* Judge Stewart concurs in the judgment only.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50259

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MOISES ESCARENO SANCHEZ 

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART* and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:

Moises Escareno Sanchez (“Sanchez”) appeals his conviction for possession

of cocaine with the intent to distribute, arguing that the district court erred

when it denied his motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine and refused to

instruct the jury a second time regarding the government’s burden of proof.

Sanchez also appeals his sentence, arguing that it is unreasonable. For the

following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 8, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-50259

2

On May 26, 2004, Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Trooper

Michael Turk (“Turk”) patrolled Interstate Highway 10 (“I-10”) in Gonzales

County, Texas. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Turk, an eight-year veteran of the

DPS, observed a 1972 white pickup truck with Mexican license plates switch

lanes and overtake a commercialtruck. Turk “paced” the pickup truck, meaning

that he followed at the same distance behind the truck to determine its speed.

During that time, Turk manually activated his DPS vehicle’s camera. He

determined that the truck was speeding at 74 miles per hour, in excess of the

posted speed limit.

Turk pulled the truck over for a speeding violation and turned the volume

control on for the videotape recorder. He approached the vehicle and asked the

driver, Sanchez, to exit the truck for safety reasons because it was parked too

close to the highway. He asked Sanchez for his driver’s license and proof of

insurance. Turk noticed that the truck’s wheels, rims, and lug nuts had been

freshly painted, which made him suspicious because, in his experience, drug

smugglers painted wheels of vehicles to mask tampering of the tires and wheel

rims. He also noticed that the tires were oversized for the truck, and he had

encountered drug smugglers who hid drugs in a vehicle’s tires.

Sanchez spoke very little English, and Turk spoke little Spanish, which

hindered the conversation between the two. During their brief exchange

regarding the purpose of Sanchez’s trip to the United States, Sanchez told Turk

that he and his wife, who was sitting in the truck, were making a one-day trip

to Houston, Texas from Monterey, Mexico to shop for spare parts for washing

machines. Sanchez’s wife told Turk the same when asked. After visually

inspecting the outside of the truck and the cab area, Turk noted that the couple

had no bags or luggage of any kind, an odd fact considering that the distance

from Monterey to Houston was approximately 500 miles, the time was already

late afternoon, and yet the couple stated they had no plans to spend the night
No. 06-50259

3

anywhere. Turk also noticed during their conversation that Sanchez’s lips and

facial muscles quivered and that he appeared “overly nervous.”

In light of these circumstances and the fact that Turk knew through

experience that I-10 to Houston was a common drug-trafficking route, he asked

Sanchez if he was transporting any drugs or contraband. When Sanchez denied

transporting drugs, Turk asked if he would consent to a search of the truck.

Sanchez agreed. The time that elapsed between the moment Turk pulled

Sanchez over for the speeding violation and the moment Sanchez consented to

the search was five minutes.

Turk searched the truck, which included looking under the hood of the

truck, thumping the body of the truck to look for compartments, searching the

cab, thumping the tires, and checking the wheel wells. He heard a “solid, tight

sound” when he thumped the tires, and he noticed that the wheels had extra

weights attached to them. His experience told him to suspect the possibility of

contraband hidden in the tires, which would cause the sound that he heard after

thumping the tires and would also cause an imbalance in the wheels when in

motion so that added weights would be necessary to prevent the truck from

shimmying. He asked Sanchez to follow him to a nearby garage so that further

inspection ofthe truck could be conducted. Sanchez agreed. Once the mechanics

removed the tires, they discovered approximately sixty-five pounds of cocaine

located in compartments built into the wheel rims.

Sanchez was charged with one count of possession of cocaine with the

intent to distribute. He moved to suppress the cocaine, but the district court

denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. During closing arguments,

Sanchez’s counsel raised a “blind mule” defense, arguing that Sanchez had

unknowingly transported drugs into the United States. During deliberations,

the jury senttwo notes to the judge, requesting additional information regarding

Sanchez’s ownership and control ofthe truck and tires. The judge instructed the
No. 06-50259

4

jury that the time to submit evidence in the trial had closed. After the delivery

of each note, Sanchez asked the judge to remind the jury of the government’s

burden of proof and ofthe presumption of innocence. Both requests were denied.

The jury convicted Sanchez.

The presentence investigation report by the U.S. probation officer

recommended a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, as calculated by the

Sentencing Guidelines. Sanchez requested a downward departure to 120

months. The judge found that the Guidelines range was fair and reasonable and

sentenced Sanchez to 151 months of incarceration. Sanchez appealed, arguing

that it was error to deny his motion to suppress the cocaine. Sanchez contended

that because Turk did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him after the

initial traffic stop, the cocaine seized was the fruit of an illegal detention.

Sanchez also appealed the denial of his requestto instructthe jury a second time

regarding the burden of proof and challenged the reasonableness of his sentence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To assess whether Turk had reasonable suspicion to detain Sanchez for

approximately five minutes, we review the district court’s factual findings for

clear error and its determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. United States

v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2006). We view the evidence considered

atthe suppression hearing and all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party. Id.; United States v. Munoz, 957 F.2d 171, 173

(5th Cir. 1992). This Court may also consider the evidence presented during

trial in our review of the ruling on the motion to suppress. United States v.

Maldonado, 472 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006). 

We review the instructions to the jury for abuse of discretion. Cooper

Indus., Inc. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 704, 714 (5th Cir. 2002).

Finally, all sentences after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), are
No. 06-50259

5

ultimately reviewed for unreasonableness. UnitedStates v.Smith, 440F.3d 704,

706 (5th Cir. 2006). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion To Suppress the Evidence of Cocaine

A routine traffic stop is a limited seizure closely resembling an

investigative detention and is analyzed within the framework established by the

Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Estrada, 459 F.3d at

630. “Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and an officer’s

initial suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless

there is additional reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts.” Id. at

631. Reasonable suspicion is present “when the detaining officer can point to

specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences

from those facts, reasonably warrant continued detention.” Id. To determine

whether reasonable suspicion has been developed, courts must examine the

totality of the circumstances, including the collective knowledge and experience

levels of the officers involved. Id. at 631–32. “Courts must allow law

enforcement officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information

available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. at 632

(internal quotations omitted).

Sanchez does not contest the validity of the initial traffic stop, nor does he

challenge the voluntariness of his consent to the search of his truck; rather, he

contends that, once the purpose for the initial stop was satisfied, Turk did not

have reasonable suspicion to detain him for an additional five-minute period

between the initial stop and the point at which he consented to the search. The

government argues that at the outset of the valid traffic stop, Turk became

aware of circumstances that gave rise to reasonable suspicion warranting

further detention. We agree.
No. 06-50259

1 Turk stated this fact in his testimony at the trial. Additionally, the videotape of the

traffic stop shows Turk looking directly at the tires as he initially approached the side of the

truck to ask Sanchez to exit the truck and later when Turk questioned Sanchez’s wife

regarding their travel plans.

6

Turk, who had eight years of experience in the field, immediately noticed

that the wheel rims on Sanchez’s truck had been painted after he pulled the

truck over.1In his testimony at the trial, he stated that he knew that drug

traffickers often painttheir wheel rims to hide marks stemming from alterations

they make to tires and rims to conceal contraband. As an experienced officer in

the Houston area, he also understood that I-10 is a common trafficking route for

drugs originating in Mexico. These facts, added to the facts that the tires were

oversized for the vehicle, Sanchez was visibly nervous, and he did not appear to

have any supplies or luggage for a 1000-mile round-trip from Mexico to Houston,

support a finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain

Sanchez while he investigated further. After he answered negatively to the

question of whether or not he was transporting drugs, Sanchez consented to a

search of his vehicle and he later consented to follow the officer to a garage so

that the officer could perform a more detailed search of the truck and the tires.

The Supreme Court has held that the “touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment is reasonableness,” and “[r]easonableness, in turn, is measured in

objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Ohio v.

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Given the

totality ofthe circumstances, we find Turk’s actions to be reasonable. Therefore,

the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence. 

B. The Instructions to the Jury

At the close of the trial, the district court provided oral and written

instructions to the jury regarding the elements of the charge, the presumption

of innocence, and the government’s burden of proof. During deliberations, the

jury sent two notes to the judge, asking him questions of fact about Sanchez’s
No. 06-50259

2 The first question from the jury to the judge read: “We would like to know how long

Mr. Sanchez has owned his truck. We would like to know when the new tires were purchased.

We would like to know where the tires were purchased, USA or Mexico.” The judge responded:

“Dear jury, thank you for these questions. However, I cannot answer any of them because the

case is closed and no further evidence can be presented.” The second note sent from the jury

asked: “We would like to know if the tire in Government’s Exhibit number 3 is from Mr.

Sanchez’s truck?” The judge answered that the evidence did not identify the tire. 

7

truck and tires. The judge refused to answer these questions and told the jury

that the time to provide evidence during the trial had ended and that no further

entry of evidence was permitted.2 The jury did not ask questions of law.

Afterward,the judge refused Sanchez’s requests to instructthe jury again on the

government’s burden of proof.

Sanchez relies on our decision in United States v. Meadows, 598 F.2d 984

(5th Cir. 1979), to argue that the judge was obligated to recharge the jury and,

therefore, he committed reversible error when he failed to do so. We stated then:

“It is well-established that in giving additional instructions to a jury;

particularly in response to inquiries from the jury, a court must be especially

careful not to give an unbalanced charge.” Id. at 990. But in United States v.

Colatriano, 624 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1980), we explained that Meadows does

not support the contention that convictions must be automatically reversed when

a trial court fails to recharge the jury. “Rather, the trial court’s actions must be

evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances, considering the complete

instructions given to the jury.” Id. 

In Meadows,the jury asked for clarification on the elements ofthe charges

against the defendants. 598 F.2d at 989–90. The judge repeated a small portion

of his initial instruction regarding the charge, but failed to reference the

government’s burden of proof or the presumption of innocence. Id. at 989. We

reversed based upon the imbalance of the supplemental instruction. Here, the

judge initially gave thorough, balanced instructions regarding the presumption

of innocence and the government’s burden of proof to the jury both orally and in
No. 06-50259

3 The factors to be considering when imposing a sentence include, in part:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of

the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and

to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). 

8

writing, and he gave no supplemental instruction to the jury to clarify questions

of law. Under these circumstances, the district court’s decision not to recharge

did not result in a prejudicial unbalanced charge. See Colatriano, 624 F.2d at

690. Therefore, we find no reversible error. 

C. The Reasonableness of Sanchez’s Sentence

The Supreme Court has directed us to review Sanchez’s sentence for

“reasonableness,” guided by the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).3

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005). In United States v. Mares,

the first sentencing decision rendered by this Court after Booker, we established

that a presumption of reasonableness exists for sentences falling within the

range advised by the Guidelines. 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

Ifthe sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence

within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness

review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for

a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines. Given the deference due

the sentencing judge’s discretion under [Booker], it will be rare for

a reviewing court to say such a sentence is “unreasonable.”

Id. The Supreme Court recently affirmed this position by holding that courts of

appeals are permitted to adopt a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing

federal sentences within properly calculated Guidelines ranges. See Rita v.

United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007). 
No. 06-50259

9

Sanchez challenges the reasonableness of his sentence, even though it fell

within the recommended Guidelines range. Recognizing that the presumption

of reasonableness for sentences falling with the Guidelines only extends to

appellate courts, see id., Sanchez argues that the judge relied exclusively on the

Guidelines calculation when he determined the sentence and did not consider

other factors listed in § 3553(a). Specifically, Sanchez contends that the judge

did not consider whether “the case at hand falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which

the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply, . . . [whether] the

Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or

. . . [whether] the case warrants a different sentence regardless.” Id.

The judge calculated Sanchez’s sentence using the Guidelines and

determined thatthe recommended sentence fell in the range of 151–188 months.

Sanchez requested a 120-month sentence, noting the fact that he was fifty years

old and that he had no prior criminal history and arguing that such a sentence

would accomplish Congress’s sentencing goal of deterrence. Sanchez was

sentenced to 151 months incarceration, the lowest end of the Guidelines range.

At sentencing, the judge noted the length of the sentence and indicated that he

considered Sanchez’s age in sentencing, but qualified these considerations by

finding the recommended sentence to be “appropriate and reasonable.” The

district court’s statement of reasons also indicated that the objectives of

deterrence, punishment, and incapacitation listed in § 3553(a) were considered

in determining the sentence. 

Sanchez argues that the law requires more evidence of the rationale than

a bare statement of reasons. But “when a trial judge exercises his discretion to

select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to

a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.” Booker, 543

U.S. at 233. Here, the statement of reasons was “brief but legally sufficient.”

Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469. The record is clear that the judge listened to and
No. 06-50259

10

considered the mitigating factors that Sanchez raised and also took into account

Congress’s objectives listed in § 3553(a). The judge simply found that a sentence

within the range recommended by the Guidelines was warranted. “Where a

matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes

clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do

not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.” Id. We do not

find the sentence imposed by the district court to be unreasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.