66752 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 216 / Tuesday, November 7, 2000 / Notices

*Session Closed—Exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

552b(c)(8) and (9).

Open Session

1. Approval of Minutes

October 12, 2000 (Open and Closed)

2. Report

Report on Corporate Approvals

3. New Business

A. Other

Corporate and Chartering Approvals

B. ACA Restructures

AgChoice Farm Credit, ACA

Carolina Farm Credit, ACA

Central Kentucky Agricultural Credit

Association

Farm Credit of Southwest Florida, ACA

Closed Session*

4. Report

OSMO Report

Dated: November 2, 2000.

Kelly Mikel Williams,

Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board.

[FR Doc. 00–28644 Filed 11–3–00; 2:22 pm]

BILLING CODE 6705–02–M

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC–00–31–I (Auction No. 31);

DA 00–2404]

Auction of Licenses in the 747–762 and

777–792 MHz Bands Scheduled for

March 6, 2001; Comment Sought on

Modifying the Calculation for

Determining Minimum Accepted Bids

and Changing the Provisions

Concerning ‘‘Last and Best’’ Bids

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This document seeks

comment on modifying the calculation

for determining minimum accepted bids

and changing the provisions concerning

‘‘last and best’’ bids.

DATES: Comments are due on or before

November 15, 2000, and reply

comments are due on or before

November 22, 2000.

ADDRESSES: An original and four copies

of all pleadings must be filed with the

Commission’s Secretary, Magalie Roman

Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal

Communications Commission, 445

Twelfth Street, SW., TW–A325,

Washington, DC 20054.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Walter D. Strack, Bureau Chief

Economist, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, (202)

418–0600;

Evan Kwerel, Senior Economist, Office

of Plans and Policy, (202) 418–2030;

Howard Davenport, Auctions Attorney;

Craig Bomberger, Auctions Analyst; or

Karen Wrege, Auctions and Industry

Analysis Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, (202)

418–0660.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a

summary of a Public Notice released

November 2, 2000. The complete text of

the public notice is available for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours in the FCC Reference

Center (Room CY–A257), 445 12th

Street, SW, Washington, DC. It may also

be purchased from the Commission’s

copy contractor, International

Transcription Services, Inc. (ITS, Inc.)

1231 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC

20036; (202) 857–3800. It is also

available on the Commission’s web site

at http://www.fcc.gov.

I. General

1. On July 3, 2000, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (‘‘Bureau’’)

announced the procedures for

implementing package bidding for

Auction No. 31. See Auction No. 31

Package Bidding Procedures Public

Notice, 65 FR 43361 (July 13, 2000).

After further analysis and testing, we

have determined that it may be

appropriate to make further refinements:

(i) To the calculation for determining

minimum accepted bids; and (ii) to the

provisions that allow a bidder that

wishes to drop out of the auction to

have an opportunity to make ‘‘last and

best’’ bids on licenses and packages.

II. Calculation for Determining

Minimum Accepted Bid

2. With regard to determining

minimum accepted bids, we adopted

the following three-part calculation: The

minimum accepted bid for any license

or package will be the greatest of: (i) The

minimum opening bid; (ii) the bidder’s

own previous high bid on that package

plus x%, where the Bureau will specify

the value of x in each round; or (iii) the

number of bidding units for the license

or package multiplied by the lowest $/

bidding unit on any provisionally

winning package in the last five rounds.

3. We initially adopted part (iii) of the

formula so that bids have a reasonable

chance of becoming part of the

provisionally winning set and because it

was simple to implement for the thenscheduled auction date of September 6,

2000. Based on our initial experimental

testing, we are concerned that part (iii)

of the minimum accepted bid formula

may not be sufficiently refined to

discourage parking strategies, which

could excessively delay the completion

of the auction.

4. Several commenters responding to

the Auction No. 31 Package Bidding

Comment Public Notice, 65 FR 35636

(June 5, 2000) suggested an alternative

approach to determining minimum

accepted bid amounts, which they

claimed would be more likely to ensure

serious bids and help address the

threshold problem. This approach

would allocate among non-provisionally

winning bids the total increase in

revenue needed to tie the provisional

winners. One of the commenters, Paul

Milgrom, defines the ‘‘shortfall’’

associated with a license or package as

the difference between the revenue of

the provisionally winning bid set and

the maximum total revenue associated

with the set of bids that includes that

particular license or package. He defines

the ‘‘deficit’’ for the license or package

as the shortfall multiplied by that

package or license’s proportion of the

[non-provisionally winning] bidding

units. In other words, the deficit is an

allocation of the shortfall to the

particular license or package in

proportion to its share of bidding units

relative to those associated with bids

that were not part of the provisionally

winning set, but are part of the set that

maximizes revenue when including the

particular license or package. Milgrom

suggests that the minimum acceptable

bid should be the greater of 50% of the

deficit or the bidder’s own previous

high bid on that package plus x%.

Alternatively, Pekec and Rothkopf

propose allocating the shortfall in

proportion to the bid amounts instead of

the bidding units. Pekec and Rothkopf

would permit bids at less than this

amount but would only give activity

credit for such a bid if it was the highest

bid for that license or package.

5. We propose to replace part (iii) of

the minimum accepted bid formula with

a percentage of the deficit as defined by

Milgrom because it better approximates

the amount of a bid that could become

part of the provisionally winning set.

We propose to set the percentage

initially at 100 percent. We would retain

the discretion to adjust the percentage of

the deficit during the course of the

auction to provide control over the pace

of the auction. We believe that

allocating the shortfall according to

bidding units as opposed to bid

amounts reduces the risk that bidders

might attempt to bid up the prices of

licenses or packages they do not wish to

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 216 / Tuesday, November 7, 2000 / Notices 66753

acquire in order to increase the share of

the shortfall allocated to those licenses

or packages. We seek comment on this

proposal.

6. To account for the possibility that

there can be more than one set of bids

that yields the same shortfall for a given

bid, we propose to choose the shortfall

set that includes the most provisionally

winning bidding units. Once such a

shortfall set is determined, the deficit

for the bid of interest is determined by

multiplying the shortfall by the ratio of

bidding units associated with the bid to

the total non-provisionally winning

bidding units in the set. This approach

is likely to produce new bids with a

realistic chance of becoming part of the

provisionally winning set because it

does not allocate any of the shortfall to

provisional winners or to bids that were

simple ties with provisionally winning

bids but not chosen as provisional

winners.

7. To illustrate the proposed new

method for calculating part (iii) of the

minimum accepted bid formula,

consider the following example:

Suppose that in round x the

provisionally winning set is a set of two

packages: one nationwide package of the

10 MHz licenses and another

nationwide package of the 20 MHz

licenses. The revenue for this set is

$500,000,000.

Suppose that the last time Bidder A

bid on the Northeast 10 MHz license

was in round y when he made a bid of

$30,000,000. To determine the

minimum accepted bid amount in

round x+1 for Bidder A for the

Northeast 10 MHz license, we begin by

calculating the shortfall for that license.

This is calculated by forcing Bidder A’s

$30,000,000 bid from round y into the

solution set for round x, allowing that

bid to partner with all other bids by

Bidder A in the considered bid set from

round y, and making it mutually

exclusive with all of Bidder A’s bids not

in round y. Assume that the maximum

revenue obtained by forcing this bid

into the solution set is $400,000,000.

Therefore, the shortfall for this bid is

$100,000,000 ($500,000,000 ¥

$400,000,000).

Next, to address the possibility of

multiple shortfall sets, we solve an

optimization problem that maximizes

the number of provisionally winning

bidding units from round x in the

shortfall set with the added constraints

that the maximum revenue equals

$400,000,000 and that Bidder A’s bid on

the 10 MHz license must be in the

solution. Suppose that the solution set

for this optimization problem includes,

in addition to Bidder A’s 10 MHz

Northeast license, the package of

nationwide 20 MHz licenses that was in

the provisionally winning set, and one

or more other packages making up the

remaining five 10 MHz licenses. Since

provisionally winning bids have no

shortfall, we would allocate the shortfall

only among those bids in the shortfall

set that are not in the provisionally

winning set.

The total bidding units from nonprovisionally winning bids is 6 ×

14,000,000 = 84,000,000 bidding units.

Since Bidder A’s bid has 14,000,000 of

the 84,000,000 bidding units,

14,000,000/84,000,000, or 1⁄6, the

shortfall would be allocated to Bidder

A’s bid on the Northeast 10 MHz

license. Thus, the minimum accepted

bid increment for Bidder A’s bid using

this calculation would be $100,000,000/

6 = $16,667,000 (rounded to the nearest

thousand), making part (iii) of the new

minimum accepted bid for this license

$46,667,000 for Bidder A ($16,667,000 +

$30,000,000 (Bidder A’s previous bid)).

Part (i) of the minimum accepted bid

formula would be the minimum

opening bid for this license

($14,000,000), and part (ii) would be x%

more than this bidder’s previous bid

amount (assuming x = 10, $33,000,000).

Part (iii) yields the maximum value

among the three alternatives;

accordingly, Bidder A’s minimum

accepted bid for this license in the next

round would be $46,667,000.

8. We propose an exception to the

modified minimum accepted bid

formula for new packages. For

operational considerations (running the

optimization solver only between

rounds), we propose that part (iii) of the

formula for the initial minimum

accepted bid for a new package created

during the auction will continue to be

calculated by multiplying the number of

bidding units in the package by the

lowest $/bidding unit of any

provisionally winning bid in the last

five rounds.

This exception will not apply to bids

for the global package, however. In that

case we will apply the three-part

calculation as modified herein because

the shortfall and deficit are so simple to

calculate. Because a bid for the global

package could never become a

provisional winner unless it equals the

maximum revenue from the previous

round, we propose that the initial

minimum accepted bid of a global

package will be a percentage of the

maximum revenue from the previous

round. We seek comment on this

proposal.

III. ‘‘Last and Best’’ Bids

9. In the Auction No. 31 Package

Bidding Procedures Public Notice, we

adopted a procedure by which bidders

that wish to drop out of the auction

would have the opportunity before they

drop out to make a ‘‘last and best’’ bid

on any license or package for which

they remain eligible. We adopted this

procedure in part to allow bidders to bid

the maximum amount they are willing

to pay for a package regardless of how

the Commission sets the minimum

accepted bid.

We propose to modify this procedure

to allow bidders to pursue contingent

bidding strategies. In mock auctions we

conducted for software testing, there

were bidders who wanted to provide a

‘‘last and best’’ bid on every license or

package they wanted but did not have

the opportunity to do so because some

of their bids were mutually exclusive.

Allowing two rounds of ‘‘last and best’’

bids would give bidders this flexibility.

Specifically, we propose to allow

bidders to make two sets of mutually

exclusive last and best bids. In

determining the provisionally winning

bid(s), the round solver would consider

these two sets of mutually exclusive

bids, as well as any of the bidder’s bids

that remain in the provisionally

winning set. The bidder who chooses

this option would not be permitted to

make any further bids during the

auction. We seek comment on this

proposal to modify the ‘‘last and best’’

bid procedures.

IV. Filing Comments

10. Comments should refer to the DA

number on this Public Notice, DA 00–

2404. See 47 CFR 1.51(c). In addition,

one copy of each comment must be

delivered to each of the following

locations:

(1) the Commission’s duplicating

contractor, International

Transcription Service, Inc. (ITS), 1231

20th Street, N.W., Washington, DC

20036;

(2) Office of Media Relations, Public

Reference Center, 445 Twelfth Street,

S.W., CY–A257, Washington, DC

20554;

(3) Rana Shuler, Auctions and Industry

Analysis Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, 445

Twelfth Street, S.W., 4–A628,

Washington, DC 20554.

Comments and reply comments will

be available for public inspection during

regular business hours in the FCC

Public Reference Room, CY-A257, 445

12th Street, S.W., Washington, DC

20554.

11. This proceeding has been

designated as a ‘‘permit-but-disclose’’

proceeding in accordance with the

Commission’s ex parte rules. See 47

66754 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 216 / Tuesday, November 7, 2000 / Notices

CFR 1.1200(a), 1.1206. Persons making

oral ex parte presentations are reminded

that memoranda summarizing the

presentations must contain summaries

of the substance of the presentations

and not merely a listing of the subjects

discussed. More than a one or two

sentence description of the views and

arguments presented is generally

required. See 47 CFR 1.1206(b). Other

rules pertaining to oral and written ex

parte presentations in permit-butdisclose proceedings are set forth in

§ 1.1206(b) of the Commission’s rules,

47 CFR 1.1206(b).

Federal Communications Commission.

Margaret Wiener,

Deputy Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division.

[FR Doc. 00–28608 Filed 11–6–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting

November 2, 2000.

Open Commission Meeting, Thursday,

November 9, 2000

The Federal Communications

Commission will hold an Open Meeting

on the subjects listed below on

Thursday, November 9, 2000, which is

scheduled to commence at 9:30 a.m. in

Room TW–C305, at 445 12th Street,

SW., Washington, DC.

Item No. Bureau Subject

1 .................. Common Carrier ....................... Title: 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review—Telecommunications Service Quality Reporting Requirements.

Summary: The Commission will consider a Notice of Proposed Rule Making concerning measures to streamline and reform its service quality monitoring program.

2 .................. Common Carrier ....................... Title: 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review of Part 68 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations

(CC Docket No. 99–216).

Summary: The Commission will consider a Report and Order concerning streamlining and

privatizing the detailed regulations in Part 68 of the rules relating to the attachment of terminal equipment to the public switched telephone network.

3 .................. Wireless Telecommunications

and Office of Engineering

and Technology.

Title: Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development

of Secondary Markets.

Summary: The Commission will consider a Notice of Proposed Rule Making concerning the

promotion of secondary market mechanisms to facilitate efficient use of wireless spectrum in

the public interest.

4 .................. Office of Engineering and

Technology and Wireless

Telecommunications.

Title: Principles for Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets for Spectrum.

Summary: The Commission will consider a Policy Statement setting forth guiding principles for

the promotion of secondary market mechanisms to facilitate efficient use of wireless spectrum in the public interest.

5 .................. Wireless Telecommunications .. Title: Implementation of Sections 309(j) and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934 as

Amended (WT Docket No. 99–87); Promotion of Spectrum Efficient Technologies on Certain

Part 90 Frequencies (RM–9332); Establishment of Public Service Radio Pool in the Private

Mobile Frequencies Below 800 MHz (RM–9405); and Petition for Rule Making of The American Mobile Telecommunications Association (RM–9705).

Summary: The Commission will consider a Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed

Rule Making regarding the Balanced Budget Act of 1997’s statutory revisions to section

309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, which governs the Commission’s

competitive bidding authority, and certain Petitions for Rule Making proposing revisions to

the licensing rules for the public safety and private radio services.

Additional information concerning

this meeting may be obtained from

Maureen Peratino or David Fiske, Office

of Media Relations, telephone number

(202) 418–0500; TTY (202) 418–2555.

Copies of materials adopted at this

meeting can be purchased from the

FCC’s duplicating contractor,

International Transcription Services,

Inc. (ITS, Inc.) at (202) 857–3800; fax

(202) 857–3805 and 857–3184; or TTY

(202) 293–8810. These copies are

available in paper format and alternative

media, including large print/type;

digital disk; and audio tape. ITS may be

reached by e-mail:

itslinc@ix.netcom.com. Their Internet

address is http://www.itsdocs.com/.

This meeting can be viewed over

George Mason University’s Capitol

Connection. The Capitol Connection

also will carry the meeting live via the

Internet. For information on these

services call (703) 993–3100. The audio

portion of the meeting will be broadcast

live on the Internet via the FCC’s

Internet audio broadcast page at

<http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/>. The

meeting can also be heard via telephone,

for a fee, from National Narrowcast

Network, telephone (202) 966–2211 or

fax (202) 966–1770. Audio and video

tapes of this meeting can be purchased

from Infocus, 341 Victory Drive,

Herndon, VA 20170, telephone (703)

834–0100; fax number (703) 834–0111.

Federal Communications Commission.

Magalie Roman Salas,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00–28605 Filed 11–3–00; 11:25 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–M

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION

Sunshine Act Meeting

Pursuant to the provisions of the

‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5

U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that

at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, November 7,

2000, the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation’s Board of Directors will

meet in closed session, pursuant to

sections 552b(c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(6), (c)(8),