Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Barbara J. Simmons

Batesville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher G. Wellman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 10, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CR-1673

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Charnette D. 

Garner, Judge

The Honorable Ronnie Huerta, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D35-2103-CM-6761

Opinion by Judge Weissmann

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023 Page 2 of 13

Weissmann, Judge.

[1] Charged with three alcohol-related driving offenses, Christopher Wellman 

repeatedly asked the trial court to continue his case because the State had not 

yet provided the results of a blood test to which Wellman submitted on the 

night of his arrest. After 13 months of waiting, Wellman moved for discharge 

under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). 

[2] The trial court denied Wellman discharge, attributing the 13-month delay to his

“trial strategy” of waiting for the test results rather than forcing the State to 

proceed to trial without them. In so doing, the court effectively faulted

Wellman for having to choose between his right to prepare a defense and his

right to a speedy trial. But it was not Wellman’s action that placed him in that

untenable position. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to 

discharge Wellman under Criminal Rule 4(C).

Facts

[3] Police arrested Wellman for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and in 

compliance with Indiana’s implied consent law, Wellman submitted to a blood 

draw. The next day—March 5, 2021—the State charged Wellman with three 

alcohol-related driving offenses, including operating a vehicle with an “alcohol 

concentration equivalent” of 0.15 grams or more. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b). The 

State promptly sent Wellman’s blood samples to a state laboratory for testing, 
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and pursuant to local court rules, the State was required to provide Wellman 

with the test results. LR49-CR00-107(a)(4).1

[4] Over the next 13 months, the parties engaged in numerous pretrial conferences, 

all while awaiting Wellman’s blood test results and with Wellman consistently 

requesting continuances on that basis. Specifically, at Wellman’s initial hearing 

in April 2021, defense counsel reported that Wellman had not yet received 

discovery or “labs” from the State. Tr. Vol. II, p. 6. At the next three pretrial

conferences, held in May, July, and August, defense counsel repeated that

Wellman was still awaiting a plea offer and “labs.” Id. at 10, 14, 19. During the 

August conference, the trial court confirmed that the State had submitted 

Wellman’s blood samples for testing in March. Id. at 19. Yet Wellman was still 

awaiting a plea offer and “lab results” at the next two pretrial conferences, held 

in September and October. Id. at 22, 25.

[5] Neither party ever requested a trial date. By the December pretrial conference, 

the State had tendered a plea offer, but Wellman’s blood test results were still 

not available. Id. at 28. At the next two pretrial conferences, held in January 

and February of 2022, Wellman repeated his request for “lab results.” Id. at 31, 

33. Finally, on April 5, 2022—396 days after he was charged—Wellman moved 

1 LR49-CR00-107(a) provides, in pertinent part: “The State shall disclose the following material and 

information within its possession or control: . . . (4) Any reports or statements of experts, made in connection 

with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, 

experiments, or comparisons.” 
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for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), asserting that the State failed to bring 

him to trial within one year. The State received the test results exactly one week 

later. 

[6] At the discharge hearing, the trial court put the onus on Wellman for his case 

not being tried in a timely manner, stating, among other things: “I’ve always 

considered lab results as a trial strategy,” id. at 53; “[Defendants] need to hold

[the State’s] feet to the fire,” id. at 62-63; and “You [Wellman] could’ve filed for 

a discovery deadline saying look, Judge, this is taking too long.” Id. at 63.

Ultimately, the court attributed to Wellman the delay caused by the State’s 

failure to produce Wellman’s blood test results, effectively concluding that the

State’s one-year countdown under Criminal Rule 4(C) was paused on the date 

of Wellman’s initial hearing.

2 The trial court denied Wellman’s motion for

discharge, and Wellman filed this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Wellman argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge 

under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), thereby violating his right to a speedy trial. 

When faced with Criminal Rule 4 claims, we review questions of law de novo 

2 At the discharge hearing, the State calculated the one-year period beginning from March 19, 2021—

the date of Wellman’s initial hearing. Tr. Vol. II, p. 44. Criminal Rule 4(C) is triggered by the latter of 

two dates: the date the defendant is arrested or the date charges are filed. The rule is not triggered by the 

defendant’s initial hearing or arraignment. See Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 615 (Ind. 2020). Because 

Wellman was arrested on March 4 and charged on March 5, the State’s Criminal Rule 4(C) clock began 

ticking on March 5, 2021.
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and factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Harper, 135 

N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 

1039-40 (Ind. 2013)). “Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040.

I. Speedy Trial Rights

[8] “The right to a speedy trial is one of this country’s most basic, fundamental 

guarantees—one much older than the nation itself.” Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 

608, 614 (Ind. 2020) (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24, 87 

S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)). “It protects against ‘prolonged detention 

without trial’ as well as unreasonable ‘delay in trial.’” Id. (quoting Klopfer, 386 

U.S. at 224). “To safeguard these protections, the State and the courts—

together, the government—have an obligation to ensure the timely prosecution 

of criminal defendants.” Id. When that obligation goes unfulfilled, Criminal 

Rule 4(C) provides defendants a “path to ensure the speedy administration of 

justice.”

3

Id. at 615.

II. Criminal Rule 4(C)

[9] Criminal Rule 4(C) “places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a 

defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for 

3 A defendant has three sources from which to assert a violation of his right to a speedy trial: (1) the 

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana 

Constitution; and (3) Criminal Rule 4. Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 614 (Ind. 2020). This appeal 

only concerns the latter.
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extensions of that time for various reasons.” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 

1065 (Ind. 2004). The rule specifically states:

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer 

a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than 

one year from the date the criminal charge against such 

defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, 

whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, 

or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient 

time to try him during such period because of congestion of the 

court calendar . . . .

Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C) (emphasis added). “[I]f a delay is caused by the 

defendant’s own motion or action, the one-year time limit is extended 

accordingly.” Cook, 810 N.E.2d at 1066.

[10] There is no dispute that Wellman requested the continuances that pushed his 

case past Criminal Rule 4(C)’s one-year deadline. The State asks to end the 

analysis there, faulting Wellman for the delay even though the continuances 

were based on the State’s failure to produce his blood test results. Wellman 

points to the State’s failure and claims his actions did not cause the delay. 

III. State’s Delay in Providing Discovery

[11] Under Criminal Rule 4(C), a defendant generally is chargeable with a delay 

effected by his own motion for a continuance. State ex rel. O’Donnell v. Cass 

Superior Ct., 468 N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ind. 1984). However, our Supreme Court has 

recognized an exception—which we shall call “the discovery exception”—when 
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the continuance is caused by the State’s delay in providing discovery. As stated 

most recently in Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 2010):

When a trial court grants a defendant’s motion for continuance 

because of the State’s failure to comply with the defendant's 

discovery requests, the resulting delay is not chargeable to the 

defendant.

Id. at 1101 (citing Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ind. 1996); see also 

Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 488 (Ind. 2001); State ex rel. Bramley v.

Tipton Cir. Ct., 835 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind. 2005).

[12] The discovery exception derives from Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1989), in which the two defendants requested a continuance due to the 

State’s failure to procure its out-of-state confidential informant for scheduled 

depositions. Id. at 1272-73. The trial court later denied the defendants’ motion 

for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), and this Court reversed the trial court’s 

ruling on appeal. Id. at 1275-76. In finding the delay not attributable to the 

defendant, this Court reasoned:

To put the defendants in a position whereby they must either go 

to trial unprepared due to the State’s failure to respond to 

discovery requests or be prepared to waive their rights to a speedy 

trial, is to put the defendants in an untenable situation.

Id. at 1275.

[13] This Court has since applied Biggs and the discovery exception in several cases 

in which a defendant requested a continuance due to the State’s failure to 
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provide test results it had not yet received from a state laboratory. See, e.g.,

Martin v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (not attributing to 

defendant delay caused by pendency of State’s blood test results); Marshall v. 

State, 759 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (not attributing to defendant delay 

caused by pendency of State’s DNA test results); see State v. Black, 947 N.E.2d 

503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (deciding case on other grounds but approving of trial 

court’s decision not to attribute to defendant delay caused by pendency of 

State’s chemical analysis of alleged drugs).

IV. Defendant’s Motion for Continuance

[14] Despite an abundance of case law recognizing and applying the discovery 

exception, the State argues that the delay caused by the State’s failure to 

produce Wellman’s blood test results should be attributed to Wellman because 

he requested the continuances that effected the delay. The State directs us to 

two cases in support of its argument: Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1997), and Hillenburg v. State, 777 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[15] In Sturgeon, the parties agreed to continuances because the State had not yet 

received DNA test results from a state laboratory. 683 N.E.2d at 614. Though 

the trial court later found the State had been negligent in requesting those 

results, the court denied the defendant’s motion for discharge under Criminal 

Rule 4(C) because the defendant had agreed to the continuances. Id. at 615. In 

affirming the trial court’s ruling on appeal, this Court stated: “It does not matter 

that the defendant’s act was justifiable or meritorious, since it is not the motive 
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behind defendant’s actions, but the effect of his actions, that determines 

whether the delay is chargeable to him.” Id. at 616 (quoting State v. Moles, 166 

Ind. App. 632, 647, 337 N.E.2d 543, 553 (1975)).

[16] In Hillenburg, the defendant requested continuances due to the State’s failure to 

provide DNA test results it had not yet received from a state laboratory. 777 

N.E.2d at 105. The trial court later denied the defendant’s motion for discharge 

under Criminal Rule 4(C), and this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on 

appeal. Id. In attributing the delay to the defendant, this Court explained: “In 

Sturgeon, the defendant merely acquiesced in the State’s requests for 

continuance. Here, Hillenburg affirmatively sought them of his own initiative.” 

Id. at 104. This Court also reiterated: “[I]t is not the motive behind the 

defendant’s actions, but the effect of his actions, that determines whether the 

delay is attributable to him.” Id. (quoting Sturgeon, 683 N.E.2d at 616).

[17] To the extent Sturgeon and Hillenburg still can be considered good law, we are 

not compelled to follow them in this case.4 Neither Sturgeon nor Hillenburg

addressed this Court’s prior holding in Biggs or the discovery exception in 

general. And the language quoted in Sturgeon and reiterated in Hillenburg derives 

from a long line of Criminal Rule 4 cases in which the subject delay was 

effected by a motion for something other than a continuance. See State v. Grow, 

4

Indiana does not recognize horizontal stare decisis. In re C.F., 911 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

While we respect the decisions of other panels, “each panel of this Court has coequal authority on an issue 

and considers any previous decisions by other panels but is not bound by those decisions.” Id.
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255 Ind. 183, 185, 263 N.E.2d 277, 278 (1970) (attributing to defendant delay 

effected by defendant’s motion for change of judge).

V. State’s Negligence Not Required

[18] Nonetheless, the State seemingly insists that the discovery exception only 

applies when the State is negligent in its failure to comply with discovery. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 13-14. Though some panels of this Court have distinguished

Biggs and its progeny on such grounds, none has relied on this distinction in 

denying discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). See C.L.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 894 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing discovery delay under Indiana Juvenile Code

provisions); Paul v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (analyzing 

discovery delay under Criminal Rule 4(B)).

[19] The State specifically points to Cole v. State, 780 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002), in which this Court observed that the State “diligently complied” with 

the defendant’s discovery requests while certain discovery exception cases 

involved “blatant and well-documented” discovery violations. Id. at 397. But 

this Court ultimately “follow[ed] the reasoning set out in Moles, Sturgeon, and 

Hillenburg” in denying the defendant’s motion for discharge under Criminal 

Rule 4(C). Id. This Court also found that the defendant waived his discharge 

claim by failing to object when his trial was set beyond the one-year deadline. 

Id. n.1. Accordingly, we do not read Cole as requiring negligence by the State

before the discovery exception applies. 
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[20] To the extent the State asks us to adopt a negligence requirement, we decline. A 

defendant should not be forced to either waive the right to a speedy trial or 

proceed to trial unprepared. Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1989). And that “untenable situation” can arise with even the most innocent of

State discovery delays. Id.

VI. Criminal Rule 4(D)

[21] We recognize that state laboratories sometimes face unavoidable backlogs of

evidence to be tested, thereby driving delays that prosecutors cannot control. 

But the State has a relief valve in Criminal Rule 4(D). That rule provides:

If when application is made for discharge of a defendant under 

this rule, the court be satisfied that there is evidence for the state, 

which cannot then be had, that reasonable effort has been made 

to procure the same and there is just ground to believe that such 

evidence can be had within ninety (90) days, the cause may be 

continued, and the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail; and if 

he be not brought to trial by the state within such additional 

ninety (90) days, he shall then be discharged.

Crim. R. 4(D).

[22] In determining whether the State is entitled to a continuance under Criminal 

Rule 4(D), “the trial court must be satisfied that the State made a reasonable 

effort to procure the evidence.” Dilley v. State, 134 N.E.3d 1046, 1049 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2019). “It is well established that Criminal Rule 4 places an affirmative

duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 

1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). And “[a] defendant is 
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under no duty to take an affirmative action to ensure his being brought to trial 

within the time guidelines of the rule.” State ex rel. O’Donnell v. Cass Super. Ct., 

468 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. 1984). Criminal Rule 4(D) keeps the onus where it 

belongs—on the State—while allowing latitude when circumstances beyond the 

prosecutor’s control prevent the State from complying with discovery in time to 

bring a defendant to trial by the Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline.

[23] When Wellman filed his motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), the 

State failed to utilize Criminal Rule 4(D). Had the State used this tool, the trial 

court could have determined whether the State engaged in “reasonable efforts” 

to obtain Wellman’s blood test results. Although the record does not reveal the 

reason behind the 13-month delay in obtaining the blood test results, Wellman’s 

request for discharge finally spurred action from the State. The prosecutor 

emailed a coworker who regularly corresponds with the laboratory, and the 

State had the results back within a week. Tr. Vol. II, p. 60. The trial court noted 

this same pattern “has been going on for years.” Id. at 64. This begs the 

question of whether due diligence by the State could have produced Wellman’s 

results within the timeframe established by Criminal Rule 4(C). 

Conclusion

[24] Because Wellman’s continuances were based on the State’s failure to produce 

his blood test results, the 396-day delay effected by those continuances was not 

attributable to Wellman. In the end, the State failed to bring Wellman to trial 

within the one-year deadline established by Criminal Rule 4(C). We therefore 
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reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the court to 

grant Wellman’s motion for discharge under that rule.

[25] Reversed and remanded.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.