IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DANIEL PASKINS,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee.

§

§ 

§ No. 583, 2014

§

§

§ Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware,

§ in and for Sussex

§ Cr. ID No. 88S01362DI

§

§

Submitted: December 18, 20141

Decided: January 14, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, Justices.

O R D E R

This 14th day of January 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s 

opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below,

2

it appears to 

the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Daniel Paskins, filed this appeal from the Superior 

Court’s September 29, 2014 order summarily dismissing his first motion for 

 

1

The motion to affirm was filed on November 5, 2014, but the record was filed on December 18, 

2014.

2

This Court has not considered the Appendix or the Notice of Appeal with a Superior Court 

caption that Paskins filed after the motion to affirm. Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), no 

response to a motion to affirm is permitted unless requested by the Court. The Court did not 

request a response to the motion to affirm and finds no good cause to permit a response in this 

case.
2

postconviction relief from a January 4, 2013 VOP sentence. The State of Delaware

has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is 

manifest on the face of Paskins’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.3 

We agree and affirm. 

(2) The record reflects that Paskins pled guilty in October 1988 to one 

count of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Burglary in the First 

Degree. The Superior Court sentenced him to a total period of twenty years at 

Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving four and one-half years for 

probation. Paskins did not appeal.

(3) In January 1994, Paskins was convicted by a Superior Court jury of 

four counts of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a 

Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. The Superior Court 

sentenced him to a total period of thirty-three years at Level V incarceration to be 

suspended after serving twenty-five years for probation. On direct appeal, this 

Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

4

(4) In November 2010, Paskins filed a motion for sentence reduction or 

modification, which the State opposed. The Superior Court held a hearing on 

Paskins' motion on December 22, 2010. At the hearing, the Superior Court 

 

3

Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).

4

Paskins v. State, 1995 WL 120665 (Del. Mar 15. 1995).
3

indicated that it would grant Paskins’ motion but stated that the modified 

sentencing order would not be issued until the Superior Court had the opportunity 

to consider all of Paskins’ sentences and account for all of the time he previously 

served on each. On January 19, 2011, the Superior Court issued its modified 

sentencing orders, suspending all of the Level V time remaining on Paskins’

sentences (approximately thirty-one years and six months) for one year at Level IV 

home confinement followed by a total period of eight years and six months at 

Level III probation. The sentencing orders contained zero tolerance illegal drug 

and alcohol conditions.

(5) On July 15, 2012, Paskins was arrested and charged with Driving 

Under the Influence of Alcohol. As a result of this arrest, Paskins was charged 

with violating his probation. After a contested VOP hearing on August 10, 2012, 

the Superior Court found Paskins had violated his probation and sentenced him to a 

total period of thirty-one years at Level V incarceration to be suspended for one 

year at Level IV home confinement followed by a total period of eight years and 

six months at Level III probation. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the

judgment of the Superior Court.5 

(6) On December 20, 2012, administrative warrants were filed for 

Paskins’ VOP. Paskins’ probation officer alleged that Paskins had a positive urine 

 

5

Paskins v. State, 2012 WL 5948969 (Del. Nov. 27, 2012).
4

test for alcohol and admitted to drinking a six-pack of beer in violation of the zero 

tolerance condition for alcohol in his sentencing orders. A VOP hearing was held 

on January 4, 2013.

(7) At the VOP hearing, the public defender informed the Superior Court 

that she gave Paskins a copy of his appeal rights and tried to speak with him, but 

he was unwilling to speak with her. The Superior Court granted Paskins’ request 

to speak on his own behalf. Paskins admitted that he had consumed alcohol, but 

argued that his term of probation violated his constitutional rights because his 1994 

convictions were illegal. The Superior Court found that Paskins had violated his 

probation and sentenced him to thirty-one years at Level V incarceration to be 

suspended after successful completion of the Level V Greentree program for 

decreasing levels of treatment and supervision. Paskins’ appeal was dismissed 

after he failed to pay the Supreme Court filing fee or file a motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis and failed to file a timely response to a notice to show cause.6

(8) On September 16, 2014, Paskins filed a motion for postconviction 

relief. In this motion, Paskins claimed that his VOP counsel was ineffective and 

that the test used to detect alcohol in his system was unreliable. The Superior 

Court summarily dismissed the motion on September 29, 2014. This appeal 

followed. 

 

6

Paskins v. State, 2013 WL 1098258 (Del. Mar. 14, 2013).
5

(9) On appeal, Paskins claims that: (i) he was deprived of due process at 

the VOP hearing because the test used to detect alcohol in his system was 

unreliable; (ii) his VOP counsel was ineffective because she failed to prevent the 

presentation of the unreliable test results and failed to inform Paskins of his appeal 

rights or file a direct appeal; (iii) the Superior Court judge sentenced him with a 

closed mind; and (iv) his sentence exceeded SENTAC guidelines. We review the 

Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and 

questions of law de novo.

7

 The procedural requirements of Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) must be considered before any substantive issues are 

addressed.8 

(10) Paskins’ motion for postconviction relief is untimely under Rule 

61(i)(1).

9

 Paskins was sentenced for his VOP on January 4, 2013, but he did not 

file the motion for postconviction relief until September 16, 2014. To overcome 

the one-year time bar of Rule 61(i)(1),

10 Paskins must plead with particularity that 

 

7 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).

8

Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

9

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (2014) (barring postconviction motion filed more than one year 

after conviction is final or, if it asserts retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized 

after conviction, more than one year after right is first recognized by this Court or United States 

Supreme Court). Paskins filed his motion for postconviction relief after Rule 61 was amended 

effective June 4, 2014, so we apply the provisions of Rule 61 in effect as of June 4, 2014. 

10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing Rule 61(i)(1) does not apply to claim that court lacked 

jurisdiction or that satisfies pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or Rule 61(d)(2)(ii)).
6

there is new evidence creating a strong inference that he is actually innocent11or 

that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 

by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to his 

case and renders his conviction invalid. 12 Paskins’ contention that the alcohol test 

was unreliable and his efforts to downplay his VOP hearing admission to 

consumption of alcohol by claiming he meant non-alcoholic beer do not satisfy 

either standard. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in summarily 

dismissing Paskins’ motion for postconviction relief. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

 

11 Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(d)(2)(i).

12 Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(d)(2)(ii).