COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 11, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP638-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF2208

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DANIEL D. MOORE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: T. CHRISTOPHER DEE, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and White, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Daniel D. Moore appeals a judgment convicting him 

of first-degree recklessly endangering safety and unlawfully possessing a firearm 
No. 2022AP638-CR

2

after being convicted of a felony. He also appeals an order denying his motion for 

postconviction relief. Moore argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel because his counsel did not object during voir dire when prospective jurors 

were primarily referred to by numbers rather than their names. We affirm.

¶2 During Moore’s direct appeal, his appointed counsel filed a no-merit 

report. See WIS. STAT.RULE 809.32 (2021-22),1and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). After conducting an independent review of the record, as mandated by 

Anders, we rejected the no-merit report, concluding that there were potential nonfrivolous arguments that could be raised on appeal.2

 See State v. Moore, 

No. 2019AP1194-CRNM, unpublished op. and order (WI App Apr. 16, 2021). On 

remand, Moore’s counsel filed a postconviction motion arguing that he received 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel did not object to the fact 

that the jury was referred to largely by juror numbers during voir dire, rather than 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.

2

 In our order rejecting the no-merit report, we stated that we had not reached any 

conclusion about whether the non-frivolous arguments would or should prevail. Rather, in accord 

with Anders, we concluded that the arguments were not frivolous and thus should be raised in a 

merits brief. We explained:

When resolving an appeal under WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.32, the question is whether a potential issue would be 

“wholly frivolous.” State v. Parent, 2006 WI 132, ¶20, 298 

Wis. 2d 63, 725 N.W.2d 915. The test is not whether the lawyer 

should expect the argument to prevail. See SCR 20:3.1, cmt. 

(action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes his or her 

client’s position will not ultimately prevail). Rather, the question 

is whether the potential issue so lacks a basis in fact or law that it 

would be unethical for the lawyer to prosecute the appeal. See 

McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988).

State v. Moore, No. 2019AP1194-CRNM, unpublished op. and order at 3 (WI App Apr. 16, 2021).
No. 2022AP638-CR

3

by their names. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the 

motion. This appeal follows.

¶3 To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show that his or her counsel performed deficiently and that this deficient 

performance prejudiced him or her. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient only if it falls “below ... objective 

standard[s] of reasonableness.” State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 

782 N.W.2d 695 (citation omitted). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have 

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. To show 

prejudice, “the defendant must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.’” Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶37 (citation omitted). A reviewing court may 

dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on either ground. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697. 

¶4 A circuit court may restrict information about jurors by impaneling an 

anonymous jury, which occurs when the circuit court withholds information about 

the jury from the public and the parties, or by impaneling a jury that uses numbers 

rather than names in open court, sometimes called a “numbers jury,” which restricts 

juror information available to the public, but not to the parties themselves. State v. 

Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶11, 259 Wis. 2d 484, 657 N.W.2d 374. When a circuit court 

restricts juror information, it raises “serious concerns regarding a defendant's rights 

to an impartial jury and [the] presumption of innocence.” Id., ¶19. An anonymous 

jury may cause the jury to believe “that the defendant is a dangerous person from 

whom the jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the defendant's 

constitutional right to a presumption of innocence.” Id., ¶18 (citation omitted). “[I]f 
No. 2022AP638-CR

4

a circuit court restricts any juror information, the court must make an individualized 

determination that the jury needs protection and take reasonable precautions to 

minimize any prejudicial effect to the defendant.” Id., ¶4. 

¶5 At the beginning of the voir dire hearing, the circuit court informed 

the pool of potential jurors that they should give their names when answering 

questions. The circuit court stated: “When answering the questions, if you would 

please, start with your juror number, your name and your answer. Everyone needs 

to hear your answer, so we need to be very loud and clear when you give your 

answers.” (Emphasis added.) As the voir dire hearing proceeded, several jurors

followed this direction and provided their names and numbers when answering 

questions. However, the majority of jurors provided only their juror number when 

they answered questions. 

¶6 The primary concern with restricting juror information is that it may 

adversely affect a defendant’s right to the presumption of innocence because the 

jury may speculate as to the reason for the court order requiring anonymity and may 

conclude that the defendant is a bad or dangerous person. This concern does not 

exist here. Under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not advise or 

order the jury to keep their identities shielded from the defendant. To the contrary, 

the circuit court explicitly asked the jurors to state their names when answering 

questions. Most of the jurors simply failed to include all of the information that the 

circuit court had asked them to include when responding. There was no reason for 

trial counsel to object to the fact that many of the jurors were referred to by numbers

because there was no court order requiring them to only use numbers and there was 

no concern that the jury would draw any adverse inference about the defendant. 

Therefore, we conclude that trial counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective 

assistance. 
No. 2022AP638-CR

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By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.