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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ROBERT EARL RAMSEUR, 

#53900-177,

 Movant,

§

§

§

§ No. 3:22-cv-00749-N (BT) 

v. § No. 3:16-cr-00065-N-1 

§

UNITED STATES of AMERICA, §

§

 Respondent. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Movant Robert Earl Ramseur, a federal inmate at Residential Reentry 

Management (RRM) Dallas in Grand Prairie, Texas,1 filed a pro se motion to 

vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District 

Court referred the resulting civil action to the United States magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. For the 

following reasons, the Court should deny Ramseur’s § 2255 motion. 

Background

Ramseur was the sole owner of R&R Insurance and Breakthrough 

Financial Services in Dallas, Texas, where he worked as a tax preparer. See 

United States v. Ramseur, 793 F. App’x 245 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). 

Over several years, he prepared tax returns containing false deductions 

1 See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited June 20, 2023) (Federal 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Inmate locator) (showing Ramseur is expected to 

be released from BOP custody on December 22, 2025). 

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and/or credits that resulted in fraudulent tax refunds. Id. The Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) opened an investigation into Ramseur’s business 

after receiving a tip from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI). Id. The 

investigation revealed that a disproportionate number of Ramseur’s tax 

filings included a Schedule C—a document that reports profit or loss by a 

self-employed individual. Id. IRS agents interviewed taxpayers who had 

used Ramseur’s services, and they discovered that most of the taxpayers 

were not self-employed—meaning they could not have Schedule C losses. Id. 

The IRS also sent an undercover agent to Ramseur’s office, posing as a client 

who needed a tax return prepared. Id. Ramseur prepared the return and 

included a Schedule C loss for a non-existent marketing business. Id. at 247.

A jury found Ramseur guilty on 26 counts of aiding or assisting in the 

preparation or the presentation of a false or fraudulent individual income 

tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), and the District Court 

sentenced him to a total term of 64 months’ imprisonment. The District 

Court also ordered him to pay $399,400.00 in restitution to the IRS. 

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s 

judgment as to Ramseur’s convictions, but it vacated the restitution order 

and remanded the case back to the District Court to correct the restitution 

order and written judgment. United States v. Ramseur, 793 F. App’x 245 

(5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

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The District Court resentenced Ramseur on March 9, 2020. The 

custodial portion of the original judgment remained the same, but the 

District Court reduced the restitution amount to $141,419.04. Ramseur 

appealed and challenged the new, reduced restitution order, claiming it 

exceeded the IRS’s actual loss from the offenses of conviction. The Fifth 

Circuit affirmed the District Court’s revised judgment, United States v. 

Ramseur, 830 F. App’x 737 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam), and the Supreme 

Court denied Ramseur’s petition for writ of certiorari. Ramseur v. United 

States, 141 S. Ct. 1718 (2021). 

On November 13, 2021, Ramseur filed a motion requesting an 

extension of time to file his § 2255 motion. Ramseur v. United States, Case 

No. 3:21-cv-2934-N-BT, (ECF No. 2). The undersigned magistrate judge 

entered findings and conclusions, recommending the case be dismissed 

without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Id. (ECF No. 3).2 Ramseur filed 

objections. Id. (ECF No. 4). The District Court overruled the objections, 

accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the case 

without prejudice for lack or jurisdiction, and entered judgment. Id. (Ord. 

(ECF No. 5); J. (ECF No. 6)). 

2

 For purposes of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation, “CR 

ECF” refers to the underlying criminal action, case number 3:16-cr-00065-

N-1, and “CV ECF” refers to this civil action, case number 3:22-cv-00749-

N-BT.

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Ramseur then filed his § 2255 motion (CV ECF No. 2) and a 

memorandum in support (CV ECF No. 3), in which he argues: 

(1) His trial attorney provided ineffective assistance counsel 

when she 

a. failed to introduce evidence that he suffered from a 

traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD);

b. failed to present a factual defense of a constitutional 

violation committed by IRS Special Agent David L. 

Williams; 

c. failed to object and move to suppress the discovery 

involving the illegally obtained audio wire recording;

d. failed to investigate the racial and prejudicial assumption 

of fraud alleged by the TDI;

e. failed to move to suppress the evidence illegally seized 

from his home;

f. failed to move for the dismissal of the unconstitutional 

indictment;

g. failed to present witnesses and evidence that would have 

been exculpatory;

h. failed to impeach the Government’s witnesses;

i. gave erroneous advice about his right to testify;

j. failed to identify an unconstitutional jury that was 

prejudiced by the Government;

k. failed to meet professional standards of conduct; and 

l. failed to clearly object to obvious errors in the judgment 

and at sentencing. 

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(2) The Court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction 

and imposed a sentence that exceeded the maximum 

allowed by law. 

The Government responds that Ramseur’s § 2255 motion should be 

denied with prejudice because he primarily raises claims that can be 

characterized as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but most are 

conclusory, many are contradicted by the record, others are procedurally 

defaulted or non-cognizable, and all are meritless. Ramseur filed a reply. His 

claims are fully briefed and ripe for determination. 

Legal Standards and Analysis

A. Ramseur’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail under Strickland. 

Ramseur raises twelve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mot. 

12-23 (CV ECF No. 2); Mem. (CV ECF No. 3); see also Reply (CV ECF No. 

7). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must 

show that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense so gravely as to deprive him of a fair 

trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In Strickland, the 

Court stated that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 

highly deferential” and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight.” 466 U.S. at 689. Courts, therefore, must 

“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

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1. Claim One 

Ramseur initially argues that he is a disabled veteran of the United 

States Army, who was injured “while on a special mission,” and now suffers 

from the effects of a TBI and PTSD. Mot. 12 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Reply 

8 (CV ECF No. 7); Mem. 33-35 (CV ECF No. 7) (exhibits in support). He 

contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel when 

she failed to introduce evidence of his medical conditions at trial, “and the 

court did not recognize TBI and PTSD as an illness.” Mot. 12 (CV ECF No. 

2). Ramseur concludes that his attorney’s failure to introduce this evidence 

at trial violated his rights under the “Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).” 

Mot. 12 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Reply 8 (CV ECF No. 7) (alleging his 

injuries are also covered by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA)). 

This claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland standard. Under 

the performance prong of Strickland, a court’s review of counsel’s 

performance should be “highly deferential.”466 U.S. at 698. This is so 

because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction or adverse sentence[.]” Id. at 689. And “[g]iven 

the almost infinite variety of possible trial techniques and tactics available 

to counsel, this Circuit is careful not to second guess legitimate strategic 

choices.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United 

States v. Scott, 11 F.4th 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2021) (recognizing there are 

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“countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case”) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Ramseur states that he suffered an injury while on a mission in the 

United States Army, but he does not explain how this injury impacted his 

ability to understand the charges against him or assist his attorney with his 

defense. He has not shown how the mere fact that he suffers from a TBI and 

PTSD are relevant to whether he was guilty, as charged in the indictment. 

And because Ramseur’s injury evidence was not relevant to the charges 

against him, it most likely would have been excluded at trial if his attorney 

had attempted to admit it. Likewise, there is no indication that Ramseur’s 

TBI and PTSD interfered with his ability to understand the charges against 

him or the criminal proceedings. (CR ECF No. 175 at 6-8) (showing no 

indication Ramseur failed to understand what was taking place at his initial 

appearance on the violation of conditions of pretrial release held on 

February 26, 2019). 

Ramseur has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. Under the 

prejudice prong, a movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. The movant must “affirmatively prove,” not just allege, prejudice. Id. at 

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693. If he fails to prove prejudice, the court need not address the question of 

counsel’s performance. Id. at 697.

Ramseur fails to allege—much less demonstrate—that the result of his 

trial would have been different if evidence of his TBI and PTSD had been 

admitted. See Mot. 12 (CV ECF No. 2). Instead, he merely states that his 

attorney’s failure to mention these conditions violated his rights under the 

Sixth Amendment and the ADA. Id. But Ramseur fails to elaborate, and his 

conclusory statement fails to demonstrate prejudice. See Green v. Johnson, 

160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Mere conclusory allegations in support 

of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a 

constitutional issue.”); see also Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 

1983) (per curiam) (“We are thus bound to re-emphasize that mere 

conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas 

proceeding.”) (citing Schlang v. Heard, 691 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1982)

(collecting cases).

Ramseur also cannot demonstrate prejudice because evidence of his 

injury was before the District Court at sentencing. The PSR addresses 

Ramseur’s assertion that he suffered a TBI while serving in the United States 

Army. (PSR ¶ 76); see also (CR ECF No. 125) (the District Court adopted the 

PSR “without change”). According to the PSR, Ramseur reported that he 

sustained a head injury in 1999 while he was in the Army, and thereafter, he 

suffered post-traumatic injury headaches. (PSR ¶ 76.) Also, when the 

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District Court gave Ramseur an opportunity to speak at sentencing, he stated 

that he had suffered a head injury causing a TBI and “was left for dead in all 

actuality.” (CR ECF No. 140 at 7.) Ramseur has not established the result of 

his sentencing would have been different if his attorney had done anything 

more with the evidence of his TBI.

For these reasons, Ramseur’s first claim fails under both prongs of the 

Strickland standard, and it should be denied. 

2. Claim Two 

Next, Ramseur argues that his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when she “failed to present a factual defense of a 

constitutional violation,” and due to this failure by his attorney, the Court 

lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Mot. 12 (CV ECF No. 2); accord Mem. 

2 (CV ECF No. 3). Ramseur further argues that an IRS agent is “not an 

‘investigative or law enforcement officer under Title 18 USC 2510(7)” 

because “it’s not an offense enumerated in 18 USC 2516.” Mot. 12 (CV ECF 

No. 2). Ramseur concludes that the evidence used against him at trial was 

“obtained in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 

Streets Act of 1968,” and the evidence should have been suppressed. Id.

Ramseur apparently believes that the IRS agents assigned to his case 

failed to qualify as “investigative or law enforcement officers.” 18 U.S.C. § 

2516(2), (3); see also (CR ECF No. 137 at 120). However, Ramseur is 

mistaken. IRS agents, like the ones who investigated his case, qualify as 

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“investigative or law enforcement officers” for the United States. See 

Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 875 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing 

IRS special agents are “investigative or law enforcement officers” under 18 

U.S.C. § 2510(7)). 

Ramseur’s argument regarding the Title III wiretap provisions is 

similarly based on a misunderstanding of the law. Specifically, Ramseur 

refers to § 2510(7) and § 2516, which address who is authorized to use Title 

III wiretaps to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications. However, 

a Title III wiretap is inapplicable to Ramseur’s case. Because, in his case, the 

IRS agent made an appointment with Ramseur and legally recorded their 

consensual conversation on an iPhone. (CR ECF No. 137 at 124-45) 

(providing the recorded statements “appear to be voluntarily made”). The 

investigative technique used by the IRS agent did not require a Title III 

wiretap or prior court approval, and Ramseur’s references to §2510(7) and § 

2516 are misplaced. 

Ramseur cannot demonstrate that his attorney provided deficient 

performance by failing to raise the Title II wiretap issue or that he somehow 

suffered prejudice therefrom. This claim fails under both prongs of the 

Strickland standard. See United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (“An attorney’s failure to raise a meritless argument thus cannot 

form the basis of a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim because 

the result of the proceeding would not have been different had the attorney 

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raised the issue.”) (citing Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 634-35 (5th 

Cir.1994)); see also Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 415 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995)

(“Counsel cannot be deficient for failing to press a frivolous point.”). 

For these reasons, Ramseur’s second claim fails under both prongs of 

the Strickland standard, and it should be denied. 

3. Claim Three 

Ramseur next argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel when she failed to object and move to suppress the discovery 

involving the audio recording made by the IRS agent. Mot. 13 (CV ECF No. 

2); Mem. 3 (CV ECF No. 7); see also Reply 19 (CV ECF No. 7) (alleging the 

failure to object to the “illegal recordings” played at trial amounted to “fruit 

of the poisonous tree”). Specifically, he contends that the audio recording 

was made “without a valid warrant,” and it violated his rights under the 

Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Mot. 13 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Mem. 5 (CV 

ECF No. 3) (the agent’s audio recording was made “without a warrant”). 

Ramseur further contends that the agent’s affidavit included a “false 

allegation of violating 18 USC 287 (the required underlying offense for a 

felony status of 7206(2), a civil statute without it),” and the agent’s warrant 

was a “flawed and unconstitutionally general warrant.” Mot. 13 (CV ECF No. 

2). 

This ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails for several reasons. 

First, Ramseur invited the undercover IRS agent into his office, so a search 

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warrant was not necessary. Similarly, no warrant was needed for statements 

he voluntarily made, and the photographs the agent took of items found in 

plain view. Ramseur’s argument that the undercover operation was legally 

invalid because no warrant was obtained is meritless. See United States v. 

Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the deputies were 

lawfully in the defendant’s home when the firearm was discovered, and the 

firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine); United States v. 

Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The plain view doctrine will 

justify such a seizure if (1) the officers lawfully entered the area where the 

items could be plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating nature of the items was 

immediately apparent; and (3) the officers had a lawful right of access to the 

items.”); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (setting forth 

the plain view exception to the warrant requirement). 

Second, Ramseur appears to argue that he would not have prepared a 

tax return for the undercover agent. Mot. 13 (CV ECF No. 2) (“The defendant 

does not do business with a perfect stranger without a social security card, 

identification card and bank deposit information.”). He further argues that 

“[t]he file was planted and altered by adding a Schedule C & E that actually 

reduced [the agent’s] refund, contradicting the government’s argument.” Id.

But these arguments are belied by the record. See (CR ECF No. 145-17 at 1) 

(a chart showing the fake Schedule C and E and how they resulted in an 

increase to Agent refund); (CR ECF No. 137 at 133-36) (agent testified the 

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false Schedule C information “would have come from the return preparer 

Mr. Ramseur,” and he got a refund of about $1,800, when he should have 

owed the IRS money). 

Third, the fact the Government later obtained search warrants to 

allow agents to search Ramseur’s home in the Eastern District of Texas and 

his storage unit in the Northern District of Texas has no bearing on whether 

the undercover agent legally needed a warrant to make an audio recording 

of a consensual conversation. 

Ramseur makes the following arguments in support of suppressing 

the two search warrant applications: 

(1) The search warrant applications filed in the Eastern District of 

Texas and the Northern District of Texas failed to specify that the meeting 

between the undercover agent and Ramseur was recorded. Mot. 13 (CV ECF 

No. 2). But even if this were true, Ramseur fails to explain why this 

information was critically absent, and the search warrant affidavits 

otherwise address the undercover IRS operation involved in his case. See In 

re Search of Public Storage Unit Space Number C219, No. 3:13-MJ-457-BN, 

ECF No. 1 at 7-9 (N.D. Tex. Filed July 24, 2013) (application for the search 

warrant for Ramseur’s storage unit located in Dallas, Texas); Search 

Warrant, No. 4:13-MJ-293-DDB, ECF No. 1 at 7 (E.D. Tex. Filed July 19, 

2013) (application for the search warrant of Ramseur’s residence located in 

Denton County, Texas); 

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(2) There is a “missing deputy signature” on the search warrant for his 

residence located in the Eastern District of Texas. Mot. 13 (CV ECF No. 13). 

Again, Ramseur’s argument is misplaced. It appears he is referring to the 

Eastern District of Texas “filed” stamp on the search warrant return in 

connection with that search warrant. Mem. 16 (CV ECF No. 3). But the 

search warrant return Ramseur references has valid signatures from the 

magistrate judge and the IRS agent. Id. The fact that the “filed” stamp does 

not appear to have been initialed by the deputy clerk when they applied the 

stamp does not invalidate the search warrant issued in the Eastern District 

of Texas; and 

(3) The two search warrant applications set forth facts sufficient to 

establish probable cause that Ramseur violated 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) and 18 

U.S.C. § 287. See In re Search of Public Storage Unit Space Number C219, 

No. 3:13-MJ-457-BN, ECF No. 1 at 7-9 (N.D. Tex. Filed July 24, 2013) 

(application for the search warrant for Ramseur’s storage unit located in 

Dallas, Texas); Search Warrant, No. 4:13-MJ-293-DDB, ECF No. 1 at 7 

(E.D. Tex. Filed July 19, 2013) (application for the search warrant of 

Ramseur’s residence located in Denton County, Texas). Ultimately, the 

Government only pursued charges against Ramseur under 26 U.S.C. § 

7206(2), but the reference in the search warrants to § 287 was not 

misleading. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (involving a claim that is “false, fictitious, or 

fraudulent”). And his contention that a violation of § 287 was required to 

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show he violated § 7206(2) to amount to more than a mere civil violation, is 

incorrect. Mot. 13 (CV ECF No. 2). Rather, a violation of § 7206(2) is a 

criminal felony that carries a statutory penalty of no more than three years 

of imprisonment per violation. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). 

Each of Ramseur’s arguments in support of his claim that his attorney 

should have moved to suppress the audio recordings fail under Strickland. 

Specifically, he cannot show that his attorney provided deficient 

performance when she failed to move to suppress the agent’s audio 

recording or that he somehow suffered prejudice. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 

893 (“An attorney’s failure to raise a meritless argument thus cannot form 

the basis of a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the 

result of the proceeding would not have been different had the attorney 

raised the issue.”) (citing Williams, 16 F.3d at 634-35; see also Sones, 61 F.3d 

at 415 n.5 (“Counsel cannot be deficient for failing to press a frivolous 

point.”). 

For these reasons, Ramseur’s third claim fails under both prongs of 

the Strickland standard, and it should be denied. 

4. Claim Four 

Ramseur next argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel when she “failed to investigate the racial and prejudicial 

‘assumption’ of fraud alleged by the Texas Department of Insurance [ ] that 

violates the element of ‘materiality’ [required for a conviction under] 26 USC 

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7206(2).” Mot. 14 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Mem. 3 (CV ECF No. 3) (alleging 

his attorney’s failure to investigate “caused the danger of undue prejudice, a 

violation of the Ku [sic] Klux Klan Act of 1871, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 

and 1964, and constitutional rights”). He further argues that TDI illegally 

obtained his “private bank statements.” Mot. 14 (CV ECF No. 2). 

In or about February 2013, TDI agent contacted the IRS to report that 

Ramseur was being investigated for insurance fraud, and during that 

investigation, the TDI agent uncovered information indicating Ramseur 

may also be involved in filing fraudulent tax returns. (PSR ¶ 14.) As part 

TDI’s investigation, it subpoenaed Ramseur’s bank records; the subpoena 

uncovered multiple treasury checks that had been deposited directly into 

Ramseur’s R&R business account. (PSR ¶ 14.) This raised suspicion because 

treasury refund checks are normally deposited into the taxpayer’s account, 

not the tax preparer. (PSR ¶ 14.) This contact from TDI to the IRS led to the 

beginning of the IRS’s investigation into Ramseur’s filing of fraudulent tax 

returns. (PSR ¶ 14.) Thereafter, the IRS sought warrants, but they were not 

based solely on the tip from TDI. (PSR ¶¶ 15-17.) Rather, the IRS agent 

reviewed the tax returns Ramseur had filed, compared them to national 

statistics, and obtained further evidence through the undercover operation 

to demonstrate the requisite probable cause. (PSR ¶¶ 15-17.) 

This ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails for multiple reasons. 

Initially, this claim fails because it is conclusory. Although pro se filings are 

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liberally construed, this does not mean the court must develop the 

arguments on behalf of the litigant. See United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 

22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[M]ere conclusory allegations on critical issues are 

insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.”) (quoting United States v. 

Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989)). Federal courts do not 

“consider a habeas petitioner’s bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro 

se petition ... [and] mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional 

issue in a habeas proceeding.” Smallwood v. Johnson, 73 F.3d 1343, 1351 

(5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011-12); see also Lookingbill v. 

Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting where a habeas 

petitioner fails to brief an argument adequately, it is considered waived) 

(citing Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998)). “The 

subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics 

is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the 

record are wholly incredible.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 

 This claim also fails because it is belied by the record. Ramseur 

alleges that TDI colluded with various law enforcement agencies to 

incriminate him by circulating “illegally obtained private statements” and a 

“private photo.” Mot. 14 (CV ECF No. 2). However, as discussed, TDI 

lawfully subpoenaed Ramseur’s bank records and discovered multiple 

treasury checks that had been deposited directly into Ramseur’s R&R 

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business account. (PSR ¶ 14.) And because these checks are normally 

deposited into a taxpayer’s account, it created suspicion. (PSR ¶ 14.) 

Ramseur has failed to show that his attorney provided deficient 

performance or that he suffered prejudice. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 893

(citing Williams, 16 F.3d at 634-35); see also Sones, 61 F.3d at 415 n.5. For 

these reasons, Ramseur’s fourth claim fails under both prongs of the 

Strickland standard, and it should be dismissed or denied. 

5. Claim Five

Next, Ramseur argues that his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when she failed to file a motion to suppress the 

evidence seized from his home. Specifically, he contends that agents seized 

evidence from his home in “violation of the ban on ‘no knock warrants’; ‘fruit 

of the poisonous tree.’” Id. (claiming law enforcement failed to knock and 

announce before executing the search warrant); Reply 24 (CV ECF No. 7) 

(claiming the agent who “violently” broke into his home violated the “knock 

and announce rule”). Ramseur further contends that the agent who executed 

the search warrant at his house violently entered his home, broke his 

window and front door, and aimed assault weapons at him and a “guest.” 

Mot. 15 (CV ECF No. 2); accord Reply 24 (CV ECF No. 7) (alleging the search 

of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights). He concludes that his 

“constitutional and civil rights” were violated, and his attorney erred by 

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failing to issue subpoenas for witnesses to the search of his home. Mot. 15 

(CV ECF No. 2). 

Ramseur also argues that the agent misled the U.S. Magistrate Judge 

in the Eastern District of Texas into issuing a “general warrant” to search his 

home. Mem. 8 (CV ECF No. 3). But he is mistaken. “A general warrant is a 

warrant that authorizes ‘a general exploratory rummaging in a person’s 

belongings.’” United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 752 (3d Cir. 1982)

(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)). The search 

warrant application in Ramseur’s case was sufficiently specific, and it stated 

the specific items agents intended to seize. See Search Warrant, No. 4:13-

MJ-293-DDB, (ECF No. 1 at 19-20) (E.D. Tex. Filed July 19, 2013) 

(application for the search warrant of Ramseur’s residence located in 

Denton County, Texas). Ramseur also argues that agents seized a firearm 

during the execution of the search warrant at his home. Mot. 15 (CV ECF No. 

2). This argument is not correct. As the Government explained, “Testimony 

from IRS agent David Williams confirmed that, contrary to Ramseur’s 

testimony, agents did not take possession of Ramseur’s .380-caliber firearm 

when they searched his home in connection with his prosecution for 

preparing fraudulent tax returns.” United States v. Ramseur, No. 20-11112, 

2021 WL 1172646, at *5-6 & *5 n.3 (Appellee’s Br. March. 26, 2021). 

In sum, each fact Ramseur relies upon in support of this argument 

fails, and he has not shown that his attorney provided deficient performance 

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or that he suffered prejudice. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 893 (citing Williams, 

16 F.3d at 634-35); see also Sones, 61 F.3d at 415 n.5. For these reasons, 

Ramseur’s fifth claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland standard, 

and it should be denied. 

6. Claim Six 

Ramseur argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel when she failed to move to dismiss the “flawed” and “conflated” 

indictment. Mot. 16 (CV ECF No. 2); accord Reply 24 (CV ECF No. 7) 

(claiming the Fifth Amendment was violated by the “flaws” in the 

indictment). Specifically, he contends that the indictment was “missing [a] 

signature and apparently [had an] altered date,” and it “added [the] 

opinionated element of ‘grossly overstated.’” Mot. 16 (CV ECF No. 2); see 

also Mem. 13 (CV ECF No. 3) (first page of the indictment). Ramseur further 

contends that the indictment was “unconstitutional [and] was formed with 

defamation letters and other arbitrary methods,” such as anonymous 

internet and web postings, an illegal vehicle towing from Denton to Dallas, 

harassment, stalking, and the act of drilling a hole in the door of his car (a 

Hummer). Mot. 16 (CV ECF No. 2). 

Ramseur claims there were various flaws in his indictment: 

(1) The indictment was “missing [a] signature.” Id.; see also Mem. 13 

(CV ECF No. 3) (the first page of the indictment, and it refers to the file 

stamp and states “Missing Signature”). Once again, Ramseur is referring to 

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the file stamp affixed by the clerk and not the signature from the grand jury 

foreperson or the U.S. Magistrate Judge. Mem. 13-14 (CV ECF No. 3). The 

indictment in his criminal case was filed on February 18, 2016, and it 

appears to include a deputy clerk initial on the file stamp. (CR ECF No. 1 at 

1.) Moreover, even if this claim were otherwise true, Ramseur has not 

demonstrated that a “missing” clerk signature on the indictment would 

render it legally invalid; 

(2) Ramseur also claims that the indictment alleged the relevant tax 

returns were either false or fraudulent regarding a material matter because 

they included Schedule C losses where there were none or “grossly 

overstated” these losses. Mot. 16-17 (CV ECF No. 2); see also (CR ECF No. 1 

at 2) (the indictment listing Schedule C losses). Notably, he does not argue 

that the indictment failed to include an element of the offense charged, but 

rather, he claims that the “grossly overstated” language was “opinionated” 

and prejudiced the jury. Mot. 16-17 (CV ECF No. 2); see also (CR ECF No. 1 

at 2-4) (counts 1-26 of the indictment). Ramseur’s claim that the business 

losses were “grossly overstated” bears on whether the false or fraudulent 

statements were “material,” and saying that certain business losses were 

“grossly overstated,” did not add an element to the crime charged as he 

suggests. Rather, it simply described why some of the false or fraudulent 

statements in the tax returns were material; 

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(3) Ramseur takes issue with the Government’s decision to indict him, 

and he argues that the decision was based only on “a photo and bank 

statements.” Mot. 16 (CV ECF No. 2). But he is mistaken and has failed to 

overcome the undisputed fact that a jury found him guilty as charged when 

they saw the tax returns he filed and heard the testimony from taxpayers 

about how he added fictitious Schedule C losses to their returns. Ramseur 

claims that the IRS agents engaged in “covert collusion” and used 

inappropriate methods to investigate his case. Id. But he has failed to refer 

to anything in the record that provides support for this claim; 

(4) Ramseur argues that he was not subpoenaed to testify before the 

grand jury before it decided to indict him, and this violated his rights under 

the Due Process Clause. Mot. 16-17 (CV ECF No. 2) (arguing the indictment 

was received from the grand jury in the absence of the defendant and his 

attorney). But Ramseur had no right to appear before the grand jury. See 

United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he 

defendant has no absolute right to appear before the grand jury.”) (citing 

United States ex. rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 605-06 (2d Cir. 

1944); United States v. Kernodle, 367 F. Supp. 844, 854 (M.D.N.C. 1973)); 

(5) Ramseur refers to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) in 

his argument addressing grand jury proceedings. Mot. 16 (CV ECF No. 2) 

(stating Rule 404(b) “requires more than the ‘assumption’”). Again, his 

argument is misplaced. Rule 404(b) deals with the notice that must be 

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provided to a defendant in a criminal case regarding evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts that the government plans to introduce against him 

at trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b); see also United States v. Stroud, 2022 WL 

1063029, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2022); and 

(6) Ramseur contends that the indictment against him was required 

to include additional facts or evidence, but he is mistaken. An indictment 

must only “be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential 

facts constituting the offense charged and must be signed by an attorney for 

the government.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); see also United States v. Sneed, 

2022 WL 35801, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022). To the extent Ramseur is 

arguing that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction under § 7206(2) with a finding of “willfully,” the argument fails 

based on the jury’s findings at trial and the Fifth Circuit’s decision rejecting 

his argument attacking the sufficiency of the evidence. See Ramseur, 793 F. 

App’x at 248 (Ramseur argued “the evidence was not sufficient to show that 

the false statements were material, as required under 7206(2)”). 

In sum, Ramseur has failed to demonstrate any deficiencies in his 

indictment. Likewise, his attorney did not provide ineffective assistance 

under Strickland by failing to move to dismiss the indictment, and he has 

not shown he suffered prejudice. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 893 (citing 

Williams, 16 F.3d at 634-35); see also Sones, 61 F.3d at 415 n.5. For these 

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reasons, Ramseur’s sixth claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland

standard, and it should be denied. 

7. Claim Seven 

Ramseur summarily argues that his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when she failed to present witnesses and evidence that 

would have been exculpatory. Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Reply 19 (CV 

ECF No. 7). He concludes that his attorney’s failure to present the favorable 

witnesses and exculpatory evidence impacted his outcome at trial. Mot. 19 

(CV ECF No. 2). 

“Complaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas 

corpus review because allegations of what a witness would have testified are 

largely speculative.” Lockhart v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 

1986) (citing Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also 

Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Cockrell, 720 F.2d 1423, 1427 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Buckelew v. United 

States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978)). To show ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the context of an uncalled witness, a movant must: (1) name the 

witness he would have called; (2) show the witness would have been 

available to testify; (3) show the witness would have testified; and (4) show 

there is a reasonable probability the witness would have provided testimony 

that would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Bray v. 

Quarterman, 265 F. App’x 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing 

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Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Gomez 

v. McKaskle, 734 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (5th Cir. 1984) (petitioner failed to meet 

his burden of showing that uncalled witnesses would have testified favorably 

to his case). When “the only evidence of a missing witnesses’ [sic] testimony 

is from the [movant], this Court views the claims of ineffective assistance 

with great caution.” Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Lockhart, 782 F.2d at 1282). Generally, when a movant fails to 

present at least some evidence from an uncalled witness regarding the 

witness’s potential testimony and willingness to testify, it is fatal to an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Harrison v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 

419, 428 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Sayre, 238 F.3d at 636.

Ramseur contends that his attorney should have called the “home 

guest” present during the execution of the search warrant in the Eastern 

District of Texas as a witness at trial. Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 2). He further 

contends that the “home guest” was willing to testify about the violent entry 

made by agents at his home. Id. But Ramseur has failed to show that the 

“home guest” would have been available to testify at his trial. Mot. 19 (CV 

ECF No. 2); see Bray, 265 F. App’x at 298; see also Alexander, 775 F.2d at 

602. Likewise, he has failed to demonstrate that the testimony from the 

“home guest” would have made a difference in the outcome of his trial. Mot. 

19 (CV ECF No. 2); see Bray, 265 F. App’x at 298; see also Alexander, 775 

F.2d at 602. 

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Ramseur has set forth several facts in support of this argument, but 

each purported “fact” is false: 

(1) Ramseur argues that many of the tax returns were self-prepared 

by the taxpayers, and they were not prepared by him. Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 

2). However, this claim is factually false. See, e.g., (CR ECF No. 138 at 97) 

(Jose Fernando Robles testified Ramseur filed his tax returns for 2010, 2011, 

2012); (CR ECF No. 142-1 at 3) (Robin Bryan’s 2009 tax return was prepared 

by Ramseur); (CR ECF No. 142-4 at 3) (Robin Bryan’s 2010 tax return was 

prepared by Ramseur); (CR ECF No. 142-7 at 5) (Robin Bryan’s 2011 tax 

return was prepared by Ramseur); (CR ECF No. 142-10 at 4) (Robin Bryan’s 

2012 tax return was prepared by Ramseur); (CR ECF No. 142-13 at 3) 

(Anthony Walker’s 2011 tax return was prepared by Ramseur); see also (CR 

ECF No. 1) (indictment listing taxpayers’ initials); 

(2) Ramseur also argues that many of the tax returns were confirmed 

by the taxpayers. Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 2). In support, he points to Jose 

Robles’s tax return as an example. Id. This assertion is false because Robles 

testified at trial that Ramseur added falsified Schedule C losses to his 

returns. (CR ECF No. 138 at 101-06); 

(3) Ramseur contends that the execution of the search warrant at his 

home in the Eastern District of Texas was improper and very violent. Mot. 

19 (CV ECF No. 2). But, as discussed, these allegations are belied by the 

record and false. See supra Claim Five; 

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(4) Ramseur claims that the business records support the accuracy of 

Bertraim Thomas’s tax returns. Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 2). But this claim is 

belied by the record. See (CR ECF No. 138 at 61-62) (Thomas testified that 

the Schedule C attached to her return showing she owed a religious business 

was “not true.”); see also (CR ECF No. 145-19 at 1) (document demonstrating 

Thomas’s tax return had Schedule C losses); Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 2) 

(contends Thomas owed a “debt balance”). And, to the extent that Thomas 

owed a debt balance to the IRS, the falsely inflated refunds only lowered 

Thomas’s overall tax liability, which still amounts to a violation of § 7206(2); 

and 

(5) Ramseur also claims that a three-year statute of limitations applies 

to his violations of § 7206(2). Mot. 19 (CV ECF No. 2). But he is mistaken. 

Ramseur’s crimes had a six-year statute of limitations, and his charges were 

timely filed. See 26 U.S.C. § 6531(3) (providing the statute of limitations for 

Ramseur’s crimes under § 7206(2) was six years). 

This claim fails for at least two reasons. First, Ramseur’s argument is 

conclusory. See Green, 160 F.3d at 1042; see also Ross, 694 F.2d at 1012. 

Second, it fails because he relies on purported “facts” that are false. For these 

reasons, he cannot demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice, and his 

claim therefore fails under both prongs of the Strickland standard. 

Ramseur’s seventh claim should be summarily dismissed or denied. 

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8. Claim Eight 

Next, Ramseur summarily argues that his attorney should have 

impeached the Government’s witnesses. Mot. 20 (CV ECF No. 2). He further 

argues that “[t]here was no preliminary hearing, no pre-trial conference 

until after jury selection.” Id. Ramseur concludes, “The defendant did not 

recognize the [undercover] agent” as anyone that he’d seen before.”). Id.

Once again, the facts Ramseur relies upon to support his claim are 

belied by the record. For instance, he argues that there was no “preliminary 

hearing,” but that is incorrect. Ramseur was properly arraigned by a U.S. 

Magistrate Judge on February 24, 2016. (CR ECF No. 8). He did not have a 

detention hearing, but that was due to the fact that the Government did not 

pursue pretrial detention. Ramseur also argues that voir dire was not 

conducted prior to the final pretrial conference, but he fails to suggest why 

this approach was somehow legally deficient. And he has failed to show his 

attorney was deficient in connection with the timing of the voir dire or that 

he somehow suffered prejudice. The record also fails to suggest that the 

Government did not comply with its obligations under the Jencks Act. (CR 

ECF No. 83 at 1-2) (“The government has complied with [its obligation 

under the Jencks Act] and understands its continuing duty to do so.”); see 

also 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (“After a witness called by the United States has 

testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, 

order the United States to produce any statement . . . of the witness in the 

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possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to 

which the witness has testified.”). And on April 15 and August 26, 2016, as 

part of its pretrial orders, the District Court ordered, “The Government shall 

provide each defendant with all Jencks Act material (18 U.S.C. § 3500), on 

the day prior to the testimony of the witness to whom such material 

relates.”). (CR ECF No. 17 at 2) (the District Court’s April 15, 2016 Amended 

Pretrial Order); (CR ECF No. 29 at 2) (the District Court’s August 26, 2016 

Amended Pretrial Order). It is not entirely clear what Ramseur is arguing 

when he states that his attorney “refused” to present IRS Form 8879s, an efile signature authorization form. Mot. 20 (CV ECF No. 2). Those IRS forms 

were discussed at his trial, and the investigating agent testified that he saw 

such a form that listed the amount of his inflated refund, and that Ramseur 

calculated that return. (CR ECF No. 137 at 135-36.) Ramseur claims in this 

§ 2255 action that he did not recognize the undercover IRS agent involved 

in his criminal case, but his assertion is of no moment. The agent recognized 

Ramseur and identified him for the jury. Id. at 121-24; 137-38 (IRS agent 

pointed out Ramseur in the courtroom during trial). 

Ramseur’s claim fails because it is fatally conclusory. See Green, 160 

F.3d at 1042; see also Ross, 694 F.2d at 1012. This claim also fails because 

the purported “facts” Ramseur relies upon are false. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 

893; Williams, 16 F.3d at 634-35; see also Sones, 61 F.3d at 415 n.5. For 

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these reasons, Ramseur’s eighth claim fails under both prongs of the 

Strickland standard, and it should be dismissed or denied. 

9. Claim Nine 

Ramseur next argues that his attorney “gave erroneous advice on the 

right of the defendant to testify.” Mot. 20 (CV ECF No. 2). He further argues 

that his attorney informed him if he testified, “it would lead to ‘a blood 

bath.’” Id.; see also Reply 19 (CV ECF No. 7) (his attorney “coerced the 

defendant not to testify”). 

This claim fails for several reasons. It fails because it is not supported 

by the record. (CR ECF No. 139 at 6) (trial transcript). In a colloquy with the 

District Court at trial, Ramseur confirmed that he understood: (1) he had a 

right to testify at his trial; (2) his attorney advised him about the pros and 

cons of testifying; and (3) it was his decision alone whether he would testify. 

Id. at 6-7. Ramseur further confirmed that he had decided not to testify at 

his trial after discussing the advantages and disadvantages with his attorney. 

Id. at 7. Finally, contrary to his present claim, he advised the Court that his 

attorney had “answered all of [his] questions [regarding his right to testify 

at trial] to [his] satisfaction.” Id. at 6. 

Ramseur’s ninth claim also fails because it is so conclusory that it is 

legally deficient. See Green, 160 F.3d at 1042 (“Mere conclusory allegations 

in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to 

raise a constitutional issue.”); Ross, 694 F.2d at 1012 (“We are thus bound 

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to re-emphasize that mere conclusory allegations do not raise a 

constitutional issue in a habeas proceeding.”); see also Schlang, 691 F.2d at 

798 (collecting cases). Specifically, Ramseur’s claim fails under the 

performance prong because he fails to explain how his attorney’s advice was 

“erroneous.” And to the extent that his attorney advised him not to testify at 

his trial, that advice was sound advice considering the overwhelming 

evidence against him. Under Strickland, a court’s review of counsel’s 

performance should be “highly deferential.” 466 U.S. at 698. This is so 

because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction or adverse sentence[.]” Id. at 689. And “[g]iven 

the almost infinite variety of possible trial techniques and tactics available 

to counsel, this Circuit is careful not to second guess legitimate strategic 

choices.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United 

States v. Scott, 11 F.4th 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2021). Moreover, if Ramseur had 

testified, he would have risked harming his case further or committing 

perjury if he had taken the stand, and both occurred in a subsequent trial 

based on his failure to report to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). See Ramseur, 

850 F. App’x 325, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (upholding the 

obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on 

Ramseur’s false testimony). 

Ramseur’s claim fails under the prejudice prong because he has not 

attempted to demonstrate prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (a 

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movant must satisfy both prongs of the two-pronged test); see also United 

States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1995) (to prevail on a claim under 

Strickland, a movant must prove both elements of the two-pronged test); 

see also United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012)

(demonstrating prejudice “is a heavy burden which requires a ‘substantial,’ 

and not just a ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result”) (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)). Based on the evidence 

against Ramseur in this case and the testimony at his subsequent trial for 

failure to appear at the BOP, a decision by him to take the stand at his trial 

would have likely resulted in a “blood bath,” just as his attorney allegedly 

predicted. 

For these reasons, Ramseur’s ninth claim fails under both prongs of 

the Strickland standard, and it should be dismissed or denied. See Kimler, 

167 F.3d at 893. 

10. Claim Ten 

Ramseur argues that his attorney “failed to identify an 

unconstitutional injury that was prejudiced by the government.” Mot. 21 (CV 

ECF No. 2). He provides several instances of alleged error. Id. In support of 

this argument, Ramseur contends: (1) there were less than twelve jurors, and 

he failed to consent; (2) a juror indicated to Ramseur they were under the 

influence of a secret society; (3) the jury failed to follow the instructions on 

materiality; (4) the Government prejudiced the jury by presenting an illegal 

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amount of tax returns; (5) a guilty jury verdict was returned on all counts, 

despite the fact that evidence was inconclusive; (6) the jury was misled about 

restitution; (7) the jury failed to follow the jury instructions on the element 

of materiality; and (8) the jury was not composed of his peers (it was a 

primarily white jury, and the one non-white juror slept through the trial). 

Mot. 21 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Mem. 6-7 (CV ECF No. 3) (claiming a 

“qualified black juror was excluded from the jury to attend a Beyonce 

concert,” and another black juror was excused with a doctor’s note); see also

Reply 18, 20 (CV ECF No. 7). 

Ramseur alleges that less than twelve jurors served on the jury that 

convicted him. However, this claim is belied by the record. The Court 

originally sat three alternate jurors. Two of the alternate jurors had to be 

excused during the trial. (CR ECF No. 136 at 138) (referring to seating of the 

“third alternate”). Then, on August 29, 2018, the remaining third and final 

alternate was excused when the jury began its deliberations. (CR ECF No. 

139 at 30-31.) Therefore, the record reflects that Ramseur was convicted by 

a full jury of twelve jurors. Id. at 33-34 (polling the jury). 

Ramseur also alleges that the one non-white juror slept through his 

entire trial, but he has failed to provide any record support for this 

allegation. Moreover, the Government commented at Ramseur’s trial on the 

“attentive[ness]” of the jurors and how “interested” they were during the 

trial. Id. at 27. 

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Ramseur contends that there was only one non-white juror on his 

jury, but this claim lacks any record support. Moreover, the record suggests 

that at least two jurors from his jury had a Hispanic or Latino heritage. Id.

at 33-34. In addition, Ramseur fails to allege that the Government exercised 

its strikes during jury selection in an unconstitutional, racially motivated 

manner under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). And nothing in the 

record provides support for a finding there were irregularities with the voir 

dire process or the jury venire. Ramseur’s contention is conclusory and 

should be summarily dismissed. See Pineda, 988 F.2d at 23 (“[M]ere 

conclusory allegations on critical issues are insufficient to raise a 

constitutional issue.”) (quoting Woods, 870 F.2d at 288 n.3).

Ramseur also contends that the Government misled the jury about 

restitution. This argument is misplaced and factually incorrect. Restitution 

was not an issue for the jury to decide, and it was not presented to them. 

Ramseur’s first appeal to the Fifth Circuit addressed a restitution argument. 

Ramseur, 793 F.3d at 248-49. However, that restitution issue did not 

address a jury matter or involve evidence presented at Ramseur’s trial for 

jury consideration. Id. at 248. 

Ramseur asserts that a jury verdict was returned against him on all 

counts, but he claims the evidence was inconclusive. This argument is not 

supported by the record. Specifically, the record demonstrates that multiple 

witnesses testified that Ramseur included false Schedule C losses in their tax 

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returns without their knowledge with the intent to inflate their returns and 

increase his personal profits. See e.g., (CR ECF No. 137 at 28-30, 54-56, 75-

77, 109-10). Moreover, the IRS agent testified in detail about how Ramseur 

did the exact same thing during the undercover operation. Id. at 125-38. 

Ramseur also asserts that the jury failed to follow the instructions they 

were given on “materiality.” (CR ECF No. 112 at 11-12) (jury charge). But he 

has failed to provide a citation to the record in support of this bare claim, 

and the Court fails to find any evidence to support it. Moreover, the Fifth 

Circuit specifically rejected Ramseur’s argument that the evidence against 

him was insufficient for a conviction because the materiality element of § 

7206(2) was not met. See Ramseur, 793 F. App’x at 248. 

Each of the facts Ramseur relies upon to support this argument are 

false, and he cannot show that his attorney provided deficient performance 

or that he suffered prejudice. For these reasons, Ramseur’s tenth claim fails 

under both prongs of the Strickland standard, and it should be dismissed or 

denied. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 893 (“An attorney’s failure to raise a 

meritless argument thus cannot form the basis of a successful ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim because the result of the proceeding would not 

have been different had the attorney raised the issue.”). 

11. Claim Twelve 

Ramseur argues that his attorney failed to “meet professional 

standards of conduct entrusted by the people of Texas.” Mot. 22 (CV ECF 

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No. 2). Specifically, he contends that his attorney violated the “laws and 

rules of professionalism” and failed “to keep the committment [sic] to the 

creed for no other reason than it is right.” Id. Ramseur provides the following 

examples: (1) his attorney talked the prosecuting AUSA into not “removing 

Counts 21-26, which were not ‘clerical errors”; id., (2) his attorney stated to 

the jury at closing argument that her excuse for “not meeting the 

professional standard was because of a cold”; id.; and (3) his attorney did 

not prepare for trial, “developed an adversarial relationship with [the 

AUSA],” id., and made objections to her own motions and assumed the 

Government had an opposition. 

Ramseur’s argument is based on the following erroneous facts: 

(1) Ramseur’s attorney did not advise the AUSA not to remove Counts 

21 through 26 during his trial. Id. The jury convicted him of these counts, 

but they were inadvertently left off the original judgment, (CR ECF No. 124), 

due to a clerical error. See Ramseur, 793 F. App’x at 250 (recognizing the 

final judgment omitted counts 21-26); 

(2) Ramseur’s attorney did not tell the jury that she had not met her 

professional standards due to a cold. Mot. 22 (CV ECF No. 2). Rather, his 

attorney merely apologized at the beginning of her closing argument because 

she had “a bit of a cold.” (CR ECF No. 137 at 20.) The record fails to suggest 

that his attorney’s cold prevented her from competently representing 

Ramseur in any respect; and 

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(3) The record belies Ramseur’s claim that his attorney did not 

prepare for trial, and the email he attaches to his memorandum fails to show 

she had any inappropriately adversarial relationship with the AUSA. Mot. 

22 (CV ECF No. 2); Mem. 18 (CV ECF No. 3). Rather, the email shows that 

Ramseur’s attorney stated she would move to exclude testimony from the 

Government’s witness list under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 403 and 

404, and she assumed the Government would be opposed to her motion. Id.

This was a reasonable and logical assumption for his attorney to make. Id.

For these reasons, Ramseur’s twelfth claim fails under both prongs of 

the Strickland standard, and it should be denied. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 

893. 

12. Claim Thirteen 

Next, Ramseur argues that his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when she “failed to specifically and concisely object to 

clear and obvious errors in the judgment and [at] sentencing.” Mot. 23 (CV 

ECF No. 2). In support, he refers to the following: (1) when the Fifth Circuit 

remanded this case, the Court declared it “illegal,” id.; (2) the dismissal of 

Counts 21 to 26 was determined to be a clerical error, despite the AUSA’s 

efforts to remove them from the judgment; (3) the restitution was not 

properly calculated; and (4) his sentence was illegal and violated his 

“constitutional and civil rights.” Mot. 23 (CV ECF No. 2); see also Mem. 21 

(CV ECF No. 3). 

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Ramseur argues that the Fifth Circuit declared his case “illegal” and 

remanded it back to this Court. However, he misstates the facts. On appeal, 

Ramseur argued that the Court’s restitution order was unlawful for two 

reasons. See Ramseur, 793 F. App’x at 248. One, the IRS failed to account 

for the repayments some of Ramseur’s clients made to the IRS. Id. Two, the 

restitution order exceeded the actual loss from the offense of conviction by 

accounting for 55 tax returns from 21 taxpayers. Id. The Fifth Circuit held: 

Here, as the Government concedes, the district court 

committed reversible plain error when it imposed a restitution 

order that included losses from tax returns other than the 

twenty-six for which Ramseur was convicted. Moreover, the 

district court committed reversible plain error by failing to 

account for the fact that several of Ramseur’s clients paid the 

IRS for payments owed on tax returns that were the basis of 

Ramseur’s convictions. Other witnesses testified that they 

made back payments to the IRS for unidentifiable tax years, 

which may be attributable to one of Ramseur’s convicted 

offenses.

Id. at 249. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit vacated the Court’s restitution order 

and remanded the case back to this Court to reconsider the restitution order 

in a manner consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. Id. at 250. 

Also, on appeal, Ramseur argued that the case should be remanded 

for correction of the final judgment because the final judgment omitted 

Counts 21 to 26. Id. The Government agreed. Id. The Fifth Circuit remanded 

the case back to the District Court to correct the final judgment to reflect all 

26 counts of conviction. Id.

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Ramseur further argues that his restitution was not properly 

calculated, but this claim is not cognizable under § 2255. See United States 

v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999) (§ 2255 motions can raise 

only constitutional errors and other injuries that could not have been raised 

on direct appeal that will result in a miscarriage of justice, and because 

misapplications of the sentencing guidelines do not fall into either category, 

they are not cognizable in § 2255 motions); see also Robertson v. United 

States, 2021 WL 662108, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2021) (citing Williamson, 

183 F.3d at 462). Ramseur’s claim regarding the restitution calculation is 

neither jurisdictional nor Constitutional. See United States v. Cervantes, 

132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[R]eview of convictions under section 

2255 ordinarily is limited to questions of constitutional or jurisdictional 

magnitude which may not be raised for the first time on collateral 

review[.]”). This claim is not cognizable under § 2255, and it should be 

dismissed. 

For these reasons, Ramseur’s thirteenth claim fails under both prongs 

of the Strickland standard, and it should be dismissed, in part, or denied, in 

part. See Kimler, 167 F.3d at 893. 

B. Ramseur has not shown the Court lacked personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction.

Last, Ramseur argues in his eleventh claim that his status as a tax 

preparer makes him an “employee” of the IRS, so “[t]he court was without 

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personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and imposed a sentence in excess 

of the maximum by law or otherwise open to collateral attack.” Mot. 22 (CV 

ECF No. 2). Specifically, he contends that his case lacked an “underlying 

offense to make it a felony (i.e. 18 USC 371, 18 USC 1343, 18 USC 1343), Title 

26 USCS 7206(2) gives the Tax Court jurisdiction for the subject-matter.” 

Id.

This claim is procedurally defaulted because he could have but failed 

to raise this issue on direct appeal. When a movant fails to raise a claim on 

direct appeal, the claim is procedurally defaulted and can only be considered 

under § 2255 if the movant can show cause for his failure to raise the claim 

on direct appeal and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent. United 

States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. 

Shaid,937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991). A movant bears the burden of 

demonstrating either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually 

innocent. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (citing 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)). Ramseur did not raise this 

claim on direct appeal. See Ramseur, 793 F. App’x at 245. And he has not 

demonstrated cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse the 

procedural default. Therefore, this claim has been procedurally defaulted 

and should be dismissed. 

This claim also fails on the merits. 

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(1) Ramseur was convicted of twenty-six counts of aiding or assisting 

in the preparation or presentation of a false or fraudulent individual income 

tax return in violation of § 7206(2). Section 7206(2) applies to anyone who 

“[w]illfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the 

preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising 

under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other 

document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether 

or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person 

authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or 

document.” 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Contrary to 

Ramseur’s argument, there is no exception for tax preparers, such as he was. 

Likewise, § 7206(2) does not require a separate underlying felony in order 

for a tax preparer, or anyone else, to be prosecuted for a felony in federal 

district court; 

(2) A conviction under § 7206(2) is punishable by up to three years’ 

imprisonment. 26 U.S.C. § 7206. Ramseur was convicted of violating 

twenty-six counts of § 7206(2), and his statutory maximum sentence was 

three years’ imprisonment per count with the counts to run concurrently. 

(PSR ¶ 97.) He was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment on counts one 

through twenty-five, to run concurrently, and 28-months’ imprisonment on 

count twenty-six, to run consecutively. (CR ECF No. 166 at 3.) Ramseur was 

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sentenced to a total term of 64 months’ imprisonment, which is well below 

the statutory maximum sentence he could have received; and 

(3) Ramseur suggests that the Tax Court, rather than the federal 

district court, would have exclusive jurisdiction over a federal criminal taxrelated fraud case, such as his. This claim is meritless. When the IRS issues 

a final notice and determination of a tax deficiency, the affected taxpayer has 

a right to appeal that determination to the United States Tax Court. See 26 

U.S.C. § 6330(d). On the other hand, a federal district court has the 

jurisdiction to address tax-related felonies. See United States v. Isenhower, 

754 F.2d 489, 490 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he district courts of the United States 

shall have original jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the 

United States.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231).

For these reasons, Ramseur’s eleventh claim fails under both prongs 

of the Strickland standard, and it should be dismissed or denied. See Kimler, 

167 F.3d at 893. 

Conclusion

The District Court should DENY Ramseur’s motion to vacate, setaside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Signed June 21, 2023. 

_________________________

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all 

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of 

this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will 

bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the 

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United 

Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996)

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