J-A08041-16

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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HASSIEN SISTRUNK,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1731 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 11, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010256-2012 

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 09, 2016

Hassien Sistrunk (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered May 11, 2015, after he was found guilty of persons not to possess a 

firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying firearms 

on the streets of Philadelphia. We affirm.

The pertinent factual history of this case has been summarized by the 

trial court as follows.

On January 17, 2012, at 9:50AM, Officer [Timothy] 

Murphy and his partner observed [Appellant] driving a Jeep 

Grand Cherokee, with the tag of HFF-9026, in the area of 4200 

Torresdale Avenue, which fits the flash information that was 

dispatched at 8:20AM that morning. The Officer then activated 

his lights and sirens to stop [Appellant], whom [sic] was 

cooperative. Since the flash information involved a gun, the 

Officer secured [Appellant] from the car and searched him. 

Officer Murphy testified that he personally did not search the car. 

Instead, he contacted Detective [Shawn] Dewey from the 

Northeast Detective Division, who told him to secure the vehicle, 

put it on a property receipt, and transport it to McCallister and 
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Whitaker, which is the major crimes investigation auto squad 

where vehicles are searched and fingerprinted. Initially, 

Detective Dewey did not find anything relative to the 

investigation in [Appellant]’s car so he transported the car to the 

auto pound, a locked secured police facility, while [Appellant] 

was in custody. At the auto pound, Officer [John] Prendergast 

and an assistant officer performed a routine inventory search of 

[Appellant]’s car to check and list any kinds [sic] of valuables. 

Officer Prendergast opened the rear door of the Grand Cherokee 

and observed a large pile of clothes and gym equipment. He 

then found a heavy medium-sized green bag underneath the 

piles of clothes. Officer Prendergast unzipped the bag, saw the 

muzzle of a gun, and found an operable silver Smith & Wesson 

.38 [s]pecial revolver from inside the green bag. He notified 

Detective Dewey, who then recovered the gun the next morning 

on January 18, 2012. Counsel[] stipulated that the owner[s] of 

the vehicle [are Appellant] and Rochelle Brown. It was further 

stipulated that [Appellant] did not have a valid license to carry 

firearms. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO) 8/17/2015 at 2-3 (citations omitted). 

Appellant was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes following a 

bench trial on November 19, 2014. On May 11, 2015, Appellant received a 

sentence of five to ten years of incarceration for persons not to possess a 

firearm, a concurrent sentence of two and one-half to five years of 

incarceration for firearms not to be carried without a license, and five years 

of consecutive probation for carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia. 

This timely filed appeal followed.1

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Was not the evidence 

insufficient for conviction on three possessory firearm offenses, insofar as all 

charges required proof that [Appellant] possessed a firearm and the 

 

1 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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evidence was insufficient to show either actual or constructive possession of 

a firearm?” Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We address Appellant’s argument mindful of the following standard of 

review.

[O]ur standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we 

evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict 

winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be 

deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each 

material element of the crime charged and the commission 

thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Lynch, 72 A.3d 706, 707-08 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Commonwealth may 

sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence, and we must 

evaluate the entire trial record and consider all evidence received against the 

defendant. Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 598 (Pa. 2007).

Because Appellant was not found with the firearm on his person, and 

each of the crimes he was convicted of involves possession as a critical 

element for conviction, the Commonwealth was required to establish that 

Appellant had constructive possession of the firearm. Commonwealth v. 

Kirkland, 831 A.2d 607, 611 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct 

to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. 
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Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of 

facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.

We have defined constructive possession as “conscious 

dominion.” We subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as 

“the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise 

that control.” To aid application, we have held that constructive 

possession may be established by the totality of the 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Appellant contends

[he] was driving a car that was jointly owned by himself and 

another person. Concealed in the trunk of that car, under a pile 

of clothes, inside a bag, was a handgun. That gun was so well 

concealed that the first police officer to search the car did not 

find it. The car was impounded by police; the next morning a 

routine inventory search by police revealed the gun in the trunk. 

[Appellant] was never seen touching the gun, or going anywhere 

near it. There is absolutely no evidence of [Appellant] 

interacting in any way with the gun, or even being in any closer 

proximity to it than it being in the trunk of a car he was driving. 

It is undisputed that [Appellant] was not the only person with 

access to the car, as it was jointly owned. There is simply no 

way that the evidence of record here is sufficient to prove that 

[Appellant] constructively possessed the firearm, and therefore, 

the trial court erred in convicting him. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

Considering all of the evidence, the trial court offered the following 

analysis:

The direct and circumstantial evidence, along with all 

reasonable inferences viewed in light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, establishes that [Appellant] constructively 

possessed the firearm. [Appellant] had the power to control the 

gun inside the gym bag and the intent to exercise that control. 

Counsel[] stipulated that [Appellant] was the owner of the Jeep 

Grand Cherokee and [Appellant] himself admitted to the Officer 
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that he was in possession of the car the entire time, 

demonstrating exclusive control. The facts on the record also 

[created the inference] that he was the only person in the car at 

the time of arrest. Not only was [Appellant] the owner and the 

sole occupant of the car, [Appellant’s] occupation as a personal 

trainer at LA Fitness provides circumstantial evidence that the 

green medium sized gym bag, where the gun was later 

recovered, belonged to him. Further, besides [Appellant], no 

other person gained access to the car after the time of his 

arrest. Officer Murphy, who initially stopped [Appellant,] 

testified that he towed the car directly to Detective Dewey, who 

had 29 1⁄2 years of experience as a police officer and 7 years[’] 

experience as a detective, from the Northeast Detectives 

Division. Detective Dewey then testified that after he initially 

overlooked [Appellant’s] huge pile of clothes and gym equipment 

in the rear door of the car, he immediately transported the car to 

the auto pound, which is a gated secured police facility. Hence, 

from the time between the stopping and towing of [Appellant’s] 

car to the time Officer Prendergast discovered the firearm at the 

auto pound, [Appellant’s] car was safely secured by the police 

officers. In addition, circumstantial evidence inferred [sic] that 

[Appellant] attempted to hide the gun in the rear of his car 

inside a green gym bag underneath a large pile of gym 

equipment and clothes, displaying consciousness of guilt.

...[Appellant’s] argument that the officers arrested him and 

searched his gym bag with negative results, then inexplicably 

placed the bag onto the middle of the street, and later thr[ew] it 

back to the backseat of the car is incredible.[2] Rather, the trial 

court finds the Officers’ testimony to be credible accounts of the 

facts. Under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence 

adduced at trial shows that [Appellant] is guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt for the conviction of possessing a firearm, 

carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying [a] firearm in 

the public in Philadelphia.

TCO, 8/17/2015, at 4-6. (citations omitted). 

 

2 At trial, Appellant testified that the officers “went into [Appellant’s] gym 

bag, took everything out in the middle of the street and was looking through 

it outside.” N.T., 11/19/2014, at 47. Appellant testified that after the 

officers didn’t find anything, they put the bag back in the vehicle. Id. 
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The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. The 

Commonwealth showed that Appellant was an owner and the driver of the 

vehicle and from Appellant’s admission, the person in exclusive control of 

the vehicle. The Commonwealth also established that Appellant was a 

personal trainer at a gym, and the firearm was located in a gym bag in the 

rear of the vehicle under a pile of gym equipment and clothing.

Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the trial court, sitting as 

finder of fact, to conclude from the evidence presented, giving credit to the 

officers’ testimony, that Appellant constructively possessed the firearm.3 

“Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that 

possession of the contraband was more likely than not.” Commonwealth 

v. Jackson, 659 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986)). It is well established that “the 

evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the 

fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

 

3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1283 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (“We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that 

of the fact-finder. ... When evaluating the credibility and weight of the 

evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence.”).
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probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” 

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 928 (Pa. Super. 2006).4 

Thus, the evidence was more than sufficient to permit the trial court to 

conclude that Appellant constructively possessed the gun. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s claim fails. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/9/2016

 

4 Appellant’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Juliano, 490 A.2d 891, 894 

(Pa. Super. 1985) is misplaced. In that case, Juliano was one of several 

people present where the contraband was found. Here, Appellant was the 

sole occupant of the vehicle and had exclusive control over its contents.