J-S63016-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.N.G.-W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1798 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Dated May 23, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000310-2019

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2019

A.W. (Mother) appeals from the order involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her minor daughter, A.N.G.-W. (born August 2010) (Child),

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption 

Act.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child’s father, R.G. (Father), indicated his consent to voluntarily relinquish 

his parental rights to Child. See N.T., 5/23/19, at 4-5. A petition to 

voluntarily terminate Father’s rights and praecipe of notice of intent to confirm 

was filed September 5, 2019. See Petition, 9/5/19, at 1. Father’s termination 

was confirmed on September 25, 2019; Father has not separately appealed 

and is not a party to this appeal.
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The family became known to the Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) on August 25, 2010, when DHS received a 

substantiated General Protective Services (“GPS”) report which 

alleged Mother tested positive for marijuana and cocaine at the 

time she gave birth to Child [in August 2010]. On June 12, 2015, 

DHS received an indicated Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report 

alleging that on September 10, 2013, Child was diagnosed with 

thirteen cavities. Mother, however, consistently minimized the 

seriousness of Child’s dental problems and refused to take Child 

to treatment. Ultimately, Child did not receive oral surgery until 

Child’s Maternal Grandmother became proactive and Child 

underwent surgery on September 2, 2015. An adjudicatory 

hearing was held on May 9, 2017[,] and Child was adjudicated 

dependent.

On July 10, 2017, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) 

held a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) meeting. The objectives identified 

for Mother were (1) to Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) [sic] and 

to participate in court-ordered assessments including random 

drug screens; (3) [sic] to work with CUA to find housing; and (4) 

to maintain a relationship with Child through visitation. Following 

a court hearing on August 9, 2017, Mother reported to the CEU 

but failed to attend any of her scheduled random drug screens. 

On April 25, 2019, DHS filed the underlying Petition to Terminate 

Parental Rights because Mother had not completed her SCP 

objectives. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/10/19, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

On May 23, 2019, the court convened a hearing on the petition. Mother

was represented by counsel, but did not appear at the hearing. Child was 

represented by William Rice, Esquire. Testimony was offered from Turning 

Points for Children supervisor, Patrice Garvey; Paternal Grandmother, B.G.,

and social worker, Ms. Roya Paller. Beverly Pearson, Turning Points for 

Children Case Manager, was scheduled to testify, but Mother’s counsel 

stipulated that Ms. Pearson’s testimony would be in accordance with DHS’s
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statement of facts attached as Exhibit A to the petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. See N.T., 5/23/19, at 3-5, 10-11.

At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court changed Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

Mother timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.2 On September 3, 2019, 

Mother’s counsel filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal.3

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2 While hybrid representation is generally not permitted on appeal, this Court 

is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal “even in instances where the 

pro se appellant was represented by counsel in the trial court.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(emphasis and internal brackets omitted) (citation omitted). Mother’s counsel 

has submitted all subsequent filings.

3 Mother violated Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by failing to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal concurrently with her notice of appeal. 

Mother, through counsel, filed her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on September 

3, 2019. Although Mother filed her statement two months after her notice of 

appeal, there is no assertion of any prejudice, so we do not quash or dismiss 

her appeal. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding 

that failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement concurrently with a children’s fast 

track appeal is considered a defective notice of appeal, to be disposed of on a 

case-by-case basis, but did not result in dismissal or quashal where there was 

no prejudice to the other parties as a result of the late filing). 

Additionally, Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement indicates that she wished 

to challenge the change of Child’s permanency goal to adoption. However, 

Mother did not file a notice of appeal from the dependency docket challenging 

Child’s goal change, and does argue the goal change issue in her appellate 

brief. Accordingly, Mother has waived any challenge to Child’s permanency 

goal change. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 

893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues 

that are not raised in both his concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal and the statement of questions involved in his brief on appeal); see 
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On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)] without clear 

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent to relinquish her 

parental claim or refusal to perform her parental duties[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)] without clear 

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s present incapacity to 

perform parental duties[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)] without clear 

and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were 

made by [the] Department of Human Services to provide [M]other 

with additional services and that the conditions that led to 

placement of [Child] continue to exist[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)] without clear 

and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement 

of [Child] continue to exist when [M]other presented evidence of 

compliance with the goals and objectives of her family service 

plan[?]

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)] without clear 

and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between 

[M]other and [C]hild and that termination would serve the best 

interest of [Child][?]

Mother’s Brief at 7.

We review cases involving the termination of parental rights according 

to the following standard:

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also In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating failure to 

include argument/discussion in brief as to issue results in waiver of that claim)

and In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same).
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

Termination requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

We thus turn to the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have 

long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
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banc). Accordingly, we focus our analysis on 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and 

(b).

The relevant subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 
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See In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998). The 

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1117 (Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward 

the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id. 

Mother argues that the court erred by terminating her rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(2) because she successfully completed housing and mental 

health and financial counseling, and thus all grounds that had contributed to 

her previous incapacity were remedied. See Mother’s Brief at 12.

Mother’s argument is belied by the record. On the contrary, the record 

reflects that Mother did not accomplish the majority of her goals. Mother’s 

goals were identified as complying with all court orders; complying with CEU’s 

recommendations and participating in a court-ordered drug assessment, 

monitoring, and random screens; working with CUA to obtain appropriate 

housing; maintaining a relationship with Child through visitation; participating

with CUA in planning; and meeting with her case manager to review goals and 

progress. See Petition to Terminate Parental Rights, 4/25/19, Exhibit A. 

With regard to drug treatment, Mother initially scheduled an assessment 

appointment, rescheduled her appointment to September 26, 2017, and was 

subsequently a no-show. Id. At permanency review hearings and SCP 

meetings in November 2017, January 2018, February 2018, March 2018, April 

2018, July 2018, October 2018, December 2018, and January 2019, the 

evidence indicated that Mother had not attended or completed drug treatment. 
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Id. Mother was repeatedly ordered to attend drug treatment at every status 

review and permanency review hearing, but did not do so. Id.

With regard to Mother’s housing goals, the record indicated that Mother 

completed housing, mental health, and financial counseling. Id. However, 

the record is unclear as to whether Mother actually obtained stable housing. 

With regard to Mother’s goal to meet with her case manager to review her 

goals and progress, the record reflects that Mother often was either not 

present at hearings or did not participate in SCP planning meetings. Id. 

With regard to Mother’s visitation with Child, Ms. Garvey testified that 

as of the date of the May 23, 2019 hearing, the last time Mother saw Child 

was September 27, 2018. See N.T., 5/23/19, at 11. Visits were offered but 

Mother did not attend. Id. When Mother had visited in the past, she did not 

interact appropriately with Child, and was often tearful, disruptive, or shared 

age-inappropriate information with Child. Id. at 16-17. After visits, Child was 

upset, agitated, and would act out. Id.

Consistent with the foregoing, we discern no error in the trial court’s

finding that competent, clear and convincing evidence supported the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), based 

upon Mother’s continued incapacity – namely, her inability to complete her 

court-ordered drug treatment and screening or to maintain a relationship with 

Child through visitation – that resulted in Child being without essential 

parental care, the cause of which “cannot or will not be remedied.” See Lilley, 

719 A.2d at 330; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117.
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Next, we consider whether Child’s needs and welfare will be met by 

termination pursuant to Subsection (b). See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In this 

context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists between child 

and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary 

and beneficial relationship.” Id. The court is not required to use expert 

testimony, and social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations as well. 

Id. Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Id.

We have stated:

Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort, 

security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of the relationships is 

also important to a child, for whom severance of close parental 

ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering 

what situation would best serve the child[ren]’s needs and 

welfare, must examine the status of the natural parental bond to 

consider whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would 

destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 

2000)). The trial court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child 

and may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 

103 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody 

and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her 

parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of 

[the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re 

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
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Mother argues that she and Child shared a strong emotional bond due 

to her status as Child’s exclusive caregiver during the formative years of 

Child’s life. See Mother’s Brief at 14. She further argues that there is no 

evidence she cannot provide Child with the physical necessities of life. Id. 

Mother contends that as a result, termination would not be in the best 

interests of Child because the severance of their bond would irreparably harm 

Child. Id.

Upon review, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s conclusion that termination was in Child’s best interests. The record 

reflects that if Mother and Child share a bond, it is not a parental bond, and 

severance of Child’s bond with Mother would not cause Child irreparable harm. 

We further note that Child expressed her desire to be adopted by Paternal 

Grandmother.

Ms. Garvey testified that Child expressed no desire to return home to 

Mother, and she has been living with Paternal Grandmother for almost two 

years. See N.T., 5/23/19, at 12-13, 14-15. While Child may have had a bond 

in the past with Mother, Mother had not visited with Child recently, and as a 

result, Ms. Garvey was unable to opine as to the status of the bond at the 

time of the hearing. Id. at 13. In the past, Child interacted with Mother more 

as a friend than a mother. Id. at 16. Mother was always “in and out” of the 

visits, would often cry, not understand proper boundaries, and discuss 

inappropriate topics. Id. at 16-17. After visits, Child was agitated and 

distraught. Id. at 17.
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In addition, Child views Paternal Grandmother as her parent and is very 

bonded with Paternal Grandmother; Child expressed a desire to remain in 

Paternal Grandmother’s care. Id. Paternal Grandmother meets Child’s needs 

and provides her with emotional support. Id. at 13-14. Ms. Garvey did not 

believe Child would suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated, 

and opined that it was in Child’s best interests for Mother’s rights to be 

terminated. Id. at 14-15.

Consistent with Child’s attorney, Mr. Rice, Ms. Paller testified that she 

had spoken to Child4 and Child was fully aware of what adoption meant. Id.

at 20. Child stated that she wished to be adopted by Paternal Grandmother 

and remain in her home. Id.

For the above reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s conclusion that Child’s needs and welfare are best served by 

termination, and that Child did not share a parental bond with Mother that 

would cause her irreparable harm if severed. As clear and convincing evidence 

supports the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights under Section

2511(a)(2) as well as Section 2511(b), we affirm the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1126-27; K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763.

Order affirmed.

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4 Child was approximately eight years and eight months old at the time of the 

hearing. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/19