J-S66001-15 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

STEPHEN PAUL COULSON 

 Appellant No. 699 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008360-2013 

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 05, 2016 

Appellant, Stephen Paul Coulson, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of seven and one-half (71⁄2) to fifteen (15) years of incarceration 

entered on March 10, 2014, after Appellant pled guilty to aggravated 

assault, burglary, criminal trespass, and recklessly endangering another 

person (REAP).1 Upon review, we affirm. 

 On January 22, 2014, Appellant appeared before the trial court and 

entered his plea to the above charges.2 The Commonwealth stated it was 

withdrawing a charge of criminal attempt – homicide, in exchange for the 

plea. N.T., 1/22/14, at 2. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence report. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 3502, 3503 and 2705, respectively. 

2

 The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions are detailed below in our 

analysis. 
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 On March 10, 2014, the trial court convened a sentencing hearing. 

The trial court heard from counsel, Appellant, and the victim’s two 

daughters. The trial court additionally considered written statements from 

the victim’s other daughter and son. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

trial court sentenced Appellant to seven and one-half (71⁄2) to fifteen (15) 

years of incarceration for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court 

sentenced Appellant to a consecutive five (5) years of probation for the 

burglary conviction, and imposed no further penalties for the criminal 

trespass and REAP convictions. 

 On March 17, 2014, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion to 

modify sentence, which, after conducting a hearing on April 3, 2014, the trial 

court denied on April 9, 2014. Appellant filed this timely appeal on May 2, 

2014. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Appellant presents four sentencing issues for our review: 

1. Should the sentence imposed upon Appellant 

Coulson be vacated, and his case remanded for 

re-sentencing, owing to the fact that the 

sentencing court in this case, in imposing a 

beyond-the-aggravated-range non-guidelines 

sentence, purported to sentence within the 

sentencing guidelines but applied those guidelines 

erroneously (a situation that 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c)(1) indicates requires the granting of 

sentencing relief)? 

2. Should the sentence imposed upon Appellant 

Coulson be vacated, and his case remanded for 

re-sentencing, owing to the fact that the 

sentencing court’s 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) 

statement of sentencing rationale indicated that 

Appellant was sentenced as he was because the 
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nature of the offense that he committed (a 

situation that § 9721(b) itself indicates 

constitutes grounds for the awarding of 

sentencing relief)? 

3. Should the sentence imposed upon Appellant 

Coulson be vacated, and his case remanded for 

re-sentencing, owing to the fact that the nonguidelines sentence imposed upon him was 

unreasonable in view of the totality of the 

circumstances (a situation that 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c)(3) indicates requires the granting of 

sentencing relief)? 

4. Are not all of the foregoing legal theories properly 

before th[e Superior] Court owing to the fact that 

defense counsel in the sentencing court expressly 

and repeatedly argued that a shorter prison 

sentence should be imposed upon Appellant than 

was imposed? 

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4. 

All of Appellant’s four issues are interrelated, such that we address 

them together. In each issue, Appellant objects to the length of his 

sentence, and thus challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2010) (claim 

that sentence is excessive is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence). It is well-settled that “sentencing is a matter vested in the sound 

discretion of the sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed 

absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 

1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, pursuant to statute, Appellant 

does not have an automatic right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition 
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this Court for permission to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Id.

Recently, this Court reiterated: 

The right to appellate review of the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal. See 

[Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa. 

Super. 2007)] (citation omitted). An appellant must 

satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court's 

jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence. 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; 

(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal

defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (citations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265-1266 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014). 

“A substantial question exists only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1266. 
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 Instantly, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his 

sentencing challenge in his post-sentence motion to modify sentence, and 

included a separate Rule 2119(f) concise statement in his appellate brief. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 17-22. To the extent Appellant argues that the trial 

court failed to consider certain factors, his assertion that the trial court failed 

to consider mitigating facts of record does not raise a substantial question. 

Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1266. However, with regard to Appellant’s 

contention that the trial court sentenced him beyond the guidelines to what 

the trial court “mistakenly believed was an aggravated range guideline 

sentence,” and misapplied the sentencing guidelines “in view of the totality 

of the circumstances,” such claims present substantial questions. See

Appellant’s Brief at 3; Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (claim that the sentencing court misapplied the sentencing guidelines 

presents a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 

206 (Pa. Super. 2001) (claim that the sentencing court imposed an 

unreasonable sentence by sentencing outside the guideline ranges presents 

a substantial question). This, we will consider those claims. 

In examining the merits of Appellant’s claims, we recognize that the 

primary consideration in our review of the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence imposed by a trial court is whether the court imposed an 

individualized sentence, and whether the sentence was nonetheless 

unreasonable for sentences falling outside the guidelines. Commonwealth 
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v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011). Also, “[a] trial court need 

not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or 

specifically reference the statute in question, but the record as a whole must 

reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and 

character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 

1283 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 13 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2010). 

 Here, our thorough review of the record as a whole reveals that the 

sentence imposed by the trial court – albeit outside of the guidelines, and 

with a misstatement by the trial court – was not unreasonable, and reflected 

the trial court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and the character of 

Appellant. We recount our review of the record in detail below because of its 

relevance to our analysis. 

 At sentencing, the Commonwealth explained that the victim hired 

Appellant and worked with him on the day of the attack. N.T., 3/10/14, at 

17. That evening, while the victim was asleep in his home, Appellant 

attacked him with a hammer, causing the victim to receive sixty-two (62) 

stitches and to suffer from continuing dizziness until the present day. Id. 

“At the hospital, [the victim] was told if the hammer had hit his temple, it 

would have killed him.” Id. The Commonwealth stated that the standard 

guideline sentence for Appellant was thirty-six (36) to fifty-four (54) months 

of incarceration, and indicated it was looking for a sentence that was at least 

within the standard range. Id. 
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Appellant’s counsel noted that although Appellant was a veteran and 

served two combat tours, he was rejected from both Veterans Court and 

Mental Health Court “because of the seriousness of this crime.” Id. at 5. 

Appellant’s counsel explained:

Because of the seriousness of this crime, Your 

Honor. It was an attempted homicide. He’s now 

pled guilty to the crime of aggravated assault. He

struck a sixty-five-year-old man in the head with a

hammer, so I believe that’s why it was rejected from 

the specialty court programs, like Mental Health 

Court, Drug Court, Veterans Court. 

Id. at 5-6. Appellant’s counsel requested that the trial court sentence 

Appellant in the mitigated range of the guidelines to a minimum of 

twenty-four (24) months of incarceration. 

 Thereafter, the trial court commented: 

That’s the amazing part of it to me. Here’s 

somebody who has a past, who has a criminal 

record. You use drugs. You abuse drugs. You’ve 

been thrown out of the [A]rmy. You’ve been 

basically cast to the side by basically everyone over 

your years, and the hand that [the victim has] 

extended to you, what do you do? You smash some 

man in the head while he sleeps in his bed. 

*** 

How do you do that to a friend, someone who 

extends the hand of help to you, someone who offers

you a job, someone who pays you, someone who has 

extended that random act of kindness to you? 

Id. at 7. 

 Appellant responded that there was “no excuse” for what he did. Id.
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 Although the victim was present, the Commonwealth stated that he 

“was too upset to speak.” Id. at 8. 

 Two of the victim’s daughters testified. Ms. Dana Valerio stated that 

Appellant’s attack on her father “changed her life forever” and “has been the 

most difficult time of [her] life.” Id. at 9. Ms. Valerio detailed the impact of 

the crime on the victim and his family: 

May 30, the day before the crime, was spent at 

Kennywood Park as a family, watching my dad take 

turns riding rides with seven of his ten young 

grandchildren all under the age of nine. The next 

time I would speak to my dad would be in the early 

morning hours of June 1st at 2:09 a.m. when I 

received a call from my father who notified me of the 

home invasion and the brutal attack that took place

and that he needed our help. That conversation I 

will never forget. I told him that I would drive him 

to the hospital and my brother-in-law Scott would 

stay at his house with the police as they processed

the crime scene. I will always remember the 

shakiness in his voice when he said, “I want Scott to 

take me. I don’t want you girls to see me like this.” 

However, nothing could have prepared me for the 

violent scene I was about to witness. 

I was met at my childhood home by police officers 

and detectives who walked me through my father’s 

house pointing out evidence of the attack ... The 

blood-spattered walls and floors, the light switch and 

the wall ... covered in blood and the obvious signs of 

the struggle that took place ... are images I will never 

forget. ... My siblings and I feel that our childhood 

home has forever been changed. A place that once 

held so many wonderful memories has been 

overshadowed by the horrific events of that night. 

In the weeks following the attack, I watched my 

father struggle with many different emotions, anger, 

frustration and confusion, about why a person he 
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tried to help would carry out such a malicious attack 

as he slept defenselessly in his bed. We, as his 

children, were worried for his health and safety. My 

sister Diana and I shared the task of having him stay 

with us for over two months as he recovered from 

his injuries. In addition to his physical injuries, we 

observed him having difficulty sleeping. He would 

wake frequently during the night with nightmares of

the attack. Trying to shield his grandchildren from 

the details of the attack, coordinating doctors’ 

appointments and cleaning up his home were equally 

challenging. 

Our family’s summers are usually spent at my dad’s 

house swimming at the pool, taking boat rides and 

going on trips. Instead, we spent most of that 

summer calling, e-mailing and meeting with 

biohazard removal teams, a carpet company, home 

security system installers, a door replacement 

company and a homeowners insurance agent to 

repair his home from the damage. All of these tasks 

were very time-consuming and many times required 

us to be absent from work until the process was 

completed. 

The events that transpired on June 1st, 2013, did not 

only change my father’s life, it changed the lives of 

our entire family. 

Id. at 10-12. 

 A second daughter, Mrs. Diana Seabol, testified that she felt 

responsible for “bringing [Appellant] into our lives” because she and her 

husband had hired Appellant to perform contracting work on their home and 

rental properties. Id. at 13. Mrs. Seabol also detailed the impact of the 

crime: 

The overwhelming amount of guilt and anger has led 

me to many sleepless and restless nights. On those

same nights my thoughts shift to my father. I lay 

awake and think of how he feels trying to sleep in 
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the same house, in the same room and in the same 

bed where he was awoken to the smashing of a 

hammer to his temple. 

My father is a hard-working businessman whose only 

fault was wanting to help a guy who was down on his

luck. My dad is the rock of our family. He is the

person we all go to when we need help with 

anything, and after his attack he was the one that 

needed my help. My sisters and I had to shuffle my

father between our houses to monitor his recovery 

and to lessen our own missed days of work. He 

stayed at my house most of the time while he 

recovered from his injuries. He lived at my house for 

at least two months because I was so concerned for 

his health and safety. He lives alone and was 

suffering from debilitating headaches. He 

complained of how the light and noise were so 

bothersome to him. He also mentioned a constant 

ringing in his ears that lasted for weeks. He suffered 

from dizziness and blurred vision. He could not be

left alone. 

I had to take off numerous days of work without pay

to monitor him and to drive him to many of his 

follow-up doctors’ appointments. I have twin nineyear-old boys and a four-year-old daughter who I 

had to lie to about what had happened to their 

grandfather because I didn’t want to scare them. 

We had to be careful of what we said around them 

when we were calling doctors or family to update 

them on my father’s condition. My boys have since 

overheard and discovered what happened to their 

grandfather and continue to ask questions and worry

about his well-being. 

My father had no health insurance. He is selfemployed. In the weeks following the attack, he 

constantly agonized over how he was going to pay 

for his financially overwhelming medical bills. He

only allowed us to get the treatment the doctors 

deemed absolutely necessary and skipped the rest 

because he [didn’t know] how he was going to pay 

for it. 
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I can describe those weeks as emotionally and 

physically draining for my entire family. We were 

still in shock that this happened. The array of 

emotions are overwhelming; anger, guilt, pain, 

sadness, shock, wondering how someone could do 

such a horrific thing, mixed with joy, happiness, 

thankfulness and love that my dad was still alive. I 

could not imagine my life without him in it. 

I have taken steps to insure his safety by 

immediately calling to have his home security 

system updated to the latest technology. I continue 

to worry about him so much that I had the 

monitoring system set up so I am e-mail-alerted 

every time his alarm arms or disarms. Since he has

returned to his home, I vigilantly check it every 

morning and every evening and sometimes in the 

middle of the night just to make sure he’s locked in 

and secure in his home. 

I ask that Your Honor invoke the maximum sentence 

allowed by law to [Appellant] for his violent and 

vicious attack on my father. This attack has taken

away my family’s sense of security. [Appellant] has 

taken away my father’s willingness to help others, 

and I think that’s the most tragic thing of all, and my 

family will never be the same. Thank you. 

Id. at 13-15. 

 After Mrs. Seabol’s testimony, the Commonwealth provided the trial 

court with written statements from the victim’s daughter, Maureen Loyer, 

and his son, Mark Winzek, who did not speak on the record. Id. at 16. 

 Appellant spoke on his behalf, and apologized to the victim and his 

family: 

I wrote a statement, but I memorized it. I’m sorry

Joe. I have problems with it too. I have issues with 

it too. When I replay what I did in my head, I have 

problems with it myself. 
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Scott, I am sorry. I was in your dad’s house. You

guys did give me work when I needed work. I can’t 

understand why I did what I did, to be honest with 

you. 

Joe’s business is a block from my house, and I’ve 

been down there in the mornings – every morning 

for coffee. I take my little boy down there, and Joe 

puts him on the counter. He slices up watermelon 

and gives me food when I need it. I’m sorry, but as 

his father – I’m so sorry, man. I really am. And I 

can’t understand why I did what I did. Joe is a good 

man, and he’s helped me a lot of times, and so has 

Scott. I’m just sorry. I look at you, and I really am. 

I don’t even know why I did what I did. I can’t even 

recall it, and I think about it all the time. I think 

about what you guys had to go through too, because 

I think about if it was my father, what I would feel, 

and I don’t have [any] excuse, and I can’t use drugs 

as an excuse because I know what they do, and I 

can’t use that as an excuse, and I’m not going to. 

That’s all I have. 

Id. at 18. 

 After hearing from the victim’s family and Appellant, the trial court 

offered the following detailed rationale for its sentence: 

I’ve considered the sentencing guidelines, the nature 

of the charges, the fact that [Appellant has] 

accepted responsibility by pleading guilty. I’ve 

considered [Appellant’s] statement to the [trial 

c]ourt, [Appellant’s] apologies to the victim in open 

court. I’ve considered also [Appellant’s] lawyer’s

statements and arguments on [Appellant’s] behalf. 

I’ve considered the Commonwealth’s attorney’s 

arguments on behalf of the Commonwealth and the 

victim. I’ve considered the contents of the 

presentence report, including [Appellant’s counsel’s] 

amendments and – or corrections, rather, to a 

subsection with page six, the third block regarding

an incident on January 31st of 1999 while [Appellant] 

apparently was in the military, the Army. I’ve also 
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considered the letters that have been written on 

behalf of the victim; his daughter, Maureen Loyer; 

Mark Winzek; Dana Valerio, who testified in open 

court today; Diana Seabol, who also testified in open 

court. I’ve considered the viciousness and the 

nature and seriousness of this offense, the apparent 

lack of provocation or any reasonable or rational 

basis for this, and as well and as importantly, the

impact on the victim and his family that continues as 

well as the financial impact. I have a proposed 

Order of Court for $6,068.56 and $1,000 for 

restitution. And the punitive, rehabilitative and 

deterrent aspects of sentencing. I’ve also considered 

[Appellant’s] long history of drug abuse that’s 

apparently been interwoven with [Appellant’s] life in 

the military and even after [Appellant had] gotten 

out which continues up to and through the events of

this criminal episode. 

For all those reasons, it’s the judgment and sentence 

of the [trial c]ourt at Count 2 that [Appellant] be

sentence to not less than seven and [one-]half nor 

more than fifteen years at a state correctional facility 

to be determined by the Department of Corrections. 

*** 

This is in the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines, and the reasons are the seriousness of 

the offense, the unprovoked nature of the attack, the 

long-standing impact on the victim and his family, 

and [Appellant’s] history. Even though [Appellant 

has] a prior record score of zero, [Appellant has] had 

a lot of contact with the criminal justice system both 

as a civilian and the military that seems to be a 

common thread also with drug abuse that [Appellant 

has] neglected to get under control in all of these

years. 

Id. at 18-20. 
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Although the trial court misspoke when explaining that its sentence 

was “in the aggravated range,” it later acknowledged that the sentence was 

outside of the guidelines, and stated: 

The [trial] court misspoke when it stated the 

sentence was in the aggravated range. (N.T. 1, p. 

20). The sentence, in fact, exceeds the aggravated

range of the applicable sentencing guidelines. The

[trial c]ourt intended to sentence [Appellant] to 71⁄2 - 

15 years plus probation, and placed its reasons on 

the record. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/15, at 5. 

 In addition, as noted above, Appellant filed a motion to modify 

sentence, and the trial court convened a hearing on April 3, 2014. At the 

hearing, Appellant’s counsel’s reiterated Appellant’s prior record score of 

zero, and asserted that the attack was an “isolated incident,” and Appellant’s 

“first run-in with any crime of violence.” N.T., 4/3/14, at 3. Appellant’s 

counsel argued, “While the facts of this case are not mitigated, the person 

is. There’s a lot of mitigating circumstances about [Appellant].” Id. 

Appellant’s counsel recounted Appellant’s military tours of duty in Somalia 

and Haiti, his diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, and his 

demonstrated remorse. Id. at 4. Again, Appellant apologized to the victim 

in open court. Id. at 4-5. 

 The Commonwealth responded that it did not seek “only a standard 

range sentence,” and repeated the victim’s continued health challenges. Id.

at 5-6. Subsequently, and significantly, the trial court commented: 
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I feel that the sentence – I gave it a lot of thought, 

especially with the presentence investigation, [and] 

all the testimony entered at that time. I felt it was 

an appropriate sentence then. I still feel it’s an

appropriate sentence. 

Id. at 7. 

In assessing the reasonableness of an extra-guidelines sentence, we, 

as a reviewing court, must look at the nature and circumstances of the 

offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the opportunity of 

the sentencing court to observe the defendant, the presentence investigation 

report, the findings on which sentence was based, and the sentencing 

guidelines. Commonwealth v. Septak, 518 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 1986). 

Here, our review of the entire record confirms that the trial court, after 

careful and thorough consideration of the relevant factors, tailored 

Appellant’s sentence to the particular circumstances of this case. Hence, we 

do not find that Appellant’s sentence is unreasonable. Given the foregoing, 

we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, and conclude that 

Appellant’s sentencing issues are without merit. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

 Judge Stabile joins this memorandum. 

 Judge Strassburger files a Dissenting Memorandum. 

Judgment Entered. 
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/5/2016