (a region known as the “Northern Triangle”) is driven by extreme levels of 

violence. Northern Triangle residents experience violence comparable to that in war 

zones, and homicide in this region has led to higher numbers of civilian casualties 

than anywhere else in the world, including countries with armed conflicts or war.23

Children who attempt to migrate to the United States to escape these conditions face 

physical violence, abduction, theft, extortion, torture, and rape, often perpetrated by 

gangs and other criminal organizations.24 Amici States have an obvious interest in 

ensuring that the minor children and families of their residents are not subjected to 

such conditions.

In addition to this urgent humanitarian interest, the CAM program also serves 

the amici States’ interest in family unity. As of March 2021, grants of refugee and 

parole status under the CAM program had already “reunified nearly 5,000 children 

safely and securely with their families.”25 Family reunification is a goal broadly 

shared by the amici States. Under Illinois law, for example, “[t]he maintenance and 

strengthening of the family unit shall be a principal consideration” in public aid.26

 

23 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Forced to Flee Central American’s Northern Triangle: A 

Neglected Humanitarian Crisis at 8–9 (May 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6pxmlp6; 

UNICEF, Death threats and gang violence forcing more families to flee northern 

Central America – UNHCR & UNICEF survey (Dec. 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/40eCMtS.

24 Id. at 4–5, 11–12.

25 U.S. Dep’t of State, Restarting the Central American Minors Program (Mar. 10, 

2021), https://bit.ly/32o9gYs.

26 305 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-1. The same principles guide custody and child welfare 

decisions in Illinois. See Preserving Families, Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Services, 

https://bit.ly/46hMnlH=.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 22 of 25 PageID 2712
18

Similarly, California’s public policy is to “encourage the continuity of the family unit,” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 16500.5(a)(1), which is “of fundamental importance to 

society in nurturing its members, passing on values, averting potential social 

problems, and providing the secure structure in which [Californians] live out their 

lives,” id. § 11205. Moreover, studies show that family reunification benefits 

economic, social, and psychological well-being while preventing the mental and 

physical injuries caused by family separation.27 The CAM program serves similar 

policy goals by reuniting parents residing in the amici States with their children and 

family members.

More generally, accepting plaintiffs’ legal theories could implicate numerous 

other parole programs, see supra pp. 12–15, which in turn could upend the lives of 

many amici State residents already living in the United States under grants of parole.

Immigrants, including noncitizens, enrich their communities in a variety of ways. For 

example, immigrants fuel and sustain state economies by contributing hundreds of 

billions of dollars in taxes and consumer spending each year.28 Recently, people who 

entered the country through immigration parole—together with other immigrants 

who have work authorization—have helped to ease worker shortages in critical 

 

27 Zoya Gubernskaya & Joanna Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy and the Case for 

Family Unity, 5 J. Migration & Hum. Sec. 417, 422–23 (2017), https://bit.ly/3FbOiMF.

28 Immigrants Are Vital to the U.S. Economy at 5, U.S. Cong., Joint Econ. Comm. 

(Apr. 6, 2021), https://bit.ly/3IFNJed.

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 23 of 25 PageID 2713
19

industries.29 At the same time, family reunification through the CAM parole program 

reduces the public expense associated with irregular or unlawful migration, including

by ensuring that parolees can access financial support from qualifying parents and 

guardians.30

Because the Executive’s parole programs serve a wide range of critical 

humanitarian purposes and benefit the public at large consistent with the text and 

purpose of section 1182(d)(5), amici States urge the Court to reject plaintiffs’ 

unprecedented request that the Court drastically limit the parole power.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted

with respect to Counts A and D of plaintiffs’ complaint. 

KATHRYN HUNT MUSE

Deputy Chief, Public Interest Division

ALEX HEMMER

Deputy Solicitor General

Respectfully submitted,

KWAME RAOUL

Attorney General 

State of Illinois

/s/ John Hazinski

JOHN HAZINSKI

Assistant Attorney General

Illinois Bar No. 6329791 (pro hac vice

motion pending)

100 West Randolph Street

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 814-3000

John.Hazinski@ilag.gov

 

29 Lydia DePillis, Immigration Rebound Eases Shortage of Workers, Up to a Point, 

N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2023), https://bit.ly/48YfWL0. 

30 Central American Minors Program, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration, 88 Fed. Reg. 21,694, 21,699 (April 11, 2023). 

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 24 of 25 PageID 2714
20

ROB BONTA

Attorney General

State of California

PHIL WEISER

Attorney General

State of Colorado

WILLIAM TONG

Attorney General

State of Connecticut

KATHLEEN JENNINGS

Attorney General

State of Delaware

BRIAN L. SCHWALB

Attorney General

District of Columbia

ANNE E. LOPEZ

Attorney General

State of Hawai‘i

AARON M. FREY

Attorney General

State of Maine

ANTHONY G. BROWN

Attorney General

State of Maryland

ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

DANA NESSEL

Attorney General

State of Michigan

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

AARON D. FORD

Attorney General

State of Nevada

MATTHEW J. PLATKIN

Attorney General

State of New Jersey

LETITIA JAMES

Attorney General

State of New York

ELLEN ROSENBLUM

Attorney General

State of Oregon

PETER F. NERONHA

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

BOB FERGUSON

Attorney General

State of Washington

Case 3:22-cv-00780-M Document 137 Filed 10/24/23 Page 25 of 25 PageID 2715