1

Filed 1/6/21 P. v. Spea r CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. BILLY SPEAR, Defendant and Appellant. A158302
(Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR952216)

Billy Spear was committed to the Department of State Hospitals for an indefinite term after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). 1 On appeal, he contends that his commitment cannot stand because there was
insufficient evidence that h is diagnosed mental disorder predisposes him to
commit sexually violent crimes. We affirm.
I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Spear has schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which is “a combination of a mood disorder with psychosis.” In particular, he

1 Welfare and Institutions Code, section 6600 et sequitur. All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.2

“experiences mania

. . . mixed with auditory or visual hallucinations and delusion.” He began showing symptoms of the disorder in the early 1990’s,
when he was in his twenties.
The “sexually violent offense” qualifying Spear as an SVP occurred in Sonoma County in 2010

. Spear followed a female stranger on the street and, when she stopped at a crosswalk , he “smiled at her and s aid ‘pussy.’ ” He also called her “Daphne,” an “apparent reference to a female character in the Scooby Doo cartoon.” She tried to walk away from him, but he “grabbed” her , pushed her against a fence, and “was fondling and groping her” as she
resisted. A t one point, he “pushed on her vagina and slightly inserted his finger in her vagina” through her clothes. As a result of this incident, Spea r was convicted of genital penetration
under Penal Code section 289, subdivision (a)(1), and sentenced to three years in prison. After serving this term, he was found to be a mentally disordered offender and returned to a state hospital for treatment. He was paroled in 2014 but failed to regi ster as a sex offender, and he quickly returned to prison.
A few months after Spear was again paroled , in mid

- 2016, a woman was riding a bus in Lake County when Spear boarded and “kept trying to talk to [her]” as she ignored him. Spear then sat by her and “lunge[d] at [ her ] and tried to kiss [her]” but did not actually touch her. As a result of this incident,
he was convicted of false imprisonment under Pen al Code section 236 and sentenced to four years in prison

. In November 2018 , shortly before Spear was due to be paroled, the People filed a petition seeking Spear’s indefinite commitment to a state hospital as an SVP. The trial court found probable cau se existed for the
commitment , and a jury trial was held in August 2019. At trial, evidence was3

presented about several of Spear’s other crimes in addition to the 2010 genital penetration and the 2016 false imprisonment

. In 1994, while “in a psychotic st ate,” Spear stabbed his mother and her dog. He was charged with attempted murder but found not guilty by reason of insanity , and he spent the next few years in a state hospital receiving

treatment. Over a decade later, in 2007, Spear approached a woman who was in her car near an ATM in Butte County. After asking her whether she had a boyfriend and telling her she was pretty, Spear forced his way into the car and “[got] on top of her,” putting his hand on her thigh. Spear was charged with carjacking , b ut he was ultimately convicted only of misdemeanor battery
under Penal Code section 242.
In 200 9 , Spear beat up a homeless woman in San Francisco. He told the police that “he thought that maybe it was an undercover police officer and it was really a male.” Spear was convicted of battery with serious bodily injury under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d).
In addition, t hree female correctional officers testified about incidents that occurred shortly after Spear was jailed in early 2010 for the genital penetration

. First, w hen Spear was being booked, he motioned for one of the
officer s to approach, “pulled out his penis[,] and started masturbating” while

say ing “[t]hat he was going to get at [her] or get [her].” He was also “making these very disturbing facial gestures like sticking his tongue out and wagging his tongue back and forth.” On another occasion, w hen the same officer opened a food port to deliver breakfast, Spear “placed his penis on the food port and then continue[d] to masturbate” and say “he was going to get [her]
and

. . . that [she] like[d] it, that [she] want[ed] it.”4

Second, a nother office r testified that when she opened a food port to deliver dinner, Spear “was standing in the doorway right at the food port masturbating” and “kind of leering at [her].” He did not stop when she
ordered him to do so. Finally , a third officer testif ied tha t on one occasion Spear called her
over to his cell. When she approached, he was masturbating and “thrusting his hips” while “ his eyes look [ed] at [her] and his mouth was doing this thing.” He did not stop when she told him to do so, and he again
masturb ate d and tried to make eye contact with her when she did her rounds
later that night. Spear was charged with indecent exposure as a result of the incidents in jail , but he was found incompetent to stand trial. Four psychologists testified as experts at the SVP trial : Dr s

. Charles
Flinton , Robert Owen, Shoba Sreenivasan, and Christopher North. All four experts agreed that Spear had schizoaffective disorder and posed an above

average risk of sexually reoffending if released

. Drs. Flinton, Owen, and
Sreenivasan opined that Spear’s schizoaffective disorder made him likely to engage in sexually violent behavior , but Dr. North disagreed. Accepting the opinion of the first three experts, t he jury found that Spear wa s an SVP, and the trial court ordered him committed to a state hospital for an inde finit e
term. II. D ISCUSSION
A. General Legal Standards To support a person’s commitment under the SVPA, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is an SVP. (§ 6604.) This requires a jury or court to find that the person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against at least one victim and has a “ diagnosed mental disorder that makes [him or her] a danger to the health and safety of5

others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior” if released from custody. (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1) ; People v.
Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 477 .) A “ ‘[d]iagnosed mental disorder’ includes a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600, subd. (c).)
We review a person’s commitment as an SVP for substantial evidence. ( People v. Poulsom (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 501, 518.) “ ‘Under this standard, [we] “must review the whole record in th e light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence

— that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value

— such that a
reasonable trier of fact could fin d [the person is an SVP] beyond a reasonab le doubt.” ’ ” ( Ibid. )
B. There Was Substantial Evidence that Spear’s Mental Disorder Predisposed Him to Engage in Sexually Violent Behavior.

1. Additional background We begin by discussing in more detail the expert testimony about whether Spear’s schizoaffective disorder predisposed him to engage in sexually violent behavior. The experts generally agreed that the disorder hindered Spear’s ability to manage his behavio r and impulses. This was especially evident because Spear was “unable to control his behavior despite repeatedly experienc ing negative legal and [other] consequences , ” and he acted out even “in a very structured locked setting.” Although the symptoms
of schizoaffective disorder can be managed with medication, Spear admitted, and his record confirmed, that he did not consistently take his medication. Indeed, he was not on medication during any of the crimes described, with the exception of the 2016 false imprisonment . Dr. Owen observed that “this6

is a man who either doesn’t completely respond well to his medications or doesn’t consistently take them and some of these psychotic symptoms appear.” In addition, while schizoaffective disorder “does [not] nec essarily entail a propensity to commit sex crimes,” Dr. Flinton testified that Spear’s disorder “manifests in sexually violent behavior.” The psychologist explained that “ i n this particular case, there’s a clear pattern

. . . [of] hostility towards women. [Spear] has delusions and thoughts about them and inability to control himself. And a script is acted out with making comments to women, ignoring their resistance, and pursuing them despite the consequences and

. . . the

su ffering to the victim.” Similarly, Dr. Owen o pine d that Spear’s “problems fall into two categories[,]

. . . violence or sex.” The psychologist observed that Spear’s most

recent crimes

— the carjacking, the genital penetration, the indecent exposures, and the false imprisonment

— “all had sexual elements. So

. . . his poor self

- control now seems to affect his sexual impulses. And these crimes were very impulsive, and they were sexual, and he was very out of control.”
And Dr. Sreenivasan testified that Spe ar’s disorder “has rendered him psychotic and hypersexual at various times, and under episodes of psychosis, he acts out. And the energy of hypersexuality that the bipolar piece adds, he acts out in a sexually[]assaultive manner towards females.”
Dr. North , in contrast , opined that “if the schizoaffective [disorder] really

. . . predisposed [Spear] to commit sex crimes, we would have much
more evidence of arrests for sex offense s and for sexually[]violent offense s over the 30 years that he suffered wit h [the] disorder than we have.” Although Spear “gets psychotic, and he becomes inappropriate, and he7

becomes aggressive at times with women,” Dr. North believed his behavior “f[e]ll short of what we normally have in

. . . [SVP] cases.”

2. Analysis
S pear claims that there was insufficient evidence that his mental
dis order “predisposes him to commit sexually violent predatory criminal acts, as opposed to random criminal acts of all sorts.” W hile he admits that “it is likely that [he] might commit eith er a sexually[]motivated, or sexually inappropriate, or viol ent act in the future,” h e argues that since “[t]he evidence presented consisted of crimes that were either sexual or violent, but not both,” there was no showing that he was a “sexually violent p redator” within the meaning of section 6600

. To begin with, section 6600 plainly requires that a person have been convicted of only one “sexually violent offense ” to qualify as an SVP. (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) Spear does not contest that the 2010 genital penetration qualified as a sexually violent offense . (See § 6600, subds. (a)(2)(A), (b).) Although “[c]onviction of one or more crimes enumerated in [section 6 600]

. . . shall not be the sole basis for the determination” that a person is an SVP (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3)), this provision does not mean that such a determination requires evidence of more than one qualifying offense, as Spear seems to suggest. Rather, it means merely that a jury may not determine that a person is an SVP solely “based on prior offens es , ” as there must al so be “relevant evidence of a currently diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in t hat it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3).)
Nor can we agree with Spear’s implication that a person must have committed multiple sexually violent offenses in order to be found likely to8

commit such offenses in the future. We will assume that , with the exception
of the 2010 genital penetration, none of his crimes qualified as a “sexually
violent offense” unde r section 6600. But several of them involved both sexual and violent components , and expert testimony specifically linked this
criminal behavior to his mental disorder

. Indeed, there was ample evidence that Spear’s disorder impede d his ability to control his behavior , especially
when , as was often the case, he failed to take his medication. The fact that Spear ’s uncontrolled behavior was simultaneously aggressive and sexual on
several occasions , even if only one of his crimes rose to the level of a “sexu ally violent offense,” provided a sufficient basis to conclude that his mental
disorder predisposed him to commit sexually violent crimes if released

. Finally, we reject Spear’s cursory claim that “the State failed to provide evidence that [he] is any kind of ‘predator,’ sexual or otherwise.”
Section 6600 defines “ predatory” as describing “an act directed toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exist s, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.” (§ 6600, subd. (e).) With the exception of Spear’s attack on his mother, the described
crimes were committed against strangers, makin g them classic “predatory”
offenses.
III. D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.9 _________________________ Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Margulies, J.

_________________________ Sanchez, J.

People v. Spear A158302