2023 UT App 141

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BOUNTIFUL CITY,

Appellee,

v.

PETER ALEXANDER SISCH,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20220599-CA

Filed November 24, 2023

Second District Court, Bountiful Department

The Honorable David J. Williams

No. 211800281

Peter Daines, Attorney for Appellant

Heather Waite-Grover, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 The manager of a Smith’s Marketplace store asked Peter 

Alexander Sisch to leave the parking lot next to the store. Sisch 

ignored the request and refused to leave the parking lot; a few 

minutes later, police officers arrived and removed Sisch from the 

premises. Sisch was later charged with various misdemeanor and 

infraction crimes, including criminal trespass, and was convicted 

after a bench trial. He appeals his conviction for criminal trespass, 

asserting that the prosecution did not elicit sufficient evidence 

that the “owner” of the property asked him to leave. We reject 

Sisch’s arguments and affirm his conviction. 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 2 2023 UT App 141

BACKGROUND1

¶2 One summer day, Sisch entered a Smith’s Marketplace 

store (Smith’s) in Bountiful, Utah. While inside, he purchased a 

pair of shoes at the self-checkout area, briefly interacted with a 

Smith’s employee (Employee) there, and left. About an hour later, 

Sisch returned to the store to exchange the shoes for a different 

size; during this second visit, he again encountered Employee, 

who directed him to the customer service counter, where all 

returns and exchanges take place. After successfully making the 

exchange, Sisch left the store, but he then tarried in the parking 

lot on the northeast side of the building. In this area, there is a 

“kind of a cage” located outside the building that contains a 

number of “propane canisters.” It is also an area in which Smith’s 

“baggers” retrieve shopping carts used by customers. And this 

part of the parking lot is primarily used for employee parking, 

though there is no signage indicating that only employees may 

park there. The parking lot in general, and this area in particular, 

is open to members of the public.

¶3 Sometime after Sisch left the store, the manager of the store

(Manager), wearing a Smith’s shirt and name badge, exited the 

building and noticed that Sisch was “pacing back and forth next 

to the employees’ cars” and looked “lost or upset.” Manager 

approached Sisch and asked him “to leave the premises.” Sisch 

refused, “started getting pretty excited,” and asked Manager if he 

“wanted to fight.” Sisch also asked Manager if he was affiliated 

with “the store,” to which Manager answered affirmatively. 

¶4 Manager called a co-worker (Co-worker), who was then 

inside the store, informed her of the situation and asked her to call 

1. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view and recite the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings; we present 

additional evidence only as necessary to understand the issues on 

appeal.” State v. Jack, 2018 UT App 18, n.2, 414 P.3d 1063. 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 3 2023 UT App 141

911. As Co-worker called 911, she walked outside with Employee, 

approaching Sisch. At that point, Sisch was “throwing his hands 

in the air . . . screaming vulgarity” and engaging in “very loud, 

aggressive yelling.” 

¶5 A police officer (Officer) arrived “between two to three 

minutes” after Co-worker’s 911 call. Prior to identifying himself 

as a police officer, and before Sisch noticed him, Officer observed 

Sisch’s behavior. He witnessed Sisch yelling profanities and 

acting in an agitated manner. Officer then identified himself to 

Sisch and asked him about the situation. Sisch told Officer, “[T]he 

employees are saying that I’m loitering, but I’m not loitering 

because I just spent $100 in there at their business, so I can go 

wherever I want.”

¶6 Further, Sisch was “rambling” and going from “topic to 

topic,” which concerned Officer and prompted him to ask Sisch 

for identification. Sisch refused, the situation escalated, and 

Officer placed handcuffs on him. However, once Officer removed 

the cuffs a few minutes later, Sisch calmed down and began 

offering information. During the conversation, Sisch “indicated 

that he talked to [a] guy in the back parking lot,” and he 

acknowledged that a Smith’s employee had “asked him to leave.”

¶7 Later, Bountiful City (the City) charged Sisch with criminal 

trespass, disorderly conduct, and failure to disclose his identity. 

The case proceeded to a bench trial, where the City called four 

witnesses in its case-in-chief: Employee, Manager, Co-worker, 

and Officer. Each gave testimony regarding the events described 

above. Sisch defended the trespass charge largely on two 

grounds: first, that the property was open to the public and that 

he had a right to be there as a Smith’s customer and, second, that 

Sisch was not in a position to know that Manager—the person 

who asked him to leave—had the authority to act on behalf of 

Smith’s. Sisch did not argue, at trial, that Smith’s was not the 

owner of the parking lot. 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 4 2023 UT App 141

¶8 On that latter point—perhaps because it was not 

perceptibly contested at trial—the City did not offer a great deal 

of direct evidence. Manager testified that he was the “[s]tore 

manager” and that, in that capacity, he “ha[d] the authority to ask 

people . . . to leave the premises,” and that he told Sisch “to leave 

the premises.” Officer testified that the scene to which he 

responded was “a private parking lot owned and operated by 

Smith’s.” Co-worker testified that she called 911 to have the police 

“remove [Sisch] from our property.” And in closing argument, 

based on this evidence, the City argued that, while Sisch had 

“lawfully entered” Smith’s property, he had “refused to leave” 

that property “after he was directed to do [so] by an employee.”

¶9 At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Sisch guilty 

of all three charges. In an oral ruling, the court stated that Sisch 

lawfully entered “an area of the [Smith’s] parking lot that was 

open to the public,” but found that Sisch was “asked to leave by 

somebody”—Manager—who had “authority to act for the 

owner.” The court specifically noted that Manager “was wearing 

his name badge that identified him as a manager” and that 

Manager “identified himself [to Sisch] as the store manager,” and 

the court found that Sisch “certainly knew that [Manager] was a 

store manager.” The court also found that, after being asked, Sisch 

“refused to leave.” Accordingly, the court found “that the City 

ha[d] met [its] burden of proof with regard to proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt the elements of criminal trespass.”

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Sisch now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his criminal trespass conviction.2 “In the 

context of a bench trial, when a defendant contends the evidence 

was insufficient to support a conviction, we review the court’s 

2. Sisch does not appeal any of his other convictions. 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 5 2023 UT App 141

findings for clear error.” State v. Ayala, 2022 UT App 1, ¶ 18, 504 

P.3d 755. And in such situations, “we must sustain the trial court’s 

judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or 

if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Id. ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶11 Sisch contends that the City failed to introduce evidence 

sufficient to satisfy one of the required elements of criminal 

trespass: that Smith’s was the “owner” of the parking lot Sisch 

was asked to vacate. While we acknowledge that this specific 

issue was hardly the focal point of the City’s evidentiary 

presentation, in our view the City submitted enough evidence in 

this regard to support a conviction.3

¶12 Utah’s criminal trespass statute provides, in relevant part, 

that “[a]n actor commits criminal trespass if, . . . knowing the 

actor’s . . . presence is unlawful, the actor enters or remains on . . . 

property to which notice against entering is given by . . . personal 

communication to the actor by the owner or someone with 

apparent authority to act for the owner.” Utah Code § 76-6-

3. As noted, at trial Sisch never asserted that Smith’s was not the 

owner of the parking lot, and he never argued that the City had 

failed to present sufficient evidence on that point. But this 

oversight does not present a preservation problem for Sisch, 

because a defendant in a criminal bench trial is “not required to 

take any action to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence with regard to the statutory elements of the crime.” See

State v. Charles, 2020 UT App 154, ¶ 20 & n.4, 477 P.3d 492; see also

State v. Ayala, 2022 UT App 1, ¶ 15, 504 P.3d 755 (stating that 

“challenges to sufficiency need not be expressly preserved in a 

bench trial context because the trial court necessarily determines 

sufficiency in making its conclusion as to guilt”). 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 6 2023 UT App 141

206(2)(b)(i). Here on appeal—as contrasted from the arguments 

he made before the trial court—Sisch does not assert that Manager 

lacked authority to act for Smith’s; instead, he argues that the City 

failed to conclusively prove that Smith’s was the “owner” of the 

parking lot. See id. As Sisch sees it, even if Manager had authority 

to act on Smith’s behalf, the City failed to demonstrate that 

Manager had the necessary authority “to act for the owner” in 

telling him to leave the parking lot. See id. 

¶13 There is no statutory definition of “owner” in the criminal 

trespass statute or in any of the statutory “definitions” sections 

that are directly applicable to that statute. See id. §§ 76-1-101.5, 76-

6-101, -201, -206. In a situation like this, “where no specialized 

statutory definition is provided,” we usually arrive at a definition 

by “interpret[ing] statutory language according to the plain 

meaning of its text.” See Vineyard Props. of Utah LLC v. RLS Constr. 

LLC, 2021 UT App 144, ¶ 25, 505 P.3d 65 (quotation simplified), 

cert. denied, 509 P.3d 767 (Utah 2022). But here, the parties are in 

apparent agreement about what “owner” means in this context, 

and therefore we apply their agreed-upon definition to the facts 

of this case, without rendering any conclusive opinion as to the 

meaning of “owner” as used in Utah’s criminal trespass statute. 

¶14 In this case, Sisch posited in his opening brief that “‘owner’ 

includes not just the title holder” of the property but also “any 

tenant or other occupant with an exclusive or other possessory 

interest in the parking lot sufficient to exercise dominion over it.” 

In response, the City did not take issue with this definition. We 

therefore proceed to evaluate the merits of Sisch’s appeal using 

this working definition of the term “owner.” 

¶15 Under this definition, the City can meet its burden of proof 

in one of two ways. First, it can present evidence (for instance, 

from county land records or other similar sources) indicating that 

Smith’s either owns record title to the real property upon which 

the parking lot is located, or that it possesses authority from the 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 7 2023 UT App 141

record title holder to ask people to leave the property. Sisch 

correctly points out that the City made no effort to present any 

evidence regarding the identity of the record title holder of the 

land underneath the parking lot.4

¶16 Alternatively, the City can present evidence that Smith’s is 

a “tenant or occupant” of the parking lot “with an exclusive or 

other possessory interest” in it “sufficient to exercise dominion 

over it.” On this point, Sisch correctly points out that the City did 

not place into evidence any lease agreement or other document 

indicating that Smith’s has a leasehold (or other tenancy) interest 

in the parking lot property. And Sisch contends that the evidence 

that does exist in the record on this point is insufficient to support 

the trial court’s finding that Manager had authority to act for the 

“owner” of the parking lot. On this point, we disagree. 

¶17 When judges sit as factfinders in bench trials, they may not 

base their verdicts on speculation, but they “are permitted to 

draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.” State v. 

Charles, 2020 UT App 154, ¶ 21, 477 P.3d 492. “To be sure, the line 

separating ‘speculation’ from ‘reasonable inference’ can at times 

4. Indeed, on appeal Sisch asks us to take judicial notice of the fact 

that a “publicly-accessible and self-authenticating title search of 

the Davis County official recorder demonstrates that Smith’s does 

not in fact own the parking lot.” Sisch did not attempt to introduce 

any such evidence at trial, and we decline Sisch’s invitation to take 

judicial notice of it now. Cf. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 

847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“Judicial notice is taken on appeal only 

where there is a compelling countervailing principle to be served. 

With very limited exceptions, judicial notice should not be used 

to get around the rule precluding raising issues for the first time 

on appeal.” (quotation simplified)). But even if we were to take 

judicial notice of the fact that Smith’s is apparently not the record 

title owner of the parking lot, under Sisch’s own definition of 

“owner” that would not resolve the relevant question. 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 8 2023 UT App 141

be faint.” State v. Prisbrey, 2020 UT App 172, ¶ 23, 479 P.3d 1126, 

cert. denied, 485 P.3d 946 (Utah 2021). An “inference” is “a 

conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a 

logical consequence from them.” Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 

73, ¶ 12, 358 P.3d 1067 (quotation simplified). “On the other hand, 

‘speculation’ is the act or practice of theorizing about matters over 

which there is no certain knowledge at hand.” Id. (quotation 

simplified). As our supreme court has explained, “the difference 

between an inference and speculation depends on whether the 

underlying facts support the conclusion.” Id.; see also Salt Lake City 

v. Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78, ¶ 10, 347 P.3d 842 (stating that 

“inferences drawn from facts in evidence are appropriate,” but 

“inferences drawn from inferences are not” (quotation 

simplified)), cert. denied, 362 P.3d 1255 (Utah 2015). Moreover, “in 

criminal cases, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, and any 

inferences drawn from the evidence must comport with this 

stringent burden of proof.” Charles, 2020 UT App 154, ¶ 21; see also

State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993) (“A guilty verdict 

is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise 

to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.”). 

¶18 In this case, the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient 

to support a finding, arrived at beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Smith’s had a possessory interest in the parking lot sufficient to 

exercise dominion over it. Perhaps most significantly, Officer

testified—quite directly—that the parking lot was “owned and 

operated by Smith’s.” On appeal, Sisch criticizes Officer’s 

statement as “unsupported” and “lacking in foundation,” but he

lodged no objection to the admissibility of Officer’s statement at 

trial. Accordingly, Sisch has not preserved for appellate review 

any objection to that statement, and he does not ask us to evaluate 

the court’s admission of this statement for plain error or assert 

that Sisch’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to lodge an 

objection. Under these circumstances, Officer’s statement 

constituted evidence that the trial court was allowed to consider. 
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 9 2023 UT App 141

¶19 In addition to Officer’s statement, the trial court heard 

Manager testify that he had authority to remove people “from the 

premises” and that he asked Sisch to leave those premises. In 

context, Manager’s use of the term “premises” indicates that the 

relevant “premises” included the parking lot. Moreover, the court 

also heard Co-worker’s testimony that she called 911 to have the 

police remove Sisch “from our property”; in context, “our” refers

to Smith’s and “property” refers to the parking lot.

¶20 Even aside from this direct testimony, there existed 

additional circumstantial evidence indicating that Smith’s was the 

owner of the parking lot. The part of the lot in which Sisch was 

found was a section in which employees parked their cars and in 

which Smith’s baggers retrieved shopping carts. That section also 

included an outdoor “cage” where Smith’s kept propane canisters 

related to its business. And the trial court might also have drawn 

on its own common-sense understanding of how big-box retailers 

operate and inferred—especially in the absence of any contest on 

the point—that it would be extremely unlikely for a retailer like 

Smith’s to operate a large grocery store in Utah without rights to 

the parking lot next to the store. Indeed, even Sisch thought he 

had a right to be in the lot simply because he made a purchase at 

Smith’s, telling Officer that he couldn’t be loitering because he 

had “just spent $100 in” the store, a fact he thought gave him the 

right to “go wherever [he] want[ed]” in the parking lot. 

¶21 All of this evidence regarding Smith’s relationship with the 

parking lot was unrebutted and unchallenged by Sisch during 

trial. In our view, the evidence the City presented—including 

both the direct evidence as well as reasonable non-speculative 

inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence—was 

sufficient to support a determination, arrived at beyond any 

reasonable doubt, that Smith’s maintained a possessory interest 

in the parking lot sufficient to exercise dominion over it.
Bountiful City v. Sisch

20220599-CA 10 2023 UT App 141

CONCLUSION

¶22 The City provided sufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s determination that Manager had authority to act for the 

“owner” of the parking lot. We therefore reject Sisch’s arguments 

and affirm his criminal trespass conviction.