NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIRCH LAW FIRM, LLP; et al., 

Appellants, 

 v. 

ELIAS NAKHLEH; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-56207 

D.C. No. 

2:20-cv-05734-PA-MAA 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2022

Pasadena, California

Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and DANIELS,** District Judge.

Mirch Law Firm, LLP (“Mirch”) appeals the district court’s order 

disqualifying it as plaintiffs’ counsel in a RICO action brought by Seyed Zia Eddin 

Ahmadi Abhari, Donya Entertainment, Inc., and Noureen Entertainment, Inc.

against defendants Elias Nakhleh, Slater’s 50/50 Franchise, LLC, and Elite 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable George B. Daniels, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 26 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Restaurant Group, Inc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm.1

1. Defendants argue that Mirch lacks standing to challenge the 

disqualification order. Where a disqualification order “clearly and intentionally 

sanction[s] an attorney,” the attorney has suffered sufficient injury-in-fact to have

standing. United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 

United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an 

attorney had standing to appeal a district court ruling that she violated an ethical 

rule because it constituted a “per se” sanction). Here, given the district court’s 

clear findings of ethical violations, we are satisfied that Mirch has standing to 

appeal.

2. We review disqualification orders for abuse of discretion. Trone v. 

Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980). “[A]n order disqualifying counsel will 

not be disturbed if the record reveals ‘any sound’ basis for the court’s action,” Paul 

E. Iacono Structural Eng’r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983), 

which may include a violation of ethical rules, see id. at 440. The district court 

properly applied California law in determining whether disqualification was 

proper. Wininger v. SI Mgmt. L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 

1 We grant appellees’ request for judicial notice (Dkt. 55) and deny Mirch’s request 

for judicial notice (Dkt. 15). 
3 

C.D. Cal. Local R. 83-3.1.2 (requiring attorneys in the Central District of 

California to comply with California’s Rules of Professional Conduct). Relevant 

here, an attorney may be disqualified based on his presumed or actual acquisition 

of an adversary’s privileged information. See Humphrey, 722 F.2d at 440; see also 

Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1067, 1085 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1994).

The record supports the district court’s finding that Martin Reiner obtained 

privileged information from Defendants during a prior lawsuit through an implied 

attorney-client relationship. See Cal. Evid. Code § 950. “[I]t is the intent and 

conduct of the parties that controls the question as to whether an attorney-client 

relationship has been created.” Zenith Ins. Co. v. O’Connor, 148 Cal. App. 4th 

998, 1010 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Defendants reasonably believed Reiner was acting 

as their attorney and that their communications were privileged. 

The record also supports the district court’s finding that Defendants 

disclosed confidential information to Reiner that was materially relevant to this 

case. The party seeking disqualification need not “disclose the actual information 

contended to be confidential.” In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 232 Cal. App. 

3d 572, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The court should be given “the nature of the 

information and its material relationship to the proceeding.” Id. Defendants did so 
4 

here, outlining the categories of confidential business materials Nakhleh disclosed

to Reiner, which materially relate to many of the allegations in this case.

Where a law firm witness or employee has an adversary’s relevant, 

privileged information, a “rebuttable presumption arises that the information has 

been used or disclosed” to the law firm. Shadow Traffic Network, 24 Cal. App. 3d 

at 1085 (citing Complex Asbestos, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 596). Reiner claimed to be 

Mirch’s witness, and although Mirch denies receiving confidential information 

from Reiner, the district court’s weighing of the evidence is entitled to deference. 

On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Mirch 

because there is a “sound basis,” Humphrey, 722 F.2d at 438 (internal quotation 

marks omitted), for the district court’s conclusion that disqualification was 

required to remedy the unfair advantage that Plaintiffs obtained through Mirch’s 

representation. 

3. The district court did not violate Mirch’s due process rights by taking the

motion to disqualify under submission. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. Local 

R. 7-15; Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)

(holding that a district court’s failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss 

was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).

AFFIRMED.