UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

DONALD G . JONES, P laintif f,

v. Civil Action No. 09-0616 (JD B) LOUISI ANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATI ON, et al., Defendan ts.

MEMORAN DUM OP INION Plaintiff, proce eding pro se , bring s this action seekingrec overy of $50 billion for the victims of Hurrica

ne Ka trina and H urrica

ne Rita, $22 milli on in personal damag es, and e x tensive injunctive relief

ag ainst attorney s at the law f irm of J ones & Walker and othe r per sons involved in hurrica ne re lief ef

forts and a ctions aff

ectingplaintiff' s L ouisiana prope rties. In total, plaintiff has name d over 120 de fenda nts, most of whom reside in L ouisiana. On Apr il 21, 2009, the Court issued an orde r obser ving that venue wa s likely improper in this district beca use only seven de fenda

nts are a lleg ed to re side in the District of Columbia, with the rest of the 100- plus defe ndants locate d primarily in L ouisiana, whe re most of the pr operty is located a

nd the re levant events took plac e. See O rder at 1-2 & n.2 , ECF #5. The Court further deter mined that threshold defe nses under

Rule 12(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e should be c onsidered w ith respe ct to the seve n District of Columbia defe ndants, for if the y wer e dismissed, it would li kely be appr opriate to tra

nsfer venue to a

n appropriate judicial district lying w ithin L ouisiana pursua ntto 28 U.S.C. § 1404. I d. Those motions have now be en filed a nd fully briefe d. 1 The D.C. B ar move s to dismi ss the complaint for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. The Jones W alker defe ndants in the District of Columbia -- R. Christian J ohnsen, B ill C ody , W. Russell King, N ancy Peele, Paul Cambon and Norma

J ane Sabiston (" J ones Walker DC De fenda nts") - - have separ ately

moved to dismiss on those same grounds. Plaintiff has responde d to both moti ons and the matter is ripe 2 for r esolution. For the r easons state d below, the Court will grant the motions to dismi ss, and then transf

er the case to the Easter

n District of L ouisiana as to the r emainingdefe ndants. BACK GR OUND The e ssence of plaintiff' s prolix 143-pag e ame nded complaint with re spect to the defe ndants in the District of Columbia is that the J ones Walker attorney s misused their leg al licenses a nd violated numerous c ivil rights laws a nd the Constitut ion when they lobbied Congr ess and other

g overnme ntal ag encie s to secure various ty pes of r elief f

or their c lients in the wake of Hurr icane Katrina and Hur rica ne Rita in 2005. See Am. Compl. at 79-92. As plaintiff puts it: [t he Jones W alker Def endants] misused their licenses whe n they lobbied Congr ess to pass leg islation . . . which sent over $200 billion dollars of US HUD, D OC, CORPS OF ENGI

NEERS, FEMA, a

nd such other w ell intended fe dera l assistance , which has not re stored plaintiff e t al Communi ties . . . , but which in

For ease of re fer ence , the Court will refe r to defe ndants' memoranda in support of their 1 motions t o dismiss as " D.C. Ba r Mem." and " J ones Walker Me m.," r espec tively . Plaintiff has filed seve ral memora

nda with the Court, which will be r efe rre d to by an abbr eviated title and ECF docume nt number. Cody and Sabiston deny

plaintiff' s contention that they are employ ed by

the J ones 2 Walker law f

irm, but state they

will treat plaintiff' s fac tual alleg ations as true f or purpose s of the motion to di smiss. S ee Jones Walker Mem. at 1 n.2. The y also note that they

have not be en serve d with proce ss, but have joined in the Jones W alker motion to di smiss i n the intere st of judicial economy . I d. 2fac t has cre ated industry . . . in are as which w ere not the true Congressional intended re cipients of these billions of dollars of f eder al funds and pr og rams. . . . . . . The [J ones Walker] Defe ndants misused their license s when they built an interlockingfabr ic of e x perie nce, r elationships, and expertise in g etting Congress, and other State leg islatures to approve leg islation to appropriate f unds under the disguise that it is in the "G ener al Welfare of the Public," but in fact it has bee n desig ned to end up in the ha nds of those whom the F eder al L aw did not pre scribe it for. See Am. Compl. at 83, 87 (emphasis in orig inal). Plaintiff rec asts this alleg ation in numerous way s throug hout the Amended Complaint (id. at 79-92) , but overa ll to the same eff ect - - that the J ones Walker DC De fenda nts have ser

ved only the intere sts of their private business clients and failed to ser

ve the public we lfare , in particular , the " true" victims of the hurrica nes, i.e., " the L ow Income, the H andica

pped, the less f

ortunate A merica

n people, whom we re por trayed in their dire plights at the Super dome, and the Conve ntion Center, in the af termath of hur

rica nes Ka trina and Rita." See Am. Compl. at 86. Be cause the J ones Walker DC De fenda nts are a lleg edly

attorney s licensed to pra ctice la w in the District, plaintiff also has sue d the District of Columbia Ba r (" D.C. Ba

r" ) base d on his belief that the D.C. Ba

r is responsible for

licensingand disciplining attorney s and his belief that the D.C. Ba

r has f ailed to fulfill its duti es with respe ct to the J ones Walker attorney s. See Am. Compl. at 12, 52. I t bear s noting at the outset that the D.C. Ba r is not the entity

that "lice nses" attorney s -- that duty

falls to the District of Columbia Court of Appea ls. D.C. Code § 11-2501. Rather, the D .C. Bar

is the "of ficial a rm" of the District of Columbia Court of Appe als that manag es those attorne y s who have been a dmitted by the Court of Appe als to the prac tice of law -- a matter

of which this Court takes judicial notice . See Rules Gover ning the District of Columbi a B ar, Pre amble & Rule 1. In any event, plaintiff a lleg es that the D.C. B ar ha s "f ail[ed] to addre ss numerous 3complaints of fra ud, unethical be havior, obvious conf licts of interest, fa lsifying of court documents, and . . . c ontinu[ ed] to renew the licenses of these attorney s, in spite of obvious evidenc e that they

war rant disbar

ment, and/or suspension . . . ." Am. Compl. at 12. P laintiff thus seeks a judicial order

requiringthe D.C. Ba

r (a nd all other state lice nsing boa rds) to " revie w[] and investig at[e]" the J ones Walker attorney s "to de termine if suspension a nd/or disbarment is

war rante d for these heinous violations." I d. at 92. STANDARD OF REVIEW "[I ]n passing on a motion to dismis s, whether on the ground of lac k of jurisdiction over the subject matter

or for failure to state a c ause of action, the a lleg ations of the complaint should be construe d favor ably

to the pleade r." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see L eathe rman v. Ta

rra nt Cty . Nar cotics and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Phi llips v. Bur eau of

Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The ref ore, the fac tual alleg ations must be pre sumed true, a

nd plaintiff must be g iven eve ry favor able infe renc e that may be dra wn from the alleg ations of fa ct. Scheue r, 416 U.S. at 236; Sparrowv. United Air L ines, Inc., 216 F .3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Howe ver, the Court need not ac cept a s true " a leg al conc lusion couche d as a f

actua l alleg ation," nor

infere nces that are unsupported by the fa cts set out in the complaint. Trudea

u v. Fe dera l Trade Comm'n, 456 F .3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. A llain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Under Rule 12(b)(1) , the par

ty seekingto invoke the jurisdiction of a fe dera l court -- plaintiff her e -- bear s the burden of establishing that the court ha s jurisdiction. S ee U S Ecolog y , Inc. v. U.S. Dep' t of Interior, 231 F .3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see a lso Grand L odg e of F rate rnal Orde r of Police v. Ashc roft, 185 F . Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (a court ha s an " aff

irmative obligation to ensure that it is actingwithin the scope of its jurisdictional authority .") ; Pit ney 4Bow es, I

nc. v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F . Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1998). " ' [P ]l aintiff' s fac tual alleg ations in the complaint . . . will bear c loser scr utiny in resolvinga 12(b) (1) motion' than in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for f ailure to state a

claim." Gra

nd L odg e, 185 F . Supp. 2d at 13-14 (quoting5A Charles A lan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, F eder al Prac tice and Proc edure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987) ). Additionally , a cour t may consider material other

than the alleg ations of the complaint in determiningwhether it has jurisdiction to hear the c ase, a s long a s it sti ll acce pts the fac tual alleg ations in the complaint as true. See J erome Stevens Pharmac euticals, Inc. v. F DA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253- 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005); EEOC v. St. Fra ncis Xavie r Paroc hial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997); He rber t v. Nat' l Acad. of

Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir.1992). In revie winga motion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) , the Court is mindful that all that the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e re quire of a complaint is that it contain "' a short and plain statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,' in order to ' g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.'" Be ll Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) ; acc ord Eric kson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h "de tailed fac tual alleg ations" a

re not ne cessa

ry to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the " g rounds" of " entitle[m ent] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish " more than la bels and conclusions" or " a for

mulaic re citation of the e lements of a c ause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555-56; see also Papasan v. A llain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). " To survive a motion to dismiss , a complaint must contain suffic ient fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to 'state a c laim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " A shcrof t v. I qbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotingTwombly , 550 U.S. at 570); Atherton v. District of Columbi a Of

fice of the Mayor, 567

5F.3d 672, 681 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). A complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff ple ads

fac tual content that allows the c ourt to draw the rea sonable infe renc e that the de fenda nt is li able for the misconduc t alleg ed." I qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. DISCUSSIO N I. Stand ing The D.C. B ar a

nd the J ones Walker DC De fenda nts both move to dism iss the amended complaint on the g round that plaintiff lac ks standing to pur sue the c laims. I t is well-settled that there are three minimum elements ne cessa ry to establish standing: First, the plaintiff must have suffe red a n "injury in fac t" - - an inva sion of a leg ally protec ted intere st which is (a) c oncre te and pa rticularized, and (b) " actua l or imminent, not 'c onjectura l' or

' hy pothetical.' " Sec ond, there must be a ca usal conne ction betwee n the injury and the c onduct complained of -- the injury

has to be " fairly

. . . trac e[able] to the challeng ed ac tion of the defe ndant, and not . . . th[e] result [ of] the independent a ction of some third party

not before the cour

t." Third, it must be " likely ," a s opposed to mere ly "spe culative," that the injury will be "r edre ssed by

a fa vorable decision." Lujan v. Def

ender s of Wildl ife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 ( 1992) (c itations and footnote omitted);

acc ord Center

for L aw a

nd Educ. v. De p' t of Educ., 396 F .3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Def endants c ontend that plaintiff fa ils to m eet a ny of these e lements, althoug h focusingon

causation and redr essability

. See D.C. B ar Me m. at 4-7; J ones Walker Me m. at 14-19. 3 Def endants c ontend that plaintiff has not, a nd cannot, a lleg e an injury "f airly trac eable " to

Def endants sug g est that plaintiff also has f ailed to establish injury -in-fa ct, but stress the 3 other two prong s for simplicity . See D.C. B ar Me m. at 5 n.2. The Court also has se rious doubts as to whethe r plaintiff ha s alleg ed injury -in-fa ct, in light of the g ener alized nature of his injury

-- that is, the continued suffe ringof plaintiff a nd all others in the L ouisiana ar ea f rom an a lleg edly inadequate and mismanag ed fe dera l and state re sponse to Hurric anes K atrina a nd Rita. I njuries which ar e " g ener al rather than pa rticularized ar e not suffic ient to cre ate standing ." See Taitz v. Obama, - -- F . Supp. 2d ---, 2010 WL1525030, at *2 (D.D .C. Apr. 14, 2010). He nce, a plaintiff seeking"' relief

that no more dire ctly

and tang ibly

benef its him than it does the public at lar g e . . . does not state an Article I I Icase or controve rsy .' " I d. (quotingL ujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74). Howeve r, the de fenda

nts have not brief

ed this aspec t of standing , and henc e the Court does not rest its holding on the a

bsence of injury -in-fa ct. 6their conduc t beca use his injury

flows instead fr om the acts of third pa rties -- that is, Congre ss, which ena cted the le g islation complained of, and othe r fe dera l and local g overnme ntal bodies, which alleg edly

implemented def

icient, or other

wise mismanag ed, hurr icane relief programs The Court ag ree s. Plainti ff simply fails to alleg e the manne r in which the D .C. Bar or the Jones Walker attorne y s ag g rieve d plaintiff other tha n his wholly

conclusory

statement that their a ctions deprive d him of mill ions of dollars of hurr icane relief monies that Congr ess and other s should have a llocated more equitably . See Am. Compl. at 92 (conc lusory alleg ation that he should be

awa rded $22 million "pe rsonally for the da

mag es ca used by the J ones' defe ndants misuse of their licenses" beca

use they preve nted plaintiff fr om benef itting from Cong ress' s hurrica ne re lief leg islation); Pl .' s Opp' n to J ones Walker Mot., ECF D oc. No. 35- 1, at 21 (a lleg ing that plaintiff has " rec eived not one dime" of Cong ressional hurr icane relief monies). In other wor ds, plaintiff' s injury -- his continued f

inancial suff

eringafte r the de vastation of the 2005 hur rica nes -- is not fairly trac eable to the conduct of the D.C. Ba

r or the Jones Walker DC Def endants. The ref

ore, plaintiff lacks standingto sue these de fenda nts. Plaintiff lacks standingto pursue his claims ag ainst the D.C. Ba r for a sec ond rea son. The primar

y relief soug ht ag ainst the D.C. Ba r -- an orde r re quiringan investig ation of the Jones Walker attorne y s -- would not re dress a ny alleg ed injury

plaintiff has suff

ere d. As the D.C. B ar points out, such an order

would only

relate to potentially

prospec tive discipline ag ainst the J ones Walker attorne y s and would not ensure that plaintiff would re ceive any monetary damag es fr om them. See D.C. B ar Me m. at 7. Whether disciplinary action mig ht result in the pay ment of damag es " can, a

t best, be terme d only

as spec ulative." See L inda R.S. v. Ri char d D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) ( holding that " a citizen lacks standingto contest the policies of the prosec uting authority when he himself is neither prose cuted nor threatened with prose cution," a nd noting the

7speculative nature of any direc t rec overy

by the citizen). In other wor ds, plaintiff' s injury is not redr essable by

a fa vorable decision ag ainst the D.C. Ba r, and he nce, pla intiff lacks standingto sue the D.C. B ar f

or this additional rea son. II. The Jones Walk er D C Defendants Even if plaintiff ha d standingto sue the Jones W alker DC attorney s or the D.C. B ar, his complaint should be dismissed for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. The J ones Walker DC De fenda nts move to dismi ss plaintiff' s complaint on the g round that the g overnme ntal petitioning of which plaintiff complains is immune from liability under the Noer

rPennington doc trine. See Jones Walker Mem. at 19-21. Under the Noer r-Penning ton doctrine, those who " petition[ ] t he Gove rnment for redr ess of grieva

nces, whether

by eff orts to influence leg islative or executive ac tion or by seekingredr ess in court, [are ] i mmune from liability " f or such ac tivity

under the First Amendme nt. Covad Commc'ns Co. v. B ell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (c iting E.R.R. Presidents Confere nce v. N oerr Motor Fr eight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961), and Ca l. Motor Transp. Co. v. Truc king Unlimit ed, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)) . An exception to that immuni ty is recognized where the def endants' activity

is a " sham" for " threats, inti midation, and other c oerc ive measur es," primarily to "ha rass or disc riminate ag ainst the plaintiff[] ." See Smit hfield F oods, Inc. v. United F ood and Commercia l Workers Int'l Union, 593 F. Supp. 2d 840, 844 (E.D. V a. 2008). The Court has r eviewe d plaintiff' s orig inal and ame nded complaints, and his memora nda in oppositi on to the J ones Walker motion to dismi ss, and it is clear tha t all of plaintiff' s alleg ations ag ainst the J ones Walker DC De fenda nts solely conce rn their pe titioni ngactivities on behalf of their c lients before various g overnme ntal bodies. See Am. Compl. passim ; Pl.'s Opp' n to J ones Walker Mot., ECF D oc. No. 35, at 24-25 (conte nding that in petitioni ngCongr ess, 8"Jones Walker . . . [acted] in their officia l capa city of L obby ist for L aws, [and] . . . solely as an Attorney L aw F irm," a

nd "PURELY FO R PR OFI TS"). F urthermor e, none of the alleg ations

even r emotely

sug g est that the Jones W alker DC Defe ndants used that petitioning a ctivity as a "sha m" f or the purpose of intimidating or ha rassingplaintiff or other

wise discriminatingag ainst him. Accor dingly , the Court holds that the J ones Walker DC De fenda nts are immune f

rom plaintiff' s claims under the Noer r-Penning ton doctrine. 4 III. The District of Colum bia B ar The D.C. B ar c ontends that, eve n if plaintiff had standing to assert a

claim ag ainst it, the D.C. Ba r should be dismissed from this case based on, inter alia, immunity

ag ainst claims challeng ing how

it conducts the attorne y

disciplinary

proce ss. See D.C. Ba

r Mem. at 11- 13. The Court ag ree s. First, D.C. B ar Rule XI , § 19(a) provides for broad immunity

to participants in the disciplinary

proce ss. It states: (a) Immunity . Complaints s ubmitted to the Boar d or B ar Counsel shall be absolutely

privileg ed, and no c laim or ac tion predicated there on may be instituted or maintained. Me mbers of the Boa rd, its employ ees, me mbers of H ear ing Commi ttees, B ar Counsel, a nd all assistants and employ ees of Ba r Counsel, all persons e ng ag ed in counse ling, e valuatingor monitoring othe r attorne y s pursuant to a B oard or

Court order or

a diver sion agree ment, and all assistants or employ ees of

persons e ng ag ed in such c ounseling , evaluating or monitoring shall be immune from disciplinary complaint under this rule a nd from civil suit for any conduct in the c ourse of

their off icial duties. I d. (empha sis added). The District of Columbia Court of Appea ls promulgated this rule under

The Jones W alker

DC Defe ndants also move to dismiss pl aintiff' s claims on the g round 4 that they did not have an attorney -client re lationship with hi m and, henc e, owe d him no lega l duties. See Jones W alker Mem. at 9-14; Jones W alker Supplemental Mem. at 2-4; Jones W alker Reply at 2-14; Pl.'s Opp' n, ECF Doc . No. 35, at 9-14, 20- 21. Howeve r, plaintiff a nd defe ndants both refe r to fac ts outside of the complaint to make their a rguments on this is sue, and he nce the Court does not rea ch it in resolvingthe pending motions. 9the statutory authority g iven to it by

Congr ess to adopt rules c oncer ning the "c ensure , suspension, and expulsion" of bar

members. See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedur e Act of 1970, Pub. L . No. 91-358, §§ 11-2501, 11- 2502, 84 Stat. 473, 521 (J uly 29, 1970); see also Rules Governingthe District of Columbia Ba r, Preamble. Acc ording ly , suits aga inst those components of the D .C. Bar eng ag ed in the disciplinary proce ss are appropr iately dismiss ed based on the immunit y

confe rre d by

this rule. See Thomas v. Knight, 257 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D.D.C. 2003) ( wher e def endants a re " actingwithin the scope of the ir offic ial duties as the disciplinary

arm of the [D.C. C ourt of Appe als], they are immune" f

rom suit), aff

' d, 2003 WL 22239653 (D.C.Cir. Sept. 24, 2003); Nwac hukwu v. Rooney , 362 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192 (D.D .C. 2005) (notingthat D.C. Ba r Rule XI , § 19(a) g rants those a ctingas the disciplinary arm of the court -- there , the B ar Counsel -- "immunity from suit for a

ny conduct in the c ourse of

their officia l duties"). Additionally , the common law a lso provides absolute immunity to the D.C. Ba

r with respe ct to its decisions whether or not to init iate disciplinary proce eding s. The D.C. Circuit has held that another

disciplinary

arm of the District of Columbia Court of Appea ls -- the Committee on the Unauthor ized Practice of L aw - - is entitled to "the f ull protection of absolute immunity " for its ac tions invol ved in the asse ssment of whethe r to initiate disciplinary proce eding s. See Simons v. Be llinger , 643 F.2d 774, 780 ( D.C. Cir. 1980). The c ourt explained that "the Commi ttee wa s perf

orming , by

deleg ation, the inhere nt judicial function of dete rmining who is authorized to prac tice law," and wa s "se rv[ing] as an ar m of the cour

t." I d. Those same principles apply

to the D.C. Ba

r, which pla intiff has sued ba sed on its alleg ed fa ilure to disbar or pursue some othe r disciplinary action ag ainst the J ones Walker attorney s. See Nwa chukwu, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (holdingthat "a n alleg edly

wrong ful dec ision not t o initiate formal

10proce eding s . . . is judicial in nature" and, henc e, entitled to absolute immunity under Simons v. Be llinger , 643 F.2d at 780). Plaintiff objects to dismiss al, invoking br oad re fer ence s to the g ener al duty

of the D.C. B ar " to protect, de fend, a nd honor the United States Constitution," and the primac y

of his Constit utional rig hts over any immunit y

doctrines. See Pl.'s Opp' n to D.C. Ba r' s Mot., ECF Doc. No. 40, at 8-15. Howe ver, tha t rhetoric f

ails altog ether

to addre ss the leg al standards that gove rn absolute immunity . In short, the D.C. Ba r is shielded fr om plaintiff' s claims by the immunity

set forth in D.C. B ar Rule XI , § 19(a) and the a bsolute immuni ty attendant to its disciplinary functions as re cog nized in S imons v. Belling er. IV. Venue Plaintiff has alleg ed that venue lies in the District of Columbia based on the a ctions of the J ones Walker DC attorney s and the D.C. B ar. A m. Compl . at 12. The Court obser ved in its initial order that a tr ansfe r of ve nue to L ouisiana would likely be appr opriate if the DC defe ndants wer e dismissed, in light of the location of well over 100 de fenda nts there a

nd the close ne x us betwee n the eve nts alleg ed and that state. See Or der at 2-3 (filed A pr. 21, 2009). 5 The g ener al venue statute provides that: " For the conve nience of par

ties and witnesses, in the intere st of justice, a district cour t may transfe r any

civil action to any

other district or division wher e it might have been br oug ht." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) . Her e, virtually all of the re maining named pa rties ar e loca

ted in L ouisiana. These include the L ouisiana State B ar A ssociation and its Boar d of Gove rnors, two judg es in the Easte rn District of L ouisiana, dozens of attorne y s in

For example, plaintiff alleg es that many of the L ouisiana def

endants misused their 5 profe ssional licenses to pursue illeg al seizures, sales, a nd attachme nts of his L ouisiana prope rties and to interfe re w ith severa l lawsuits in st ate a nd fede ral c ourts located in L ouisiana. See, e .g ., Am. Compl. at 51-72, 95-97. The c omplaint further indicates that plaintiff wa s a re sident of L ouisiana duringmuch of the time pe riod at issue. I d. at 59-70. 11New O rlea ns or elsewhere in J eff

erson Parish, and sheriff

s located in Jeffer son Parish. See Am. Compl. at 13-40. Many

of these pa

rties appe ar to be the re levant witnesses a s well. Since the few defe ndants locate d in the District of Columbia have be en dismissed, this case ha s no further

connec tion to thi s venue. Plainly , then, venue is appropriate in L ouisiana, and in pa rticular, in the Easter n District of L ouisiana (whic h cover s New O rlea ns and the Jeffer son Parish). There fore , pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the Court concludes that it is in the interests of justice to transfe r this action to the Easter n District of L ouisiana for the conve nience of the pa rties and witnesses and a lso consideringthe close ne x us betwee n the eve nts alleg ed and tha t district. 6 CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, the Court will g rant the motions to dismi ss filed by the District of Columbia Ba

r and the J ones Walker DC De fenda nts. W ith respec t to the remaining defe ndants, the Court will transfer this action to the Eastern D istrict of L ouisiana. A sepa rate order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion.

/s/ J OHN D. B ATES United States District J udg e Date: Septembe r 16, 2010

Transf er of venue a rguably is require d under 28 U .S.C. § 1406(a) as we ll, which 6 provides for

transfe r whe re a

case is filed in the wrongdistrict.

12