Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1405-CR-306 | August 20, 2015 Page 1 of 6

OPINION ON REHEARING

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Darren Bedwell 

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jamar Washington,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1405-CR-306

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg, 

Judge

Cause No. 49G02-1203-FA-17626

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1405-CR-306 | August 20, 2015 Page 2 of 6

Opinion on Rehearing

[1] Jamar Washington appealed his conviction for dealing in cocaine as a class A felony. 

In a memorandum decision, this court affirmed his conviction. Washington v. State, 

No. 49A02-1405-CR-306 (Ind. Ct. App. December 23, 2014). The conviction was 

based upon evidence found after Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Luke 

Schmitt initiated a traffic stop of Washington after observing him speeding and 

making an illegal lane change. During the traffic stop and prior to the completion of 

the writing of a ticket for speeding and failure to signal a lane change, a police dog 

alerted to the presence of narcotics. This court held that the dog sniff and Officer 

Schmitt’s actions were not conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond 

the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket. See id. at 10. 

Washington has petitioned for rehearing, which we now grant in order to discuss 

Washington’s arguments based upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).

[2] Washington argues that Officer Schmitt’s inquiry about his prior arrests, attempt to 

retrieve his criminal history, and question of whether there were drugs in the car 

resulted in a measurable delay. He asserts that the delay caused by the unrelated 

questioning of whether there was any cocaine in the car without reasonable suspicion 

was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. He contends that Officer Schmitt 

delayed the traffic stop measurably in order to conduct a drug investigation unrelated 

to the traffic stop and his convictions must be reversed under Rodriguez. The State 

asserts that Rodriguez does not call this court’s decision into doubt and rather 

underscores the correctness of this court’s analysis. 
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[3] In Rodriguez, the Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle 

the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against 

unreasonable seizures.” 135 S. Ct. at 1612. The Court held that “[a] seizure justified 

only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is 

prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing 

a ticket for the violation.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. 

Ct. 834 (2005)). The Court observed that it had “so recognized in Caballes” and 

“adhere[d] to the line drawn in that decision.” Id. 

[4] The facts in Rodriguez reveal that, just after midnight, Police Officer Morgan Struble 

observed a Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the shoulder of a highway for one 

or two seconds and then jerk back onto the road. Id. Officer Struble pulled the 

vehicle over at 12:06 a.m. while his dog was in his patrol car. Id. Officer Struble 

spoke with Rodriguez, the driver of the vehicle, and gathered his license, registration 

and proof of insurance. Id. at 1613. After running a records check on Rodriguez, 

Officer Struble returned to the Mountaineer and asked passenger Scott Pollman for 

his driver’s license and began to question him about where the two men were coming 

from and where they were going. Id. Pollman replied that they had traveled to 

Omaha, Nebraska, to look at a Ford Mustang that was for sale and that they were 

returning to Norfolk, Nebraska. Id. Officer Struble returned again to his patrol car, 

where he completed a records check on Pollman, called for a second officer, and 

began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of the road. 

Id. 
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[5] Officer Struble returned to Rodriguez’s vehicle to issue the written warning. Id. By 

12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Officer Struble had finished explaining the warning to 

Rodriguez and had given the documents obtained from Rodriguez and Pollman back 

to them. Id. Officer Struble later testified that at that point all the reasons for the 

stop were “out of the way.” Id. Officer Struble then asked for permission to walk his 

dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle, and Rodriguez said no. Id. Officer Struble then 

instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front of 

the patrol car to wait for the second officer. Id. Rodriguez complied. Id. At 12:33 

a.m., a deputy sheriff arrived, and Officer Struble then led his dog twice around the 

Mountaineer. Id. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Id. Seven or eight 

minutes had elapsed from the time Officer Struble issued the written warning until 

the dog indicated the presence of drugs. Id. A search of the vehicle revealed a large 

bag of methamphetamine. Id. 

[6] On appeal, the Court addressed the question of whether police routinely may extend 

an otherwise completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct 

a dog sniff. Id. at 1614. The Court held that because addressing the infraction is the 

purpose of the stop, “it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] 

purpose.’” Id. (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S. Ct. 834). The Court held that 

“[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or 

reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. The Court observed that its 

decisions in Caballes and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), heed 

these constraints. Id. at 1614. The Court stated:
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In [Caballes and Arizona], we concluded that the Fourth Amendment 

tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside 

detention. Johnson, 555 U.S., at 327-328, 129 S. Ct. 781 (questioning); 

Caballes, 543 U.S., at 406, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834 (dog sniff). In Caballes, 

however, we cautioned that a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is 

prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” 

of issuing a warning ticket. 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S. Ct. 834. And we 

repeated that admonition in Johnson: The seizure remains lawful only “so 

long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the 

stop.” 555 U.S., at 333, 129 S. Ct. 781. See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 

93, 101, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (because unrelated

inquiries did not “exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,] . . . no 

additional Fourth Amendment justification . . . was required”). An officer, 

in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise 

lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, 

absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 

individual. 

Id. at 1614-1615. The Court held that beyond determining whether to issue a traffic 

ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop 

which typically include checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are 

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration 

and proof of insurance. Id. The Court held that the critical question is whether 

conducting the sniff prolongs or adds time to the stop. Id. at 1616. The Court 

remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic 

infraction investigation. Id. at 1616-1617.

[7] In our initial memorandum decision, this court observed that the Court in Caballes

noted that a “seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket 

to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
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required to complete that mission.” Slip op. at 8 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 

125 S. Ct. at 837). We also stated that “[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated 

to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something 

other than a lawful seizure, so long as the inquiries do not measurably extend the 

stop’s duration.” Id. at 8-9 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 325, 129 S. Ct. at 783). We 

stated that “the question is whether the dog sniff was conducted in a manner that 

prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of 

issuing a ticket.” Id. at 9. We held:

The record reveals that the video recording began thirty to forty seconds 

after the vehicles stopped and the recording shows a time stamp of 4:17:44. 

Officer Schmitt asked Washington a few questions and returned to his 

vehicle less than three minutes after the start of the video. His computer was 

in a dead spot and after four or five minutes of not receiving a response, he 

contacted control. At 4:25:30, dispatch informed Officer Schmitt that 

Washington had a valid driver’s license. Officer Wildauer deployed his dog 

at 4:27:33, less than ten minutes after the beginning of the video and less 

than eleven minutes after the vehicles stopped. At this point, Officer 

Schmitt had not finished completing the electronic ticket. At approximately 

4:28:02, Officer Wildauer’s dog indicated the presence of the odor of 

narcotics. While Officer Schmitt typically hands the traffic ticket to the 

violator, he had to give the ticket to Detective Ingram because Washington 

was arrested for the other offenses. Under the circumstances, we cannot say 

that the dog sniff or Officer Schmitt’s actions were conducted in a manner 

that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the 

mission of issuing a ticket.

Id. at 9-10. We cannot say that our previous memorandum decision conflicts with 

the holding in Rodriguez. Accordingly, we reaffirm our previous decision.

Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.