FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HEXCEL CORPORATION, 

No. 10-56765 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  2:09-cv-05334-

INEOS POLYMERS, INC., F/K/A BP MRP-RNB

Amoco Polymers, Inc., OPINION Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Mariana R. Pfaelzer, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 12, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed June 1, 2012

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

6131
COUNSEL

John DeQ. Briggs (argued), Michael L. Keeley, Daniel J.

Matheson, Washington D.C., for plaintiff-appellant Hexcel

Corp.

Corey C. Watson, Los Angeles, Scott W. Fowkes (argued),

Kathleen Ehrhart, Russell King, Chicago, Illinois, for

defendant-appellee Ineos Polymers, Inc.

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6133
OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Hexcel Corporation (Hexcel) sued

Defendant-Appellee Ineos Polymers, Inc., formerly known as

BP Amoco Polymers, Inc. (BP Amoco) on November 26,

2008 for antitrust injuries it allegedly suffered as the result of

a carbon fiber price-fixing scheme, beginning in 1992. To

avoid the effect of the applicable four-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § l5b, Hexcel contends that the statute of limitations was tolled due to fraudulent concealment by BP

Amoco. Hexcel contends that because of BP Amoco’s fraudulent concealment, it neither knew, nor could have known, of

its potential claims until the conclusion of its own internal

investigation in February 2001. 

Hexcel was aware of, and likely even participated in the

alleged carbon fiber price-fixing scheme, throughout the

1990s. Hexcel’s involvement in this scheme led to its being

subpoened in January 1999, along with other carbon fiber producers BP Amoco, Toray, and Toho, by a federal grand jury

that was investigating a possible industry-wide price-fixing

conspiracy. Hexcel confirmed its knowledge of widespread

anticompetitive practices in its annual Form 10-K disclosures

in March 1999. Based upon the overwhelming evidence of

Hexcel’s knowledge in the record, we hold that Hexcel’s

claims are time-barred, and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR 

PROCEEDINGS

Hexcel manufactures prepreg, a product made from carbon

fiber. Prepreg is sold to customers who convert it into various

composites for use in a wide variety of end products, including commercial aerospace and military applications. Following an acquisition in 1996, Hexcel also became a producer of

carbon fiber. Both before and after Hexcel’s acquisition, Hex6134 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS
cel was the largest purchaser of carbon fiber in the United

States. 

On January 29, 1999, Hexcel received a grand jury subpoena from the Antitrust Division of the United States

Department of Justice (DOJ). No later than the date of the

receipt of that subpoena, Hexcel learned that the DOJ was

investigating an alleged industry-wide antitrust conspiracy in

the carbon fiber and prepreg industries, and that the targets of

the investigation included Hexcel, BP Amoco, Toray, and

Toho. Hexcel retained Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

LLP (Skadden) to represent it in the government’s investigation. On March 30, 1999, Hexcel filed a Form 10-K with the

United States Securities and Exchange Commission, in which

it publicly disclosed that it was the “subject” of a federal

grand jury investigation into “the pricing of all manufacturers

of carbon fiber and carbon fiber prepreg.”

1

On July 29, 1999, direct purchasers of carbon fiber class

action plaintiffs filed the first of several federal class action

lawsuits in the Central District of California against Hexcel,

BP Amoco, Toray, Toho, and others, alleging price-fixing and

unlawful market allocation under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ l. Over the next ten months, seven more direct purchasers

of carbon fiber filed suit in federal court alleging the same

conspiracy. 

On January 24, 2003, Hexcel, BP Amoco, and the other

defendants amended a joint defense agreement (JDA) originally executed on April 29, 1999. The amended JDA included

a tolling provision of potential claims against each other for

the duration of the JDA, terminable upon 30 days written

notice. On August 13, 2008, BP Amoco terminated the tolling

1

In 2001, Hexcel’s antitrust lawyer from Skadden advised Hexcel that

the January 1999 subpoena was likely sufficient to put Hexcel on notice

of its own claim, and thus caused the statute of limitations to begin running. 

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6135
provision as to any claims against it, effective September 12,

2008. 

On November 26, 2008, Hexcel filed suit against BP

Amoco alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15, and 22 by

conspiring to fix the price of carbon fiber that BP Amoco sold

to Hexce1 during the 1990s. BP Amoco moved to dismiss,

contending that Hexcel’s lawsuit was time-barred. In support

of its motion, BP Amoco pointed to Hexcel’s Form 10-K public disclosure on March 30, 1999 that it was the target of a

grand jury price-fixing investigation into the carbon fiber

market as the latest possible date its claims against BP Amoco

accrued. It also claimed that Hexcel knew of the government’s investigation into the carbon fiber market before Hexcel made its disclosure, because it received the grand jury

subpoena from the DOJ on January 29, 1999. 

Hexcel responded by claiming that it did not become aware

of its potential claims until after its own diligent inquiry produced enough evidence to support the filing of a lawsuit under

Rule 11’s “good faith basis” requirement, in February 2001.

The parties stipulated that any claims that had accrued before

Hexcel’s public disclosure were time-barred unless Hexcel

could prove that fraudulent concealment prevented it from

discovering its claims before that date. The district court

denied BP Amoco’s motion to dismiss, despite its doubts that

Hexcel would be able to prove the timeliness of its claims, on

the ground that statute of limitations challenges are generally

poorly suited for resolution on the pleadings.

The parties engaged in limited discovery regarding the statute of limitations issue. BP Amoco filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 2010. Therein, BP Amoco

presented evidence that Hexcel had actual or constructive

knowledge of its claims prior to April 11, 1999, the date

which BP Amoco contended was the earliest possible date

Hexcel’s claims could have accrued. BP Amoco argued that

if Hexcel had acquired actual or constructive notice of its

6136 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS
claims between April 11, 1999 and the present, then the

claims would not be time-barred. However, BP Amoco

claimed, if Hexcel had actual or constructive notice of the relevant facts showing antitrust violations before April 11, 1999,

then the statute of limitations had lapsed, and the claims were

time-barred. 

Hexcel countered that its claims were not time-barred

because the receipt of the DOJ subpoena came as a complete

surprise, and that it had no reason to suspect price-fixing in

the carbon fiber industry. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that “BP Amoco [ ] presented enough evidence to persuade the Court to the contrary. Hexcel

employees undisputedly knew or had reason to suspect that

price-fixing might be occurring in the carbon fiber market

before Hexcel received the DOJ subpoena on January 29,

1999.” After having received the subpoena and having been

alerted to the government’s investigation into the carbon fiber

market, the district court reasoned, Hexcel immediately began

investigating its own conduct and its possible claims against

other carbon fiber manufacturers. By March 30, 1999, Hexcel’s attorneys had interviewed several of Hexcel’s employees, who confirmed the extent of Hexcel’s knowledge or

suspicions of price-fixing. 

On October 13, 2010, the district court entered summary

judgment for BP Amoco on the ground that Hexcel had actual

or constructive notice of its claims on or before April 10, 19992

and, therefore, that the statute of limitations for the filing of

Hexcel’s alleged antitrust claims had run. Hexcel timely

appealed.

2As more fully described infra, the district court calculated the earliest

possible valid accrual date for the running of the statute of limitations as

April 10, 1999. In its appellate briefs, BP Amoco also adopted the April

10, 1999 date as the earliest valid accrual date. We also adopt the district

court’s calculation of the April 10, 1999 date as the earliest possible

accrual date for the running of the statute of limitations. 

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6137
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and

1294. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.,

858 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing T.W. Elec. Serv. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.

1987)). 

Where the moving party has identified the portions of the

record that it claims show the absence of any genuine issue

of fact, the nonmoving party must set forth by affidavit or otherwise specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine

issue for trial. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 830. The evidence

must be viewed, and inferences from the evidence must be

drawn, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

at 830-31.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fraudulent Concealment

[1] Antitrust actions must be commenced within four years

from the date when the causes of action accrue. 15 U.S.C.

§ 15b. We do not require a plaintiff to actually discover its

antitrust claims before the statute of limitations begins to run.

Beneficial Standard Life Ins., Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d

271, 274-75 (9th Cir. 1988). 

[2] A statute of limitations may be tolled if the defendant

fraudulently concealed the existence of a cause of action in

such a way that the plaintiff, acting as a reasonable person,

did not know of its existence. Hennegan v. Pacifico Creative

Serv., Inc., 787 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1986). “[The plaintiff] carries the burden of pleading and proving fraudulent

concealment; it must plead facts showing that [the defendant]

affirmatively misled it, and that [the plaintiff] had neither

actual nor constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to

6138 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS
its claim despite its diligence in trying to uncover those facts.”

Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502 (citing Rutledge v. Boston Woven

Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1978))

(emphasis added). “A fraudulent concealment defense

requires a showing both that the defendant used fraudulent

means to keep the plaintiff unaware of his cause of action, and

also that the plaintiff was, in fact, ignorant of the existence of

his cause of action.” Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of

Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1521 (9th Cir. 1983).

[3] If a defendant proves that the plaintiff had actual or

constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim,

the doctrine of fraudulent concealment does not apply. Id.

“The plaintiff is deemed to have had constructive knowledge

if it had enough information to warrant an investigation

which, if reasonably diligent, would have led to the discovery

of the fraud.” Beneficial Standard Life Ins., 851 F.2d at 275.

It is enough that the plaintiff “should have been alerted to

facts that, following duly diligent inquiry, could have advised

it of its claim.” Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502; see also GO Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir.

2007) (“Full knowledge often awaits discovery, and the very

notion of ‘inquiry notice’ implies something less than that”).

The district court here determined the earliest date Hexcel’s

causes of action could have accrued as follows: 

• Hexcel filed suit on November 26, 2008, 75 days

after the effective date (September 12, 2008) of

BP Amoco’s termination of the tolling agreement

in the JDA. 

• The tolling agreement tolled the running of the

statute of limitations for the period between January 24, 2003 and September 12, 2008. 

• Subtracting the 75 days that expired between the

date when BP Amoco’s termination of the tolling

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6139
agreement became effective, and Hexcel’s filing

of the complaint, the district court found that a

period of three years and 290 days remained

within the original four-year statute of limitations. 

• The district court then subtracted the remaining

three years and 290 days from January 24, 2003,

the date the tolling agreement was executed,

establishing the earliest date for the accrual of the

statute of limitations as April 10, 1999. 

If we use this date as a benchmark, and if Hexcel acquired

actual or constructive notice of its claims against BP Amoco

during the three years and 290 days before January 24, 2003,

its claims against BP Amoco would not be time-barred. However, if Hexcel had actual or constructive knowledge of facts

giving rise to the claims before April 10, 1999, then the statute of limitations would have lapsed and Hexcel’s claims

would be time-barred.3

We find that substantial evidence shows that Hexcel had

constructive, if not actual notice, of its claims long before

April 10, 1999. By its own admission, Hexcel knew of two

specific anticompetitive agreements between BP Amoco and

Toray during the early 1990s: (1) the distribution agreement

under which BP Amoco purchased and resold carbon fiber

manufactured by Toray; and (2) the licensing agreement

3We review the district court’s analysis of the earliest possible accrual

date assuming that the tolling agreement contained in the JDA did not statutorily lapse after four years, on January 24, 2007. BP Amoco argues in

the alternative that, under Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 360.5, the tolling agreement contained in the JDA lapsed as a matter of law four years after its

execution, as a result of which, the earliest possible accrual date would be

November 27, 2000. We do not reach this question, however, because

Hexcel’s claim accrued no later than March 30, 1999, before either April

10, 1999 or November 27, 2000, so even if BP Amoco’s position were

correct, it would not affect our analysis. 

6140 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS
under which BP Amoco used Toray technology to manufacture certain carbon fiber products. Indeed, following the abandonment of joint venture negotiations in 1998, Hexcel’s

concern about BP Amoco’s agreements with Toray was so

great that it met with its general counsel to discuss the legality

of the practices. 

[4] Moreover, undisputed evidence shows that Hexcel was

aware of industry-wide anticompetitive practices throughout

the 1990s. Hexcel knew that the executives from BP Amoco,

Toray and Toho met once a month in Tokyo to discuss carbon

fiber volumes, programs and pricing. In fact, Hexcel may

have participated in the very price-fixing conspiracy of which

it now complains when it discussed the possibility of “straddling the market” and allocating regional control with Toho.

And, Hexcel had knowledge of both the specific agreements

and the industry-wide anticompetitive practices throughout

the 1990s, more than a decade before the filing of its complaint. The January 29, 1999 grand jury subpoena and the

March 1999 Form 10-K disclosures should have served as the

final red flags alerting Hexcel of its claims.4 Accordingly,

Hexcel’s intimate knowledge of the carbon fiber price-fixing

conspiracy, coupled with the grand jury subpoena and the

Form 10-K disclosures, proves that Hexcel had constructive,

if not actual, knowledge of its claims well before April 10,

1999. 

Hexcel argues that Conmar compels us to reverse the district court’s judgment because there we held that summary

judgment is only appropriate “if uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates that a plaintiff discovered or should have

discovered the cause of action but failed to file a timely complaint.” Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502 (internal quotation marks

4As noted supra, the record even shows that Hexcel’s lead antitrust

counsel advised it that the grand jury subpoena received on January 29,

1999, was likely sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations on its potential claims against BP Amoco. 

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6141
and alterations omitted). In Conmar, we reversed on the

ground that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to

whether the plaintiff, Conmar, had constructive notice of its

claim sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. However, Hexcel’s attempted analogy to the plaintiff in

Conmar overlooks critical distinctions between the two cases.

In Conmar, the only evidence proffered to defeat Conmar’s

defense of fraudulent concealment consisted of a tangentially

related guilty plea, an earlier filed indictment, and minimal

press coverage. 858 F.2d at 503-04. There was no evidence,

as there is here, that Conmar had earlier knowledge or suspicion of anticompetitive practices from its suppliers, or that

Conmar had been subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury

investigating the very conduct it alleged against the defendant. Whereas Hexcel was named as a co-defendant with BP

Amoco in multiple antitrust suits, Conmar had no relationship

with the parties involved in the litigation beyond that of

consumer-supplier. In addition, where Hexcel had been

advised by its lead antitrust counsel that the subpoena likely

triggered the running of the state of limitations, Conmar had

never been so counseled. Id.

Hexcel’s reliance on Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, Inc., 130 S.

Ct. 1784 (2010) is equally unpersuasive. Merck involved the

impact of inquiry notice on the statutory “discovery rule” in

federal securities law. 130 S. Ct. at 1797-98. As a preliminary

matter, the accrual doctrine for a discovery rule is conceptually distinct from the equitable tolling doctrine in fraudulent

concealment cases. Compare TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d

987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that under the federal common law discovery rule, “a claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis

of the action”), with Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409,

414 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that fraudulent concealment

focuses on the actions of the defendant that are calculated to

prevent the plaintiff from filing suit within the limitations

period). Moreover, to the extent that the general principles of

Merck do apply, Merck is consistent with our rule under Con6142 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS
mar, that the statute of limitations begins to run when a reasonably diligent plaintiff “would have discovered the

necessary facts.” Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1798. 

[5] We find Hexcel’s position to be more like that of the

plaintiff in Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. 576

F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1979). In Rutledge, the plaintiff first sued

five hydraulic hose manufacturers and producers for pricefixing and price discrimination, in 1969. Id. at 249. The 1969

suit was subsequently dismissed, and the dismissal was

affirmed on appeal. In 1975, Rutledge sued again, this time

naming Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. as a defendant. Id.

The suit was virtually identical to the original suit filed in

1969. In addition to finding that the suit was barred by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel, we held that Rutledge’s claim

was time-barred under the four-year statute of limitations

because Rutledge had suspected a price-fixing conspiracy as

early as 1965, and further, could have easily discovered its

claim through the course of diligent discovery in the 1969

suit. Id. at 250. Similarly, Hexcel was named in multiple previous lawsuits as a co-defendant with BP Amoco. Moreover,

long predating those suits, Hexcel knew of, and allegedly

even participated in, the very price-fixing conspiracy for

which it later sued BP Amoco. Given Hexcel’s direct involvement as co-defendant with BP Amoco in multiple previous

lawsuits for the same conduct of which it now complains, just

as in Rutledge, no reasonable juror could find that Hexcel

lacked sufficient notice of the facts giving rise to its claims.

576 F.2d a 249.

Morever, as we held in Volk v. D.A. Davidson Co., 816

F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987), the doctrine of fraudulent

concealment may not be used to toll the statute of limitations

where a plaintiff has received an annual report providing constructive notice of its claims. Here, Hexcel not only received,

but authored on March 30, 1999 its Form 10-K detailing its

involvement, along with the other major carbon fiber and prepreg manufacturers, as a subject of a federal price-fixing

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6143
investigation. The mere receipt of such annual reports in Volk

was sufficient to show that several plaintiffs had “constructive

notice” of their claims. Id. at 1416. Here, Hexcel authored the

Form 10-K report detailing its involvement in a price-fixing

investigation in the carbon fiber and prepreg industries. Under

the reasoning of Volk, we conclude that Hexcel’s authorship

of its Form 10-K disclosures provided sufficient knowledge to

render its fraudulent concealment defense inapplicable. 

The district court correctly applied the controlling law

under Conmar in holding that Hexcel had “actual or constructive knowledge” of its claims on or before April 10, 1999. 

The undisputed facts show that Hexcel had constructive notice of its claims by April 10, 1999. Hexcel’s

receipt of the DOJ subpoena was preceded by a

decade of “red flags[,”] which should have excited

its suspicion. By the time Hexcel received the grand

jury subpoena on January 29, 1999, there were

enough red flags to put Hexcel on notice of its

claims. See GO Computer, Inc., 508 F.3d at 172

(affirming grant of summary judgment on statute of

limitations grounds where plaintiff had “enough red

flags,” including an ongoing government investigation, statements from customers, and industry rumors

“that a reasonably diligent person would have investigated and acted”). In fact, Hexcel’s own antitrust

lawyer opined that receipt of the DOJ subpoena was

sufficient to put Hexcel on notice of its claims and

trigger the running of the statute of limitations. 

The record contains uncontroverted evidence that Hexcel possessed constructive knowledge of its claims before April 10,

1999 because, long before then, it “should have been alerted

to facts that, following duly diligent inquiry, could have

advised it of its claim.” Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502; see GO

Computer, Inc., 508 F.3d at 179 (“[I]t bears emphasis that the

date of inquiry notice is not a filing deadline. It is only the

6144 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS
date which a cause of action accrues and the four year period

allotted by Congress for plaintiff to investigate begins.”).

B. Summary Judgment

To put at issue a defendant’s evidence of a plaintiff ’s

knowledge sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of

limitations, the plaintiff must produce “at least some ‘significant, probative evidence tending to support the complaint,’ ”

to create a genuine issue of material fact. T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). “[C]onclusory, self-serving affidavit[s], lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence,”

are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. FTC

v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir.

1997). Declarations must be made with personal knowledge;

declarations not based on personal knowledge are inadmissible and cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1990);

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). The district court may grant

summary judgment only if uncontroverted evidence “irrefutably demonstrates that a plaintiff discovered or should have

discovered [the cause of action] but failed to file a timely

complaint.” Volk, 816 F.2d at 1417. 

[6] To refute BP Amoco’s proof of Hexcel’s constructive

knowledge, Hexcel proffered eight declarations of current and

former employees containing virtually identical boiler-plate

general denials of Hexcel’s knowledge of its claim prior to

2001. We hold that the district court did not usurp the role of

the jury in considering these declarations because it held,

without rejecting or treating them as sham affidavits, that

Hexcel’s “self-serving, boilerplate declarations” were narrow,

conclusory denials, insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact against BP Amoco’s voluminous evidence. 

To further refute BP Amoco’s evidence of Hexcel’s knowledge specifically based on the January 1999 subpoena, Hexcel

HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS 6145
proffered a declaration from its lead antitrust counsel in which

he declared that his previous advice to Hexcel, that the statute

of limitations on its claim likely began to run on January 29,

1999, did not consider the possibility of a fraudulent concealment defense. Such contradictory, self-serving testimony likewise fails to create a genuine issue of material fact. Publ’g

Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171. Indeed, Hexcel’s other

declarations, such as the Mettenet declaration, regarding

whether Hexcel employee, Mike Mettenet, actually knew of

the price-fixing rumors, were equally unhelpful concerning

the question of whether he subjectively suspected a pricefixing conspiracy. Ultimately, however, we agree with the

district court that whether a single executive actually knew

about the price-fixing conspiracy fails to counterbalance BP

Amoco’s substantial evidence that a reasonable plaintiff

“should have been alerted to facts that, following duly diligent

inquiry, could have advised it of” the price-fixing conspiracy.

Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502.

Hexcel’s argument that the district court drew various

inferences in BP Amoco’s favor is also unavailing; the district

court dealt only with the objective standard of actual or constructive notice, based upon the record evidence before it.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that

Hexcel’s claims were time-barred and entering summary

judgment for BP Amoco because Hexcel failed to proffer evidence sufficient to create any genuine issues of material fact.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the

district court holding Hexcel’s claims are time-barred under

the applicable four-year statute of limitations.

6146 HEXCEL CORP. v. INEOS POLYMERS