Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 46 / Monday, March 10, 2014 / Notices 13375 

1Although the module is a reentry vehicle and 

not a reusable launch vehicle, 14 CFR 435.33 

incorporates and applies § 431.43 to all reentry 

vehicles. 

northerly airport property line located 

easterly of Pinewald-Keswick Road. 

The County of Ocean also requests the 

release of real property totaling 19.26 

acres in addition to the granting of an 

access easement right of way on same 

parcels for use as spoil storage area and 

a dog park. Parcel 3 (Highway 

Department Spoil Area) consists of 

16.52 acres located within the 

Township of Lacey. The parcel consists 

of a rectangular parcel 1200 feet long by 

600 feet wide adjacent and at right 

angles to the Lacey Township line. The 

east corner of the parcel is located 145 

feet southeast of the centerline of the 

existing sand entry road to the spoil 

area. Parcel 4 (Dog Park) consists of 2.74 

acres located within the Township of 

Berkeley. The perimeter of this parcel is 

located 10 feet outside of the existing 

dog park fence line. The south line of 

the parcel is 20 feet north of the 

centerline of the existing airport access 

road pavement. As shown on the 

Airport Layout Plan (ALP), the above 

describe properties do not serve an 

aeronautical purpose and are not 

needed for airport development. 

No AIP funds were used to purchase 

the parcels to be released. All of the 

parcels were acquired through either 

condemnation or fee simple purchase 

with County funds. The ALP will be 

updated to show the new airport 

property boundary. The airport property 

will be released to the County and will 

remain County owned. 

Any person may inspect the request 

by appointment at the FAA office 

address listed above. Interested persons 

are invited to comment on the proposed 

lease. All comments will be considered 

by the FAA to the extent practicable. 

Issued in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, 

February 28, 2014. 

Lori K. Pagnanelli, 

Manager, Harrisburg Airports District Office. 

[FR Doc. 2014–05148 Filed 3–7–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Waiver of Autonomous Reentry 

Restriction for a Reentry Vehicle 

AGENCY: Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation; Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of waiver. 

SUMMARY: This notice concerns three 

petitions for waiver related to the 

launch and reentry of an Orion MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle. In the first of 

these petitions, United Launch Alliance 

(ULA) requested a waiver of the FAA’s 

requirement that the expected number 

of casualties for a launch not exceed 

0.00003 casualties (Ec ≤ 30 × 10¥6) from 

debris. For the second and third 

petitions, Lockheed Martin (Lockheed) 

requested waivers of the FAA’s 

regulatory requirements that (1) the 

expected number of casualties for the 

entire mission, including launch and 

reentry, not exceed 30 × 10¥6 casualties 

from debris; and (2) an operator only 

initiate reentry of a reentry vehicle by 

command. The FAA elects to consider 

all three petitions together because all 

three involve the same essential facts 

and risk analyses. The FAA grants all 

three petitions. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

waiver, contact Charles P. Brinkman, 

Aerospace Engineer, AST–200, Office of 

Commercial Space Transportation 

(AST), Federal Aviation Administration, 

800 Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–7715; email: phil.brinkman@

faa.gov. For legal questions concerning 

this waiver, contact Laura Montgomery, 

Manager, Space Law Branch (AGC–250), 

Regulations Division, Office of the Chief 

Counsel, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–3150; email: 

laura.montgomery@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Lockheed and ULA are private 

commercial space flight companies. 

Lockheed entered into a contract with 

the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) to provide the 

first orbital flight test for NASA’s Orion 

Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program. 

Lockheed has contracted with ULA to 

provide launch services for the mission. 

The FAA is responsible for licensing, 

in relevant part, the launch of a launch 

vehicle and the reentry of a reentry 

vehicle, under authority granted to the 

Secretary of Transportation by 51 USC 

Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), 

and delegated to the FAA’s 

Administrator and Associate 

Administrator for Commercial Space 

Transportation. 

The mission at issue in this notice is 

Orion Exploration Flight Test 1, 

launching from Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station in Florida. The mission 

tests the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew 

Vehicle in an un-crewed, limitedcapability configuration, and serves as a 

stepping stone towards a crew-capable 

vehicle that would enable human 

exploration missions beyond Earth 

orbit. The mission is comprised of a 

launch, which is conducted by ULA, 

and a reentry, which is conducted by 

Lockheed. The launch vehicle is ULA’s 

Delta IV Heavy launch vehicle, which 

consists of a Common Booster Core 

(CBC) as the first stage with two 

additional strap-on CBCs and a Delta IV 

Cryogenic Second Stage (DCSS). The 

first burn of the DCSS places the Orion 

and the DCSS in orbit, and a second 

DCSS burn places the Orion into a 

highly elliptical, negative-perigee 

trajectory, to simulate the thermal 

conditions and high reentry speeds the 

module would experience returning 

from missions beyond Earth orbit. After 

separating from the DCSS, the Orion 

module reenters over the eastern Pacific 

Ocean, splashing down 231 nautical 

miles west of Baja California, Mexico. 

Section 417.107(b)(1) of Title 14 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 

prohibits the launch of a launch vehicle 

if the expected casualty (Ec) for the 

flight exceeds 30 × 10¥6 for, in relevant 

part, impacting inert and explosive 

debris (debris). On February 27, 2014, 

ULA petitioned for a waiver because the 

launch has a debris risk of 163 × 10¥6. 

Section 435.35 establishes acceptable 

risk for reentry vehicles, and requires 

operators to comply with §§ 431.35(a) 

and 431.35(b)(1)(i),1 which in turn 

prohibit an Ec for debris in excess of 30 

× 10¥6, for both launch and reentry 

combined. On February 27, 2014, 

Lockheed also petitioned for a waiver 

because the mission has a combined risk 

of 164 × 10¥6. 

Section 431.43(e) requires any 

reusable launch vehicle (RLV) that 

enters Earth orbit to be operated such 

that the vehicle operator can monitor 

and verify the status of safety critical 

systems before enabling reentry. This 

section also prohibits operators from 

designing a system to reenter 

autonomously. On February 27, 2014, 

Lockheed requested a waiver from this 

prohibition. 

Waiver Criteria 

Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive 

a license requirement if the waiver (1) 

will not jeopardize public health and 

safety, and safety of property; (2) is in 

the public interest; and (3) will not 

jeopardize national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States. 51 

U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14 CFR 404.5(b). 

A. Sixty Day Requirement 

Section 404.3(b)(5) requires that a 

petition for waiver be submitted at least 


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13376 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 46 / Monday, March 10, 2014 / Notices 

sixty days before the proposed effective 

date of the waiver, which in this case 

would be March 8, 2014, the date by 

which the FAA must make its licensing 

determination. This section also 

provides that a petition may be 

submitted late for good cause. 

Here, ULA and Lockheed submitted 

their waiver petitions on February 27, 

2014, less than sixty days before the 

statutory deadline for the FAA’s license 

determination. However, both launch 

operators have shared drafts of their 

petitions with the FAA, thus providing 

the FAA with sufficiently early access to 

the information to review the 

information in a timely fashion. 

Accordingly, the FAA is able to find 

good cause. 

B. Public Health and Safety, and Safety 

of Property 

For the purposes of clarity, the FAA’s 

analysis of public health and safety, and 

the safety of property, is broken down 

into subsections reflecting the various 

issues raised by the risk waivers and 

autonomous reentry waivers, 

respectively. 

1. Launch and Mission Risk 

Although the FAA’s regulations 

prohibit debris risk in excess of 30 × 

10¥6, a waiver is warranted in this case 

because the United States Government’s 

experience conducting other space 

missions with risk in excess of 100 × 

10¥6 demonstrates that the risks of this 

mission are consistent with the public 

health and safety, and the safety of 

property. ULA and Lockheed provided 

risk analyses for both launch and 

reentry, respectively, but it was the FAA 

who calculated the total mission risk for 

debris as 165 × 10¥6. That number may 

be broken down as follows: 

—20 × 10¥6 from launch, with 

approximately 10 × 10¥6 attributable 

to local area risk and approximately 

10 × 10¥6 attributable to overflight 

(downrange) risk; 

—143 × 10¥6 from random and offtarget reentry of the DCSS during the 

second DCSS burn; 

—<1 × 10¥6 for reentry of the Orion 

module 

The United States Government has 

repeatedly accepted risk for government 

launches in excess of the FAA’s 30 × 

10¥6 and in excess of 100 × 10¥6, 

without negative consequences for 

safety. For example, the current Ec

requirement for government launches 

from U.S. National Test Ranges is 1 × 

10¥4 (equal to 100 × 10¥6), 

encompassing all risk from debris, 

toxics, and overpressure. See Air Force 

Instruction 91–217, Space Safety and 

Mishap Prevention Program (2010). 

Moreover, the Space Shuttle used a 

debris risk criterion of 200 × 10¥6 for 

launch risk to the public. See NASA’s 

Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle 

Return to Flight and Beyond, Vol. 1 

Final Edition, at 2–39 (May 15, 2007). 

And, in 2005, the U.S. Air Force 

approved a government launch of a 

Titan where the risk ranged from 145 to 

317 × 10¥6. Dept. of the Air Force 

Memorandum, Overflight Risk 

Exceedance Waiver for Titan IV B–30 

Mission (Apr. 4, 2005). 

Additionally, in 2012, the FAA 

granted a waiver to SpaceX under 

similar circumstances. Waiver of 

Acceptable Risk Restriction for Launch 

and Reentry, Notice of Waiver, 77 FR 

24556 (Apr. 24, 2012). SpaceX’s 2012 

mission was also NASA-sponsored; 

involved a test of the company’s reentry 

vehicle, the Dragon module; and posed 

an estimated total mission risk from 

debris of between 98 and 121 × 10¥6. Id. 

ULA’s launch risk of 163 × 10¥6 is 

less than the risk approved for these 

government systems. Accordingly, 

granting a waiver of §§ 417.107(b)(1) 

and 431.35(b)(1)(i) in this case does not 

jeopardize the public health and safety, 

or the safety of property. 

2. Safety of Autonomous Reentry 

Waiver 

Because Orion’s reentry system allows 

Lockheed to identify anomalies or other 

non-compliant conditions, a waiver 

allowing autonomous reentry in this 

instance would not jeopardize the 

public health and safety, or the safety of 

property. In 1999, in the preamble to the 

reentry-rule NPRM, the FAA expressed 

concern that autonomous reentry was 

not adequately safe. Commercial Space 

Transportation Reusable Launch 

Vehicle and Reentry Licensing 

Regulations, Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking, 64 FR 19626, 19645 (Apr. 

21, 1999). The FAA was specifically 

concerned about the possibility that 

anomalies or other non-compliant 

conditions occurring in then-existing 

technology would not be identified 

prior to an autonomous reentry 

initiation. Id. By requiring the capability 

for human intervention, however, the 

FAA did not intend to permanently 

foreclose the use of autonomous systems 

or autonomous decision-making. In fact, 

the agency expressly acknowledged that 

safer autonomous systems were feasible, 

and that greater levels of confidence in 

a particular system could cause the 

agency to change its position. 

Commercial Space Transportation 

Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry 

Licensing Regulations, Final Rule, 65 FR 

56618, 56641 (Sept. 19, 2000). Despite 

its concerns, the FAA retained the 

authority to waive the autonomous 

reentry restriction. Id. Lockheed’s 

proposed approach to reentry addresses 

the concerns underlying the FAA’s 

regulatory requirements. Under 

Lockheed’s proposed plan, Lockheed 

would use two means of detecting 

anomalies and non-compliant 

conditions. Lockheed’s Flight Control 

Team can monitor and control the 

module, and the Orion module monitors 

itself real-time. 

ULA’s proven DCSS system propels 

the module to a targeted reentry location 

over 200 miles into the Pacific Ocean. 

In a nominal reentry, the Orion module 

waits for the DCSS to signal that the 

module is at its pre-determined time for 

separation, the DCSS thrusters are 

inhibited, and the vehicle is operating 

within pre-determined state vector rate 

requirements. The Orion then 

autonomously commands its separation 

from the DCSS and activates the 

module’s propulsion system. Each string 

of Orion thrusters is capable of 

providing closed-loop attitude control 

in the pitch, yaw, and roll axes, as well 

as translational delta-velocity. Given the 

trajectory and landing location chosen 

for the mission, however, combined 

with the limited thrust performance 

capability of the module’s individual 

thrusters and limited total onboard 

propellant, the module does not have 

the propulsive capability to move its 

impact point over land following DCSS 

separation. 

While the module is in flight, 

Lockheed’s Flight Control Team is 

capable of receiving and monitoring 

real-time vehicle telemetry 

transmissions. By doing so, the team 

will be able to detect anomalies and 

non-compliant conditions. In the event 

the Flight Control Team detects an offnominal condition, the team can send 

several pre-approved contingency 

commands to the module to mitigate 

loss of vehicle and protect public safety. 

In the event a communications failure 

causes the Flight Control Team to lose 

direct insight into the raw health-andstatus telemetry data, the module has 

the ability to autonomously guide itself 

to its pre-determined landing site. This 

autonomous capability allows the 

module to safely reenter, descend, land, 

and safe itself post-splashdown—even 

after a communications failure with the 

ground. 

In addition to the systems already 

described, the Orion module itself has 

the ability to identify anomalies or other 

non-compliant conditions. Orion has 

the ability to monitor its safety-critical 

systems in real-time. It has a spacegrade vehicle management computer 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 46 / Monday, March 10, 2014 / Notices 13377 

with redundant flight control modules. 

It has the ability to check the validity of 

its data by reviewing—using built-in 

channel selection criteria—data 

received from redundant sensors. The 

redundant sensors include redundant 

GPS receiver antennas and redundant, 

space-grade inertial measurement units. 

Also playing an instrumental role in 

the FAA’s ability to grant a waiver is the 

fact that Orion is equipped with a 

number of mitigating features. First, 

Orion has a ‘‘cold-restart’’ capability 

and self-checking pair processors to 

maintain proper vehicle commanding 

after any unexpected power cycle, 

radiation upset, or other off-nominal 

event that would require an automatic 

restart of the module’s computing 

system. Also, Orion’s computing system 

has fail-silent functionality to prevent 

off-nominal corrupted or inadvertent 

vehicle commanding. Finally, Orion has 

two independent and redundant 

propulsion strings, which ensure that 

even if one fails the propulsion system 

will still perform the planned reentry. 

C. Public Interest 

The FAA looks to its enabling statute 

to determine how Congress has defined 

the public interest. The FAA, through 

AST, implements the agency’s statutory 

mandate to encourage the development 

of commercial space capabilities and the 

continuous improvement of the safety of 

launch vehicles designed to carry 

passengers. 51 U.S.C. 50901(b). 

ULA and Lockheed’s petitions to 

waive the FAA’s risk and reentry 

restrictions are consistent with the 

public interest because the test flight is 

necessary to the development of 

NASA’s human-missions capability 

beyond Earth orbit. 

D. National Security and Foreign Policy 

Interests 

The FAA has not identified any 

national security or foreign policy 

implications associated with granting 

this waiver. 

Summary and Conclusion 

The FAA determines that the waivers 

associated with this mission will not 

jeopardize public health and safety or 

safety of property. In addition, the 

waivers are in the public interest 

because they accomplish the goals of 

Chapter 509 and do not unduly increase 

risk to the public. Finally, they will not 

jeopardize national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States. 

The FAA therefore waives the 

requirements of 14 CFR 417.107(b)(1) 

and 431.35(b)(1)(i) for launch and 

mission risk, respectively, and of 14 

CFR 431.43(e) for a commanded reentry. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 28, 

2014. 

Kenneth Wong, 

Licensing and Evaluation Division Manager. 

[FR Doc. 2014–05136 Filed 3–7–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. FMCSA–2013–0312] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities; Revision of a CurrentlyApproved Information Collection 

Request: Training Certification for 

Drivers of Longer Combination 

Vehicles 

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

FMCSA announces its plan to submit 

the Information Collection Request (ICR) 

described below to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

approval and invites public comment. 

FMCSA requests approval to revise the 

ICR entitled ‘‘Training Certification for 

Drivers of Longer Combination Vehicles 

(LCVs),’’ due to a change in the 

estimated number of annual responses. 

This ICR relates to Agency requirements 

for driver certification to operate LCVs 

that motor carriers must satisfy before 

permitting their drivers to operate LCVs. 

Motor carriers, upon inquiry by 

authorized Federal, State or local 

officials, must produce an LCV drivertraining certificate for each of their LCV 

drivers. 

DATES: Please send your comments by 

April 9, 2014. OMB must receive your 

comments by this date in order to act on 

the ICR. 

ADDRESSES: All comments should 

reference Federal Docket Management 

System (FDMS) Docket Number 

FMCSA–2013–0312. Interested persons 

are invited to submit written comments 

on the proposed information collection 

to the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs, Office of 

Management and Budget. Comments 

should be addressed to the attention of 

the Desk Officer, Department of 

Transportation/Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration, and sent via 

electronic mail to oira_submission@

omb.eop.gov, or faxed to (202) 395– 

6974, or mailed to the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget, 

Docket Library, Room 10102, 725 17th 

Street NW., ., Washington, DC 20503. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Thomas Yager, Chief, Driver and Carrier 

Operations Division, Department of 

Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration, West Building 

6th Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: 

202–366–4325; email tom.yager@

dot.gov. Office hours are from 9 a.m. to 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal Holidays. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Title: Training Certification for 

Drivers of LCVs. 

OMB Control Number: 2126–0026. 

Type of Request: Revision of a 

currently-approved information 

collection. 

Respondents: Drivers who complete 

LCV training each year, current LCV 

drivers who submit their LCV DriverTraining Certificate to prospective 

employers, and employers (motor 

carriers) that receive and maintain 

copies of their drivers’ LCV DriverTraining Certificates. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

50,880, consisting of 940 newly certified 

LCV drivers plus 24,500 currently 

certified LCV drivers plus 25,440 motor 

carriers employing LCV drivers. 

Estimated Time per Response: 10 

minutes for preparation of LCV DriverTraining Certificates for drivers who 

successfully complete the LCV training, 

and 10 minutes for activities associated 

with the LCV Driver-Training Certificate 

during the hiring process. 

Expiration Date: March 31, 2014. 

Frequency of Response: On occasion. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden: 

4,240 hours. The total number of drivers 

who will be subjected to these 

requirements each year is 25,440, 

consisting of 940 newly certified LCV 

drivers, and 24,500 currently certified 

LCV drivers obtaining new employment. 

The total annual information collection 

burden is approximately 4,240 hours, 

consisting of 157 hours for preparation 

of LCV Driver-Training Certificates [940 

drivers successfully completing LCV 

driver training × 10 minutes ÷ 60 

minutes/hour] and 4,083 hours for 

requirements related to the hiring of 

LCV drivers [24,500 LCV drivers 

obtaining new employment × 10 

minutes ÷ 60 minutes/hour]. 

Background: An LCV is any 

combination of a truck-tractor and two 

or more semi-trailers or trailers that 

operates on the National System of 

Interstate and Defense Highways 

(according to 23 CFR 658.5) and has a 

gross vehicle weight greater than 80,000 

pounds. To enhance the safety of LCV 


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