Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 213 / Thursday, November 2, 2000 / Notices 65895

1Each of the five SOFA Working Group

recommendations is described in the ‘‘Findings and

Recommended Actions of the SOFA Working

Group’’ section of this advisory.

• Terminal Building expansion, and

expansion of the automobile parking

area.

• Construction of a new Taxiway M.

• Construction of additional Thangars and a new air cargo facility.

• Realignment of Tecolotito Creek,

2,000 feet to west, to be rerouted around

the new runway safety area and

relocation of Carneros Creek.

• Acquisition of Runway Protection

Zones on each end of Runway 7/25.

• Relocation of navigational aids at

the airport.

• Revisions to the standard

instrument departure and arrival

procedures at the airport.

West Creek Culvert Alternative

• Same as Alternative 1, except that

a culvert would be built for Tecolotito

Creek to allow it to flow under the

runway, taxiway and safety area.

No Action Alternative

• No construction activities at the

airport would occur under this

alternative.

Comments received during the first

scoping meeting raised concerns about

the potential emissions from air

pollutants, impacts on biological

resources, noise impacts to surrounding

residential areas, potential disruption of

archaeological or historic sites,

incompatibility with existing land uses,

traffic impacts on existing streets, and

possible contamination of Goleta Slough

or alterations of it’s flow patterns.

Comments and suggestions to this

second Notice of Intent are invited from

Federal, State and local agencies, and

other interested parties to ensure that

the full range of issues related to these

proposed projects are addressed and all

significant issues are identified. Written

comments and suggestions concerning

the scope of the EIS/EIR may be mailed

to the FAA informational contact listed

above and must be received no later

than Friday, December 15, 2000.

Public Scoping Meeting

The FAA will hold a public scoping

meeting to solicit input from the public

with respect to any environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

project. The public scoping meeting will

be held at 1 p.m. on December 7, 2000,

at the City Council Chambers, Santa

Barbara City Hall, 735 Anacapa Street,

Santa Barbara, CA 93101.

Issued in Hawthorne, California on Friday,

October 20, 2000.

Mia Paredes Ratcliff,

Acting Manager, Airports Division, WesternPacific Region, AWP–600.

[FR Doc. 00–28189 Filed 11–1–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory 2000–03

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety

Advisory 2000–03 addressing safety

practices to reduce the risk of serious

injury or death both to railroad

employees engaged in switching

operations and to the general public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director,

Operating Practices Division, Office of

Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA,

1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., RRS–11,

Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone 202–493–6255) or David H.

Kasminoff, Trial Attorney, Office of

Chief Counsel, 1120 Vermont Avenue,

N.W., RCC–12, Mail Stop 10,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone

202–493–6043).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA has

determined that the safety of railroad

employees and the general public

compels the issuance of this safety

advisory. A review of FRA’s accident/

incident data demonstrates that overall

the safety of rail transportation has

continued to improve; however, so far

this year, ten railroad employees have

lost their lives while engaged in

switching operations. This figure

already exceeds the total number of

switching-related deaths in 1999, and

has caused FRA serious concern about

the safety of certain aspects of rail

operations. Specifically, these deaths

have raised questions about the safety

practices employed by crewmembers

assigned to perform switching

operations. These deaths occurred on

both large and small railroads and

included employees with levels of

experience that ranged from as little as

two years to over 30 years.

The most recent incident occurred on

September 9, 2000. FRA believes that

each of the ten fatalities could probably

have been prevented if all employees on

each railroad had strictly followed the

five recommendations of FRA’s

Switching Operations Fatality Analysis

(SOFA) Working Group and the

applicable Federal and railroad

company operating and safety rules to

which they relate.1 The ten employee

fatalities, which occurred between

January 2 and September 9, 2000, on

seven separate railroads, are

summarized in Appendix A to this

safety advisory.

Findings and Recommended Actions of

the SOFA Working Group

During February of 1998, the SOFA

Working Group was formed at the

request of FRA to review recent fatal

incidents that occurred during railroad

switching operations and to develop

recommendations for preventing such

fatalities. The Working Group was

comprised of representatives from FRA,

the Association of American Railroads,

the United Transportation Union, the

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

and The American Short Line and

Regional Railroad Association. The

Working Group developed a codified

database of standardized information,

referred to as the ‘‘SOFA Matrix,’’ from

the wide range of information on the 76

fatal switching incidents that occurred

between January 1992 and July 1998. In

addition, the Working Group reviewed

very limited data obtained from FRA

files concerning employee fatalities

from 1975 to 1991 and participated in

a series of systematic exercises designed

to tap the extensive expertise acquired

by the Working Group during its review

and analysis of these employee

fatalities.

For statistical purposes, the total

number of employee fatalities studied

by the Working Group was too small

and the circumstances were too varied

to permit formal statistical analysis.

Notwithstanding these limitations,

based on the objective evidence of likely

contributing factors, a number of

findings and recommendations were

developed. The Working Group’s

recommendations include actions to

improve both the safety of railroad

switching operations and the quality of

data collected on fatalities in switching

operations. That database and the

expertise-capturing exercises were then

used to identify trends or patterns in the

data for a more comprehensive

understanding of the fatalities the

Working Group was investigating, and

became the foundation for the analysis

and recommendations in the report,

entitled ‘‘Switching Operations Fatality

Analysis,’’ which the Working Group

issued in October 1999.

The five critical SOFA Working

Group recommendations (‘‘five SOFA

lifesavers’’) are set forth below:

• Recommendation 1. Notification to

the locomotive engineer before fouling

track or equipment. ‘‘Any crew member

intending to foul track or equipment

must notify the locomotive engineer

before such action can take place. The

65896 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 213 / Thursday, November 2, 2000 / Notices

2The RSAC is compried of representativs of the

varoius interest groups of the railroad industry,

including management and labor, and

representatives of the National Transportation

Safety Board. The RSAC provies a forum for FRA

to receive advice on railroad safety issues.

locomotive engineer must then apply

locomotive or train brakes, have the

reverser centered, and then confirm this

action with the individual on the

ground. Additionally, any crew member

that intends to adjust knuckles/

drawbars, or apply or remove EOT

device, must insure that the cut of cars

to be coupled into is separated by no

less than 50 feet. Also, the person on the

ground must physically inspect the cut

of cars not attached to the locomotive to

insure that they are completely stopped

and, if necessary, a sufficient number of

hand brakes must be applied to insure

that the cut of cars will not move.’’

• Recommendation 2. Extra

precautions when two or more train

crews are working on the same track.

‘‘When two or more train crews are

simultaneously performing work in the

same yard or industry tracks, extra

precautions must be taken:

• Same Track. Two or more crews are

prohibited from switching into the same

track at the same time, without

establishing direct communication with

all crew members involved.

• Adjacent Track. Protection must be

afforded when there is the possibility of

movement on adjacent track(s). Each

crew will arrange positive protection for

(an) adjacent track(s) through positive

communication with yardmaster and/or

other crew members.’’

• Recommendation 3. Safety briefing.

‘‘At the beginning of each tour of duty,

all crew members will meet and discuss

all safety matters and work to be

accomplished. Additional briefings will

be held any time work changes are made

and when necessary to protect their

safety during their performance of

service.’’

• Recommendation 4. Proper

communications. ‘‘When using radio

communication, locomotive engineers

must not begin any shove move without

a specified distance from the person

controlling the move. Strict compliance

with ‘distance to go’ communication

must be maintained. When controlling

train or engine movements, all crew

members must communicate by hand

signals or radio signals. A combination

of hand and radio signals is prohibited.

All crew members must confirm when

the mode of communication changes.’’

• Recommendation 5. Paying proper

attention to new crew members. ‘‘Crew

members with less than one year of

service must have special attention paid

to safety awareness, service

qualifications, on-the-job training,

physical plant familiarity, and overall

ability to perform service safely and

efficiently. Programs such as peer

review, mentoring, and supervisory

observation must be utilized to insure

employees are able to perform service in

a safe manner.’’

The recommendations from the SOFA

Working Group and the circumstances

surrounding the ten unfortunate deaths

that have occurred this year during

switching operations were discussed at

length at the September 14, 2000,

meeting of FRA’s Railroad Safety

Advisory Committee (RSAC2) in

Washington, D.C. As a result, FRA and

RSAC representatives jointly wrote a

Declaration expressing the firm

commitment of the railroad community

to address this issue. Consensus was

achieved, and a Declaration was

approved by the RSAC members present

at the meeting. Subsequent to the RSAC

meeting, the wording in the Declaration

was slightly modified, and concurred

with and signed by the appropriate 32

RSAC members. Those signatories were:

• Ross Capon, Executive Director,

National Association of Railroad

Passengers

• Daniel Davis, Director—Railroad

Department, International Brotherhood

of Electrical Workers

• Charles E. Dettmann, Executive

Vice President, Association of American

Railroads

• Edward Dubroski, International

President, Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers

• Diane Elliott, Executive Director,

American Association of Private

Railroad Car Owners

• Allan C. Fisher, Director of

Operating Rules, Consolidated Rail

Corporation

• Dewey Garland, International

Representative, Sheet Metal Workers

International Association

• George Gavalla, Associate

Administrator for Safety, Federal

Railroad Administration

• Carl Ice, Senior Vice President

Operations, The Burlington Northern

and Santa Fe Railway Company

• Rick A. Inclima, Director of

Education and Safety, Brotherhood of

Maintenance of Way Employes

• Thomas F. Jacobi, Senior Assistant

Vice President Safety & Operating

Practices, Union Pacific Railroad

Company

• Richard A. Johnson, General

President, Brotherhood of Railway

Carmen Division—Transportation

Communications Union

• Leroy Jones, Vice President and

National Legislative Representative,

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers

• Tom Leopold, General Director

Rules & Safety, The Kansas City

Southern Ry. Co.

• Jerry Martin, Director, Rail Division,

Texas Railroad Commission,

(Representing the State Rail Safety

Program Managers)

• Chris Martinez, Legislative

Representative—New Mexico,

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way

Employees, (Representing the Labor

Council for Latin American

Advancement)

• Jack T. McBain, Senior Vice

President Operations, Canadian

National Railway

• Francis G. McKenna, President,

Tourist Railway Association Inc.

• Dennis Mogan, Director, Safety and

Rules, Metra (Chicago)

• Jolene M. Molitoris, Administrator,

Federal Railroad Administration

• Chuck R. Mundy, Vice President,

American Train Dispatchers

Department/Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers

• Carmen Patriarca, NRC Safety

Committee Chairman, National Railroad

Construction & Maintenance

Association

• Pat Pender, Vice President Field

Operations, Canadian Pacific Railway

• W. Dan Pickett, President,

Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen

• Franklin Pursley, Vice President,

Safety and Service Design, CSX

Transportation

• John M. Samuels, Senior Vice

President, Operations Planning and

Support, Norfolk Southern Corporation

• James A. Stem, Alternate National

Legislative Director, United

Transportation Union

• Greg Stengem, Vice President of

Safety, Training & Operations, The

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe

Railway Company,

• William J. Thompson, Chairman

and State Legislative Director, Ohio,

United Transportation Union

• Frank K. Turner, President,

American Short Line & Regional

Railroad Association

• Kathryn D. Waters, Manager and

Chief Operating Officer, Mass Transit

Administration of Maryland—MARC

Train Service

• Paul Worley, Assistant Director for

Engineering & Safety American

Association of State Highway &

Transportation Officials

The modified Declaration is set forth

in Appendix B to this safety advisory.

Recommended Actions

FRA believes that each employee is

personally accountable for his or her

actions on the job. Based upon FRA’s

review of the circumstances

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 213 / Thursday, November 2, 2000 / Notices 65897

surrounding the above-referenced

employee deaths, the five SOFA

Working Group recommendations, and

the RSAC Declaration, FRA further

believes that railroads can reduce the

likelihood of suffering the loss of

additional employee lives during

switching operations if they and their

employees elect to follow the

recommendations of the Working Group

and commit to the principles of the

RSAC Declaration.

Based on the information obtained

from FRA’s ongoing initiatives

concerning safety during switching

operations, investigations of railroad

accidents and incidents, and

information gathered pursuant to the

Declaration and other partnership

initiatives with rail labor and

management, FRA may modify Safety

Advisory 2000–03, issue additional

safety advisories, or take other

appropriate necessary action to ensure

the highest level of safety on the

Nation’s railroads.

Appendix A—Calendar Year 2000

Switching Operations Fatalities

Employee job title

Years of

railroad

service

Date of death Circumstances surrounding the death

Conductor ......................................... 21 January 2 .......... Struck by a box car fouling the track while riding the lead car of a shoving movement into an industry track.

Conductor ......................................... 23 March 9 ............ Coupled (crushed) between two rail cars while switching in a classification yard.

Foreman ........................................... 32 April 21 ............. Stepped into the path of a rail car that had been released into the track

for classification from the gravity hump.

Brakeman ......................................... 2 May 22 .............. Crushed between the side of a hopper car and a coal unloader while

riding the leading end of a shoving move into a customer’s siding.

Switchman ........................................ 2 May 31 ............. Crushed between the locomotive he was riding and a standing cut of

box cars.

Conductor ......................................... 19 July 7 ................ Stepped between moving cars and was struck and run over by the

equipment.

Conductor ......................................... 30 July 24 .............. Struck by own locomotive after lining a switch on the opposite side of

the track from the engineer.

Brakeman ......................................... 27 July 28 .............. Pinned between the car he was riding and the loading dock at a customer’s siding during a shoving move.

Brakeman ......................................... 4 August 11 ......... Struck by another train crew’s consist while switching at an intermodal

facility.

Switch Foreman ............................... 27 September 9 ..... Stepped into the path of and struck by own equipment.

Appendix B—The Railroad Safety

Advisory Committee Declaration

Together, the railroad community will

initiate an on-going focused safety campaign

to prevent fatalities and injuries from

occurring during switching operations. This

initiative underscores our collective

commitment to zero injuries and accidents in

the workplace. This safety campaign will

include the following steps:

• Switching operations industry wide will

immediately be assessed as a team effort by

labor, management and FRA through

increased monitoring and audits to determine

safety risks;

• Supervisors and employees will increase

their efforts to communicate the importance

of safety and urge everyone to redouble their

focus on safe practices;

• The Switching Operations Fatality

(SOFA) Analysis report and the ‘‘Five SOFA

Lifesavers’’ will be used as the basis to create

a plan to address safety risks; and

• Managers will communicate with

employees and their families to educate them

on potential dangers and to seek their

support in eliminating fatalities and injuries

in the workplace.

We will work together to further strengthen

a rail safety culture that protects the lives and

well being of every railroad employee. As an

industry, we are dedicated to achieving this

safety goal.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on October 27,

2000.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator, Federal Railroad

Administration.

[FR Doc. 00–28150 Filed 11–01–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Reports, Forms and Record Keeping

Requirements Agency Information

Collection Activity Under OMB Review

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In compliance with the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44

U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this notice

announces that the Information

Collection Request (ICR) abstracted

below has been forwarded to the Office

of Management and Budget (OMB) for

review and comment. The ICR describes

the nature of the information collections

and their expected burden. The Federal

Register Notice with a 60-day comment

period was published on May 5, 2000

[65 FR 26273–26274].

DATES: Comments must be submitted on

or before December 1, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kim

Jackson at the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, Office of

Technology and Resource Management,

(NAD–40), 202–366–2588. 400 Seventh

Street, SW, Room 6240, Washington, DC

20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Title: Air Bag Deactivation.

OMB Number: 2127–0588.

Type of Request: Extension of a

currently approved information

collection.

Abstract: If a private individual or

lessee wants to install an air bag on-off

switch to turn-off either or both frontal

air bags, they must complete Form OMB

2127–0588 to certify certain statements

regarding use of the switch. The dealer

or business must, in turn, submit the

completed forms to NHTSA within

seven days. The submission of the

completed forms by the dealers and

repair business to NHTSA, as required,

will serve the agency several purposes.

They will aid the agency in monitoring

the number of authorization requests

submitted and the pattern in claims of

risk groups membership. The completed

forms will enable the agency to

determine whether the dealers and