* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. Proc. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge , United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by design ation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 9/11/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

EMILY J. BOLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5007 (D.C. No. 94-C-1035-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before TACHA, ALDISERT, *** and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.1 The parties consented to disposition of the case bythe magistrate judge,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Our jurisdictio n is therefore secured by § 636(c)(3), in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1291. -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Emily J. Bolin appeals from an order of t he magistrate judge 1 affirming the Secretary’s denial of supplemental se curity income benefits. We carefully examine the record to determine whether t he Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and adheres to ap plicable legal standards. Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). As with anyother appeal, however, the scope of our review is limitedto the issues properly preserved and presented by the appellant. See Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389-90 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1994); Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). Guided by these principles, we affirm for the reasons stated below. Plaintiff raises several objections to the ALJ’s de cision. However, only two of these were preserved in district court: (1) the ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiff’s complaints of chest pain, and (2) the A LJ erred in finding plaintiff capable of performing medium work. Compare Appellant’s Br. at 15-16 with-3-

“Plaintiff’s Memorandum Brief” (attached to Appellant’s Br.) at 3-5 andR. Vol. I at 7-8 (recitation of issues by magistrate judge). All other matters are, therefore, deemed waived. Crow , 40 F.3d at 324. Moreover, since the ALJ also rel ied on plaintiff’s ability to perform a number of light an d sedentary jobs identified by the vocational expert, see R. Vol. II at 19, 20, any error relating only to m edium work would not undermine the ALJ’s disposition. Se e Murrell , 43 F.3d at 1389-90 (affirmance appropriate where claimant chal lenges only one of alternative grounds supporting ALJ’s decision). Co nsequently, we are concerned here solely with the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’ s chest pain. All of the medical documentation cited in support o f plaintiff’s allegation of chest pain derives from Dr. Carver, her treating physician. Dr. Carver initially diagnosed mild congestive heart failure with functi onally disabling angina based on a preliminary finding of 70% mid-LAD aortic sten osis, see R. Vol. II at 150-58, 206-07, which led him to specify the follow ing plan: “Repeat selected coronary angiograms [to confirm the degree of steno sis, seen only in a single view] and if anatomically indicated will consider p ercutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty to her mid-LAD.” Id. at 207. As the ALJ noted, the confirming angiograms revealed only a 20-30% mid-LA D stenosis, leading Dr. Carver to revise his initial impression, now findin g only “Insignificant Coronary Disease” and ascribing plaintiff’s subjective compl aints to “[c]hest pain of-4-

uncertain etiology.” Id. at 200. A year later, Dr. Dahlmann examined plain tiff and, consistent with Dr. Carver’s final diagnosis, concluded she “does not appear to have any medical abnormality that would preclude her participation in the labor force . . . .” Id. at 177. Furthermore, plaintiff has stated that he r sporadic pain is not exertional and is controlled by medication, to which she has not attributed any side effects. See id. at 51-52; see also id. at 174-75, 178 (chest pain is “not exertional” and “stops completely” 15-20 minutes af ter medication). Under these circumstances, the ALJ did not err in concluding th at plaintiff’s chest pain would impose no significant limitation on her work activi ties. Cf. Dixon v. Heckler , 811 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987)(because medical cond itions are “well-controlled . . . without negative side effects,” “we cannot re verse the ALJ’s finding that [plaintiff] was capable of performing a full range of light work, not significantly compromised by her nonexertional limitations”). The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge