FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA A. POMARES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-55205 

D.C. No. 

3:21-cv-00084-HMSB 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 27, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed August 13, 2024

Before: Susan P. Graber, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Danielle J. 

Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest
2 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

SUMMARY*

Freedom of Information Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the 

district court’s summary judgment in favor of the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in plaintiff’s action 

seeking information from the VA under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA).

Plaintiff submitted three FOIA requests to the VA 

concerning potential misconduct within the 

VA. Specifically, she believed that Charmain Bogue, the 

director of the Education Service in the Veterans Benefit 

Administration, had improper ties to a political advocacy 

organization and that the VA might have leaked nonpublic 

information. Bogue’s husband was the founder and 

President of Evocati, LLC, a consulting company that 

provided public relations services to organizations that serve 

the veterans’ community; and was also an advisor to 

Veterans Education Success (VES), a nonprofit organization 

that advocated before the Education Service. After plaintiff 

submitted her FOIA requests, the VA’s Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) found that Bogue had acted improperly.

Plaintiff argued that the VA’s manual search for 

responsive emails in addressing her first FOIA request 

seeking emails received or sent by several VA officials was 

inadequate. The panel held that the VA’s search process was 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 3

reasonable and affirmed the district court’s judgment as to 

the adequacy of the search.

Plaintiff next argued that the VA improperly relied on 

several FOIA exemptions to withhold responsive records in 

addressing her third FOIA request for records relating to 

OIG investigations in which Bogue was a subject or a 

witness. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment 

that the VA properly relied on FOIA Exemption 4 

(commercial or financial and confidential information) in 

withholding responsive documents that it obtained from 

Evocati. With respect to the VA’s redaction of names and 

contact information from certain emails under Exemption 6 

(personal privacy), the panel affirmed the district court’s 

judgment except as to the names (but not the email 

addresses) of the VES employees who lobbied Congress or 

the VA. Finally, with respect to the VA’s withholding of 

interview transcripts from the OIG investigation under 

Exemption 7(E) (law-enforcement techniques and 

procedures), the panel held that it could not tell whether the 

interview techniques and methods used by OIG fell within 

Exemption 7(E), and therefore reversed the district court’s 

judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
4 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

COUNSEL

Gary J. Aguirre (argued), Aguirre Law APC, San Diego, 

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Betsey Boutelle (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; 

Katherine L. Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Chief, Civil Division; Tara K. McGrath, United States 

Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Office of the 

United States Attorney, San Diego, California; for 

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

Maria Pomares requested information from the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The VA produced 

many responsive records but withheld others under FOIA’s 

exemptions. Pomares sued the VA under FOIA, and the 

district court granted summary judgment to the VA. On 

appeal, Pomares raises two challenges. First, she argues that 

the VA’s manual search for responsive emails was 

inadequate. Second, she argues that the VA improperly 

relied on FOIA Exemptions 4 (commercial or financial and 

confidential information), 6 (personal privacy), and 7(E) 

(law-enforcement techniques and procedures) to withhold 

responsive records. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, and we affirm the district court’s judgment as to the 

adequacy of the VA’s search, Exemption 4, and partially as 

relates to Exemption 6, but we reverse and remand as to 

Exemption 7(E) and partially as to Exemption 6. 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 5

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pomares’s Requests

Pomares sought records to shed light on potential 

misconduct within the VA. She believed that a VA official 

had improper ties to a political advocacy organization and 

that the VA might have leaked nonpublic information. 

Pomares’s first suspicion seems well-founded. Charmain 

Bogue was the director of the Education Service in the 

Veterans Benefit Administration. Director Bogue’s husband, 

Barrett Bogue, was the founder and president of Evocati, 

LLC, a consulting company that provides public relations 

services to organizations serving the veterans’ community. 

Mr. Bogue was also a part-time senior communications 

advisor to Veterans Education Success (VES), a nonprofit 

organization that advocated before the Education Service. 

After Pomares submitted her FOIA requests, the VA’s 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that Director Bogue 

had acted improperly. Specifically, OIG found that Director 

Bogue participated in matters involving VES without 

considering the apparent conflict of interest, solicited

professional assistance from VES’s president, insufficiently 

disclosed details about Mr. Bogue’s business, and refused to 

cooperate fully in OIG’s investigation. 

Pomares also suspected that the VA leaked information 

to VES before it was public. VES wrote a letter to the 

Veterans Benefit Administration suggesting that four forprofit schools were ineligible to enroll veterans using federal 

educational benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 3696. Several weeks 

later, and before any government announcement, VES 

tweeted a press release stating that the VA intended to 

suspend new enrollment at five schools (including three 

schools that VES mentioned in its letter). Later that day, after 
6 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

the markets closed, the VA announced its decision. Before 

either announcement, the stock of the company that owned 

two of the for-profit schools had already been falling. 

Pomares inferred that some investors had learned of the 

decision from the VA before it was announced.

To learn more, Pomares submitted three FOIA requests 

to the VA. The requests were processed by several officials. 

On appeal, Pomares challenges the VA’s search for emails 

sought in her first request and the VA’s withholding of OIG 

records that she sought in her third request. 

B. Email Search

Pomares’s first request sought emails received or sent by

several VA officials, including Margarita Devlin and 

Director Bogue. The request for Devlin’s emails was 

assigned to Veterans Benefit Administration FOIA Program 

Specialist Quanisha Jones. Jones asked the Office of 

Information and Technology, Operations and Services 

eDiscovery department (ITOPS) to perform an electronic

search for Devlin’s emails containing terms specified by 

Pomares. ITOPS identified 155 pages that Jones determined 

were responsive and that she released after considering 

FOIA’s exemptions. Pomares appealed administratively, 

and the Office of General Counsel remanded the request for 

reprocessing. In its second search, using slightly modified 

search terms as directed on remand, ITOPS produced 731 

pages. Following review, Jones determined that only 138 of 

those pages were responsive and that some should be 

withheld under FOIA exemptions.

The request for Director Bogue’s emails was first 

assigned to Veterans Benefit Administration FOIA analyst 

Stephanie Tucker. Tucker told Pomares that 463 pages of 

emails were found, but some were not responsive, and many 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 7

redactions were made for personal privacy under Exemption 

6. Tucker later resigned from her position, and no 

declaration or Vaughn Index was created for her search.1 The 

Office of General Counsel directed Jones to reprocess 

Pomares’s request for Director Bogue’s emails. As with the 

Devlin emails, Jones requested ITOPS to perform a search 

based on the terms in the FOIA request. ITOPS produced

8,049 potentially responsive pages. For more than a month, 

Jones reviewed the documents “page-by-page and line-byline.” Ultimately, Jones determined that 166 pages were 

responsive, and she released them after applying FOIA’s 

exemptions.

C. Inspector General’s Records

Pomares’s third request sought all records relating to 

OIG investigations concerning the handling of material, 

nonpublic information or investigations in which Director 

Bogue was a subject or witness. OIG Supervisory 

Government Information Specialist Ruthlee GowinsBellamy processed the request. VES and Evocati reviewed 

records that they had submitted to OIG under subpoena, and 

both requested exemptions under Exemption 4 for 

commercial, confidential records. These records were 

withheld almost entirely, and several names were redacted 

from emails under Exemption 6 to protect individuals’ 

privacy. Finally, the VA withheld 2,164 pages of interview 

transcripts in their entirety under Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 

1 A Vaughn Index is a document that a government agency supplies to 

opposing parties and the court that identifies the documents withheld, the 

statutory exemptions claimed, and particularized explanations of how 

disclosure of a particular document would damage the interest protected 

by the claimed FOIA exemption. Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 797 F.3d 

759, 769 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015).
8 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

7(E) to protect witnesses’ privacy and shield confidential 

interview methods. 

D. District Court Proceedings

Pomares sued the VA under FOIA, seeking declaratory 

relief, an injunction compelling production of responsive 

records, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Pomares and the VA 

each moved for summary judgment, and the district court 

granted the VA’s motion. The court concluded that FOIA 

authorizes manual or electronic searches, so the VA’s search 

process was lawful and otherwise reasonable. The district 

court also determined that the VA properly justified

withholdings under Exemptions 4, 5, 6, and 7. The Vaughn 

Indices were necessarily adequate, the court reasoned,

because they included sufficient detail to justify the 

withholdings. The district court considered thousands of 

pages across more than ten separate FOIA searches. The 

scope of our review in this appeal is narrower: we consider 

the adequacy of the VA’s search for two officials’ emails and 

the applicability of Exemption 4 to records submitted by 

Evocati; Exemption 6 to emails from VES, Evocati, and the 

Inspector General; and Exemption 7(E) to transcripts from 

OIG interviews. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s summary judgment 

decision de novo. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & 

Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(per curiam).

A. Adequacy of the VA’s Search

Upon request, a federal agency “shall make . . . records 

promptly available.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). To determine 

whether an agency has fulfilled its duty, rather than 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 9

rummaging through government files, we analyze whether 

the agency performed an adequate search. See Transgender 

L. Ctr. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 46 F.4th 771, 779 (9th 

Cir. 2022). An adequate search is one that is “reasonably 

calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Id. (quoting 

Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 770). And it is the agency’s burden to 

prove “beyond material doubt” that it has taken “all 

reasonable measures to uncover all relevant documents.” Id. 

at 779–80. We consider not whether the agency produced 

every responsive document but rather whether its search was 

reasonable. Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 770–71; accord Trentadue 

v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 572 F.3d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 

2009) (“[T]he focal point of the judicial inquiry is the 

agency’s search process, not the outcome of its search.”). 

In 1996, Congress amended FOIA to require agencies to 

“make reasonable efforts to search for . . . records in 

electronic form or format,” unless doing so would 

“significantly interfere” with the agency’s information 

systems. Electronic FOIA Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 

104-231, § 5, 110 Stat. 3048, 3050 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(3)(C)). “‘[S]earch’ means to review, manually or 

by automated means, agency records” to determine 

responsiveness. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D). Pomares reads 

§ 552(a)(3)(C) as requiring not only that electronic records 

be searched but also that records must be searched

electronically so long as that method would not significantly 

interfere with the agency’s information systems. Under that 

reading, Pomares argues, Jones violated FOIA by manually

reviewing each email identified by ITOPS. In Pomares’s 

view, Jones simply should have produced the documents that 

ITOPS located in its search. Pomares’s reading contradicts 

the text—FOIA does not prohibit manual review of 

electronic files. 
10 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

Throughout § 552, “form or format” refers to the 

medium in which records are kept, not the search method 

used to locate or produce those records. Certain records must 

be published for public inspection in electronic format, 

“regardless of [the records’] form or format.” Id. 

§ 552(a)(2)(D). “[A]n agency shall provide the record in any 

form or format requested . . . .” Id. § 552(a)(3)(B). And 

FOIA defines “record” to cover “any format, including an 

electronic format.” Id. § 552(f)(2)(A). Congress added these 

three provisions when it added subparagraph (a)(3)(C), and 

we presume that Congress used “form or format” 

consistently. Electronic FOIA Amendments § 5; see 

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refin., LLC v. Renewable Fuels 

Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382, 389 (2021) (“[A]bsent contrary 

evidence, this Court normally presumes consistent usage.”); 

see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law 171–

73 (1st ed. 2012) (the presumption of consistent usage is 

strongest for terms in the same section or enacted at the same 

time).

And so construed, subparagraph (a)(3)(C) requires 

agencies to search for records stored in an electronic 

medium; it does not dictate a specific search method. Indeed, 

Congress expressly authorized manual review of electronic 

records to determine responsiveness. Subparagraph 

(a)(3)(D) defines “search” “[f]or purposes of [§ 552(a)(3)].” 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D). Within this paragraph, “search” 

appears once: in subparagraph (a)(3)(C). If the definition of 

“search” in subparagraph (a)(3)(D), which contemplates 

manual review of records, does not define “search” as used

in subparagraph (a)(3)(C), then it serves no function. We do 

not read the definition to be meaningless surplusage. See, 

e.g., United States v. Barraza-Lopez, 659 F.3d 1216, 1220 

(9th Cir. 2011) (applying the canon against surplusage). 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 11

Separate from the textual analysis, Pomares argues that 

requiring an exclusively electronic search method in this 

case better serves FOIA’s policy and the VA’s FOIA

regulations. When Congress added subparagraphs (a)(3)(C) 

and (a)(3)(D), Pomares reasons, it sought to streamline the 

FOIA process, and manual review hinders that goal. See 

TPS, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 330 F.3d 1191, 1195–96 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (recognizing Congress’s intent “to encourage 

government agencies to use advancing computer technology 

. . . to enhance public access to records” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)); 38 C.F.R. § 1.561(b)(9) (searches shall be 

conducted “in the most efficient and least expensive manner 

reasonably possible”). But this argument fails for two 

reasons. First, the statute’s text, not congressional intent, 

governs. Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. 

Sys., 144 S. Ct. 2440, 2454 (2024). Second, Pomares’s 

premise is flawed: Jones would have manually reviewed the

records that ITOPS located to apply FOIA’s exemptions

even if she did not also consider responsiveness. See 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b). 

Although FOIA’s provisions do not require electronic 

searches in all cases, its reasonableness requirement surely

dictates at least some degree of electronic searching in some 

cases. For example, an agency could not reasonably search 

for emails by looking only in desk drawers. As with all FOIA 

searches, courts must make a fact-specific determination 

regarding the adequacy of the agency’s search. See, e.g., 

Inter-Coop. Exch. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 36 F.4th 905, 912 

n.3 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The government’s response to a FOIA 

request is context specific . . . .”); see also Rubman v. U.S. 

Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 800 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 

2015) (“Reasonableness is a flexible and context-dependent 

standard.”).
12 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

The VA’s search process here was reasonable. Jones’s 

method of requesting an initial electronic search and then

manually reviewing the results of that search to determine 

responsiveness and application of FOIA’s exemptions was 

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. She 

explained that the ITOPS software could not exclude internal 

emails or “analyze the page content,” which necessitated 

manual review. Other FOIA analysts processing other 

aspects of Pomares’s requests followed a similar process.

For example, RuthAnn Parise used a different software but 

also noted that many emails identified in the electronic 

review were nonresponsive, such as internal 

communications or marketing emails. And, like Jones, 

Michelle Jackson reviewed 1,509 pages provided by ITOPS 

and determined that only 11 were responsive. The record 

does not show any requests that ITOPS exclude internal 

emails, which suggests that ITOPS lacked that capacity. And 

we may rely on Jones’s declarations because they are 

reasonably detailed and nonconclusory, and Pomares has not 

introduced evidence to overcome the presumption of good 

faith. Transgender L. Ctr., 46 F.4th at 780. 

Pomares may have preferred a different search method, 

but her objections do not undermine the adequacy of the 

VA’s search. We affirm the district court’s judgment as to 

the adequacy of the search for Devlin’s and Director 

Bogue’s emails. 

B. Exemptions

FOIA requires an agency to provide requested records

unless they fall within one of nine exclusive statutory 

exemptions. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 

(2011); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). Mindful of FOIA’s 

general command to provide “broad disclosure,” we 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 13

interpret its exemptions narrowly, U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Tax 

Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989), and the agency has the 

burden of showing that a claimed exemption applies, Rojas 

v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 941 F.3d 392, 397 (9th Cir. 2019). 

But FOIA lawsuits inherently generate obstacles for 

challenging and reviewing agency withholdings because 

only the agency has seen the documents at issue. See Wiener 

v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 943 F.2d 972, 977–78 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

To facilitate challenge and review, an agency must

prepare a Vaughn Index detailing its withholdings and 

related justifications. Id.; see generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 

484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). An adequate Vaughn 

Index must: (1) identify each document withheld; (2) state 

the applicable statutory exemption; and (3) explain how 

disclosure would harm the interests protected by the 

statutory exemption. Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 769 n.4. An 

agency must provide more than “boilerplate or conclusory 

statements,” Transgender L. Ctr., 46 F.4th at 781 (quoting 

Shannahan v. IRS, 672 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2012)), and 

allow “a meaningful opportunity to contest, and . . . an 

adequate foundation to review,” the agency’s withholdings, 

Citizens Comm’n on Hum. Rts. v. Food & Drug Admin., 45 

F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wiener, 943 F.2d

at 977). 

We address each of the challenged exemptions and the 

sufficiency of the VA’s justifications for its withholdings,

considering its Vaughn Index and other supporting 

documents.

1. Exemption 4

The VA withheld documents responsive to Pomares’s 

requests that it obtained from Evocati under Exception 4. 
14 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

FOIA exempts from disclosure “trade secrets and 

commercial or financial information obtained from a person 

and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Thus, 

to satisfy Exemption 4, an agency must show that the 

information is (1) commercial or financial, (2) obtained from 

a person, and (3) privileged or confidential. Id. Evocati is a 

“person” under Exemption 4. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2); Fed. 

Commc’ns Comm’n v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 408–09 

(2011). The issues, then, are whether the VA established that 

Evocati’s records were both (a) commercial or financial and 

(b) privileged or confidential. 

We give “commercial” and “financial” their ordinary 

meanings. Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border 

Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). Information is 

“commercial” if it pertains to “business [or] trade,” or is 

designed to be profitable. Commerce, Commercial, 

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 267 

(1969); see also Commercial, Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 456 (1963) (defining commercial 

as “from the point of view of profit”). Other courts have read 

the term similarly. See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in 

Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 58 F.4th 1255, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 

2023) (“We have read Exemption 4 to cover only 

information that, in and of itself, demonstrably pertains to 

the exchange of goods or services or the making of a 

profit.”). Information is “financial” if it relates to “the 

management of money and other assets.” Finance, 

Financial, American Heritage Dictionary of the English 

Language 492 (1969). And information is “confidential” if 

it is “customarily kept private, or at least closely held, by the 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 15

person imparting it.” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader 

Media, 588 U.S. 427, 434 (2019).2

Viewed together, the Gowins-Bellamy Declaration, the 

Vaughn Index, and the letter from Evocati’s attorney 

incorporated in the Vaughn Index (later submitted as a 

declaration by Mr. Bogue) sufficiently detail the records that 

the VA withheld and the justification for the withholdings. 

The Vaughn Index incorporated materials that Evocati sent 

to OIG requesting withholdings under Exemption 4. The 

letter from Evocati’s attorney and its attached index 

described records that were commercial (including 

consulting agreements and business emails with confidential 

information) or financial (including private financial 

information shared between the Bogues and their 

accountants). And Mr. Bogue declared that the information 

was “closely held by Evocati” and neither “publicly 

available nor freely shared.” The district court viewed the 

documents together and concluded that the VA satisfied its 

burden. Pomares disagrees for two reasons. 

First, Pomares argues that the VA did not satisfy its 

burden to show that Exemption 4 applied because the 

Vaughn Index simply incorporated the letter from Evocati. 

2 In Food Marketing Institute, the Supreme Court noted that information 

might be considered confidential only if the party receiving the 

information assured confidentiality. 588 U.S. at 434–35. But the Court 

declined to decide whether such assurances are necessary. Id. at 435. We 

need not answer that question. In his declaration, Mr. Bogue noted that 

the documents Evocati provided to OIG under a subpoena “were 

prominently labeled ‘Confidential’ and were produced by Evocati, LLC 

with the implied understanding that the OIG would treat the documents 

as confidential.” Pomares has not argued that assurances of 

confidentiality are required or that OIG’s implied assurances were 

insufficient. 
16 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

But Exemption 4, by its nature, requires agencies to rely on 

assertions by the third parties that provided the information

sought in a FOIA request. Agencies cannot determine, on 

their own, whether a person who provided information to the 

government treated that information as confidential. Given 

the practicalities at play in this context, courts routinely 

consider information from third parties on which an agency 

relied to assert Exemption 4. See, e.g., Citizens Comm’n on 

Hum. Rts., 45 F.3d at 1328 (although a company participated 

in preparing the Vaughn Index, “the FDA was ultimately 

responsible for the decision to withhold these documents”); 

Greenberg v. Food & Drug Admin., 803 F.2d 1213, 1216–

17 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (relying on affidavits submitted by the 

company that provided commercial information). The VA 

had to rely on Evocati’s assertions to determine whether 

Exemption 4 applied. Nothing in FOIA required the VA to 

copy-and-paste Evocati’s representations into a Vaughn 

Index rather than attaching and incorporating them by 

reference. 

Second, Pomares argues that no admissible evidence 

supports the VA’s withholding. After Pomares noted that the 

letter from Evocati’s counsel to OIG was an inadmissible 

unsworn statement, the VA refiled the identical letter with 

Mr. Bogue’s attestation that the letter was “true and correct 

to the best of [his] knowledge.” Pomares contends that this 

declaration was insufficient because Mr. Bogue did not 

establish his personal knowledge and competency to testify 

to the contents of the letter. Though its introduction was 

perhaps inartful, the district court properly considered 

Mr. Bogue’s declaration. He signed the declaration as 

Evocati’s president, and we have recognized that similar 

witnesses were competent to testify by virtue of their 

positions. See Stuart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.3d 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 17

1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (a hospital executive had 

personal knowledge to testify regarding contributions to 

employee insurance plans); United States v. Thompson, 559 

F.2d 552, 553–54 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (a restaurant’s 

manager had personal knowledge of the restaurant’s normal 

operations). Pomares’s arguments do not support a different 

result here. 

We affirm the district court’s judgment as to Exemption 

4. 

2. Exemption 6

The VA redacted names and contact information from 

emails it produced that were subpoenaed from VES and 

Evocati and from emails that were sent by and to the 

Inspector General.3 Agencies may withhold “personnel and 

medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). If the information withheld 

by the agency is the type of file covered by this exemption, 

we engage in a two-step, burden-shifting analysis. See Rojas, 

941 F.3d at 404–05. First, the agency must show that there 

is a nontrivial privacy interest against disclosure. Id. at 405.

Second, if the agency makes that showing, the requester 

must show that the public interest in disclosure outweighs 

3 Pomares also argues that withholdings from Tucker’s initial search for 

Director Bogue’s emails were improper because Tucker never filed a 

declaration or Vaughn Index. Viewed in isolation, we might agree. But 

the VA directed Jones to repeat the search for Director Bogue’s emails. 

And as we explained, that search was adequate, and Pomares has not 

challenged Jones’s application of the exemptions. Whatever infirmity 

that existed in Tucker’s search was remedied by Jones’s subsequent 

search that complied with FOIA. Pomares was “entitled to a reasonable 

search” for Director Bogue’s emails, Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 772, which 

Jones provided.
18 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

the asserted privacy interest. Id.; see also Lahr v. Nat’l 

Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(reasoning that FOIA requires balancing because the 

exemption applies to “unwarranted” invasions of privacy). 

To overcome a privacy interest, a requester must 

demonstrate a “significant” public interest in disclosure. 

Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172–

73 (2004) (applying the related Exemption 7(C)). The public 

interest must concern government operation and activity, 

and the requester’s individual intentions are irrelevant 

because released records may be shared with anyone. Forest 

Serv. Emps. for Env’t Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 

1021, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2008). When the requester asserts a 

public interest in learning about official misconduct, she 

must provide evidence that would allow a reasonable person 

to conclude that the misconduct “might have occurred.” 

Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. And the requester must show “some 

nexus” between the requested information and “unveiling 

agency misconduct.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 978. 

Pomares does not dispute that the redacted information 

qualifies as a “similar file” covered by Exemption 6. See 

Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1024 (names and identifying 

information satisfied the “similar file” requirement). We 

consider, then, whether the VA established a nontrivial 

privacy interest in the redacted names and whether the 

district court properly balanced the public interest in 

disclosure against the asserted privacy interest. 

Pomares argues that the VA failed to establish a 

nontrivial privacy interest in the redacted names. Reviewing 

far more withheld documents than are at issue here, the 

district court concluded that the name or contact information 

“of a lower-level employee” would not shed light on the 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 19

VA’s performance, so the privacy interest outweighed the 

public interest in disclosure. For many withholdings that 

Pomares has not challenged, the VA provided the title and 

position of the employees whose names it withheld, and its 

briefing cites the declarations and Vaughn Indices that 

include those details. But the VA did not provide that same 

information for the withholdings that we consider. 

The Gowins-Bellamy Declaration does not address how 

Exemption 6 applies to the VES and Evocati records or OIG 

emails. And the Vaughn Index provides no further detail, 

stating only that the VA redacted “[p]ersonally identifying 

information regarding VA employees and third parties 

consisting of names, email addresses and phone numbers.” 

But with one exception, the Vaughn Index does not state the 

role or level of the employees whose names were withheld 

from these records. This hinders our ability to weigh the 

public and privacy interests. We have previously 

emphasized the importance of “the employee’s position in 

her employer’s hierarchical structure” to this analysis. Id. at 

1025. 

But the standard for recognizing a nontrivial privacy 

interest is not demanding. An agency must show that the 

disclosure would affect employees’ “control of information 

concerning [their] person[s]” or expose them to harassment. 

Rojas, 941 F.3d at 405 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. 

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989)). 

The VA employees have a nontrivial privacy interest in their 

personal identities, even though we cannot fully evaluate the 

strength of that interest. And the VES employees have a 

greater privacy interest because they are private individuals 

whose identities are less closely connected to government 

functioning, which is the public interest recognized by 

FOIA. See Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
20 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

884 F.2d 1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1989); accord Common 

Cause v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 938 (D.C 

Cir. 1982) (“[Exemption 6] provides greater protection to 

private individuals . . . .”). 

To overcome the nontrivial privacy interests that exist, 

Pomares must show a stronger public interest in disclosure. 

She argues that the OIG report concerning Director Bogue 

shows that misconduct occurred, and the names of VA and 

VES employees corresponding with one another would shed 

further light on that misconduct. But Pomares has not 

identified a nexus between the employees’ names and any 

misconduct by the Bogues. And the public OIG report 

weakens the public interest in disclosure because the 

misconduct has already been publicized. See Forest Serv. 

Emps., 524 F.3d at 1028. Pomares suggests that revealing the 

names might reveal the source of the suspected leak to VES 

of the VA’s decision to suspend enrollment at five for-profit 

schools. But none of the emails that Pomares cites 

establishes that connection. Put differently, revealing the 

names of individuals who have not been shown to have a 

connection to the suspected leak does not help Pomares 

determine whether information was leaked or, if so, who 

might have done it. 

Our balancing comes out differently for the VES 

employees who lobbied Congress or the VA. The VA 

redacted the names of VES employees who emailed 

congressional aides recommending Director Bogue and 

others for presidential appointments. It also redacted the 

names and email addresses of VES employees who emailed 

VA employees. Finally, it redacted the name of a VES 

employee who testified before a congressional committee, 

which was included in an email from a VES employee to 

Director Bogue.
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 21

We have recognized that the public has a “‘robust 

interest’ in knowing who is ‘seeking to influence’ an 

agency.” Rojas, 941 F.3d at 406 (citation omitted); accord 

Elec. Frontier Found. v. Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., 639 

F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[C]ases considering a private 

party attempting to influence government policy typically 

find in favor of disclosure . . . .”), abrogated on other 

grounds, Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990. We do 

not evaluate the public interest from the vantage of the 

person making the FOIA request. See Forest Serv. Emps., 

524 F.3d at 1025. Rather, we consider the general public 

interest in “understanding . . . the operations or activities of 

the government,” id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Lab.

Rels. Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994)), and that interest 

includes knowing the identities of private parties attempting 

to influence government policy, Elec. Frontier Found., 639 

F.3d at 886. There is a strong public interest in disclosing the 

names of lobbyists because that may “shed light on which 

companies and which individuals influence government 

decision making.” Id. at 888. On the other hand, “email

addresses may add to the risk of privacy invasion with little 

additional benefit to the public interest.” Id. Therefore, in 

balancing the public interest against the privacy interests of 

the VES lobbyists, we conclude that disclosure of the names 

of the VES employees who lobbied the VA or congressional 

aides or who testified before a congressional committee do 

not constitute “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). However, there is little 

public interest in disclosure of the VES employees’ email 

addresses.

Accordingly, with regard to Pomares’s challenge to 

withholdings made under Exemption 6, we affirm the district 

court except as relates to the names (but not the email 
22 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

addresses) of the VES employees who lobbied Congress or 

the VA. 

3. Exemption 7(E)

The VA withheld interview transcripts from the OIG 

investigation that were responsive to Pomares’s requests 

under Exemption 7(E). Agencies may withhold “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes” to the 

extent that production “would disclose techniques and 

procedures for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such 

disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 

circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). Pomares 

does not dispute that the records gathered by OIG for its 

internal investigation were gathered for a law-enforcement 

purpose. See Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 737 F.2d 

84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[A]n agency’s investigation of its 

own employees is for ‘law enforcement purposes’ only if it 

focuses ‘directly on specifically alleged illegal acts . . . 

which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions.’” 

(citation omitted)). And because the VA’s interview 

methods are “techniques and procedures,” rather than 

“guidelines,” it need not show any danger of future 

lawbreaking resulting from disclosure. Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 

778 (citation omitted); see also Transgender L. Ctr., 46 F.4th 

at 784–85 (defining techniques and procedures). 

But not all techniques and procedures are shielded by 

Exemption 7(E). The government must show that the 

technique or procedure is “not generally known to the 

public.” Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 57 F.3d 803, 815 

(9th Cir. 1995). Four of our cases have addressed whether an 

agency made this showing. First, we held that an agency met 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 23

its burden where an affidavit in support of a 7(E) 

withholding explained why disclosure of documents related 

to investigating the poisoning of consumer products would 

seriously threaten future law-enforcement “investigations by 

revealing specifics of cyanide-tracing techniques.” Bowen v. 

U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 925 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 

1991). The tracing techniques at issue were not publicly 

known or disclosed. Id. at 1228. Put differently, although the 

general “chemical process of tracing” was generally known, 

the specific, technical procedures were not. Id. 

Next, we rejected an agency’s attempt to withhold 

records showing that it used pretextual phone calls in an 

investigation. Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 815. We reasoned that 

Exemption 7(E) does not cover investigative techniques that 

are generally known, and a pretextual phone call “would leap 

to the mind of the most simpleminded investigator.” Id. We 

dismissed the government’s argument that the use of a 

particular alias transformed the generally known pretextual 

call into an unknown technique. Id. Reframing a generally 

known practice as a novel “application of the practice to the 

particular facts” does not bring the practice (and the 

documents that would reveal its use) within Exemption 

7(E)’s ambit. Id. 

Our third case explained that although Exemption 7(E) 

does not protect the application of a well-known technique, 

it does shield the means of investigation if those means are 

not generally known. Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777– 78. In

Hamdan, the agency properly invoked Exemption 7(E) 

because its affidavits stated that the records sought would 

have revealed “techniques and procedures related to 

surveillance and credit searches” and “a stratagem, the 

details of which if revealed would preclude its use in future 

cases.” Id. at 777. Even though surveillance and credit 
24 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

searches are generally known investigative techniques, the 

requested records concerned an unknown way of deploying 

those techniques that disclosure would frustrate, which was 

sufficient to invoke Exception 7(E). Id. at 777–78. 

Most recently, we held that narrative sections of an 

internal manual for federal prosecutors could not be withheld 

under Exemption 7(E). Am. Civ. Liberties Union of N. Cal. 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 880 F.3d 473, 492 (9th Cir. 2018). The 

records described in general terms “publicly known 

investigative techniques” for obtaining a suspect’s location 

information, as well as the legal authorizations to obtain that 

information and legal arguments to obtain those 

authorizations. Id. The records lacked “detailed, technical 

analysis” and did not contain “non-public details” about the 

surveillance techniques. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the 

records did not reveal means of conducting an investigation 

that were not generally known, and the records were not 

shielded by Exemption 7(E). Id. 

Pomares argues that the Gowins-Bellamy Declaration 

and Vaughn Index are inadequate to justify the VA’s 

Exemption 7(E) withholdings. We agree. The Declaration 

never mentions Exemption 7(E), and the Vaughn Index 

excludes all interview transcripts in their entirety with a 

single entry stating that the transcripts “contain specific 

information about how VA OIG conducts official 

investigations, including sequence and manner of 

questioning, and specific interview methods which are 

confidential.”4

4 Pomares also argues that Gowins-Bellamy was not competent to testify 

about OIG’s interview techniques. But we generally recognize that an 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 25

Although interviewing witnesses and subjects is a 

generally known investigative practice, in some cases the 

specific means for conducting the interview may be 

protected by Exemption 7(E). See, e.g., Knight First Amend. 

Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 

30 F.4th 318, 325, 331–33 (2d Cir. 2022). But here the VA’s 

Vaughn Index does not suggest any means of interviewing 

that are not publicly known—every interview involves a

“sequence and manner of questioning” and “interview 

methods.” And although confidential interview methods 

might resemble the “stratagem” that we found sufficient in 

Hamdan, unlike the agency in that case, here the VA never 

presented any evidence that disclosure would hinder future 

investigations (a strong signal that the technique is not 

publicly known). See 797 F.3d at 777–78 (“We conclude that 

the affidavits, which state that further detail would 

compromise the very techniques the government is trying to 

keep secret, are sufficient . . . .”); see also Bowen, 925 F.2d 

at 1229 (referring to the “detailed assertions” in an agency 

affidavit that disclosure would hinder future investigations).

The inadequacy of the VA’s explanation becomes even 

clearer when compared to the scope of its withholding. In 

other cases, the government’s Exemption 7(E) withholdings 

were relatively limited. In Knight, for example, the agency 

withheld questions designed to identify potential 

immigrants’ terrorism connections but otherwise released 

the training materials that contained those questions. 30 

F.4th at 325; see also Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777 (the agency 

affidavit from an official supervising a FOIA search satisfies the 

personal knowledge requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56(c)(4), and Pomares has not given any reason to treat this case as an 

exception. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 990. 
26 POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A.

withheld five documents entirely, and ten documents in 

part). Here, the VA withheld more than 2,000 pages of OIG 

interview transcripts in their entirety because they would 

reveal question sequencing. But that explanation would 

allow the government to “withhold information under 

Exemption 7(E) under any circumstances, no matter how 

obvious the investigative practice at issue, simply by saying” 

that the records reveal a sequence of questions. Rosenfeld, 

57 F.3d at 815. 

Based on the record presented, we cannot tell whether 

the interview techniques and methods used by OIG fall 

within Exemption 7(E). Accordingly, we reverse the district 

court’s judgment as to the withholdings under Exemption 

7(E) and remand for further proceedings.

5 On remand, if the 

VA provides a revised Vaughn Index, the district court 

should consider whether any portions of the transcripts could 

be segregated and provided to Pomares. See Hamdan, 797 

F.3d at 779 (“It is reversible error for the district court to 

simply approve the withholding of an entire document 

without entering a finding on segregability.” (cleaned up) 

(quoting Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988)); see also 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record 

shall be provided to any person requesting such record after 

deletion of the portions which are exempt . . . .”). 

III. CONCLUSION

The VA conducted an adequate search for Devlin’s and 

Director Bogue’s emails, and it met its burden for 

5 The Vaughn Index also cited Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to justify 

withholding the transcripts in their entirety to protect witnesses’ and 

subjects’ identities. On appeal, the VA argues only that Exemption 7(E) 

justifies the withholding. Thus, we do not consider Exemptions 6 and 

7(C). 
POMARES V. DEP’T OF V.A. 27

withholding confidential documents received from Evocati 

under FOIA Exemption 4 and the names of government and 

private employees under Exemption 6. However, the VA did 

not adequately justify withholding the names of VES 

employees who lobbied Congress or the VA under 

Exemption 6 or OIG interview transcripts under Exemption 

7(E). 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

6

6 Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).