1

Filed 7/16/21 P. v. Vanegas CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO VANEGAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A158717

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CR020927)

A jury convicted Antonio Vanegas of committing multiple sexual 

offenses against his stepdaughter, Jane Doe, when she was between 11 and 

14 years old. Vanegas argues his convictions should be reversed due to 

several evidentiary errors. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The prosecution charged Vanegas with 14 felony counts of sexual 

abuse, which included rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, against Jane. The 

jury convicted Vanegas of 10 counts that occurred when Jane was 14 years 

old or younger, and acquitted him of the four counts alleged to have occurred 

when she was 10 years old or younger. The trial court sentenced Vanegas to 

state prison.
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A.

Prosecution Evidence

Jane, who was 17 years old at the time of trial, was born in 2001 to 

parents outside the United States. Jane’s parents ended their relationship 

soon after she was born. Jane’s mother began dating Vanegas in November 

2002. Jane’s mother and Vanegas married in 2004; soon after, Jane’s halfsister was born. In 2008, the family moved to California.

1. Sexual Abuse of Jane

In 2010, Jane’s mother began working at night. Although the girls had 

their own bedroom, mother would leave the house with the children lying in 

the bed she shared with Vanegas, watching movies; when she would return in 

the early mornings, the children were often still in bed with him.

Jane and her family lived in a few different places while she was 

growing up, and she recalled Vanegas’s sexual conduct in relation to where 

the family lived at the time. In 2011, the family moved to a blue townhouse 

in Hayward. Soon after moving into the townhouse, Jane’s half-brother was 

born. In 2012, Jane’s aunt and uncle moved into the garage of the 

townhouse, along with their son and daughter.

Jane remembered that Vanegas touched her in a sexual way in the blue 

townhouse. One night she woke up when she felt “a hand go around” her. 

Jane realized it was Vanegas’s hand, which he slid down to her vagina. 

Vanegas started to rub both the outside and inside of Jane’s vagina, and she 

“froze” in response. Vanegas then pulled Jane’s pants and underwear down 

to her knees and “put his penis inside [her] vagina.” While Vanegas was 

penetrating Jane, he held and moved her body against his and made a 

“shhhh” noise to her. Although the penetration caused Jane pain, she 

complied and stayed quiet. Vanegas’s body movements became “harder and 
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harder” until he stopped and withdrew his penis from Jane’s vagina, at which 

point she “felt . . . something wet on” her “butt cheeks.”

Jane went to the bathroom and “tried to pee,” but urinating hurt and 

she noticed blood on the toilet paper when she wiped herself. Jane then went 

to sleep in her own bedroom, leaving her sister in the bed with Vanegas. 

While the family lived in the blue townhouse, Vanegas abused Jane on many 

more occasions, essentially repeating the same sequence of sexual acts. 

Although Jane did not “want to be having sex with” Vanegas, she did not 

express her feelings to him because “he was very violent” and she “was 

scared” of him.

In 2013, when Jane was 11 years old, she and her extended family 

moved to a four-bedroom house in Hayward. Jane’s mother and brother, and 

Vanegas stayed in one bedroom; Jane and her sister in a second bedroom; 

uncle and aunt in a third bedroom; and their children in the fourth bedroom. 

At this house the pattern of abuse was the same: Vanegas would penetrate 

Jane’s vagina with his fingers and then his penis while the two laid beside 

one another in the bed; Jane did not ask him to stop because she was afraid 

of him.

In January 2014, Jane’s mother told Vanegas she wanted a divorce and 

he moved to an apartment. Jane’s mother and Vanegas agreed to share 

custody of the children; Jane and her two siblings spent three nights per 

week with Vanegas at his apartment. Sometimes Jane’s cousin also spent 

the night there.

The same pattern of sexual abuse occurred at Vanegas’s apartment. 

When Jane was 12 years old, Vanegas “started to introduce more sex acts.”

On “four or five” occasions Vanegas tried to place his penis in Jane’s mouth, 

using his hand to guide her head and occasionally succeeding despite her 
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efforts to keep her mouth closed. Vanegas also “licked . . . [Jane’s] vagina”

after using his hands to pry apart her legs. “[A]round four or five” times, 

Vanegas “tried to put . . . his penis in [Jane’s] butt,” and he actually 

succeeded twice in placing his penis “in between [her] butt cheeks.” And 

Vanegas “sometimes . . . would just . . . grab [her] hand and . . . put it on top 

of his penis,” using his other hand to “have [her] hand rub his penis.”

When Jane was in seventh grade, Vanegas became concerned that he 

might have impregnated her. At one point, Vanegas told Jane to “pee in a 

cup” in his bathroom. As Jane was urinating, she noticed a pregnancy test in 

the bathroom. She gave Vanegas the cup of urine and left the bathroom as 

he went inside. When Vanegas came out of the bathroom, he was “really 

emotional,” “crying” and telling Jane he was “sorry.” Jane had not considered 

reporting Vanegas’s abuse because she “felt embarrassed and . . . it was nasty 

to . . . even share with anybody.” She was also worried that her siblings 

would either be angry at her or not believe her account of the abuse.

Jane testified that sometime after the pregnancy test, Vanegas had her 

lie on her back, inserted two small white pills into her vagina, and had her 

place her “legs up against the wall.” After the pill insertion, Jane suffered 

serious abdominal cramping—far worse than normal menstrual cramps—and 

“felt really weak.” She “started to bleed really heav[il]y,” expelling “big clots” 

of blood from her vagina. Jane’s pain and weakness lasted another day, and 

she continued to bleed “three to four more days.” A “month or two” later, 

Vanegas again inserted two small pills into Jane’s vagina and had her place 

her legs up against the wall. Jane experienced “the same symptoms all over 

again” for the same duration of time.

In 2015, Jane’s mother decided Jane, then 13 years old, should stop 

having overnight visits with Vanegas, but Jane’s half siblings continued to
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have overnights with him. Vanegas cried and was upset when he learned 

that Jane was no longer going to stay with him. Jane’s interactions with 

Vanegas from then on were mostly brief and “awkward.” At some point, 

Vanegas told Jane that he was “sorry,” which she understood to mean that 

“he was saying sorry for . . . all the sex acts and the pills and everything that 

he did to” her.

Jane testified that it felt “nasty” to be having sex with Vanegas because 

he was her “father figure.” However, she never told him to stop because she 

was afraid of him and his “very violent” temper. None of Jane’s family 

members witnessed or knew about the abuse until she told them about it in 

2017. Jane testified that she had not initially disclosed the abuse to her 

family members because she was ashamed and embarrassed.

When she was in eighth grade, Jane told her friend about the abuse. 

Jane also told her about the pills Vanegas put in her body and her concern 

that the pills could have effected her long-term ability to bear children. 

Although Jane’s friend told Jane to tell her mother about the abuse, Jane

remained silent because she “felt scared” about how her family would react 

and she did not want Vanegas to go to jail. Jane further explained she did 

not want to speak up because Vanegas was a trusted family member.

In June 2017, Jane, who was then 15 years old, was concerned that she 

might be pregnant after having sex “with a boy not related to this” case. 

Jane shared her concerns with her aunt, who then told Jane’s mother. Jane’s 

mother immediately confronted Jane, “saying . . . why would you do 

that . . . that’s not right and things like that.” Jane’s mother then “kind of 

stepped away,” and Jane told her aunt “how [Vanegas] had disrespected [her] 

body throughout so long and [she] didn’t really care about [her] body anymore 

because he had already like touched it and everything.” Her aunt started to 
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cry, which attracted her mother’s attention, and Jane told her mother that 

Vanegas had “raped” her. Jane did not tell her mother about the specific acts 

Vanegas committed, and even by the time of trial Jane still had not told her 

family members “every single detail.”

During the course of four days of cross-examination, Jane’s memory 

and credibility were tested. Jane did not remember telling the forensic 

interviewer that Vanegas had hit her younger sister. Jane further admitted 

that she did not tell the interviewer about the pregnancy test, and she could 

not remember if she ever told the police about it. She also did not remember 

that she gave the police conflicting dates about when the abuse began. She 

did not recall that she had given differing accounts about the number and 

color of the pills that were inserted into her body.

Jane testified that, despite the years of abuse, she continued to visit 

Vanegas at his apartment and celebrated special events, birthdays, and 

holidays with him. Jane also confirmed that she never told her mother or 

any other family member about the abuse until 2017. 

2. Other Witnesses

Jane’s sister testified that she woke up one night in Vanegas’s

apartment because the bed was moving. Her back was to Jane, so she turned 

around and said to Jane, “Can you stop, I’m trying to go to sleep.” Jane “was 

looking . . . at the ceiling and her eyes were open but she wasn’t . . . talking 

back.” Jane’s eyes were “shiny, like watery.” Meanwhile, she could see 

Vanegas “hugging [Jane] from the back.” She “kept telling [Jane] to go to 

sleep but she . . . wasn’t talking back or anything or even looking at” her, so 

she “just turned around and went back to sleep” with the bed still moving.

Jane’s sister also testified that one time she came inside from cleaning 

Vanegas’s car and found Jane with her legs up against the wall. When she 
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asked why Jane was in that position, Vanegas responded that Jane was “on 

her period” and was sitting in that position “so that she wouldn’t . . . leak.” 

He then told Jane’s sister to “go downstairs and keep cleaning the car,” which 

she did. Later, Jane told her sister about the pill insertion.

Jane’s father, a medical doctor working out of the country, testified that 

in July 2014, Vanegas called him to ask if he “could help him out because he 

was thinking that he had gotten somebody pregnant.” Jane’s father

understood Vanegas to be asking how to “[p]rovoke an abortion,” and he 

responded that he “could not help [Vanegas]” because he was “against 

abortion.” Vanegas continued pressing Jane’s father for help, explaining that 

“the person who was pregnant was a minor,” which “was going to cause a lot 

of problems for” Vanegas.

Jane’s friend testified that she vividly recalled the conversation she had 

with Jane, when they were both in eighth grade, about how Vanegas “would 

sexually abuse her” and that “he would take advantage of her.” Jane’s friend

recalled that Jane began crying and seemed “really scared” as she told her 

about the abuse. Jane’s friend also recalled that Jane told her Vanegas put 

“a small black pill into her vagina,” which “had to do with . . . her getting 

pregnant[.]” She testified that Jane got mad at her when she told Jane that

she needed to tell an adult about the abuse or her friend would do so for her. 

Nevertheless, she tried to persuade Jane to at least tell her mother. Jane

told her friend that she was worried that her mother would get mad if she 

found out that Vanegas had been having sex with her. Jane also felt guilty 

and partly to blame. She told her friend that Vanegas was a “good person” 

who “didn’t deserve to go to jail.”
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3. Police Investigation 

After reporting the abuse to the police, Jane underwent a forensic 

interview at Child Abuse, Listening, Interviewing, and Coordination 

(CALICO). Alameda County Sheriff’s Deputy Luis Martinez witnessed the 

interview, in which Jane was “very detailed” in describing Vanegas’s abuse. 

After the CALICO interview, Jane spoke to Deputy Martinez several times. 

Deputy Martinez also spoke to Jane’s friend, who “confirm[ed] . . . what 

[Jane] had revealed in the CALICO interview.”

During cross-examination, Deputy Martinez testified that this case had 

“haunted” him ever since he took it. Although Deputy Martinez denied that 

his emotions affected his investigation of this case, he admitted that he 

almost cried as he watched Jane’s CALICO interview. Deputy Martinez 

admitted failing to note various inconsistencies in Jane’s descriptions of the 

abuse in his report. Deputy Martinez confirmed that early on in his 

investigation he believed Jane was being truthful. He could not remember if 

any of the witnesses had told him that Jane had taken a pregnancy test.

Deputy Martinez also failed to conduct follow-up with interviews of 

various witnesses, including Jane’s sister, father, and cousin. Deputy 

Martinez also admitted that he failed to investigate Jane’s social media 

accounts, and did not obtain her school and medical records. He also never

attempted to locate any physical evidence. Deputy Martinez further 

admitted that he failed to document in his police report that he had had 

numerous text messages with Jane’s family, including 49 text messages with 

Jane’s mother.

4. Expert Testimony 

The prosecution introduced testimony of Blake Carmichael, Ph.D., as 

an expert in child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. 
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Carmichael explained that CSAAS is an educational tool to help others 

understand the experiences and reactions of abused children, specifically to 

“address misconceptions or myths that people can have as it relates to child 

sexual abuse.” He further explained that while the CSAAS acronym has 

traditionally included the word “syndrome,” that term can be misleading 

because CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool; indeed, CSAAS cannot be “predictive” 

because “trauma is an individualized experience.” Dr. Carmichael expressly 

disavowed having any knowledge of “the factual details of this case” or any 

intent “to determine whether or not there was actually sexual abuse in this 

case.” We further expand on this testimony post in section I.A of our 

discussion.

B.

Defense Evidence

Vanegas testified he had never touched Jane in a sexual way. He 

acknowledged purchasing sanitary pads for Jane but denied administering a 

pregnancy test to Jane or giving her pills to abort a possible pregnancy. He 

denied speaking to Jane’s father about abortions, or telling Jane’s father that

he had impregnated a minor.

DISCUSSION

Vanegas argues his convictions should be reversed due to various 

evidentiary errors. First, he contends the court improperly admitted expert 

testimony on CSAAS. Second, he claims the court erroneously limited his 

attempts to impeach Deputy Martinez by precluding his cross-examination of 

the detective about his contacts with the victim’s family and by rejecting his 

proffered expert regarding child sexual abuse investigation procedures.
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I.

Admission of CSAAS Evidence

Vanegas argues the court erred in admitting Dr. Carmichael’s 

testimony because CSAAS evidence was not relevant, as there was a 

plausible explanation for Jane’s delay in reporting the alleged abuse: her 

fear of Vanegas. Thus, according to Vanegas, Dr. Carmichael’s testimony 

was not probative of any fact in dispute and, as such, it served to improperly 

corroborate Jane’s testimony in the eyes of the jury.

A. Background

Before trial, the prosecution and the defense each filed motions 

regarding the admissibility of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony regarding CSAAS 

evidence. The prosecution argued Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was admissible 

to educate the jury that delayed disclosure of abuse was not inconsistent with 

truthful claims of sexual abuse. Defense counsel sought to exclude the 

CSAAS evidence on numerous grounds, including relevance, improper expert 

opinion on the ultimate question of Vanegas’s guilt or innocence, and 

improper expert opinion regarding Jane’s credibility as a witness. The trial 

court granted the prosecution’s motion, subject to certain limitations not 

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.1

At trial, Dr. Carmichael described four aspects of CSAAS: secrecy, 

helplessness, entrapment or accommodation, and delayed, unconvincing or 

conflicting disclosure. He stated most children are abused by someone they 

know and trust. Thus, the consequences of reporting abuse can seem so huge 

that the child keeps it a secret in order to keep the perpetrator out of legal 

1 Dr. Carmichael was not permitted to testify as to statistics regarding 

the percentage of false reports; to discuss the phenomenon of recantation; or 

to describe CSAAS as a mental health disorder.
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trouble, and to avoid disrupting the family. The closer the relationship 

between the child and perpetrator, the more difficult it is for the child to 

report the abuse. It is rare for a child to physically ward off a perpetrator 

who is both an authority figure and physically stronger.

According to Dr. Carmichael, most children do not report abuse quickly, 

and delayed reporting is not inconsistent with abuse. He estimated that 40 

to 60 percent of victims do not report abuse in the first year, and 50 to maybe 

70 percent do not report it until they are 18. Only around 20 percent report 

abuse within days or weeks of the event.

Dr. Carmichael testified that children who do report abuse may appear 

to be untruthful or unconvincing. Children may have trouble recalling and 

describing events that happened over a period of time, and sometimes years 

before the reporting of them. Children often give inconsistent details, telling

different details to different people at different times.

B. Legal Principles 

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under the highly 

deferential abuse of discretion standard, reversing only if the court’s ruling 

was “ ‘arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.’ ” (People v. Suff (2014) 

58 Cal.4th 1013, 1066.) 

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or 

disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence” to the action, including 

“evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) 

Expert testimony must relate to a subject sufficiently beyond common 

experience that the opinion would assist the jury, although the jury need not 
12

be wholly ignorant of that subject.2 (§ 801, subd. (a); People v. Rodriguez 

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 639.) 

Expert testimony on “the common reactions of child molestation 

victims”—known as CSAAS theory evidence—“is admissible to rehabilitate 

such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s 

conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his 

or her testimony claiming molestation.” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 

1289, 1300 (McAlpin).) “ ‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors 

of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the 

emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching 

behavior.’ ” (Id. at p. 1301.) 

The need for this type of evidence arises when the defendant attacks 

the child’s credibility by suggesting that the child’s conduct after the incident, 

such as delay in reporting or paradoxical behavior, is inconsistent with the 

child’s testimony claiming molestation. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 

p. 1300; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1745 [CSAAS evidence 

is relevant “if the issue of a specific misconception is suggested by the 

evidence”]; People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1383 [CSAAS 

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code. Vanegas 

also contends the CSAAS evidence was not relevant because “the jurors 

expressly affirmed before trial that they understood that victims of child 

abuse may be reluctant to disclose” the abuse. However, the voir dire 

transcripts are not included in the record. Although a blank copy of the juror 

questionnaire is included in the record, nothing in it reveals that potential 

jurors were asked about specific CSAAS aspects. Moreover, Vanegas 

provides no authority to support his claim that CSAAS evidence is irrelevant 

simply because jurors may be aware that child abuse victims might be 

hesitant to come forward. Inasmuch as this claim is neither supported by 

appropriate citation to the record nor applicable law, we deem it forfeited. 

(See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1182; Jones v. Superior 

Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.)
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evidence enables the jury to evaluate the case “ ‘free of the constraints of 

popular myths’ ”].)

However, such evidence “is not admissible to prove that the 

complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused.” (McAlpin, supra, 

53 Cal.3d at p. 1300.) “Because the line between impermissible use of expert 

testimony to prove the child was abused, and permissible use of such 

testimony to ‘ “explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s 

seemingly self-impeaching behavior” ’ . . . is by no means a bright one, the 

better practice is to limit the expert’s testimony to observations concerning 

the behavior of abused children as a class and to avoid testimony which 

recites either the facts of the case at trial or obviously similar facts.” (People

v. Gilbert, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383–1384.)

Finally, “the jury must be instructed simply and directly that the 

expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine 

whether the victim’s molestation claim is true. . . . The evidence is 

admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as 

demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been 

molested.”

3 (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394.)

C. Analysis

Here, CSAAS evidence was relevant to address the credibility issues 

raised by the defense. From the opening statement, the defense strategy was 

3 The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1193, which provided: 

“You have heard testimony from Dr. Blake Carmichael regarding child sexual 

abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Dr. Blake Carmichael’s testimony 

about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the 

defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may 

consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [Jane] Doe[’s] conduct 

was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who had been molested, 

and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.” 
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to portray Jane as a liar who had made delayed, partial, and inconsistent 

disclosures.4 Over four separate days of cross-examination, defense counsel 

consistently pressed Jane on her failure to disclose Vanegas’s abuse for years; 

the staggered nature of her disclosures, e.g., that she disclosed less at her 

CALICO interview than she later disclosed to law enforcement and at trial; 

and the apparent inconsistencies among her various disclosures. Defense 

counsel also cross-examined Deputy Martinez about those same purported 

inconsistencies.

Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel argued, among other 

things, that Jane “gave no indication” of abuse; her family “saw nothing” and 

“suspected nothing”; she “never . . . seemed afraid or reluctant to be around” 

Vanegas; she “loved him as a father”; and she “could never tell the story the 

same way twice.”

The seemingly inconsistent behavior of Jane in continuing to be around 

Vanegas despite years of abuse, her failure to seek protection from him, her 

somewhat inconsistent versions of the events, together with her delayed and 

staggered disclosure of the abuse, were the very issues to which CSAAS 

evidence applies. That Jane testified that she was afraid of Vanegas does not 

make the CSAAS evidence any less relevant. If anything, Jane’s fear of 

Vanegas demonstrates her feeling of helplessness in the face of the sexual 

abuse. Far from manifesting the kind of irrationality required to show abuse 

of discretion—the admission of the CSAAS evidence here was entirely proper. 

4 For example, in opening statements, defense counsel told the jury that 

Jane “is going to take that stand and she’s going to tell you a story, a story 

that she’s told many times before, a story that when you look at the details, 

when you look at the context of who this family is what was going on will not

make sense. A story where the details change every time she tells it.”
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Relying on out-of-state authority, Vanegas attempts to make the case 

against admission of CSAAS evidence in general. (E.g. Newkirk v. 

Commwealth (Ky. 1996) 937 S.W.2d 690, 695 [CSAAS evidence “lacked 

relevancy and invaded the province of the jury by expressing an opinion on 

the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence”]; Hadden v. State (Fla. 1997) 690 

So.2d 573, 574, 581; State v. Bolin (Tenn. 1996) 922 S.W.2d 870, 872–873 

[CSAAS evidence cannot reliably determine abuse and invades the province 

of the jury to determine credibility].)

However, the California Supreme Court has expressly approved the 

admissibility of CSAAS evidence in McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, and we 

are bound by that precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) And since McAlpin, numerous California 

appellate courts have found expert testimony about CSAAS admissible to 

rehabilitate a complaining witness’s credibility. (People v. Perez (2010) 

182 Cal.App.4th 231, 245; People v. Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1744–1745; People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 955–956; People 

v. Gilbert, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383–1387.) Vanegas provides no 

compelling reason to depart from those decisions.

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. 

Carmichael’s testimony about CSAAS.

II.

Refusal to Allow Impeachment of Deputy Martinez

Vanegas contends the court erred by (1) limiting his ability to crossexamine Deputy Martinez about the friendship he had formed with Jane’s 

family, and (2) excluding the proposed testimony of an expert who would 

have testified about the proper methodology of investigating sexual abuse 

cases, including the importance of maintaining neutrality.
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A. Deputy Martinez’s Relationship with Jane’s Family 

1. Background

During trial, it came to light that Deputy Martinez had exchanged 

numerous text messages with Jane’s family members, including 49 messages 

with Jane’s mother. It was further revealed that Deputy Martinez had 

arranged for Jane and her siblings to receive Christmas gifts in 2017 from 

the special victim’s unit (an annual recognition bestowed upon one boy and 

girl each year), and Jane’s mother had delivered food to the police station at 

one point.

Defense counsel wanted to cross-examine Deputy Martinez about these 

matters. Defense counsel argued that the mutual support between Jane’s 

mother and Deputy Martinez could have dissuaded Jane from “retract[ing] 

what was previously a false statement,” but the court observed that counsel 

could “always make the argument that once these charges got made, [Jane

had] gone down that road, and people may [have been] supporting” her. “But 

the fact that she was given these special gifts on Christmas . . . seem[ed] like 

it ha[d] no probative value at all as to whether [Jane was] telling the truth.”

The court tentatively ruled to exclude the evidence under section 352.

After hearing further testimony and argument, the court observed that 

“nothing ha[d] been said that change[d its] opinion on” the tentatively 

excluded communications—they were “not probative of anything in this case,” 

were “unduly time consuming,” and would “confuse the jury.” The court thus 

adopted its tentative ruling, while clarifying that defense counsel could still 

ask Deputy Martinez “about other things that might be in the text messages.”

Later, when moving for a new trial, Vanegas argued the court erred in 

refusing to allow cross-examination of Deputy Martinez about the 

communications with Jane’s family. Specifically, he asserted that the 
17

proposed line of questioning would have been “relevant to bias and motive to 

fabricate” because Jane and her family “were rewarded for their participation 

in this prosecution” and Jane “may have been afraid to admit she fabricated 

these charges once her family developed this relationship with [Deputy] 

Martinez and received [a] monetary reward.”

In denying the motion, the court observed that Jane “and her family 

were not rewarded for their participation in this prosecution” because the 

gifts given were not contingent on whether her case was prosecuted or 

brought to trial. The court further noted that defense counsel had thoroughly 

cross-examined Deputy Martinez on his late disclosure of the challenged 

communications and that the jury had received “a special instruction under 

CALCRIM 306 regarding late discovery, specifically referring to these

[messages].”

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2. Analysis

Under the state and federal Constitutions, a defendant’s right to 

confront the witnesses against him encompasses a right to impeach those 

witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678; Davis v. Alaska (1974) 

415 U.S. 308, 316; People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623.) But 

not every restriction on a defendant’s desired method of cross-examination is 

5 As given, CALCRIM No. 306 provided: “Both the People and the 

defense must disclose their evidence to the other side before trial, within the

time limits set by law. Failure to follow this rule may deny the other side the 

chance to produce all relevant evidence, to counter opposing evidence, or to 

receive a fair trial. [¶] In this case Detective Martinez discovered during the 

trial that he had multiple text messages between himself and [Jane’s mother] 

stored on his cell phone. These text messages were discoverable evidence 

that should have been disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial. [¶] In 

evaluating the weight and significance of that evidence, you may consider the 

effect, if any, of that late disclosure.”
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a constitutional violation. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 372.) 

The trial court “retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is 

repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.” 

(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, disapproved on other grounds by 

People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; see also People v. King

(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1315–1316.) 

Absent a showing by defendant that the prohibited cross-examination 

would have produced “a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] 

credibility” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680), there is 

no confrontation clause violation. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at

p. 946.) Thus, “the exclusion of impeachment evidence on collateral matters, 

which have only a slight probative value on a witness’s veracity, does not 

infringe on the right to confrontation.” (People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 

222 Cal.App.4th 741, 751.)

According to Vanegas, the court improperly curtailed the crossexamination of Deputy Martinez—about (1) the Christmas gifts given to 

Jane and her siblings and (2) the food Jane’s mother brought to the police 

station—which he claims prevented the defense from showing the jury that 

Deputy Martinez was biased or lacked credibility.

On cross-examination, Deputy Martinez admitted that he failed to 

follow-up on numerous investigative leads, including following up with 

witnesses and searching for physical evidence. Defense counsel also 

extensively cross-examined Deputy Martinez about his emotional 

involvement with the case and his late-disclosed communications with Jane’s 

family. Finding further questioning would likely confuse the jury by getting 

into collateral matters, the trial court excluded these topics.
19

We find no error. The proffered line of cross-examination was not 

relevant to any disputed fact or consequence regarding Vanegas’s guilt with 

respect to the charged crimes, or to Deputy Martinez’s veracity. (§ 210.) 

Deputy Martinez’s emotional attachment to Jane’s family was fully explored 

at trial. That Jane’s mother brought food to the police department in 

gratitude for the holiday gifts given to her children would have added little to 

discredit Deputy Martinez on this basis.6 Because Vanegas cannot show that 

the introduction of the excluded line of cross-examination would have 

produced a significantly different impression of Deputy Martinez’s credibility 

(Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680), we conclude the trial 

court’s ruling did not violate Vanegas’s Sixth Amendment rights. 

Moreover, the ordinary rules of evidence, including the application of 

section 352, do not infringe on the accused’s due process right to present a 

defense. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 948.) We will not disturb a 

trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 352 unless it is shown the 

trial court exercised its discretion “ ‘in an arbitrary, capricious or patently 

absurd manner.’ ” (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 512.)

Here, the court could reasonably find the defense’s attempt at 

demonstrating bias on the part of Deputy Martinez in the form of the gifts 

given and the food received was highly attenuated and posed a risk of 

diverting the jury’s attention to extraneous matters. (§ 352.) We conclude 

the court acted within its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from 

delving into the Christmas gifts Jane and her siblings received and the food 

Jane’s mother brought to the police station in gratitude.

6 Similarly, to the extent that excluded line of questioning might have 

had any bearing on Jane’s credibility and veracity as a witness, these topics 

were exhaustively covered during her four days of cross-examination.
20

B. Proffered Defense Expert Testimony 

1. Background

Before trial, defense counsel informed the prosecutor that she intended 

to call an expert witness on child sexual abuse investigations. The witness, 

Michael Musgrove, had been a police officer for 26 years, worked as a child 

sexual abuse investigator for 13 years, and participated in over 1,000 

interviews involving child victims of sexual abuse. He was offered to testify 

to the proper method of interviewing witnesses, the importance of preserving 

and collecting information, factors that may indicate untruthfulness, the 

importance of neutrality in the investigation, and the importance of 

documenting the details of the investigation.

The prosecutor objected that Musgrove’s testimony was not admissible 

under section 801. The defense argued the jury would benefit from expert 

testimony from an experienced investigator regarding what a complete and 

thorough investigation actually looked like. The court granted the motion to 

exclude Musgrove’s testimony, ruling the proffered expert testimony was not 

beyond the “common experience” of the jury and was therefore inadmissible 

under section 801. 

2. Analysis 

“ ‘ “Generally, the opinion of an expert is admissible when it is ‘[r]elated 

to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of 

an expert would assist the trier of fact . . . .’ ” ’ [Citations.]” However, 

“[e]xpert testimony will be excluded ‘ “ ‘when it would add nothing at all to 

the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when “the subject of inquiry is 

one of such common knowledge that men [and women] of ordinary education 

could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.

Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 157; see § 801, subd. (a).)
21

Additionally, “[s]ome topics are categorically off-limits to expert 

testimony. (See . . . §§ 801, subd. (b) [caveat to admissibility where ‘expert is 

precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion’], 802 

[expert may state basis for opinion ‘unless he is precluded by law from using 

such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion’].)” (People v. Brown, supra,

245 Cal.App.4th at p. 158.) For example, juries are competent to decide such 

things as witness credibility without expert assistance. (People v. Wells

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 189.)

Here, Musgrove was not offered as an expert in forensic interviewing. 

Rather, Musgrove was offered to explain that Deputy Martinez’s emotional 

connection to the case could have negatively impacted the investigation and 

that it was “important for an investigator to remain neutral.” In this regard, 

Musgrove would have critiqued Deputy Martinez’s handling of the case, 

including his interview of Jane’s mother, his decision not to interview other 

family members, and his failure to search for exculpatory evidence and/or 

preserve exculpatory evidence. The court ruled that Musgrove did not qualify 

as an expert, as nothing in the proffered testimony was beyond the common 

experience of the jury. We agree. 

People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395 (McDowell) is instructive. In 

McDowell, the California Supreme Court held that expert testimony was not 

required to explain how the defendant’s childhood could have affected him as 

an adult. (Id. at pp. 427–428.) Similarly, in People v. Johnson (1993) 

19 Cal.App.4th 778, 791 (Johnson), the appellate court found no abuse in 

discretion in excluding two expert witnesses on the unreliability or lack of 

credibility of statements or testimony of prison inmates. The court explained 

“there was no need for a sociological lecture on the nature of the prison 

environment—the jury learned plenty about that subject from the other 
22

evidence,” and “the prospective abandonment of common sense by lay jurors 

for reliance on paid ‘expert’ testimony covering a subject well within a jury’s 

ken.” (Id. at p. 791.)

Here, as in McDowell and Johnson, the proffered expert testimony of 

Musgrove covered topics commonly understood by jurors. The essence of his 

proposed testimony was that criminal investigators should remain impartial, 

conduct thorough interviews, follow-up on leads, and preserve exculpatory 

evidence. This proposed testimony was neither technical nor complex, and it 

pertained to matters readily understood by lay jurors. (McDowell, supra,

54 Cal.4th at p. 427; Johnson, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) There simply 

was no need for expert testimony that an officer should conduct a thorough 

and neutral investigation, as the jurors could rely on their common sense to 

consider whether Deputy Martinez conducted an effective investigation of 

this case. Finally, to the extent Vanegas contends Musgrove’s testimony 

could have shed light on the credibility of Deputy Martinez and Jane, this 

determination was beyond the proper role of an expert. (People v. Brown,

supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 158.)

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 

proffered expert testimony.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Seligman, J.*

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Simons, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Burns, J.

A158717

* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.