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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

ROBERT (BOB) ROSS, § 

§ 

 Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, § 

§ 

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00343-Y 

§ 

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL § 

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, JULIE § 

HEDRICK, AND ERIK HARRIS, § 

§ 

 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. § 

UNION DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO PLAINTIFF ROSS’S RESPONSE (DOC 33) 

TO THE UNION DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC.27) 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The Union Defendants have respectfully and repeatedly submitted to the Court what they 

believe to be the well settled legal principles requiring dismissal of all of the claims by Plaintiff 

Ross in this case and in the companion case of Vargas v. APFA et. al., Civil Action No. 4:22-cv00430-Y, under both Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rather than restate all of the settled 

and dispositive legal precedents in this Reply to the Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

by Plaintiff Ross (doc. 33) (“Ross Resp.”), which we have already detailed in our Motion to 

Dismiss (doc. 27), we submit the following to address and dispose of only the most recent 

erroneous legal arguments by Ross.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

As previously noted, Plaintiff Ross’s only assertion of subject matter jurisdiction, Section 

101(a)(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Section 411(a)(5) (Ross Complaint, pg. 1 para. 1; pgs. 3-4 

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para. 9; pg. 18 para. 5), is unavailing and, on this ground, his lawsuit should be denied. To be 

actionable under Section 101(a)(5) the alleged violation must "be (d)iscipline ... done in the 

name of or on behalf of the union as an organizational entity.” Breininger v. Sheet Metal 

Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1987). Here, it is undisputed that the 

arbitration decision at issue was not undertaken by or on behalf of the Defendant Union or its 

officers, but was filed and processed by Union members; the Defendant Union and its officers 

did not initiate and were not parties to the arbitration process, and did not take any position with 

respect to either the merits of the underlying charges or the remedy. (Def. Mem. pgs. 1-3, 5; Ross 

Complaint, pgs. 6-7 para. 18; pg. 11 para. 29; pgs. 12-13 paras. 30, 31, 32 (Union members 

initiated the charges); pgs. 13-16 paras. 33-38 (Union Defendants were not parties to the 

arbitration proceeding). 

As previously noted in the companion Vargas case, the courts have consistently ruled, 

even where, as is undisputedly not the case here, it was the union that filed and processed a 

grievance in its own stead, “(a) local union's action or inaction in the processing of a grievance is 

not ‘discipline’ or punishment within the meaning of the LMRDA.” Hebert v. Gen. Truck 

Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 270, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13406 at 

*12-17 (E.D. La. 2004); Camporeale v. Airborne Freight Corp., 732 F. Supp. 358, 366 

(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd without op., 923 F.2d 842 (2nd Cir. 1990). 

There are only two citations to Section 101(a)(5) to be found anywhere in Ross’s 

Opposition, and they do not appear until pages 13 and 14 of his Response, suggesting at least 

that Ross understands the weakness of that particular provision as his entire source of purported 

subject matter jurisdictional authority. Rather than cite specifically to Section 101(a)(5) as the 

only jurisdictional basis for his attempt to vacate the arbitration decision at issue, Plaintiff 

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misleadingly attempts to substitute LMRDA Section 102 as the jurisdictional basis for his 

Complaint. Ross Resp. 12. Section 102 generally provides jurisdiction for all “of the provisions 

of this title” – LMRDA Sections 101(a) through 101(a)(5) -- and, as noted, Plaintiff’s only claim 

is for alleged violation of Section 101(a)(5). (Ross Complaint, pg. 1 para. 1; pgs. 3-4 para. 9; pg. 

18 para. 58). 

“Title I of the LMRDA is not a catch-all into which might be swept all manner of 

miscellaneous charges without any specificity.” Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F. 2d 1234, 1250 

(2nd Cir. 1970), cert den. 401 US 1007 (1971) (citing Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678, 681 (7th 

Cir. 1964), cert. den, 380 U.S. 963 (1965); Green v. Local 705, Hotel and Restaurant Employees' 

and Bartenders' International Union, AFL-CIO, 220 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Mich. 1963)). 

III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

Given the adverse legal precedents facing his erroneous assertions of LMRDA Section 

101(a)(5), as both his only basis for jurisdiction and his asserted standard of review, Plaintiff 

Ross has now reversed course and made a half-hearted post hoc attempt to introduce a new 

standard: that the arbitration decision at issue should be vacated pursuant to Section 301(a) of the 

LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a). Ross Resp. 19. Ross’s Complaint contains no such assertion 

of Section 301(a) subject matter jurisdiction, of course. Indeed, no citation to Section 301 of the 

LMRA can be found within the four corners of the Ross Complaint. Plaintiff’s belated attempt 

in his Response to establish compliance with LMRA Section 301(a) – without even citing to that 

statute in his Complaint -- is, once again, in error as a matter of law. 

First, Plaintiff confusingly describes Section 301(a) as applicable only to collective 

bargaining agreements involving employers like American Airlines. (Ross Resp. pgs. 17-18). 

Section 301(a), by its terms, also governs “contracts ... between labor organizations,” here the 

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APFA Constitution between the Union and its constituent local bodies (so-called “Bases”). (Def. 

Mem. Pg. 10). Section 301(a) caselaw applies the “highly deferential” standard of judicial 

review to arbitration decisions without exception. (Def. Mem. Pgs. 6-7. 8 fn. 8). 

Then, in his post hoc attempt to argue compliance with the Section 301(a) standard of 

judicial review of arbitration decisions, Plaintiff Ross cites a Section 301(a) decision by the 

Supreme Court, United Paper Workers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), at 38-39, as standing 

for an exception to the deferential Section 301(a) standard of judicial review: where the 

arbitration decision was obtained through “the arbitrator’s dishonesty.” Ross Resp. 19. Ross 

then offers an unspecified citation to “Exh. H. Pl. Original Complaint” as the entire basis for his 

allegation of arbitrator “dishonesty.” (Ross Resp. pg. 19). 

Paragraphs 41 and 42, the only references in Ross’s Complaint (pgs. 16-18) which 

contain any reference to alleged arbitrator “dishonesty,” actually refute his post hoc

allegation. The purported “dishonesty” referenced in the paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Ross 

Complaint refers to evidentiary rulings by the Arbitrator during the hearing, rulings that Ross 

apparently disagreed with. (Ross Complaint, pgs. 13-16 paras. 33-38). 

Evidentiary rulings by an arbitrator, as well as all other procedural issues arising in 

arbitration, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator and not the courts. John Wiley & 

Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 378 U.S. 543, 557 (1964); Columbian Carbon Co. v. Operating 

Engineers, 360 F. 2d 1018, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1966). Ross’s ninth inning attempt to re-invent a 

basis for judicial review of the arbitration decision at issue by complaining about the Arbitrator’s 

evidentiary rulings obviously fails to state a claim for relief as a matter of law. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff Ross has failed to assert a valid basis for subject matter jurisdiction to support 

his suit attempt to vacate the arbitration decision at issue, or the closely related state court claims, 

and his asserted legal basis for attempting to litigate those issues fails to state a claim upon which 

relief should be granted. He has implicitly conceded the absence of jurisdiction for his claims 

against the APFA officers and the absence of jurisdiction for his state law claims, and conceded 

as well his failure to even attempt to exhaust the mandatory internal procedures in the APFA 

Constitution. 

Ross’s claims against the Union Defendants should therefore be dismissed in their 

entirety under Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), leaving the Defendants’ counterclaims, 

including to enforce the arbitration decision at issue, to be determined by the Court. 

Date: August 18, 2022 Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/ Sanford R. Denison

SANFORD R. DENISON 

Tex. Bar No. 05655560 

Baab & Denison, LLP 

6301 Gaston Ave., Suite 550 

Dallas, TX 75214 

Tel.: (214) 637-0750; Fax.: (214) 637-0730 

Email: denison@baabdenison.com 

WILLIAM W. OSBORNE JR.* 

D.C. Bar No. 912089 

Osborne Law Offices P.C. 

5335 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Suite 440 

Washington, D.C. 20015 

Tel.: (202) 243-3200; Fax: (202) 686-2977 

Email: b.osborne@osbornelaw.com 

*Admitted Pro Hac Vice Counsel for Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff 

Association of Professional Flight Attendants, and 

Defendants Julie Hedrick and Erik Harris

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on this 18th day of August 2022 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document was served on the below listed counsel of record for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 

Vargas by a means permitted by Rule 5(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”). 

KERRI PHILLIPS 

HEATHER ABREU 

K.D. Phillips Law Firm, PLLC 

5700 Tennyson Parkway, Suite 300 

Plano, Texas 75024 

Phone: (972) 327-5800 

Fax: (940) 400-0089 

Email: kerri@KDphillipslaw.com 

Email: Heather@KDphillipslaw.com 

/s/ Sanford R. Denison

SANFORD R. DENISON 

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