J-S06037-23

2023 PA SUPER 42

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIK CHARLES LAWRENCE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1019 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-31-CR-0000243-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 15, 2023

Appellant Erik Charles Lawrence appeals the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County after Appellant 

pleaded guilty to Driving While Operating Privilege is Suspended or RevokedDUI Related (3rd offense) (hereinafter, “DWS”)1 and False Identification to a 

Law Enforcement Officer.2 We affirm.

On March 17, 2021, Trooper Briona Mort conducted a traffic stop of a 

motorcycle driven by an individual later discovered to be Appellant. Initially, 

Appellant claimed to be “Brian Lawrence,” the owner of the subject 

motorcycle, which had no working rear lights and an expired inspection.

Appellant subsequently identified himself correctly and indicated that he gave 

the trooper false information as his license was DUI suspended.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(iii).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914(a).
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On March 18, 2022, Appellant entered a guilty plea to DWS - DUI 

Related (3rd offense) and False Identification to a Law Enforcement Officer. At 

the plea hearing, defense counsel argued that it would be unconstitutional to 

impose a sentence of imprisonment on the DWS conviction. The trial court 

deferred sentencing to hear oral argument on this issue.

On May 23, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six to twelve 

months’ imprisonment on the DWS conviction, a consecutive one-year term 

of probation on the False Identification conviction, along with a $2,500 fine 

for the DWS conviction. On June 8, 2022, the trial court entered an amended 

sentencing order which corrected the name of the DWS charge and its grading 

as a third-degree misdemeanor.

On June 22, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed 

at 931 MDA 2022. After the appeal was already pending, the trial court entered 

another amended sentence on July 14, 2022, changing the language of the 

order which originally stated that the sentence of confinement was 

consecutive to the probationary sentence and modified it to clarify that the 

term of imprisonment would be served first. On July 19, 2022, Appellant filed 

a second notice of appeal, which was docketed at 1019 MDA 2022.

On September 26, 2022, this Court directed Appellant to show cause as 

to why the appeal docketed at 931 MDA 2022 should not be dismissed as 

duplicative of the appeal docketed at 1019 MDA 2022. On September 29, 

2022, Appellant filed a response, explaining the procedural history of the case 

and agreeing to dismiss the appeal at 931 MDA 2022 so long as it did not 
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prejudice the timeliness of the appeal docketed at 1019 MDA 2022. On 

October 17, 2022, this Court dismissed the appeal docketed at 931 MDA 2022.

Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must address whether the 

trial court properly amended its sentencing order on July 14, 2022 once this 

appeal was pending. Trial courts are typically divested of jurisdiction over a 

case once a notice of appeal is filed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (courts may 

modify or rescind an order within 30 days after its entry, so long as no appeal 

has been taken); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (after an appeal is taken, the 

trial court may no longer proceed further in the matter). However, trial courts 

have the inherent power to correct patent and obvious mistakes even if they 

are without jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1227-28

(Pa. 2013).

The trial court’s second amended sentence, entered on July 14, 2022, 

during the pendency of this appeal, appears to have only corrected the linked 

sentences at the bottom of the order. While the order had stated that the 

term of incarceration would be served consecutive to the probationary term, 

the trial court corrected the order to state that probation would be served 

consecutive to the term of incarceration. As the trial court amended its 

sentence to correct a patent mistake, it was permitted to enter the amended 

sentence during the pendency of the appeal.

The instant notice of appeal was timely filed within thirty days of the 

entry of the July 14, 2022 sentencing order. As such, we may proceed to 

review the merits of this appeal.
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Appellant raises one issue for our review:

Whether the absence of a maximum term renders the pertinent 

Driving Under Suspension – DUI Related sentencing provision 

under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(iii) unconstitutionally vague 

violating state and federal due process provisions?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5 (footnote omitted).

Appellant’s claim challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing 

statute set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(iii) as unconstitutionally vague 

implicates the legality of sentence. Commonwealth v. White, 268 A.3d 499, 

500 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citing Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 993 

(Pa. 2021)). “A sentencing court does not have authority to sentence a 

defendant pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague sentencing statute.”

White, 268 A.3d at 500 (quoting Moore, 247 A.3d at 997). “As with all 

questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Boyd, 287 A.3d 957, 959 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 608 (Pa. 2020)).

Appellant contends that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is unconstitutionally 

vague as it only provides a specific term for the minimum sentence and does 

not specify a maximum term of incarceration. In support of his claim, 

Appellant relies on the decisions in Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030, 

1044 (Pa. 2021) and Commonwealth v. Jackson, 271 A.3d 1286 (Pa.Super. 

2022). However, those cases are distinguishable from the case at bar. 

In Eid, the defendant was convicted of the summary offense of DWS 

set forth at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i), which applied when an individual 
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was found to be driving with a suspended or revoked license and refused a 

breath test. Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) provided that an individual found in 

violation of this section “shall, upon first conviction, be guilty of a summary 

offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo 

imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1543(b)(1.1)(i) (emphasis added). Eid was sentenced to a term of ninety days 

to six months’ imprisonment as well as a $1,000 fine.

On appeal, our Supreme Court ruled that Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) was 

“unconstitutionally vague and inoperable” as the provision failed to provide a 

maximum term of incarceration. Eid, 249 A.3d at 1044. Although the Supreme 

Court affirmed Eid’s DWS conviction and fine, it vacated the imprisonment 

term as it declined to infer a maximum sentence, which would have forced the 

Court to “engage in sheer speculation as to which sentence the General 

Assembly intended.” Id. at 1044-45.

Thereafter, in Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to the summary 

offense of DWS set forth at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), which applied when 

an individual was found to have a second DWS violation. Section 

1543(b)(1)(ii) provided “[a] second violation of this [crime] shall constitute a 

summary offense and, upon conviction [ ], a person shall be sentenced to pay 

a fine of $1,000[.00] and to undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.”

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i) (emphasis added). The defendant in Jackson

was sentenced to ninety days of house arrest and a $1,000 fine.
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On appeal, this Court found in Jackson that Section 1543(b)(1)(ii) was 

unconstitutionally vague and inoperable as it contained identical language as 

the statute struck down in Eid which provided a minimum prison sentence but 

failed to provide for a maximum term of incarceration. Consistent with the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Eid, this Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction and 

the imposition of the fine, but vacated the house arrest portion of the 

sentence.

In this case, Appellant was convicted of the third-degree misdemeanor 

offense set forth at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(iii), which applies when an 

individual is found to have a third DWS violation. Appellant claims that Section 

1543(b)(1)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague as it does not specifically provide 

for a maximum term of imprisonment and contains the identical phrase struck 

down as improper in Eid and Jackson.

Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle Code provides that “[a] third or 

subsequent violation of this paragraph shall constitute a misdemeanor of the 

third degree and, upon conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be 

sentenced to pay a fine of $2,500 and to undergo imprisonment for not less 

than six months.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).

However, Appellant fails to acknowledge that this case involves 

sentencing on a third-degree misdemeanor while the defendants in Eid and 

Jackson were sentenced on summary offenses. This distinction is important 

because the Vehicle Code specifically provides that the Crimes Code’s 

provisions regarding fines and imprisonment are not applicable to summary 
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convictions under the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 6502(c) (“Title 18 (relating 

to crimes and offenses), insofar as it relates to fines and imprisonment for 

convictions of summary offenses, is not applicable to this title”).

In comparison, there is no equivalent statutory provision that prohibits

the application of the Crimes Code to misdemeanor convictions under the 

Vehicle Code. Therefore, Appellant’s third-degree misdemeanor conviction

under Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is governed by Crimes Code’s provisions that 

limit the maximum sentence for third-degree misdemeanors to be one year 

imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 106(b)(8); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(3). As a result, 

unlike in Eid and Jackson, the trial court in this case was not compelled to 

speculate as to the maximum sentence of incarceration when sentencing 

Appellant for a violation of Section 1543(b)(1)(iii).
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Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s claim that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is 

unconstitutionally vague and we affirm the judgment of sentence.3

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2023

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3 We acknowledge that this Court previously rejected an identical challenge to 

the constitutionality of Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) in Commonwealth v. Rollins, 

161 EDA 2021 (Pa.Super. December 21, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), 

appeal granted, 27 MAL 2022 (Pa. 2022). Our Supreme Court has granted 

Rollins’s petition for allowance of appeal in that case and the appeal is 

currently pending.