Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JEFFERSON DUNN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v.
 

VERNON MADISON
 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 17–193. Decided November 6, 2017

 PER CURIAM. 

More than 30 years ago, Vernon Madison crept up behind police officer Julius Schulte and shot him twice in the 

head at close range. An Alabama jury found Madison 

guilty of capital murder. The trial court sentenced him to 

death. See Ex parte Madison, 718 So. 2d 104, 105–106 

(1998).

In 2016, as Madison’s execution neared, he petitioned

the trial court for a suspension of his death sentence. He 

argued that, due to several recent strokes, he has become

incompetent to be executed. The court held a hearing to 

receive testimony from two psychologists who had examined Madison and prepared reports concerning his competence. The court’s appointed psychologist, Dr. Karl Kirkland, reported that, although Madison may have “suffered 

a significant decline post-stroke, . . . [he] understands the 

exact posture of his case at this point,” and appears to 

have a “rational understanding of . . . the results or effects” of his death sentence. App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a

(internal quotation marks omitted); Madison v. Commissioner, Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 851 F. 3d 1173, 1193 

(CA11 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Asked at 

the hearing whether Madison understands that Alabama

is seeking retribution against him for his criminal act, Dr. 

Kirkland answered, “Certainly.” Id., at 1180 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Dr. John Goff, a psychologist hired by Madison’s coun-
 

2 DUNN v. MADISON 

Per Curiam 

sel, reported that Madison’s strokes have rendered him

unable to remember “numerous events that have occurred 

over the past thirty years or more.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

77a. Nevertheless, Dr. Goff found that Madison “is able to 

understand the nature of the pending proceeding and he

has an understanding of what he was tried for”; that he 

knows he is “in prison . . . because of ‘murder’ ”; that he

“understands that . . . [Alabama is] seeking retribution” 

for that crime; and that he “understands the sentence, 

specifically the meaning of a death sentence.” Id., at 76a– 

78a (some internal quotation marks omitted). In Dr. Goff ’s 

opinion, however, Madison does not “understan[d] the act 

that . . . he is being punished for” because he cannot recall 

“the sequence of events from the offense to his arrest to 

the trial or any of those details” and believes that he 

“never went around killing folks.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The trial court denied Madison’s petition. It held that, 

under this Court’s decisions in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 

U. S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930 

(2007), Madison was entitled to relief if he could show that

he “suffers from a mental illness which deprives [him] of 

the mental capacity to rationally understand that he is 

being executed as a punishment for a crime.” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 74a. The court concluded that Madison had 

failed to make that showing. Specifically, it found that

Madison understands “that he is going to be executed

because of the murder he committed[,] . . . that the State is

seeking retribution[,] and that he will die when he is

executed.” Id., at 82a. 

Madison then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

in Federal District Court. As a state prisoner, Madison is 

entitled to federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) only if 

the state trial court’s adjudication of his incompetence 

claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Per Curiam 

cation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by” this Court, or else was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” 

in state court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). A habeas petitioner

meets this demanding standard only when he shows that 

the state court’s decision was “so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 

(2011). The District Court denied Madison’s petition after 

concluding that the state court “correctly applied Ford and 

Panetti” and did not make an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” App. to Pet. for 

Cert. 67a. 

The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability

and, on appeal, reversed over Judge Jordan’s dissent. In 

the majority’s view, given the undisputed fact that Madison “has no memory of his capital offense,” it inescapably 

follows that he “does not rationally understand the connection between his crime and his execution.” 851 F. 3d, 

at 1185–1186. On that basis, the Eleventh Circuit held 

that the trial court’s conclusion that Madison is competent

to be executed was “plainly unreasonable” and “cannot be

reconciled with any reasonable application of Panetti.” Id., 

at 1187–1188 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We disagree. In Panetti, this Court addressed the question whether the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution 

of a prisoner who lacks “the mental capacity to understand

that [he] is being executed as a punishment for a crime.”

551 U. S., at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

noted that the retributive purpose of capital punishment 

is not well served where “the prisoner’s mental state is so

distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the 

crime and punishment has little or no relation to the

understanding of those concepts shared by the community 

as a whole.” Id., at 958–959. Similarly, in Ford, we ques-
 

4 DUNN v. MADISON 

Per Curiam 

tioned the “retributive value of executing a person who

has no comprehension of why he has been singled out.” 

477 U. S., at 409. Neither Panetti nor Ford “clearly established” that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed 

because of a failure to remember his commission of the 

crime, as distinct from a failure to rationally comprehend 

the concepts of crime and punishment as applied in his 

case. The state court did not unreasonably apply Panetti 

and Ford when it determined that Madison is competent 

to be executed because—notwithstanding his memory 

loss—he recognizes that he will be put to death as punishment for the murder he was found to have committed. 

Nor was the state court’s decision founded on an unreasonable assessment of the evidence before it. Testimony 

from each of the psychologists who examined Madison 

supported the court’s finding that Madison understands 

both that he was tried and imprisoned for murder and 

that Alabama will put him to death as punishment for 

that crime. 

In short, the state court’s determinations of law and fact 

were not “so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error

“beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Richter, supra, at 103. Under that deferential standard, 

Madison’s claim to federal habeas relief must fail. We 

express no view on the merits of the underlying question 

outside of the AEDPA context. 

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the

judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

GINSBURG, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JEFFERSON DUNN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v.
 

VERNON MADISON
 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 17–193. Decided November 6, 2017

 JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, concurring. 

The issue whether a State may administer the death 

penalty to a person whose disability leaves him without 

memory of his commission of a capital offense is a substantial question not yet addressed by the Court. Appropriately presented, the issue would warrant full airing.

But in this case, the restraints imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, I agree, 

preclude consideration of the question. With that understanding, I join the Court’s per curiam disposition of this 

case. 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

BREYER, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JEFFERSON DUNN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v.
 

VERNON MADISON
 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 17–193. Decided November 6, 2017

 JUSTICE BREYER, concurring. 

I join the Court’s per curiam disposition of this case for 

the reason set forth in JUSTICE GINSBURG’s concurrence 

(which I also join). I write separately to underline the fact 

that this case illustrates one of the basic problems with

the administration of the death penalty itself. That problem concerns the unconscionably long periods of time that 

prisoners often spend on death row awaiting execution. 

See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) 

(BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2, 17–33). 

As I have previously noted, this Court once said that

delays in execution can produce uncertainty amounting to

“‘one of the most horrible feelings to which’” a prisoner 

“‘can be subjected.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 20) (quoting In 

re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 172 (1890)). Justice Stevens 

later observed that the delay in Medley was a delay of four 

weeks. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U. S. 1045, 1046 (1995) 

(memorandum respecting denial of certiorari). And he 

wrote that the Medley description “should apply with even

greater force in the case of delays that last for many 

years.” 514 U. S., at 1046. 

In light of those statements, consider the present case. 

The respondent, Vernon Madison, was convicted of a

murder that took place in April 1985. He was sentenced 

to death and transferred to Alabama’s William C. Holman 

Correctional Facility in September 1985. Mr. Madison is 

now 67 years old. He has lived nearly half of his life on 
 

 

 

2 DUNN v. MADISON 

BREYER, J., concurring 

death row. During that time, he has suffered severe 

strokes, which caused vascular dementia and numerous 

other significant physical and mental problems. He is 

legally blind. His speech is slurred. He cannot walk 

independently. He is incontinent. His disability leaves

him without a memory of his commission of a capital 

offense. 

Moreover, Mr. Madison is one among a growing number 

of aging prisoners who remain on death row in this country for ever longer periods of time. In 1987, the average

period of imprisonment between death sentence and execution was just over seven years. See Dept. of Justice, 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, T. Snell, Capital Punishment,

2013—Statistical Tables 14 (rev. Dec. 19, 2014) (Table 10).

A decade later, in 1997, the average delay was about 11 

years. Ibid. In 2007, the average delay rose to a little less

than 13 years. Ibid. In 2017, the 21 individuals who have 

been executed were on death row on average for more than

19 years. See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution List 2017, online at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/

execution-list-2017 (as last visited Nov. 3, 2017). Alabama 

has executed three individuals this year, including Thomas 

Arthur, who spent 34 years on death row before his 

execution on May 26, 2017, at the age of 75; Robert Melson, who spent 21 years on death row before his execution

on June 8, 2017; and Torrey McNabb, who spent nearly 

two decades on death row before his execution on October 

19, 2017. 

Given this trend, we may face ever more instances of

state efforts to execute prisoners suffering the diseases

and infirmities of old age. And we may well have to consider the ways in which lengthy periods of imprisonment

between death sentence and execution can deepen the

cruelty of the death penalty while at the same time undermining its penological rationale. Glossip, supra, at 

___–___ (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 17–18) (rec-
Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

BREYER, J., concurring 

ognizing the inevitability of delays in light of constitutional

requirements needed to ensure procedural and substantive validity of death sentences); see ante, at 1 (GINSBURG, 

J., concurring). 

Rather than develop a constitutional jurisprudence that

focuses upon the special circumstances of the aged, however, I believe it would be wiser to reconsider the root 

cause of the problem—the constitutionality of the death

penalty itself. Glossip, supra, at ___ (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1).