IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

GARRETT R., §

PLAINTIFF, §

 §

V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-829-D-BK

 §

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL §

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, §

 §

DEFENDANT. §

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, the parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment are now before the Court. For the reasons detailed here, Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment, Doc. 14, should be GRANTED IN PART, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgement, Doc. 19, should be DENIED IN PART, the decision of the Commissioner 

should be REVERSED, and this case should be REMANDED for further administrative 

proceedings.

 I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner denying his

application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed his application on November 27, 2019, 

alleging he suffers from diabetes, depression, insomnia, gastroparesis, and a bulging disc, and is 

thus disabled. Doc. 11-1 at 35, 105-106. He initially alleged a disability beginning January 1, 

2016, but later amended his onset date to January 1, 2019. Doc. 11 at 35, 105, 249. Plaintiff’s 

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application was denied at all administrative levels, and he now appeals to this Court pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff was 28 years old on his amended onset date of January 1, 2019. Doc. 11-1 at 48. 

He has a high school education and past relevant work as a lube servicer and receiving clerk. 

Doc. 11-1 at 48. In terms of his relevant medical history, Plaintiff was treated on an ongoing 

basis for Type 1 diabetes, lumbar degenerative disc disease that necessitated lumbar surgery in 

2015, chronic pain, depression, anxiety, and polysubstance abuse. Doc. 11-1 at 952-959; 965-

967; 1172-1174; 1177-1180; 1181-1185. For purposes of his DIB application, Plaintiff’s date 

last insured (“DLI”) was September 30, 2019. 

C. The ALJ’s Findings

On October 14, 2021, the ALJ conducted a hearing during which Plaintiff and a 

vocational expert testified. On October 29, 2021, the ALJ issued his decision denying Plaintiff’s 

DIB and SSI applications. He found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since his amended alleged onset date of January 1, 2019. Doc. 11-1 at 37. Next, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of diabetes, lumbar degenerative disc disease, major 

depressive disorder, anxiety, and polysubstance abuse. Doc. 11-1 at 37. The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled a listing for presumptive disability under the Code of Federal Regulations. Doc. 11-1 at 

38. The ALJ next found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform 

light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. [§§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)[,] except standing and 

walking are limited to 4 hours out of an 8-hour workday.” Doc. 11-1 at 40. The ALJ also found 

that Plaintiff could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs, but 

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could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he must avoid all exposure to hazards, including no 

operation of moving machinery and unprotected heights; and he could not perform commercial 

driving. Doc. 11-1 at 40. From a mental standpoint, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform 

simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and engage in superficial interaction with coworkers and the 

public. Doc. 11-1 at 40. Next, relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found 

that although Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the jobs of 

addresser and assembler. Doc. 11-1 at 49-50. The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. Doc. 11-1 at 50. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision on February 17, 2022. Doc. 11-1 at 23. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review 

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 11-1 at 29.

 II. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is disabled under the Act if, inter alia, he is unable “to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment” which has lasted or can be expected to last for at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner uses the following sequential five-step inquiry to determine 

whether a claimant is disabled: (1) an individual who is working and engaging in substantial 

gainful activity is not disabled; (2) an individual who does not have a “severe impairment” is not 

disabled; (3) an individual who “meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1” of the 

regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors; (4) if an 

individual is capable of performing her past work, a finding of “not disabled” must be made; and 

(5) if an individual’s impairment precludes him from performing her past work, other factors 

including age, education, past work experience, and RFC must be considered to determine if any 

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other work can be performed. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) 

(summarizing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f), 416.920(b-(f)).

Under the first four steps of the analysis, the burden of proof lies with the claimant. 

Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). The analysis terminates if the 

Commissioner determines at any point during the first four steps that the claimant is disabled or 

is not disabled. Id. If the claimant satisfies her burden under the first four steps, the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that there is other gainful employment available 

in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 

(5th Cir. 1994). This burden may be satisfied either by reference to the Grid Rules, vocational 

expert testimony, or other similar evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 

1987). 

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to whether the 

Commissioner’s position is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner 

applied proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236; 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 405(g), 1383(C)(3). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, 

and is such relevant and sufficient evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. Under this standard, the reviewing court does not 

reweigh the evidence, retry the issues, or substitute its own judgment, but rather, scrutinizes the 

record to determine whether substantial evidence is present. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236.

In considering the parties’ summary judgment arguments, the Court has relied upon their 

assessment of and citation to the evidence of record. The Court is not under any obligation to 

probe the record to find supporting evidence for one side or the other. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (the 

movant and opponent of a motion for summary judgment must support their positions by “citing 

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to particular parts of materials in the record”); Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 

156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006) (the court has no obligation under Rule 56 “to sift through the record in 

search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment”) (quotation omitted).

 III. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff challenges the Commissioner’s decision on the grounds that the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment is not supported by any medical opinion of record and, therefore, is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Doc. 15 at 10-15 (citing Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1995)). He

contends that the ALJ rejected the medical opinions rendered by the State Agency Medical 

Consultants (“SAMCs”) and one of Plaintiff’s physicians, Dr. Fay Simon, and relied on his own 

unsupported opinion and interpretation of the raw medical data to assess Plaintiff’s RFC.

The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff’s argument ignores the legal requirement that 

the RFC determination is the ALJ’s responsibility. Doc. 21 at 24-25. Moreover, the 

Commissioner maintains that “substantial evidence—in the form of diagnostic imaging studies, 

objective examination findings from treating and consulting physicians, prior administrative 

medical findings, and Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities and functional abilities—supports the 

ALJ’s RFC finding.” Doc. 21 at 34. In reply, Plaintiff points to “factually inaccurate” and 

“mistaken” assertions in the Commissioner’s brief, including the Commissioner’s assertion that 

the ALJ relied on the prior administrative medical findings of the SAMCs in assessing his RFC. 

Doc. 23 at 8. 

The RFC is an assessment, based upon all relevant evidence, of a claimant’s ability to 

work, despite his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Stated differently, it is the most a 

claimant can do, notwithstanding his physical and mental limitations. Id. When making the 

assessment, the ALJ should consider medical assessments, descriptions by physicians, 

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descriptions by the claimant, and any other evidence that shows any limitations on the claimant’s 

ability to work. Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1988). The RFC 

determination falls solely to the ALJ, who is responsible for resolving any conflicts in the 

evidence. See Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 

In Ripley, the ALJ ruled that a claimant could perform sedentary work even though there 

was no medical evidence or testimony supporting that conclusion. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. The 

appellate court noted that while the claimant’s record contained a vast amount of evidence 

establishing he had a back problem, it did not clearly establish what effect the condition had on 

his ability to work. Id. Thus, the court remanded the case with instructions for the ALJ to obtain 

a report from a treating physician regarding the effects of the claimant’s back condition on his 

ability to work. Id. at 557-58. The Ripley panel explained that “[t]he absence of such a 

statement . . . does not, in itself, make the record incomplete.” Id. at 557. The panel held that 

reversal in such cases is only appropriate if the claimant shows that he was prejudiced. Id.

Here, the Court first addresses the reports of the SAMCs. At the initial level in November 

2020, Jeanine Kwum, M.D., found Plaintiff’s physical impairments non-severe because there 

was “[insufficient evidence] prior to DLI in the past, non-severe.” Doc. 11-1 at 99. Don 

Johnson, Ph.D., the state agency psychologist, determined Plaintiff’s mental health disorder was 

“non-severe” and imposed no limitations on understanding, remembering or applying 

information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or adapting 

and managing oneself, because there was “[insufficient evidence] prior to DLI in the past, nonsevere.” Doc. 11-1 at 100-101. At the reconsideration level in January 2021, George Carrion, 

M.D., concurred with Dr. Kwum that there was “[insufficient evidence] prior to DLI in the past.”

Doc. 11-1 at 130. Michael Dennis, Ph.D. concurred with Dr. Johnson, noting there was 

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“insuff[icient] [evidence] to assess at DLI.” Doc. 11-1 at 131. The state agency decisions noted 

“[t]he evidence as a whole, both medical and non-medical, is not sufficient to support a decision 

on the claim.” Doc. 11-1 at 97, 111, 128, 142. No SAMC rendered an RFC. Doc. 11-1 at 102, 

117, 133, 147 (noting “no RFC/MRFC assessments are associated with this claim.”).

As to the SAMCs’ respective reports, the ALJ determined “[t]he Disability Determination 

Service (DDS) opinions . . . are not persuasive.” Doc. 11-1 at 47. The ALJ found these opinions 

were “not supported by the objective evidence, such as [Plaintiff’s] lumbar spine MRI and 

mental status examination, which noted anxious mood.” Doc. 11-1 at 47. The ALJ noted “the 

opinions . . . are not consistent with the objective evidence of record, which supports my residual 

functional capacity.” Doc. 11-1 at 47.

The only remaining medical opinion that addressed the effects of Plaintiff’s impairments 

on his ability to work was that of Dr. Simon. Doc. 11-1 at 1245-47. Dr. Simon opined that 

Plaintiff could sit for three hours in an eight-hour day, stand/walk one hour in an eight-hour day, 

and occasionally lift ten pounds. Doc. 11-1 at 1245. Dr. Simon further opined that Plaintiff was 

limited to occasional grasping bilaterally, seldom fine manipulation bilaterally, seldom reaching 

with the right, and occasional reaching with the left upper extremity. Dr. Simon opined that 

Plaintiff would need a “20-30 minute[s]” break “every 45 min[utes] – 1 hour.” Doc. 11-1 at 

1246. Dr. Simon also opined that Plaintiff would be absent “[m]ore than three times a month.” 

Doc. 11-1 at 1247. Dr. Simon noted the “earliest date” for these limitations was 2014. Doc. 11-

1 at 1247. 

The ALJ found “[t]he opinion of Fay Simon, M.D., . . . is not persuasive.” Doc. 11-1 at 

47. The ALJ noted Dr. Simon’s “opinion lacks an explanation to support the extreme limitations 

that were opined” and “is not supported by her own examinations.” Doc. 11-1 at 47.

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After rejecting all the medical opinions in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found “that 

the evidence of the claimant’s daily activities along with the objective medical evidence 

discussed above establishes the claimant has a greater sustained capacity than he alleges.” Doc. 

11-1 at 48. The ALJ concluded “[t]he claimant’s testimony in conjunction with the longitudinal 

medical findings, such as the claimant’s mental status and physical examinations, support my 

findings.” Doc. 11-1 at 48. 

Having rejected Dr. Simon’s medical opinion and the SAMCs’ reports, the Court agrees 

with Plaintiff that the ALJ relied on his own interpretation of raw medical data to assess 

Plaintiff’s RFC, including that Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform light work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. [§§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)[,] except standing and walking are limited to 4 hours out 

of an 8-hour workday.” Doc. 11-1 at 40. The problem with the ALJ’s RFC finding is, as 

Plaintiff argues, that the ALJ rejected the only medical opinion addressing or touching on 

Plaintiff’s conditions’ effects on his ability to work and instead relied on progress notes and the 

longitudinal record, which in themselves do not address Plaintiff’s work limitations. And, while 

the ALJ considered evidence of Plaintiff’s daily activities, it is difficult to decipher the 

connection between these activities and the ALJ’s determination about the effect of Plaintiff’s 

impairments on his ability to hold down a full-time job. In sum, the ALJ improperly made an 

RFC finding with no supporting medical opinion that purports to address the effects of Plaintiff’s 

impairments on his ability to perform work-related tasks. See Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 n.27

(“Without reports from qualified medical experts, however, we cannot agree that the evidence 

substantially supports the conclusion that Ripley was not disabled because we are unable to 

determine the effects of Ripley’s condition, no matter how ‘small,’ on his ability to perform 

sedentary work.”).

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Judges of this court have consistently found that an ALJ contravenes Ripley under the 

circumstances presented here. See Raper v. Colvin, 262 F. Supp. 3d 415, 422-23 (N.D. Tex. 

2017) (Godbey, J.) (collecting cases holding that an ALJ is not permitted to reject all relevant 

medical opinions and then independently assess a claimant’s RFC without medical evidence 

addressing the effects of the claimant’s impairments on the claimant’s ability to work); see also 

Oderbert v. Barnhart, 413 F. Supp. 2d 800, 803 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (“Ripley clarifies that an [ALJ] 

cannot determine from raw medical data effects of impairments on claimants’ ability to work.”); 

Tyria R. v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-0109-S-BH, 2020 WL 10050779, at *11 (N.D. Tex. March 6, 

2020) (Ramirez, J.) (finding the ALJ’s mental RFC was not supported by substantial evidence 

where the ALJ made an RFC determination without medical evidence addressing the effects of 

Plaintiff’s impairment on her ability to work), adopted by 2020 WL 1434516 (Mar. 20, 2020).

In support of her argument that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC under the 

facts of this case, the Commissioner relies on a smattering of cases, including that of the Court of 

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Doc. 21 at 26, 33 (citing Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715 

(5th Cir. 2021)). In Webster, a case in which the court found substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s RFC, the appellate court noted that the ALJ found the state agency’s medical consultants’ 

assessments “persuasive” because they were “supported by the evidence and consistent with 

Webster’s other records,” and “the ALJ incorporated these findings into Webster’s RFC.”

Webster, 19 F.4th at 718-19. Here, by contrast, the ALJ rejected the SAMCs’ reports and the 

opinion of Dr. Simon. Thus, the Commissioner’s reliance on Webster to support her argument is 

misplaced. 

The Commissioner also points to decisions of this Court to support her argument that 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC. See, e.g., Doc. 21 at 26, 33 (citing Steven K. v. 

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Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-01655-G-BT, 2022 WL 1056920, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2022)

(Rutherford, J.)), adopted by 3:20-CV-1655-G-BT (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2022), Doc. 21 (sealed). 

In Steven K., the Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC finding and 

subsequent determination that claimant was not disabled, and rejected the claimant’s Ripley

challenge. Unlike here, where the ALJ rejected the SAMCs’ reports and Dr. Simon’s opinion, the 

ALJ in Steven K. partially relied on expert medical opinions to determine the impairment’s 

effects on the claimant’s ability to work, and not solely on her own evaluation of the medical 

record. See Steven K., 2022 WL 1056920, at *12 (noting that the ALJ “determined the stateagency physician’s medical-opinion evidence was ‘partially persuasive’”). Thus, Steven K. also 

does not support the Commissioner’s position. 

The Commissioner’s reliance on a decision of the undersigned to support her argument is 

likewise misplaced. See Doc. 21 at 33 (citing Gina R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:19-

CV-2038-BK, 2021 WL 1209198, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021) (Toliver, J.)). In Gina R., the 

Court rejected a claimant’s Ripley challenge and concluded that substantial evidence supported 

the ALJ’s RFC assessment and subsequent finding that the claimant was not disabled. Gina R., 

2021 WL 1209198, at *4. The Court noted that, contrary to the claimant’s argument, the ALJ 

did not discount the opinion of the consultative examiner, and the ALJ considered the findings of 

the state agency doctors in reaching her RFC findings. Id. Again, in the case sub judice, the 

ALJ discounted Dr. Simon’s opinion and the reports of the SAMCs. Gina R. is, therefore, 

distinguishable. 

Finally, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ . . . properly found that the record as a 

whole required a more restrictive RFC even though he found a SAMC opinion that opined less 

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restrictions was persuasive.” Doc. 21 at 34. The Commissioner’s statement is erroneous. As 

previously noted, the ALJ found the SAMCs’ reports “not persuasive.” Doc. 11-1 at 47.

This Court “is not able to agree that the evidence substantially supports the ALJ’s 

conclusion that [Plaintiff] was not disabled, because there is no medical opinion supporting the 

ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] has the RFC” to perform work at the physical level the ALJ 

defined. Fitzpatrick v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-3202-D, 2016 WL 1258477, at *8 (N.D. Tex. 

March 31, 2016) (Fitzwater, J). The ALJ cites to no opinion by a treating or examining medical 

source that makes any mention of the effect of Plaintiff’s impairments on his ability to work. 

And, the SAMCs made no RFC findings on which the ALJ could have relied. Doc. 11-1 at 102, 

117, 133, 147 (noting “no RFC/MRFC assessments are associated with this claim.”). In fact, the 

state agency decisions noted “[t]he evidence as a whole, both medical and non-medical, is not 

sufficient to support a decision on the claim.” Doc. 11-1 at 97, 111, 128, 142. 

Consequently, the Court concludes that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 

RFC finding with respect to the effects of Plaintiff’s impairments on his ability to work. See

Williams v. Astrue, 355 F. App’x 828, 831-32 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing and remanding where 

the ALJ rejected the opinions of the claimant’s treating physicians and relied on his own medical 

opinions as to the limitations presented by the claimant’s back problems in determining RFC).

Because “[p]rocedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required” and a 

court “will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected,” 

Plaintiff must show he was prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to rely on medical opinion evidence 

in assessing his RFC. See Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). To 

establish prejudice, he must show that the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion as to the 

effects that his impairments had on his ability to work casts doubt on the existence of substantial 

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evidence supporting his disability determination. See McNair v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

537 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Procedural errors in the disability determination 

process are considered prejudicial when they cast doubt onto the existence of substantial 

evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision.”) (citing Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 

1988)).

Here, the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion in determining Plaintiff’s RFC casts 

doubt as to whether substantial evidence exists to support the finding that he is not disabled. See 

Tyria R., 2020 WL 10050779, at *13 (finding prejudice and remanding for further proceedings 

for lack of substantial evidence because of the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion in 

determining the plaintiff’s RFC); Thornhill v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-335-M-BN, 2015 WL 

232844, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2014), adopted by 2015 WL 232844 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 

2015) (finding prejudice and remanding “where the ALJ could have obtained evidence that 

might have changed the result—specifically, a medical source statement”). Had the ALJ 

obtained an updated medical opinion, his determination of Plaintiff’s RFC could, conceivably, 

have included greater limitations. This, in turn, could have altered the ALJ’s findings at step five, 

at which the Commissioner bears the burden to identify gainful employment available in the 

national economy that Plaintiff can perform, and at which the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not 

disabled. Accordingly, the error is not harmless, and remand is required on this issue.1

1 Because remand is required on this issue, the Court does not reach Plaintiff’s remaining claim.

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 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Doc. 14, should be

GRANTED IN PART, Defendant’s motion for summary judgement, Doc. 19, should be 

DENIED IN PART, the decision of the Commissioner should be REVERSED, and this case 

should be REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.

SO RECOMMENDED on July 20, 2023.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific 

written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific 

written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 

1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file 

objections to 14 days). 

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