alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### McGREGOR v. STATE (two cases).

Nos. 21766, 21767.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 3, 1941.

Ratliff & Ratliff, of Haskell, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant pleaded guilty in the district court of Haskell County on a charge of driving while intoxicated, and was assessed a penalty of ten days in jail and a fine of $50.

The record contains no statement of facts, but it is the contention that inasmuch as the law relative to driving on a public highway while intoxicated was changed by House Bill No. 73, Acts of the Forty-seventh Legislature, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. arts. 802, 802b, 802c, that the case should be reversed and ordered dismissed. Recently this matter has been considered in the cases of R. C. Davis v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 155 S.W.2d 801, and Pete Houston v. State, Tex.Cr.App., - S.W.2d -1 (neither of which has been reported [in State Reports]) and decided adversely to appellant’s contention.

No other question is presented. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1

 Not released by court at date of publication.
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|-----------|----------------|--|--------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|           |                |  |                     |
|           |           |  |                          |  |                                 |
| Date: | March 27, 2023 |  | /S/Ross R. Moody |
|           |           |  |                          |  | Ross R. Moody                        |
|           |                |  |                          |  | Chairman of the Board, President and |
|           |           |  |                          |  | Chief Executive Officer              |
|           |           |  |                          |  |                                      |
|           |           |  |                          |  |                                 |
|           |           |  |                          |  |                                 |
|           |           |  |                          |  | /S/Brian M. Pribyl           |
|           |           |  |                          |  | Brian M. Pribyl                      |
|           |           |  |                          |  | Senior Vice President,               |
|           |           |  |                          |  | Chief Financial Officer              |
|           |           |  |                          |  | and Treasurer                        |
March 19 , 2013.



### JUDGMENT


## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

HENRY JAMES KOHRHAMER , Appellant

NO. 14

- 12

- 00 814

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________ This cause was heard on the transcripts of the record of the court below, and having inspected the record, the Court holds there was no error in the judgment requiring reversal, but there was error in the ju dgment as entered, which is cap able of reformation by this Court. Therefore, the judgment is REFORMED to delete the specific amount of costs assessed. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED as REFORMED

. We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Case 3:22-cr-00124-L Document 20 Filed 08/23/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 29
#### Boston Post Lumber Company, Inc., Plaintiff, *v.*Shirlee Rubin, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County,

December 10, 1957.

*630
      *Zimmerman & Skopp*for plaintiff.

*Rocco Leone*for defendant.

Morris E. Spector, J.

Motion for summary judgment and to strike out the answer is granted.

The action is on a check issued by defendant to the order of Arthur Lev, of which check plaintiff became a holder in due course. . The plaintiff’s affidavits reveal that the check was negotiated to it by Lev for a valuable consideration without notice to plaintiff of any infirmity in the check and without knowledge by plaintiff that payment bad been stopped.

Defendant admits that the check was issued in payment of services rendered by Lev under a contract between him and defendant. However, it is claimed that upon discovery of the fact that Lev had breached the contract by performing defective work and using imperfect materials, defendant stopped payment. It is asserted that plaintiff had represented to defendant that Lev was a competent workman and would use good material to be furnished to him by plaintiff. Because of these facts, defendant argues that plaintiff is not a holder in due course since it was, in effect, an interested party to the contract and therefore had notice that the contract was breached by Lev and that there was a failure of consideration.

But defendant submits no facts to indicate in what respects the materials were not suitable for the work performed or to show that plaintiff had knowledge of the particular quality of materials which the contract required Lev to furnish. The plaintiff was not a party to the contract nor is there any claim that it guaranteed that Lev would perform the work in a satisfactory manner and in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Noth*631ing is shown, other than plaintiff’s part in recommending Lev, to indicate that it was connected in any way with Lev’s breach of the contract. Any defenses based upon that breach, while valid as against Lev, the payee, are not available against plaintiff as a holder in due course.

Here, plaintiff took the check for value without notice of any defect or equities between the parties. As such, it is a holder in due course and, despite its knowledge of the existence and purpose of the contract, it was not under a duty at the time it purchased the check to ascertain whether the contract had been breached. Since the plaintiff denies having notice of the existence of any equities between Lev and the defendant at the time the check was negotiated to it, and the defendant offers no proof to show plaintiff had actual or constructive notice which would require plaintiff to make inquiry as to the facts, the plaintiff has sufficiently established it is a holder in due course.

The answer is struck out and the clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $250, with interest as demanded.
#### Ex parte LUEHRS.

No. 24209.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 20, 1948.

Berger, Swearingen & Blackmon, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.

King & Nesbitt, of Corpus Christi, (Special prosecutors) and Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus granted by the District Judge of Nueces County, wherein it was alleged that relator was held in custody and directed to make a bond to keep the peace for a period of one year in the sum of $3,000.00. Relator has appealed from this order of the District Judge, it being based upon an order of a Justice of the Peace setting the bond at a greater amount, but reduced herein to the above sum of $3,000.00 by the District Judge.

The testimony heard in both courts is present here, and the State’s witnesses make out a clear case of a threat upon the part of relator to take the life of Dr. Pilcher, relator denying any such threat or intention. We are of the opinion that the court was correct in finding such threat to have been made while relator was in possession of a pistol, that same was seriously made, and that there was just reason to apprehend that the offense was intended to be committed. Hence, he was required to make a bond to keep the peace in the sum of $5,000.00 by the Justice of the Peace, which bond was reduced by the District Judge to $3,000.00 in this cause here under consideration.

Touching the State’s testimony herein, which is denied by relator, we agree with the trial judge that a threat to take the life of Dr. Pilcher was shown, llut it is contended by relator that the facts show same not to have been seriously made, that same was an idle threat, and as evidence of its lack of seriousness, relator says that there is shown ample opportunity upon his part to take Dr. Pilcher’s life and also a failure to execute' such threat. It is shown by proof that relator could have seen Dr. Pilcher through several doors of his office at the time it is said he made the threat and was in possession of the *127pistol, and he merely said at the mention of Dr. Pilcher’s name, “that is who I am after”, and continued his walk down the hallway in front of Dr. Pilcher’s office. If we should take the criterion offered us by relator relative to an attempt to shoot Dr. Pilcher, the courts would have to remain inactive until an effort to kill had been made, and another and more serious offense would be present.

The very purpose of Articles 79 and 80, C.C.P., passed from the Old Code into the present 1925 Revision, was to halt such threats prior to an effort at their execution, and we think these articles were properly and timely invoked by the State.

We see no error shown herein, and relator is therefore remanded as under the court’s judgment requiring him to give bail in the sum of $3,000.00. It is so ordered.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CHARLES THOMAS WESNER, JR. as

Trustee of the Charles Wesner Jr. Living

Trust, 

 Plaintiff,

V.

MARK SOUTHALL, PRINCIPLE

MANAGEMENT GROUP INC.,

ASSOCIATIONS INC. d/b/a ASSOCIA,

ESTATES OF WINDSOR RIDGE

HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION INC.,

ASSOCIA CLIENT SHARED SERVICE

CENTER INC. d/b/a CSSC, WHITTEN

AND WHITTEN PLLC, ADAM T.

WHITTEN, WYATT FRANCIS, BILLY

RAY SMITH, ELIZABETH FALCON,

MATTHEW BRYANT, LISA

HILDINGER, SCOTT MARTIN, and

SUSAN DENNEY,

 Defendants.

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§

 No. 3:22-cv-927-B

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

After making an independent review of the pleadings, files, and records in this case, and the

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge dated August

21, 2023, the Court finds that the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge are correct an they are accepted as the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the

Court.

Case 3:22-cv-00927-B Document 68 Filed 09/12/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1123
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation

of the United States Magistrate Judge are accepted.

SO ORDERED this 12

TH

 day of September, 2023.

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-00927-B Document 68 Filed 09/12/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 1124
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Dallas Division

ROBERT HOPKINS, III, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. * Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00706 (C)

*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *

*

Defendant. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION OF Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Initial Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment and for Expedited Consideration, any Opposition thereto, and the 

entire record herein, it is this _______ day of __________, 2023, 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED; and

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall complete its prepublication review of 

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, brief, and appendix, and return all three filings 

to Plaintiff’s counsel no later than June 30, 2023; and 

FURTHER ORDERED that, if Defendant makes any redactions to any of Plaintiff’s 

filings, it shall provide unredacted copies of the filings to the Court for its in camera review no 

later than July 3, 2023; and 

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file the cleared versions of his filings within 

one business day of receipt from Defendant; and

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall file any opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for 

partial summary judgment within four business days of the filing of Plaintiff’s motion; and

Case 3:22-cv-00706-E Document 25-1 Filed 06/24/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 453
2

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file any reply within four business days of 

the filing of Defendant’s opposition.

_______________________________________

ADA BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-00706-E Document 25-1 Filed 06/24/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 454
Appointment # 1020102

Booking Name: GUEDESPAGES, HENRYA Booking Number: To: Karen Oprea The Fair Defense Act mandates that court appointed attorneys make contactwith their clients within one working day afterappointment. Within three working days after receiving notice ofappointment, the attorney shall enter confirmation that contact has been made into the AMP application. Status ofCase at Time ofAppointment: Booking # Cause # Asg Court Set Court Setting Date Setting Time Offense Desc Ind Dt Cause Added C1CR14400141 CC8 N/A N/A ACCIDENT INVOLVING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE>=$200 Yes 6/8/2015

** CONFIRM THIS SETTING WITH THE COURT   Ifa cause does not show a setting, we will notify you ofthe setting date when it is entered. **  ** For Court4 cases, contact the coordinatorto determine ifthe inmate needs to be broughtfrom thejail.** Booking Address: AUSTIN,TX,78744, Booking Phone: Booking MNI: 1838967 Booking DOB: 2/21/1973 Booking Gender: Male Arrest Date: Notes:
Exhibit
31.1



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302

OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I,
Jack E. Stover, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed
    this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2019 of Interpace Biosciences, Inc.;                                                                                                                                                                       
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
|2. | Based on my knowledge,
    this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
    statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
    covered by this report.



|Date:
    May 29, 2020 | /s/
    Jack E. Stover       
|---------------------- | -----------------------------
|                       | Chief Executive Officer      
|                       | (Principal Executive Officer)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

ARNULFO RICARDO MARTINEZ,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-30256

D.C. No. 2:13-cr-02062-TOR-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 16, 2015** 

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

Arnulfo Ricardo Martinez appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the conviction and 80-month sentence for possession with intent to

distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Martinez’s counsel has filed a brief

FILED

SEP 18 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as

counsel of record. We have provided Martinez the opportunity to file a pro se

supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been

filed. 

Martinez has waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. 

Because the record discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the appeal

waivers, we dismiss the appeal. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986-88

(9th Cir. 2009). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

2
Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y   Document 240   Filed 05/14/24    Page 1 of 6   PageID 7629

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y   Document 240   Filed 05/14/24    Page 2 of 6   PageID 7630

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y   Document 240   Filed 05/14/24    Page 3 of 6   PageID 7631

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y   Document 240   Filed 05/14/24    Page 4 of 6   PageID 7632

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y   Document 240   Filed 05/14/24    Page 5 of 6   PageID 7633

Case 4:22-cv-00343-Y   Document 240   Filed 05/14/24    Page 6 of 6   PageID 7634
Exhibit 35.13



|     |  |  |                                                                                 |                              
|---- |  |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -----------------------------
|LOGO |  |  |                                                                                 | Commercial Mortgage Servicing
|     |  |  | D1086-120, 12th Floor
550 South Tryon Street
Charlotte, NC 28202
1-800-326-1334

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 1, 2015, by and among J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, LNR Partners, LLC, as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Wilmington Trust, National
Association, as Trustee, and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Senior Trust Advisor with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2015-C32 (the Agreement). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall
have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

Pursuant to Section 11.09 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President
of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:



| | 1. | A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from October 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 (the Reporting Period), and of its performance per the Agreement during such
period has been made under my supervision, and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 4th day of
March 2016.



|                        
|------------------------
|/s/ Daniel Bober        
|Daniel Bober            
|Executive Vice President
|Wells Fargo Bank        



|                       |  |     
|---------------------- |  | ----
|Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. |  | LOGO
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3541 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3541

       To prevent a taxpayer bailout of health insurance issuers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 19, 2013

 Mr. Griffin of Arkansas (for himself and Mr. Gardner) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To prevent a taxpayer bailout of health insurance issuers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Obamacare Taxpayer Bailout 
Prevention Act''.

SEC. 2. PREVENTION OF BAILOUT OF HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUERS.

    The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is amended by 
striking section 1342 (42 U.S.C. 18062).
                                 <all>
```
#### EUBANK v. STATE.

No. 24312.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 23, 1949.

M. H. Barton, of Henderson, for appellant.

Ernest S. *Goens,*State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The conviction is for burglary with a sentence of six years in the penitentiary. The State proved the presence of appellant and his companion, Tommy Martin, together in the town of Woodville on the night of the burglary. The next day the same two parties were taken from a bus as they stopped at Lufkin. The Sheriff of Angelina County arrested them on information by telephone from the Sheriff of Tyler County. The two men had stopped the bus along the road between stations while traveling together and admitted that they were together. After their arrest they produced *1003some articles taken from a drugstore in Woodville in a burglary the previous night. Appellant had two watches which he offered to give to the sheriff. They had some narcotics that were identified by the druggist as having his price mark written in his own handwriting and coming from his store. They also took the sheriff to a place on the railroad where they had de^ posited more drugs. As a result of the information given to the sheriff, other packages were recovered and they were identified by the druggist in the same manner. The defendant offered no evidence. We find in the record no exception to the court’s charge and there are no bills of exception.

A brief filed by the attorney of record in this case, Mr. Barton, explains that he was not the trial attorney but says the man who was employed to represent this appellant had abandoned the case and, for some reason, had failed to prepare the bills of exception. He complains of the admissibility of the testimony of the two sheriffs who testified in the case. In the absence of bills of exception the matter is not before us for consideration.

We find no reversible error and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.