J-S50013-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NEIL GARDNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1958 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 5, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004542-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: March 18, 2021

Appellant, Neil Gardner, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 4-10 

years’ incarceration, imposed after the trial court found him guilty of persons 

not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105. Herein, Appellant challenges the court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress the seized firearm. After careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the facts adduced at the suppression hearing 

as follows:

On April 25, 2018, a video captured a shooting that occurred in 

the area of 8th and Diamond Streets in Philadelphia, an area known 

for illicit drug sales, turf wars and gun violence. []N.T.[,] 

12/10/18, [at] 8, 13[]. Appellant was depicted in the video 

walking in and out of a store along with two men who began firing 

hand guns at Appellant and continued to do so as Appellant fled. 

[Id. at] 8-10[]. Philadelphia Police Officer Jason Seigafuse 

received a radio call to investigate the shooting. This officer, who 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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worked in the area for fifteen years, proceeded to the location of 

the shooting and retrieved the video. [Id. at] 8-10, 13[]. The 

next day, having watched the video, Officer Seigafuse and his 

partner returned to the area of the shooting at about 6:00 p.m. 

and saw Appellant, who[m] the officer knew from a prior arrest. 

[Id. at] 10, 18[]. Officer Seigafuse exited his patrol car and asked 

to speak with Appellant. [Id. at] 10[]. Appellant replied, “Yes[,]”

and began walking toward the officer. [Id. at] 8-10, 14[]. 

Appellant then fled into a vacant lot and continued running from 

the officer. [Id. at] 10-11, 14[].

Officer Seigafuse followed Appellant and noticed that he was 

grabbing his right front pants pocket. [Id. at] 11, 14-15[]. When

Officer Seigafuse caught up to Appellant and grabbed him, a 

struggle ensued, and Appellant attempted to push the officer 

away. [Id. at] 11, 21-22[]. During the struggle, Appellant 

continued to hold his right pants pocket, which caused the officer 

to fear that Appellant might be armed. [Id. at] 11[]. Based on 

that fear, Officer Seigafuse drew his service revolver and 

Appellant put his hands in the air. [Id.]

After Appellant placed his hands in the air, Officer Seigafuse took 

Appellant to the ground. [Id. at] 8-10[]. Appellant then 

volunteered that he had a gun in his right front pants pocket[,]

after which the officer retrieved an operable and loaded .45 caliber 

handgun. [Id. at] 11, 23, 46[].

2

2 A later search of Appellant resulted in the recovery of eight 

clear jars containing marijuana. [Id.] 11, 25[].

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 12/23/19, at 2-3.

Subsequently, the Commonwealth charged Appellant for his possession 

of the seized firearm pursuant to Section 6105.1 Appellant filed a suppression 

motion, which the court denied at the conclusion of the December 10, 2018 

hearing. Immediately thereafter, the case proceeded to a bench trial, wherein 

the transcript from the suppression hearing was incorporated by mutual 

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth charged Appellant with several other crimes, however, 

the Section 6105 violation was the only offense it pursued to trial. 
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consent. The trial court then rendered a guilty verdict. On February 15, 2019, 

the court sentenced Appellant to 6-12 years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court granted. Subsequently, on 

June 5, 2019, the court resentenced Appellant to 4-12 years’ incarceration. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

December 23, 2019. 

Appellant now presents the following question for our review:

Did not the trial court improperly deny a motion to suppress 

evidence because police lacked even reasonable suspicion under 

the Fourth Amendment and the expanded protections of Article 1, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to stop, detain or arrest 

[Appellant], a witness to a crime who did not seek out the police, 

and who ran from the police in a “high crime area” when the police 

attempted to question him and then immediately pursued him?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Our standard of review for the issue before this Court is well-settled:

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we 

examine the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in 

context of the record as a whole. We then determine whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Our review of the application of the law to the facts is 

plenary.

Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895, 897 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(cleaned up).

There are three types of encounters between law enforcement 

officials and private citizens. A “mere encounter” need not be 

supported by any level of suspicion but carries no official 
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compulsion to stop or respond. Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 

A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2006).... An “investigative 

detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion and 

subjects the suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but it 

does not have the coercive conditions that would constitute an 

arrest. Id. The courts determine whether reasonable suspicion 

exists by examining the totality of the circumstances. In the 

interest of D.M., ... 727 A.2d 556, 559 ([Pa.] 1999). An arrest, 

or “custodial detention,” must be supported by probable cause. 

Clinton, 905 A.2d at 1030.

In Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Here, it is undisputed that Officer Seigafuse’s interaction with Appellant 

began as a mere encounter. However, as this Court has previously 

recognized:

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution afford protections 

against unreasonable searches and seizures. Among the 

protections is the requirement that an officer have reasonable 

suspicion before conducting an investigatory stop. See Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 ... (1968); Commonwealth v. Hicks, ... 253 

A.2d 276, 280 ([Pa.] 1969). Our Supreme Court has, however, 

interpreted Article I, Section 8 protection more broadly than the 

Fourth Amendment and has found that a seizure occurs when an 

officer gives chase. Compare California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 

621, 629 ... (1991), with Commonwealth v. Matos, ... 672 A.2d 

769, 776 ([Pa.] 1996). Under Pennsylvania law, any items 

obtained as the result of a pursuit are considered fruits of a 

seizure. See generally Matos, 672 A.2d at 770. Those items 

may be received in evidence only when an officer, before giving 

chase, has at least the reasonable suspicion necessary for an 

investigatory detention. Id. at 771.

Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 141–42 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Thus, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, an investigative stop

occurred when Officer Seigafuse began his pursuit of Appellant. Any 

contraband seized from Appellant should have been suppressed by the trial 
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court absent a showing that Officer Seigafuse possessed reasonable suspicion 

that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity when Officer Seigafuse gave 

chase.

2

 Reasonable suspicion 

requires a finding that based on the available facts, a person of 

reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was appropriate. 

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal 

activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

that activity. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing 

court must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts 

available to the officer at the moment of intrusion warrant a 

[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken 

was appropriate. Reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop 

cannot rest on ... mere presence ... in a high crime area. Likewise, 

flight, in and of itself, does not constitute reasonable suspicion of 

criminal conduct to justify a stop.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(cleaned up).

The trial court provided the following analysis in support of its 

determination that Officer Seigafuse possessed reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigative stop of Appellant:

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2 Appellant concedes that when he was ultimately apprehended, Officer 

Seigafuse “possessed enough facts to warrant the arrest of Appellant and the 

subsequent search of Appellant incident to arrest. Those facts include 

Appellant’s flight, Appellant’s holding his pocket while he ran, the officer’s 

experience suggesting that this action indicated that Appellant had a weapon, 

and Appellant’s statement that he possessed a gun.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. 

Thus, our attention is focused solely on the facts known to Officer Seigafuse 

at the time of the investigative detention that occurred when he began chasing 

Appellant. 
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Police initially approached Appellant to discuss his involvement in 

the prior day[’]s shooting. On approach, Appellant inexplicably 

fled while holding what appeared to be a large, heavy object in his 

pants pocket. The unprovoked flight, in a high crime area, 

warranted police pursuit. The totality of circumstances clearly 

established that Appellant likely was involved in criminal activity 

when he inexplicably fled after agreeing to speak to Officer 

Seigafuse. Here, the day after a shooting occurred during which 

Appellant was the intended victim, police obviously wanted to 

speak to Appellant after Officer Seigafuse recognized Appellant in 

the video based on previous encounters. Upon spotting Appellant, 

Officer Seigafuse merely approached Appellant to ask if he would 

agree to talk. Appellant initially agreed but then, for no apparent 

reason, fled without provocation. This initial interaction clearly 

was a mere encounter[,] given that Officer Seigafuse did not give 

any orders to Appellant or engage in any conduct that would cause 

a person to believe that he was not free to leave.

When Officer Seigafuse started to approach, Appellant 

immediately began to run. The dynamic changed[,] giving the 

officer reason to believe that Appellant may be involved in criminal 

activity. That belief was confirmed and became likely when 

Appellant took hold of his right front pocket leading Officer 

Seigafuse to believe that he may be armed and dangerous. In 

addition, these events occurred in a high drug and crime area well 

known for gun violence, facts Officer Seigafuse was well familiar 

with. The officer had been assigned to the neighborhood for 

fifteen years and knew the crimes that occurred therein, including 

“turf wars.” His experience coupled with the other facts and 

circumstances more than justified the officer’s pursuit and 

detention of Appellant. 

TCO at 7-8 (citation omitted). 

Initially, Appellant contests the trial court’s summation of the facts with 

respect to Officer Seigafuse’s observation of Appellant’s reaching for his 

pocket/waistband when in flight as justification for the temporary detention. 

Appellant argues that “this additional development of facts (that Appellant was 

holding his pocket in a manner suggestive of being armed) occurred only after 

the officer’s chase of Appellant, and therefore [after] the officer’s seizure of 
J-S50013-20

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Appellant under Pennsylvania law[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 12 n.4. The 

Commonwealth disputes this account, insisting that

[Appellant]’s factual assertion is belied by the record. Officer 

Seigafuse testified that he chased [Appellant] after he “took off 

running through a lot[.]” N.T., 12/10/18, at 11. Asked when it 

was that [Appellant] started grabbing at his waistband, the officer 

replied: “As soon as he hit the edge of the lot. So the—at the 

curb, he hits the edge of the lot and he’s running, holding it[.]” 

Id. at 14-15. The officer further explained that [Appellant] had 

his hand at his waistband “the whole time” he ran[.] Id. at 11. 

Thus, contrary to what [Appellant] claims, his grabbing at his 

waistband occurred before Officer Seigafuse pursued him and may 

be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion 

existed.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12 n.4 (citations reformatted).

We agree with Appellant. Officer Seigafuse testified that, “As I started 

to walk around the car, [Appellant] took off running through a lot. I started 

to chase him. As he -- as he was running, he was holding his right front pant’s 

pocket as he was running the whole time.” N.T., 12/10/18, at 11. Whatever 

ambiguity there was in that statement was soon resolved upon further 

questioning by the prosecutor during the following exchange:

Q[:] How far away were you from him when you first started 

running?

A[:] I mean, he was walking towards the vehicle, towards the --

the length of the vehicle. Maybe another, I would say, 10 to 15

feet tops.

Q[:] How far away was he from -- how far after the initial 

encounter when he first started running did you see him start 

grabbing his waistband?

A[:] As soon as he hit the edge of the lot. So the -- at the curb, 

he hits the edge of the lot and he’s running, holding it.
J-S50013-20

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Id. at 14-15.

The record clearly belies the Commonwealth’s account. Officer

Seigafuse indicated that he immediately began chasing Appellant when he 

took flight. Appellant ran through the lot, and Officer Seigafuse stated that 

he first observed the hand movement toward Appellant’s waistband as 

Appellant reached the end of the lot. At no point did Officer Seigafuse 

indicate that he only began chasing Appellant after he noticed Appellant’s hand 

movement. Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that this observation cannot 

serve to support a finding of reasonable suspicion to engage in the pursuit. 

Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Appellant fled from police in a high 

crime area. These two facts, although innocent in isolation, see Chambers, 

supra, have been held to be sufficient, in combination, to support a finding of 

reasonable suspicion, see Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 853 A.2d 404 (Pa. 

Super. 2004).

The precise question before this Court in Jefferson was “whether the 

observation of [the] appellant in a high crime area and [his] flight from police 

combine to establish the familiar Terry standard of reasonable suspicion.” Id.

at 405. The Jefferson Court began its analysis by recognizing that, in Illinois 

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), “The United States Supreme Court held 

that although mere presence in a high crime area is insufficient to support a 

Terry stop, the additional factor of unprovoked flight was indeed relevant. 

The Court ultimately concluded that the two factors in combination were 
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sufficient to satisfy the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion[, hereinafter, 

‘the Wardlow Rule’].” Jefferson, 853 A.2d at 406. 

The Jefferson Court then considered whether additional protections 

existed under the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, the Jefferson Court 

determined that our Supreme Court had already answered that question in In 

the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2001) (“D.M. II”), wherein the 

Supreme Court reversed its prior decision in In the Interest of D.M., 743 

A.2d 422 (Pa. 1999) (“D.M. I”), based, in part, on Wardlow. Recognizing 

that our Supreme Court has consistently followed the federal rationale in cases 

involving interpretation of Terry, and that “the D.M. II court specifically 

addressed and rejected the suggestion that it depart from the federal high 

court’s reasoning on state constitutional grounds[,]” the Jefferson Court 

concluded that flight from police in a high crime area was also sufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicion under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

Jefferson, 853 A.2d at 406. 

Nevertheless, Appellant argues that we should reject application of the 

Wardlow Rule under the facts of this case, first citing to concurring and 

dissenting opinions from various courts that have called that rule into 

question. See Appellant’s Brief at 14-16. None of these criticisms of the 

Wardlow Rule reflects the current state of the law, as Appellant fails to cite 

any controlling case at odds with the Jefferson Court’s conclusion that the 

Wardlow Rule represents both the Federal and State Constitutional standard

applicable in Pennsylvania. 
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Appellant also argues that the Wardlow Rule effectively “subordinates 

the totality of the circumstances test” to “a two-factor (i.e., unprovoked flight 

and a high crime area) per se rule.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. He analogizes to 

our Supreme Court’s rejection of the Robinson Rule3in Hicks.

Hicks is distinguishable. In that case, our Supreme Court rejected the 

Robinson Rule because,

rather than requiring a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting an individual, the [Robinson] Court has deemed the 

conduct of the individual to be functionally irrelevant to the 

analysis. Such is a danger of per se rules, pursuant to which the 

totality of the circumstances inquiry—the whole picture—is 

subordinated to the identification of one, single fact. This is 

distinctly problematic where, as discussed above, the single fact 

isolated from the remainder of the circumstances is an activity

that is indistinguishable from lawful conduct.

Hicks, 208 A.3d at 939 (cleaned up).

Under the Wardlow Rule, although the high-crime-area factor cannot 

establish individualized suspicion by itself, it is the flight-from-police factor 

that demonstrates that the fleeing individual, rather than any other member 

of the community situated in the same high crime area, warrants 

particularized concern by police. In Hicks, our Supreme Court identified the 

problem of per se rules under search and seizure analyses as being reliant on 

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3

In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 600 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. 1991), 

overruled by Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), the

Superior Court held that the observation by police of the possession of a 

concealed firearm by an individual in public was sufficient to create a 

reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop in order to determine whether 

that individual was properly licensed. 
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“one, single fact[,]” and particularly on a solitary fact that was 

“indistinguishable from lawful conduct.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 939. Here, the 

Wardlow Rule does not involve reasonable suspicion based on a single fact. 

Nevertheless, we agree with Appellant that per se rules are generally 

disfavored, as the overarching standard under both the Fourth Amendment 

and Article I, Section 8, demands consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances known to the officer at the time a seizure is effectuated. 

Recently, for instance, this Court rejected recognition of a per se rule that the 

odor of marijuana, by itself, always establishes probable cause to conduct a 

search. See Commonwealth v. Barr, 240 A.3d 1263, 1276 (Pa. Super. 

2020). We noted therein that a “per se rule undermines the very nature of 

the totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause, which is a fluid 

concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual 

contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” 

Id. (cleaned up). In Barr, we determined that, at suppression, the lower 

court “was free to weigh the inference of criminality implied by the odor of 

marijuana against other relevant facts known to the officers in 

determining whether they possessed probable cause to conduct the search.” 

Id. (emphasis added). In that case, before they conducted a search of Barr’s 

vehicle, the police were presented with a medical marijuana card that 

potentially undermined the assumption of criminality. See id. at 1288.

Likewise, with respect to the Wardlow Rule, there may some 

circumstances in which additional facts tend to undermine the 
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reasonableness of the suspicion of criminal activity that stems from the 

observation of flight from police in a high crime area. Appellant argues that 

such additional facts are present here:

Turning now to the instant matter, it must be appreciated that the 

officer’s stop of Appellant here did not occur in a factual vacuum. 

When the officer exited his vehicle and asked to talk to Appellant, 

Appellant was being confronted by an officer who had previously 

assisted in the arrest of Appellant. That such a talk was a prelude 

to further detention of Appellant by this officer must have 

appeared to Appellant as a not insignificant possibility, 

notwithstanding the fact that Appellant was the victim of the crime 

being investigated by the officer. Furthermore, Appellant was 

accosted near the very location in which he had been shot at the 

day before. Since Appellant was the intended target of gun 

violence in that area, being seen talking to the police, perhaps 

being seen by the very persons who had shot at him, would give 

those persons greater incentive to carry through with their 

harmful intentions towards Appellant, as well as perhaps gaining 

Appellant further opprobrium in the neighborhood by being 

labeled as a snitch. In addition, as present experiences have 

taught, the specter of unlawful harm by the police is always 

present.

Appellant’s Brief at 23. Appellant also contends, at various times throughout 

his brief, that it is relevant that Officer Seigafuse knew Appellant was the 

victim of the shooting under investigation, not a perpetrator and, thus, the 

officer did not initially approach Appellant with the suspicion that he was 

engaged in criminal activity. 

We are not convinced that any of these additional circumstances 

undermined the trial court’s determination that Officer Seigafuse possessed 

reasonable suspicion to pursue Appellant. We instead agree with the 
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Commonwealth that these potentially innocent reasons for Appellant’s flight 

are not relevant to our analysis: 

[Appellant] attempts to minimize the relevance of his flight as a 

factor in the reasonable-suspicion analysis by advancing noncriminal reasons as to why someone in his shoes may have wanted 

to flee from the police. But[,] the fact that he can conjure up 

innocent explanations for such a person’s flight hardly undermines 

the lower court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed. 

This is because a finding of reasonable suspicion “need not rule 

out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); see also Commonwealth v. 

Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) ([stating 

that,] “even in a case where one could say that the conduct of a 

person is equally consistent with innocent activity, the 

suppression court would not be foreclosed from concluding that 

reasonable suspicion nevertheless existed”) (emphasis in 

original). In fact, even the higher standard of probable cause does 

not require the police to rule out the possibility of an innocent 

explanation for otherwise suspicious facts. District of Columbia 

v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 588 (2018). Significantly, in ... 

Wardlow, supra—which itself held that flight in a high-crime 

area provides sufficient basis to stop an individual for 

investigation—the United States Supreme Court rejected the very 

argument advanced by [Appellant]: 

Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent 

reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is 

not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This 

fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation 

of the Fourth Amendment. Even in Terry, the conduct 

justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an 

innocent explanation. The officer observed two individuals 

pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the 

window and periodically conferring. [Terry,] 392 U.S. at 5–

6. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it also 

suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a 

planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers could 

detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 30.

[]Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (parallel citations omitted); see also

... Carter, 105 A.3d at 772-73 (noting that “in Terry itself, the 
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conduct of the defendant could have easily been characterized as 

completely innocent”).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14-15. Indeed, the desire to avoid visible contact 

with police in a high crime area may very well lead many to flee from police 

for non-criminal reasons, such as the desire to avoid negative social 

consequences, and Appellant’s prior interactions with Officer Seigafuse do not 

make him unique in that regard. This same motivation could be in play in 

most cases involving application of the Wardlow Rule. However, the mere 

potential for a non-criminal reason for taking flight does not negate a finding 

of reasonable suspicion. As the Wardlow Court recognized, “[h]eadlong 

flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not 

necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 

Moreover, the fact that Officer Seigafuse was not initially investigating 

Appellant as the perpetrator of a shooting, but as a victim, is also irrelevant 

to our analysis. Jefferson is instructive here. In that case, police “were on 

marked patrol in a Philadelphia neighborhood in which drug sales were 

common and a shooting recently occurred.” Jefferson, 853 A.2d at 405. 

Subsequently, “[w]hen the officers observed [the] appellant and another man 

on the street in the area, the men promptly ran away. The officers stopped 

to investigate and the pair responded by fleeing in a different direction. The 

police then gave chase....” Id. Nevertheless, the Jefferson Court applied the 

Wardlow Rule. Id. at 407. The fact that Appellant was initially being 

approached due to his status as a victim is effectively no different than had 
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he been approached for no particular reason at all. This is because the nexus 

between Appellant’s conduct and the suspected criminal activity justifying the 

seizure stemmed solely from his flight from police in a high crime area, not 

from Officer Seigafuse’s observation of Appellant on the video of the shooting. 

In sum, Appellant has not demonstrated that any additional 

circumstances known to Officer Seigafuse undermine the reasoning of the

Wardlow Rule. The Wardlow Rule assumes that there may be innocent 

explanations for flight from police, but nevertheless holds that the observation 

of flight from police in a high crime area provides sufficient individualized 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot so as to justify a Terry stop. 

Additionally, to the extent that Appellant asks this Court to reconsider 

Jefferson, we are compelled to decline that invitation.4 “As a subsequent 

panel reviewing an issue already decided by a panel of this Court, we are 

obligated to follow the law as articulated by the previous panel.” 

Commonwealth v. Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 466 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 

____________________________________________

4

In this regard, Appellant provides several arguments and citations to 

relevant research that collectively suggests that the observation of flight from 

police in a high crime area is not “a reliable indication of criminal activity.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 17. While we share at least some of Appellant’s concerns 

about the Wardlow Rule, see Barr, 240 A.3d at 1291 (Strassburger, J., 

concurring), it is simply beyond the authority of this panel to reject the rule’s 

application in Pennsylvania given this Court’s prior decision in Jefferson. 
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Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision 

of this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/18/21