alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# AGENCY:

Department of the Navy, DOD. 

# ACTION:

Final Rule; Correction. 

# SUMMARY:

                        The Department of the Navy published a document in the                         **Federal Register**                         on September 5, 2000, (65 FR 53589) amending regulations on disposition of property. One amendment inadvertently removed the authority of the Department of the Navy to sell property not excess to its needs. This document corrects that error.                    

# DATES:

Effective on November 13, 2000. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Major Chris Carlson, USMC, Regulations and Legislation, FOIA/PA Branch, Administrative Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General (Code 13), 1322 Patterson Ave. SE., Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066. Phone (703) 604-8219. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The Department of the Navy (DON) published a document in the                     **Federal Register**                     on September 5, 2000, (65 FR 53589) amending Part 736. In FR Doc. 00-22445, published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on September 5, 2000, § 736.5(e) was inadvertently amended. This correction adds back the language on the sale of property that was deleted in the revision to § 736.5(e).                 

In rule FR doc. 00-22445 published on September 5, 2000, (65 FR 53589) make the following correction. On page 53590, in the third column, at amendment 4(d) correct the paragraph to read: 

§ 736.5 

* * * * *

                            (e) Exchange or sale of property for replacement purposes. Under the authority of section 201(c) of the Federal Property Act (40 U.S.C. 481(c)) and                             Start Printed Page 67629                            consistent with Department of Defense implementing regulations, DOD 4140.1-R and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, the Department of the Navy is authorized in the acquisition of new equipment to exchange or sell similar items which are not excess to its needs, and apply the exchange allowance or proceeds of sale in whole or part payment for the items acquired.                        

Dated: October 31, 2000. 

C.G. Carlson, 

U.S. Marine Corps, Alternate Federal Register, Liaison Officer. 

[FR Doc. 00-28867 Filed 11-9-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3810-FF-P
A01A1351.

#### DANIELS et al. v. THE STATE.

(548 SE2d 108)

Decided April 25, 2001 —

Reconsideration denied May 11,2001.

*Andrej S. Bajuk,*for appellants.

Phipps, Judge.

Frederick and Sanchez Daniels were convicted of aggravated battery for shooting Kelvin Carter in the eye, thus depriving him of its use. They argue that under *Jackson v. Virginia,*
      *1*
      **the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. This argument is without merit.

It is undisputed that during the course of a melee involving members of the Daniels and Carter families, Kelvin Carter was shot in the eye and that this resulted in loss of the eye. Numerous State’s witnesses testified that Carter was so injured when appellants began shooting indiscriminately and without provocation at members of the Carter family. Defense witnesses, on the other hand, testified that Sanchez Daniels was not involved in the shooting and that Frederick Daniels discharged his firearm in Carter’s direction to defend himself against gunshots being fired at him by Carter family members.

Under *Jackson v. Virginia,*conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses are a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve.2 As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.3 Here, there is competent evidence supporting appellants’ convictions.

*Judgments affirmed.*

*Smith, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.*

*594
      *J Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Joseph N. Walden III, Assistant District Attorneys,*for appellee.

443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

*Turner v. State,*223 Ga. App. 448, 449 (1) (a) (477 SE2d 847) (1996).

Id.
2017 Annual Statement of Servicer Compliance (Item
1123)



Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “Pooling
and Servicing Agreement”) dated as of April 1, 2015 by and among Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., as Depositor,
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC as Special Servicer, TriMont Real Estate
Advisors, Inc. as Trust Advisor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Certificate Administrator, as Tax Administrator and
as Custodian, and Wilmington Trust, National Association as Trustee relating to the Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-NXS1,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-NXS1

(WFCM 2015-NXS1)





The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Rialto
Capital Advisors, LLC, as special servicer (the “Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:



| | 1. | All servicing activities and performance of such servicing activities under the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement are performed on behalf of the Special Servicer.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | A review of the servicing activities and performance by the Special Servicer for the period of
January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
has been conducted under my supervision.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 3. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its
obligations under the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in all material respects for the Reporting Period and if there
has been a failure to fulfill any such obligations in any material respect, each failure and the nature and status thereof has
been specifically identified herein.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------







|Certified by: | /s/ Adam Singer                |  | Date:  March
    1, 2018
|------------- | ------------------------------ |  | ------------------------
|              | Adam Singer, Managing Director |  |
EXHIBIT 24

                  Power of Attorney of Director and/or Officer

         The  undersigned  director of Titan  Motorcycle  Co. of  America,  does
hereby make,  constitute  and appoint  Frank S. Keery and Robert P. Lobban,  and
either of them, the undersigned's true and lawful attorneys-in-fact,  with power
of substitution,  for the undersigned and in the  undersigned's  name, place and
stead,  to sign  and  affix  the  undersigned's  name as such  director  of said
Corporation to an Annual Report on Form 10-KSB or other applicable form, and all
amendments  thereto,  to be filed by said  Corporation  with the  Securities and
Exchange  Commission,  Washington,  D.C.,  under the  Securities Act of 1934, as
amended, with all exhibits thereto and other supporting documents, granting unto
said  attorneys-in-fact,  and either of them, full power and authority to do and
perform  any and  all  acts  necessary  or  incidental  to the  performance  and
execution of the powers herein expressly granted.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  the undersigned has hereunto set the undersigned's
hand this day of March, 1997.


                                                       /s/ Tony Turner
                                                       -------------------------
                                                       H.B. Tony Turner

                  Power of Attorney of Director and/or Officer

         The  undersigned  director of Titan  Motorcycle  Co. of  America,  does
hereby make,  constitute  and appoint  Frank S. Keery and Robert P. Lobban,  and
either of them, the undersigned's true and lawful attorneys-in-fact,  with power
of substitution,  for the undersigned and in the  undersigned's  name, place and
stead,  to sign  and  affix  the  undersigned's  name as such  director  of said
Corporation to an Annual Report on Form 10-KSB or other applicable form, and all
amendments  thereto,  to be filed by said  Corporation  with the  Securities and
Exchange  Commission,  Washington,  D.C.,  under the  Securities Act of 1934, as
amended, with all exhibits thereto and other supporting documents, granting unto
said  attorneys-in-fact,  and either of them, full power and authority to do and
perform  any and  all  acts  necessary  or  incidental  to the  performance  and
execution of the powers herein expressly granted.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has hereunto set the undersigned's
hand this day of March, 1997.


                                                       /s/ Harry H. Birkenruth
                                                       -------------------------
                                                       Harry H. Birkenruth


                                       53
#### Bill ERVIN v. STATE.

No. 24470.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 9, 1949.

None on appeál, for appellant;

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty.,. of Austin, for the State. ,

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is ‘possession of whiskey in a dry area for the purpose of sale. The punishment assessed is confinemeflt in the county jail for a period of thirty days and a fine of $750.

Appellant has filed in this court a verified motion in which he states that he does not desire to further prosecute his appeal herein and requests this court to- dismiss the same.

The motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
Case 3:22-cr-00103-K Document 26 Filed 09/27/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 46
REPORT OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS


 



 Exhibit 10(ii)


 

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

 

To the Board of Directors and Policyholders of

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company:

 

                  We have audited the accompanying statutory statement of financial
position of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company as of December 31, 1998, and the related statutory statements of income and changes in policyholders’ contingency reserves, and of cash flows for each of the two years in the period ended
December 31, 1998. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits.

 

                  We conducted our audits of these statements in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis,
evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. We have not audited the financial statements of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company for any period subsequent to December 31, 1998.

 

                  As described in Note 1, these financial statements were prepared
in conformity with accounting practices prescribed or permitted by the Division of Insurance of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which practices differ from generally accepted accounting principles. The effects on the financial statements of the
variances between the statutory basis of accounting and generally accepted accounting principles, although not reasonably determinable, are presumed to be material.

 

                  In our opinion, because of the effects of the matter discussed in
the preceding paragraph, the financial statements audited by us do not present fairly, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, the financial position of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company as of December 31, 1998 or the
results of its operations or its cash flows for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 1998.

 

                  In our opinion, the financial statements audited by us, present
fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company as of December 31, 1998, and the results of its operations and its cash flows for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 1998, on the
basis of accounting described in Note 1.

 

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Hartford, Connecticut

February 25, 1999
#### John R. San Filippo, Plaintiff, *v.*Tany G. Gaglio, as Executor of Raffaele La Gaipa, Deceased, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County,

December 10, 1957.

*Isidor Neuwirth*for plaintiff.

*Yellon, Banno, Lombardo & Verrilli*for defendants.

*1039Benjamin Brenner, J.

Plaintiff commenced this action to compel specific performance by the defendants of the terms of an alleged joint and mutual last will and testament and to impress a trust on the property of the estates of Raffaele and Vincenzina Lagaipo, and now moves for an injunction *pendente lite*to enjoin the defendants from transferring, selling, converting or disposing of said property pending the final determination of the action. It is plaintiff’s claim that the joint and mutual will of said decedents constitutes an agreement made for his benefit and which, if established, will entitle him to the proceeds of all the assets comprising the estate of Raffaele Lagaipo; that a second will of the decedent later executed and admitted to probate, attempting to revoke the provisions of the joint will is not binding; that the executor and beneficiary named in the second testament will be required to specifically perform the terms of the joint will and hold the property of the estate in trust for plaintiff. The plaintiff may, of course, ultimately establish his right to the creation of a trust in his behalf and to a specific performance of the terms of the alleged joint and mutual will *(Tutunjian*v. *Vetzigian,*299 N. Y. 315; *Olsen*v. *Olsen,*189 Misc. 1046). He has, however, failed to submit adequate and positive evidentiary facts warranting the drastic remedy of a temporary injunction. His conclusory statements merely indicate fear that the defendants will dispose of the assets, overlooking the fact that the defendant Gaglio is acting as a fiduciary under the authority of the Surrogate’s Court, and thus obliged to conform to its requirements in administering the estate for the benefit of creditors and claimants. He may be unaware, too, that distribution cannot be made until the passage of seven months and the filing of the executor’s account subject to the , decree of the court. An injunction *pendente lite*is thus unavailable here since the moving papers do not establish that some act is being done, threatened and imminent, which will be destructive of plaintiff’s rights or cause actual material and irreparable injury *(People*v. *Canal Bd.,*55 N. Y. 390; *Kane*v. *Walsh,*295 N. Y. 198, 205). Motion for an injunction *pendent lite*is denied on condition that defendants serve their answers within five days following the entry of an order herein, whereupon plaintiff may place the cause on the Trial Calendar at Special Term, Part III, for the next available term and the action then tried, subject to the approval of the justice presiding.

Settle order.
EXHIBIT
32.2














CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
1350





In connection with the Annual Report of
Surge Global Energy, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended
December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and to
which this Certification is an exhibit (the “Report”), the undersigned officer
of the Company does hereby certify, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. 1350):





(1)                  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)                  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial conditionand results of operations of the Company.





Date:
April 14, 2008





/s/ E. JAMIE SCHLOSS


E. Jamie
Schloss


Chief
Financial Officer
Case 5:22-cr-00034-H-BQ Document 373 Filed 07/28/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 866
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Digital Broadband Networks, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Chee Hong Leong, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Chee Hong Leong
-------------------
Chee Hong Leong
Chief Financial Officer
August 1, 2003
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4205-18T2

 

ERNEST BOZZI,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CITY OF JERSEY CITY, and

IRENE MCNULTY, 

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________________

Submitted March 23, 2020 – Decided April 15, 2020

Before Judges Sabatino, Sumners and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-0354-19. 

Peter J. Baker, Corporation Counsel, attorney for 

appellants (Maura E. Connelly, Assistant Corporation

Counsel, and John A. McKinney, III, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel, on the briefs).

Donald M. Doherty, Jr., attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4205-18T2

Defendants Jersey City and Irene McNulty (City Clerk of Jersey City and 

Custodian of Records), appeal the order of Judge Francis B. Schultz directing 

defendants, in accordance with the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 

47:1A-1 to -13, to provide plaintiff Ernest Bozzi with the names and addresses 

of individuals possessing a dog license issued by Jersey City. Plaintiff requested 

the information to solicit customers for his invisible dog fence installation 

business.

Before us, defendants contend:

POINT I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

THE INFORMATION SOUGHT IN PLAINTIFF’S 

OPRA REQUEST WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE 

PRIVACY PROTECTIONS OF N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

POINT II

THE LOWER COURT ALSO ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO THE 

INFORMATION SOUGHT IN HIS OPRA REQUEST 

UNDER THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS. 

Defendants add the following argument in their reply brief: 

PLAINTIFF MISINTERPRETS MUCH OF THE 

CASE LAW RELIED UPON IN HIS OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL. 
3

A-4205-18T2

Because the issues and arguments raised in this appeal mirror those 

resolved in our recent published decision in Bozzi v. Borough of Roselle Park, 

____ N.J. Super. ____ (App. Div. 2020), where we held the plaintiff was entitled 

under OPRA to the names and addresses of dog licensees issued by the defendant 

municipalities, we affirm.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6227 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DEREK LAVELLE STATEN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (8:01-

cr-00284-PJM; 8:05-cv-00144-PJM)

Submitted: September 28, 2006 Decided: October 5, 2006

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derek Lavelle Staten, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Derek Lavelle Staten seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Staten has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Staten’s motion for

stay and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FT. WORTH DIVISION

ROBERT (BOB) ROSS, §

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00343-Y

§

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL §

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al. §

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiff. §

EUGENIO VARGAS, §

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00430-Y

§

ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL §

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, et al. §

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiff. §

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

COMES NOW, Robert “Bob” Ross and Eugenio Vargas, Defendants in the aboveentitled causes and hereby withdraws their Motions for Leave to File Amended Complaints and 

Briefs in Support filed on April 8, 2023, based on updates needed to Certificate of Conferences 

filed therein. The Docket numbers for the withdrawn filings include 85 and 86 for 22-CV-00343-

Y, and 82 and 83 for 22-CV-00430-Y, respectively. 

 Date: April 11, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

K.D. PHILLIPS LAW FIRM, PLLC

 By: /s/Kerri Phillips

 Kerri Phillips

Texas Bar No. 24065906 

Phone: (972) 327-5800

Email: kerri@KDphillipslaw.com

6010 W. Spring Creek Parkway

Plano, Texas 75024

Fax: (940) 400-0089

notice@KDphillipslaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y Document 87 Filed 04/11/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1962
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that true and correct copy of this document was sent to all counsel of 

record, hereunder listed via ECF filing on this the 11th day of April 2023.

William Osborne, Sanford Denison, Michael Rake

/s/Kerri Phillips

Kerri Phillips

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that true and correct copy of this document was sent to all counsel of 

record, hereunder listed via ECF filing on this the 11th day of April 2023.

William Osborne, Sanford Denison

/s/Kerri Phillips

Kerri Phillips

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y Document 87 Filed 04/11/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 1963