COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Kelsey and Senior Judge Hodges

KAREN A. DELUCA MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 3021-04-4 PER CURIAM JUNE 14, 2005 DENIS KATCHMERIC

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY M. Langhorne Keith, Judge (Karen A. DeLuca, pro se , on briefs). (Michael A. Ward, on brief), for appellee.
Karen A. DeLuca, wife, appeals a decision of th e trial court finding her in contempt of court for failing to abide by the terms of the parties’ fina l divorce decree. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this ap peal is without merit. We summ arily affirm the decision in part, see Rule 5A:27, and we dism iss the appeal in part. The parties were married in 1984 and separate d in 2001. On June 25, 2004, the trial court entered a final divorce decree which provided for th e sale of the parties’ condominium within 120 days from the date of entry of the order. The final decree also provided that Denis Katchmeric, husband, would pay the existing mort gage secured by the property until settlement on the sale of the property. Wife refused to sign a listing agreement with a real es tate agent for th e sale of the property. Husband filed a motion to compel wife to sign a listing agreement or the appointment of a special commissioner to execute the listing agreement an d related documents on her behalf if she continued to refuse to sign the documents.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - On September 17, 2004 , the trial court entere d an order directing wife to sign a listing agreement and all related documents. The order al so appointed a special co mmissioner to act on wife’s behalf in the event wife fa iled to sign the docu ments by the close of business on September 17, 2004. Wife failed to sign the listing agreement, and the special commissi oner signed the agreement on Oc tober 18, 2004. Subsequent to the execution of the listing ag reement, wife failed to cooperate with real estate agents concerning their access to the condominium in order to show the property to prospective purchasers. Husband again filed a motion to compel and a motion for finding of contempt and sanctions based on wife’s failure to cooperate in the sale of the property. On November 12, 2004 , the trial court held a hear ing wherein both parties presented evidence. The trial court granted husband’s motions and ordered that a lock box be place d on the residence, that wife provide to the real estate agent al l keys necessary to gain access to the property, and that wife be absent from the property when prospective buyers were looking at the residence. In addition, the court granted husband’s reque st that wife be ordered to pay the monthly condominium fees associated with the property beginning in N ovember 2004. The court also ordered that at the settle ment husband would receive reimbursemen t for all principal paid by him on the mortgage loan since the entry of the final divorce decree, plus inte rest at the judgment rate from November 1, 2004 on the total amo unt of principal paid. Furthermore, the court ordered that wife could obtain, at her own expense, a fair market appr aisal of the property wh ich she could present at the next hearing. The trial court then continue d the case until December 17 , 2004 for a review of the status of the sale of the property, for other proceedings consis tent with the order, and to consider husband’s request for attorney’s fees. In addition to challenging the trial court’ s finding of contempt, wife presents several arguments concerning the trial court’s rulings regard ing the sale of the cond ominium. For example,- 3 - she asserts the trial court erred by ordering the placement of the lock bo x on the residence and ordering her to leave the premises when it was being shown to prospective buyers. However, the November 19, 2004 order from which wife app eals was not a final order c oncerning the sale of the property. “‘A final order is one which dispos es of the whole subject, gives all the relief contemplated, . . . and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to supe rintend ministerially the execution of the order.’” Da niels v. Truck & Equip. Corp. , 205 Va. 579, 585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1964) (citations omitted). Indeed, the November 19, 2004 order specifica lly continue d the matter until December 17, 2004 for a revi ew of the status of the sale of the property. The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the circuit courts in domestic relations cases and interlocutory orders involving injunctions or “adjudicat ion [of] the principles of a cause.” Code § 17.1-405. Therefore, to the extent wife’s appeal raises arguments concerning the trial court’s rulings regarding the specifics of the sale of the condominium, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. We dismiss those issues without prejudice. Wife also asserts the trial court failed to act impartially in the case. However, wife failed to present this argument to the trial court. “T he Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to th e trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). See Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this question on appeal. Wife contends the trial court abused its di scretion by finding her in contempt because she did not violate any court orders. “Willful disobedience to any lawful . . . order of court is contempt and . . . punishable as such.” Board of Supervisors v. Bazile , 195 Va. 739, 745, 80 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1954). A trial court “has the authority to hold [an] offending party in contempt for acting in bad faith or for willful disobedience of its order.” Carswell v. Masterson , 224 Va. 329, 332, 295 S.E.2d 899,- 4 - 901 (1982). It is well established that “use of contem pt powers is clearly subject to the discretion of the trial court.” Sapp v. Commonwealth , 263 Va. 415, 425, 559 S.E. 2d 645, 650 (2002). Even where a court has found that a party to litigatio n has violated an order of the cour t and could be held in contempt, the tria l court retains its discretion whether to enter the finding of cont empt and impose sanctions. Wells v. Wells , 12 Va. App. 31, 36, 4 01 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1991). The final divorce decree, entered on June 24, 2004, provided that th e condominium “shall be sold within one hundr ed twenty (120) days from the entry of this Decree.” Husband’s evidence established that wife repeatedly fa iled to cooperate in ta king the necessary steps in order to sell the property in compliance with the court’s order. Wi fe initially refused to sign a listing agreement with a real estate agent, requiring the appoin tment of a special commissioner to execute the agreement. Subsequently, wife failed to cooperate with real estate agents attempting to show the property to prospective b uyers. During this lengthy process, husband f iled two motions to compel wife’s cooperation in the sale of the property and the record shows that about six months passed from the date of entry of the final divorce decree to the date of settleme nt for the sale of the property. Therefore, the trial court’s decision finding wife in contempt is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we fi nd no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. Wife also requests that we fi nd husband and his attorney in contempt, and sh e asks for an award of costs for her time and cost s involved in this matter “trial court through appeal.” In wife’s “Opposition to Motion To Co mpel, Motion for Findings of C ontempt and Sanctions,” wife requested that the trial court impose sanctions on husband and his attorney, including compensation to her for her time and effort in defending the matter. On this record and where husband merely sought wife’s compliance with the terms of the final divorce decree, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying wife’s motions.- 5 - Both parties request costs and attorney’s fe es for matters relati ng to this appeal. The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to determine the propriety of an awar d of attorney’s fees for efforts expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for requiring additional payment. O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). In this context, and upon consideration of the entire reco rd in this case, we hold that husband is entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and co sts. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the tria l court for it to determine the proper amount of the award. Dismissed, in part, affirmed, in part,

and remanded.