2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-9-2014

USA v. Ernest Harris

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 13-1442

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Ernest Harris" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 489.

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 13-1442

______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

ERNEST THOMAS HARRIS

a/k/a PICKLE

a/k/a MICHAEL YOUNG

a/k/a MICHAEL FORD,

Appellant

_______________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 2:11-cr-00196-001)

District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer

______________

Argued October 29, 2013

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER and SLOVITER, 

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: May 9, 2014)

Jane M. Dattilo, Esq.(Argued)

Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq.

David J. Hickton, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellee
2

Joseph M. Yablonski, Esq. (Argued)

Yablonski, Costello & Leckie, P.C.

505 Washington Trust Building

30 East Beau Street

Washington, PA 15301

Counsel for Appellant

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

McKEE, Chief Judge

Ernest Thomas Harris appeals the 120-month sentence

that the district court imposed on him following his nolo 

contendere plea for possession of a firearm by a felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Harris claims that his 

sentence was substantively and procedurally flawed. The 

primary contention that he raises, one of first impression for 

this Court, is whether one who pleads nolo contendere to an 

offense is thereby ineligible for a reduction in the offense 

level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 

3E1.1. Although we hold that a nolo contendere plea does not 

automatically preclude a district court from granting such a 

reduction, we will nevertheless, affirm the sentence. 

I.

On May 31, 2011, Harris consumed large amounts of 

drugs and alcohol from about 4:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. in 

celebration of his birthday. He continued his celebration by 

meeting some friends at a bar in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At 

some point after arriving at the bar, Harris brandished a gun 

several times as he walked around the bar, sometimes

swaying from side to side. His actions were recorded by the 

bar’s video cameras. In response, two patrons inside the bar 

called 911 and identified Harris as the man who was 

brandishing the gun. 

When Officer Raymond Perry arrived on the scene, 

Harris was standing outside of the bar with the gun in his 
3

hand. With the help of other officers, Officer Perry arrested 

Harris and seized the gun. Officer Perry testified that Harris 

uttered nonsensical things to the officers as they arrested him. 

Officer Perry concluded that Harris was highly intoxicated, 

and the officers declined to interview him at that time. 

On August 24, 2011, a federal grand jury returned a 

two-count indictment against Harris charging him with 

unlawful possession of ammunition (Count One), and 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 

Two). 

On December 20, 2011, the district court held a change 

of plea hearing to determine whether Harris could plead nolo 

contendere to Count Two.1 During the hearing, Harris 

testified that, on the night in question, he was so intoxicated 

that he did not remember anything after he arrived at the bar. 

Officer Perry testified that Harris uttered strange things to 

him during the arrest and was too intoxicated to be 

interviewed. The district court also watched the video 

recording made by the bar’s camera that night, and Harris 

admitted he was the man in the video with the gun. 

At the end of this hearing, the government agreed that 

Harris probably did not remember the events from that night 

and suggested that the district court accept the nolo 

contendere plea. The district court agreed with the 

government that Harris was too intoxicated to remember the 

details of that night, and concluded that a nolo contendere 

plea was appropriate on Count Two. 

The district court thereafter accepted the plea and 

subsequently sentenced Harris to the statutory maximum of 

120-months imprisonment on Count Two. His base offense 

level for violating § 922(g)(1) was 24; he received a 4-level 

increase for possessing a firearm in connection with another 

felony; and he incurred a 2-level increase for possessing a 

stolen firearm. The district court denied Harris’s requests for 

a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 

 

1 Harris pleaded not guilty to Count One and was 

subsequently acquitted after a three day trial. 
4

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and a downward variance based on his 

mental health history. With a base offense level of 30 and a 

criminal history category of IV, his advisory sentencing 

Guidelines range was 135 to 168 months. The district court 

reduced this sentence to the statutory maximum of 120 

months. 

II.

Harris argues the district court erred in rejecting his 

request for a U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. We review a district court’s determination of 

whether the defendant is entitled to an acceptance of

responsibility under reduction for clear error. United States v. 

Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996). 

Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a defendant who “clearly 

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” is 

entitled to a 2-level reduction to his calculated offense level. 2 

The defendant, however, must show by a preponderance of 

the evidence that s/he is entitled to this reduction. United 

States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, 

in assessing whether a defendant has adequately accepted 

responsibility, the district court “has the obligation to assess 

the totality of the situation.” United States v. Cohen, 171 

F.3d 796, 806 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted) (emphasis added). 

Harris claims he did everything he could to 

demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. According to 

Harris, he had to plead nolo contendere rather than guilty 

 

2 In his brief, Harris mentions that, in addition to the 2-level 

reduction under § 3E1.1(a), he expected a 1-level reduction 

under § 3E1.1(b). To qualify for a § 3E1.1(b) reduction, 

however, the defendant must first qualify for a 2-level 

reduction under § 3E1.1(a). The government must also 

submit a motion “stating that the defendant has assisted 

authorities . . . by timely notifying [them] of his intention to 

enter a plea of guilty thereby permitting the government to 

avoid preparing for trial and . . . allocate their resources 

efficiently.” Since we agree that Harris did not qualify for a § 

3E1.1(a) reduction, and the government did not submit the 

requisite motion, Harris is ineligible for this 1-level reduction. 
5

because he was so “high” from ingesting alcohol and 

controlled substances that he simply could not remember the 

events of the night in question. Nevertheless, he argues that 

he told the truth and immediately accepted responsibility for 

his actions, and should therefore have been afforded the 

benefit of a reduced offense level. He argues that he should 

not be forced to perjure himself by admitting to actions under 

oath that he could not remember in order to receive the 

benefit of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Although we do not disagree, 

Harris’s argument ignores the circumstances surrounding his 

plea. 

The district court found Harris’s statements that he 

could not recall the evening in question credible, and we 

therefore do not doubt that Harris simply could not recall the 

circumstances leading to his arrest to the extent required to 

admit his conduct under oath. We are not unsympathetic to 

Harris’s claim that he should not be lured into perjury in order 

to admit to conduct that he simply cannot remember. 

Nevertheless, on this record, we are not prepared to say that 

the district court committed clear error in concluding that 

Harris was not sufficiently remorseful to receive the benefit 

of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 

The district court was in a unique position to assess his 

sincerity, and “we are especially deferential to [its] 

assessment of whether the defendant accepted responsibility.” 

United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003); 

see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5. Here, the district court was 

able to carefully evaluate Harris’s demeanor prior to 

imposing this sentence. During Harris’s change of plea 

hearing, the district court observed Harris’s demeanor as the 

court viewed the surveillance video from the bar. The district 

court could also observe Harris as the video played in court. 

Even though Harris did not remember his actions in the bar, 

he saw what he did. Although we certainly do not expect him 

to admit to something he did not remember just so that he 

could “game the system” into giving him a reduction under 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Harris’s claim of clear error ignores the 

fact that the district court could draw certain conclusions from 

Harris’s reaction to the surveillance video. The court 

concluded that, even though he could not then remember his 

actions in the bar, his demeanor when confronted with the 
6

video suggested an absence of remorse for what he saw. 

Even if his conduct did not endanger anyone in the bar – a 

rather dubious proposition that we will accept for purposes of 

argument – he clearly placed the people in the bar in fear of

imminent harm. 

We are simply not prepared to say that it was clearly 

erroneous for the district court to conclude that Harris’s 

reaction to that video was inconsistent with an expression of 

remorse for the conduct depicted. Despite Harris’s 

arguments to the contrary, this situation is simply not the 

same as penalizing him for his inability to recall his conduct 

that night, and we cannot agree that he received a greater 

sentence because he refused to perjure himself and admit to 

conduct he did not remember. The district court closely and 

carefully assessed the totality of the situation, and there is no 

clear error. 

III.

Harris also argues that the district court erred by 

applying U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) to 

his sentence. We “review factual findings relevant to the 

[Sentencing] Guidelines for clear error.” United States v. 

Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). A district court’s 

‘“finding is clearly erroneous when . . . the reviewing body on 

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States 

v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Concrete 

Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust 

for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)). 

A.

Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a defendant incurs a 

4-level enhancement if the district court finds that he “[u]sed 

or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with 

another felony offense.” In making this determination, the 

district court applies a preponderance of the evidence 

standard. United States v. West, 643 F.3d 102, 104-05 (3d 

Cir. 2011). 

Here, the district court found by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Harris committed simple assault in violation 

of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(3) by placing patrons in 
7

the bar in fear of imminent bodily injury with his actions. 

Harris argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish 

that he committed simple assault. Specifically, Harris 

contends that the video recordings demonstrated that he only 

possessed and brandished the firearm. He claims that is not 

sufficient to constitute simple assault under Pennsylvania law. 

The district court noted that although the surveillance 

recording did not have audio, the menacing nature of Harris’s 

actions was established by observing the video. Moreover, 

the district court listened to recordings of the 911 calls placed 

that night from the bar. Those recordings included one caller 

affirming that Harris was threatening people in the bar. The 

district court found that this was sufficient to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Harris’s actions that night 

placed patrons in the bar in fear of imminent bodily injury. 

Thus, we are not left with a “definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been committed.” Ali, 508 F.3d at 143. 

B.

Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), a defendant incurs a 

2-level enhancement if the district court finds that the 

defendant possessed a stolen firearm. In making this 

determination, the district court again applies a 

preponderance of the evidence standard. See Grier, 568 F.3d 

at 567. 

Harris claims that the government failed to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the firearm in question 

was stolen. He claims that the firearm owner, who passed 

away before Harris’s sentencing hearing, would not have 

been a credible witness had he been able to testify at Harris’s 

sentencing. According to Harris, the firearm owner’s 

purported lack of credibility establishes that the government 

could not prove the firearm was stolen, and therefore the 

district court clearly erred in so finding. 

Despite the firearm owner’s possible credibility issues, 

the district court determined that sufficient evidence was 

present to demonstrate the firearm was stolen. The district 

court carefully examined two reports from the Department of 

Justice that indicated that the firearm was stolen. The district 

court also pointed out that Harris had not presented any 
8

evidence suggesting he had a lawful right to the firearm. The 

district court therefore concluded that the government had 

satisfied its burden. We cannot conclude that the district court 

clearly erred in applying this enhancement.

IV.

Nor did the district court commit procedural or 

substantive error by denying Harris’s request for a downward 

variance based on his mental-health. On review of a district 

court’s sentencing decision, “[w]e must first ensure that the 

district court committed no significant procedural error in 

arriving at its decision.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 

217 (3d Cir. 2008). This review is for abuse of discretion. Id. 

If the district court has committed no substantial procedural 

error, “we then review the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 218. 

Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or 

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United 

States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 

Here, although not explicitly alleged by Harris, the 

only procedural error he could attempt to argue is that the 

court did not properly consider all of the factors contained in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although we do not suggest the district 

court did fail to adequately consider § 3553(a), Harris seems 

to argue that the court failed to adequately consider the

“history and characteristics of the defendant” under § 

3553(a)(1) by failing to sufficiently consider his mental 

health history and background. 

Harris asserted that his alcohol and drug problems 

were a significant part of his mental health issues. The 

district court correctly found that substance abuse problems, 

without more, do not necessarily justify a downward variance 

under the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. The district court 

also considered, but rejected, a downward variance based on 

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3. The court concluded that Harris’s case 
9

was not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a departure 

based on this provision. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3. Accordingly, 

the district court committed no procedural error. 

Harris’s sentence was also substantively reasonable. 

Substantive review of a district court’s sentence “requires us 

not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the 

circumstances.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. Due to the district 

court’s unique position as the sentencing court, “[w]e may not 

reverse [it] simply because we would have imposed a 

different sentence.” Wise, 515 F.3d at 218. Indeed, we “will 

affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 

imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 

the reasons the district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 

568. Here, in imposing the statutory maximum sentence on 

Harris, the district court adequately considered all of the § 

3553(a) factors. Accordingly, there is no reason to conclude 

that the sentence was unreasonable. See id. (“[A]bsent any 

significant procedural error, we must give ‘due deference to 

the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on 

a whole,’ justify the sentence.” (citation omitted)). 

For these reasons, we will affirm the district court’s 

sentence.