OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 

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 The State ex rel. Smith, Appellant, v. Etheridge, 

Superintendent, et al., Appellees. 

 The State ex rel. Brown et al., Appellants, v. Columbus 

Public Schools et al., Appellees. 

 [Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. Etheridge (1992), Ohio 

St.3d .] 

Schools -- Employment of administrators -- R.C. 3319.02 is a 

 remedial statute that must be liberally construed in favor 

 of administrators. 

R.C. 3319.02 is a remedial statute that must be liberally 

 construed in favor of administrators. (State ex rel. 

 Brennan v. Vinton Cty. Local Bd. of Edn. [1985], 18 Ohio 

 St.3d 208, 18 OBR 271, 480 N.E.2d 476; and State ex rel. 

 Luckey v. Etheridge [1992], 62 Ohio St.3d 404, 583 N.E.2d 

 960, approved and followed.) 

 (Nos. 91-2483 and 91-2484 -- Submitted November 10, 1992 

-- Decided December 15, 1992.) 

 Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

Nos. 90AP-849 and 90AP-847. 

 Case No. 91-2483 

 Appellant, Dr. Kevin C. Smith, was employed by appellee, 

Columbus Public Schools, as an assistant principal at Columbus 

Alternative High School. On August 2, 1988, the appellee, 

Columbus Public Schools Board of Education ("board"), passed a 

resolution whereby Smith was appointed to the position of 

principal at Monroe Middle School. Smith asserts that he 

requested a new contract from his supervisors that would 

reflect his new position, but his supervisors told him that he 

did not need a new contract form since "the Board speaks 

through its minutes," and that, in any event, he should sign 

the "senior high assistant principal" contract form that he had 

already received from the board. Around the latter part of 

August 1988, the personnel office of the board informed Smith 

that his paycheck would be withheld until he signed the senior 

high assistant principal contract form he had been previously 

sent. Consequently, Smith signed and returned the senior high 

assistant principal contract form even though he was serving as 

a middle school principal. 
 On or about January 10, 1990, Smith received a letter from 

the appellee, Superintendent of Columbus Public Schools, Dr. 

Ronald E. Etheridge, which informed him of the superintendent's 

intention to recommend that the board not renew his 

administrative contract. The letter from Etheridge, however, 

did not specifically identify the contract being considered for 

nonrenewal. 

 On March 20, 1990, Smith met with the board in executive 

session wherein he discussed, inter alia, his evaluation of 

December 1988 and his performance as principal of Monroe Middle 

School. 

 On April 11, 1990, the board passed a resolution to 

nonrenew Smith's expiring contract which was listed as "Senior 

High Assistant Principal," and subsequently informed Smith that 

the board did not intend to reemploy him following the 

expiration of his "current administrative contract." 

 Thereafter, Smith filed an original action in mandamus in 

the court of appeals seeking to compel appellees to reemploy 

him as principal of Monroe Middle School. Smith further 

requested an award of back pay, attorney fees and costs. 

 In denying Smith's requested writ, the appellate court 

held that "R.C. 3319.08 created a contract by operation of law 

between relator and the Board for relator's services as 

principal of Monroe Middle School" and that there was no other 

contract of employment between Smith and the board "because a 

school administrator can serve in only one full-time 

administrative capacity at a time." The court of appeals 

justified the board's action by stating that "[t]he incorrect 

designation of [Smith's] position in the Board's resolution can 

be used only to identify the person whose contract is not 

renewed rather than to constitute nonrenewal of a nonexistent 

contract." 

 Case No. 91-2484 

 Appellants, Dr. L. Wayne Brown, David R. Buxton, Dr. James 

Cauley, Hugh Durbin, Edna Payne, Charles E. Pollock, Titus A. 

Saunders, Jr., Dr. Kevin C. Smith (also the appellant in case 

No. 91-2483), John A. Taracko, Margaret R. Wehner, Dr. Amos J. 

White and Dr. Stacy Woodford, were employed by the appellee 

board as administrators. 

 On or about October 4, 1988, the board directed appellee 

Etheridge to engage the management consulting firm of Ernst & 

Whinney to assist the board in conducting an organizational 

audit and developing recommendations for changes in the 

organizational structure of Columbus Public Schools. In its 

final report to the board which was issued on or about April 

18, 1989, Ernst & Whinney recommended, inter alia, that 

fifty-four administrative positions be eliminated, and that 

twenty-nine positions be created. The board accepted these 

recommendations and directed Etheridge to implement them. 

 In consultation with Associate Superintendents Dr. Timothy 

J. Ilg and Dr. Damon F. Asbury, Etheridge determined which 

administrative positions would be eliminated and which 

administrators would be nonrenewed. Ilg and Asbury met, or 

attempted to meet, with the administrators under their 

respective supervision and discuss the reasons for nonrenewal. 

Appellants Saunders and Taracko, however, failed or refused to 

meet with Ilg, their supervisor. 
 In letters dated January 10, 1990, Etheridge informed each 

of the appellants that they could "* * * request a meeting with 

the Board to discuss the Board's reasons for considering the 

renewal or non-renewal of your current contract by submitting a 

written request to me on or before February 16, 1990. If you 

request such a meeting, it will be held at the regular Board 

meeting on March 20, 1990 at 5:00 p.m." 

 Appellants therefore requested meetings with the board 

wherein each appellant, according to board member Richard 

Fahey, was given their "best shot" for renewal, under the 

presumption that "someone in the administration had provided 

[appellants] with the opportunity to know the reasons why they 

were being * * * recommended for nonrenewal." 

 On March 23, 1990, the Ohio Association of Elementary 

School Administrators obtained a temporary restraining order in 

the court of common pleas on behalf of all appellants, except 

Durbin and Cauley, to prevent the board from carrying out the 

plan to nonrenew appellants' contracts. 

 On March 27, 1990, Cauley was notified of the board's 

intention to not renew his administrative contract. On March 

29, 1990, Durbin was also notified of the board's intention to 

not renew his administrative contract. 

 Shortly thereafter, the temporary restraining order 

expired, and the trial judge gave the board until April 30, 

1990 to either reemploy or give written notice of its intention 

not to reemploy the remaining appellants. Consequently, on 

April 12, 1990, all the remaining appellants were notified that 

the board intended not to renew their administrative contracts, 

pursuant to a board resolution adopted April 11, 1990. 

 Subsequently, appellants filed a complaint for a writ of 

mandamus with the court of appeals seeking reinstatement to 

their former administrative positions, as well as back pay, 

attorney fees and costs. However, the court found appellants' 

claim for relief to be not well taken. In denying the 

requested writ, the appellate court held, inter alia, that the 

board essentially complied with the mandates of R.C. 3319.02 in 

not renewing the administrative contracts of appellants. 

 This court has sua sponte consolidated these causes for 

review and determination. The causes are now before this court 

upon appeals as of right. 

 

 Espy & Benton and Ben E. Espy, for appellants. 

 Lawrence H. Braun; Bricker & Eckler, Jerry E. Nathan and 

Diane R. Richards, for appellees. 

 A. William Sweeney, J. 

 I 

 In case No. 91-2483, we are asked whether R.C. 3319.02 

requires a board of education to vote on the nonrenewal of an 

administrator's actual position before the board can nonrenew 

his or her contract. In our view, the statute requires that we 

answer this issue in the affirmative and, therefore, we reverse 

the judgment of the court of appeals below. 

 R.C. 3319.02(C) directs a board of education to "* * * 

execute a written contract of employment with each assistant 

superintendent, principal, assistant principal, and other 

administrator it employs or reemploys. * * *" This provision 
also deems an administrator reemployed if the board does not 

notify him or her in writing of its intention not to reemploy 

such person on or before March 31 of the year in which the 

contract expires. 

 In State ex rel. Brennan v. Vinton Cty. Local Bd. of Edn. 

(1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 208, 18 OBR 271, 480 N.E.2d 476, and 

State ex rel. Luckey v. Etheridge (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 404, 

406, 583 N.E.2d 960, 962, we held that R.C. 3319.02 is a 

remedial statute that must be liberally construed in favor of 

administrators. 

 With this in mind, we first note that R.C. 3319.02 

required the board to issue appellant Smith a written contract 

for the position of principal, but the board either failed or 

refused to issue a correct contract for the position to which 

Smith was promoted. The record indicates that the board's 

personnel office threatened to withhold Smith's paycheck unless 

and until he signed the contract which listed his former 

position as a senior high assistant principal. Subsequently, 

Smith signed the senior high assistant principal's contract, 

but served as the principal of Monroe Middle School. 

Thereafter, the board notified Smith that he was nonrenewed for 

a senior high assistant principal's position that he did not 

then hold. Under these circumstances, and given the remedial 

nature of R.C. 3319.02, we believe that since the board voted 

not to renew Smith's contract for a position he did not hold, 

he was automatically renewed, by operation of the statute, for 

the position he actually did hold, which was principal of the 

middle school. 

 Contrary to the reasoning of the court of appeals below 

and appellees, we find R.C. 3319.08 to be inapplicable to 

Smith's contract status. Ordinarily, R.C. 3319.08 will 

validate a contract where the board does not put such contract 

in writing but the employee performs his or her duties as 

though a written contract were present. However, in this case, 

Smith not only did not have a written contract for the 

principal's position, he was not provided sufficient or timely 

notice that his position as principal was to be nonrenewed. 

Under a clear reading of R.C. 3319.08, the board is not 

relieved of the requirement to provide a written contract or to 

provide an administrator with sufficient notice of nonrenewal. 

 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals in case No. 91-2483, and remand the cause to that court 

to issue the requested writ of mandamus to validate Smith's 

administrative contract as a principal, as well as grant him 

lost wages and any other appropriate relief. 

 II 

 Turning our focus to case No. 91-2484, we note that in 

Luckey, supra, this court held in the syllabus: 

 "Pursuant to R.C. 3319.02(C), a board of education must 

provide written notice of its intention not to reemploy an 

assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal or 

other administrator on or before the last day of March of the 

year in which the contract of employment expires." 

 A careful review of the record indicates that none of the 

appellants herein, except Cauley and Durbin, was given 

sufficient notice of nonrenewal of his or her administrative 

contract pursuant to the syllabus law announced in Luckey, 
supra. 

 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals with respect to appellants Brown, Buxton, Payne, 

Pollock, Saunders, Smith, Taracko, Wehner, White and Woodford, 

and remand the cause to that court to issue the requested writ 

of mandamus which entitles these appellants to a renewal of 

their respective administrative contracts, lost wages and any 

other relief deemed appropriate. 

 III 

 Given our disposition above, the only remaining issues of 

relevance in these appeals are as follows: (1) whether R.C. 

3319.02 grants a public school administrator the right to be 

advised of the reasons for his or her recommended nonrenewal; 

and (2) whether R.C. 3319.02 requires a board of education to 

base a decision to nonrenew an administrative contract on the 

administrator's evaluation. For the reasons that follow we 

answer both of these questions in the negative and, therefore, 

affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in case No. 91-2484 

on these particular issues. 

 A 

 With respect to the issue of whether R.C. 3319.02 grants 

administrators the right to be advised of the reasons for 

nonrenewal of their administrative contracts, we find that 

under R.C. 3319.02(C), administrators are to "be employed or 

reemployed in accordance with nominations of the superintendent 

of schools of the district except that a city * * * board of 

education, by a three-fourths vote, may reemploy any assistant 

[administrator] whom the superintendent refuses to nominate 

after considering two nominees for the position. * * *" 

 Furthermore, an administrator is deemed reemployed unless 

the board, on or before March 31 in the last year of the 

contract, gives him or her written notice of nonrenewal. In 

addition, R.C. 3319.02(D) states in part: 

 "Before taking action to renew or nonrenew the contract of 

an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or 

other administrator under this section and prior to the last 

day of March of the year in which such employee's contract 

expires, the board of education shall notify each such employee 

of the date that his contract expires and that he may request a 

meeting with the board. Upon request by such an employee, the 

board shall grant the employee a meeting in executive session 

to discuss the reasons for considering renewal or nonrenewal of 

his contract." 

 Appellants argue that R.C. 3319.02 requires a board of 

education to provide an administrator with reasons for its 

intention to nonrenew the administrator's contract and to 

discuss these reasons at the administrator's meeting with the 

board. Appellees deny this but argue, alternatively, that the 

board satisfies any such requirement if, as here, the 

administrator knows that the superintendent has recommended 

nonrenewal, since that recommendation is the "reason" for the 

board's considering nonrenewal. 

 In State ex rel. Saltsman v. Burton (1950), 154 Ohio St. 

262, 267, 43 O.O. 136, 138, 95 N.E.2d 377, 379, this court held 

that a superintendent is not entitled to a continuing contract 

as a superintendent merely because he had tenure as a teacher, 

and we explained the practical and statutory differences 
between an administrator and a teacher. According to our 

decision in Saltsman, teacher tenure Acts protect qualified 

teachers and prevent their arbitrary dismissal. However, the 

teacher tenure Acts omit administrators from coverage because 

administrators exercise executive and discretionary power in 

addition to holding professional qualifications as a teacher. 

See, also, State ex rel. Specht v. Painesville Twp. Local 

School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 146, 17 O.O.3d 

89, 407 N.E.2d 20. 

 In comparing R.C. 3319.02 with 3319.11(G), we note that 

R.C. 3319.11 concerns continuing contracts for teachers, and 

provides for written notice upon request describing the 

circumstances leading to the board's intention not to reemploy 

the teacher. R.C. 3319.11(G)(1). The statute also sets forth 

specific times for responses and orders a hearing before the 

board if requested, which may be recorded, within a specific 

time period. In addition, R.C. 3319.11(G)(6) requires a board 

to issue a written decision within ten days after the hearing. 

 On the other hand, the court of appeals in case No. 

91-2484 concluded that the R.C. 3319.02 requirement that a 

board "* * * 'discuss reasons' for an administrator's 

nonrenewal mandates that an administrator be made aware of the 

underlying reasons that the Board is considering as a basis for 

nonrenewal of his contract so that the administrator can 

respond thereto." 

 Nevertheless, R.C. 3319.02, unlike 3319.11, does not 

require any written notification regarding reasons for the 

nonrenewal of an administrator's contract. What the statute 

does require is what in fact was provided to all of the 

appellants, viz., a meeting to discuss the reasons for 

considering the renewal or nonrenewal of their contracts. 

While appellants deny that the reasons for nonrenewal were 

discussed in their respective meetings with the board, we find 

nothing in the record which compels us to overturn the decision 

of the court of appeals on this issue. 

 In our view, appellees complied with the requirements of 

R.C. 3319.02 in this regard and, thus, we affirm the court of 

appeals' disposition with respect to this issue. 

 B 

 With respect to the issue of whether R.C. 3319.02 requires 

a board of education to base its decision to nonrenew on the 

administrator's evaluation, we note that subsection (D) of the 

statute provides in relevant part: 

 "Each board of education shall adopt procedures for the 

evaluation of all assistant superintendents, principals, 

assistant principals, and other administrators and shall 

evaluate such employees in accordance with those procedures. 

The evaluation based upon such procedures shall be considered 

by the board in deciding whether to renew the contract of 

employment of an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant 

principal, or other administrator. The evaluation shall 

measure each assistant superintendent's, principal's, assistant 

principal's, and other administrator's effectiveness in 

performing the duties included in his job description and the 

evaluation procedures shall provide for, but not be limited to, 

the following: 

 "(1) Each assistant superintendent, principal, assistant 
principal, and other administrators shall be evaluated annually 

through a written evaluation process. 

 "(2) The evaluation shall be conducted by the 

superintendent or his designee. 

 "(3) In order to provide time to show progress in 

correcting the deficiencies identified in the evaluation 

process the completed evaluation shall be received by the 

evaluatee at least sixty days prior to any action by the board 

of education on the employee's contract of employment. 

 "* * * 

 "The establishment of an evaluation procedure shall not 

create an expectancy of continued employment. Nothing in this 

section shall prevent a board of education from making the 

final determination regarding the renewal of or failure to 

renew the contract of any assistant superintendent, principal, 

assistant principal, or other administrator." (Emphasis added.) 

 While the foregoing statutory language requires the board 

to consider the administrator's evaluation, it does not require 

the board to base its decision on such evaluations. A review 

of the record sub judice indicates that the board members had 

copies of each administrator's evaluation, and we will not 

assume that they did not consider such evaluations in making 

their determinations. In any event, the above-emphasized 

language indicates that even if a board did not consider an 

administrator's evaluation in voting to nonrenew a contract, 

such a failure does not by itself undermine a board's decision 

to nonrenew an administrative contract. 

 Finally, we also find no merit in appellants' argument 

that the board herein improperly administered a reduction in 

work force under R.C. 3319.17. A clear reading of the record 

indicates that the board decided to reduce the number of 

administrators by not renewing expiring contracts rather than 

by suspending existing contracts. Thus, R.C. 3319.02 rather 

than 3319.17 was the vehicle used by the board in its attempt 

to reduce the number of administrators within the school system. 

 Based on all the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the 

court of appeals in case No. 91-2483 and remand the cause to 

that court for further proceedings. 

 In case No. 91-2484, we reverse the judgment of the court 

of appeals with respect to all appellants except Cauley and 

Durbin. The cause is remanded to the court of appeals to issue 

the requested writ of mandamus and to grant other appropriate 

relief. With respect to appellants Cauley and Durbin, the 

judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 

 Judgment accordingly. 

 H. Brown and Resnick, JJ., concur. 

 Douglas, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 

 Moyer, C.J., Holmes and Wright, JJ., concur in part and 

dissent in part. 

 

 Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

I concur with the syllabus law announced by the majority, and 

with the majority's disposition of case No. 91-2483. I concur 

in Part II of the opinion with regard to how the majority 

decides, in part, case No. 91-2484, and in Part III(B) of the 

opinion, as to the majority's discussion and disposition 

pertaining to R.C. 3319.02(D) and 3319.17. I respectfully 
dissent as to the discussion and judgment of the majority in 

Part III(A) of the opinion. 

 As set forth in the majority opinion, R.C. 3319.02(D) 

states, in part, that "* * * [u]pon request by such an 

employee, the board shall grant the employee a meeting in 

executive session to discuss the reasons for considering 

renewal or nonrenewal of his contract." It is my judgment that 

the majority's discussion and decision as to this subdivision 

of the statute may be interpreted, for all practical purposes, 

to read it out of existence. I would find that both the 

statute and fundamental fairness require that reasons be given 

for nonrenewal. 

 It would appear implicit that when the General Assembly 

provides for a nonrenewed administrator to request and be 

granted a hearing before the board "to discuss the reasons for 

* * * nonrenewal," a necessary condition precedent therefor is 

that reasons for the nonrenewal be given the employee. 

Otherwise, the provision has no meaning and it is our duty to 

give credence to the entire statute--not just a part thereof. 

Since the record in this case clearly reflects that no reasons 

for nonrenewal were given the employees and, in addition, that 

at the meeting before the board, the employees were simply 

given the opportunity to express to the board why they (the 

employees) should have their contracts renewed, it is obvious 

that there has not been compliance with the statute. 

 Finally, there is the question of fundamental fairness. 

Which of us, if we were administrators, would like to face the 

prospect of applying for a new job in a new school district and 

appearing before a new school board, a new superintendent or 

screening committee and having to respond to the question of 

"Why were you nonrenewed?" with the answer "I don't know. They 

did not tell me." Either such response would not be believed 

or the worst would be assumed. Every person should know why 

she or he has been terminated from employment. Was it because 

of lack of funds, decreased enrollment, reduction in force or 

even just because the administrator drives a blue, rather than 

a red, car to work? Without being given any reasons, a stigma 

attaches that will be difficult, if not impossible to remove. 

Simply put--it is fundamentally unfair. I trust that the 

majority opinion will not be read to sanction such unfairness. 

 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in 

part. 

 

 Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

I respectfully dissent from the court's opinion in Parts I and 

II for the reasons I have stated previously in my dissents in 

State ex rel. Brennan v. Vinton Cty. Local Bd. of Edn. (1985), 

18 Ohio St.3d 208, 210, 18 OBR 271, 273, 480 N.E.2d 476, 478, 

and State ex rel. Luckey v. Etheridge (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 

404, 407, 583 N.E.2d 960, 963. Relators received adequate 

notice and an opportunity to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal 

at the board meeting. This is sufficient to comply with R.C. 

3319.02. 

 I concur in Part III of the majority's opinion. 

 Moyer, C.J., and Holmes, J., concur in the foregoing 

opinion.