1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-20165.

Summary Calendar.

DeCELL & ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Receiver for Guaranty

Bank, et al., Defendants,

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Guaranty

Bank, Defendant-Appellee.

Nov. 1, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Southern

District of Texas.

Before KING, JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant DeCell & Associates ("DeCell") appe als from the

district court's dismissal of its claims ag ainst the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), in both its receivership

and corporate capacities, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

DeCell is a company engaged in the business of buying and

selling oilfield drill pipe and related products. In April 1986,

JRL International and Associates, Inc. ("JRL") ordered drill collar

bits from DeCell, instructing DeCell to ship the bits to a Mexican

company, Perforaciones Marinas Del Golfo, S.A. ("Permargo").

Before it w ould sell to JRL, DeCell required a letter of credit;

consequently, Guaranty Bank ("Guaranty") issued a $250,0001 The statute provides in relevant part:

Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the Corporation

may, without bond or security, remove any action, suit,

or proceeding from a State court to the appropriate

United States district court before the end of the 90-

day period beginning on the date the action, suit, or

proceeding is filed against the Corporation or the

Corporation is substituted as a party.

12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B).

2 DeCell claimed that its letter of credit was an insured

deposit, and as a consequence, DeCell asserted that it could

recover $100,000 of deposit insurance rather than a simple pro

rata share of the receivership estate.

2 irrevocable letter of credit on the account of Permargo and in

favor of JRL. JRL allegedly transferred the letter of credit to

assignee DeCell, and upon receipt of the letter of credit, DeCell

shipped the drill collar bits to Permargo.

On June 9, 1986, DeCell presented the letter of credit to

Guaranty for payment, but Guaranty refused to honor it. On August

13, 1986, DeCell filed suit in state court against Guaranty and JRL

for the alleged wrongful dishonor of the letter of credit. While

the case was pending in state court, Guaranty failed, and the

Banking Commissioner of Texas app ointed the FDIC as Receiver

("FDIC-Receiver") on June 3, 1988. FDIC-Receiver intervened as

defendant in place of Guaranty, and removed the case to federal

district court pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B). 1

In its amended answer, FDIC-Receiver raised t wo affirmative

defenses that were uniquely applicable to the agency. First, FDICReceiver asserted that the federal court lacked jurisd iction to

determine whether the l etter of credit was an "insured deposit." 23 The statute provides in relevant part:

In case of the liquidation of, or other closing or

winding up of the affairs of, any insured depository

institution, payment of the insured deposits in such

institution shall be made by the Corporation as soon as

possible.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1).

4 DeCell admits in the "Statement of facts" portion of its

brief that "DeCell did not file any proof of claim with FDIC at

any time."

3 Second, FDIC-Receiver argued that DeCell had failed to sue the

corre ct party—the FDIC in its corporate capacity ("FDICCorporate")—which alone is authorized under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1) 3

to pay insured deposits upon the closing of an insured depository

institution. On February 7, 1992, DeCell and JRL filed a

stipulation for entry of judgment against JRL in favor of DeCell;

thus, only the remaining wrongful di shonor action against FDICReceiver ( substituting for Guaranty) proceeded to a bench trial

before a United States Magistrate.

Without issuing a judgment, the Magistrate sua sponte ordered

a new trial because she determined that FDIC-Co rporate was an

indispensable party to DeCell's claim for deposit insurance. The

Magistrate also ruled that the district c ourt had subject matter

jurisdiction to determine whether the letter of credit is an

insured deposit. FDIC-Receiver filed a motion for reconsideration,

urging that, by statute, no court has jurisdiction over the deposit

insurance claim until DeCell files the claim with FDIC-Co rporate

and FDIC-Corporate makes a "final determination." It is undisputed

that DeCell never filed such a claim wi th FDIC-Corporate. 4 The4

Magistrate denied the motion for reconsideration and set the case

for a new trial.

FDIC-Receiver then filed a second s upplemental motion for

reconsideration, reiterating its jurisdictional challenges. FDICCorporate, having been added as a party by DeCell, moved to dismiss

on the same jurisdictional grounds, and withdrew its consent to

proceed before the Magistrate. The district court then ordered the

parties to file cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues in

the case.

In a January 4, 1994 order, the district court dismissed

Decell's claims against both FDIC-Receiver and FDIC-Corporate for

lack of jurisdiction. As the district court wrote:

In carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court recognized

that something we nt awry in the rulings in this dispute,

perhaps because in its early stages the applicable law was

new, untested, and, indeed, still developing. Nevertheless it

is now clear to the Court that under the applicable law, cited

by the FDIC in both its receivership and corporate capacities,

that [sic] DeCell is required to file a claim with the federal

agency and that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the

dispute.

DeCell appeals from this ruling.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we

review on a de novo basis. See Carney v. Resolution Trust Corp.,

19 F.3d 950, 954 (5th Cir.1994) ( per curiam); C eres Gulf v.

Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir.1992). The question of

federal court jurisdiction "may be raised by parties, or by the

court sua sponte, at any time." M CG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy

Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir.1990).5 III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Many of DeCell's contentions ca n be resolved merely by

examining the deposit insurance system and our holdings in the

area. Because this case hinges on our interpretation of the

statutory provisions, a thorough description of the statu t ory

scheme is necessary. DeCell's arguments will then be discussed in

turn.

A. The Exhaustion Requirement

Federal statutes govern the process by which the FDIC

d esignates claims entitled to federal deposit insurance. S ee 12

U.S.C. § 1821(f). This "designation" responsibility is statutorily

given to FDIC-Corporate, as that entity is charged with insuring

the deposits of banking institutions and processing the insurance

claims of failed banks. S ee 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a), (f). The

relevant sections on the payment of insured deposits provide:

(f) Payment of insured deposits

. . . . .

(2) Proof of claims

The Corporation, in its discretion, may require

proof of claims to be filed and may approve or reject such claims for insured deposits.

(3) Resolution of disputes

(A) Resolutions in accordance to corporation

regulations

In the case of any disputed claim relatin g to any

insured deposit or any determination of insurance

coverage with respect to any deposit, the

Corporation may resolve such disputed claim in

accordance with regulations prescribed by the

Corpor ation establishing procedures for resolving

such claims.6 (B) Adjudication of claims

If the Corporation has not prescribed regulations

establishing procedures for resolving disputed

claims, the Corporation may require the final

determination of a court of competent jurisdiction

before paying any such claim.

(4) Review of corporation's determination

Final determination made by the Corporation shall

be reviewable in accordance with chapter 7 of Title

5 by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Distr ict of Columbia or the court of appeals for

the Federal judicial circuit where the principal

place of business of the depository institution is

located.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(f).

Based on this statutory scheme, the FDIC contends that a

deposit insurance claim is not ripe for federal court review until

the cl aim has been presented to FDIC-Corporate, and until FDICCorporate has made a "final determination." In contrast, DeCell

emphasizes the te ntative "may" language of sub-sections (2) and

(3), asserting that "[t]here is nothing mandatory about the filing

of claims or the approval or rejection of the claim[s] process."

DeCell's interpretation, however, has previously been rejected

by this Court. In A ztec General Agency v. Federal Deposit

Insurance Corp., No. 93-1424, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994)

(per curiam) (unpublished opi nion), plaintiff Aztec filed suit

against a failed bank and FDIC-Corporate in state court for

wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit. FDIC-Receiver substituted

itself in place of the failed bank, and the lawsuit was removed to

federal court. S ee id. On appeal, FDIC-Corporate argued that the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear disputes7

concerning FDIC-Corporate's final determination of "insured

deposit" status. See id. at 4.

This Co urt agreed with the position of the FDIC, concluding

that the district court lacked ju risdiction over the insured

deposit dispute. See id. at 6. As we explained:

[W]e note that Aztec acknowledges that FDIC-Corporate has not

made a final determination in this case. In fact, although

Aztec wrote a letter to FDIC-Receiver seeking payment of the

letter of credit, Aztec never sub mitted a claim to FDICCorporat e for payment of an insured deposit. Because Aztec

never sought payment of an insured deposit from F DICCorporate, it is not surprising that FDIC-Corporate never made

a final determination denying payment. T hus, without a final

determination from FDIC-Corporate denying payment of the

alleged insured deposit, this case is not, in any event, ripe

for judicial review.

Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, just as we

have found an exhaustion requirement in t he § 1821(d) procedures

for presenting creditors' claims to FDIC-Receiver, see Meliezer v.

Resolution Trust Co., 952 F.2d 879, 881-82 (5th Cir.1992) (stating

that creditors of a failed institution must first pres ent their

c laims to the Receiver for administrative consideration before

pursuing a ju dicial remedy), so too have we established an

exhaustion requirement in the § 1821(f) procedures for presenting

deposit insurance claims to FDIC-Corporate.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that DeCell has never

presented its deposit insurance claim to FDIC-Corporate. As a

consequence, ther e has been no opportunity for FDIC-Corporate to

make a "final determination" regarding whether DeCell's letter of

credit was an insured deposit. Thus, following from our decision

in Aztec, DeCell's claims against FDIC-Receiver and FDIC-Corporate8

are not ripe for judicial review, and the district court correctly

dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Even if FDIC-Corporate had made a "final determination," we

nevertheless would affirm the district court's dismissal for lack

of jurisdiction. Our cases have repeatedly held that under §

1821(f)(4), an appeal of FDIC-Corporate's "final determination"

concerning payment of insured deposits can only be made to the

appropriate circuit court of appeals. S ee Aztec General Agency v.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp

., No. 93-1424, slip op. at 7 (5th Cir.

Feb. 7, 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); K ershaw v.

Resolution Trust Corp., 987 F.2d 1206, 1208 (5th Cir.1993) (per

curiam); N imon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 975 F.2d 240, 243-44

(5th Cir.1992) ("Congress used pl ain language in 12 U.S.C. §

1821(f)(4) which specifies that the courts of appeal will be the

fora of these [deposit insurance coverage] reviews."). Thus, even

if we assume that DeCell did present its claim to FDIC-Corporate

and that FDIC-Corporate had made a "final determination," the

district court still lacked jurisdiction under the plain language

of § 1821(f)(4) and the mandate of our prior opinions.

B. Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement

DeCell begins its brief by suggesting, through a number of

arguments, that FDIC-Corporate wa ived its right to rely upon

DeCell's failure to file a deposit insurance claim. To support

this contention, DeCell argues that the FDIC, in both its corporate

and receivership capaciti es, has been involved in the case since

FDIC-Receiver's intervention. DeCell seems to assert that because5 Similarly, DeCell seems to contend that the FDIC waived its

right to argue that it appeared in the limited capacity of

Receiver because the FDIC did not specifically raise a lack of

capacity defense when it intervened in the lawsuit.

9 FDIC-Receiver intervened in the state court lawsuit without

expressly limiting its appearance to tha t of Receiver, the FDIC

waived its rig ht to claim that FDIC-Corporate was not presented

with, and was unaware of, the deposit insurance claim. 5 As Decell

itself summarized:

Because of FD IC's knowledge of the state court suit, and

because of its participation in the case for 22 months without

a Rule 12 motion, plea in abatement, answer alleging estoppel

for failure to participate in the claims process or other

indication that DeCell should seek administrative remedies, it

has waived any right to complain about DeCell's lack of filing

for determination of insured depositor status th[ r]ough the

administrative process.

DeCell's waiver arguments are without merit. First, DeCell's

contention that the FDIC's intervention was a "general appearance"

because it did not expressly limit its appearance to that of

Receiver is misguided. It is well-settled that the FDIC operates

in two separate and legally di stinct capacities, each with very

different responsibilities. S ee Az tec General Agency v. Federal

Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 93-1424, slip op. at 2 n. 1 (5th Cir. Feb.

7, 1994) (per c uriam) (unpublished opinion) ("FDIC-Receiver and

FDIC-Corporate are distinct legal entities."); T exas Am.

Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329, 335 (5th Cir.1992) ("The

separateness of these dual identities of the FDIC has been well

respected by federal courts."); F ederal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.

Condit, 861 F.2d 853, 854, 858 (5th Cir.1988). FDIC-Receiver is

charged with the responsibility of winding up the affairs of failed10

institutions, including selling assets and paying creditors'

claims. S ee 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d); A ztec General Agency v. Federal

D eposit Ins. Corp., No. 93-1424, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 7,

1994) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). FDIC-Corporate functions

as an insurer of bank deposits, and is ch arged with paying the

insured deposits of failed banks within a reasonable time. S ee 12

U.S.C. § 1821(a); A ztec General Agency v. Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp., No. 93-1424, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994) (per

curiam) (unpublished opinion).

Only FDIC-Receiver intervened in DeCell's state court lawsuit

against Guaranty. As a wholly distinct entity, there was no need

for F DIC-Receiver to expressly designate itself as separate from

FDIC-C orporate; mere designation of the Receiver status in the

pleadings was enough. No lack of capacity allegations or special

appearance motions were needed. Only FDIC-Receiver intervened, and

because FDIC-Receiver has no authority to make deposit insurance

determinations, FDIC-Corporate did not waive its statutory right to

require present ation of a deposit insurance claim. S ee Aztec

General Agency v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 93-1424, slip op.

at 6-7 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion)

(noting that even though FDIC-Receiver was aware of a claim for

payment of a letter of credit, th e court lacked jurisdiction

because a cla im had not been submitted to FDIC-Corporate for

payment of an insured deposit). As the FDIC noted in its brief,

"DeCell simply failed to sue the correct party, FDIC Corporate, on

its claim for deposit insurance and neglected to file a claim for6 DeCell's contention that FDIC-Corporate must have

intervened because only FDIC-Corporate could have removed under

12 U.S.C. § 1819 is also unpersuasive. Although § 1819(b)(2)(B)

allows for removal, removal is not proper when: 1) the FDIC is a

party to the lawsuit, other than as a plaintiff, in its capacity

as Receiver of a state bank, and designated as the Receiver by

the exclusive appointment of State authorities; 2) the lawsuit

involves only the rights or obligations of depositors and the

bank itself; and 3) the lawsuit only involves the interpretation

of state law. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(D). DeCell argues that

these three conditions are met in this case; thus, because

removal was allowed, it must have been undertaken by FDICCorporate, as FDIC-Receiver would have been statutorily precluded

from removing.

Unfortunately for DeCell, the Magistrate allowed FDICReceiver to remove because "the FDIC has been given latitude

in circumventing subparagraph (D) exceptions," and because

federal issues were involved in the lawsuit. We agree with

these conclusions. Thus, DeCell cannot assert that the mere

act of removal was proof that FDIC-Corporate was involved in

11 deposit insurance with FDIC Corporate."

A review of the record strengthens th e conclusion that the

exhaustion requirement has not been waiv ed. After a thorough

examination of the pleadings, we find that the FDIC originally

intervened solely as FDIC -Receiver. The pleadings, in both the

captions and the substance, denominate that the FDIC was appearing

in its receivership capacity. In fact, the Magistrate granted

DeCell permission to amend its complaint to include FDIC-Corporate

in a November 18, 1992 order—more than three years after FDICReceiver had intervened as defendant on November 14, 1989. We

agree with the district court's c onclusion that "[t]he notice of

removal and the intervenor's amended answer make it abundan tly

clear

... that there was only one intervenor, FDIC-Receiver."

Thus, we disagree with DeCell's assertion that FDIC-Corporate was

a party to this litigation from the beginning. 6the lawsuit at that time.

12

In addition, the record clea rly demonstrates that FDICReceiver and FDIC-Corporate timely raised their jurisdictional

challenges as soon as they became aware that DeCell was claiming

the letter of credit as an "insured deposit." Initially, DeCell's

actions were only against Guaranty and JRL, as the original

petition and the first amended original petition did not make an

insurance deposit claim. After the intervention of FDIC-Receiver,

DeCell's lawsuit was viewed "as a claim against the r eceivership

estate," rather than as a claim for deposit insurance. Therefore,

FDIC-Receiver appropriately asserted in its answer that DeCell was

an unsecured creditor entitled only to a pro rata asset

distribution, if entitled to any recovery at all.

Our review of the record indicates that DeCell's first

assertion that it was an insured depositor was in pre-trial

proceedings in October of 1991. As soon as this deposit insurance

claim was made, FDIC-Receiver filed a Memorandum of Au thorities

contending that DeCell had not raised an insured deposit claim in

it s pleadings, that the district court had no jurisdiction over

insured deposit claims, and that FDIC-Corporate was the proper

party to be sued. Moreover, as soon as FDIC-Corporate was joined

as a defend ant, it too raised the same jurisdictional and

exhaustion defenses. Simply put, there is nothing in the record to

indicate that FDI C-Corporate was present in the lawsuit from the

initial intervention, nor does the record indicate that FDICCorporate waived its right to require submis sion of a deposit13

insurance claim.

Finally, any assertion that the FDIC's alleged waiver allowed

the district court to exercise jurisdiction is wholly without

merit. As mentioned, even if we assume that FDIC-Corporate waived

its statutory right to make a "final determination," § 1821(f)(4)

clearly provides for review only in the circuit courts of appeal,

not in the district courts. Inasmuch as DeCell is making a subject

matter jurisdiction argument, the law is clear that subject matter

jurisdiction cannot be waived. S ee Warren v. United States, 874

F.2d 280, 281-82 (5th Cir.1989); F orsythe v. Saudi Arabian

Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285, 289 n. 6 (5th Cir.1989).

C. District Court Designation Under § 1821(f)(3)(B)

DeCell also contends "that by removing the case, then failing

to object to the pendency of DeCell's request for deposit insurance

for almost 2 years, FDIC had made a de facto designation of the

district court to hear the case." DeCell relies on the language of

§ 1821(f)(3)(B) which notes that "the Corporation may require the

fi nal determination of a court of competent jurisdiction before

paying any such claim." For many of the reasons already discussed,

this contention is without merit.

First, as mentioned, both FDIC-Receiver and FDIC-Corporate

made timely jurisdictional objections to DeCell's failure to file

a deposit insurance claim with FDIC-Corporate. Contrary to

DeCell's assertion that two years had passed before a n objection

was made, our review of t he record indicates that jurisdictional

objections were made a s soon as DeCell first claimed to be an14

insured depositor. Neither FDIC-Receiver nor FDIC-Corporate

invoked § 1821(f)(3)(B) in any other manner.

Second, FDIC-Receiver 's removal to federal court cannot be

construed as a de facto designation of district court jurisdiction

over FDIC- Corporate. As discussed, FDIC-Receiver and FDICCorporate ar e wholly separate entities with wholly separate

functions. Moreover, we have previously held that "removing a suit

instigated by [the pla intiff] to federal court is not the

functional equivalent of voluntarily requesting judicial

determination under § 1821(f)(3)(B)." A ztec General Agency v.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 9 3-1424, slip op. at 7 n. 5 (5th

Cir. Feb. 7, 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). In short,

DeCell's de facto designation argument is not supported by the

facts or the law.

D. Due Process

It is undisputed that F DIC-Corporate has not promulgated

regulations establishing procedures for resolving deposit insurance

claims. DeCell contends that requiring the formal submission of a

deposit insurance claim to FDIC's administrative process—a process

with admittedly no regulations—amounts "to an unconstitutional

denial of due process and a taking of private property for public

use without just compensation."

At best, however, DeCell's positi on is premature. As an

initial matter, the statutory language of § 1821(f) clearly states

that the promulgation of regulations is not mandatory. Section

1821(f )(3)(A) provides that in the case of disputed deposit15

insurance claims, "the Corporation may resolve such disputed claim

in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Corporation

establishing procedures for resolving such claims" (emphasis

added). Similarly, § 1821(f)(3)(B) begins "[i]f the Corporation

has not prescribed regulations establishing procedures for

resolving disputed claims...." Thus, the statutory language

contemplates that formal regulations might not be prescribed.

Second, our cases have previously found that the deposit

insurance claims process can withstand constitutional scrutiny.

See Kershaw v. Resolution Trust Corp., 987 F.2d 1206, 1210 (5th

Cir.1993) (per curiam); N imon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 975 F.2d

240, 247-48 (5th Cir.1992). In N imon, the petitioners claimed that

the ir due process rights were violated in a deposit insurance

dispute because the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") failed to

prescribe formal procedural rules; instead, the petitioner's claim

was handled through informal procedures. S ee Nimon, 975 F.2d at

247. Although we acknowledged that RTC's decision "affects a

property right of the [plaintiffs], implicating the [D]ue [P]rocess

[C]lause of the U.S. Constitution," id., we found no due process

violation, even though we explicitly noted that the "RTC has no

regulations formalizing insurance dispute resolution," and that

"FIRREA does not require FDIC to prescribe re gulations governing

the resolution of these disputes." Id. at 247-48.

In Nimon, however, we did examine whether the RTC's informal

procedures satisfied the demands of due process. See id. at 247.

As we noted:7 DeCell's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Coit

Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance

Corp. ("FSLIC"), 489 U.S. 561, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 103 L.Ed.2d 602

(1989), does not further its argument. In Coit, the Supreme

Court held that Coit was not required to exhaust the

administrative procedures of the FSLIC because they were

"inadequate." See id. at 587, 109 S.Ct. at 1374-75. The Court

noted that there was a formal regulation allowing the FSLIC to

retain a claim for further review for an indefinite period of

time. See id. at 586, 109 S.Ct. at 1375 ("Under the current

regulations, ... no time limit is established for FSLIC's

consideration of those claims retained for further review."). In

addition, the Court observed that Coit's claim had been under

consideration for thirteen months, yet the FSLIC had still not

16 We make three inquiries in determining the requirements of due

process in a particular case: (1) the private interests that

will be affected by the agen cy's action; (2) the risk of

erroneous deprivation due to the procedures used and the

reduction of that risk through additional or sub stitute

procedures; and (3) the interests of the government,

including the burden that would be imposed by additional or

substitute procedures.

Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893,

903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)) (emphasis added). In the present case,

DeCell has not submitted a formal deposit insurance claim to FDICCorporate; thus, the administrative procedures, formal or

informal, have not been invoked. We cannot entertain a due process

claim in this particular case because we hav e no informal

procedures to evalu ate under the M athews framework; simply put,

DeCell's due process claim is premature because no claim has been

submitted for FDIC-Corporate's determination. C f. Metro County

Title, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 13 F.3d 883, 887-88 (5th

Cir.1994) (finding no due process v iolation after evaluating the

FDIC's informal handling of a claim under the Mathews framework).

With respect to both formal and informal procedures in this case,

we cannot find a violation of DeCell's due process rights. 7made a determination. See id.

In Coit, however, these facts led the Supreme Court to

waive the exhaustion requirement; a due process violation

was neither mentioned nor addressed by the Court. Moreover,

unlike the FSLIC regulation that was facially inadequate in

Coit, FDIC-Corporate has no formal regulations regarding the

time periods for consideration of claims. Similarly, in

contrast to Coit's submission of its claim to the FSLIC,

DeCell has not yet submitted its claim to FDIC-Corporate;

thus, we cannot evaluate whether the informal procedures

used by FDIC-Corporate are "inadequate." Finally, we have

previously affirmed the deposit insurance exhaustion

requirement, see Aztec General Agency v. Federal Deposit

Ins. Corp., No. 93-1424, slip op. at 6-7 (5th Cir. Feb. 7,

1994) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion), and even if we

were to waive it, § 1821(f) does not provide for review in

the district courts.

17

E. "Informal" Proof of Claim

Even though DeCell admits in its brief that it "did not file

any proof of claim with FDIC at any time," DeCell argues that its

suit against Guaranty sufficed as an informal proof of claim to

invoke FDIC-Corporate's administrative procedures. For a number of

reasons, we find this argument unpersuasive.

First, as mentioned, only FDIC-Receiver initially substituted

for Guaranty, and at that time, DeCell's petition did not make a

deposit insurance claim. Thus, DeCell's lawsuit against Guaranty

failed t o provide notice that the § 1821(f) deposit insurance

procedures we re applicable. Second, even if the lawsuit did

provide notice of a deposit insu rance claim, only FDIC-Receiver

would have had that notice. FDIC-Corporate, the entity responsible

for handling the deposit insurance claims, was not joined in the

lawsuit until a later time. Finally, even if we assume (without

deciding) that an "informal proof of claim" is legitimate, the18

district court would still not have jurisdiction; first, because

FDIC-Corporate has yet to make a "final determination," and second,

because § 1821(f)(4) provides for review only in the circuit courts

of appeal. Based on this analysis, the "informal proof of claim"

argument is not helpful to DeCell.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

dismissing DeCell's claims against FDIC-Receiver and FDIC-Corporate

for lack of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.