UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KENNETH R. MARSHALL, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. KAMERON HARVANEK, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 17-7083 (D.C. No. 6:17-CV -00200-RAW-KEW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , MATHESON , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Pro se state prisoner Kenneth R. M arshall seeks a certificate o f appealability (COA) to appeal the district c ourt’s dismissal of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 1 We deny Marshall’s request for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I. Marshall is serving a life sente nce in Oklahoma for a first-deg ree murder conviction. On January 27, 2017 , a Nowata County District Cour t judge entered an order denying Marshall’s applica tion for postconviction release . But the judge left

* This order is not binding preced ent, except under the doctrine s of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Marshall is proceeding pr o se, “we construe his filing s liberally.” Garza v. Davis , 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2010). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 the final sentence of the order unfinished. On February 1, 201 7, Marshall filed a motion for clarification and aske d the court to complete the un finished sentence with language directing the Department of Corrections to discharge h im if he had served forty-five years of his life sentence. On February 2, 2017, the court en tered an order that incorporat ed the requested language. But on February 10 the court entered an amended orde r stating “that the order filed January 27 , 2017 . . . was proper,” ROA at 94, that “the order filed on February 2, 2017 was incorrect in its assignment of a forty-fiv e (45) year term,” id. , and that the February 2 order “s hould be stricken from the reco rd.” Id. After unsuccessfully seeking manda mus relief from the Atoka Cou nty District Court and the Oklahoma Court of C riminal Appeals, Marshall file d a motion in federal district court for habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . He also asked the district court to hold an evide ntiary hearing. Marshall believ ed he was entitled to a hearing to prove that the Oklaho ma Department of Corrections en gaged in ex parte communications with the Nowata C ounty judge. The court denied the motion and dismissed the petition. In this appeal Marshall contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for an evidentiary hearin g. He also seeks a COA to chal lenge the district court’s dismissal of his petiti on. As we conclude below, there is “nothing in the record [to] indicate[] [Marsha ll] is entitled to any relief.” Wilson v. Oklahoma , 335 F. App’x 783, 784 (10th Cir. 2009). Consequently, “the denial of [the evidentiary] hearing[] was not error.” Id.3 Additionally, we note that Marsh all filed a motion to supplemen t the appellate record with a certified copy of t he February 2, 2017 order. Th e certified copy indicates the February 2, 2017 or der was filed with the Oklahom a Court of Criminal Appeals on February 6, 2017. We GRANT Marshall’s motion to sup plement the record. We have also considered his supplemental authorities.
II. To obtain appellate review of the district court’s dismissal of his petition, Marshall must acquire a COA. To acquire a COA, Marshall must m ake a “substantial showing of the denial of a cons titutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, he must demonstrat e “that reasonable jurists woul d find the district court’s assessment of the const itutional claims debatable or wr ong.” Slack v.
McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (20 00). Marshall has fa iled to make this s howing. Below, the district court prope rly framed the question as wheth er Marshall has established “he is being held i n state custody in violation of the United States Constitution or other federal law .” Dist. Ct. Op. at 4. The d istrict court then found that Marshall’s life sentence is not excessive under federal la w. 2 Reasonable jurists

2 On appeal Marshall contends tha t the district court improperly construed his argument. Specifically, he argue s that the crux of his positio n below was that the February 10 order is invalid and that the February 2 order is t he only valid order. The district court likely did not address this argument because Marshall has failed to successfully tie it to the denial of a federal right. Marshall contends that the Oklahoma state courts’ treatment of these orders denied him sub stantive and procedural due process. But unde r Oklahoma law, “[d]efendants sentenced to life imprisonment . . . remain under th at sentence all of their days , and obtain their liberty only after a recommendation from the Pardon and Parole Board, a nd then only4 would not find this conclusion de batable. The United States Su preme Court will uphold a sentence that is not gro ssly disproportionate to the c rime. See Ewing v. California , 538 U.S. 11, 21–23 (2003). Her e, Marshall’s life sentence wa s not grossly disproportionate to his first-degree mur der conviction. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a)–(b), 3559(a)(1), 3581(b)(1) (authorizing imposition of a life sentence for Class A felonies such as f irst-degree murder). As for the remaining issues Marsh all raises in his brief, we ne ed not reach them because none of them aids in determining whether the execu tion of Marshall’s sentence violates federal law. See Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a f ederal habeas court to reexami ne state-court determinations on state-law ques tions. In conducting a habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Consti tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). For exa mple, reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district court properly disregar ded Marshall’s a ccess to the co urts arguments because those are civil rights complain ts Marshall can pursue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See,

conditionally, under terms dictated by the Governor, if ever.” Anderson v. State , 130 P.3d 273, 286–87 (Okl a. Crim. App. 2006) (Lewis, J., concurring ). Additionally, “Oklahoma law prohibits the use o f earned time credits to reduc e a sentence of life imprisonment.” Dist. Ct. Op. a t 7 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A) (“No deductions [by applica tion of earned credit s] shall be credited to any inmate serving a sentence of life imprisonment . . . .”)). Thus, because the Fe bruary 2 order instructed the Oklahoma Department of Corre ctions to consider Marshall’s e arned credits and release him if “a term of forty -five (45) years ha[d] been serv ed,” it was incorrect as a matter of Oklahoma law. We do not see how the Nowata County judge’s decision to correct this erroneous order resulted in a deprivation of du e process. Reasonable jurists would not find this c onclusion to be debatable.5 e.g. , Muhammad v. Close , 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (pe r curiam) (discussing the difference between section 1983 and habeas petitions).
III. Based on the foregoing, we DENY Ma rshall’s request for a COA an d DISMISS this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge