Filed 1/24/14 In re James P. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1 115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re JAMES P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

STAN ISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JUAN E., Defendant and Appellant. F066441 (Super. Ct. No. 515877)



### OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Ju dge. Hassan Gorguinpour , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant

. John P. Doering, County Counsel, Carrie M. Stephens and Robin Gozzo , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

- ooOoo

-2

.

Juan E. is the father of six

- year

- old James P. who was removed from his care. Father contends that the juvenile court incorrectly determined the date of James ’ s removal for purposes of calculating the length of reunification services. He further
contends that the services were n ot reasonable. We disagree and affirm.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE S Background Facts This is the third appeal in this case. The first two appeals were brought by
James ’ s m other, Tiffany P. , who had had sole legal and physical custody of James.
James , then age t wo , and half sister Hailey, then age one , 1 were removed from mother
f ollowing a September 2010 Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition 2 alleg ing
that mother lock ed the children in a bedroom for hours. Father was not named in the pet ition. James was placed in the temporary custody of father , who up until this point was only casually involved with James.
T he report prepared in anticipation of mother ’ s jurisdiction/disposition hearing

rec ommended that James remain with father, and th at father receive family maintenance services in the form of parent ing education and a clinical assessment to determine the
extent of father ’ s self

- reported emotional or educational issues.
James Placed with Father in January 2011 with Family Maintenanc e Services Following mother ’ s contested hearing in December 2010 and January 2011, the juvenile court found that return of the children to mother ’ s custody posed a substantial risk of harm. James was placed with his father, under court supervision with fa mily
maintenance services. A clinical evaluation was ordered for father.

1 Hailey and subsequently born children Daniel and Aubrey all have different fathers. Only James is the subject of this appeal, but at times we refer to the other children when relevant to this appeal, either by name or collec tively as the children.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.3

.

Mother appealed. While the appeal was pending, a status review report in May of 2011 stated that James was living with father and his girlfriend . Father was working on
his mainte nance plan. He had completed two of three parent

- child labs and was progressing . It was recommended that James remain in father ’ s care under court supervision , with the added requirement that father undergo a psychological evaluation. Supplemental Peti tion filed A gainst Father
W hile mother ’ s appeal was pending, a section 387 supplemental petition was filed against father , stating that f ather had allowed mother to move into his home with James, contrary to the court order that all contact between James a nd mother be supervised by
the social services agency

. As a result, James was placed in protective custody on August 30, 2011

. In a subsequent interview concerning the incident , father became very emotional, yelling that he did not want to live in the a partment without James. According to father, he needed someone to help him “not give up.” Father said he might hurt himself if James was taken from him, but denied having suicidal thoughts. Although he stated he never left James alone with mother, he ad mitted she was on her way to pick him up from school. He also stated he needed the welfare money James provided in order to afford his apartment. The September 20, 2011, jurisdiction/disposition report recommended that
James remain in protective care and that father be granted reunification services.
The combined contested review hearing on mother ’ s original petition and father ’ s secti on 387 supplemental petition was heard over a number of dates . P rior to the scheduled hearing , in November 2011 this c ourt , in response to mother ’ s first appeal,

a ffirmed the January 2011 order of jurisdiction but reversed the disposition orders, finding there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a substantial risk of harm to the
children a t the time of the hearing wh ich could not be mitigated by family maintenance services and close supervision by child welfare staf f. James and Haley were ordered to
be returned to mother.4

.

The January 2012 report prepared for disposition on the remittitur for mother ’ s

case recommende d the children remain dependents of the court. It f urther recommended James and Haley be released to mother ’ s custody with family maintenance services and
that father receive reunification services for James. According to the report, father was now livi ng with his father after he broke up

w ith his girlfriend and lost his apartment. He stated he was struggling with mental health issues and a diagnosis of Asperger ’ s s yndro m e

. Since he had difficulty caring for himself, his father was taking care of him. Although he had completed a psychological evaluation for social security disability, he did not have the results of the evaluation. He was denied disability and was now appealing. In December of 2011, father had a breakdown and checked himself into a he alth center and was prescribed medication for depression and anxiety. Because he would

soon no longer be eligible for his father ’ s insurance, he was advised to apply for indigent aid, but he claimed he could not complete the application process due to tra nsportation
issues. F ather recognized that he was unable to care for himself and therefore could not
care for James. Because he missed an appointment, father had not yet completed a psychological evaluation, but was in the process of being referred. The social worker
noted that father ’ s mental health had deteriorated since James was placed in his care.
Father attrib uted this to Asperger ’ s , which he had researched on the internet and which he claimed was confirmed during the disability evaluation. Accor ding to father, his bad judgment was attributable to this disorder. The recommended psychological evaluation
was to determine if there were other services that would be needed to assist father in reunifying with James.
James continued to receive service s through Valley Mountain Regional Center ( VMRC ) and was reported by his care providers to be improving in both speech and
social skills.5

.

Section 342 Subsequent Petition Filed Against Father Prior to the hearing on the remittitur, it was determined tha t the social services
agency would file a section 342 subsequent petition regarding James, with the January
2012 disposition report serving as the jurisdiction/disposition report for the section 342 petition . The January 18, 2012, petition alleged under s ection 300, subdivision (b) that
father was unable to care for James due to his mental health issues as well as his failure to protect James from mother , citing the court order that she only have contact at the social
services agency offices during supervi sed visitation.
At the combined disposition and remittitur hearing held January 19, 2012, father waived his right to a hearing and submitted on the petition and reports. The juvenile

court , noting that James had previously been removed from father, foun d the petition true
and that return of James to father would create a substantial risk of harm. Father had made only limited progress on alleviating the issues necessitating placement.
Father Granted Six Months of Reunification Services Father was gra nted reunification services. Following discussion, it was
determined there was a six

- month limitation on services because James was placed with his siblings, who were under the age of three. Father was admonished that, if he did not make progress in six months, services could be terminated. On the remittitur, James and Hailey were returned to mother ’ s full

- time custody
with family maintenance services

. Daniel, who had been placed with his father (John) , remained in his father ’ s primary care

. Supplemen tal Petition Against Mother
O nly one month later, in February of 2012, the social services agency filed another
section 387 supplemental petition seeking removal of James and Hailey from mother ’ s home. The jurisdiction/disposition report on the suppleme ntal petition recommended that
James be removed from mother ’ s custody and she be granted reunification services. It6

.

also recommended that reunification services continue for father. The report noted that father had been instructed to continue with his pr eviously issued case plan. He had completed the psychological evaluation, which was attached to the report. The evaluation was conducted in early February 2012. Psychological Evaluation of Father
The doctor who evaluated father noted that , although fat her described himself as depressed, his social interactions were suggestive of adult attention deficit h yperactivity
d isorder ( ADHD ) . He was quite talkative, but had limited insight and direction in his
life. Father had a limited work history, stating th at the longest time he had held a job was
for one month. He reported being physically abused by his father as a teenager. He
described himself as lac k ing motivation to do much of anything with his life. The report also noted father ’ s belief that he had Asperger ’ s , which he based on his social security disability evaluation and his self

- described unique or “creative” way of thinking, which he claimed was one of Asperger ’ s diagnostic criteria. But the report also noted father had stated that the diagnosi s led to his decompensation and hospitalization the previous December. The doctor was unsure of whether it was an actual diagnosis. Again, while father described himself as depressed , the doctor noted that father ’ s affect during the evaluation and a pres ent sense of humor argued against clinical depression. The doctor noted that, while father had some of the common symptoms of Asperger ’ s, he lacked others . The doctor did not specifically test for this disorder in the
evaluation. The doctor did adminis ter the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

2 , the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory

- 2 and Interpersonal Behavioral Survey to
father. The doctor ’ s cli nical diagnosis for father was d ysthymia and ADHD on Axis I,
and p ersonality d isorder NOS with avoidant and schizoid features on Axis II. Testing found father to have dep e n d ent traits , which led him to rely on relationships to take care
of his basic needs. The doctor attributed father ’ s difficulties to being raised in a n unh ealthy family and suff ering physical and emotional abuse.7

.

The doctor recommended ongoing p arent ing training for father and noted his avoidant tendencies would make it difficult for him to parent p articularly James, because
James ’ s autism would make parenting difficult and fru strating. This would trigger
father ’ s avoidant behaviors, likely resulting in neglect. Father had a high probability of turning over responsibilities for James to someone like a girlfriend. The doctor recommended that father maintain his medication regi me and be evaluated for ADHD. He recommended further parenting education and individual counseling be provided by a single provider, preferably Sierra Vista, where father was already involved. He recommended a hair follicle test to rule out any possible illegal drug use. He did not recommend any further testing for Asperger ’ s syndrome. Hearing on Mother ’ s Second Supplemental Petition The contested hearing on mother ’ s second section 387 petition continued over six days, beginning on April 17, 20 12, and concluding May 11, 2012. Father did not provide any evidence and appeared at only two of the six hearing days. The juvenile court ordered a new disposition, leaving Hailey in mother ’ s care with continued family
maintenance services. James was re moved from mother and father ’ s custody and
continued in foster care with reunification services. The juvenile court found father ’ s progress limited. It made changes to the propose d plan regarding mother, but no changes were requested or made to the case plan for father.
Mother ’ s second appeal challenged this order , which this court subsequently
affirmed. ( In re James P. (Sept. 11, 2013, F065284) [nonpub. opn.].)
Follow

- up Reports on Father
An interim review r eport p repared for the August 15, 2012 , pro gress review hearing stated that father had been visiting and generally had good visits, except on the occasions when he was observed to be playing on his telephone or listening on earphones rather than interacting with James. While father expressed a des ire for increased visits, he made no effort to make these visits happen. The report recommended that8

.

reunification services for father continue. The report noted that, as of the end of May of 2012, father was back with his previous girlfriend, who accomp anied him to the visit. They reported that they planned to get married. In June of 2012, father reported that his depression and anxiety stemmed from his Asperger ’ s syndrome, but that the medications he was taking helped. He was planning on moving out o f his parent ’ s home and in with his girlfriend. Father did not appear at the August 16, 2012, interim review h earing. The juvenile court granted discretion to the social services agency t o begin day

- long and overnight visits with mother for James.
The status review r eport prepared in anticipation o f the November 7, 2012, six

month review hearing stated that James remained in foster care

. James was making significant progress in social skills and communication. The report stated f

ather continued to e ngage in counseling at Sierra Vista, but that the counselor reported father had not prog ressed as he still claimed he was unable to
work , cook or clean for himself. The counselor questioned father ’ s ability to care for
James ’ s basic needs with his limitat ions in caring for himself. Father was still taking medication for depression and anxiety. He had contacted VMRC and was informed that he would not qualify for services with a diagnosis of Asperger ’ s syndrome, but he did not pursue it further. When the social worker attempted to determine where father reportedly received the diagnosis of Asperger ’ s, father could not name the menta l health center nor
the doctor he had seen. The social worker ’ s attempts to find some record of the diagnosis proved futile. Father continued to live with his parents, but was no longer in a relationship with his girlfriend. He had not been able to establish another residence. According to father, the “hold up” was in getting a job and a place to live so he could show that h e could do things on his own. He wanted more time to “prove himself.”9

.

The social worker noted that, although father had “basically” completed his case plan , he had made little progress in demonstrating that he could care for his son alone
because he was n o t able to care for himself. He frequently forgot appointments and failed to follow through on things he started. On August 20, 2012, the social worker asked him when his next court appearance was. He said he had gotten a paper in the mail, but he did not know the date. It had been August 15, 2012, and he failed to appear. In a discussion in September of 2012, between the social worker, father, and
father ’ s father, father ’ s father stated that he thought James would be care d for by father

un til fathe r ’ s girlfriend left him. Father became visibly angry and agitated and told his father “not to ever, ever say her name to him again.” The report recommended that reunification services for mother continue but that they be terminated for father. It also recommended that James begin a trial visit with
mother. At the November 7, 2012, six

- month and section 364 review hearing , the social
services a gency was given discretion to start a trial visit for James with mother. Father ’ s counsel requested a contes ted hearing on the recommendation to terminate reunification services and raised “procedural issues.” The juveni le court set the matter for pre trial hearing on November 15, 2012 , to address the procedural issues and for contested hearing i n December 2012. On November 15, 2012, both parties ’ counsel were directed to file points and authorities on the disputed issue of how the length of reunification services should be
handled under the somewhat convoluted events of the case. Hearing and Order on Reunif ication and Reasonableness of Services
At the December 12, 2012, section 366.21 review hearing, father ’ s counsel argued
that father had received only six months of reunification services under her reading of the
code . She also argued that reasonable servi ces had not been offered and request ed that services specific to Asperger ’ s s yndrome be offered father. Counsel for the social10

.

services agency c ountered that there was no actual evidence other than father ’ s own statement of an Asperger ’ s s yndrome diagnosi s. After argument, the juvenile court reasoned that “James has been detained from
his father ’ s care at least, if not sooner, but at least since August 30th, 2011, and therefore, date of entry into foster care would be October 29th, 2011.” The juvenile c ourt then found, based on these dates, that father had already had 12 months of reunifications services. The juvenile court also found that there was no evidence that father had been diagnosed with any sort of autistic disorder. It found that father had been unable to care for himself and “if he can ’ t care for himself after 12 months of services, I don ’ t know how he could possibly care for the needs of James. And James ’ s needs are more difficult
than some ....” The juvenile court found that reasonable ser vices were offered father and
terminated his services.
DISCUSSION
I. LENGTH OF REUNIFICATION SERVICES Father contends that the trial court erred when it determined that his reunification services had expired. Respondent disagrees . We find no error in the juvenile court ’ s termination of father ’ s reunification services. As aptly put by respondent, this case involves “twists and turns [that] are both factual and procedural, including original, supplemental and subsequent petitions, placement with a non

- cust odial parent, an appellate reversal, extended contested hearings, the addition of sibling s to the family during the cour s e of the case and siblings sometimes being placed together and other times being placed apart. The issue, however, is whether despite these many twists and turns, [father] received 12 months of reunification services under [section] 361.5.” Procedural Summary To fully understand father ’ s argument, we summarize, as best we can, the procedural history of this case:11

.

9

- 9

- 10: The children were removed from mother ’ s care (§§ 300, 325, 332) and
James was placed in the temporary custody of father (§ 319).
1

- 11

- 11: Following a contested hearing, James was placed with father under court supervision with family maintenance services (§ 361.2)

. 8

- 30

- 11: James was removed from father ’ s care and placed in protective custody after father allowed contact with mother against court order (§ 361, subd. (c)).
9

- 1

- 11: A s upplemental petition was filed against father (§ 387).
1

- 18

- 1 2 : A fter remittitur w as received from this court, a s u bsequent petition was filed against father in response to father ’ s inability to care for James (§ 342).
1

- 19

- 12: On remittitur from this court, James and Haley were returned to mother, who was provided maintenance services. The s upplemental petition against father was found true and father was granted six months reunification services (§§ 342; 361.5, subd. (a)).
2

- 23

- 12: A s upplemental petition wa s filed against mother to remove James and Haley from mother ’ s home based on new allegations (§ 387). 5

- 11

- 12: After several days of hearing s on the supplemental petition against mother , James wa s removed from mother and father ’ s custody. Reunification services

were continued for both mother and father.
8

- 15

- 12: A r eview hear ing report recommend ed continued reunification services for father.
11

- 7

- 12: A r eview hearing report recommended termination of reunification services for father.
12

- 12

- 12: A r eview hearing was held and reunification services for father were terminated

. The court ruled that father had already had 12 mont h s of services, beginning on October 29, 2011 (§ 361.49). Applicable Law and Analysis Section 361.5 generally requires the court to order the social services agency to provide reunification services to t he parents. However, the services are limited under12

.

section 361.5 to 12 months, with a possible extension to 18 months. (§ 361.5.) Section 361.5 , subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “(1) Family reunification services, when provided, shall be pr ovided as follows: “(A) ... for a child who, on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian, was three years of age or older, court

- ordered services shall be provided beginning with the dispositional hearing and end ing 12 months after the date the child entered foster care as provided in section 361.49, unless the child is returned to the home of the parent or guardian. ” ( Italics added.) A child is “deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of t he jurisdictional hearing ... or the date that is 60 days after the date o n which the child was initially removed from the physical custody of his or her parent ....” (§ 361.49.) At the December 12, 2012, review hearing, the juvenile court terminated fathe r ’ s reunification services, determining that the date at which point reunification services began for father was October 29, 2011 , 60 days after James was removed from father ’ s custody on August 30, 2011 . Father argues that the date at which point reunifi cation services began for him was April 21, 2012, 60 days after James was removed from both
mother and father ’ s custody in February of 2012 , and should expire on April 21, 2013. As argued by father, the italicized language above suggests that the requirem ent for reunifications services established under section 361.5 and the correspondin g time limits
on those services do not apply when the child is returned to the home of at least one parent at the disposition hearing , but only at a disposition hearing whe n the court finds that neither parent can safely assume custody of the child. The issue of whether the services provided father fell short of the statutory requirements is a question of statutory interpretation. As such, we apply a de novo standard of review. ( Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 849 [issues of law and statutory construction are reviewed de novo]; In re Alanna A. (2005)13

.

135 Cal.App.4th 555, 562 [where facts are not disputed, the effect or legal significance of those facts is a question of law to be reviewed de novo].) Father relies on two cases, In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636 ( A.C. ) and In re
T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154 ( T.W. ) , for the proposition that his right to
reunification services did not commence until James was removed from mother ’ s custody as well, and thus, any reunification services he received up to James ’ s removal from mother should not be considered in calculating the 12

- month period for reunification services. Both cases cited by father i nvolve similarly complicated factual situations akin to those here. In both, the child ( T.W. ) and children ( A.C. ) were removed from one parent, placed with the other, and then removed from that parent and either placed with the original parent and then cu stody ( T.W. ) or placed directly into out of home custody ( A.C. ) . The issue in each was when the time line for r eunification services began.
In A.C., the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court ’ s ruling, finding that “the
time limits for services set forth in section 361.5 do not apply if dependents are not removed from the custody of both parents at the dispositional hearing. [Citations.]” ( A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) The court explained that the “section 361.5, subdivision (a) ‘ clock ’ does not start to run against such parents unless and until the

c hildren are removed from the ph y sical custody of the parent (s) and the court determines whether the parent(s) ( are ) entitled to reunification services pursuant to the lengthy analysis set f

orth in section 361.5.” ( Id. at p. 650 , fn. omitted .) In its analysis of the issue, the court in T.W. looked at the interplay between section s 361.2 and 361.5, which were enacted as parts of a single legislative scheme and agreed with the court in A.C. ( T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; see also In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 470, 475.) It noted that the goal of section 361.5 is to promote the return of the child to parental custody. With this goal in mind, the statute contains general ru les for providing family reunification services to parents of minor children removed from parental custody and, that u nder the statute, reunification services14

.

are mandatory except in certain specified circumstances. ( T.W., supra, at p. 1165, citing § 361. 5, subds. (a) & (b)(1)

- (15).)
T he court determined that, under the plain language of section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A), the period for mandatory reunification services begins at the time of disposition and continues while the child is in foster car e or until the child is returned to the home of the parent. “The statute does not apply if, at the disposition hearing, a child does not enter foster care, but is placed with a parent. [Citation.]” ( T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) Thus, the “ clock” for services under section 361.5, subdivision (a), does not start to run “unless and until the child is removed from the physical custody of the parents and the court determines whether they are entitled to reunification services according to the le ngthy analysis set forth in that statute. [Citations.]” ( T.W., supra, at p. 1165.) Section 361.2 also pertains to the provision of reunification services, but unlike section 361.5, applies only when the minor is removed from the physical custody of o ne parent under section 361 and placed in the custody of the noncustodial parent under supervision of the juvenile court. (§ 361.2, subds. (a) & (b) ; In re Erika W., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 475.) Reunification services under section 361.2 are discret ionary and not expressly time

- limited because the minor remains in the custody of a parent and the goal of placing a child in parental custody has been met. ( In re Erika W., supra, at p. 478.) As stated by the court in T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pag e 1167 , “A comparison of section s 361.5 and 361.2 suggests there are two separate statutory tracks for services: one wh en a child is placed with a non custodial parent (§ 361.2), and another when a child is placed with someone other than a parent (§ 361.5)

. [Citation.] ” Due to the various conflicting court orders before us, the various plausible time frames for when reunification services began is either October 29, 2011, as determined by the juvenile court, which is 60 days after James was first placed i n out of home custody; January 19, 2012, when father was granted reunification services after the section 342 subsequent petition was found true; April 21, 2012, which is 60 days after15

.

James was removed from mother ’ s custody after the second section 387 pe tition was filed; or May 11, 2012, at the hearing on the section 387 petition when the juvenile court removed James from both mother and father ’ s custody and continued reunification services for both. But we need not resolve the complex and possibly confli cting rules enunciated in section s 361.2 and 361.5 and the interpretation of those rules in A.C. or T.W. because, even if the reunification period began on the latest of these dates, May 11, 2012, and continued for only seven months, until terminated on De cember 12, 2012, any potential error in this respect was harmless

. As we discuss further, below, father received reasonable services but failed to make any progress in his case plan. Therefore,

s ubstantial evidence independently supports termination of s ervices for him

. As noted earlier, the statutory language set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (a) “establishes a dual

- track approach based on the dependent minor ’ s age. If the child is under three, the default position is six months of reunificat ion services. If the child is over three, the default position is 12 months. For both categories, the outer limit is 18 months. But none of these time periods is immutable.” ( In re Derrick S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 436, 444

- 445 ( Derrick S. ) .) Here, in asmuch as James was four years old in April of 2012, the default period for reunification services was 12 months. However, as noted by the court in Derrick S. , “there is no absolute right to receive the maximum amount of statutorily fixed services in any and all circumstances.” ( Id. at p. 445.) This follows the principle stated in In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234 ( Aryanna
C. ) that “reunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional

‘ “entitlement” ’ to those services.” ( Id

. at p. 1242; Derrick S. , supra, at p. 445.) Thus, for dependent children over the age of three “ ‘ [n]owhere is it provided that a minimum of 12 months of services is required

.... ’ ” ( Derrick S., supra, at p. 445 , italics in original .) The statutory langu age set forth in section 366.21, subdivision (e) fortifies this conclusion, which provides, in part, as follows:16

.

“At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing,

... the court shall order the return of the child to the physica l custody of his or her parent ... unless the court finds ... that the return of the child ... would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or em otional well

- being of the child

.... The failure of the parent ... to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court

- ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination, the court shall ... consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the paren t ... and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided

.... ” After addressing various situations that are not applicable to the instant case, subdivision (e) goes on to state: “In all other cases, the court shall direct that any reunification services previously order e d shall continue to be offered to the parent ... pursuant to the time period set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 361.5, provided that the court may modify the terms and conditions of those services. [¶] If the child is not returned to his or her parent ..., the court shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent ... have been provided or offered to the parent

.... The court shall order that those services be initiated, continued, o r terminated. ” (Italics added.)
In Aryanna C., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, the court was faced with the issue of whether the juvenile court had acted appropriately when it terminated services for the parent of a child under the age of three, even before the conclusion of the initial six

month reunification period. In support of its conclusion that the juvenile court had acted appropriately, the appellate court explained such a termination was not only consistent with the language of the applicable statu tes, but also “with the purposes underlying the dependency system. Where, as the record shows in this case, the likelihood of reunification is extremely low [citation], a continuation of the reunification period would waste scarce resources and delay perm anency for dependent minors.” ( Id. at p. 1242.) The court noted that its “interpretation of the pertinent statutes is consistent with the legislative intent behind the statutory scheme

- ‘ to balance efforts to reunify the family
with the child ’ s need f

or stability. ’ ” ( I

bid .) Moreover, the court emphasized that17

.

“reunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional ‘ “entitlement” ’ to those services. [Citation.] [¶] ... [Thus it] remains within the discretion of the juvenile
court to d etermine whether continued services are in the best interests of the minor, or whether those services should be ended at some point before six months have elapsed.” ( Id. at pp. 1242

- 1243, fn. omitted.)
In Derrick S., supra, 1 56 Cal.App.4th 436, the court applied the reasoning of Aryanna C., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 1234 to a case involving the termination of services for the parent of a child who was over the age of three. There, the court addressed the issue of whether it was ever appropriate to terminate services short of the 12

- month point
in a case of an older child. Based upon the reasoning of Aryanna C. , the court concluded it was: “No statute or rule of court restricts a juvenile court ’ s discretion to order less than
the maximum amount of reunificat ion services when confronted with a parent who is unwilling or unable to benefit from additional reunification services, or if for other reasons the likelihood of reunifying the family is faint.” ( Derrick S., supra, at p. 439.) Here, the juvenile court g ranted the social services agency ’ s request to terminate services, finding, in part, that father ’ s mental health had deteriorated “over the course of this case” and that, while father may have at one point had the capacity to care for James, “that capacity has been compromised.” The juvenile court noted father ’ s psychological

exam and the various reports in his file, which indicated father had a tendency to avoid difficult issues and had an inability to care for himself even after all of the maintenance

an d reunification services offered him, making it especially difficult for him to meet the special needs of James. The report prepared in anticipation of the December 2012 hearing supports the juvenile court ’ s determination. At the time, father continued to live with his parents in
their home. While father continued to attend counseling, he had made “no further progress,” as he was still unable to li v e independent of his parents and still claimed he was unable to work, cook or clean for himself. The cou nselor questioned father ’ s ability18

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to care for even James ’ s basic needs. And while father had completed the parenting program, the counselor was unable to determine that father understood what he had
learned. Father had attended two

- hour weekly visits wi th James, although at time s he played with his phone or insisted on wearing earphones, and therefore was not engaging with James. The social worker reported that father had “basically completed his case plan but has made little progress in being able to d emonstrate that he can care for his son alone because he is unable to care for himself.” Father often forgot appointments, including court dates. And while father made no progress in getting a place of his own so that he could have James visit, he also d id not want James to visit at father ’ s parents ’
home because he did not want his father around James. We recognize that the exercise of discretion to terminate services short of 12
months will be “very infrequent. ” ( Derrick S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th a t p. 450.) “Such a decision will be warranted only in those situations where the parent has already received or been offered reunification services, thus giving the juvenile court a basis for evaluating whether additional services will be utilized by the parent in the time remaining for reunification. Only from this historical perspective will the juvenile court be able to conclude ... that ‘ the likelihood of reunification is extremely low. ’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) Here, while the 12

- month “clock” may not h ave begun to run until April of 2012, father
receiv ed a total of more than 26 months of combined family maintenance and
reunification services. The juvenile court had an adequate “historical perspective” from
which to determine that the likelihood of reun ification in the remaining four months was extremely low. ( Ibid. ) We find the evidence was more than sufficient to support the juvenile court ’ s conclusion that the likelihood of reunification was extremely low, even if father had been given an additi onal four months of reunification services as argued here. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating services when
it did.19

.

II. REASONABLENESS OF REUNIFICATION SERVICES
Father contends that the juvenile court e rred when it found reasonable
reunification services had been offered or provided. Sp ecifically, father argues that his
claims that he s uffered from Asperger ’ s were ignored . We disagree.

“Family preservation is the priority when dependency proceedings
co mmence. [Citation.] ‘ Reunification services implement “the law ’ s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible.” [Cita tion.] ’ [Citation.] Therefore, reasonable reunification services must usually be offered to a parent. [Citation.] [The social services agency] must make ‘ “ ‘ a good faith effort ’ ” ’ to provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family. [Citation.] ‘ [T]he plan must be specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family [c itation], and must be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the juvenile court ’ s jurisdictional finding

. [ C itation

. ] ’ [Citation.] ... The adequacy of [the social services agency ’ s] efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to th e circumstances of the particular case. [Citation.]” ( Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1501.) “It is the job of [the social services agency] to assist parents with inadequate parenting skills in remedying the sources of the prob lem, not to eradicate the problem itself.” ( In re
Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) We realize, however, “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfec t. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” ( In re
Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.A pp.4th 538, 547.) The applicable inquiry is wh ether the social services agency did all that is reasonably possible to do in order to help the parent accomplish the return of his or her child. ( In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 839 .) However, if the parent believes they are not receiving reasonabl e services, they should call upon the court to help or seek the assistance of their attorney do so. ( In re Christina
L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) A parent ’ s emotional issues do not excuse them from20

.

a failure to participate. Some capacity to achiev e reunification goals is presumed. ( Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) We review the juvenile court ’ s finding of reasonable services for substantial evidence. (

Angela S. v. Superior Court , supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) Father ’ s sole contention is that he was not provided reasonable services because the social services agency did not refer him for evaluation and services for his claimed diagnosis of Asperger ’ s. Father mentioned that he believed he had been dia gnosed w ith Asperger ’ s around the time that James was removed from his care, but such diagnosis was never confirmed. Father claims this diagnosis was made by a doctor during his social security disability
evaluation

. Because father had mental health issues, he w as referred for counseling with Melissa Hale. Hale, in turn, referred father to Dr. Edward Moles for a psychological evaluation “to determine if there are any underlying mental health issues which may impact his ability to parent his child.” As part of Dr. Moles ’ s report, he included medical records from father ’ s mental
health admission to a med ical center in December of 2011. 3 Father was admitted on a “5150 for danger to self.” While in the hospital, father mentioned that he had been diagnose d with A sperger ’ s s yndrome and that he had researched the diagnosis, which made him “sever e ly depressed.” The discharge diagnosis wa s for “ Axis I: Depressive
Disorder NOS [¶] Axis II: Deferred, ” but makes no mention of Asperger ’ s. Dr. Moles opined that father ’ s behavior “suggested the presence of adult ADHD.”
Dr. Moles questioned whether father had an “actual diagnosis” for Asperger ’ s because
his medical record s from his recent hos pital stay indicated that his “decompensation”

was due , in part, to father ’ s be lief that he had been so diagnose d

. Dr. Moles stated that,

3 The record lists this date as December of 2012, but it was obviously December of 2011.21

.

while father exhibited some of the symptoms associated with Asperger ’ s, he did not have others, and he made “no effort in this evaluati on to verify this diagnosis.” Dr. Moles ’ s diagnosis was that father suffered from A xis I: d y sthymia and ADHD, and Axis II:
p ersonality d isorder NOS with avoidant and schizoid features. Dr. Moles recommended continued parenting training for father and noted that
father ’ s avoidant tendencies would make it difficu lt for him to parent James, compounded by James ’ s autism , which would make parenting even more difficult and frustrating. This, in turn, would trigger father ’ s avoidant behaviors, likely resulting in neglect. According to Dr. Moles, father had a high pro bability of turning over responsibility of James to someone else, like a girlfriend. Dr. Moles recommended that
father continue his medication and be evaluated for medication for ADHD , but did not recommend any further testing for Asperger ’ s. Dr. Moles ’ s report was attached to the disposition report for the hearing which ultimately concluded on May 11, 2012. Father did not appear on May 10 or May 11, 2012, when arguments and a ruling were held regarding disposition. Father ’ s counsel, who was present, stated, “[Father] has services, and he seems to be doing just fine, and I will leave the rest to the Court.” No objection was made to Dr. Moles ’ s evaluation and no request was ever made for additional testing or help on father ’ s claimed diagnosis of Asper ger ’ s

. The social worker attempted to verify father ’ s claim of having been diagnosed with Asperger ’ s, but father could not tell her the name of the doctor who made the diagnosis, nor th e name or location of the clinic. Further attempts to find this information proved futile. It was not until the hearing on December 12, 2012, that father ’ s cou nsel first
mentioned father ’ s request that he receive “services designed for a person with Asperger ’ s ....” Counsel for the social services agency stated that there was no evidence that father had been diagnosed with Asperger ’ s, only his self

- diagnosis. The juvenile22

.

court agreed , in making its ruling terminating services, that there was no evidence of an actual diagnosis

. Father argues further that, be cause he was participating but not progressing in his case plan, it was ipso facto inadequate. Not so. As noted by Dr. Moles , father had both dependent and avoidant aspects to his personality , which would make it difficult for him to parent a child , espe cially a difficult child like James . Melissa Hale reported that counseling with father was hampered by his avoidant personality traits , which made it difficult to delve deeper into issues. Father himself told the social worker that without his girlfrien d, he could not take care of himself, and, when he and his girlfriend broke up, he then moved in with his father, whom he claimed abused hi m as a teenager. “[ T ] he record should show that the supervising agency i dentified the problems leading to the l oss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parent[] during the course of the service plan, and
made reasonabl e efforts to assist the parent[ ] in areas wh ere compliance proved
difficult ....” ( I

n re Riva M. , supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) Here, the social services department identified father ’ s mental health issues.
Melissa Hale and Dr. Moles both found father suffer ed from a serious personality disorder and that the severity of this personal ity disorder made it unlikely that he would benefit from services within the time allowed by law. Moreover, to the extent father ’ s failure was one of his own choosing, reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indiffere nt parent. ( In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.) In light of the services offered father, his failure to win back James indicates his lack of interest or capacity, rather than inadequacy of services offered. ( In re Laura F.,

supra, 33 C al.3d at p. 839.) Under these circumstances, the juvenile court properly found that the social services agency had provided reasonable reunification services to father.23

. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.

_____________________ Franson, J. WE CONCUR:

_____________________ Cornell, Act ing P.J.

_____________________ Poochigian, J.