REDACTED OPINION

 In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 16-126C

Filed: April 7, 2016

Redacted Version Issued for Publication: April 26, 20161

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UNIVERSAL PROTECTION 

SERVICE, LP,

 Protestor,

 v.

UNITED STATES,

 Defendant,

v.

COMMAND SECURITY CORP.,

 Defendant-Intervenor.

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Post-Award Bid Protest; Motion to 

Dismiss; Standing; Successor-inInterest.

Kevin P. Mullen, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., for protestor. With him 

was Ethan E. Marsh, Charles L. Capito, and R. Locke Bell, Jenner & Block LLP, 

Washington, D.C.

Matthew P. Roche, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Robert 

E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, and Douglas K. Mickle, 

Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Department of Justice. Of counsel were 

Michelle Windmueller and Richard Y. Rho, Attorneys, United States Postal Service.

Scott A. Schipma, Winston & Strawn, LLP, Washington, D.C., for defendantintervenor. With him was Bryant E. Gardner, Winston & Strawn, LLP, Washington, D.C.

 

1 This opinion was issued under seal on April 7, 2016. The parties were asked to propose 

redactions prior to public release of the opinion. This opinion is issued with some of

redactions that the parties proposed in response to the court’s request. Words which are 

redacted are reflected with the notation: “[redacted].” The name of the license which the 

parties’ requested be redacted is reflected as: “[ABM Security Services’ license].”
2

O P I N I O N

HORN, J.

The protestor, Universal Protection Service, LP (Universal), filed a bid protest in 

this court on January 27, 2016, challenging the United States Postal Service’s (USPS) 

award of a contract to Command Security Corporation (CSC or Command)

2 under 

Solicitation No. 2B-14-A-0078 (the Solicitation). Protestor raises six counts in this court 

arguing that the evaluations of protestor’s and intervenor CSC’s proposals were flawed, 

the best value decision was arbitrary and capricious, and that the agency “conducted 

unequal and inadequate discussions with ABM [ABM Security Services, Inc.].”3

Therefore, protestor seeks temporary relief from the court restraining “USPS from 

transitioning the NLECC [National Law Enforcement Communications Centers] and 

Security Guard services contract to CSC pending the Court's resolution of this bid 

protest,” and to “[p]ermanently enjoin USPS and CSC from performing the NLECC and 

Security Guard services contract until USPS reopens the procurement process, solicits 

revised proposals, evaluates the revised proposals, and makes a new award decision 

consistent with the Solicitation.” Protestor also seeks an order declaring the contract 

award to CSC to be “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and a violation of 

procurement law and policy.”

FINDINGS OF FACT

On July 25, 2014, the USPS issued a purchase plan, establishing an intent to 

obtain a contractor or contractors for two services: (1) staffing and operating the National 

Law Enforcement Communications Centers (NLECC) in Dulles, VA and Fort Worth, TX; 

and (2) Security Guard Services at approximately 57 locations across the United States 

and its territories.4 Securitas Critical Infrastructure Services, Inc. (Securitas) was the 

 

2 CSC filed a motion to intervene in the above captioned protest on January 27, 2016, 

which was granted on January 29, 2016. 

3 As discussed at length below, on October 26, 2015, there was a sale of the assets of 

ABM Security Services, Inc. (ABM Security Services) from ABM Industries, Inc. (ABM 

Industries), ABM’s parent company, to protestor Universal. Protestor alleges in its 

complaint that Universal acquired all of the assets of ABM Security Services, including 

ABM Security Services’ September 30, 2014 offer to the Solicitation. 

4 The joint stipulation of facts state:

The NLECC operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The centers log 

and record events, such as: “emergency dispatch, incident report writing 

and analysis.” “NLECCs provide centrally managed law enforcement radio 

traffic for approximately 2,500 radios, alarm monitoring for approximately 

11,000 intrusion detection systems, and remote alarm panel 

programming.” The centers “provide after-hours emergency phone 

coverage for all Inspection Service divisions, receive notification 
3

incumbent for the NLECC contract, and ABM Security Services was the incumbent for 

the Security Guard Services contract. The purchase plan noted that although USPS had 

contracted for these services separately in the past, the purchase plan sought to 

consolidate the services into one solicitation “in order to consider consolidating the supply 

base by using one supplier to potentially provide both services.” The purchase plan noted 

that “[t]he USPS may award one or multiple contracts based on the results of the 

competitive solicitation.” The purchase plan provided a four-year base term, with three,

two-year options for both the NLECC and Security Guards Services, and the purchase 

plan stated that the solicitation would require the award decision to be based upon the 

best value to the USPS. 

On August 28, 2014, USPS issued Solicitation No. 2B-14-A-0078 (the Solicitation).

The Solicitation contained two line items. Line item no. 00001 was for NLECC Services 

and required the awardee to: 

Provide dispatch and alarm monitoring services in support of the U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service (USPIS) at each NLECC according to the attached 

NLECC Statement of Work (SOW). The two (2) locations are Dulles VA, 

and Ft. Worth TX. This includes direct support of each NLECC by 

monitoring multiple types of alarm systems, closed-circuit television, 

dispatch communications and access to national law enforcement 

databases.

Line item no. 00002 was for Security Guard Services and required the awardee to: 

“Provide Guard I and II, and security mail screeners, as needed in support of the security 

program according to the attached Security Services Statement of Work. In addition 

potentially provide canine handlers with trained working dogs according to the attached 

Security Services Statement of Work.” 

The evaluation factors were the same for both the NLECC and the Security Guard 

Services, and the four technical evaluation factors, in descending order of importance,

were: (1) Technical Approach; (2) Management and Staffing Plan; (3) Supplier Capability; 

and (4) Past Performance. The Solicitation explained that the technical factors were more 

important than price, but noted that the “Postal Service will not pay significantly more for 

marginal increases in technical value or merit, and the perceived benefits of a higher 

priced proposal must warrant the additional cost.” The Solicitation also indicated that 

USPS would make the award decisions based upon best value, which it defined as “the 

outcome that provides the optimal combination of elements, such as lowest total cost of 

ownership, technology, innovation and efficiency, assurance of supply, and quality 

relative to the Postal Services’ needs.” 

 

concerning biological detection system (BDS) alarms from postal 

processing and distribution centers, and access law enforcement and 

intelligence information databases.” 

(internal citations omitted). 
4

In addition, the Solicitation had a section titled “Contract Clauses.” Clause 4-1

stated, in part:

b. Assignment. If this contract provides for payments aggregating $10,000 

or more, claims for monies due or to become due from the Postal Service 

under it may be assigned to a bank, trust company, or other financing 

institution, including any federal lending agency, and may thereafter be 

further assigned and reassigned to any such institution. Any assignment or 

reassignment must cover all amounts payable and must not be made to 

more than one party, except that assignment or reassignment may be made 

to one party as agent or trustee for two or more parties participating in 

financing this contract. No assignment or reassignment will be recognized 

as valid and binding upon the Postal Service unless a written notice of the 

assignment or reassignment, together with a true copy of the instrument of 

assignment, is filed with: 

(1) The contracting officer; 

(2) The surety or sureties upon any bond; and 

(3) The office, if any, designated to make payment, and the contracting 

officer has acknowledged the assignment in writing. 

(4) Assignment of this contract or any interest in this contract other than in 

accordance with the provisions of this clause will be grounds for termination 

of the contract for default at the option of the Postal Service.

Clause 4-1b.

USPS received six timely proposals in September 2014, in response to the 

Solicitation. Four offerors submitted proposals for both the NLECC and Security Guards 

Services: ABM Security Services, CSC, G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. (G4S), and 

Securitas. In addition, Gonzales Consulting Services, Inc. (Gonzales) submitted only a 

NLECC proposal, and U.S. Security Associates, Inc. (U.S. Security) submitted only a 

Security Guards proposal. The Supply Management Competitive Award 

Recommendation (Award Recommendation) reflected that the Technical Evaluation 

Team reviewed the proposals, and evaluated them for strengths, weaknesses, 

deficiencies, and risks in relation to the evaluation factors, as well as conducted oral 

presentations with the six offerors in October 2014. The parties have stipulated that,

“[a]ccording to the Award Recommendation, the TET [Technical Evaluation Team] then 

reached a consensus on the ratings for each proposal in relation to the respective 

evaluation schemes, establishing rankings for the offerors, and summarizing the results 

in an evaluation spreadsheet.”

The Technical Evaluation Team indicated that for ABM Security Services, “[t]he 

NLECC proposal did not clearly demonstrate an understanding of the requirements in the 
5

Statement of Work. ABM presents a program that is more security guard based as is 

evident in the suggested program for the NLECC centers, which is essentially a guard 

conversion program,” and rated ABM Security Services’ NLECC technical proposal as 

“Fair.” For CSC, the Technical Evaluation Team indicated that “Command Security 

offered a sound program for the NLECC that will meet the Statement of Work 

requirements, indicating a high probability of successful performance in supporting 

USPIS,” and rated CSC’s NLECC technical proposal as “Good.” The technical evaluation 

for the offerors’ NLECC proposals were summarized in the Award Recommendation:

NLECC Technical 

Approach 

Mgmt. & 

Staffing 

Plan 

Supplier 

Capability 

Past 

Performance 

Overall 

Technical 

Rating 

Overall 

Technical 

Ranking 

Securitas GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD 1 

Command GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD 2 

ABM GOOD POOR FAIR GOOD FAIR 3 

Gonzales FAIR FAIR FAIR GOOD FAIR 4 

G4S FAIR FAIR GOOD GOOD FAIR 5 

The Technical Evaluation Team stated that in its Security Guards Services 

technical proposal, ABM Security Services “offered some new programs and 

technological advances that could make the program more robust than it is today. ABM 

also suggested an innovative revenue idea for charging electric vehicles on USPS sites. 

ABM is capable of running the unarmed guard program on a national level and providing 

resources.”5 The Technical Evaluation Team rated ABM Security Services’ Security 

Guards Services technical proposal as “Good,” ranking it as first amongst the offerors. 

The Technical Evaluation Team also rated CSC’s Security Guards Services technical 

proposal as “Good” and indicated that “Command’s proposal for Guards offered some 

experience and capability that other suppliers did not demonstrate.” The technical 

evaluation for all the offerors for the Security Guards Services proposal were summarized 

in the Award Recommendation:

Guards Technical 

Approach 

Mgmt. & 

Staffing 

Plan 

Supplier 

Capability 

Past 

Performance 

Overall 

Technical 

Rating 

Overall 

Technical 

Ranking 

ABM GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD 1 

Command GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD 2 

Securitas GOOD POOR GOOD GOOD FAIR 3 

G4S FAIR FAIR GOOD GOOD FAIR 4 

U.S. 

Security 

FAIR GOOD FAIR GOOD FAIR 5 

 

5 The agency in its evaluation documents, as well as the parties in their submissions to 

the court, typically refer to ABM Security Services as “ABM.” Unless otherwise indicated, 

the court has left unchanged any quotations which refer to ABM Security Services as 

ABM. 
6

After discussions,6the offerors submitted revised prices, and according to the 

Award Recommendation, the final price evaluations were:

Price Ranking 

NLECC 

Supplier Base Period 

+ Transition

Base 4 years + 3, 

2-year Options + 

Transition 

1 Gonzales $[redacted] $[redacted]

2 ABM $[redacted] $[redacted]

3 Securitas $[redacted] $[redacted]

4 Command Security $15,819,419 $40,026,301 

5 G4S $[redacted] $[redacted]

The Award Recommendation concluded the NLECC analysis as follows: 

From a multiple award perspective, Securitas’ proposal is most 

advantageous and USPS would obtain best value from awarding the 

NLECC contract to this offeror. However, since Securitas’ proposal along 

with the proposals submitted by ABM and Command were rated highest 

technically and all were judged price competitive for both NLECC and 

Guards, it was necessary for the Purchase/SCM Team to first conduct the 

trade-off analysis for the Guards proposals followed by a single award 

trade-off analysis for both service components before reaching a final best 

value determination.

Price Ranking 

GUARDS 

 Supplier Base Period 

+ Transition 

Base 4 years + 3, 

2-year Options + 

Transition 

1 Command Security $84,408,289 $209,990,394 

2 ABM $[redacted] $[redacted]

3 Securitas $[redacted] $[redacted]

4 U.S. Security $[redacted] $[redacted]

5 G4S $[redacted] $[redacted]

The Award Recommendation concluded the Security Guards Services trade-off analysis, 

as follows:

 

6 As noted in joint stipulation of facts, the agency made the decision only to hold 

discussions with the offerors who “submitted the highest technically rated (no less than 

Good) proposals for each service (NLECC and Guards).” Therefore, USPS held 

discussions for the NLECC proposals with Securitas and CSC, as both of their proposals 

were rated as “Good,” and did not hold discussions with ABM Security Services, 

Gonzales, or G4S, as their NLECC proposals were all rated “Fair.” 
7

From a multiple award perspective, Command’s proposal is most 

advantageous and USPS would obtain best value from awarding the 

Guards contract to this offeror. At this point in the source selection process 

the Purchase/SCM Team needed to determine if best overall value would 

be obtained from awarding two separate contracts, one to Securitas for 

NLECC and one to Command for Guards, or from awarding a single 

contract to one of the three highest rated technical proposals offering 

competitive prices for both service components.

The agency then performed a NLECC and Security Guards Services combined7trade-off 

analysis, in which the agency considered the technical and price evaluations from the 

both the NLECC and Security Guards Services proposals. The Award Recommendation 

explained the combined trade-off analysis as follows: 

As previously stated, the USPIS [United States Postal Inspection Service]

has determined that there are significant advantages to the USPS if a single 

supplier provides both service components. Communications will be 

enhanced with one supplier, especially during emergent events. The USPIS 

relies on the NLECC for communications and radio traffic. A single supplier 

would be in a better position to enhance overall resource allocation across 

the security network for both USPIS as well as supplier assets. The USPIS 

requires information at all times during emergent and routine security 

incidents. It has multiple departments that are involved with the guards and 

the NLECC operations. A single supplier would eliminate historically 

identified communication barriers and facilitate the ability to for USPIS to 

achieve operational and administrative efficiencies while strengthening the 

effectiveness of the enterprise security program. 

The Award Recommendation summarized the combined trade-off analysis as follows: 

Although both Securitas and Command were adjectivally rated Good for the 

NLECC and Guards, Command's combined proposals are judged 

technically superior to the combined offerings of either ABM or Securitas. 

Ranked technically first and third respectively for NLECC and Guards, 

ABM’s combined service component total evaluated price is $[redacted]

Ranked technically third and first respectively for NLECC and Guards, 

Securitas’ combined total evaluated price is $[redacted]. Ranked technically 

second for both components, Command’s combined total evaluated price is 

$250,016,695, which is [redacted] lower than ABM’s and [redacted] lower 

than Securitas’ evaluated prices over the anticipated 10-year life of the 

contract.

. . .

 

7 As noted above, the purchase plan provided that “[t]he USPS may award one or multiple 

contracts based on the results of the competitive solicitation.” 
8

Any further trade-off analysis between ABM’s combined proposal and 

Command’s combined proposal is simplified by the fact that the 

Purchase/SCM Team judged Command’s proposal to be more 

advantageous both from a technical and price perspective. As previously 

stated in the Guards trade-off analysis, the Purchase/SCM Team was 

unable to identify any clear technical differentiation between ABM’s 

proposal and Command’s proposal sufficient to offset Command’s total 

evaluated price advantage of $[redacted]. Moreover, Command’s NLECC 

proposal was rated technically superior to ABM’s NLECC proposal. With a 

combined total evaluated price advantage of [redacted] over ABM, 

Command’s NLECC and Guards proposals taken as a whole represents a 

better life cycle value to USPS.

On January 2, 2015, USPS notified ABM Security Services that CSC had been 

selected for contract award under the Solicitation. Four days later, on January 6, 2015, 

USPS provided ABM Security Services an oral debriefing regarding the award decision. 

Three days after that, on January 9, 2015, ABM Security Services filed a business 

disagreement with the contracting officer, which the contracting officer subsequently 

denied on January 20, 2015. On January 22, 2015, ABM Security Services filed an appeal 

with USPS Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official, and requested that, if the Official 

did not issue a decision by February 1, 2015, that he stay the transition to CSC. The 

Official, however, denied ABM Security Services’ stay request on January 28, 2015. The 

same day, ABM Security Services filed a post-award bid protest in the United States Court 

of Federal Claims, Case No. 15-87C, and requested a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction to prohibit the transition to CSC, pending the appeal process. The 

court held an initial status conference on January 29, 2015. The same day, January 29, 

2015, the USPS Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official reconsidered his decision and 

agreed to postpone the transition of the contracts to CSC pending the appeal process. 

The defendant filed a notice of corrective action in the United States Court of Federal 

Claims on January 30, 2015, at which time ABM Security Services filed a motion for

voluntary dismissal of Case No. 15-87C, which the court granted on January 30, 2015.

On June 15, 2015, the USPS Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official denied 

ABM Security Services’ appeal on the merits, which challenged USPS’ technical and price 

evaluations. Although the Official affirmed USPS’ best value determination, he noted that 

he had identified computational errors in the contracting officer’s price analysis, which 

indicated that CSC’s price advantage was $[redacted], rather than the approximately 

$[redacted] advantage identified in the Award Recommendation. Despite the errors, the 

Official determined that the computational errors were not prejudicial, and stated that he

had notified the “CO [contracting officer] and his management” of the mistake and, “they 

concluded that even with the smaller price advantage, the best value decision remains 

the same.” On June 29, 2015, ABM Security Services again filed a post-award bid protest

in the United States Court of Federal Claims, Case No. 15-648C, in which ABM Security 

Services argued that the evaluations of ABM Security Services’ and CSC’s proposals 

were flawed, the best value decision was arbitrary and capricious, and that the agency 
9

had conducted inadequate discussions with ABM Security Services. After an initial status 

conference, and a subsequent hearing which established a briefing schedule, the 

defendant again filed a notice of corrective action on July 9, 2015, and indicated that 

agency intended to:

[U]ndertake corrective action in ABM Security Services, Inc.’s (ABM) protest 

of USPS’s award of a contract for staffing and operating two National Law 

Enforcement Communications Centers (NLECC) and Security Guard 

Services at approximately 57 locations. Following the USPS Supplier 

Disagreement Resolution Official’s identification of a price calculation error, 

and counsel’s subsequent review of the record, corrective action is 

warranted to permit the contracting officer to determine the correct price 

differential between the offerors and conduct a revised best value 

determination. The contracting officer will have the discretion to address 

any other issues raised by the parties or otherwise identified in the record.

(internal citations omitted). Once again, in light of defendant’s representation, on July 9, 

2015, the court dismissed the second protest, Case No. 15-648C, filed by ABM Security 

Services, without prejudice.

On October 26, 2015, protestor Universal concluded an acquisition of ABM 

Security Services. Two days later, on October 28, 2015, ABM Security Services notified 

the contracting officer, and specifically requested that the agency execute a novation 

agreement concerning ABM Security Services’ two existing contracts with USPS.8 The 

following day, ABM Security Services sent the contracting officer another letter, signed 

by Oded Barlev, ABM Security Services’ Vice President of National Operations, which 

stated: “With regard to ABM’s September 30, 2014 offer, we hereby confirm that the offer, 

along with all of ABM’s assets, has been legally transferred to Universal. The offer, now 

owned by Universal, continues to rely on the same assets – including facilities, resources, 

and personnel – as originally proposed by ABM.”

On November 20, 2015, the contracting officer informed ABM Security Services9

of the results of the most recent corrective action and indicated that the “ultimate outcome 

of the best value analysis remained the same.” Therefore, the contracting officer 

concluded that the “award of the contract to CSC will not be disturbed.” The contracting 

officer informed ABM Security Services that the corrective action was intended “to review 

 

8 Subsequently, on November 30, 2015, the contracting officer responded to ABM 

Security Services’ request to novate its existing USPS contracts, and requested certain 

documentation. ABM Security Services responded that it would compile the requested 

documentation to novate its existing contracts. As of March 21, 2016, the agency had not 

yet acted on the request to novate the contracts. 

9 Although the sale of ABM Security Services to Universal had been completed on 

October 26, 2015, in a response to a letter from protestor’s counsel of record, the agency 

addressed its response to “ABM Security Services.”
10

all of the underlying numbers that constituted the calculated evaluated prices and to 

correct any errors that were found in the numbers. Every pricing sheet was scrutinized.” 

The contracting officer further stated that he had “updated my Award Recommendation 

to reflect corrections in the numbers” and “re-visited my best value analysis in the light of 

the corrected numbers.” Specifically, the contracting officer indicated that “the purchase 

team undertook a thorough review of the pricing evaluation sheets prepared prior to the 

original award recommendation and found that errors had been made,” but determined 

that “none of these errors were significant enough to undermine the validity of the original 

best value determination.” 

The agency included the following chart in the updated Award Recommendation 

which provided both the original and the revised evaluated prices of the offerors: 

Final Price Rankings Including Options

Original

Updated10

 

10 “TCO” refers to total cost of ownership.

Price Ranking 

NLECC Supplier Base Period + Transition

Base 4 years + 

3, 2-year Options + 

Transition

1 Gonzales $[redacted] $[redacted] 

2 ABM $[redacted] $[redacted] 

3 Securitas $[redacted] $[redacted] 

4 Command Security $15,819,419 $40,026,301 

5 G4S $[redacted] $[redacted] 

Price Ranking 

GUARDS Supplier Base Period + Transition

Base 4 years + 

3, 2-year Options + 

Transition

1 Command Security $84,408,289 $209,990,394 

2 ABM $[redacted] $[redacted] 

3 Securitas $[redacted] $[redacted] 

4 U.S. Security $[redacted] $[redacted] 

5 G4S $[redacted] $[redacted] 
11

With regard to the NLECC and Guards combined trade-off analysis, the Award 

Recommendation was updated with the corrected numbers to state: 

Command’s combined proposal is judged superior to the combined 

offerings of either ABM or Securitas. Ranked technically third and first for 

NLECC and Guards, respectively, ABM’s updated combined total evaluated 

price is $[redacted]. Ranked technically first and third for NLECC and 

Guards, respectively, Securitas’ updated combined total evaluated price is 

$[redacted]. Ranked technically second for both components, Command’s 

updated combined total evaluated price is $248,637,469, which is 

[redacted] lower than ABM’s and [redacted] lower than Securitas’ updated 

evaluated prices over the anticipated 10-year life of the contract.

As indicated in the joint stipulation of facts, “[t]he summary of results of the NLECC and 

Guards trade-off analysis for each of the three highest rated and most price competitive 

proposals was updated to reflect the corrected numbers.” The updated Award 

Recommendation indicated as follows: 

Price Ranking 

NLECC Supplier Base Period + Transition

Base 4 years + 

3, 2-year Options + 

Transition

1 Gonzales $[redacted] $[redacted] 

2 Command Security $15,819,419 $39,196,997 

3 ABM $[redacted] $[redacted] 

4 Securitas $[redacted] $[redacted] 

5 G4S $[redacted] $[redacted] 

Price Ranking 

GUARDS Supplier Base Period + Transition

Base 4 years + 

3, 2-year Options + 

Transition

1 Command Security $83,325,039 $209,440,472 

2 ABM $[redacted] $[redacted] 

3 Securitas $[redacted] $[redacted] 

4 U.S. Security $[redacted] $[redacted] 

5 G4S $[redacted] $[redacted] 
12

Suppliers NLECC

Technical

Ranking

Guards

Technical

Ranking

NLECC Price

Ranking

Guards

Price

Ranking

Combined

Overall

Ranking

Combined Overall

Price Base 4 years +

3, 2-year Options +

Transition

Command 2 2 2 1 1 $248,637,469

ABM 3 1 3 2 2 $[redacted]

Securitas 1 3 4 4 3 $[redacted]

Therefore, the contracting officer noted that the updated Award Recommendation 

determined that “a combined award to Command offers the Postal Service the optimal 

best value scenario for this particular purchase.” 

On November 30, 2015, protestor submitted another business disagreement to the

contracting officer challenging, what protestor defined as, the “re-award” of the contract 

to CSC. On December 10, 2015, the contracting officer responded to protestor stating

that “there was no ‘re-award.’” The contracting officer informed protestor that he believed 

protestor was not an interested party to protest, stating that:

[I]t does not appear that Universal was an actual or prospective offeror with 

respect to the solicitation . . . . I am not aware of any binding regulation or 

authority that would allow a purchaser to step into the shoes of an actual 

offeror, long after a solicitation has closed, without the express consent and 

approval of the Postal Service.

In response, on December 14, 2015, protestor submitted a business disagreement 

with the USPS Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official, challenging the results of the 

corrective action and the contracting officer’s response to Universal’s November 30, 2015 

letter. The USPS Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official responded to the protestor 

on January 13, 2016, and agreed with the contracting officer that “no new business 

disagreement exists and no further Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official review is 

required.” The Official also indicated to the protestor and that the decision to take 

corrective action “did not result in the termination of the January 2015 award to CSC nor 

did it result in any award, but rather a reevaluation that affirmed the original best value 

determination and left the existing award in place.” After the USPS Supplier Disagreement 

Resolution Official’s response, protestor filed the current, above captioned bid protest, 

Case No. 16-126C, in this court on January 27, 2016. After an initial hearing with the 

parties, the court set a schedule and the parties briefed the defendant’s and intervenor’s 

motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as the parties’ crossmotions for judgment on the Administrative Record. On March 21, 2016, the court held 

oral argument.

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the court addresses defendant and defendant-intervenor’s 
13

allegations that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide protestor’s

bid protest in the above-captioned case because protestor does not have standing and is

not an “interested party.” Defendant claims that the protestor, Universal, did not submit a 

bid in response to the solicitation and, therefore, cannot be an “actual bidder.” By contrast, 

protestor states that: 

Universal is an interested party with standing to file this action, because (i) 

it is the complete successor-in-interest to ABM, the entity that submitted a 

proposal in response to the USPS Solicitation at issue here; and (ii) ABM 

would have had a substantial chance of receiving the new USPS contract 

but for the procurement errors made by USPS.

It is well established that “‘subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s 

power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.’” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 

U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 

“[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the 

scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional 

questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. 

Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 

94 (2010) (“Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter 

jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 

U.S. at 514)); Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 269 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“[A] court has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case.” (citing 

Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 918 F.2d 160, 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); 

View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts 

must always look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties raise the issue or not."). “The 

objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, 

or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the 

entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; see also Hymas v. United 

States, 810 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that a federal court must satisfy 

itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case); 

Cent. Pines Land Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360, 1364 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(“An objection to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party or the 

court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of judgment.” (citing 

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506)); Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 

521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]ny party may challenge, or the court may raise 

sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time.” (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 

U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en

banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005); and Fanning, Phillips 

& Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. 

Cl. 71, 76, appeal dismissed, 425 F. App’x 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In fact, “[s]ubject matter 

jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even where . . . neither 

party has raised this issue.” Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 

F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 

1485 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied and en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 

525 U.S. 826 (1998)), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted in
14

part sub. nom Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005), 

cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 

This court has jurisdiction to hear bid protests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) 

(2012) of the Tucker Act, which provides that this court has:

jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting 

to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed 

contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged 

violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a 

proposed procurement. 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); see also Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 

1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA), 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1)–(4) (2012), amended the Tucker Act to establish a 

statutory basis for bid protests in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Impresa 

Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1330–32 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001). 

In order to have standing to sue as an “interested party” under this provision, a 

disappointed bidder must show that it suffered competitive injury or was “prejudiced” by 

the alleged error in the procurement process. See Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 

656 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (To prevail, a bid protester must first “‘show that it 

was prejudiced by a significant error’ (i.e., ‘that but for the error, it would have had a 

substantial chance of securing the contract).’” (quoting Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United 

States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009))); Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United 

States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. v. 

United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 235, 281 (2012); Linc Gov’t Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 

Fed. Cl. 672, 693 (2010) (“In order to establish standing to sue, the plaintiff in a bid protest 

has always needed to demonstrate that it suffered competitive injury, or ‘prejudice,’ as a 

result of the allegedly unlawful agency decisions.” (citing Rex Serv. Corp. v. United 

States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 

1577, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 84, 88 

(1988); Morgan Bus. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 325, 332 (1980))). In order 

to establish what one Judge on this court has called “allegational prejudice” for the 

purposes of standing, the bidder must show that there was a “substantial chance” it would 

have received the contract award, but for the alleged procurement error. See Linc Gov’t 

Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. at 675; see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States,

404 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 

F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 2004); Info. Tech. & Applications 

Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied

(Fed. Cir. 2003); Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d at 1581; Hyperion, Inc. v. United 

States, 115 Fed. Cl. 541, 550 (2014) (“The government acknowledges that proving 

prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires “allegational prejudice,” as contrasted 

to prejudice on the merits . . . .”); see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 

148, 153 (2014); Archura LLC v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 487, 497 (2013); Lab. Corp. 
15

of Am. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 549, 557 (2012). Because standing is a jurisdictional 

issue, this showing of prejudice is a threshold issue. See Corus Grp. PLC v. Int’l Trade 

Comm'n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. 

v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Defendant argues, and intervenor agrees, that “Universal does not possess 

standing because the solicitation specifically precluded ABM’s post-award, unilateral 

assignment of its offer to Universal.” As noted above, the Solicitation contained a series 

of contract clauses, including Clause 4-1, which stated, in part:

b. Assignment. If this contract provides for payments aggregating $10,000 

or more, claims for monies due or to become due from the Postal Service 

under it may be assigned to a bank, trust company, or other financing 

institution, including any federal lending agency, and may thereafter be 

further assigned and reassigned to any such institution. Any assignment or 

reassignment must cover all amounts payable and must not be made to 

more than one party, except that assignment or reassignment may be made 

to one party as agent or trustee for two or more parties participating in 

financing this contract. No assignment or reassignment will be recognized 

as valid and binding upon the Postal Service unless a written notice of the 

assignment or reassignment, together with a true copy of the instrument of 

assignment, is filed with: 

(1) The contracting officer; 

(2) The surety or sureties upon any bond; and 

(3) The office, if any, designated to make payment, and the contracting 

officer has acknowledged the assignment in writing.

(4) Assignment of this contract or any interest in this contract other than in 

accordance with the provisions of this clause will be grounds for termination 

of the contract for default at the option of the Postal Service.

Clause 4-1b. Intervenor argues that “Clause 4-1 specifically provides that the assignment 

of “any interest in this contract” not in accordance with the clause ‘will be grounds for 

termination of the contract for default at the option of the Postal Service.’” (footnote 

omitted). Intervenor argues, therefore, that the “plain meaning of the language in Clause 

4-1 supports the view that the phrase ‘any interest in this contract’ includes ABM’s rights 

and interests in the proposal it submitted in an attempt to secure the award of ‘this 

contract.’” By contrast, protestor claims that “[t]he clause itself plainly indicates that it only 

applies to contracts.”

When the terms of a solicitation are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to 

resort to extrinsic evidence for its interpretation. See CBY Design Builders v. United 

States, 105 Fed. Cl. at 327 (citing Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 
16

1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 

F.3d 817, 824 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. 

Ct. 997 (2011); Teg–Paradigm Envtl., Inc. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006) (“When the contract's language is unambiguous it must be given its ‘plain and 

ordinary’ meaning and the court may not look to extrinsic evidence to interpret its 

provisions.” (quoting Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003)); Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 

2004) (“If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their 

plain meaning—extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to interpret them.”). “A solicitation term 

is ambiguous if ‘more than one meaning is reasonably consistent with [its] language.’” 

Furniture by Thurston v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 505 511 (2012) (quoting Grumman 

Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (modification in original). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that, “[t]o show an 

ambiguity [in contract language,] it is not enough that the parties differ in their respective 

interpretations of a contract term.” NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159

(Fed. Cir. 2004). In order to demonstrate ambiguity, the interpretations offered by both 

parties must “‘fall within a “zone of reasonableness.”’” Id. (quoting Metric Constructors, 

Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)); see also Ace 

Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]n interpreting 

a solicitation, ‘[it] is ambiguous only if its language is susceptible to more than one 

reasonable interpretation. . . . If the provisions of the solicitation are clear and

unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.’” (quoting Banknote 

Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d at 1353)).

The court agrees with the protestor that the plain meaning of the contract clause 

in the Solicitation is clear.11 Protestor indicates that the

clause concludes that “[a]ssignment of this contract or any interest in this 

contract other than in accordance with the provisions of this clause [Clause 

4.1b] will be grounds for termination of the contract for default at the option 

of the Postal Service.” Further confirming that it applies only to contracts, 

the same clause authorizes the contracting officer to “order changes within 

the general scope of this contract,” “to terminate this contract, or any part 

hereof, for its sole convenience,” and “to may terminate this contract, or any 

part hereof, for default by the supplier . . . .” None of these provisions makes 

sense if the term “contract” is interpreted to include a proposal.

(emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). The court also agrees with the protestor

that the contract clause in the Solicitation is directed at a time when the contract awardee 

 

11 Although the court believes the clause is clear, if the contract clause was in fact 

ambiguous, the ambiguity would be a latent one, and “[u]nder the rule of contra

proferentem, a latent ambiguity is resolved against the government as drafter of the 

solicitation.” Linc Gov’t Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. at 708-709 (citing E.L. 

Hamm & Assocs., Inc. v. England, 379 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (footnote 

omitted).
17

attempts to assign a contract that had been awarded to a contractor, and does not 

address the scenario in which an offeror tries to assign a proposal. The rules applicable 

regarding an awardee’s assignment of a contract are different than the rules applicable 

to assignment of a proposal submitted in response to a solicitation by an ultimately

unsuccessful bidder. The court concludes that Contract Clause 4.1b could apply to a 

contract dispute between the agency and an awardee, but does not does resolve issues 

regarding an entity which has only submitted a proposal, and does not address a situation 

in a post-award bid protest brought by a disappointed bidder. Notably in this protest, 

protestor was not awarded the contract, and, therefore, the assignment would not be 

relevant under this clause. As indicated in the clause, one of the remedies available to 

the USPS is termination for default if the contract does not follow the provisions of the 

contract clause. That clause, however, is not applicable to protestor who did not get 

awarded the contract. Therefore, Contract Clause 4.1b does not preclude Universal from 

bringing the protest in this court.

Defendant also argues that “Universal does not meet even the most basic 

requirement to establish jurisdiction because Universal did not submit a proposal in this 

procurement. Rather, it was ABM Security Services, Inc. - not Universal Protection 

Services [sic] LP - that submitted the proposal.” Moreover, intervenor argues that “the

sale to Universal did not include all the assets committed to the performance of the 

contract by ABM’s proposal and, as a result, Universal lacks a direct economic interest 

because ABM’s proposal has no substantial chance of receiving an award.” Protestor 

responds that:

Defendant’s and Intervenor’s claims that Universal is not the complete 

successor-in-interest to ABM also are misplaced. The legal entity that 

submitted the proposal was ABM, not its parent or its affiliates. The proposal 

does not include any parent or affiliate guarantee or otherwise commit the 

resources of the parent or affiliates to performance of the contract.

(internal citations omitted).

The Federal Circuit has articulated the logical conclusion that in order to be an 

actual or prospective bidder, a protestor must have submitted a bid.12 See Rex Serv., 

Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d at 1307. As explained by the Rex court, 

MCI [MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. 

Cir. 1989)] held that “in order to be eligible to protest, one who has not 

actually submitted an offer must be expecting to submit an offer prior to the 

closing date of the solicitation.” Further, “the opportunity to qualify either as 

an actual or a prospective bidder ends when the proposal period ends.” 

 

12 At oral argument, the parties agreed that the court should look to the protestor’s status 

as an actual or a prospective bidder at the time the protest was filed to determine if a 

protestor has standing to bring a protest. 
18

Here, because Rex could have bid, but chose not to, it cannot be considered 

a prospective bidder.

See Rex Serv., Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d at 1307 (quoting MCI 

Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d at 365) (emphasis in original). It is 

equally clear, however, that even if a bidder did not submit a proposal, if it is the complete 

successor-in-interest to the actual offeror, the bidder may stand in the shoes and have 

standing to bring a protest. See L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 84 

Fed. Cl. 768, 778-79 (2008) (“L–3 is the complete successor-in-interest to the actual 

offeror, Raytheon Company, and embraces the identical business unit which submitted 

Raytheon Company's bid in the C–5 AMP procurement. As such, L–3 stands in the shoes 

of Raytheon Company in the instant case and has standing to pursue this claim.”); see

also Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 666, 682 

(2008) (successor-in-interest to the original offeror, was the de facto same legal entity 

which had submitted its proposal), rev’d on other grounds, 586 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Therefore, the court must determine if Universal is the complete successor-ininterest to ABM Security Services, and, moreover, if Universal can offer an identical 

proposal and all of the assets and services promised in the proposal by ABM Security 

Services. As the court must compare not only ABM Security Services at the time of sale 

to Universal, but also if ABM Security Services relied on its corporate parent to qualify for 

award and to provide services if selected for contract award, this inquiry is a very factspecific one.

The court first looks to ABM Security Services’ proposal. As noted by defendant,

the Supplier Capability portion of the proposal listed “Fast Facts,” which refer to ABM 

Industries, ABM Security Services’ parent company, and not ABM Security Services. The 

“Fast Facts” submitted by ABM Security Services in its proposal state:

Item Data Point

Founded 1909 in San Francisco, CA

Annual Revenue $4.8 Billion

Customers 20,000+

Employees 110,000+

Ownership Publicly traded (NYSE: ABM)

Offices 350+ U.S. & International locations

Janitorial Services 2 Billion square feet cleaned each day

Energy Services $18 Million+ savings from energy reductions

Security Services 12,000+ licensed security personnel

1,000+ customers

Unarmed & armed security guard services

K-9 services

Mail screening

Command Center staffing

Security officers Armed & Unarmed

Access control monitoring
19

Background investigations

Crowd control

Fire watch coverage

Life safety monitoring

Mobil & Bike Patrol services

Security consulting and surveys

Special event coverage

EMT & Paramedic Services

Fire Fighter Services

Alarm & Command Center Monitoring

 Public Venues Ushers and Ticket Takers

Electrical & Lighting 40,000+ parking lot poles & lights maintained

Facilities Engineering 4,000+ certified engineers

Parking & Transportation $1.5 Billion collected for customers in parking revenue

Landscape & Grounds 25,000+ acres of landscaping & golf courses maintained

(emphasis in original). In addition, above the “Fast Facts,” for the Supplier Capability

portion of the technical proposal, ABM Security Services’ proposal stated that: “ABM will 

continue to leverage our entire network of corporate resources, third-party subject matter 

experts and intellectual capital to best serve the Postal Service’s needs and 

expectations,” without differentiating between ABM Security Services and its parent, ABM 

Industries. (emphasis added). Intervenor claims that “[t]his expression of ABM’s reliance 

on ABM Industries Inc. is more specifically and starkly demonstrated in portions of ABM’s 

proposal relating to ‘Supplier Capability,’” citing to the statement above that “ABM will 

continue to leverage our entire network of corporate resources . . . to best serve the Postal 

Service’s needs and expectations.” (omission in original). Protestor, however, dismisses

this argument, noting that the 

“Fast Facts” section states that ABM corporate family has over 110,000 

employees, but surely no one would reasonably conclude that ABM was 

promising that 110,000 employees would work on the contract. The table 

also says that the janitorial section of ABM’s corporate family cleans over 

two billion square feet per day and the landscaping and grounds section 

maintains over 25,000 acres, but USPS cannot with a straight face claim 

that it thought by this statement that ABM was promising to provide janitors 

or ground maintenance crews to perform this security guard services 

contract. Rather, these statements are naturally read to indicate only that 

ABM is the subsidiary in a larger corporation and that it has the support of 

its corporate family.

(internal citation omitted).
20

Oded Barlev, the then Vice President of National Operations for ABM Security 

Services,13 the individual who earlier had contacted the contracting officer regarding the 

sale to Universal,14 filed an affidavit in the case before this court, which was attached to 

protestor’s response to the motions to dismiss, in which he stated:

I am aware that ABM's proposal made a number of references to ABM's 

parent, ABM Industries Inc., and included the consolidated financial 

statements of the entire ABM corporate family. None of these references 

were intended to, nor did they, commit to contract performance the assets 

of the ABM parent companies, ABM Onsite Services, Inc. and ABM 

Industries Inc., or any of its affiliates. Rather, ABM's proposal clearly 

committed only the resources of ABM itself to contract performance.

. . .

The purpose of these references was to indicate and explain that ABM was 

part of a larger company and had the support of that company. I think this 

is clear from the context of those statements, which included a lot of 

information that did not directly bear on performance of the USPS contract, 

or any security guard/NLECC contract for that matter. For instance, I 

included information about the ABM corporate family's work in golf course 

and other grounds maintenance, its engineering arm, and its janitorial work 

to demonstrate its breadth as a company, not because I expected USPS to 

order these services under the contract.

Despite Universal’s and Mr. Barlev’s attempt to minimize the references to entities other 

than ABM Security Services in its proposal, Mr. Barlev concedes that the proposal 

includes references to ABM Security Services’ parent, ABM Industries. Those references 

and the strengths of ABM Industries would have been read, considered, and evaluated 

by the agency in determining ABM Security Services’ technical rating, as well as in the

trade-off analysis.

For example, defendant suggests that in “response to the requirement that an 

offeror demonstrate adequate financial resources to perform the work,” ABM Security 

Services provided consolidated financial statements of its parent company, as well as 

Dunn & Bradstreet reports. Defendant notes:

 

13 In his affidavit submitted with protestor’s response to the motions to dismiss, Mr. Barlev 

indicates that before he was the Vice President of National Operations for Universal, he 

was the Vice President of National Operations for ABM Security Services.

14 As noted above, Mr. Barlev indicated: “With regard to ABM’s September 30, 2014 offer, 

we hereby confirm that the offer, along with all of ABM’s assets, has been legally 

transferred to Universal. The offer, now owned by Universal, continues to rely on the 

same assets – including facilities, resources, and personnel – as originally proposed by 

ABM.” 
21

On October 17, 2014, the Postal Service sent ABM a request for 

clarification, asking for ABM to explain an unfavorable Equifax credit report 

and to provide additional assurances regarding its financial capabilities. 

ABM responded on October 20, 2014, dismissing the Equifax report as “a 

small local report, which does not reflect ABM’s financial and risk profile 

correctly.” ABM’s response also stated that it was attaching “copies of a full 

Dunn & Bradstreet report for ABM as supplied on this date along with a 

letter of reference from Bank of America to support our credit worthiness 

and low risk ratings.” The “full Dunn & Bradstreet report of ABM” that ABM’s 

response provided was for “ABM Industries Inc.” Similarly, the letter from 

Bank of America discusses the financial strength of ABM Industries.

(internal citations omitted). Defendant also points out that ABM Security Services’

response to the requirement that the offeror demonstrate a “‘record of integrity and 

business ethics,’ emphasized that fact that its parent company, ABM Industries, is a 

publically-traded company ‘and thus held to a higher standard of ethics and compliance 

compared with any other competitor.’”

Protestor responds that:

USPS and CSC cite a number of references to ABM’s corporate parent and 

affiliates in the proposal, ABM’s submission of consolidated financial 

statements, and the LinkedIn profiles of some key employees indicating 

they still work at ABM. However, the proposal statements simply indicate 

that ABM had the support of its parent and affiliates, and the consolidated 

financial statements were required by the Solicitation itself. None of this 

indicates that ABM committed or would employ the assets or resources of 

those entities in contract performance.

Regarding the consolidated financial statements and credit reports, protestor also argues 

that defendant and intervenor’s arguments ignore “the fact that USPS required the 

information regarding ABM’s parent and affiliates. Specifically, the Solicitation required 

offerors to submit certified and audited financial statements prepared in accordance with

generally accepted accounting principles,” and claims that “[g]enerally accepted 

accounting principles require that the financial statements of a wholly-owned subsidiary 

be consolidated with its parent and affiliates under common control.” (emphasis in 

original). Protestor also claims that “ABM’s submission of consolidated financial 

statements and a statement that ABM Industries, Inc. had not declared bankruptcy was 

simply an effort to be responsive to the USPS requests, not an indication that ABM was 

committing its parent’s or affiliates’ financial resources.” Mr. Barlev’s affidavit similarly 

indicates:

I included the consolidated financial statements in the proposal because the 

Solicitation required certified and audited financial statements prepared in 

accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. As I understand 

it, generally accepted accounting principles require a subsidiary company 
22

like ABM to consolidate its financial statements with the other companies 

that are under common control. Because of this requirement, ABM did not 

prepare separate audited financial statements as only consolidated 

statements are prepared and reported. For a similar reason, I submitted 

consolidated Dunn & Bradstreet and credit reports.

Notably, protestor does not deny that information which was submitted as part of 

the proposal reflected the parent’s information or suggest that the agency would not have 

considered it in its evaluation. Moreover, although protestor emphasizes “that USPS 

required the information regarding ABM’s parent and affiliates,” it appears that ABM 

Security Services voluntarily chose to submit the financial information that it did.

(emphasis in original). Indeed, as defendant correctly points out, “ABM Security Service’s 

status as a wholly-owned subsidiary did not prevent it from providing its own certified 

financial records that were GAAP compliant - ABM simply chose not to do so.” As

defendant’s states:

There simply is no reason why ABM could not have provided the income 

statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash flow for ABM Security 

Services Inc. in its proposal, except that it wanted to make its proposal more 

attractive to the Postal Service by incorporating the assets of ABM 

Industries, Inc. - which, as ABM’s proposal repeatedly emphasized, was 

worth over $4 billion.

Defendant also states, “nothing prevented ABM from providing its own certified financial 

statements in addition to the consolidated financials of its parent. In fact, Universal’s 

contention is belied by the Asset Purchase Agreement attached to Universal’s opposition 

brief filed in this court, which includes ABM Security Services, Inc.’s unaudited financial 

statements (as opposed to those of its parent).” Defendant indicates that the Asset 

Purchase Agreement represents that the financial Information “attached to the purchase 

agreement’s disclosures includes ABM Security Service [sic] Inc.’s profit and loss 

statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash flows,” and quotes the Asset 

Purchase Agreement at Section 2.01 which states: “Financial Information was derived 

from the books and records of the Seller Group and was prepared in accordance with the 

Accounting Principles in good faith.” The court notes that the Annex to Section 2.01 

provides a chart of the “Profit and Loss Statement as of FY2013, FY2014 and 9‐months 

ended, July 31, 2015.” It appears that ABM Security Services had the ability to provide its 

own financial information to the agency during the procurement process if it had been so 

inclined. It appears that even Mr. Barlev indicates how dependent on the parent company 

ABM Security Services was by noting that ABM Security Services consolidated “its 

financial statements with the other companies that are under common control.” 

Furthermore, defendant and intervenor emphasize that although ABM Security 

Services’ proposal identified seventeen people as key personnel in the Guard Services 

proposal for the Management and Staffing Plan, “at least six of these individuals selfidentify as employees of ABM Industries, Inc. or ABM Onsite Services, not ABM Security 

or Universal,” and that “[redacted], who was listed in ABM’s proposal as the ‘Program 
23

Development Director’ under key personnel, appears to no longer be employed by ABM 

or Universal Protection Services, [sic] LP.” As noted by the intervenor, “it appears that 

ABM’s proposed Management and Staffing Plan for Guard Services relied on a significant 

number of ‘Key Personnel’ that are not currently employees of ABM Security Services, 

Inc. or Universal.” Mr. Barlev’s affidavit tries to explain:

ABM and Universal are in the process of transferring employees from ABM 

to Universal. This includes the key personnel included in ABM's proposal. 

Because of the number of employees and other assets involved in the sale, 

these transfers do not and cannot happen immediately on the day the sale 

closes. Indeed, I have just completed the transition process myself. 

[redacted] has transferred and [redacted] will transfer at a later date to 

Universal, although [redacted’s] status remains uncertain . . . [redacted], 

[redacted], and [redacted] left employment with ABM after ABM submitted 

its proposal in September 2014. I understand that [redacted] is leaving ABM 

tomorrow [2/12/16]. [redacted] moved to a different position in ABM Onsite, 

Inc. before the sale. It would be quite unusual if none of ABM's employees 

had moved on in their careers during this significant passage of time. That's 

the normal pattern of business. Universal has replaced these employees in 

their capacities as key personnel for the USPS Solicitation.

Protestor’s response argues that defendant’s and intervenor’s 

evidence consists solely of outdated and incorrect LinkedIn profiles. As this 

Court may suspect, a LinkedIn profile pulled off the internet is not a 

particularly reliable source of current employment information, particularly 

during a time of a corporate transition. In fact, each of the seven employees 

identified by Defendant and CSC is either transitioning to Universal or has 

left ABM since the time of proposal submission nearly one and half years 

ago.

The determination of whether the ABM Security Services proposal remains intact and

even can be executed by Universal as a successor-in-interest to ABM Security Services’ 

proposal, and, therefore, whether Universal is a complete successor-in-interest to ABM 

Security Services on the submitted proposal, includes whether the departures and now 

unavailable resources of the parent company will impact Universal’s ability to succeed. 

Protestor argues that:

The Court of Federal Claims’ decision in Alabama Aircraft provides the 

proper legal framework for this issue. Ala. Aircraft Indus., 83 Fed. Cl. 666. 

Like Defendant here, the agency in that case argued that the offeror had 

relied on the workforce, capabilities, facilities and resources of its parent in 

its proposal, and those resources were no longer available following a 

corporate reorganization and sale of corporate assets. Id. at 682. The 

agency also contended that the protester, as a result of the sale of corporate 

assets, did not have the financial ability to perform the contract. The Court 
24

rejected both of these contentions. First, the Court noted that while the 

proposal contained a number of references to the offeror’s parent company, 

those references “connoted only that [the offeror] had the financial support 

of its parent.” 

(citing Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. at 682). 

Indeed protestor, defendant,

15 and intervenor all cite to the Federal Claims decision in 

Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 666, with 

defendant arguing that:

Here, unlike in Alabama Aircraft, ABM Security Services Inc. did “rely upon 

the availability of resources from [ABM Industries, Inc.] in formulating its 

proposal.” Id. at 683. Further, as we explain in greater detail below, unlike 

in Alabama Aircraft, the sale of ABM Security Services Inc. to Universal 

does affect assets that are necessary to contract performance or that were 

“necessary to [ABM Security Services’] proposed approach.” 

(citing Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. at 683). 

In Alabama Aircraft, the Court of Federal Claims noted that “[t]he Air Force and 

Boeing claim that Alabama Aircraft fails to qualify as an ‘interested party’ because ‘it is 

not the same entity that submitted a proposal’ and because it lacks adequate financial 

resources to perform the KC–135 contract.” Id. at 681. The protestor in Alabama Aircraft

argued “that it is the same corporate entity as Pemco Aeroplex, that the Air Force had 

notice of the sale of Pemco World Air and the resulting name change, and that it has the 

financial capability to perform the contract, as evidenced by an audit report prepared in 

June 2008 by the Defense Contract Audit Agency.” Id. The Alabama Aircraft court noted 

that intervenor Boeing’s motion to dismiss did not explain how the assets sold by 

“Alabama Aircraft's parent corporation were necessary for Alabama Aircraft to perform 

the contract or that the assets were ‘necessary to its proposed approach.’ The sale of 

Pemco World Air did not affect the physical resources on which Alabama Aircraft would 

rely in performing the KC–135 PDM contract.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The Alabama 

Aircraft court further determined that:

 

15 The court notes that, although defendant also cites to Emerald Coast Finest Produce 

Co. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 466 (2007), the facts of that case are very different from 

the above captioned protest, as the protestor in Emerald Coast admitted that “Emerald 

Coast can no longer compete for a successor contract issued by DeCA [Defense 

Commissary Agency of the Department of Defense, Resale Contracting Division]. . . .” Id.

at 471. Protestor in Emerald Coast was seeking recovery of its proposal costs and an 

award of its costs and attorney fees. The Emerald Coast court concluded, “[b]ecause 

plaintiff had standing when it filed this bid protest, the court finds that, regardless of 

whether plaintiff can perform the contract at this time, plaintiff does indeed have standing 

to continue its bid protest.” Id.
25

The sale of the Pemco World Air subsidiary did not affect the operational 

resources that Alabama Aircraft could devote to the KC–135 PDM contract. 

Prior to the sale, Alabama Aircraft did not rely on either the personnel or the 

assets of Pemco World Air to perform its work. Consistent with the separate 

existence of Pemco World Air and Alabama Aircraft, Pemco World Air had 

no involvement with the current KC–135 bridge contract. The sale of Pemco 

World Air did not affect any of the facilities, equipment, or personnel that 

were necessary to perform the work contemplated by Alabama Aircraft's 

proposal. 

Id. at 682 (internal citations omitted). The Alabama Aircraft court concluded:

Alabama Aircraft has standing to challenge the Air Force's award of the KC–

135 PDM contract because it satisfies the definition of “interested party.” 

Despite its name change and the sale of a sister subsidiary, Alabama 

Aircraft is the same legal entity as the company that submitted its second 

final proposal revision in June 2007. Alabama Aircraft has the same 

operational capabilities as its predecessor and due to the sale to the sister 

company it is in a stronger financial position to perform the instant contract. 

Furthermore, the Air Force had ample notice of the sale of the sister 

company and failed to initiate any inquiries about whether the sale called 

into question Alabama Aircraft's capabilities to perform the contract.”

Id. at 685.

This court believes that Alabama Aircraft supports defendant’s and intervenor’s 

position. Unlike the conclusion in Alabama Aircraft, that, “Alabama Aircraft has the same 

operational capabilities as its predecessor and due to the sale to the sister company it is 

in a stronger financial position to perform the instant contract,” this court believes 

Universal is not the same position now as ABM Security Services was when it submitted 

its proposal. In fact, Universal appears to lack all of the resources ABM Security Services 

articulated when it referenced its parent and related corporations.16 ABM Security 

Services repeatedly used, and relied on, the name and financial information of its parent 

company in its proposal. Each instance was designed to bolster the proposal of ABM 

Security Services, and was not, as Mr. Barlev’s affidavit would like the court to believe, 

mere information about “ABM corporate family’s work in golf course” and “grounds 

maintenance.” Protestor would have this court believe that each reference was only 

coloration and not relevant to the merits of the evaluation. The court disagrees, and 

concludes that, there are simply too many references to support from, or reliance on, the 

parent company, ABM Industries. Moreover, the information supplied by Mr. Barlev in his 

affidavit, including about available personnel, although intended to bolster protestor’s 

 

16 At oral argument, protestor claimed: “At this point, Universal is 80,000 employees, a 

$2.5 billion company. It’s huge. The biggest or one of the biggest security firms out 

there.”
26

case, in fact, does the opposite. The court believes that, unlike in Alabama Aircraft, in 

which the court found the references to the parent company “connoted only that [the 

offeror] had the financial support of its parent,” id. at 682, ABM Security Services’ 

references to its parent company promised more, including personnel and back up 

support, which Universal has not demonstrated it can provide after the sale of ABM 

Security Services by ABM Industries. 

Additionally, although protestor also cites to the case L-3 Communications 

Integrated Systems, L.P. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 768, as an example of an agency 

wrongly arguing that a protestor did not have standing as a successor in interest, L-3

does not assist the protestor. The L-3 court indicated:

Defendant contends that L–3 fails to qualify as an interested party because 

it was not an actual or prospective offeror and did not submit a proposal—

indeed it did not even exist when its predecessor submitted its offer. While 

this is true, this argument ignores the reality that L–3 is the complete 

successor-in-interest to the actual offeror, Raytheon Company, and 

embraces the identical business unit which submitted Raytheon Company's 

bid in the C–5 AMP procurement. As such, L–3 stands in the shoes of 

Raytheon Company in the instant case and has standing to pursue this 

claim. 

Id. at 779. As demonstrated above, this court does not believe that even if Universal is a

complete successor-in-interest to ABM Security Services, the specific references to ABM 

Industries in the proposal submitted by ABM Security Services necessarily means that 

Universal cannot with any certainty fulfill the promises made in the proposal submitted by 

the agency.

17

Defendant also alleges that ABM Security Services’ proposal relied upon not only 

the personnel, but also the assets of ABM Industries that were not purchased by or 

transitioned to Universal. Defendant specifically points to the fact that

[i]n its proposal, ABM relied heavily upon “[ABM Security Services’ license],” 

a proprietary third-party web-based data collection and analytics system. 

 

17 The court notes that defendant cites to American Government Properties v. United 

States, 118 Fed. Cl. 61 (2014) and claims the holding of that case was a “finding parent 

was not successor-in-interest to subsidiary’s interest in contract with Government in-part 

because parent did not maintain same management or had ‘same financial wherewithal 

to perform the contract.’” (quoting Am. Gov’t Properties v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. at 

68). That case, however, and was not a protest situation, but an alleged breach of contract 

regarding the termination of a contract. Moreover, the successor-in-interest issue in

American Government stemmed not from a contract clause, as in the above captioned 

protest, but from a statute, 41 U.S.C. § 6305 (2012), known as the Contracts Act, which 

prohibits the transfer of federal contracts, or any interest in such a contract, to another 

party. See Am. Gov’t Properties v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. at 66.
27

Indeed, ABM specifically proposed integrating [ABM Security Services’ 

license] into the Postal Service contract: ABM develops and deploys 

proprietary and best-in-class outsourced technology systems to manage 

service performance and cost. We provide web-based secure access to 

extensive amounts of data for tracking service performance including 

contact information, scope of work levels, service compliance to schedules, 

quality levels, staffing activities, service calls, and financial status. The 

following technology components are being used, and/or proposed for use 

to the national USPS portfolio 

• Mobile security management via laptops & smartphones — [ABM 

Security Services’ license] 

• Labor Management System for Scheduling & Payroll— [redacted]

• Online Performance Metrics — [redacted]

• USPS dedicated ABM web portal — [redacted]

• Training Technology — [redacted]

• Collaborative Web Service for Continuous Improvement — [redacted]

• Security guard alerts viewed at NLECC — [ABM Security Services’ 

license]

• Best-Practices Sharing in Online Community — [redacted]

• Infrastructure Technology Platform – [redacted]

(emphasis added by defendant). As defendant correctly points out, “[h]owever, the 

Disclosure Schedules attached to the Asset Purchase Agreement lists [ABM Security 

Services’ license] as an excluded asset: ‘The License / Partnership Agreement for 

subscription with [redacted] for security software solutions, dated November 12, 2014, 

between ABM Security Services, Inc. and [ABM Security Services’ license] will not be 

Conveyed to Buyer.’”

18 At oral argument, protestor addressed the excluded assets for the 

first time and contended that the [ABM Security Services’ license] software was not 

material to the sale or to the court’s inquiry of whether Universal is the complete 

successor-in-interest to ABM Security Services, and, therefore, it did not matter that the 

[ABM Security Services’ license] and other licenses were carved out of the transfer, 

because the licenses were “commercially available licenses. Universal Protection can 

simply go to [ABM Security Services’ license] and buy it. It’s as simple as that.” Protestor 

also emphasized that the [ABM Security Services’ license] is “a commercially available 

 

18 Defendant also notes that “other information technology assets included in ABM’s 

proposal were excluded from the assets transferred to Universal. Annex 2.10 to the Asset 

Purchase Agreement provides that the following “Core applications” that are committed 

to contract performance in ABM’s proposal will not be transferred to Universal: [redacted]; 

[redacted]; and [redacted].” (internal citations omitted). Therefore, defendant argues, 

“significant portions of the information technology assets included in ABM’s proposal were 

resources of ABM Industries, Inc. — and were not acquired by Universal.”
28

piece of software that also was available in a similar form at Universal.”19 Despite the 

claims made by protestor at oral argument, it is indisputable that the [ABM Security 

Services’ license], which was a part of ABM Security Services when it submitted its 

proposal, was not part of Universal’s assets when it filed the protest in this court. 

Moreover, although protestor claims that Universal likely had similar commercially 

licensed software or could obtain it from [redacted], the court cannot only rely on 

protestor’s projections, and there is no evidence of protestor’s contentions in the record 

or in the submissions to the court regarding the motions to dismiss. Therefore, as alleged 

by defendant, “because Universal is not the complete successor-in-interest to ABM 

Security Services, Universal cannot demonstrate that the Postal Service’s award of the 

contract to CSC prejudiced it.” Protestor cannot demonstrate that it can meet the

“substantial chance” test to be awarded the contract, and, therefore, lacks standing in this 

court. See Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 656 F.3d at 1315.

CONCLUSION

The court notes that the sale of ABM Security Services did not occur until after the 

agency agreed to take corrective action, and the corrective action appears to have 

changed little of the underlying evaluation and award justification. Had the agency not 

taken the corrective action and had the court evaluated the merits of the claims earlier, 

defendant and intervenor could not have alleged lack of standing due to the sale to 

Universal because it would not yet have occurred. Despite the unfortunate procedural 

history of this protest, and the previous, related protests, and the difficult situation in which 

protestor Universal finds itself, the court concludes that Universal is not the complete 

successor-in-interest to ABM Security Services’ proposal, and, therefore, the court cannot 

consider the merits of the protest. Based on the above discussion, defendant’s and 

intervenor’s motions to dismiss protestor’s complaint are GRANTED. The parties’ crossmotions for judgment on the Administrative Record are MOOT. Protestor’s complaint is 

DISMISSED. The Clerk’s Office shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Marian Blank Horn 

 MARIAN BLANK HORN

 Judge

 

19 Protestor also argued at oral argument that “the [ABM Security Services’ license] 

software is not mentioned anywhere in the evaluation. It’s not something pivotal to the 

Government’s view of the proposal.”