NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0345n.06

Nos. 14-3565/4222

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SEBASTIAN ESCALADA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 

FROM THE UNITED STATES 

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 

APPEALS

BEFORE: SILER, ROGERS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Sebastian Escalada petitions for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his petition to 

remove the conditional status of his permanent residency. Escalada also petitions for review of 

an order denying his motion to reopen.

Escalada is a native and citizen of Argentina. In 1998, he entered the United States as a

conditional lawful permanent resident based on his marriage to a United States citizen. In 

September 2000, Escalada and his first U.S. citizen wife filed a joint petition to remove the 

conditional status of his residency. The couple divorced shortly thereafter, however, and 

Escalada withdrew the joint petition. In 2002, Escalada filed his own petition to remove the 

conditional status of his residency, seeking a hardship waiver from the requirement that he file a 

joint petition on the basis that he married in good faith and the marriage ended in divorce. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B).
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After the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Escalada’s 

petition and terminated his permanent resident status in 2009, he sought review by an IJ. The IJ 

denied Escalada’s petition and ordered him removed to Argentina, concluding that Escalada and 

his former wife did not testify credibly and that Escalada failed to otherwise show that he 

married in good faith. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.

A few months later, Escalada filed a motion to reopen proceedings with the BIA, which 

the BIA denied. In his motion, Escalada argued, for the first time, that he was eligible under 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) for a waiver of inadmissibility. The BIA rejected this argument for

two reasons. First, Escalada had failed to seek a waiver under § 1227(a)(1)(H) below and had 

given no explanation for this failure. Second, Escalada was not eligible for a waiver under 

§ 1227(a)(1)(H) because that provision “only waives misrepresentation or fraud related grounds 

of removability and [Escalada] was charged as being removable under [8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(1)(D)] as a conditional resident whose status was terminated.” In his motion, 

Escalada, also for the first time, requested the BIA reopen proceedings based on a pending I-130 

application for adjustment of status filed by his fourth U.S. citizen wife, Sarah Escalada. The 

BIA rejected this argument, noting that Escalada had a criminal history, that his case had been 

pending before the Immigration Judge for eight years, and that Escalada had failed to raise the 

possibility of an I-130 application to the BIA despite having married Sarah Escalada before his 

initial BIA hearing. Escalada does not seek review of the BIA’s decision regarding the I-130 

application.

On appeal, Escalada raises the following arguments: (1) the IJ and BIA erred when 

deciding whether he married in good faith by departing from the regulations and case law and 

imposing their own standards; (2) the BIA erred by mischaracterizing certain testimony; (3) the 
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BIA erred when assessing the strength and consistency of the testimony and evidence by failing 

to consider the impact of the USCIS’s long delay in adjudicating the petition; and (4) the IJ’s 

improper questions and comments denied him due process. Escalada also argues that the BIA 

abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s factual determinations regarding whether 

Escalada married in good faith. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(4), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Johns v. Holder, 

678 F.3d 404, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2012). It is true that in Johns v. Holder we ruled—essentially as 

part of an alternate basis for denying the petition in that case—that we could still review for 

substantial evidence whether a marriage was bona fide. 678 F.3d at 407. Because the substantial 

evidence standard of review by its nature addresses factual determinations, it is somewhat 

anomalous to apply it when our jurisdiction extends only to purely legal determinations. The 

language in Johns may not be binding because it was not necessary to the holding in that case, 

but we need not make that determination because, even in Johns, we recognized that it would be 

“very difficult, if not impossible, to overrule a hardship-waiver decision premised on lack of 

credibility,” and we explained that the BIA in Johns accepted the credibility of the witnesses. Id. 

That is not the case here, where the IJ found neither Escalada nor his first wife credible and the 

BIA upheld these findings. Thus, Johns is distinguishable, and we accordingly lack jurisdiction 

over any determinations of the agency that are not purely legal or constitutional. See Ettienne v. 

Holder, 659 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2011); Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 747–48 (6th 

Cir. 2006). We may however review questions of law and constitutional claims. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D); Johns, 678 F.3d at 406.

To the extent that Escalada’s arguments in No. 14-3565 present pure questions of law, the 

arguments lack merit. Escalada has not shown that the IJ or BIA departed from established law 
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and imposed their own standards when deciding whether he married in good faith. Escalada has 

also not shown that the BIA mischaracterized testimony. The BIA was not required to explicitly 

consider whether the USCIS’s delay in adjudicating Escalada’s petition adversely affected his 

ability to present supporting evidence. Finally, Escalada’s due process claim fails because he has 

not shown that the IJ’s allegedly improper questions and comments affected the outcome of his 

proceedings. See Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 979 (6th Cir. 2009).

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen because 

Escalada’s motion to reopen raises grounds for relief that do not require review of the BIA’s 

factual determinations regarding the bona fides of Escalada’s first marriage. Escalada argues 

that, even assuming that his first marriage was fraudulent, he is eligible under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(1)(H) for a waiver of inadmissibility because he is now married to another U.S. citizen 

with whom he has two U.S. citizen children. That section provides that the Attorney General, in 

her discretion, may waive certain provisions relating to the removal of an alien who is 

inadmissible because of fraud or misrepresentation, if the alien has an immediate relative who is 

a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident and is otherwise admissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). 

The statute further specifies that “[a] waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted 

under this subparagraph shall also operate to waive removal based on the grounds of 

inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation.” Id.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Escalada’s motion to reopen because his 

motion raised only previously available grounds for relief. As observed by the BIA, 

§ 1227(a)(1)(H) relief was available to Escalada before his initial BIA hearing, yet he failed to 

raise it. Escalada’s only response to this point is to argue that he could not apply for a waiver 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) until the agency issued a final order concluding his first marriage 
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was fraudulent, i.e., the BIA’s denial of his appeal. But the fraudulent act, not the final order, is 

the ground of inadmissibility, see Avila-Anguiano v. Holder, 689 F.3d 566, 568–69 (6th Cir. 

2012), and therefore Escalada could have requested relief under § 1227(a)(1)(H) during his 

initial BIA hearing.

Accordingly, we deny Escalada’s petitions for review.