IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AMARILLO DIVISION 

) 

STATE OF TEXAS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-00094-Z

) 

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, ) 

in his official capacity as ) 

Secretary of Homeland Security, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1631 AND MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING 

RESOLUTION OF THE MOTION 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................1

BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................2

STANDARD ..........................................................................................................................5 

ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................7 

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................17 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases

A.B.-B. v. Morgan, 

548 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2020) .......................................................................................... 15

Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 

199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................ 8, 9, 15 

Arias v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 

No. CV 20-00546-BAJ-SDJ, 2021 WL 1206600 (M.D. La. Mar. 30, 2021) ............................. 6 

Awad v. United States, 

No. 1:93CV376-D-D, 2001 WL 741638 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 27, 2001) ........................................ 6 

Barnhart v. Thomas, 

540 U.S. 20 (2003) .................................................................................................................... 10 

Brumme v. I.N.S., 

275 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................ 8, 14 

Castellar v. Mayorkas, 

No. 17-cv-00491, 2021 WL 4081559 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021)......................................... 11, 12 

Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016)...................................................................................................... 14 

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 

486 U.S. 800 (1988) ................................................................................................................ 2, 5 

Clark v. Martinez, 

543 U.S. 371 (2005) ................................................................................................................ 7, 8 

Clinton v. Jones, 

520 U.S. 681 (1997) .................................................................................................................... 7 

Cunningham v. Velstar, Inc., 

No. 421CV00127ALMCAN, 2022 WL 483193 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2022) ............................... 6 

DeLeon v. Tey, 

No. 7:13-CV-439, 2013 WL 7157957 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2013) .............................................. 17 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 

140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) ................................................................................................................ 9 

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Direct Innovations, L.L.C. v. Weisgarber, 

No. CIV.A. H-14-3211, 2015 WL 1976558 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2015) ................................... 17 

Dugdale v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 

88 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) .......................................................................................... 15, 16 

Evans v. Johnson & Johnson, 

No. CIV.A. H-14-2800, 2014 WL 7342404 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014) ................................... 17 

Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 

762 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................... 6 

Grace v. Barr, 

965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020) .................................................................................................. 15 

Harutyunyan v. Love, 

No. CV 19-41, 2019 WL 5551901 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2019)...................................................... 6 

In re Kutner, 

656 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................... 6 

In re Ramu Corp., 

903 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................................... 7 

J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 

837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................... 9 

Khan v. Holder, 

608 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................... 14 

Kiakombua v. Wolf, 

498 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) .............................................................................................. 15 

L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 

442 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) .............................................................................................. 15 

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 

299 U.S. 248 (1936) .................................................................................................................... 7 

Las Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Wolf, 

507 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) .............................................................................................. 15 

Make the Road v. Wolf, 

962 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................ 9, 10, 15 

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McKnight v. Blanchard, 

667 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................... 7 

Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 

No. CV 17-818, 2017 WL 3175693 (W.D. La. July 24, 2017) ............................................ 7, 16 

Pat Huval's Fisherman Wharf v. U.S. Int'l Trade Co., 

29 ITRD 1994 (W.D. La. 2006) .................................................................................................. 6 

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 

525 U.S. 471 (1999) .................................................................................................................... 9 

Reyes v. Nielsen, 

No. CV H-18-3971, 2020 WL 1442349 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2020) ..................................... 13, 14 

Rodrigues v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

No. 3:20-CV-0139-B, 2020 WL 777278 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020) ....................................... 15 

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

526 U.S. 574 (1999) .............................................................................................................. 6, 16 

S.L.V. v. Rosen, 

No. 21-cv-0017, 2021 WL 243442 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2021) ................................................ 13 

Sanders v. ExxonMobil Corp., 

No. SA-08-CA-590-OG, 2008 WL 11417386 (W.D. Tex. 2008) .............................................. 5 

Schamerhorn v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 

No. CIV.A. 01-914, 2009 WL 774964 (W.D. La. Mar. 23, 2009) ............................................. 6 

Sequeria Reyes v. Nielsen, 

No. 4:18-CV-3971, 2020 WL 1444920 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2020) ......................................... 14 

Shah v. Director, 

No. 3:19-CV-1164, 2019 WL 4254139 (W.D. La. Sept. 6, 2019) ........................................... 15 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83 (1998) .................................................................................................................... 16 

TransFirst Grp., Inc. v. Magliarditi, 

237 F. Supp. 3d 444 (N.D. Tex. 2017) ....................................................................................... 6 

United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 

655 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................. 14 

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USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 

647 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................... 6 

Vijender v. Wolf, 

No. 19-CV-3337, 2020 WL 1935556 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2020) ................................................. 15 

Statutes

6 U.S.C. § 251 ................................................................................................................................. 7 

8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) ...................................................................................................................... 2 

8 U.S.C. § 1158 ............................................................................................................................... 3 

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) ................................................................................................................ 1, 8, 10 

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) ....................................................................................................... 1, 2, 4, 15 

8 U.S.C. § 1229a ............................................................................................................................. 4 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) ...................................................................................................... 2, 7, 15 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) ........................................................................................................................ 13 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A) ................................................................................................................ 9 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) ................................................................................................ 1, 6, 10, 15, 16 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A) ........................................................................................................ 12, 14 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(B) ...................................................................................................... 8, 9, 16 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) ...................................................................................................................... 3 

28 U.S.C. § 1631 ........................................................................................................... 1, 2, 5, 6, 16 

Regulations

8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) ........................................................................................................................ 4 

8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) ................................................................................................................. 3 

8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d) ....................................................................................................................... 3 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(f) ...................................................................................................................... 4 

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INTRODUCTION 

 This action must either be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 

the sole federal court with jurisdiction to adjudicate this case, or dismissed. 

Plaintiff challenges an interim final rule jointly issued by the Departments of Justice and 

Homeland Security, entitled Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of 

Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 

18,078 (March 29, 2022) (the “IFR”). The IFR, by its own terms, implements “Section 235 of the 

INA,” i.e. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and specifically § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which “provides that if an 

asylum officer determines that a noncitizen subject to expedited removal has a credible fear of 

persecution, the noncitizen shall receive ‘further consideration of the application for asylum.’ INA 

235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).” 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,080. Congress has limited review 

of regulations implementing § 1225(b)(1) to a single forum. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), 

“[j]udicial review of determinations under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and its implementation is available 

in an action instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” This 

includes review of whether “any regulation issued to implement” § 1225(b) “is constitutional,” 

and of “whether such a regulation ... issued by or under the Authority of the Attorney General to 

implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions of this subchapter or is 

otherwise in violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). “Review relating to section 

1225(b)(1)” is strictly limited in this way: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory 

or nonstatutory) ... no court shall have jurisdiction to review,” among other things, any 

“procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement the provisions of section 

1225(b)(1) of this title,” “except as provided in subsection [1252](e).” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). 

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The IFR that Plaintiff challenges in the complaint implements § 1225(b). See 87 Fed. Reg. 

at 18,080 (explaining that “[t]his IFR addresses how” “further consideration of the application for 

asylum” under “8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)” “will occur”). The IFR is issued under authority 

granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security, as well as similar authority granted to the Attorney 

General, to “establish such regulations ... as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority” to 

implement “this chapter,” including § 1225(b)(1), and “all other laws relating to the immigration 

and naturalization of aliens.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,080 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (3), (g)(2)). 

As a result, under § 1252 a challenge to the IFR may be brought only in the District of Columbia, 

in accordance with the provisions of § 1252(e)(3); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). 

Accordingly, because § 1252(e) contemplates review of the challenged IFR exclusively in 

the District of Columbia, this Court must either transfer this case to the District of Columbia under 

28 U.S.C. § 1631, or dismiss it. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 

818 (1988). And, because this transfer motion raises threshold jurisdictional issues with this 

Court’s authority to hear this case, the Court should stay this case in its entirety pending resolution 

of this motion.1

BACKGROUND 

Expedited Removal. Congress has authorized the Department of Homeland Security 

(“DHS”) to summarily remove from the United States certain noncitizens who arrive at ports of 

entry or “certain other noncitizens” who recently entered the country as designated by the 

Secretary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Under this summary-removal mechanism—known as 

expedited removal—a noncitizen “arriving in the United States” who an immigration officer 

 

1 Defendants are aware of one other case challenging the IFR at issue in this case. See Arizona v. 

Garland, Case No. 6:22-cv-01130 (W.D. La.). Defendants are filing a similar motion to transfer 

and stay in that case.

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determines lacks valid entry documentation or makes certain kinds of material misrepresentations, 

shall be “order[ed] ... removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the 

noncitizen indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under [8 U.S.C. § 1158] or a fear of 

persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); see id. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7). 

Implementing regulations establish procedures to be used before effectuating an expedited 

removal order. Immigration officers must “advise the alien of the charges against him or her,” 

provide “an opportunity to respond to those charges in the sworn statement,” and provide an 

interpreter if needed. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i). A noncitizen may “present evidence” “that he or 

she was admitted or paroled into the United States,” or was “physically present ... continuously for 

the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility,” and therefore 

ineligible for expedited removal. Id. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii), (b)(6). And “any removal order,” the “sworn 

statement,” and any claims concerning a noncitizen’s status “must be reviewed and approved by 

the appropriate supervisor before the order is considered final.” Id. § 235.3(b)(7). 

Under current law, additional procedures apply if a noncitizen asserts an “intention to apply 

for asylum ... or a fear of persecution,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1158(a)(1), 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). In that situation, a noncitizen is provided a non-adversarial 

interview with an asylum officer at which the officer determines whether the noncitizen has a 

“credible fear of persecution,” and is also provided the rights to request de novo review of that 

determination by an immigration judge, to consult with a person of the noncitizen’s choosing 

during the credible fear process, and to an interpreter. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), 

(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), (B)(1)(B)(iv), (v); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(d), (d)(4), (d)(5); 1003.42(d), 

1208.30(g)(2). If the asylum officer or immigration judge determines that the noncitizen has a 

credible fear of persecution, the individual is “detained for further consideration of the application 

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for asylum,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), unless that individual is eligible for release on parole or 

bond. Although § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) does not specify how that “further consideration” should 

occur, currently operative regulations provide that the noncitizen is placed in full removal 

proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f). If the officer and immigration judge 

find that the noncitizen lacks such a fear, the noncitizen shall be “removed from the United States 

without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), (b)(1)(C); 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii), 

(e)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.42(f), 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). 

The IFR. On August 20, 2021, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice jointly 

published a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NRPM”). The NPRM proposed amending the 

regulations governing the procedures for determining “further consideration of the application for 

asylum,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), for individuals subject to expedited removal who are found 

to have a credible fear of persecution or torture under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and governing 

whether they may be released during the pendency of that application. See Procedures for Credible 

Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection 

Claims by Asylum Officers, 86 Fed. Reg. 46906 (Aug. 20, 2021); see also 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,079 

(explaining that the NPRM proposed “to amend the regulations governing the process for further 

consideration of asylum and related protection claims raised by individuals subject to expedited 

removal and found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture” under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)). 

On March 29, 2022, after receiving and reviewing public comments submitted in response 

to the NPRM, the Departments issued an IFR. See Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and 

Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum 

Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18,078 (Mar. 29, 2022). As the NPRM anticipated, the Departments issued 

the IFR to implement § 1225(b)(1), which the IFR notes “provides that if an asylum officer 

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determines that a noncitizen subject to expedited removal has a credible fear of persecution, the 

noncitizen shall receive ‘further consideration of the application for asylum.’” 87 Fed. Reg. at 

18,080. The “IFR addresses how that further consideration, including of the noncitizen’s related 

claims to statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection, will occur.” Id. at 18,080; 

see also id. at 18,085 (“this rule establishes a new process by which such ‘further consideration’ 

may occur, wherein a noncitizen will have their asylum claim adjudicated following an Asylum 

Merits interview before a USCIS asylum officer in the first instance, rather than by an IJ in section 

240 removal proceedings.”). 

STANDARD 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, “[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court ... and that court 

finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such 

action ... to any other such court ... in which the action ... could have been brought at the time it 

was filed.” Id.; see also Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., Inc., 3 F.4th 788, 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2021). 

As the Fifth Circuit recently held, § 1631 is mandatory: where subject matter jurisdiction is 

lacking, “§ 1631’s provisions apply to the [] case because the statute establishes a mandatory duty 

when it is triggered.” Franco, 3 F.4th at 795. The “statute therefore requires a transfer when a 

district court lacks” subject matter jurisdiction “and the other statutory prerequisites are met.” Id. 

(emphasis added). 

Section 1631 thus confers the authority on the Court “to make a single decision upon 

concluding that it lack[ed] jurisdiction—whether to dismiss the case or, ‘in the interest of justice,’ 

to transfer it to a court ... that has jurisdiction.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 

U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (reversing decision by court of appeals to address merits notwithstanding 

lack of jurisdiction, and holding that § 1631 required dismissal or transfer); see, e.g., Sanders v. 

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ExxonMobil Corp., No. SA-08-CA-590-OG, 2008 WL 11417386, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (citing 

Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818) (“For this reason, section 1631 ‘confers on the [courts] authority to 

make a single decision upon concluding that it lacks jurisdiction— whether to dismiss the case or, 

‘in the interest of justice,’ to transfer it’”); Cunningham v. Velstar, Inc., No. 

421CV00127ALMCAN, 2022 WL 483193, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2022), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-127, 2022 WL 476077 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022) 

(similar); Arias v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 20-00546-BAJ-SDJ, 2021 WL 1206600, at 

*2 (M.D. La. Mar. 30, 2021); Harutyunyan v. Love, No. CV 19-41, 2019 WL 5551901, at *4 (E.D. 

La. Oct. 28, 2019) (similar); TransFirst Grp., Inc. v. Magliarditi, 237 F. Supp. 3d 444, 456 (N.D. 

Tex. 2017) (similar); Schamerhorn v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. CIV.A. 01-914, 2009 WL 774964, 

at *6 (W.D. La. Mar. 23, 2009) (similar); International Pat Huval's Fisherman Wharf v. U.S. Int'l 

Trade Co., 29 ITRD 1994 (W.D. La. 2006); Awad v. United States, No. 1:93CV376-D-D, 2001 

WL 741638, at *7 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 27, 2001) (similar). “[I]f such a transfer is not ‘in the interest 

of justice,’ our sole alternative is to dismiss the [case].” USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 

647 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2011). 

“Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the 

subject matter before it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 

574, 583 (1999). Accordingly, both Article III and the federal rules of civil procedure require a 

court “to consider the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if it is not raised by the 

parties and to dismiss any action if such jurisdiction is lacking.” Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 

762 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and ln re Kutner, 656 F.2d 

1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1981)). Because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) bars jurisdiction in this Court, 

and because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) provides that the District of Columbia is the only court that 

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could possibly have jurisdiction over challenges to the IFR, if the Court does not dismiss, its only 

alternative is to transfer this matter to the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 

Finally, district courts have broad discretion to stay an action to control the course of 

litigation and promote judicial economy. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997); Landis v. N. 

Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1990); 

McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The district court has a general 

discretionary power to stay proceedings before it in the control of its docket and in the interests of 

justice.”); cf. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., No. CV 17-

818, 2017 WL 3175693, at *2 (W.D. La. July 24, 2017) (granting stay and noting it is “often 

advisable for a district court to defer resolution of certain pretrial matters until ... a decision with 

regard to whether a case should be transferred”). 

ARGUMENT 

The unambiguous statutory text of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) and § 1252(e)(3) foreclose 

jurisdiction for any review of or challenge to the IFR in this forum. Section 1252(a)(2)(A), titled 

“review relating to section 1225(b)(1),” states that “notwithstanding any other provision of law” 

and “except as provided in subsection (e),” no court has jurisdiction over any challenge to 

“decision[s] by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to invoke” the expedited removal provisions 

or to review any “procedures and policies adopted by the [Secretary] to implement the provisions 

of section 1225(b)(1).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv).2

 Section 1252(e) imposes several 

limitations on the “[j]udicial review” that is permitted related to “section 1225(b)(1).” Section 

 

2

 Sections 1225(b) and 1252(e) refer to the Attorney General, but those functions have been 

transferred to the Secretary for Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 552(d); Clark v. 

Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005). In any event, the IFR at issue here was jointly issued by 

DOJ and DHS under the authority of both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to issue implementing regulations. See 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,078, 18,080. 

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1252(e)(3), which is titled “[c]hallenges on validity of the system,” provides that “[j]udicial review 

of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its implementation is available in an action 

instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” (emphasis added). As 

relevant here, such review includes “determinations of . . . whether such a regulation, or a written 

policy directive, written policy guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the authority of 

the [Secretary] to implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions of this 

subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law.” Id. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). In other 

words, any rule or written policy implementing § 1225(b) may be challenged, if at all, only in the 

District Court for the District of Columbia. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno (“AILA”), 

199 F.3d 1352, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The statute permits judicial review of the ‘implementation’ 

of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), the provision spelling out the procedures for inspecting applicants for 

admission to the United States . . . only in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia.”); Brumme v. I.N.S., 275 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2001) (similar). 

Through § 1252(e)(3), Congress made clear that all challenges to regulations implementing 

§ 1225(b) must be considered by a single forum and under the special procedures laid out in 

§ 1252(e)(3). When Congress substantially revised the “inspection process” in the Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), AILA, 199 F.3d at 

1355, and codified the current version § 1225(b), H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–828, at 158, 209 

(1996), it included these specific limits on the permitted scope and forum for judicial review of 

the “procedures for inspecting applicants for admission to the United States.” AILA, 199 F.3d at 

1358; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(B). For the new procedures in § 1225(b) and any implementing 

guidance or regulations, Congress provided “that judicial review is available only in an action 

instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and is limited to whether 

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[§ 1225(b)(1)], or any regulations issued pursuant to that section, is constitutional, or whether the 

regulations, or a written policy directive, written policy guidance, or written procedures issued by 

the Attorney General are consistent with the INA or other law.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–828, at 

220-21; see also id. at 219 (“no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... except as provided in 

subsection (e), procedures and policies to implement section [1225](b)(1)”). 

As the D.C. Circuit explained in construing § 1252(e)(3), given the importance of the 

system “in § 1225(b) and its implementing regulations” to the inspection of noncitizens at or near 

the border, Congress meant to “cabin judicial review and to have the validity of the new law [or 

its implementation] decided promptly.” AILA, 199 F.3d at 1359, 1364; see also id. § 1252(e)(3)(D) 

(providing that cases filed with the District Court for the District of Columbia should be 

“expedite[d] to the greatest possible extent”). Congress also included other limits on the available 

avenues to challenge regulations implementing § 1225(b), such as precluding “class actions,” 

AILA, 199 F.3d at 1359, limiting declaratory and injunctive relief beyond that permitted 

specifically by § 1252(e), see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A), and providing that any implementing 

procedures would remain operative even as they were being challenged, see H.R. Rep. No. 104-

469, pt. 1, at 161 (1996) (“[C]ourts may issue injunctive relief pertaining to the case of an 

individual alien, and thus protect against any immediate violation of [individual] rights. However, 

single district courts or courts of appeals do not have authority to enjoin procedures established by 

Congress to reform the process of removing illegal aliens from the U.S.”).3

 3

 “A major objective of IIRIRA was to ‘protec[t] the Executive's discretion’ from undue 

interference by the courts; indeed, ‘that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.’” Dep’t 

of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1966 (2020) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab 

Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999)). Other provisions of § 1252 similarly limit 

and channel review of any issue arising in removal proceedings not covered by § 1252(e)(3)—

“including policies-and-practices challenges” to particular courts. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 

1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Make the Road v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 

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Congress thus channeled all challenges to agency action, rules, or policies implementing 

the provisions of § 1225(b)(1) to the District of Columbia, and that jurisdictional limitation applies 

regardless of whether the plaintiff is a noncitizen raising challenges related to his or her individual 

expedited removal action or a plaintiff more broadly raising challenges to rules or policies that 

relate to the implementation of the expedited removal process. The “review under Subsection 

1252(e)(3)” is “not textually confined to claims arising from individual removal actions.” Make 

the Road v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2020). “Congress included within Subsection 

1252(e)(3) ... claims that, by their terms, are not confined to individual expedited-removal 

proceedings,” including “challenges to ‘procedures and policies adopted by the [Secretary] to 

implement [the statute]’ divorced from any individual determination.” Id.

4

Plaintiff’s challenge to the IFR is precisely such a challenge to “implementation” of 

“section 1225(b).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). The IFR implements a provision of § 1225(b)(1), 

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which “provides that if an asylum officer determines that a noncitizen subject 

to expedited removal has a credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen shall receive ‘further 

consideration of the application for asylum.’” 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,080 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)). This IFR sets out procedures for implementing that “further consideration” 

 

(“What IIRIRA does in Section 1252 is route those legal and constitutional challenges to” 

particular “fora,” and “those challenges pertaining to the expedited removal program must be filed 

in the District of Columbia district court.”). 

4

 Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that it does not “challenge any ‘determinations’ under the 

expedited removal authority and its implementation,” Compl., ¶ 16, is thus without merit, as the 

judicial review provision is not limited to individual determinations. Moreover Plaintiff entirely 

ignores that § 1252(e)(3) governs “[j]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of 

this title and its implementation.” (emphasis added). As the D.C. Circuit has held in a case brought 

under § 1252(e)(3), “[t]he natural meaning of the singular ‘its’ points directly to litigation over 

Section 1225(b)’s implementation. ‘[S]ection 1225(b) of this title’ is also the last antecedent to 

which the word ‘its’ refers.” Make the Road, 962 F.3d at 625; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 

20, 26 (2003) (Under the “rule of the last antecedent,” a clause or phrase “should ordinarily be 

read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows[.]”). 

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contemplated by § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). See, e.g., 87 Fed. Reg. at 18,079 (noting the purpose of the 

IFR is “to amend the regulations governing the process for further consideration of asylum and 

related protection claims raised by individuals subject to expedited removal and found to have a 

credible fear of persecution or torture.”); id. at 18,080 (“This IFR addresses how that further 

consideration, including of the noncitizen’s related claims to statutory withholding of removal and 

CAT protection, will occur.”); id. at 18,085 (“this rule establishes a new process by which such 

‘further consideration’ may occur, wherein a noncitizen will have their asylum claim adjudicated 

following an Asylum Merits interview before a USCIS asylum officer in the first instance, rather 

than by an IJ in section 240 removal proceedings.”). 

Plaintiff’s complaint thus plainly seeks to challenge “implementation” of § 1225(b). Each 

of their five claims challenge a “policy or procedure,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv), that is, an IFR 

that implements § 1225(b)(1) by setting out how that statute will be applied to noncitizens subject 

to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii) (defining 

“implementation[s]” of § 1225(b) to include “a regulation, or a written policy directive, written 

policy guideline, or written procedure”) (emphasis added); see also Webster’s Third International 

Dictionary (1987) (defining “implement” as “to give practical effect to and ensure of actual 

fulfillment by concrete measures”); Implement, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (April 29, 

2022), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implement (to “carry out, accomplish” or 

“provide instruments ... for.”). 

Plaintiff first challenges the IFR’s “use of asylum officers”—rather than “immigration 

judges”—“to adjudicate final asylum claims after a credible fear interview.” Compl. ¶ 63. Plaintiff 

thus challenges how the IFR implements the “further consideration of the application for asylum” 

in § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) that follows the “interview” to assess “credible fear of persecution,” under 

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12 

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Plaintiff’s third claim raises a similar challenge that “[t]he Interim Rule 

empowers asylum officers” to consider applications for asylum, Compl. ¶ 67, which Plaintiff 

alleges is an improper “transfer of adjudicatory authority” from immigration judges, Compl. ¶ 69. 

Section § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) forecloses jurisdiction in this district over such challenges to 

whether “any regulation issued to implement” § 1225(b) “is constitutional; or whether such a 

regulation ...is otherwise in violation of law.” Cf. Castellar v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-00491, 2021 

WL 4081559, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (“Whether and when to present” an “individual to an 

immigration judge ... concerns a means by which to carry out, accomplish, or provide an 

instrument for ... individuals subject to expedited removal proceedings and thus concerns the 

implementation of Section 1225(b)(1),” and “Section 1252(e)(3) channels such actions to the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia”). 

Plaintiff also challenges how the IFR implements “Defendants’ parole authority” for 

noncitizens subject to expedited removal. Compl. ¶ 64. The IFR’s parole provisions apply 

exclusively to individuals subject to § 1225(b)(1) and therefore implement that provision. See 87 

Fed. Reg. at 18,082 (“this rule establishes the regulatory authority for consideration for parole of 

noncitizens in expedited removal or in expedited removal with pending credible fear 

determinations” (emphasis added)); see also Compl. ¶ 49-10 (alleging the IFR “allowed ‘for 

consideration for parole of [aliens] in expedited removal or in expedited removal with pending 

credible fear determinations’”). These provisions thus “concern[] a means by which to carry out, 

accomplish, or provide an instrument for a mandatory detention applicable to individuals subject 

to expedited removal proceedings and thus concerns the implementation of Section 1225(b)(1).” 

Castellar, 2021 WL 4081559, at *6. 

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13 

To the extent Plaintiff argues the IFR’s parole provisions are “contrary to law” based on 

other statutory provisions in the same subchapter of the Immigration and Nationality Act as 8 

U.S.C. § 1225, Compl. ¶ 64, that is of no moment. The strict limitations on “[j]udicial review” of 

the “implementation” of § 1225(b) to “the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A), extend to claims such as this which would require a court 

to assess “whether such a regulation ... to implement such section” is “not consistent with 

applicable provisions of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law,” id.; see also Castellar, 

2021 WL 4081559, at *5-6 (Section 1252(e)(3) limits any challenges to the “means” used by the 

government “to carry out or accomplish the expedited removal scheme set forth in Section 

1225(b),” including challenges related to “detention” of individuals subject to that scheme). 

Plaintiff’s final two claims challenge the IFR as arbitrary and capricious under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), see Compl. ¶¶ 70-77, and as allegedly providing 

insufficient notice and opportunity to comment, id. ¶ 78. In these two claims, Plaintiff challenges 

the manner in which the IFR was promulgated, but does not dispute that the IFR implements the 

provisions of § 1225(b)(1)(B) governing “consideration of the application for asylum” following 

a credible fear interview—nor could Plaintiff do so, see supra at 10-11. These claims are thus 

similarly barred in this forum by § 1252(e)(3) and by § 1252(a)(2)(A), which otherwise bars 

review of “procedures and policies” that “implement the provisions of section 1225(b)(1)” 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory).” See M.M.V. v. Garland, 

1 F.4th 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (holding § 1252(e)(3) restricts jurisdiction outside the District 

of Columbia for APA challenges to rules implementing the expedited removal process because 

“[t]he bar is keyed to the nature of the challenged agency action, not the basis for the challenge” 

and so it channels APA claims, whether “procedural” or “substantive”); S.L.V. v. Rosen, No. 21-

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cv-0017, 2021 WL 243442, at *4-5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction 

and explaining that § 1252(e) “lists what relief is unavailable ‘[w]ithout regard to the nature of the 

action or claim and without regard to the identity of the party or parties bringing the action’” and 

provides “clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial review” by a 

district court in this circuit); Reyes v. Nielsen, No. CV H-18-3971, 2020 WL 1442349, at *3 (S.D. 

Tex. Feb. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Sequeria Reyes v. Nielsen, No. 

4:18-CV-3971, 2020 WL 1444920 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2020) (limitation on systemic challenges 

related “to the legality and constitutionality of the expedited removal regime” apply “[r]egardless 

of how Plaintiff characterizes [the] claims” including claims “under the APA or Mandamus Act.”). 

Except for the “[r]eview relating to section 1225(b)(1)” Congress authorized in the District 

of Columbia, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” “procedures and policies adopted by the 

Attorney General to implement the provisions of section 1225(b)(1).” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv); see Brumme, 275 F.3d at 447 (5th Cir. 2001) (“IIRIRA recognizes limited 

judicial review, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of certain 

challenges to the expedited removal ‘system’.”); see also Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

835 F.3d 422, 430, 432 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The expedited removal statutes are express and 

unambiguous” and “[t]he clarity of the language forecloses acrobatic attempts at interpretation” 

and “makes abundantly clear that if jurisdiction exists to review any claim related to an expedited 

removal order, it exists only under subsection (e) of the statute.”); United States v. BarajasAlvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1087 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing § 1252(e)(3)); Khan v. Holder, 

608 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2010) (similar); Rodrigues v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

No. 3:20-CV-0139-B, 2020 WL 777278, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020) (“systemic challenges to 

the validity of any regulation implementing the expedited removal statute must be brought in the 

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15 

District Court for the District of Columbia.”); Shah v. Director, No. 3:19-CV-1164, 2019 WL 

4254139, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 6, 2019) (explaining that § 1252(e)(3) requires any “challenges on 

the validity of the [expedited removal] system” to be brought in the District of Columbia and that 

no jurisdiction existed for any such challenge in the Western District of Louisiana). Plaintiff’s 

claims thus can be raised, if at all, only “as provided in subsection (e),” in the District of Columbia. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), (e)(3); see also Make the Road, 962 F.3d at 625-26 (explaining 

that “Congress underscored” the permitted “judicial review over legal challenges to the rules 

implementing the expedited removal system ...by emphasizing that review is barred ‘except as 

provided in subsection (e).’”); AILA, 199 F.3d at 1354 (“8 U.S.C. § 1252 provides the exclusive 

jurisdictional basis for challenging the removal procedures.”).5

 

Because § 1252(e)(3) applies, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case and 

must dismiss it on its own motion. Under Rule 12(h)(3), the Court may dismiss a case at any time, 

if it “determines ... that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Because Plaintiff’s complaint on its 

face challenges implementation of § 1225(b), no amendment of the complaint in this forum will 

cure the jurisdictional deficiencies. Alternatively, if the Court does not dismiss this case, it may 

 5

 Plaintiff does not acknowledge cases addressing expedited removal policies or procedures 

through the exclusive judicial review scheme Congress established, perhaps because they arise 

exclusively in the District Court for the District of Columbia, as required under § 1252, and thus 

undermine the entire premise of their claim of jurisdiction in this Court. See, e.g., M.M.V., 1 F.4th 

at 1107-11; Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 887-88 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Make the Road, 962 F.3d at 

625-26; AILA, 199 F.3d at 1355-58; A.B.-B. v. Morgan, 548 F. Supp. 3d 209, 217 (D.D.C. 2020); 

Las Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Wolf, 507 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2020); Kiakombua v. 

Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kiakombua v. Mayorkas, 

No. 20-5372, 2021 WL 3716392 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 2021); L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 

1, 9 (D.D.C. 2020); Vijender v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-3337, 2020 WL 1935556, *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 

2020); Dugdale v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 88 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2015). Nor does 

Plaintiff acknowledge the many cases in this Circuit that find that § 1252(a)(2)(A) and 

§ 1252(e)(3) bar jurisdiction over challenges to policies or procedures implementing § 1225(b)(1). 

See supra at 13-14.

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16 

transfer this matter to the District of Columbia in the interest of justice, see 28 U.S.C. § 1631, in 

order to allow that court to determine in the first instance whether it has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(e)(3) and whether such a suit may proceed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(B); see also supra 

at 5-6. In moving for such a transfer, the government asserts only that the District of Columbia is 

the only federal court that could possibly have jurisdiction for challenges to the IFR. With respect 

to the Plaintiff in this case, while the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction over all such 

claims, the government does not concede that Plaintiff has pled cognizable claims that satisfy 

§ 1252(e)(3) or that Plaintiff has standing or a cause of action to raise the claims contained in the 

complaint in that district. The government reserves the right to contest those issues as appropriate 

if relevant. 

Finally, the Court should stay this case until it decides the threshold jurisdictional question 

presented in this motion and whether to transfer this case to the District of Columbia. “Article III 

generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before 

it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 583. “For a court to pronounce upon 

the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, 

by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 

83, 101-02 (1998). Because § 1252(a)(2)(A) and § 1252(e)(3) are unambiguous and clear, this 

Court lacks jurisdiction to litigate the merits of this case in any respect. Accordingly, while this 

transfer motion is pending, the Court should “defer resolution” or other matters pending “a 

decision with regard to whether a case should be transferred.” Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. 

Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., No. CV 17-818, 2017 WL 3175693, at *2 (W.D. La. July 

24, 2017); see also e.g., Direct Innovations, L.L.C. v. Weisgarber, No. CIV.A. H-14-3211, 2015 

WL 1976558, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2015) (staying case pending resolution of questions related 

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17 

to jurisdiction and whether case should be transferred); Evans v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CIV.A. 

H-14-2800, 2014 WL 7342404, at *3, 6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014); DeLeon v. Tey, No. 7:13-CV439, 2013 WL 7157957, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2013). 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court should conclude that sections 1252(a)(2)(A) and 1252(e)(3) 

foreclose jurisdiction in this Court and, if the Court does not dismiss this case without prejudice 

on that basis, transfer the matter to the District Court for the District of Columbia. Because the 

Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims in this matter, the Court should also stay this case in its 

entirety pending resolution of this motion. 

Case 2:22-cv-00094-Z Document 7 Filed 04/29/22 Page 23 of 25 PageID 212
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Dated: April 29, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 

 

 BRIAN M. BOYNTON 

 Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

 WILLIAM C. PEACHEY 

 Director 

Office of Immigration Litigation 

District Court Section 

EREZ REUVENI 

Assistant Director

/s/ Brian C. Ward 

BRIAN C. WARD 

Senior Litigation Counsel 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Civil Division 

Office of Immigration Litigation 

District Court Section 

P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station 

Washington, DC 20044 

Tel.: (202) 616-9121 

brian.c.ward@usdoj.gov 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 

I hereby certify that on April 29, 2022, I conferred with counsel for Plaintiff about the 

relief requested in this motion. Plaintiff opposes this motion. 

/s/ Brian C. Ward 

BRIAN C. WARD 

U.S. Department of Justice 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on April 29, 2022, I electronically filed this motion with the Clerk of 

the Court for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas by using the 

CM/ECF system. Counsel in the case are registered CM/ECF users and service will be 

accomplished by the CM/ECF system. 

/s/ Brian C. Ward 

BRIAN C. WARD 

U.S. Department of Justice 

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