UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

JAMES L. SIMS, JR.,

Plaintiff, 

v. No. 4:22-cv-0390-P

FNU LOVE,

ET AL.,

Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER

Came on for consideration the motion of Defendant Lex Love for

summary judgment. The Court, having considered the motion, to which 

Plaintiff has not responded, the record, and applicable authorities, finds 

that the motion should be GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, James L. Sims, Jr., then a pretrial detainee at the Wise 

County Detention Center, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. ECF No. 1. The Court required that he file an amended 

complaint using the proper form, ECF No. 4, and he did so. ECF No. 7. 

His amended complaint named Love, the Wise County Sheriff’s 

Department, and Lane Akin, Sheriff, as Defendants. The Court required 

Plaintiff to file a more definite statement including answers to questions 

posed by the Court. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff complied. ECF No. 11. The 

Court then engaged in the screening process as required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A, ordering that Plaintiff’s claims against the Wise County 

Sheriff’s Office and Lane Akin be dismissed, and allowing Plaintiff to 

proceed with his claims against Love. ECF Nos. 12, 13. 

Defendant Love seeks judgment as a matter of law based on the 

defense of qualified immunity. In addition, he maintains that because 

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Plaintiff was not injured as a result of the use of pepper spray, he cannot 

pursue damages in that regard. ECF No. 26.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could change the 

outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). And a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id. The Court views the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant but need not comb through the record in 

search of evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. See 

Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). Moreover, 

“[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is 

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could 

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes 

of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 380 (2007).

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity insulates a government official from civil 

damages liability when the official’s actions do not “violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). For a right to be “clearly established,” the right’s contours must 

be “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 

635, 640 (1987). Individual liability thus turns on the objective legal 

reasonableness of the defendant’s actions assessed in light of clearly 

established law at the time. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); 

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40. In Harlow, the Court explained that a 

key question is “whether that law was clearly established at the time an 

action occurred” because “[i]f the law at that time was not clearly 

established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 

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subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that 

the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.” 457 U.S. 

at 818. More recently, the Court has clarified that the “violative nature 

of the particular conduct [must be] clearly established.” Mullenix v. 

Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

In assessing whether the law was clearly established at the time, the 

court is to consider all relevant legal authority, whether cited by the 

parties or not. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994). If public 

officials of reasonable competence could differ on the lawfulness of the 

defendant’s action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); City 

of Arlington v. Fraire, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992). “[A]n 

allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat qualified immunity if the 

defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner.” Malley, 475 U.S. 

at 341. As the Supreme Court explained:

The qualified immunity standard “gives ample room for 

mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 

Malley, [475 U.S.] at 343. . . . This accommodation for 

reasonable error exists because “officials should not err 

always on the side of caution” because they fear being sued.

Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229. Further, that the officer himself may have 

created the situation does not change the analysis. That he could have 

handled the situation better does not affect his entitlement to qualified 

immunity. Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir. 

1985).

As for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim, the Supreme Court 

has determined that an objective standard applies. Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). That is, the pretrial detainee 

need only show that the force purposely or knowingly used against him 

was objectively unreasonable. Id. The court makes this determination 

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what 

the officer knew at the time, not in hindsight. Id. “The calculus of 

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that [] officers are 

often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 

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tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that 

is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396–97 (1989). The court must defer to policies and practices that in the 

judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve order and discipline and 

maintain institutional security. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Factors that 

may bear on the reasonableness of the force used include:

the relationship between the need for the use of force 

and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s 

injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit 

the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at 

issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and 

whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

Id.

In sum, to prevail when a defense of qualified immunity is asserted, 

the plaintiff must show (1) what the clearly established law at the time 

required in the particular circumstances and (2) that the defendant 

violated that clearly established law. The court may rest its analysis on 

either prong. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Both must 

be satisfied and if the plaintiff fails to establish one, the court need not 

consider the other. Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020); 

King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff does not 

satisfy his burden by conclusory allegations based on speculation or 

unsubstantiated assertions of wrongdoing; he must point to specific 

evidence in the record. Mitchell v. Mills, 895 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 

2018); Williams-Boldware v. Denton Cnty., 741 F.3d 635, 643–44 (5th 

Cir. 2014).

UNDISPUTED FACTS

The record establishes the following undisputed facts: 

Plaintiff was an inmate at the Wise County Jail. On November 19, 

2021, Plaintiff was being held in a “detox” cell as he awaited a dentist 

appointment. When he put another inmate in the cell with Plaintiff, 

Love noticed a medical clipboard and pen that he believed had been left 

behind by medical staff. Love took the clipboard. Plaintiff repeatedly 

asked for Love to return it because it had his medical paperwork on it. 

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Plaintiff was angry and yelling at Love for failing to return the 

paperwork. Plaintiff put his foot in the cell door to prevent Love from 

closing it. Love told Plaintiff at least twice to move his foot and Plaintiff 

refused to do so because Love had not recognized his request for his 

paperwork. Love cautioned Plaintiff to move his foot or he would be 

pepper sprayed. Plaintiff again asked for his paperwork and Love 

sprayed him with pepper spray. Plaintiff immediately threw his hands 

up and ducked to the left. Love shut the cell door, which caught 

Plaintiff’s finger. Plaintiff noticed the bone hanging out of his middle 

finger and pressed the call button for help. Neither Plaintiff nor Love 

recognized that Plaintiff’s finger was in the doorframe when the door 

was shut. ECF 11; ECF 26, Ex. A.

ANALYSIS

Jail officials are justified in using force in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline when a prisoner refuses to cooperate with 

directives. Gonzales v. Rowe, No. 5:20-CV-052-BQ, 2020 WL 4811005, at 

*3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2020) (citing Minix v. Blevins, No. 6:06-CV-306, 

2007 WL 1217883, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (even when prisoner 

believes an order is unjustified or improper, he does not have the right 

to disobey); Calhoun v. Wyatt, No. 6:11-CV-4, 2013 WL 1882367, at *6 

(E.D. Tex. May 2, 2013). In particular, courts have consistently 

concluded that using pepper spray is reasonable where a plaintiff 

refuses to comply with directives. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cagel, No. 4:21-

CV-692-P, 2022 WL 17586547, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2022), report 

and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17584425 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 

2023), appeal dism’d, No. 23-10045, 2023 WL 4546548 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 

2023); Piper v. Preston, No. 5-15-CV-00771-FB-RBF, 2018 WL 3193819, 

at *6 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2018); Calhoun, 2013 WL 1882367, at *6. Here, 

Plaintiff acknowledges that he refused to move his foot from the cell door 

after demand was made several times. He was pepper sprayed only after 

he refused to comply. He has not shown that use of pepper spray was 

objectively unreasonable.

As for the closing of the cell door on Plaintiff’s hand, Plaintiff admits 

that after being sprayed, he immediately threw his hands up and 

ducked. ECF No. 11 at 1. He heard the cell door slam shut, then looked 

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up and realized that his hand had been caught in the door. Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show, or come forward with any proof, 

that Love knew that Plaintiff’s hand was in the door frame. Due process 

is not implicated by the accidental or negligent use of force. Kingsley, 

576 U.S. at 396; Greer v. Fowler, No. 4:19-CV-1017-P, 202 WL 2745544, 

at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2020). Here, the evidence establishes that Love 

was simply closing the cell door after Plaintiff ceased blocking it with 

his foot.

Because Plaintiff has failed to overcome either prong of the qualified 

immunity defense, Love is entitled to judgment and the Court need not 

consider the other ground of the motion.

ORDER

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; Plaintiff takes

nothing on his claims against Love; and Plaintiff’s claims are 

DISMISSED with prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 5th day of September 2023.

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