Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 47017 

■ 2. Amend Appendix G, Section 3 by 

removing and reserving paragraph 

(b)(1). 

Issued under authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f), 40103, 40113, and 44701(a) in 

Washington, DC, on July 12, 2016. 

Michael Huerta, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2016–17155 Filed 7–19–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 417, 420, 431, and 435 

[Docket No.: FAA–2014–0418; Amdt. Nos. 

417–4, 420–7, 431–4 and 435–3] 

RIN 2120–AK06 

Changing the Collective Risk Limits for 

Launches and Reentries and Clarifying 

the Risk Limit Used To Establish 

Hazard Areas for Ships and Aircraft 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is amending its 

regulations concerning the collective 

risk limits for commercial launches and 

reentries. These changes include: 

Separating the risk limits for 

commercial launches and reentries; 

aggregating the risk posed by impacting 

inert and explosive debris, toxic release, 

and far field blast overpressure; limiting 

the aggregate risk for these three hazards 

to 1 × 10¥4; reducing the number of 

significant digits used in launch and 

reentry risk analysis; and various nonsubstantive clarifying revisions. These 

changes update FAA regulations to 

reflect the United States Government’s 

greater experience with commercial 

launch and reentry and to align more 

closely the FAA’s risk standards with 

those of other United States Federal 

agencies, while continuing to protect 

public safety. 

DATES: Effective September 19, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: For information on where to 

obtain copies of rulemaking documents 

and other information related to this 

final rule, see ‘‘How To Obtain 

Additional Information’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Rene Rey, AST–300, 

Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–7538; email 

Rene.Rey@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The Commercial Space Launch Act of 

1984, as amended and codified at 51 

United States Code (U.S.C.) Subtitle V— 

Commercial Space Transportation, Ch. 

509, Commercial Space Launch 

Activities, 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923 (the 

Act), authorizes the Secretary of 

Transportation and thus the FAA, 

through delegations, to oversee, license, 

and regulate commercial launch and 

reentry, and the operation of launch and 

reentry sites as carried out by U.S. 

citizens or within the United States. 51 

U.S.C. 50904, 50905. The Act directs the 

FAA to exercise this responsibility 

consistent with public health and safety, 

safety of property, and the national 

security and foreign policy interests of 

the United States. 51 U.S.C. 50905. 

Section 50901(a)(7), in relevant part, 

directs the FAA to regulate private 

sector launches, reentries, and 

associated services only to the extent 

necessary to protect the public health 

and safety and safety of property. The 

FAA is also responsible for encouraging, 

facilitating, and promoting commercial 

space launches and reentries by the 

private sector. 51 U.S.C. 50903. 

I. Overview of Final Rule 

The FAA is adopting this final rule to 

revise certain regulations related to the 

collective risk limits for commercial 

launches and reentries in part 417 

(Launch Safety), part 420 (License to 

Operate a Launch Site), part 431 

(Launch and Reentry of a Reusable 

Launch Vehicle (RLV)), and part 435 

(Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle Other 

Than a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV)) 

of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR). 

This final rule divides the risk 

analysis for launch and reentry, 

providing a separate risk budget for 

each. For all launches, regardless of 

vehicle type, this final rule requires a 

single expected number of casualties 

(Ec) be calculated by aggregating the risk 

posed to the collective members of the 

public from three hazards: Impacting 

and inert explosive debris, toxic release, 

and far field blast overpressure. This 

final rule also revises the acceptable risk 

threshold for launch from an Ec of 30 × 

10¥6 for each hazard to an Ec of 1 × 

10¥4 for all three hazards combined. 

Furthermore, this final rule expresses 

the revised Ec limit using the correct 

number of significant digits to properly 

represent the uncertainty in Ec

calculations. This final rule changes the 

FAA’s collective risk limits for launch 

and reentry to more closely match the 

Ec standard currently used by the 

United States (U.S.) Air Force and the 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) for government 

missions, and to account for the level of 

uncertainty that exists in the Ec

calculations. 

This final rule also makes two 

revisions to § 417.107 to clarify the 

launch and reentry regulations. The first 

revision removes the phrase ‘‘including 

each planned impact’’ from 

§ 417.107(b)(1) to clarify that public risk 

is assessed from lift-off through orbital 

insertion for orbital launches and from 

lift-off to final impact for suborbital 

launches. The second revision modifies 

§ 417.107(b)(3) and (b)(4) to make 

transparent the criteria for establishing 

hazard areas by replacing the references 

to equivalent levels of safety for water 

borne and aircraft hazard areas required 

for launch from a federal launch range 

with the actual levels of safety provided 

by hazard areas for launches from a 

federal range in 2006, the year the FAA 

promulgated § 417.107. Under 

§ 417.107(b)(3), a hazard area for water 

borne vessels satisfies part 417 if the 

probability of impact with debris 

capable of causing a casualty on any 

potential water borne vessel within the 

hazard area does not exceed 0.00001 (1 

× 10¥5). Under § 417.107(b)(4), a hazard 

area for aircraft will satisfy part 417 if 

the probability of impact with debris 

capable of causing a casualty on any 

potential aircraft within that hazard area 

does not exceed 0.000001 (1 × 10¥6). 

These clarifying edits do not change the 

risk requirement for launch licensees or 

launch license applicants. 

Summary of the Costs and Benefits of 

the Final Rule 

The final rule will result in net 

benefits for both the commercial space 

transportation industry (industry) and 

government by reducing the number of 

waivers that must be prepared by the 

industry and processed by the 

government for launches with an 

aggregate Ec between 90 × 10¥6 and 149 

× 10¥6, and by averting unnecessary 

mission delays and scrubs. The 

resulting savings for both the industry 

and the FAA from reducing the number 

of waivers range from a low estimate of 

approximately $8.3 million to a high 

estimate of $16.7 million ($5.8 million 

and $11.7 million present value at a 7% 

discount rate, respectively). 

II. Background 

An operator conducts a launch using 

an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) or 

a reusable launch vehicle (RLV). An 

ELV is a launch vehicle whose 


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47018 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

1See, e.g., Commercial Space Transportation 

Licensing Regulations, Final Rule (Launch 

Licensing Rule), 64 FR 19586, 19605 n.11 (Apr. 21, 

1999). 

2Changing the Collective Risk Limits for 

Launches and Reentries and Clarifying the Risk 

Limit Used to Establish Hazard Areas for Ships and 

Aircraft, 79 FR 42241 (July 21, 2014). 

3See National Space Policy of the United States 

of America (June 28, 2010), available at https://

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_

space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 

4However, it should be noted that the FAA made 

a non-substantive change to 417.107(b)(2) to 

improve consistency and clarity. 

propulsive stages are flown only once. 

14 CFR 401.5. An RLV is a launch 

vehicle that is designed to return to 

Earth substantially intact and, therefore, 

may be launched more than one time or 

that contains vehicle stages that may be 

recovered by a launch operator for 

future use in the operation of a 

substantially similar launch vehicle. Id. 

Reentry is conducted with RLVs or 

other reentry vehicles. A reentry vehicle 

is a vehicle designed to return from 

Earth orbit or outer space to Earth 

substantially intact, and includes a 

reentering RLV. Id. 

Parts 417, 420, 431, and 435 

(collectively, the collective risk 

regulations) limit the collective risk that 

a commercial launch or reentry may 

pose to the public. The FAA’s collective 

risk regulations, as originally 

promulgated, were based primarily on 

Ec limits that the U.S. Air Force 

imposed on launches from federal 

launch ranges at the time the FAA began 

establishing its own Ec limits.1 In 

addition to imposing Ec limits on risk 

posed by launches and reentries to 

collective members of the public, these 

regulations also impose separate limits 

on the risk posed by these operations to 

individual members of the public. 

In July 2014, the FAA published in 

the Federal Register a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (2014 NPRM) 

proposing various revisions to the 

FAA’s launch and reentry regulations.2

This final rule adopts the proposal 

outlined in the 2014 NPRM, with minor 

modifications and clarifications in 

response to comments from the public. 

A. Statement of the Problem 

Prior to the 2014 NPRM, 

developments in the industry and 

among U.S. Government agencies led 

the FAA to question its collective risk 

regulations. In 2010, the U.S. Air Force, 

after conducting over 5,000 launches 

under a 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit, determined 

that it could increase its Ec limit from 

30 × 10¥6 per hazard to 100 × 10¥6 for 

the aggregate public risk associated with 

debris, toxicity, and far field blast 

overpressure without harming public 

safety. The U.S. Air Force’s new Ec

standards also apply a separate Ec limit 

to reentry, limiting reentry Ec to 100 × 

10¥6 for the aggregate public risk 

associated with all hazards, which 

typically include debris, toxicity, and 

far field blast overpressure. In addition, 

in 2010 NASA also revised its risk 

acceptability policy to limit the Ec from 

launch and reentry missions to 100 × 

10¥6 each. 

Because the FAA’s collective risk 

regulations were based on the U.S. Air 

Force’s former 30 × 10¥6 limit—a limit 

that both the U.S. Air Force and NASA, 

after considerable experience, have now 

revised—the FAA questioned in the 

2014 NPRM whether its collective risk 

limits, revised by this final rule, 

continued to represent appropriate 

public risk criteria for commercial ELV 

and RLV operations. In addition, the 

FAA’s own experience led the agency to 

question whether those Ec limits created 

an obstacle to NASA’s implementation 

of the National Space Policy (e.g., NASA 

proposed commercial flights to the 

International Space Station that would 

not meet FAA’s current Ec limits).3

Finally, the FAA also sought to 

address in the 2014 NPRM whether its 

former collective risk regulations 

sufficiently distinguished between 

commercial launch and reentry risk. 

Instead of regulating risk based on 

whether the operation in question was 

a launch or a reentry, the former 

collective risk regulations focused on 

the type of vehicle used in the 

operation, namely whether the vehicle 

was an ELV, RLV, or a reentry vehicle. 

B. Summary of the 2014 NPRM 

The 2014 NPRM proposed several 

revisions to the FAA’s risk framework. 

These proposals included: Aggregating 

launch hazards and establishing an Ec

limit of 1 × 10¥4, thus reducing the 

number of significant digits in a launch 

or reentry risk analysis; separating the 

risk limits for the launch and reentry of 

a reentry vehicle; including toxic release 

as a hazard in the risk analysis for 

reentries; and clarifying the acceptable 

risk threshold for impact with ships and 

aircraft in hazard areas. For more 

detailed information, interested parties 

may consult the preamble of the 2014 

NPRM. 

C. General Overview of Comments 

The comment period for the July 2014 

NPRM closed on October 20, 2014. The 

FAA received comments from nine 

commenters, including ACTA Inc. 

(ACTA), Blue Origin, LLC (Blue Origin), 

Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed 

Martin), Orbital Sciences Corporation 

(Orbital Sciences), Sierra Nevada Corp. 

(Sierra Nevada), Space Exploration 

Technologies Corp. (SpaceX), XCOR 

Aerospace (XCOR), and two individual 

commenters. Most of the commenters 

supported the proposed changes, and 

some suggested additional changes that 

are discussed more fully below. Several 

commenters fully supported the 

proposed changes, and one commenter 

opposed the proposed changes. The 

comments focused on the following 

general areas of the proposal: 

• Individual risk limits 

• Separation of launch and reentry 

• Significant figures 

• Ship and aircraft hazard areas 

• Including toxic release in the reentry 

risk analysis 

III. Discussion of Public Comments and 

Final Rule 

A. Individual Risk 

As discussed in the 2014 NPRM, this 

final rule does not substantively revise 

the FAA’s limitation on risk posed to 

individuals found in §§ 417.107, 431.35, 

and 435.35.4 The individual risk limits 

in § 417.107(b)(2) prohibit launch risk to 

an individual from exceeding 1 × 10¥6

for each hazard (debris, toxic release, 

and far field blast overpressure) for 

launch of an ELV. For the launch of a 

RLV or other reentry vehicle, 

§§ 431.35(b)(1)(ii) and 435.35 continue 

to prohibit the risk to an individual 

from exceeding 1 × 10¥6 per mission. 

The FAA proposed no change to this 

risk limit, so any change now would be 

outside the scope of the proposal. 

Nonetheless, the comments raise issues 

of interest and are addressed below. 

XCOR agreed that no change is 

necessary because it is easier for launch 

operators to mitigate risk to a particular 

individual than the collective public, 

and because the FAA has never waived 

individual risk for launches in the past. 

On the other hand, Orbital Sciences 

recommended that the FAA ‘‘[e]xamine 

historical data for all U.S. launches to 

determine the highest level of risk 

realized by any individual member of 

the public and propose a more realistic 

. . . risk [figure] based on this 

successful precedent.’’ Orbital Sciences 

also recommended that the FAA adopt 

‘‘identical risk limits for individual 

members of the public’’ for U.S. 

Government and commercial launches. 

The FAA disagrees with Orbital 

Sciences’ recommendation to revise the 

individual risk threshold. Unlike the 

FAA’s collective risk limitation, the 

FAA is aware of only a small number of 

historical U.S. government launches for 

which the predicted individual risk for 

any one member of the public exceeded 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 47019 

5The separation of Ec limits for launch and 

reentry affects §§ 431.35(b) and 435.35. 

6Waiver of Acceptable Mission Risk Restriction 

for Reentry and a Reentry Vehicle, 75 FR 75619, 

75620 (Dec. 6, 2010). 

7The Waiver explained that ‘‘[b]ecause a random 

uncontrolled reentry arising out of a reentry vehicle 

ceasing to function upon arrival in orbit is not 

purposeful and is thus not licensed, an 

interpretation that section 431.35 applies to this 

type of reentry would conflict with’’ limitations on 

the FAA’s authority. 

1 × 10¥6. From a statistical perspective, 

this casualty-free launch record is the 

expected outcome because 1 × 10¥6

corresponds to a one-in-a-million 

chance of a particular person being a 

casualty and there have been no more 

than a few thousand launches from the 

United States. The FAA therefore finds 

insufficient evidence at this time to 

justify relaxing the current individual 

risk limits, which are an integral part of 

an interdependent set of safety 

requirements that have produced a 

flawless public safety record for U.S. 

launches and reentries. Furthermore, 

the FAA notes that limiting risk to 

individual members of the public at the 

1 × 10¥6 level is consistent with the 

consensus standard produced by U.S. 

range safety organizations as adopted by 

NASA and the U.S. Air Force. 

ACTA stated that maintaining the 

current individual risk thresholds 

perpetuates inconsistent individual risk 

standards for ELVs, RLVs, and reentry 

vehicles. ACTA observed that 

§ 417.107(b)(1)(ii) limits individual risk 

to 1 × 10¥6 for each hazard for ELVs. 

ACTA stated that this was inconsistent 

with the risk threshold for RLVs and 

reentry vehicles in § 431.35(b)(2)(ii), 

which limits total risk to an individual 

to 1 × 10¥6 over the course of the entire 

mission, without any reference to 

specific hazards. As a result, ACTA 

argued, ELV missions would have a 

different individual risk criterion than 

missions involving an RLV or other 

reentry vehicle. 

ACTA’s recommendation to 

harmonize all individual risk limits is 

outside the scope of the current 

rulemaking. Also, the FAA has 

insufficient data to justify a change to 

the individual risk criteria for either 

launch or reentry, and thus no change 

was proposed. Finally, the current 

regulatory framework governing 

individual risk for launch and reentry 

risk has successfully protected the 

public since 2000. 

B. Separating Ec for Launch and Reentry 

The FAA proposed to separate the Ec

limits for the launch and reentry of all 

reentry vehicles, instead of applying a 

single risk limit to both phases of a 

mission.5

Blue Origin, Lockheed Martin, Orbital 

Sciences, and SpaceX fully supported 

the proposal to separate launch and 

reentry risk. ACTA supported the 

proposal to separately assess launch and 

reentry risk if reentry occurs after a 

health check, but noted that ‘‘separation 

of risk budgets for launch and reentry 

ignores the risk contribution from a 

failure to initiate a planned reentry.’’ In 

particular, ACTA noted that ‘‘[t]here 

does not appear to be any consideration 

for consequences if the health check 

prior to reentry fails. . . . [The 

vehicle’s] orbit will eventually degrade 

and re-enter . . . [and the] risk of this 

potentially uncontrolled re-entry (if the 

health of the vehicle can never be 

restored) appears to be neglected.’’ 

ACTA is correct that the FAA does 

not regulate the risk associated with 

reentry vehicles or parts of reentry 

vehicles that do not initiate or attempt 

to initiate a purposeful reentry. As the 

FAA has explained, the Act limits the 

FAA’s licensing of reentry to scenarios 

involving purposeful reentry; 6

therefore, the FAA is prohibited from 

considering the ‘‘possibility of a random 

uncontrolled reentry that occurs as a 

result of a reentry vehicle ceasing to 

function upon arrival in orbit.’’ 7

Although the 2014 NPRM did not 

propose to change the requirement that 

suborbital launches and reentries be 

subject to a single launch Ec, the FAA 

invited comment on the issue. Sierra 

Nevada commented that suborbital 

flights also should have separate risk 

limits for launch and reentry because 

each phase of flight required 

independent operational decisions. 

XCOR, on the other hand, commented 

that suborbital vehicles should continue 

to have a single risk limit because, for 

a suborbital launch, ‘‘reentry is a 

physical inevitab[ility]’’; there is ‘‘no 

intervening event between launch and 

reentry’’; and that ‘‘reentry is closely 

proximate in time—four minutes, for 

most concepts to launch.’’ 

The FAA agrees with XCOR that a 

suborbital mission should continue to 

be analyzed using a single risk budget 

for the entire mission, from launch 

through final impact, because there is 

no intervening event between launch 

and reentry and because reentry is a 

physical inevitability. Moreover, 

separating launch and reentry risk limits 

for suborbital flights is beyond the scope 

of this final rule because it would 

require revising the definitions of 

‘‘reentry’’ and ‘‘launch’’ found in 

§ 401.5, changes the NPRM did not 

propose. 

The FAA will require separate 

analysis of the risks associated with 

launch and reentry because the two are 

separate events. A launch may not 

always be successful, and a single risk 

limit that encompasses both launch and 

reentry makes reentry risk calculations 

unnecessarily dependent on the 

probability of failure associated with 

launch. The FAA leaves unchanged, 

however, the requirement that 

suborbital launches and reentries must 

comply with a single launch Ec limit 

that encompasses the entire operation 

from launch through final impact. 

C. Revising the Acceptable Risk 

Standard 

The FAA proposed to revise the 

acceptable risk limit for launch to 1 × 

10¥4, encompassing all three hazards— 

debris, toxic release, and far field blast 

overpressure. This would amend the 

risk framework’s three components by 

aggregating the analysis of debris, 

toxics, and far field blast overpressure; 

establishing a new, unified risk standard 

for the three primary hazards combined; 

and revising the risk standard to be 

expressed using one significant figure. 

The commenters addressed each of 

these issues separately. 

1. Aggregating Ec for Debris, Toxics, and 

Far Field Blast Overpressure 

ACTA, Orbital Sciences, and SpaceX 

supported the proposal to aggregate risk 

calculations. The FAA received no 

negative comments on this component 

of the proposal. Therefore, this final rule 

replaces the prior requirement to satisfy 

three separate Ec criteria (one each for 

debris, toxics, and far field blast 

overpressure) with a single Ec criterion 

accounting for all three primary 

hazards. 

2. Revising the Number of Significant 

Figures 

Numerous commenters, including 

Blue Origin, Lockheed Martin, Orbital 

Sciences, and SpaceX, supported the 

FAA’s proposal to express the risk 

threshold using one significant figure. 

Lockheed Martin stated that the 

proposal ‘‘would improve efficiency and 

maintain a level of safety for 

commercial launches that is 

commensurate with the current high 

level of safety associated with civil and 

military launches.’’ 

ACTA and an individual commenter 

advocated against changing the number 

of significant figures. An individual 

commenter recommended that one 

significant figure would be more 

appropriate at the level of 1 × 10¥5. 

ACTA agreed with the proposal to 

increase the risk limitations insofar as 

‘‘it is reasonable to apply a higher 

acceptability limit (around 100 × 


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47020 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

8 In fact, an uncertainty analysis produces a set 

of point estimates, each of which is an equally valid 

result, to quantify the uncertainty in the Ec estimate. 

ACTA itself developed a tool that computes the 

uncertainty in the point estimate of Ec by using 

multiple input data sets within the range of 

feasibility given the uncertainty associated with the 

input data, together with a multiple sets of factors 

applied to each sub-model to account for the 

estimated biases and uncertainties in the applicable 

sub-models. 9Of course, the probability of failure uncertainty 

is very large for relatively new vehicles, which are 

most likely to have risk estimates near the 1 × 10¥4

Ec limit. However, even vehicles with extensive 

flight history, such as the Delta II, have probability 

of failure estimates that vary by a factor of two or 

more based on the analysis approaches applied by 

the two major federal ranges where commercial 

launches most often occur. For example, the Delta 

II demonstrated nine failures in 227 launches in 

advance of the GRAIL mission. Valid probability of 

failure analysis methods produced mean estimates 

of probability of failure for the GRAIL launch 

between less than 2% to more than 4%, depending 

on whether and how reliability growth was 

accounted for. 

10All expendable launch vehicle failure 

probability analysis methods used by Federal 

ranges today assume that launches may be treated 

as Bernoulli trials: That the vehicle has a constant 

‘‘true probability’’ of failure for each and every 

launch, and that the outcome of each launch is 

statistically independent of all others. A toss of an 

evenly weighted coin is a classic example of a 

Bernoulli trial. Of course, launches are not exactly 

Bernoulli trials because no two launches are 

precisely the same. For example, the vehicle may 

be modified or improved as needed during a 

sequence of launches, particularly if it has failed on 

previous launches, and there are natural variations 

due to environmental conditions during the vehicle 

manufacturing, processing, and launch. 

10¥6),’’ but also stated the FAA’s 

proposal to both raise the limit and 

reduce the number of significant figures 

resulted in an effective increase of ‘‘the 

acceptable risk limit to 50% above 

current Air Force and NASA practice.’’ 

Referring to the effects of revising the 

number of significant figures, ACTA 

stated that ‘‘the difference between 100 

× 10¥6 and 149 × 10¥6 is real and 

significant.’’ ACTA also stated that, 

because of this ‘‘effective’’ 50% 

increase, the FAA’s proposal would not 

maintain safety levels for commercial 

space transportation commensurate 

with the current requirements for civil 

and military reentries. Finally, ACTA 

also disagreed with the FAA’s rationale 

for increasing the acceptable risk limit. 

In particular, ACTA stated that it is 

inappropriate to exceed the Range 

Commanders Council (RCC) 321 

consensus standard; the success of a 

relatively small number of missions 

operated under waivers is statistically 

irrelevant; and the continued use of 

waivers is reasonable in a developing 

industry. 

The FAA disagrees that the difference 

between 100 × 10¥6 and 149 × 10¥6 is 

real and significant because the 

uncertainty associated with many of the 

variables that go into determining Ec are 

too large to justify using more than one 

significant digit. The FAA and others, 

including ACTA, have performed 

extensive uncertainty analyses for both 

launch area and downrange overflight. 

These analyses accounted for aleatory— 

irreducible—and epistemic— 

modeling—sources of uncertainty, 

including the inherent variability in the 

impact distribution due to wind and lift 

effects for irregular debris following 

failure; probability of failure; casualty 

area for people in shelters that are 

impacted by debris; size of the debris 

impact probability distribution; yield 

from exploding propellant and 

propellant tanks; probability of injury 

from a blast wave for people in 

buildings or unsheltered; and 

population density. Uncertainty also 

exists in the Ec estimate for overflight 

because of the uncertainty in the time of 

launch,cargo debris, and different 

methods to characterize the normal 

trajectory dispersions based on input 

data provided by the launch operator. 

A standard public risk analysis for 

launch or reentry produces a single Ec

value, but these state-of-the-art analyses 

demonstrate that the modeling 

uncertainties are too large to justify 

calculating Ec to more than one 

significant figure.8 In fact, the 

uncertainty in a vehicle’s probability of 

failure alone is generally large enough to 

render meaningless any calculated 

differences involving more than one 

significant digit, such as a calculated 

difference of 100 × 10¥6 compared to 

149 × 10¥6 in Ec estimates for a 

commercial launch.9 Specifically, 

during SpaceX’s third Falcon 9 mission 

(F9–003), two probability of failure 

analysis approaches applied by the two 

major federal ranges for commercial 

launches, which the FAA deemed 

equally valid based on the requirements 

in § 417.224, produced mean probability 

of failure estimates during Eurasian 

over-flight that varied by approximately 

40 percent. Also, the uncertainty in the 

Ec estimate scales linearly with the 

statistical uncertainty associated with 

any probability of failure analysis 

method, even when the assumptions of 

the model are absolutely true. For 

example, applying the binomial 

approach in part 417, appendix A, 

§ 417.25(b)(5)(iii), to a new vehicle with 

a record of no failures in the first two 

flights produces a reference probability 

of failure estimate of 0.28. Even if the 

assumption of Bernoulli trials 10

inherent in the binomial approach is 

absolutely true, which is doubtful given 

the evolutionary nature of expendable 

launch vehicles, particularly during the 

first several flights, there is about a 20 

percent chance that the true probability 

of failure is at least twice the reference 

probability of failure estimate. It is 

impossible to know the true probability 

of failure for any launch vehicle flight. 

The FAA believes that the uncertainty 

in the probability of failure alone always 

renders meaningless any more than one 

significant digit in any commercial 

launch or re-entry Ec estimate. 

ACTA provided three alternatives to 

the FAA’s July 2014 proposal. These 

alternatives included (1) using ‘‘the 

approach specified in RCC 321–10’’ in 

which increasing degrees of analysis 

and mitigation are required as the risk 

increases above 30 × 10¥6 and again at 

100 × 10¥6; (2) ‘‘[e]xpress[ing] the limit 

that log10(EC) is less than ¥4.0 (to two 

significant figures’’; and (3) 

‘‘[a]pply[ing] a limit of 9 × 10¥5 rather 

than 1 × 10¥4 which results in an 

effective limit of 95 × 10¥6.’’ 

The FAA appreciates the potential 

value in using the RCC 321–10 

approach, in which increasing degrees 

of analysis and mitigation are required 

as the risk increases. Such a dramatic 

change, however, is beyond the scope of 

this rulemaking. The FAA disagrees 

with ACTA’s recommendations to 

‘‘[e]xpress the limit that log10(EC) is less 

than ¥4.0 (to two significant figures’’ or 

‘‘[a]pply[ing] a limit of 9 × 10¥5 rather 

than 1 × 10¥4 which results in an 

effective limit of 95 × 10¥6’’ because 

either of those approaches would still 

imply more significant digits in the Ec

estimate than justified based on the Ec

uncertainty analyses summarized above. 

3. Establishing an Acceptable Risk Limit 

of 1 × 10¥4

Under the 2014 NPRM, 

§§ 417.107(b)(1), 431.35(b)(1)(i), and 

435.35(b) would establish an acceptable 

collective risk limit of 1 × 10¥4. Two 

commenters, Lockheed Martin and 

SpaceX, supported the proposal without 

additional significant comment. SpaceX 

noted that the proposal would align the 

FAA’s risk limit with the standards set 

by other organizations within the U.S. 

Government. 

Orbital Sciences supported the 

proposal but also recommended that the 

FAA ‘‘[e]xamine historical data for all 

U.S. launches and determine the highest 

level of collective risk realized by the 

public [to] propose a more realistic . . . 

collective risk [number] based on this 

successful precedent.’’ Similarly, Blue 

Origin recommended that the collective 

risk number be revised higher than 

proposed, to 1 × 10¥3. Blue Origin 

noted that Federal ranges have, in the 

past, waived risks associated with noncommercial reentry to as high as 1 × 

10¥3, and stated, ‘‘[t]he commercial 


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11Emphasis in original. 

12See Range Commanders Council Risk 

Committee of the Range Safety Group, Common 

Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, RCC 321–10, 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, 2010. 

13Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory 

Circular No. 39–8, Continued Airworthiness 

Assessments of Powerplants and Auxiliary Power 

Unit Installations of Transport Category Planes, 

Washington, DC, September 2003. 

14U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Commission Issuance of White Paper on Riskinformed and Performance-based Regulation, 

Yellow Announcement # 019, Washington, DC, 

dated March 11, 1999. 

15See Range Commanders Council Risk 

Committee of the Range Safety Group, Common 

Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, RCC 321–10, 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, 2010. 

16Wilde P., Public Risk Criteria and Rationale for 

Commercial Launch and Reentry, 5th IAASS 

Symposium, Versailles, France, October 2011. 

17Wilde, P. Public Risk Tolerability Criteria for 

Space Launch and Reentry, Presented at the 51st 

Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the 

United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 

Outer Space, Vienna, Austria, 18 Feb. 2014. 

spaceflight industry should be held to 

the standard that the nation’s civil and 

military programs are held to in 

practice.’’ 11 Blue Origin suggested that 

reducing the need for waivers would 

increase transparency and ‘‘more closely 

reflect FAA’s regulatory practice, rather 

than relying on a waiver process such as 

practiced by NASA and’’ the U.S. Air 

Force. Blue Origin further stated that, if 

the FAA adopts ‘‘a risk level that differs 

from [the FAA’s] actual practice, the 

commercial spaceflight industry will be 

left not knowing what the real, actual 

risk level will be in practice,’’ 

suggesting that reducing the agency’s 

reliance on waivers would provide an 

important measure of stability and 

predictability to the commercial space 

industry. 

The FAA disagrees with Orbital 

Sciences’ and Blue Origin’s 

recommendations to increase the Ec

limit beyond 1 × 10¥4. The United 

States has achieved a flawless public 

safety record for orbital launch and reentry missions in part because of a 

comprehensive and interdependent set 

of public safety requirements developed 

and implemented by numerous, 

cooperating entities within the U.S. 

government. Three U.S. government 

entities, the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and 

the FAA, have oversight of the safety of 

launches. Both the U.S. Air Force and 

NASA, working alone and collaborating 

through organizations such as the RCC 

and the Common Standards Working 

Group, have examined the available 

data and determined that 100 × 10¥6, 

also expressed as 1 × 10¥4, is an 

appropriate standard for acceptable 

risk.12 There are an insufficient number 

of casualty-free launches and reentries 

with Ec greater than 1 × 10¥4 to justify 

departing from the standard adopted by 

the U.S. Air Force and NASA. In the few 

cases where waivers were granted by the 

FAA, prior to and including 2014, the 

respective Ec was always less than the 

risk levels previously approved for 

government launches. Hence, any 

precedent for granting waivers for prior 

non-commercial reentries is not 

sufficient justification for implementing 

a more lenient risk limit, especially in 

light of the increased scrutiny given to 

each waiver applicant. 

Moreover, a fundamental tenent of 

risk management, both as applied to the 

regulation and general safety 

management of various industries, is to 

set acceptability criteria for collective 

risk that are below the level that may be 

acceptable in unusual circumstances or 

on a short term basis. For aviation risk 

management, the FAA has identified 

risk-informed Continued Airworthiness 

Assessment Methodologies (CAAM) that 

include short term acceptable risks that 

are orders of magnitude greater than 

long term acceptable risk levels.13 Thus, 

AC 39–8 is another example of the FAA 

adopting a risk management approach 

where basic acceptability criteria are 

more stringent than may be acceptable 

in unusual circumstances or on a short 

term basis. Note that the FAA’s use of 

quantitative risk analysis results is 

consistent with the risk-informed 

approach to regulatory decision-making 

adopted by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). In 1999, the NRC 

wrote that ‘‘a ‘risk-informed’ approach 

to regulatory decision-making 

represents a philosophy whereby risk 

insights are considered together with 

other factors to establish requirements 

that better focus licensee and regulatory 

attention on design and operational 

issues commensurate with their 

importance to public health and 

safety.’’ 14

In light of these considerations and all 

currently available data, the FAA finds 

that a collective Ec limit of 1 × 10¥4

reflects an appropriate consensus safety 

risk standard for launch and re-entry. 

Consistent with Executive Orders 13563 

and 13610, the FAA plans to 

periodically review and revise this 

public risk standard, if warranted, based 

upon factors such as the quantity of 

launch and reentry activities, 

demonstrated reliability and safety 

record and benefits provided, 

technological capabilities, and maturity 

of the industry. 

ACTA and an individual commenter 

cautioned against justifying any increase 

to the acceptable risk standards by 

reference to either a relatively small 

number of successful launches or the 

uncertainty of launch risk calculations. 

The individual commenter 

recommended that any increase to the 

acceptable risk limits be premised on a 

determination that higher numbers still 

adequately ensure public safety. 

The FAA disagrees with ACTA’s and 

the individual commenter’s premise 

concerning the basis of this final rule. 

Contrary to their assertion, the FAA is 

not relying on the historical success of 

a relatively small number of past 

launches as a justification for increasing 

the acceptable risk standard. Rather, the 

FAA, by statute, is authorized to 

regulate ‘‘only the extent necessary’’ to 

protect public health and safety. 51 

U.S.C. 50901(a)(7). The U.S. Air Force 

and NASA, two federal agencies with 

significant expertise in this area, have 

both examined the currently available 

data and concluded that it does not 

justify an aggregated Ec limit lower than 

100 × 10¥6. Furthermore, there are 

published materials that explain the 

rationale for the collective risk limit 

adopted both by the U.S. Air Force and 

NASA.15 16 17 The currently available 

data does not justify a regulatory 

restriction on Ec for commercial 

licensees that is more stringent than the 

standards adopted both by the U.S. Air 

Force and NASA. 

D. Clarifying Hazard Areas for Ships 

and Aircraft 

Prior to this final rule, § 417.107(b)(3) 

and (4) required the launch operator of 

an ELV to implement and establish ship 

and aircraft hazard areas providing an 

equivalent level of safety to that 

provided by the ship and aircraft hazard 

areas implemented for launch from a 

Federal launch range. 71 FR 50508. The 

FAA proposed to amend § 417.107(b)(3) 

and (4) to clarify the requirements for 

hazard areas for ships and aircraft, 

respectively, by removing references to 

an ‘‘equivalent level of safety to that 

provided by [ship or aircraft] hazard 

areas implemented for launch from a 

Federal range’’ and replacing them with 

a numeric limit on the probability of 

impact with debris capable of causing a 

casualty. 

Orbital Sciences recommended that 

no change be made to the hazard area 

regulations. Orbital Sciences stated that 

the proposal to implement a specific 

risk standard, even if it is quantitatively 

the same as the Federal launch ranges’ 

standard, creates the possibility that the 

Federal launch ranges will change their 

standard and the FAA’s regulation will 

become obsolete. The FAA disagrees 

with Orbital Sciences’ recommendation. 

Regardless of whether the Federal 


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47022 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

18The FAA notes that its 2014 waiver for the 

Orion Exploration Test Flight 1, which authorized 

an Ec of up to 218 × 10¥6, improperly accounted 

for public risks outside the scope of § 417.107(b)(1) 

by considering public risk associated with planned 

impacts after orbital insertion in the Ec calculation. 

Notice of Waiver, Mar. 10, 2014 (79 FR 13375); 

Notice of Amended Waiver, Dec. 5, 2014, (79 FR 

72240). 

launch ranges change their risk criteria 

for ships and aircraft, the 

Administrative Procedure Act, with 

limited exceptions, prohibits the FAA 

from changing its regulatory 

requirements without notice and 

comment. 5 U.S.C. 553. Therefore, even 

if the FAA maintained these provisions 

using a purportedly outdated standard, 

a change to the Federal launch range 

requirements would not automatically 

flow through to FAA regulations, and 

licensed launch operators would have to 

abide by the Federal launch range 

standard in effect when the FAA first 

promulgated the regulation. 

Accordingly, if the Federal launch 

ranges change their standard, the FAA 

will have to initiate its own rulemaking 

in order to harmonize its water-borne 

vessel and aircraft hazard areas limits 

with the Federal launch ranges’. To 

prevent this confusion, the FAA is 

revising § 417.107(b)(3) and (4) to 

identify the numeric requirements. 

An individual commenter questioned 

the proposed clarifications regarding the 

ship and aircraft hazard areas. 

Specifically, the individual commenter 

pointed out that the proposal, which is 

based on the probability of impact with 

debris capable of causing a casualty, 

could be either excessively conservative 

or non-conservative depending on the 

details of the analysis, such as the 

threshold characteristics of the debris 

and the size of the area considered 

vulnerable to such debris impact. ACTA 

provided similar comments, stating the 

regulations (1) do ‘‘not define the area 

for computing impact’’ with a vessel or 

aircraft, and (2) do not clarify that 

operators must account for ‘‘the nearfield explosive effects of propellants 

impacting in the vicinity of [a] ship.’’ 

The individual commenter’s 

recommendation to substantively 

amend the hazard area risk standards is 

outside the scope of this rulemaking. As 

described in the 2014 NPRM, this final 

rule does not substantively change the 

hazard area risk standards. 79 FR 42241, 

42249–50. The hazard area revisions 

only clarify the FAA’s standards by 

using a specific number, rather than an 

unquantified reference to Federal 

launch range standards. The FAA 

therefore rejects the commenter’s 

recommendations to make substantive 

changes to the rule. 

ACTA’s comments also included 

numerous additional observations 

related to the hazard area regulations. 

ACTA stated that the regulations do not 

‘‘specify how (or even if) hazard areas 

are to be used to implement mitigation’’ 

to protect specific individuals or the 

general public. This observation, 

however, ignores other sections of the 

regulations that do address how hazard 

areas are to be used to implement 

mitigation techniques, such as issuing 

public warnings and performing 

surveillance. To meet the public risk 

criteria of § 417.111(b), § 417.223 

requires ‘‘a flight hazard area analysis 

that identifies any regions of land, sea, 

or air that must be surveyed, publicized, 

controlled, or evacuated in order to 

control the risk to the public from debris 

impact hazards.’’ Furthermore, 

§ 417.111(j) requires a launch operator 

to ‘‘implement a plan that defines the 

process for ensuring that any 

unauthorized persons, ships, trains, 

aircraft or other vehicles are not within 

any hazard areas identified by the flight 

safety analysis or the ground safety 

analysis,’’ and explicitly includes 

hazard areas identified under §§ 417.107 

and 417.223. 

ACTA also criticized the proposal for 

failing to justify ‘‘why the acceptable 

risk limit to the general public on ships 

is higher than for people on land.’’ The 

premise of this comment is not correct. 

Specifically, § 417.107(b)(2) provides 

that a launch operator may initiate flight 

only if the risk to any individual 

member of the public does not exceed 

a 1 × 10¥6 probability of casualty, 

regardless of the location of that 

individual member of the public. Thus, 

the FAA’s risk criteria provide equal 

protection to each individual member of 

the public, on ships or on land. 

Moreover, to the extent ACTA is 

criticizing the water-borne vessel hazard 

areas requirement, the FAA is not 

changing the water-borne vessel hazard 

area requirement; it is merely clarifying 

the requirement by removing a reference 

to where the requirement can be found 

and replacing it with the actual 

requirement. 

ACTA also was concerned that the 

criteria for ship and aircraft do not 

explicitly exclude ‘‘mission-support 

vessels and aircraft,’’ creating an 

inconsistency with the remainder of the 

regulation. Although ACTA is correct 

that the criteria do not apply to vessels 

and aircraft that support the launch, the 

FAA’s launch and reentry regulations 

address only public safety, which 

§ 401.5 defines as ‘‘for a particular 

licensed launch, the safety of people 

and property that are not involved in 

supporting the launch . . .’’ It, 

therefore, is unnecessary to explicitly 

exclude ‘‘mission-support vessels and 

aircraft’’ from the public safety criteria 

for launch. 

Finally, ACTA recommended that 

§ 417.107(b)(3) and (4) state that ‘‘a 

launch operator must make reasonable 

effort to ensure that the probability of 

casualty to members of the public on 

water borne vessels or in aircraft does 

not exceed the limit specified in 

[§ 417.107(b)(2)].’’ ACTA stated that this 

revision would establish a ‘‘specific risk 

value’’ while at the same time giving 

operators flexibility as to ‘‘the method of 

protection’’ or risk mitigation. The 

regulations already allow a launch 

operator to employ different methods of 

mitigating risk so the FAA will not 

adopt ACTA’s proposal. 

E. Including Toxic Release in the 

Reentry Risk Analysis 

The FAA proposed to include the 

risks associated with toxic release in the 

Ec limitations for the reentry of an RLV 

or other reentry vehicle. Blue Origin 

opposed the proposal to include toxic 

release in the reentry risk calculation. 

Blue Origin, quoting from the regulatory 

evaluation in the 2014 NPRM, stated 

that ‘‘toxic release risks for reentry 

vehicles are ‘expected to remain a minor 

factor in Ec calculations,’ because most 

of the propellant will have been used 

during the mission . . .’’ The FAA is 

revising its position, and disagrees with 

Blue Origin’s assertion, because the 

FAA is aware of plans that involve the 

return to land with a significant 

hypergolic, highly toxic, propellant load 

carried until touchdown. The FAA 

therefore continues to include toxic 

release in the reentry risk analysis at 

this time. 

F. Miscellaneous 

Sierra Nevada recommended that the 

FAA define orbital insertion to help 

‘‘reduce misinterpretation of the 

regulations’’ because ‘‘[s]etting a 

specific boundary would allow 

commercial space companies to clearly 

understand the boundaries for expected 

casualty limits.’’ 

The FAA agrees with Sierra Nevada’s 

comments that § 417.107(b)(1) can be 

amended to prevent potential 

misinterpretation.18 The FAA takes this 

opportunity to clarify that risk 

associated with planned impacts after 

orbital insertion should not be included 

in an Ec analysis governed by § 417.107. 

Accordingly, to minimize confusion, the 

FAA is removing the phrase ‘‘including 

each planned impact’’ from 

§ 417.107(b)(1) to state only that the 

operator account for risk through orbital 

insertion. The risk assessment 

conducted under § 417.107(b)(1) must 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 47023 

19For example, the return to Earth and successful 

landing of the first stage of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 

launch vehicle was considered part of launch and 

was accounted for in the calculation of launch risk. 20 GRA study can be found in the docket. 

only include impacts through—meaning 

up to and including—the moment of 

orbital insertion. More specifically, Ec

encompasses risks associated with 

planned events occurring from launch 

through the moment of orbital insertion, 

but not the risks associated with onorbit activities. For example, the 

§ 417.107 risk analysis must include the 

planned impact of a first stage jettisoned 

prior to orbital insertion regardless of 

whether the actual impact of the first 

stage occurs before or after orbital 

insertion.19 This is true whether the first 

stage makes a controlled or uncontrolled 

impact. In contrast, the § 417.107 risk 

analysis does not require accounting for 

the planned impact of an upper stage 

jettisoned after the vehicle has achieved 

orbital insertion. 

An individual commenter observed 

that the 2014 NPRM proposed to revise 

the Ec requirements in parts 417, 431, 

and 435, but neglected to revise the 

corresponding Ec requirements in part 

420, License to Operate a Launch Site. 

This was an oversight. This final rule 

revises §§ 420.19(a)(1); 420.23(a)(2), 

(b)(3), and (c)(1)(ii); 420.25(b); 

431.43(d)(2); paragraph (d) of Appendix 

C to part 420; and paragraphs (a)(5), 

(e)(2), and (e)(3) of Appendix D to part 

420 to account for the Ec revisions made 

throughout chapter III of title 14 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations. 

Previously, § 417.107(b)(2) referenced 

Ec when describing the risk limit to any 

individual member of the public. This 

reference may cause confusion because 

Ec is a measure of collective risk to 

public safety, not individual risk. To 

prevent any potential confusion, this 

final rule makes a non-substantive 

change to § 417.107(b)(2) to remove the 

reference to Ec. 

The FAA is streamlining the 

terminology in the collective risk 

requirements. Specifically, we are 

removing the colloquial term ‘‘average’’ 

from ‘‘expected average,’’ which is 

redundant and unnecessary. In statistics 

there are three measures of central 

tendency or ‘‘averages’’: The median, 

mode, and mean. The expected value is 

synonymous with the mean value 

specifically, thus the term ‘‘expected’’ is 

technically precise and sufficient. 

G. Differences Between the 2014 NPRM 

and the Final Rule 

As described above, there are two 

differences between the FAA’s proposal 

in the 2014 NPRM and this final rule as 

adopted. These changes include: (1) 

removing the phrase ‘‘including each 

planned impact’’ from § 417.107(b)(1) 

and (2) revising part 420 to account for 

revisions to the Ec standard in parts 417, 

431, and 435. 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 and 

Executive Order 13563 direct that each 

Federal agency shall propose or adopt a 

regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, the Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of final rules that 

include a Federal mandate likely to 

result in the expenditure by State, local, 

or tribal governments, in the aggregate, 

or by the private sector, of $100 million 

or more annually (adjusted for inflation 

with base year of 1995). This portion of 

the preamble summarizes the FAA’s 

analysis of the economic impacts of this 

final rule. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined that this final rule: (1) 

Has net benefits that justify the costs; (2) 

is not an economically ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is not 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (5) will not create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States; and (6) will not impose 

an unfunded mandate on state, local, or 

tribal governments, or other private 

sectors by exceeding the threshold 

identified above. 

Department of Transportation Order 

DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies and 

procedures for simplification, analysis, 

and review of regulations. If the 

expected cost impact is so minimal that 

a final rule does not warrant a full 

evaluation, this order permits that a 

statement to that effect and the basis for 

it to be included in the preamble if a full 

regulatory evaluation of the cost and 

benefits is not prepared. Such a 

determination has been made for this 

final rule. Based on the facts and 

methodology explained for the NPRM, 

the FAA provided cost-savings 

estimates for the proposed rule and 

requested comments. The FAA did not 

receive any comments on the estimates 

and thus the FAA follows the same 

approach herein. These analyses are 

summarized below. 

Parties Potentially Affected by This 

Rulemaking 

• Satellite owners 

• License applicants for launches and 

reentries 

• Commercial space transportation 

suppliers 

• The Federal Aviation Administration 

and the general public 

Principal Assumptions and Sources of 

Information 

• Benefit-Cost Analysis for the 

collective risk limits during launches 

and reentries (GRA study 2013 20 by 

GRA, Incorporated) 

• FAA Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation forecast of suborbital 

launches using subject experts’ 

judgments 

• All monetary values are expressed in 

2014 dollars 

• Projected impacts for a 10-year period 

from 2016 to 2025 

Cost-Benefit Analysis 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

parts 417, 431, and 435 by changing the 

collective risk limits for launches and 

reentries and clarifying the risk limit 

used to establish hazard areas for ships 

and aircraft. The NPRM was published 

in the Federal Register on July 21, 2014 

(79 FR 42241). 

Prior to this final rule, the FAA 

prohibited the expected casualty (Ec) for 

each physically distinct source of risk 

(impacting inert and explosive debris, 

toxic release and far field blast 

overpressure) from exceeding 30 × 10¥6

or an expected average number of 

0.00003 casualties per launch. The 

aggregate Ec equals the sum of these 

risks, i.e., (30 × 10¥6) + (30 × 10¥6) + 

(30 × 10¥6), for a total of 90 × 10¥6. 

However, launches were not subject 

only to this single aggregate Ec limit. If 

there was a reentry using a reentry 

vehicle, an additional regulatory 

provision became applicable that 

prohibited the combined Ec of the 

launch and reentry from exceeding 30 × 


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47024 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

21This limit is specified in 14 CFR 431.35, which 

applies only to reusable launch vehicles. However, 

14 CFR 435.35 incorporates and applies 14 CFR 

431.35 to all reentry vehicles. 

22AST/FAA launch data as of Feb 1, 2013, 

excluding 21 failed launches. This data can be 

found at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/

headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license. See also 

Appendix A in GRA study, which can be found on 

the docket for this rule. 

10¥6 for vehicle or vehicle debris 

impact hazards.21

Under this final rule, the FAA 

separates its expected casualties (Ec) for 

launches and reentries. The final rule 

adopts an aggregate Ec requirement for 

a launch not to exceed 1 × 10¥4 posed 

by the following hazards: (1) Impacting 

inert and explosive debris, (2) toxic 

release, and (3) far field blast 

overpressure. The FAA also finalizes a 

separate aggregate Ec requirement for a 

reentry not to exceed 1 × 10¥4 posed by 

the hazards of debris and toxic release. 

An Ec value of 1 ×x 10¥4

mathematically equals 100 × 10¥6, 

which is the Ec value currently used on 

federal ranges for civil and military 

launch and reentry missions. However, 

because the aggregate Ec limit uses only 

one significant digit in the format of 1 

× 10¥4, this final rule, in practice, 

allows a commercial launch or reentry 

with an aggregate Ec limit up to 149 × 

10¥6 to proceed without requiring the 

applicant to seek an FAA waiver. 

Based on analysis of the historical 

data, the FAA found the criteria are 

supported by the commercial mission 

experiences and post-mission safety 

data available since 1989. The FAA’s 

launch data indicate during this time 

there were 45 suborbital launches and 

193 orbital launches, for a total of 238 

launches.22 At least four of these 

launches used an Ec that was allowed to 

go above the existing 30 × 10¥6 Ec

limits. None of those four launches 

resulted in any casualties or other 

adverse impacts on the public safety. 

As discussed in the preamble above, 

the FAA believes managing the 

precision of rounding digits below and 

above the Ec limit (i.e., 1 × 10¥4) is 

unrealistic and unnecessary for 

administering launch or reentry 

licenses. By using only one significant 

digit, the Ec limit for launches become 

less restrictive than the three existing 

launch Ec limits combined (i.e., 90 × 

10¥6). The regulatory-compliance 

difference between 90 × 10¥6 and 149 

× 10¥6 falls under the accepted FAA 

commercial launch safety margin 

because the level of imprecision 

associated with Ec calculations means 

that there is no substantive difference 

between these two Ec figures. However, 

changing the regulations to use only one 

significant digit will improve efficiency 

to license applicants in the launch 

approval process. In addition, using a 

single Ec limit that applies to an 

aggregate risk in place of three separate 

hazard-specific Ec limitations will 

further increase efficiency. As a result, 

the FAA believes the final rule 

maintains a level of safety for 

commercial launches commensurate 

with the current level of safety 

associated with civil and military 

counterparts, but will be cost-relieving 

by eliminating some waiver processes 

necessary prior to this rule. 

The criteria also separately address 

the public risk limits of toxic release 

and inert and explosive debris risks for 

reentry operations by establishing 

public safety requirements similar to 

current practice. Based on past practices 

of administering reentry licenses, the 

FAA found it was unrealistic and 

unnecessary to administer reentry 

licenses with a strict Ec limit of 30 × 

10¥6 for the combination of launch and 

reentry debris hazards. Aggregating Ec

limits of toxic release and inert and 

explosive debris risks, the Ec limit for 

reentry will be commensurate with the 

safety requirements applied to civil and 

military reentries, and more 

conservative than past federal ranges’ 

practices that gave waivers to allow 

non-commercial reentry missions to 

proceed with Ec risks on the order of 1 

× 10¥3. 

The final rule revises reentry Ec limits 

for toxic release and inert and explosive 

debris risks to be close to the current 

FAA reentry licensing practice, on 

which we assess the current economic 

baseline of the revised Ec limits. The 

FAA expects that the nominal increase 

in the debris Ec limit on reentry in this 

rule will impose no or minimal societal 

costs. This is because the FAA has 

historically issued a number of waivers 

to commercial launches that allowed 

those launches to exceed the regulatory 

Ec limits as long as those launches did 

not exceed the 100 × 10¥6 Ec limits 

imposed by the federal ranges. The FAA 

has issued waivers to commercial 

reentries that allowed the Ec for those 

reentries to be considered separately 

from the Ec for launch. While the FAA, 

as part of its waiver process, has not yet 

had to consider whether a reentry 

operation should be issued a waiver to 

exceed the 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit on reentry, 

the FAA expects that its launch waiver 

analysis will apply equally to future 

reentry operations. Consequently, the 

FAA anticipates that many of the future 

reentry operations would be eligible for 

an FAA waiver in the absence of this 

rule. Therefore, this rule will eliminate 

extra expenses of processing such 

waivers. 

The FAA finalizes the NPRM’s 

proposal to include the risks associated 

with toxic release in the Ec limitations 

for the reentry of a reentry vehicle. By 

including toxic release risks during a 

reentry operation, the final rule 

provides an incremental margin of 

safety to the public that did not exist 

prior to this final rule. 

The propellant load for a reentry 

vehicle using parachutes to land is 

generally minimal because most of the 

propellant will have been used before 

landing. The Ec risk for reentry vehicles 

landing in the ocean will likely be 

below the collective Ec limit. Toxic 

release risks for reentry will remain a 

minor factor in Ec calculations until a 

licensee plans to land a reentry vehicle 

on the ground, under power, using 

highly toxic hypergolic propellants 

carried all the way to touchdown. 

Currently, toxic release risk during 

launch generally exceeds an Ec of 1 × 

10¥4 when a reentry vehicle with 

hypergolic propellants on board has to 

separate from its launch vehicle during 

an abort-to-orbit, forcing an unplanned 

landing on land. Hence, a reentry 

vehicle planning to land on the ground 

in such an abort-to-orbit scenario will 

not get a government launch license 

under current U.S. Air Force 

regulations. The FAA has not received 

applications for reentry vehicles that are 

capable of landing on land without 

substantial risks of releasing hypergolic 

propellants, although the FAA learned 

through conversations with the U.S. Air 

Force that the industry is in the early 

planning stage of developing this type of 

vehicle. However, if a reentry risk 

analysis found the reentry vehicle 

imposed a substantial toxic release risk 

to a launch site or outside of the hazard 

area, the reentry operator is required 

under proposed regulation to choose an 

alternative landing site to ensure any 

potential toxic release does not exceed 

the collective Ec of 1 × 10¥4. Because 

operators were required to do a reentry 

risk analysis prior to this final rule, 

there will be no additional compliance 

costs resulting from this final rule. The 

necessary reentry risk analysis required 

for toxics only by this final rule can be 

done within 3 weeks of time by 1.5 

analysts being paid at $35 per hour for 

the total of $6,300 per study. The FAA 

considers this analysis cost to be 

minimal. 

The changes in the risk limits apply 

to all three hazards combined rather 

than to each individual hazard. This 

final rule permits launch or reentry 

operations without requiring operators 

to seek FAA waivers as long as the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 47025 

23 GRA Study 2013, Table 5–7. 

24Basis is provided in GRA Study 2013, 

Appendix C, Table C–3. 

25 GRA Study 2013, Appendix C, Tables C–1 and 

C–2 for the basis of this value. 

aggregated risks will not exceed 0.0001 

expected casualties per launch or 

reentry mission (i.e., 1 × 10¥4). Both the 

commercial space transportation 

industry and the government will 

receive savings attributable to less 

paperwork by avoiding some waiverapplication process expenses. 

Based on historical records of requests 

and FAA-issued waivers from the 

previous Ec limits, the FAA estimates 

that launch operators would seek 

additional 38 waivers from 2016 to 2025 

in the absence of this rule.23 After the 

promulgation of this final rule, the FAA 

expects these 38 waivers will not be 

needed. Thus, this final rule will result 

in savings for both the industry and the 

FAA, as the industry does not have to 

expend resources to request waivers and 

the FAA will not have to expend 

resources to evaluate waiver requests. 

The methodology of this final 

regulatory impact analysis (RIA) mirrors 

the RIA associated with the NPRM. The 

cost of a formal waiver request to 

industry ranges from $137,097 for 1,717 

hours to $195,094 for 2,443 hours of 

aerospace engineering time to prepare 

and submit the necessary 

documentation to the FAA for 

approval.24 Multiplying the forecasted 

38 waivers for the 10-year period by the 

lower and upper bound costs yields cost 

savings ranging from $5.2 million to 

$7.4 million. The estimates for the 

FAA’s cost savings are based on the 

costs of FAA personnel time ranging 

from $81,231 for 1,040 hours to 

$243,693 for 3,120 hours 25 to process 

each waiver request. This range is 

related to the characteristics of the 

individual launch or reentry request. 

Multiplied by the forecasted 38 waivers 

granted, the total estimated savings of 

FAA personnel time to review requests 

and issue waivers range from $3.1 

million to $9.3 million. The resulting 

savings for both the industry and the 

FAA with an estimated mid-point will 

be approximately $12.5 million ($8.8 

million present value at a 7% discount 

rate). The lower and the higher 

estimates are approximately $8.3 

million and $16.7 million ($5.8 million 

and $11.7 million present value at a 7% 

discount rate), respectively. 

The final rule may also result in costsaving by reducing launch delays and 

mission scrubs. The FAA currently does 

not have sufficient data to quantify 

these savings, but believes the possible 

reduction of launch delays and mission 

scrubs may increase the overall capacity 

of the U.S. space transportation 

industry. Accordingly, the FAA sought 

comments on cost-savings in the NPRM 

and did not receive comments on the 

estimated benefits of reduced launch 

delays and mission scrubs. Therefore, 

the FAA maintains the same benefit 

determination. 

In summary, the final rule maintains 

safety levels for commercial space 

transportation commensurate with the 

current requirements applied to 

launches and reentries. In addition, the 

final rule will result in net benefits for 

both industry and government. The net 

benefit will be achieved by avoiding 

costs pertaining to applying and 

granting waivers with Ec limits between 

90 × 10¥6 and 149 × 10¥6. Further, 

related industries may also benefit by 

averting unnecessary mission delays 

and scrubs. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide-range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. If 

the agency determines that it will, the 

agency must prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis as described in the 

RFA. However, if an agency determines 

that a rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the RFA provides that 

the head of the agency may so certify 

and a regulatory flexibility analysis is 

not required. 

The FAA expects many small entities 

will benefit from this final rule because 

the regulatory revisions to the collective 

Ec limits are cost-relieving. The FAA 

solicited comments in the NPRM and 

did not receive comments with regard to 

this certification. Therefore, the FAA 

Administrator certifies that this rule 

does not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such the 

protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA assesses the 

potential effect of this final rule and 

thus determines that the rule does not 

impose obstacles to foreign commerce, 

as foreign exporters do not have to 

change their current export products to 

the United States. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a final rule 

that may result in an expenditure of 

$100 million or more (in 1995 dollars) 

in any one year by State, local, and 

tribal governments, in the aggregate, or 

by the private sector; such a mandate is 

deemed to be a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action.’’ The FAA currently uses an 

inflation-adjusted value of $155 million 

in lieu of $100 million. This final rule 

does not contain such a mandate; 

therefore, the requirements of Title II of 

the Act do not apply. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the 

FAA consider the impact of paperwork 

and other information collection 

burdens imposed on the public. The 

FAA has determined that there is no 

new requirement for information 

collection associated with this final 

rule. 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 


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47026 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these proposed 

regulations. 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency determined that this action will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, or the relationship between 

the Federal Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and, therefore, 

does not have Federalism implications. 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this final rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order and it is not likely to 

have a significant adverse effect on the 

supply, distribution, or use of energy. 

VI. How To Obtain Additional 

Information 

A. Rulemaking Documents 

An electronic copy of a rulemaking 

document my be obtained by using the 

Internet— 

1. Search the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visit the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ or 

3. Access the Government Publishing 

Office’s Web page at http://

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request (identified by notice, 

amendment, or docket number of this 

rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. 

B. Comments Submitted to the Docket 

Comments received may be viewed by 

going to http://www.regulations.gov and 

following the online instructions to 

search the docket number for this 

action. Anyone is able to search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of the FAA’s dockets 

by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or signing the 

comment, if submitted on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

C. Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act 

The Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996 requires the FAA to comply with 

small entity requests for information or 

advice about compliance with statutes 

and regulations within its jurisdiction. 

A small entity with questions regarding 

this document, may contact its local 

FAA official, or the person listed under 

the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

heading at the beginning of the 

preamble. To find out more about 

SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ 

rulemaking/sbre_act/. 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 417 

Launch and reentry safety, Aviation 

safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Rockets, Space 

transportation and exploration. 

14 CFR Part 420 

Environmental protection, Launch 

safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Space transportation and 

exploration. 

14 CFR Parts 431 and 435 

Launch and reentry safety, Aviation 

safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Rockets, Space 

transportation and exploration. 

The Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

amends chapter III of title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 417—LAUNCH SAFETY 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 417 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 2. In § 417.107, revise paragraphs 

(b)(1) through (4) to read as follows: 

§ 417.107 Flight safety. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) A launch operator may initiate the 

flight of a launch vehicle only if the 

total risk associated with the launch to 

all members of the public, excluding 

persons in water-borne vessels and 

aircraft, does not exceed an expected 

number of 1 × 10¥4 casualties. The total 

risk consists of risk posed by impacting 

inert and explosive debris, toxic release, 

and far field blast overpressure. The 

FAA will determine whether to approve 

public risk due to any other hazard 

associated with the proposed flight of a 

launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis. 

The Ec criterion applies to each launch 

from lift-off through orbital insertion for 

an orbital launch, and through final 

impact for a suborbital launch. 

(2) A launch operator may initiate 

flight only if the risk to any individual 

member of the public does not exceed 

a casualty expectation of 1 × 10¥6 per 

launch for each hazard. 

(3) A launch operator must establish 

any water borne vessel hazard areas 

necessary to ensure the probability of 

impact (Pi) with debris capable of 

causing a casualty for water borne 

vessels does not exceed 1 × 10¥5. 

(4) A launch operator must establish 

any aircraft hazard areas necessary to 

ensure the probability of impact (Pi) 

with debris capable of causing a 

casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 × 

10¥6. 

* * * * * 

PART 420—LICENSE TO OPERATE A 

LAUNCH SITE 

■ 3. The authority citation for part 420 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 4. In § 420.19, revise paragraph (a)(1) 

to read as follows: 

§ 420.19 Launch site location review— 

general. 

(a) * * * 

(1) A safe launch must possess a risk 

level estimated, in accordance with the 

requirements of this part, not to exceed 

an expected number of 1 × 10¥4

casualties (Ec) to the collective members 

of the public exposed to hazards from 

the flight. 

* * * * * 

■ 5. In § 420.23, revise paragraphs (a)(2), 

(b)(3), and (c)(1)(ii) to read as follows: 

§ 420.23 Launch site location review— 

flight corridor. 

(a) * * * 

(2) Includes an overflight exclusion 

zone where the public risk criteria of 1 

× 10¥4 would be exceeded if one person 

were present in the open; and 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(3) Includes an overflight exclusion 

zone where the public risk criteria of 1 

× 10¥4 would be exceeded if one person 

were present in the open; and 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(ii) An overflight exclusion zone 

where the public risk criteria of 1 × 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 20, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 47027 

10¥4 would be exceeded if one person 

were present in the open. 

* * * * * 

■ 6. In § 420.25, revise paragraph (b) to 

read as follows: 

§ 420.25 Launch site location review—risk 

analysis. 

* * * * * 

(b) For licensed launches, the FAA 

will not approve the location of the 

proposed launch point if the estimated 

expected casualty exceeds 1 × 10¥4. 

■ 7. In Appendix C to part 420, revise 

paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(1) and (2) to 

read as follows: 

Appendix C to Part 420—Risk Analysis 

(a) * * * 

(2) An applicant shall perform a risk 

analysis when a populated area is located 

within a flight corridor defined by either 

appendix A or appendix B. If the estimated 

expected casualty exceeds 1 × 10¥4, an 

applicant may either modify its proposal, or 

if the flight corridor used was generated by 

the appendix A method, use the appendix B 

method to narrow the flight corridor and then 

redo the overflight risk analysis pursuant to 

this appendix. If the estimated expected 

casualty still exceeds 1 × 10¥4, the FAA will 

not approve the location of the proposed 

launch point. 

* * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(1) If the estimated expected casualty does 

not exceed 1 × 10¥4, the FAA will approve 

the launch site location. 

(2) If the estimated expected casualty 

exceeds 1 × 10¥4, then an applicant may 

either modify its proposal, or, if the flight 

corridor used was generated by the appendix 

A method, use the appendix B method to 

narrow the flight corridor and then perform 

another appendix C risk analysis. 

■ 8. In Appendix D to part 420, revise 

paragraphs (a)(5) and (e)(2) and (3) to 

read as follows: 

Appendix D to Part 420—Impact 

Dispersion Areas and Casualty 

Expectancy Estimate for an Unguided 

Suborbital Launch Vehicle 

(a) * * * 

(5) If the estimated Ec is less than or equal 

to 1 × 10¥4, the FAA will approve the launch 

point for unguided suborbital launch 

vehicles. If the estimated Ec exceeds 1 × 

10¥4, the proposed launch point will fail the 

launch site location review. 

* * * * * 

(e) * * * 

(2) If the estimated expected casualty does 

not exceed 1 × 10¥4, the FAA will approve 

the launch point. 

(3) If the estimated expected casualty 

exceeds 1 × 10¥4, then an applicant may 

modify its proposal and then repeat the 

impact risk analysis in accordance with this 

appendix D. If no set of impact dispersion 

areas exist which satisfy the FAA’s risk 

threshold, the applicant’s proposed launch 

site will fail the launch site location review. 

PART 431—LAUNCH AND REENTRY 

OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE 

(RLV) 

■ 9. The authority citation for part 431 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 10. In § 431.35, revise paragraph (b)(1) 

to read as follows: 

§ 431.35 Acceptable reusable launch 

vehicle risk. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) To obtain safety approval, an 

applicant must demonstrate the 

following for public risk: 

(i) The risk to the collective members 

of the public from the proposed launch 

meets the public risk criteria of 

§ 417.107(b)(1) of this chapter; 

(ii) The risk level to the collective 

members of the public, excluding 

persons in water-borne vessels and 

aircraft, from each proposed reentry 

does not exceed an expected number of 

1 × 10¥4 casualties from impacting inert 

and explosive debris and toxic release 

associated with the reentry; and 

(iii) The risk level to an individual 

does not exceed 1 × 10¥6 probability of 

casualty per mission. 

* * * * * 

■ 11. In § 431.43, revise paragraph (d)(2) 

to read as follows: 

* * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(2) The expected number of casualties 

to members of the public does not 

exceed 1 × 10¥4 given a probability of 

vehicle failure equal to 1 (pf=1) at any 

time the IIP is over a populated area; 

* * * * * 

PART 435— REENTRY OF A REENTRY 

VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE 

LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) 

■ 12. The authority citation for part 435 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 13. Revise § 435.35 to read as follows: 

§ 435.35 Acceptable reusable launch 

vehicle risk. 

To obtain safety approval for reentry, 

an applicant must demonstrate the 

following for public risk: 

(a) The risk to the collective members 

of the public from the proposed launch 

meets the public risk criteria of 

§ 417.107(b)(1) of this chapter; 

(b) The risk level to the collective 

members of the public, excluding 

persons in water-borne vessels and 

aircraft, from each proposed reentry 

does not exceed an expected number of 

1 × 10¥4 casualties from impacting inert 

and explosive debris and toxic release 

associated with the reentry; and 

(c) The risk level to an individual 

does not exceed 1 × 10¥6 probability of 

casualty per mission. 

Issued under authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f), and 51 U.S.C. 50903, 50905 in 

Washington, DC, on July 11, 2016. 

Michael P. Huerta, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2016–17083 Filed 7–19–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 165 

[Docket Number USCG–2016–0650] 

RIN 1625–AA00 

Safety Zone; Houma Navigation Canal 

Miles 23 to 23.5, Dulac, LA 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Temporary final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is 

establishing a temporary safety zone for 

all navigable waters surface to bottom, 

of the Houma Navigation Canal from 

mile marker 23 to 23.5. The safety zone 

is needed to protect personnel, vessels, 

and the marine environment from 

potential hazards created by 

replacement work of the Falgout Canal 

Pontoon Bridge. Entry of vessels or 

persons into this zone is prohibited 

unless specifically authorized by the 

Captain of the Port Morgan City or a 

designated representative. 

DATES: This rule is effective without 

actual notice from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 

p.m. daily from July 20, 2016 through 

July 27, 2016. For the purposes of 

enforcement, actual notice will be used 

from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. daily 

from July 7, 2016 through July 20, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: To view documents 

mentioned in this preamble as being 

available in the docket, go to http://

www.regulations.gov, type USCG–2016– 

0650 in the ‘‘SEARCH’’ box and click 

‘‘SEARCH.’’ Click on Open Docket 

Folder on the line associated with this 

rule. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have questions on this rule, contact 

MSTC Justin Helton, Marine Safety Unit 

Houma, U.S. Coast Guard; telephone 

985–850–6457, email Justin.K.Helton@

uscg.mil. 


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