alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 237

Authorizing the use of the Capitol grounds for the 13th annual National

Peace Officers’ Memorial Service.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 24, 1994

Mr. TRAFICANT submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the use of the Capitol grounds for the 13th

annual National Peace Officers’ Memorial Service.

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring),

3 SECTION 1. USE OF CAPITOL GROUNDS FOR NATIONAL

4 PEACE OFFICERS’ MEMORIAL SERVICE.

5 The National Fraternal Order of Police and its auxil6 iary shall be permitted to sponsor a public event, the 13th

7 annual National Peace Officers’ Memorial Service, on the

8 Capitol grounds on May 15, 1994, or on such other date

9 as the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the

10 President pro tempore of the Senate may jointly des-
2

•HCON 237 IH

1 ignate, in order to honor the 151 law enforcement officers

2 who died in the line of duty during 1993.

3 SEC. 2. TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The event authorized to be con5 ducted on the Capitol grounds under section 1 shall be

6 free of admission charge to the public and arranged not

7 to interfere with the needs of Congress, under conditions

8 to be prescribed by the Architect of the Capitol and the

9 Capitol Police Board.

10 (b) EXPENSES AND LIABILITIES.—The National

11 Fraternal Order of Police and its auxiliary shall assume

12 full responsibility for all expenses and liabilities incident

13 to all activities associated with the event.

14 SEC. 3. EVENT PREPARATIONS.

15 (a) STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT.—Subject to the

16 approval of the Architect of the Capitol, the National Fra17 ternal Order of Police and its auxiliary are authorized to

18 erect upon the Capitol grounds such stage, sound amplifi19 cation devices, and other related structures and equip20 ment, as may be required for the event authorized to be

21 conducted on the Capitol grounds under section 1.

22 (b) ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.—The Architect of

23 the Capitol and the Capitol Police Board are authorized

24 to make any such additional arrangements as may be re25 quired to carry out the event.
3

•HCON 237 IH

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6189

ANTHONY J. JOHNSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

THOMAS R. CORCORAN, Warden, Maryland House of

Corrections - Annex; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-98-1862-AW)

Submitted: May 25, 1999 Decided: June 2, 1999

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony J. Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Regina Hollins Lewis, Assistant Attorney General,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

January 21, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on January 22, 1999. Pursuant to Rules

58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the

date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as

the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v.

Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Johnson seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the district court. See Johnson v. Corcoran, No. CA98-1862-AW (D. Md. Jan. 22, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 16, 2009 

p0113 

Order 

 

January 16, 2009 

137736 & (12)(13) 

CHRISTY ANDERSON, Guardian of the 

Estate of YVETTE ANDERSON, a 

Legally Incapacitated Person, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137736 

 COA: 289006 

Wayne CC: 05-529951-NF 

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Chief Justice, a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties 

agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the 

application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs. 

HATHAWAY, J., not participating. To avoid unnecessary delay to the parties in 

cases considered by this Court before I assumed office, I follow the practice of previous 

justices in transition and participate only in cases that need my vote to achieve a 

majority for a decision.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

October 22, 2012

s1015

Order 

October 22, 2012

145297

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 145297

COA: 307390

Wayne CC: 91-002313-FC

JOHN ALBERT MURPHY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 21, 2012 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion 

for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER>  1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          15,270
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                26,900
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    131,453
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          30,871
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            31,189
<LOANS>                                        295,324<F1>
<ALLOWANCE>                                      5,441
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 522,487
<DEPOSITS>                                     389,670
<SHORT-TERM>                                    53,417
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              7,271
<LONG-TERM>                                     12,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            55
<OTHER-SE>                                      60,074
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 522,487
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 20,974
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                7,109
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   624
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                28,707
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              12,287
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,457
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           14,250
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      345
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  46
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 11,172
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,397
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       6,397
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,322
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.80
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.78
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.95
<LOANS-NON>                                      2,404
<LOANS-PAST>                                       402
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   127
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 5,306
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      410
<RECOVERIES>                                       200
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                5,441
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             5,441
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
<FN>
<F1>Includes mortgages available-for-sale and net of allowance
for loan losses of $5,306.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### PARHAM v. STATE.

No. 25618.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 9, 1952.

Doyle Pevehouse, Corsicana, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, a fine of $100.00.

In view of our disposition of the case, a recitation of the facts shall not be necessary.

Bill of exception No. 1 shows the following question was asked a prosecuting witness by the counsel for the State: “Mr. Tucker, can you tell the jury approximately how many, what percentage of these people you observe that you determine to be intoxicated, and how many you just turn loose?” The witness was permitted, over appellant’s objection, to answer as follows: “I wouldn’t think we have arrested one out of every fifty we actually observe and checked.”

We conclude that this was both an effective and improper method of bolstering the State’s witness. It would be only natural for a jury to conclude that an officer who arrested only one out of fifty suspects in driving while intoxicated cases was a fair and careful officer who resolved all doubt in favor of those he suspected of violating the law and should, therefore, be afforded the highest degree of credibility.

We say, in passing, that the record reflects that the officer in question, together with his partner, observed appellant in what they contended was a state of intoxication in a public place but made no effort to arrest him, as it was their duty to do; let him go to his automobile and drive away; and then followed and arrested him for driving while intoxicated. Such a practice on the part of peace officers should not be condoned. To do so would endanger the safety of those upon the highway in order that an officer might establish a more serious case.

For the error pointed out, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
#### BELCHER v. STATE.

No. 25185.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 7, 1951.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 1951.

No attorney on appeal.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

Appellant was charged by complaint and information with driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He waived a jury and plead guilty before the court. His punishment was assessed at a fine of $100.

There being no statement of facts and no bill of exception brought forward, and all proceedings appearing regular, no issue is raised for our consideration.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### JOHNSON v. STATE.

No. 22689.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 5, 1944.

Roy A. Scott, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Louise Johnson was charged with the murder of Langston Mitchell and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary.

From a very confused statement of facts, it appears that the jury was supported in its finding, but a discussion of the evidence will not be necessary.

The record contains one bill of exception approved by the court, together with several bystanders’ bills. We will discuss only that bill which relates to the failure of the court to grant appellant one day’s time after the list of the special venire had been returned to the clerk of the court, before forcing appellant to trial. By a bystanders’ bill, it is shown that some kind of a list of special veniremen had been filed with the clerk while appellant was out on bail. This return appears to be insufficient to meet the statutory requirements. When the question was raised, the trial court recognized the failure to make proper return and granted the sheriff permission to amend the return and gave him until two o’clock in the afternoon to do so. This return was made and duly filed, after which appellant was immediately placed on trial over his objection, as reflected by Bystanders’ Bill No. 3. It was further'shown by affidavit of the attorneys that they appeared in the office of the clerk on the previous day to the trial and attempted to see the sheriff’s return showing service on the veniremen with the list of them and were informed that none had been made. Whether or not they did' is immaterial. No legal return had been made and it was conceded by the court that it was necessary to make such return, which was done under his direction in the form of an amendment by the sheriff, as hereinabove stated. The court should have postponed the trial for a whole day from the filing of this return. Art. 601, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., with annotations. Ollora v. State, 60 Tex.Cr.R. 217, 131 S.W. 570; Dixon v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 217, 238 S.W. 227; Thomas v. State, 63 Tex.Cr.R. 98, 138 S.W. 1018.

It will not be necessary to discuss the other bills. They pertain to matters which,' in all probability, will not arise in the same way on another trial.

For the error stated, judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. CHANTHA J. TOK, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 595 EAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 18th day of March, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-2118

___________

In re: M & M Marketing, L.L.C., *

*

Debtor, *

----------------------------------------- *

*

Michael L. Blumenthal, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

* for the Eighth Circuit.

Richard D. Myers, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant, *

*

Jerry Cronk; Cheryl Cronk; *

Jerome Langdon; Coleen Langdon; *

Phillip Cronk; Lorraine Cronk, *

*

Appellees, *

------------------------------------------ *

*

In re: Premier Fighter, L.L.C., *

*

Debtor, *

------------------------------------------ *

*

Michael L. Blumenthal, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *
*

Richard D. Myers, *

*

Appellant, *

*

Jerome Langdon; Coleen Langdon; *

Ryan Cronk; Jeremiah McAndrew, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 15, 2010

Filed: October 20, 2010 

___________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After the trustee of the bankruptcy estates of M&M Marketing L.L.C. and

Premier Fighting, L.L.C. employed counsel to assist him in connection with the

estates, creditor Michael L. Blumenthal moved to disqualify counsel based on a

conflict of interest. The bankruptcy court denied the motion but the Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed, and this appeal followed. Following careful review,

we agree with the BAP that the trustee’s attempt to justify the employment by arguing

that counsel was employed for a special purpose fails: 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) governs

special-purpose representation, and that statute is inapposite here, where counsel did

not previously represent the debtors. We agree further that counsel held an interest

adverse to the estates, because he was also serving as attorney for several creditors

who held interests adverse to the estates. See In re Vote, 276 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th

Cir. 2002); United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2003)). 

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
EXHIBIT 99.1


                             CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
                           TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

                                     BY THE
              CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER*


       In connection with the Quarterly Report of LION, Inc. (the  "Registrant")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange  Commission on May 15, 2003,  hereof (the "Report"),  each of David
Stedman, Chief Executive Officer, and Steve Thomson, Chief Financial Officer, of
LION, Inc., a Washington corporation (the "Company"), hereby certifies that:

(1)    Based on our knowledge,  the Company's  periodic  report on Form 10 - QSB
       for the period ended March 31, 2003 fully complies with the  requirements
       of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)    Based on our knowledge,  the  information  contained in the Form 10 - QSB
       fairly presents,  in all material respects,  the financial  condition and
       results of operations of the Company.




CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER                        CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


/s/ David Stedman                              /s/ Steve Thomson
----------------------------------------       ---------------------------------
David Stedman                                  Steve Thomson

May 15, 2003                                   May 15, 2003
----------------------------------------       ---------------------------------

* A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has been provided to LION, Inc. and will be retained
by LION,  Inc. and furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § 2:22-CR-00046-Z-BR

§

JIM BOB BEEN (9) §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

JIM BOB BEEN (9), by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997), has 

appeared before me pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, and has entered a plea of guilty to Count 7 of the Indictment. After 

cautioning and examining JIM BOB BEEN (9) under oath concerning each of the subjects mentioned in Rule 11, I 

determined that the guilty plea was knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense charged is supported by an 

independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend that the plea of 

guilty be accepted, and that JIM BOB BEEN (9) be adjudged guilty of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) -

POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE METHAMPHETAMINE and have sentence imposed accordingly. After

being found guilty of the offense by the District Judge,

☒ The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) unless the Court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community 

if released.

☐ The Government does not oppose release.

☐ The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release.

☐ I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community if released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c).

☐ The Government opposes release.

☐ The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release.

☐ If the Court accepts this recommendation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the 

Government.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there is a 

substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or (b) the Government has 

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed, or (c) exceptional circumstances are clearly shown 

under § 3145(c) why the defendant should not be detained, and (2) the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released.

Date: July 27, 2022

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its 

service shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States 

District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Case 2:22-cr-00046-Z-BR Document 185 Filed 07/27/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 355
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 54

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Congress should enact real and

substantial cuts in spending and approve a Balanced Budget Amendment

to the Constitution before it considers raising taxes on the American

people.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 24, 1993

Mr. KNOLLENBERG submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Congress should

enact real and substantial cuts in spending and approve

a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution before it considers raising taxes on the American people.

Whereas, in the last thirty years the Federal Government has

raised taxes fifty-four times and balanced the budget in

only one year;

Whereas, historically, tax increases have resulted in higher

deficits, in part because Congress has spent $1.59 for

each new tax dollar raised;

Whereas, the most recent example of a Federal deficit-reduction effort, the 1990 Budget Summit tax hike, produced

increased spending of $2.34 for each tax dollar raised;
2

HCON 54 IH

Whereas, the American people, who already send over

$1,100,000,000,000 in tax dollars to the Federal Government, deserve to see that Congress and the President

have reduced Government spending in every way possible

before they are asked to pay more in taxes;

Whereas, in the first year of the President’s economic proposal net spending cuts total only $2,000,000,000 while

tax and fee increases are $36,000,000,000, an incredible

eighteen to one ratio of tax increases over spending cuts;

and

Whereas, from 1994 to 1997 the President’s plan calls for

nearly $3 in new taxes for every $1 of proposed spending

cuts: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that Con3 gress should not consider any tax increases on the Amer4 ican people until:

5 (1) Congress has enacted real and substantial

6 spending cuts; and

7 (2) Approved and sent to the States for ratifi8 cation a Balanced Budget Amendment to the United

9 States Constitution.

Æ
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT MICHAEL HAGAN, DOC #18547, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-3524 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed April 18, 2018. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Neil A. Roddenberry, Judge. Michael Hagan, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, LUCAS, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.