United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30019

SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C., doing business as SCF Liquids, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Aris T M/V, a bulk carrier ship, IMO No. 9343895, MMSI No. 

2406260000, her engines, tackle, and other appurtenances, in rem, in 

admiralty,

Defendant—Appellee,

versus

Genesis Marine, L.L.C., owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth 

Robinson and her tow; Genesis Marine, L.L.C. of Delaware, 

owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth Robinson,

Third-Party Defendants—Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

versus

Cenac Marine Services, L.L.C.,

Third-Party Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

versus

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 24, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

Aris T. Ene, 

Third-Party Defendant—Appellee,

versus

Valero Refining - New Orleans, L.L.C.; Motiva 

Enterprises, L.L.C., 

Third-Party Plaintiffs—Appellees,

Valero Refining - New Orleans, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Marmaras Navigation Limited; Aris T. Ene,

Defendants—Appellees,

versus

Genesis Marine, L.L.C., owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth 

Robinson and her tow; Genesis Marine, L.L.C. of Delaware, 

owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth Robinson, 

Defendants—Appellants,

Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

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Marmaras Navigation Limited; Aris T. Ene,

Defendants—Appellees,

versus

Genesis Marine, L.L.C., owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth 

Robinson and her tow; Genesis Marine, L.L.C. of Delaware, 

owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth Robinson, 

Defendants—Appellants,

Shell Chemical, L.P.,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Marmaras Navigation Limited; Aris T. Ene,

Defendants—Appellees,

versus

Genesis Marine, L.L.C., owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth 

Robinson and her tow; Genesis Marine, L.L.C. of Delaware, 

owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth Robinson, 

Defendants—Appellants,

In re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Aris T. Ene, 

Owner, and Marmaras Navigation Limited, Managers, 

of the Aris T M/V, for Exoneration from or Limitation 

of Liability 

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4

Aris T. Ene; Marmaras Navigation Limited, as Managers of 

the Aris T M/V petitioning for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,

Petitioners—Appellees,

versus

Genesis Marine, L.L.C., owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth 

Robinson and her tow; Genesis Marine, L.L.C. of Delaware, 

owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth Robinson,

Third-Party Plaintiffs–Claimants—Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

versus

Cenac Marine Services, L.L.C., 

Third-Party Defendant–Claimant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

versus

SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C., doing business as SCF Liquids; 

Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C.; Shell Chemical, L.P.; 

Valero Refining - New Orleans, L.L.C.; Kirby Inland 

Marine, L.P., 

Claimant—Appellee,

Antoine Morris, 

Claimant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

In re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Cenac Marine 

Services, L.L.C., Owner and Operator of M/V Loretta Cenac, Barge 

CTCO 338, Barge CTCO 339, and Barge CTCO Barge 357B, for Exoneration 

from or Limitation of Liability

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5

Cenac Marine Services L.L.C., as owner and operator of the MV 

Loretta Cenac, Barge CTCO 338, Barge CTCO 339, and Barge CTCO Barge 

357B, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,

Petitioner—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

versus

Genesis Marine, L.L.C., owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth 

Robinson and her tow; Genesis Marine, L.L.C. of Delaware,

owners and operators of the M/V Elizabeth Robinson, 

Third-Party Plaintiffs–Defendants–Claimants—Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

versus

Aris T. Ene; Marmaras Navigation Limited, 

Third-Party Plaintiffs–Defendants–Claimants—Appellees,

Valero Refining - New Orleans, L.L.C.,

Third-Party Plaintiff–Claimant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C.,

Third-Party Plaintiff–Claimant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

Shell Chemical, L.P.,

Claimant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

versus

New York Marine and General Insurance Company; 

Stonington Insurance Company; National Specialty 

Insurance Company,

Third-Party Defendants—Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

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Continental Insurance Company; AGCS Marine 

Insurance Company; Lloyd’s Syndicates, 4444CNP, 

0958CNP, 1036COF, 1225AES, 0457WTK, 2003SJC, 0033HIS, 

2001AML, 4472LIB, 2121ARG, 2623AFB, 0623AFB, 2987BRT, 

1183TAL, 3000MKL and 0382HDU 2001AML, 4472LIB, 

2121ARG, 2623AFB, 0623AFB, 2987BRT, 1183TAL, 3000MKL 

and 0382HDU, 

Third-Party Defendants—Appellees/Cross-Appellees,

SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C., doing business as SCF Liquids; 

Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.,

Claimants—Appellees,

versus

Antoine Morris,

Claimant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC Nos. 2:16-CV-902, 2:16-CV-959, 2:16-CV-1022, 

2:16-CV-1060, 2:16-CV-1134, 2:16-CV-1614 

Before Jones, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:

On the evening of January 31, 2016, three vessels were travelling on 

the Mississippi River. Unfortunately, they did not pass peacefully in the 

night. This case is about why, and how fault should be assigned. Because we 

hold that the district court did not err in allocating the parties’ respective 

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liabilities, in limiting the parties’ liability, or in dismissing the personal injury 

claim, we AFFIRM.

I.

On the evening of January 31, 2016, the Mississippi River was running 

high. The weather was fair, and a light surface fog was developing on the 

portion of river near Hahnville, Louisiana.

The Aris T was moving up the Mississippi River at the same time the 

Elizabeth and the Loretta were moving down it.

1

 The allision occurred as the 

three vessels were passing each other in the Hahnville Bar, a bend between 

mile markers 124.5 and 126 in the Mississippi River where a number of 

moorings are located. In a nutshell, the allision occurred as the Aris T was 

passing the Loretta and the Elizabeth at the same time as the Loretta was 

overtaking the Elizabeth, and given their positioning, there simply was not

enough room for the three vessels to be adjacent to each other 

simultaneously.2

1 The Aris T refers to the vessel itself and “Aris T Interests” refers collectively to 

the vessel, its owner Aris T. Ene, and its manager Marmaras Navigation Limited. 

The Elizabeth refers to the vessel itself and “Elizabeth Interests” refers collectively

to the co-owners of the defendant vessel: Genesis Marine, L.L.C. and Genesis Marine, 

L.L.C. of Delaware.

The Loretta refers to the vessel itself and “Loretta Interest” refers to its owner, 

Cenac Marine Services, L.L.C. (also referred to as “Cenac”). We also note that Cenac’s

various insurance companies (collectively, the “Insurance Parties”) are involved in this 

case: Continental Insurance Company, AGCS Marine Insurance Company, New York 

Marine and General Insurance Company, Stonington Insurance Company, National 

Specialty Insurance Company, and Lloyd’s Syndicates.

2 A video reconstruction of the allision shows the paths of the vessels and includes 

relevant audio recorded from the Aris T’s VDR, which recorded all VHF 

transmissions sent or received by the Aris T’s VHF radio and all voices recorded on 

the four microphones located on the Aris T’s bridge. This video reconstruction was 

admitted into evidence, and no party has contested its accuracy.

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The Aris T was mastered by Captain Baltas, but at all relevant times 

was piloted by Michael Leone, a compulsory pilot.3

 The Aris T was in good 

working order and its crew was duly trained. It was equipped with two 

Electronic Chart Display and Information System (“ECDIS”) units which 

could be used for navigation, but at the time were only being used for training 

purposes and had limited functionality. Instead, the Aris T was using radar 

and paper charts for navigation, and Pilot Leone had a portable Rose Point 

electronic chart system. 

The Elizabeth was under the command of Captain Christiansen. The 

Elizabeth was in good working order and navigated with both radar and a Rose 

Point system. 

The Loretta was piloted by Captain Sanamo; it too was navigated with 

radar and a Rose Point system. Unlike the other two vessels, however, the 

Loretta was not in good working order. The Loretta was secured to the barges 

it was towing by two-part face wires.

4 At some point during these events, this 

wiring system failed, limiting the Loretta’s maneuverability. This was not the 

first time the Loretta’s face-wire system failed, but Cenac chose a band-aid 

solution rather than redesigning to a three-part face-wire system, which 

would have run back to the barge an additional time. 

As the Loretta and the Elizabeth were approaching the Hahnville Bar, 

Captain Christiansen suggested to Captain Sanamo that the Loretta overtake 

the Elizabeth. Captain Sanamo had previously asked to overtake the 

Elizabeth, but at that point Captain Christiansen thought the maneuver was 

3 A compulsory pilot is “one who is legally required to be taken by the vessel 

owner,” typically to guarantee that the pilot has knowledge of the local waters. Guy C. 

Stephenson, A Pilot Is A Pilot: Compulsory Pilots—Vessel Owner’s Responsibilities for 

Intervention and Personal Injury, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 633, 634 (1995).

4 Face wires secure the towboat to its tow. A face wire is two-part when it runs 

from winches on the towboat to terminal fittings welded to the deck of the barge (one part) 

and then back to the towboat (second part). Three-part face wire would then run back to 

the barge one more time.

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too dangerous. But Captain Christiansen was going to be “stopping and 

backing up” at the Bayou Fleet, just south of the Hahnville Bar. Because he

would be slowing down to back in, he thought that this was a good time for 

the Loretta to overtake him. 

Further, Captain Christiansen mistakenly believed there was nothing 

nearby going upriver; neither he nor Captain Sanamo had heard the Aris T’s

earlier announcement of its position over the radio, which could be because

Pilot Leone transmitted using a handheld VHF radio from within the steel 

confines of the Aris T’s bridge. But the Aris T, despite being able to hear 

Captain Sanamo and Captain Christiansen’s communications about the 

overtaking agreement, did nothing to correct the captains’ faulty assumption 

that nothing was coming upriver towards them. Pilot Leone did not reach 

out and advise the Elizabeth and the Loretta of its upbound route, nor did he 

reduce the Aris T’s speed. 

It was not until five minutes later, when the Loretta was already 

overtaking the Elizabeth, that Captain Christiansen reached out to Pilot 

Leone to organize the Aris T’s passing. They agreed to a one-whistle, portto-port side passing. Captain Sanamo then reached out to Pilot Leone, and 

they too organized a port-to-port side passing. This meant that the three 

vessels agreed to pass each other with the Elizabeth on the west moving

downriver, the Aris T on the east moving upriver, and the Loretta in between 

them moving downriver, overtaking the Elizabeth.

It did not go as planned. Because Captain Christiansen said the 

Elizabeth would be backing into the Bayou Fleet, Captain Sanamo and Pilot 

Leone expected the Elizabeth to be very close to the west bank. But instead, 

the Elizabeth was in the middle of the river, and continuously slid east during 

the passing due to the four- to five-knot current. This greatly reduced the 

amount of space the Loretta and the Aris T had to execute their pass. Captain 

Sanamo, perhaps realizing there might not be sufficient space, suggested to 

Pilot Leone that the Loretta abandon its attempt to overtake the Elizabeth. 

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At this point, “the maneuver was so precarious that it could only work 

if: “(a) the Elizabeth somehow stopped its slide and began moving towards 

the west bank, which it gave no sign of doing; (b) the Loretta could somehow 

push out in front of the Elizabeth to complete the overtaking maneuver, 

which it had not been able to do thus far; and (c) nothing else went wrong.” 

But Pilot Leone told Captain Sanamo there was “plenty of room” and to 

continue forward, and Captain Sanamo did not protest. Pilot Leone 

momentarily suggested altering the passing plan so the Aris T would pass in 

between the Loretta and the Elizabeth, but he quickly recanted that 

suggestion. And so, despite the limited river space, the boats proceeded with 

their planned passage.

The Elizabeth continued sliding east, which forced Captain Sanamo to 

slow down to avoid colliding with the Elizabeth, and this kept the Loretta in 

the Aris T’s path. Further preventing the Loretta from getting out of the Aris 

T’s path was its face wire breaking.5

 Cenac discarded the face wire before it 

could be examined.

At some point, Pilot Leone realized the Aris T was on course to hit the 

Loretta, so he took emergency evasive maneuvers. The maneuvers avoided 

a collision with the Loretta. But they resulted in the Aris T’s colliding with 

the vessel SCF Vision, which was moored at the Valero facility. The SCF 

Vision in turn struck and damaged the Valero facility. The Aris T, at this 

point trying to stop, then collided with the vessels M/V Pedernales and Kirby 

28080 and allided with Shell/Motiva Berth 4 and Berth 2, damaging both of 

them.6 

5 The parties contest whether the face wire broke before or after the accident 

occurred. The district court, after hearing testimony and reviewing the Loretta’s Rose 

Point system, camera, and radar footage, concluded that it broke before the passing was 

complete. 

6 We refer to the owners of vessels that were moored at or near the docks and came 

into the Aris T’s collision course as the “Vessel Plaintiffs.”

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During the failed passing, Captain Christiansen was incommunicado 

with Captain Sanamo and Pilot Leone. He later testified that their passing 

each other did not concern his vessel, so there was no need for him to 

communicate with them, even though his not acting in accordance with his 

stated intention to back into the Bayou Fleet reduced their maneuvering 

space. Captain Sanamo was talking on his cell phone with his girlfriend 

during the accident, in violation of Cenac’s cell phone policy. And Pilot 

Leone failed to react appropriately to the overtaking announcement and kept 

the Aris T going at speed, rather than slowing down. 

While this was happening, Antoine Morris, an employee of 

Shell/Motiva, was working at Shell/Motiva Berth 1, located about 1000 feet 

from Berth 2. Upon hearing a warning from the Berth 4 operator about the 

accident, Morris decided to walk to the emergency shutdown device to turn 

off the dock’s product lines. But while on his way, upon seeing the Aris T in 

the distance, Morris panicked, lost his footing, and fell. Immediately after 

his fall, he was able to get up and walk. 

He remained at work until his shift ended and did not report any 

symptoms to his coworker or supervisor. He later saw a series of doctors, 

and was eventually diagnosed with PTSD and a traumatic brain injury by Dr. 

Axelrad, the third doctor he saw.7

 An independent evaluator, Dr. Ginzburg, 

testified that Morris did not have either of these ailments. 

SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C., owner of the moored vessel SCF Vision, 

sued the Aris T, in rem, for damages caused by the accident. Then, each of 

the Shore Plaintiffs8 sued both the Aris T in rem and the other Aris T Interests 

in personam. Then the Aris T filed a complaint under the Limitation of 

7 At the first and second doctor’s visits, Morris denied hitting his head or 

experiencing any concussion symptoms, but he did complain of neck pain. 

8 “Shore Plaintiffs” refers to the owners of the docks and berths damaged by the 

accident: Valero Refining - New Orleans, L.L.C. (“Valero”), Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C., 

and Shell Chemical, L.P.

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Liability Act,9 asserting that the owners were not liable, and the Loretta

Interest did the same. The cases were consolidated, and thereafter, the 

Loretta Interest and the Aris T Interests filed third-party complaints against 

the Elizabeth Interests. 

The Elizabeth Interests then asserted limitation of liability as a 

defense. Morris asserted claims in the limitation proceedings, seeking claims 

for personal injuries. Finally, the Shore Plaintiffs filed third party complaints 

against the Insurance Parties under “Louisiana’s direct-action statute, La. 

R.S. 22:1269, which allows injured persons to sue the insurers of a person 

alleged to have caused and accident.” 

Two bench trials followed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. 

First, the district court tried the negligence and limitation-of-liability claims 

over the course of 10 days. Second, the district court tried Morris’s personal 

injury case. Before the bench trials commenced, the district court denied the 

Shore Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether 

the Insurance Parties could limit their liability if the Loretta Interest could. 

The district court found that the Elizabeth, Loretta, and Aris T were 

all liable for the damages to the Shore Plaintiffs and Vessel Plaintiffs. The 

court used maritime statutes and regulations, including the U.S. Inland 

Navigation Rules, 33 C.F.R. §§ 83.01, et seq., to determine the applicable 

standards of care. Because comparative fault applies to maritime accidents, 

the district court then described each vessel’s faults. It found the Loretta and 

Elizabeth primarily and equally at fault for creating the dangerous situation 

with their overtaking agreement (allocating 45% of the liability to each) and

found the Aris T at fault to a lesser extent (allocating 10% of the liability). 

9 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq. The Act allows owners of vessels involved in accidents 

to limit their liability to the value of the vessel and pending freight in certain situations. See 

id. § 30505. It also allows them to proactively bring suits to claim this limited liability. Id. 

§ 30511.

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The district court ruled that the Loretta Interest and the Elizabeth

Interests could not limit their liability because they were themselves 

negligent but that the Aris T Interests could limit their liability because the 

culpability rested solely with the compulsory pilot, Pilot Leone. 

Finally, the district court dismissed Morris’s claims with prejudice. It 

found that the cause of his injuries was his own carelessness and inattention, 

and not the Aris T’s alliding with a different berth; therefore, Morris could 

not establish the duty or cause elements of his claim. It further found that 

Morris could not recover for emotional injuries under a “zone of danger” 

theory because he was not in the zone of danger. 

II.

Four appeals involving different subsets of the parties were 

consolidated into this case. The Elizabeth Interests appeal the district court’s 

assigning them 45% of the fault and denying its limitation of liability. The

Loretta Interest appeals on the same grounds as the Elizabeth Interests. The

Shore Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s previous denial of partial summary 

judgment regarding the Cenac Insurer’s ability to limit their liability to that 

of the Loretta Interest. Finally, Morris appeals the district court’s dismissal 

of his case.

A. Allocation of Liability

The first issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in its 

allocation of fault among the three vessel defendants: the Elizabeth, the 

Loretta, and the Aris T.

Negligence in general maritime law operates much like negligence in 

state tort law. To establish maritime negligence, “a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that there was [1] a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, 

[2] breach of that duty, [3] injury sustained by the plaintiff, and [4] a causal 

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” 

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GIC Servs., L.L.C. v. Freightplus USA, Inc., 866 F.3d 649, 659 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(quotation omitted).

The appellants, the Loretta Interest and the Elizabeth Interests, do not 

contest that they are liable. Instead, they contest how the district court 

apportioned fault among them and the Aris T Interests. “[W]hen two or 

more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a 

maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated 

among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their 

fault . . . .” United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975). 

“Apportionment is not a mechanical exercise that depends upon counting up 

the errors committed by both parties. The trial court must determine, based 

upon the number and quality of faults by each party, the role each fault had 

in causing the collision.” Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B.E. Lindholm, 447 

F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2006).

“[W]e review ‘a trial court’s finding on apportionment of relative 

fault in a maritime collision’ only for clear error.” Deloach Marine Servs., 

L.L.C. v. Marquette Transp. Co., L.L.C., 974 F.3d 601, 609 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2017)). 

Allocation is treated as a finding of fact. See Deloach, 974 F.3d at 607. “Even 

if we might have given different weight to different pieces of evidence than 

did the district court, this is not a reason to disturb that court’s findings of 

relative responsibility, absent a showing of clear error.” Id. at 609 (quotation 

omitted). The exception to this is “when factual findings in an admiralty case 

are essentially based on an incorrect legal principle, [the] Rule 52(a) clearly 

erroneous [standard] does not apply and we disregard any such possible 

findings.” Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. M/V Tako Invader, 37 F.3d 1138, 1142 

(5th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).

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The Elizabeth Interests and the Loretta Interest argue that they should 

be allocated less than 45% of the fault and that others should be allocated 

more. The Aris T Interests and the Shore Plaintiffs defend the district 

court’s apportionment. 

We do not find error in the district court’s evaluation of the 

Elizabeth’s violations of the Inland Navigation Rules or in the Loretta’s 

violations of the Inland Navigation Rules.10 The district court correctly 

found that the Elizabeth violated Inland Rules 2 (prudent seamanship), 5 

(lookout), 7 (risk of collision), 8 (action to avoid collision), 9 (keeping to the 

outer limit of the channel that lies on the vessel’s starboard side as is safe and 

practicable), and 17 (action by stand-on vessel). In addition, the district court 

properly found that the Loretta violated Inland Rules 2 (prudent 

seamanship), 5 (lookout), 7 (risk of collision), 8 (action to avoid collision), 9 

(failure to propose manner of passing in narrow channel), 13 (overtaking), 14

(failure to propose manner of passing in meeting situation), 16 (action by 

give-way vessel), and 34(d) (danger signal). Finally, the district court 

properly found that the Aris T was liable for violating Inland Rules 2 (prudent 

seamanship), 6 (safe speed), 7 (risk of collision), and 9 (failure to hold up to 

allow a safe passing). 

Though the district court did not mention whether the Aris T violated 

Inland Rules 8, 14, and 16, we do not consider that to be clearly erroneous. 

Rather, based on the conflicting evidence presented at trial, we infer that the 

10 Relatedly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on 

undisclosed portions of Cunningham’s testimony elicited on cross examination, and that 

even assuming arguendo that it was error to admit the testimony, such error was harmless 

because the district court only relied upon disclosed portions of his testimony in its 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 

We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

the Loretta’s face wire was in poor condition.

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district court (based on its ultimate conclusions) did not believe that the Aris 

T violated Inland Rules 8 and 16 because she could not have taken “early and 

substantial” “positive” action to avoid the incident based on the narrow 

passage facing the vessels (and the relative positions of the Elizabeth and the 

Loretta). See 33 C.F.R. §§ 83.08, 83.16. And given that the Aris T was 

entering the outside bend of a west-bound turn in high-current conditions, 

we infer that the district court concluded that the Aris T did not violate Inland 

Rule 14 because she could not have altered her course any more than she 

already had leading up to the incident. See id. § 83.14. And in any event, the 

conflicting evidence on what the Aris T could have done under those 

circumstances leaves little room for legal error. Thus, though the district 

court did not mention these Inland Rules in discussing the Aris T’s liability, 

we find no clear error in its ultimate conclusions.

We thus conclude that the district court did not clearly err in 

allocating liability as to the Elizabeth, the Loretta, or the Aris T.

B. Limitations of Liability

The Aris T Interests, Elizabeth Interests, Loretta Interest, and the 

excess insurers for the Loretta Interest all claim the right to limit their 

respective liability to the value of their vessels, plus pending freight at the 

conclusion of the voyage. The district court found that the Aris T Interests 

are able to do so but that the others could not.

There are two distinct ways the owner of a vessel involved in an 

accident can limit its liability to the value of the vessel and its freight. First, 

the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq., provides for such 

limitation in certain situations. The Loretta Interest and the Elizabeth

Interests claim their liability should be limited under the Act, an argument 

addressed in Part II.B.1 below. Second, when the negligence of a vessel is 

attributable solely to a compulsory pilot, the vessel is only liable in rem, 

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effectively limiting the owner’s liability to the same extent as the Limitation 

of Liability Act. See Probo II London v. Isla Santay MV, 92 F.3d 361, 365 (5th 

Cir. 1996). The Aris T Interests assert their liability should be limited in this 

way, as the district court found. This is addressed in Part II.B.2 below.

1.

The Limitation of Liability Act provides that “the liability of the 

owner of a vessel for any claim, debt, or liability” “arising from . . . any act, 

matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, 

without the privity or knowledge of the owner” “shall not exceed the value 

of the vessel and pending freight.” 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a)–(b).

In short, “[u]nder the Act, a party is entitled to limitation only if it is 

‘without privity or knowledge’ of the cause of the loss.” In re Hellenic Inc., 252 

F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Brunet v. United Gas 

Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, “if the vessel’s 

negligence or unseaworthiness is the proximate cause of the claimant’s loss, 

the [ship owner] must prove it had no privity or knowledge of the 

unseaworthy conditions or negligent acts.” Trico Marine Assets Inc. v. 

Diamond B Marine Servs. Inc., 332 F.3d 779, 789 (5th Cir. 2003). 

“[K]nowledge, when the shipowner is a corporation, is judged not only by 

what the corporation’s managing officers actually knew, but also by what they 

should have known.” Id. at 789–90. That is, if the unseaworthy “condition 

could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence,” a 

corporate owner is deemed to have knowledge of it and cannot limit its 

liability. In re Omega Protein, Inc., 548 F.3d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1991)).

Importantly, the owner must have privity or knowledge of the “acts 

of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness [that] caused the accident.” 

Farrell Lines Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). 

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The owner’s knowledge of acts of negligence or conditions of 

unseaworthiness that did not cause the accident does not prevent the owner 

from limiting liability. See id.; see also In re Omega Protein, 548 F.3d at 369–

70 (finding that the owner’s failure to train its employees on a navigation 

system did not mean they could not limit liability when the failure to use the 

navigation system did not cause the accident). Similarly, the owner’s 

knowledge of acts that actually caused the accident, but were not acts of 

negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness, does not prevent the owner 

from limiting liability. See Farrell Lines Inc., 530 F.2d at 10.

A vessel can be rendered unseaworthy by having either insufficient 

equipment or an insufficiently competent and trained crew. See Jackson v. 

OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, the privity or knowledge 

standard “obliges the owner to select a competent master.” In re Omega 

Protein, 548 F.3d at 374. It also requires the owner to properly train the 

master and crew. See Trico Marine Assets, 332 F.3d at 790 (finding knowledge 

when the “captain was improperly trained”). It does not, however, render 

the owner liable for “mere ‘mistakes of navigation’ by an otherwise 

competent crew.” In re Omega Protein, 548 F.3d at 371 (quoting Brister, 946 

F.2d at 356). This is because “when the owner is so far removed from the 

vessel that he can exert no control over the master’s actions, he should not 

be taxed with the master’s negligence.” Cont’l Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 

F.2d 1365, 1377 n.15 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

Therefore, when the cause of the allision was the crew’s errors, the 

owner’s ability to limit its liability turns on whether the crew was 

incompetent, which the owner should have known, or whether the crew 

made mere mistakes of navigation, which the owner could not have known 

about. A captain’s record and years of experience are relevant to this inquiry. 

See Kristie Leigh Enters. v. Am. Com. Lines, 72 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Also relevant is the owner’s knowledge of how well trained the captain is. See 

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Trico Marine Assets, 332 F.3d at 790. Finally, all of these questions—the 

cause of the accident, the owner’s privity or knowledge, and the crew’s 

competence—are fact-specific, and therefore subject to clear-error review. 

See In re Omega Protein, 548 F.3d at 361. 

The district court found that the Elizabeth Interests could not limit 

their liability because they themselves were negligent in: (1) hiring an 

incompetent master without doing a proper background check; (2) failing to 

properly train Captain Christiansen in how to use the Rose Point navigation 

system; and (3) approving Captain Christiansen’s decision to maneuver into 

the Bayou Fleet without an assist tug. Further, the court found that the

Loretta Interest could not limit its liability because it was negligent in (1) 

sending the Loretta out with an inadequate face-wire system, and (2) not 

enforcing its cell-phone policy. The district court found that the Aris T

owners could limit their liability.

In challenging this ruling, the Elizabeth Interests contend that the

district court’s finding that Captain Christiansen was incompetent was error. 

They point out that the Coast Guard did not cite Captain Christiansen for 

the incident, but the Coast Guard did cite Captain Sanamo and Pilot Leone. 

Moreover, Captain Christiansen had years of experience navigating the 

Hahnville Bar, and his prior suspensions were twenty years before this 

incident and not at all relevant to evaluating his competence here. Given all 

this, the Elizabeth Interests contend that Captain Christiansen’s errors were 

mere mistakes of navigation that the Elizabeth’s owners could not have 

known of, and not incompetence they should have known about before hiring 

him. We agree that the district court erred in finding Captain Christiansen 

incompetent. 

Nevertheless, the district court provided two other grounds for not 

limiting the Elizabeth Interests’ liability: the Elizabeth Interests failed to 

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provide Captain Christiansen with training on the Rose Point navigation 

system—which resulted in Captain Christiansen’s not using all available 

means to maintain a proper lookout—and the Elizabeth Interests’ general 

manager approved the down-streaming maneuver without a tugboat assist 

that was employed by Captain Christiansen during the allision sequence. 

The Elizabeth Interests thus had “privity or knowledge” of the conditions

that contributed to the Aris T’s allision. 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b). We affirm on 

these grounds. 

The Loretta Interest, Cenac, contends the district court erred in 

finding that Cenac could not limit its liability. Cenac argues that the factors 

the district court held that Cenac had knowledge of—the faulty face-wire 

system and Captain Sanamo’s talking on his cell phone—were not causes of 

the accident. Cenac posits that the face wire parting could not have been a 

cause of the accident because, according to Cenac, the parting did not occur 

until after the Loretta was mostly past the Aris T. Cenac points to Captain 

Sanamo’s testimony as to when he believed it broke, as well as to some expert 

testimony that the Loretta could not have maneuvered as it did if the face wire 

had broken earlier. Cenac also posits that Captain Sanamo’s cell phone call 

with his girlfriend during the accident was not a cause of the accident because 

it did not distract him. According to Cenac, though the line was open, 

Captain Sanamo was not actively talking with his girlfriend and was 

adequately focused on the task at hand, as evidenced by his active 

communication with Pilot Leone on the radio. Thus, because Cenac believes 

these factors were not causes of the accident, Cenac contends that those 

issues do not preclude it from limiting its liability.

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We affirm the district court because the district court’s finding of 

causality with respect to these issues was not clearly erroneous.11 It was not

error for the district court to discount Captain Sanamo’s testimony about the 

face wire, and instead credit other expert testimony and evidence (e.g., radar 

and video footage) that it broke earlier, and thus was a cause of the allision. 

Moreover, it was not error for the district court to conclude that the cell 

phone was a distraction and a cause of the allision, especially in light of the 

fact that the Coast Guard sanctioned Captain Sanamo for it. 

Thus, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the Limitation of 

Liability Act does not allow the Elizabeth Interests or the Loretta Interest to 

limit liability in this case.

2.

The district court determined that the Aris T could limit its liability 

using the “compulsory pilot” defense. “[T]he ‘compulsory pilot defense,’ 

can be traced back to” as early as the nineteenth century. Probo II London, 92 

F.3d at 365. Under it, “the vessel itself is liable in rem for a maritime collision 

caused by the fault of its compulsory pilot; if the pilot alone was at fault, the 

shipowner will not be liable in personam; however, if the negligence of the 

master or crew contributed to the collision, then in addition to the vessel’s 

liability in rem the shipowner also will face in personam liability.” Id. 

The negligence of a vessel’s master can contribute to an allision either 

through actions or omissions. Generally, the “master is entitled to assume 

that the pilot is an expert on local conditions and practices,” and defersto his 

command. Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Marine Carriers, Inc., 15 F.3d 489, 

493 (5th Cir. 1994). But the master may not “regard the presence of a duly11 Because we affirm the district court’s ruling that Cenac may not limit its liability, 

we dismiss as moot Cenac’s excess insurers’ challenge.

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licensed pilot in compulsory pilot waters as freeing him from every obligation 

to attend to the safety of the vessel.” The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 195 (1895). 

Instead, if “it becomes manifest that the pilot is steering the vessel into 

danger,” the master is negligent if he does not timely intervene. Avondale, 

15 F.3d at 493. This responsibility to intervene places a duty on the ship’s 

master to maintain an “adequate level of information” about the ship’s 

navigation. Id.

The Elizabeth Interests and the Loretta Interest contend the district 

court erred in allowing the Aris T to limit its liability because the negligence

contributing to the allision can be attributed to more than just Pilot Leone’s 

decisions. First, they argue that Captain Baltas, the Aris T’s master, agreed 

with Pilot Leone’s decisions and therefore the crew’s negligence contributed 

to the allision. Second, they contend that the shipowner’s failure to equip 

the Aris T with a functional ECDIS system was negligent and contributed to 

the accident. Third, they contend that the shipowner offered no training to

its bridge officers on the Inland Rules of Navigation.

We affirm the district court’s ruling that the Aris T can limit its 

liability. Captain Baltas was monitoring the situation, and he was entitled to 

trust Pilot Leone’s greater expertise on the spacing in the Hahnville Bar. 

Moreover, the Aris T was adequately equipped; the ECDIS system was not 

mandatory at the time, and Pilot Leone had the same navigation system as 

the Elizabeth and the Loretta. Finally, Pilot Leone had adequate knowledge 

of the Inland Rules of Navigation; the point of having compulsory pilots for 

areas with specific navigational rules is to compensate for the crew’s lack of 

knowledge in that area. We conclude that the Aris T’s negligence was 

attributable solely to the compulsory pilot, Pilot Leone, and therefore, the 

Aris T is only liable in rem.

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C. The Personal Injury Claim

Antoine Morris, a Shell/Motiva employee was working on a berth 

when he caught sight of the Aris T alliding with a berth over 1,000 feet away. 

The berth he was standing on was not struck and did not move or shake. 

Morris simply panicked at the surprising sight of the vessel alliding with 

another berth, lost his footing, and fell. The district court dismissed his 

negligence claim, and Morris challenges the dismissal on both procedural and 

substantive grounds. We affirm the district court’s dismissal.

Morris raises four points of error. First, he contends that the district 

court abused its discretion by denying him a continuance on the morning of 

the trial because his key expert, Dr. Axelrad, was at his brother’s deathbed

and would be unable to testify in person. This prejudiced him, Morris says, 

because the other parties’ expert witness sharply criticized Dr. Axelrad’s 

deposition testimony, and Dr. Axelrad could not respond. 

The matter of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 

Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). District courts are given 

“exceedingly wide” discretion in making “scheduling decision[s], such as 

whether a continuance should be granted.” HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. 

City of Hous., 201 F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 2000). We determine that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the last-minute 

continuance. The numerous other parties also had expert witnesses who had 

arranged their schedules around the existing trial dates. Denying the 

continuance did not prejudice Morris because the trial court admitted Dr. 

Axelrad’s video perpetuation deposition as evidence. As the district court 

explained, “[the video] was taken for perpetuation purposes, and that’s what 

the rules provide, and for -- just for situations such as this that are 

unanticipated that render a witness unavailable, and then the deposition 

becomes the reasonable substitute for that testimony.” 

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Second, Morris contends that the district court erred by relying on the 

testimony of Dr. Ginzburg, a forensic psychiatrist retained by the Aris T 

Interests, over Morris’s expert, Dr. Axelrad. Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 52, “findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and legal issues 

are reviewed de novo.” Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 586 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 

2009). Because Morris’s objection is about the district court’s finding that 

one expert’s account of Morris’s injury was factually correct, it is reviewed 

for clear error. “When findings are based on determinations regarding the 

credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the 

trial court’s findings.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 

(1985). Objective evidence contradicting a witness’s testimony or internal 

inconsistencies can render a district court’s accepting a witness’s testimony 

clearly erroneous. Id. “But when a trial judge’s finding is based on his 

decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of 

whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted 

by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually 

never be clear error.” Id.

District courts make credibility decisions, and the district court was 

well within its discretion to credit Dr. Ginzburg’s diagnosis over Dr. 

Axelrad’s. Morris has pointed to no inconsistencies in Dr. Ginzburg’s 

testimony, nor has he pointed to any extrinsic evidence that leaves a firm 

conviction that the district court’s crediting Dr. Ginzburg was error.

Third, Morris asserts that the district court erred in concluding he was 

not in the zone of danger and therefore could not recover emotional damages. 

He argues that the district court impermissibly relied on the fortuity that the 

berth Morris was on was not struck, and that despite this, the Aris T was close 

enough to Morris to put him in immediate danger. Specifically, he argues 

that the 1,000-foot distance between the Aris T and himself was not that large 

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because the Aris T was large, and the poor visibility conditions made it seem 

closer than it was.

Under a zone-of-danger tort theory, plaintiffs can recover for 

emotional injuries if they “are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by 

that conduct.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 548 (1994). The 

theory extends the ambit of plaintiffs who can recover for emotional injuries 

from those who sustain a physical impact from the tort to those who were 

close enough to reasonably be emotionally damaged by it. See id. at 547–48.

We have “repeatedly declined to adopt or preclude the zone of danger 

theory” for general maritime law. Gough v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 996 

F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1993).12 Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs can 

recover under the zone-of-danger theory in general maritime law, analogous 

case law from other contexts state that a plaintiff must establish that “the 

claimant was objectively within the zone of danger; claimant feared for his 

life at the time of the accident or person was in danger, and his emotional 

injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s 

alleged negligence.” Owens, 2005 WL 840502, at *3. To be in the zone of 

danger, a plaintiff must be in “immediate risk of physical harm.” Consol. Rail 

Corp., 512 U.S. at 548. And in determining whether emotional injuries were 

reasonably foreseeable, courts can consider the experience seamen are likely 

to have. See Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1992) (en 

banc).

12 Our court, however, has allowed recovery under a zone-of-danger theory under 

the Jones Act. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 938 (5th Cir. 2014). 

Moreover, district courts throughout the circuit regularly allow recovery under general 

maritime law using this theory. See, e.g., Owens v. Glob. Santa Fe Drilling Co., No. Civ. A. 

04-702, 2005 WL 840502, at * 3 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (citing Anselmi v. Penrod Drilling 

Corp., 813 F. Supp. 438, 442 (E.D. La. 1993); Williams v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 

Nos. 2:95-CV-3968, 2:97-CV-0947, 1998 WL 42586 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 1998)).

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We agree with the district court. Morris was never in any danger of 

being hurt by the Aris T, as he had ample time to leave the berth before the 

Aris T would have reached it. The ship was travelling less than 3 miles per 

hour, giving Morris several minutes to leave the berth, even with his fall. 

Moreover, Morris remained on the berth after his fall. 

Finally, Morris argues that the accident was a substantial cause of his 

fall, so he can recover physical damages. “Questions of . . . causation[] are 

factual issues, and may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” 

In re Omega Protein, 548 F.3d at 367. Under maritime law, causation requires 

that the negligence be “a substantial factor” in the injury. Donaghey, 974 

F.2d at 649 (citation omitted). “The term ‘substantial factor’ means more 

than ‘but for the negligence, the harm would not have resulted.’” Id.

(quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1975)). In 

addition, foreseeability is also relevant to the proximate-cause determination. 

See In re Signal, 579 F.3d at 490 n.12.

The district court’s determination of causation is subject to clearerror review, and nothing Morris has pointed to leaves a firm conviction that 

the accident was a substantial factor in his fall. On the contrary, we agree 

with the district court’s conclusion that Morris unreasonably panicked, and 

that this unforeseeable panic caused the accident. Thus, at a minimum, he 

cannot meet the proximate-cause element of his negligence case.

III.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment in all respects.

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