alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of
Elite Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended March 31, 2012 filed with Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Carter J. Ward, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated result of operations of the Company for the periods presented.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Date: September 14, 2012 |  | /s/ Carter J. Ward                                               | 
|------------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|                         |  | Carter J. Ward, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary



This certification has been furnished solely
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.



A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to Elite Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and will be retained by Elite Pharmaceuticals Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

IH/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESUS BALTAZAR RAMIREZ-LEON,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-72765

Agency No. A070-737-439

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 5, 2010** 

Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. 

Jesus Baltazar Ramirez-Leon, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for adjustment of

FILED

APR 16 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
IH/Research 2 07-72765

status. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo

questions of law, Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003),

and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA properly denied Ramirez-Leon’s application for relief because he

failed to depart within the voluntary departure period after receiving adequate

notice of the penalties for failure to do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B) (failure

to depart voluntarily within the time period results in a ten-year bar to certain

forms of relief, including adjustment of status); De Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d

759, 762 (9th Cir. 2004) (BIA’s written notice of the penalties for failure to depart

is adequate under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)).

Ramirez-Leon’s remaining contentions are not persuasive.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
Case 2:22-cv-00094-Z Document 23 Filed 05/23/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 569
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Dallas Division

ROBERT HOPKINS, III, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. * Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00706 (C)

*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *

*

Defendant. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION OF Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Status Conference, and 

the entire record herein, it is this _______ day of __________, 2023, 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

_______________________________________

SAM R. CUMMINGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:22-cv-00706-C Document 13-1 Filed 05/09/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 372
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 237 Received in Senate (RDS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 237

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 2, 1994

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Authorizing the use of the Capitol grounds for the 13th annual National 
                   Peace Officers' Memorial Service.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. USE OF CAPITOL GROUNDS FOR NATIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' MEMORIAL 
              SERVICE.

    The National Fraternal Order of Police and its auxiliary shall be 
permitted to sponsor a public event, the 13th annual National Peace 
Officers' Memorial Service, on the Capitol grounds on May 15, 1994, or 
on such other date as the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the President pro tempore of the Senate may jointly designate, in order 
to honor the 151 law enforcement officers who died in the line of duty 
during 1993.

SEC. 2. TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

    (a) In General.--The event authorized to be conducted on the 
Capitol grounds under section 1 shall be free of admission charge to 
the public and arranged not to interfere with the needs of Congress, 
under conditions to be prescribed by the Architect of the Capitol and 
the Capitol Police Board.
    (b) Expenses and Liabilities.--The National Fraternal Order of 
Police and its auxiliary shall assume full responsibility for all 
expenses and liabilities incident to all activities associated with the 
event.

SEC. 3. EVENT PREPARATIONS.

    (a) Structures and Equipment.--Subject to the approval of the 
Architect of the Capitol, the National Fraternal Order of Police and 
its auxiliary are authorized to erect upon the Capitol grounds such 
stage, sound amplification devices, and other related structures and 
equipment, as may be required for the event authorized to be conducted 
on the Capitol grounds under section 1.
    (b) Additional Arrangements.--The Architect of the Capitol and the 
Capitol Police Board are authorized to make any such additional 
arrangements as may be required to carry out the event.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 26, 1994.

            Attest:

                                           DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

QUINN WILLIAMS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 341 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 30th day of December, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                EXHIBIT 10.16(a)


                       SECOND AMENDMENT TO LEASE AGREEMENT


This Second Amendment shall be a part of the original Lease Agreement with an
effective date of July 22, 1998, between DART CONTAINER CORPORATION OF MICHIGAN,
a Michigan corporation ("Landlord"), and GENOMIC SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware
corporation ("Tenant"), covering the premises known as Lot 4A, Oakwood Executive
Park, more commonly known as 3120 Sovereign Drive, Suite A, Lansing, Michigan
48911. The original Lease Agreement has a Commencement Date of July 22, 1998,
and has a Termination Date of July 21, 2003.

Tenant, in addition to Lot 4A, will also be leasing Lot 4B for the remainder of
the lease term.

Lease payments for Lot 4B will be as follows:

           $2,436.75 per month from July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001

           $2,511.16 per month from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002

           $2,585.52 per month from July 1, 2002 through July 21, 2003

These payments are in addition to what Tenant is currently paying for Lot 4A

Tenant shall pay to Landlord Four Hundred Ninety-Five Dollars ($495.00) per
month as its prorated share of estimated CAM Charges paid by Landlord on behalf
of the Tenant for Lot 4B. These estimated CAM Charges are in addition to the
estimated CAM Charges Tenant is currently paying for Lot 4A.

Landlord will pay for new carpet and baseboard for Lot 4B. Carpeting shall be
the same grade as that used throughout the Park.

The cost of all other improvements to Lot 4B shall be the responsibility of
Tenant and if costs are paid by Landlord they may be amortized over the
remaining term of the Lease.

All other terms and conditions of the original Lease Agreement shall remain in
effect as first written or amended.

The effective date of this Second Amendment shall be June 1, 2000, regardless of
the date written below.

WITNESS                                 GENOMIC SOLUTIONS, INC.
                                        a Delaware corporation (Tenant)

/s/  Steven J. Richvalsky               /s/  Jeffrey S. Williams
-----------------------------------     ----------------------------------
[signature]                             By:  Jeffrey S. Williams
                                        Its: President and CEO
Steven J. Richvalsky
-----------------------------------
[print name]                            Date:  July 5   , 2000
                                             -----------

                                        DART CONTAINER CORPORATION OF
                                        MICHIGAN, a Michigan corporation
WITNESS                                 (Landlord)

/s/ G K Sewell                          /s/  William L. Myers
-----------------------------------     ----------------------------------
[signature]                             By:  William L. Myers
                                        Its: Treasurer
G K Sewell
-----------------------------------
[print name]                            Date:  July 18  , 2000
                                             -----------
#### CHILDERS v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 30, 1953.

J. E. Childers and E. J. Picldesimer, Pike-ville, for appellant.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Zeb A. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

WADDILL, Commissioner.

This is the second appeal of this case. On the first appeal we reversed the judgment for the reason that the record filed here on appeal 'did not affirinatively show that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the accused. Childers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 255.

On retrial, appellant was again convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment.

In substance, the evidence discloses that on July 18, 1949, the appellant, age 16, went squirrel hunting near his'home in a remote section of Pike county. He carried a shotgun for that purpose. He testified that he saw a squirrel on a limb of a tree and fired a shot at it and thought he had missed. He reloaded his gun and then seeing the squirrel run down the tree and jump into some bushes, he shot into those bushes. Upon reaching those bushes he discovered that he had shot and fatally wounded Mrs. Josephine Ratliff who was his friend and neighbor. A more complete recitation of the evidence may be found in the former opinion of this Court, cited above.

As grounds for reversal it is urged that no juvenile hearing was held as required by KRS 199.080, therefore the court had *no*jurisdiction of the accused; and that the court failed to instruct the jury on the whole law of the case.

We find no merit in the appellant’s argument in. support of his first contention. There appears in the record on appeal an order entered in the circuit court which was sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdiction, of the.accused.

Appellant’s second ground for reversal is well taken. Appellant admitted that he shot Mrs. Ratliff, but his defense is that the shooting of Mrs. Ratliff was unintentionally or accidentally committed. Under this defense, which is supported by appellant’s testimony, 1⁄8 was the duty of the court to give an instruction on accidental homicide. The instructions that were given by the court did not contain his *705sole defense to the charge laid against him in the indictment. Such failure on the court’s part constitutes prejudicial error. McCown v. Com., 250 Ky. 574, 63 S.W.2d 601; Maiden v. Com., 203 Ky. 446, 262 S.W. 588; Crum v. Com., 196 Ky. 802, 245 S.W. 501; Mann v. Com., 110 S.W. 243, 33 Ky.Law Rep. 269; See Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, Section 887, p. 1183; Robertson’s New Ky. Criminal Law & Procedure, Second Edition, Section 526, p. 721.

Judgment reversed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>   1
       
<S>                                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                               Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                                  Jul-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                                    Sep-30-1997
<CASH>                                                                  708,441
<SECURITIES>                                                                  0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                        885,084
<PP&E>                                                                2,548,678
<DEPRECIATION>                                                          580,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                        3,478,762
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                                   588,089
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<COMMON>                                                                 81,465
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                          3,478,762
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                         1,347,235
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                              0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                      (20,561)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                      (1,326,674)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                                  (5,190,024)
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<NET-INCOME>                                                         (5,190,024)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                             (0.70)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                             (0.70)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § CASE NO.: 3:22-CR-00146-L

§

RIGOBERTO BARRETO-PINEDA (1) §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

RIGOBERTO BARRETO-PINEDA, by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th 

Cir. 1997), has appeared before me pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.P. 11, and has entered a plea of guilty to Count(s) One of the 

Indictment After cautioning and examining RIGOBERTO BARRETO-PINEDA under oath concerning each of the subjects 

mentioned in Rule 11, I determined that the guilty plea was knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense(s) charged is

supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend 

that the plea of guilty be accepted, and that RIGOBERTO BARRETO-PINEDA be adjudged guilty of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 

namely, Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute Cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance and have sentence 

imposed accordingly. After being found guilty of the offense by the district judge, 

☐ The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) unless the Court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community 

if released.

☐ The Government does not oppose release.

☐ The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release. 

☐ I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community if released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c). 

☐ The Government opposes release.

☐ The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release. 

☐ If the Court accepts this recommendation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the 

Government.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there is a 

substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or (b) the Government has 

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed, or (c) exceptional circumstances are clearly shown 

under § 3145(c) why the defendant should not be detained, and (2) the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released. 

Date: 28th day of February, 2023 

 ______________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its service 

shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States District 

Judge. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). 

Case 3:22-cr-00146-L Document 99 Filed 02/28/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 244
The State of TexasAppellee



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

July 14, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00193

- CR

George R. LUNA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No . 5, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 405848

John Longoria, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The Appellant ’ s motion for extension of time to file the brief is GRANTED. Time is

extended to August 12, 2015. No fu rther extensions will be granted.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Ju stice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 14th day of July, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Cler k of Court
#### ARMSTRONG v. GADDIS et al.

No. 11868.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Sept. 22, 1948.

O. R. Armstrong, of Cotitlla, for appellant.

Charles D. Bates, Jr., of Cotulla, for ap-pellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

This suit was instituted by O. R. Armstrong, Esq., in the District Court of La Salle County, Texas, seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus against H'. P. Gad-dis as County Treasurer and Ex Officio Trustee of La Salle County Water Improvement District No. One, Dissolved, and the Commissioners’ Court of La Salle County, requiring the defendants, among other things, to take the necessary legal steps to collect unpaid taxes or levy new taxes to complete the liquidation of the affairs of the district in an orderly and expeditious manner and to report, etc.

At a hearing in the district court the petition for the issuance of writ of mandamus was denied and O. R. Armstrong; Esq., has prosecuted this appeal.

Appellant bases his right to maintain this suit upon the fact that his mother, Mrs. A. Y. Armstrong, recovered a judgment in Cause No. 2091, in the District Court of La Salle County against the La Salle County Water Improvement District in the sum of $2,098.11,- together with interest which has never been paid, and that he was attorney for his mother in this matter. Mrs. A. Y. Armstrong died on the 28th day of June, 1947, and this suit was filed October 29, 1947.

Appellant does not show that he has such justiciable interest in the subject matter in litigation as to authorize him to maintain this suit. The record does show that he is the son of Mrs. A. Y. Armstrong and that she was deceased at the time he'instituted this proceeding, but it fails to show whether she died testate or intestate. Appellant’s employment as attorney for his mother was terminated by her death, so we think the trial court properly found as follows: “I •find that Mrs. A. Y. Armstrong, the original plaintiff in this cauáe, died about the month of June, 1947. I further find that there is no evidence in this record as to whether she died testate or intestate, and *150further that there.is no evidence in this record' as to who and how many her heirs at law or devisees were or are. In that connection,’ I- further find that the plaintiff, O. R. Armstrong', has wholly failed to show by any evidence that he succeeded in title to said judgment either by devise, descent, purchase or otherwise.”

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court to the effect that appellant take nothing by reason of this suit is affirmed.