alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

Exhibit 10.1.2

                               Addendum #2 to the
                        EMPLOYMENT AND SEPARATION AGREEMENT


This employment agreement addendum #2 ("Agreement") made effective March 24,
2004, by and between DURASWITCH INDUSTRIES, INC., a Nevada corporation,
("DuraSwitch"), and Robert J. Brilon ("Employee").

Mr. Brilon's current employment contract has a Term of Employment stated as
April 30, 2004.  Mr. Brilon and DuraSwitch are currently negotiating the terms
of an employment agreement anticipated to have a Term of Employment through
December 31, 2007.

Mr. Brilon's Term of Employment (Section 2.1) and Profit Incentive Bonus
(Section 15.1) shall be extended for one year to April 30, 2005 and December 31,
2005, respectively.

As a definition clarification to the agreement Article II, 1.3 (A) in the event
of a takeover as defined it is hereby clarified that the condition of "Mr.
Brilon is asked to leave" is assumed to occur upon any change of position or
salary decrease, not mutually agreed upon, subsequent to or in contemplation
of a takeover.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned execute this Agreement to be effective on
the date herein written.



                                                             /s/Robert J. Brilon
                                                          ______________________
                                                                Robert J. Brilon


                                                    DURASWITCH INDUSTRIES, INC.,
                                                            a Nevada corporation

                                                    By:    /s/ William E. Peelle
                                                    ____________________________
                                                               William E. Peelle

                                                                   /s/ John Hail
                                                                  ______________
                                                                       John Hail
                                             Its: Compensation Committee Members
<PAGE>



                         [PUTNAM INVESTMENTS LETTERHEAD]


                             FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
                      BENTHOS, INC. 401(k) RETIREMENT PLAN

Benthos, Inc. (the "Employer") having heretofore adopted the Benthos, Inc.
401(k) Retirement Plan, a prototype plan document consisting of the Plan
Agreement #001 and the Putnam Basic Plan Document #07 (the "Plan") effective
as of July 1, 1999, pursuant to the power reserved to the Employer in Section
17.1 of the Plan, hereby amends the Plan Agreement as set forth below.

1. Subsection D. of Section 9., of the Plan Agreement is hereby amended
   effective July 1, 1999, by striking said subsection in its entirety and by
   substituting the following new paragraph in lieu thereof:

         "D.  YEAR OF SERVICE MEASURING PERIOD FOR VESTING (PLAN SECTION
              2.52). The periods of 12 months used for measuring Years of
              Service will be (check one):

              [ ]  (1)  Plan Years

              [X]  (2)  12-month Eligibility Periods

     Note: if you are adopting this Plan to replace an existing plan,
     employees will be credited under this Plan with all service credited to
     them under the plan you are replacing."


In all other respects, the Plan provisions remain in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS, WHEREOF, the Employer has caused the First Amendment to the Plan
to be duly executed in its name and behalf and its corporate seal to be
affixed as of the date signed below.

ATTEST:

Benthos, Inc.                                Putnam Fiduciary Trust Company

By: /s/ Francis E. Dunne, Jr.                By: /s/ Tina Campbell
    ---------------------------                  -----------------------------

Title:  Treasurer                            Title: VP Compliance & Consulting
       ------------------------                     --------------------------

Date:  9/29/99                               Date:  10/1/99
       ------------------------                     --------------------------
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
     form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 1997 and is qualified in
     its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     US$
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                          1
<CASH>                                           1,100,615
<SECURITIES>                                     1,246,875
<RECEIVABLES>                                      588,273
<ALLOWANCES>                                       (25,000)
<INVENTORY>                                        488,666
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,531,081
<PP&E>                                             849,907
<DEPRECIATION>                                    (223,242)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4,188,287
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              398,665
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            52,937
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,307,668
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     4,188,287
<SALES>                                          1,883,964
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,883,964
<CGS>                                            1,006,453
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,006,453
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,677,266
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  90,788
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (708,967)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (708,967)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (708,967)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.13)
        


</TABLE>
#### Ex parte SULLIVAN.

No. 22802.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 9, 1944.

Fryer & Milstead, of El Paso, for appellant.

Ernest Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

After a hearing in habeas corpus proceeding the District Judge of the 34th Judicial District remanded appellant to the custody of the sheriff, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellant was convicted in the State of Oregon on October 8, 1938 of the offense of robbery, and sentenced to serve seven years in the penitentiary of that state. On June 1, 1942 appellant was granted a conditional parole liberating him on the conditions therein specified. On September 25, 1942, said parole was revoked by the Governor of the State of Oregon because appellant had violated the conditions of the parole. A warrant was issued for the rearrest of appellant to serve the unexpired term of his sentence. Appellant was not re-arrested under said warrant. Thereafter, and prior to May 18, 1943, appellant was convicted in the U. S. District Court at Phoenix, Arizona, of a violation of a Federal offense and sentenced to serve one year’s imprisonment. Upon said May 18, 1943, appellant was transferred by Federal authorities to the Federal Correction Institution at La Tuna, Texas, to serve the remaining part of said one-year term. On December 3, 1943, a complaint was duly filed before a magistrate of El Paso County charging that appellant was a fugitive from the State of Oregon by reason of the unserved portion of the seven-year sentence for robbery. A warrant of arrest was issued by the magistrate upon the fugitive complaint, and the sheriff of El Paso County arrested appellant thereon at the Federal Correction Institution upon the termination of the one-year sentence imposed in Arizona. Appellant was not at liberty in Texas between the time he completed the said one-year sentence and the time of his arrest under the fugitive complaint. Appellant obtained a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was illegally held by the sheriff. The latter replied that he was holding appellant under the fugitive warrant issued by the magistrate. Before the habeas corpus hearing an extradition warrant issued by the Governor of Texas directing that appellant be delivered to a designated person to be returned to the State of Oregon. The sheriff amended his return, stating that he was then holding appellant under the extradition warrant, *784whereupon the District Judge remanded appellant to the custody of the sheriff.

We have not been favored with a brief from appellant and therefore are without information as to the grounds upon which appellant questions the validity of the trial judge’s order remanding him. The case of Ex parte Walton, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 534, 112 S.W.2d 467, seems to support the court’s action. Nothing in the record has been called to our attention which would authorize this court to interfere with the return of appellant to the State of Oregon.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Case 2:22-cv-00076-Z-BR Document 6 Filed 04/12/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 24
Order – Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SYED HOSAIN ALI, §

 §

Petitioner, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-785-L-BN

 §

MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney §

General of the United States, et al., §

 §

Respondents. §

ORDER 

On April 7, 2022, the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge (“Report”) (Doc. 5) was entered, recommending that the court transfer 

Petitioner’s section 2241 habeas application to the Ablilene Division of this district where 

Petitioner is physically confined. No objections to the Report were received as of the date of this 

order.

Having considered Petitioner’s habeas application, the record, filed, and Report, the court 

determines that the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions are correct, and accepts them as 

those of the court. The court, therefore, transfers Petitioner’s section 2241 habeas application to 

the Ablilene Division of the Northern District of Texas where Petitioner is physically confined, 

and the clerk of the court is directed to effect the transfer in accordance with normal procedure.

It is so ordered this 29th day of April, 2022.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge

Case 1:22-cv-00052-H Document 7 Filed 04/29/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 21
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 (ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

            In connection with the quarterly report of PC Mall, Inc., a Delawarecorporation, and its wholly owned subsidiaries (collectively, the "Company") onForm 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the"Report"), I, Ted Sanders, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, herebycertify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63,Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:

                   (1)  the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, and 

                   (2)  the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for theperiods indicated.  

              This Certification has notbeen, and shall not be deemed, "filed" with the Securities and ExchangeCommission.
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage  Servicing**D1050-084, 8th Floor  401 South Tryon Street  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Reference is hereby made tothat certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 1, 2015, by andamong WELLS FARGO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., as Depositor, WELLSFARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, RIALTO CAPITAL ADVISORS,LLC, as Special Servicer, TRIMONT REAL ESTATE ADVISORS, INC, as Trust Advisor,WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, as TaxAdministrator and as Custodian and WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, asTrustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series2015-LC20 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein nototherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.12 ofthis Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of CommercialMortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1. A review of the activitiesof the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2016 through December31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period) , and of its performance per theAgreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2. To the best of myknowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, has fulfilled all of itsobligations under this Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2017.

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAY 23, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-13351 

Non-Argument Calendar

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00448-VMC-TGW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

VINCENT EDWARD UNDERWOOD,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Middle District of Florida

 ________________________

(May 23, 2011)

Before BARKETT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Vincent Edward Underwood appeals his sentence of 180 months of

imprisonment for possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21

U.S.C. § 841(a), being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),

and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, id.

§ 924(c)(1). We affirm.

Underwood pleaded guilty to drug and firearms offenses without the benefit

of a plea agreement. His presentence investigation report provided a combined

base offense level of 24. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1

(2009). The report stated that the Supreme Court had held in United States v.

Spears, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009), that a district court may vary from the crack cocaine

guidelines, but the report stated that a variance would not affect Underwood’s

sentence because he faced mandatory minimum sentences of 10 years for his drug

crime, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), and of 5 years for possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The report also detailed Underwood’s three prior convictions

for selling and possessing illegal drugs and other criminal conduct.

At his sentencing hearing, Underwood asked the district court to vary from

the crack cocaine guidelines, but the district court rejected the request “for the

reasons . . . set[] forth” in the presentence report. After the district court sentenced

Underwood, he objected and argued that his sentence was unreasonable. The

2
district court responded “that the minimum mandatory sentences [were]

appropriate and fair” based on Underwood’s criminal history.

Underwood argues that he is “entitled” to be sentenced according the Fair

Sentencing Act, which was enacted while his appeal was pending, but this

argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Gomes, 621 F.3d 1343

(11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1833 (2011). In Gomes, we held that the

savings statute, “1 U.S.C. § 109[,] bars the Act from affecting . . . punishment” for

crimes committed before its enactment. Id. at 1346. Underwood also argues that

his sentence to the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment based on the 100 to

1 crack cocaine ratio violates his right to equal protection under the Fifth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but we have held that this disparity is not

unconstitutional, United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 1992).

Underwood’s sentence is AFFIRMED.

3
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Max Langer, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Kings County,

February 11, 1958.

*Ralph Vatner*for petitioner.

*Harold F. Hay,*special guardian for grandchildren.

Maximilian Moss, S.

The proposed compromise of the causes of action for conscious pain and suffering and for wrongful death of decedent is approved. The compensation of petitioner’s attorney is fixed and allowed in the requested amount, to include all disbursements and to cover all services rendered and *48to be rendered. Petitioner will be reimbursed for funeral expenses and the cost of the monument paid by her in the stated amounts. These amounts and the amount of the hospital bill shall be paid out of the recovery for personal injuries to the extent possible and the balance out of the recovery for wrongful death (cf. *Matter of Shapiro,*116 N. Y. S. 2d 780).

Decedent was survived by three adult children, five adult children of a predeceased daughter and three minor children of a predeceased son. No claim however is made by any of the parties for pecuniary injuries suffered by reason of decedent’s death; nor is there any indication of dependency which would be an element of pecuniary loss (see *Matter of Pridell,*206 Misc. 316). Prior to 1949, section 133 of the Decedent Estate Law had provided that damages recovered in a wrongful death action were to be distributed “as if they were unbequeathed assets ”, i.e., pursuant to section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law. In 1949, the statute was amended (L. 1949, ch. 639) in its present form. The only change effected by the amendment was to require proof of pecuniary injury in order to determine the proportionate shares to which the surviving spouse and respective next of kin were entitled, as opposed to the former rule which determined their shares in accordance with the provisions of section 83. The Legislature did not alter the definition of the class of persons entitled to share, namely the spouse and next of kin, but merely imposed the condition of pecuniary injury. (See *Gross*v. *Abraham,*306 N. Y. 525, 530.) It follows that where such proof is not at hand and the condition cannot be met, as here, no determination of distribution is possible based upon any relative pecuniary injuries suffered by those entitled to share in the recovery for wrongful death of the decedent. Under these circumstances the damages recovered must still be treated as if they were unbequeathed assets and distributed pursuant to section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law. Consequently, the net proceeds herein are to be distributed in five equal shares as follows: one to each of decedent’s three surviving children, one to be divided among the five adult grandchildren, and one to be paid to the mother of the three minor grandchildren for their equal use and profit. Settle decree on notice.
# AGENCY:

 Office of the Secretary, DHHS.

# ACTION:

 Notice of meeting.

                    Pursuant to Public Law 92-463, notice is hereby given of a meeting of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT), U.S. Public Health Service. The meeting will be held at the International Trade Center, Polaris Ballroom, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004, starting on February 24, 2000, at approximately 9:00 a.m. and will recess at approximately 5:30 p.m. The meeting will reconvene on February 25, 2000, at approximately 8:00 a.m. and will adjourn at approximately 5:00 p.m. The meeting will be open to the public. Attendance by the public will be limited by the space available. The committee will review public comments received in response to A Public Consultation on Oversight of Genetic Tests published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on December 1, 1999 (64 FR 67273), and work toward the development of final recommendations on the oversight of genetic testing. A limited period of time will be provided for public comment, and individuals interested in participating in the public comment period should contact Ms. Sarah Carr, SACGT Executive Secretary, as shown below.                

Under authority of 42 U.S.C. 217a, Section 222 of the Public Health Service Act, as amended, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) established the SACGT to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary through the Assistant Secretary for Health on all aspects of the development and use of genetic tests. The SACGT is directed to: (1) Recommend policies and procedures for the safe and effective incorporation of genetic technologies into health care; (2) assess the effectiveness of existing and future measures for oversight of genetic tests; (3) and identify research needs related to the Committee's purview.

                    Further information about the SACGT is available at the following web site:                     *http://www4.od.nih.gov/​oba/​sacgt.htm.*                    If you wish to attend, please register through the web site. A draft meeting agenda will be posted to the web site prior to the meeting. Individuals who wish to provide public comments should notify Ms. Carr, by telephone at 301-496-9838 or E-mail at                     *sc112c@nih.gov*                    as soon as possible and provide a copy of their remarks to Ms. Carr by February 15, 2000. Those who plan to attend the meeting and need special assistance, such as sign language interpretation or other reasonable accommodations, should notify Ms. Carr at 301-496-9838. The SACGT office is located at 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 302, Bethesda, Maryland 20892.                

Dated: February 3, 2000.

Sarah Carr,

Executive Secretary, SACGT.

[FR Doc. 00-2906 Filed 2-7-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P