IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 56529-3-II

Respondent,

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CHRISTOPHER ALEX SLIPKO,

Appellant.

PRICE,J. — Christopher Slipko pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder and two 

counts of first degree assault for crimes he committed when he was 15 years old. The parties made 

a joint recommendation for an exceptional mitigated sentence based on the mitigating qualities of 

Slipko’s youth. The sentencing court decided that an exceptional mitigated sentence was 

appropriate, but imposed a greater sentence than the joint recommendation. 

Slipko appeals his sentence. He argues that (1) the sentencing court failed to meaningfully 

consider the mitigating qualities of youth as they applied to him, (2) the sentencing court erred by 

presumptively applying the adult Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA)

1

standards, (3) the case 

should be remanded to a different sentencing court judge, (4) the judgment and sentence 

erroneously included discretionary supervision fees, the victim penalty assessment (VPA), and the 

DNA collection fee, and (5) remand is necessary to correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment. 

 

1 Ch. 9.94A RCW. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 10, 2023
No. 56529-3-II

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We affirm the trial court’s exceptional sentence. However, we remand to the superior court 

to strike discretionary supervision fees, the DNA collection fee, and correct a scrivener’s error in 

the judgment and sentence. We also remand for the superior court to determine Slipko’s indigency 

and, following this determination, reconsider the imposition of the VPA. 

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2021, Slipko agreed with two friends and his younger brother to rob S.K., an 

acquaintance of Slipko’s.

2

 The group lured S.K. to Slipko’s apartment complex purportedly to 

buy drugs from Slipko. S.K.’s cousin, J.P., and S.K.’s pregnant girlfriend, J.R., were in S.K.’s car. 

After S.K. paid Slipko for the drugs, Slipko pulled out a gun and pointed it directly at S.K., and 

said, “Give me all your sh[*]t!” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 317. S.K. accelerated away. As S.K. 

drove away, both Slipko and one of his friends fired shots at the fleeing car. As S.K.’s car turned 

the corner away from the apartment complex, two others in the group, including Slipko’s younger 

brother, opened fire at S.K.’s fleeing car. A bullet fired by Slipko’s brother struck S.K. in the 

neck. S.K. died from his injuries eight days later. 

Slipko was charged in juvenile court with first and second degree murder, three counts of 

first degree assault, conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, and second degree unlawful 

possession of a firearm. 

 

2 The crimes were committed about two weeks before Slipko’s 16th birthday. 
No. 56529-3-II

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II. SLIPKO’S PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND MITIGATION PACKAGE 

Slipko received a forensic psychological evaluation by Dr. Brent Oneal to evaluate mental 

functioning and psychological factors relevant for consideration in declination proceedings. The 

evaluation described Slipko’s family, academic, social, criminal, and substance abuse history. It 

stated that Slipko was physically abused by his biological father and he regularly observed his 

father abuse his mother. His father used drugs and alcohol and left the home when Slipko was 

young. Additionally, Slipko was raised by a single mother who did not provide discipline, his 

family grew up in poverty in a high-crime area, and Slipko struggled academically in school. 

According to the psychologist, Slipko acknowledged needing help to address his problems, 

demonstrated a positive attitude toward personal change, and recognized the value of therapy and 

personal responsibility. But the psychologist also stated in his evaluation that Slipko’s aggressive 

behaviors could pose a problem for treatment. The psychologist opined that Slipko met the criteria 

for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder, conduct disorder, and 

polysubstance use disorder based on his reported history and behaviors. The psychologist 

concluded that Slipko posed a “moderate-to-high risk of future violence, based on moderate violent 

and aggressive tendencies, high level of planned and extensive criminality, [and] high level of 

callous-unemotional traits,” but that there were “good prospects of rehabilitation” for him in the 

juvenile justice system given his high level of motivation and amenability for treatment. CP at 

308, 310. 

Slipko’s counsel also prepared a mitigation package that included information about 

Slipko’s background. The package suggested that Slipko’s academic struggles as a child may have 

been, in large part, due to a language barrier. Slipko’s family immigrated to the United States 
No. 56529-3-II

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from Ukraine before he was born and spoke Russian in the household. Slipko reported that he 

began using marijuana on a daily basis starting at the age of 10 and abused other substances like

acid, alcohol, “Molly,” and cocaine. CP at 298. Slipko said he was always high when he 

committed crimes. 

III. DECLINATION HEARING 

On November 23, 2021, the parties appeared before the juvenile court for a declination 

hearing to determine whether juvenile court authority should be retained. The parties presented a 

written stipulation and agreement in which Slipko waived his right to a contested decline hearing, 

stipulated to facts regarding his role in the commission of the crime, and requested transfer of his 

case to adult court. The agreement also showed that Slipko agreed to plead guilty in adult court to 

one count of first degree murder and two counts of first degree assault, all with firearm sentencing 

enhancements. In return, the State agreed to a joint sentencing recommendation whereby, if 

accepted by the sentencing court, Slipko would be released on his 25th birthday. The joint 

recommendation amounted to nine years of confinement, plus an additional three years of 

community custody. Slipko acknowledged that the court was not bound by the parties’ sentencing 

recommendation and could impose the maximum sentence authorized by law. 

The juvenile court heard from both parties about the propriety of declining Slipko from 

juvenile court to adult court. The State noted that decline would offer a greater period of time to 

rehabilitate Slipko than the Juvenile Justice Act (JJA)3 would allow, stating that “there is some 

 

3 Ch. 13.40 RCW. 
No. 56529-3-II

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hope and optimism that he can be rehabilitated[] and that he can turn things around.” Verbatim 

Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Nov. 23, 2021) (declination hearing) at 17. 

The juvenile court said that it reviewed a copy of the stipulation and Slipko’s mitigation 

package, which included the psychological evaluation. Following its review of the materials, the 

juvenile court commented: 

Looking at these, and in particular I was struck by the psychological evaluation, the 

psychologist pointed out . . . . a number of very significant things, and they’re also 

pointed out here in the stipulation. 

One of them is sort of the level of autonomy that [Slipko] was operating under when 

this offense was happening. Basically, he was not involved actively in school, a lot 

of absentees. He wasn’t following the rules at home. Basically, kind of living the 

rule[s] of the street. He was involved in adult activities. Not necessarily committed 

by adults but involved other individuals that were older than him that were involved 

in gun-related offenses, robberies, drug-related offenses. All of that showing a 

significant level of adult criminal-type behaviors. 

That’s significantly a concern because if you consider a juvenile and what’s 

believed to be the adolescent brain development where a juvenile’s brain doesn’t 

fully develop they say until between the ages of 23 and 25, if you keep a person 

involved in those kind[s] of activities in the juvenile system, and they get released 

at age 21, they haven’t matured. They haven’t really developed the kind of skills 

that would be appropriate to help them be able to survive in the adult world after 

that. 

VRP (declination hearing) at 25-27. Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that adult jurisdiction 

was in the best interests of both Slipko and the public, and Slipko was declined to adult court. 

IV. GUILTY PLEA, VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS, AND JOINT RECOMMENDATION

Later the same day, the case proceeded with plea and sentencing in adult court before the 

same judge. Slipko pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder and two counts of first 

degree assault, all with firearm sentencing enhancements. Prior to accepting the plea, the 

sentencing court reconfirmed with Slipko that although the parties would be presenting a joint 
No. 56529-3-II

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recommendation, he understood the sentencing court was not bound by the parties’ 

recommendation. The sentencing court also confirmed with Slipko the standard range for each 

count, which amounted to a total standard range of 606 to 742 months with enhancements. 

Following its colloquy with Slipko, the sentencing court accepted his guilty plea. 

The sentencing court next heard testimony from S.K.’s family. The family did not support 

the joint sentencing recommendation. S.K.’s mother told the sentencing court, 

The plea that is being offered to you, [Slipko], today makes me sick. Our state is 

failing those who walk in our shoes, the victims. . . . 

[Slipko] is being offered nine years until he’s 25 until his brain reaches adult 

maturity. So[,] [Slipko] will spend only his immature years of his life in juvenile 

detention. Then as soon as he reaches the mature age, the age they are saying that 

your brain is fully developed to understand right from wrong and the severity of the 

crimes committed, he’s just going to be released. How is that going to rehabilitate 

anyone? 

Here all of us are struggling every day with broken hearts, serious mental health 

issues, PTSD, anxiety, depression, et cetera, because our loved one was murdered, 

and our state is so worried about the offenders and their comfort and their needs 

and rehabilitating them. I won’t say that part. Where is our comfort? When does 

someone address our needs? Where’s our rehabilitation? We are being treated as 

though we committed the crimes. Open your eyes, people. See things from our 

shoes. You’re failing all of us. 

. . . . 

This is sickening and very sad. I get very angry and emotional about all of this.

Say it? You motherf[*]ckers murdered my son, and just like every other time 

before you guys found yourself in trouble, you are being forced to suffer the 

consequences. Just please listen to what I’m saying and don’t allow these boys to 

get away with murder. Hand them a punishment that makes an impact on them, 

and maybe then less people will have to walk in our shoes. . . . 
No. 56529-3-II

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VRP (Nov. 23, 2021) (guilty plea and sentencing) at 17-19. After the family’s statements 

concluded, Slipko’s counsel requested that the sentencing court accept the parties’ joint 

recommendation that would release Slipko on his 25th birthday, specifically pointing to his youth: 

He’s 15 at the time this offense occurs. The [c]ourt, in reviewing that, will find 

he’s an immigrant with a single mother who was left to his own devices. He was 

subject to everything around him at the time. He wasn’t going to school, and I 

understand that cuts both ways. He had a complete inability to appreciate the 

seriousness of what the consequences were going to be from his actions on January 

28th. 

. . . .

I know the [c]ourt’s reviewed the mitigation [package]. [Slipko’s] life touches on 

all of the things that the courts consider when sentencing under youthfulness 

components. Obviously[,] his age, his developmental maturity, his engagement in 

risk behavior, his inability to appreciate consequences, his poor impulse control, 

his educational deficiencies, his socioeconomic status, and obviously his lack of 

parental support. All of those things contribute to the child that’s before this court, 

and that are all factors that the courts indicate this court should consider when 

imposing an appropriate sentence. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 30-31. 

V. SENTENCING

Prior to imposing its sentence, the sentencing court acknowledged the difficulty of the case, 

Okay. So[,] this is a terrible case from both sides. It’s two families that were 

struggling with a lot of their own issues. People talk about drug use, and that there 

is a drug system that’s being a victimless crime; that drugs should be legalized 

because there are not real victims when we talk about drugs. This is a prime 

example of how drugs lead to terrible consequences. These drug rip-off crimes are 

becoming more and more common, and, typically, they end up with somebody 

being shot and killed. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 34. The sentencing court also commented on the role that 

parenting plays in these types of crimes, stating,
No. 56529-3-II

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Sixteen-year-olds shouldn’t be running around the street with guns. Seventeenyear-olds shouldn’t be running around the streets with guns. As parents, we need 

to do better, and as difficult as it [is] to police your child, you need to be policing 

your child from both sides. Some families are ill-equipped to do that for their own 

issues, their own history of abuse, their being victims, not really understanding. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 34. The sentencing court then tied its general comments to 

Slipko’s particular environment and familial circumstances, observing,

Certainly[,] in [Slipko’s] family coming to America, having difficulties with 

language. All of those [unintended] consequences that happen when you’re an 

immigrant family, and the environment and the neighborhood where [Slipko] was 

living. I believe the psychological evaluation talks about [Slipko’s] brother having 

a fight to get out of the building to go play on the street. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 34.

Thereafter, the sentencing court addressed Houston-Sconiers and its application to Slipko. 

The sentencing court stated,

But we have a situation where two young people, ill-equipped to deal with 

consequences, ill-equipped to understand the nature of their actions, and really to 

appreciate the consequences. In the Houston-Sconiers case, which is a case in our 

state, requires the [c]ourt to consider youthfulness, the ability to appreciate 

consequences, the adolescent brain development, the level of maturity, all of those 

things, and take that into consideration. A judge sentencing a youth is not bound 

by what are the standard sentence ranges. Their hands are basically free to impose 

any reasonable sentence that the law allows. 

[Slipko] was the victim of a lot of violence in this family. He was the victim of 

himself being abused and witnessing abuse. And the impact of domestic violence 

on young children is significant. It does alter their brain chemistry. It sets them up 

for future drug use. It sets them up for school failure. It sets them up to becoming 

victims themselves and/or perpetrators of crime. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 36-37. 

The sentencing court then found that there were substantial and compelling reasons to grant 

an exceptional sentence downward based on Slipko’s youth. The sentencing court noted,
No. 56529-3-II

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So I do find that there are substantial and compelling reasons to grant an exceptional 

sentence downward in this case based upon the age of [Slipko] at the time of the 

offense, the nature of the offense, his inability to appreciate the consequence of his 

acts. The fact that he had limited school success. The psychological evaluation 

indicates that he was performing below average [level] in terms of his intelligence. 

Although he’s described to be a highly intelligent young man in terms of actual 

testing, that didn’t come through in the testing, and that may be a product of the 

language barrier at various times in his life. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 38. 

However, the sentencing court ultimately did not accept the parties joint sentencing 

recommendation that would release Slipko on his 25th birthday. The sentencing court stated, 

But, on the other hand, I can’t ignore that there was a murder that was committed 

here. I can’t ignore the fact that two people were shot at. And if he were to be 

sentenced a straight-up adult offender, he would be looking at 360 months roughly 

plus the two consecutive counts of another 180 months with 15 years of flat time 

for the firearm enhancements. 

I appreciate the work that went into this and the attempt at resolution. But as I said 

at the beginning, I’m not bound by an agreed sentence recommendation. I can’t 

ignore the fact that [S.K.] lost his life, and two other people were shot at and could 

have been killed, and the baby could have been a victim of this as well. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 38-39. 

The sentencing court still imposed an exceptional downward sentence, but imposed a total 

confinement of 216 months (18 years), including all enhancements running concurrently.

4

 The 

sentencing court also imposed 36 months of community custody upon release.

The sentencing court summed up by stating, 

There is a benefit to keeping [Slipko] in the juvenile system as long as possible, but 

I also think that for a murder conviction, first degree murder conviction along with 

the assault in the first degree conviction, sending a message that a nine-year 

sentence is appropriate is the wrong message. I just can’t do that to other people 

 

4 The judgment and sentence imposed 193 months for each count of assault, but the sentencing 

court orally stated that it imposed 123 months on each assault count. 
No. 56529-3-II

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out there and other people that I will sentence in the future for similar type 

behaviors. 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 39-40. The sentencing court concluded by encouraging Slipko 

to take advantage of the educational programs and vocational training at the “Juvenile 

Rehabilitation Administration” (JRA) to reduce the likelihood of him returning to criminal 

behavior upon his release. 

The sentencing court also reduced its sentencing decision to written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. The written document acknowledged that the sentencing court had considered 

all arguments from both parties and all written reports presented. The written findings included 

the following: 

4. [T]he defendant’s development maturity, his vulnerability to peer pressure, his 

inability to foresee the consequences of his actions, his self-regulation deficits, his 

poor impulse control, and overall brain development are further substantial and 

compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence, as recognized by higher 

[c]ourts. 

5. [J]ustice is best served by the imposition of an exceptional sentence based on 

the defendant’s family and living situation at the time of the incident, his 

educational circumstances at the time of the incident, and his use of drugs around 

the time of the incident. 

. . . . 

8. Because of the presence of the above mitigating factors, and considering the 

purpose of the [SRA], and considering youthfulness and other factors identified by 

the reviewing [c]ourts, a sentence within the standard range is not [an] appropriate 

sentence. An exceptional sentence below the standard range is appropriate. 

CP at 55-56. 

Slipko appeals his sentence. 
No. 56529-3-II

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ANALYSIS

Slipko appeals, making several arguments. First, Slipko argues the sentencing court failed 

to meaningfully consider the mitigating factors of youth when it imposed his exceptional mitigated 

sentence. Second, Slipko argues that the sentencing court did not sentence him commensurate 

with the culpability of a child when it presumptively applied the adult SRA standards. Third, 

Slipko claims that that the judgment and sentence erroneously included discretionary supervision 

fees, a DNA fee, and a VPA. And fourth, Slipko argues that we should remand to correct a 

scrivener’s error in the judgment and sentence. Each argument will be addressed in turn.5 

I. YOUTH AS A MITIGATING FACTOR 

Slipko argues that the sentencing court failed to meaningfully consider the mitigating 

factors of youth when it imposed his exceptional mitigated sentence. We disagree. 

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“[C]hildren are different from adults” for sentencing purposes. State v. Houston-Sconiers,

188 Wn.2d 1, 18, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). Although the sentencing court has broad discretion to 

impose an appropriate sentence, it also must ensure that proper consideration is given to mitigating 

qualities of youth. Id. at 21; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d 581, 

596, 520 P.3d 939 (2022) (sentencing courts may exercise discretion to sentence below adult 

standard range based on juvenile’s diminished culpability). We review sentencing decisions for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 116, 456 P.3d 806 (2020). 

 

5 Slipko also argues that, if remanded, this case should be heard before a different judicial officer 

because the sentencing judge was biased. Whether or not there is any merit to Slipko’s argument, 

it is moot. As Slipko concedes in his reply brief, the particular judicial officer has retired from the 

bench. 
No. 56529-3-II

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Houston-Sconiers requires sentencing courts to consider factors when sentencing any 

juvenile in adult court, including: (1) the mitigating circumstances of youth, including the 

juvenile’s “ ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,’ ” (2) the 

juvenile’s environment and family circumstances, (3) their participation in the crime and the 

possible effects of familial and peer pressure, (4) “how youth impacted any legal defense,” and (5) 

“any factors suggesting that the child might be successfully rehabilitated.” Houston-Sconiers,

188 Wn.2d at 23 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 

407 (2012)). 

Meaningful consideration of the Houston-Sconiers factors requires courts to do more than 

merely recite the differences between juveniles and adults. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 121. The 

court must meaningfully consider the differences between juveniles and adults, including “ ‘how 

those differences apply to the facts of the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420,

434-35, 387 P.3d 650 (2017)). Courts “must ‘receive and consider relevant mitigation evidence 

bearing on the circumstances of the offense and the culpability of the offender . . . . ’ ” Id. (quoting 

Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 443). This can include expert and lay testimony. Id. 

Age does not automatically entitle every juvenile defendant to an exceptional downward 

sentence. State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 285, 516 P.3d 1213 (2022). The juvenile defendant 

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there are substantial and 

compelling reasons warranting an exceptional sentence below the standard range. Ramos,

187 Wn.2d at 434. A juvenile “must show that their immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to 

appreciate risks and consequences—characteristics of youth that suggest a juvenile offender may 

be less culpable than an adult offender—contributed to the commission of their crime.” Anderson,
No. 56529-3-II

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200 Wn.2d at 285. A sentencing court is not required to impose an exceptional sentence below 

the standard range if it considers the qualities of youth at sentencing and determines that a standard 

range is appropriate. See Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21. And while the sentencing court

must focus on the mitigating qualities of youth, they must bear in mind the facts of the particular

case, including those that counsel in favor of punishment. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 286. 

B. APPLICATION

Slipko argues that the sentencing court failed to meaningfully consider the mitigating 

factors of youth as applied to him and did not thoroughly explain its reasoning. Slipko further 

claims that the sentencing court imposed its sentence based on broad generalizations and personal 

opinions and decided to make an example out of Slipko. Slipko’s claims are unpersuasive. 

Here, the sentencing court spoke at length about the mitigating qualities of youth and 

Slipko’s particular circumstances both at the declination hearing and, later that same day, at the 

sentencing hearing. The sentencing court considered and spoke about Slipko’s mitigation package, 

his psychological evaluation, presentations from the parties and family members, and the joint 

sentencing recommendation. 

All of the Houston-Sconiers factors were folded into the sentencing court’s considerations. 

As to the first factor, the mitigating circumstances of youth, the sentencing court recognized that 

Slipko was not prepared to understand the nature of his actions and their consequences. The 

sentencing court noted that it was also required to consider adolescent brain development, the level 

of maturity, and “all of those things.” VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 37. The sentencing 

court also stated that being a victim of, and witnessing, violence and abuse, alters a young child’s 

brain chemistry. 
No. 56529-3-II

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As to the second factor, the juvenile’s environment and family circumstances, the 

sentencing court discussed at length Slipko being a victim of violence in his family home and 

noted that young children who are victims of domestic violence are set up to become perpetrators

of crime. The sentencing court also heard from Slipko’s counsel who explained that Slipko was 

an immigrant, had a single mother who did not supervise him, and he did not attend school. And 

the sentencing court further recognized that these issues likely contributed to Slipko’s limited 

success in school. The sentencing court said the evaluation showed that Slipko performed below 

average in testing (perhaps due to a language barrier) despite also describing him as a highly 

intelligent young man. 

As to the third factor, the juvenile’s participation in the crime and the effect of any family 

or peer pressures, the sentencing court discussed Slipko’s participation in a drug rip-off crime that 

resulted in a murder and two additional people being shot at. Moreover, the sentencing court also 

found in its written findings that Slipko’s vulnerability to peer pressure was one of several further 

substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. 

As to the fourth and fifth factors, how youth impacted any legal defense and any factors 

suggesting that the child might be rehabilitated, the sentencing court reviewed the mitigation 

package, including the psychological evaluation, and heard extensive evidence about Slipko and 

his potential for rehabilitation. For example, the psychologist’s report noted that Slipko posed a 

“moderate-to-high risk of future violence” but that there were “good prospects of rehabilitation” 

in the juvenile justice system. CP at 308, 310. The State argued at the declination hearing that 

there was “some hope and optimism” for Slipko. VRP (declination hearing) at 17. Slipko, through 

his counsel, also expressed his regret for his actions and the pain and suffering he caused the 
No. 56529-3-II

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victim’s family and wanted to take responsibility. And the sentencing court based, at least in part, 

its decision at the declination hearing on trying to maximize Slipko’s development of skills that 

would help him “survive in the adult world.” VRP (declination hearing) at 27. The sentencing 

court also directly tied Slipko’s extensive exposure to family violence to an alteration of brain 

chemistry that could set him up for future failures with school, drug use, and being a future victim 

or perpetrator of crime. Finally, after imposing its sentence, the sentencing court also told Slipko 

that it hoped that he took advantage of the educational programs and vocational training while in 

the JRA to help avoid the possibility of him returning to criminal behaviors. 

After considering the evidence relevant to the Houston-Sconiers’ factors, the sentencing

court agreed that an exceptional sentence downward was appropriate. As the sentencing court 

wrote in his written findings,

[T]he defendant’s development maturity, his vulnerability to peer pressure, his 

inability to foresee the consequences of his actions, his self-regulation deficits, his 

poor impulse control, and overall brain development are further substantial and 

compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence, as recognized by higher 

[c]ourts. 

CP at 55. Nevertheless, the sentencing court rejected the joint recommendation of the parties, 

explaining that it could not ignore the fact that the victim lost his life and two other people were 

shot at and could have been killed.6 

 

6 The 216 month sentence imposed by the sentencing court was still significantly lower than the 

standard range of 606 to 742 months. 
No. 56529-3-II

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Still, Slipko challenges the sufficiency of the sentencing court’s consideration of the 

Houston-Sconiers factors. He argues that the sentencing court engaged in mere generalizations of 

how domestic violence might potentially impact a child and did not evaluate Slipko’s particular 

circumstances. He complains the sentencing court expressed its own personal opinion about the 

problematic nature of legalizing drugs, absent parents, and children having guns. Slipko contends 

that the sentencing court’s generalizations and opinions had little to do with his circumstances and 

how they mitigated his culpability. 

Slipko asks too much. Although it is true that the sentencing court made general 

observations about drugs and parenting, when reviewed as a whole, the sentencing court clearly 

considered how Slipko’s youth may have impacted his criminal behavior. The sentencing court 

did more than recite the differences between juveniles and adults. See Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at

121. Instead, by recounting the events of the evening, Slipko’s history as a victim of domestic 

abuse and violence, his absent mother, his background as an immigrant with a potential language 

barrier, his limited school success, and facts gleaned from his psychologist’s evaluation, the

sentencing court tied the Houston-Sconiers factors to the circumstances of the crime and Slipko’s 

life experiences. 

Sentencing courts have absolute discretion to impose whatever sentence they deem 

appropriate so long as they meaningfully consider youth at sentencing. Houston-Sconiers, 188

Wn.2d at 9, 21, 23. Here, the end result from the sentencing court’s consideration of Slipko’s 

youth was an exceptional mitigated sentence, just not one requested by the parties. Although 

Slipko takes issue with the court’s ruling, his criticisms ultimately go to the decision the court 

reached rather than the manner in which the court exercised its discretion. Even if we disagreed 
No. 56529-3-II

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with the sentencing court’s decision ourselves, our inquiry on appeal is not whether we agree with 

the judgment of the sentencing court, but whether the sentencing court erred in exercising its 

discretion. Viewed as a whole, we conclude that the sentencing court met its obligation to 

meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth and, thus, did not abuse its discretion when 

it imposed its exceptional sentence in this case. 

II. PRESUMPTIVE APPLICATION OF JJA STANDARDS 

Slipko next argues the sentencing court erred by presumptively applying the adult SRA 

standards because the SRA does not account for his diminished culpability and capacity for 

rehabilitation. He argues that article I, section 14 of our state constitution, and specifically, the 

prohibition against cruel punishment, categorically bars the presumptive application of adult 

sentencing standards to children whose crimes are mitigated by youth and that we should 

presumptively apply the JJA. Slipko contends that, instead of the SRA, the JJA should be 

presumptively applied because it recognizes a child’s diminished culpability and gives children 

greater opportunities for redemption and rehabilitation than the criminal justice system does for 

adults.7 We disagree. 

Slipko’s argument that the application of the SRA to juvenile offenders in adult court 

violates article I, section 14’s prohibition against cruel punishment is unpersuasive. In the first 

place, courts sentencing juveniles in adult court are not bound by the SRA ranges in the same way 

 

7 The JJA provides completely different—and far lower—sentencing ranges than the SRA for 

offenders in juvenile court. RCW 13.40.0357. As observed by the dissenting opinion in State v. 

Gregg, “Our juvenile justice system . . . gives children far more opportunities for redemption and 

rehabilitation than our criminal justice system offers to adults.” 196 Wn.2d 473, 486, 474 P.3d 

539 (2020) (González, J., dissenting). 
No. 56529-3-II

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as when sentencing adults. Sentencing courts possess “absolute discretion to depart as far as they 

want below otherwise applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements when sentencing 

juveniles in adult court, regardless of how the juvenile got there.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 

at 9. This discretion is actually broader than Slipko’s requested result of presumptively applying 

the JJA. Said another way, adopting Slipko’s argument would actually infringe upon the absolute 

discretion that Houston-Sconiers bestowed upon sentencing courts to depart as far as they want 

below the applicable SRA ranges when sentencing juveniles in adult court and youth is found to 

be a mitigating factor. 

But more importantly, adopting Slipko’s argument would require us to declare the SRA 

unconstitutional in a manner that exceeds the boundaries of current jurisprudence from our 

Supreme Court. Although children are different under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution for sentencing purposes, no Washington case has held that using the SRA when

sentencing juveniles in adult court violates our state constitution. Indeed, recent cases from our 

Supreme Court have carefully cabined the exceptions to the SRA in juvenile sentencing. For 

example, in State v. Gregg, our Supreme Court was asked to declare that juvenile sentencing must 

start with a general presumption that a mitigated sentence is required unless the State proves 

otherwise. 196 Wn.2d 473, 482, 474 P.3d 539 (2020). The Gregg Court rejected that invitation 

stating, 

Without explicitly stating as much, Gregg asks this court to rewrite the SRA and 

declare standard range sentences to be exceptional sentences when applied to 

juveniles. To reach this result, we would not only need to declare the SRA structure 

partially unconstitutional but we would also need to overrule some of our cases. 

We disagree with the arguments made by Gregg, and he has not shown that such 

relief is appropriate in this case. 
No. 56529-3-II

19

Id. at 482-83. And in State v. Anderson, the court explained that article I, section 14’s categorical 

bar on the imposition of life without parole or release sentences on juveniles whose crimes reflect 

youthful immaturity did not extend to a term-of-years sentence despite the imposition of a 61-year 

sentence in that case because, in part, judicial discretion provided the necessary protection against 

cruel punishments. 200 Wn.2d at 272, 283-84.

8

 

Here, Slipko asks us to extend article I, section 14’s invalidation of the SRA well beyond 

the lines drawn by our Supreme Court. Similar to the defendant in the Gregg case, Slipko 

essentially asks us to rewrite the SRA by having sentencing courts presumptively apply the JJA to 

juveniles being sentenced in adult court where youth has already been found to be a mitigating 

factor. Slipko provides no persuasive reason for us to take this unprecedented step in the face of 

our Supreme Court’s recent decisions. See Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at 482-83; Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 

283-85; see also 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’ship v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wn.2d 566, 590, 146 P.3d

423 (2006) (the court of appeals is bound to follow precedent established by our Supreme Court). 

This is especially true given that presumptive application of the JJA to offenders where youth is a 

mitigating factor is unnecessary—sentencing courts already have complete discretion in 

 

8 Slipko appears to urge the use of a categorial bar framework to evaluate his article I, section 14 

argument. But he offers no analysis or explanation of how he proposes to apply that two-pronged 

framework. See Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at 481 (under the categorical bar analysis, “we first consider 

‘whether there is objective indicia of a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue,’ 

then the court applies its own independent judgment to determine whether the practice is 

unconstitutional based on precedent from our cases and the court’s own understanding and 

interpretation of article I, section 14.” (quoting State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 83, 428 P.3d 343 

(2018))).
No. 56529-3-II

20

sentencing juveniles under Houston-Sconiers where youth is a mitigating factor.9 188 Wn.2d at 

9. Accordingly, we reject Slipko’s request for an expansion of the current law.

10

 In sum, we hold 

that article I, section 14 does not require presumptive application of the JJA when sentencing 

juveniles in adult court. 

III. IMPOSITION OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

Slipko argues that the judgment and sentence erroneously included discretionary 

supervision fees and those fees are no longer authorized by statute, and therefore, we should 

remand to strike these fees from his judgment and sentence. He also argues in his reply brief that 

because of recent legislative changes, we should remand to strike the VPA and the DNA collection 

fee. 

 

9 Slipko takes issue with this broad discretion, contending that it leads to unfair results because 

such discretion is subject to the sentencing court’s “ ‘imprecise and subjective judgments’ ” about 

a child’s culpability. Br. of Appellant at 41 (quoting Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 89). But Slipko fails 

to persuasively show that broad discretion, appropriately exercised, is meaningfully altered by any 

reference to the adult SRA standards by the sentencing court. 

Indeed, we reject Slipko’s suggestion that there is a presumptive application of the SRA when 

youth are sentenced in adult court. The SRA standard sentencing ranges serve as a “starting point” 

for the sentencing of juveniles. Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 596. But this is different than a 

“presumptive application” of the SRA ranges. Br. of Appellant at 33. As noted above, trial courts 

have full discretion to impose any sentence below the standard range if the offender has diminished 

culpability based on youth. Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 597; Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 

at 21. This could include a sentence crafted to be within the JJA sentencing ranges or even a 

sentence with no prison time at all. 

10 The State argues that Slipko waived the application of the JJA when he agreed to adult 

jurisdiction at the declination hearing, citing State v. Saenz, 175 Wn.2d 167, 174, 283 P.3d 1094 

(2012) (“When a juvenile waives juvenile court jurisdiction he or she also waives the increased 

protections of the juvenile justice system, exiting a system designed to rehabilitate and entering a 

system designed to punish.”). Because we decide that article I, section 14 does not require 

presumptive application of the JJA as urged by Slipko, we do not address this argument. 
No. 56529-3-II

21

The State concedes that the case should be remanded to strike the supervision fees. We 

accept the State’s concession regarding the supervision fees and remand to the sentencing court to 

strike the fees related to community custody supervision from the judgment and sentence.

As for the DNA collection fee, until very recently, a court was required to impose such a 

collection fee unless the defendant’s DNA was previously collected as a result of a prior 

conviction. Former RCW 43.43.7541 (2018). But in 2023, the legislature eliminated this 

requirement. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 4. And the court must waive any DNA collection 

previously imposed, on the defendant’s motion. RCW 43.43.7541(2). Like the community 

custody supervision fees, we remand to the sentencing court to strike the DNA collection fee from 

the judgment and sentence.

Recent legislative changes have also affected the VPA. Previously, the law imposed a 

VPA of $500 on any person found convicted of one or more convictions of a felony or gross 

misdemeanor in the superior court. Former RCW 7.68.035 (2018). But in the 2023 session, the 

legislature changed the law to prohibit the imposition of the VPA on indigent defendants. LAWS

OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1; RCW 7.68.035(4). The new law also requires trial courts to waive any VPA 

imposed prior to the effective date of the amendment if the offender is indigent, on the offender’s 

motion. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1; RCW 7.68.035(5)(b). Indigency, in the context of the VPA, 

is defined by RCW 10.01.160(3). This change took effect on July 1, 2023, but applies to Slipko 

because his appeal was pending at the time. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449; State v. Ellis, __ Wn. App. 

2d __, 530 P.3d 1048, 1057-58 (2023) (the legislature’s VPA amendment applied to the defendant 

because the case was still on direct appeal). 
No. 56529-3-II

22

The sentencing court mentioned Slipko’s indigency at the sentencing hearing when it stated 

it was imposing “[n]o other costs [beyond the VPA and DNA collection fee] as he’s indigent.” 

VRP (guilty plea and sentencing) at 42. However, because it is unclear whether the sentencing 

court found Slipko indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3), we remand for the sentencing court 

to make this determination and to reconsider imposition of the VPA. 

IV. SCRIVENER’S ERROR

Slipko argues that we should remand to correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment and 

sentence. At sentencing, the court orally ordered Slipko to serve 123 months for each assault 

count, concurrent with the term of incarceration for the murder count. However, the judgment and 

sentence imposed 193 months for each count of assault. The State concedes the error and agrees 

that remand is appropriate. We accept the State’s concession and remand to correct the scrivener’s 

error. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s exceptional sentence. However, we remand to strike the 

discretionary supervision fees, the DNA collection fee, and to correct the scrivener’s error in the 

judgment and sentence. We also remand for the superior court to determine Slipko’s indigency 

and, following this determination, reconsider the imposition of the VPA. 
No. 56529-3-II

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

PRICE, J.

We concur:

GLASGOW, C.J.

MAXA, J.