IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ADELBERT H. WARNER,II, §

#13604-040, §

PETITIONER, §

§

V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-621-G-BK

§

C. RIVERS, WARDEN, §

FCI SEAGOVILLE, §

RESPONDENT. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, Petitioner Adelbert H. Warner’s pro 

se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was referred to the United States 

magistrate judge for management, including the issuance of findings and a recommended 

disposition where appropriate. The Court did not order a response pending preliminary 

screening. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, and for the reasons stated 

here, the petition should be summarily DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Warner is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the FCI in Seagoville, Texas. In 2008, he

pled guilty to producing and distributing child pornography and was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of 360 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a life term of supervised release. United 

States v. Warner, No. 1:08-CR-63-01 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2008), aff’d, 399 F. App’x 88, 89 

(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming the criminal judgment). Warner also pled guilty in Barry County, 

Michigan, to first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a person under thirteen years of age and 

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was sentenced to imprisonment for 135-to-300 months, to be served concurrently with his federal 

sentence. Warner v. State, No. 08-103-FC (5th Jud. Cir. Ct., Barry Cnty. 2008); Doc. 3 at 1. 

Warner unsuccessfully challenged his federal conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255. See United States v. Warner, No. 1:08-CR-63, 2013 WL 12343704 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 

2013), certificate of appealability denied, No. 13-1439 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2013). He also 

challenged his state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but his federal petition was dismissed as 

untimely. See Warner v. State of Michigan , No. 1:13-CV-458, 2014 WL 806392, at *1 (W.D. 

Mich. Feb. 28, 2014), certificate of appealability denied, No. 14-1388 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2014). In 

2020, Warner filed a successive § 2255 motion, challenging his federal conviction and claiming 

actual innocence. The district court transferred Warner’s motion to the Sixth Circuit Court of 

Appeals, which in turn denied him authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. In re 

Warner, No. 20-1663 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2021). 

Warner then renewed his actual innocence arguments in this Court in a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, attacking his federal conviction under the savings 

clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Because he could not carry his burden, the Court dismissed his 

petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Warner v. Zook, No. 3:21-CV-1473-M-BN, 2021 WL 

4142396, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2021), R. & R. adopted, 2021 WL 4133646 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 

10, 2021), notice of appeal docketed, No. 21-10961 (Sep. 24. 2021).

Undeterred, on March 17, 2022, Warner filed the § 2241 petition sub judice challenging 

his Michigan state court conviction based on the same actual innocence arguments. Doc. 3 at 2-

3. He contends both his state and federal convictions are premised on the same fabricated 

evidence. Doc. 3 at 1. Warner explains, inter alia: 

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if I sought permission to file a second 28 USC § 2254 using the same evidence and 

facts I used to seek authorization to file a second § 2255 motion . . . , the Sixth Cir. 

Court (a) would not authorize me to file a second 28 USC § 2254 application in the 

Western District of Michigan's U.S. Court, and (b) will not honor the actual 

innocence exception in my case to allow my actual innocence to serve as a gateway 

through 28 USC § 2244(b)(2)’s procedural bars to second or successive § 2254 

applications if my new evidence fails, in the court's opinion, to meet any of that 

statute’s standards. That means that any attempt by me to seek authorization to filea second § 2254 would be futile, and further delay the relief and justice I have been 

entitled to, and have deserved for years.

Doc. 3 at 2-3.

Because Warner cannot rely on § 2241 to avoid the prohibition against successive 

petitions under § 2254, his petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

II. ANALYSIS

At the outset, this Court evaluates the substance of Warner’s claims to determine if they 

are properly brought only under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Upon review, the Court concludes that they 

are not and that the petition should be construed as seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which 

is reserved for habeas applications on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court.” See Carmona v. Andrews, 357 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Section 2254 

‘confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear collateral attacks on state court judgments.’” 

(quoting Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000))). 

Federal courts have generally interpreted § 2241 as a broad statutory grant of authority to 

issue habeas writs, while § 2254 is deemed to implement that authority with respect to state 

prisoners. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief 

to state prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which such relief 

may be granted to ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’”); Hartfield v. 

Osborne, 808 F.3d 1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 2015) (concluding § 2241 authorizes a federal court to 

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grant writs of habeas corpus in general, while § 2254 “applies to ‘a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court’” (quoting Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1059 (11th Cir. 

2003))). Stated another way, “‘§ 2254 is not an independent avenue through which petitioners 

may pursue habeas relief.’” Topletz v. Skinner, 7 F.4th 284, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Hartfield, 808 F.3d at 1073). “Instead, all habeas petitions (as distinguished from the § 2255 

habeas motions available to prisoners held pursuant to a federal court conviction) are brought 

under § 2241, and § 2254 places additional limits on a federal court’s ability to grant relief if the 

petitioner is being held in custody ‘pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’” Id. at 294

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)); DeVaughn v. Dodrill, 145 F. App’x 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam) (“A prisoner challenging either the validity or execution of his state court sentence must 

rely on the more specific provisions of § 2254 and may not proceed under § 2241.”).

Because Warner challenges a state court conviction here, § 2254 applies. Warner 

apparently seeks to avoid the prohibition on successive petitions under § 2254 by attempting to 

proceed under § 2241. Habeas petitioners, however, may not rely on the general habeas 

provisions found in § 2241 to circumvent restrictions found in the specific statutes governing 

habeas corpus review. See, e.g. Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing 

a federal petitioner’s attempt to circumvent the restriction on successive motions under § 2255); 

Medberry, 351 F.3d at 1060-61 (noting a state prisoner cannot avoid § 2254 restrictions “simply 

by writing ‘§ 2241’ on his petition”). 

Moreover, contrary to Warner’s assertion, § 2241(d) does not authorize the challenge of a 

state conviction under § 2241. Doc. 3 at 1. Rather “[s]ection 2241 ‘specifies the court in which 

the petition [under § 2254] must be brought.’” Wadsworth, 235 F.3d at 961 (quoting Story v. 

Collins, 920 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir.1991))). Further, a § 2254 “petition challenging a state 

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court conviction must be filed only in a district court within the original state of conviction . . . .” 

Jones v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. CIV 09-930(JBS), 2009 WL 2413666, at *3 

(D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009). “This means . . . a habeas petition . . . is appropriate in the district of 

confinement only if that district is also in the state of the conviction being challenged.” Id.; Cf. 

Mayfield v. Klevenhagen, 941 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim that a District of 

Columbia district court could hear a § 2254 petition and stating the petitioner “was tried and 

sentenced in Texas; he is confined in Texas”); White v. Workman, No. 3:09-CV-0457-P, 2009 

WL 812073, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2009) (accepting recommendation dismissing for want of 

jurisdiction § 2254 petition attacking conviction that arose in Oklahoma, were the petitioner was 

confined); see also Johnson v. Stephens, No. 2:14-CV-0200, 2015 WL 6445875, at *3 (N.D. 

Tex. Sept. 17, 2015), R. & R. adopted, 2015 WL 6447229 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2015) (noting § 

2254 petition challenging Virginia state convictions was not appropriate in Texas, where 

petitioner was confined).

Warner was convicted and sentenced in Barry County, Michigan, which is located within 

the boundaries of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. See 28 

U.S.C. § 102(b)(1). Because the state of conviction is Michigan, this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over Warner’s construed § 2254 petition. Warner’s current incarceration in a BOP facility in the 

Northern District of Texas does not change the jurisdictional requirements of § 2241(d). See

Carmona, 357 F.3d at 538 (filing requirements of § 2241(d) are jurisdictional); Webb v. Beto, 

362 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1966). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d), the Court has the discretion to transfer a habeas petition to 

the appropriate district court in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice. See 

also 28 U.S.C. § 1631. However, given Warner’s attempted end-run around the prohibition 

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against filing a successive § 2254 petition in the proper jurisdiction, the Court should decline to 

do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (before a petitioner may file his application in the district 

court, a three-judge panel of the appropriate court of appeals must determine whether the 

application makes the requisite prima facie showing); Cf. White, No. 3:09-CV-0457-P, 2009 WL 

812073, at *2 and n.1 (dismissing for want of jurisdiction in lieu of transferring to Oklahoma 

where the conviction arose because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously denied 

leave to file a successive habeas application). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Warner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, construed as one 

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

SO RECOMMENDED on May 31, 2022.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific 

written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific 

written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time 

to file objections to 14 days). 

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