# FILED
May 5, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE MAY 1998 SESS ION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9708-CR-00327

) ) Sullivan County v. ) ) Honorable R. Jerry Beck, Judge ) ROBERT M. SNEED, ) (Habitual motor vehicle offender) ) Appellant. ) For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Robert M. Sneed, Pro Se John Knox Walkup 1817 Oak wood Drive Attorney General of Tennessee Kingsport, TN 37664 and Todd R. Kelley Assistant Attorney Gener al of Tennessee 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 H. Greeley Welles, Jr. District Attorney General P.O. Box 526 Blountville, TN 37617-0526

OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED Joseph M. Tipton Judge2 O P I N I O N
The defendant, Robert M. Sneed, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Sullivan County Criminal Court declaring him to be a habitual motor vehicle offender, thereby barring hi m from operating a motor vehic le on the highways of Tennessee. He raises var ious issues dealing w

ith (1) the sufficiency of the e vidence of the predicate convictio ns, (2) the constitutional ity of the convicting , sentencing, and Motor Vehicle Habitual O ffender (MVHO) proceedings, particularly reg arding due process and double jeopardy , and (3) the failure of the tri al court to appoint him counsel for this appeal. We affirm the trial court.

The judgment of the trial court declaring the defendant to be a habit ual motor vehicle offender was entered on July 25, 1997. The trial court ba sed this conviction upon the follow ing predicate convic

tions regarding dri

ving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and driving with a revoked license (DRL): OFFENSE COURT CONVICTION DATE DRL Sullivan County General Sessions Court March 23, 1995 DUI Sullivan County Criminal Court May 10, 1996 DUI Sullivan County General Sessions Court October 1, 1996

As a starting point, w

e note certain propositions of law that dispose of many of the defendant’s contentions. An MVHO proceeding is ci vil in nature, not criminal. See Everhart v. State , 563 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). It involves revoc

ation of the privilege of dr iving, not the depriv

ation of a property rig ht. Id. It is remedial in nature and does not constitute multiple pun ishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause relati

ve to the prior conv

ictions upon which the pr oceeding is based. See State v. Conley , 639 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Malady , 952 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Also, the def endant may not collaterally attack3

predicate convictions during an MVHO proceedi ng. See Everhart , 563 S.W.2d at 797-98. Under these principles, any complaint about the consti tutional validity of the predicate convictions or of the MVH O process must fail. Simila rly, given the c ivil nature of the proceeding, the defendant has no cons titutional right to the appointment of counsel. Likewise, no such statutory right exists.

The remaining issue is w hether sufficient predicate conv ictions existed to justify the defendant being decl ared a habitual motor vehic le offender. On this point, the defendant asserts that the DUI conviction of May 10, 1996 , was not final because it was on appeal to this cour t when the trial court

entered the MVHO judgment. The record bears this out, ev en though the defendant has failed to make the transcript of the MVHO hearing a part of the record on appeal. W e take judicial notice of the fact that the case was on appeal at the time of the trial court hear ing. See State v. Robert M. Sneed , No. 03C01-9610-CR-00371, Sullivan County (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1997).

The defendant notes that the MVHO act defines a conviction for its purposes as a “final conviction.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(1 ). He asserts that this means that a conviction that is on appeal may not be used as a predicate conviction in an MVHO proceeding.

In response, the state relie s upon State v. Loden , 920 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), a driv ing on a revoked lic

ense case. In Loden , the defendant claimed that because the DUI c onviction that led to li cense revocation was still on appeal, the revocation was not effective at the time that he was charged with DRL. He relied upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50- 501, which requires

the department of safety to revoke a license upon receipt of a record of a convict ion for certain offenses, including DUI, “when such conv

iction has become final.” In Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-503,1 Public pol icy . -- I t is hereb y declar ed to be the pol icy of this state to: (1) Provide maximum safety for allpersons who travel or otherwi se use the publi c highways of the stat e; (2) Deny the pri

vilege of operatingmotor vehicl es on such highw ays to pe rson s wh o by th eir co nduct and record h ave demonstrated their indif

ference to t he safe ty and welfa re of othe rs an d the ir disrespect for the laws of the state; and

(3) Disc oura ge re petitio n of u nlaw ful ac ts by in dividu als against t he peace and digni ty of t his stat e and its polit ical subdi visions, and to impose the added depriva tion of the priv ilege of

operatingmotor vehicl es upon habitual offenders who have been conv icted repe ated ly of vi olati ons of l aws involv ing the oper

ation of motor vehicle s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-6 02. 4 conviction is defined for the purposes of the Driver Li censes chapter as a “final conviction.”
In considering what a “final conviction” means, this court stated that it should look to “the context of the entire statutory scheme” and quoted from what it called the legislature’s stated “purposes of the motor vehicle statute.” Loden , 920 S.W.2d at 264. 1 This court also stated that “a defendant is presumed guilty after judgment,” citing a ca

se that states this proposition relative to an appel late standard of review in determini ng if the evidence is suffici ent to convict. Id. ; see State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). It then concluded that “ to allow an indivi dual convicted of and presumed to be g uilty of driving while intoxicated to continue to operate a motor vehicle pending appeal would be inconsistent with the legislature’s statement of public policy.” Loden , 920 S.W.2d at 264.

We vie w Loden to be precedential authority to which we will adhere. This means that the defendant’s predicate con victions were final

for the purpose of declaring him to be a habitual motor vehicle offender.5 In consideration of the foregoing , we affirm the judgment of the tri al court.

______________________________ Joseph M. Tipton, Judge CONCUR:

__________________________ Joe G. Riley, Judge

__________________________ James Curwood W itt, Jr., Judge