NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL MOI, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CHIHULY STUDIO, INC., a Washington 

corporation; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35852

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00853-RSL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2021

San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and CORKER,** District Judge.

Michael Moi appeals a summary judgment in favor of Chihuly Studio, Inc., 

Dale Chihuly (“Chihuly”), and Leslie Chihuly (collectively, “the Chihuly 

Defendants”) on his claims under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Clifton L. Corker, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 1 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A, and Washington 

common law. Moi also challenges a protective order and the district court’s award 

of attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Feldman 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 2003). We review a district court’s 

grant of a protective order and award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. 

Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1992); Shame On 

You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 893 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

I.

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Moi’s claim 

under the Copyright Act because no genuine issues of material fact exist as to 

whether Moi is a co-author of a “joint work” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101. 

For purposes of the Copyright Act, a “joint work” requires each of the following 

elements: “(1) a copyrightable work, (2) two or more ‘authors,’ and (3) the authors 

must intend their contributions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts 

of a unitary whole.” Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Moi’s failure to identify any particular copyrightable works to which he contributed 

strongly undermines his claim of co-authorship. See Richlin v. Metro-GoldwynMayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2008). Even if Moi could identify 

such contributions, he presented no evidence to establish that he qualifies as a co-
3 

author. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232 (holding that even if an individual 

substantially contributes to a work, they still must be an “author” within the meaning 

of 17 U.S.C. § 101 to obtain co-ownership rights). 

The following factors are considered in determining whether two or more 

individuals qualify as co-authors: (1) control, (2) objective manifestations of shared 

intent, and (3) audience appeal. Id. at 1234. Moi failed to meet two out of the three 

Aalmuhammed factors. As for control, Chihuly controlled everything from the 

artistic design to the decision of whether the finished paintings would be signed, 

marketed, and sold or merely discarded. Moi has, at most, established that “subject 

to [Chihuly’s] authority to accept them, he made very valuable contributions to the 

[paintings]” which is “not enough for co-authorship of a joint work.” Id. at 1235.

There is also no evidence that Chihuly and Moi objectively manifested a 

shared intent to be co-authors. In fact, Moi acknowledges that Chihuly represented 

to the public that he was the sole creator. Moi asserts that Chihuly promised to take 

care of him, which does not rise to the level of expressing intent to recognize Moi as 

a co-author. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Moi, his lack of 

control coupled with Chihuly’s express intent to remain a sole author preclude a 

finding of co-authorship. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary 
4 

judgment on Moi’s Copyright Act claim.1

II.

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Moi’s common 

law promissory estoppel claim because Moi failed to establish the existence of a 

legally enforceable promise. To warrant estoppel under Washington law, a promise 

must be “clear and definite.” Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Wash. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 332 

P.3d 428, 435 (Wash. 2014). The only agreement alleged here is a promise by 

Chihuly to “take care of” Moi in the future. Moi concedes that he and Chihuly never

discussed the amount or the terms of compensation. A statement of future intent to 

“take care of” someone, where no formal commitment is made and the terms are not 

discussed, does not constitute a legally enforceable promise. See Havens v. C & D 

Plastics, Inc., 876 P.2d 435, 442–44 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Elliott Bay Seafoods, 

Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 98 P.3d 491, 495 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, the district 

court properly granted summary judgment on Moi’s promissory estoppel claim.

III.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a protective order 

precluding disclosure of confidential settlement agreements. It is well-established 

that the scope of discovery is within the discretion of the district court. United States

1

 Moi’s claims under VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, are derivative of his 

Copyright Act claims. Therefore, we also affirm the dismissal of those claims. 
5 

v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1372 (9th Cir. 1986). This includes the district court’s 

ability “to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of 

protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). Rule 

26 authorizes the district court to “forbid[] the disclosure or discovery” of matters or 

“limit[] the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(c)(1)(A) & (D). Additionally, Rule 26 expressly limits discovery to “any 

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional 

to the needs of the case....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). However, 

“[i]nformation...need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. 

The district court found the agreements to be irrelevant to any party’s claim 

or defense. Moi argues on appeal that the settlement agreements are relevant to 

explore the bias or prejudice of certain witnesses. However, because Moi failed to 

raise this argument before the district court, we decline to consider it. See Smith v. 

Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general rule, we will not consider 

arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”). We therefore decline to 

disturb the protective order. Regardless, Moi has not shown error in the district 

court’s relevancy determination.

IV.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $1,646,659.68 in 

attorney’s fees to the Chihuly Defendants. The Copyright Act gives district courts
6 

discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party. 17 

U.S.C. § 505. District courts consider the following factors: “(1) the degree of 

success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) the objective 

unreasonableness of the losing party's factual and legal arguments; and (5) the need, 

in particular circumstances, to advance considerations of compensation and 

deterrence.” Love v. Assoc’d Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 614 (9th Cir. 2010). 

These factors “are not exclusive and need not all be met.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 

94 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1996).

The district court properly considered the aforementioned factors and found 

that they weighed strongly in favor of an award of fees. Specifically, it considered 

Chihuly’s complete success on the merits, the “paucity of supporting evidence” for 

Moi’s claims, Moi’s bad faith in the conduct of litigation, and the need for deterrence 

of baseless copyright claims. The court also considered the parties’ respective 

financial positions. Although the award is substantial, it was not “based on an 

inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Schwarz v. 

Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 73 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 1995). And, because 

Moi failed to challenge the reasonableness of either the hourly rates or the hours 

billed before the district court, he has again waived any such argument on appeal. 

See Smith, 194 F.3d at 1052.

AFFIRMED.