IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

TRACY JENICE HANCOCK 

PLAINTIFF, 

v. 

WAL-MART STORES, INC. 

DEFENDANT. 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-cv-00456-K 

DEFENDANT WAL-MART STORES TEXAS LLC’S 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Respectfully submitted, 

DEREK S. DAVIS 

Texas Bar No. 00793591 

Email: Derek.Davis@CooperScully.com 

EVAN K. SCOTT 

Illinois Bar No. 6325854 

Email: Evan.Scott@CooperScully.com

COOPER & SCULLY, P.C.

900 Jackson Street, Suite 100 

Dallas, Texas 75202 

Telephone: (214) 712-9500 

Facsimile: (214) 712-9540 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 

WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC 

Case 3:22-cv-00456-K Document 26 Filed 05/05/23 Page 1 of 14 PageID 131
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii-iii 

I. SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................1 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE .............................................................................2 

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................3 

A. Summary Judgment Standards .......................................................................................3 

B. Plaintiff’s Premises Liability Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.......................................3 

1. Plaintiff has no competent summary judgment evidence that Walmart 

had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonably 

dangerous condition ................................................................................................4 

2. Plaintiff has no competent summary judgment evidence that Walmart 

failed to use reasonable care ...................................................................................7 

3. Plaintiff has no competent summary judgment evidence that Walmart 

proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries ...................................................................8 

C. Plaintiff’s Respondeat Superior Claim Must Fail as a Matter of Law ...........................9 

IV. PRAYER...................................................................................................................................9 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page i 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

Cases 

Allen ex rel. B.A. v. Albin, 

97 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002) ...................................................................................... 8 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................... 3 

Cedars Treatment Ctr. Of Desoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 

143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2004) ....................................................................................................... 9 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................................................................................... 3 

City of Denton v. Paper, 

376 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2012) ....................................................................................................... 4 

CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 

15 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2000) ........................................................................................................... 8 

Coburn v. Toys R Us-Delaware, Inc., 

2011 WL 345936 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Feb. 3, 2011, no pet.) ................................ 6 

Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 

907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995) ....................................................................................................... 9 

G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, 

347 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. 2011) ....................................................................................................... 9 

Garcia v. Ross Stores, Inc., 

896 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D. Tex. 2012) ......................................................................................... 5 

GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 

998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) ....................................................................................................... 9 

Henkel v. Norman, 

441 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) ....................................................................................................... 3 

Hyde v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 

511 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 2007) ....................................................................................................... 3 

Keetch v. Kroger Co., 

845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992) ................................................................................................... 2, 3 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page ii 

King v. Ames, 

179 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 1999) ....................................................................................................... 3 

Kroger Co. v. Benavides, 

486 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1972, no writ) ...................................................... 8 

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 

37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) ....................................................................................................... 3 

Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 

106 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2003) ....................................................................................................... 9 

Neely v. Petro Stopping Centers, L.P., 

2007 WL 1168437 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth April 19, 2007, pet. denied) ................................. 5 

Singletary v. Atrium Fin. II, LP, 

2017 WL 1396124 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 2, 2017) ......................................................................... 8, 9 

Sturdivant v. Target Corp., 

464 F. Supp.2d 596 (N.D. Tex. 2006) ......................................................................................... 6 

Taylor v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 

2005 WL 2035836 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 24, 2005, no pet.) .................................................. 5 

Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 

211 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 2000) ....................................................................................................... 5 

Travis v. City of Mesquite, 

830 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1992) ......................................................................................................... 8 

Wal-Mart Stores v. Reece, 

81 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. 2002) ................................................................................................. 4, 5, 6 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 

968 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1998) ............................................................................................... 3, 8, 9 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 

186 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2006) ....................................................................................................... 6 

Rules 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ....................................................................................................................... 3 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

TRACY JENICE HANCOCK 

PLAINTIFF, 

v. 

WAL-MART STORES, INC. 

DEFENDANT. 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-cv-00456-K 

DEFENDANT WAL-MART STORES TEXAS LLC’S 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Defendant WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC (incorrectly named Walmart, Inc.) 

(“Walmart”), respectfully submits this Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, in 

which it moves this Honorable Court to grant summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiff’s 

claims, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Northern District of Texas 

Local Rule 56.3. 

I. SUMMARY 

Plaintiff Tracy Hancock alleges that, on or about February 3, 2020, she went to Walmart’s 

store to get a few things to make supper.1 She further alleges that, as she was shopping in the 

produce section, she slipped on a “foreign transitory substance” on the aisle floor causing her to 

fall and forcefully strike the ground with her body.2 Plaintiff filed suit on the legal theories of 

premises liability and respondeat superior.3

 

1

 Ex. B at 24:15-16 (APPX_011). 

2

 Ex. A at p. 2 (APPX_002). 

3

 Ex. A at p. 4 (APPX_004). 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2 

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff testified that she did not recall seeing anything on the floor before 

she fell.4 Plaintiff also does not know what exactly she slipped on.5 Plaintiff continued to shop, did 

not report the incident that day, and did not seek treatment on the day of the incident.6 As a result 

of her fall, Plaintiff alleges she sustained various injuries.7

To prevail on her premises liability claim, Plaintiff must prove, among other things, that 

Walmart had actual or constructive notice of the hazard. See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 

262, 264 (Tex. 1992). Plaintiff cannot show evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 

Walmart’s actual or constructive notice of a hazard. Accordingly, this Court should grant summary 

judgment to Walmart on Plaintiff’s claim of premises liability, thereby rendering Plaintiff’s 

remaining respondeat superior claim as moot, and dismiss this case with prejudice. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE 

Filed contemporaneously herewith, and pursuant to N.D. Tex. Loc. R. 56, is Defendant’s 

Appendix containing the following summary judgment evidence, which is incorporated herein by 

reference as if fully set forth: 

Exhibit A: Plaintiff’s Original Petition; 

Exhibit B: Deposition Transcript of Plaintiff Tracy Hancock (referenced as Ex. B at 

Page: Line); 

Exhibit C: Declaration of Cindy Escobedo. 

 

4

 Ex. B at 26:12-14 (APPX_013). 

5

 Ex. B at 25:24—26:11, 27:5-13 (APPX_012-013) 

6

 Ex. B at 28:24—29:3, 28:15-17, 29:15-17 (APPX_015-016). 

7

 Ex. A at p.3 (APPX_003). 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 

A. Summary Judgment Standards 

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery, disclosure materials, along with 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). 

A defendant seeking summary judgment on a plaintiff’s cause of action first must demonstrate the 

absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). Once the defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff must come forward with summary 

judgment evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; 

King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 1999). 

A defendant also may obtain summary judgment by showing a plaintiff has no evidence to 

support an essential element of his or her claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The plaintiff, in 

responding to the motion for summary judgment, must go beyond the pleadings and designate 

evidence of specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. 

B. Plaintiff’s Premises Liability Claim Fails as a Matter of Law 

In this diversity case, the substantive law of Texas applies. E.g., Hyde v. Hoffmann-La 

Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2007). To prove an action under a Texas premises liability 

theory of recovery, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a condition on the premises posed an 

unreasonable risk of harm; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the danger; 

(3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) the failure 

to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g., Henkel v. Norman, 441 

S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex. 2014); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998) 

(citing Keetch, supra, 845 S.W.2d at 264). As argued here, Plaintiff cannot prove notice to 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4 

Walmart, which is defined in element (2). It follows that without actual or constructive notice to 

Walmart, Plaintiff cannot prove elements (3) or (4). 

Plaintiff has no competent summary judgment evidence that Walmart had 

actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous 

condition. 

Plaintiff cannot present any evidence that Walmart had either actual or constructive 

knowledge of the foreign transitory substance on the floor prior to her fall. Premises owners are 

not liable on a strict liability basis; there must be some notice of a dangerous condition prior to an 

invitee’s injury for liability to attach. Wal-Mart Stores v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. 2002).

A slip-and-fall plaintiff satisfies the notice element by establishing that (1) the defendant placed 

the substance on the floor, (2) the defendant actually knew that the substance was on the floor, or 

(3) it is more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a 

reasonable opportunity to discover it. Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816. Actual knowledge is selfexplanatory—the premises owner (or the owner’s employees) must be shown to have actually 

known an unreasonable risk of harm existed before the plaintiff was injured. City of Denton v. 

Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex. 2012). 

Here, Plaintiff has no evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Walmart or its 

employees caused any foreign transitory substance to be on the floor. Plaintiff cannot personally 

know how the hazard came to be on the floor, because she did not notice it until after she fell.8

There is no evidence that indicates Walmart actually knew of the hazard prior to her incident.9

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot raise a fact issue on the element of actual notice of an unreasonably 

dangerous condition. 

 

8

 Ex. B at 26:12-14 (APPX_013). 

9

 Ex. C at 2 (APPX_021). 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 5 

Because Plaintiff cannot establish actual notice, she must prove constructive notice. The 

Texas Supreme Court in Reece set out three non-exclusive factors that demonstrate constructive 

notice in a premises liability case: 

1) Temporal Evidence – That an unreasonably dangerous condition was 

present long enough to be discovered by an employee. 

2) Proximity Evidence – That an employee in the course and scope of 

employment was close enough to the condition to discover it. 

3) Conspicuousness Evidence – That the condition was capable of discovery 

prior to the injury (i.e. that it was visible and apparent). 

Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816. Plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact as to any of these factors. 

The first factor requires proof that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed for a long 

enough time to be discovered by the premises owner or their employee. See Id. at 815. Federal 

courts have held that “[a] dangerous condition that has existed for forty-five minutes or less has 

been considered to be legally insufficient to show constructive knowledge.” Garcia v. Ross Stores, 

Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see also Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 

F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a puddle which was on the floor of the defendant’s 

premises for forty-five minutes was not present for a long enough time to impute constructive 

knowledge). Further, Texas courts have found a lack of constructive knowledge on the part of the 

premises owner where hazards, even conspicuous hazards, were only present for as little as five or 

less minutes. See, e.g., Neely v. Petro Stopping Centers, L.P., No. 02-06-00385-CV, 2007 WL 

1168437 *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth April 19, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidence that duffle 

bag protruded into aisle of store for five to ten minutes before plaintiff fell over it was not evidence 

of actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the store); Taylor v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 

No. 12–04–00159–CV, 2005 WL 2035836 at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 24, 2005, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (no constructive knowledge where a Plaintiff tripped over a step-stool that had been in 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 6 

the same location for approximately five to seven minutes before the injury). 

The second factor—proximity—requires proof that an employee in the course and scope 

of his or her employment was close enough to the condition to discover it. Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 

816. Even if the employee was in the proximity of the allegedly dangerous condition, the employee 

had to have been in the proximity for a reasonable amount of time to have been able to discover 

it. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006) (summary judgment 

proper because evidence that plastic ring was behind the back of store employee for 30-45 seconds 

before fall was legally insufficient to raise fact issue on constructive notice). 

The third factor—conspicuity—requires evidence that the condition was conspicuous and 

capable of discovery prior to the injury. See Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816-17 (using the example of a 

large puddle of dark liquid on a light floor). Courts recognize that a clear liquid on a light floor is 

generally not conspicuous. See, e.g., Coburn v. Toys R Us-Delaware, Inc., No. 01-09-00871-CV, 

2011 WL 345936 at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Feb. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); 

Sturdivant v. Target Corp., 464 F. Supp.2d 596, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 2006).

As explained above, finding constructive notice requires analyzing the combination of 

proximity, conspicuity, and longevity of the hazard. See Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 567 (Tex. 2006). 

Here, Plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence that could raise a genuine fact issue on the 

components of constructive notice. While Plaintiff’s testimony indicated that there were Walmart 

employees nearby when the incident occurred, this fact alone is not determinative of constructive 

notice.10 The Texas Supreme Court unanimously held that the mere proximity of an employee to 

a spill, without evidence of when or how it came to be on the floor was legally insufficient to 

charge a premises owner with constructive notice of the hazard. See Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816-

 

10 See Ex. B at 25:24—26:11 (APPX_012-13). 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 7 

17 (Tex. 2002). Additionally, the creation of the condition was unknown, and nobody, including 

the Walmart employees, had any knowledge of how the condition was created or how long the 

condition existed prior to Plaintiff’s incident.11

Thus, even if the Court finds that proximity and temporality elements have been satisfied, 

which is denied, there are no facts that Plaintiff may rely on to indicate conspicuity. Plaintiff herself 

testified that she did not see anything on the floor prior to her fall.12 The foreign transitory 

substance was not conspicuous in any manner to allow for Walmart or its employees to discover 

it prior to Plaintiff’s incident.13 The only reasonable inference here is that, even if there was a 

foreign transitory substance on the floor, it was not capable of discovery by Walmart or its 

employees prior to Plaintiff’s fall.14 This establishes that no fact issue exists on the 

conspicuousness elements of constructive notice, which negates another element of Plaintiff’s 

premises liability claim. 

In sum, Plaintiff cannot present any competent evidence to raise a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Walmart had actual or constructive notice of a condition that posed an 

unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff (i.e., this element is unsupported by the testimony, pleadings, 

and applicable case law). As such, Plaintiff’s premises liability claim fails, and the Court should 

grant summary judgment in favor of Walmart as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff has no competent summary judgment evidence that Walmart 

failed to use reasonable care. 

A Texas store owner owes its invitees only the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect 

them against unreasonably dangerous conditions in the store, known to or discoverable by the 

 

11 Ex. C at 2 (APPX_020). 

12 Ex. B at 26:12-14 (APPX_013). 

13 Ex. C at 2 (APPX_021). 

14 Ex. C at 2 (APPX_021). 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 8 

owner. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). This duty 

does not make the store owner an insurer of the invitees’ safety. Id.; see also CMH Homes, Inc. v. 

Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 102 (Tex. 2000) (“We reiterate that premises owners are not strictly liable 

for conditions that result in injury.”). 

Here, Walmart did not owe any duty to warn or to make the condition safe because Plaintiff 

failed to establish that any such condition was reasonably discoverable by Walmart. See Gonzalez, 

968 S.W.2d at 936. Since Walmart did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged 

foreign transitory substance on the floor when Plaintiff slipped, Walmart could not have breached 

any duty to warn Plaintiff or to make the area safe. Walmart cannot warn about or fix something 

it did not know about. See, e.g., Singletary v. Atrium Fin. II, LP, No. 4:16-CV-00496, 2017 WL 

1396124 at *4 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 2, 2017) (“Clearly, an owner does not owe a duty to remedy a 

dangerous condition of which it is not aware”); Kroger Co. v. Benavides, 486 S.W.2d 877, 880 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1972, no writ) (no evidence of breach because no evidence showed 

that dangerous condition had existed for such length of time that, in exercise of ordinary care, 

defendant or any of its agents could have discovered it). 

Because Plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact that Walmart failed to use 

reasonable care, Walmart’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. 

Plaintiff has no competent summary judgment evidence that Walmart 

proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. 

Premises liability is not a strict liability cause of action. See CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenan, 

15 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. 2000); Allen ex rel. B.A. v. Albin, 97 S.W.3d 655, 659-60 (Tex. App.-

Waco 2002). Therefore, Plaintiff is required to provide evidence that Walmart proximately caused 

Plaintiff’s injuries. See id. Proximate cause requires a show of cause in fact and foreseeability. 

Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992). These elements cannot be established 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 9 

by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 

472, 477 (Tex. 1995). The test for cause in fact is whether the act or omission was a substantial 

factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. Marathon Corp. v. 

Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003). If the defendant’s negligence merely furnished a 

condition that made the injuries possible, there can be no cause in fact. HIS Cedars Treatment Ctr. 

Of Desoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. 2004). 

Walmart cannot be held to owe a duty to warn or to fix an alleged condition of which it 

was not aware and could not reasonably have discovered before Plaintiff encountered it. Gonzalez, 

supra, 968 S.W.2d at 936; Singletary v. Atrium Fin. II, LP, No. 4:16-CV-00496, 2017 WL 

1396124 at *4 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 2, 2017). Thus, Plaintiff cannot raise any fact issue on whether 

Walmart proximately caused the incident or her injuries. 

C. Plaintiff’s Respondeat Superior Claim Must Fail as a Matter of Law 

To hold a defendant vicariously liable under respondeat superior, the plaintiff must prove 

it was injured as a result of a tort. See G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tex. 

2011); GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 617-18 (Tex. 1999). As argued above, Plaintiff 

cannot show that she was injured as a result of Walmart’s employees’ alleged tortious conduct. 

Since Plaintiff’s sole claim based upon Defendant’s allegedly tortious actions, premises liability, 

cannot prevail, it must follow that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her respondeat superior claim. For 

these reasons, Walmart’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. 

IV. PRAYER 

WHEREFORE, Defendant Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC respectfully prays that this Court 

grant its Motion for Summary Judgment, dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, tax all costs of 

court against Plaintiff, and grant Walmart all other relief to which it may show itself justly entitled 

in law or in equity. 

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DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 10 

Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Evan K. Scott 

DEREK S. DAVIS 

Texas Bar No. 00793591 

Email: Derek.Davis@CooperScully.com 

EVAN K. SCOTT 

Illinois Bar No. 6325854 

Email: Evan.Scott@CooperScully.com 

COOPER & SCULLY, P.C.

900 Jackson Street, Suite 100 

Dallas, Texas 75202 

Telephone: (214) 712-9500 

Facsimile: (214) 712-9540 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 

WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on the 5th day of May, 2023, I served a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document on the following counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF filing service: 

GEOFFREY E. SCHORR 

Texas Bar No. 24029828 

Email: Geoff@schorrfirm.com

A. JARED ALDINGER 

Texas Bar No. 24068455 

Email: Jared@schorrfirm.com

HUTTON W. SENTELL 

Texas Bar No. 24026655 

Email: Hutton@schorrfirm.com

328 W. Interstate 30, Suite 2 

Garland, Texas 75043 

Telephone: (972) 226-8860 

Facsimile: (972) 226-9787 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 

/s/ Evan K. Scott 

EVAN K. SCOTT 

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