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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

HARITHARAN MAHALINGAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-1076-L

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Haritharan Mahalingam filed a Motion to Compel Production of 

Documents and Motion for Rulings on Objections, see Dkt. No. 20 (the “MTC”), which 

United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay has referred to the undersigned United 

States magistrate judge for a hearing, if necessary, and determination under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b), see Dkt. No. 40.

The MTC asks the Court to order Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to serve 

adequate and complete responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production – 

specifically, Request Nos. 1-3, 4, 5-10, and 14-34 – and overrule Well Fargo’s 

objections to those requests. See Dkt. No. 20 at 5-8.

Wells Fargo responded to the MTC. See Dkt. No. 28.

Mahalingam has not filed a reply after the Court extended his deadline to do 

so, see Dkt. No. 35.

For the reasons and to the extent explained below, the Court now grants in 

part and denies in part Plaintiff Haritharan Mahalingam’s Motion to Compel 

Production of Documents and Motion for Rulings on Objections [Dkt. No. 20].

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Background

Mahalingam’s MTC explains that his

claims against Defendant arise from a mortgagor/mortgagee 

relationship that began in early 2016 when Plaintiff financed the 

purchase of real property commonly known as 4110 Admirality Way, 

Irving, Texas 75061. Plaintiff maintains, inter alia, that during the 

course of the parties’ working relationship, Defendant repeatedly and 

unabashedly committed egregious accounting errors as it relates to 

Plaintiff’s Wells Fargo loan/account, grossly mismanaged Plaintiff’s 

escrow account, and improperly disbursed Plaintiff’s funds and/or made 

duplicative payments. After Plaintiff’s investigation revealed the 

foregoing, he immediately and repeatedly requested 

documents/information and reconciliation of his account. Rather than 

provide the information requested, Defendant instead chose to launch a 

retaliatory campaign wherein it deliberately mispresented the status of 

Plaintiff’s account to the various credit bureaus, improperly attempted 

to declare certain defaults under the loan agreement without a proper 

basis, and in retaliation to Plaintiff’s repeated reconciliation requests 

and demands for information, wrongfully interfered with Plaintiff’s 

ability to secure third-party through another lender; all of which caused 

Plaintiff to sustain considerable monetary damages.

2. In support of its attempts to prosecute his claims against Defendant, 

on September 28, 2022, Plaintiff served Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests 

for Production (“Discovery Requests”) upon Defendant Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A. in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, et. 

seq.

3. While Defendant’s responses to the Discovery Requests were timely, 

they were woefully incomplete. Defendant improperly lodged a series of 

boilerplate objections and despite Defendant’s obligation to do produce 

responsive documents, Defendant wholly failed and refused to produce 

any documents.

4. On or about October 28, 2022, in an effort to resolve the discovery 

dispute at hand, Plaintiff notified defense counsel of the deficiencies in 

the responses and requested that Defendant immediately cure the same. 

5. Over the next few months, the parties were unable to meaningfully 

confer in greater detail about to what extent, if any, Defendant would be 

supplementing and/or amending its responses to become compliant with 

its discovery obligations under the Rules. Finally, after numerous 

attempts to convince defense counsel to produce documents, 

undersigned counsel made one final effort on February 4, 2023 via email, 

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wherein undersigned counsel specified the relevance of each request as 

it/they relate to the issues in the case, as well as the inapplicability of 

the objections raised by Defendant. Moreover, undersigned counsel 

offered to shorten the look back period in hopes that would alleviate 

some of Defendant’s concerns and documents would be forthcoming.

6. Finally, on February 15, 2023, Defendant produce a measly 284 pages 

of document; many of which are duplicative. Defendant qualified its 

production by insisting that it would only produce documents as late as 

late 2021, well after the events giving rise to this lawsuit began to 

unfold.

7. On February 21, 2023, undersigned counsel sent defense counsel a 

follow up email advising that the February 15th document production 

remained incomplete and requesting confirmation as to if and when 

supplemental documents would be forthcoming. Undersigned counsel 

never received a response.

8. On March 8, 2023, undersigned counsel notified defense counsel that 

Plaintiff would be filing a motion to compel by the end of the week. Once 

again, no response. As set forth herein, Plaintiff has made every effort 

to resolve the pending discovery dispute(s) without the need for court 

intervention. Despite said attempts, Defendant continues to abuse the 

discovery process by brazenly withholding discoverable documents from 

Plaintiff in the face of proper and timely requests for the same. As such,

Plaintiff brings this Motion.

Dkt. No. 20 at 1-3 (cleaned up).

In response, Wells Fargo explains that

Plaintiff seeks to compel Wells Fargo with respect to Plaintiff’s Requests 

for Production of Documents and Other Tangible Items. However, Wells 

Fargo has already responded and objected to Plaintiff’s document 

requests, and Wells Fargo has produced documents to Plaintiff subject 

to Wells Fargo’s objections. In addition, Wells Fargo has filed its Motion 

to Dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss”) (Docs. 23, 25-26) demonstrating 

that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by, among other grounds, res judicata 

and collateral estoppel. This is Plaintiff’s second lawsuit against Wells 

Fargo and was filed only a few months after the first lawsuit was 

dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the Motion to Compel should 

be denied. 

Dkt. No. 29 at 1.

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Legal Standards and Analysis

The Court has previously laid out standards that govern a Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 37(a) motion to compel as to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 requests 

for production, and the Court incorporates and will apply, but will not repeat, those 

standards here. See VeroBlue Farms USA Inc. v. Wulf, ___ F.R.D. ____, No. 3:19-cv764-X, 2021 WL 5176839, at *5-*9 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2021); Lopez v. Don Herring 

Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 573-86 (N.D. Tex. 2018).

I. Objections based on pending motion to dismiss and case’s merits

Wells Fargo asserts that Mahalingam’s claims fail as a matter of law and “are 

barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel,” explaining that

Plaintiff filed his previous lawsuit against Wells Fargo on July 19, 2019, 

asserting nebulous claims relating to alleged problems on his mortgage 

escrow account. Ultimately, the Dallas County Court at Law granted 

Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary Judgment, from which Plaintiff did 

not appeal. The Dallas County Court at Law’s summary judgment 

against Plaintiff is a final, non-appealable judgment. See Brief in 

Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 23 at pp. 6-10). 

Plaintiff’s instant lawsuit was filed less than three months after the 

state court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and motion for 

new trial. Doc. 23 at p. 4. Yet the instant lawsuit asserts the same 

nebulous claims about the subject mortgage account. See id. Indeed, the 

most recent action by Wells Fargo cited in the instant second lawsuit 

was allegedly taken on October 6, 2021 – more than one month before 

the state court granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo in 

the first lawsuit. Id. In sum, Plaintiff’s current lawsuit is barred by the 

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Doc. 23 at pp. 6-10. 

Wells Fargo cited these bases for objection in its Responses and 

Objections. See Doc. 20-1 at ¶ 6.

Moreover, the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff in the instant 

lawsuit – breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, 

and breach of contract – fail as a matter of law, as demonstrated in the 

Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 23 at pp. 10-17. 

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Under Texas law, Wells Fargo does not owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. 

Id. at pp. 10-11. Plaintiff’s purported claim for negligent 

misrepresentation does not concern a representation made for the 

guidance of Plaintiff in his business, and in any event that claim is 

barred by the economic loss rule and failure to plead reliance. Id. at pp. 

12-14. The fraud claim fails under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 and also under the 

economic loss rule. Id. at pp. 15-16. The breach of contract claim is 

likewise fatally defective. Id. at pp. 16-17. As a result, the Motion to 

Compel should be denied. 

Dkt. No. 29 at 6-7.

If Wells Fargo prevails on its assertions regarding res judicata and collateral 

estoppel, the Court could dismiss Mahalingam’s entire case.

But the Court has not yet done so. At this point, Mahalingam has “a live 

pleading that alleges ... pending ... claim[s] unless and until the Court determines 

otherwise on a motion or after trial.” Nerium Skincare, Inc. v. Olson, No. 3:16-cv1217-B, 2017 WL 277634, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2017) (cleaned up), objections 

overruled sub nom. Nerium SkinCare, Inc. v. Nerium Int’l, LLC, No. 3:16-cv-1217-B, 

2017 WL 9934881 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2017).

Wells Fargo did not move to stay all discovery pending a ruling on its motion 

to dismiss. And “no federal rule, statute, or binding case law applies [] to 

automatically stay discovery pending a ruling on ... a [Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”; rather, “such a stay is the exception rather 

than the rule.” Id. (cleaned up). Neither did Wells Fargo move for a Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(c) protective order against any discovery based on its pending 

motion to dismiss or otherwise.

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Wells Fargo instead refused to engage in discovery relevant to Mahalingam’s 

pending claims because Wells Fargo believes that it should prevail on its assertions 

regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel and on Mahalingam’s claims’ merits 

and that the Court will agree and grant its motion to dismiss. Apparently on those 

grounds (as well as other objections), in Defendant’s Objections and Responses to 

Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents and Other Tangible Items, Wells 

Fargo states that it “will not produce documents in response to Request” Nos. 1-34 –

that is, every request that Mahalingam served. Dkt. No. 20-1 at 4-19 of 20.

And Wells Fargo now defends against the MTC not by asserting that the Court 

should stay discovery pending what could be a favorable ruling on Wells Fargo’s 

motion to dismiss but rather by asserting that the Court should declare in the context 

of this discovery motion that Mahalingam’s claims will fail on one or all of the grounds 

that Wells Fargo asserts.

But “the Court will not engage in a preemptive merits analysis to determine 

whether [Mahalingam] is entitled to discovery on the claim that [he] has pleaded and 

is pursuing.” Randstad Gen. Ptr. (US), LLC v. Beacon Hill Staffing Grp., LLC, No. 

3:20-cv-2814-N-BN, 2021 WL 4319673, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) (cleaned up).

Under these circumstances, Wells Fargo “cannot refuse to engage in – and 

should not be excused from being subjected to – discovery simply because the 

discovery is relevant to a claim on which [Wells Fargo, as] the resisting party[,] 

believes that [it] will or should prevail.” Id.

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II. Specific objections and responses to requests

A. Boilerplate objections

In response to Mahalingam’s complaining that Wells Fargo served boilerplate 

objections to his requests, Wells Fargo argues that it “has responded to Plaintiff’s 

requests for production with detailed objections,” asserting that “Plaintiff’s document 

requests are overbroad, neither relevant to any party’s claim or defense nor 

proportional to the needs of the case, and harassing” and “are phrased in an overbroad 

and harassing manner and do not reflect any attempt at all to precisely state specific 

documents requested.” Dkt. No. 29.

The Court cannot agree with Wells Fargo’s assessment of its objections.

In Defendant’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production 

of Documents and Other Tangible Items, Wells Fargo begins with a list of 

“Incorporated Objections,” at the end of which it asserts that “[e]ach specific response 

or answer set forth below is made expressly subject to and without waiving the 

objections set forth above.” Dkt. No. 20-1 at 1-4 of 20. Its responses to all 34 requests 

then begin with “In addition to the Incorporated Objections.” Id. at 4-19 of 20. 

Among the general “Incorporated Objections,” Wells Fargo objects as “vague 

and ambiguous” to Mahalingam’s requests’ definitions of “Loan” (“The term ‘Loan’ 

shall mean the Wells Fargo loan number 0490314523”) and “Property” (“The term 

‘Property’ shall mean the real property commonly known as 4110 Admirality Way, 

Irving, Texas 75061”). Id. at 3 of 20; Dkt. No. 20-2 at 2 of 9.

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Along with the issues with including “multiple ‘general objections’ [that] are 

incorporated into many of the responses with no attempt to show the application of 

each objection to the particular request,” a “party objecting to discovery as vague or 

ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity”; “must explain the 

specific and particular way in which a request is vague”; “should exercise reason and 

common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized in 

interrogatories”; “[i]f necessary to clarify its answers, ... may include any reasonable 

definition of the term or phrase at issue”; and, “[should] attempt to obtain clarification 

[by conferring with the requesting party] prior to objecting on this ground.” Heller v. 

City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 483, 491-92 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (cleaned up).

Wells Fargo has done none of that, and the definitions of “Loan” and “Property” 

– which are based on a loan number and an exact address – are not “so vague or 

ambiguous as to be incapable of reasonable interpretation and to prohibit [Wells 

Fargo’s] responses.” Id. at 492.

Then, in response to the 31 specific requests at issue here, Wells Fargo asserted 

some combination of the following objections “[i]n addition to the Incorporated 

Objections”:

• “Defendant objects to [this Request] on the grounds it is overbroad by 

requesting ‘all communications and documents.’”

• “Defendant objects for [or to the] lack of a defined timeframe.”

• “Defendant further objects to [this Request] on the grounds it calls for 

information that is not relevant, not proportional to the needs of the 

case, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence.”

• “This appears to be a formulaic, harassing discovery request.”

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• “Defendant objects that the request is overbroad, unduly burdensome, 

vague and ambiguous.”

• “Defendant objects to this request because it seeks documents that are 

equally available to Plaintiff.”

• “Defendant further objects that mere communications with other 

parties have no relevance to any claim or defense in this case.”‘

• “Defendant objects that discovery concerning any ‘third-party’ is not 

relevant, because Plaintiff has not alleged a claim concerning a ‘thirdparty.’”

• “Defendant objects that the use of the term ‘third-party’ is over broad, 

unduly burdensome and vague because ‘third-party’ is not a defined 

term.”

• “Defendant objects to [this Request] on the grounds it is overbroad.”

• “Defendant objects that this request violates the parol evidence rule and 

the statute of frauds.”

• “Defendant further objects that this Request is overly burdensome, an 

invasion of privacy, vague and ambiguous.”

• “Defendant also objects that this Request is overbroad and unduly 

burdensome.”

• “Defendant objects to [this Request] on the grounds it calls for 

information that is not relevant, not proportionate to the needs of the 

case, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence, overbroad, and unduly burdensome.”

• “Defendant objects that this Request is unduly burdensome and 

overbroad.”

• “Defendant objects on the grounds it seeks disclosure of confidential and 

proprietary business information.”

• “Defendant objects to [this Request] on the grounds it is overbroad by 

requesting ‘all documents.’”

• “Defendant objects that the Request is unduly burdensome, vague and 

ambiguous.”

• “Defendant further objects to [this Request] on grounds that it calls for 

the disclosure of confidential and proprietary information.”

Dkt. No. 20-1 at 4-19 of 20.

These objections are all unsupported boilerplate and are invalid based on Wells 

Fargo’s failing to make the objections “with specificity” and “to explain and support 

[its] objections.” VeroBlue, 2021 WL 5176839, at *7 (cleaned up). For objections that 

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deserve the label “boilerplate,” counsel’s repeating them in response to more than one 

discovery request is not the problem; counsel’s failing to explain the basis for them as 

to each individual discovery request is. See id. (“Boilerplate objections are those that 

utilize standardized text or ready-made or all-purpose language, but copying and 

pasting an objection, by itself does not render that objection a boilerplate objection – 

rather, [o]bjections are typically deemed boilerplate when they are identical and not 

tailored to the specific discovery request.” (cleaned up)); see also Archer v. Kennedy, 

No. 3:21-cv-748-N, 2022 WL 17069122, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2022) (“The Court 

notes at the outset that the Archers advance several boilerplate objections that are 

not accompanied by an adequate explanation to resist discovery. The Archers’ 

responses merely state the grounds of overbreadth, vagueness, and undue burden 

without explaining what portions of the request are overbroad, what terms in the 

request lack a reasonable interpretation, or why producing responsive documents 

would require excessive expense.” (cleaned up)).

Again, Wells Fargo has not properly supported any of its vague and ambiguous 

objections – most of which do not identify what word or phrase in, or part of, a request 

Wells Fargo is directing the objection to. See Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 491-92.

As to relevance, the Court has explained that,

[u]nder Rule 26(b)(1), “[u]nless otherwise limited by court order, ... 

[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 

is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs 

of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the 

action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 

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resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 

discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of 

discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

“The 2015 amendments to Rule 26 deleted ‘from the definition of 

relevance information that appears ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence’ because ‘[t]he phrase has been used by 

some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery’ and ‘has continued to 

create problems’ given its ability to ‘swallow any other limitation on the 

scope of discovery.’’”

“Under Rule 26(b)(1), [as amended,] discoverable matter must be 

both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case – which are 

related but distinct requirements.” Samsung Electronics Am., Inc. v. 

Chung, 321 F.R.D. 250, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2017). “To be relevant under Rule 

26(b)(1), a document or information need not, by itself, prove or disprove 

a claim or defense or have strong probative force or value. If it were 

otherwise, it would make little sense for Rule 26(b)(1) to direct courts to 

consider whether discovery that is relevant to any party’s claim or 

defense is also important in resolving the issues.” Id. at 280.

Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 573 (cleaned up).

“In the Fifth Circuit, a party who opposes its opponent’s request for production 

[must] show specifically how ... each [request] is not relevant.” Maiden Biosciences, 

Inc. v. Document Sec. Sys., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-327-D, 2022 WL 7662658, at *2 (N.D. 

Tex. Oct. 13, 2022) (cleaned up).

Wells Fargo’s objections do not explain how the materials that each request 

seeks are irrelevant to the claims or defenses in this case or, for that matter, are not 

proportional to the needs of the case. See Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 585 (explaining that 

the burden is placed “on the party resisting discovery to – in order to successfully 

resist a motion to compel – specifically object and show that the requested discovery 

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does not fall within Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope of relevance (as now amended) or fails the 

required proportionality calculation or is otherwise objectionable”).

And Wells Fargo’s objections to discovery requests as seeking information that 

is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence have no 

basis in the Federal Rules because “[t]he 2015 amendments to Rule 26 deleted from 

the definition of relevance information that appears ‘reasonably calculated to lead to 

the discovery of admissible evidence.’” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 573 (cleaned up).

Neither does Wells Fargo explain how any request fails Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 34(b)(1)(A)’s reasonable particularity requirement or is otherwise so 

“formulaic” or “harassing” that the Court should not require Wells Fargo to respond. 

As the Court has explained, 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) provides that a request for 

production or inspection “must describe with reasonable particularity 

each item or category of items to be inspected” or produced. FED. R. CIV.

P. 34(b)(1)(A). The test for reasonable particularity is whether the 

request places the party upon ‘reasonable notice of what is called for and 

what is not. Therefore, the party requesting the production of documents 

must provide sufficient information to enable [the party to whom the 

request is directed] to identify responsive documents. The goal is that 

the description be sufficient to apprise a man of ordinary intelligence 

which documents are required.

This test, however, is a matter of degree depending on the 

circumstances of the case. But, although what qualifies as reasonabl[y] 

particular surely depends at least in part on the circumstances of each 

case, a discovery request should be sufficiently definite and limited in 

scope that it can be said to apprise a person of ordinary intelligence what 

documents are required and [to enable] the court ... to ascertain whether 

the requested documents have been produced. A Rule 34(a) request 

made with reasonable particularity does not require a reasonable 

attorney or party attempting to properly respond to ponder and to 

speculate in order to decide what is and what is not responsive.

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All-encompassing demands that do not allow a reasonable person 

to ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity 

standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A). For example, [b]road and undirected 

requests for all documents which relate in any way to the complaint do 

not meet Rule 34(b)(1)(A)’s standard. Similarly, [a] request for “all 

documents and records” that relate to “any of the issues,” while 

convenient, fails to set forth with reasonable particularity the items or 

category of items sought for [the responding party’s] identification and 

production of responsive documents.

Based on these rules, this Court has, for example, determined 

that an interrogatory asking a defendant to “[d]escribe in detail all facts, 

proof, or evidence which, in whole or in part, form the basis of any 

defendant or affirmative defenses pled in this lawsuit” is an improper, 

so-called blockbuster interrogatory. Likewise, the Court has sustained 

objections to Rule 34(a) requests for “[a]ll documents which evidence, 

describe, concern, or otherwise relate to the allegations in your 

Complaint” and “[a]ll documents not previously produced that support, 

contradict, or otherwise relate in any way to any of the allegations you 

have made in this lawsuit.”

Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 575-76, 577 (cleaned up). On the Court’s review of Mahalingam’s 

requests, no request fails Rule 34(b)(1)(A)’s standard.

As to overbreadth and undue burden, Wells Fargo’s objections fail to “explain 

the extent to which [each request] is overbroad and ... respond to the extent that it is 

not – and explain the scope of what [Wells Fargo] is ... responding to.” Heller, 303 

F.R.D. at 488. Neither does Wells Fargo “show how the requested discovery is overly 

broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering 

evidence revealing the nature of the burden.” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 580 (cleaned up). 

That, too, “makes [these] unsupported objection[s] nothing more than unsustainable 

boilerplate.” Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 490.

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Wells Fargo does not explain how a discovery request could violate “the parol 

evidence rule and the statute of frauds” when “[i]nformation within [Rule 26(b)(1)’s] 

scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 26(b)(1).

Wells Fargo has refused “to produce documents that [it] claim[s] are ... equally 

available to [Mahalingam]” but, “again, ha[s] not supported this objection, and the 

Court does not find the [objected-to] request[s] to be improper under Rule 26(b)(1) 

without some showing by” Wells Fargo. Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta, 178 F. 

Supp. 3d 476, 508 (N.D. Tex. 2016), objections overruled, No. 3:13-cv-2110-KS, 2016 

WL 5942223 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2016). 

Neither has Wells Fargo explained or supported its objections that some 

requests seek disclosure of confidential and proprietary information or otherwise 

invade Wells Fargo’s privacy. And, even if these objections were not invalid on that 

basis, a confidentiality-based protective order will generally address any concerns as 

to confidential and proprietary information. See Samsung, 321 F.R.D. at 294.

And, through its “Incorporated Objections,” Wells Fargo responded to all the 

requests “subject to and without waiving the objections set forth above.” Dkt. No. 20-1 

at 4 of 20. But responding “‘subject to’ and ‘without waiving’ objections is improper, 

as the undersigned and many other judges in this circuit and elsewhere have now 

made clear for several years.” VeroBlue, 2021 WL 5176839, at *8 (cleaned up).

All of Wells Fargo’s objections are overruled as unsupported boilerplate, for the 

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reasons that the Court explained above.

And, even if they were not, Wells Fargo’s objections are waived insofar as Wells 

Fargo did not urge those objections and “argue[] in support [of them] in responding 

to the MTC.” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 592.

But, in its response to the MTC, Wells Fargo did argue in support of some 

objections as to certain requests. And, “under Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), a 

court can – and must – limit proposed discovery that it determines is not proportional 

to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the 

action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, 

the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 

whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit 

– and the court must do so even in the absence of a motion.” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 583.

So the Court now turns to the specific requests at issue and Wells Fargo’s 

arguments in support of certain objections.

B. Request Nos. 1-4 & 14-34

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and 

Plaintiff regarding the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and 

Plaintiff regarding the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and 

Plaintiff regarding the Loan File.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Copy of all agreements – whether 

formal or informal – between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Plaintiff.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Copies of all notices You sent to 

Plaintiff regarding the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Copies of all notices You sent to 

Plaintiff regarding the Loan File.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Copies of all notices You sent to 

Plaintiff regarding the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Copies of all notices You sent to 

Plaintiff regarding any escrow accounts maintained and/or managed by You in 

connection with the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: All communications and 

documents received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and Plaintiff regarding any escrow accounts You maintained or managed 

in connection with the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: All communications and 

documents received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and any third-party regarding any escrow accounts You maintained or 

managed in connection with the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Copies of all property tax 

payments/disbursements You made and/or issued from any escrow account 

You maintain or manage in connection with the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Copies of all insurance 

payments/disbursements You made and/or issued to any third-party from any 

escrow account you maintain or manage in connection with the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: Copies of all 

payments/disbursements You made on Plaintiff’s behalf with funds escrowed 

in connection with the Property or the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Copies of any and all refunds 

and/or disbursements You made to Plaintiff during the life of the Loan for 

escrow overages.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: Copies of any and all requests You 

received from Plaintiff to modify the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25: Copies of any and all requests or 

notices You received from Plaintiff seeking to refinance the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26: Copies of any and all requests or 

notices You received from Plaintiff seeking to refinance the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27: All communications and 

documents received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and Plaintiff regarding alleged late payments on the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: All communications and 

documents received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and any third-party regarding alleged late payments on the Loan.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29: All communications and 

documents received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and any credit bureaus regarding alleged late payments on the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30: All communications and 

documents received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and any third-party credit agencies regarding alleged late payments on 

the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31: Copies of any and all internal 

policies or procedures You follow to reconcile escrow accounts maintain by 

Wells Fargo customers.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32: Copies of any and all documents 

reflecting, referencing or substantiating that You reconciled Plaintiff’s escrow 

account(s).

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: Copies of any and all internal 

policies or procedures You follow to ensure Wells Fargo customer escrow 

accounts are sufficiently funded each year.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34: Copies of any and all documents 

reflecting, referencing or substantiating that You took steps to ensure that 

Plaintiff’s escrow account with Wells Fargo was sufficiently funded each year.

In response to the MTC, Wells Fargo argues:

The requests are overbroad as to timeframe. The subject 

loan was originated in January 2016. See, e.g., Doc. 26 at App. 012. 

Plaintiff filed his first lawsuit against Wells Fargo in July 2019, and 

that lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice in November 2021. See Doc. 

23 at pp. 1, 3; Doc. 26 at App. 213. However, the requests for production 

served by Plaintiff in the instant lawsuit (which is his second lawsuit 

against Wells Fargo) are unlimited as to scope of time – in the form that 

they were served on Wells Fargo. The Definitions and Instructions to 

the requests do not state a timeframe. Doc. 20-2 at pp. 1-5. The requests 

themselves are unlimited as to timeframe. Id. at pp. 6-9. Wells Fargo 

has produced its correspondence with Plaintiff dated after the dismissal 

of the state court lawsuit, and Plaintiff acknowledges this. See, e.g., 

Motion to Compel at p. 6. Documents dated before the dismissal of the 

previous lawsuit are irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of this 

case. [Wells Fargo produced documents dated after the dismissal of the 

previous lawsuit out of an abundance of caution and without waiving its 

argument that all of the claims in Plaintiff’s current lawsuit are barred 

by the dismissal of the previous lawsuit with prejudice.] During the 

parties’ communications concerning Wells Fargo’s objections, Plaintiff 

at one time offered to limit the scope of time of certain of the requests to 

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begin at January 2017 or January 2018. See App. 06-07. The Motion to 

Compel does not appear to refer to this offer. In any event, even with 

that proffered timeframe, Plaintiff’s document requests seek documents 

dated years before the dismissal of the previous lawsuit. The Motion to 

Compel should be denied.

The requests are overbroad as to subject matter. In 

addition, the requests are broadbrush and do not even attempt to relate 

to the allegations pleaded in this, Plaintiff’s second lawsuit against 

Wells Fargo. Instead, Plaintiff asks for what amounts to the entirety of 

Wells Fargo’s files concerning Plaintiff and the subject loan. See, e.g., 

Request for Production No. 1 (“All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between [Wells Fargo] and 

Plaintiff regarding the Loan”) (Doc. 20-1 at p. 4) (emphasis added); 

Request for Production No. 3 (“All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between [Wells Fargo] and 

Plaintiff regarding the Loan File”) (id. at p. 5) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, Wells Fargo objected, and Plaintiff has not provided an 

explanation as to how such broadbrush requests are proportional to the 

needs of the instant second lawsuit.

....

Documents related to the origination of the subject loan 

are not relevant to the instant lawsuit. Plaintiff in his second 

lawsuit against Wells Fargo does not complain about the origination of 

the subject loan. See generally Doc. 1-4. Moreover, Plaintiff has proposed 

that the requests for production be limited in time going back to 2017 or 

2018. App. 06-07. This timeframe proposed by Plaintiff is a timeframe 

covering a period long after the origination of this loan, which was in 

2016. Motion to Compel at ¶ 1. Nonetheless, multiple requests for 

production ask for documents related to the closing of the loan. See, e.g., 

Requests for Production No. 11 (“all closing documents”), 12 (“the title 

commitment”), 13 (“the lender’s title policy”), Doc. 20-1 at pp. 9-10 

(emphasis added). These requests are not specifically referenced in the 

Motion to Compel, see Doc. 20 at pp. 6-7, and it is not clear whether 

Plaintiff seeks to compel such production. However, Requests Nos. 1-4 

are so broad as to implicate the origination of the loan, and those 

requests are specifically referenced in the Motion to Compel.

The requests seek documentation as to policies and 

procedures without reason. Plaintiff also requests documentation 

concerning Wells Fargo’s policies and procedures without any showing 

of relevance or proportionality. See, e.g., Requests for Production Nos. 

31, 33 (Doc. 20-1 at pp. 18-19). Plaintiff does not allege claims concerning 

other customers or other loans. These requests are harassing and 

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overbroad, and they improperly seek confidential and proprietary 

documents. Moreover, these requests are invasive of privacy rights. The 

outrageousness of these requests is highlighted by the fact that the last 

specific act of Wells Fargo alleged in the instant lawsuit was in October 

2021 – which was more than one month before the state court granted 

summary judgment dismissing the first lawsuit with prejudice. Doc. 23 

at p. 4.

Wells Fargo’s objections to the requests for production should be 

sustained.

Dkt. No. 29 at 2-3, 4-5 (cleaned up).

Wells Fargo appears to base its objections to producing documents dated before 

the prior lawsuit’s dismissal on its assumption that the Court will agree that res 

judicata and collateral estoppel bar Mahalingam’s claims. But the Court has not 

determined that yet. And Wells Fargo does not otherwise explain how “[d]ocuments 

dated before the dismissal of the previous lawsuit are irrelevant and not proportional 

to the needs of this case.”

Wells Fargo also complains that Mahalingam “asks for what amounts to the 

entirety of Wells Fargo’s files concerning Plaintiff and the subject loan,” but 

Mahalingam’s allegations in his live complaint cover the entire life of the loan.

And, even if Mahalingam has not explained how these requests are 

proportional to the needs of this case, neither has Wells Fargo provided the Court 

with information to assess, for example, the parties’ relative access to this 

information and the burden or expense that Wells Fargo would incur to produce its 

entire files on this one customer and his one loan. See Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 584 (“Rule 

26(g)(1) does not impose on a party filing a motion to compel the burden to show 

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relevance and proportionality in the first instance..... [And] Rule 26(b)(1) does not 

place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality 

considerations. While it is a good practice for a movant to explain the relevance and 

proportionality of its discovery requests, and while a failure to appropriately address 

Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors may be determinative in a proportionality 

analysis and result in the motion to compel being denied on its merits, [t]he parties 

and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all 

discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes[.] Thus, a party seeking to 

resist discovery on Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) grounds still bears the 

burden of making a specific objection and showing that any discovery request that is 

relevant to any party’s claim or defense fails the proportionality calculation mandated 

by Rule 26(b) by coming forward with specific information to address – insofar as that 

information is available to it – the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the 

amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 

parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 

whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” 

(cleaned up)).

Considering the possible importance of these files to Mahalingam’s claims and 

what appears to the Wells Fargo’s greater access to its own files and failure to point 

to any burden involved in producing the requested documents, the Court finds that 

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the materials that Mahalingam seeks through Request Nos. 1-10 and 14-34 are 

proportional to the needs of the case – with two exceptions.

On this record, the internal policies and procedures that Mahalingam seeks 

through Request Nos. 31 and 33 do not appear to be proportional to the needs of the 

case, considering the importance of that information to the claims alleged, and the 

Court will deny the MTC as to those two requests.

C. Request Nos. 5-10

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and 

third-party regarding the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and 

third-party regarding the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: All communications and documents 

received from, sent to, and exchanged between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and 

third-party regarding the Loan File.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: All communications, documents, or 

other tangible items or exchanged with any third party regarding all 

agreements – whether formal or informal – between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

and Plaintiff regarding the Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: All communications, documents, or 

other tangible items or exchanged with any third party regarding all 

agreements – whether formal or informal – between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

and Plaintiff regarding the Loan.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: All communications, documents, or 

other tangible items or exchanged with any third party regarding all 

agreements – whether formal or informal – between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

and Plaintiff regarding the Loan File.

In response to the MTC, Wells Fargo argues:

The requests for no reason seek communications with 

third parties. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks documents concerning 

communications between Wells Fargo and third parties. However, the 

third parties are neither named nor identified, and moreover Plaintiff 

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provides no indication of the relevance of such communications to 

Plaintiff’s second lawsuit against Wells Fargo. See e.g., Request for 

Production No. 6 (“All communications and documents received from, 

sent to, and exchanged between [Wells Fargo] and third-party regarding 

the Loan”), id. at p. 6 (emphasis added); Request for Production No. 9 

(“All communications, documents, or other tangible items or [sic] 

exchanged with any third party regarding all agreements – whether 

formal or informal – between [Wells Fargo] and Plaintiff regarding the 

Loan”), id. at p. 8 (emphasis added). See also Requests for Production 

Nos. 5, 7, 8, 10, 19, 28-30. The instant lawsuit has a vague reference to 

alleged communications with credit bureaus, but no cause of action is 

asserted regarding such alleged communications. See Haritharan 

Mahalingam’s Original Petition at ¶ 14 (Doc. 1-4). In addition to lacking 

relevance to the claims asserted by Plaintiff in this lawsuit and being 

completely out of proportion to the allegations made by Plaintiff in his 

pleading, these requests are overbroad, unduly burdensome, harassing 

and invasive of privacy.

Dkt. No. 29 at 4.

Mahalingam’s claims are based in part on Wells Fargo’s communications about 

his loan and other related matters, including communications that Wells Fargo may 

have had with third parties. See Dkt. No. 1-4 at 5-9 of 11.

The Court finds that Request Nos. 5-10 seek information that would be 

sufficiently relevant to the claims at issue and proportional to the needs of the case 

to fall within Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope of discovery. See McGowan v. S. Methodist Univ., 

No. 3:18-cv-141-N, 2023 WL 2920848, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2023) (“Courts 

construe relevance broadly, as a document need not, by itself, prove or disprove a 

claim or defense or have strong probative force to be relevant.”).

D. Incomplete production

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2) requires that “[a]n objection must 

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state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that 

objection” and so reflects that “[o]bjections must have a consequence” – that is, that 

parties should only object where the “objection ... preclude[s] or prevent[s] a response, 

at least in part,” and “the request is truly objectionable” because “the information or 

documents sought are not properly discoverable under the Federal Rules.” VeroBlue, 

2021 WL 5176839, at *7, *8, *27 (cleaned up). Rule 34(b), “in combination with 

[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(1)],” is written and structured as it is “so that 

both the requesting party and the court may be assured that all responsive, nonprivileged materials are being produced, except to the extent a valid objection has 

been made.” Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487 (cleaned up).

Wells Fargo, in its Objections and Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for 

Production of Documents and Other Tangible Items, does state that it “will not 

produce documents in response to Request” Nos. 1-10 and 14-34 – that is, every 

request at issue in this MTC. Dkt. No. 20-1 at 4-19 of 20.

But, in response to the MTC, Wells Fargo asserts that it has produced 

documents and explains that, after it

served its responses and objections to Plaintiff’s requests for production, 

Plaintiff alleged deficiencies in the responses. The parties exchanged 

emails over several months. See generally Appendix. Communications 

between the parties were prolonged due to Plaintiff counsel’s medical 

leave in the fall of 2022. Doc. 13; Doc. 15 at ¶ 3. In communications with 

Plaintiff about the requests for production, Wells Fargo noted, among 

other things, that the requests sought the complete loan file, even 

though the instant lawsuit did not concern the origination of the loan, 

App. 02, and that the instant lawsuit did not concern third parties or 

credit reporting, yet the requests for production also sought such 

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documents. Id. Plaintiff proposed that the timeframe for the requests 

begin in January 2017 or January 2018 – but that is still more than 

three years before the dismissal of Plaintiff’s previous lawsuit against 

Wells Fargo asserting the same claims that are now pleaded in the 

instant lawsuit. The dismissal of the first lawsuit was in November 

2021. App.07-08; Doc. 26 at App. 213.

After communications with Plaintiff’s counsel, and in a good faith 

effort to try to limit potential discovery disputes, on February 15, 2023, 

Defendant produced more than 280 pages of documents in response to 

Plaintiff’s requests. Wells Fargo produced loan correspondence dated 

after the dismissal of Plaintiff’s first lawsuit and before the filing of the 

instant lawsuit. Wells Fargo also produced publicly filed loan 

documents. App. 12. [As set forth in the Brief in Support of Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss, the current lawsuit is barred in its entirety by the 

doctrine of res judicata, including claims that could have been asserted 

in Plaintiff’s first lawsuit. Doc. 23 at pp. 6-9. Nonetheless, out of an 

abundance of caution, Wells Fargo produced documents dated after the 

dismissal of the first lawsuit. See supra.] Plaintiff now complains about 

this being a “measly” production, but Plaintiff fails to address that the 

current lawsuit was filed less than three months after dismissal of the 

first lawsuit. Plaintiff also fails to address that the most recent action of 

Wells Fargo cited in the current lawsuit is in October 2021 – more than 

one month before the first lawsuit was dismissed. Additionally, Plaintiff 

fails to acknowledge that in the current lawsuit Plaintiff complains 

about the same matters that were the subject of the first lawsuit. See

Doc. 23 at pp. 4, 6-10. The Motion to Compel should be denied. 

Dkt. No. 29 at 5-6 (cleaned up).

That is, Wells Fargo is defending its actual – but incomplete – production to 

date as sufficient based on its views that Mahalingam’s claims will fail on the merits 

or on res judicata grounds and on its views of the proper scope of discovery.

But the Court has already addressed those arguments and is not persuaded 

that they provide any basis to excuse Wells Fargo from its further discovery 

obligations.

III. Award of Expenses and Sanctions

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Finally, after carefully reviewing the parties’ arguments as to awarding 

expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5), and considering all of the 

circumstances here and the Court’s rulings above, the Court determines that, under 

Rule 37(a)(5)(C), the parties will bear their own expenses, including attorneys’ fees, 

in connection with the MTC.

But Wells Fargo’s approach to objecting to and refusing to produce materials 

in response to Mahalingam’s discovery requests required this MTC. The Court does 

not know what led Wells Fargo’s counsel to draft the objections as they did: whether 

it was relying on outdated forms for objections, or falling into “a practice of objecting 

to discovery requests reflexively – but not reflectively – and without a factual basis,” 

or something else. Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 477.

As the Court noted almost a decade ago, “[t]he practice of asserting objections 

and then answering ‘subject to’ and/or ‘without waiving’ the objections – like the 

practice of including a stand-alone list of general or blanket objections that precede 

any responses to specific discovery requests – may have developed as a reflexive habit 

passed on from one attorney to another without any attorney giving serious thought 

or reflection as to what this manner of responding means or could hope to accomplish 

as to a particular discovery request.” Id. at 486.

“[T]he Court again reminds counsel that they must cease and desist from 

raising these free-standing and purportedly universally applicable ‘general 

objections’ in responding to discovery requests and that [d]eploying these general 

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objections in this manner is ... inconsistent with the Federal Rules and is not 

warranted by existing law.” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 591-92 (cleaned up).

And “failing to follow the Federal Rules’ and case law’s requirements for 

specificity in objecting and responding and answering, as well as correspondingly 

answering or responding ‘subject to’ and ‘without waiving’ those objections, is 

improper, as the undersigned and many other judges in this circuit and elsewhere 

have now made clear for several years.” State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Freehold Mgmt., 

Inc., No. 3:16-cv-2255-L, 2018 WL 3548866, at *13 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018). These 

“are practices that attorneys must stop.” VeroBlue, 2021 WL 5176839, at *30.

“As all the courts have said over and over, boilerplate objections are, 

essentially, nothing more than autonomic responses from attorneys and are 

ineffective. .... [And], just because boilerplate objections have a long history does not 

mean that the continued warnings and holdings of all the courts are to be ignored.” 

VeroBlue, 2021 WL 5176839, at *30 (cleaned up).

The Court has warned that counsel who fail to comply the Federal Rules’ and 

case law’s requirements for discovery responses and objections may face sanctions –

including under Rule 26(g)(3) – and does so here again. See VeroBlue, 2021 WL 

5176839, at *30; Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 600; State Auto., 2018 WL 3548866, at *13;

Firebirds Int’l, LLC v. Firebird Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-2719-B, 2018 WL 

3655574, at *18 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2018); Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487, 490, 494-95; see 

also Baker v. Walters, No. 3:22-cv-552-M, 2023 WL 2752844, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 

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31, 2023) (awarding expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) to 

plaintiffs based on an order granting a motion to compel when, among other things, 

“Defendants’ objections to all 59 requests in Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for 

Production to Defendants are unsupported boilerplate and are invalid based on 

Defendants’ failing to make the objections with specificity and to explain and support 

their objections,” as explained in Baker v. Walters, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 3:22-cv552-M, 2023 WL 424788 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2023)).

Conclusion

For the reasons and to the extent explained above, the Court grants in part 

and denies in part Plaintiff Haritharan Mahalingam’s Motion to Compel Production 

of Documents and Motion for Rulings on Objections [Dkt. No. 20] and orders 

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to, by Monday, June 5, 2023, serve on Plaintiff 

Haritharan Mahalingam complete written responses – without objections – to 

Request Nos. 1-10, 14-30, 32, and 34 in Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production 

and produce all unproduced, non-privileged documents and electronically stored 

information that are responsive to Request Nos. 1-10, 14-30, 32, and 34 in Plaintiff’s 

First Set of Requests for Production and that are in Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A.’s possession, custody, or control, in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 34(b)’s requirements, as explained above and laid out in VeroBlue, 2021 

WL 5176839, at *6-*9, and Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 575-79.

SO ORDERED.

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DATED: May 19, 2023

_________________________________________

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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