MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

SALT AND LIGHT ENERGY 

EQUIPMENT, LLC, 

§ 

§ 

 § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-00654-N 

 § 

ORIGIN BANCORP, INC., § 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 This Order addresses Plaintiff Salt and Light Energy Equipment, LLC’s (“SNLEE”) 

counsel’s, Lynn Pinker Hurst & Schwegmann, LLP’s (“LPH&S”), motion for leave to 

withdraw as counsel to third-party defendant Denise Mudigere [172]. Both Ms. Mudigere 

and Defendant Origin Bancorp, Inc. (“Origin”) oppose LPH&S’s request to withdraw from 

representing Ms. Mudigere. Because the Court finds a legitimate conflict exists, creating 

adversity between Ms. Mudigere and Mr. Mudigere, the Court grants the motion. 

However, the Court preliminarily disqualifies LPH&S from representing Mr. Mudigere 

unless Ms. Mudigere consents to LPH&S’s continued representation of Mr. Mudigere. 

I. THE COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW

Counsel may withdraw from representation “only upon leave of the court and a 

showing of good cause and reasonable notice to the client.” Matter of Wynn, 889 F.2d 644, 

646 (5th Cir. 1989). “A court’s determination whether an attorney has good cause to 

withdraw depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Edwards v. 

Oliver, 2022 WL 4820147, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2022). Federal law applies to questions of 

attorney ethics, but courts utilize state and national standards to inform these decisions. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 2 

See In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992) (addressing motion to 

disqualify attorney). Specifically, under local rule 83.3(e), courts in the Northern District 

of Texas rely on the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”) to 

inform decisions involving attorney ethics. See N.D. Tex. L.R. 83.8(e). The issue of 

withdrawal is “entrusted to the sound discretion of the court and will be overturned on 

appeal only for an abuse of that discretion.” Matter of Wynn, 889 F.2d at 646. Importantly, 

denying withdrawal in the face of a demonstrated irreconcilable conflict is an abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Wild, 92 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1996). 

TDRPC 1.15(a)(1) mandates that a lawyer “shall withdraw” if “the representation 

will result in violation of Rule 3.08, other applicable rules of professional conduct or other 

law.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15. LPH&S seeks to withdraw because 

“[a]n irreconcilable conflict under [TDRPC] 1.06 has developed in the undersigned 

counsel’s representation of Ms. Mudigere that cannot be remediated through other means 

than withdrawing as her attorneys.” Pls.’ Mot. Withdraw 1. The Court conducted an in 

camera review of evidence that LPH&S supplied to the Court which details its conflict. 

Upon review, the Court finds that an irreconcilable conflict exists1

 between Mr. Mudigere 

and Ms. Mudigere, making withdrawal appropriate. 

The Court is mindful that “[e]ven where good cause for withdrawal exists, it is 

‘incumbent on the court to assure that the prosecution of the lawsuit before it is not 

1

 The Court notes Defendant’s argument that any proposed conflict existed since the 

inception of litigation; therefore, Plaintiffs waived this conflict. However, evidence 

presented to the Court for in camera review reveals a conflict that just recently arose. This 

conflict does not appear to apply to SNLEE. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 3 

disrupted by the withdrawal of counsel.’” White v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2010 

WL 2473833, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2010). (quoting Broughten v. Voss, 634 F.2d 880, 882 (5th 

Cir. 1981)). “This requires the court to consider certain additional factors before allowing 

an attorney to withdraw. Those additional factors include: (1) the extent to which the 

attorney’s withdrawal will delay or disrupt the case; (2) the length of time for which the 

case and any dispositive motions have been pending; (3) the time it would take – and the 

financial burden it would impose on – the client to find new counsel; (4) the financial 

burden the attorney would suffer if not allowed to withdraw; (5) prejudice to the other 

parties; and (6) whether withdrawal will harm the administration of justice.” Id. (citations 

omitted). The Court is sympathetic that this withdraw will disrupt the case and impose 

some financial burden on the Ms. Mudigere. But Mr. Mudigere would be prejudiced by 

LPH&S’s continued representation of Ms. Mudigere and the potential harm to the 

administration of justice that could ensue is too great due to the present conflict. 

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion. 

II. THE COURT PRELIMINARILY DISQUALIFIES

LPH&S FROM REPRESENTING MR. MUDIGERE

As a result of the Court granting this motion, the Court finds it necessary to inquire 

sua sponte if LPH&S should be disqualified from representing Mr. Mudigere in the face 

of an ethics violation. See United States v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1993) 

(“The district court had the authority and duty to inquire sua sponte into whether counsel 

should not serve because of a conflict with another client.”); see also O’Connor v. Jones, 

946 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th Cir. 1991) (“In cases where counsel is in violation of professional 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 4 

ethics, the court may act on motion of an aggrieved party or may act sua sponte to 

disqualify.”). 

The Court recognizes that “attorney disqualification . . . is a sanction that must not 

be imposed cavalierly.” F.D.I.C. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1316 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Looking to the TDRPC for guidance, Rule 1.09 states that “[w]ithout prior consent, a 

lawyer who personally has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 

represent another person in a matter adverse to the former client . . . if it is the same or a 

substantially related matter.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.09; see also id.

§§ 1.06(d), 1.07(c). The Court is mindful that in Federal Court the TDRPC is not 

dispositive when ruling on disqualification; however, the elements for disqualification 

found in Rule 1.09 are nearly identical to the elements of the “substantial relationship” test 

utilized by the Fifth Circuit in motion to disqualify. See generally In re American Airlines, 

Inc., 972 F.2d 605.2

 The substantial relationship test requires the moving party to establish 

“(1) actual attorney-client relationship between the moving party and the attorney he seeks 

to disqualify, and (2) substantial relationship between the subject matter of the former and 

present representations . . . .” Id. at 614. An attorney-client relationship and the 

“substantial relationship” element both exist without question. Accordingly, the Court 

preliminarily disqualifies LPH&S from representing Mr. Mudigere unless Ms. Mudigere 

2

 American Airlines dealt with a successive representation issue, i.e., where a lawyer 

represented one client, and after the termination of that relationship sought to represent 

another client adversely to the prior client. This case raises a simultaneous representation 

issue, where a lawyer represents two clients in the same matter who then become adverse, 

arguably a more severe problem. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 5 

consents to counsel’s continued representation of Mr. Mudigere or unless LPH&S can 

demonstrate that it is not disqualified from that representation. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the motion to withdrawal. The Court 

further order LPH&S to either show Ms. Mudigere consents to its continued representation 

of Mr. Mudigere or demonstrate that disqualification is not required within fourteen (14) 

days of the date of this Order. Origin may have seven (7) days to respond. Additionally, 

the Court vacates the current trial setting. 

 Signed August 15, 2024. 

 

 David C. Godbey 

Chief United States District Judge 

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