RENDERED: MAY 3, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0697-MR

MARANDA HANSON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE WILLIAM ANTHONY KITCHEN, 

SPECIAL JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00106

MARSHALL COUNTY KENTUCKY; 

KEVIN NEAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS MARSHALL 

COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE; AND 

MARSHALL COUNTY FISCAL 

COURT APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; A. JONES AND LAMBERT, 

JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Maranda Hanson (“Appellant”) appeals from an 

order of the Marshall Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of 

Marshall County, Kentucky, Kevin Neal, in his official capacity as Marshall 
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County Judge Executive, and Marshall County Fiscal Court (“Appellees”). 

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the correct standard 

to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. She also asserts that she provided 

adequate evidence to support her claim of wrongful discharge per Kentucky 

Revised Statutes (“KRS”) Chapter 39A, and proved entitlement to damages for 

negligence per se under KRS 446.070. After careful review, we find no error and 

affirm the order on appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant was employed by Marshall County, Kentucky as a 911 

dispatcher. In December, 2019, Appellant’s supervisor, John Townsend, spoke 

with Appellant about what he characterized as insubordination for sending an 

inappropriate text message related to 911 training. About four months later, and 

just as the COVID-19 pandemic was spreading, Appellant sent an email to 911 

Director Christopher Freeman regarding Freeman’s management of the dispatch 

center in light of the pandemic. The email, which is contained in the record, 

questioned the adequacy of Freeman’s communication to 911 employees, and 

accused Freeman of dishonesty and of being untrustworthy. According to 

Appellant, she was upset that Freeman had not informed her of the reason for 

Townsend’s recent absence from work, believing Townsend’s absence was due to

his exposure to COVID-19 outside the workplace. 
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Freeman would later state that he did not inform Appellant or other 

911 employees why Townsend was absent from work because Freeman believed 

such a disclosure would violate the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act of 1996, as well as Marshall County Administrative Code §

5.49. It was subsequently determined that Townsend was not infected with the 

COVID-19 virus.

Freeman learned that Appellant was complaining to co-workers about 

her grievances and was trying to coordinate a walk-out. He discussed the matter 

with Marshall County Judge Executive Kevin Neal, and then arranged to meet with 

Appellant to discuss her email. Freeman would later state that at the meeting to 

discuss the email on March 23, 2020, Appellant was confrontational and agitated. 

After explaining the situation to Appellant, Freeman suspended Appellant for three 

days based on her insubordinate conduct. Appellant immediately resigned her 

employment with Marshall County 911 dispatch, agreeing to work 2 more weeks 

before leaving. The three-day suspension was to take effect immediately, with 

Appellant then working for the remainder of the two-week period.

Appellant told other 911 employees that she had resigned and she 

cleaned out her locker. She did not appeal her suspension as provided for in the 

county’s policy manual, and did not report back to work after the service of her 

suspension. Instead, Appellant engaged legal counsel, who emailed Freeman 
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stating that Appellant was withdrawing her resignation, and would be quarantining 

based on her belief that she had been exposed to COVID-19 in the workplace. 

Marshall County government, through counsel, responded to 

Appellant’s counsel stating that Appellant had resigned, and that the resignation 

had been accepted and could not be withdrawn. Marshall County then paid 

Appellant for her accrued vacation time and sick time, and she was removed from 

the 911 dispatch schedule.

Thereafter, Appellant filed the instant action in Marshall Circuit Court 

setting forth the following claims: wrongful discharge (KRS 338.010 et seq. and 

KRS 39A.010); negligence per se (KRS 446.070); and retaliation (KRS 338.121 

and KRS 61.102(1)). Appellant withdrew her claims of wrongful discharge in 

violation of KRS 338.010 et seq., and retaliation in violation of KRS 338.121.

Thereafter, Neal was dismissed in his individual capacity and Appellees filed a 

motion for summary judgment.

In support of the motion, Appellees argued that Appellant was not 

fired from her employment; that even if she were fired, she was an at-will 

employee whose employment could be terminated for any reason or no reason at 

all per KRS 338.010, et seq.; that Appellees had not violated any statewide 

emergency management rules governing 911 employees; that Appellees had not 

violated any provisions of the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Act; that 
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Appellant had no private right of action and was not a whistleblower; that she 

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and that the claims against Fiscal 

Court and Judge Executive Neal were redundant to the claims of Marshall County.

On June 9, 2023, the Marshall Circuit Court rendered an order 

granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The order centered on the 

court’s finding that Appellant quit her employment and was not fired, that her 

resignation was accepted, and that Appellant was not entitled to rescind her 

resignation. The court determined that Appellant failed to present any evidence 

that her working conditions were so intolerable that she was compelled to resign. 

Based on its findings that Appellant quit her employment, and that she was an atwill employee who could have been fired for good cause or no cause at all, the 

circuit court concluded that Appellant could not prove wrongful discharge if the 

matter proceeded to trial. The court also determined that Appellant’s statewide 

emergency management claim (KRS Chapter 39A), negligence per se claim (KRS 

446.070), and retaliation claim (KRS 338.121) were unsupported by the record.

Based on the foregoing, the Marshall Circuit Court concluded that 

even when the record was considered in a light most favorable to Appellant with 

all doubts resolved in her favor, there was no genuine issue of any material fact 

and Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. This appeal 

followed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. “The record must be 

viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary 

judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. 

Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary 

judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party 

will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. Id. 

“Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not 

succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of 

material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary 

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine 

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Appellant first argues that in dismissing her claims, the Marshall 

Circuit Court erred in failing to apply the correct summary judgment standard. 
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Citing Steelvest, supra, Appellant asserts that on a motion for summary judgment, 

all issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Appellant argues 

that in considering Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the Marshall Circuit 

Court improperly applied an opposite standard by resolving factual issues in favor 

of Appellees. Specifically, Appellant maintains that in contrast to her claim that 

she was discharged from her employment for reporting her concerns regarding 

workplace safety in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the circuit court 

determined that Marshall County properly worked with state and local officials to 

enact safety measures to prevent any workplace outbreaks of the virus. Appellant 

argues that this finding was improper, as the court failed to resolve this issue of 

fact in her favor. She asserts that the question is not whether the evidence she 

propounded is true or false, but rather whether it created genuine issues of material 

fact sufficient to overcome Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. She argues 

that because the circuit court erred in failing to consider the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the non-movant, the entry of summary judgment must be 

reversed.

The focus of both Appellant’s complaint, and the circuit court’s 

resolution of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, was Appellant’s 

contention that she was wrongfully discharged from employment per KRS 338.010 

and KRS 39A.010. In determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
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on this claim, and that Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the 

circuit court found that Appellant was not fired but rather that she quit her job. 

This finding is supported by the record. Appellant acknowledged in 

the trial record, as well as in her appellate brief, that she resigned from her 

employment with Marshall County.1 It cannot reasonably be argued that she was 

wrongfully discharged from employment, when she acknowledges having 

immediately resigned in protest to her suspension for insubordination. There are

no genuine issues of material fact on this issue, and Appellees are entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law on her claim of wrongful discharge. The Marshall 

Circuit Court expressly applied the correct standard in so ruling.

Appellant goes on to argue that she provided adequate evidence to 

overcome summary judgment on her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of 

KRS Chapter 39A (“Statewide Emergency Management Programs”). Specifically, 

Appellant points to Governor Andy Beshear’s Executive Order 2020-215, made in 

concert with KRS Chapter 39A, which allowed certain essential businesses to 

remain open during the pandemic, but required that sick or exposed employees be 

sent home. Appellant argues that Appellees’ failure to send home 911 employees 

who were exposed to the virus violated the Governor’s executive order. This 

1

“In an immediate response to the suspension, Hanson . . . tendered her resignation[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief at p. 8, citing Record (“R.”) Vol III pgs. 808-66; R. Vol. IV pgs. 867-1008; 

and, R. Vol. V pgs. 1025-86. 
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failure, she asserts, resulted in her constructive discharge because she was left with 

no choice but to resign her employment to avoid exposure to the virus. She also 

argues that, though she did resign, Appellees’ refusal to accept the rescission of her 

resignation four days later was itself an improper termination of her employment. 

Appellant did not plead constructive discharge in her complaint, and it 

appears that the first time this claim was raised was in her response to Appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment. In disposing of Appellees’ motion, the circuit 

court did briefly note that “there is no evidence of constructive discharge in that 

her working conditions were not so intolerable that she was forced to resign.” 

Arguendo, even if Appellant’s claim of constructive discharge were properly 

pleaded and argued, we agree that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to 

this claim, and that Appellees were entitled to summary judgment. 

“The commonly accepted standard for constructive discharge is 

whether, based upon objective criteria, the conditions created by the employer’s 

action are so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to 

resign.” Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Ky.

App. 2001) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted). Even when 

viewing the record in a light most favorable to Appellant per Steelvest, it is void of 

any objective criteria creating conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person 

would have felt compelled to resign. Although Appellant subjectively believed 
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that Townsend’s presence in the workplace threatened her health and safety by 

exposing her to COVID-19, she was incorrect as the record reveals that Townsend 

did not contract COVID-19 nor expose others to the virus during the relevant 

timeframe. Appellant was not privy to Townsend’s medical records (nor should 

she be); she was not vested with the authority to make human resources decisions 

on behalf of her superiors; and, she produced no evidence of exposure or infection 

in the workplace arising from Appellees’ policies or conduct. 

Appellant, through counsel, acknowledges that she was “extremely 

concerned” and “beyond terrified” regarding COVID-19. This was a widespread 

and understandable response to the virus, especially in the early weeks and months 

of the pandemic. However, one’s subjective and emotional response to the 

pandemic is not a substitute for the objective criteria of intolerable workplace 

conditions required to sustain a claim of constructive discharge. The Marshall 

Circuit Court correctly found that Appellant was not constructively discharged, and 

we find no error on this issue. 

Lastly, Appellant claims entitlement to damages under KRS 446.070. 

This statute provides that, “[a] person injured by the violation of any statute may 

recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, 

although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” As the record does 

not demonstrate any violation of statute nor resultant injury, this argument is moot.
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CONCLUSION

The circuit court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as 

to any material fact, and that Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law. Scifres, supra. For these reasons, we find no error and affirm the Marshall 

Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Marilyn Shrewsbury

Eddyville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Stacey A. Blankenship

Kristen N. Krueger

Paducah, Kentucky