IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ALEXANDER BAKER, §

PLAINTIFF, §

§

V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-741-X-BK

§

ANITA TAPIA, ET AL., §

DEFENDANTS. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this case was referred to the United 

States magistrate judge for case management, including the issuance of findings and a 

recommended disposition where appropriate. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and 

applicable law, this action should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, sua sponte, for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2022, Alexander Baker of Dallas, Texas, filed a pro se complaint against his 

landlord, Indio Management Company, and managers Anita Tapia and Patricia Bethencourt. 

Doc. 3 at 1. Baker complains Defendants failed to fix a leak in his ceiling, thereby making his

“living conditions uninhabitable.” Doc. 3 at 1. He asserts that the leak has caused mold to grow 

on the ceiling and that a lot of his belongings have been ruined due to the leak. Doc. 3 at 1. 

In the Civil Cover Sheet, Baker checks the boxes for (1) plaintiff and defendant as 

citizens of this state and (2) defendant incorporated/principal business in this state. Doc. 3 at 2. 

He also checks the box for civil rights “housing/accommodation” for the nature of suit. Id.

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II. ANALYSIS

The Court should always examine, sua sponte, if necessary, the threshold question of 

whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. System Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor 

Kurnatovsky, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

action.”). Unless otherwise provided by statute, a federal district court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over (1) a federal question arising under the Constitution, a federal law, or a treaty, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) a case where there is complete diversity of citizenship between 

parties and the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “Under the wellpleaded complaint rule, ‘a federal court has original or removal jurisdiction only if a federal 

question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; generally, there is no 

federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action.’” Gutierrez v. 

Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2008). 

The Court liberally construes Baker’s complaint with all deference due a pro se litigant. 

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings are “to be liberally 

construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Cf. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under this most 

liberal construction, however, Baker has not alleged facts that establish federal question or 

diversity jurisdiction.

“A federal question exists only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint 

establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief 

necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Singh v. Duane 

Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 

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omitted). However, the complaint in this case does not support federal question jurisdiction, as 

Baker does not allege any constitutional or federal statutory violation. At best, he alleges only 

state claims arising from a landlord-tenant dispute. Moreover, his fleeting mention of civil rights 

violations stemming from a “housing/accommodations” matter is insufficient to invoke the 

Court’s federal question jurisdiction. See Girard v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 12-CV-4264-N, 

2013 WL 5873297, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2013) (Godbey, J.) (adopting magistrate judge’s 

dismissal recommendation because plaintiff’s “single passing reference” to a federal statute did 

not constitute a cause of action, and was not “sufficient to support the exercise of federal 

question jurisdiction”); see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust v. Broussard, No. 13-CV-1400, 2013 

WL 3185919, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2013) (Lynn, J.) (adopting magistrate judge’s dismissal 

recommendation because “vague references to various federal statutes . . . are insufficient to 

support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction”). 

Additionally, Baker’s scant pleadings, including his assertion that all Defendants are

located in or incorporated/doing business in Texas defeats subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis 

of diversity. Doc. 3 at 2; see Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2003)

(finding district court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff shares the same state 

of citizenship as any one of the defendants) (citation omitted). And because the complaint does 

not present a sufficient basis for federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the Court cannot 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Baker may be attempting to assert. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

III. LEAVE TO AMEND

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint prior to 

dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pled his “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke,

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587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, the facts as alleged by Baker in his amended 

complaint clearly demonstrate a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. Thus, granting 

leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 

SO RECOMMENDED on April 7, 2022.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by 

law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific 

written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific 

written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon 

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time 

to file objections to 14 days). 

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