2022 UT App 55

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TARIQ AHMAD,

Appellant,

v.

GRACO FISHING & RENTAL TOOLS INC.,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20200642-CA

Filed May 5, 2022

Eighth District Court, Vernal Department

The Honorable Edwin T. Peterson

No. 160800095

Terry R. Spencer and Reid W. Lambert, 

Attorneys for Appellant

Joseph E. Minnock and Rod N. Andreason, 

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DIANA HAGEN

concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Tariq Ahmad appeals various rulings from the district 

court. But due to Ahmad’s untimely notice of appeal, we lack 

jurisdiction to consider all but one of the issues Ahmad raises. 

With respect to that issue, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND1

¶2 After purchasing an oil well in 2010, Pacific Energy 

& Mining Company2 attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the 

previously unproductive well producing again. During this time, 

Ahmad was the secretary of Pacific and a member of its board of 

directors. Ahmad was also Pacific’s former president and held a 

“very small” ownership interest in the company.

¶3 Pacific asked Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc., for an 

estimate for the cost of the tools necessary to fix the well and the 

cost for Graco to operate those tools over an eight-day period. An 

agreement was reached, and work commenced on the well. Soon, 

however, issues arose. The work took longer than eight days and 

a hole was drilled into the well casing. 

¶4 A dispute over the scope of Graco’s work and whether 

Graco was liable for the damage caused to the casing soon 

1. Because we lack jurisdiction over nearly all the issues Ahmad 

raises on appeal, see infra Section I, we need not belabor the facts 

underlying all aspects of the dispute between the parties. Instead, 

we present only the facts necessary to understand the 

jurisdictional issue and the single remaining issue that we have 

jurisdiction to consider.

2. The well was initially sold to JMD Resources and Entrada 

Enterprises, which were controlled by Ahmad’s wife and Pacific’s 

president, respectively. Those companies subsequently formed 

Greentown Oil, which held 100% of the working interest in the 

well during the time in question. Pursuant to a joint operating 

agreement, Pacific acted as the operator of the well on Greentown 

Oil’s behalf and was “required to litigate on behalf of the working 

interest owners.” For convenience, we refer to all actions 

regarding ownership and operation of the well as being 

undertaken by Pacific.
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followed. Pacific did not pay Graco, and Graco placed a lien on 

the well.

¶5 In 2016, Pacific, through its attorney, Terry Spencer, filed 

suit against Graco. Pacific claimed damages for the hole in the 

casing. Graco filed a counterclaim against Pacific for the payment 

owed. Graco also filed what it styled a third-party complaint 

against Ahmad, claiming that he had personally guaranteed the 

payment of Pacific’s obligations. Through Spencer, Ahmad

answered the third-party complaint. Following numerous legal 

proceedings in state district court and Ahmad filing a complaint 

in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Graco 

moved to have Ahmad joined as a party-plaintiff in this case. The 

state district court granted that motion.

¶6 The instant case proceeded to trial in June 2019, during 

which Spencer represented both Pacific and Ahmad. At the end 

of Pacific and Ahmad’s case, Graco moved for, and was granted, 

a directed verdict. The case was then submitted to the jury on 

Graco’s claims only, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of 

Graco. Pacific then filed a bankruptcy petition, and Ahmad 

attempted to move the claims against him to bankruptcy court. 

Apparently, due to the procedural hurdles in that process, the 

district court did not enter a judgment against Ahmad and Pacific 

until October 7, 2019. The document the court filed was titled 

“JUDGMENT,” and the court stated that it “enters JUDGMENT 

as follows” and laid out the jury’s verdict.

¶7 On November 1, 2019, pursuant to rule 59 of the Utah Rules 

of Civil Procedure, Pacific, through Spencer, filed a motion for a 

new trial. Ahmad then filed a pro se motion on November 4, 

joining Pacific’s new trial motion. The court held a telephonic 

conference on December 2, the minutes of which indicate that 

Spencer appeared as “Plaintiff’s Attorney,” and a hearing on the 

motion for a new trial was scheduled for January 3, 2020.

¶8 Ahmad did not personally appear at the hearing. Spencer 

did appear, however, and informed the court that because Pacific 
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was in bankruptcy, he could “only appear today on behalf of Mr. 

Ahmad.” Spencer then argued on Ahmad’s behalf, referring to 

Ahmad as “my client,” and not correcting the court when it 

referred to Ahmad as “your client.” On January 14, a new attorney 

filed a notice of substitution of counsel, indicating that she would 

be acting as the attorney for both Pacific and Ahmad. But just six 

days later, she filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel for both. 

Graco then filed a notice to appear or appoint counsel, in 

accordance with rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and served it on both Pacific and Ahmad. Ahmad later admitted 

he received the notice, but he did not appear or appoint counsel.

¶9 On May 22, 2020, the district court issued a written order 

deeming the motion for a new trial to be withdrawn due both to 

the substitute attorney’s statement at the time of her withdrawal 

that “there were no pending motions before the Court” and 

Ahmad’s and Pacific’s failures to appear or appoint counsel. On 

May 28, Ahmad filed a pro se motion entitled “Motion for 

reconsideration of Courts Order dated May 22, 2020 Pursuant to 

Rule 60(b).” Ahmad argued that the court and Graco’s counsel 

“were properly notified,” when he filed his pro se motion on 

November 4, that he “did not retain counsel and was representing 

himself.” Ahmad further asserted that he did not receive notice of 

the hearing held on the motion for a new trial or of the court’s 

subsequent entry of judgment and, as a result, that his “right to 

due process” was violated. On June 15, Ahmad filed another pro 

se motion notifying the court that his May 28 motion “should have 

been titled ‘Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Court Order Dated 

May 22, 2020.’”3 The court denied the motion on August 6. It ruled 

3. Attached to this motion was an affidavit from Spencer stating, 

“On Monday, November 4, 2019, Ahmad asked me why he was 

not included in the Motion for New Trial, I informed Ahmad that 

I did not represent him in his personal capacity, as the court 

records indicate I only represented [Pacific] in the above 

captioned matter.” The veracity of this assertion is certainly 

(continued...)
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questionable. The record before us shows that Spencer purported 

to represent Ahmad in the district court for years. On September 

26, 2016, Spencer filed an answer to Graco’s counterclaim and 

so-called third-party complaint on behalf of both Pacific and 

Ahmad, at the bottom of which he stated that he was the 

“Attorney for Pacific Energy & Mining Company and Tariq 

Ahmad.” Then, on November 6, 2018, after Ahmad was made a 

party-plaintiff in the action on Graco’s motion, Spencer filed a 

complaint on Ahmad’s behalf against Graco, signing the 

complaint “Terry R. Spencer Attorney for Ahmad.” Earlier that 

month, Spencer also filed “Plaintiff Ahmad’s Initial Disclosures,” 

and he signed it “Terry R. Spencer Attorney for Plaintiffs.” 

Spencer then filed a motion asserting “Ahmad’s Right to Conduct 

Discovery After Being Joined as a Party-Plaintiff by Graco,” again 

signing the motion “Terry R. Spencer Counsel for [Pacific] and 

Ahmad.” And at the January 3, 2020 hearing, Spencer informed 

the court that he would “only appear today on behalf of Mr. 

Ahmad,” and he proceeded to refer to Ahmad as “my client” 

during the hearing. During this entire time, Spencer never filed a 

motion to withdraw as Ahmad’s counsel. Spencer’s claim that the 

“court records indicate” he did not represent Ahmad is equally 

dubious. The very first page of the district court’s docket on the 

case states that Ahmad is a plaintiff in the case and he is 

“Represented by: Terry Spencer.” And throughout the docket, 

Spencer is consistently named as Ahmad’s attorney. Finally, 

Spencer filed an attorney’s lien in our court for nearly $1.5 million 

against any potential judgment Ahmad would receive for “legal 

work completed by Terry R. Spencer at the request of the 

Appellant, Tariq Ahmad.” It is hard to imagine Ahmad amassing 

such extraordinary legal fees from Spencer if Spencer “did not 

represent [Ahmad] in his personal capacity” and “only 

represented [Pacific] in the above captioned matter,” as Spencer 

claimed. The record compels the conclusion that Spencer did, in 

fact, represent Ahmad, and Spencer’s claims in his declaration to 

the contrary simply do not comport with the facts of record.
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that Ahmad’s argument was unpersuasive because he did not act 

pro se during trial and never offered any evidence or argument 

that differed from that offered by Pacific and because Spencer 

acted as the attorney for both Pacific and Ahmad “until after the 

hearing on the motion for a new trial.” The court also noted that 

Spencer never filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel prior to the 

January 3 hearing on the motion for a new trial and that Ahmad 

received the notice to appear or appoint counsel long before the 

court issued its written order.

¶10 Ahmad filed his notice of appeal, pro se, on August 19, 

2020, asserting that he was appealing “the entire order or 

judgment, which was entered on August 06, 2020.” 

Approximately one month later, Spencer filed his appearance of 

counsel in our court, notifying the court that he was representing 

Ahmad on appeal. Before the briefs were filed in this case, 

however, Graco moved for summary disposition on the ground 

that we lacked jurisdiction. It argued that Ahmad did not file his 

notice of appeal within 30 days of the court’s May 22, 2020 ruling 

on the new trial motion. Graco asserted that Ahmad’s rule 60(b) 

motion, filed on May 28, did not further extend the time for 

Ahmad to file a notice of appeal because rule 4 of the Utah Rules 

of Appellate Procedure provides that for a rule 60(b) motion to 

extend the time for appeal, the motion must be “filed no later than 

28 days after the judgment is entered.” Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(E).

We denied the motion but instructed the parties to address 

jurisdiction in their briefs, paying particular attention to “if, and 

how, the definition of ‘judgment’ found in rule 54 of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure affects the analysis.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11 Ahmad claims that multiple errors before and during trial 

necessitate a remand. But we may reach those issues only if we 

determine that we have appellate jurisdiction. “Questions about 

appellate jurisdiction are questions of law.” Zion Village Resort 
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LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC, 2020 UT App 167, ¶ 21, 480 P.3d 1055 

(quotation simplified). And because we conclude that Ahmad’s 

notice of appeal was largely untimely, it did not vest this court 

with jurisdiction over the issues arising from the underlying 

judgment. “When this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal, it

retains only the authority to dismiss the appeal.” In re adoption of

A.B., 2010 UT 55, ¶ 21, 245 P.3d 711.

¶12 We do, however, have jurisdiction to consider Ahmad’s 

challenge to the district court’s denial of his rule 60(b) motion, as 

to which his notice of appeal was timely. Ahmad asserts that this 

issue is reviewed for correctness. He is mistaken. “We review a

district court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009

UT 39, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 859.

4

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

¶13 Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a 

party to file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after the date of 

entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Utah R. App. P. 

4(a). This requirement “is jurisdictional, meaning that an 

appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of 

appeal is untimely.” Trapnell & Assocs. v. Legacy Resorts, LLC, 2020

UT 44, ¶ 35, 469 P.3d 989 (quotation simplified). The rule allows 

for this time to be extended, however, in enumerated 

circumstances: 

4. After the briefs were filed in this case, Graco filed a motion with 

this court attempting to be substituted as the appellant because it 

“purchased Mr. Ahmad’s appeal rights in this matter” at an 

execution sale. At oral argument, however, Graco withdrew this 

motion, and we have no occasion to consider it.
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(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the 

following, the time for all parties to appeal from the 

judgment runs from the entry of the dispositive 

order: 

. . .

(D) A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of 

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 

(E) A motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure if the motion is 

filed no later than 28 days after the judgment 

is entered.

Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1).

¶14 Ahmad argues that his notice of appeal was timely because 

the new trial motion filed on November 1, 2019—within 30 days 

of the court’s judgment entered on October 7, 2019—extended the 

time for appeal. And after the court issued its May 22, 2020 order 

denying that motion, Ahmad argues, his rule 60(b) motion further 

extended the time for appeal because that motion was filed within 

28 days of that order. Thus, Ahmad contends that his notice of 

appeal, filed within 30 days of the court’s August 6 denial of his 

rule 60(b) motion, was timely, allowing him to challenge the 

court’s underlying judgment. Graco responds that Ahmad’s 

argument does not comport with the plain language of the rule, 

which distinguishes between the “judgment” and “the entry of 

the dispositive order.” Id. Thus, to properly extend the time for 

appeal by means of a rule 60(b) motion, Graco argues that the rule 

required Ahmad to file the motion within 28 days of the 

judgment, which was entered on October 7, 2019. Given that 

Ahmad filed his rule 60(b) motion ten months after entry of 

judgment, Graco argues that the motion could not operate to 

extend the time for appeal, even though his notice of appeal was 

filed soon after entry of the order disposing of that motion. 
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¶15 We do agree with Ahmad that the motion for a new trial 

filed on November 1, 2019, extended the time to file a notice of 

appeal, allowing him to file an appeal from the underlying 

judgment up until 30 days after the court ruled on that motion, 

which occurred on May 22, 2020. See id. R. 4(b)(1)(D). But we agree 

with Graco that, per the text of rule 4, Ahmad’s rule 60(b) motion, 

filed months after entry of the underlying judgment, did not then 

further extend the time for appeal. Accordingly, his August 19 

notice of appeal was untimely as to the underlying judgment.

¶16 When interpreting a court rule, we do so “in accordance 

with its plain meaning.” State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 15, 

147 P.3d 1176. And in so doing, we endeavor “to give meaning to 

all its parts [and] avoid construing the rule in a way that renders 

any portion of it superfluous.” Id. ¶ 21. 

¶17 The text of rule 4 states that a rule 60(b) motion extends the 

time for appeal only if it “is filed no later than 28 days after the 

judgment is entered.” Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). 

To be sure, the rule uses both the word “judgment” and the word 

“order.” Subsection (a) of the rule states that a party has “30 days 

after the date of entry of the judgment or order” in which to file a 

notice of appeal, and subsection (b) states that if a party files one 

of the enumerated motions, “the time for all parties to appeal from

the judgmentruns from the entry of the dispositive order.” Id. R. 4(a), 

(b)(1) (emphases added). Thus, the rule clearly anticipates a 

difference between the two, making orders disposing of 

post-judgment motions “dispositive orders”—not “judgments”—

for the purposes of a rule 4 timeliness analysis. If we were to hold 

otherwise, we would render the distinction between “judgment” 

and “order” in rule 4 superfluous and would not “give meaning 

to all its parts.” See Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 21. 

¶18 Here, the court undisputedly issued its “judgment”

memorializing the jury’s verdict against Ahmad on October 7, 

2019. The original time for appeal was then extended by the filing 

of the motion for a new trial, see Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(D), which 
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the court denied on May 22, 2020. Based on the plain language of 

rule 4, the ruling on this motion was the operative “dispositive 

order.” As such, it restarted the 30-day time limit in which to 

appeal, but it did not operate as a judgment under rule 4(b)(1)(E). 

Ahmad, therefore, had 30 days from that order—i.e., until June 22, 

2020—to file a notice of appeal if he wished to appeal the 

underlying judgment, as well as the order itself. See id.

¶19 But Ahmad did not do so. Rather, he filed a rule 60(b) 

motion on May 28, 2020, and did not file his notice of appeal until 

August 19. While this was within 30 days of the court’s denial of 

the rule 60(b) motion, this rule 60(b) motion did not again extend

the time for Ahmad to appeal from the court’s underlying 

judgment. For a rule 60(b) motion to extend the time to appeal a 

district court’s underlying judgment, the motion must be filed 

within “28 days after the judgment is entered.” Id. R. 4(b)(1)(E) 

(emphasis added). And here, the court entered the judgment 

memorializing the jury’s verdict on October 7, 2019, and Ahmad 

did not file his rule 60(b) motion within 28 days of the date the 

judgment was entered. Thus, his rule 60(b) motion did not extend

the time for Ahmad to file a notice of appeal from the judgment, 

and Ahmad’s August 19 notice of appeal was untimely as to the 

judgment itself. 

¶20 Ahmad argues in his reply brief that “judgment,” as used 

in rule 4(b)(1), incorporates the definition of “judgment” from rule 

54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which includes “any other 

order from which an appeal of right lies.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a). 

Based on that definition, Ahmad argues that the May 22 ruling 

denying the motion for a new trial is a “judgment” within the 

meaning of rule 4(b)(1) because an appeal of right could be taken 

from that order. But despite our order expressly directing the 

parties to “address if, and how, the definition of ‘judgment’ found 

in rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure affects the 

analysis,” Ahmad did not make this argument in his opening 
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brief.5Instead, he opted to do so only in his reply brief. But issues 

raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. See Allen v.

Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (“It is well settled that issues 

raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented 

in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be 

considered by the appellate court.”) (quotation simplified). In 

addition, Graco persuasively argues that this reading is 

inconsistent with the plain language of rule 4(b)(1), which 

specifically governs the timeliness of appeals, and which 

distinguishes between the “judgment” and “the entry of the 

dispositive order” ruling on an authorized post-judgment motion.

Ahmad has thus failed to carry his burden of persuasion that the 

definition of judgment in rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure also applies to rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. And based on the plain language of rule 4, Ahmad’s 

rule 60(b) motion did not again extend the time for appeal from 

the judgment itself because it was filed more than 28 days after 

the district court entered its judgment on October 7, 2019.

¶21 In sum, because Ahmad did not file his notice of appeal 

within 30 days of the district court’s May 22 order, it was 

5. In his opening brief, Ahmad makes a single conclusory 

statement that the May 22, 2020 order “was a final ‘judgment,’ as 

defined in Rule 54(a) . . . as it adjudicated the claims, rights, and 

liabilities of the parties.” But Ahmad did not cite a single case to 

support this proposition and provided no analysis of how the 

language of rule 54 works in conjunction with rule 4’s use of the 

words “judgment” and “dispositive order.” Thus, this issue was 

inadequately briefed in Ahmad’s principal brief, see Allen v. Friel, 

2008 UT 56, ¶ 9, 194 P.3d 903 (“In addition to requiring issues to 

be raised in the opening brief, this court has repeatedly noted that 

a brief is inadequate if it merely contains bald citations to

authority without development of that authority and reasoned 

analysis based on that authority.”) (quotation simplified), 

rendering the argument “not presented in the opening brief” and 

thus “waived,” see id. ¶ 8.
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untimely, and we therefore do not have jurisdiction to consider 

any of Ahmad’s claims of error that arose prior to the court’s 

August 6 denial of his rule 60(b) motion.6 We are, however, vested 

with jurisdiction over the court’s order denying his rule 60(b) 

motion because Ahmad filed his notice of appeal to challenge that 

order well within the 30-day time limit. Accordingly, we now 

proceed to analyze whether the district court erred in denying 

Ahmad’s rule 60(b) motion. 

II. Rule 60(b) Motion

¶22 To obtain relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, a party must show that “(1) the motion is timely;

(2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections

of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense.” 

Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 64, 150 P.3d 480. “These

considerations should be addressed in a serial manner.” Id. Thus, 

6. This resolution is consistent with the policy against successive 

extensions of the time for appeal by post-judgment motions,

which courts have previously endorsed. See America Mutual Ins. v.

Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that 

“successive post-judgment motions interfere with” the policy of 

judicial economy that dictates that “there must be finality, a time 

when the case in the trial court is really over and the loser must 

appeal or give up”) (quotation simplified); Glinka v. Maytag Corp.,

90 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Allowing subsequent motions to

repeatedly toll the filing period for a notice of appeal would

encourage frivolous motions and undermine a fundamental

canon of our legal system, to promote the finality of judgments.”). 

See also Little Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Sandy City, 2016 UT

45, ¶ 17, 387 P.3d 978 (“The finality of judgments rule recognizes 

that at some point, litigation must end.”); Holbrook v. Hodson, 466

P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1970) (“The overriding principle of [our] rules 

is to assure the finality of judgments.”).
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there is no need to address additional considerations if one is 

found wanting.

¶23 Here, it is clear that the motion was timely as Ahmad filed 

it well within the 90-day requirement of rule 60. See Utah R. Civ. 

P. 60(c). Ahmad’s motion fails on the second requirement, 

however, as he cannot show that the court abused its discretion in 

determining that there was no basis for granting relief.

¶24 Rule 60(b) lists the following as grounds for relief from a 

“judgment, order, or proceeding”: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due 

diligence could not have been discovered in time to 

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation or other misconduct 

of an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 

based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer 

equitable that the judgment should have 

prospective application; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Id. R. 60(b). Ahmad did not clarify which ground for relief he was 

asserting in his rule 60(b) motion. But because he argued that his 

due process rights were violated—an argument that, as he 

phrases it, does not obviously come within any of the specific 

reasons for granting relief articulated in the rule—we assume that 

his motion was brought pursuant to rule 60(b)(6) and that he 
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sought relief based on “any other reason that justifies relief.”7Id.

See Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 71 (noting that subsection 60(b)(6) is a 

“catch-all provision of rule 60(b) . . . meant to operate as a 

residuary clause”) (quotation simplified).

¶25 Ahmad’s argument boils down to two points. First, he 

complains that his due process rights were violated when he did 

not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for a new trial 

because he did not employ Spencer as his attorney at that time

and so the notice Spencer received is not chargeable to Ahmad. 

Second, he asserts that his due process rights were violated for the 

same reason because he did not receive notice of the court’s 

written order on May 22. Both arguments are unavailing.

¶26 Ahmad asserts that his November 4 pro se motion joining 

Pacific’s motion for a new trial put the court on notice that he was 

now proceeding pro se, necessitating that he thereafter personally 

receive notice of the proceedings. We disagree. Although Ahmad 

did file this motion pro se, Spencer never filed a motion to 

withdraw as his counsel, as is required of all attorneys seeking to 

withdraw. See Utah R. Civ. P. 74. The court therefore had no 

reason to believe that Spencer no longer represented Ahmad. In 

fact, besides that single November 4 motion, Ahmad did not file 

another document with the court as a pro se litigant before the 

January 3 hearing. And, at the January 3 hearing, Spencer 

informed the court that because Pacific was in bankruptcy, he 

could “only appear today on behalf of Mr. Ahmad.” Then during 

the hearing, Spencer referred to Ahmad as “my client” and 

argued on Ahmad’s behalf.

7. Some due process violations would render a judgment void, 

implicating rule 60(b)(4) and the less deferential review for 

correctness. See, e.g., Rojas v. Montoya, 2020 UT App 153, ¶ 12, 477 

P.3d 38. Ahmad does not assert that the judgment against him is 

void.
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¶27 While this may have been inconsistent with Ahmad’s 

understanding at the time, the district court was absolutely 

entitled to take Spencer at his word that he was representing 

Ahmad at the hearing. This is especially so given that Spencer had 

not filed a withdrawal of counsel, nor was there any other filing 

after the November 4 motion indicating Spencer no longer 

represented Ahmad, and given that Spencer had been Ahmad’s 

attorney for nearly the entirety of the legal proceeding. See supra 

note 3. Thus, the court had no reason to look beyond Spencer’s 

representation and do its own investigation to determine whether 

Spencer really represented Ahmad. Thus, the court did not abuse 

its discretion in determining that this was not a basis to grant 

Ahmad relief from the judgment.

¶28 Second, we are also unpersuaded by Ahmad’s argument 

that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive 

notice of the court’s May 22 written order. After the January 3 

hearing, new counsel appeared on Ahmad’s behalf on January 14. 

Then, just six days later, she filed a motion to withdraw. At this 

point, Graco sent a notice to appear or appoint counsel to Ahmad, 

and it is undisputed that Ahmad received this notice, but Ahmad 

failed to appear or appoint counsel thereafter. Having failed to 

take any action to inform the court about the status of his 

representation, he cannot then complain that his rights were 

violated when he did not receive notice of the court’s order. 

Furthermore, his contention that he did not receive notice of the 

May 22 order seems dubious given that he filed a rule 60(b) 

motion just six days later on May 28 seeking relief from that order.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Ahmad relief from the judgment on this basis.

CONCLUSION

¶29 For the most part, Ahmad’s notice of appeal was untimely, 

resulting in this court lacking jurisdiction to consider nearly all of 

Ahmad’s claims. On the one issue we do have jurisdiction to 
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consider, we determine that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Ahmad’s rule 60(b) motion.

¶30 Affirmed.