NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA

, Appell ee ,

v.

TAMANIKA LA KRIESE WHITE, Appell ant

.

N o . 1 CA

- C R 12

- 0570

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. C R2011

- 007261

- 004

The Honorable Kristin C. Hoffman

, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office , Phoenix By Myles A. Braccio Counsel for Appell ee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office

, Phoenix By Thomas K. Baird

C ounsel for Appell antSTATE v. WHITE

Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding J udge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

N O R R I S

, Judge:

¶1 A ppellant, Tamanika La Kriese White, appeals from her

conviction and senten ce for attempt to commit sexual assault and sexual

assault. White argues the superior court should not have denied her challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct

. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), to the State’ s peremptory strikes of male jurors

. See J.E.B. v.

Alabama ex rel

. T.B

. , 511 U.S. 127, 129, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 ( 1994 ) ( Batson challenges extended to gender). We review the denial of a
Batson challenge for clear error. See State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 404,
¶ 43, 306 P.3d 48, 61 (2013)

. For the following reasons, we disagree with

White and affirm the superior court’s d enial of White’s Batson challenge

.

¶2 “A Batson challenge involves three steps : (1) T he defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor

must offer a [gender]

- neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful [gender]

discrimination.” Id

. at ¶ 44 (quoting State v. Hardy

, 230 Ariz. 281, 285

, ¶ 12, 283 P.3d 12, 16 (2012) )

.

¶3 Here, the State used all six of its peremptory juror strikes to dismiss male jurors. Following the State’s strikes, White made a timely

Batson challenge contending the State exercised its strikes in a gender

discriminatory manner. The superior court implicitly found that White

had made a prima facie showing of discrimination by asking the State for gender

- neutral reason s for the strikes. After the S tate explained the basis for the strikes, the superior court rejected White’s Batson challenge. The superior court thus implicitly determined that White had not carried her burden of proving purposeful gender discrimination

.

¶4 White argues the superior court erroneously found the State

offered gender

- neutral reason s for its peremptory strike s

. We disagree

.

“ Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [non

- moving party’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed” nondiscriminatory. Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs

. , 215 Ariz. 154, 168, ¶ 74 , 158 P.3d 877, 891 (App.STATE v. WHITE

Decision of the Court

3 2007) (alteration in original) (applying rule in context of race

- based Batson challenge)

. The reason s given by the S tate were not inherently discriminatory , or “ [ i ] mplausible or fantastic

. ” See i d. at ¶ 75 (citation omitted)

.

¶5 The State struck Juror 20 because it believed he had acted as thou gh he did not want to be there. At the beginning of the voir dire

process , Juror 20 initially claimed a work

- scheduling hardship ; b ut when

the court noted the juror’s company paid for juror service , he quickly backed off his hardship claim

.

¶6 The State struck Jurors 4, 38, and 42 because they had served on prior juries in criminal cases that had found the defendant not guilt y or guilty of a lesser

- included offense. Moreover, the S tate struck Juror 4

because his family members had been convicted of various crimes

.

¶7 The State struck J uror 25 because he appeared to be attempting to be comical

. When asked if he was married, t he juror said he

did not “have a husband or a wife,” and the prosecuto r subsequently

indicated he could not tell whether the juror was joking or offering some sort of “view of [] society.” And, the State struck Juror 26 because he had been charged with po ssession of marijuana and bu rglary

.

¶8 Finally, White argues that some of the stricken jurors had

similarities with non

- stricken jurors. White, however, did not raise this comparison analysis during voir dire . Both our supreme court and “the

United States Supreme Court ha[ve] warned that ‘ a retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial. ’ ” Medina

, 232 Ariz

. at 404, ¶ 48, 306 P.3d at 61 (quoting Snyder v. Louisian a , 552 U.S.
472, 483, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1211, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008)). Because White did not raise this argument in the superior court

, the State did not have an opportunity to offer distinctions between similarly situated jurors. Similarly, the superio r court did n ot have an opportunity to compare the jurors who were stricken with those who remained on the panel

. Because

neither the St ate nor the superior court had an opportunity to compare similarly situated jurors, we decline t o engage in a comparison analysis not raised during voir dire

. See i d. at 405, ¶ 49, 306 P.3d at 62.STATE v. WHITE

Decision of the Court

4 ¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s rejection of White’s Batson challenge

.