NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ERIC CHRISTOPHER SALES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0788

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County

No. S0900CR201300865

The Honorable Ralph E. Hatch, Judge

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCING MINUTE ENTRY 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

___________________________________

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee

The Rigg Law Firm PLLC, Pinetop

By Brett R. Rigg, Shane J. Shumway

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. SALES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Eric Christopher Sales appeals his conviction and sentence for 

sale of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine). He argues that he was 

denied his rights to a speedy trial and to counsel. Sales also contends that 

the trial court erred by denying his motion for change of judge. For the 

following reasons, we affirm Sales’ conviction and sentence, and modify the 

sentencing minute entry to correct a technical error.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In December 2013, the State charged Sales with one count of 

sale of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine), a class 2 felony. At his 

January 9, 2014, arraignment, the trial court released Sales to pretrial

services and appointed counsel. As terms of his pretrial release, the trial 

court ordered that Sales not be allowed to consume alcohol or go to bars, 

and that he had to complete drug testing. The trial court also admonished

Sales and his mother that, because Sales was represented, they could not, 

as they had, constantly contact the court’s judicial assistant to seek 

information about the case. Approximately three months later, Sales’ 

counsel withdrew, citing a conflict of interest because Sales had previously 

filed a complaint against an attorney in counsel’s office. The trial court 

consequently appointed new counsel from the legal defender’s office, after 

which Sales told the court that he was just “trying to get this [speedy trial] 

going.”

¶3 At the subsequent case management conference in April 2014, 

Sales successfully requested a two-week continuance pending disclosures 

relating to a plea offer that the State had made. At that rescheduled 

conference, defense counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest stemming 

from his prior representation of a witness in Sales’ case. The trial court again 

appointed new counsel and reset the conference for May 22, 2014.

¶4 At the May 22 conference, Sales informed the court that he 

had discussed the State’s plea offer with the State and wanted the trial court 
STATE v. SALES

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3

to set a settlement conference and a Donald1 hearing. The trial court granted 

Sales’ request and scheduled the conference for June 24, 2014. At that 

conference, Sales indicated that he was adamant about wanting to go to 

trial, so the court consequently set trial for September 3, 2014. Sales agreed 

to this trial date. One week before trial was to begin, however, the State 

moved to continue. Noting that Sales stated that he did not object to the 

motion, the trial court granted the continuance and subsequently reset trial 

for November 12, 2014. Sales expressly did not object to this trial date. 

¶5 But five days before his trial’s start date, Sales moved to 

dismiss, alleging a violation of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 8. Sales argued that his prior counsel 

continued this matter several times over his objection or without his 

consent. The trial court denied the motion that same day, though, finding 

that the delays Sales referred to were occasioned by or on his behalf.

¶6 The following week, for reasons not discernible from the 

record, the trial court issued an order setting trial for December 3, 2014. Due 

to a health issue affecting the assigned prosecutor, however, the State 

moved on November 25, 2014, to continue for at least 30 days. Sales agreed

to the continuance, and requested a hearing pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 609 to determine whether a witness who was expected to testify 

at trial could be impeached with prior convictions. The trial court granted 

both motions, setting the Rule 609 hearing for January 13, 2015, and trial to 

begin the day after.

¶7 Sales did not attend the January 13 Rule 609 hearing due to 

transportation issues, but waived his presence. Defense counsel informed 

the court that he had a calendar conflict with another case, and after stating 

that Sales did not object, requested a continuance. Accordingly, the court 

reset trial to February 18, 2015. But after two subsequent motions to 

continue by Sales for need of trial preparation and a medical appointment, 

respectively, the trial court reset trial to April 15, 2015.

¶8 Before that trial date arrived, the State twice successfully 

requested a continuance due to the birth of the prosecutor’s child. Sales did 

not object to either continuance, so trial was reset to June 24, 2015. 

Apparently due to calendar conflict, the trial date was once again continued 

to September 16, 2015. Sales agreed to exclude the intervening time from 

June 24 until trial for Rule 8 purposes.

 

1 State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193 (App. 2000). 
STATE v. SALES

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¶9 Five days before trial, Sales requested new counsel. Sales 

informed the trial court that counsel was not “giving me strategy. He don’t 

call me . . . . [W]e ain’t even sit down five or ten minutes to even talk about 

our case.” Sales also stated that his counsel often threatened him, telling 

him, “[Y]ou might as well get your toothbrush . . . because you’re going to 

prison.” In response, defense counsel explained that he was unable to 

communicate with Sales because he did not have a valid telephone number 

for Sales until Sales provided it on his request to change counsel. Counsel 

continued that the most severe breakdown in communication between 

himself and Sales was their disagreement over how the case had been 

managed and the trial documents’ meanings, and stated that it did not 

“blow [his] skirt up” to represent Sales. Based on Sales’ and counsel’s 

statements, the trial court found that Sales did not show good cause for a 

change of counsel and denied his motion. 

¶10 Sales also claimed for the first time that the trial judge was the 

prosecutor on one of his prior convictions, which Sales asserted “would be 

a conflict.” He did not, however, request a change of trial judge. After 

reviewing the files in Sales’ previous cases, the trial judge discovered that 

he was the prosecutor who appeared at a 2001 arraignment of Sales’

codefendants. A different prosecutor appeared at Sales’ arraignment that 

occurred one week earlier. Based on these findings, the trial judge 

determined that no basis existed for recusal. During the hearing, the court 

affirmed with the State and defense counsel that they were prepared to 

proceed the next day as scheduled. Additionally, the court noted that Sales 

and his mother continued to contact the court’s staff, “constantly asking 

things that [staff] is not authorized to talk about.”

¶11 The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Sales of 

the sale of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine). The trial court imposed 

a mitigated term of eight years’ imprisonment, and Sales timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. Right to a Speedy Trial

¶12 Sales first argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

denying his motion to dismiss because the trial court failed to make 

findings of extraordinary circumstances to justify the several continuances. 

We review a trial court’s Rule 8 ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Hunter, 227 Ariz. 542, 543 ¶ 4, 260 P.3d 1107, 1108 (App. 2011). But we 

review issues not raised in the trial court only for fundamental error. See 

State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). To obtain 
STATE v. SALES

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relief under fundamental error review, the defendant has the burden to 

show that error occurred, the error was fundamental, and that he was 

prejudiced thereby. Id. at 567–68 ¶¶ 20–22, 115 P.3d at 607–08. Error is 

fundamental if it goes to the foundation of the defendant’s case, takes away 

a right that is essential to his defense, and is of such magnitude that he could 

not have received a fair trial. Id. at 568 ¶ 24, 115 P.3d at 608. A defendant

must affirmatively prove prejudice; speculation is insufficient to carry this 

burden. State v. Dickinson, 233 Ariz. 527, 531 ¶ 13, 314 P.3d 1282, 1286 

(App. 2013). Because the delays were occasioned by or on Sales’ behalf and 

Sales has failed to establish prejudice, the trial court did not err, much less 

err fundamentally.

¶13 In Arizona, a defendant must be tried within 180 days from 

arraignment. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(2). This time, however, is subject to 

excludable periods, including delays (1) occasioned by or on behalf of the 

defendant and (2) resulting from continuances the trial court granted after 

a finding of extraordinary circumstances or that the continuance is in the 

indispensable interests of justice. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(a), (e); see also Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 8.5. Although the federal and state constitutions also guarantee 

the right to a speedy trial, neither provide a time limit within which a trial 

must be held. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24; see also

State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 578, 863 P.2d 861, 870 (1993).

¶14 Here, the trial court did not err by denying Sales’ motion to 

dismiss. Based on Sales’ January 9, 2014, arraignment date, he should have 

been tried by July 8, 2014, absent intervening events that exclude time from 

the computation of the 180-day limit, including continuances based on 

findings of extraordinary circumstances. The trial court granted both the 

State’s and Sales’ motions for continuances throughout the litigation, which 

were made due to illness, parental leave, need for more trial preparation, 

and calendar conflicts. Although the trial court did not follow the technical 

requirements of Rule 8.5(b) by stating on the record that it found these 

circumstances to be extraordinary, Sales has not shown that the error went 

to the foundation of his case, affected a right essential to his defense, or 

denied him a fair trial. Therefore, the court did not fundamentally err. See 

State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139, 945 P.2d 1260, 1270 (1997) (describing Rule 

8 as a procedural right, not a fundamental one, which cannot be “a shield 

by which the accused may avoid trial and possible punishment by taking 

advantage of loopholes in the law or arithmetic errors”). 

¶15 Sales also asserts that he personally objected to the trial 

continuances. Specifically, he argues his comment about trying to get his 

speedy trial “going” when the court appointed new counsel in April 2014 
STATE v. SALES

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constituted an assertion of his right to a speedy trial. But at all times in this 

case, Sales was represented by counsel. As a represented party, Sales was 

bound by his counsel’s requests for continuances and acquiescence to the 

State’s requests to postpone trial. See State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 515, 658 

P.2d 162, 168 (1982) (noting delays sought by defense counsel bind the client 

and constitute waiver of right to speedy trial even if done without the 

defendant’s consent). Accordingly, we attribute to Sales his counsel’s 

decisions regarding the continuances.

¶16 Sales also does not persuasively argue that the delayed trial 

generally prejudiced him in such a manner that requires reversal on Rule 8 

or constitutional grounds. See Henry, 176 Ariz. at 578–79, 863 P.2d at 870–71

(providing that of the factors considered in determining whether a trial 

delay warrants reversal on constitutional grounds, the length of the delay 

is the least important and prejudice to the defendant is the most significant).

Sales argues, without citation to authority, that he suffered prejudice

because he was subject to the terms and conditions of pretrial services,

including abstinence from alcohol and bars, submitting to drug testing, and 

obeying directives of a pretrial services officer. Sales also complains that he 

“spent two years of his life . . . facing the uncertainty and anxiety that 

accompany being accused of a crime.” Further, Sales argues, somewhat 

confusingly, that he was prejudiced because the confidential informant who 

purchased the methamphetamine from him testified at trial that he could 

not remember whether he videotaped the purchase and was unable to 

identify voices “and what is being said” on the audio recording of the 

purchase.

¶17 We are unaware of authority standing for the proposition that 

the pretrial services Sales received while on release constitute the type of 

prejudice warranting reversal for a violation of speedy trial rights. 

Although we recognize that “uncertainty and anxiety” may be considered 

prejudicial in the context of a speedy trial violation, Doggett v. United States, 

505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992), Sales does not specify the uncertainty and anxiety 

that the delayed trial caused him to suffer. The unsubstantiated uncertainty

and anxiety that he may have experienced as a result of the delay are not 

alone sufficient to warrant dismissal on speedy trial grounds. See State v. 

Soto, 117 Ariz. 345, 348, 572 P.2d 1183, 1186 (1977) (concluding that the 

defendant’s and his family’s anxieties are not sufficiently prejudicial to 

require reversal).

¶18 In any event, the most significant form of prejudice sought to 

be avoided by requiring speedy trials is the harm to a defendant’s ability to 

put on a defense. See Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 140, 945 P.2d at 1271 (noting that, 
STATE v. SALES

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although five years in custody awaiting trial “may have increased 

defendant’s anxiety quotient,” the delay did not prejudice defendant’s 

ability to defend against the charges). Sales’ assertions of prejudice do not 

show that the delays had any deleterious effect on his defense. He does not 

argue that he was unable to fully investigate his case, could not adequately 

prepare for trial or locate evidence or witnesses, lost the opportunity to 

present any evidence or testimony, or otherwise could not present his entire 

defense as intended. See State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 572 ¶ 20, 161 P.3d 

608, 615 (App. 2007). Indeed, delaying the trial arguably benefited Sales, as 

illustrated by his numerous motions to continue—including those filed 

after he moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds—and the confidential 

informant’s inability at trial to remember specifics about the drug 

transaction. Accordingly, the trial delay did not result in sufficient 

prejudice warranting dismissal of Sales’ case on grounds of a Rule 8 or 

constitutional violation.

2. Request to Change Counsel

¶19 Sales argues the trial court erred in denying his request to 

change counsel.

2 Sales complains that he should not have been forced to go 

to trial represented by counsel who “detested” him. We review the trial

court’s decision to deny a request for new counsel for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186 ¶ 27, 119 P.3d 448, 453 (2005). We will 

uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is legally correct for any reason. State v. 

Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984). Because Sales has not 

met his burden of establishing an irreconcilable conflict with his counsel, 

the trial court did not err. 

¶20 A criminal defendant has the right to be represented by 

competent counsel, but is not entitled to either counsel of his choice or to a 

meaningful relationship with his attorney. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186 

¶ 28, 119 P.3d at 453. Ordinarily, only the presence of an “irreconcilable 

conflict or a completely fractured relationship” between trial counsel and 

 

2 In making this argument, Sales refers to a document he attached to 

his opening brief that apparently indicates that “[Defense c]ounsel and the 

State had information prior to trial that [Sales] had been deemed ‘seriously 

mentally ill’ by the State[.]” The State moved to strike the document because 

it was not contained in the record. This Court granted the motion, and Sales 

subsequently requested we take judicial notice of the facts reflected in the 

attachment. A ruling on the request was deferred to this panel. We decline 

to take judicial notice.
STATE v. SALES

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an accused will require the appointment of new counsel. Id. at ¶ 29. To 

establish a colorable claim, a defendant must allege more than personality 

conflicts or disagreements with counsel about trial strategy. Id. at 187 ¶ 30, 

119 P.3d at 454. He must allege sufficient facts to support the belief that an 

irreconcilable difference exists between them that requires the appointment 

of new trial counsel in order to avoid the clear prospect of an unfair trial. 

Id.

¶21 Considered in conjunction with Sales’ complaint about not 

“[getting] strategy,” counsel’s explanation of the conflict he and Sales were 

experiencing demonstrates a difference of opinion regarding the 

evidentiary value of documents Sales apparently wanted to offer at trial. 

Moreover, what Sales characterizes as “threats” we construe as counsel’s 

inartful evaluation of Sales’ prospects at trial.3 The disagreement about 

strategy and counsel’s evaluation of Sales’ case does not indicate a 

completely fractured relationship requiring a change in counsel; indeed, the 

disagreement demonstrates that Sales and counsel were communicating. 

And whatever lack of communication did exist resulted, at least in part, 

from Sales’ failure to provide counsel with a working telephone number. 

More importantly, Sales cites nothing in the record that indicates that his 

relationship with counsel resulted in an unfair trial. In light of Sales’ failure 

to establish an irreconcilable conflict with counsel, the numerous pretrial 

delays—many at Sales’ request—and the timing of the motion to change 

counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sales’ motion.

3. Request for Change of Judge

¶22 Sales argues finally that the trial court erred under Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.1(c) by failing to assign another judge the 

task of addressing his complaint that the trial judge prosecuted Sales’ 

previous case. Sales also argues that the trial was biased against him as 

evidenced by (1) the trial judge’s instructions to Sales (and his mother) to 

not personally address the court and (2) the judge’s statement that further

argument was unnecessary to address Sales’ motion to dismiss. Because 

Sales did not raise these arguments in the trial court, we review for 

 

3 While we do not condone defense counsel’s remarks made in 

response to Sales’ request for change of counsel, the remarks do not 

themselves amount to a complete breakdown of communication. See State 

v. Peralta, 221 Ariz. 359, 361 ¶ 5, 212 P.3d 51, 53 (stating that the evidence 

showing a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable 

difference “must show more than mere animosity causing loss of trust or 

confidence”).
STATE v. SALES

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fundamental error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. The 

trial court did not err here because Rule 10.1(c) did not apply. 

¶23 Within 10 days of discovering grounds for a change of judge 

based on the judge’s purported conflict of interest or prejudice, a party may 

move for a change of judge, verified by affidavit specifically alleging the 

grounds for the change. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.1(a), (b). “Promptly after the 

filing of the motion, the presiding judge shall provide for a hearing on the 

matter before a judge other than the judge challenged.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

10.1(c).

¶24 First, the trial court did not err by not applying Rule 10.1(c)

here because Sales did not move for a change of judge. Sales merely 

informed the trial judge the day before trial that he was the prosecutor in 

one of Sales’ previous cases. Under these circumstances, the trial judge 

properly investigated this assertion to determine the existence of a possible 

conflict of interest. Sales does not challenge the trial judge’s conclusion that 

recusal was unnecessary on this basis. Second, the record also fails to 

support Sales’ assertion that the trial judge was biased against Sales. 

Judicial rulings alone do not support a finding of bias or partiality without 

a showing of extrajudicial comments or facts. Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. 

v. City of Benson, 232 Ariz. 562, 568 ¶ 21, 307 P.3d 989, 995 (App. 2013). Even 

considering the trial judge’s comments throughout the proceedings, 

though, the trial judge did not err by not referring the matter to another 

judge. The record establishes that Sales and his mother not only attempted 

to personally address the court, but they contacted the court’s staff

constantly, seeking information that staff was not authorized to provide.

The court’s admonishment to Sales and his mother to cease engaging in 

such behavior and to instead contact the court only through defense counsel 

does not indicate judicial bias. Similarly, the court’s determination that 

further argument was unnecessary to resolve Sales’ motion to dismiss does

not indicate bias. Accordingly, because the trial court was not required to 

seek a different judge for purposes of considering Sales’ claim that the trial 

judge had a conflict of interest, no error, fundamental or otherwise, 

occurred. 

4. Amendment of Sentencing Minute Entry

¶25 Based on our independent review of the record, we notice that

the sentencing minute entry dated November 3, 2015, incorrectly reflects 

that the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence. The sentencing 

transcript reveals that the trial court specifically imposed a mitigated term 

of eight years’ imprisonment, which is consistent with Arizona law that 
STATE v. SALES

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applies to a first conviction of sale of a dangerous drug

(methamphetamine). See A.R.S. §§ 13–3407(A)(7), (E). Pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 13–4036, we amend the sentencing minute entry to reflect that the 

imposed sentence is mitigated, not aggravated. See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 

214, 216, 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992) (providing that when the oral 

pronouncement of a sentence and the minute entry differ, a remand is 

unnecessary if the record indicates that the minute entry contains a clerical 

error).

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sales’ conviction and 

affirm the sentencing minute entry as modified.