alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 218 (Thursday, November 9, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67348-67349]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28833]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-583-816]


Notice of Postponement of Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review: Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings 
From Taiwan

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of postponement of final results of antidumping duty 
administrative review.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 9, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alex Villanueva or James Doyle, Office 
IX, DAS Group III, Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-6412 
and (202) 482-0159, respectively.

Postponement of Preliminary Determination

    The Department of Commerce (``the Department'') is postponing the 
final results in the antidumping duty administrative review of Certain 
Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings (``SSBWPF'') from Taiwan. The 
deadline for issuing the final results in this administrative review is 
now December 15, 2000.
    On July 29, 1999, the Department initiated this administrative 
review. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Administrative Reviews and Requests for Revocation in Part, 64 FR 41075 
(July 29, 1999). The date for issuing the final results of the review 
was November 3, 2000. In order to provide interested parties an 
opportunity to comment on the issue of reimbursement, which arose late 
in the proceeding, we are extending the time limit for the final 
results of the administrative review of SSBWPF from Taiwan by 42 days, 
in accordance with section 751(a)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended. See November 3, 2000 memorandum from Edward Yang to Joseph 
Spetrini: Extension of Time Limit for the Administrative Review of 
Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from Taiwan.
    The date for issuing the final results is moved from November 3, 
2000 to December 15, 2000.


[[Page 67349]]


    Dated: November 3, 2000.
Edward C. Yang,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, AD/CVD Enforcement Group III.
[FR Doc. 00-28833 Filed 11-8-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
#### ELLIOTT v. STATE.

No. 25291.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 31, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1951.

*840Leonard R. Winborn, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Crim. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Charles S. Potts, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Dallas, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Commissioner.

Having again examined the record in accordance with appellant’s request, we now note that the statement of facts does not bear the approval of the trial judge, as required under the statute applicable at the time of its filing in the trial court. We further observe that the statement of facts does not appear to have been agreed to by the attorney representing the State.

The statement of facts having been taken into account in the former opinions herein, such former opinions are now withdrawn.

The conviction is for statutory rape with punishment assessed by a jury at 10 years in the penitentiary.

There are several bills of exception in the record, but they cannot be appraised in the absence of a statement of facts.

The bills relating to the admittedly improper argument of the special prosecutor each show that the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the complained of remarks. And it is' not contended that the argument violated any constitutional or statutory provision.

Whether or not the argument was obviously hurtful and prejudicial and therefore so vicious as to warrant reversal, notwithstanding the trial judge’s instructions to disregard, must be determined in the light of the facts of the case and the punishment assessed by the jury.

Being without authority to consider the statement of facts, it follows that we are in no position to find that the argument was prejudicial, or that it resulted in harm to appellant.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
```

[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 213 (Thursday, November 2, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 65899]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28262]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Notice of Meeting

AGENCY: United States Institute of Peace.
    Date/Time: Thursday, November 16, 2000, 9 a.m.-5:30 p.m.
    Location: 1200 17th Street, NW, Suite 200--Conference Room, 
Washington, DC 20036.
    Status: Open Session--Portions may be closed pursuant to Subsection 
(c) of Section 552(b) of Title 5, United States Code, as provided in 
subsection 1706(h)(3) of the United States Institute of Peace Act, 
Public Law 98-525.
    Agenda: November 2000 Board Meeting; Approval of Minutes of the 
Ninety-Sixth Meeting (September 14, 2000) of the Board of Directors; 
Chairman's Report; President's Report; Committee Reports; Other General 
Issues.
    Contact: Dr. Sheryl Brown, Director, Office of Communications, 
Telephone: (202) 457-1700.

    Dated: October 30, 2000.
Charles E. Nelson,
Vice President for Management and Finance, United States Institute of 
Peace.
[FR Doc. 00-28262 Filed 10-31-00; 1:36 pm]
BILLING CODE 6820-AR-M
```
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 217 (Wednesday, November 8, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 67020]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28655]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Notice of Permits Issues Under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 
1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION:  Notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation of 
1978, Public Law 95-541.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish 
notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. 
This is the required notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nadene G. Kennedy, Permit Office, 
Office of Polar Programs, Rm. 755, National Science Foundation, 4201 
Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  On September 27, 2000, the National Science 
Foundation published notice in the Federal Register of a permit 
application received. The permit was issued on October 27, 2000 to: 
Robert A. Blanchette, Permit No. 2001-015.

Nadene G. Kennedy,
Permit Officer.
[FR Doc. 00-28655 Filed 11-7-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-M
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

RECEE MAE REED, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:22-CV-989-E-BK

§

R. REED, ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge made Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendation 

in this case. Objections were filed. The District Court reviewed de novo those portions of the 

proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which objection was made, and reviewed 

the remaining proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. Finding no 

error, the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States 

Magistrate Judge.

SIGNED: July 25, 2022.

Case 3:22-cv-00989-E-BK Document 9 Filed 07/25/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 42
#### HINDLEY v. STATE.

No. 22337.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 16, 1942.

Aubrey Davee, of Brady, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

For unlawfully selling a pint of whisky in a dry area appellant was assessed a fine of $200.

There are no bills of exception accompanying the record. The uncontradicted testimony shows the sale of the whisky as alleged in the information.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

AMERICAN PROPERTY

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-325-P

NNF, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Second Motion to Quash (ECF No. 

87). Having considered the filings, the Court hereby REFERS the

Motion and related filings to the same to United States Magistrate 

Judge Hal R. Ray, Jr. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). All papers filed hereafter 

referring to the Motion shall include the following notation under the 

case-number: “(Relates to the Second Motion to Quash Referred to 

Magistrate Judge Ray)”. 

That said, the Court is deeply disturbed by the substance and 

number of discovery motions filed in this case. Such conduct appears to 

conflict with the Court’s scheduling order, which requires Counsel to 

“abide by the standards of litigation conduct for attorneys appearing in 

civil actions in the Northern District of Texas, as outlined in Dondi 

Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 

1988) (en banc).” ECF No. 28. Specifically, Dondi requires that “[a] 

lawyer should not use any form of discovery, or the scheduling of 

discovery, as a means of harassing opposing counsel or counsel’s client.” 

Id. at 288. But “the spirit of Dondi is completely absent from this latest 

round of discovery motions.” See Ramirez v. Abreo, No. 5:09-CV-189-C, 

2010 WL 11565387, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2010). 

The Court thus ORDERS that all Counsel of record for all Parties 

shall each read: (1) Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan 

Assoc., 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988); (2) the Texas Lawyer’s Creed; 

Case 4:22-cv-00325-P Document 92 Filed 01/26/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1758
2

and (3) the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. It is further 

ORDERED that all Counsel of record for all Parties shall each certify 

to the Court via a sworn affidavit filed by 5:00 p.m. on January 30, 

2023, that they have read, understand, and will comply with these three

documents throughout the remainder of this litigation. 

Failure to comply with this Order shall result in monetary sanctions 

being imposed against individual Counsel, the Parties, or both. The 

Court, however, is “confident that, with a renewed sense of the 

professional courtesy expected by the Court, counsel ‘should have little 

difficulty conducting themselves as members of a learned profession 

whose unswerving duty is to the public they serve and to the system of 

justice in which they practice.’” See Ramirez, 2010 WL 11565387, at *1

(quoting Dondi Properties Corp., 121 F.R.D. at 288).

SO ORDERED on this 26th day of January 2023.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:22-cv-00325-P Document 92 Filed 01/26/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 1759
Case 6:22-cr-00010-H-BU Document 25 Filed 11/16/22 Page 1 of 3 PageID 43
Case 6:22-cr-00010-H-BU Document 25 Filed 11/16/22 Page 2 of 3 PageID 44
Case 6:22-cr-00010-H-BU Document 25 Filed 11/16/22 Page 3 of 3 PageID 45
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-2001
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           6,476,433
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,428,219
<ALLOWANCES>                                        10,000
<INVENTORY>                                     26,184,699
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                38,146,244
<PP&E>                                          17,803,618
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,155,043
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  53,222,014
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,356,878
<BONDS>                                          6,978,863
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        15,076,947
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,800,776
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    53,222,014
<SALES>                                          8,897,825
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,897,825
<CGS>                                            4,032,631
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,217,459
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 257,730
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,534,640
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,020,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,514,640
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,514,640
<EPS-BASIC>                                           0.31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0.30



</TABLE>
#### CASTILLEJA v. STATE.

No. 26398.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 13, 1953.

*712Clayton Bray, Sonora, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s' Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The conviction is for murder. Upon a former trial, appellant was convicted for murder with malice, and his punishment assessed at fifty years in the penitentiary, which conviction was reversed and remanded by this Court as shown by our. opinion in Castilleja v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 249 S.W.2d 64.

Upon the present trial, appellant was again convicted of murder with malice and his punishment assessed at twenty-five years in the penitentiary.

The facts set out in the former opinion are substantially the same as those upon the trial of this case. However, upon this trial, neither the witness Jesus Gonzales nor the appellant testified.

Appellant contends that the court erred in failing to charge the jury upon the law of circumstantial evidence, to which he timely obj ected and excepted.

The sheriff testified that he first saw appellant on the night of August 19, 1952, when appellant walked around a corner with blood all over the front of his shirt and a gun in his hand, and-that appellant said that he had killed Mike Gonzales; the sheriff further testified that appellant told him where to look for the body, and that he found the body where he (appellant) said it would be; that he was the first person to the body, and there was a bullet hole in the left breast.

There being direct evidence in the record that appellant killed the deceased, no error is shown by the failure to charge, the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence. Crum v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 614, 91 S-W-2d 353; Easterwood v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 9, 101 S.W.2d 576.

Appellant further contends that the court erred in failing to submit to the jury the issue of the suspension of his sentence.

-There was no evidence offered showing that the defendant had never before been convicted of a felony in this or in any other state. In the absence of such proof, the court did not err in failing to submit the issue of suspension of sentence to the jury. Art. 776, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; 12 Texjur. 745.

Appellant next complains because the court failed to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense.

There was no testimony by any witness to the actual shooting; the appellant did not testify; the sheriff testified that appellant came to him and said he had killed Mike Gonzales and told him where he could find the body. No explanation of the' killing was offered.

In the absence of evidence raising the issue of self-defense, no error is shown in failing to instruct the jury thereon.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
#### TEXAS-CANADIAN OIL CORPORATION et al. v. SHELL OIL CO., Inc.

No. 9363.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

March 10, 1943.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 1943.

Wheeler & Wheeler, of Austin, for appellant Texas-Canadian Oil Corporation.

Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., James D. Smullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lloyd Armstrong, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ed Roy Simmons, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant Railroad Commission.

R. H. Whilden, of Houston, and Dan Moody, and J. B. Robertson, both of Austin, for appellee.

McClendon, chief justice.

Rule 37 case. The appeal is by the per-mittee and the Railroad Commission from a final judgment in a trial to jury cancel-ling a permit to drill well No. 3 upon a 3-acre lease in the East Texas oil field, and enjoining production thereunder. The permit was granted “to prevent confiscation of property and to prevent physical waste.”

At the close of plaintiff’s (appellee’s) testimony defendants (appellants) moved for an instructed verdict. Upon its overruling they announced they desired to present no evidence, “whereupon,” the judgment recites, “it appearing to the court that the law and the facts are with the plaintiff, and the evidence did not present any issue for decision by the jury, it was discharged and the court announced that judgment would be rendered for plaintiff.” As stated at the outset, this was done. The sole question which the appeal presents is whether the evidence conclusively negatived the existence of substantial evidence supporting either the prevention of waste or prevention of confiscation of property theories, thus rebutting the prima facie presumption of validity of the permit.

But two witnesses (those of appellee) testified. One of these was a surveyor who showed the relative location of the two wells on the lease, and of those upon the surrounding territory covering the eight times area. The other witness was a petroleum engineer of appellee, who testified as to his familiarity with conditions in this area, and various factors affecting the waste and confiscation theories. His testimony was unequivocal that from these factors the well was not essential to prevent either waste or confiscation of property. This witness was not cross examined by either the permittee or the Commission. Their contention, and only contention, is that the witness did not specifically detail various factual matters which might affect the issues of waste and confiscation, and therefore the prima facie presumption of *784validity of the permit was not overcome. We overrule this contention. The evidence was clearly sufficient to support the judgment. The matters testified to and the conclusions drawn therefrom constituted information as well within the knowledge of permittee and the Commission as that of appellee. The factual elements upon which the permit was based were matters which appellants were bound to have known. Their failure to offer any disparaging evidence, whether original or by way of cross examination, left the testimony of this witness unchallenged, and it therefore stands as conclusive proof in support of the judgment.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
|                                                                                                                       
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|View History: Annual Download Data (XLS File)                                                                         
|View History: Annual                                                                                                   
|View History: Annual                                                                                                   
|View History:                                                                                                          
|                                                                                                                       
|U.S. Refinery Distillate Fuel Oil Greater than 500 ppm Sulfur Shell Storage Capacity as of January 1 (Thousand Barrels)
|                                                                                                                       
|                                                                                                                       
|U.S. Refinery Distillate Fuel Oil Greater than 500 ppm Sulfur Shell Storage Capacity as of January 1 (Thousand Barrels)
|                                                                                                                       

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2000's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        | 30,429 | 28,398 | 23,909 | 19,442 | 17,208 | 16,765
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 16,847 | --     | --     | --     | --     | --     | --     | --     | --     | --    
|2020's                                                                                                                            | --     | --     | --     | --     | --     |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 6/14/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: June 2025
Exhibit 99.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of TELEFÓNICA
HOLDING DE ARGENTINA S.A. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2002, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, José María Alvarez
Pallete López, Chairman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (i) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|    | 
|--- | 
|By: | 
|    | 
|    | 



June
27, 2003