UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00297-O

ORDER

Before the Court is (1) Non-Party Jane Roe’s Motion to Quash, and Alternatively, for 

Protective Order (Mot. to Quash, ECF No. 66), filed August 3, 2022, (2) Texas Christian 

University’s Response and Brief to Non-Party Jane Roe’s Motion to Quash (Def.’s Resp., ECF 

No. 78), (3) John Doe’s Response to Jane Roe’s Motion to Quash (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 79), and 

(4) Non-Party Jane Roe’s Reply in Support of Motion to Quash (Reply, ECF No. 81). On 

September 14, 2022, the Court issued an interim Order regarding Roe’s motion (Interim Order, 

ECF No. 84), relieving Roe of her obligation to comply with the subpoena until the Court could 

further consider the motion on the merits.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2022, non-party to this litigation, Jane Roe, filed a Motion to Quash Plaintiff 

John Doe’s Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action, issued on July 19, 2022 

(Subpoena, ECF No. 67 at 2–7). Roe’s earlier reports of sexual assault by Plaintiff John Doe 

prompted Defendant TCU’s Title IX disciplinary proceedings against him and, in turn, gave rise 

to this suit. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Doe’s subpoena commands Roe to appear for deposition and 

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to produce an array of documents and electronically stored information1(Subpoena at 7).

The parties disagree about (1) the importance of Roe’s testimony to Doe’s claims and (2) 

the burden a deposition might impose on her. They have the same fundamental disagreements with 

respect to Roe’s production of requested documents. Unless Plaintiff can show particular need for 

the information sought, TCU supports Roe’s motion to quash because TCU has no reason to doubt 

1 The subpoena seeks information compiled from a two-year period including: 

1. Each communication between Roe and Doe, including (without limitation), all 

screenshots and archives of Snapchats and text messages. 

2. Each communication sent or received by Roe that mentions Doe, the Allegations, and/or 

the Proceedings. The scope of this request includes social media posts by Roe, and/or 

communications between Roe and TCU, Roe’s family, four named individuals and/or any 

law enforcement personnel (including police reports or complaints filed). 

3. Each communication sent or received by any of Roe’s lawyers, to or from a person other 

than Roe that mentions Doe, the Allegations, and/or any of the Proceedings. 

4. Each TikTok video posted by Roe that refers (directly or indirectly) to Doe. The scope of 

this request includes deleted TikTok videos. 

5. Communications between Roe and any person regarding a named individual.

6. Each document evidencing questions, notes or scripts prepared for or by a named 

individual to testify at the Panel Hearing.

7. Each document evidencing Snapchat conversations or photos between Roe and Doe. 

8. Each photograph and/or video that depicts Doe or records Doe’s voice. 

9. Each audio and video recording made of a conversation during which the Allegations, 

Doe or the Proceedings are mentioned. 

10. Each communication between TCU and Roe or Roe’s family or Roe’s lawyers that 

reference any text message between a named individual and Roe.

11. All no-contact orders signed by Roe with respect to Doe.

12. Journal entries, diaries or any form of notes made by Roe about Doe, the Allegations, 

and/or the Proceedings. 

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Roe’s claim that a deposition would impose an undue burden (Def.’s Resp. at 2).

2 TCU did not 

express a position on the document production request. 

A. Deposition

Roe argues that requiring her to appear for an in-person deposition would produce only 

irrelevant, duplicative testimony (Mot. to Quash at 7–9), given that she has already testified 

exhaustively on the record produced in the Title IX disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 8. She argues 

that any information she possesses has no bearing on any of Doe’s claims—erroneous

outcome, selective enforcement, or gender bias (id. at 7–9; Reply at 3–5)—and that the Court’s 

consideration should be confined to the disciplinary record (Mot. to Quash at 9; Reply at 2). 

Second, Roe claims that compelling her testimony would impose an undue burden in the form of 

“significant emotional harm and trauma” by forcing her to relive the experiences giving rise 

to her sexual assault allegations. Id. at 9–11. 

Doe argues that it is essential to depose Roe—who is designated as a key witness by both 

parties to the suit—because she has personal knowledge and information “relevant to the fairness 

and thoroughness of the process from its inception to its end,” including information about 

the myriad interviews, meetings, and investigation that TCU conducted prior to and during 

the proceedings to which she was a party or witness; and information shedding light on her 

own credibility, including her motives for and manner of reporting (Pl.’s Resp. at 2–5). Doe also 

claims that Roe’s evidence that compelling her testimony would impose an undue burden is 

insufficient and that she must therefore be deposed. Id. at 9–12. Should the Court uphold the 

subpoena, Roe requests strict limitations on deposition (Mot. to Quash at 19–22), which Plaintiff 

partially accepts (Pl.’s Resp. at 15). 

2 Notably, TCU does not waive its right to have Roe testify at trial (Def.’s Resp. at 2)—a 

requirement that might exact a similar toll as the deposition TCU would quash. 

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B. Production of Documents

Roe argues that each document request is either irrelevant, duplicative, or—if relevant—is 

either obtainable from another source (TCU) or that any usefulness is outweighed by the burden 

production imposes (Mot. to Quash at 12–19). If the Court disagrees, Roe requests cost-shifting in 

light of her projections that compliance costs would exceed $380,000. Id. at 19–22. Defendant

counters that Roe has offered only “boilerplate” objections lacking adequate evidentiary support

and claims the documents are not available from TCU because “almost all” are FERPA-protected 

(Pl.’s Resp. at 12–15). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter

that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, 

considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, . . . the parties’ relative access to 

relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, 

and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). And as the rule clearly states: “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery

need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Even if the discovery request meets this standard, however, Rule 45 dictates that a court 

“must quash or modify” a subpoena that “subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

45(3)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). The party opposing the subpoena has the burden of proving that 

compliance would be “unreasonable and oppressive,” a fact-specific determination for which 

courts consider several items: (1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party 

for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the 

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request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the 

burden imposed. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (cleaned 

up) (applying the rule to subpoenas duces tecum). The party opposing the subpoena may use 

affidavits or other evidence to demonstrate the unreasonable or oppressive nature of the burden 

imposed. HCAPS Conroe Affiliation Inc. v. Angelica Textile Servs. Inc., No. 3:15-MC-60-N-BN, 

2015 WL 3867923, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2015) (emphasis added). 

When the subpoena applies to a nonparty, as is the case here, courts “must be sensitive to 

the nonparty’s compliance costs.” Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2022). And when 

a court orders a nonparty to comply with a subpoena despite objection, the court must shift costs 

to protect the nonparty, provided those costs are significant. Id. at 489, 490 n.8 (finding a wellsupported estimate of $60,000 in compliance costs was of disproportionate value compared to any 

information compliance would produce regarding the subpoenaed party’s credibility). 

As a general matter, “modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it outright.” 

Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818. This is in keeping with the general rule that discovery rules are to be 

broadly and liberally construed. Aderholt v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 7:15-CV-00162, 2016 WL 

11782267, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2016). And when imposing limitations on discovery, courts

have broad discretion to craft appropriate protective orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Harris v. 

Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985). 

III. ANALYSIS

The Court has considered the parties’ arguments,

3

including their fundamental 

3 Having set out and applied the legal standards above, which dictate the outcome of this motion, 

the Court need not address the parties’ other arguments such as: the relative persuasive weight of 

certain authorities; the dispute over Fed. R. Evid. 702’s applicability to Ms. Garrett’s opinion 

regarding the burden a deposition would impose on Roe; or the sufficiency of Roe’s evidence in 

support of her costs of compliance estimate, among others. 

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disagreement about whether Doe is entitled to discover evidence beyond just that “on the record 

before the disciplinary tribunal.” See Mot. to Quash at 9; Pl.’s Resp. at 6; Reply at 2. Based on a 

straightforward application of Rule 26, the Court agrees that Doe’s discovery is not so limited and

finds that the information Doe seeks—via deposition and document requests—is relevant and, with 

some modification, can be sought without imposing an undue burden on Roe.

a. Appearance for In-Person Deposition

The Court finds that Doe’s need to discover information about interviews, meetings with 

TCU officials, the investigation, the panel hearing, and the appeal in which she participated

directly or as a witness are relevant to Doe’s claims as it may shed light on both the accuracy of 

the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding (erroneous outcome) and TCU’s potentially disparate 

treatment of Roe (a female) and Doe (a male) throughout the investigation and proceedings (gender 

bias; selective enforcement).4

Information reflecting on Roe’s credibility—including potential 

motives to lie or to report, contradictory statements, and conversations with others throughout the 

process—is similarly relevant to Doe’s claim of erroneous outcome. 

Having considered her evidence, the Court recognizes that Roe’s deposition will 

necessarily impose some hardship on her given the sensitive nature of the case. However, with the 

following limitations, the Court finds that allowing the deposition would not impose an undue

burden and that it is justified in light of Doe’s need to obtain the information. In keeping with its 

broad discretion to craft appropriate protective remedies, the Court ORDERS that any

deposition of Roe will be subject to the following conditions: 

4 All Doe must allege are facts that, if true, raise a plausible inference of sex discrimination. 

Overdam v. Texas A&M Univ., 43 F.4th 522, 526–28 (5th Cir. 2022) (applying the Title IX 

pleading standard, consistent with Purdue and Yusuf (erroneous outcome, selective enforcement, 

etc.), requiring the plaintiff to allege facts that, “if true, raise a plausible inference that [the 

university] or its administrators discriminated against [him] on the basis of sex).

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1. The single deposition shall occur at a neutral site (as agreed by the parties);5

2. The deposition shall be limited to 4 hours total;6

3. No more than two attorneys may be present for either party (as agreed by the parties);

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4. Roe shall be entitled to have one person present aside from counsel;

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5. Doe may be present in-person but may not communicate with anyone other than his

counsel;

6. Doe may notseek information from Roe regarding her prior sexual history with anyone

other than Doe and is ORDERED to refrain from seeking information for the purpose

of embarrassment, harassment, or other improper means.

b. Production of Documents

Here the Court applies its prior reasoning as to relevance—namely, that much of the 

information Doe seeks may shed light on both the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary 

proceeding (erroneous outcome) and TCU’s potentially disparate treatment of Roe (a female) and 

Doe (a male) throughout the investigation and proceedings (gender bias; selective enforcement), 

and is therefore relevant. And Roe has not offered anything but conclusory objections in protest. 

Likewise, Roe is in exclusive possession of much of the information sought, most of which is 

FERPA-protected. Nor has Roe sufficiently demonstrated that the burden of producing such 

information outweighs its likely benefit. Thus, the Court ORDERS that Doe may compel

disclosure of the requested information except for police reports or complaints filed that Doe may

personally request and obtain.

5 Pl.’s Resp. at 15. 

6 Mot. to Quash at 23. 

7 Pl.’s Resp. at 15. 

8 Mot. to Quash at 23.

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c. Cost Shifting 

Roe estimates that the costs of compliance with the subpoena will exceed $380,000 (Mot. 

to Quash at 19–22). In the event Roe’s costs do become “significant”—a standard that does not 

necessitate meeting even a portion of that total estimate, see Leonard, 38 F.4th at 489, 490 n.8—

the Court will shift costs as necessary. Doe is free to amend his document production requests 

accordingly. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having considered the parties’ briefing materials, for the foregoing reasons, and in light of 

the modifications outlined above, the Court ORDERS that Non-Party Jane Roe’s Motion to Quash 

be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 

SO ORDERED on this 21st day of September, 2022. 

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