IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

FRANCIS LEE BULLOCK, § 

TDCJ No. 2243585, § 

 § 

Petitioner, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-870-B-BN 

§ 

DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, § 

§ 

Respondent. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Through a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

filed in the Southern District of Texas, Petitioner Francis Lee Bullock, a Texas 

prisoner, collaterally attacks his Johnson County convictions for three counts of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than 14 years of age, one count of 

indecency with a child by contact, and two counts of indecency with a child by 

exposure. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 2; State v. Bullock, No. DC-F201800013 (249th Dist. Ct., 

Johnson Cnty., Tex. Jan. 18, 2019), aff’d, No. 10-19-00031-CR, 2020 WL 103692 (Tex. 

App. – Waco Jan. 8, 2020, no pet.). 

After Bullock’s Section 2254 application was transferred to the district, see

Dkt. No. 5, United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred it to the undersigned 

United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) 

and a standing order of reference. The State responded to the application, as ordered, 

and argues that it should be dismissed with prejudice as time barred, Bullock failed 

to file a reply, and the deadline to do so has passed. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 19. 

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The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should dismiss the federal habeas petition with 

prejudice as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Legal Standards 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 

“introduced both ‘simple logic’ to the federal habeas landscape and uniform rules for 

federal courts to apply.” Wallace v. Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting Smith v. Titus, 141 S. Ct. 982, 987 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from 

denial of cert.), then citing Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006)). 

“Namely, it implemented a host of greatly needed procedural requirements for 

petitioners seeking habeas relief.” Id. (citing Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 

1524 (2022) (“In many ways, the statute represented a sea change in federal habeas 

law.”)). 

One such requirement is “the one-year period for an individual in custody 

pursuant to a state-court judgment to file a § 2254 petition for habeas relief” that 

“begins running from the latest of four events.” Id. at 497 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)): 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or 

other collateral review is pending is excluded from the limitations period. See id. § 

2244(d)(2). 

The one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling – “a 

discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case,” 

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999), and only applies in “rare and 

exceptional circumstances,” United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). As such, “a litigant is 

entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes 

two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” 

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). 

“‘The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, 

not maximum feasible diligence.’ What a petitioner did both before and after the 

extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing may indicate 

whether he was diligent overall.” Jackson v. Davis, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; footnote omitted). 

But “[a] petitioner’s failure to satisfy the statute of limitations must result from 

external factors beyond his control; delays of the petitioner’s own making do not 

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qualify.” Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 

(citation omitted). So this “prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the 

circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond [the 

litigant’s] control.” Menominee Indian Tribe, 577 U.S. at 257. 

A showing of “actual innocence” can also overcome AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). But the actual 

innocence gateway is only available to a petitioner who presents “evidence of 

innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial 

unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional 

error.” Id. at 401 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

That is, the petitioner’s new, reliable evidence must be enough to persuade the 

Court that “‘no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329); see also Johnson v. 

Hargett, 978 F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The Supreme Court has made clear 

that the term ‘actual innocence’ means factual, as opposed to legal, innocence – ‘legal’ 

innocence, of course, would arise whenever a constitutional violation by itself requires 

reversal, whereas ‘actual’ innocence, as the Court stated in McCleskey [v. Zant, 499 

U.S. 467 (1991)], means that the person did not commit the crime.” (footnotes 

omitted)); Acker v. Davis, 693 F. App’x 384, 392-93 (5th Cir 2017) (per curiam) 

(“Successful gateway claims of actual innocence are ‘extremely rare,’ and relief is 

available only in the ‘extraordinary case’ where there was ‘manifest injustice.’” 

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327)). 

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Analysis 

The timeliness of most Section 2254 applications – Bullock’s is no exception – 

is determined under Subsection A, based on the date on which the judgment became 

final. 

A state criminal judgment becomes final under AEDPA “when there is no more 

‘availability of direct appeal to the state courts.’” Frosch v. Thaler, No. 2:12-cv-231, 

2013 WL 271423, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013) (quoting Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 

U.S. 113, 119 (2009)), rec. adopted, 2013 WL 271446 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2013). 

And Bullock’s state criminal judgment “became final for federal limitations 

purposes ‘upon the expiration of the time for seeking further review through the filing 

of a [petition for discretionary review, or] PDR,’” Macon v. Davis, No. 3:15-cv-855-DBN, 2016 WL 7496180, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2016) (quoting Phillips v. 

Quarterman, No. 3:09-cv-1131-B, 2009 WL 1974302, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2009) 

(citing, in turn, Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 692 (5th Cir. 2003))), rec. adopted, 

2016 WL 7491848 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2016) – “which was thirty days after the [Waco] 

Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction,” or on February 7, 2020, id. (cleaned up; 

citing Flores v. Quarterman, 467 F.3d 484, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2006); Roberts, 319 F.3d 

at 694 (5th Cir. 2003); TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2); see also Dkt. No. 19-1 at 3 (certification 

from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the CCA) that it had no record of a PDR 

for Bullock’s direct appeal). 

For the following reasons, even after accounting for tolling under Section 

2244(d)(2), Bullock’s Section 2254 application was filed more than one year after his 

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state criminal judgment became final. 

First, Bullock’s Section 2254 application was filed no sooner than March 18, 

2022, the date on which he certifies that he placed it in the prison mailing system.

See Dkt. No. 1 at 10; RULE 3(d), RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURTS (“A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is 

timely if deposited in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last 

day for filing.”); Uranga v. Davis, 893 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2018) (“We reaffirm that 

the operative date of the prison mailbox rule remains the date the pleading is 

delivered to prison authorities.”). 

And the period during which Bullock sought state habeas relief, from the filing 

of the application in the state trial court, on October 18, 2020, see Dkt. No. 19-1 at 45, 

to its denial by the CCA, on April 14, 2021, see id. at 39; Ex parte Bullock, WR-91,952-

01 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2021), statutorily tolled the limitations period. So, 

crediting Bullock the 179 days that the limitations period was tolled, his Section 2254 

petition would have been timely if it was filed by August 5, 2021 (February 7, 2021 + 

179 days = August 5, 2021). 

Alternatively, Bullock claims that he did not receive notice that his state 

habeas petition was denied until October 25, 2021, see Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2, but even if 

the Court extends statutory tolling to this date, crediting Bullock 373 days, his 

Section 2254 petition remains time barred, as it should have been filed by February 

15, 2022 (February 7, 2021 + 373 days = February 15, 2022). Cf. Lookingbill v. 

Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2002) (“At the margins, all statutes of 

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limitations and filing deadlines appear arbitrary. AEDPA relies on precise filing 

deadlines to trigger specific accrual and tolling provisions. Adjusting the deadlines 

by only a few days in both state and federal courts would make navigating AEDPA’s 

timetable impossible. Such laxity would reduce predictability and would prevent us 

from treating the similarly situated equally. We consistently have denied tolling even 

where the petition was only a few days late.” (collecting cases)). 

Accordingly, under Section 2244(d)(1)(A), the Section 2254 application, filed no 

sooner than March 18, 2022, is due to be denied as untimely absent applicability of 

another provision of Section 2244(d)(1), equitable tolling, or actual innocence. 

But Bullock neither explains how another provision of Section 2244(d)(1) could 

apply here, nor advances a claim of tolling under the narrow actual innocence 

gateway, nor makes allegations that could establish either prong of equitable tolling 

– that he pursued his rights diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance 

beyond her control prevented the timely filing of the federal petition. See Dkt. No. 1 

at 9. 

The Court should therefore dismiss the Section 2254 petition with prejudice as 

time barred. 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss Petitioner Francis Lee Bullock’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

habeas application with prejudice as time barred. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

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findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: April 26, 2023 

_________________________________________ 

 DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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