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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re M. JONES, JR., Minor. April 4, 2017 

No. 335423 

Jackson Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 13-001032-NA 

 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and O’CONNELL and BORRELLO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights 

to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody) and 

(j) (child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm. 

 The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the minor child in February 2015 after the minor 

child tested positive for tetrahyrocannabinol (THC) upon birth. The petition further alleged that 

father had a history of domestic violence toward mother. Both parents had their parental rights 

to previous children with other partners terminated due to domestic violence concerns and an 

inability to benefit from services provided. 

 From February 2015 to September 2015, father followed the parent-agency treatment 

plan and interacted with the minor child appropriately during supervised parental visitations. 

Father completed a psychological evaluation, engaged in a parenting class, participated in 

random drug screens, and completed an anger management course. In September 2015, father 

assaulted mother and was subsequently incarcerated through February 2016. 

 The minor child was returned to mother’s care in January 2016. Despite a court order 

providing that father was to receive supervised parental visitation only, mother allowed father 

unsupervised visitation with the minor child on multiple occasions. In March 2016, father tested 

positive for heroin and alcohol. In April 2016, father was arrested for another domestic violence 

incident with mother, committed while the minor child was present in the home. Father’s 

parental rights were terminated in October 2016. 

Father argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to parent the minor child 

by terminating his parental rights. We disagree. 

 We typically review de novo a respondent’s claim of a violation to his constitutional 

rights to substantive or procedural due process. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 
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208 (2014). However, because father failed to preserve this issue by raising it in the trial court, 

this Court reviews for plain error. Id. Defendant may obtain relief only if “(1) error . . . 

occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, (3) and the plain error affected substantial 

rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

 Father is correct that he has a constitutional right to parent the minor child, which “does 

not evaporate simply because [he has] not been [a] model parent[ ].” Santosky v Kramer, 455 

US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). However, “[a] parent’s right to control the 

custody and care of [his] children is not absolute, as the state has a legitimate interest in 

protecting ‘the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor,’ and in some 

circumstances ‘neglectful parents may be separated from their children.’ ” In re Sanders, 495 

Mich 394, 409-410; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), quoting Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 652; 92 S Ct 

1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972). Once the trial court finds that clear and convincing evidence 

establishes at least one ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3), “the liberty interest of 

the parent no longer includes the right to custody and control of the children.” In re Trejo, 462 

Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). At that point, a “parent’s interest in the companionship, 

care, and custody of the child gives way to the state’s interest in the child’s protection.” Id. at 

356. Therefore, father’s constitutional right to parent his minor child was not violated if the trial 

court correctly found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a statutory ground for 

termination. See id. 

 Because father fails to argue that the trial court erred in finding that there were statutory 

grounds to terminate his parental rights, he has abandoned the issue. See Berger v Berger, 277 

Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008) (“A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a 

meaningful argument in support of its position.”). Consequently, father’s argument as to his 

constitutional right to parent must also fail because father’s liberty interest no longer included the 

right to custody and control of his minor child once the trial court found statutory grounds to 

terminate his parental rights. See In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 355. However, even if father had not 

abandoned the statutory-grounds issue, we would conclude nevertheless that the trial court did 

not err in finding that there were statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). 

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that clear and convincing evidence 

exists to establish at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3). In 

re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Once the trial court finds a statutory 

ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and finds that termination is in the best 

interests of the child by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court shall order termination of 

parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 353. The trial court’s decision to 

terminate parental rights is reviewed for clear error. Id. at 356-357. A finding is “clearly 

erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). 

 Respondent’s parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). A 

parent’s parental rights to a minor child may be terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) where 

the parent “fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that a parent’s parental rights 
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to a minor child may be terminated where “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the 

conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to 

the home of the parent.” 

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing evidence 

established these grounds for termination of father’s parental rights. Despite being provided 

extensive services to address his domestic violence issues, father proceeded to assault mother 

twice during the proceedings. Moreover, father placed the minor child’s safety in jeopardy by 

having unsupervised parental visitation despite the trial court’s orders otherwise. Father’s failure 

to comply with and benefit from the service plan constitutes evidence that he would be unable to 

provide proper care and custody and that the minor child’s health would be at risk if the minor 

child was returned to him. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that 

termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court may consider 

the record as a whole in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests. In re 

Trejo, 462 Mich at 354. The trial court must “state on the record or in writing its findings of fact 

and conclusions of law with respect to whether or not parental rights should be terminated.” 

MCL 712A.19b(1). When deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial 

court may consider “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need 

for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s 

home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). It is also proper to 

consider evidence concerning the length of time the child has been in foster care and whether the 

child could be returned to the parent “within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 

Mich App 242, 249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Although the parent’s interests may be considered, 

“[t]he primary beneficiary” of the best-interest determination “is intended to be the child.” In re 

Trejo, 462 Mich at 356. 

The trial court also did not err in making its best-interest determination. Although father 

interacted appropriately with the minor child during supervised parental visitation and had a 

bond with the minor child, father only exercised this visitation from February 2015 to September 

2015. Against court orders, father exercised unsupervised visitation in February 2016 and March 

2016. At no point in the minor child’s life was father responsible for the care and custody of the 

minor child, and at no point during the proceedings did father demonstrate sufficient progress to 

achieve court-sanctioned unsupervised visitation. Further, the minor child had been placed with 

a foster-care family with his step-siblings, and the foster-care family indicated a willingness to 

adopt the minor child and provide the minor child with permanency, stability, and finality. 

Considering father’s lack of progress and his recent incarceration, it was “unlikely that the child 

could be returned to [his] parents’ home within the foreseeable future,” and termination of 

father’s parental rights was proper to facilitate the placement of the minor child into a permanent, 

stable, loving home. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 249. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello