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Filed 9/30/14 P. v. Superior Court CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). T his opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVER SIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;

MEI JUN WANG,
Real Party in Interest. E061466
(Super.Ct.No. INF1301165)

OPINION

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. John J.
Ryan, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Petition granted.
Paul Zellerbach, District Attorney, and Natalie M. Pitre, Deputy District Attorney,

for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.2

Peter R. Cabrera for Real Party in In terest.
In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition thereto
, which we
conclude adequately address the issues raised by the petition. We have determined that
resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of la w , and that an
alternative writ would add nothing to the presentation already made and would cause
undue delay in bringing the action to trial. We therefore issue a peremptory writ in the

first instance

. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984)
36 Cal.3d 171, 178

- 179; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222

- 1223,
disapproved on another ground in Hassan v. Mercy American River Hosp ital (2003) 31
Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4.)

“An information will not be set asid e or a prosecution ther e on prohibited if there is
some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and
the accused is guilty of it.

. . . ( Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471.)”
( Caughlin v. Superior Court ( 1971) 4 Cal.3d 461, 464

- 465.) Every legitimate inference
that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the information. ( People
v. Superior Court ( Grilli ) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 506, 511, disapproved on other grounds

in People v. Superior C ourt ( Mendella ) (1983) 33 C al.3d 754, 758 .) The same standard
of review applies to charges added to the information by the district attorney under Penal
Code section 739. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629.)3

Applying these princ iples to the instant case, we must conclude that the superior
court erred in dismissing the charge of pandering alleged in the information.
Section 266i, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that “any person who does
any of the following is guilty of pandering, a felony, and shall be punish able by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years: [¶] (1) Procures another
person for the purpose of prostitution. [¶] (2) By promises, threats, violence, or by any
device or scheme, caus es, induces, persuades
, or encourages another person to become a
prostitute.” Section 266i’s remaining subdivisions, roughly paraphrased, criminalize a
variety of other types of pandering, including finding another a place in a house of
prostitution; caus ing, by various means, another to remain as an inmate in a house of
prostitution; and receiving or giving money for procuring another for purposes of
prostitution.
“Pandering, as defined in section 266i, includes a broad spectrum of behaviors and
degrees of culpability.” ( People v. Almodovar (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 732, 740

- 741.)
The first amended information alleges that real party in interest willfully and unlawfully
procured another for the purpose of prostitution. This pleading alleges a violation un der
section 266i, subdivision (a)(1).
The evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing established that a Riverside
County Sheriff’s investigator called for a prostitute and real party in interest arranged for
a woman calling herself Vivian to perform

— ev en providing transportation and
“accessories” for the job. “ Procure ” is defined as, inter alia, “ to get and make available4

for promiscuous sexual intercourse ” (Webster ’ s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (19 91 ) p. 938);

“ [t]o obtain, as a prostitute, for another ” ; and “ [t]o bring the seller and the buyer together
so that the seller has an opportunity to sell. ” (Black ’ s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1208,

col. 1.)
Procurement encompasses a broad range of conduct, and it is not necessary that

the victim ever actuall y perform acts of prostitution. ( People v. DeLoach (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 323, 333.) Thus, there was no requirement t hat the prosecution establish real

party in interest encourage d or persuade d another to become a prostitute; it was enough

that she procur ed another person for the purposes of prostitution

. (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1).)
This is exactly what real party did and it is unnecessary under that particular subdivision
to show that she persuaded or induced Vivian to commit the act.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Riverside
County to set aside its order granting in part real party in interest ’s section 995 motion
and to enter a new order denying that motion.5

Petitioner is directed to prepare and hav e the peremptory writ of mandate issued,
copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of
service on all parties.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON J. We concur:

RICHLI Acting P. J.

KIN G J.