140 Nev., Advance Opinion g3 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 85564 

FILED 

BY 

C 1EF DEPUTY CLERK 

JESSE CALVIN GILBERT, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a no-contest 

plea, of ex-felon in possession of a firearm. Tenth Judicial District Court, 

Churchill County; Thomas L. Stockard, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Evenson Law Office and Steve E. Evenson, Fallon, 

for Appellant. 

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Arthur E. Mallory, District 

Attorney, and Chelsea D. Sanford, Senior Deputy District Attorney, 

Churchill County, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, C.J., and PICKERING and 

BELL, JJ. 

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OPINION 

By the Court, CADISH, C.J.: 

The inventory search is a well-established exception to the 

warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Generally, if an inventory 

search complies with standardized procedures, it is reasonable and 

therefore constitutional. We have previously recognized that even when an 

inventory search does not comply with standardized procedures, it may still 

be constitutional if it is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 

We are called on today to address how courts should conduct this 

reasonableness analysis. First, we clarify that while an inventory search 

cannot be a ruse for general rummaging, an investigatory motive does not 

necessarily invalidate an inventory search so long as the search that 

occurred is the same as the inventory-based search that would have 

happened absent any such motivation and the circumstances leading to the 

search were not created as a ruse to establish a basis for that search. 

Instead, a court deciding a suppression motion must determine the search's 

reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances by evaluating (1) the 

extent to which law enforcement departed from the standardized 

procedures, (2) whether the scope of the search was as expected in light of 

the underlying justifications for inventory searches, and (3) whether the 

inventory produced served the purposes of an inventory search. 

Here, a law enforcement deputy pulled over appellant Jesse 

Calvin Gilbert because the car Gilbert was driving did not have an operating 

license plate light. As Gilbert had an active warrant, the deputy arrested 

him. During the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle, the deputy 

made several statements that indicated the deputy hoped to locate 

incriminating evidence in the vehicle. While searching, the deputy found a 

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handgun under the driver's seat. Gilbert was charged with ex-felon in 

possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the evidence on the basis 

that the search was not a true inventory search, but rather a ruse to conduct 

an investigatory search. Finding that the deputy appropriately impounded 

the vehicle and the inventory search was reasonable, the district court 

denied the motion. Gilbert appeals from his subsequent conviction based 

on the search and resulting unsuppressed evidence. 

Perceiving no error in the district court's decision denying the 

motion to suppress, we affirm. The investigatory motive here does not 

invalidate the inventory search because the search that occurred was 

precisely the same as the search that would have occurred absent the 

impure motivation. Because the deputy properly stopped Gilbert for the 

nonfunctioning license plate light and arrested Gilbert on the outstanding 

warrant, the deputy was required under police policy to tow the car Gilbert 

was driving. Therefore, the search that uncovered the gun would have 

occurred pursuant to the inventory search policy even absent the deputy's 

investigatory motives. Additionally, we conclude that while the inventory 

search here did not comply with standardized policies, it passes 

constitutional muster because it was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances, as the district court concluded. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTOR Y 

In the early morning hours, Deputy Nollan of the Churchill 

County Sheriff s Office observed two vehicles enter a parking lot, meet up, 

and leave the parking lot a short time later. Deputy Nollan followed one of 

the vehicles and initiated a traffic stop because it did not have an operating 

license plate light. Appellant Jesse Calvin Gilbert, who was driving the 

vehicle, pulled over and stopped in a private residential driveway. 

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Deputy Nollan approached the vehicle and recognized Gilbert 

from prior law enforcement contact. Gilbert indicated to Deputy NoIlan 

that he was driving on a suspended license. Deputy Nollan confirmed this 

information with dispatch and was informed that Gilbert had an active 

arrest warrant. Deputy Nollan arrested Gilbert, after which other officers, 

including Deputy Nollan's supervisor, arrived on the scene. Deputy Nollan 

told his supervisor that he wanted to search the car and that he intended to 

tow it. 

Before Gilbert was transported to jail, he made a phone call to 

an unidentified woman. Either Gilbert or the unidentified woman asked 

Deputy Nollan if the woman could take the car, which Deputy Nollan 

refused because the vehicle was being illegally operated on a roadway, such 

that the vehicle had to be towed. Shortly after, a woman approached the 

officers and identified herself as Lauren Sealock. She asked the officers if 

she could take the vehicle, stating that she was a friend of the residents of 

the house in front of which the car was parked, to which Deputy NoIlan said 

no. A different officer transported Gilbert to jail, and Deputy Nollan 

searched Gilbert's vehicle. 

Among other iterns, Deputy NoIlan found a handgun under the 

driver's seat approximately one minute into the search. The entire search, 

which was captured on Deputy Nollan's body-camera video, lasted roughly 

15 minutes, during which Deputy NoIlan searched the car door pockets, the 

floor, under the seats, and in the trunk of the car. During the search, 

another deputy asked Deputy NoIlan if he found anything, to which Deputy 

Nollan responded "not yet" and then "not yet anyway." Deputy Nollan did 

not apply for or obtain a search warrant. 

During the search, the officers interacted with two more people: 

another unidentified woman and the owner of the residence where Gilbert 

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had pulled over. The woman allegedly co-owned the car Gilbert was driving 

and requested to take the vehicle. Deputy Nollan denied this request. The 

owner of the residence asked the officers what was happening and indicated 

he needed to leave. Later, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the 

owner testified that he never gave Gilbert permission to park in his 

driveway. 

After the search, Deputy Nollan completed a Churchill County 

Sheriffs Office Vehicle Inventory/Impound Sheet. On that sheet, Deputy 

Nollan listed the following items as "property, tools, or other items in the 

vehicle": set of golf clubs, two earrings white metal/white stone, black metal 

ring, two air rifles, and miscellaneous trash. Deputy Nollan failed to 

include on the inventory sheet several other items that were in the car, 

including a glass pipe, a substance he suspected to be methamphetamine, 

and the handgun. 

Gilbert was formally charged by information with one count of 

ex-felon in possession of a firearm. Gilbert filed a motion to suppress 

evidence of the gun, arguing that the inventory search was a "ruse for the 

purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of a crime." (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Respondent State of Nevada opposed, arguing 

the vehicle was appropriately impounded and the inventory of the vehicle 

was not unlawfully excessive. 

At the hearing on the motion. Deputy Nollan testified that he 

stated he was going to tow the vehicle because "[he] was arresting the driver 

who was also parked in a private driveway." After reviewing his bodycamera footage, he admitted that during the stop, he planned to tow the 

vehicle because it was being operated illegally on the roadway, i.e., dispatch 

confirmed that Gilbert had a suspended driver's license. On crossexamination, he stated that he noticed the license plate light was out on 

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Gilbert's car when it left the parking lot. When asked about his comment 

that he wanted to go through the car, Deputy Nollan testified that lilt was 

my vehicle stop. It was my arrest. It was my scene. I told my supervisor I 

wanted to—that I wanted to go through the vehicle because that's why. It 

was my arrest . . . I wanted to be responsible for it." Id at 74-75. Deputy 

Nollan acknowledged that he does not always conduct a vehicle inventory 

following an arrest, but he wanted to do so in this case because "[he] was 

relatively new on the—on patrol. [He] wanted the experience. [He] wanted 

to be responsible for it." 

Deputy Nollan also testified that the two vehicles meeting in 

the parking lot "played a part" in his stopping Gilbert and towing the vehicle 

because he believed the meeting was suspicious, he believed he would find 

drugs in the car and that was a substantial reason why he decided to search 

and tow the vehicle. He also testified that he suggested his supervisor 

search Gilbert's wallet because he thought it might have dope in it. Deputy 

Nollan acknowledged that he located a handgun, a glass pipe, and what he 

presumed to be methamphetamine but did not list them in his inventory. 

Deputy Nollan, however, listed the gun and possible drugs in his report and 

turned all three items over to the task force officer. Deputy Nollan admitted 

that he "made mistakes as far as what items [he] did not list on the form" 

and lacked proper diligence and documentation for all the items in the car. 

Relying on State v. Nye, 136 Nev. 421, 468 P.3d 369 (2020), the 

district court denied Gilbert's motion, finding that the inventory search of 

Gilbert's vehicle was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances, 

including that (1) law enforcement had an unquestionable right to tow the 

vehicle because Gilbert was arrested, the car was inoperable due to a 

nonfunctioning license plate light, and it was dark; (2) the inventory search 

did not exceed the scope of a proper inventory; (3) the search was recorded 

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on a body-worn camera; and (4) Deputy NoIlan produced a nearly completed 

inventory sheet. The district court found, however, that Deputy Nollan's 

failure to produce a complete inventory sheet and clear motivation to search 

the car because he believed he would find drugs weighed against 

reasonableness.' 

Gilbert entered a conditional no-contest plea to ex-felon in 

possession of a firearm, wherein he preserved his right to appeal on the 

basis that the district court erred in. denying his motion to suppress. The 

district court entered a judgment of conviction on the no-contest plea. 

Gilbert now appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

"A motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and 

fact." State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. 739, 743, 312 P.3d 467, 469 (2013). "A district 

court's legal conclusion regarding the constitutionality of a challenged 

search receives de novo review." Id. at 743, 312 P.3d at 469. Because 

Gilbert does not challenge the district court's factual findings and instead 

challenges only its legal conclusions that the search was valid and 

reasonable, we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Beckman, 129 

Nev. 481, 486, 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013) (reviewing de novo the issue of 

reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context). 

The Nevada Constitution and United States Constitution both 

prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Nev. 

Const. art. 1, § 18. "Under these cognate provisions of our federal and state 

'The district court also found the inevitable discovery doctrine was 

inapplicable. We agree because the search conducted by Deputy Nollan was 

the only inventory search that was conducted or would have been conducted 

on the vehicle. The State does not argue on appeal that the inevitable 

discovery doctrine applies. 

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constitutions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable . . . subject only 

to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Lloyd, 129 

Nev. at 743, 312 P.3d at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevada 

recognizes inventory searches as one such exception to the warrant 

requirement. Weintraub v. State, 110 Nev. 287, 288, 871 P.2d 339, 340 

(1994). The purpose of the inventory search exception is to protect an 

individual's property while it is in the custody of the police, to ensure 

against claims of damaged or missing property, and to guard the police 

against danger. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987). In 

Weintraub, we held that an inventory search will pass constitutional muster 

if it is carried out pursuant to standardized official department procedures 

and administered in good faith. 110 Nev. at 288, 871 P.2d at 340. Further, 

"the officers conducting the search must produce 'a true inventory of 

personal items found during the search." Nye, 136 Nev. at 423, 468 P.3d at 

371 (quoting Weintraub, 110 Nev. at 289, 871 P.2d at 340). Indeed, without 

an inventory, there can be no inventory search. State v. Greenwald, 109 

Nev. 808, 811, 858 P.2d 36, 38 (1993). However, "inventory searches need 

not be conducted in a totally mechanical, all or nothing fashion." United 

States v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States 

v. Garreau, 658 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). In State v. Nye, we observed that the failure to precisely follow 

the department's policies does not necessarily invalidate an inventory 

search, as the validity of the search turns on reasonableness. 136 Nev. at 

425 n.3, 468 P.3d at 372 n.3 (stating that "an inventory search need not 

conform to official procedure to be valid, so long as the State can otherwise 

prove that the search was reasonable"); see id. at 426-28; 468 P.3d at 373-

74 (Cadish, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on reasonableness, and a 

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reasonableness evaluation "does not necessarily require adherence to an 

official procedure"). 

While the search did not comply with the Churchill County Sheriff's Office 

Policy 3.415 procedure, it was reasonable under all the circumstances 

Inventory searches that comply with standardized procedures 

are reasonable—and thus constitutional—because the standardized 

procedures "ensure[ ] that an inventory search is truly designed to produce 

an inventory and is not just a ruse for a general rummaging . . . to discover 

incriminating evidence." Jim v. State, 137 Nev. 557, 560, 495 P.3d 478, 481 

(2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Taylor, 636 

F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2011) ("The reasonableness requirement is met when 

an inventory search is conducted according to standardized police 

procedures, which generally remove the inference that the police have used 

inventory searches as a purposeful and general means of discovering 

evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 

Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1993))). In Nye, we acknowledged 

that an inventory search that does not fully comply with standardized 

procedures may still pass constitutional muster so long as it is reasonable. 

136 Nev. at 425 n.3, 468 P.3d at 372 n.3. As reasonableness is the 

touchstone by which courts measure the constitutionality of police searches, 

an inquiry into an inventory search that does not comply with such 

procedures must focus on whether the police conduct was reasonable under 

the totality of the circumstances. See Smith, 715 F.3d at 1117 (holding an 

inventory search must be reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances). 

Today we clarify that this reasonableness evaluation is not 

dependent on the motive of law enforcement under a so-called pretext 

theory unless the inventory search itself would not have occurred or would 

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have been more limited absent the investigatory motive. Instead, we 

announce the factors a district court must consider in determining whether 

an inventory search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances: 

(1) to what extent law enforcement departed from the standardized 

procedures, (2) whether the scope of the search is what one would expect in 

light of the underlying justifications of inventory searches, and (3) whether 

the inventory produced served the purpose of an inventory search. Jim, 137 

Nev. at 561, 495 P.3d at 481 (noting law enforcement's deviation from the 

standardized policy was slight); cf. United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 

931 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting officers are entitled to some latitude in 

conducting their community caretaking role, but their actions must be 

44reasonably related in scope" to the underlying justification for the 

community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement (quoting 

Lundstrorn v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010))); cf. United 

States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding a search 

where law enforcement disregarded items without evidentiary value despite 

them being of possible monetary value suggested the search did not serve 

the purpose of an inventory search). These factors will properly focus the 

court on the search that actually took place and whether it is in reality an 

inventory search justifying an exception to the warrant requirement. 

The investigatory motive to search a vehicle does not alone make the 

search unconstitutional 

Gilbert argues that the district court erred in determining the 

search was reasonable despite Deputy Nollan's investigatory motive to 

search the car, which he expressed before ever searching the vehicle. 

Gilbert points to Nye for support that an inventory search cannot be 

reasonable where law enforcement does not comply with the standardized 

procedures for the search and the motive to conduct the search is impure. 

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The mere expectation that incriminating evidence may be found 

in a search is not impermissible pretext within the context of the Fourth 

Amendment. 3 Wayne R. LaFaye, Search and Seizure 926 (6th ed. 2020). 

Rather, impermissible pretext within this context "arises out of the fact that 

the evidence is found in a search which would not have occurred at all but 

for the manipulation of circumstances and events by the police because of 

their desire to conduct a search that could not otherwise be lawfully made." 

Id. That is, an impermissible pretextual inventory search is one where law 

enforcement created the circumstances warranting the search to satisfy 

their investigatory desire. See Jim, 137 Nev. at 560, 495 P.3d at 481 ("While 

an officer's failure to complete an inventory per department policy may 

foreclose the inventory warrant exception, such a failure does not per se 

establish that an officer's motive for beginning an inventory was a 

subterfuge."); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996) 

(observing that although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, 

deviation from procedures does not prove or serve as an operational 

substitute for pretext). The suppression of evidence is not required when, 

even assuming a questionable motivation is dominant, "the Fourth 

Amendment activity undertaken is precisely the same as would have 

occurred had that intent or motivation been entirely absent from the case." 

1 Wayne R. LaFave, supra, at 177. 

Other courts have concluded this "would have ... anyway" 

rationale applies in the context of inventory searches. United States v. 

Bowhay, 992 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Lillard, 

929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991)). In Bowhay, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals explained that, in the context of inventory searches, dual motives—

i.e., a motive to investigate for incriminating evidence and a motive to 

compile an inventory of an individual's property—do not make a search 

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pretextual and thus do not invalidate it. 992 F.2d at 231. The court 

observed that unlike in pretextual cases, department inventory procedures 

required that the officer take an inventory of all personal property, such 

that the officer had no discretion in initiating a search of the defendant's 

satchel, in which narcotics, a gun, and cash were found. Id. at 230-31. 

Other courts have agreed, observing that "Nile police are not precluded 

frorn conducting inventory searches when they lawfully impound the vehicle 

of an individual that they also happen to suspect is involved in illegal 

activity." Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1175-76; see also United States v. Lopez, 

547 F.3d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that the expectation and 

motivation to find criminal evidence does not constitute bad faith where 

good faith is a prerequisite of an inventory search). We agree that the 

would have . . . anyway" rationale appli.es to inventory searches. 

Here, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Deputy 

NoIlan "clearly had motives to inventory the vehicle that were unrelated to 

the constitutionally recognized purpose of an inventory search." See 

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73. Deputy Nollan's comments leading up to and 

during the search indicate that he was suspicious of the two vehicles 

meeting in the parking lot, and his belief that he would find drugs in the 

vehicle was a substantial reason why he decided to search and tow Gilbert's 

car. However, Deputy Nollan was legally permitted to initiate the traffic 

stop because the car did not have a functioning license plate light and was 

thus inoperable considering it was dark outside. See NRS 484D.115(4) 

("Every passenger car, bus and truck under 80 inches in overall width must 

be equipped with a lamp so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a 

white light the rear registration or license plate and render it clearly legible 

from a distance of 50 feet to the rear."). Further, Gilbert was lawfully 

arrested due to an outstanding warrant, and officers removed him from the 

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scene. 'phis left the car parked on private property without the permission 

of the property owner. While two individuals approached Deputy Nollan 

indicating they could remove the car from the property, including the 

claimed co-owner of the vehicle, the car was not operable at night. NRS 

484D.115(4). Under these circumstances, Deputy Nollan had an 

unquestionable and undisputed right to tow the car under Churchill County 

Sheriffs Office Policy 3.415 (governing towing and storage of vehicles) as a 

vehicle that was illegally parked. Further Churchill County Sheriff s Office 

Policy 3.410 provides vehicles will be towed when the driver is arrested. 

Thus, the car would have been towed and inventoried under Churchill 

County Sheriffs Office policies regardless of Deputy Nollan's expressed 

expectation or hope to find drugs in the car. In other words, Deputy Nollan 

had a right and obligation to perform an inventory on the car. See Collins 

v. State, 113 Nev. 1177, 1181, 946 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (1997) (recognizing 

that "police have a duty to inventory the contents of an automobile" for 

legitimate purposes). Gilbert does not dispute the constitutionality of the 

stop itself, his arrest, or that Deputy Nollan's decision to tow the vehicle 

complied with department polices. Therefore, we conclude Deputy Nollan's 

investigatory motive to search Gilbert's car did not invalidate the search 

because the inventory search would have occurred regardless of such a 

motive. 

Deputy Nollan's deviation frorn Churchill County Sheriff's Office 

Policy 3.415 is concerning 

Turning to the factors we announce today to evaluate the 

reasonableness of the purported inventory search under all the 

circumstances, we first address the extent to which Deputy Nollan strayed 

from the standardized procedure. First, Deputy Nollan complied with 

Churchill County Sheriff s Office Policy 3.410, which provides that a vehicle 

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will be towed in the event the driver of the vehicle is arrested. While the 

policy also permits a co-owner to take the vehicle if a deputy objectively 

determines the co-owner is capable of safely operating the vehicle, Deputy 

Nollan properly determined the vehicle could not be driven safely because 

it was dark outside and one of the license plate lights was nonoperational. 

Because Deputy Nollan was required to have the vehicle towed under these 

circumstances, he was also required to conduct an inventory search of the 

vehicle. 

However, it is undisputed that Deputy Nollan failed to fully 

comply with Churchill County Sheriff's Office Policy 3.415 in that he failed 

to provide a detailed written description of the contents of all the personal 

property that was in the car. This policy provides: 

Any vehicle which is taken or removed from any 

location pursuant to the lawful authority of any 

Deputy, whether said vehicle is on public or private 

property, will be thoroughly inventoried as to its 

condition and contents . . . . Said inventory shall be 

recorded on a Vehicle Inventory Report form and 

will include a detailed written description of the 

contents and conditions of any items of personal 

property contained therein. 

Deputy Nollan did properly identify the make and license number of the 

vehicle and its features and listed certain items of personal property on the 

inventory sheet. The district court's thorough order after a full evidentiary 

hearing noted Deputy Nollan acknowledged in his testimony that other 

items of personal property were in the car and not listed on the inventory, 

including "a pipe, a Halloween mask, what appeared to be two one-dollar 

bills, a cell phone, a basket of golf balls, a rangefinder, and a pack of 

cigarettes." The court also found the body camera footage showed other 

omitted items whose nature was not clear. While some items that were not 

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catalogued may fall under Deputy Nollan's miscellaneous trash listing on 

the inventory sheet, others did not fit in that category and were of the type 

the inventory policy would cover, such as the cell phone and rangefinder. 

Thus, as the district court properly concluded, Deputy NoIlan deviated from 

the standardized policy by failing to provide a "detailed written description" 

of these items. Even Deputy Nollan acknowledged that he lacked proper 

diligence when documenting the items in the car. However, Deputy NoIlan 

did not altogether disregard his duty to document the items in the car, and 

it is not clear that any of the omitted items were of value. Compare United 

States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding an 

inventory search was valid despite the officer failing to list some of the 

property in the inventory list), with Weintraub, 110 Nev. at 289, 871 P.2d 

at 340 (concluding an inventory search was unconstitutional where the 

inventory list included only 8 items, but the vehicle contained 

approximately 100 items including a wallet with money and identification 

and $150 in cash that were not listed). We conclude that while Deputy 

Nollan deviated from the standardized policy, and these deviations are 

concerning, he made a good faith effort and prepared a nearly complete 

inventory list with the items that appeared to him to be of potential value. 

Thus, this factor weighs against the reasonableness of the search, but not 

significantly so. 

The search performed did not exceed the scope expected of an inventory 

search 

The second metric in the reasonableness inquiry is whether the 

search's scope was as expected in light of the underlying justifications of 

inventory searches, i.e., to protect the owner's property interests and protect 

police from liability for missing property and against danger. Here, the 

entire search spanned approximately 15 minutes, and Deputy Nollan and 

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another deputy searched the pockets of the car doors, the floor, the seats, 

under the seats, the center console, and the trunk. As the district court 

concluded, all of these locations are areas in a vehicle that were "certain to 

be searched during an inventory." Thus, as the district court also properly 

concluded, the handgun, which was found under the seat, and the drugs, 

which were found in the console, were also "almost certain to be found if an 

inventory search were conducted," whether or not the officer inventorying 

the vehicle strictly adhered to the inventory search protocol. See 3 Wayne 

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 863-64 (6th ed. 2020) (an inventory search 

customarily will "extend to all parts of the car where personal property 

might be found, and to include an inventory of containers found within the 

vehicle" (footnotes omitted)); cf. Greenwald, 109 Nev. at 809-11, 858 P.2d at 

37-38 (concluding that a search exceeded the scope of an administrative 

search where the law enforcement officer examined the contents of the gas 

and oil tanks and even dismantled a flashlight). We thus conclude that the 

search's scope was appropriate for an inventory search. 

The search served the underlying purpose of the inventory search 

exception to the warrant requirement 

Finally, we conclude that Deputy Nollan's search served the 

purposes of an inventory search. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73. Again, the 

inventory sheet prepared by Deputy Nollan did not include several items 

that potentially were valuable. In this way, the search fell short of serving 

the purpose of protecting Gilbert's property that was impounded and 

protecting police from claims that said property was lost or stolen while in 

police custody. The inventory sheet was not the only documentation of the 

search, however. Throughout the entire search, Deputy Nollan was wearing 

his body camera, and the entire search was captured by this recording. The 

district court found the footage "provided a relatively clear audio and video 

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recording of the inventory search." While it does not satisfy Churchill 

County Sheriffs Office Policy 3.415, the district court found that the 

recording showed Deputy Nollan handling virtually every item that was 

located in the car, which the parties do not dispute.2 This is distinguishable 

from Nye, which involved an unrecorded search when the inventory search 

policy required it be performed on camera. Conversely, the inventory search 

policy here required no such recording, but the entire search was recorded 

on Deputy Nollan's body camera. Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not err in determining that the search performed by Deputy 

Nollan served the underlying purpose of the inventory search exception to 

the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 

The district court extensively analyzed these factors in 

determining that the search was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances. Based on our independent review, we agree. While the 

failure to list several items in the car on the inventory is concerning and 

reduces the efficacy of the inventory procedure, weighing all of the 

circumstances under the factors we have identified leads us to conclude that 

the inventory search was reasonable and the district court correctly denied 

the motion to suppress. 

CONCLUSION 

Even when a warrantless inventory search does not comply 

with the department policies and procedures, it may be constitutional if it 

is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We conclude that an 

investigatory motive does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search so 

long as the search that occurred is the same as the inventory-based search 

that would have happened even absent any investigatory or other intent or 

2The body-camera footage of the search was not provided on appeal. 

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motivation. We hold instead that a court deciding a suppression motion in 

these circumstances must determine the search's reasonableness under the 

totality of the circumstances by evaluating (1) the extent to which law 

enforcement departed frorn the standardized procedure, (2) whether the 

scope of the search was as expected in light of the underlying justifications 

for inventory searches, and (3) whether the inventory produced served the 

purposes of an inventory search. We conclude that, after weighing these 

factors, the search here was reasonable, and we perceive no error in the 

district court's denial of Gilbert's motion to suppress. We therefore affirm 

the judgment of conviction. 

, C.J. 

We concur: 

Bell 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

18 

071 I 947A