t Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Edwin C. Walker, Acting Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M.

Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Barbara D. Kocher,

Assistant United States Attorney, Michael D. Bredenberg, Special

Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William J. Blohm appeals from the district court's order

declining

to release him from the custody of the Attorney General pursuant

to

18 U.S.C. S 4247(h) (1994). Blohm was originally committed under

18 U.S.C. S 4246 (1994), in 1986 when the district court found

that

he was "presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a

result

of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily

injury

to another person or serious damage to property of another." 18

U.S.C. S 4246(d). In order for Blohm to obtain his release

following

that finding, the district court must find, by a preponderance of

the

evidence, that he has recovered from his mental disease or defect

to

such an extent that his release would no longer create a

substantial

risk of harm to others. See 18 U.S.C. S 4246(e). The district

court's

finding will not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly

erroneous.

See United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992).

Blohm concedes that he suffers from a long-standing mental illness, but he argues that there is no evidence to support a

finding that

he presents a substantial risk of harm to others because he has

never

exhibited any violent behavior, nor has he ever acted on any of

his

threats. However, "[o]vert acts of violence are not required to

demonstrate dangerousness." United States v. S.A. , 129 F.3d 995, 1001

(8th
Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th

Cir.

1994)); see also United States v. Steil, 916 F.2d 485, 487-88

(8th Cir.

1990) (holding that delusions and threats were enough to prove

dangerousness even though defendant never had the opportunity to act

on

them).

Moreover, both Blohm's treating physicians at FCI-Butner and an

independent psychiatrist appointed to evaluate him concluded that

Blohm continues to meet the criteria for commitment under S 4246.

There is no medical opinion to the contrary in the record.

2
Because we do not find that the district court's conclusions were

clearly erroneous, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-4497

RANDOLPH E. DAWSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(CR-99-88)

Argued: April 4, 2000

Decided: May 19, 2000

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge,

and Roger J. MINER, Senior Circuit Judge of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,

sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Dale Warren Dover, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Andrew L. Snowdon, Special Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,

Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Randolph Dawson appeals from a judgment of conviction entered

in the district court on one count of operating a motor vehicle

after

having been declared an habitual offender in violation of 18

U.S.C.

S 13, assimilating Va. Code S 46.2-357(B)(3). On the night of

January

25, 1999, Dawson drove a vehicle onto the U.S. Marine Corps Base

in Quantico, Virginia and could not produce a driver's license

when

asked to do so at the gate. He was arrested after the gatekeeper

ran

a Virginia Criminal Information Network check that showed Dawson's license had been revoked and that he had two previous

convictions in Virginia for driving on a suspended license.

On May 5, 1999, a bench trial was held in the district court. The

evidence at trial showed that Dawson had been adjudicated an

habitual offender by order of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,

Virginia

dated May 21, 1992, and that his license to drive had been

revoked

pursuant to S 46.2-355 of the Virginia Code. The revocation came

after several convictions for driving under the influence of

alcohol,

the last one arising from a January 1992 incident that led to

Dawson's

conviction for "Driving While Intoxicated, 3rd Offense within 5

years." The evidence also showed that since losing his license,

Dawson had pled guilty on two occasions to driving on a suspended

license, once in the General District Court of Prince William

County

on February 13, 1995 and again in the General District Court of

Fair-
fax County on March 31, 1995. Based on these facts, the court

found

Dawson guilty of one count of "Unlawful Operation of a Motor

Vehicle While a[n] Habitual Offender," in violation of 18 U.S.C. S

13,

assimilating Va. Code S 46.2-357(B)(3).

The district court continued the case for sentencing until July

2,

1999, pending completion of the presentencing investigation and

report. On that date, Dawson asserted that his conviction had

been

2
rendered a nullity by the July 1, 1999 legislative repeal of the

adjudication provisions of the Virginia Habitual Offender Act, Va. Code

SS 46.2-351 through 46.2-355. The government opposed the motion

to set aside the conviction on the ground that only the

adjudication

provisions, but not the enforcement provision, of the habitual

offender

statute had been done away with under the new law. The court

found

that the legislature had made administrative and procedural

changes

to the law governing serious traffic offenses, but that the

"underlying

substantive offense" with which Dawson was charged "still [wa]s

on

the books." The court therefore imposed a sentence of eighteen

months in prison, three years supervised release and a $100

special

assessment. This appeal followed.

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. See United

Mine Workers v. Martinka Coal Co., 202 F.3d 717, 720 (4th Cir.

2000). Dawson likens his case to that of the defendants in United

States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934). There, the indictments

under the National Prohibition Act were dismissed after passage

of

the Twenty-First Amendment, on the basis of the rule that

criminal

prosecutions must be halted when their underlying law has lost

its

force. See id. at 222-23. We find that argument unpersuasive

here. An

examination of Chapter 945 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1999

-- entitled "An Act to amend and reenact [fourteen subsections]

of

the Code of Virginia, to amend the Code of Virginia by adding a

section numbered 46.2-355.1, and to repeal SS 46.2-351 through 46.2-

355 of the Code of Virginia, relating to habitual offenders;

penalty"

(hereinafter, "the Act") -- shows that Chambers is inapposite.

Even

though the Act puts an end to new convictions for the crime of

being

an "habitual offender," the law evinces no intent to deprive the

state

of its enforcement power to penalize those who had already been
adjudged habitual offenders prior to its enactment.

Section 46.2-357, the enforcement section of the old habitual

offender statute, is hardly changed, having acquired in its

definitional

subsectio