NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID J CENTANNI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56518 

D.C. No. 

2:15-cv-04519-FMO-RAO 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 16, 2018**

Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

David Centanni appeals pro se the district court’s judgment affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Centanni’s application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and will reverse only if the denial of 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-56518 

benefits is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

Because nothing in the record supports his claims, Centanni fails to present a 

colorable constitutional claim of a due process violation. See Klemm v. Astrue, 543 

F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly concluded that additional 

impairments were not severe at step two because the medical evidence established 

that the impairments had no more than a minimal effect on Centanni’s ability to 

work. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ did not 

err by failing to consider pain and fatigue as impairments at step two. See Ukolov 

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that symptoms alone 

do not constitute impairments). Regardless of her conclusions at step two, the ALJ 

properly included evidence related to all of Centanni’s impairments and symptoms 

in assessing Centanni’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). See Buck v. Berryhill, 

869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical record, 

and the ALJ properly included in the RFC all limitations that were supported by 

and consistent with substantial evidence. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ did not err by failing to 

consider additional medical records that post-date the relevant time period. See 
3 16-56518 

Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the ALJ is not 

required to discuss records that are neither significant nor probative).

The ALJ properly concluded that Centanni’s testimony was not entirely 

credible regarding the intensity of his symptoms based on clear and convincing 

reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 

591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ properly rejected Centanni’s allegations of 

disabling ankle, knee, and back pain based on inconsistency with the objective 

medical evidence showing largely unremarkable physical examinations. See 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (reasoning that the ALJ properly rejected claimant 

testimony based on inconsistency with the objective medical evidence). Second, 

the ALJ properly rejected Centanni’s testimony based on an unexplained failure to 

seek any treatment except for a brief period in 2010. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 

(explaining that the ALJ may properly discredit claimant testimony based on an 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment). Third, the ALJ 

properly rejected Centanni’s testimony based on his conservative and noninvasive 

treatment, including refusals of analgesics, a steroid injection, an ankle brace, and 

ankle surgery. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(including conservative treatment in reasons the ALJ properly rejected claimant 

testimony). The ALJ failed adequately to explain how additional reasons were 

inconsistent with Centanni’s testimony. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 
4 16-56518 

(requiring the ALJ adequately to link evidence to the specific testimony it 

discredits). Any error in relying on these additional reasons was harmless. See 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (concluding that error is harmless when it is 

inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination).

The ALJ properly relied on the Vocational Expert’s (VE) testimony, and 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Centanni could perform 

his past relevant work. The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred by 

concluding that Centanni actually performed his past relevant work as an irrigation 

system installer at the medium exertion level, but any error was harmless because 

the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony that the irrigation system installer 

position generally is performed at the medium exertion level. See Stacy v. Colvin, 

825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the ALJ may properly rely on a 

claimant’s ability to perform past relevant work either as generally or as actually 

performed). Centanni waived any challenge to the version of the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles used, see Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 

2006) (explaining that issues not raised before the district court are waived), but 

even if we considered the issue on the merits, Centanni fails to show any error.

We reject Centanni’s additional contentions because none is supported by 

the record.

AFFIRMED.