PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

"EFFECTIVE SCHEDULING" LITIGATION.

JEFFREY L. ROYSTER; DANIEL BAKER;

CLARENCE L. ALSTON; CHARLES V.

STRICKLAND, JR.; RON MURCHISON;

LARRY BRITT; CARL WILLIAMS;

TRUMAN SURLES; TIM LAYDEN; KIM

PIPPA; JEFFREY BARNES; GLENN

JOHNSON; STEVE TWIDDY; LARRY

RILEY; WAYNE NEIL HAND, JR.;

MICHAEL ALPHIN; HARVEY KEITH

No. 94-2360

MATTHEWS; TERRY N. CONNER; JAMES

E. DANIELS; BILLY MADDOX; RUSSELL

THOMAS; JONATHAN ANDERSON;

WOODROW BREEDEN; AARON NORRIS;

JAMES GRUBER; REGINALD ASHFORD;

CLINTON E. BLOYER, III; RICKY

COLTREN; BILLY RAY COLLINS;

WILLIAM DALE FITZGERALD; ROBIN

DALE STEWART; STEPHEN A.

WILLIAMS; REGINALD GILL; LESTER

BRITT,

Appellants,

and
TERRY W. MCLAWHON, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly

situated; KEITH LAMONT PERRY, on

behalf of himself and all others

similarly situated; RONALD GRANNIS;

BOSTON D. MCCORNELL; RANDY E.

JONES; TIMOTHY E. PEELE; ANDY

CZUBAI; CHRISTOPHER AYDEN SURLES;

KELLY E. QUINN; JAMES L. ROYAL;

FRANCIS D. CARPENTER; GREGORY

TODD RING; LESTER JEROME

MITCHELL; RODNEY M. RAMSEY;

WILLIAM RICHARD HAMM; BILLY M.

PARSON; WOODROW CARROLL, JR.;

BOBBY GLYMPH; KEVIN CARR; BRAD

CLARK; BILLY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

James C. Fox, Chief District Judge.

(CA-91-133-4-F, MISC-92-198-5-F)

 2
In Re: FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

"EFFECTIVE SCHEDULING" LITIGATION.

DONALD T. LEDFORD; J. MICHAEL

OAKES; MICHAEL CARDOZA; R.

CHUCK VILLARREAL, JR.; ROY

SARTER; LARRY WORLEY; TOMMY

ARRINGTON; BILLY BAKER; CHERYL

BORN; DANNY BUCKNER; ROBERT

CALLOWAY; DONNA CATLIN; KIM

CAUDILL; JOSEPH COCKERHAM;

No. 94-2645

MICHAEL COFFEY; FELECIA COLEMAN;

ROBERT DALY; JAMES DARROW;

CHRISTOPHER DUNHAM; RHONDA

DUPREE; ROBERT DYER; FRANK

EASON; RHONDA ENGLAND; PAUL ERB;

RICHARD FAWLKES; CHRIS FRENCH;

RICHARD P. HENSLEY; ROGER ALLEN

HILL; RICKEY HINSON; TERRY

HORTON; PATRICIA HOYLE;

CHRISTOPHER JOLLY; ALECIA JONES;

WILLIAM JOYCE; WELDON JUNGE;

MONTY LEE; PAUL LUCAS; SCOTT

MATTOX; KEVIN O'BRIANT;

 3
GARY O'NEAL; KIM PAIVA; VICTOR

PRONIER; RUSSELL RAMSEY; JOE

REED; ELVA JEAN RILEY; SAMUEL

SHERRIN; MARLIN SHUFORD; RONALD

STURGILL; JOSEPH SULTON; RICK

TRAVIS; LESLIE TUCKER; DEREK

WHITE; WARREN WHITE; TERRY

WHITMIRE; GARY WOODS; BURNELL

G. WRIGHT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville,

after remand from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

James C. Fox, Chief District Judge, sitting by assignment

of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

(CA-91-184, CA-92-185-5-F, MISC-92-198-5-F)

 4
In Re: FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

"EFFECTIVE SCHEDULING" LITIGATION.

C. MARSHALL HOLLAND, JR.;

CHARLES LEE SMITH; WALTER

CRAWFORD THOMAS, JR.; WILLIAM

BRIAN BAREFOOT; TONYA Y. BROWN;

ROSA BOND; EARNEST A. BRYANT;

No. 95-1274

WAYNE JAY COCHRAN; WILLIAM A.

COOKE; JEFFREY J. GOERMAN; KEITH

HARRIS; CHARLES S. KNOWLES; FAYE

LEE; JOHN M. LYNCH; VERNON W.

MENIFEE; BRUCE E. POPE; BOBBY A.

ROBERTSON; WARREN D. ROMAN;

KEITH W. TINGEN; HASKELL TURNER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

 5
DARRYL ELLIS; DEBBIE GARDNER;

ERIN RICE; KENNETH W. COOPER;

ALAN E. ERETT; DANNY LEEANDER

PERSON; JOE WILLIAM BAKER; PETER

M. SLOKA, SR.; JOHNNY ANDREW

PUNCH, III: ESTER M. WOODS; FRED

MCMILLAN; ISAAC RAY PACK;

ALEXANDER J. SMITH; STEVE J.

KIRSCH; MARILYN S. WILSON; VICKI

ANN WOOD; PHILLIP LARRY OLDHAM;

TERRY A. YOUNG; RICHARD W.

MCDONALD; MICHAEL WRENN;

STEPHEN G. PARRISH; RANDALL LEE

RIGSBEE; DELORES WILSON; DIETTA

M. EDGREN; MATTHEW K. HAENSLER;

JOHN RICHARD EARP; WILLIAM P.

HASKINS; W. EDWARD CAMPBELL;

JOHN L. WALLACE; CRAIG WILSON

PRESSLEY; STAN M. GRIFFIN; MARY

PEEPLES; DAVID G. MYERS; RANDY

LAKE; KENNETH RANDALL COOPER;

WOODROW WILLIAMS, JR.; ERIN RICE

ALBRIGHT; LEISHA BAYNARD; STEPHAN

PARRISH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro,

after remand from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

James C. Fox, Chief District Judge, sitting by assignment

of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

(CA-92-503-2, MISC-92-198-5-F)

 6
Argued: October 30, 1995

Decided: January 16, 1996

Before HALL and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,

Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Hall wrote

the majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson joined. Senior Judge

Butzner wrote a dissenting opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Edward G. Connette, III, LESESNE & CONNETTE,

Charlotte, North Carolina; James McDaniel Johnson, BRYAN,

JONES, JOHNSON & SNOW, Dunn, North Carolina, for Appellants.

William Pinkney Herbert Cary, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON,

HUMPHREY & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: James T. Williams, Jr., M. Daniel McGinn,

BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD,

L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

HALL, Circuit Judge:

A number of plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment orders

entered in three actions that were consolidated with eight other

actions for pretrial proceedings. Because there are numerous other

plaintiffs who have not yet appealed but who were dismissed by the

same district court on essentially the same grounds as one or more of

the appellants, we believe that 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the multidistrict litigation statute, requires that the other dismissed plaintiffs have the

opportunity to join in the appeals before us.

 7
I

Beginning in 1991, several small groups of employees and former

employees of Food Lion, Inc., filed civil actions in federal courts in

a number of southern states in which Food Lion owns and operates

grocery stores. In each of these actions, the plaintiffs asserted claims

for unpaid overtime and penalties under the Fair Labor Standards Act

(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Hourly employees alleged that they

were forced to work "off the clock" in order to finish the tasks for

which they were responsible under Food Lion's company-wide scheduling system, and several assistant managers claimed that they were

not exempt from FLSA's overtime provisions because the tasks they

performed did not qualify as "managerial."

On June 13, 1992, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

(JPML or Panel) issued an order transferring two of these actions, one

from the District of South Carolina (Scott) and the other from the

Western District of North Carolina (Ledford), to the Eastern District

of North Carolina for "coordinated or consolidated pretrial

proceedings"1 with another action then pending there (McLawhon); all

of the cases were assigned to Judge Fox. The Panel thereafter transferred six tag-along cases2 over the next five months. Judge Fox eventually had eleven separate actions before him.3

In October 1992, court-approved notices were sent to some 60,000

current and former Food Lion employees who had worked in stores

in North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Virginia, or Tennessee after October 16, 1989.4 Almost one thousand of these

_________________________________________________________________

1 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).

2 See R. Proc. J.P.M.L. 1.

3 In addition to two cases filed in his district, Judge Fox had before him

a case from each of the other two districts in North Carolina, three from

South Carolina, one from the Eastern District of Virginia, two from the

Eastern District of Tennessee, and one from the Northern District of

Florida. Although the Virginia case arrived in Judge Fox's court via a

transfer of venue entered by the district court in Virginia pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a), it was consolidated with the other transferred cases for

pretrial matters and treated as if it were a § 1407 case.

4 The limitations period for filing overtime claims is three years for

willful violations by an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

 8
employees (including the named plaintiffs in the eleven separate

actions) opted into the litigation by returning"consent forms," and

each employee returning a consent form was assigned a "court number." A master file was created in a consolidated case denominated In

re: Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act "Effective Scheduling"

Litigation, and each "opt-in" plaintiff was assigned to one of the individual cases.

In a series of pretrial orders, Judge Fox dismissed the claims of

about half of the plaintiffs on summary judgment. On March 22,

1994, a "suggestion of remand"5 was filed by the district court and

forwarded to the Panel. On June 2, 1994, the Panel remanded eight

of the actions to their respective transferor courts.6

After remand, one of the two cases remaining in the Eastern District of North Carolina was completed, and an appeal was taken by a

number of the plaintiffs whose claims had been dismissed by summary judgment during the consolidated pretrial proceedings (the

Royster appeal). At about the same time, some of the plaintiffs who

had met a similar fate in Judge Fox's court, but who were part of

cases from one of the two other districts in North Carolina, asked for

and received Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certifications for immediate appeal

from the respective transferor district courts. These two appeals were

consolidated with the Royster appeal, and we heard oral argument on

October 30, 1995. For the reasons outlined below, we decline to reach

the merits of these appeals at this time.

II

One of the charter Panel members wrote the following with regard

to whether transferor judges should modify orders of transferee

judges:

[I]t would be improper to permit a transferor judge to overturn orders of a transferee judge even though error in the latter might result in reversal of the final judgment of the

_________________________________________________________________

5 See R. Proc. J.P.M.L. 14(c)(ii).

6 The Virginia case was retransferred by an order entered by Judge Fox.

 9
transferor court. If transferor judges were permitted to upset

rulings of transferee judges, the result would be an undermining of the purposes and usefulness of transfer under Section 1407 for coordinated or consolidated pretrial

proceedings because those proceedings would then lack the

finality (at the trial court level) requisite to the convenience

of witnesses and parties and the efficient conduct of actions.

Weigle, S.A., The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1977). The

Food Lion cases present us with the opportunity to foster the transfer

statute's goals.

A

The multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.§ 1407, was enacted

as a means of conserving judicial resources in situations where multiple cases involving common questions of fact were filed in different

districts. The statute permits the transfer of the various cases or parts

thereof to a single judge for consolidated pretrial proceedings. In

practice, however, the vast majority of transferred cases are disposed

of completely in the transferee court, either through pretrial dispositions such as summary judgment, or by trial.7 See In Re Korean Air

Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring). Although Congress has not yet seen

fit to allow the Panel or the transferee court to consolidate cases for

trial, this is possibly a next step.8

Because all of the remanded Food Lion cases had claims that had

not been dismissed, the dismissed parties were foreclosed by the

_________________________________________________________________

7 See Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124

F.R.D. 479 (1989); Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on

the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be

- Part II: Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 717 (1995).

Under R. Proc. J.P.M.L. 14(b), a transferee court may be able to use the

venue-transfer statutes, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1404(a) & 1406, to keep the

transferred actions together for trial.

8 See Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev 711 (1991).

 10
"final order rule" from appealing prior to the remand. On remand by

the Panel, however, some of the dismissed plaintiffs in the two

remanded North Carolina cases successfully moved for Rule 54(b)

determinations in their respective transferor courts, and their appeals

(Ledford and Holland) dovetailed with the appeal from the final judgment in McLawhon, one of Judge Fox's original cases. The result is

the sort of piecemeal litigation that the multidistrict scheme was

intended to discourage.

The three appeals before us involve precisely the same set of issues

as any appeals that might be taken from the summary judgment orders

in the cases remanded to the transferor courts outside North Carolina.

While we have no reason to upset the remand of those claims that

remain alive, we believe that permitting the transferor courts (and,

possibly, the Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits) to

reconsider the transferee court's summary judgment orders will frustrate the aims of § 1407.9 The overriding purpose of the multidistrict

procedure dictates that these claims be decided in the same appellate

forum.10

B

Because of the distinct factual predicates of each claim, Judge Fox

wisely limited his role to sorting out the potential claimants and clari-

_________________________________________________________________

9 Food Lion filed a supplemental brief on the jurisdictional issue advising us that only the South Carolina and Florida cases remain before their

respective district courts and that all others have been settled or adjudicated and will not be appealed.

10 Review of panel orders of transfer and remand is by petition for

extraordinary writ filed "in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over

the transferee court." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e). Our responsibility for the

orderly and efficient administration of justice within this circuit is an

adequate basis for the exercise of our power to order relief in the nature

of mandamus directed to the Panel and to the district courts for both the

District of South Carolina and the Eastern District of North Carolina. See

General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir.

1967) (en banc) (granting mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

and directing transfer of case to another district on the basis of the "maintenance of judicial economy").

 11
fying each claim to some degree.11 Each of the dismissals falls into

one of about six or seven broad categories, and the appeals of the dismissal orders in each category typically involve a single dispositive

issue of law.12 Even accounting for the peculiar facts of each case, it

is clearly more efficient to provide for review by one appellate court

in one proceeding rather than leaving open the possibility that Judge

Fox's decisions could be reconsidered by each of the transferor courts

and reviewed by as many as three courts of appeal.

C

The better practice in this case would have been for the dismissed

parties to have requested, and for Judge Fox to have directed, the

entry of Rule 54(b) final judgments prior to filing the suggestion of

remand.13 A consolidated appeal, heard by the appellate court having

jurisdiction over the transferee district court that entered the orders,

is the best means of achieving the goals of efficient and uniform adjudication of numerous actions. See FMC Corp. v. Glouster Engineering Co., 830 F.2d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining why the court

of appeals covering the transferee court, rather than the one covering

the transferor court, should hear appeals from orders of the transferee

court). There is no "just reason" for delaying the dismissed plaintiffs'

appeal rights until after remand to the transferor courts. Accordingly,

_________________________________________________________________

11 A consolidated proceeding was clearly the more efficient means of

resolving who were stating claims, for what period of time, for what

stores, and for what wages. For those cases that survived summary judgment, however, the transferor court is clearly the more convenient forum

for deciding whether the plaintiff actually worked the overtime claimed.

12 Most of these categories involve what have been characterized as

"case management dismissals" which are subject to review for abuse of

discretion. For example, one category comprises dismissals based on the

plaintiffs' failure to properly or timely respond to court-propounded

questionnaires.

13 The Panel is permitted to remand only part of a transferred action and

leave the remainder in the transferee court for further proceedings. See

28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(a) (1993). The Panel could have remanded only

those claims that had not been dismissed by Judge Fox. In the event that

we would overturn a summary judgment order for some reason, the

transferee court could refile its suggestion of remand.

 12
transferee courts in this circuit must, at some point prior to filing a

suggestion of remand, enter final judgment under Rule 54(b) with

regard to any decision or order of that court that fully disposes of

"fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than

all the parties."14

III

In the interests of judicial economy, we will delay a decision on the

pending appeals so that those plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed

by Judge Fox may bring their appeals to this court. Accordingly, we

order as follows:

(1) the pending appeals from the three North Carolina districts are

held in abeyance;

(2) the Panel is directed to retransfer from the District of South

Carolina, the Northern District of Florida, and the Eastern District of

Tennessee to the Eastern District of North Carolina those claims that

were dismissed by Judge Fox prior to the June 20, 1994, remand by

the Panel;

(3) after retransfer in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, the

district court for the Eastern District of North Carolina is directed to

enter final judgment as to all such claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

_________________________________________________________________

14 The transferee court may file a suggestion of remand with regard to

those claims and parties not the subject of the Rule 54(b) order(s).

In addition to Rule 54(b) certifications for final judgment "as to one

or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties," another tool at the

transferee court's disposal is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Appeals heard pursuant to § 1292(b) orders are heard in the circuit in which the transferee

court is located. See FMC Corp., 830 F.2d at 772 ("[A] rule which gives

the transferee circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all orders

issued by the transferor district court is simple to administer and free

from uncertainty . . . ").

 13
54(b); any appeals taken pursuant to such certifications will be heard

in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 15

An appropriate order will be entered

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In its suggestion of remand of the cases that had been consolidated

for pretrial proceedings, the district court stated:

Due to the fact-specific nature of this litigation, these cases

do not lend themselves to a consolidated disposition on the

merits. It appears likely that each individual case must be

disposed of in unique fashion, which is a process better left

to the discretion and planning of the district judges within

the districts from whence these cases originated.

The district court recognized that its pretrial rulings were interlocutory and that they were subject to revision before final judgment. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court acted responsibly. Its suggestion of remand was designed to provide a fair opportunity for each

party to seek a revision of the pretrial orders in light of evidence that

might be disclosed in further proceedings in the transferor courts.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation initially issued a conditional remand order to which Food Lion objected. Subsequently,

Food Lion withdrew its objection and the Judicial Panel issued its

order providing that the previously consolidated cases are "remanded

to their respective transferor courts for further proceedings as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)."

Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel to remand actions

that have been consolidated for pretrial proceedings"at or before the

conclusion of such pretrial proceedings" to the transferor district

courts "unless [such actions] shall have been previously terminated."

None of the actions that the Judicial Panel remanded was previously

terminated in the pretrial proceedings.

_________________________________________________________________

15 We note that failure to file a timely notice of appeal after entry of the

Rule 54(b) order will result in the loss of the right to appeal.

 14
Section 1407(e) governs appellate review of orders of the Judicial

Panel. This section provides that no proceedings for review of any

order of the Judicial Panel may be permitted except by extraordinary

writ pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Since the Judicial

Panel acted within the jurisdiction conferred by§ 1407(a), there is no

occasion for this court to issue an extraordinary writ to reverse the

Judicial Panel.

General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.

1967), which is cited as authority in the slip opinion at 11 n.10, is far

afield. In that case we dealt with a petition for a writ of mandamus

filed by one of the parties. We directed a district court in this circuit

to transfer a case to a district in another circuit where a similar case

was proceeding. We acted because the issuance of a writ was "the

only practical or adequate remedy for an abuse of discretion." 373

F.2d at 364. In the case before us, in contrast, there is no abuse of discretion on the part of either the district court, which gave very cogent

reasons for its suggestion of remand, or the Judicial Panel, which

acted pursuant to its statutory authority. No other authority is cited for

the unprecedented reversal of an order of the Judicial Panel that

remands actions pursuant to the authority granted it in § 1407(a).

I have no quarrel with FMC Corporation v. Glouster Engineering

Co., 830 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1987), or In re Korean Air Lines Disaster

of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which place

appellate jurisdiction in the court of appeals of the circuit where the

transferee district court is located. But the Judicial Panel had not

remanded these cases to the transferor courts. Certainly these cases

are not authority for reversing an order of the Judicial Panel.

In the case now before us there is no petition for an extraordinary

writ. The parties apparently are well satisfied with the status quo.

They urge us to decide the cases now before us. We have three cases

before us: cases from the Western and Middle Districts of North Carolina were properly certified, and a final order was entered in one

case originating in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Another

case from the Eastern District settled or was adjudicated with no

appeal taken.

The case from the Eastern District of Virginia, we are told, has

been settled or adjudicated, and no appeal will be taken.

 15
No final order has been entered in the three South Carolina cases.

They have not been certified for appeal, and the parties, we are told,

are engaged in settlement negotiations on the claims that Judge Fox

did not dismiss. Eventually these cases may come to us either by certification or by final order. Or they may be settled.

We are told that claims in the two Tennessee cases have been settled or adjudicated and that no appeal will be taken.

This leaves only the Florida case where neither a final order nor

certification has been entered. We are told the parties are engaged in

settlement negotiations as to those claims not dismissed by Judge

Fox. We have no jurisdiction over this case because of the Judicial

Panel's remand order. I have no doubt that the Eleventh Circuit is

capable of deciding any appeal.

Parenthetically, I note that in General Tire & Rubber Co., we

observed that we were not concerned "with the problem of whether

or not we shall ultimately lose our jurisdiction to review to another

appellate court." 373 F.2d at 370. We were, however, concerned with

effective judicial administration. To gather back into this circuit the

cases the Judicial Panel remanded will, I am afraid, negate effective

judicial administration and subject the parties to delay and to needless

counsel fees and expenses.

Rather than reaching out to the extraordinary, unsolicited, and illadvised writ of mandamus, I would consider the merits of the cases

before us, realizing that only one other circuit could potentially rule

on these issues. The greater danger to our system comes not from possible circuit conflict but from failure to honor the role that Congress

prescribed for the transferee court and the Judicial Panel in establishing a system of multidistrict litigation.

 16