IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

BRIAN BROADFIELD, § 

BOP Register No. 18618-026, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-860-K-BN 

§ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, § 

ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Brian Broadfield, a federal inmate incarcerated in this district, filed 

a pro se complaint against the United States and individual employees of the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and for 

violations of his civil rights. See Dkt. No. 3. Broadfield also moves for a preliminary 

injunction. See Dkt. Nos. 5. 

United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred Broadfield’s lawsuit to the 

undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the claims against the United States, its agencies, and its 

employees in their official capacities should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; that 

the claims for monetary damages against the individual defendants in their 

individual capacities should be dismissed with prejudice; and that the request for a 

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preliminary injunction should be denied. 

Legal Standards and Analysis 

I. The Court should dismiss Broadfield’s claims under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act for lack of jurisdiction. 

Broadfield indicates that this action is for violation of his civil rights and 

pursuant to the FTCA. See Dkt. No. 3 at 1. And he sues the United States and 

individuals alleged to be employed by the BOP. See id. at 1-3. 

Beginning with the FTCA, such “claims may be brought against only the 

United States, and not the agencies or employees of the United States.” EsquivelSolis v. United States, 472 F. App’x 338, 339 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679; Galvin v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Court 

should therefore dismiss “for want of jurisdiction” any “FTCA claim brought against 

a federal agency or employee.” Id. at 339-40 (citing Galvin, 860 F.2d at 183; Atorie 

Air, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 942 F.2d 954, 957 (5th Cir. 1991)). 

And, even where the United States is named as a defendant, “[t]he United 

States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit, meaning it cannot be sued without 

consent.” Gonzalez v. United States, 851 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations 

omitted). So, “[t]o maintain a suit in district court against the United States, a 

plaintiff must bring claims under a statute in which Congress expressly waives the 

United States’ sovereign immunity.” Ortega Garcia v. United States, 986 F.3d 513, 

522 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); see also Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 

(5th Cir. 2021) (“Sovereign immunity is indeed a jurisdictional bar.” (citation 

omitted)). 

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The FTCA is such a statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). But “[t]he FTCA 

provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing suit in federal court only 

when the plaintiff files an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency 

within two years after such claim accrues, and the plaintiff either (1) obtained a 

written denial, or (2) did not receive a response within six months.” Hanna v. United 

States, No. 20-30581 consol. with No. 21-30410, 2021 WL 5237269, at *1 (5th Cir. 

Nov. 10, 2021) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 

46, 54 (5th Cir. 1995), on reh’g in part, 81 F.3d 520 (5th Cir. 1996)). 

Accordingly, “[a]n FTCA action cannot proceed ‘unless the claimant shall have 

first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.’” Bolton v. United States, 

946 F.3d 256, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)); see also Semien v. 

United States, 838 F. App’x 88, 88 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“As a jurisdictional 

prerequisite under the FTCA, a claimant must exhaust his claim administratively 

before suing by giving notice of the claim to the appropriate federal agency.” (citations 

omitted)). And, because compliance with Section 2675(a) “‘is a prerequisite to suit 

under the FTCA,’” where a plaintiff “has not satisfied [this] ‘jurisdictional 

prerequisite,’ the district court properly dismisse[s the plaintiff’s FTCA] claims for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Barnes v. Gittel, 650 F. App’x 236, 240 (5th Cir. 

2016) (per curiam) (citations and footnote omitted)). 

Here, Broadfield states that he “exhausted the administrative grievance 

procedure as required by the P.L.R.A. and the Federal [T]ort Claims Act.” Dkt. No. 3 

at 5. But he provides no evidence that he filed an administrative claim with the 

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appropriate federal agency, the prerequisite to waiving sovereign immunity under 

the FTCA. See generally id. And a review of Broadfield’s complaint reveals no 

“exceptions that would exempt [him] from this requirement.” McGraw v. Mejia, No. 

3:13-cv-740-L, 2015 WL 569002, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2015) (“The court cannot 

identify any form of notice provided by Plaintiffs to the BOP that would satisfy the 

requirements of the FTCA, nor can it identify any exceptions that would exempt 

Plaintiffs from this requirement. Because Plaintiffs failed to provide notice to the 

appropriate federal agency, the court lacks jurisdiction.”); accord Casas-Amador v. 

FCI Seagoville, No. 3:17-cv-2478-G-BN, 2018 WL 3763845, at *3-*4 (N.D. Tex. July 

13, 2018), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 3756946 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2018); see also LopezHeredia v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch Hosp., 240 F. App’x 646, 647 (5th Cir. 2007) (per 

curiam) (“The BOP’s FTCA claims procedure is separate from the BOP’s 

administrative remedies procedure.” (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 543.30-543.32)). 

II. The Court should dismiss the claims for monetary damages against the 

individual defendants in their individual capacities with prejudice 

because Broadfield has not shown that Bivens should be extended to the 

new context of this case. 

Turning to the alleged civil rights violations and Broadfield’s request for 

monetary damages, see Dkt. No. 3 at 7, a plaintiff may bring an action under Bivens 

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 

“against individual [federal employees] for [an] alleged constitutional violation, but 

he may not bring an action against the United States, the BOP, or BOP [employees] 

in their official capacities as such claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity,” Gibson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 121 F. App’x 549, 551 (5th Cir. 2004) 

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(per curiam) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71-72 (2001); Hafer v. 

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)); see also Multi Denominational Ministry of Cannabis & 

Rastafari, Inc. v. Gonzales, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“A Bivens

action does not lie against federal agencies or the United States, which possess 

sovereign immunity; such actions may be brought only against named federal officers 

or agents in their personal capacity.” (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483-86 

(1994))). 

But Bivens, unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is not a Congressional statute that 

“entitles an injured person to money damages if a state official violates his or her 

constitutional rights.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017) (“Congress did 

not create an analogous statute for federal officials. Indeed, in the 100 years leading 

up to Bivens, Congress did not provide a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose 

constitutional rights were violated by agents of the Federal Government.”). 

And the United States Supreme Court “has approved of an implied damages 

remedy under the Constitution itself” only three times – in Bivens, to enforce “a 

damages remedy to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the 

prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures” in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment; in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), holding “that the Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Clause gave [a Congressman’s administrative assistant] a 

damages remedy for gender discrimination”; and in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 

(1980), holding “that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause gave [a prisoner] a damages remedy for failure to provide adequate medical 

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treatment.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854-55. 

In Abbasi, the Supreme Court further “stressed that any extension of Bivens

to new factual scenarios is now a ‘“disfavored” judicial activity.’” Maria S. ex rel. EHF 

v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 783 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 

(quoting, in turn, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009))); accord Oliva v. Nivar, 

973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Bivens was the product of an ‘ancien regime’ that 

freely implied rights of action. That regime ended long ago. Today, Bivens claims 

generally are limited to the circumstances of the Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases in 

this area....” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2669 (2021); Byrd v. Lamb, 

990 F.3d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“The Supreme Court has cautioned 

against extending Bivens to new contexts.” (citing Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 

744 (2020) (Hernandez II); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861)); Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d 

287, 293 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Indeed, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has 

‘consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context.’” (quoting Malesko, 534 

U.S. at 68; citation omitted)). 

So, as to whether Broadfield may assert claims against the individual 

defendants for alleged constitutional violations, the Court should consider the “two 

part inquiry for determining whether to allow a Bivens cause of action: (1) whether 

the instant case involves a ‘new context’ that is distinct from prior Bivens cases and 

(2) whether any ‘special factors’ preclude extending Bivens to this ‘new context.’” 

Maria S., 912 F.3d at 784 (citation omitted); accord Oliva, 973 F.3d at 441-42 (“Courts 

confronting Bivens claims generally ‘must ask two questions. First, do [the plaintiff’s] 

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claims fall into one of the three existing Bivens actions? Second, if not, should we 

recognize a new Bivens action here?’” (quoting Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 422 (5th 

Cir. 2019))); Byrd, 990 F.3d at 881 (“Only where a claim arises in a new context should 

courts then proceed to the second step of the inquiry, and contemplate whether there 

are ‘any special factors that counsel hesitation about granting the extension.’” 

(quoting Hernandez II, 140 S. Ct. at 743)). 

“The proper test for determining whether a case presents a new 

Bivens context is” whether it is “different in a meaningful way from 

previous Bivens cases decided by” the Supreme Court. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 

at 1859. A meaningful difference may include the Constitutional right 

at issue, the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer 

was operating, or the presence of potential special factors that previous 

Bivens cases did not consider. Id. at 1860. “[E]ven a modest extension is 

still an extension.” Id. at 1864. 

Canada v. United States, 950 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2020). 

In short, “the proper test is whether the case differs in a meaningful way from 

Bivens, Davis, or Carlson.” Id. (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859; Loumiet v. United 

States, 948 F.3d 376, 381-82 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). And, in practice, “[v]irtually everything 

else” – any case falling outside the specifics of these three cases – “is a ‘new context.’” 

Oliva, 973 F.3d at 442 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865); see also Byrd, 990 F.3d at 

883 (Willett, J., specially concurring) (“The Bivens doctrine, if not overruled, has 

certainly been overtaken.” And, at least in this circuit, after Oliva, “‘[v]irtually 

everything’ beyond the specific facts of the Bivens trilogy ‘is a “new context”’ .... And 

new context = no Bivens claim.” (footnote omitted)).1

1 See, e.g., Cantú, 933 F.3d at 422-23 (“Cantú purports to address the first 

question. And he thinks he’s home free because his malicious-prosecution-typeclaim alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful 

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Broadfield alleges that, “in the fall of 2020,” BOP medical providers began 

“placing consultations for [his] medical issues.” Dkt. No. 3 at 8. For example, he 

alleges that, for his breathing issues, “the clinical director placed a consultation for 

pulmonology which was approved.” Id. So the undersigned interprets “a consultation” 

to mean a referral to a specialist. 

Broadfield further alleges that, when he was transferred to FCI Oakdale, that 

prison’s clinical director honored Broadfield’s pending referrals and further referred 

him to an otolaryngologist and a cardiologist. See id. But, after his transfer to FCI 

Seagoville in April 2021, with several referrals still pending, medical providers there 

cancelled those referrals and ordered other testing or treatment. See id. at 8-9. 

According to Broadfield, he “has worsening conditions since he has arrived at 

FCI Seagoville; his breathing has worsened; his GERD has worsened; and [he] is still 

experiencing chest discomfort and back pain has worsened.” Id. at 9 (cleaned up). And 

he alleges that “administration and medical administration and staff ... are 

unqualified to disregard specialist orders and proscribed courses of action” and that 

their actions have caused him further injury, pain, and suffering. Id. 

Insofar as Broadfield asserts that these allegations show that medical 

providers and officials at FCI Seagoville were deliberately indifferent to his medical 

seizures – the same right recognized in Bivens. That’s wrong. Courts do not define a 

Bivens cause of action at the level of ‘the Fourth Amendment’ or even at the level of 

‘the unreasonable-searches-and-seizures clause.’ .... [But, w]hat if a plaintiff asserts 

a violation of the same clause of the same amendment in the same way? That still 

doesn’t cut it. .... [In sum, b]y any measure, Cantú’s claims are meaningfully 

different from the Fourth Amendment claim at issue in Bivens. He does not allege 

the officers entered his home without a warrant or violated his rights of privacy.”).

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needs, “[o]f the three recognized Bivens actions,” this “case is most like Carlson

because it involves alleged violations under the Eighth Amendment.” Watkins v. 

Carter, No. 20-40234, 2021 WL 4533206, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) (per curiam). 

But, “[s]imply because Carlson extended Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim 

by a federal prisoner in that context, does not mean that [Broadfield] may rely on 

Carlson in this context.” Nabaya v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:19-cv-215-L-BN, 2020 

WL 7029909, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) (citation omitted), rec. accepted, 2020 WL 

7027470 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2020).2

This is, this case meaningfully differs from Carlson, in which “the Supreme 

Court held that the Eighth Amendment gave a prisoner’s estate a monetary remedy 

because the federal jailers caused the prisoner’s death by failing to treat his asthma.” 

Gonzalez, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 64. “Here, the deprivations ... are vastly less serious.” 

Id. Indeed, the facts that Broadfield provides reflect his disagreement with the 

medical care he has received since his transfer to FCI Seagoville, but it’s not clear 

that those facts demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation, considering that 

“‘[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’” and can only “be 

2 See also Gonzalez v. Hasty, 269 F. Supp. 3d 45, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 

(“Although the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens remedy under the Eighth 

Amendment in Carlson, this does not mean all Eighth Amendment claims have a 

Bivens remedy.” (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864 (“[E]ven a modest extension is 

still an extension.”); Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(“Instead of an amendment-by-amendment ratification of Bivens actions, we are 

bound to examine each new context – that is, each new ‘potentially recurring 

scenario that has similar legal and factual components.’” (citation omitted)); Wilson 

v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 86 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Bivens actions are not recognized 

Amendment by Amendment in a wholesale fashion. Rather, they are contextspecific.”))).

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satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope v. 

Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal 

Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)). 

Specifically, “[d]eliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond mere 

negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice, not 

merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 

F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 

617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 

(5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) 

(“‘[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a 

grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm.’ Rather, ‘the plaintiff 

must show that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, 

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would 

clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.”’” (citations 

omitted)). 

So, alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide 

additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 

239 F.3d at 756; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).3

3 See also Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 248 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f we 

were to address whether Bivens extends to this context in light of Abbasi, Petzold’s 

deliberate-indifference claims based on denied medical treatment are likely a ‘new 

[Bivens] context’ because they ‘differ in a meaningful way’ from existing Bivens

claims. Here, the federal officers involved were low-level, the specific actions 

distinct, and the alternative remedial process robust.” (citations omitted)).

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And, because this case presents a “next context,” distinct from prior Bivens

cases, the Court must “contemplate whether there are ‘any special factors that 

counsel hesitation about granting the extension.’” Byrd, 990 F.3d at 881 (quoting 

Hernandez II, 140 S. Ct. at 743; emphasis added); see Butler, 999 F.3d at 294 

(“Importantly, ‘[e]ven before Abbasi clarified the special factors inquiry, we agreed 

with our sister circuits that the only relevant threshold – that a factor counsels 

hesitation – is remarkably low.” (citation omitted)). 

This “inquiry ‘concentrate[s] on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent 

congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of 

allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Butler, 999 F.3d at 294 (quoting Abbasi, 137 

S. Ct. at 1857-58). That is, “[t]he ‘most important’ Bivens question is ‘who should 

decide whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?’” Watkins 

v. Three Admin. Remedy Coordinators of Bureau of Prisons, 998 F.3d 682, 685 (5th 

Cir. 2021) (quoting Hernandez II, 140 S. Ct. at 750). And, “‘[w]hen a party seeks to 

assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution,’ as in this case, ‘separationof-powers principles ... should be central to the analysis.’” Byrd, 990 F.3d at 882 

(quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857). 

The administration of the federal prison system qualifies as a special factor 

that should prevent the Court’s creating an implied cause of action under Bivens for 

the context of this case. See Petzold, 946 F.3d at 248 n.2 (“[W]e are unlikely to imply 

a Bivens remedy for this new context as ‘special factors’ counsel hesitation in federal 

prison administration.” (citation omitted)); Callahan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 965 

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F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2020) (“‘[L]egislative action suggesting that Congress does not 

want a damages remedy’ counsels against judicial do-it-yourself projects. Congress 

paid close attention to inmate constitutional claims when it enacted the [PLRA]. The 

Act ‘does not provide for a standalone damages remedy against federal jailers.’” 

(quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865; citations omitted)); Watkins, 2021 WL 4533206, 

at *2 (“[T]here are special factors that counsel hesitation. The existence of the Federal 

Tort Claims Act weighs against inferring a new cause of action. See Cantú, 933 F.3d 

at 423 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). Additionally, the existence of the BOP’s 

Administrative Remedy Program provides an alternative method of relief to Bivens

actions. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74; 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2001).” (citations modified)). 

Accordingly, because this “case is a new context and there are special factors 

that counsel hesitation, [Broadfield] does not have a viable Bivens claim against the 

[individual defendants].” Watkins, 2021 WL 4533206, at *3. 

III. Broadfield has not shown that a preliminary injunction should be 

granted. 

Insofar as Broadfield seeks preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 65 – an order requiring FCI Seagoville officials to provide the medical 

care he seeks, including the previously-scheduled consultations, without delay, see, 

e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 7 – such relief is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be 

granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden 

of persuasion.” White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Cf. E. Ritter & Co. v. Dep’t of Army Corps of Eng’rs, 874 

F.2d 1236, 1244 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he FTCA provides only for money damages, not 

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injunctive relief.”); Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 

863 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the 

FTCA to provide injunctive and declaratory relief.” (citation omitted)). 

An “applicant must show (1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the 

merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction 

is not granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party 

whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve 

the public interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 

250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For the reasons set out above, Broadfield cannot show a substantial likelihood 

that he will prevail on the merits. See Anderson v. Oakley, 77 F.3d 475, 1995 WL 

798510, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 1995) (per curiam) (“The district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Anderson 

failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because the 

district court lacked federal jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); accord Nianga v. Wolfe, 

435 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (N.D. Tex. 2020). 

Recommendation

The Court should deny the request for a preliminary injunction; dismiss the 

claims against the United States, its agencies, and its employees in their official 

capacities for lack of jurisdiction; and dismiss the claims for monetary damages 

against the individual defendants in their individual capacities with prejudice. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

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all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: April 20, 2022 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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