IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

WILLIAM McKNIGHT, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-00037-M-BP

 § 

DAVID DUKE, Sheriff, §

Wichita County, Texas, §

 § 

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is comprised of civil rights claims severed from William McKnight’s previous 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. See ECF Nos. 1, 3; see also Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. 

of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n instances in which a petition combines 

claims that should be asserted in habeas with claims that properly may be pursued as an initial 

matter under § 1983, and the claims can be separated, federal courts should do so.”). Because the 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7) was factually incomplete, the Court sent McKnight a 

Questionnaire seeking more information on his legal claims. ECF No. 10; see Watson v. Ault, 525 

F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976) (“The employment of a [] questionnaire is a useful means by which 

the court can develop the factual basis for the prisoner’s complaint.”). Because McKnight has not 

submitted Questionnaire answers despite repeated orders to do so, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that Chief United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn DISMISS this 

action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

District courts may dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or follow court 

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orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). This power flows from the Court’s inherent docket-management 

authority. Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. 

Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. 

Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 880 (5th Cir. 1996). However, dismissals with prejudice for want 

of prosecution are considered “an extreme sanction.” Id. Accordingly, the Court should employ 

such dismissals only where a litigant’s acts or omissions are “the result of purposeful delay or 

contumaciousness and the record reflects that the district court employed lesser sanctions before 

dismissing the action [with prejudice].” Id.

II. ANALYSIS

McKnight did not respond to the Court’s Questionnaire despite its warning that “[f]ailure

to submit answers . . . may result in a recommendation that the case be dismissed for want of 

prosecution.” ECF No. 10 at 2. The Questionnaire was due May 17, 2022. Id. When that date came 

and went, the Court afforded McKnight an additional opportunity to comply and extended the 

deadline to June 7. ECF No. 11 at 2. The Court again warned McKnight “failure to comply by that 

date will result in a recommendation that his case be dismissed without further notice under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Id. Because McKnight has neither submitted Questionnaire 

answers nor filed any pleadings explaining the delay, Chief Judge Lynn should dismiss his case 

for failure to prosecute or obey court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Hickerson v. 

Christian, 283 F. App’x 251, 253 (5th Cir. 2008) (observing that district courts are empowered to 

dismiss actions sua sponte under Rule 41(b) and routinely do). This is precisely the circumstance 

envisaged by the Rule, which flows from the Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. 

Boudwin, 756 F.2d 399, at 401 (citing Link, 370 U.S. 626). Nevertheless, because nothing indicates 

McKnight’s noncompliance stems from “purposeful delay or contumaciousness,” and the Court 

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has not first “employed lesser sanctions,” the Court should dismiss McKnight’s case without 

prejudice. Long, 77 F.3d at 880. 

III. CONCLUSION

McKnight failed to comply with prior court orders despite being warned noncompliance 

could lead to a recommendation that his case be dismissed without further warning. But his 

noncompliance does not appear to stem from purposeful delay or contumaciousness and the Court 

has not employed any lesser sanctions in this case, such as dismissal without prejudice. 

Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge Lynn DISMISS this case 

without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute or comply 

with court orders. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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SIGNED on June 14, 2022. 

____________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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