UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY & 

VICTOR J. BOSCHINI, JR.,

Defendants.

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§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00297-O

OPINION & ORDER ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 

Injunction (ECF Nos. 6–7), filed April 12, 2022; Defendants’ Response (ECF No. 26), filed April 

18, 2022; Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 27), filed April 19, 2022; and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 

the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 22), April 15, 2022. On April 26, 2022, 

the Court held an evidentiary hearing and oral argument on the motions. Having considered the 

motions, arguments, and evidence, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Amend (ECF No. 22) and 

GRANTS the motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6).

I. BACKGROUND

John Doe is a student at Texas Christian University (“TCU”). Doe and another TCU 

student, Jane Roe, dated in high school. At TCU, they maintained an on-and-off romantic and 

sexual relationship. Some time after their relationship ended, Roe filed a complaint with TCU 

accusing Doe of sexually assaulting her on two separate occasions. The complaint proceeded to an 

investigation and a hearing, in which a Title IX panel found in favor of Roe on one allegation and 

in favor of Doe on the other. The panel immediately suspended Doe until May 2023. Doe claims 

that the panel improperly suspended him simply because he is a man. He filed this lawsuit against 

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TCU and Victor J. Boschini, Jr., the Chancellor of TCU, alleging violations of Title IX and breach 

of contract. The same day, he moved for a preliminary injunction to lift TCU’s suspension.

A. The Allegations

The first incident occurred in August 2020 when Doe visited Roe in her dorm room. Their 

stories conflict. Roe alleges that Doe digitally penetrated her vagina without her consent.1 She says 

she repeatedly said “no” and told him to stop, but Doe forcefully persisted.2 Doe disputes her 

version of the events. According to Doe, she began grinding on him in a manner that led him to 

believe they were going to have sex.3 He began to move his hand down her pants toward her 

vagina, but Roe told him to stop.4 Doe says that he immediately removed his hand and never 

touched her vagina.5

The two exchanged text messages shortly after the incident. Doe apologized, saying he 

knew they “weren’t going to hook up,” and that he “just [has] no self control.”6 Roe responded, “I 

never said yes once that whole time and how many times did u do it — I realize I don’t push u off 

but I said no loudly and I never once said yes.”7 Doe continued to apologize and said he felt “really 

badly about how [he] behaved.”8 Roe said that “rapists say the same thing,” to which Doe 

responded, “[O]h my god — i’m one of those aren’t i.”9 Roe replied, “I don’t think it’s rape,” and 

said she is “very used to [him] doing that.”10 Doe continued to offer apologies, and they eventually 

moved on from the issue.11

1 Hearing Exs. at 140, ECF No. 37.

2

Id.

3

Id. at 3.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 79, 81.

7 Hearing Exs. at 82, ECF No. 37.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10 Id. at 83.

11 Id. at 83–85.

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The second incident occurred in October 2020 in Austin, Texas. The two had traveled

separately to Austin for a football game, though neither attended the game.12 That night, Roe had 

been frightened by a nightmare about being raped, and she called Doe, who responded 

immediately.13 Doe picked her up from her hotel and brought her back to the apartment where he 

was staying.14 Their stories diverge about what happened at the apartment. According to Roe, she 

repeatedly rebuffed Doe’s sexual advances while trying to sleep.15 Doe, on the other hand, says 

that they had consensual sex and he drove Roe back to her hotel in the morning.16

The two continued to see each other over the next few months. They exchanged photos and 

messages, and they had consensual sex at least once more.17 Doe also continued to apologize for 

his behavior. On one occasion, Doe said in a message to Roe, “[I]t was difficult for me hearing 

that i am a rapist again but it is true and i am very sorry.”18 Doe began dating someone else in 

January 2021, and he and Roe stopped seeing each other.19

B. Title IX Process

About a year later, in October 2021, Roe filed a formal complaint with TCU’s Office of 

Institutional Equity.

20 The complaint alleged sexual misconduct and named John Doe as the 

respondent.21 After conducting interviews, TCU issued a preliminary investigative report noting 

that Roe “refused to provide detailed answers to questions poser in her interview.”22 Doe and Roe 

12 Id. at 252.

13 Hearing Exs. at 252, ECF No. 37.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 252–53.

16 Id. at 4.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 147, 250.

19 Hearing Exs. at 5, ECF No. 37.

20 Id. at 127–29.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 133.

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submitted responses and addenda to the report.23 Roe’s response contained a more detailed 

statement and included text messages, photos, and emails as exhibits.24 Doe’s response requested 

that the complaint be dismissed because of Roe’s failure to provide details supporting the 

allegations.

25 It included results from a polygraph examination but no other evidence.26 TCU then 

issued a final investigative report, to which the parties submitted timely final responses,27 and TCU

scheduled a hearing.28

Judge Ignazio J. Ruvolo, a retired California state judge, presided over the hearing as the 

panel chair.

29 The panel itself was comprised of three members of the TCU community: Reece 

Harty, Clark Jones, and Laura Shaw. Assistant Deans Jessica Ledbetter and Jeremy Steidl served 

as co-procedural chairs throughout the hearing.30 Before the hearing began, Judge Ruvolo 

excluded several large batches of evidence, including text messages and photos exchanged 

between Doe and Roe after the incidents.31 Notably, Judge Ruvolo excluded a message Roe sent 

to Doe after the first incident in which Roe said, “I don’t think it’s rape.”32 He also excluded a 

message Roe sent after the second incident in which she told Doe, “I want to fuck you.”33 Judge 

Ruvolo said he excluded the additional texts and photos because (1) “they were not shown to be 

unavailable at the time of the investigation,” and (2) their “relevance . . . was more prejudicial than 

23 Id. at 135–64.

24 Id. at 140–64.

25 Hearing Exs. at 135, ECF No. 37.

26 Id. at 135–38.

27 Id. at 175–244.

28 Id. at 166–69.

29 Id. at 247.

30 Id. at 248.

31 Hearing Exs. at 253–54, ECF No. 37

32 Id. at 83.

33 Id. at 4.

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probative of a material fact.”34 Judge Ruvolo admitted some texts and evidence, but he excluded 

nearly all of the evidence offered by Doe.

The panel concluded that Doe violated TCU’s sexual-harassment policy regarding the first 

allegation, but not the second. As to the first allegation, the panel gave weight to the texts 

immediately following the encounter in which Doe apologized and admitted to being a “rapist.”35

The panel also credited texts Doe had sent one of Roe’s friends in which he confessed to being a 

“bad person” who had made “irredeemable mistakes.”36 Relying on these messages, the panel 

concluded that Doe “would not have made these statements and his profuse apologies” if he had 

not sexually assaulted Roe.37

As to the second allegation, the panel first determined that it lacked Title IX jurisdiction 

because the incident occurred off campus in Austin.

38 Because the incident still fell within TCU’s 

student-conduct policy, however, they addressed the allegation.39 On this count, the panel found 

that Doe had not violated the policy. The panel gave weight to the fact that during the car ride back 

to Fort Worth, Roe had said nothing about the sexual encounter to her friend.40 The panel also 

found important that the couple continued to communicate and have sex with each other for several 

months after the incident.

41 The panel determined that it could not conclude by a preponderance 

of the evidence that Doe sexually assaulted Roe in Austin.42

34 Id. at 253.

35 Id. at 249–51.

36 Id. at 251–52.

37 Hearing Exs. at 252, ECF No. 37.

38 Id. at 248.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 253.

41 Id.

42 Id.

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In February 2022, Judge Ruvolo prepared a deliberative report detailing the panel’s 

findings.

43 The panel members did not review the report.44 The panel suspended Doe until May 

2023, effective immediately.45 The panel also ordered Doe to attend counseling and Title IX 

training, and it placed Doe on conduct probation for the rest of his time at TCU.

46 Doe appealed 

the panel’s decision to the Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs, who issued a memo on April 1, 

2022, upholding the panel’s determination.47 Doe has applied to different schools and been 

accepted to at least one.48 But he remains unable to transfer while under suspension because TCU 

will not provide him a letter of good standing.49

On April 12, Doe sued TCU.50 He asserts causes of action for violations of Title IX and for 

breach of contract.51 The same day, Doe moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction.52 The Court expedited briefing and held an evidentiary hearing on April 26, 2022. At

the hearing, Ledbetter, Doe, Steidl, and Harty testified, and the Court heard argument on the 

motion, which is now ripe for determination.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” and will be granted only if the 

movant carries his burden on all four requirements. Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 

372 (5th Cir. 2008). The Court should issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order 

only if the movant establishes (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial 

43 Hearing Exs. at 246–55, ECF No. 37.

44 Hearing Transcript (Harty), at 9–10.

45 Hearing Exs. at 248, ECF No. 37.

46 Id.

47 Id. at 256–75.

48 Id. at 5.

49 Id. at 5, 43, 52.

50 Compl., ECF No. 1.

51 Id. at 27–33.

52 Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 6.

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threat of irreparable harm; (3) that the balance of hardships weighs in his favor; and (4) that the 

issuance of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Daniels Health Servs., 

L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

65. “The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is discretionary with the district court.” 

Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). The movant 

must make a clear showing that the injunction is warranted, and the issuance of a preliminary 

injunction “is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Title IX prohibits educational institutions that receive federal funding, such as TCU, from 

discriminating “on the basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Title IX is “enforceable through an implied 

private right of action.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998). The 

Supreme Court has “consistently interpreted Title IX’s private cause of action broadly to 

encompass diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 

544 U.S. 167, 169 (2005). For example, “Title IX bars the imposition of university discipline where 

gender is a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.” Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 

(2d Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit’s framework, recognizing two 

categories of claims attacking a university disciplinary proceeding on grounds of gender bias.

Klocke v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 938 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 2019). The first category is an 

“erroneous outcome” claim, which alleges that “gender bias was a motivating factor behind the 

erroneous finding.” Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. The second category is a “selective enforcement” claim, 

which alleges that “regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence,” the severity of the penalty or 

the decision to initiate proceedings “was affected by the student’s gender.” Id.

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Doe relies on an erroneous-outcome theory in support of his motion. “A plaintiff alleging 

an erroneous outcome must point to ‘particular facts sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on 

the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.’” Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210. “The 

plaintiff must also demonstrate a ‘causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender 

bias.’” Id.

1. Doe has demonstrated articulable doubt as to the accuracy of the 

outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.

First, Doe must show that the Title IX panel reached an erroneous conclusion. To do so, he 

must provide evidence “on the record before the disciplinary tribunal” that casts “articulable 

doubt” on the panel’s decision. Id. (cleaned up). For example, “a motive to lie on the part of a 

complainant or witnesses, or particularized strengths of the disciplined student’s defense” may 

indicate an erroneous decision. Id. (cleaned up).

The panel’s decision is illogical. The panel found that Doe violated school policy as to the 

first allegation, but not as to the second. But in forming that conclusion, the panel arbitrarily 

applied evidence to one allegation that was clearly applicable to both allegations. For example, the 

panel provided two reasons for acquitting Doe of allegation two: (1) soon after the incident in 

Austin, Roe did not tell her friend what had happened or ask for assistance; and (2) for some time 

after the incident, Roe and Doe continued to talk to and have sex with each other.

53 Both of those 

facts are also true of the first allegation. Roe did not immediately talk to her friend about the first 

incident, and she and Doe continued to talk to each other and have sex.54 Harty, the only panel 

member to testify at the hearing, explained that the panel thought it unlikely that Roe would 

53 Hearing Exs. at 253, ECF No. 37.

54 Id. at 4, 253.

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continue to see Doe and have sex with him if he had in fact sexually assaulted her.55 But to the 

extent that is true, it is necessarily true of both allegations.

The panel’s reasoning as to the first allegation is similarly illogical. The panel provided 

two reasons for concluding that Doe violated school policy regarding the first allegation: (1) Doe 

admitted to being a rapist in text messages to Roe; and (2) Doe admitted to being a bad person in 

messages to Roe’s friend.56 Again, the messages on which the panel relied were sent after both 

incidents, but the panel arbitrarily applied them only to the first incident. Doe said in a message to 

Roe after the second incident, “[I]t was difficult for me hearing that i am a rapist again but it is 

true and i am very sorry.”57 The panel applied that message against Doe only as to the first 

allegation, even though it occurred—and references—the second incident.58 Likewise, Doe’s 

messages to Roe’s friend in which he confessed to being a “bad person,” were sent months after 

the second incident.59 But the panel either disregarded or overlooked those obvious facts. 

The panel did rely on messages Doe sent the day after the first incident in which he 

apologized and confessed to being a rapist.60 Doe “would not have made these statements and his 

profuse apologies,” the panel said, if he had not sexually assaulted Roe.61 Doe made nearly 

identical statements and apologies after the second incident—indeed, some of the very messages 

that the panel relied on—yet the panel chose to apply those statements only to the first allegation. 

In short, the panel concluded that the evidence demonstrated that Doe violated TCU’s sexual 

55 Hearing Transcript (Harty), at 14.

56 Hearing Exs. at 252, ECF No. 37.

57 Id. at 147, 250.

58 Id. at 250–51.

59 Id. at 251–52.

60 Id. at 249–50.

61 Id. at 252.

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assault policy, and that the very same evidence demonstrated he did not violate TCU’s sexual 

assault policy. Concluding that a thing is both true and not true is, by definition, erroneous.

The panel also disregarded Roe’s motive to lie. For several months after the second 

incident, Roe and Doe continued seeing and having sex with each other.62 Their volatile 

relationship ended sometime in December 2020, and Doe began dating another woman.63

Thereafter, Roe sent Doe messages indicating her jealousy of Doe’s new girlfriend.64 The record 

also indicates that Roe and her friend targeted and harassed Doe’s girlfriend throughout 2021.65

On one occasion, Roe approached Doe’s girlfriend and told her not to go home with Doe.66 Roe 

filed her initial report after these events—over a year after the first incident occurred.67 The panel’s

disregard of “a motive to lie on the part of a complainant or witnesses” is evidence of an erroneous 

outcome. Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210. 

The panel also disregarded the strength of Doe’s case. The preliminary investigative report

found that Roe “declined the initial investigative interview” and in her follow-up interview 

“declined to give detailed information” about either allegation.68 Roe’s response to that report is 

full of contradictions and false statements. For example, Roe incorrectly stated that the first 

incident in the dorm room occurred after the second incident in Austin.69 Roe also falsely stated 

62 Hearing Exs. at 4, ECF No. 37.

63 Id. at 5.

64 Id. at 94–95.

65 Id. at 5.

66 Id.

67 Id. at 141. TCU’s own policies state: 

Reports of misconduct in violation of this Code . . . should be submitted as soon as possible 

after the incident takes place and under most circumstances, should be submitted within 

one (1) calendar year. Failure to make a timely Report may hinder the University’s ability 

to effectively investigate and take disciplinary action against the Responding Student.

Id. at 39.

68 Hearing Exs. at 132, ECF No. 37.

69 Id. at 140.

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that when Doe asked to come to her dorm room the night of the first incident, she told him no.70

The text messages reveal that Roe invited Doe over to “watch a show with [her]” and expressly 

told him to come over.71 At the hearing, Roe also broadened her claim, saying that Doe had raped 

her “hundreds” or “over a thousand times,” because, retrospectively, she often did not want to have 

sex when they did, though she did not express her reluctance to Doe.

72 Roe’s dishonest and 

inconsistent statements severely undermine her case. See Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210; Yusuf, 35 F.3d 

at 715. But the panel’s deliberative report does not discuss these weaknesses. Contrary to TCU’s 

assertion, the report does not “clearly reveal[]” that the panel weighed the parties’ credibility.73

And if the panel did consider this evidence, that makes its decision more perplexing, not less.

Finally, Judge Ruvolo excluded a significant amount of exculpatory evidence offered by 

Doe. For example, Roe sent a message to Doe the day after the first incident saying, “I don’t think 

it’s rape.”

74 The couple also took pictures together and had a long history of amicable messages 

before and after both incidents.75 In December 2020, Roe sent Doe a message saying, “I want to 

fuck you.”

76 Doe also submitted texts that contextualized his apologies and their disagreements.77

Doe offered all of that evidence, but because Judge Ruvolo excluded it, the panel did not consider 

it.78 The exclusion of “compelling exculpatory evidence” from the decisionmakers is further 

evidence of an erroneous decision. Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 585 (E.D. Va. 

2018). TCU argues that Judge Ruvolo excluded the evidence because it was untimely.79 But that 

70 Id.

71 Id. at 76.

72 Hearing Transcript (Doe), at 100–01.

73 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 17, ECF No. 26.

74 Hearing Exs. at 83, ECF No. 37.

75 Id. at 118–19, 253.

76 Id. at 4.

77 Id. at 257–58.

78 Id. at 254.

79 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 17, ECF No. 26.

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argument proves too much: Judge Ruvolo’s decision violated Title IX regulations, as explained in 

the following section. In sum, the record casts “articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome 

of the disciplinary proceeding.” Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted).

2. Doe has demonstrated a causal connection between the flawed 

outcome and gender bias.

Doe must next show that gender bias caused the panel’s erroneous decision. Evidence of 

bias comes in many varieties. For example, “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, 

statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that also tend to show 

the influence of gender” can all demonstrate gender bias. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. In addition, several 

circuits have held that multiple “procedural irregularities,” when combined with other indicia, may 

support a finding of gender bias. Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th 930, 940 (9th Cir. 2022)

(collecting cases). Procedural irregularities are particularly relevant when they consistently favor 

the complainant. E.g., id. at 941. So too are procedural irregularities that violate Title IX 

regulations, which are “intended to effectuate Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimination.” 

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 

Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,026 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 

106). Much of the “bias” evidence overlaps with the “error” evidence because “some allegations 

. . . may suffice both to cast doubt on the accuracy of the disciplinary adjudication and to relate the 

error to gender bias.” Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.

The first indicator of bias is the irrationality of the panel’s decision. The panel arbitrarily 

applied evidence to one allegation that was equally applicable to the other allegation. The most 

plausible explanation for the panel’s decision is that the panel wanted to hold Doe responsible for 

something, regardless of what the evidence showed. That the panel did not even attempt to explain 

the inconsistencies in its decision only bolsters Doe’s claim of bias. In addition, the panel’s 

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deliberative report ignored evidence on the record of Roe’s dishonest and inconsistent statements. 

The Sixth Circuit held in a similar case that “the failure of the hearing panel even to comment on 

the flat contradiction . . . provide[d] strong support for Doe’s claim of bias.” Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 

963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020). 

TCU responds that any irregularities did not prejudice Doe because the panel ultimately 

acquitted him of the more serious allegation.80 Courts have rejected that argument. “[T]hat the 

[school] ultimately found Doe not responsible for twelve of the thirteen allegations made against 

him does not make the allegations of irregularities in the proceedings any less relevant.” Regents 

of Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th at 941 (collecting cases). The panel’s consistent missteps running 

“against the substantial weight of the evidence” are at least some indication of bias against Doe. 

Doe v. Univ. of Ark. - Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 864 (8th Cir. 2020). “[A]t some point an 

accumulation of procedural irregularities all disfavoring a male respondent begins to look like a 

biased proceeding despite the [school’s] protests otherwise.” Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th at 

941.

The second indicator of bias is TCU’s exclusion of exculpatory evidence in violation of its 

own policies and Title IX regulations. Judge Ruvolo excluded nearly all the evidence offered by 

Doe.81 The most significant piece of evidence he excluded was a text Roe sent to Doe the day after 

the first incident saying, “I don’t think it’s rape.”82 Judge Ruvolo offered two reasons for his 

decision: (1) the evidence was “not shown to be unavailable at the time of the investigation,” and 

(2) “any relevance of the proffered evidence was more prejudicial than probative of a material 

fact.”83 As to the first reason, Doe’s evidence was not untimely under TCU’s policies. Even if it 

80 Id. at 18.

81 Hearing Exs. at 253–54, ECF No. 37.

82 Id. at 83.

83 Id. at 253–54.

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were, Title IX regulations require that Doe be permitted to present it. As to the second reason, 

TCU has been unable to explain how the “relevance” of a clearly exculpatory text message is 

“more prejudicial than probative of a material fact.”84

TCU’s policies work differently on paper than in practice. After a student files a sexualassault complaint, TCU investigates the allegations and prepares a preliminary investigative 

report.

85 The parties have ten days to respond to that report.86 The investigator considers the 

responses and then prepares a final investigative report.87 The parties may continue to submit 

written responses to the final investigative report, and to the other party’s responses, up to fortyeight hours before the hearing.88 Just before the hearing begins, the panel chair considers “[a]ny 

evidentiary responses made . . . during the investigation,” and makes “relevancy determinations” 

about any disputed evidence.89 Doe followed this procedure. He and Roe submitted timely 

responses to the preliminary investigative report.90 TCU issued a final investigative report on 

December 8, 2021.91 Four days before the hearing, Doe submitted his response to the final 

investigative report containing nearly all of the evidence he intended to present at the hearing.92

Roe submitted a similar response.93 Those responses were timely under TCU’s policies, and Judge 

Ruvolo was permitted to make only “relevancy determinations” about that evidence.

84 Id.

85 Id. at 43, 350–51.

86 Id. at 351.

87 Hearing Exs. at 351, ECF No. 37.

88 Id. at 48.

89 Id. at 49.

90 Id. at 168–69.

91 Id. at 247.

92 Id. at 175–77.

93 Hearing Exs. at 179–244, ECF No. 37.

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TCU reads their policies differently. According to TCU, the final investigative report ends 

the “investigation.”94 After that, any “new evidence” that a party wants to present at the hearing is 

admissible only if it “was not available at the time of the investigation.”95 TCU provides no textual 

support for its interpretation that the final investigative report terminates the investigation.

96 Read 

more naturally, the investigation terminates after the parties have submitted their responses to the 

final investigative report. “New evidence” is thus evidence that a party seeks to admit for the first 

time at the hearing. The parties may submit responses “1) to the final Investigative Report or 2) to 

the other party’s responses to the investigative materials and the preliminary Investigative Report” 

up to forty-eight hours before the hearing.97 That rule would be meaningless—or at least severely 

restricted—if parties could respond to the final report and each other’s responses only with “new 

evidence.” Under TCU’s interpretation, the parties would have ten days after the preliminary 

investigative report to gather and submit all evidence they wish to present at a hearing that will 

occur months later. The rest of the investigative process would seem to serve little purpose. TCU’s

interpretation is particularly troubling in this case because the preliminary investigative report 

stated that Roe “declined the initial investigative interview” and “refused to provide detailed 

answers” in her follow-up interview.98 TCU’s policies do not require a student to gather and submit 

all evidence in his defense within ten days of receiving unsubstantiated allegations. That TCU 

strenuously argued otherwise is even more troubling.

Title IX regulations support the Court’s interpretation of TCU’s policies. The Department 

of Education passed a final rule in August 2020 concerning institutions’ responses to formal 

94 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 8–9, ECF No. 26.

95 Hearing Exs. at 49, ECF No. 37.

96 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 8–9, ECF No. 26.

97 Hearing Exs. at 48, ECF No. 37.

98 Id. at 132–33.

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complaints of sexual harassment. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45 (2021). In general, an institution’s 

grievance process must “[r]equire an objective evaluation of all relevant evidence.” Id. 

§ 106.45(b)(1)(ii). And “[w]hen investigating a formal complaint and throughout the grievance 

process, a recipient must . . . [n]ot restrict the ability of either party to discuss the allegations under 

investigation or to gather and present relevant evidence.” Id. § 106.45(b)(5)(iii). TCU does not 

contend that Doe’s evidence was irrelevant, yet it undoubtedly restricted his ability to present that 

relevant, exculpatory evidence. TCU’s argument that it may exclude evidence submitted after it 

has closed the “investigation” ignores the plain text of the regulation: “When investigating a formal 

complaint and throughout the grievance process,” TCU must not “restrict the ability of either party 

to . . . gather and present relevant evidence.” Id. (emphasis added).

The commentary to the regulations confirms that they require institutions to permit parties 

to present all relevant evidence submitted prior to the hearing. “Relevance is the standard that these 

final regulations require, and any evidentiary rules that a recipient chooses must respect this 

standard of relevance.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,248. Judge 

Ruvolo excluded Doe’s exculpatory evidence in part because it was prejudicial, but an institution 

“may not adopt a rule excluding relevant evidence because such relevant evidence may be unduly 

prejudicial.” Id. Likewise, institutions may “place limits on evidence introduced at a hearing that 

was not gathered and presented prior to the hearing,” but the regulations do not contemplate 

excluding evidence introduced prior to the hearing, as Judge Ruvolo did. Id. at 30,360. Doe was 

not attempting to introduce evidence at the hearing. He merely wished to present evidence that he 

had already introduced. 

TCU policies, Title IX regulations, and Department of Education commentary all point in 

the same direction. TCU’s indefensible decision to exclude nearly all of Doe’s evidence—

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including key exculpatory messages—severely prejudiced Doe’s defense. And TCU cannot 

plausibly claim an innocent mistake, as Doe’s counsel informed TCU of these regulatory violations 

prior to the hearing.99 The exclusion of “compelling exculpatory evidence” from the 

decisionmakers is evidence of an erroneous decision. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d at 585. 

Much more so, then, is the exclusion of such evidence in violation of federal law and a school’s 

own policies. Title IX regulations exist “to effectuate Title IX’s prohibition against sex 

discrimination.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,026. Circumventing 

those regulations to Doe’s detriment is solid evidence of gender discrimination.

The third indicator of bias is that TCU consolidated the two allegations into a single 

proceeding in violation of the Title IX regulations. The hearing panel concluded it lacked Title IX 

jurisdiction over the second allegation because the incident had occurred off campus.100 The 

regulations permit institutions to “consolidate formal complaints as to allegations of sexual 

harassment against more than one respondent, or by more than one complainant against one or 

more respondents, or by one party against the other party, where the allegations of sexual 

harassment arise out of the same facts or circumstances.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(4). TCU suggests 

that the two incidents arise out of the same facts because Doe and Roe had been in a prior 

relationship and much of the evidence was applicable to both incidents.101 But that is true of 

virtually all allegations by “one party against the other party.” Id. The provision does not allow 

consolidation of all allegations between the same parties. The allegations must also “arise out of 

the same facts or circumstances.” Id. TCU’s interpretation renders that limitation redundant. The 

two incidents occurred over a month apart, in different cities, and they arise out of different facts 

99 Id. at 171–74.

100 Id. at 248.

101 Hearing Transcript (Harty), at 13.

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and allegations. The panel lacked Title IX jurisdiction over the second allegation for those very 

reasons.

TCU also argues that, even if improper, consolidation was harmless because the panel 

acquitted Doe of the allegation that it had no Title IX jurisdiction to consider.102 That argument 

ignores the other half of the panel’s decision finding Doe liable for the first allegation. As already 

discussed, that the panel found in Doe’s favor on one of two allegations “does not make the 

allegations of irregularities in the proceedings any less relevant.” Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th 

at 941. Indeed, the panel’s incomprehensible reasoning readily demonstrates the dangers of 

consolidating such allegations. 

The fourth indicator of bias consists of statements by Ledbetter, the co-procedural chair of 

the hearing. “[S]tatements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent 

university officials, or patterns of decision-making that also tend to show the influence of gender”

may all indicate gender bias. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. At the evidentiary hearing, Ledbetter testified 

about her recent doctoral dissertation entitled Moral Identity, Implicit Theory, and Moral 

Behavior: Untangling the Web of Connected Characteristics in Student Conduct. The Court 

admitted the dissertation into evidence.103 Ledbetter conducted a study of TCU students “to 

understand the link between a student’s moral mindset, moral identity, and subsequent moral 

decisions, particularly as they pertain to student perspectives about the code of conduct.”104 The 

study indicated that “[m]ale students tend to have lower moral identity internalization and 

symbolization,” and that “being a male student significantly predicted lower moral behavior 

102 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 15–16, ECF No. 26.

103 Hearing Exs. at 381–608, ECF No. 37.

104 Id. at 407.

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intentionality and consciousness, as well as more negative code of conduct policy evaluations.”105

Standing alone, the results of the study are purely descriptive. 

Ledbetter’s normative commentary, however, says more. “Unfortunately,” Ledbetter says, 

the results of the study are “unsurprising . . . given some of the available academic literature.”

106

In explaining the results, Ledbetter wonders, “[C]ould it be that institutional messaging, both 

implicit and explicit, resonate [sic] more closely with female gender norms?”

107 Or, Ledbetter 

speculates, “It is possible that male students simply desire to fit in and be perceived as strong in 

stark contrast with the female norm of care and empathy, which could be viewed as weak.”108 To 

address the problem of male students’ “lower moral internalization and symbolization,” Ledbetter 

suggests that “male students need context to understand why their behavior is harmful to their 

peers and to their community.”109 She recommends “targeted programming” that is “informed by 

gender norms which dictate perceptions about what classifies as appropriate male behavior.”110

“This programming is needed regardless of the male student’s moral learning disposition . . . .”111

Ledbetter’s dissertation is evidence of gender bias. “Well-established Supreme Court 

precedent demonstrates that archaic assumptions [about gender] constitute intentional gender 

discrimination.” Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 881 (5th Cir. 2000). TCU responds 

that any bias on the part of Ledbetter is irrelevant because she was not on the panel.112 That 

argument is unpersuasive. Ledbetter played a significant role in the disciplinary process. She was 

105 Id. at 555.

106 Id.

107 Id. at 575.

108 Id. at 556.

109 Hearing Exs. at 565, ECF No. 37.

110 Id. at 565–66.

111 Id. at 565.

112 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 19–20, ECF No. 26.

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a constant point of communication with the parties,

113 she made key procedural decisions,114 and 

she was present at the hearing—including deliberations.115 Ledbetter even testified that she wrote 

some of the very policies that Doe says led to the erroneous decision.116 Courts have thus rejected 

similar arguments that only decision-maker bias can support a Title IX violation. See, e.g., Doe v. 

Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2016). Rather, “statements by pertinent university 

officials” such as Ledbetter can demonstrate gender bias. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. Moreover, even if 

Ledbetter were not associated with the process herself, her writing hypothesizes that the reason 

male students have “lower moral internalization” could be because TCU’s “institutional 

messaging, both implicit and explicit,” resonates “more closely with female gender norms.”117 In 

a nutshell: TCU’s policies—according to those who make them—may be biased in favor of 

women.

Doe has shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his Title IX claim. He has 

provided “particular facts sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome 

of the disciplinary proceeding” and has demonstrated a “causal connection between the flawed 

outcome and gender bias.” Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Given that Doe has shown a likelihood of success regarding his Title IX claim, the Court need not 

address the merits of his breach of contract claim.

B. Irreparable Harm

Doe must also show that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not grant 

the injunction. “In general, a harm is irreparable where there is no adequate remedy at law, such 

113 Hearing Exs. at 171–77, 274–75, 361–62, ECF No. 37.

114 Id. at 364–66.

115 Hearing Transcript (Ledbetter), at 76–77.

116 Id. at 33.

117 Hearing Exs. at 575, ECF No. 37.

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as monetary damages.” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011). The injury must be 

more than “speculative,” that is, “there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the 

applicant.” Daniels Health Scis., 710 F.3d at 585 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Doe argues that he will suffer irreparable harm in the form of lost economic opportunity 

and reputational damage.118 If TCU does not lift Doe’s suspension, he will be unable to take his 

exams, will not receive credit for his courses this semester, and will have to repeat the semester.119

That delay will result, he says, in lost opportunities, interviews, and wages.120 In addition, Doe 

argues that TCU’s suspension and mandatory counseling effectively label Doe a sex offender.121

The gap in his transcript will be visible to every employer and institution to which he applies.122

Even if Doe ultimately prevails on the merits, when asked to explain the gap, “a truthful 

explanation would seriously hinder his prospects.” Doe v. Univ. of Conn., No. 3:20-cv-92, 2020 

WL 406356, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2020).

Doe faces irreparable injury. Courts have granted preliminary injunctions in similar cases 

after finding irreparable injury would otherwise result: 

The Court finds it inevitable that he would be asked to explain either situation by 

future employers or graduate school admissions committees, which would require 

him to reveal that he was found guilty of sexual misconduct by DePauw. 

Successfully seeing this lawsuit to its conclusion could not erase the gap or the 

transfer; the question will still be raised, and any explanation is unlikely to fully 

erase the stigma associated with such a finding. Money damages would not provide 

an adequate remedy at that point; DePauw’s disciplinary finding—even if 

determined to have been arbitrary or made in bad faith—would continue to affect 

him in a very concrete way, likely for years to come.

118 Pl.’s Br. 26, ECF No. 7.

119 Hearing Exs. at 274–75, ECF No. 37.

120 Pl.’s Br. 26, ECF No. 7.

121 Id.

122 Pl.’s Reply Br. 9, ECF No. 27.

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King v. DePauw Univ., No. 2:14-cv-70, 2014 WL 4197507, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2014); see 

also, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 325 F. Supp. 3d 821, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“Money damages 

cannot compensate Plaintiff for the reputational harm he has already suffered and will continue to 

suffer as a consequence of sexual assault allegations.”), vacated and remanded sub nom. Doe v. 

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., No. 18-1870, 2019 WL 3501814 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019); Ritter 

v. State of Okla., No. CIV-16-0438, 2016 WL 2659620, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 6, 2016) (“The 

loss of educational and career opportunities he will encounter if he is not reinstated and allowed 

to graduate is not readily compensable in money damages.”); Univ. of Conn., 2020 WL 406356, 

at *2 (“[I]t is highly likely that a two-year suspension and a sanction for sexual assault would 

indeed forever change the trajectory of [the student’s] education and career,” because “he would 

need to explain a gap on his résumé in future applications to schools or jobs.” (cleaned up)).

TCU argues that Doe’s alleged injuries are speculative. The Court disagrees. Even a 

favorable decision on the merits will not restore the gap in Doe’s transcript. And as other courts 

have found, it is “highly likely” that Doe will be asked to explain that gap. Id. Doe has already 

suffered the consequences of the suspension. Because TCU will not issue a letter of good standing 

to a suspended student, Doe was—and remains—unable to transfer out of TCU.

123 Doe has 

demonstrated “more than an unfounded fear” that his reputation and life will be irreversibly 

damaged absent a stay. Daniels Health Scis., 710 F.3d at 585 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

TCU also argues that Doe’s injuries are compensable with monetary damages. But “the 

mere fact that economic damages may be available does not always mean that a remedy at law is 

‘adequate.’” Janvey, 647 F.3d at 600. Courts routinely find that reputational harm can constitute 

123 Hearing Exs. at 5, 43, 52, ECF No. 37.

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irreparable injury. See Daniels Health Scis., 710 F.3d at 585; Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 

F.3d 1047, 1056 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that absent an injunction the plaintiff would suffer “such 

severe injury to her professional reputation that a monetary award would likely be inadequate and 

almost certainly speculative”). “Injury to reputation or goodwill is not easily measurable in 

monetary terms, and so often is viewed as irreparable.” 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. Civ. § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2022). Doe’s injury absent an injunction is nearly 

impossible to measure, but nearly certain to occur. That makes a paradigmatic case for granting a 

preliminary injunction. Doe has thus shown that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm.

C. Balance of the Equities

The Court must next weigh the equities. TCU asserts an abstract interest in enforcing its 

policies. It also claims that forcing TCU to lift the suspension will “potentially endanger the safety 

of other students.”124 The Court disagrees. Allowing Doe to finish this semester “would not visit 

any substantial harm” on TCU or its students. Valley, 118 F.3d at 1056. After the two incidents 

occurred, Doe and Roe coexisted on campus without incident for over a year before Roe even filed 

her complaint with TCU. Classes are over, finals are approaching, and then summer begins. 

Moreover, TCU can mitigate any hardship to itself or Roe by instituting another “no-contact” order 

on Doe. The Court is also willing to expedite resolution of the merits at the convenience of the 

parties, potentially before the fall semester begins. Finally, the Court emphasizes that it is not

ordering TCU to allow Doe back on campus, nor is it reversing other remedies ordered by TCU.

125

The Court tailors its Order to remedy the specific harm caused by not allowing Doe to finish his 

courses this semester. The balance of the equities weighs in Doe’s favor.

124 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 24, ECF No. 26.

125 Hearing Exs. at 248, ECF No. 37 (requiring Doe to attend therapy and complete Title IX training).

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D. Public Interest

Finally, the Court “must decide whether the issuance of an injunction would undermine the 

public interest.” Id. TCU is correct that the public has a strong interest in curbing campus sexual 

violence, as demonstrated by federal and state policy.126 But the public also has a strong interest 

in ensuring due process for those accused of sexual assault, as well as holding institutions 

accountable for sex discrimination. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45. The public interest thus neither favors 

nor disfavors a preliminary injunction in this case.

E. Status Quo

Before concluding, the Court must address another critical disagreement between the 

parties. TCU argues that preliminary injunctions are particularly disfavored where the moving 

party seeks to alter the status quo.127 TCU cites Roark v. Individuals of Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

Former & Current, 558 F. App’x 471 (5th Cir. 2014), but the unpublished case does not support 

TCU’s proposition. Nevertheless, the issue of defining the status quo is well-taken. “It is often 

loosely stated that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo.” Canal 

Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974). TCU argues that the status 

quo is Doe’s status as a suspended student, and so the Court must favor preserving Doe’s 

suspension.128 But a more accurate description of the status quo is the “last uncontested status of 

parties.” Yeargin Const. Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore Ala. Mach. & Servs. Corp., 609 F.2d 829, 

831 (5th Cir. 1980). At bottom, “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent 

irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the 

126 Defs.’ Resp. Br. 24–45, ECF No. 26.

127 Id. at 12.

128 Id. at 11–12.

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merits.” Canal Auth., 489 F.2d at 576. In this case, preserving the status quo requires lifting the 

suspension so that the Court may consider the merits with minimal harm to both parties.

IV. CONCLUSION

“[C]ourts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school 

administrators.” Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 

(1999). That is particularly so when reviewing a school’s decision dealing with two emotionally 

challenged students. But courts must step in when severely flawed proceedings discriminate “on 

the basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681. At this preliminary stage, the evidence demonstrates that TCU 

has discriminated against Doe because of his sex. Because Doe is facing irreparable harm from 

that discrimination and the equities tip in his favor, the Court issues this preliminary injunction.

Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) ordinarily requires the moving party to post 

a security “to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 

enjoined or restrained.” But in appropriate cases “the court ‘may elect to require no security at 

all.’” Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Doe 

requests that the Court waive the security requirement because TCU faces no risk of monetary loss 

from the injunction.129 TCU does not object. The Court thus waives the security requirement of

Rule 65(c). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff John Doe’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 22) and 

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6).

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that, for the duration of this Temporary Restraining 

Order, TCU is RESTRAINED and ENJOINED from enforcing Plaintiff’s suspension.

129 Pl.’s Br. 27–28, ECF No. 7.

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The Court further ORDERS that Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, 

and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, are ENJOINED from 

prohibiting Plaintiff’s attendance of classes or taking finals.

The Court further ORDERS that Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, 

and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, are ENJOINED from 

refusing Plaintiff excused absences since April 8, 2022, resulting from Plaintiff’s suspension.

SO ORDERED on this 29th day of April, 2022.

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