IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

RONNIE JAMES CURTIS, § 

TDCJ No. 297634, § 

 § 

Petitioner, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1188-M-BN 

§ 

DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, § 

§ 

Respondent. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Petitioner Ronnie James Curtis challenges his 1979 Tarrant County conviction 

for aggravated rape. See Dkt. No. 3 at 2. He alleges that, as to this conviction, he filed 

applications for a state writ of habeas corpus in 2021 and 2022. See id. at 3-4. And 

records from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals available online indicate that 

Curtis sought state habeas relief as to this conviction as early as 1999. See Ex parte 

Curtis, WR-11,825-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (denying relief without written order). 

Proceeding pro se, Curtis has now filed his first application for a writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Dkt. No. 3. Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn 

referred the Section 2254 petition to the undersigned United States magistrate judge 

for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should dismiss the federal habeas application with 

prejudice as time barred under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 

(Habeas Rule 4). 

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Jurisdiction and Venue 

“Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in 

custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains 

two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court 

for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district 

within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each 

of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); see also Ex parte Green, 39 F.3d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1994). 

These filing requirements are jurisdictional. See Carmona v. Andrews, 357 F.3d 535, 

537 (5th Cir. 2004); Webb v. Beto, 362 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1966). 

Tarrant County lies within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(2). So the Court 

has jurisdiction over Curtis’s petition. Regardless, as Tarrant County lies within the 

Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas, not the Dallas Division, under 

its discretion and in furtherance of justice, the district court in which a Section 2254 

application is filed may transfer the application to another district court for hearing 

and determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). But, considering the clear untimeliness 

of Curtis’s federal habeas petition, a transfer to the Fort Worth Division would only 

prolong the process, not further justice. 

Limitations 

Under Habeas Rule 4, a district court may summarily dismiss a 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 habeas application “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any 

exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” 

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Id.

This rule differentiates habeas cases from other civil cases with 

respect to sua sponte consideration of affirmative defenses. The district 

court has the power under [Habeas] Rule 4 to examine and dismiss 

frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other pleading by the 

state. This power is rooted in “the duty of the court to screen out 

frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on 

the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.” 

Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 

Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes). 

And the Court may exercise this power to summarily dismiss Curtis’s 

application with prejudice as time barred under Habeas Rule 4. 

“[E]ven though the statute of limitations provision of the [Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)] is an affirmative defense rather than 

jurisdictional,” a district court may dismiss a time barred Section 2254 application 

sua sponte under Habeas Rule 4. Kiser, 163 F.3d at 329. But, “‘before acting on its 

own initiative’ to dismiss an apparently untimely § 2254 petition as time barred, a 

district court ‘must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their 

positions.’” Wyatt v. Thaler, 395 F. App’x 113, 114 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 

(quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006); alteration to original). Under 

the circumstances here, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide 

Curtis fair notice, and the opportunity to file objections to them provide him an 

opportunity to present to the Court his position as to limitations concerns explained 

below. See, e.g., Ingram v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 6:12cv489, 2012 WL 3986857, at 

*1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2012) (a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation gives 

the parties “fair notice that the case may be dismissed as time-barred, which [gives a 

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petitioner] the opportunity to file objections to show that the case should not be 

dismissed based on the statute of limitation” (collecting cases)). 

AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas 

proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE 

DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The limitations 

period runs from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or 

other collateral review is pending is excluded from the limitations period. See id. § 

2244(d)(2). 

The one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling – “a 

discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case,” 

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999), and only applies in “rare and 

exceptional circumstances,” United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 800 n.9 (5th Cir. 

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2002) (citing Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[A] litigant is 

entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes 

two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” 

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016) (quoting 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). 

Taking the second prong first, “[a] petitioner’s failure to satisfy the statute of 

limitations must result from external factors beyond his control; delays of the 

petitioner’s own making do not qualify.” Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596, 598 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted). This “prong of the equitable tolling test is 

met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both 

extraordinary and beyond [the litigant’s] control.” Menominee Indian Tribe, 136 S. 

Ct. at 756 (emphasis in original).1

But “‘[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable 

diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.’ What a petitioner did both before and 

after the extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing may 

indicate whether he was diligent overall.” Jackson v. Davis, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; footnote omitted). 

1 See, e.g., Farmer v. D&O Contractors, 640 F. App’x 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2016) 

(per curiam) (holding that because “the FBI did not actually prevent Farmer or any 

other Plaintiff from filing suit” but instead “advised Farmer that filing suit would 

have been against the FBI’s interest” and “that the RICO claims could be filed after 

the investigation concluded,” “[a]ny obstacle to suit was ... the product of Farmer’s 

mistaken reliance on the FBI, and a party’s mistaken belief is not an extraordinary 

circumstance” (citing Menominee Indian Tribe, 136 S. Ct. at 756-57)). 

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A showing of “actual innocence” can also overcome AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). But the actual 

innocence gateway is only available to a petitioner who presents “evidence of 

innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial 

unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional 

error.” Id. at 401 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

That is, the petitioner’s new, reliable evidence must be enough to persuade the 

Court that “no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329).2

Curtis argues that his “conviction was in 1979.... The AEDPA didn’t come into 

effect until April 1996. [So t]here is no one year statute [of] limitation that [affects 

him].” Dkt. No. 3 at 10. 

2 See also Johnson v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The 

Supreme Court has made clear that the term ‘actual innocence’ means factual, as 

opposed to legal, innocence – ‘legal’ innocence, of course, would arise whenever a 

constitutional violation by itself requires reversal, whereas ‘actual’ innocence, as the 

Court stated in McCleskey [v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)], means that the person did 

not commit the crime.” (footnotes omitted)); Acker v. Davis, 693 F. App’x 384, 392-93 

(5th Cir 2017) (per curiam) (“Successful gateway claims of actual innocence are 

‘extremely rare,’ and relief is available only in the ‘extraordinary case’ where there 

was ‘manifest injustice.’ Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. When considering a gateway 

claim of actual innocence, the district court must consider all of the evidence, ‘old 

and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would 

necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.’ 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). ‘Based on this total record, the court must make “a probabilistic 

determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.”’ Id.

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). ‘The court’s function is not to make an 

independent factual determination about what likely occurred, but rather to assess 

the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.’ Id.” (citations modified)). 

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The undersigned disagrees. AEDPA and its one-year limitations period became 

effective when AEDPA was signed into law on April 24, 1996. See United States v. 

Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 929 (5th Cir. 2000). The United States Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit then allowed prisoners a one-year grace period in which to file claims 

for federal habeas relief. See United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 

1998); see also Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 1998) (clarifying that 

one-year grace period extended the filing date to April 24, 1997). 

Consequently, Curtis’s 2022 Section 2254 application is more than 25 years too 

late. The application is therefore due to be denied as untimely absent statutory or 

equitable tolling of the limitations period or establishment of actual innocence. 

But Curtis fails to explain how another provision of Section 2244(d)(1) could 

apply here, fails to advance a claim of tolling under the narrow actual innocence 

gateway, and fails to provide allegations that could establish either prong of equitable 

tolling – that he pursued his rights diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance 

prevented his timely filing of the federal petition. The Court should therefore dismiss 

the Section 2254 petition with prejudice as time barred. 

Recommendation and Directions to Clerk

Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court should 

dismiss Petitioner Ronnie James Curtis’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application with 

prejudice. And the Court should direct that the Clerk of Court serve any order 

accepting or adopting this recommendation on the Texas Attorney General. 

The Clerk shall serve electronically a copy of this recommendation and the 

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petition, along with any attachments thereto and brief in support thereof, on the 

Texas Attorney General as counsel for Respondent, directed to the attention of 

Edward L. Marshall, Chief, Criminal Appeals Division, Texas Attorney General’s 

Office. See RULE 4, RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT COURTS. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: June 6, 2022 

_________________________________________ 

 DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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