IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

ROBERT (BOB) ROSS, § 

§ 

 Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, § 

 § 

V. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00343-Y

§ 

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL § 

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al., § 

§ 

 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. § 

UNION DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 

SANFORD R. DENISON 

Tex. Bar No. 05655560 

Baab & Denison, LLP 

6301 Gaston Ave., Suite 550 

Dallas, TX 75214 

MARGOT A. NIKITAS* 

Illinois Bar No. 6309782 

General Counsel 

Association of Professional 

 Flight Attendants 

1004 W. Euless Boulevard 

Euless, TX 76040 

WILLIAM W. OSBORNE JR.* 

D.C. Bar No. 912089 

Osborne Law Offices P.C. 

5335 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Suite 440 

Washington, D.C. 20015 

*Admitted Pro Hac Vice

Counsel for Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff 

Association of Professional Flight Attendants, and 

Defendants Julie Hedrick and Erik Harris 

 Dated: July 21, 2022 

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1 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Julie Hedrick, Erik Harris and Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Association 

of Professional Flight Attendants (“APFA”) (collectively, “Union Defendants”) by their 

undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this Motion to Dismiss the claims for relief by Plaintiff 

Robert (Bob) Ross (“Ross”) against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as a matter of law, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 

(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).1 In support of their Motion, the Union 

Defendants submit this Memorandum of Law. 

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Ross, a member and former National President of APFA, has brought this 

lawsuit against APFA and two of its current officers, National President Julie Hedrick and 

National Treasurer Erik Harris, in an attempt to vacate and annul the arbitration decision and 

order2, issued against him by Arbitrator Ruben Armendariz (“Arbitrator’s Decision and Order”). 

The facts of the case are plain from Ross’s Complaint and attached Arbitrator’s Decision and 

Order: 

Based upon internal union charges against Ross filed by two APFA members, Melissa 

Chinery-Burns and Sandra Lee (“Charging Parties”), under Article VII of the APFA 

Constitution, reviewed by the APFA Executive Committee and then referred for resolution to 

Arbitrator Armendariz, pursuant to Article VII of the APFA Constitution, a three-day hearing 

1

 This motion seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiff Ross’s claims against all Defendants herein as 

asserted in his Complaint (doc.1), leaving pending APFA’s Counterclaim against Ross asserted 

in the Union Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaim (doc. 8, at pgs.32-43, PAGE ID 32-43). As 

individual defendants Julie Hedrick and Erik Harris are not parties to APFA’s counterclaim 

against Ross, upon dismissal of Ross’s claims against the Defendants, Hedrick and Harris should 

be dismissed as parties to this action. 

2

 Attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint (doc.1-3, PAGE ID 35-51).

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was held on the record on June 16 and November 17-18, 2021. The issues as presented to the 

Arbitrator were whether Ross, when acting as the APFA National President, violated the APFA 

Constitution3 and Policy Manual by engaging “in malfeasance, fraud [and] misappropriation of 

funds” during his term of office as President” and whether any violations of the APFA 

Constitution and Policy Manual were “willful.” Arbitrator’s Decision and Order at 2. 

During the three-day hearing, the Charging Parties called five (5) witnesses to testify in 

support of their charges against Ross and Ross called three (3) witnesses in his defense. 

Arbitrator’s Decision and Order at 2. Following the close of the hearing and the filing of briefs 

by the parties, the Arbitrator issued his decision on March 19, 2022. Id. 

The Arbitrator concluded that Ross had “intentionally and willfully ignored the APFA 

Policy Manual and thus has violated his fiduciary duty as entrusted by the APFA membership.” 

Arbitrator’s Decision and Order at 22 (emphasis in original). He further observed that “Ross’s 

testimony was inconsistent and not forthright,” that Ross “should be prohibited from serving in 

any official position for life within the APFA organization,” and that he be required to resign 

from any positions within APFA that he currently held. Arbitrator’s Decision and Order at 23-24. 

As further remedies, the Arbitrator ordered that APFA assign an auditor to review Ross’s 

expenses as submitted to APFA including credit card, rental car, and mileage; that Ross repay 

APFA for any inappropriate expenses he had submitted as determined by the auditor; that Ross 

repay APFA for additional specific amounts for erroneous vacation and apartment leasing; and 

that he repay APFA for both the auditor’s fees and the Arbitrator’s fee. Arbitrator’s Decision and 

Order at 24. The Arbitrator has retained jurisdiction over compliance with the remedial issues in 

the case. Id. 

3

 The relevant provisions of the APFA Constitution and Policy Manual are restated in the 

Arbitrator’s Decision and Order at 4-7. 

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Plaintiff Ross then filed this lawsuit against APFA and its National President and 

National Treasurer—none of whom were parties to the Ross arbitration proceeding. The 

Complaint asserts federal subject matter jurisdiction to support Ross’s claims: diversity of 

citizenship, Section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§402, and the Fair Credit and Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681. Complaint, paras. 1-2, 8-10. 

Plaintiff Ross’s specific claims for relief against the Union Defendants are: 

1. To vacate the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order as purportedly violative of the Federal 

Arbitration Act, Complaint paras. 39-42; 

2. To vacate the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order as purportedly violative of LMRDA 

Section 101(a)(5), Complaint paras. 57-50; 

3. Alleged violations of the APFA Constitution, Complaint, paras. 60-66; 

4. Alleged breach of Ross’s employment contract, Complaint, paras. 69-77; and 

5. Other allegations: alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Complaint, 

paras. 67-69; defamation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, breach of fiduciary 

duty. Complaint, paras. 85-89. 

In its answer to the Complaint, APFA filed a Counterclaim4 against Ross for enforcement 

of the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order and for breach of Ross’s fiduciary duties as APFA 

National President as determined by the Arbitrator in his Decision and Order.5

As we now show, Ross’s claims for relief should all be dismissed. Under well settled 

precedent, there is no subject matter jurisdiction for Ross’s claims under either the Section 

101(a)(5) of the LMRDA or the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Moreover, none of the allegations in 

the Complaint asserts a claim upon which relief can be granted again as a matter of law. 

Dismissal of Ross’s baseless claims against the Union Defendants will leave APFA’s 

Counterclaim against Ross for enforcement of the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order and breach of 

4

 Doc. 8, at pgs.32-43, PAGE ID 32-43. 

5

 See Exhibit C to the Complaint (doc.1-3, PAGE ID 35-51). 

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fiduciary duty to be resolved by the Court. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

FRCP 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of any claim over which federal courts lack subject 

matter jurisdiction. If the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss 

the action. FRCP 12(h)(3). A court may find subject matter jurisdiction is lacking from “(1) the 

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or 

(3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” 

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 

“The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does 

in fact exist.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citation omitted). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed 

in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 

12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. Id. (citing Hitt v. City 

of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam)).

With regard to dismissal under Rule 12)b)(6), this Court recently summarized the 

relevant precedents in Oliver v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med Sch., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21289, 

2019 WL 536276 at *16-17 (2019) (J. Boyle): 

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." 

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). The 

court will "not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether relief 

should be granted based on the alleged facts." Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 

772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 

"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 

(2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks 

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for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.

When well-pleaded facts fail to achieve [*17] this plausibility standard, "the 

complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to 

relief." Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

In addition, the court may consider documents attached to the complaint in considering a 

motion under Rule 12(b)(6) if they are referred to in the plaintiffs’ complaint and are central 

to the plaintiff’s claims. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F3d 553, 536, (5th Cir. 2003). 

IV. ARGUMENT 

A. The Arbitrator’s Decision Is Not Subject to Judicial Review Under LMRDA 

Section 101(a)(5) 

The entire jurisdictional basis for Ross’s allegation that the Arbitrator’s Decision and 

Order should be vacated is LMRDA Section 101(a)(5) (Complaint, paras. 57-59) an allegation 

that is baseless as a matter of law. To the contrary, it is well settled that LMRDA Section 

101(a)(5) provides subject matter jurisdiction for judicial review of internal, union-conducted

disciplinary proceedings but not subject matter jurisdiction for judicial review of other unionrelated administrative or legal matters such as the third-party arbitration award in this case. 

Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 92-94 (1989); Guidry v. ;Operating 

Engineers Local 406, 907 F.2d 1491, 1492 (5th Cir. 1990); Webster v. United Auto Workers 

Local 5, 394 F. 3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2005); Hackenburg v. Boilermakers, 694 F. 2d 1237, 1239 

(10th Cir. 1982); Bass v. Int’l Bro. of Boilermakers, 630 F. 2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1980); Kirk v. 

Transport Workers Union, 934 F. Supp. 775, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Ryals v. ILA Local 1771, 33 

F. Supp. 3d 634, 639-40 (D.S.C. 2014). 

In other words, because there is no subject matter jurisdiction under or LMRDA Section 

101(a)(5), the only jurisdictional bases cited in the Complaint as support for a challenge to the 

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Arbitrator’s Decision and Order, any and all claims in the Complaint for vacation of the 

Arbitrator’s Decision and Order must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See FRCP 12(b)(1).6

B. Plaintiff’s Asserted Basis for Judicial Review of the Arbitrator’s Decision 

and Order Violates Settled Federal Labor Law Principles 

Even assuming, for purposes of argument only, that Ross has asserted a viable 

jurisdictional basis in the Complaint to support his challenge to the Arbitrator’s Decision and 

Order, the Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted because, on its face, 

that claim violates the federal labor law axiom requiring judicial deferral to final and binding 

labor arbitration decisions. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 

U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960); Delek Ref. Ltd. v. Local 202 Steelworkers, 891 F. 3d 566, 570 (5th Cir. 

2018); Weber Aircraft v . IBT Local 767, 253 F.3d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 2001); Refresco Bevs.v. 

Teamsters Local 997, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 238421, 2021 WL 5908988 at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. 

2021) (J. O’Connor); Teamsters Gen. Drivers Warehousemen v. Greif Packaging, LLC, 2010 

WL 1417889, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010) (J. Atlas); Allied Waste Systems Inc. v. Teamsters 

Local 767, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43035, 2007 WL 1703634 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (J. Means). 

The Fifth Circuit recently summarized the restrictive standard of judicial review of labor 

arbitration decisions in its unpublished decision in Ball Metal Container Corp. v. United Auto 

Workers Local 129, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 33214, 2022 WL 340573 at *7-8 (5th Cir. 2022): 

"Judicial review of arbitration awards is severely limited." "The standard for this 

review is 'among the narrowest known to the law.'" When an arbitration award 

6 Although Ross does not assert the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) as a basis for subject 

matter jurisdiction for judicial review and vacation of the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order 

(Complaint, Paragraph 2-3, 7-8), the Complaint does allege that the Decision and Order violates 

the FAA. Complaint, paras. 39-42. Any assertion of subject matter jurisdiction under the FAA 

would be erroneous as a matter of law. Precedent is well settled to the contrary: the FAA does 

not provide subject matter jurisdiction to review arbitration awards. Smith v. Rush Retail Ctr., 

Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (citing authorities), aff’d 360 F. 3d 504, 505 

(5th Cir. 2004); Mellado v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25471, 2004 WL 2937224 

at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (J. Lynn); Judd v. Texakoma Fin., Inc., No. 3:96-CV-26 04-P, 1996 

WL 734940, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1996) (J. Solis).

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settles a labor dispute, judicial review is "particularly constrained." "The reasons 

for insulating arbitral decisions from judicial review are grounded in the federal 

statutes regulating labor-management relations," which "reflect a decided 

preference for private settlement of labor disputes without the intervention of 

government." 

Under this unusually deferential standard of review, "courts are not authorized to 

reconsider the merits of an award." "Because the parties 'bargained for the 

arbitrator's construction of their agreement,' an arbitral decision 'even arguably 

construing or applying the contract' must stand, regardless of a court's view of its 

(de)merits. Instead of assessing how well the arbitrator interpreted the 

contract, [*8] we ask if the arbitrator acted within the contract's bounds. "[A]n 

arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining 

agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." 

To determine whether arbitrators have overstepped their authority, "courts apply 

the 'essence test,' evaluating whether the arbitration award 'ha[s] a basis that is at 

least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the letter or purpose of the 

collective bargaining agreement.'" "[W]here the arbitrator exceeds the express 

limitations of his contractual mandate, judicial deference is at an end." In these 

situations, "an arbitrator is no longer applying or interpreting the agreement but 

rewriting it," and we will vacate the award. "Where 'there is ambiguity as to whether 

an arbitrator is acting within the scope of his authority,'" however, "'that ambiguity 

must be resolved in favor of the arbitrator.'" (Footnotes and citations omitted). 

See also Allied Waste Systems Inc. v. Teamsters Local 767, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43035, 2007 

WL 1703634 at *19-21 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (J. Means) (awarding attorneys fees as remedy for 

baseless attempt to vacate arbitration award).7

Nowhere in the Complaint does Ross allege, much less assert any specific citation for any 

contention, that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority or violated the express terms of his 

jurisdiction under the governing provisions of Article VII of the APFA Constitution. Indeed, his 

objections are entirely limited to the merits of the charges and to the procedural conduct of the 

hearing. Complaint, paras. 39-42. Nor did Ross make any such jurisdictional argument to the 

7

 The same “exceedingly deferential” standard of review of arbitration awards governs cases 

which, unlike the instant case, are subject to judicial review under the FAA. Lalo LLC v. Hawk 

Apparel, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72218, 2022 WL 1173801 at *5-7 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (J. 

Lindsay). 

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Arbitrator during or after the hearing. Arbitrator’s Decision and Order at 8-13. Ross’s attempt to 

persuade the Court to vacate the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order thus fails on this independent 

legal basis. 

As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals put it well, “[b]ecause arbitration presents such a 

`narrow standard of review,' [28 U.S.C.] Section 1927 sanctions are warranted if the arguments 

presented are `completely meritless'" [citation omitted] [and] to underscore the point that 

unjustified, protracted attempts to vacate arbitration awards . . . will not be tolerated [one] does 

so at the risk of being sanctioned.” DMA Inter., Inc. v. Qwest Comm. Inter., Inc., 585 F3d 

1341,1345-46 (10th Cir. 2009). 8

C. Plaintiff’s Claims for Violation of the APFA Constitution and Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty Are Without Merit 

The breach of the APFA Constitution and breach of fiduciary duty allegations (which the 

Union Defendants assume refers to an alleged violation of LMRDA Section 501, 29 U.S.C. 

§501) are likewise subject to dismissal again as a matter of law. 

First, Ross has neglected to assert any specific jurisdictional basis for either claim. 

Second, relief is precluded, again as a matter of law, because, under the APFA 

Constitution and settled precedent, Ross was legally obligated to exhaust the mandatory internal 

union remedies “prior to taking any legal action,” Clayton v. International Union, 451 U.S. 679, 

692 (1981); Hayes v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Airline Clerks, 727 F.2d 1383, 1385-86 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied 469 U.S. 953 (1984). In other words, if he had any valid claims against National 

President Hedrick or National Treasurer Harris, he could have brought them internally under 

8

 Ross’s attempt to vacate the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order likewise violates the settled 

doctrine of judicial noninterference in internal union governance. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 

345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); Carr v. ALPA, 866 F.3d 597, 602-03 and n.16 (5th Cir. 2017); O'Neill 

v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 939 F.2d 1199, 1206 (5th Cir. 1991); Newell v. IBEW, 789 F.2d 1186, 

1189 (5th Cir. 1986). 

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Article VII of the APFA Constitution, but he did no such thing and his failure to do so is grounds 

for dismissal of his claims under FRCP12(b)(6).9

Third, before filing a breach of fiduciary duty claim (which we assume is intended as an 

LMRDA Section 501(a) claim), Ross was required by Section 501(b) to make a demand for 

remedial action by the APFA. Adams-Lundy v. Ass’n of Prof. Flight Attendants, 844 F. 2d 245, 

248-49 (5th Cir. 1988); Van Elder v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1338, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

Lexis 63202, 2014 WL 1808079 at *10-11 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (J. Horan). Once again, Ross did 

not even attempt to comply with this mandatory statutory prerequisite and his breach of fiduciary 

duty claim fails to state a claim for relief on its face. 

D. Ross’s Remaining Claims Are All Preempted 

Finally, the remaining allegations in Ross’s Complaint fail, again as a matter of law, on 

preemption grounds: the underlying allegations are all “inextricably intertwined” with Ross’s 

challenge to the merits of the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order and are therefore preempted. 

Woodcock v. Marathon Petroleum, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, 2019 WL167618187 at *5-6 

(S.D. Tex. 2019) (“Preemption occurs when a decision on the [nonlabor] claim is inextricably 

intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract or when the application of state 

law to a dispute requires interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.” Thomas v. LTV 

Corp., 39 F. 3d 611, 615-16 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Blanks v UAW, 837 F. Supp. 2d 609, 616 

(N.D, Tex. 2011), (J. Means), aff’d 464 Fed. Appx. 284 (5th Cir. 2012). 10

9

 Likewise, as a matter of law, any and all claims by Ross against National President Hedrick and 

National Treasurer Harris are void on their face. As union officers they are not proper 

Defendants in any case. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1962); 

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 406-07 (1981); Universal Communications 

Corp. v. Burns, 499 F.2d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1971). 

10 Ross’s additional claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the arbitration proceedings in this 

case: his claim against APFA for alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Complaint, 

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Here, the governing “labor contract” under Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management 

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a), is the APFA Constitution, not a collective bargaining 

agreement. United Ass’n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 622 (1981); Wooddell v. 

Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 502 U.S. 93, 99, 101 (1991); Hampton v. Int’l Longshoreman’s 

Ass’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218154 at *5-6 (S.D. Tex. 2007). But the legal principle of 

federal preemption and the outcome are the same. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Union Defendants respectfully submit that all of Ross’s claims 

for relief in the Complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FRCP 

12(b)(1) and also for their failure to state a claim for relief as a matter of law under FRCP 

12(b)(6), leaving APFA’s Counterclaim for enforcement of the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order 

and for Ross’s breach of fiduciary duty as an APFA officer to be resolved by the Court. 

Individual defendants Julie Hedrick and Erik Harris, upon dismissal of all claims against them by 

Plaintiff Ross, should also be dismissed as parties to this action as they are not parties to the 

remaining counterclaim by APFA against Ross. 

paras. 67-69) relates directly to, and seeks to challenge and interfere with APFA’s efforts to 

collect moneys owed by Ross under the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order and invades the 

Arbitrator’s continuing jurisdiction over the remedial issues in this case. Arbitrator’s Decision 

and Order at 23. His claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Complaint, paras. 81-

84) is expressly based on presentations made to the Arbitrator during the arbitration hearing and 

seeks to collaterally attack the Arbitrator’s rulings. His defamation and interference with 

contract allegations (Complaint, paras 85-89) likewise directly relate to, and implicitly attempt to 

relitigate the merits of the Arbitrator’s Decision and Order. Id. Finally, although Ross’s 

allegations against Defendant Diversified Credit Systems (“Diversified”) (Complaint, paras. 4, 

78-80) are not addressed to the Union Defendants, they are also directed to interfere with efforts 

to enforce the Arbitrator’s remedy and violate with the Arbitrator’s continuing remedial 

jurisdiction, and are therefore also preempted. 

. 

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Date: July 21, 2022 Respectfully Submitted 

/s/ Sanford R. Denison

SANFORD R. DENISON 

Tex. Bar No. 05655560 

Baab & Denison, LLP 

6301 Gaston Ave., Suite 550 

Dallas, TX 75214 

Tel.: (214) 637-0750 

Fax.: (214) 637-0730 

Email: denison@baabdenison.com 

MARGOT A. NIKITAS* 

Illinois Bar No. 6309782 

General Counsel 

Association of Professional 

 Flight Attendants 

1004 W. Euless Boulevard 

Euless, TX 76040 

Tel. (817) 540-0108 ext. 8108 

Fax. (817) 355-1919 

Email: MNikitas@apfa.org 

WILLIAM W. OSBORNE JR.* 

D.C. Bar No. 912089 

Osborne Law Offices P.C. 

5335 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Suite 440 

Washington, D.C. 20015 

Tel.: (202) 243-3200 

Fax: (202) 686-2977 

Email: b.osborne@osbornelaw.com 

Counsel for Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff 

Association of Professional Flight Attendants, and 

Defendants Julie Hedrick and Erik Harris 

*Admitted Pro Hac Vice

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on this _21st day of July 2022 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document was served on the below listed counsel of record for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 

Ross by a means permitted by Rule 5(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”). 

KERRI PHILLIPS 

HEATHER ABREU 

K.D. Phillips Law Firm, PLLC 

5700 Tennyson Parkway, Suite 300 

Plano, Texas 75024 

Phone: (972) 327-5800 

Fax: (940) 400-0089 

Email: kerri@KDphillipslaw.com 

Email: Heather@KDphillipslaw.com 

Date: July 21, 2022 /s/ Sanford R. Denison

SANFORD R. DENISON 

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