[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-11325

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00019-JES-CM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

EDUARDO VICENTI VERA, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(January 15, 2016)

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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Eduardo Vera appeals his 130-month sentence for conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute marijuana and for manufacturing and possessing with 

intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii), 

and 846. Vera’s convictions stem from Vera’s involvement in a marijuanagrowing operation. On appeal, Vera challenges the district court’s application of a 

two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. No 

reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

In determining whether the district court applied correctly an obstruction-ofjustice enhancement, we review for clear error the district court’s factual findings 

and review de novo the court’s application of the guidelines to those facts. United 

States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006). “Under the clearly 

erroneous standard, we must affirm the district court unless review of the entire 

record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(quotation omitted).

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In pertinent part, section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level increase to the 

defendant’s base offense level if “(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or 

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with 

respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing” of his offense of 

conviction, and “(2) the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense 

of conviction and any relevant conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The Application 

Notes to section 3C1.1 list examples of conduct warranting the enhancement, 

including “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.” Id. § 3C1.1, 

comment. (n.4(B)). 

A defendant’s testimony constitutes perjury when the testimony: (1) is made 

under oath; (2) is false; (3) is material; and (4) is “given with the willful intent to 

provide false testimony and not a result of mistake, confusion, or faulty memory.” 

United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 763 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002). For purposes of 

section 3C1.1, “material . . . means evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if 

believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.6). 

The record supports the district court’s factual determination that Vera 

committed perjury. At trial, while under oath, Vera denied “absolutely” that he 

was involved in marijuana cultivation, after being released from jail in November 

2011. Two separate witnesses testified, however, about Vera’s involvement in a 

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marijuana-growing operation in 2012. The testimony of these two witnesses 

contradicted flatly and was irreconcilable with Vera’s testimony. Viewing the 

record as a whole, we are not left “with the definite and firm conviction” that the 

district court committed a mistake in determining that Vera testified falsely. See 

McPhee, 336 F.3d at 1275. The district court’s determination is further supported 

by the jury’s guilty verdict, which demonstrates necessarily that the jury credited 

the testimony of the two witnesses over that of Vera. The district court committed 

no clear error in determining that Vera perjured himself and, thus, applied properly 

a two-level enhancement under section 3C1.1. 

We reject Vera’s contention that his trial testimony constituted only a 

“general denial of guilt” and, thus, was not subject to the obstruction-of-justice 

enhancement. The guidelines provide expressly that “[a] defendant’s denial of 

guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury), . . . is not a 

basis for application of” an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 

comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). Because Vera’s denial of guilt was both made 

under oath and constituted perjury, Vera’s argument that his testimony should be 

exempted from section 3C.1.1 is without merit. 

AFFIRMED.

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