UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

LINDA LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00171-O

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 

7), filed March 29, 2022; Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 12), filed April 22; and Defendant’s Reply 

(ECF No. 15), filed May 5. Having considered the motion, briefing, and applicable law, the Court

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Texas Christian University (“TCU”) is a private university doing business in

Texas.1 Plaintiff Linda Lopez is a Hispanic/Mexican American who was employed by TCU for 

about thirteen years as an administrative assistant in the university advancement department. In 

January 2020, Lopez took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) because of health 

complications related to “meningitis combined with her other health issues.”2 Lopez’s supervisor, 

Mike Edwards, became upset with Lopez when TCU instructed him to halt communications with 

Lopez during her FMLA leave. In March, after her return from FMLA leave, Lopez received a 

negative performance review from Edwards.

1 Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. 

2

Id. at 3.

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Lopez began to feel her work was scrutinized to a greater degree than her white colleagues, 

and in April, she complained to TCU that Edwards was discriminating against her based on her 

race and her disability. Lopez was not informed of any action TCU took because of her complaint.

In January 2021, Edwards issued Lopez another negative performance review. In February, Lopez 

complained to human resources representative Kristen Taylor that Edwards was racially 

discriminating against her.

3 The next day, Edwards informed Lopez that her position was 

terminated due to budget cuts.

After her termination, coworkers informed Lopez that Edwards had told them Lopez was 

terminated because of her poor performance rather than because of budget cuts. Meanwhile, in 

April 2021, TCU Chancellor Victor Boschini, stated that “no jobs had been lost” and “everyone 

who got a paycheck in August [2020] is getting a paycheck today.”

4

On March 8, 2022, Lopez sued TCU for FMLA interference and retaliation, race and 

disability discrimination, and retaliation for complaining of discrimination.

5 She requests 

injunctive and monetary relief.6 On March 29, TCU filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim.

7 The parties briefed the issues, and the motion is ripe for review. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 “does not require 

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

3

Id. at 4.

4

Id. (alteration in original).

5

Id. at 6.

6

Id.

7

See Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss, ECF No. 7.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the defendant may file 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.”

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where 

a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of 

the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the 

complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). A court may not accept legal conclusions as 

true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. When well-pleaded factual allegations are present, a court assumes 

their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id.

III. ANALYSIS 

Lopez fails to state a claim for FMLA interference, but her remaining causes of action 

survive TCU’s motion to dismiss. Lopez alleges TCU violated the FMLA by interfering with, 

restraining, and denying Lopez her FMLA rights.8 To establish a prima facie case of FMLA 

8 Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. 

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interference, Lopez must show: (1) she was an eligible employee; (2) her employer was subject to 

FMLA requirements; (3) she was entitled to leave; (4) she gave proper notice of her intention to 

take FMLA leave; and (5) her employer denied her the benefits to which she was entitled under 

the FMLA. Hester v. Bell-Textron, Inc., 11 F.4th 301, 306 (5th Cir. 2021). 

TCU contests element five, arguing that Lopez has not pled that TCU denied or 

discouraged FMLA leave.

9

In her complaint, Lopez alleges that Edwards “became upset” with her

when an FMLA specialist instructed Edwards to “stop communicating” with Lopez during her 

FMLA leave.10 Lopez clarifies in her response that Edwards was communicating with Lopez

“about work” during her FMLA leave.11 Lopez argues that because her supervisor contacted her 

during her FMLA leave, the Court should infer that their discussions amount to coercion, and thus 

impermissible interference.12 See Lindsey v. Bio-Med. Applications of La., L.L.C., 9 F.4th 317 (5th

Cir. 2021). TCU responds that because Lopez received the leave she requested and returned to the

job she left, she does not have grounds for an interference claim.13 See Lister v. Nat’l Oilwell

Varco, L.P., No. 11-01-0108, 2013 WL 5515196, at *29 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2013). TCU further

argues that because Lopez has not pled that she was coerced to work while on leave, pressured to

return early, or discouraged from taking additional leave, Lopez’s pleadings do not survive TCU’s

motion to dismiss.

14

“To establish a claim for FMLA interference, an employee must show that the defendant 

‘interfered with, restrained, or denied her exercise or attempt to exercise FMLA rights, and that 

the violation prejudiced her.’” D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2018)

9 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 7, ECF No. 7.

10 Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.

11 Pl.’s Resp. 15, ECF No. 12. 

12 Id.

13 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 8, ECF No. 7. 

14 Id. at 9. 

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(quoting Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2015)). But the 

FMLA does not prohibit an employer from all contact with an employee. Smith-Schrenk v. Genon

Energy Servs., L.L.C., No. 13-2902, 2015 WL 150727, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2015). De minimis

contact between an employer and employee on FMLA leave does not amount to interference. Ray

v. Compass Bank, No. 3:06-cv-1153, 2007 WL 9711686, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2007). And an

employer may extend the option to work to an employee on FMLA leave, “so long as working

while on leave is not a condition of continued employment.” D’Onofrio, 888 F.3d at 210.

In her response, Lopez asserts that Edwards “was communicating with Lopez about work

issues” during her FMLA leave, and that it isreasonable to infer that those communications amount

to coercion.

15 But Lopez has pled no facts suggesting how the communications prejudiced her. See

id. at 209; Hester, 11 F.4th at 306. Lopez’s request for FMLA leave was granted, and she returned

to the same position she left.16 “The Fifth Circuit has held that when a plaintiff receives the leave

he requests and returns to the job he left, he has no interference claim as a matter of law.” Lister,

2013 WL 5515196, at *29 (citing De La Garza-Crooks v. AT&T, 252 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Lopez alleges only that Edwards spoke with her about work while on leave. That allegation is

insufficient to support an inference that TCU interfered with Lopez’s FMLA rights. Lopez

received the leave she requested and returned to the job she left. The Court thus GRANTS TCU’s

motion to dismiss Lopez’s FMLA interference claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Lopez has pled insufficient facts to survive TCU’s motion to dismiss her FMLA

interference claim. Lopez states claims on her remaining causes of action. Accordingly, the Court 

15 Pl.’s Resp. 15, ECF No. 12. 

16 Pl. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. 

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GRANTS in part and DENIES in part TCU’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7), and DISMISSES

Lopez’s claim for interference under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

SO ORDERED on this 10th day of August, 2022. 

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