RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4722-18T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.A.M.R.,

Defendant-Appellant, 

and

R.J.C.M.,

Defendant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF M.A.M., JR.,

and J.A.M.,

Minors.

_____________________________

Submitted February 10, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Natali. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 27, 2020
2

A-4722-18T3

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FG-07-0056-18. 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender,

of counsel; Ruth Ann Harrigan, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Fatime Meka, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief). 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor M.A.M., Jr. (Meredith Alexis 

Pollack, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Danielle 

Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief). 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor J.A.M. (Meredith Alexis Pollack, 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Margo E.K. 

Hirsch, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this Title 30 guardianship case, M.A.M.R. (Michael),

1

the father of 

M.A.M., Jr. (Mark) and J.A.M. (John), appeals from a Family Part order

terminating his parental rights claiming that the Division of Child Protection and 

Permanency (Division) failed to establish clearly and convincingly prongs three 

and four of the statutory best interests of the child test. The Law Guardians and 

1

 We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
3

A-4722-18T3

the Division urge that we uphold the trial court's decision. Mark and John's 

biological mother, R.J.C.M. (Rita), does not appeal the termination of her 

parental rights. We affirm substantially for the sound reasons detailed in Judge 

James R. Paganelli's fifty-six-page written opinion issued at the conclusion of 

the trial.

I.

Michael is the biological father of Mark, born August 2005, and John, 

born October 2007.2 The Division had already provided services to the family 

since 2003 when it learned that Rita left Maureen and Audrey with their maternal 

grandmother without returning, failed to take them to their scheduled medical 

appointments, and reported to the Division that she was homeless. In 2007 and 

2008, the Division also received multiple referrals because of physical injuries 

to Maureen, resulting in Michael's incarceration and a substantiation of abuse

by the Division.

In 2009, the family relocated to Puerto Rico without notifying the 

Division. The Division received a call from the local child protective services 

2

 Michael and Rita had four other children: M.M. (Maureen), born September

2001; A.J.M. (Audrey), born October 2002; J.M. (Jessica), born August 2004; 

and A.M. (Ann), born August 2006. These children are not involved in the 

current appeal, but information as to Michael's care for them is provided for 

context and because it is relevant to the issues under review.
4

A-4722-18T3

agency there when Rita burned Jessica and Mark on their mouths with a hot 

spoon and Michael failed to take any preventive action. Both Michael and Rita 

were convicted of offenses related to the incident, and all children were removed 

from the family's care. Mark and John were placed with their paternal aunt in 

Ohio, and the remaining children were placed with other family members.

In 2015, the court terminated Michael and Rita's parental rights to Jessica 

and Ann who were subsequently adopted. The Division received another 

referral in 2015 concerning Maureen and Audrey because their paternal 

grandmother placed them back with Michael. The Division subsequently 

obtained custody of Maureen and Audrey after the court concluded that Michael 

abused or neglected them. Michael and Rita then completed identified 

surrenders of their parental rights as to Audrey and the Division placed Maureen 

in a residential facility with a goal of long-term care.

At that time, Michael was married to L.O. (Laura) who had three children 

of her own. Laura had an open case with the Division and was referred for a 

psychological evaluation. She was recommended for individual counseling and 

couples counseling with Michael. In 2016, the Division referred Michael, 

Laura, and Rita to Frank J. Dyer, Ph.D., for additional psychological 

evaluations.
5

A-4722-18T3

In August 2017, Laura informed the Division that she separated from 

Michael. Laura also stated that Mark and John's paternal aunt brought Mark and 

John back to New Jersey and placed them with her because she could no longer 

care for either child. The trial court awarded the Division custody of Mark and 

John who were then placed in a resource home as the paternal aunt improperly 

transferred custody of the boys to Laura with only a notarized letter.

The Division proposed a family team meeting with Michael, Rita, Mark, 

and John, but neither Michael nor Rita accepted the request. The Division also 

offered visitation, which both attended, but Michael's attendance was notably 

"more sporadic."

The Division ultimately filed a guardianship complaint for Mark and John 

in November 2017, and the trial court approved the Division's permanency plan 

of termination of parental rights followed by adoption. Thereafter, both Michael 

and Rita entered identified surrenders of the boys to their resource parent, and 

the court entered a conforming guardianship order.

By May 2018, however, the Division received calls "almost daily . . . about 

the boys' behaviors" indicating that the children were destroying the residence. 

The court accordingly removed both Mark and John from the resource parents' 

care and vacated the judgment of guardianship. The Division then successfully 
6

A-4722-18T3

moved to be relieved of its obligation to provide reasonable efforts to reunify 

the children with Michael and Rita as their parental rights to Jessica and Ann

had been terminated. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.2(a)(3).

The Division unsuccessfully attempted to contact Michael after the 

judgment of guardianship was vacated. When they finally reached him two 

months later, the Division offered him visitation, but he did not stay in contact 

with the Division and did not see Mark and John until a bonding evaluation in 

January 2019. After the bonding evaluation, Michael visited Mark and John 

only one additional time.

Thereafter, the Division ruled out a maternal aunt and Laura as placements 

for Mark and John. According to Division records, Laura was ruled out due to 

inadequate space in her residence and her inability to assure the Division that 

Michael would not have unsupervised contact with the boys. The trial court 

again accepted the Division's plan of termination of parental rights followed by 

adoption for Mark and John and held the guardianship trial on May 7 and May 

21, 2019.

At trial, the Division presented extensive documentary evidence, the 

testimony of a caseworker and an adoption unit supervisor who testified as to 

the Division's history with the family, and the expert testimony of Dr. Dyer.
7

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Judge Paganelli found all three witnesses to be credible. In particular, he noted 

that the caseworker "provided detailed and knowledgeable testimony . . . [and] 

made eye contact with all questioners." As to the adoption unit supervisor, the 

judge noted that she "was particularly well versed regarding the Division's 

efforts in terms of the select home . . . [and] adoption matters." Finally, as to 

Dr. Dyer, Judge Paganelli found that his uncontroverted testimony was 

"thorough, detailed, and informative," he was "fully conversant with the facts,"

and he "made eye contact with all questioners and was not defensive on crossexamination." Michael neither testified nor presented any witnesses or 

documentary evidence.

Dr. Dyer testified that his first impression of Michael was that he "had a 

tendency to engage in very abrasive and conflicted intimate relationships," and 

that Michael's "entire presentation throughout all the evaluations . . . was 

character[ized] by a minimization and a denial of any problems, blame or 

responsibility, and a glib assurance that if the children were placed with him 

then all of the matters would be resolved without problems." Dr. Dyer also 

found that Michael "did not possess adequate parenting capacity at the time" 

based on his "instability and his lack of cooperation with services, [and] no 
8

A-4722-18T3

reason to believe that [Michael] ha[d] undergone any meaningful therapeutic 

in[ter]vention that might have positively influenced him."

With respect to visitation, Dr. Dyer testified that by the time of the 

November 2017 psychological evaluations of Mark and John, the boys had not 

had any contact with Michael since they were transported back to New Jersey 

from Ohio. Dr. Dyer stated that this lack of parental contact "sends a message 

to the boys that their birth father is not particularly interested in seeing them" 

and that "it very strongly indicates that [Michael's] emotional investment . . . in 

these children is deficient." Dr. Dyer concluded that "every adult who has held 

themselves out to these boys since their early childhood . . . has wound up 

rejecting them . . . and for [Michael] to not visit them when he had the 

opportunity to do so . . . sends a message."

He also noted that Michael's lack of sensitivity was reflective of "a lack 

of competence with respect to being able to do anything realistic in the way of 

rectifying these problems or taking adequate care of these children with an 

acknowledgement or appreciation of their special needs and vulnerabilities" and 

that returning Mark and John to his care would "pose a very substantial risk to 

both of [them]." Dr. Dyer stated that this "tendency in [Michael] generally to 

deny and minimize any problems" suggested that he would likely allow the care 
9

A-4722-18T3

and discipline of the children to fall onto Laura, who was "very poorly equipped 

to undertake such a challenge with these very aggressive and volatile children."

Dr. Dyer testified that based on the bonding evaluations between Michael, 

Mark, and John, Michael "is so poorly attuned to these boys and so unresponsive 

to all of the adverse experiences that they have had and their psychological, 

emotional and behavioral vulnerabilities that the placement of either or both 

children into his care would just be setting them up for more of the same." He 

explained that "[b]ased on the very long hiatus in [their] contact with [Michael] 

while they were in Ohio . . . and based on [Michael's] spotty visitation with them

and ultimately a hiatus of a year in which [Michael] did not go to see these 

boys," Mark and John "do not have anything that even approaches an attachment 

to [Michael]."

Dr. Dyer further concluded that "if the children's relationship with 

[Michael] was terminated they would not experience . . . something that would 

cause either serious or prolonged emotional harm" and that "based on 

[Michael's] poor compliance with services and eventually dropping out of 

services . . . [Michael is] not going to be able to acquire adequate parenting 

capacity through any type of intervention within the foreseeable future."
10 A-4722-18T3

Dr. Dyer also testified with respect to his evaluation of Laura. He initially 

concluded that Michael and Laura together could potentially become a viable 

parenting plan, with Laura as the primary caregiver. Michael and Laura were 

reevaluated, however, and Dr. Dyer determined that Laura "would be a negative 

factor with respect to [Michael's] involvement with these children because of 

the extreme instability of both their relationship coupled with the fact that they 

both are unwilling to disclose [their] conflicts." He specifically highlighted that 

despite being separated, "it's on one day and off the next . . . [and] that, coupled 

with [Laura's] characteristic dependence and passivity makes for a very 

troubling prognosis" as he was concerned about "how many separations and 

rejections and disruptions these two boys are capable of bearing without coming 

apart completely."

When asked about the consequences for Mark and John if the Division's 

plan for terminating Michael's parental rights followed by select home adoption3

was unsuccessful, Dr. Dyer stated that "the likelihood that eventually there will 

be permanency for these children if they are freed for that purpose . . . 

overshadow[ed] anything that [Mark and John] could get from continued contact 

3

 Select home adoption refers to "a process that includes looking for an adoptive 

home in New Jersey and registering the child[ren] on the national adoption 

exchange." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 98 (2008).
11 A-4722-18T3

with their parents." He noted that Mark and John need "some sort of permanent 

situation with a caretaker whom they can view as somebody who has ultimate 

authority . . . [and] responsibility over them, who invests in them and provides 

them with appropriate stability [and] security" and Michael "does not have that 

capability" and "is not going to acquire that capability within the foreseeable 

future." He concluded that if Mark and John were never adopted, "certainly 

there would be a disappointment, but not anywhere near approaching the 

disappointment that they experience when they are placed with a caretaker who 

rejects them or . . . who at one point seemed to be invested in them and then 

drops out of sight for long periods of time."

On this point, a Division adoption unit supervisor also testified and

acknowledged that Mark and John's age, their history of behavior, and current 

services including Mark's ADHD diagnosis, could be an obstacle to adoption, 

but she emphasized more extensive adoption options become available after a 

court terminates a parent's parental rights. Specifically, she stated that "the pool 

becomes wider . . . [as] [s]ome families . . . feel more comfortable or are more 

open to dealing with children that are not attached to a litigation process." She 

also informed the court that at the time of the trial, there was a potential family 
12 A-4722-18T3

willing to take Mark and John together, and a separate family willing to take 

John individually.

After considering all of the evidence, Judge Paganelli concluded that the 

Division established by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of the 

statutory criteria for termination of parental rights under N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a)(1) through (4). In particular, Judge Paganelli found the Division 

established: John and Mark's safety, health, and development have been and 

will continue to be endangered by their parental relationship with Michael, 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1); Michael is unable or unwilling to eliminate that 

harm, he is unable to provide a safe and stable home for them, and delaying 

permanent placement will add to their harm, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2); the 

Division made reasonable efforts to reunify Michael with Mark and John, and 

considered alternatives to termination of Michael's parental rights, N.J.S.A. 

30:4C-15.1(a)(3); and termination of parental rights will not cause Mark and 

John more harm than good, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4).

On appeal Michael challenges only the court's prong three and four 

findings. As to prong three, he specifically claims the Division failed to provide 

services that were timely and reasonable, and the court failed to consider 

alternatives to termination of his parental rights and support its findings by 
13 A-4722-18T3

substantial, credible evidence in the record. He similarly claims the court's 

prong four findings are deficient as the trial evidence did not clearly and 

convincingly establish that termination of parental rights would not do more 

harm than good.4 We disagree with all of these arguments.

II.

Our scope of review in Title 30 guardianship cases is limited. In such 

cases, the trial court's findings generally should be upheld so long as they are 

supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). The court's decision should 

only be reversed or altered on appeal if its findings were "so wholly 

unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004). We must give substantial deference to 

the trial judge's opportunity to have observed the witnesses first-hand and to 

4

 As noted, Michael does not contest the court's findings under the first or 

second prong of the best interests test, and we therefore consider any challenge 

to the court's findings on those prongs waived. See Pressler & Verniero, Current 

N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2019) ("[A]n issue not briefed is deemed 

waived."); Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Taxation, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 

393 (App. Div. 2012) (deeming a contention waived when the party failed to 

include any arguments supporting the contention in its brief). Despite Michael's 

waiver, we have nevertheless reviewed the court's prong one and two findings 

and are satisfied they are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the 

record and the court's legal conclusions unassailable.
14 A-4722-18T3

evaluate their credibility. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552. We must also recognize the 

expertise of the Family Part, which repeatedly adjudicates cases brought by the 

Division under Title 9 and Title 30 involving the alleged abuse or neglect of 

children. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 

448 (2012); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 

476 (App. Div. 2012).

A. Prong Three

Turning first to Michael's argument that the Division failed to provide him 

with reasonable services, we are satisfied that the trial court properly determined

the Division made diligent efforts to provide services to Michael and his family 

since 2003, which included a period of time before Mark and John's birth. As 

summarized by the court, the list of services offered include: "referral to shelters

. . . psychological evaluations, bonding evaluations, visitation (including 

therapeutic), [family team meetings], board rate, relative assessments, [family 

preservation services], parenting skills, family therapy, a relative psychological 

assessment [for Laura], and individual therapy." With respect to Mark and John

specifically, the Division provided Michael with psychological evaluations, a 

bonding evaluation, visitation and bus tickets, a family team meeting, 

psychological assessments for Laura, and parenting skills.
15 A-4722-18T3

There is no evidence to suggest that Michael sought or participated in 

services while in Puerto Rico or when he returned to New Jersey. Indeed, it was 

not until the end of 2015 that Michael engaged in services and completed a 

parenting class. When offered visitation with Mark and John prior to executing 

a voluntary surrender of his parental rights, the Division noted that his 

attendance was sporadic. Even after learning that Mark and John's judgment of 

guardianship had been vacated, the Division offered visitation, but Michael did 

not see the boys until the bonding evaluation in January 2019. Based on 

Michael's lack of visits up until the January 2019 bonding evaluation, the court 

ordered him to visit with Mark and John more consistently. Despite the Division 

being relieved of its obligation to provide reasonable efforts to Michael, the 

Division still established a visitation schedule for Michael and provided him bus 

tickets, but Michael only visited Mark and John once in January, once in 

February, and at no time during March and April of 2019.

The record further reflects that Michael failed to consistently engage in 

services over the sixteen years that the Division was involved with the family. 

Contrary to Michael's assertions, the Division's offer of services was timely and 

more than sufficient under the circumstances in light of his significant 

unavailability. The failure to remedy the circumstances and conditions that led 
16 A-4722-18T3

to the placement of Mark and John was not a result of the Division's lack of

effort, but rather the result of Michael's "failure to cooperate or follow through"

with the services that the Division provided. New Jersey Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 119 (App. Div. 2004).

We also disagree with Michael's argument that the Division failed to 

adequately consider alternatives to terminating his parental rights. Michael

specifically claims that the Division failed to fully explore the option of him and 

Laura co-parenting Mark and John. We initially note that although the Division 

has a statutory duty to consider alternative placements, even where a relative 

has been identified and is an appropriate placement the law does not create a 

presumption in favor of relative placement. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 82 (App. Div. 2013); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. M.F., 357 N.J. Super. 515, 528-29 (App. Div. 2003). Here, the record 

clearly indicates that Laura was ruled out as a potential placement because she 

resided in a two-bedroom apartment with her three children and because she 

continued her volatile relationship with Michael. There is no evidence that she 

requested a waiver or appealed the rule-out letter.

Furthermore, the Division provided psychological assessments of Laura 

and implemented services for her including individual and family therapy. 
17 A-4722-18T3

Although Dr. Dyer believed at one point that Michael and Laura could 

successfully co-parent, that conclusion relied heavily on Laura as the primary 

caregiver. After their separation, Dr. Dyer concluded that Laura was now "a 

negative factor with respect to [Michael's] involvement with these children 

because of the extreme instability of both their relationship coupled with the fact 

that they both are unwilling to disclose these conflicts." Dr. Dyer was 

particularly concerned about how many separations, rejections, and disruptions 

Mark and John were capable of withstanding "without coming apart 

completely," which the record indicates is a likely scenario based on their 

troubling history.

Michael also argues the Division violated its obligation by not considering

Laura in a KLG arrangement. A kinship legal guardian is "a caregiver who is 

willing to assume care of a child due to parental incapacity, with the intent to 

raise the child to adulthood, and who is appointed the kinship legal guardian of 

the child by the court." N.J.S.A. 3B:12A–2. The kinship legal guardian receives 

the same rights, authority, and responsibilities as the birth parent; however, the 

birth parent retains visitation rights, the right to consent to adoption, and the 

right to consent to a name change of the child. N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-4(a)(1) to (2).
18 A-4722-18T3

The trial court concluded that "KLG is not an option in the matter at bar 

because there is no offered guardian." As noted, Laura was ruled out as a 

potential placement for Mark and John due to space considerations and her 

ongoing relationship with Michael after their separation. Thus, even if Laura 

was offered as a guardian, Dr. Dyer testified that placing children with Laura 

would be potentially harmful due to her wholly unstable relationship with 

Michael and her inability to protect the children from him. With respect to the 

care and discipline of the boys, Dr. Dyer particularly noted that Laura was "very 

poorly equipped to undertake such a challenge with these very aggressive and 

volatile children."

Given the concerns regarding Laura's relationship with Michael, the 

potential harm to the children if Michael was exposed to them, and the 

conclusion that Laura was ill-prepared to provide for the children on her own, it 

was not error to deny placing the children with Laura in either a co-parenting or 

KLG arrangement, even if adoption was not yet certain.

B. Prong Four

Michael's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court's conclusion that termination of parental rights would not do more harm 

than good is again belied by Dr. Dyer's unrefuted expert testimony. Dr. Dyer
19 A-4722-18T3

testified that based on Michael's inconsistent engagement in services, he "was

not going to be able to acquire adequate parenting capacity within the 

foreseeable future." He also noted that Michael's lack of sensitivity added up to 

a "lack of competence . . . [in] taking adequate care of [Mark and John] with an 

acknowledgement or appreciation of their special needs and vulnerabilities" and 

returning them to his care would "pose a very substantial risk." With respect to 

the children's bond with Michael, Dr. Dyer determined that Mark and John "do 

not have anything that even approaches an attachment to [Michael]," and that

"if the children's relationship with [Michael] was terminated they would not 

experience . . . something that would cause either serious or prolonged emotional 

harm."

We are also unpersuaded by Michael's final argument that "[a] plan of 

'select home adoption' does not provide Mark or John with permanency due to 

the extent of their behavioral issues, which have resulted in failed placements 

and a failed adoption" and "leaves them in limbo." As the Division supervisor 

testified, Mark and John's age, their behavioral history, and current services

including those related to Mark's ADHD diagnosis can be an obstacle to 

adoption, however, select home adoption provides Mark and John with 

considerably more options for permanency as "the pool becomes wider" and 
20 A-4722-18T3

families "feel more comfortable or are more open to dealing with children that 

are not attached to a litigation process." At the time of the trial, the Division 

had already identified a potential family willing to take both Mark and John, and 

a separate family willing to take John individually.

Dr. Dyer additionally testified that the likelihood that Mark and John 

would be placed in a permanent home if they were freed for adoption 

"overshadow[ed] anything that [Mark and John] could get from continued 

contact with their parents." He concluded that if Mark and John were never 

adopted, there would be disappointment, but not anywhere near approaching the 

disappointment that they might experience if returned to Michael's care. Thus,

the Division established prong four clearly and convincingly as Dr. Dyer 

recommended terminating Michael's parental rights and pursuing select home 

adoption despite there not yet being an identified adoptive home for Mark and 

John. He definitively concluded that Michael had no bond with these children, 

and it would not harm them to sever the parental bond.

In sum, we discern no basis to set aside Judge Paganelli's well-supported 

and well-reasoned decision to terminate Michael's parental rights. To the extent 

we have not addressed defendant's other arguments, we conclude they are 
21 A-4722-18T3

without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.