UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00297-O

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiff John Doe’s Emergency Motion to Hold Non-Party Jane Roe 

in Contempt of Court and to Compel Roe’s Deposition (ECF No. 125), filed November 9, 2022; 

Non-Party Jane Roe’s Response to Motion to Hold in Contempt and Motion to Compel Deposition 

and Jane Roe’s Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash (ECF No. 131), filed November 

14, 2022; Plaintiff’s Reply to Non-Party Jane Roe’s Response to Plaintiff John Doe’s Emergency 

Motion to Hold Non-Party Jane Roe in Contempt of Court and to Compel Roe’s Deposition (ECF 

No. 136), filed November 17, 2022; Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Non-Party Jane Roe’s 

Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash (ECF No. 150), filed November 30, 2022; 

Defendant’s Corrected Response to Non-Party Jane Roe’s Motion for Protective Order and Motion 

to Quash (ECF No. 158), filed December 1, 2022; and Non-Party Jane Roe’s Reply in Support of 

Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash (ECF No. 162), filed December 5, 2022. The 

parties have briefed their cross-motions and the issues are ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff John Doe’s and Non-Party Jane Roe’s cross-motions arise from Roe’s recent 

deposition, which occurred November 3, 2022. Among other things, both parties accuse the other 

of egregious conduct that supports their opposing motions to compel or quash the remainder of 

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Roe’s deposition. To briefly summarize, mid-way through the deposition, Roe terminated 

questioning and left the building, claiming that Doe’s counsel engaged in harassing and oppressive 

conduct. Doe, on the other hand, claims that Roe engaged in improper conduct—evasive testimony

and uncooperative behavior—and unilaterally terminated her deposition without a legitimate basis

for doing so. He says this conduct justifies a finding of contempt and moves to compel the 

remainder of Roe’s Court-ordered deposition. In response, Roe moves for a protective order and 

to quash (i) the remainder of her deposition testimony and (ii) Doe’s subpoena requiring her to 

testify at the parties’ upcoming trial in January. 

Having considered the parties’ briefing, supporting evidence, and applicable law, the Court 

DENIES Doe’s Motion to Hold Non-Party Jane Roe in Contempt, GRANTS in part Doe’s 

Motion to Compel (ECF No. 125), and DENIES in part Roe’s Motion for Protective Order and 

Motion to Quash (ECF No. 131). The Court will not address Roe’s motion with respect to the trial 

subpoena in this Order and reserves resolution of that issue for a later date. 

II. DOE’S MOTIONS TO HOLD ROE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND TO 

COMPEL DEPOSITION

This Court has inherent authority and discretion to enforce its own orders. Degen v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g) (“The court . . . may hold in 

contempt a person who . . . fails without adequate excuse to obey [a] subpoena or an order related 

to it.”). When a party seeks a civil contempt order, the movant must establish, “by clear and 

convincing evidence, ‘(1) that a court order was in effect, (2) that the order required certain conduct 

by the respondent, and (3) that the respondent failed to comply with the court’s order.’” Lyn-Lea 

Travel Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting FDIC v. 

LeGrand, 43 F.3d 163, 170 (5th Cir. 1995)). A refusal to answer questions after being directed to 

do so by the Court may be grounds for civil contempt. In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust 

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Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1090 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Lincoln Laboratories, Inc. v. Savage 

Laboratories, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 476, 4779 (D. Del. 1961)). 

The Court has reviewed the deposition transcript and video footage in their entirety. 

Despite the fact that she did offer some evasive responses throughout her deposition, the Court 

agrees with Roe that she was not ordered to answer specific questions and that a finding of 

contempt on this basis is improper. Nor is the Court persuaded that her referral back to her Title 

IX testimony regarding the details of the alleged assaults—without the Court’s specific resolution 

of this issue prior to deposition—qualifies as contempt-worthy conduct. Finally, the Court does 

not find that her unilateral termination of the deposition justifies a finding of contempt. 

A movant has a right to terminate or limit a deposition “on the ground that it is being 

conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the 

deponent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(A). Such motion is to be made during the deposition and, if 

the objecting party demands, the deposition must be suspended until the Court resolves the motion. 

Id.; Homes v. N. Tex. Health Care Laundry Coop. Ass’n, No. 3:15-CV-2117-L, 2016 WL 2609995, 

at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2016). 

The parties dispute whether Roe satisfied Rule 30’s requisite procedural requirements prior 

to terminating her deposition. Doe claims that Roe should have formally moved to terminate the 

deposition while questioning was ongoing. Because Roe did not formally so “move,” as required 

by the Rule, Doe argues she should be held in contempt. To the contrary, Roe claims she properly, 

and on the record, “reserve[d] [her] rights to seek redress” with the Court as required, which she 

says clearly satisfies the requirements of Rule 30. Though the Court does not find that Doe’s 

counsel’s behavior amounted to bad faith harassment,1the Court agrees that Roe’s counsel 

1 Repetitive question asking where a deponent has offered evasive answers is not harassment. See, e.g., 

Kasparov v. Ambit Tex., LLC, No. 3:16-cv-3206-G-BN, 2017 WL 4842350, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017) 

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adequately moved to terminate the deposition on his good faith belief that his client was being 

subjected to unreasonably embarrassment and oppression. Thus, the Court does not find contempt 

appropriate here and DENIES Doe’s motion for the same. 

Doe also moves to compel Roe to finish her deposition. Rule 37 permits a party to move 

the Court for an order compelling another party (or here, non-party) for cooperation in discovery. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). The Court has some discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the movant 

depending on the ultimate disposition of the motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5).

Although the Court does not find Roe in contempt of Court based on her deposition 

testimony thus far, or for terminating her deposition on the good faith (albeit somewhat misguided) 

belief that Doe’s counsel was engaging in improper conduct, the Court finds that completion of 

her testimony is necessary in light of Doe’s need for information, which the Court has analyzed 

extensively in its prior decisions litigating the relevance of Roe’s testimony to this lawsuit. See 

Orders, ECF Nos. 96, 118. Based on its prior reasoning, which it incorporates here by reference, 

the Court GRANTS in part Doe’s motion to compel, subject to the additional protective 

conditions outlined below. 

(finding that counsel did not “cross the line in asking questions multiple times if counsel believes the 

witness has not given a responsive answer. . . . ‘[D]epositions have more flexibility than interrogatories 

because they permit an attorney to ask follow-up questions based on answer to previous questions or repeat 

questions if a deponent is being evasive’”) (cleaned up); (Carroll v. Jaques, 926 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (E.D. 

Tex. 1996) (finding that Plaintiff’s counsel’s repetitive questions were necessitated by the deponent’s 

unwillingness to answer questions and did not constitute “harassment” sufficient to absolve a party’s 

contempt). Nor is the Court persuaded—again, having reviewed the entire deposition recording—that Doe’s 

counsel’s conduct as a whole qualifies as bad faith behavior that he engaged in for the express purpose of 

harassing, oppressing, or needlessly embarrassing Roe. 

In addition, Roe cites to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, and asks this Court to protect Roe from 

having to undergo any further invasion of privacy, embarrassment, or sexual stereotyping associated with 

questions related to her sexual history. Doe’s counsel did not violate this rule, as none of his questions 

pertained to Roe’s other sexual behavior or her sexual predisposition as it related to anyone other than Doe. 

Indeed, the Court crafted its prior Orders (ECF Nos. 96, 118) with this specific Rule in mind. 

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III. ROE’S MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND TO QUASH 

COMPLETION OF HER DEPOSITION

Under Rule 26, a movant may ask the Court, “for good cause,” to issue a protective order 

“to protect [her] from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden” in the course of 

discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). Good causes requires a specific demonstration of such 

embarrassing or oppressive conduct. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981). Under 

Rule 45, the Court “must quash or modify” a subpoena that “subjects a person to undue burden.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). The party opposing the subpoena has the burden 

of proving that compliance would be “unreasonable and oppressive,” a fact-specific determination 

for which courts consider several items: (1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need 

of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered 

by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and 

(6) the burden imposed. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(cleaned up) (applying the rule to subpoenas duces tecum). 

Generally, “modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it outright.” Id. at 818. 

This is in keeping with the general rule that discovery rules are to be broadly and liberally 

construed. Aderholt v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 7:15-CV-00162, 2016 WL 11782267, at *2 

(N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2016). When imposing limitations on discovery, courts have broad discretion 

to craft appropriate protective orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 

F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985).

Roe employs both Rule 26 and Rule 45 to ask this Court to protect her from any further 

participation in this litigation—including completion of her (twice-litigated and Court-ordered) 

deposition and from having to appear at trial. Upon terminating the deposition, Roe’s counsel cited 

Doe’s counsel’s purportedly oppressive conduct, including repeated questioning (despite her 

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counsel’s objection and Roe’s refusal to answer) about the details of Roe’s alleged sexual assaults. 

Roe characterizes Doe’s counsel’s conduct as bad faith, purposeful harassment that justifies a 

protective order or quashing. As noted above, the Court does not find that Doe’s counsel’s conduct 

meets that threshold. However, Roe also raises new evidence of the undue burden associated with 

her recent deposition and the stress of further participation in this lawsuit. 

In support of her motions for a protective order and to quash, Roe has produced multiple 

supporting affidavits indicating the burden that participation in this lawsuit has imposed on her. 

This evidence includes affidavits from Roe’s treating counselors regarding their belief that 

requiring Roe’s further participation in this lawsuit may pose a suicide risk, as Roe has made 

statements that she considers death a viable alternative to offering further testimony about the 

sexual assault allegations which gave rise to this lawsuit between Doe and TCU. Roe’s parents 

have also provided affidavits indicating Roe has dropped out of her classes for the remainder of 

the semester and moved home to live with her parents in the interim. 

The Court has reviewed all of the affidavits, as well as the deposition transcript and 

corresponding video footage in their entirety. The Court takes each into consideration in issuing 

this ruling. As noted above, the Court does not find that Doe’s counsel’s conduct rises to the level

of bad faith or purposeful harassment that justifies quashing the remainder of Roe’s deposition. 

Moreover, the Court’s prior reasoning with respect to Doe’s need for discovery from Roe still 

stands. In light of Roe’s proffered evidence regarding the increased burden that compelling her 

testimony has imposed, however, the Court finds that additional protections are necessary to 

protect her from any undue burden that may come with requiring her to complete her deposition. 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Roe complete her deposition under the following 

conditions: 

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1. Roe’s deposition shall be held at 1:30pm on Tuesday, December 27th, 2022 in 

the 2nd Floor Courtroom of the Federal Courthouse in Forth Worth (501 West 10th

Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102); 

2. The time allotted for completion of Roe’s deposition is one hour and forty-five 

minutes; 

3. The undersigned shall preside over the deposition, shall decide any objections and 

relevancy determinations, and shall monitor any purportedly inappropriate 

behavior on the part of either party; and

4. Unless otherwise jointly stipulated by the parties, the parties’ prior agreements with 

respect to the number of attorneys and additional persons who may be present 

during the deposition shall apply. 

The Court has balanced Roe’s stated hardship with Doe’s need to obtain relevant 

information and, in its discretion, finds that modifying Roe’s deposition accordingly is more 

appropriate than quashing it outright. For purposes of monitoring the deposition and relevancy of 

any of Doe’s questions throughout, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file on the docket a SEALED 

transcript of Roe’s prior testimony given during the Title IX panel hearing no later than 

December 16, 2022 for the Court’s review. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court DENIES Doe’s Motion for Contempt, GRANTS in part 

Doe’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 125) and DENIES in part Roe’s Motion for Protective Order 

and Motion to Quash (ECF No. 131). The Court leaves the remainder of Roe’s Motion to Quash 

with respect to her trial testimony for later resolution. Any relief requested by Doe that was not 

expressly granted herein is DENIED. 

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SO ORDERED on this 15th day of December, 2022.

_____________________________________

Reed O’Connor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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