NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIRCH LAW FIRM, LLP; et al.,

Appellants,

v. ELIAS NAKHLEH; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 20

- 56207
D.C. No. 2:20

- cv - 05734

- PA

- MAA

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 12, 2022 Pasadena, California Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and DANIELS, * * District Judge. Mirch Law Firm, LLP (“Mirch”) appeals the district court’s order disqualifying it as plaintiffs’ counsel in a RICO action brought by Seyed Zia Eddin
Ahmadi Abhari , Donya Entertain ment, Inc ., and Noureen Entertainment, Inc. against defendants Elias Nakhleh , Slater’s 50/50 Franchise, LLC, and Elite

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable George B. Daniels, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

MAY 26 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Restaurant Group, Inc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm. 1
1. Defendants argue that Mirch lacks standing to challenge the disqualification order. Where a disqualification order “clearly and intentionally sanction[s] an attorney,” the attorney has suffered sufficient injury

- in

- fact to have standing. United States v. Ensign , 491 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) ; see also
United States v. Talao , 222 F.3d 1133, 1137

- 38 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an attorney had standing to appeal a district court ruling that she violated an ethical
rule because it constituted a “per se” sanction). Here, given the district court’s clear findings of ethical violations , we are satisfied that Mirch has standing to appeal.
2. We review disqualification orders for abuse of discretion

. Trone v. Smith , 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980)

. “[A]n order disqualifying counsel will not be disturbed if the record reveals ‘any sound’ basis for the court’s action,” Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng’r, Inc. v. Humphrey , 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983), which may include a violation of ethical rules, see id. at 440. The district court properly applied California law in determining whether disqualification was
proper. Wininger v. SI M gmt. L.P. , 301 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

1 We grant appellees’ request for judicial notice (Dkt. 55) and deny Mirch’s request f or judicial notice ( Dkt. 15 )

.3

C.D. Cal. Local R

. 83

- 3.1.2 (re quiring attorneys in the Central District of
California to comply with California’s Rules of Professional Conduct). Relevant here, an attorney may be disqualified based on his presumed or actual acquisition of an adversary’s privileged information. See Humphrey , 722 F.2d at 440; see also Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court , 24 Cal. App. 4th 1067, 1085 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The record supports the district court’s finding that Martin Reiner obtained privileged information from D efendants during a prior lawsuit through an implied attorney

- client relationship

. See Cal. Evid. Code § 950. “[I]t is the intent and conduct of the parties that controls the question as to whether an attorney

- client relationship has been created.” Zenith Ins. Co. v. O’Connor , 148 Cal. App. 4th 998, 1010 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Defendants reasonably believed Reiner was acting

as their attorney and that their communications were privileged

. The record also supports the district court’s finding that Defendants
disclosed confidential information to Reiner that wa s materially relevant to this

case. T he party seeking disqualification need not “ disclose the actual information
contended to be conf

idential.” In re Complex Asbestos Litigation , 232 Cal. App. 3d 572, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The court should be given “the nature of the information and its material relationship to the proceeding.” Id. Defendants did so4

here, outlining the categorie s of confidential business material s Nakhleh disclosed
to Reiner , which materially relate to many of the allegations in this case

. Where a law fir m witness or employee has an adversary’s relevant, privileged information , a “rebuttable presumption arises th at the information has been used or disclosed” to the law firm. Shadow Traffic Network , 24 Cal. App. 3d

at 1085 (citing Complex Asbestos , 232 Cal. App. 3d at 59 6). Reiner claimed to be Mirch’s witness , and a lthough Mirch denies receiving confidential information
from Reiner , the district court ’s weighing of the evidence is entitled to deference. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Mirch because there is a “sound basis,” H umphrey , 722 F.2d at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted) , for the district court’s conclusion that disqualification was required to remedy the unfair advantage that P laintiffs obtained through Mirch’s representation

. 3. The district court did not violate Mirch’s due process rights by taking the motion to disqualify under submission

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 (b) ; C.D. Cal. Local
R. 7

- 15; Morrow v. Topping , 437 F.2d 1155, 1156

- 57 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ( holding that a district court’s failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss
was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
AFFIRMED.